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Justice Kennedy
| 2,016 | 4 |
dissenting
|
Luis v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3189871/luis-v-united-states/
|
both the tracing and the FBI’s analysis were “still ongoing.” The whole purpose of a pretrial restraint under is to maintain the status quo in cases, like this one, where a defendant is accused of committing crimes that involve fungible property, e.g., a banking law violation or a federal health care offense. The plurality’s approach serves to benefit the most sophisticated of criminals whose web of transfers and concealment will take the longest to un- ravel. For if the Government cannot establish at the outset that every dollar subject to restraint is derived from the crime alleged, the defendant can spend that money on whatever defense team he or she desires. Of equal concern is the assertion that a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is limited to only those attorneys who charge a “reasonable fee.” Ante, at 16. If Luis has a right to use the restrained substitute assets to pay for the counsel of her choice, then why can she not hire the most expensive legal team she can afford? In the plurality’s view, the reason Luis can use the restrained funds for an attorney is because they are still hers. But if that is so, then she should be able to use all $2 million of her remain- ing assets to pay for a lawyer. The plurality’s willingness to curtail the very right it recognizes reflects the need to preserve substitute assets from further dissipation. * * * Today’s ruling abandons the principle established in Caplin & and Monsanto. In its place is an ap- proach that creates perverse incentives and provides protection for defendants who spend stolen money rather than their own. In my respectful view this is incorrect, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 1 KAGAN, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. –419 SILA LUIS, PETITIONER v.
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Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
The Court today holds that a icumbet teachers' uio may egotiate a collective-bargaiig agreemet with a school board that grats the icumbet access to teachers' *56 mailboxes ad to the iterschool mail system ad deies such access to a rival uio. Because the exclusive-access provisio i the collective-bargaiig agreemet amouts to viewpoit discrimiatio that ifriges the respodets' First Amedmet rights ad fails to advace ay substatial state iterest, I disset.[1] I The Court properly ackowledges that teachers have protected First Amedmet rights withi the school cotext. See I particular, we have held that teachers may ot be "compelled to reliquish the First Amedmet rights they would otherwise ejoy as citizes to commet o matters of public iterest i coectio with the operatio of the public schools i which they work." See also Mt. Healthy City Board of We also have recogized i the school cotext the First Amedmet right of "idividuals to associate to further their persoal beliefs," ad have ackowledged the First Amedmet rights of dissidet teachers i matters ivolvig labor relatios. City of Madiso Joit School Agaist this backgroud it is clear that the exclusive-access policy i this case implicated the respodets' First Amedmet rights by restrictig their freedom of expressio o issues importat to the operatio of the school system. As the Court of Appeals suggested, this speech is "if ot at the very apex of ay hierarchy of protected speech, at least ot far below it." Perry Local Educators' From this poit of departure the Court veers sharply off course. Based o a fidig that the iterschool mail system *57 is ot a "public forum," ate, at 48-49, the Court states that the respodets have o right of access to the system, ib ad that the School Board is free "to make distictios i access o the basis of subject matter ad speaker idetity," ate, at 49, if the distictios are "reasoable i light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves." Accordig to the Court, the petitioer's status as the exclusive bargaiig represetative provides a reasoable basis for the exclusive-access policy. The Court fudametally misperceives the essece of the respodets' claims ad misuderstads the thrust of the Court of Appeals' well-reasoed opiio. This case does ot ivolve a "absolute access" claim. It ivolves a "equal access" claim. As such it does ot tur o whether the iteral school mail system is a "public forum." I focusig o the public forum issue, the Court disregards the First Amedmet's cetral proscriptio agaist cesorship, i the form of viewpoit discrimiatio, i ay forum, public or opublic. A
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
of viewpoit discrimiatio, i ay forum, public or opublic. A The First Amedmet's prohibitio agaist govermet discrimiatio amog viewpoits o particular issues fallig withi the realm of protected speech has bee oted extesively i the opiios of this Court. I two Jehovah's Witesses were deied access to a public park to give Bible talks. Members of other religious orgaizatios had bee grated access to the park for purposes related to religio. The Court foud that the deial of access was based o public officials' disagreemet with the Jehovah's Witesses' views, ad held it ivalid. Durig the course of its opiio, the Court stated: "The right to equal protectio of the laws, i the exercise of those freedoms of speech ad religio protected by the First ad Fourteeth Amedmets, has a firmer foudatio tha the whims or persoal opiios of a local goverig body." I a opiio cocurrig i the result, Justice *58 Frakfurter stated that "[t]o allow expressio of religious views by some ad dey the same privilege to others merely because they or their views are upopular, eve deeply so, is a deial of equal protectio of the law forbidde by the Fourteeth Amedmet." at See also I we held ucostitutioal a decisio by school officials to susped studets for wearig black armbads i protest of the war i Vietam. The record disclosed that school officials had permitted studets to wear other symbols relatig to politically sigificat issues. The black armbads, however, as symbols of oppositio to the Vietam War, had bee sigled out for prohibitio. We stated: "Clearly, the prohibitio of expressio of oe particular opiio, at least without evidece that it is ecessary to avoid material ad substatial iterferece with schoolwork or disciplie, is ot costitutioally permissible." City of Madiso Joit School cosidered the questio of whether a State may costitutioally require a board of educatio to prohibit teachers other tha uio represetatives from speakig at public meetigs about matters relatig to pedig collective-bargaiig egotiatios. The board had bee foud guilty of a prohibited labor practice for permittig a teacher to speak who opposed oe of the proposals advaced by the uio i cotract egotiatios. The board was ordered to cease ad desist from permittig employees, other tha uio represetatives, to appear ad to speak at board meetigs o matters subject to collective bargaiig. We held this order ivalid. Durig the course of our opiio we stated: "Whatever its duties as a employer, whe the board sits i public meetigs to coduct public busiess ad hear the views of citizes, it may ot be required to discrimiate
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
views of citizes, it may ot be required to discrimiate betwee speakers o the basis of their employmet, or the cotet of their speech. See Police Dept. of *59"[2] There is aother lie of cases, closely related to those implicatig the prohibitio agaist viewpoit discrimiatio, that have addressed the First Amedmet priciple of subject-matter, or cotet eutrality. Geerally, the cocept of cotet eutrality prohibits the govermet from choosig the subjects that are appropriate for public discussio. The cotet-eutrality cases frequetly refer to the prohibitio agaist viewpoit discrimiatio ad both cocepts have their roots i the First Amedmet's bar agaist cesorship. But ulike the viewpoit-discrimiatio cocept, which is used to strike dow govermet restrictios o speech by particular speakers, the cotet-eutrality priciple is ivoked whe the govermet has imposed restrictios o speech related to a etire subject area. The cotet-eutrality priciple ca be see as a outgrowth of the core First Amedmet prohibitio agaist viewpoit discrimiatio. See geerally Stoe, Restrictios of Speech Because of its Cotet: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictios, *60 We have ivoked the prohibitio agaist cotet discrimiatio to ivalidate govermet restrictios o access to public forums. See, e. g., Carey v. Brow, ; Grayed v. City of Rockford, ; Police Departmet of We also have relied o this prohibitio to strike dow restrictios o access to a limited public forum. See, e. g., Widmar v. Vicet, Fially, we have applied the doctrie of cotet eutrality to govermet regulatio of protected speech i cases i which o restrictio of access to public property was ivolved. See, e. g., Cosolidated Ediso Co. v. Public Service Comm', ; Erzozik v. City of Jacksoville, See also Metromedia, Ic. v. Sa Diego, (plurality opiio). Admittedly, this Court has ot always required cotet eutrality i restrictios o access to govermet property. We upheld cotet-based exclusios i Lehma v. City of Shaker Heights, i ad i Joes v. North Carolia Prisoers' Uio, All three cases ivolved a uusual forum, which was foud to be opublic, ad the speech was determied for a variety of reasos to be icompatible with the forum. These cases provide some support for the otio that the govermet is permitted to exclude certai subjects from discussio i opublic forums.[3] They provide *61 o support, however, for the otio that govermet, oce it has opeed up govermet property for discussio of specific subjects, may discrimiate amog viewpoits o those topics. Although Greer, Lehma, ad Joes permitted cotet-based restrictios, oe of the cases ivolved viewpoit discrimiatio. All of the restrictios were viewpoit-eutral. We expressly oted i Greer that the exclusio was "objectively
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
We expressly oted i Greer that the exclusio was "objectively ad evehadedly applied."[4] Oce the govermet permits discussio of certai subject matter, it may ot impose restrictios that discrimiate amog viewpoits o those subjects whether a opublic forum is ivolved or ot.[5] This prohibitio is implicit i the lie of cases, i ad i those cases i which we have approved cotet-based restrictios o access to govermet property that is ot a public forum. We have ever held that govermet may allow discussio of a subject *62 ad the discrimiate amog viewpoits o that particular topic, eve if the govermet for certai reasos may etirely exclude discussio of the subject from the forum. I this cotext, the greater power does ot iclude the lesser because for First Amedmet purposes exercise of the lesser power is more threateig to core values. Viewpoit discrimiatio is cesorship i its purest form ad govermet regulatio that discrimiates amog viewpoits threates the cotiued vitality of "free speech." B Agaist this backgroud, it is clear that the Court's approach to this case is flawed. By focusig o whether the iterschool mail system is a public forum, the Court disregards the idepedet First Amedmet protectio afforded by the prohibitio agaist viewpoit discrimiatio.[6] This *63 case does ot ivolve a claim of a absolute right of access to the forum to discuss ay subject whatever. If it did, public forum aalysis might be relevat. This case ivolves a claim of equal access to discuss a subject that the Board has approved for discussio i the forum. I essece, the respodets are ot assertig a right of access at all; they are assertig a right to be free from discrimiatio. The critical iquiry, therefore, is whether the Board's grat of exclusive access to the petitioer amouts to prohibited viewpoit discrimiatio. II The Court addresses oly briefly the respodets' claim that the exclusive-access provisio amouts to viewpoit discrimiatio. I rejectig this claim, the Court starts from the premise that the school mail system is ot a public forum[7] ad that, as a result, the Board has o obligatio to *64 grat access to the respodets. The Court the suggests that there is o idicatio that the Board iteded to discourage oe viewpoit ad to advace aother. I the Court's view, the exclusive-access policy is based o the status of the respective parties rather tha o their views. The Court the states that "[i]mplicit i the cocept of the opublic forum is the right to make distictios i access o the basis of subject matter ad speaker idetity." Ate, at 49.
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
basis of subject matter ad speaker idetity." Ate, at 49. Accordig to the Court, "[t]hese distictios may be impermissible i a public forum but are iheret ad iescapable i the process of limitig a opublic forum to activities compatible with the iteded purpose of the property." As oted, whether the school mail system is a public forum or ot the Board is prohibited from discrimiatig amog viewpoits o particular subjects. Moreover, whatever the right of public authorities to impose cotet-based restrictios o access to govermet property that is a opublic forum,[8] oce access is grated to oe speaker to discuss a certai subject access may ot be deied to aother speaker based o his viewpoit. Regardless of the ature of the forum, the critical iquiry is whether the Board has egaged i prohibited viewpoit discrimiatio. The Court respods to the allegatio of viewpoit discrimiatio by suggestig that there is o idicatio that the Board iteded to discrimiate ad that the exclusive-access policy is based o the parties' status rather tha o their views. I this case, for the reasos discussed below, see ifra, at 66-71, the itet to discrimiate ca be iferred from the effect of the policy, which is to dey a effective chael of commuicatio to the respodets, ad from other *65 facts i the case. I additio, the petitioer's status has othig to do with whether viewpoit discrimiatio i fact has occurred. If aythig, the petitioer's status is relevat to the questio of whether the exclusive-access policy ca be justified, ot to whether the Board has discrimiated amog viewpoits. See ifra, at 66-. Addressig the questio of viewpoit discrimiatio directly, free of the Court's irrelevat public forum aalysis, it is clear that the exclusive-access policy discrimiates o the basis of viewpoit. The Court of Appeals foud that "[t]he access policy adopted by the Perry schools, i form a speaker restrictio, favors a particular viewpoit o labor relatios i the Perry schools : the teachers ievitably will receive from [the petitioer] self-laudatory descriptios of its activities o their behalf ad will be deied the critical perspective offered by [the respodets]." Perry Local Educators' 652 F. 2d, at 12. This assessmet of the effect of the policy is emietly reasoable. Moreover, certai other factors strogly suggest that the policy discrimiates amog viewpoits. O a practical level, the oly reaso for the petitioer to seek a exclusive-access policy is to dey its rivals access to a effective chael of commuicatio. No other group is explicitly deied access to the mail system. I fact, as the Court poits out, ate, at
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Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
system. I fact, as the Court poits out, ate, at 47-48, may other groups have bee grated access to the system. Apparetly, access is deied to the respodets because of the likelihood of their expressig poits of view differet from the petitioer's o a rage of subjects. The very argumet the petitioer advaces i support of the policy, the eed to preserve labor peace, also idicates that the access policy is ot viewpoit-eutral. I short, the exclusive-access policy discrimiates agaist the respodets based o their viewpoit. The Board has agreed to amplify the speech of the petitioer, while repressig the speech of the respodets based o the respodets' poit of view. This sort of discrimiatio amouts to cesorship *66 ad ifriges the First Amedmet rights of the respodets. I this light, the policy ca survive oly if the petitioer ca justify it. III I assessig the validity of the exclusive-access policy, the Court of Appeals subjected it to rigorous scrutiy. Perry Local Educators' at 12. The court pursued this course after a careful review of our cases ad a determiatio that "o case has applied ay but the most exactig scrutiy to a cotet or speaker restrictio that substatially teded to favor the advocacy of oe poit of view o a give issue." 652 F.2d, at 12. The Court of Appeals' aalysis is persuasive. I light of the fact that viewpoit discrimiatio implicates core First Amedmet values, the exclusive-access policy ca be sustaied "oly if the govermet ca show that the regulatio is a precisely draw meas of servig a compellig state iterest." Cosolidated Ediso Co. v. Public Service Comm', Cf. Carey v. Brow, -462 (to be valid, legislatio must be "fiely tailored to serve substatial state iterests, ad the justificatios offered for ay distictios it draws must be carefully scrutiized"); Police Departmet of -99 (discrimiatios "must be tailored to serve a substatial govermetal iterest"). A The petitioer attempts to justify the exclusive-access provisio based o its status as the exclusive bargaiig represetative for the teachers ad o the State's iterest i efficiet commuicatio betwee collective-bargaiig represetatives ad the members of the uit. The petitioer's status ad the State's iterest i efficiet commuicatio are importat cosideratios. They are ot sufficiet, however, to sustai the exclusive-access policy. As the Court of Appeals poited out, the exclusive-access policy is both "overiclusive ad udericlusive" as a meas *67 of servig the State's iterest i the efficiet discharge of the petitioer's legal duties to the teachers. Perry Local Educators' 652 F. 2d, at 1300. The policy is overiclusive because it does ot strictly limit
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
The policy is overiclusive because it does ot strictly limit the petitioer's use of the mail system to performace of its special legal duties ad udericlusive because the Board permits outside orgaizatios with o special duties to the teachers, or to the studets, to use the system. The Court of Appeals also suggested that eve if the Board had attempted to tailor the policy more carefully by deyig outside groups access to the system ad by expressly limitig the petitioer's use of the system to messages relatig to its official duties, "the fit would still be questioable, for it might be difficult both i practice ad i priciple effectively to separate `ecessary' commuicatios from propagada." The Court of Appeals was justly cocered with this problem, because the scope of the petitioer's "legal duties" might be difficult, if ot impossible, to defie with precisio. I this regard, we alluded to the potetial scope of collective-bargaiig resposibilities i City of Madiso Joit School whe we stated: "[T]here is virtually o subject cocerig the operatio of the school system that could ot also be characterized as a potetial subject of collective bargaiig."[9] *68 Puttig aside the difficulties with the fit betwee this policy ad the asserted iterests, the Court of Appeals properly poited out that the policy is ivalid "because it furthers o discerible state iterest." Perry Local Educators' 652 F. 2d, at 1300. While the Board may have a legitimate iterest i gratig the petitioer access to the system, it has o legitimate iterest i makig that access exclusive by deyig access to the respodets. As the Court of Appeals stated: "Without a idepedet reaso why equal access for other labor groups ad idividual teachers is udesirable, * the special duties of the icumbet do ot justify opeig the system to the icumbet aloe." I this case, for the reasos discussed below, there is o idepedet reaso for deyig access to the respodets.[10] *70 B The petitioer also argues, ad the Court agrees, ate, at 52, that the exclusive-access policy is justified by the State's iterest i preservig labor peace. As the Court of Appeals foud, there is o evidece o this record that gratig access to the respodets would result i labor istability.[11] I additio, there is o reaso to assume that the respodets' messages would be ay more likely to cause labor discord whe received by members of the majority uio tha the petitioer's messages would whe received by the respodets. Moreover, it is oteworthy that both the petitioer ad the respodets had access to the mail system
|
Justice Brennan
| 1,983 | 13 |
dissenting
|
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110874/perry-ed-assn-v-perry-local-educators-assn/
|
petitioer ad the respodets had access to the mail system for some time prior to the represetatio electio. See ate, at 39. There is o idicatio that this policy resulted i disruptio of the school eviromet.[12] *71 Although the State's iterest i preservig labor peace i the schools i order to prevet disruptio is uquestioably substatial, merely articulatig the iterest is ot eough to sustai the exclusive-access policy i this case. There must be some showig that the asserted iterest is advaced by the policy. I the absece of such a showig, the exclusive-access policy must fall.[13] C Because the grat to the petitioer of exclusive access to the iteral school mail system amouts to viewpoit discrimiatio that ifriges the respodets' First Amedmet rights ad because the petitioer has failed to show that the policy furthers ay substatial state iterest, the policy must be ivalidated as violative of the First Amedmet. IV I order to secure the First Amedmet's guaratee of freedom of speech ad to prevet distortios of "the market-place of ideas," see Abrams v. Uited States, (Holmes, J., dissetig), govermets geerally are prohibited from discrimiatig amog viewpoits o issues *72 withi the realm of protected speech. I this case the Board has ifriged the respodets' First Amedmet rights by gratig exclusive access to a effective chael of commuicatio to the petitioer ad deyig such access to the respodets. I view of the petitioer's failure to establish eve a substatial state iterest that is advaced by the exclusive-access policy, the policy must be held to be costitutioally ifirm. The decisio of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
majority
|
Bruce v. Samuels
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3168777/bruce-v-samuels/
|
This case concerns the payment of filing fees for civil actions commenced by prisoners in federal courts. Until 1996, indigent prisoners, like other indigent persons, could file a civil action without paying any filing fee. See 28 U.S. C. In the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), –66, Congress placed sev- eral limitations on prisoner litigation in federal courts. Among those limitations, Congress required prisoners qualified to proceed in forma pauperis nevertheless to pay an initial partial filing fee. That fee is statutorily set as “20 percent of the greater of ” the average monthly depos- its in the prisoner’s account or the average monthly bal- ance of the account over the preceding six months. Thereafter, to complete payment of the filing fee, prisoners must pay, in monthly installments, “20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” The initial partial filing fee may not be exacted if the prisoner has no means to pay it, and no monthly installments are required unless the prisoner has more than $10 in his account, 2 BRUCE v. SAMUELS Opinion of the Court It is undisputed that the initial partial filing fee is to be assessed on a per-case basis, i.e., each time the prisoner files a lawsuit. In contest here is the calculation of subse- quent monthly installment payments. Petitioner Antoine Bruce urges a per-prisoner approach under which he would pay 20 percent of his monthly income regardless of the number of cases he has filed. The Government urges, and the court below followed, a per-case approach under which a prisoner would pay 20 percent of his monthly income for each case he has filed. Courts of Appeals have divided on which of these two approaches orders.1 To resolve the conflict, we granted certiorari. 576 U. S. (2015). We hold that monthly installment payments, like the initial partial payment, are to be assessed on a per-case basis. Nothing in current design supports treating a prisoner’s second or third action unlike his first lawsuit. I A In 1892, Congress enacted the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, now codified at 28 U.S. C. “to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Reacting to “a sharp rise in prisoner litigation,” Woodford —————— 1 ( per curiam); overruled in part on other grounds by and ; ; ; and (adopting per-case approach), with 276–277 (CA2 2001); 427– (CA3 2015); and F.3d 237, (adopting per-prisoner approach). Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court v. Ngo, Congress in 1996 enacted the PLRA, which installed a variety
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
majority
|
Bruce v. Samuels
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3168777/bruce-v-samuels/
|
Congress in 1996 enacted the PLRA, which installed a variety of measures “designed to filter out the bad claims [filed by prisoners] and facili- tate consideration of the good,” Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U. S. (2015) (slip op., at 3) ; alteration in original). Among those measures, Congress required prisoners to pay filing fees for the suits or appeals they launch. The provisions on fee payment, set forth in read: “(1) [I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be re- quired to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of— “(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s ac- count; or “(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s ac- count for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal. “(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the pris- oner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.” The monthly installment scheme described in also applies to costs awarded against prisoners when they are judgment losers. )(2)(B). To further contain prisoner litigation, the PLRA intro- duced a three-strikes provision: Prisoners whose suits or appeals are dismissed three or more times as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim on which relief may 4 BRUCE v. SAMUELS Opinion of the Court be granted are barred from proceeding IFP “unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” In other words, for most three strikers, all future filing fees become payable in full upfront. Congress included in its 1996 overhaul of a safety- valve provision to ensure that the fee requirements would not bar access to the courts: “In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” (b)(4). B Petitioner Antoine Bruce, a federal inmate serving a 15- year sentence, is a frequent litigant.2 In the instant case, Bruce challenges his placement in a special management unit at the Federal
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
majority
|
Bruce v. Samuels
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3168777/bruce-v-samuels/
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his placement in a special management unit at the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, Alabama. 3–43 Bruce had previously incurred filing-fee obliga- tions in other cases and maintained that the monthly filing-fee payments for this case would not become due until those prior obligations were satisfied. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, whose decision is before us for review, rejected Bruce’s argument. –10. Bruce must make monthly filing- fee payments in this case, the court held, simultaneously with such payments in earlier commenced cases. —————— 2 At oral argument, Bruce’s counsel informed the Court that Bruce had framed or joined 19 prison-litigation cases, although “the last seven or so have not been filed because [Bruce] had had three strikes by the 12th.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. See Brief for Respondents 40 (stating that Bruce filed three new lawsuits during the pendency of his case before this Court). 3 The Court of Appeals construed the pleadings in this case as a peti- tion for a writ of We assume without deciding that a mandamus petition qualifies as a “civil action” or “appeal” for purposes of 28 U.S. C. (b). Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court We agree with the appeals court that calls for simultaneous, not sequential, recoupment of multiple filing fees. II The IFP statute does not explicitly address whether multiple filing fees (after the initial partial payment) should be paid simultaneously or sequentially. Bruce and the Government present competing interpretations. A In support of the per-prisoner approach, Bruce relies principally on what he sees as a significant contrast be- tween the singular “clerk” and the plural “fees” as those nouns appear in 28 U.S. C. That provision requires payments to be forwarded “to the clerk of the court until the filing fees are paid.” (empha- sis added). Even when more than one filing fee is owed, Bruce contends, the statute instructs that only one clerk will receive payment each month; in other words, fee payments are to be made sequentially rather than simultaneously. The initial partial payment, which is charged on a per- case basis, plus the three-strikes provision, Bruce urges, together suffice to satisfy the PLRA’s purpose, which is to “force prisoners to think twice about the case and not just file reflexively,” 141 Cong. Rec. 14572 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Kyl). The additional economic disincentive that the per-case approach would occasion, Bruce asserts, could excessively encumber access to federal courts. Furthermore, Bruce points out, the per-case approach breaks down when a prisoner incurs more than five obliga-
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
majority
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Bruce v. Samuels
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3168777/bruce-v-samuels/
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breaks down when a prisoner incurs more than five obliga- tions. Nothing will be left in the account to pay the sixth fee, Bruce observes. Necessarily, therefore, its payment will be entirely deferred. Why treat the second obligation unlike the sixth, Bruce asks. Isn’t the statute sensibly 6 BRUCE v. SAMUELS Opinion of the Court read to render all monthly payments sequential? Bruce notes in this regard that, under the per-case approach, his ability to use his account to purchase amenities will be progressively curtailed; indeed, the account might be reduced to zero upon his filing or joining a fifth case. Finally, Bruce argues, administrative difficulties coun- sel against the per-case approach. Costs could dwarf the monetary yield if prisons, under a per-case regime, were obliged to send as many as five checks to five different courts each month. And the problems faced by state- prison officials—who sometimes must choose which of several claims on a prisoner’s income (e.g., child-support, medical copayments) should take precedence—would be exacerbated under a system demanding simultaneous payment of multiple litigation charges. B The Government emphasizes that as a whole has a single-case focus, providing instructions for each case. It would be anomalous, the Government urges, to treat paragraph (b)(1)’s initial partial payment, which Bruce concedes is directed at a single case, differently than paragraph (b)(2)’s subsequent monthly payments. The two paragraphs, the Government observes, are linked by paragraph (b)(2)’s opening clause: “After payment of the initial partial filing fee.” The per-case approach, the Government adds, better comports with the purpose of the PLRA to deter frivolous suits. See (Easterbrook, J.) (“Otherwise a prisoner could file multiple suits for the price of one, postponing payment of the fees for later-filed suits until after the end of impris- onment (and likely avoiding them altogether [because fees are often uncollectable on a prisoner’s release]).”), over- ruled in part on other grounds by 209 F.3d 1025 and Cite as: 577 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court The Government further observes that the generally small size of the initial partial fee—here, $0.64, App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a—provides scant disincentive, on its own, for multiple filings. Responding to Bruce’s observation that, for a prisoner with more than five charges, even the per-case approach resorts to sequential payments, the Government agrees, but tells us that this scenario arises infrequently. “[M]ost prisoners,” the Government states, “would accrue three strikes (and therefore be required to pay the full filing fees upfront) by the time they incurred the obligation for their sixth case.” Brief for Respondents 29. Finally, answering Bruce’s concern
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Justice Ginsburg
| 2,016 | 5 |
majority
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Bruce v. Samuels
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3168777/bruce-v-samuels/
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sixth case.” Brief for Respondents 29. Finally, answering Bruce’s concern that the per-case approach could leave a prisoner without money for ameni- ties, the Government points out that prisons “are constitu- tionally bound to provide inmates with adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” 8 ), and must furnish “ ‘paper and pen to draft legal documents’ and ‘stamps to mail them,’ ” Brief for Respondents 48 ). More- over, the Government notes, the Federal Bureau of Pris- ons (BOP) “goes beyond those requirements,” providing inmates “articles necessary for maintaining personal hygiene,” and free postage “not only for legal mailings but also to enable the inmate to maintain community ties.” Brief for Respondents 48, n. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). III The Circuits following the per-case approach, we con- clude, better comprehend the statute. Just as (b)(1) calls for assessment of “an initial partial filing fee” each time a prisoner “brings a civil action or files an appeal” (emphasis added), so its allied provision, triggered immediately after, calls for “monthly payments 8 BRUCE v. SAMUELS Opinion of the Court of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income” simultane- ously for each action pursued. The other two paragraphs of (b) confirm that the subsection as a whole is writ- ten from the perspective of a single case. See (b)(3) (imposing a ceiling on fees permitted “for the commence- ment of a civil action or an appeal” (emphasis added)); (b)(4) (protecting the right to “brin[g] a civil action or appea[l] a civil or criminal judgment” (emphasis added)). There is scant indication that the statute’s perspective shifts partway through paragraph (2).4 Bruce’s extratextual points do not warrant a departure from the interpretation suggested by the text and context. The per-case approach more vigorously serves the statutory objective of containing prisoner litigation, while the safety- valve provision, see ensures against denial of access to federal courts. Bruce’s administrability concerns carry little weight given reports from several States that the per-case approach is unproblematic. See Brief for State of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae 18–20. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is Affirmed. —————— 4 Useof the plural “fees” in that paragraph does not persuade us oth- erwise. Congress has been less than meticulous in its employment of the singular “fee” and the plural “fees,” sometimes using those words interchangeably. See, e.g., 28 U.S. C. (“The parties commenc- ing a case under title 11 shall pay to the clerk the following filing fees: [enumerating several options]. In addition to the
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
dissenting
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/
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In Complete Auto a unanimous Court observed: "A tailored tax, however accomplished, must receive the careful scrutiny of the courts to determine whether it produces a forbidden effect on interstate commerce." In this case, appellants have alleged that Montana's severance tax on coal is tailored to single out interstate commerce, and that it produces a forbidden effect on that commerce because the tax bears no "relationship to the services provided by the State." The Court today concludes that appellants are not entitled to a trial on this claim. Because I believe that the "careful scrutiny" due a tailored tax makes a trial here necessary, I respectfully dissent. I The State of Montana has approximately 25% of all known United States coal reserves, and more than 50% of the Nation's low-sulfur coal reserves.[1] Department of Energy, Demonstrated Reserve Base of Coal in the United States on January 1, 1979, p. 8 ; National Coal Assn., Coal Data 1978, p. I-6 Approximately 70-75% of Montana's *639 coal lies under land owned by the Federal Government in the State. See Hearings on H. R. 6625, H. R. 6654, and H. R. 7 before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (Hearings) (statement of Rep. Vento). The great bulk of the coal mined in Montanaindeed, allegedly as much as 90%, see ante, at 617-618is exported to other States pursuant to long-term purchase contracts with out-of-state utilities. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1527, pt. 1, pp. 3-4 Those contracts typically provide that the costs of state taxation shall be passed on to the utilities; in turn, fuel adjustment clauses allow the utilities to pass the cost of taxation along to their consumers. Because federal environmental legislation has increased the demand for low-sulfur coal, and because the Montana coal fields occupy a "pivotal" geographic position in the midwestern and northwestern energy markets, see J. Krutilla & A. Fisher with R. Rice; Economic and Fiscal Impacts of Coal Development: Northern Great Plains xvi (Krutilla), Montana has supplied an increasing percentage of the Nation's coal.[2] In 1975, following the Arab oil embargo and the first federal coal conversion legislation, the Montana Legislature, by 1975 Mont. Laws, ch. 525, increased the State's severance tax on coal from a flat rate of approximately 34 cents per ton to a maximum rate of 30% of the "contract sales price."[3] See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1527, pt. 1, p. 3 The legislative history of this tax is illuminating. The Joint Conference Committees of the Montana *640 Legislature that recommended
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
dissenting
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/
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Joint Conference Committees of the Montana *640 Legislature that recommended this amendment acknowledged: "It is true that this is a higher rate of taxation than that levied by any other American state on the coal industry."[4] Statement to Accompany the Report of the Free Joint Conference Committees on Coal Taxation 1 (1975). The Committees pointed out, however, that the Province of Alberta, Canada, recently had raised sharply its royalty on natural gas, thereby forcing consumers of Alberta gas in Montana and elsewhere to finance involuntarily Alberta's "universities, hospitals, reduction of other taxes, etc." Stating that "we should look north to Alberta," the Conference Committees observed: "While coal is not as scarce as natural gas, most of the Montana coal now produced is committed for sale under long-term contracts and will be purchased with this tax added to its price." The Committees noted that although some new coal contracts might shift to Wyoming to take advantage of that State's lower severance tax, Montana's severance tax was comparable to that recently enacted by North Dakota.[5] Thus, the Committees *641 had no doubt that the coal industry would grow even with this tax, since "the combined coal reserves of Montana and North Dakota are simply too great a part of the nation's fossil fuel resources to be ignored because of taxes at these levels."[6] As the Montana Legislature foresaw, the imposition of this severance tax has generated enormous revenues for the State. Montana collected $33.6 million in severance taxes in fiscal year 1978, H. R. Rep. No. 96-1527, pt. 1, p. 3 and appellants alleged that it would collect not less than $40 million in fiscal year 1979. App. to Juris. Statement 55a. It has been suggested that by the year 2010, Montana will have collected more than $20 billion through the implementation of this tax. Hearings 22 (statement of Rep. Vento). *642 No less remarkable is the increasing percentage of total revenue represented by the severance tax. In 1972, the then-current flat rate severance tax on coal provided only 0.4% of Montana's total tax revenue; in contrast, in the year following the 1975 amendment, the coal severance tax supplied 11.4% of the State's total tax revenue. See Griffin & Shelton, Coal Severance Tax Policies in the Rocky Mountain States, 7 Policy Studies J. 29, 33 (Griffin). Appellants assert that the tax now supplies almost 20% of the State's total revenue. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Indeed, the funds generated by the tax have been so large that, beginning in 1980, at least 50% of the severance tax is to be transferred and
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
dissenting
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/
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50% of the severance tax is to be transferred and dedicated to a permanent trust fund, the principal of which must "forever remain inviolate" unless appropriated by a vote of three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature. Mont. Const., Art. IX, 5. Moreover, in 1979, Montana passed legislation providing property and income tax relief for state residents. 1979 Mont. Laws, ch. 698. Appellants' complaint alleged that Montana's severance tax is ultimately borne by out-of-state consumers, and for the purposes of this appeal that allegation is to be treated as true.[7] Appellants further alleged that the tax bears no reasonable relationship to the services or protection provided by the State. The issue here, of course, is whether they are entitled to a trial on that claim, not whether they will succeed on the merits. It should be noted, however, that Montana imposes numerous other taxes upon coal mining.[8] In addition, *643 because 70% to 75% of the coal-bearing land in Montana is owned by the Federal Government, Montana derives a large amount of coal mining revenue from the United States as well.[9] In light of these circumstances, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the United States House of Representatives concluded that Montana's coal severance tax results in revenues "far in excess of the direct and indirect impact costs attributable to the coal production." H. R. Rep. No. 96-1527, pt. 1, p. 2 Several commentators have agreed that Montana and other similarly situated Western States have pursued a policy of "OPEC-like revenue maximization," and that the Montana tax accordingly bears no reasonable relationship to the services and protection afforded by the State. R. Nehring & B. Zycher with J. Wharton, Coal Development and Government Regulation in the Northern Great Plains: A Preliminary Report 148 ; Church, at 272. See Krutilla, at 185. These findings, of course, are not dispositive of the issue whether the Montana severance tax is "fairly related" to the services *644 provided by the State within the meaning of our prior cases. They do suggest, however, that appellants' claim is a substantial one. The failure of the Court to acknowledge this stems, it seems to me, from a misreading of our prior cases. It is to those cases that I now turn. II This Court's Commerce Clause cases have been marked by tension between two competing concepts: the view that interstate commerce should enjoy a "free trade" immunity from state taxation, see, e. g., and the view that interstate commerce may be required to "`pay its way,'" see, e. g., Western Live See generally Complete
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
dissenting
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/
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its way,'" see, e. g., Western Live See generally Complete Auto -281, -289, n. 15; Simet & Lynn, Interstate Commerce Must Pay Its Way: The Demise of Spector, 31 Nat. Tax J. 53 ; Foreword, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, In Complete Auto the Court resolved that tension by unanimously reaffirming that interstate commerce is not immune from state But at the same time the Court made clear that not all state taxation of interstate commerce is valid; a state tax will be sustained against Commerce Clause challenge only if "the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." See The Court today acknowledges and, indeed, holds that a Commerce Clause challenge to a state severance tax must be evaluated under Complete Auto 's four-part test. Ante, at 617. I fully agree. I cannot agree, however, with the Court's application of that test to the facts of the present case. Appellants concede, and the Court properly concludes, *645 that the first two prongs of the testsubstantial nexus and fair apportionmentare satisfied here. The Court also correctly observes that Montana's severance tax is facially neutral. It does not automatically follow, however, that the Montana severance tax does not unduly burden or interfere with interstate commerce. The gravamen of appellants' complaint is that the severance tax does not satisfy the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test because it is tailored to, and does, force interstate commerce to pay more than its way. Under our established precedents, appellants are entitled to a trial on this claim. The Court's conclusion to the contrary rests on the premise that the relevant inquiry under the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test is simply whether the measure of the tax is fixed as a percentage of the value of the coal taken. Ante, at 626. This interpretation emasculates the fourth prong. No trial will ever be necessary on the issue of fair relationship so long as a State is careful to impose a proportional rather than a flat tax rate; thus, the Court's rule is no less "mechanical" than the approach entertained in disapproved today, ante, at 617.[10] Under the Court's reasoning, any ad valorem tax will satisfy the fourth prong; indeed, the Court implicitly ratifies Montana's contention that it is free to tax this coal at 100% or even 1,000% of value, should it *646 choose to do so. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
dissenting
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/
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*646 choose to do so. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. Likewise, the Court's analysis indicates that Montana's severance tax would not run afoul of the Commerce Clause even if it raised sufficient revenue to allow Montana to eliminate all other taxes upon its citizens.[11] The Court's prior cases neither require nor support such a startling result.[12] The Court often has noted that "`[i]t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.'" Complete Auto 430 U. S., quoting Western Live 303 U. S., at See 451 U. S., at Accordingly, *647 interstate commerce cannot claim any exemption from a state tax that "is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto 430 U. S., We have not interpreted this requirement of "fair relation" in a narrow sense; interstate commerce may be required to share equally with intrastate commerce the cost of providing "police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work force, and `the advantages of a civilized society.'" Exxon quoting Japan Line, See, e. g., Moreover, interstate commerce can be required to "pay its own way" in a narrower sense as well: the State may tax interstate commerce for the purpose of recovering those costs attributable to the activity itself. See, e. g., Postal Telegraph-Cable 249 U.S.[13] *648 The Court has never suggested, however, that interstate commerce may be required to pay more than its own way. The Court today fails to recognize that the Commerce Clause does impose limits upon the State's power to impose even facially neutral and properly apportioned taxes. See ante, at 622-623. In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Texas argued that no inquiry into the constitutionality of a facially neutral tax on the "taking" of gas was necessary because the State "has afforded great benefits and protection to pipeline companies." The Calvert Court rejected this argument, holding that "these benefits are relevant here only to show that the essential requirements of due process have been met sufficiently to justify the imposition of any tax on the interstate activity." at -164. The Court held, that when a tax is challenged on Commerce Clause grounds its validity "`depends upon other considerations of constitutional policy having reference to the substantial effects, actual or potential, of the particular tax in suppressing or burdening unduly the commerce,'" quoting Accordingly, while *649 the Commerce Clause does not require that interstate commerce be placed in a privileged position, it does require that it not be
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/
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a privileged position, it does require that it not be unduly burdened. In framing its taxing measures to reach interstate commerce, the State must be "at pains to do so in a manner which avoids the evils forbidden by the commerce clause and puts that commerce actually on a plane of equality with local trade in local " Thus, the Court has been particularly vigilant to review taxes that "single out interstate business," since "[a]ny tailored tax of this sort creates an increased danger of error in apportionment, of discrimination against interstate commerce, and of a lack of relationship to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto 430 U. S.,[14] Moreover, the Court's vigilance has not been limited to taxes that discriminate upon their face: "Not the tax in a vacuum of words, but its practical consequences for the doing of interstate commerce in applications to concrete facts are our concern." See This is particularly true when the challenged tax, while facially neutral, falls so heavily upon interstate commerce that its burden "is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely interests within the state." Cf. Raymond Motor Transportation, In sum, then, when a tax has been "tailored" to reach interstate commerce, *650 the Court's cases suggest that we require a closer "fit" under the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test than when interstate commerce has not been singled out by the challenged tax. As a number of commentators have noted, state severance taxes upon minerals are particularly susceptible to "tailoring." "Like a tollgate lying athwart a trade route, a severance or processing tax conditions access to natural resources." Developments in the Law: Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, Thus, to the extent that the taxing jurisdiction approaches a monopoly position in the mineral, and consumption is largely outside the State, such taxes are "[e]conomically and politically analogous to transportation taxes exploiting geographical position." Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frank-furter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 Yale L. J. 219, 232 (1957) (Brown). See also Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 Nat. Tax J. 245, 249-250 ; R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 510-514 (Posner). But just as a port State may require that imports pay their own way even though the tax levied increases the cost of goods purchased by inland customers, see Michelin Tire[15] so also may a mineral-rich State require that those who consume its resources pay a fair share of the general costs of government,
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,981 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/
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pay a fair share of the general costs of government, as well as the specific costs attributable to the commerce itself. Thus, the mere fact that the burden of a severance tax is largely shifted forward to out-of-state consumers does not, standing alone, make out a Commerce Clause violation. See But the Clause is violated when, as appellants allege is the case here, the State effectively selects "a class of out-of-state *651 taxpayers to shoulder a tax burden grossly in excess of any costs imposed directly or indirectly by such taxpayers on the State." III It is true that a trial in this case would require "complex factual inquiries" into whether economic conditions are such that Montana is in fact able to export the burden of its severance tax, ante, at 619, n. 8.[16] I do not believe, however, that this threshold inquiry is beyond judicial competence.[17] If the trial court were to determine that the tax is exported, it would then have to determine whether the tax is "fairly related," within the meaning of Complete Auto The Court to the contrary, this would not require the trial court "to second-guess legislative decisions about the amount or disposition of tax revenues." Ante, at 627, n. 16. If the tax is in fact a legitimate general revenue measure identical or roughly comparable to taxes imposed upon similar industries, a court's inquiry is at an end; on the other hand, if the tax *652 singles out this particular interstate activity and charges it with a grossly disproportionate share of the general costs of government,[18] the court must determine whether there is some reasonable basis for the legislative judgment that the tax is necessary to compensate the State for the particular costs imposed by the activity. To be sure, the task is likely to prove to be a formidable one; but its difficulty does not excuse our failure to undertake it. This case poses extremely grave issues that threaten both to "polarize the Nation," see H. R. Rep. No. 96-1527, pt. 1, p. 2 and to reawaken "the tendencies toward economic Balkanization" that the Commerce Clause was designed to remedy. See It is no answer to say that the matter is better left to Congress:[19] "While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, it does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional action Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced *653 the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
majority
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PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118432/pga-tour-inc-v-martin/
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This case raises two questions concerning the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S. C. 12101 et seq., to a gifted athlete: first, whether the Act protects access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability; and second, whether a *665 disabled contestant may be denied the use of a golf cart because it would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the tournaments, 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk. I Petitioner PGA TOUR, Inc., a nonprofit entity formed in 1968, sponsors and cosponsors professional golf tournaments conducted on three annual tours. About 200 golfers participate in the PGA TOUR; about 170 in the NIKE TOUR;[1] and about 100 in the SENIOR PGA TOUR. PGA TOUR and NIKE TOUR tournaments typically are 4-day events, played on courses leased and operated by petitioner. The entire field usually competes in two 18-hole rounds played on Thursday and Friday; those who survive the "cut" play on Saturday and Sunday and receive prize money in amounts determined by their aggregate scores for all four rounds. The revenues generated by television, admissions, concessions, and contributions from cosponsors amount to about $300 million a year, much of which is distributed in prize money. There are various ways of gaining entry into particular tours. For example, a player who wins three NIKE TOUR events in the same year, or is among the top-15 money winners on that tour, earns the right to play in the PGA TOUR. Additionally, a golfer may obtain a spot in an official tournament through successfully competing in "open" qualifying rounds, which are conducted the week before each tournament. Most participants, however, earn playing privileges in the PGA TOUR or NIKE TOUR by way of a three-stage qualifying tournament known as the "Q-School." Any member of the public may enter the Q-School by paying a $3,000 entry fee and submitting two letters of reference *666 from, among others, PGA TOUR or NIKE TOUR members. The $3,000 entry fee covers the players' greens fees and the cost of golf carts, which are permitted during the first two stages, but which have been prohibited during the third stage since 1. Each year, over a thousand contestants compete in the first stage, which consists of four 18-hole rounds at different locations. Approximately half of them make it to the second stage, which also includes 72 holes. Around 168 players survive the second stage and advance to the final one, where they compete over 108 holes. Of those finalists, about a fourth qualify for membership in
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
majority
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PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118432/pga-tour-inc-v-martin/
|
Of those finalists, about a fourth qualify for membership in the PGA TOUR, and the rest gain membership in the NIKE TOUR. The significance of making it into either tour is illuminated by the fact that there are about 25 million golfers in the country.[2] Three sets of rules govern competition in tour events. First, the "Rules of Golf," jointly written by the United States Golf Association (USGA) and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of Scotland, apply to the game as it is played, not only by millions of amateurs on public courses and in private country clubs throughout the United States and worldwide, but also by the professionals in the tournaments conducted by petitioner, the USGA, the Ladies' Professional Golf Association, and the Senior Women's Golf Association. Those rules do not prohibit the use of golf carts at any time.[3] Second, the "Conditions of Competition and Local Rules," often described as the "hard card," apply specifically to petitioner's professional tours. The hard cards for the PGA *667 TOUR and NIKE TOUR require players to walk the golf course during tournaments, but not during open qualifying rounds.[4] On the SENIOR PGA TOUR, which is limited to golfers age 50 and older, the contestants may use golf carts. Most seniors, however, prefer to walk.[5] Third, "Notices to Competitors" are issued for particular tournaments and cover conditions for that specific event. Such a notice may, for example, explain how the Rules of Golf should be applied to a particular water hazard or manmade obstruction. It might also authorize the use of carts to speed up play when there is an unusual distance between one green and the next tee.[6] The basic Rules of Golf, the hard cards, and the weekly notices apply equally to all players in tour competitions. As one of petitioner's witnesses explained with reference to "the Masters Tournament, which is golf at its very highest level, the key is to have everyone tee off on the first hole under exactly the same conditions and all of them be tested over that 72-hole event under the conditions that exist during those four days of the event." App. 192. II Casey Martin is a talented golfer. As an amateur, he won 17 Oregon Golf Association junior events before he was 15, *668 and won the state championship as a high school senior. He played on the Stanford University golf team that won the 1994 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) championship. As a professional, Martin qualified for the NIKE TOUR in and 1999, and based on his 1999 performance, qualified for
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
majority
|
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118432/pga-tour-inc-v-martin/
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and 1999, and based on his 1999 performance, qualified for the PGA TOUR in In the 1999 season, he entered 24 events, made the cut 13 times, and had 6 top-10 finishes, coming in second twice and third once. Martin is also an individual with a disability as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act).[7] Since birth he has been afflicted with Klippel-TrenaunayWeber Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder that obstructs the flow of blood from his right leg back to his heart. The disease is progressive; it causes severe pain and has atrophied his right leg. During the latter part of his college career, because of the progress of the disease, Martin could no longer walk an 18-hole golf course.[8] Walking not only caused him pain, fatigue, and anxiety, but also created a significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation might be required. For these reasons, Stanford made written requests to the Pacific 10 Conference and the NCAA to waive for Martin their rules requiring players to walk and carry their own clubs. The requests were granted.[9] *669 When Martin turned pro and entered petitioner's Q-School, the hard card permitted him to use a cart during his successful progress through the first two stages. He made a request, supported by detailed medical records, for permission to use a golf cart during the third stage. Petitioner refused to review those records or to waive its walking rule for the third stage. Martin therefore filed this action. A preliminary injunction entered by the District Court made it possible for him to use a cart in the final stage of the Q-School and as a competitor in the NIKE TOUR and PGA TOUR. Although not bound by the injunction, and despite its support for petitioner's position in this litigation, the USGA voluntarily granted Martin a similar waiver in events that it sponsors, including the U. S. Open. III In the District Court, petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA as a "private clu[b] or establishmen[t]," [10] or alternatively, that the play areas of its tour competitions do not constitute places of "public accommodation" within the scope of that Title.[11] The Magistrate Judge concluded that petitioner should be viewed as a commercial enterprise operating in the entertainment industry for the economic benefit of its members rather than as a private *670 club. Furthermore, after noting that the statutory definition of public accommodation included a "golf course,"[12] he
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statutory definition of public accommodation included a "golf course,"[12] he rejected petitioner's argument that its competitions are only places of public accommodation in the areas open to spectators. The operator of a public accommodation could not, in his view, "create private enclaves within the facility and thus relegate the ADA to hop-scotch areas." Accordingly, he denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment. At trial, petitioner did not contest the conclusion that Martin has a disability covered by the ADA, or the fact "that his disability prevents him from walking the course during a round of golf." Rather, petitioner asserted that the condition of walking is a substantive rule of competition, and that waiving it as to any individual for any reason would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. Petitioner's evidence included the testimony of a number of experts, among them some of the greatest golfers in history. Arnold Palmer,[13] Jack Nicklaus,[14] and Ken Venturi[15] explained that fatigue can be *671 a critical factor in a tournament, particularly on the last day when psychological pressure is at a maximum. Their testimony makes it clear that, in their view, permission to use a cart might well give some players a competitive advantage over other players who must walk. They did not, however, express any opinion on whether a cart would give Martin such an advantage.[16] Rejecting petitioner's argument that an individualized inquiry into the necessity of the walking rule in Martin's case would be inappropriate, the District Court stated that it had "the independent duty to inquire into the purpose of the rule at issue, and to ascertain whether there can be a reasonable modification made to accommodate plaintiff without frustrating the purpose of the rule" and thereby fundamentally altering the nature of petitioner's tournaments. The judge found that the purpose of the rule was to inject fatigue into the skill of shotmaking, but that the fatigue injected "by walking the course cannot be deemed significant under normal circumstances." Furthermore, Martin presented evidence, and the judge found, that even with the use of a cart, Martin must walk over a mile during *672 an 18-hole round,[17] and that the fatigue he suffers from coping with his disability is "undeniably greater" than the fatigue his able-bodied competitors endure from walking the course. As the judge observed: "[P]laintiff is in significant pain when he walks, and even when he is getting in and out of the cart. With each step, he is at risk of fracturing his tibia and hemorrhaging. The other golfers have to endure the psychological stress of competition as part of
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to endure the psychological stress of competition as part of their fatigue; Martin has the same stress plus the added stress of pain and risk of serious injury. As he put it, he would gladly trade the cart for a good leg. To perceive that the cart puts himwith his conditionat a competitive advantage is a gross distortion of reality." -1252. As a result, the judge concluded that it would "not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA Tour's game to accommodate him with a cart." The judge accordingly entered a permanent injunction requiring petitioner to permit Martin to use a cart in tour and qualifying events. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, petitioner did not challenge the District Court's rejection of its claim that it was exempt as a "private club," but it renewed the contention that during a tournament the portion of the golf course "`behind the ropes' is not a public accommodation because the public has no right to enter it." The Court of Appeals viewed that contention as resting on the incorrect assumption that the competition among participants was not itself public. The court first pointed out that, as with a private university, "the fact that users of a facility are highly selected does not mean that the facility cannot be *673 a public accommodation."[18] In its opinion, the competition to enter the select circle of PGA TOUR and NIKE TOUR golfers was comparable because "[a]ny member of the public who pays a $3000 entry fee and supplies two letters of recommendation may try out in the qualifying school." The court saw "no justification in reason or in the statute to draw a line beyond which the performance of athletes becomes so excellent that a competition restricted to their level deprives its situs of the character of a public accommodation." Nor did it find a basis for distinguishing between "use of a place of public accommodation for pleasure and use in the pursuit of a living." Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses remain places of public accommodation during PGA tournaments. On the merits, because there was no serious dispute about the fact that permitting Martin to use a golf cart was both a reasonable and a necessary solution to the problem of providing him access to the tournaments, the Court of Appeals regarded the central dispute as whether such permission would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the PGA TOUR or NIKE TOUR. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals viewed the issue not as "whether use of carts generally would fundamentally alter
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not as "whether use of carts generally would fundamentally alter the competition, but whether the use of a cart by Martin would do so." That issue turned on "an intensively fact-based inquiry," and, the court concluded, had been correctly resolved by the trial judge. In its words, "[a]ll that the cart does is permit Martin access to a type of competition in which he otherwise could not engage because of his disability." *674 The day after the Ninth Circuit ruled in Martin's favor, the Seventh Circuit came to a contrary conclusion in a case brought against the USGA by a disabled golfer who failed to qualify for "America's greatestand most democraticgolf tournament, the United States Open."[19] The Seventh Circuit endorsed the conclusion of the District Court in that case that "the nature of the competition would be fundamentally altered if the walking rule were eliminated because it would remove stamina (at least a particular type of stamina) from the set of qualities designed to be tested in this competition." In the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the physical ordeals endured by Ken Venturi and Ben Hogan when they walked to their Open victories in 1964 and 1950 amply demonstrated the importance of stamina in such a tournament.[20] As an alternative basis for its holding, the court also concluded that the ADA does not require the USGA to bear "the administrative burdens of evaluating requests to waive the walking rule and permit the use of a golf cart." Although the Seventh Circuit merely assumed that the ADA applies to professional golf tournaments, and therefore did not disagree with the Ninth on the threshold coverage issue, our grant of certiorari, encompasses that question as well as the conflict between those courts. IV Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals. In studying the need for such legislation, Congress found that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with *675 disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S. C. 12101(a)(2); see 12101(a)(3) ("[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services"). Congress noted that the many forms such discrimination takes include "outright intentional exclusion" as well as the "failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices." 12101(a)(5). After thoroughly investigating the problem, Congress concluded that there was a "compelling need" for a "clear and comprehensive national mandate" to eliminate discrimination against disabled
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"clear and comprehensive national mandate" to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them "into the economic and social mainstream of American life." S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 20 (1989); H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p. 50 (1990). In the ADA, Congress provided that broad mandate. See 42 U.S. C. 12101(b). In fact, one of the Act's "most impressive strengths" has been identified as its "comprehensive character," Hearings on S. 933 before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 197 (1989) (statement of Attorney General Thornburgh), and accordingly the Act has been described as "a milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society," Board of Trustees of Univ. of To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among them employment (Title I of the Act),[21] public services (Title II),[22] and public accommodations (Title III).[23] At issue now, as a threshold matter, is *676 the applicability of Title III to petitioner's golf tours and qualifying rounds, in particular to petitioner's treatment of a qualified disabled golfer wishing to compete in those events. Title III of the ADA prescribes, as a "[g]eneral rule": "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S. C. 12182(a). The phrase "public accommodation" is defined in terms of 12 extensive categories,[24] which the legislative history indicates "should be construed liberally" to afford people with disabilities *677 "equal access" to the wide variety of establishments available to the nondisabled.[25] It seems apparent, from both the general rule and the comprehensive definition of "public accommodation," that petitioner's golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit comfortably within the coverage of Title III, and Martin within its protection. The events occur on "golf course[s]," a type of place specifically identified by the Act as a public accommodation. 12181(7)(L). In addition, at all relevant times, petitioner "leases" and "operates" golf courses to conduct its Q-School and tours. 12182(a). As a lessor and operator of golf courses, then, petitioner must not discriminate against any "individual" in the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,privileges, advantages, or accommodations" of those courses. Certainly, among the "privileges" offered by petitioner on the courses are those of competing in the Q-School and playing in the tours; indeed,
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Justice Stevens
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competing in the Q-School and playing in the tours; indeed, the former is a privilege for which thousands of individuals from the general public pay, and the latter is one for which they vie. Martin, of course, is one of those individuals. It would therefore appear that Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits petitioner from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability. Cf. Pennsylvania Dept. of Petitioner argues otherwise. To be clear about its position,it does not assert (as it did in the District Court) that it is a private club altogether exempt from Title III' scoverage. In fact, petitioner admits that its tournaments are conducted at places of public accommodation.[26] Nor does petitioner contend (as it did in both the District Court and *678 the Court of Appeals) that the competitors' area "behind the ropes" is not a public accommodation, notwithstanding the status of the rest of the golf course. Rather, petitioner reframes the coverage issue by arguing that the competing golfers are not members of the class protected by Title III of the ADA.[27] According to petitioner, Title III is concerned with discrimination against "clients and customers" seeking to obtain "goods and services" at places of public accommodation, whereas it is Title I that protects persons who work at such places.[28] As the argument goes, petitioner operates not a "golf course" during its tournaments but a "place of exhibition or entertainment," 42 U.S. C. 12181(7)(C), and a professional golfer such as Martin, like an actor in a theater production, is a provider rather than a consumer of the entertainment that petitioner sells to the public. Martin therefore cannot bring a claim under Title III because he is not one of the "`clients or customers of the covered public accommodation.' "[29] Rather, Martin's claim of discrimination is "job-related"[30] and could only be brought under Title Ibut that Title does not apply because he is an independent contractor (as the District Court found) rather than an employee. The reference to "clients or customers" that petitioner quotes appears in 42 U.S. C. 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv), which *679 states: "For purposes of clauses (i) through (iii) of this subparagraph, the term `individual or class of individuals' refers to the clients or customers of the covered public accommodation that enters into the contractual, licensing or other arrangement." Clauses (i) through (iii) of the subparagraph prohibit public accommodations from discriminating against a disabled "individual or class of individuals" in certain ways[31] either directly or indirectly through contractual arrangements with other entities. Those clauses make clear on
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Justice Stevens
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contractual arrangements with other entities. Those clauses make clear on the one hand that their prohibitions cannot be avoided by means of contract, while clause (iv) makes clear on the other hand that contractual relationships will not expand a public accommodation's obligations under the subparagraph beyond its own clients or customers. As petitioner recognizes, clause (iv) is not literally applicable to Title III's general rule prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals.[32] Title III's broad general rule contains no express "clients or customers" limitation, 12182(a), and 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) provides that its limitation is only "[f]or purposes of" the clauses in that separate subparagraph. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that clause (iv)'s restriction of the subparagraph's coverage to the clients or customers of public accommodations fairly describes the scope of Title III's protection as a whole. We need not decide whether petitioner's construction of the statute is correct, because petitioner's argument falters even on its own terms. If Title III's protected class were limited to "clients or customers," it would be entirely appropriate to classify the golfers who pay petitioner $3,000 for the chance to compete in the Q-School and, if successful, in the subsequent tour events, as petitioner's clients or customers. *680 In our view, petitioner's tournaments (whether situated at a "golf course" or at a "place of exhibition or entertainment") simultaneously offer at least two "privileges" to the publicthat of watching the golf competition and that of competing in it. Although the latter is more difficult and more expensive to obtain than the former, it is nonetheless a privilege that petitioner makes available to members of the general public. In consideration of the entry fee, any golfer with the requisite letters of recommendation acquires the opportunity to qualify for and compete in petitioner's tours. Additionally, any golfer who succeeds in the open qualifying rounds for a tournament may play in the event. That petitioner identifies one set of clients or customers that it serves (spectators at tournaments) does not preclude it from having another set (players in tournaments) against whom it may not discriminate. It would be inconsistent with the literal text of the statute as well as its expansive purpose to read Title III's coverage, even given petitioner's suggested limitation, any less broadly.[33] *681 Our conclusion is consistent with case law in the analogous context of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. a et seq. Title II of that Act prohibits public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. a(a). In applying Title II to the Lake Nixon Club in Little
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Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
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applying Title II to the Lake Nixon Club in Little Rock, Arkansas, we held that the definition of a "place of exhibition or entertainment," as a public accommodation, covered participants "in some sport or activity" as well as "spectators or listeners." We find equally persuasive two lower court opinions applying Title II specifically to golfers and golf tournaments. In a class action brought to require a commercial golf establishment to permit black golfers to play on its course, the District Court held that Title II "is not limited to spectators if the place of exhibition or entertainment provides facilities for the public to participate in the entertainment."[34] And in the District Court found that a private association violated Title II when it limited entry in a golf tournament on a municipal course to its own members but permitted all (and only) white golfers who paid the membership and entry fees to compete.[35] These cases support our conclusion that, as a public accommodation during its tours and qualifying rounds, petitioner may not discriminate against either spectators or competitors on the basis of disability. V As we have noted, 42 U.S. C. 12182(a) sets forth Title III's general rule prohibiting public accommodations from *682 discriminating against individuals because of their disabilities. The question whether petitioner has violated that rule depends on a proper construction of the term "discrimination," which is defined by Title III to include "a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations." 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Petitioner does not contest that a golf cart is a reasonable modification that is necessary if Martin is to play in its tournaments. Martin's claim thus differs from one that might be asserted by players with less serious afflictions that make walking the course uncomfortable or difficult, but not beyond their capacity. In such cases, an accommodation might be reasonable but not necessary. In this case, however, the narrow dispute is whether allowing Martin to use a golf cart, despite the walking requirement that applies to the PGA TOUR, the NIKE TOUR, and the third stage of the Q-School, is a modification that would "fundamentally alter the nature" of those events. In theory, a modification of petitioner's golf tournaments might constitute a fundamental alteration in two different ways. It might alter such an essential aspect of the game of golf
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Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
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alter such an essential aspect of the game of golf that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors equally; changing the diameter of the hole from three to six inches might be such a modification.[36] Alternatively, a less significant change that has only a peripheral *683 impact on the game itself might nevertheless give a disabled player, in addition to access to the competition as required by Title III, an advantage over others and, for that reason, fundamentally alter the character of the competition.[37] We are not persuaded that a waiver of the walking rule for Martin would work a fundamental alteration in either sense.[38] As an initial matter, we observe that the use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game of golf. From early on, the essence of the game has been shotmakingusing clubs to cause a ball to progress from the teeing ground to a hole some distance away with as few strokes as possible.[39] That essential aspect of the game *684 is still reflected in the very first of the Rules of Golf, which declares: "The Game of Golf consists in playing a ball from the teeing ground into the hole by a stroke or successive strokes in accordance with the rules." Rule 1-1, Rules of Golf, App. 104 (emphasis in original). Over the years, there have been many changes in the players' equipment, in golf course design, in the Rules of Golf, and in the method of transporting clubs from hole to hole.[40] Originally, so few clubs were used that each player could carry them without *685 a bag. Then came golf bags, caddies, carts that were pulled by hand, and eventually motorized carts that carried players as well as clubs. "Golf carts started appearing with increasing regularity on American golf courses in the 1950's. Today they are everywhere. And they are encouraged. For one thing, they often speed up play, and for another, they are great revenue producers."[41] There is nothing in the Rules of Golf that either forbids the use of carts or penalizes a player for using a cart. That set of rules, as we have observed, is widely accepted in both the amateur and professional golf world as the rules of the game.[42] The walking rule that is contained in petitioner's hard cards, based on an optional condition buried in an appendix to the Rules of Golf,[43] is not an essential attribute of the game itself. Indeed, the walking rule is not an indispensable feature of tournament golf either. As already mentioned, petitioner
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Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
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PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
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indispensable feature of tournament golf either. As already mentioned, petitioner permits golf carts to be used in the SENIOR PGA TOUR, the open qualifying events for petitioner's tournaments, the first two stages of the Q-School, and, until 1, the third stage of the Q-School as well. See Moreover, petitioner allows the use of carts during certain tournament rounds in both the PGA TOUR and the NIKE *686 TOUR. See and n. 6. In addition, although the USGA enforces a walking rule in most of the tournaments that it sponsors, it permits carts in the Senior Amateur and the Senior Women's Amateur championships.[44] Petitioner, however, distinguishes the game of golf as it is generally played from the game that it sponsors in the PGA TOUR, NIKE TOUR, and (at least recently) the last stage of the Q-Schoolgolf at the "highest level." According to petitioner, "[t]he goal of the highest-level competitive athletics is to assess and compare the performance of different competitors, a task that is meaningful only if the competitors are subject to identical substantive rules."[45] The waiver of any possibly "outcome-affecting" rule for a contestant would violate this principle and therefore, in petitioner's view, fundamentally alter the nature of the highest level athletic event.[46] The walking rule is one such rule, petitioner submits, because its purpose is "to inject the element of fatigue into the skill of shot-making,"[47] and thus its effect may be the critical loss of a stroke. As a consequence, the reasonable modification Martin seeks would fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner's highest level tournaments even if he were the only person in the world who has both the talent to compete in those elite events and a disability sufficiently serious that he cannot do so without using a cart. The force of petitioner's argument is, first of all, mitigated by the fact that golf is a game in which it is impossible to guarantee that all competitors will play under exactly the *687 same conditions or that an individual's ability will be the sole determinant of the outcome. For example, changes in the weather may produce harder greens and more head winds for the tournament leader than for his closest pursuers. A lucky bounce may save a shot or two.[48] Whether such happenstance events are more or less probable than the likelihood that a golfer afflicted with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome would one day qualify for the NIKE TOUR and PGA TOUR, they at least demonstrate that pure chance may have a greater impact on the outcome of elite golf tournaments than the fatigue resulting from the enforcement
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Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
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elite golf tournaments than the fatigue resulting from the enforcement of the walking rule. Further, the factual basis of petitioner's argument is undermined by the District Court's finding that the fatigue from walking during one of petitioner's 4-day tournaments cannot be deemed significant. The District Court credited the testimony of a professor in physiology and expert on fatigue, who calculated the calories expended in walking a golf course (about five miles) to be approximately 500 calories "`nutritionallyless than a Big Mac.'" 994 F. Supp., What is more, that energy is expended over a 5-hour period, during which golfers have numerous intervals for rest and refreshment. In fact, the expert concluded, because golf is a low intensity activity, fatigue from the game is primarily a psychological phenomenon in which stress and motivation are the key ingredients. And even under conditions of severe heat and humidity, the critical factor in fatigue is fluid loss rather than exercise from walking. Moreover, when given the option of using a cart, the majority of golfers in petitioner's tournaments have chosen to *688 walk, often to relieve stress or for other strategic reasons.[49] As NIKE TOUR member Eric Johnson testified, walking allows him to keep in rhythm, stay warmer when it is chilly, and develop a better sense of the elements and the course than riding a cart.[50] Even if we accept the factual predicate for petitioner's argumentthat the walking rule is "outcome affecting" because fatigue may adversely affect performanceits legal position is fatally flawed. Petitioner's refusal to consider Martin's personal circumstances in deciding whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the clear language and purpose of the ADA. As previously stated, the ADA was enacted to eliminate discrimination against "individuals" with disabilities, 42 U.S. C. 12101(b)(1), and to that end Title III of the Act requires without exception that any "policies, practices, or procedures" of a public accommodation be reasonably modified for disabled "individuals" as necessary to afford access unless doing so would fundamentally alter what is offered, 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). To comply with this command, an individualized inquiry must be made to determine whether a specific modification for a particular person's disability would be reasonable under the circumstances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at the same time not work a fundamental alteration. See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 61; H. R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 102 (public accommodations "are required to make decisions based on facts applicable to individuals"). Cf. *689 To be sure, the waiver of an essential rule of competition for anyone would fundamentally alter the nature
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Justice Stevens
| 2,001 | 16 |
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rule of competition for anyone would fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner's tournaments. As we have demonstrated, however, the walking rule is at best peripheral to the nature of petitioner's athletic events, and thus it might be waived in individual cases without working a fundamental alteration. Therefore, petitioner's claim that all the substantive rules for its "highest-level" competitions are sacrosanct and cannot be modified under any circumstances is effectively a contention that it is exempt from Title III's reasonable modification requirement. But that provision carves out no exemption for elite athletics, and given Title III's coverage not only of places of "exhibition or entertainment" but also of "golf course[s]," 42 U.S. C. 12181(7)(C), (L), its application to petitioner's tournaments cannot be said to be unintended or unexpected, see 12101(a)(1), (5). Even if it were, "the fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." Pennsylvania Dept. of[51] *690 Under the ADA's basic requirement that the need of a disabled person be evaluated on an individual basis, we have no doubt that allowing Martin to use a golf cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner's tournaments. As we have discussed, the purpose of the walking rule is to subject players to fatigue, which in turn may influence the outcome of tournaments. Even if the rule does serve that purpose, it is an uncontested finding of the District Court that Martin "easily endures greater fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking." 994 F. Supp., The purpose of the walking rule is therefore not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use a cart. A modification that provides an exception to a peripheral tournament rule without impairing its purpose cannot be said to "fundamentally alter" the tournament. What it can be said to do, on the other hand, is to allow Martin the chance to qualify for, and compete in, the athletic events petitioner offers to those members of the public who have the skill and desire to enter. That is exactly what the ADA requires.[52] As a result, Martin's request for a waiver of the walking rule should have been granted. The ADA admittedly imposes some administrative burdens on the operators of places of public accommodation that could be avoided by strictly adhering to general rules and policies that are entirely fair with respect to the able-bodied but that may indiscriminately preclude access by qualified persons with disabilities.[53] But surely, in a case of this kind, *691 Congress intended that an entity
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
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First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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Two Terms ago, this Court, by a 6-2 vote, ruled that Rev Stat 3701, as amended, 31 US C 742 (1976 ed), prohibited a State from imposing on bank shares a property tax computed on the basis of the bank's net worth without deduction for tax-exempt United held by the bank American & Trust Section 3701 at that time provided:[1] "[A]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other of the United shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or inheritance taxes" In this case, we address a question left open in American see n 10: must a State, for property tax purposes, allow a bank to deduct from net worth the full value of tax-exempt United it holds, or is 3701 satisfied by a limited deduction that excludes from net worth only that portion of the federal properly attributable to assets rather than to liabilities? I Effective January 1, 1980, the State of Georgia imposed a property tax on the fair market value of the shares of the *586 stockholders of banks and banking associations 1978 Ga Laws, No 795, 2, p 523, codified as Ga Code Ann 48-6-90(a)(1) [2] The fair market value of a bank's shares was to be determined "by adding together the amount of the capital stock, paid-in capital, appropriated retained earnings, and retained earnings as shown on the unconsolidated statement of condition of the bank and dividing the sum by the number of outstanding shares " This fair market value represented the bank's net worth The State allowed banks, in the calculation of net worth, to deduct certain holdings, such as real estate taxed separately, 48-6-90(a)(1), but did not authorize a deduction for the value of United held by the bank When appellant's predecessor-in-interest bank filed its 1980 amended return, entitled "Determination of Taxable Value of Shares," with appellee Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors, it deducted from its net worth the total value of the federal securities the bank held App A-4 The Board disallowed that deduction, and the Board of Tax Equalization affirmed the disallowance Appellant then took its case to the Superior Court of Bartow County, which consolidated it with cases filed by two other banks: Citizens and Southern National whose deduction of United securities the Board of
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
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First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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Southern National whose deduction of United securities the Board of Tax Equalization also had disallowed, and Bartow County whose deduction a different panel of the same Board had allowed The Superior Court ruled in favor of disallowance, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Bartow County The banks appealed to this Court; we vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of *587 the then-recent decision in American Bartow County On the remand to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the parties conceded that the Georgia bank-share tax statute, if construed to prohibit any deduction for the value of federal a bank holds, would be invalid under the principles announced in American The court therefore sought to save the statute by construing it to allow a bank to deduct from its net worth "the percentage of assets attributable to federal " Bartow County The court explained that if 975 percent of a bank's total assets consisted of federal the bank would be entitled to reduce its net worth by 975 percent According to the court, such a proportionate deduction recognizes that some of a bank's federal are represented on the bank's balance sheet by liabilities, while some are represented by net worth[3] Because the bankshare tax is assessed on net worth, not on total assets, the court reasoned, a proportionate deduction immunizes tax-exempt values, for it excludes federal from the tax base net worth to the extent that they are represented there 312 SE2d, at The court rejected the banks' argument that the total value of federal had to be deducted from net worth in order for 3701 to be satisfied; it indicated that such an absolute deduction would not only insulate the federal from the share tax, as 3701 requires, but would go beyond 3701 and shelter the bank's taxable assets from the tax at 312 SE2d, at [4] *588 One of the three banks, appellant First National of Atlanta, appealed[5] We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to 28 US C 1257(2) II Until 1959, Rev Stat 3701 provided in pertinent part: "[A]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other of the United shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority" In that year, however, Congress added a second sentence to 3701: "This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax," with certain exceptions not relevant here Pub L 86-346, (a), 31 US C 742 (1976 ed) In American
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
|
First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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86-346, (a), 31 US C 742 (1976 ed) In American this Court stated that 3701, as amended, provided a "sweeping" exemption for federal and that the word "considered" in the second sentence of 3701 means "taken into account, or included in the accounting" Appellant contends that those statements preclude the pro rata deduction approved by the Georgia Supreme Court because they must be read to mean that unless federal are excluded in full from the total assets before net worth is determined, they are "taken into account or included" in the tax computation, and therefore 3701 is violated Contrary to appellant's arguments, however, American 's definition of "considered," when read in proper context, *589 does not dispose of the question here The issue in American was whether a bank-share tax is a form of tax to which 3701 applies As was noted in American this Court, prior to the 1959 addition to 3701, consistently had held that 3701 prohibited taxes imposed on federal but did not prohibit nondiscriminatory taxes imposed on other property interests such as corporate shares, even though the value of the interest was measured by underlying assets, including federal The 1959 addition "rejected and set aside" that "rather formalistic pre-1959 approach to 3701" The 1959 addition made clear that a tax that does not provide an exemption for federal "is barred regardless of its form if federal must be considered, either directly or indirectly in computing the tax" (emphasis in original) American therefore addressed the forms of taxation that must allow an exemption for federal ; it did not examine the scope of the exemption that must be provided III An analysis of the scope of the exemption that 3701 requires must begin with Missouri ex rel Missouri Ins In that case this Court struck down, as violative of 3701, a Missouri tax imposed upon the personal property of an insurance company The tax base at issue in Gehner was calculated as follows: (1) the value of tax-exempt bonds held by the insurer was subtracted from total assets to determine total taxable assets; (2) total taxable assets were divided by total assets to obtain the ratio of total taxable assets to total assets; (3) that percentage figure was multiplied by total liabilities; and (4) the pro rata portion of liabilities was subtracted from total taxable assets to determine taxable net worth, upon which the tax was based The Court held that the pro rata deduction violated 3701 because it made the ownership of United bonds the *590 basis for denying a full deduction of liabilities, and thereby
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
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First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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basis for denying a full deduction of liabilities, and thereby increased the tax burden of the taxpayer The Court drew support for its holding from the recognized principle that "a State may not subject one to a greater burden upon his taxable property merely because he owns tax-exempt government securities" citing National Ins Justice Stone, in sharp joined by Justice Holmes and Brandeis, stated that he would have held that the State "does not infringe any constitutional immunity by requiring liabilities to be deducted from all the assets, including tax exempt bonds " He argued that the Court's holding ignored the fact that tax-exempt federal are, in part, liable for the debts of the taxpayer, and that the Court incorrectly assumed that tax-exempt securities alone contributed to the taxpayer's net worth He also thought the Court's conclusion that the taxpayer's ownership of exempt bonds increased the taxpayer's tax burden was not supportable He pointed out that a taxpayer who had $200,000 in taxable capital and $100,000 in liabilities had a tax base of $100,000, while a taxpayer who held $100,000 in taxable assets, $100,000 in tax-exempt bonds, and $100,000 in liabilities had a tax base of only $50,000 after the pro rata deduction The latter taxpayer's liability therefore was reduced, not increased, by ownership of exempt bonds Justice Stone also pointed out that the full-deduction method adopted by the Court allowed a taxpayer to shelter taxable assets by purchasing an equivalent amount of Government bonds The full deduction therefore did more than immunize the bonds from taxation; it "confers upon that ownership an affirmative benefit at the expense of the taxing power of the state, by relieving the [taxpayer] from the full burden of taxation on net worth to which his taxable assets have in some measure contributed" One must concede that were Gehner still an authoritative decision, it would control this case, because it indicates that *591 anything less than a full deduction for federal fails to provide the tax exemption required by 3701 and the Constitution Gehner, however, has no vitality today, for the Court has adopted the views expressed by Justice Stone JUSTICE WHITE, writing for a unanimous Court, has stated flatly that Gehner's extension of the principles of immunity to "condemn more than an increase in the tax rate on taxable dollars for those owning exempt securities" was "soon repudiated" United And just one Term after Gehner was decided, the Court upheld provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921 that allowed taxpayers to exclude from gross income interest received on state or municipal and to take
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
|
First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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income interest received on state or municipal and to take a deduction for interest paid on indebtedness, except interest paid on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase tax-exempt In Denman, the taxpayer argued that the principles of National Ins as reaffirmed and applied in Gehner, required that the taxpayer be allowed both an exemption for the interest received on tax-free and a deduction for the interest paid The Court held to the contrary: "While guaranteed exemptions must be strictly observed, this obligation is not inconsistent with reasonable classification designed to subject all to the payment of their just share of a burden fairly imposed" Echoing Justice Stone's Gehner 281 US, the Court noted that under the taxpayer's theory of immunity, he could shelter taxable income by the simple expedient of purchasing exempt with borrowed money and paying interest equivalent to the taxable -520 Similarly, in the Court upheld provisions of the Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1924 that permitted deduction of depreciation and expenses of buildings owned by life insurance companies only on condition that the company include in its gross income the otherwise nontaxable rental value of the *592 space it occupied The Court stated that the condition did not amount to a tax upon the tax-exempt rental value, but merely was a permissible "apportionment of expenses" In United a unanimous Court "affirm[ed] the principle announced in Denman and Independent that the tax laws may require tax-exempt income to pay its way" by upholding the pro rata deduction provisions of the Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 (hereinafter Insurance Tax Act) Under those provisions, a life insurance company's investment income is divided into the policyholders' share, which is not taxed, and the company's share, which is taxed, and a company is allowed to deduct only its share of tax-exempt interest from its gross The Court rejected the argument that the insurer should be allowed to deduct not only its share, but the full amount of exempt interest earned, by reasoning like that of the Gehner : "Undoubtedly the 1959 Act does not wholly ignore the receipt of tax-exempt interest in arriving at taxable investment The company will pay more than it would if it had the full benefit of the exclusion for [the policyholders' reserve] and at the same time could reduce taxable income by the full amount of exempt interest But this result necessarily follows from the application of the principle of charging exempt income with a fair share of the burdens properly allocable to it In the last analysis Atlas' insistence on both the full reserve
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
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First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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the last analysis Atlas' insistence on both the full reserve and exempt-income exclusions is tantamount to saying that those who purchase exempt securities instead of taxable ones are constitutionally entitled to reduce their tax liability and to pay less tax per taxable dollar than those owning no such securities The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity does not require such a benefit to be conferred on the ownership of municipal bonds" 381 US, at 251 *593 In sum, ever since Gehner, each time this Court has addressed the scope of the tax exemption for Government it has concluded that the exemption need not be a total exclusion, but, instead, may be limited by charging tax-exempt and interest their fair share of related expenses or burdens[6] Appellant seeks to avoid the import of these cases by arguing that they were addressed to the tax immunity required by the Constitution, see Weston v City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet 449 rather than to the requirements of 3701 It is true that 3701 was not directly at issue in Atlas Independent or Denman, and that Atlas did note that Gehner had been discredited "insofar as Gehner rested on a doctrine of implied constitutional immunity" 381 US, at n 16 But this Court consistently has "treated [ 3701] as principally a restatement of the constitutional rule" Memphis & Trust v Garner, 459 US 392, See also Society for Savings v Bowers, 349 US 143, ; New Jersey Realty Title Ins v Division of Tax Appeals, 338 US 665, IV The 1959 addition to 3701 did not broaden the scope of the exemption required by 3701 beyond that mandated by the Constitution, as interpreted in Atlas Denman, and Independent The sparse legislative history of the addition certainly provides no support for the assertion that *594 Congress intended to provide a broader exemption We noted in American 463 U S, at 865-866, that the catalyst for the amendment was an Idaho tax imposed upon an individual "according to and measured by his net " See Idaho Code 63-3011 (1948) Even though this Court had ruled that 3701 precluded the from taxing interest on federal Idaho took the position that it need not exempt the interest received on federal from the "gross income" from which taxable net income was derived Noting Idaho's stance, the Senate and House Reports on the 1959 addition stated: "The bill makes it clear that the exemption for Federal extends to every form of taxation that would require either the obligation, or the interest on it, or both to be considered directly or indirectly in
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
|
First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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it, or both to be considered directly or indirectly in the computation of the tax" S Rep No 909, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, 8 (1959); H R Rep No 1148, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, 8 (1959) The discussion of the addition in the ensuing hearings confirms that Congress intended to abolish the formalistic distinction between taxes on income and taxes measured by income that underlay Idaho's arguments See Public Debt Ceiling and Interest Rate Ceiling on Bonds, Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, 69-72 (1959) (supplemental statement of Secretary of the Treasury Robert B Anderson) Appellant points to nothing in the legislative history indicating that Congress understood the addition actually to broaden the scope of the exemption, as well as to clarify the forms of taxes to which the exemption applied Congress enacted the pro rata deduction upheld in Atlas just three months before adopting the 1959 addition to 3701 Its deliberations over the Insurance Tax Act included extended debate whether the pro rata deduction included in that Act satisfactorily protected tax-exempt values See Atlas 381 U S, at 240-242 In deciding that the pro rata deduction was adequate, Congress rejected the argument *595 that Gehner prohibited pro rata deductions Given this almost contemporaneous rejection of arguments founded on Gehner's construction of 3701, see United v American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 US 271, it does not make sense to assume that, in amending 3701, Congress intended sub silentio to broaden the required exemption to preclude pro rata deductions[7] Further, as the Gehner Denman, and Atlas recognized, if banks are allowed to deduct from their assets both federal and the liabilities fairly chargeable to those federal their ownership will shelter taxable In 1959 many, if not most, commercial banks held sufficient federal to shelter their taxable assets completely[8] Therefore, to presume that Congress intended to prohibit a pro rata deduction in the 1959 addition, we also would have to presume that Congress intended virtually to eliminate the usefulness of share taxes, the prevailing form of *596 state taxation of banks in 1959[9] We will not infer such an intent from the sparse discussions of Idaho's troublesome income tax that constitute the entire legislative history of the 1959 addition We hold instead that 3701, as amended, provides an exemption no broader than that which the Constitution requires V We see no need to depart from the principle established in Atlas that a pro rata deduction that does no more than allocate to tax-exempt values their "just share of a burden fairly imposed" is constitutional 381
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
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First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111374/first-national-bank-v-bartow-cty-tax-assessors/
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"just share of a burden fairly imposed" is constitutional 381 US, at 251 There is little to add to the persuasive arguments for upholding such a pro rata deduction made by Justice Stone in his in Gehner, and by JUSTICE WHITE, writing for a unanimous Court in Atlas Appellant asserts that a different rule is required here because allowing a pro rata deduction will decrease the investment attractiveness of federal See Smith v Davis, 323 US 111, The validity of that proposition, in our view, is highly questionable Were federal permitted to shelter taxable assets, the likely would be unable to raise worthwhile revenues through bank share taxes In that event, one would expect that the would move to tax banks through franchise or other nonproperty taxes specifically excepted from the proscriptions of 3701 Counsel for the United as amicus curiae in support of appellant stated at oral argument that the Federal Government does not know if such franchise taxes would result in a greater or lesser burden upon federal Tr of Oral Arg 18 It is far from clear, therefore, that the pro rata deduction would diminish the attractiveness of federal more than the alternative taxes the *597 would adopt were a full deduction required Indeed, banks and banking associations have filed briefs as amici curiae in support of Georgia's position here, in part because they fear that a decision striking down the pro rata deduction would result in uncertainty and increased costs to the banks as adopt other forms of taxation See, e g, Brief for Pennsylvania ers Association, Brief for Virginia ers Association, and Brief for Citizens and Southern National Furthermore, appellant and its amici point to no evidence indicating that the difference in cost to the banks between a pro rata deduction and a full deduction is significant enough to prompt banks to forgo the advantages of federal such as their extreme liquidity and safety, and to invest their money elsewhere See Brief for Pennsylvania ers Association as Amicus Curiae 15-18; Brief for Citizens and Southern National as Amicus Curiae 8-10 The tax exemption required by the Constitution and 3701 is not a tax shelter Federal may be acquired, in part, by liabilities, and, when they are, a pro rata method of allocating a fair share of the federal to liabilities does not infringe upon the constitutional or statutory immunity federal enjoy The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is affirmed It is so ordered
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,007 | 1 |
majority
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Bowles v. Russell
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145714/bowles-v-russell/
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In this case, a District Court purported to extend a party's time for filing an appeal beyond the period allowed by statute. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed after the statutory period but within the period allowed by the District Court's order. We have long and repeatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner's untimely noticeeven though filed in reliance upon a District Court's order deprived the Court of Appeals of I In 1999, an Ohio jury convicted petitioner Keith Bowles of murder for his involvement in the beating death of Ollie Gipson. The jury sentenced Bowles to 15 years to life imprisonment. Bowles unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Bowles then filed a federal habeas corpus application on September 5, 2002. On September 9, the District Court denied Bowles habeas relief. After the entry of final judgment, Bowles had 30 days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A); (a). He failed to do so. On December 12, Bowles moved to reopen the period during which he could file his notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6), which allows district courts to extend the filing period for 14 days from the day the district court grants the order to reopen, provided certain conditions are met. See 2107(c). On February 10, the District Court granted Bowles' motion. But rather than extending the time period by 14 days, as Rule 4(a)(6) and 2107(c) allow, the District Court inexplicably gave Bowles 17 daysuntil February 27to file his notice of appeal. Bowles filed his notice on February 26within the 17 days allowed by the District Court's order, but after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and 2107(c). On appeal, respondent Russell argued that Bowles' notice was untimely and that the Court of Appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court of Appeals agreed. It first recognized that this Court has consistently held the requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal is "mandatory and jurisdictional." The court also noted that courts of appeals have uniformly held that Rule 4(a)(6)'s 180-day period for filing *2363 a motion to reopen is also mandatory and not susceptible to equitable 432 F.3d, at Concluding that "the fourteen-day period in Rule 4(a)(6) should be treated as strictly as the 180-day period in that same Rule," the Court of Appeals held that it was without We granted certiorari, 549 U.S. and now affirm. II According to (a), parties
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Justice Thomas
| 2,007 | 1 |
majority
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Bowles v. Russell
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145714/bowles-v-russell/
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549 U.S. and now affirm. II According to (a), parties must file notices of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment being appealed. District courts have limited authority to grant an extension of the 30-day time period. Relevant to this case, if certain conditions are met, district courts have the statutory authority to grant motions to reopen the time for filing an appeal for 14 additional days. 2107(c). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure carries 2107 into practice. In accord with 2107(c), Rule 4(a)(6) describes the district court's authority to reopen and extend the time for filing a notice of appeal after the lapse of the usual 30 days: "(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. "The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following conditions are satisfied: "(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice of the entry, whichever is earlier; "(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to notice of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed but did not receive the notice from the district court or any party within 21 days after entry; and "(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced." (Emphasis added.)[1] It is undisputed that the District Court's order in this case purported to reopen the filing period for more than 14 days. Thus, the question before us is whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed outside the 14-day window allowed by 2107(c) but within the longer period granted by the District Court. A This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is "mandatory and jurisdictional." (internal quotation marks omitted);[2] accord, ; ; at ; United Reflecting the consistency of this Court's holdings, the courts of appeals routinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of See, e.g., (unpublished); see also 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 31, p. 6 (2d ed. 1992) ("The rule is well settled that failure to file a timely notice of appeal defeats the jurisdiction of a court of appeals"). In fact, the author of today's dissent recently reiterated that "[t]he accepted fact is that some time limits are jurisdictional even though expressed in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants, see, e.g.,
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,007 | 1 |
majority
|
Bowles v. Russell
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145714/bowles-v-russell/
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in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants, see, e.g., 2107 (providing that notice of appeal in civil cases must be filed `within thirty days after the entry of such judgment')." (citation omitted). Although several of our recent decisions have undertaken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing rules and jurisdictional rules, none of them calls into question our longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional. Indeed, those decisions have also recognized the jurisdictional significance of the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a statute. In we held that failure to comply with the time requirement in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004 did not affect a court's subject-matter Critical to our analysis was the fact that "[n]o statute specifies a time limit for filing a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge." Rather, the filing deadlines in the Bankruptcy Rules are "`procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business'" that are "`not jurisdictional.'" ). Because "[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction," (citing U.S. Const., Art. III, 1), it was improper for courts to use "the term `jurisdictional' to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court," 540 U.S., As a point of contrast, we noted that 2107 *2365 contains the type of statutory time constraints that would limit a court's and n. 8, or aid petitioner. In the statutory limitation was an employee-numerosity requirement, not a time Scarborough, which addressed the availability of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, concerned "a mode of relief. ancillary to the judgment of a court" that already had plenary This Court's treatment of its certiorari jurisdiction also demonstrates the jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress. According to our Rules, a petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed within days of the entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed. See this Court's Rule 13.1. That -day period applies to both civil and criminal cases. But the -day period for civil cases derives from both this Court's Rule 13.1 and 28 U.S.C. 2101(c). We have repeatedly held that this statute-based filing period for civil cases is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Federal Election Indeed, this Court's Rule 13.2 cites 2101(c) in directing the Clerk not to file any petition "that is jurisdictionally out of time." (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, we have treated the rule-based time limit for criminal cases differently, stating that it may be waived because "[t]he procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,007 | 1 |
majority
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Bowles v. Russell
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145714/bowles-v-russell/
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adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion" Schacht, at[4] Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense. Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. See 6 How., at Put another way, the notion of "`subject-matter'" jurisdiction obviously extends to "`classes of cases falling within a court's adjudicatory authority,'" *2366 (quoting ), but it is no less "jurisdictional" when Congress forbids federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate "class of cases" after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment. The resolution of this case follows naturally from this reasoning. Like the initial 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal, the limit on how long a district court may reopen that period is set forth in a statute, (c). Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period in 2107(c), that limitation is more than a simple "claim-processing rule." As we have long held, when an "appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of " at Bowles' failure to file his notice of appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived the Court of Appeals of And because Bowles' error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance with the statute's time limitations. See B Bowles contends that we should excuse his untimely filing because he satisfies the "unique circumstances" doctrine, which has its roots in Harris Truck Lines, 9 L. Ed. 2d 2 There, pursuant to then-Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a District Court entertained a timely motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. The District Court found the moving party had established a showing of "excusable neglect," as required by the Rule, and granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the finding of excusable neglect and, accordingly, held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the extension. Harris Truck Lines, 1-2 This Court reversed, noting "the obvious great hardship to a party who relies upon the trial judge's finding of `excusable neglect.'" Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,007 | 1 |
majority
|
Bowles v. Russell
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145714/bowles-v-russell/
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of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the "unique circumstances" doctrine is illegitimate. Given that this Court has applied Harris Truck Lines only once in the last half century, (19) several courts have rightly questioned its continuing validity. See, e.g., See also ("Our later cases. effectively repudiate the Harris Truck Lines approach"). See also We see no compelling reason to resurrect the doctrine from its 40-year slumber. Accordingly, we reject Bowles' reliance on the doctrine, and we overrule Harris Truck Lines and Thompson to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule. *2367 C If rigorous rules like the one applied today are thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to promulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits. Even narrow rules to this effect would give rise to litigation testing their reach and would no doubt detract from the clarity of the rule. However, congressionally authorized rulemaking would likely lead to less litigation than court-created exceptions without authorization. And in all events, for the reasons discussed above, we lack present authority to make the exception petitioner seeks. III The Court of Appeals correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Bowles' appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Breyer
| 2,016 | 2 |
concurring
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Ocasio v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/
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I agree with the sentiment expressed in the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE THOMAS that may well have been wrongly decided. See post, at 1–2. I think it is an exceptionally difficult question whether “extortion” within the meaning of the Hobbs Act is really “the rough equivalent of taking a bribe,” (internal quotation marks omitted)—especially when we admittedly decided that question in that case without the benefit of full briefing on extortion’s common-law history, see (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“Neither party in this case has briefed or argued the question”). The present case underscores some of the problems that raises. For example, as in the scenario presented by today’s Court, where the public health inspector asks for money from a restaurant owner in exchange for favor- able reports, see ante, at 16, courts (and juries) will have to draw the difficult distinction between the somewhat involuntary behavior of the bribe payor and the voluntary behavior of the same bribe payor, which may determine whether there is or is not a conspiracy. Compare United (finding that a transported woman could conspire to violate the Mann Act), with 2 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES BREYER, J., concurring 123 (1932) (finding no such conspiracy). Nonetheless, we must in this case take as good law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20 (Petitioner “take[s] th[e] holding [in ] as a given”). That being so, I join the majority’s opinion in full. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 14–361 SAMUEL OCASIO, PETITIONER v.
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Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
majority
|
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109348/thermtron-products-inc-v-hermansdorfer/
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The questions in this case are whether a Federal District Judge may remand a properly removed diversity case for reasons not authorized by statute, and, if not, whether such remand order may be remedied by writ of mandamus. I On April 9, 1973, two citizens and residents of Kentucky filed an action in a Kentucky state court against Thermtron Products, Inc., an Indiana corporation without office or place of business in Kentucky, and one Larry Dean Newhard, an employee of Thermtron and a citizen and resident of Indiana, seeking damages for injuries arising out of an automobile accident between plaintiff's automobile and a vehicle driven by Newhard. *338 Service on the defendants, who are petitioners here, was by substituted service on the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth, pursuant to Kentucky law. Later that month, petitioners removed the cause to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1441[1] and 1446.[2] The *339 case was assigned a number, and the defendants filed their answer and later proceeded with discovery. On February 5, 1974, respondent judge issued an order in the case which recited that the action "was removed from the Pike Circuit Court, Pike County, Kentucky, on April 30, 1973, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S. C. 1446," that his court had reviewed its entire civil docket and found "that there is no available time in which to try the above-styled action in the foreseeable future" and that an adjudication of the merits of the case would be expedited in the state court. Record 31. The order then called upon the defendants to show cause "why the ends of justice do not require this matter [to] be remanded to the Pike Circuit Court" In response to the *340 order, petitioners asserted that they believed they could not have a fair and impartial trial in the state courts, that the cause had been properly removed pursuant to the applicable statutes, that petitioners had a federal right to have the cause tried in the federal court, that respondent had no discretion to remand the case merely because of a crowded docket, and that there was no other legal ground for the remand. On March 22, 1974, respondent filed a memorandum opinion and order remanding the case to the Pike Circuit Court. The opinion noted petitioners' contention that they had a "right" to remove the action by properly invoking 28 U.S. C. 1441, and remarked that "[t]he court must concede that fact." Record 36. That right, the opinion then stated, nevertheless had to be
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Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
majority
|
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109348/thermtron-products-inc-v-hermansdorfer/
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That right, the opinion then stated, nevertheless had to be "balanced against the plaintiffs' right to a forum of their choice and their right to a speedy decision on the merits of their cause of action." Because of the District Court's crowded docket and because other cases had priority on available trial time,[3] "plaintiffs' right of redress *341 is being severely impaired," which "would not be the case if the cause had not been removed from the state courts." Remarking that the purpose of the removal statute was to prevent prejudice in local courts and being of the view that petitioners had made no showing of possible prejudice that might follow from remand, respondent then ordered the case remanded.[4] Petitioners then filed in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit their alternative petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition, requesting relief on the ground that the action had been properly removed and that respondent had no authority or discretion whatsoever to remand the case on the ground asserted by him. Based on the petition and respondent's response, the Court of Appeals denied the petition after concluding (1) that the District Court had jurisdiction to enter the order for remand and (2) that the Court of Appeals *342 had no jurisdiction to review that order or to issue mandamus because of the prohibition against appellate review contained in 28 U.S. C. 1447 (d). We granted the petition for certiorari, and now reverse. II Title 28 U.S. C. 1441 (a) provides that unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction," may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States.[5] Section 1446 provides the procedure for removal;[6] and a case removed under that section may be remanded only in accordance with 1447 which governs procedure after removal. Section 1447 (c) provides in part: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs." The following section, 1447 (d), generally forbids review of remand orders: "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it is removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise."[7] *343 It is unquestioned in this case and conceded
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Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
majority
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Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109348/thermtron-products-inc-v-hermansdorfer/
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otherwise."[7] *343 It is unquestioned in this case and conceded by petitioners that this section prohibits review of all remand orders issued pursuant to 1447 (c) whether erroneous or not and whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ. This has been the established rule under 1447 (d) and its predecessors stretching back to 1887. See, e. g., In re Pennsylvania ; Ex parte Matthew Addy S. S. ; Employers Reinsurance ; United If a trial judge purports to remand a case on the ground that it was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction," his order is not subject to challenge in the court of appeals by appeal, by mandamus, or otherwise. The issue before us now is whether 1447 (d) also bars review where a case has been properly removed and the remand order is issued on grounds not authorized by 1447 (c). Here, respondent did not purport to proceed on the basis that this case had been removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction." Neither the propriety of the removal nor the jurisdiction of the court *344 was questioned by respondent in the slightest.[8] Section 1447 (c) was not even mentioned. Instead, the District Court's order was based on grounds wholly different from those upon which 1447 (c) permits remand. The determining factor was the District Court's heavy docket, which respondent thought would unjustly delay plaintiffs in going to trial on the merits of their action. This consideration, however, is plainly irrelevant to whether the District Court would have had jurisdiction of the case had it been filed initially in that court, to the removability of a case from the state court under 1441, and hence to the question whether this cause was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction" within the meaning of the statute. Removal of cases from state courts has been allowed since the first Judiciary Act, and the right to remove has never been dependent on the state of the federal court's docket. It is indeed unfortunate if the judicial manpower provided by Congress in any district is insufficient to try with reasonable promptness the cases properly filed in or removed to that court in accordance with the applicable statutes. But an otherwise properly removed action may no more be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy to try it than an action properly filed in the federal court in the first instance may be dismissed or referred to state courts for such reason. ; Chicot ; We agree with petitioners: The District Court exceeded its authority in remanding on grounds not permitted by the
|
Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
majority
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Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109348/thermtron-products-inc-v-hermansdorfer/
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its authority in remanding on grounds not permitted by the controlling statute.[9] III Although the Court of Appeals, erroneously we think, held that the District Court had jurisdiction to enter its remand order, the Court of Appeals did not mention 1447 (c), did not suggest that the District Court had proceeded under that section, properly or improperly, and did not itself suggest that this case was not removable under 1441 or that it had been improvidently removed from the state court for want of jurisdiction or otherwise. In the face of petitioners' position that the remand was for reasons not authorized by the statute, the Court of Appeals acted solely on the ground that under 1447 (d) it had no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the remand order issued by respondent in this case. We disagree with that conclusion. Section 1447 (d) is not dispositive of the reviewability of remand orders in and of itself. That section and 1447 (c) must be construed together, as this Court has said of the predecessors to these two sections in Employers Reinsurance and These provisions, like their predecessors, "are in pari materia [and] are to be *346 construed accordingly rather than as distinct enactments." Employers Reinsurance This means that only remand orders issued under 1447 (c) and invoking the grounds specified thereinthat removal was improvident and without jurisdictionare immune from review under 1447 (d). Section 1447 (d) has its roots in the Act of Mar. 3, 1887, Prior to 1875, orders of remand were not reviewable by appeal or writ of error for want of a final judgment. Railroad Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1875, provided that if the trial court became satisfied at any time during the pendency of a case brought in or removed to that court that the case did not really or substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, the action was to be either dismissed or remanded to the court from which it was removed as justice might require. The section expressly provided that the order dismissing or remanding the cause was to be reviewable on writ of error or appeal.[10] The Act of Mar. 3, 1887, however, while not disturbing *347 the provision for dismissal or remand for want of jurisdiction, not only repealed the provision in 5 of the 1875 Act providing for appellate review of remand orders but contained a provision that "improperly removed" cases should be remanded and that "no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the circuit court so remanding
|
Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
majority
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Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109348/thermtron-products-inc-v-hermansdorfer/
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error from the decision of the circuit court so remanding such cause shall be allowed."[11] (Emphasis added.) These provisions for the disposition of removed cases where jurisdiction was lacking or removal was otherwise improper, together with the prohibition of appellate review, were later included in 28 and 37 of the Judicial Code of 1911, appeared in 28 U.S. C. 71 and 80 (1946 ed.), 1098, and endured until 1948[12] when *348 28 U.S. C. 1447 was enactedminus, however, the prohibition against appellate review. The omission was corrected in 1949 when the predecessor of the present subsection (d) came into being.[13] Until 1948, then, district courts were authorized to remand cases over which they had no jurisdiction or which had been otherwise "improperly" removed, and district court orders "so remanding" were not appealable. It was held that a case remanded for want of jurisdiction under 80, which itself contained no prohibition of appellate review, was an "improperly" removed case under 71 and hence subject to the reviewability bar of that section. Employers Reinsurance But under the plain language of 71, a case was "so remanded" and within the reviewability prohibition only if it had been improperly removed. Insofar as we are advised, no case in this Court ever held that 71 prohibited appellate review by mandamus of a remand order not purporting to be based on the statutory ground.[14] *349 Sections 1447 (c) and (d) represent the 1948 recodification of 71 and 80. They were intended to restate the prior law with respect to remand orders and their *350 reviewability.[15] There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to extend the prohibition against review to reach remand orders entered on grounds not provided by the statute. *351 There is no doubt that in order to prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues, United Congress immunized from all forms of appellate review any remand order issued on the grounds specified in 1447 (c), whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court. But we are not convinced that Congress ever intended to extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are not recognized by the controlling statute. That justice may move more slowly in some federal courts than in their state counterparts is not one of the considerations that Congress has permitted the district courts to recognize in passing on remand issues. Because the District Judge remanded a properly removed case on
|
Justice White
| 1,976 | 6 |
majority
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Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109348/thermtron-products-inc-v-hermansdorfer/
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Because the District Judge remanded a properly removed case on grounds that he had no authority to consider, he exceeded his statutorily defined power; and issuance of the writ of mandamus was not barred by 1447 (d). In so holding we neither disturb nor take issue with the well-established general rule that 1447 (d) and its *352 predecessors were intended to forbid review by appeal or extraordinary writ of any order remanding a case on the grounds permitted by the statute. But this Court has not yet construed the present or past prohibition against review of remand orders so as to extinguish the power of an appellate court to correct a district court that has not merely erred in applying the requisite provision for remand but has remanded a case on grounds not specified in the statute and not touching the propriety of the removal. We decline to construe 1447 (d) so woodenly as to reach that result now. IV There remains the question whether absent the bar of 1447 (d) against appellate review, the writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to require the District Court to entertain the remanded action. The answer is in the affirmative. A "traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." ; Ex parte Peru, ; Bankers Life & Cas. "Repeated decisions of this Court have established the rule that the writ will lie in a proper case to direct a subordinate Federal court to decide a pending cause," Insurance or to require "a Federal court of inferior jurisdiction to reinstate a case, and to proceed to try and adjudicate the same." In accordance with the foregoing cases, this Court has declared that because an order remanding a removed *353 action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal, "[t]he remedy in such a case is by mandamus to compel action, and not by writ of error to review what has been done." Railroad Absent statutory prohibitions, when a remand order is challenged by a petition for mandamus in an appellate court, "the power of the court to issue the mandamus would be undoubted." In re Pennsylvania There is nothing in our later cases dealing with the extraordinary writs that leads us to question the availability of mandamus in circumstances where the district court has refused to adjudicate a case, and
|
Justice Stevens
| 2,007 | 16 |
majority
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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
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The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a "`fresh start'" to the "`honest but unfortunate debtor.'" Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 3 of the Code permit an insolvent individual to discharge certain unpaid debts toward that end. Chapter 7 authorizes a discharge of prepetition debts following the liquidation of the debtor's assets by a bankruptcy trustee, who then distributes the proceeds to creditors. Chapter 3 authorizes an individual with regular income to obtain a discharge after the successful completion of a payment plan approved by the bankruptcy court. Under Chapter 7 the debtor's nonexempt assets are controlled by the bankruptcy trustee; under Chapter 3 the debtor retains possession of his property. A proceeding that is commenced under Chapter 7 may be converted to a Chapter 3 proceeding and vice versa. U.S. C. 307(a) and (c). An issue that has arisen with disturbing frequency is whether a debtor who acts in bad faith prior to, or in the course of, filing a Chapter 3 petition by, for example, fraudulently concealing significant assets, thereby forfeits his right to obtain Chapter 3 relief. The issue may arise at the outset of a Chapter 3 case in response to a motion by creditors or by the United States trustee either to dismiss the case or to convert it to Chapter 7, see It also may arise in a Chapter 7 case when a debtor files a motion under to convert to Chapter 3. In the former context, despite the absence of any statutory provision specifically addressing the issue, the federal courts are virtually unanimous that prepetition bad-faith conduct may cause a forfeiture of any right to proceed with a Chapter 3 case.[] In the latter context, however, some courts have suggested that even a bad-faith debtor has an absolute right to convert at least one Chapter 7 proceeding into a Chapter 3 case even though the case will thereafter be dismissed or immediately returned to Chapter 7.[] We granted certiorari to decide whether the Code mandates that procedural anomaly. 547 U. S. (006). I On March 003, petitioner, Robert Marrama, filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7, thereby creating an estate consisting of all his property "wherever located and by whomever held." U.S. C. Respondent Mark DeGiacomo is the trustee of that estate. Respondent Citizens Bank of Massachusetts (hereinafter Bank) is the principal creditor. In verified schedules attached to his petition, Marrama made a number of statements about his principal asset, a house in Maine, that were misleading or inaccurate. For instance, while he disclosed that he was the sole beneficiary
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Justice Stevens
| 2,007 | 16 |
majority
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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
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instance, while he disclosed that he was the sole beneficiary of the trust that owned the property, he listed its value as zero. He also denied that he had transferred any property other than in the ordinary course of business during the year preceding the filing of his petition. Neither statement was true. In fact, the Maine property had substantial value, and Marrama had transferred it into the newly created trust for no consideration seven months prior to filing his Chapter 3 petition. Marrama later admitted that the purpose of the transfer was to protect the property from his creditors. After Marrama's examination at the meeting of creditors, see U.S. C. the trustee advised Marrama's counsel that he intended to recover the Maine property as an asset of the estate. Thereafter, Marrama filed a "Verified Notice of Conversion to Chapter 3." Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 07(c)(), the notice of conversion was treated as a motion to convert, to which both the trustee and the Bank filed objections. Relying primarily on Marrama's attempt to conceal the Maine property from his creditors,[3] the trustee contended that the request to convert was made in bad faith and would constitute an abuse of the bankruptcy process. The Bank opposed the conversion on similar grounds. At the hearing on the conversion issue, Marrama explained through counsel that his misstatements about the Maine property were attributable to "scrivener's error," that he had originally filed under Chapter 7 rather than Chapter 3 because he was then unemployed, and that he had recently become employed and was therefore eligible to proceed under Chapter 3.[4] The Bankruptcy Judge rejected these arguments, ruling that there is no "Oops" defense to the concealment of assets and that the facts established a "bad faith" case. App. 34a-35a. The judge denied the request for conversion. Marrama's principal argument on appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit[5] was that he had an absolute right to convert his case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 3 under the plain language of of the Code. The panel affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court. It construed when read in connection with other provisions of the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, as creating a right to convert a case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 3 that "is absolute only in the absence of extreme circumstances." In re Marrama, In concluding that the record disclosed such circumstances, the panel relied on Marrama's failure to describe the transfer of the Maine residence into the revocable trust, his attempt to obtain a homestead exemption on
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Justice Stevens
| 2,007 | 16 |
majority
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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
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revocable trust, his attempt to obtain a homestead exemption on rental property in Massachusetts, and his nondisclosure of an anticipated tax refund. On appeal from the panel, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also rejected the argument that gives a Chapter 7 debtor an absolute right to convert to Chapter 3. In addition to emphasizing that the statute uses the word "may" rather than "shall," the court added: "In construing subsection 706(a), it is important to bear in mind that the bankruptcy court has unquestioned authority to dismiss a chapter 3 petitionas distinguished from converting the case to chapter 3based upon a showing of `bad faith' on the part of the debtor. We can discern neither a theoretical nor a practical reason that Congress would have chosen to treat a first-time motion to convert a chapter 7 case to chapter 3 under subsection 706(a) differently from the filing of a chapter 3 petition in the first instance." In re Marrama, While other Courts of Appeals and bankruptcy appellate panels have refused to recognize any "bad faith" exception to the conversion right created by see n. we conclude that the courts in this case correctly held that Marrama forfeited his right to proceed under Chapter 3. II The two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code most relevant to our resolution of the issue are subsections (a) and (d) of U.S. C. which provide: "(a) The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter or 3 of this title at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 08, or 307 of this title. Any waiver of the right to convert a case under this subsection is unenforceable. "(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a case may not be converted to a case under another chapter of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter." Petitioner contends that subsection (a) creates an unqualified right of conversion. He seeks support from language in both the House and Senate Committee Reports on the provision. The Senate Report stated: "Subsection (a) of this section gives the debtor the one-time absolute right of conversion of a liquidation case to a reorganization or individual repayment plan case. If the case has already once been converted from chapter or 3 to chapter 7, then the debtor does not have that right. The policy of the provision is that the debtor should always be given the opportunity to repay his debts, and a waiver of the right to convert a case is unenforceable." S.
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Justice Stevens
| 2,007 | 16 |
majority
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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
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of the right to convert a case is unenforceable." S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 94 (978); see also H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 380 (977) (using nearly identical language). The Committee Reports' reference to an "absolute right" of conversion is more equivocal than petitioner suggests. Assuming that the described debtor's "opportunity to repay his debts" is a short-hand reference to a right to proceed under Chapter 3, the statement that he should "always" have that right is inconsistent with the earlier recognition that it is only a one-time right that does not survive a previous conversion to, or filing under, Chapter 3. More importantly, the broad description of the right as "absolute" fails to give full effect to the express limitation in subsection (d). The words "unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter" expressly conditioned Marrama's right to convert on his ability to qualify as a "debtor" under Chapter 3. There are at least two possible reasons why Marrama may not qualify as such a debtor, one arising under of the Code, and the other turning on the construction of the word "cause" in The former provision imposes a limit on the amount of indebtedness that an individual may have in order to qualify for Chapter 3 relief.[6] More pertinently,[7] the latter provision, provides that a Chapter 3 proceeding may be either dismissed or converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding "for cause" and includes a nonexclusive list of 0 causes justifying that relief.[8] None of the specified causes mentions prepetition bad-faith conduct (although subparagraph 0 does identify one form of Chapter 7 errorwhich is necessarily prepetition conductthat would justify dismissal of a Chapter 3 case).[9] Bankruptcy courts nevertheless routinely treat dismissal for prepetition bad-faith conduct as implicitly authorized by the words "for cause." See n. In practical effect, a ruling that an individual's Chapter 3 case should be dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 because of prepetition bad-faith conduct, including fraudulent acts committed in an earlier Chapter 7 proceeding, is tantamount to a ruling that the individual does not qualify as a debtor under Chapter 3. That individual, in other words, is not a member of the class of "`honest but unfortunate debtor[s]'" that the bankruptcy laws were enacted to protect. See 498 U. S., at 87. The text of therefore provides adequate authority for the denial of his motion to convert. The class of honest but unfortunate debtors who do possess an absolute right to convert their cases from Chapter 7 to Chapter 3 includes the vast majority of the hundreds of thousands of individuals
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Justice Stevens
| 2,007 | 16 |
majority
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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
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the vast majority of the hundreds of thousands of individuals who file Chapter 7 petitions each year.[0] Congress sought to give these individuals the chance to repay their debts should they acquire the means to do so. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals observed, the reference in to the unenforceability of a waiver of the right to convert functions "as a consumer protection provision against adhesion contracts, whereby a debtor's creditors might be precluded from attempting to prescribe a waiver of the debtor's right to convert to chapter 3 as a non-negotiable condition of its contractual agreements." 430 F. 3d, at A statutory provision protecting a borrower from waiver is not a shield against forfeiture. Nothing in the text of either or §307(c) (or the legislative history of either provision) limits the authority of the court to take appropriate action in response to fraudulent conduct by the atypical litigant who has demonstrated that he is not entitled to the relief available to the typical debtor.[] On the contrary, the broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take any action that is necessary or appropriate "to prevent an abuse of process" described in §05(a) of the Code,[] is surely adequate to authorize an immediate denial of a motion to convert filed under in lieu of a conversion order that merely postpones the allowance of equivalent relief and may provide a debtor with an opportunity to take action prejudicial to creditors.[3] Indeed, as the Solicitor General has argued in his brief amicus curiae, even if §05(a) had not been enacted, the inherent power of every federal court to sanction "abusive litigation practices," see Roadway Express, 447 U.S. 75, (980), might well provide an adequate justification for a prompt, rather than a delayed, ruling on an unmeritorious attempt to qualify as a debtor under Chapter 3. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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The Court's decision commits us to a new and, in my view, unwise course. Its contextual approach places unnecessary and unwarranted new responsibilities on state trial judges, injects troubling instability into the criminal justice system, and reaches the wrong result even under its own premises. These considerations prompt my respectful dissent. I The rule that an adequate state procedural ground can bar federal review of a constitutional claim has always been "about federalism," for it respects state rules of procedure while ensuring that they do not discriminate against federal rights. The doctrine originated in cases on direct review, where the existence of an independent and adequate state ground deprives this Court of jurisdiction. The rule applies with equal force, albeit for somewhat different reasons, when federal courts review the claims of state prisoners in habeas corpus proceedings, where ignoring procedural defaults would circumvent the jurisdictional limits of direct review and "undermine the State's interest in enforcing its laws." Given these considerations of comity and federalism, a procedural ground will be deemed inadequate only when the *389 state rule "force[s] resort to an arid ritual of meaningless form." Staub `s formulation was imprecise, but the cases that followed clarified the two essential components of the adequate state ground inquiry: First, the defendant must have notice of the rule; and second, the State must have a legitimate interest in its enforcement. The Court need not determine whether the requirement of Missouri Supreme Court Rule09 that all continuance motions be made in writing would withstand scrutiny under the second part of this test (or, for that matter, whether Lee had cause not to comply with it, cf. infra, at 405). Even if it could be assumed, for the sake of argument, that Rule09 would not afford defendants a fair opportunity to raise a federal claim, the same cannot be said of Rule10. The latter Rule simply requires a party requesting a continuance on account of missing witnesses to explain why it is needed, and the Rule serves an undoubted and important state interest in facilitating the orderly management of trials. Other States have similar requirements. See, e. g., 36-71(b) ; La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 709 (West 1981); ; Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, 668 ; S. C. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(b) ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 29.06 ; Vt. Rule Crim. Proc. 50(c)(1) (1983); Wash. Rev. Code 10.46.080 The Court's explicit deprecation of Rule10and implicit deprecation of its many counterpartsis inconsistent with the respect due to state courts and state proceedings. A The initial step of the adequacy inquiry
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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state proceedings. A The initial step of the adequacy inquiry considers whether the State has put litigants on notice of the rule. The Court will disregard state procedures not firmly established and regularly followed. In for example, the rule was "not always clear or closely hewn to"; in "petitioner could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of [the rule's] existence." As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 367, Rule10 is not in this category, for unlike the practices at issue in James and Patterson, Rule10 is codified and followed in regular practice. Several of the considerations offered in support of today's decision, however, would seem to suggest that the Court believes Rule10 was not firmly established or regularly followed at the time of Lee's trial. For example, the majority cites the lack of published decisions directing flawless compliance with the Rule in the unique circumstances this case presents. Ante, at 382. While this description of Missouri law is dubious, see, e. g., the Court's underlying, quite novel argument ignores the nature of rule making. If the Court means what it says on this point, few procedural rules will give rise to an adequate state ground. Almost every case presents unique circumstances that cannot be foreseen and articulated by prior decisions, and general rules like Rule10 are designed to eliminate second-guessing about the rule's applicability in special cases. Rule10's plain language admits of no exception, and the Court cites no Missouri case establishing a judge-made exemption in any circumstances, much less circumstances close to these. Its applicability here was clear. The Court also ventures into new territory by implying that the trial judge's failure to cite the Rule was meaningful, ante, at 366, 380, 387, and by noting that he did not give a reason for denying the continuance that could have been addressed by a motion complying with the Rule, ante, at 381. If these considerations were significant, however, we would have relied upon them in previous cases where the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion on the merits was affirmed by the state appellate court because of an uncited procedural defect. See, e. g., *391 ; at 317 318. None of these decisions used this rationale to disregard a state procedural rule, and with good reason. To require trial judges, as a matter of federal law, to cite their precise grounds for decision would place onerous burdens on the state courts, and it is well settled that an appellate tribunal may affirm a trial court's judgment on any ground supported by the record. See Here, moreover, the
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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any ground supported by the record. See Here, moreover, the uncited procedural rule was designed both to "permi[t] the trial court to pass on the merits," and to facilitate the appellate court's review of asserted due process errors. Notwithstanding the Court's guess about the judge's and prosecution's inner thoughts concerning the completeness of Lee's motion, see ante, at 380, the Missouri Court of Appeals tells us that Lee's failure to comply with the Rule is considered consequential as a matter of state law. If Lee had complied with Rule10, the trial court might have granted the continuance or given a different reason for denying it. The trial court, in effect, is deemed to have relied on Rule10 when it found Lee had not made a sufficient showing. Lee was on notice of the applicability of Rule10, and the Court appears to recognize as much. The consideration most important to the Court's analysis, see ante, at 382, relates not to this initial question, but rather to the second part of the adequacy inquiry, which asks whether the rule serves a legitimate state interest. Here, too, in my respectful view, the Court errs. B A defendant's failure to comply with a firmly established and regularly followed rule has been deemed an inadequate state ground only when the State had no legitimate interest in the rule's enforcement. ; at ; Most state procedures *392 are supported by various legitimate interests, so established rules have been set aside only when they appeared to be calculated to discriminate against federal law, or, as one treatise puts it, they did not afford the defendant "a reasonable opportunity to assert federal rights." 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 4027, p. 392 (2d ed. 1996) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). See, e. g., ; -318 ; In light of this standard, the adequacy of Rule10 has been demonstrated. Delays in criminal trials can be "a distinct reproach to the administration of justice," and States have a strong interest in ensuring that continuances are granted only when necessary. Rule10 anticipates that at certain points during a trial, important witnesses may not be available. In these circumstances, a continuance may be appropriate if the movant makes certain required representations demonstrating good cause to believe the continuance would make a real difference to the case. The Court acknowledges, as it must, that Rule10 does not discriminate against federal law or deny defendants a reasonable opportunity to assert their rights. Instead, the Rule "serves a governmental interest of undoubted legitimacy" in "arm[ing] trial judges with the information
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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of undoubted legitimacy" in "arm[ing] trial judges with the information needed to rule reliably on a motion to delay a scheduled criminal trial." Ante, at 385. Nor is there any doubt Lee did not comply with the Rule, for the Missouri court's word on that state-law question is final. See 1-160 The Court's *393 acceptance of these two premises should lead it to conclude that Lee's violation of the Rule was an adequate state ground for the Missouri court's decision. Yet the Court deems Lee's default inadequate because, it says, to the extent feasible under the circumstances, he substantially complied with the Rule's essential requirements. Ante, at 385. These precise terms have not been used in the Court's adequacy jurisprudence before, and it is necessary to explore their implications. The argument is not that Missouri has no interest in enforcing compliance with the Rule in general, but rather that it had no interest in enforcing full compliance in this particular case. This is so, the Court holds, because the Rule's essential purposes were substantially served by other procedural devices, such as opening statement, voir dire, and Lee's testimony on the stand. These procedures, it is said, provided the court with the information the Rule requires the motion itself to contain. Ante, at 382-385. So viewed, the Court's substantial-compliance terminology begins to look more familiar: It simply paraphrases the flawed analytical approach first proposed by the Court in but not further ratified or in fact used to set aside a procedural rule until today. Before Henry, the adequacy inquiry focused on the general legitimacy of the established procedural rule, overlooking its violation only when the rule itself served no legitimate interest. See, e. g., ; at Henry was troubling, and much criticized, because it injected an as-applied factor into the equation. See, e. g., R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and 's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 584 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter Hart & ) (calling this element of Henry "radical"); 16B Wright & Miller 4028, at 394 (arguing that Henry `s approachunder which "state procedural rules may accomplish forfeiture only if necessary to further a legitimate state interest in the *394 actual circumstances of application to the very case before the court""unduly subordinates state interests"); cf. ante, at 376 ("There are exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate"). The petitioner in Henry had defaulted his Fourth Amendment claim in state court by failing to lodge a contemporaneous objection to the admission of the contested evidence. Despite conceding
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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objection to the admission of the contested evidence. Despite conceding the legitimate state interest in enforcing this common rule, the Court vacated the state-court judgment, proposing that the default may have been inadequate because the rule's "purpose may have been substantially served by petitioner's motion at the close of the State's evidence asking for a directed verdict." The suggestion, then, was that a violation of a rule serving a legitimate state interest may be ignored when, in the peculiar circumstances of a given case, the defendant utilized some other procedure serving the same interest. For all Henry possessed in mischievous potential, however, it lacked significant precedential effect. Henry itself did not hold the asserted state ground inadequate; instead it remanded for the state court to determine whether "petitioner's counsel deliberately bypassed the opportunity to make timely objection in the state court." -453. The cornerstone of that analysis, the deliberatebypass standard of later was limited to its facts in and then put to rest in U. S., at 750. Subsequent cases maintained the pre-Henry focus on the general validity of the challenged state practice, either declining to cite Henry or framing its holding in innocuous terms. See, e. g., 466 U. S., at ; ; see also Hart & 585-586 (describing the "[d]emise of Henry "); 16B Wright & Miller 4020, at 291 ("Later decisions, over a period now measured in decades, *395 are more remarkable for frequently omitting any reference to the Henry decision than for clarifying it"). There is no meaningful distinction between the Henry Court's analysis and the standard the Court applies today, and this surprising reinvigoration of the case-by-case approach is contrary to the principles of federalism underlying our habeas corpus jurisprudence. Procedural rules, like the substantive laws they implement, are the products of sovereignty and democratic processes. The States have weighty interests in enforcing rules that protect the integrity and uniformity of trials, even when "the reason for a rule does not clearly apply." Regardless of the particular facts in extraordinary cases, then, Missouri has a free standing interest in Rule10 as a rule. By ignoring that interest, the majority's approach invites much mischief at criminal trials, and the burden imposed upon States and their courts will be heavy. All requirements of a rule are, in the rulemaker's view, essential to fulfill its purposes; imperfect compliance is thus, by definition, not compliance at all. Yet the State's sound judgment on these matters can now be overridden by a federal court, which may determine for itself, given its own understanding of the rule's purposes, whether a requirement
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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its own understanding of the rule's purposes, whether a requirement was essential or compliance was substantial in the unique circumstances of any given case. Henceforth, each time a litigant does not comply with an established state procedure, the judge must inquire, even "in the midst of trial, whether noncompliance should be excused because some alternative procedure might be deemed adequate in the particular situation." Hart & 585. The trial courts, then the state appellate courts, and, in the end, the federal habeas courts in numerous instances must comb through the full transcript and trial record, searching for ways in which the defendant might have substantially complied with the essential requirements of an otherwise broken rule. *396 The Court seeks to ground its renewal of Henry `s longquiescent dictum in our more recent decision in -125. Though isolated statements in Osborne might appear to support the majority's approach or, for that matter, Henry `s approachOsborne `s holding does not. This case bears little resemblance, if any, to Osborne. The statute in question there made it criminal to possess a photograph of a minor in "a state of nudity." Rev. Code Ann. 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989). In a pretrial motion to dismiss, Osborne objected to the statute as over broad under the First Amendment. The state trial court denied the motion, allowed the case to proceed, and adopted no limiting construction of the statute when it instructed the jury on the elements of the crime. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Osborne argued that the statute violated the First Amendment for two reasons: First, it prohibited the possession of non lewd material; and second, it lacked a scienter requirement. In rejecting the first contention, the appellate court did what the trial court had not: It adopted a limiting construction so that "nudity constitute[d] a lewd exhibition or involve[d] a graphic focus on the genitals." 37 St. 3d 9, In addressing Osborne's second point, the Supreme Court noted that another statute provided a mens rea of recklessness whenever, as was the case there, the criminal statute at issue was silent on the question. at -253, 525 N.E.2d, at (citing Rev. Code Ann. 2901.21(B) (1987)). Osborne also argued that his due process rights were violated because the trial court had not instructed the jury on the elements of lewdness and recklessness that the Supreme Court had just read into the statute. The appellate court rejected this claim on procedural grounds, observing that Osborne "neither requested such charge[s] nor objected to the instructions as given." 37 St. 3d, at 254, 258, * 1373 (citing Rule
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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37 St. 3d, at 254, 258, * 1373 (citing Rule Crim. Proc. 30(A) (1989)). When Osborne's case reached this Court, the parties' due process discussion focused on the merits, not the procedural bar. "It is a violation of due process," Osborne's brief argued, "where a state supreme court adds new elements to save a statute and then affirms the conviction." Brief for Appellant, O. T. 1989, No. 88-86, p. 25. 's response, contending that the appellate court's limiting construction was "foreseeable," mentioned the procedural rule in a short, conclusory paragraph. Brief for Appellee, O. T. 1989, No. 88-86, pp. 43-44. Against this backdrop, we decided the asserted procedural ground was adequate to block our assessment of the scienter claim but not the lewdness claim. This was not the watershed holding today's majority makes it out to be. The procedure invoked by the State with respect to lewdness required defendants in all over breadth cases to take one of two steps, neither of which comported with established adequacy principles. First, 's primary contention was, as we noted, "that counsel should have insisted that the court instruct the jury on lewdness" by proposing an instruction mirroring the unforeseeable limiting construction the Supreme Court would later 495 U.S., at To the extent the State required defendants to exhibit this sort of prescience, it placed a clear and unreasonable burden upon their due process rights. Shuttles ; see also Osborne might, for example, have guessed "obscenity" rather than mere "lewdness," or "focus on the genitals" without the additional "lewdness" option; yet according to the State, *398 neither proposed instruction would have preserved his federal claim. That our decision was based on this foreseeability concern is evident from our discussion of the state court's treatment of the scienter question. This holding was supported by an adequate state ground, we found, because the state statute cited by the Supreme Court "state[d] that proof of scienter is required in instances, like the present one, where a criminal statute does not specify the applicable mental state." In other words, while the recklessness element was foreseeable (and in fact established by statute), the lewdness element was not. Second, to the extent faulted the defendant for not raising a more general objection to the jury instructions, Osborne followed from -423. In Douglas, the defendant was required to repeat, again and again, the same Confrontation Clause objection while his codefendant's confession was read to the jury. The trial court's initial adverse ruling foreclosed the possibility that the subsequent objections would be sustained. 's treatment of over breadth objections raised similar concerns.
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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sustained. 's treatment of over breadth objections raised similar concerns. By ruling on and rejecting the pretrial objectionat the time when over breadth challenges are generally madethe trial court would make its position on lewdness clear. The case would continue on the assumption that the statute was not over broad and that possession of non lewd materials could be a criminal offense. Any evidence the defendant introduced to establish that the photographs were not lewd would be irrelevant, and likely objectionable on this ground. As both a logical and a practical matter, then, the ruling at the trial's outset would foreclose a lewdness instruction at the trial's close. 's requirement that the defendant nonetheless make some sort of objection to the jury instructions, as we concluded, served "no perceivable state interest." 495 U.S., at On this point, too, the Osborne Court's different conclusion with respect to scienter is enlightening. Osborne did not *399 argue in an appropriate pretrial motion that the other statute supplied the recklessness element, so no ruling precluded him from admitting evidence on mens rea or requesting a recklessness instruction. Osborne thus stands for the proposition that once a trial court rejects an over breadth challenge, the defendant cannot be expected to predict an unforeseeable limiting construction later adopted by the state appellate court or to lodge a foreclosed objection to the jury instructions. That holding, of course, has no relevance to the case at hand. Rule10 does not require defendants to foresee the unforeseeable, and no previous ruling precluded the trial court from granting Lee's continuance motion. And though the Osborne Court's analysis was tailored to First Amendment over breadth concerns, it did not adopt the majority's fact-specific approach. Osborne `s rationale would apply to all over breadth cases without regard to whether their facts were unique or their circumstances were extraordinary. The majority's suggestion to the contrary exaggerates the importance of certain language employed by the Osborne Court. We did take note of the "sequence of events," at but only because in all over breadth cases, procedure mandated a sequence whereby defendants were required to predict unforeseeable limiting constructions before they were adopted or to lodge objections foreclosed by previous rulings. We also mentioned the trial's brevity, at 123-, but that fleeting reference was not only unnecessary but also in tension with the Osborne Court's analysis. The adequacy doctrine would have dictated the same result, brief trial or no. The Osborne decision did not lay the groundwork for today's revival of Yet even if it made sense to consider the adequacy of state rules on
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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made sense to consider the adequacy of state rules on a case-bycase basis, the Court would be wrong to conclude that enforcement of Rule10 would serve no purpose in this case. Erroneous disregard of state procedural rules will be common under the regime endorsed by the Court today, for its *400 basic assumptionthat the purposes of a particular state procedure can be served by use of a rather different one ignores the realities of trial. The Court here sweeps aside as unnecessary a rule that would have produced the very predicate the trial court needed to grant the motion: an assurance that the defense witnesses were still prepared to offer material testimony. The majority contends that Lee compensated for any inadequacies in his motion, even if through inadvertence, by various remarks and observations made during earlier parts of the trial. To reach this conclusion, the Court must construe counsel's statements with a pronounced liberality. Even if we could assume, however, that Lee and his lawyer provided all the required information at some point, we could not conclude that "th[e] purpose of the rule" was "substantially served," 379 U. S., or, in the terms used by today's majority, that "[t]he Rule's essential requirements were substantially met," ante, at 385. The most critical information the Rule requires "What particular facts the affiant believes the witness will prove"was revealed not at the time of the motion, but at earlier stages: voir dire, opening statements, and perhaps, the majority speculates, the charge conference. Ante, at 383-384. To say the essential requirements of Rule10 were met, then, is to assume the requirement that representations be made at the time of the motion is not central to the Rule or its objectives. This assumption ignores the State's interest in placing all relevant information before the trial court when the motion is made, rather than asking the judge to rely upon his or her memory of earlier statements. Cf. The assumption looks past the State's *401 corresponding interest in facilitating appellate review by placing all information relevant to the continuance motion in a single place in the record. The assumption also ignores the plain fact that the posture of this case was far different when Lee made his continuance motion than it was at the outset of the trial. Even if the judge recalled the precise details of voir dire and opening statements (as the majority believes, see ante, at 384), the State's interest in requiring Lee to make the representations after the prosecution rested was no less pronounced. As the very existence of rules like Rule10
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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less pronounced. As the very existence of rules like Rule10 indicates, seasoned trial judges are likely to look upon continuance motions based on the absence of witnesses with a considerable degree of skepticism. This case was no different, for the trial judge suspected that the witnesses had abandoned Lee. The majority is simply wrong to suggest that no one in the courtroom harbored a doubt about what Lee's family members would have said if they had returned. See On the contrary, in light of the witnesses' sudden disappearance, it is more likely that no one in the courtroom would have had any idea what to expect. The Court fails to recognize that the trial judge was quite capable of distinguishing between counsel's brave promises to the jury at various stages of the trial and what counsel could in fact deliver when the continuance was sought. There is nothing unusual about lawyers using hyperbole in statements to the jury but then using careful and documented arguments when making representations to the court in support of requests for specific rulings. Trial judges must distinguish between the two on a daily basis. In closing argument, for example, defense counsel told the jury: "I'm an old man, been in this business 43 years, seen a little of criminal cases. Never seen one as weak as this." Tr. 618. *402 Quite aside from the prosecutor's predictable response"He said that in the last case I tried with him too," at 620 the rhetoric was an ill fit with the routine, mechanical way defense counsel presented his motion for acquittal, with the jury absent, at the close of the prosecution's case. He gave not one specific reason to grant the motion, his complete argument consisting of the following: "MR. McMULLIN: I'll file it. I left it in the office. There's nothing exceptional in it. The defendantthat we move for judgment of acquittal for the reason that the State's evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction and that should be easily disposed of." These are the customary dynamics of trial, perhaps; but the whole course of these proceedings served to confirm what the trial judge told counsel at the outset of the case: "I don't have a lot of faith in what's said in opening statement." Opening statements can be imprecise, and are sometimes designed to force the opposition's hand or shape the jurors' perception of events. When the time came for presentation of the defense case, counsel faced significant obstacles in establishing the alibi he had promised before. Indeed, it is a
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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the alibi he had promised before. Indeed, it is a fair inference to say the alibi defense had collapsed altogether. Two witnesses with no connection to the defendants or the crime identified Lee as the driver of the automobile used by the passenger-gunman. Any thought that difficulties with these eyewitnesses' identification might give Lee room to present his alibi defense was dispelled by two additional witnesses for the prosecution. Both had known Lee for a considerable period of time, so the chances of mistaken identity were minimal. Both saw him in Kansas Citynot in Californiaon the night before the murder. He was not only in town, they testified, but also with the shooter and looking for the victim. *403 Faced with this and other evidence adduced by the prosecution, defense counsel elected to open not with the alibi witnesses whose testimony was supposed to be so critical, but rather with two witnesses who attempted to refute a collateral aspect of the testimony given by one of the prosecution's eyewitnesses. Only then did the defense call the alibi witnesses, who were to testify that Lee went to California to attend a birthday party in July 1992 and did not return to Kansas City until October. At this point the case was far different from what defense counsel might have hoped for at the opening. When Lee's witnesses were then reported missing, the judge had ample reason to believe they had second thoughts about testifying. All three of Lee's family members had traveled from California to testify, but all three left without speaking to Lee or his lawyer. Two sets of witnesses, four persons in all, had just placed Lee in Kansas City; and the prosecution had said it had in reserve other witnesses prepared to rebut the alibi testimony. Lee had been sentenced to 80 years in Missouri prison for an unrelated armed assault and robbery, and any witness who was considering perjury would have had little inducement to take that riska risk that would have became more pronounced after the prosecution's witnesses had testifiedif Lee would serve a long prison term in any event. The judge's skepticism seems even more justified when it is noted that six weeks later, during a hearing on Lee's motion for a new trial, counsel still did not explain where Lee's family members had gone or why they had left. It was not until 17 months later, in an amended motion for post conviction relief, that Lee first gave the Missouri courts an explanation for his family's disappearance. Before any careful trial judge granted a
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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his family's disappearance. Before any careful trial judge granted a continuance in these circumstances, he or she would want a representation that the movant believed the missing witnesses were still prepared to offer the alibi testimony. Cf. If Lee and his counsel had any reason to believe his witnesses had not abandoned him, this representation would not have been difficult to make, and the trial judge would have had reason to credit it. Yet defense counsel was careful at all stages to avoid making this precise representation. In his opening statement he said: "We will put on three witnesses for the defense, and you will see them and be able to evaluate them and see whether or not they're liars or not. You can determine for yourself." App. 12. When he moved for the continuance, Lee's counsel, consistent with his guarded approach, would not say the witnesses would still testify as advertised: "THE COURT: The folks were here today. They were seen here on this floor of the courthouse, and they apparently simply have abandoned MR. McMULLIN: Well THE COURT:the defendant inalthough they're family, despite the fact that they're under subpoena. MR. McMULLIN: It looks like that, Judge. I don't know. I wouldI can neither confirm nor deny." No onenot Lee, not his attorneystood before the court and expressed a belief, as required by Rule10, that the missing witnesses would still testify that Lee had been in California on the night of the murder. Without that assurance, the judge had little reason to believe the continuance would be of any use. In concluding that the purposes of Rule10 were served by promises made in an opening statement, the majority has ignored one of the central purposes of the Rule. *405 In sum, Rule10 served legitimate state interests, both as a general matter and as applied to the facts of this case. Lee's failure to comply was an adequate state ground, and the Court's contrary determination does not bode well for the adequacy doctrine or federalism. II A federal court could consider the merits of Lee's defaulted federal claim if he had shown cause for the default and prejudice therefrom, see -91, or made out a compelling case of actual innocence, see He has done neither. As to the first question, Lee says the sudden disappearance of his witnesses caused him to neglect Rule10. In one sense, of course, he is right, for he would not have requested the continuance, much less failed to comply with Rule10, if his witnesses had not left the courthouse. The argument, though, is unavailing. The
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Justice Kennedy
| 2,002 | 4 |
dissenting
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Lee v. Kemna
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118478/lee-v-kemna/
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not left the courthouse. The argument, though, is unavailing. The cause component of the cause-and-prejudice analysis requires more than a but-for causal relationship between the cause and the default. Lee must also show, given the state of the trial when the motion was made, that an external factor "impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." While the departure of his key witnesses may have taken him by surprise (and caused him not to comply with Rule09's writing requirement), nothing about their quick exit stopped him from making a complete oral motion and explaining their absence, the substance of their anticipated testimony, and its materiality. Nor has Lee shown that an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." To fall within this "narrow class of cases," Lee *406 must demonstrate "that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence." at 327, Lee would offer the testimony of his mother, stepfather, and sister; but to this day, almost eight years after the trial, Lee has not produced a shred of tangible evidence corroborating their story that he had flown to California to attend a 4-month long birthday party at the time of the murder. To acquit, the jury would have to overlook this problem, ignore the relatives' motive to concoct an alibi for their kin, and discount the prosecution's four eyewitnesses. Even with the relatives' testimony, a reasonable juror could vote to convict. * * * "Flying banners of federalism, the Court's opinion actually raises storm signals of a most disquieting nature." So wrote Justice Harlan, dissenting in 379 U. S., at The disruption he predicted failed to spread, not because Henry `s approach was sound but because in later cases the Court, heeding his admonition, refrained from following the course Henry prescribed. Though the Court disclaims reliance upon Henry, it has in fact revived that case's discredited rationale. Serious doubt is now cast upon many state procedural rules and the convictions sustained under them. Sound principles of federalism counsel against this result. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,018 | 0 |
dissenting
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Hughes v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4504243/hughes-v-united-states/
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Seven years ago, four Justices took the position that a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment specified in a binding plea agreement may have been sentenced “based on” a Sentencing Guidelines range, simply because the district court must consider the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agreement. That view has since garnered more votes, but has not gotten any more persuasive. A defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction following a retroactive Guidelines amendment if he was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S. C. When a defendant enters into a binding “Type-C” plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), however, the resulting sentence is “dictated by the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties, not the judge’s Guidelines calculation.” (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment). Five Justices recognized as much in See ibid.; (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). If a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a Type-C 2 agreement specifying a particular term of imprisonment, the district court may sentence him only to that term. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1)(C) (the parties’ choice of an “appropriate” sentence “binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement”). If the judge considers the parties’ chosen sentence to be inappropriate, he does not have discretion to impose a different one. Instead, the court’s only option is to reject the agreement and afford the defendant the opportunity to be released from his guilty plea. See Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(A), (4), (5). As the Court points out, a district court considering whether to accept a Type-C agreement must consult the Guidelines, as the District Court did here. Ante, at 5; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a–36a. But “when determining the sentence to impose,” the district court may base its deci- sion on “one thing and one thing only—the plea agree- ment.” (ROBERTS, C. J., dis- senting). The Court characterizes this distinction as “artificial,” arguing that the district court’s ultimate impo- sition of a sentence often has as much to do with its Guide- lines calculation as anything else. Ante, at 13; see ante, at 10–11. But that is not so: With a Type-C agreement, the sentence is set by the parties, not by a judge applying the Guidelines. Far from being “artificial,” that distinc- tion is central to what makes a Type-C plea a Type-C plea. “In the (C) agreement context” it is “the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for the term of impris- onment.” (opinion of SOTOMAYOR,
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Justice Roberts
| 2,018 | 0 |
dissenting
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Hughes v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4504243/hughes-v-united-states/
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foundation for the term of impris- onment.” (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). “To hold otherwise would be to contra- vene the very purpose of (C) agreements—to bind the district court and allow the Government and the defend- ant to determine what sentence he will receive.” at 536. That commonsense understanding accords with our reading of the phrase “based upon” in the context of decid- ing when a cause of action is based upon particular con- Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 3 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting duct. In Saudi we considered a provision in the Foreign Sovereign Immuni- ties Act of 1976 providing an exception to a foreign state’s immunity when “the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” 28 U.S. C. We said that the phrase did not encompass a foreign state’s activity that “led to” the tortious Instead, we inter- preted the phrase to refer only to the conduct that forms “the ‘basis,’ ” or “foundation,” of the cause of action—that is, “the ‘gravamen of the complaint.’ ” And as we explained, the “torts, and not the arguably commercial activities that preceded their commission, form the basis for the [plaintiffs’] suit.” So too here: The Type-C agreement, and not the Guidelines calculation that preceded its acceptance, forms the basis for the sentence. More recently, in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. (2015), we found that a cause of action was not “based upon” commercial activity when the activity established just one element of the action. The phrase “based upon,” we explained, instead looks to “the core of [the] suit” and what the claims “turn on.” at – (slip op., at 7–8). Here the sentence that petitioner Hughes received “turned on” the agreement, not the Guidelines or anything else. The Court finds new justification for its interpretation in and Molina- Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. (2016). But those cases—which do not concern the language of or sentencing pursuant to Type-C agreements—do not inform the distinct question at hand. I agree that when a district court has discretion to select an appropriate sentence, the resulting sentence can often be said to be based on the advisory Guidelines range. See ); Molina-Martinez, 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 15) (“[i]n the ordinary case” the Guidelines “anchor the court’s discretion in selecting an appropriate sentence”). But there are circumstances where the district court’s discretion is confined such that the Guidelines range does not play a meaningful part in the ultimate determination of the defendant’s sentence. One such scenario
|
Justice Roberts
| 2,018 | 0 |
dissenting
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Hughes v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4504243/hughes-v-united-states/
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the ultimate determination of the defendant’s sentence. One such scenario is when an applicable mandatory minimum supersedes the Guidelines range. See Koons v. United States, U. S. (2018) (slip op., at 2) (a Guide- lines range can be “overridden” by “a congressionally mandated minimum sentence”). Another is the situation before us, where Rule 11(c)(1)(C) compels the district court to sentence the defendant to a term chosen by the parties, or none at all. Finally, as five Members of this Court recognized in “[a]llowing district courts later to reduce a term of imprisonment simply because the court itself considered the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agree- ment would transform into a mechanism by which courts could rewrite the terms of (C) agreements in ways not contemplated by the parties.” – 537 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). The Court dismisses this point as hav- ing “nothing to do with whether a defendant’s sentence was based on the Sentencing Guidelines.” Ante, at 12. But of course it does. The very purpose of a Type-C agreement is to present the defendant’s sentence to the district court on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, preventing the district judge from altering the sentence as he sees fit. The Court’s interpretation of allows for just such revision, possibly many years down the line, when the Government has already fulfilled its side of the bargain. The Court justifies this result by arguing that its rule ensures that “those who commit crimes of similar severity Cite as: 584 U. S. (2018) 5 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting under similar conditions receive similar sentences.” Ante, at 11. But that ignores the crucial way in which Type-C defendants are not similarly situated to other defendants. They entered into binding agreements—based on the unique facts of their cases and their negotiations with prosecutors—and received benefits (often quite significant ones) that other defendants do not. The facts of this case provide a striking illustration. In exchange for the cer- tainty of a binding 180-month sentence, the Government not only dropped additional charges against Hughes, but also promised not to pursue a recidivist enhancement that would have imprisoned him for life. The Court stresses that the question presented concerns only a Type-C defendant’s eligibility under and that the district court might exercise its discretion to deny a reduction if it “concludes that it would have im- posed the same sentence even if the defendant had been subject to the lower range.” Ante, at 14; see ante, at 13 (suggesting that the district court “can consider the bene- fits the defendant gained by
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Justice Roberts
| 2,018 | 0 |
dissenting
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Hughes v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4504243/hughes-v-united-states/
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court “can consider the bene- fits the defendant gained by entering a Type-C agreement” in deciding “whether a reduction is appropriate”). But even if the district court ultimately decides against a reduction, the Government will be forced to litigate the issue in the meantime—nullifying another of its benefits from the Type-C agreement. To secure the sentence to which the parties already agreed, the Government likely will have to recreate the state of play from the original plea negotiations and sentencing to make counterfactual “what if ” arguments—which, naturally, the defendant will then try to rebut. Settling this debate is unlikely to be as straightforward as the Court anticipates. The point is a very practical one: Hughes pleaded guilty and entered into a binding agreement because he other- wise was looking at life in prison. Although the District Court dutifully performed the required Guidelines calcula- tions, Hughes’s sentence was based on the agreement, not 6 the Guidelines range. Hughes should not receive a wind- fall benefit because that range has been changed. The Government may well be able to limit the frustrat- ing effects of today’s decision in the long run. Going for- ward, it presumably can add a provision to every Type-C agreement in which the defendant agrees to waive any right to seek a sentence reduction following future Guide- lines amendments. See Brief for Petitioner 34–35 (refer- ring to the possibility of such an “explicit waiver”). But that is no comfort when it comes to cases like this one, where the parties understood their choice of sentence to be binding. I respectfully dissent
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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In we set forth a test for determining whether speech by a government employee may, consistently with the First Amendment, serve as a basis for disciplining or discharging that employee. In this case, we decide whether the test should be applied to what the government employer thought was said, or to what the trier of fact ultimately determines to have been said. I This case arises out of a conversation that respondent Cheryl Churchill had on January 16, 1987, with Melanie Perkins-Graham. Both Churchill and Perkins-Graham were nurses working at McDonough District Hospital; Churchill was in the obstetrics department, and Perkins-Graham was considering transferring to that department. The conversation took place at work during a dinner break. Petitioners heard about it and fired Churchill, allegedly because of it. There is, however, a dispute about what Churchill actually said, and therefore about whether petitioners were constitutionally permitted to fire Churchill for her statements. *665 The conversation was overheard in part by two other nurses, Mary Lou Ballew and Jean Welty, and by Dr. Thomas Koch, the clinical head of obstetrics. A few days later, Ballew told Cynthia Waters, Churchill's supervisor, about the incident. According to Ballew, Churchill took "`the cross trainee into the kitchen for at least 20 minutes to talk about [Waters] and how bad things are in [obstetrics] in general.' " Ballew said that Churchill's statements led Perkins-Graham to no longer be interested in switching to the department. Supplemental App. of Defendants-Appellees in No. 91-2288 (CA7), p. 60. Shortly after this, Waters met with Ballew a second time for confirmation of Ballew's initial report. Ballew said that Churchill "was knocking the department" and that "in general [Churchill] was saying what a bad place [obstetrics] is to work." Ballew said she heard Churchill say Waters "was trying to find reasons to fire her." Ballew also said Churchill described a patient complaint for which Waters had supposedly wrongly blamed Churchill. Waters, together with petitioner Kathleen Davis, the hospital's vice president of nursing, also met with PerkinsGraham, who told them that Churchill "had indeed said unkind and inappropriate negative things about [Waters]." Also, according to Perkins-Graham, Churchill mentioned a negative evaluation that Waters had given Churchill, which arose out of an incident in which Waters had cited Churchill for an insubordinate remark. The evaluation stated that Churchill "`promotes an unpleasant atmosphere and hinders constructive communication and cooperation,' " 977 F. 2d, at and "`exhibits negative behavior towards [Waters] and [Waters'] leadership through her actions and body language' "; the evaluation said Churchill's work was otherwise satisfactory, Churchill allegedly told Perkins-Graham that she
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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work was otherwise satisfactory, Churchill allegedly told Perkins-Graham that she and Waters had the evaluation, and that Waters "wanted to wipe the slate clean but [Churchill thought] this wasn't possible." *666 Supplemental App. of Defendants-Appellees in No. 91-2288, Churchill also allegedly told Perkins-Graham "that just in general things were not good in OB and hospital administration was responsible." Churchill specifically mentioned Davis, saying Davis "was ruining MDH." Perkins-Graham told Waters that she knew Davis and Waters "could not tolerate that kind of negativism." Churchill's version of the conversation is different. For several months, Churchill had been concerned about the hospital's "cross-training" policy, under which nurses from one department could work in another when their usual location was overstaffed. Churchill believed this policy threatened patient care because it was designed not to train nurses but to cover staff shortages, and she had complained about this to Davis and Waters. According to Churchill, the conversation with Perkins-Graham primarily concerned the crosstraining policy. 977 F. 2d, at Churchill denies that she said some of what Ballew and Perkins-Graham allege she said. She does admit she criticized Davis, saying her staffing policies threatened to "ruin" the hospital because they "`seemed to be impeding nursing care.' " She claims she actually defended Waters and encouraged Perkins-Graham to transfer to obstetrics. Koch's and Welty's recollections of the conversation match Churchill's. Davis and Waters, however, never talked to Koch or Welty about this, and they did not talk to Churchill until the time they told her she was fired. Moreover, Churchill claims, Ballew was biased against Churchill because of an incident in which Ballew apparently made an error and Churchill had to cover for her. Brief for Respondents 9, n. 12. After she was discharged, Churchill filed an internal grievance. The president of the hospital, petitioner Stephen Hopper, met with Churchill in regard to this and heard her side of the story. App. to Pet. for Cert. 75-77. He then reviewed *667 Waters' and Davis' written reports of their conversations with Ballew and Perkins-Graham, and had Bernice Magin, the hospital's vice president of human resources, interview Ballew one more time. Supplemental App. of Defendants-Appellees in No. 91-2288, at 108, 139-142. After considering all this, Hopper rejected Churchill's grievance. Churchill then sued under Rev. Stat. 42 U.S. C. 1983, claiming that the firing violated her First Amendment rights because her speech was protected under In May 1991, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment to petitioners. The court held that neither version of the conversation was protected under : Regardless of
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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version of the conversation was protected under : Regardless of whose story was accepted, the speech was not on a matter of public concern, and even if it was on a matter of public concern, its potential for disruption nonetheless stripped it of First Amendment protection. Therefore, the court held, management could fire Churchill for the conversation with impunity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45-49. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court held that Churchill's speech, viewed in the light most favorable to her, was protected speech under the test: It was on a matter of public concern"the hospital's [alleged] violation of state nursing regulations as well as the quality and level of nursing care it provides its patients," and it was not disruptive, The court also concluded that the inquiry must turn on what the speech actually was, not on what the employer thought it was. "If the employer chooses to discharge the employee without sufficient knowledge of her protected speech as a result of an inadequate investigation into the employee's conduct," the court held, "the employer runs the risk of eventually being required to remedy any wrongdoing *668 whether it was deliberate or accidental." We granted certiorari, to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on this issue. Compare the decision below with ; ; II A There is no dispute in this case about when speech by a government employee is protected by the First Amendment: To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the employee's interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to "`the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' " ). It is also agreed that it is the court's task to apply the test to the n. 7, and 150, n. 10. The dispute is over how the factual basis for applying the testwhat the speech was, in what tone it was delivered, what the listener's reactions were, see at 151-153is to be determined. Should the court apply the test to the speech as the government employer found it to be, or should it ask the jury to determine the facts for itself? The Court of Appeals held that the employer's factual conclusions were irrelevant, and that the jury should engage in its own factfinding. Petitioners argue that the employer's factual conclusions should be dispositive. Respondents take a middle course: They suggest that the court should accept the
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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middle course: They suggest that the court should accept the employer's factual conclusions, but only if those conclusions were arrived at reasonably, see Brief for Respondents 39, something they say did not happen here. *669 We agree that it is important to ensure not only that the substantive First Amendment standards are sound, but also that they are applied through reliable procedures. This is why we have often held some proceduresa particular allocation of the burden of proof, a particular quantum of proof, a particular type of appellate review, and so onto be constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected speech. See ; ; Philadelphia Newspapers, ; ; Bose These cases establish a basic First Amendment principle: Government action based on protected speech may under some circumstances violate the First Amendment even if the government actor honestly believes the speech is unprotected. And though Justice Scalia suggests that this principle be limited to licensing schemes and to "deprivation[s] of the freedom of speech specifically through the judicial process, " post, at 687 (emphasis in original), we do not think the logic of the cases supports such a limitation. Speech can be chilled and punished by administrative action as much as by judicial processes; in no case have we asserted or even implied the contrary. In fact, in we struck down procedures, on the grounds that they were insufficiently protective of free speech, which involved both administrative and judicial components. Speiser, like this case, dealt with a government decision to deny a speaker certain benefitsin Speiser a tax exemption, in this case a government jobbased on what the speaker said. Our *670 holding there did not depend on the deprivation taking place "specifically through the judicial process," and we cannot see how the result could have been any different had the process been entirely administrative, with no judicial review. We cannot sweep aside Speiser and the other cases cited above as easily as Justice Scalia proposes. Nonetheless, not every procedure that may safeguard protected speech is constitutionally mandated. True, the procedure adopted by the Court of Appeals may lower the chance of protected speech being erroneously punished. A speaker is more protected if she has two opportunities to be vindicatedfirst by the employer's investigation and then by the jurythan just one. But each procedure involves a different mix of administrative burden, risk of erroneous punishment of protected speech, and risk of erroneous exculpation of unprotected speech. Though the First Amendment creates a strong presumption against punishing protected speech even inadvertently, the balance need not always be struck in that direction.
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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the balance need not always be struck in that direction. We have never, for instance, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in civil cases where First Amendment interests are at stake, though such a requirement would protect speech more than the alternative standards would. Compare, e. g., California ex rel. with Likewise, the possibility that defamation liability would chill even true speech has not led us to require an actual malice standard in all libel cases. Dun & Bradstreet, ; Nor has the possibility that overbroad regulations may chill commercial speech convinced us to extend the overbreadth doctrine into the commercial speech area. *671 We have never set forth a general test to determine when a procedural safeguard is required by the First Amendmentjust as we have never set forth a general test to determine what constitutes a compelling state interest, see or what categories of speech are so lacking in value that they fall outside the protection of the First Amendment, New or many other mattersand we do not purport to do so now. But though we agree with Justice Scalia that the lack of such a test is inconvenient, see post, at 687-688, this does not relieve us of our responsibility to decide the case that is before us today. Both Justice Scalia and we agree that some procedural requirements are mandated by the First Amendment and some are not. See post, at None of us have discovered a general principle to determine where the line is to be drawn. See post, at -688. We must therefore reconcile ourselves to answering the question on a case-by-case basis, at least until some workable general rule emerges. Accordingly, all we say today is that the propriety of a proposed procedure must turn on the particular context in which the question ariseson the cost of the procedure and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the risks it would decrease and increase. And to evaluate these factors here we have to return to the issue we dealt with in and in the cases that came before it: What is it about the government's role as employer that gives it a freer hand in regulating the speech of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at large? B We have never explicitly answered this question, though we have always assumed that its premise is correctthat the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign. See, e. g., 391 U. S., at ; Civil Service ; This assumption is amply borne out
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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; Civil Service ; This assumption is amply borne out by considering the practical realities of government employment, and the many situations in which, we believe, most observers would agree that the government must be able to restrict its employees' speech. To begin with, even many of the most fundamental maxims of our First Amendment jurisprudence cannot reasonably be applied to speech by government employees. The First Amendment demands a tolerance of "verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance," as "necessary side effects of. the process of open debate," But we have never expressed doubt that a government employer may bar its employees from using Mr. Cohen's offensive utterance to members of the public or to the people with whom they work. "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea," ; the "fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones," But when an employee counsels her co-workers to do their job in a way with which the public employer disagrees, her managers may tell her to stop, rather than relying on counterspeech. The First Amendment reflects the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times But though a private person is perfectly free to uninhibitedly and robustly criticize a state governor's legislative program, we have never suggested that the Constitution bars the governor from firing a high-ranking deputy for doing the same thing. Cf. Even something as close to the core of the First Amendment as participation in political campaigns may be prohibited to government employees. ; Letter Public *673 Government employee speech must be treated differently with regard to procedural requirements as well. For example, speech restrictions must generally precisely define the speech they target. ; Hustler Magazine, Yet surely a public employer may, consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from being "rude to customers," a standard almost certainly too vague when applied to the public at large. Cf. (upholding a regulation that allowed discharges for speech that hindered the "efficiency of the service"); (agreeing on this point). Likewise, we have consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large. Few of the examples we have involve tangible, present interference with the agency's operation. The danger in them is mostly speculative. One could make a respectable argument that political activity by government employees is generally not harmful, see Public ; or that high officials should allow
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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harmful, see Public ; or that high officials should allow more public dissent by their subordinates, see ; Whistleblower Protection Act of or that even in a government workplace the free market of ideas is superior to a command economy. But we have given substantial weight to government employers' reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public concern, and even though when the government is acting as sovereign our review of legislative predictions of harm is considerably less deferential. Compare, e. g., ; Letter with Sable Communications of Cal., ; Similarly, we have refrained from intervening in government employer decisions that are based on speech that is of entirely private concern. Doubtless some such speech is sometimes nondisruptive; doubtless it is sometimes of value to the speakers and the listeners. But we have declined to question government employers' decisions on such matters. This does not, of course, show that the First Amendment should play no role in government employment decisions. Government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed opinions. And a government employee, like any citizen, may have a strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters. In many such situations the government may have to make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before it may be punished. See, e. g., ; ; at 569 571. Moreover, the government may certainly choose to give additional protections to its employees beyond what is mandated by the First Amendment, out of respect for the values underlying the First Amendment, values central to our social order as well as our legal system. See, e. g., Whistleblower Protection Act of But the above examples do show that constitutional review of government employment decisions must rest on different principles than review of speech restraints imposed by the government as sovereign. The restrictions above are allowed not just because the speech interferes with the government's operation. Speech by private people can do the same, but this does not allow the government to suppress it. Rather, the extra power the government has in this area comes from the nature of the government's mission as employer. Government agencies are charged by law with *675 doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible. When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's effective operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her. The reason the governor may, in the example given above, fire the deputy is not that this dismissal would somehow be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. It is that the governor and the governor's staff have a job to do, and the governor justifiably feels that a quieter subordinate would allow them to do this job more effectively. The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment decisions, then, is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate. C 1 The Court of Appeals' decision, we believe, gives insufficient weight to the government's interest in efficient employment decisionmaking. In other First Amendment contexts the need to safeguard possibly protected speech may indeed outweigh the government's efficiency interests. See, e. g., ; 357 U. S., at But where the government is acting as employer, its efficiency concerns should, as we above, be assigned a greater value. The problem with the Court of Appeals' approachunder which the facts to which the test is applied are determined *676 by the judicial factfinderis that it would force the government employer to come to its factual conclusions through procedures that substantially mirror the evidentiary rules used in court. The government manager would have to ask not what conclusions she, as an experienced professional, can draw from the circumstances, but rather what conclusions a jury would later draw. If she relies on hearsay, or on what she knows about the accused employee's character, she must be aware that this evidence might not be usable in court. If she knows one party is, in her personal experience, more credible than another, she must realize that the jury will not share that personal experience. If she thinks the alleged offense is so egregious that it is proper to discipline the accused employee even though the evidence is ambiguous, she must consider that a jury might decide the other way. But employers, public and private, often do rely on hearsay, on past similar conduct, on their personal knowledge of people's credibility, and on other factors
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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their personal knowledge of people's credibility, and on other factors that the judicial process ignores. Such reliance may sometimes be the most effective way for the employer to avoid future recurrences of improper and disruptive conduct. What works best in a judicial proceeding may not be appropriate in the employment context. If one employee accuses another of misconduct, it is reasonable for a government manager to credit the allegation more if it is consistent with what the manager knows of the character of the accused. Likewise, a manager may legitimately want to discipline an employee based on complaints by patrons that the employee has been rude, even though these complaints are hearsay. It is true that these practices involve some risk of erroneously punishing protected speech. The government may certainly choose to adopt other practices, by law or by contract. But we do not believe that the First Amendment requires it to do so. Government employers should be allowed to use personnel procedures that differ from the evidentiary *677 rules used by courts, without fear that these differences will lead to liability. 2 On the other hand, we do not believe that the court must apply the test only to the facts as the employer thought them to be, without considering the reasonableness of the employer's conclusions. Even in situations where courts have recognized the special expertise and special needs of certain decisionmakers, the deference to their conclusions has never been complete. Cf. New ; United ; Universal Camera It is necessary that the decisionmaker reach its conclusion about what was said in good faith, rather than as a pretext; but it does not follow that good faith is sufficient. Justice Scalia is right in saying that we have often held various laws to require only an inquiry into the decisionmaker's intent, see post, at 690-691, but, as in Part IIA, this has not been our view of the First Amendment. We think employer decisionmaking will not be unduly burdened by having courts look to the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be. It may be unreasonable, for example, for the employer to come to a conclusion based on no evidence at all. Likewise, it may be unreasonable for an employer to act based on extremely weak evidence when strong evidence is clearly availableif, for instance, an employee is accused of writing an improper letter to the editor, and instead of just reading the letter, the employer decides what it said based on unreliable hearsay. If an employment action is based on what an employee supposedly said, and
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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action is based on what an employee supposedly said, and a reasonable supervisor would recognize that there is a substantial likelihood that what was actually said was protected, the manager must tread with a certain amount of care. This need not be the care with which trials, with their rules of evidence and procedure, are *678 conducted. It should, however, be the care that a reasonable manager would use before making an employment decisiondischarge, suspension, reprimand, or whatever else of the sort involved in the particular case. Justice Scalia correctly points out that such care is normally not constitutionally required unless the employee has a protected property interest in her job, post, at 688; see also Board of Regents of State 408 U.S. ; but we believe that the possibility of inadvertently punishing someone for exercising her First Amendment rights makes such care necessary. Of course, there will often be situations in which reasonable employers would disagree about who is to be believed, or how much investigation needs to be done, or how much evidence is needed to come to a particular conclusion. In those situations, many different courses of action will necessarily be reasonable. Only procedures outside the range of what a reasonable manager would use may be condemned as unreasonable. Petitioners argue that Mt. City Bd. of forecloses a reasonableness test, and holds instead that the First Amendment was not violated unless "`the defendant[s'] intent [was] to violate the plaintiff[`s] constitutional rights.' " Brief for Petitioners 25; see also post, at 690 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia makes a similar argument based on and Perry, which alluded to the impropriety of management "retaliation" for protected speech. Post, at 689. But in all those cases the employer assertedly knew the true content of the employee's protected speech, and fired the employee in part because of it. In none of them did we have occasion to decide what should happen if the defendants hold an erroneous and unreasonable belief about what plaintiff said. These cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument that they never dealt with. United *679 3 We disagree with Justice Stevens' contention that the test we adopt "provides less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for less exalted rights." Post, at 695. We have never held that it is a violation of the Constitution for a government employer to discharge an employee based on substantively incorrect information. Where an employee has a property interest in her job, the only protection we have found the Constitution gives her is a right to
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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have found the Constitution gives her is a right to adequate procedure. And an at-will government employeesuch as Churchill apparently was, App. to Pet. for Cert. 70generally has no claim based on the Constitution at all. Of course, an employee may be able to challenge the substantive accuracy of the employer's factual conclusions under state contract law, or under some state statute or commonlaw cause of action. In some situations, the employee may even have a federal statutory claim. See Likewise, the State or Federal Governments may, if they choose, provide similar protection to people fired because of their speech. But this protection is not mandated by the Constitution. The one pattern from which our approach does diverge is the broader protection normally given to people in their relationship with the government as sovereign. See, e. g., New York Times -280, cited post, at 696, 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the reasons for this are those in Part IIB: "[O]ur `profound national commitment' to the freedom of speech," post, at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting), must of necessity operate differently when the government acts as employer rather than sovereign. III Applying the foregoing to this case, it is clear that if petitioners really did believe Perkins-Graham's and Ballew's *680 story, and fired Churchill because of it, they must win. Their belief, based on the investigation they conducted, would have been entirely reasonable. After getting the initial report from Ballew, who overheard the conversation, Waters and Davis approached and interviewed Perkins-Graham, and then interviewed Ballew again for confirmation. In response to Churchill's grievance, Hopper met directly with Churchill to hear her side of the story, and instructed Magin to interview Ballew one more time. Management can spend only so much of their time on any one employment decision. By the end of the termination process, Hopper, who made the final decision, had the word of two trusted employees, the endorsement of those employees' reliability by three hospital managers, and the benefit of a face-to-face meeting with the employee he fired. With that in hand, a reasonable manager could have concluded that no further time needed to be taken. As respondents themselves point out, "if the belief an employer forms supporting its adverse personnel action is `reasonable,' an employer has no need to investigate further." Brief for Respondents 39. And under the test, Churchill's speech as reported by Perkins-Graham and Ballew was unprotected. Even if Churchill's criticism of cross-training reported by Perkins-Graham and Ballew was speech on a matter of public concernsomething we need not decidethe potential disruptiveness of the speech as reported
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Justice O'Connor
| 1,994 | 14 |
majority
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Waters v. Churchill
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087950/waters-v-churchill/
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need not decidethe potential disruptiveness of the speech as reported was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value it might have had. According to Ballew, Churchill's speech may have substantially dampened Perkins-Graham's interest in working in obstetrics. Discouraging people from coming to work for a department certainly qualifies as disruption. Moreover, Perkins-Graham perceived Churchill's statements about Waters to be "unkind and inappropriate," and told management that she knew they could not continue to "tolerate that kind of negativism" from Churchill. This is strong evidence that Churchill's complaining, if not dealt with, threatened to undermine *681 management's authority in Perkins-Graham's eyes. And finally, Churchill's statement, as reported by PerkinsGraham, that it "wasn't possible" to "wipe the slate clean" between her and Waters could certainly make management doubt Churchill's future effectiveness. As a matter of law, this potential disruptiveness was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the speech might have had. This is so even if, as Churchill suggests, Davis and Waters were "[d]eliberately [i]ndifferent," Brief for Respondents 31, to the possibility that much of the rest of the conversation was solely about cross-training. So long as Davis and Waters discharged Churchill only for the part of the speech that was either not on a matter of public concern, or on a matter of public concern but disruptive, it is irrelevant whether the rest of the speech was, unbeknownst to them, both on a matter of public concern and nondisruptive. The test is to be applied to the speech for which Churchill was fired. Cf. ; Mt. 287. An employee who makes an unprotected statement is not immunized from discipline by the fact that this statement is surrounded by protected statements. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in petitioners' favor. Though Davis and Waters would have been justified in firing Churchill for the statements outlined above, there remains the question whether Churchill was actually fired because of those statements, or because of something else. See Mt. Churchill has produced enough evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact about petitioners' actual motivation. Churchill had criticized the cross-training policy in the past; management had exhibited some sensitivity about the criticisms; Churchill pointed to some other conduct by hospital *682 management that, if viewed in the light most favorable to her, would show that they were hostile to her because of her criticisms. 977 F. 2d, at 1125-1126. A reasonable factfinder might therefore, on this record, conclude that petitioners actually fired Churchill not because of the disruptive things she said
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Justice Thomas
| 2,020 | 1 |
majority
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Kansas v. Glover
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4742386/kansas-v-glover/
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This case presents the question whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investiga- tive traffic stop after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner has a revoked driver’s license. We hold that when the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable. I Kansas charged respondent Charles Glover, Jr., with driving as a habitual violator after a traffic stop revealed that he was driving with a revoked license. See Kan. Stat. Ann. (2001). Glover filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the stop, claiming that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion. Neither Glover nor the police officer testified at the suppression hearing. Instead, the parties stipulated to the following facts: “1. Deputy Mark Mehrer is a certified law enforcement officer employed by the Douglas County Kansas Sher- iff ’s Office. 2. On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mehrer was on routine patrol in Douglas County when he observed a 1995 2 KANSAS v. GLOVER Opinion of the Court Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ. 3. Deputy Mehrer ran Kansas plate 295ATJ through the Kansas Department of Revenue’s file service. The registration came back to a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck. 4. Kansas Department of Revenue files indicated the truck was registered to Charles Glover Jr. The files also indicated that Mr. Glover had a revoked driver’s license in the State of Kansas. 5. Deputy Mehrer assumed the registered owner of the truck was also the driver, Charles Glover Jr. 6. Deputy Mehrer did not observe any traffic infrac- tions, and did not attempt to identify the driver [of] the truck. Based solely on the information that the regis- tered owner of the truck was revoked, Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop. The driver of the truck was identified as the defend- ant, Charles Glover Jr.” App. to Pet. for Cert. –61. The District Court granted Glover’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “it was reason- able for [Deputy] Mehrer to infer that the driver was the owner of the vehicle” because “there were specific and artic- ulable facts from which the officer’s common-sense infer- ence gave rise to a reasonable suspicion.” 54 Kan. App. 2d 3, 385, The Kansas Supreme Court reversed. According to the court, Deputy Mehrer did not have reasonable suspicion be- cause his inference that Glover was behind the wheel amounted to “only a hunch” that Glover was engaging in criminal activity. (2018). The court further explained that Deputy Mehrer’s “hunch” involved
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Justice Thomas
| 2,020 | 1 |
majority
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Kansas v. Glover
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4742386/kansas-v-glover/
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(2018). The court further explained that Deputy Mehrer’s “hunch” involved “applying and stacking unstated assump- tions that are unreasonable without further factual basis,” namely, that “the registered owner was likely the primary Cite as: 589 U. S. (2020) 3 Opinion of the Court driver of the vehicle” and that “the owner will likely disre- gard the suspension or revocation order and continue to drive.” at 595–, –0. We granted Kansas’ petition for a writ of certiorari, 58 U. S. (2019), and now reverse. II Under this Court’s precedents, the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has “a particularized and objective basis for sus- pecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United ; see also “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Prado (quotation altered); United (1989). Because it is a “less demanding” standard, “reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is differ- ent in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.” (1990). The standard “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” at 402 (quoting 51 U.S. 690, (1996) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit- ted)). Courts “cannot reasonably demand scientific cer- tainty where none exists.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). Rather, they must permit officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human be- havior.” Ibid.; see also (noting that an officer “ ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct’ ”). 4 KANSAS v. GLOVER Opinion of the Court III We have previously recognized that States have a “vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles [and] that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed.” (199). With this in mind, we turn to whether the facts known to Deputy Mehrer at the time of the stop gave rise to reason- able suspicion. We conclude that they did. Before initiating the stop, Deputy Mehrer observed an in- dividual operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ. He also knew that the registered owner of the truck had a revoked license and that the model of the truck matched the observed vehicle. From these three facts, Deputy Mehrer drew the commonsense infer- ence that Glover was likely the driver of the vehicle, which provided more than
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Justice Thomas
| 2,020 | 1 |
majority
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Kansas v. Glover
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likely the driver of the vehicle, which provided more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. The fact that the registered owner of a vehicle is not al- ways the driver of the vehicle does not negate the reason- ableness of Deputy Mehrer’s inference. Such is the case with all reasonable inferences. The reasonable suspicion inquiry “falls considerably short” of 51% accuracy, see United States v. 534 U.S. 2, 24 for, as we have ex- plained, “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect,” v. North Carolina, 54 U.S. 54, Glover’s revoked license does not render Deputy Mehrer’s inference unreasonable either. Empirical studies demon- strate what common experience readily reveals: Drivers with revoked licenses frequently continue to drive and therefore to pose safety risks to other motorists and pedes- trians. See, e.g., 2 T. Neuman et al., National Coop. Hwy. Research Program Report 500: A Guide for Addressing Col- lisions Involving Unlicensed Drivers and Drivers With Sus- pended or Revoked Licenses, p. III–1 (2003) (noting that 5% of drivers with suspended or revoked licenses continue Cite as: 589 U. S. (2020) 5 Opinion of the Court to drive); National Hwy. and Traffic Safety Admin., Re- search Note: Driver License Compliance Status in Fatal Crashes 2 (noting that approximately 19% of motor vehicle fatalities from 2008–2012 “involved drivers with invalid licenses”). Although common sense suffices to justify this inference, Kansas law reinforces that it is reasonable to infer that an individual with a revoked license may continue driving. The State’s license-revocation scheme covers drivers who have already demonstrated a disregard for the law or are categorically unfit to drive. The Division of Vehicles of the Kansas Department of Revenue (Division) “shall” revoke a driver’s license upon certain convictions for involuntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, battery, reckless driv- ing, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, or convic- tion of a felony in which a motor vehicle is used. Kan. Stat. Ann. 8–252. Reckless driving is defined as “driv[ing] any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” §8–15(a). The Division also has discretion to revoke a license if a driver “[h]as been convicted with such frequency of serious offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways,” “has been con- victed of three or more moving traffic violations committed on separate occasions within a 12-month period,” “is incom- petent to drive a motor vehicle,” or “has been convicted of a moving traffic violation, committed at a
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Justice Thomas
| 2,020 | 1 |
majority
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Kansas v. Glover
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4742386/kansas-v-glover/
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been convicted of a moving traffic violation, committed at a time when the per- son’s driving privileges were restricted, suspended[,] or re- voked.” Other reasons include violat- ing license restrictions, being under house arrest, §21–09(c), and being a habitual violator, which Kansas defines as a resident or nonresident who has been convicted three or more times within the past five years of certain enumerated driving offenses, The 6 KANSAS v. GLOVER Opinion of the Court concerns motivating the State’s various grounds for revoca- tion lend further credence to the inference that a registered owner with a revoked Kansas driver’s license might be the one driving the vehicle. IV Glover and the dissent respond with two arguments as to why Deputy Mehrer lacked reasonable suspicion. Neither is persuasive. A First, Glover and the dissent argue that Deputy Mehrer’s inference was unreasonable because it was not grounded in his law enforcement training or experience. Nothing in our Fourth Amendment precedent supports the notion that, in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, an officer can draw inferences based on knowledge gained only through law enforcement training and experience. We have repeatedly recognized the opposite. In we noted a number of behaviors—including driving in the median, crossing the center line on a highway, and swerving—that as a matter of common sense provide “sound indicia of drunk driving.” 52 U.S., at 402. In Wardlow, we made the unremarkable observation that “[h]eadlong flight— wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion” and therefore could factor into a police officer’s reasonable sus- picion And in we recognized that the defendant’s method of payment for an airplane ticket contributed to the agents’ reasonable sus- picion of drug trafficking because we “fe[lt] confident” that “[m]ost business travelers purchase airline tickets by credit card or check” rather than –9. So too here. The inference that the driver of a car is its registered owner does not require any specialized training; rather, it is a reasonable inference made by ordinary people on a daily basis. Cite as: 589 U. S. (2020) Opinion of the Court The dissent reads our cases differently, contending that they permit an officer to use only the common sense derived from his “experiences in law enforcement.” Post, at 5 (opin- ion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Such a standard defies the “common sense” understanding of common sense, i.e., information that is accessible to people generally, not just some special- ized subset of society. More importantly, this standard ap- pears nowhere in our precedent. In fact, we have stated that reasonable suspicion is an “abstract” concept that can- not be reduced
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Justice Thomas
| 2,020 | 1 |
majority
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Kansas v. Glover
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4742386/kansas-v-glover/
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suspicion is an “abstract” concept that can- not be reduced to “a neat set of legal rules,” 534 U.S., at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted), and we have repeatedly rejected courts’ efforts to impose a rigid structure on the concept of reasonableness, ibid.; 490 U.S., at –8. This is precisely what the dissent’s rule would do by insisting that officers must be treated as bifur- cated persons, completely precluded from drawing factual inferences based on the commonly held knowledge they have acquired in their everyday lives. The dissent’s rule would also impose on police the burden of pointing to specific training materials or field experiences justifying reasonable suspicion for the myriad infractions in municipal criminal codes. And by removing common sense as a source of evidence, the dissent would considerably nar- row the daylight between the showing required for probable cause and the “less stringent” showing required for reason- able suspicion. ; see White, 496 U.S., at Finally, it would impermissibly tie a traffic stop’s validity to the officer’s length of service. See Such re- quirements are inconsistent with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and we decline to adopt them here. In reaching this conclusion, we in no way minimize the significant role that specialized training and experience routinely play in law enforcement investigations. See, e.g., 534 U.S., at 23–24. We simply hold that such experience is not required in every instance. 8 KANSAS v. GLOVER Opinion of the Court B Glover and the dissent also contend that adopting Kan- sas’ view would eviscerate the need for officers to base rea- sonable suspicion on “specific and articulable facts” partic- ularized to the individual, see because police could instead rely exclusively on probabili- ties. Their argument carries little force. As an initial matter, we have previously stated that offic- ers, like jurors, may rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion context. See –9; Cor, Moreover, as explained above, Deputy Mehrer did not rely exclusively on probabilities. He knew that the license plate was linked to a truck matching the observed vehicle and that the registered owner of the vehi- cle had a revoked license. Based on these minimal facts, he used common sense to form a reasonable suspicion that a specific individual was potentially engaged in specific crim- inal activity—driving with a revoked license. Traffic stops of this nature do not delegate to officers “broad and unlim- ited discretion” to stop drivers at random. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 83, (195). Nor do they al- low officers to stop drivers whose conduct is no different from any other driver’s. See 443
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Justice Thomas
| 2,020 | 1 |
majority
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Kansas v. Glover
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4742386/kansas-v-glover/
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conduct is no different from any other driver’s. See 443 U.S. 4, 52 (199). Accordingly, combining database information and commonsense judgments in this context is fully conso- nant with this Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents.1 —————— 1 The dissent contends that this approach “pave[s] the road to finding reasonable suspicion based on nothing more than a demographic profile.” Post, at 6– (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). To alleviate any doubt, we reit- erate that the Fourth Amendment requires, and Deputy Mehrer had, an individualized suspicion that a particular citizen was engaged in a par- ticular crime. Such a particularized suspicion would be lacking in the dissent’s hypothetical scenario, which, in any event, is already prohibited by our precedents. See United 422 U.S. 83, 86 (195) (holding that it violated the Fourth Amendment to stop and “question [a vehicle’s] occupants [about their immigration status] when the only ground for suspicion [was] that the occupants appear[ed] to be Cite as: 589 U. S. (2020) 9 Opinion of the Court V This Court’s precedents have repeatedly affirmed that “ ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “rea- sonableness.” ’ ” 54 U.S., at ). Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Deputy Mehrer drew an en- tirely reasonable inference that Glover was driving while his license was revoked. We emphasize the narrow scope of our holding. Like all seizures, “[t]he officer’s action must be ‘justified at its in- ception.’ ” 542 U.S. 1, ). “The standard takes into account the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” 52 U.S., at (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion. See For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the cir- cumstances would not “raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” Cor- ; 51 U.S., at 696 )). Here, Deputy Mehrer possessed no exculpatory information—let alone sufficient information to rebut the reasonable infer- ence that Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the stop was justified.2 —————— of Mexican ancestry”). 2 The dissent argues that this approach impermissibly places the bur- den of proof on the individual to negate the inference of reasonable sus- picion. Post, at 3. Not so. As the above analysis makes clear, it is the information possessed by the officer at the time of the stop, not any in- formation offered by the individual after the fact, that can negate the inference. 10 KANSAS v.
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Justice Burger
| 1,984 | 12 |
majority
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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111063/press-enterprise-co-v-superior-court-of-cal-riverside-cty/
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We granted certiorari to decide whether the guarantees of open public proceedings in criminal trials cover proceedings for the voir dire examination of potential jurors. I Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., was tried and convicted of the rape and murder of a teenage girl, and sentenced to death in California Superior Court. Before the voir dire examination of prospective jurors began, petitioner, Press-Enterprise Co., moved that the voir dire be open to the public and the press. Petitioner contended that the public had an absolute right to attend the trial, and asserted that the trial commenced with the voir dire proceedings. The State opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that if the press were present, juror responses would lack the candor necessary to assure a fair trial. The trial judge agreed and permitted petitioner to attend only the "general voir dire." He stated that counsel would conduct the "individual voir dire with regard to death qualifications and any other special areas that counsel may feel some problem with regard to in private." App. 93. The voir dire consumed six weeks and all but approximately three days was closed to the public. After the jury was empaneled, petitioner moved the trial court to release a complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge *504 described the responses of prospective jurors at their voir dire: "Most of them are of little moment. There are a few, however, in which some personal problems were discussed which could be somewhat sensitive as far as publication of those particular individuals' situations are concerned." Counsel for Brown argued that release of the transcript would violate the jurors' right of privacy. The prosecutor agreed, adding that the prospective jurors had answered questions under an "implied promise of confidentiality." The court denied petitioner's motion, concluding as follows: "I agree with much of what defense counsel and People's counsel have said and I also, regardless of the public's right to know, I also feel that's rather difficult that by a person performing their civic duty as a prospective juror putting their private information as open to the public which I just think there is certain areas that the right of privacy should prevail and a right to a fair trial should prevail and the right of the people to know, I think, should have some limitations and, so, at this stage, the motion to open up the individual sequestered voir dire proceedings is denied without prejudice." After Brown had been convicted and sentenced to death, petitioner again applied for release of the transcript. In
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Justice Burger
| 1,984 | 12 |
majority
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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111063/press-enterprise-co-v-superior-court-of-cal-riverside-cty/
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death, petitioner again applied for release of the transcript. In denying this application, the judge stated: "The jurors were questioned in private relating to past experiences, and while most of the information is dull and boring, some of the jurors had some special experiences in sensitive areas that do not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." Petitioner then sought in the California Court of Appeal a writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court to release the *505 transcript and vacate the order closing the voir dire proceedings. The petition was denied. The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for a hearing. We granted certiorari. We reverse. II The trial of a criminal case places the factfinding function in a jury of 12 unless by statute or consent the jury is fixed at a lesser number or a jury is waived. The process of juror selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system. In Richmond the plurality opinion summarized the evolution of the criminal trial as we know it today and concluded that "at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open." A review of the historical evidence is also helpful for present purposes. It reveals that, since the development of trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public process with exceptions only for good cause shown. A The roots of open trials reach back to the days before the Norman Conquest when cases in England were brought before "moots," a town meeting kind of body such as the local court of the hundred or the county court.[1] Attendance was virtually compulsory on the part of the freemen of the community, who represented the "patria," or the "country," in rendering judgment. The public aspect thus was "almost a necessary incident of jury trials, since the presence of a jury. already insured the presence of a large part of the public."[2] *506 As the jury system evolved in the years after the Norman Conquest, and the jury came to be but a small segment representing the community, the obligation of all freemen to attend criminal trials was relaxed; however, the public character of the proceedings, including jury selection, remained unchanged. Later, during the 14th and 15th centuries, the jury became an impartial trier of facts, owing in large part to a development in that period, allowing challenges.[3] 1 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 332, 335 (7th ed. 1956). Since then, the
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Justice Burger
| 1,984 | 12 |
majority
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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111063/press-enterprise-co-v-superior-court-of-cal-riverside-cty/
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English Law 332, 335 (7th ed. 1956). Since then, the accused has generally enjoyed the right to challenge jurors in open court at the outset of the trial.[4] Although there appear to be few contemporary accounts of the process of jury selection of that day,[5] one early record written in 1565 places the trial "[i]n the towne house, or in some open or common place." T. Smith, De Republica * Anglorum 96 (Alston ed. 1906). Smith explained that "there is nothing put in writing but the enditement": "All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices, the enquest, the prisoner, and so many as will or can come so neare as to heare it, and all depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may heare from the mouth of the depositors and witnesses what is saide." If we accept this account it appears that beginning in the 16th century, jurors were selected in public. As the trial began, the judge and the accused were present. Before calling jurors, the judge "telleth the cause of their comming, and [thereby] giveth a good lesson to the people." The indictment was then read; if the accused pleaded not guilty, the jurors were called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant was allowed to make his challenges. Smith makes clear that the entire trial proceeded "openly, that not only the xii [12 jurors], but the Judges, the parties and as many [others] as be present may heare." This open process gave assurance to those not attending trials that others were able to observe the proceedings and enhanced public confidence. The presence of bystanders served yet another purpose according to Blackstone. If challenges kept a sufficient number of qualified jurors from appearing at the trial, "either party may pray a tales." 3 W. Blackstone Commentaries *364; see also M. Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 342 (6th ed. 1820). A "tales" was the balance necessary to supply the deficiency.[6] *508 The presumptive openness of the jury selection process in England, not surprisingly, carried over into proceedings in colonial America. For example, several accounts noted the need for talesmen at the trials of Thomas Preston and William Wemms, two of the British soldiers who were charged with murder after the so-called Boston Massacre in 1770.[7] Public jury selection thus was the common practice in America when the Constitution was adopted. B For present purposes, how we allocate the "right" to openness as between the accused and the public, or whether we view it as a
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Justice Burger
| 1,984 | 12 |
majority
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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111063/press-enterprise-co-v-superior-court-of-cal-riverside-cty/
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and the public, or whether we view it as a component inherent in the system benefiting both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused's right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness. The open trial thus plays as important a role in the administration of justice today as it did for centuries before our separation from England. The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system. Richmond 448 U. S., at -571. This openness has what is sometimes described as a "community therapeutic value." Criminal acts, especially *509 violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done. See T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess 288-295, 408 (1959). Whether this is viewed as retribution or otherwise is irrelevant. When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected. See United ; "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Richmond Closed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness.[8] In Globe Newspaper we stated: "[T]he circumstances under which the press and public can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty *510 one. Where the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." The presumption of openness may be overcome
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Justice Burger
| 1,984 | 12 |
majority
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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111063/press-enterprise-co-v-superior-court-of-cal-riverside-cty/
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serve that interest." The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. We now turn to whether the presumption of openness has been rebutted in this case. III Although three days of voir dire in this case were open to the public, six weeks of the proceedings were closed, and media requests for the transcript were denied.[9] The Superior Court asserted two interests in support of its closure order and orders denying a transcript: the right of the defendant to a fair trial, and the right to privacy of the prospective jurors, for any whose "special experiences in sensitive areas do not appear to be appropriate for public discussion." Of course the right of an accused to fundamental fairness in the jury selection process is a compelling interest. But the California court's conclusion that Sixth Amendment and privacy interests were sufficient to warrant prolonged closure was unsupported by findings *511 showing that an open proceeding in fact threatened those interests;[10] hence it is not possible to conclude that closure was warranted.[11] Even with findings adequate to support closure, the trial court's orders denying access to voir dire testimony failed to consider whether alternatives were available to protect the interests of the prospective jurors that the trial court's orders sought to guard. Absent consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire. The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain. *512 The trial involved testimony concerning an alleged rape of a teenage girl. Some questions may have been appropriate to prospective jurors that would give rise to legitimate privacy interests of those persons. For example a prospective juror might privately inform the judge that she, or a member of her family, had been raped but had declined to seek prosecution because of the embarrassment and emotional trauma from the very disclosure of the episode. The privacy interests of such a prospective juror must be balanced against the historic values we have discussed and the need for openness of the process. To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legitimate privacy, a trial judge must at all times maintain control
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