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Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
dissenting
|
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117856/mci-telecommunications-corp-v-american-telephone-telegraph-co/
|
The communications industry has an unusually dynamic character In 1934, Congress authorized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to regulate "a field of enterprise the dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfolding" National Broadcasting The Communications Act of 1934 (Act) gives the FCC unusually broad discretion to meet new and unanticipated problems in order to fulfill its sweeping mandate "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges" 47 US C 151 This Court's consistent interpretation of the Act has afforded the Commission ample leeway to interpret and apply its statutory powers and responsibilities See, e g, United ; The Court today abandons that approach in favor of a rigid literalism that deprives the FCC of the flexibility Congress meant it to have in order to implement the core policies of the Act in rapidly changing conditions I At the time the Act was passed, the telephone industry was dominated by the American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) and its affiliates Title II of the Act, which establishes the framework for FCC regulation of common carriers by wire, was clearly a response to that dominance As the Senate Report explained, "[u]nder existing provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act the regulation of the telephone monopoly has been practically nil This vast monopoly which so immediately serves the needs of the people *236 in their daily and social life must be effectively regulated" S Rep No 73d Cong, 2d Sess, 2 (1934)[1] The wire communications provisions of the Act address problems distinctly associated with monopoly Section 201 requires telephone carriers to "furnish communication service upon reasonable request therefor," and mandates that their "charges, practices, classifications, and regulations" be "just and reasonable" 47 US C 201 Section 202 forbids carriers to "make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality" 47 US C 202(a) The Commission, upon complaint or its own motion, may hold hearings upon, and declare the lawfulness of, proposed rate increases, 204, and may prescribe just and reasonable charges upon a finding that a carrier's actual or proposed charges are illegal, 205 Persons damaged by a carrier's violation of the statute have a right to damages, 206-207, and any person may file with the Commission a complaint of violation of the Act, 208 Section 203, modeled upon the filed
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
dissenting
|
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117856/mci-telecommunications-corp-v-american-telephone-telegraph-co/
|
of the Act, 208 Section 203, modeled upon the filed rate provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, see 49 US C 10761-10762; S Rep No requires that common carriers other than connecting carriers "file with the Commission and print and keep open for public inspection schedules showing all charges for itself and its connecting carriers" 47 US C 203(a) A telephone carrier must allow a 120-day period of lead time before a tariff goes into effect, and, "unless otherwise *237 provided by or under authority of this chapter," may not provide communication services except according to a filed schedule, 203(c), (d) The tariff-filing section of the Act, however, contains a proviso that states: "(b) Changes in schedule; discretion of Commission to modify requirements "(2) The Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, modify any requirement made by or under the authority of this section either in particular instances or by general order applicable to special circumstances or conditions except that the Commission may not require the notice period specified in paragraph (1) to be more than one hundred and twenty days" 47 US C 203(b)(2) (1988 ed, Supp IV) Congress doubtless viewed the filed rate provisions as an important mechanism to guard against abusive practices by wire communications monopolies But it is quite wrong to suggest that the mere process of filing rate schedulesrather than the substantive duty of reasonably priced and nondiscriminatory serviceis "the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications Act" Ante, at 229 II In response to new conditions in the communications industry, including stirrings of competition in the long-distance telephone market, the FCC in 1979 began re-examining its regulatory scheme The Commission tentatively concluded that costly tariff-filing requirements were unnecessary and actually counterproductive as applied to nondominant carriers, i e, those whose lack of market power leaves them unable to extract supracompetitive or discriminatory rates from customers See Competitive Carrier Rulemaking, 77 F C C 2d 308 (1979) Relaxing the regulatory burdens upon new entrants would foster competition into the telecommunications *238 markets; at the same time, the forces of competition would ensure that firms without monopoly power would comply with the Act's prohibitions on "unreasonable rates" and price discrimination See As the Commission explained in 1981, tariff-filing obligations for nondominant firms were simultaneously "superfluous as a consumer protection device, since competition circumscribes the prices and practices of these companies" and inimical to "price competition and service and marketing innovation" Deregulation of Telecommunications Services, 84 F C C 2d 445, 478-479 (1981) Accordingly, in a series of rulings in the early 1980's,
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
dissenting
|
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117856/mci-telecommunications-corp-v-american-telephone-telegraph-co/
|
Accordingly, in a series of rulings in the early 1980's, the Commission issued orders progressively exempting specified classes of nondominant carriers from the obligation to file tariff schedules See, e g, Second Report and Order, 91 F C C 2d 59 (1982); Third Report and Order, (1983) The Commission's Fourth Report and Order, 95 F C C 2d 554 (1983), extended and reaffirmed its "permissive detariffing" policy, under which dominant long-distance carriers must file tariff schedules whereas nondominant carriers, although subject to the Act's prohibitions on unreasonable rates and price discrimination, may, but need not, file them In the instant In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, the FCC adhered to its policy of excusing nondominant providers of long-distance telephone service from the 203 filing requirement, and codified that longstanding forbearance policy The Commission reaffirmed its commitment to "adapt regulation of telecommunications common carriers to the changed circumstances of competition and to develop a regulatory approach that furthers the purposes of the Act while fostering innovation and the efficient development of the telecommunications industry," and explained once again why, in its view, permissive detariffing furthered these goals, -8080 As it had since its initial *239 stages of detariffing, see 84 F C C 2d, 79-480, the Commission found principal statutory authority for detariffing in the "modify any requirement" language of 203(b)(2) -8075 "[A]ctual experience under permissive detariffing," including an increase in the number of long-distance carriers from 12 in 1982 to 482 a decade later, "further confirm[ed] the success of [the FCC's] approach in furthering the statutory goals of the Communications Act" Id, -8080 III Although the majority observes that further relaxation of tariff-filing requirements might more effectively enhance competition, ante, at 233-234, it does not take issue with the Commission's conclusions that mandatory filing of tariff schedules serves no useful purpose and is actually counterproductive in the case of carriers who lack market power As the Commission had noted in its prior detariffing orders, see, e g, 84 F C C 2d, 79-480, if a nondominant carrier sought to charge inflated rates, "customers would simply move to other carriers" 7 FCC Rcd, Moreover, an absence of market power will ordinarily preclude firms of any kind from engaging in price discrimination See, e g, L Sullivan, Law of Antitrust 89 (1977) ("A firm will not discriminate unless it has market power"); 9 P Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1711a, pp 119-120 (1991) The Commission plausibly concluded that any slight enforcement benefits a tariff-filing requirement might offer were outweighed by the burdens it would put on new entrants and consumers
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
dissenting
|
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117856/mci-telecommunications-corp-v-american-telephone-telegraph-co/
|
the burdens it would put on new entrants and consumers Thus, the sole question for us is whether the FCC's policy, however sensible, is nonetheless inconsistent with the Act In my view, each of the Commission's detariffing orders was squarely within its power to "modify any requirement" of 203 Section 203(b)(2) plainly confers at least some discretion to modify the general rule that carriers file tariffs, *240 for it speaks of "any requirement"[2] Section 203(c) of the Act, ignored by the Court, squarely supports the FCC's position; it prohibits carriers from providing service without a tariff "unless otherwise provided by or under authority of this Act " Section 203(b)(2) is plainly one provision that "otherwise provides," and thereby authorizes, service without a filed schedule The FCC's authority to modify 203's requirements in "particular instances" or by "general order applicable to special circumstances or conditions" emphasizes the expansive character of the Commission's authority: modifications may be narrow or broad, depending upon the Commission's appraisal of current conditions From the vantage of a Congress seeking to regulate an almost completely monopolized industry, the advent of competition is surely a "special circumstance or condition" that might legitimately call for different regulatory treatment The only statutory exception to the Commission's modification authority provides that it may not extend the 120-day notice period set out in 203(b)(1) See 203(b)(2) The Act thus imposes a specific limit on the Commission's authority to stiffen that regulatory imposition on carriers, but does not confine the Commission's authority to relax it It was no stretch for the FCC to draw from this single, unidirectional statutory limitation on its modification authority the inference that its authority is otherwise unlimited See According to the Court, the term "modify," as explicated in all but the most unreliable dictionaries, ante, at 225-228, and n 3, rules out the Commission's claimed authority to relieve nondominant carriers of the basic obligation to file tariffs Dictionaries can be useful aides in statutory interpretation, but they are no substitute for close analysis of what words mean as used in a particular statutory context *241 Cf Cabell v Markham, 148 F2d 737, (Hand, J) Even if the sole possible meaning of "modify" were to make "minor" changes, ante, at 225,[3] further elaboration is needed to show why the detariffing policy should fail The Commission came to its present policy through a series of rulings that gradually relaxed the filing requirements for nondominant carriers Whether the current policy should count as a cataclysmic or merely an incremental departure from the 203(a) baseline depends on whether one focuses on particular
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
dissenting
|
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117856/mci-telecommunications-corp-v-american-telephone-telegraph-co/
|
the 203(a) baseline depends on whether one focuses on particular carriers' obligations to file (in which case the Commission's policy arguably works a major shift)[4] or on the statutory policies behind the tariff-filing requirement (which remain satisfied because market constraints on nondominant carriers obviate the need for rate filing) When 203 is viewed as part of a statute whose aim is to constrain monopoly power, the Commission's decision to exempt nondominant carriers is a rational and "measured" adjustment to novel circumstancesone that remains faithful to the core purpose of the tariff-filing section See Black's Law Dictionary 1198 (3d ed 1933) (defining "modification" as "A change; an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact") The Court seizes upon a particular sense of the word "modify" at the expense of another, long-established meaning *242 that fully supports the Commission's position That word is first defined in Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 628 (4th ed 1934) as meaning "to limit or reduce in extent or degree"[5] The Commission's permissive detariffing policy fits comfortably within this common understanding of the term The FCC has in effect adopted a general rule stating that "if you are dominant you must file, but if you are nondominant you need not" The Commission's partial detariffing policy which excuses nondominant carriers from filing on condition that they remain nondominantis simply a relaxation of a costly regulatory requirement that recent developments had rendered pointless and counterproductive in a certain class of cases A modification pursuant to 203(b)(1), like any other order issued under the Act, must of course be consistent with the purposes of the statute On this point, the Court asserts that the Act's prohibition against unreasonable and discriminatory rates "would not be susceptible of effective enforcement if rates were not publicly filed" Ante, at 231 That determination, of course, is for the Commission to make in the first instance But the Commission has repeatedly explained *243 that (1) a carrier that lacks market power is entirely unlikely to charge unreasonable or discriminatory rates, (2) the statutory bans on unreasonable charges and price discrimination apply with full force regardless of whether carriers have to file tariffs, (3) any suspected violations by nondominant carriers can be addressed on the Commission's own motion or on a damages complaint filed pursuant to 206,[6] and (4) the FCC can reimpose a tariff requirement should violations occur See, e g, -8079 The Court does not adequately respond to the FCC's explanations, and gives no reason whatsoever to doubt the
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,994 | 16 |
dissenting
|
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117856/mci-telecommunications-corp-v-american-telephone-telegraph-co/
|
FCC's explanations, and gives no reason whatsoever to doubt the Commission's considered judgment that tariff filing is altogether unnecessary in the case of competitive carriers, see, e g, ; the majority's ineffective enforcement argument lacks any evidentiary or historical support The Court's argument is also demonstrably incorrect A contemporary cousin of the Communications Act of 1934 the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 US C 13(a), 13a, 13b, enacted in 1936contains a much broader prohibition against price discrimination than does the Communications Act That statute has performed its mission for almost 60 years without any counterpart to the filed rate doctrine Indeed, the substantive requirements of Title II of the Communications Act itself apply to "connecting carriers" even though 203(a) exempts such carriers from the 203 tariff-filing provisions See 47 US C 152(b); National Assn of Regulatory Utility Commr's v F C C, 737 F2d 1095, 1115, n 23 cert denied, 469 US 1227 The small fraction of competitive carriers that *244 existed in 1979 now represents about 40% of the market; this growth has occurred while the detariffing policy has been in effect without any indication that the absence of filed schedules has produced discriminatory or unreasonable pricing by nondominant carriers Extolling the "enormous importance" of filed rates, ante, at 231, and resorting to dictionary definitions and colorful metaphors are unsatisfactory substitutes for a reasoned explanation of why the statute requires rate filing even when the practice serves no useful purpose and actually harms consumers The filed tariff provisions of the Communications Act are not ends in themselves, but are merely one of several procedural means for the Commission to ensure that carriers do not charge unreasonable or discriminatory rates See 84 F C C 2d, 83 The Commission has reasonably concluded that this particular means of enforcing the statute's substantive mandates will prove counterproductive in the case of nondominant long-distance carriers Even if the 1934 Congress did not define the scope of the Commission's modification authority with perfect scholarly precision, this is surely a paradigm case for judicial deference to the agency's interpretation, particularly in a statutory regime so obviously meant to maximize administrative flexibility[7] Whatever the best reading of 203(b)(2), the Commission's reading cannot in my view be termed unreasonable It is *245 informed (as ours is not) by a practical understanding of the role (or lack thereof) that filed tariffs play in the modern regulatory climate and in the telecommunications industry Since 1979, the FCC has sought to adapt measures originally designed to control monopoly power to new market conditions It has carefully and consistently explained that
|
Justice Alito
| 2,007 | 8 |
dissenting
|
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
|
Under the clear terms of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor who initially files a petition under Chapter 7 has the right to convert the case to another chapter under which the case is eligible to proceed. The Court, however, holds that a debtor's conversion right is conditioned upon a bankruptcy judge's finding of "good faith." Because the imposition of this condition is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code, I respectfully dissent. I The Bankruptcy Code unambiguously provides that a debtor who has filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 has a broad right to convert the case to another chapter. Title 11 states: "[A] debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title." The Code restricts a Chapter 7 debtor's conversion right in twoand only twoways. First, makes clear that the right to convert is available only once: A debtor may convert so long as "the case has not been converted [to Chapter 7] under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title." Second, provides that a debtor wishing to convert to another chapter must meet the conditions that are needed in order to "be a debtor under such chapter." Nothing in or any other provision of the Code suggests that a bankruptcy judge has the discretion to override a debtor's exercise of the conversion right on a ground not set out in the Code. Thus, a straightforward reading of the Code suggests that a Chapter 7 debtor has the right to convert the debtor's case to Chapter 13 (or another chapter) provided that the two express statutory conditions contained in are satisfied. This reading of the Code is buttressed by the contrast between the terms of and the language employed in other Code provisions that give bankruptcy judges the discretion to deny conversion requests. As noted, says that a Chapter 7 debtor "may convert" the debtor's case to another chapter. Chapters 11, 12, and 13 contain similar provisions stating that debtors under those chapters "may convert" their cases to other chapters. See 1208(a), and 1307(a) (2000 ed. and Supp IV). Chapters 11, 12, and 13 also contain separate provisions governing conversion requests by other parties in interest. For example, the applicable provision in Chapter 11 provides: "On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11 of this title at any time."
|
Justice Alito
| 2,007 | 8 |
dissenting
|
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
|
case under chapter 11 of this title at any time." (b) (emphasis added). See also 1208(b), (d), and 1307(c). In these sections, parties in interest are not given a right to convert. Rather, parties in interest are authorized to request conversion. And the authority to convert, after notice and a hearing, is expressly left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court, which "may convert" the case if the general standard of "cause" is found to have been met. If the Code had been meant to give a bankruptcy court similar authority when a Chapter 7 debtor wishes to convert, the Code would have used language similar to that in 1208(b), (d), and 1307(c). Congress knew how to limit conversion authority in this way, and it did not do so in In Chapter 7, Congress did directly address the consequences of the sort of conduct complained of in this case. In Congress specified that a debtor may be denied a discharge of debts if "the debtor has concealed records, and papers, from which the debtor's financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained." The Code further provides that discharge may be denied if the debtor has "made a false oath or account" or "presented or used a false claim." In addition to blocking discharge, Congress could easily have deemed such conduct sufficient to bar conversion to another chapter, but Congress did not do so. Instead of taking that approach, Congress included in the statutory scheme several express means to redress a debtor's bad faith. First, if a bankruptcy court finds that there is "cause," the court may convert or reconvert a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 restructuring to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 1307(c). Second, a Chapter 13 debtor must propose a repayment plan to satisfy the debtor's creditorsa plan that is subject to court approval and must be proposed in good faith. (4); accord, Third, a debtor's asset schedules are filed under penalty of perjury. 28 U.S. C. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 1008. Fourth, a Chapter 13 case is overseen by a trustee who is empowered to investigate the debtor's financial affairs, to furnish information regarding the bankruptcy estate to parties in interest, and to oppose discharge if necessary. 11 U.S. C. (6) and (9). See also (defining the powers of a Chapter 13 trustee in part by reference to the powers of a Chapter 7 trustee). These measures, as opposed to the "good faith" requirement crafted by the Court, represent the Code's strategy for dealing with debtors who engage in the type of abusive tactics that the Court's opinion targets.[1]
|
Justice Alito
| 2,007 | 8 |
dissenting
|
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
|
the type of abusive tactics that the Court's opinion targets.[1] In sum, the Code expressly gives a debtor who initially files under Chapter 7 the right to convert the case to another chapter so long as the debtor satisfies the requirements of the destination chapter. By contrast, the Code pointedly does not give the bankruptcy courts the authority to deny conversion based on a finding of "bad faith." There is no justification for disregarding the Code's scheme. II In reaching the conclusion that a bankruptcy judge may override a Chapter 7 debtor's conversion right based on a finding of "bad faith," the Court reasons as follows. Under a Chapter 7 debtor may not convert to another chapter "unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter." Under a Chapter 13 proceeding may be dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 "for cause." One such "cause" recognized by bankruptcy courts is "bad faith." Therefore, a Chapter 7 debtor who has proceeded in "bad faith" and wishes to convert his or her case to Chapter 13 is not eligible to "be a debtor" under Chapter 13 because the debtor's case would be subject to dismissal or reconversion to Chapter 7 pursuant to I cannot agree with this strained reading of the Code. The requirements that must be met in order to "be a debtor" under Chapter 13 are set forth in 11 U.S. C. A. (main ed. and Supp. 2006), which is appropriately titled "Who may be a debtor." The two requirements that are specific to Chapter 13 appear in subsection (e). First, Chapter 13 is restricted to individuals, with or without their spouses, with regular income. Second, a debtor may not proceed under Chapter 13 if specified debt limits are exceeded.[2] As the Court of Appeals below correctly understood, 's requirement that a debtor may convert only if "the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter" obviously refers to the chapter-specific requirements of In re Marrama, Rather than reading §(e) and 706(d) together, the Court puts (e) aside and treats as a separate repository of additional requirements (namely, the absence of the grounds for dismissal or reconversion under that a Chapter 7 debtor must satisfy before conversion to Chapter 13. But plainly does not set out requirements that an individual must meet in order to "be a debtor" under Chapter 13. Instead, sets out the standard ("cause") that a bankruptcy court must apply in deciding whether, in its discretion, an already filed Chapter 13 case should be dismissed or converted to Chapter 7. Thus, the Court's holding in this case
|
Justice Alito
| 2,007 | 8 |
dissenting
|
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
|
to Chapter 7. Thus, the Court's holding in this case finds no support in the terms of the Bankruptcy Code. In holding that a bankruptcy judge may deny conversion based on "bad faith," the Court of Appeals appears to have been influenced by the belief that following the literal terms of the Code would be pointless. Specifically, the Court of Appeals observed that if a debtor who wishes to convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 has exhibited such "bad faith" that the bankruptcy court would immediately convert the case back to Chapter 7 under then no purpose would be served by requiring the parties and the court to go through the process of conversion and prompt reconversion. It is by no means clear, however, that conversion under followed by a reconversion proceeding under would be an empty exercise. The immediate practical effect of following the statutory scheme is compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 1017(f), which applies Bankruptcy Rule 9014 to the reconversion. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 1017(e)(1). Rule 9014 (a), in turn, requires that the request be made by motion and that "reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing be afforded the party against whom relief is sought." The Court's decision circumvents this process and forecloses the right that a Chapter 13 debtor would otherwise possess to file a Chapter 13 repayment and reorganization plan, 11 U.S. C. which must be filed in good faith and which must demonstrate that creditors will receive no less than they would under an immediate Chapter 7 liquidation, and (4); accord, While the plan must be filed no later than 15 days after filing the petition or conversion, the debtor may file the plan at the time of conversion, i.e., before the reconversion hearing. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3015(b). Moreover, it is not clear whether, in converting a case "for cause" under a bankruptcy court must consider the debtor's plan (if already filed) and, if the plan must be considered, whether the court must take into account whether the plan was filed in good faith, whether it honestly discloses the debtor's assets, whether it demonstrates that creditors would in fact fare better under the plan than under a liquidation, and whether the plan in some sense "cures" prior bad faith. Today's opinion renders these questions academic, and little is left to guide what a bankruptcy court must consider, or may disregard, in blocking a conversion.[3] The Court notes that the Bankruptcy Code is intended to give a "`"fresh start"'" to the "`"honest but unfortunate debtor."'" Ante, at 1, 9 ). But compliance with the statutory
|
Justice Alito
| 2,007 | 8 |
dissenting
|
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145757/marrama-v-citizens-bank-of-mass/
|
Ante, at 1, 9 ). But compliance with the statutory schemeconversion to Chapter 13 followed by notice and a hearing on the question of reconversion would at least provide some structure to the process of identifying those debtors whose "`bad faith'" meets the Court's standard for consignment to liquidation, i.e., "`bad faith'" conduct that is "atypical" and "extraordinary." Ante, at 10, n. 11. III Finally, the Court notes two alternative bases for its holding. First, the Court points to 11 U.S. C. which governs a bankruptcy court's general powers.[4] Second, the Court suggests that even without a textual basis, a bankruptcy court's inherent power may empower it to deny a conversion request for bad faith. Obviously, however, neither of these sources of authority authorizes a bankruptcy court to contravene the Code. On the contrary, a bankruptcy court's general and equitable powers "must and can only be exercised within the con fines of the Bankruptcy Code." Norwest Bank ; accord, Ultimately, and a bankruptcy court's inherent powers may have a role to play in a case such as this. The problem the Court identifies is a real one. A debtor who is convinced that he or she can successfully conceal assets has a significant incentive to pursue Chapter 7 liquidation in lieu of a Chapter 13 restructuring. If successful, the debtor preserves wealth; if unsuccessful, the debtor can convert to Chapter 13 and land largely where the debtor would have been if he or she had fully disclosed all assets and proceeded in Chapter 13 in the first instance. Bankruptcy courts have used their statutory and equitable authority to craft various remedies for a range of bad faith conduct: requiring accountings or reporting of assets[5]; enjoining debtors from alienating estate property[6]; penalizing counsel[7]; assessing costs and fees[8]; or holding the debtor in contempt[9]. But whatever steps a bankruptcy court may take pursuant to or its general equitable powers, a bankruptcy court cannot contravene the provisions of the Code. Because the provisions of the Code rule out the procedure that was followed in this case by the bankruptcy court, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
|
GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
|
We granted certiorari in this case, limited to the Fourth Amendment issue arising in the context of seizures of property in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments.[1] I Petitioner G. M. Leasing Corp. is a Utah corporation organized in April ; among its stated business purposes is the leasing of automobiles. George I. Norman, Jr., although apparently not an incorporator, officer, or director of petitioner, was its general manager. In 1971 Norman was tried and convicted in the United District for the District of Colorado on two counts of aiding and abetting a misapplication of funds from a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S. C. 2 and 656. He was sentenced to two concurrent two-year terms of imprisonment. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed. United This denied certiorari. *1 Norman and his wife, on November 1971,[2] filed a joint income tax Form 1040 for the calendar year on which, apart from their names, address, social security numbers, occupations, and dependents, they indicated only that their tax for that year, "[e]stimated," was $280,000. The sum of $289,800 was transmitted when the form was filed and was placed by the Internal Revenue Service in a suspense account for future credit. Apart from the naked figure of estimated tax, the return contained no information as to income or deductions. App. 94. The Normans also sought and were granted an extension of time within which to file their return for the calendar year 1971. A check for $405,125 was given to the Service on April for application on their 1971 tax. This check evidently was dishonored. Although further extensions of time were granted, neither of the Normans ever filed a 1971 return. In October after Norman's conviction was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, the Service assigned the Norman account for and 1971 to Agent P. J. Clayton for investigation. Mr. Clayton, however, took no immediate action. ; Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25. In March 1973, after Norman's petition for a writ of certiorari had been denied, and after his petition for rehearing had also been denied, he surrendered to the United Marshal for the serving of his sentence. By a ruse, however, he immediately disappeared. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Norman thereupon became a fugitive from justice; he was still one at the time of the oral argument. App. ; Brief for Petitioners 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. Upon Norman's becoming a fugitive, the Service activated its investigation. On March 19, it determined deficiencies in Norman's income tax liability for and 1971 in the *2 amounts of $406,099. and $545,310.59, respectively.[3]
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
|
GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
|
1971 in the *2 amounts of $406,099. and $545,310.59, respectively.[3] App. 95. These were based solely on information from third parties concerning the amount of stock sales Norman made through various brokerage houses.[4] Because of Norman's failure to file appropriate returns and because of his fugitive status, collection of the taxes as so determined was regarded by the Service as in jeopardy; the deficiencies therefore, were assessed forthwith pursuant to the authority granted by 6861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C. 6861[5] The following day revenue agents called at the Norman residence in Salt Lake City to endeavor to collect the taxes. *3 Mrs. Norman answered the door. The agents informed her of the jeopardy assessments and demanded payment. No payment was forthcoming, and Mrs. Norman suggested that the agents get in touch with her attorney. App. 56. Thereafter, pursuant to their authority under 6331 of the Code, the agents filed notice of tax liens with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office and levied on a bank account of Norman. App. 95, 58. While the agents were at the Norman residence, they observed automobiles parked in the driveway. Later, upon checking with the Utah Motor Vehicle Division, they learned that these vehicles were registered in the name of petitioner or in the name of another corporation owned by Norman, and that no automobile was registered in Norman's name or in that of his wife. They also learned that petitioner had no license to conduct business within Salt Lake County and had no telephone listing. It was further ascertained that, pursuant to the request of the Utah Department of Employment Security, petitioner had filed a Status Report. That report described the corporation's principal business activity as "Leasing Luxury Automobiles, Boats, etc." It recited that the corporation's "average number of employees" was zero and that it had paid no wages while it was in existence during the last three quarters of or thus far in 1973. On its Utah Sales and Use Tax Return for the second quarter of the corporation reported no sales. The agents regarded the automobiles seen at the Norman residence as "show" or "collector" cars and not the type "that would normally be used in a leasing business." All these facts suggested to the agents that petitioner corporation was not engaged in any business activity but, instead, was Norman's alter ego and a repository of at least some of his personal assets. The agents consulted with the Service's Regional Counsel. With his concurrence, *4 the conclusion was drawn that the assets of the corporation
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
|
GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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the conclusion was drawn that the assets of the corporation actually belonged to Norman. Accordingly, the decision was made to levy upon and seize automobiles titled in petitioner's name in partial satisfaction of the assessments against Norman. On or about March 21, two days after the jeopardy assessments, revenue officers, without a warrant, seized several automobiles. Among them were a Stutz, a Rolls Royce Phantom V, a 1930 Rolls Royce Phantom I, two 1971 Stutzes, and a Jaguar. Three were taken at two different locations in Salt Lake City; two at the Century Plaza parking lot in Los Angeles, Cal.; and one near Norman's residence in Salt Lake City. ; Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14. None of the cars was on property in which petitioner had an interest. All were registered in petitioner's name. App. The officers left a Chevrolet and a station wagon for the personal use of Mrs. Norman and her family.[6] at 58. Also on March 21, revenue officers went to petitioner's office in Salt Lake County to levy on property subject to seizure, including the building itself. They had information that one, and possibly two, luxury automobiles might be there. Upon learning that a car was in the garage on the premises, they telephoned their superior, Bert Applegate, and asked him to come out to assist. The premises consisted of a cottage-type building and the garage. When Applegate arrived, a locksmith was there. He already had removed the lock from the garage door *5 at the direction of the officers. A Stutz automobile was inside. The locksmith also had removed the lock on the cottage's rear door. Applegate entered the cottage. He observed that its outward appearance was such that it could be a residence. He noticed a kitchen. He instructed the officers not to proceed with the seizure of any property there until the status of the cottage could be confirmed.[7] at 81, 23-24. The officers then left the cottage without taking anything, and its lock was replaced. While the officers were in the cottage, Norman's son, George I. Norman III, age 19, and listed as a dependent on the Form 1040, appeared. He told the officers that the Stutz belonged to the petitioner corporation, and not to Norman. He testified that he was living at the cottage "as security." He was asked to provide evidence as to the car's ownership. A decision was made not to seize the automobile at that time. Information then came to Applegate, primarily from a Mr. Redd who was a contractor for Norman, that the cottage was a place
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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a contractor for Norman, that the cottage was a place of business and not a residence. In addition, there was activity at the cottage that night; the lights were on and boxes were being moved. The next morning the Stutz was not in the garage.[8] at 83. Sometime during the next two days, a decision was made to seize the cottage, its furnishings and any other assets there.[9] On *6 March 23,[10] agents, acting without a warrant, and with the assistance of locksmiths and the equipment of a private van and storage firm, entered the cottage and removed its remaining contents, including furnishings and books and records. An inventory was made of the property so seized. The agents hoped to examine the books and records to see if they contained stock certificates or information concerning the location of other assets. The Regional Counsel, however, instructed them to pack the books and records, seal the boxes, and remove them to a safe storage place. In May, petitioner corporation instituted this suit. By its amended complaint it asserted a claim for wrongful levy, with a request for the return of the automobiles; a claim for suppression of all evidence obtained from the seized documents; and a claim against the agents for damages. It alleged that the assessments were arbitrary and capricious, that petitioner was not an alter ego of Norman, and that the levy upon its premises and the contents violated the Fourth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the Service returned to the cottage the originals of the records and documents that had been seized. In the meantime, however, they had been photocopied.[11] By a second amendment to petitioner's complaint, punitive damages, among other relief, were requested. Norman's son filed a complaint in intervention, alleging essentially the same facts and requesting *7 similar relief. The District allowed his intervention. The Government then filed a counterclaim seeking foreclosure of the tax liens against the property held in petitioner's name. At the ensuing trial before the court without a jury there was testimony that Norman himself originally held title to some of the automobiles registered in petitioner's name, ; that petitioner had no employees and did not lease any cars, 39; that petitioner's only assets were luxury or vintage model automobiles; that the cars had not been transferred to it until at or near the end of ; and that petitioner never issued any stock, held any director's meetings, or engaged in any business.[12] at 43-45. The District entered judgment for petitioner and for the intervenor. It found that the premises in question were the offices
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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It found that the premises in question were the offices of petitioner and the residence of the intervenor; that the revenue-officer defendants had no search warrant; that they forcibly entered the premises on March 23 and again on March 25;[13] that they made the entry, search, and seizure "knowing full well that they were violating the rights" of petitioner, the intervenor, "and others"; that Agent Clayton committed the entry "maliciously"; that the defendants returned the books and records that had been seized but photocopied them and retained the photocopies; that the defendants levied upon and seized all the assets of petitioner, including seven automobiles and a bank account; that they disposed of two of the automobiles and stored the others in Salt Lake City; that the assessments of taxes, penalties, and interest against Norman and his wife for and 1971 were erroneous; that Norman and his wife had no liability for federal income tax, penalties, *8 or interest for those years; that petitioner had "engaged in substantial business activity in preparation for its business purpose of leasing automobiles"; that it was not controlled solely by Norman or his wife; that it was not an alter ego of Norman or his wife; and that it was not their nominee. The court concluded that the revenue-officer defendants committed an illegal search and seizure of petitioner's offices and the intervenor's residence, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; that the photocopies of the seized books and records in the possession of the Service should be destroyed because any use of them would be illegal; that petitioner and the intervenor were entitled to general and punitive damages in amounts to be determined; that the Government's counterclaim should be dismissed with prejudice; that the Service should return all the seized assets of petitioner and of the intervenor; and that judgment should be awarded against the United in favor of petitioner for the value of the two automobiles that had been sold. Judgment, including injunctive relief for the return of the automobiles and the books and records, and for the destruction of the photocopies, was entered accordingly. The of Appeals, for the most part, reversed. It ruled that the evidence conclusively established that petitioner was Norman's alter ego so that its assets could be seized to satisfy Norman's income tax liability; that the District 's finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous; that petitioner had not sustained its burden of proving the assessments to be erroneous; and that the trial court erred in invalidating the assessments and in dismissing the Government's counterclaim. In regard to the claim
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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in dismissing the Government's counterclaim. In regard to the claim of illegal search and seizures, the of Appeals held: "The refusal to pay authorized appellants to collect the tax by levy, and this included the power of `seizure by any means.' Thus appellants were acting pursuant to *9 statute and did not commit an illegal search. The trial court's order returning the assets and suppressing the documents is improper." (Footnote omitted.) The court also ruled that there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Clayton's participation "was of a malicious character." In accord with a concession by the Government, the of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it ordered the return of certain shares of stock to the intervenor.[14] II A. Section 6331 of the 1954 Code authorizes the Secretary or his delegate to collect taxes "by levy upon all property and rights to property" belonging to a person who "neglects or refuses to pay" any tax "or on which there is a lien for the payment of such tax."[] Section 6331 (b), *350 and 7701 (21) as well, define "levy" as including "the power of distraint and seizure by any means." Both real estate and personal property, tangible and intangible, are subject to levy. Levy upon tangible property normally is effected by service of forms of levy or notice of levy and physical seizure of the property. Where that is not feasible, the property is posted or tagged. Because intangible property is not susceptible of physical seizure, posting, or tagging, levy upon it is effected by serving the appropriate form upon the party holding the property or rights to property. See Treas. Reg. 301.6331-1 (1), 26 CFR 301.6331-1 (1) See also And the has recognized that compulsion on the part of the Service occasionally is required in the enforcement of the revenue laws. See United Indeed, one may readily acknowledge that the existence of the levy power is an essential part of our self-assessment tax system and that it enhances voluntary compliance in the collection of taxes that this has described as "the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need." Under 6321 of the Code,[16] the assessments against Norman were a lien in favor of the United upon all property *351 belonging to Norman. If petitioner was Norman's alter ego, it had no countervailing effect for purposes of his federal income tax. ; It would then follow that the Service could properly regard petitioner's assets as Norman's property subject to the lien under 6321, and the Service would be
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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to the lien under 6321, and the Service would be empowered, under 6331, to levy upon assets held in petitioner's name in satisfaction of Norman's income tax liability. See United aff'd, 71-1 USTC ¶ 9421 B. Our grant of certiorari was limited to the Fourth Amendment issue, and we declined to review petitioner's and Norman's son's claims that the assessments and levies should have been voided and that petitioner was not Norman's alter ego. Pet. for Cert. 2, 3.[17] We therefore approach this case accepting the of Appeals' determinations that the assessments and levies were valid and that petitioner was Norman's alter ego. Those facts necessarily establish probable cause to believe that assets held by petitioner were properly subject to seizure in satisfaction of the assessments. Petitioner does not claim that there was no probable cause to believe that the automobiles were held by petitioner, nor does it claim that there was no probable cause to believe that its offices would contain other seizable goods. There being probable cause for the search and seizures, the only questions before the are whether warrants were required to make "reasonable" either the seizures of the cars or the entry into and seizure of goods in the cottage. C. The seizures of the automobiles in this case took place on public streets, parking lots, or other open places, and did not involve any invasion of privacy. In Murray's this held that a judicial warrant is not required for the seizure of a debtor's land in satisfaction of a claim of the United The seizure in Murray's Lessee was made through a transfer of title which did not involve an invasion of privacy. The warrantless seizures of the automobiles in this case are governed by the same principles and therefore were not unconstitutional. See also[18] D. The seizure of the books and records, however, involved intrusion into the privacy of petitioner's offices. Significantly, the has said: "[O]ne governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search *353 of private property without proper consent is `unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." See ; ; ; United ; ; The respondents do not contend that business premises are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such a proposition could not be defended in light of this 's clear holdings to the contrary. See v. City of Seattle, ; Go-Bart ; Silverthorne Lumber Nor can it be claimed that corporations are without some Fourth Amendment rights. Go-Bart Silverthorne Lumber Oklahoma
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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are without some Fourth Amendment rights. Go-Bart Silverthorne Lumber Oklahoma Press Pub. ; Cf. California Bankers ; Federal Trade ; Wilson v. United ; Consolidated Rendering The of course, has recognized that a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context. Thus, in United v. Biswell, a warrantless search of a locked storeroom during business hours, pursuant to the inspection procedure authorized by the Gun Control Act of 18 U.S. C. 923 (g), was upheld: "When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively *354 regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." See also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United In the present case, however, the intrusion into petitioner's privacy was not based on the nature of its business, its license, or any regulation of its activities. Rather, the intrusion is claimed to be justified on the ground that petitioner's assets were seizable to satisfy tax assessments. This involves nothing more than the normal enforcement of the tax laws, and we find no justification for treating petitioner differently in these circumstances simply because it is a corporation. The respondents argue that there is a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment that allows warrantless intrusions into privacy in the furtherance of enforcement of the tax laws. We recognize that the "Power to lay and collect Taxes" is a specifically enunciated power of the Federal Government, Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 1, and that the First Congress, which proposed the adoption of the Bill of Rights, also provided that certain taxes could be "levied by distress and sale of goods of the person or persons refusing or neglecting to pay." Act of Mar. 3, 1791, c. 23, This, however, relates to warrantless seizures rather than to warrantless searches. It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or seizable by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer. *355 Indeed, one of the primary evils intended to be eliminated by the Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion on privacy undertaken in the collection of taxes pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance.[19] As Madison argued, urging the adoption of a Bill of Rights to restrain the Federal Government: "The
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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a Bill of Rights to restrain the Federal Government: "The General Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of their constitutions the State Governments had in view? If there was reason for restraining the State Governments from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the Federal Government." 1 Annals of Cong. 438 (18 ed.). The respondents urge that the history of the common law in England and the laws in several prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights support the view that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to cover intrusions into privacy in the enforcement of the tax laws. We do not find in the cited materials anything approaching the clear evidence that would be required to create so great an exception to the Fourth Amendment's protections against warrantless intrusions into privacy. The respondents also rely upon certain dicta in Boyd v. United [20] (subpoena of private *356 papers impermissible). But see Fisher v. United and We do not find in Boyd any direct holding that the warrant protections of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to invasions of privacy in furtherance of tax collection. Insofar as language in Boyd might be read so to state, we decline to follow those dicta into rejection of the basic governing principle that has shaped Fourth Amendment law. Finally, the respondents argue that warrantless searches are justified by congressional enactment, as were the searches in Biswell and Colonnade. The statute, 6331 (b) of the Code, 26 U.S. C. 6331 (b), authorizes "distraint and seizure by any means." See n. Read narrowly, it authorizes *357 the use of every means to deprive the taxpayer of use, enjoyment, or title to property (e. g., transferring title, asportation, immobilization). It does not refer to warrantless intrusions into privacy. The respondents, however, would have us read the statute to authorize such warrantless intrusions. They assert that a statute of that kind is permissible in light of the considerations discussed in Camara and See. Examination of the statute shows that quite the opposite is true. The respondents recognize that one of the 's critical concerns in Camara and See was the discretion of the seizing officers. Brief for Respondents 66. Yet 6331 clearly gives the Secretary or his delegate discretion as to what property to seize. If more
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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delegate discretion as to what property to seize. If more than one location is involved, the Secretary will choose which dwelling will be invaded. If property is to be found both in public places and in private areas, the Secretary may choose which to seize. This hardly can be called a restraint on discretion. The respondents also recognize the concern with the existence of questions of disputed fact. They argue that in the seizure situation there are no such questions; yet in the present case the agents' confusion over whether the premises were an office or a residence demonstrates the contrary. The respondents assert that the burden on the Government of obtaining a warrant is a relevant factor. Brief for Respondents 67-68. They suggest that the burden is great here because the Government is dealing with persons who may attempt to put their property beyond reach. Yet the statute authorizes distraint and seizure whenever a taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay his tax, and regardless of any indication of risk of concealment. The statute simply does not focus on situations involving a need for rapid action. The respondents argue that the interest in the collection of taxes is such as to bring this case within the reasoning of Biswell and Colonnade. Those cases involved voluntary *358 participation in a highly regulated activity. Section 6331, however, covers all defaults on all taxes, and we are unwilling to hold that the mere interest in the collection of taxes is sufficient to justify a statute declaring per se exempt from the warrant requirement every intrusion into privacy made in furtherance of any tax seizure. The respondents suggest that the privacy interest in business premises is less than that in a private home. Even if correct, the assertion is irrelevant with respect to the intent of the statute, for the statute makes no distinction between business properties and dwelling areas. If it authorizes entries at all, it authorizes entries into both business premises and private homes. The respondents offer no legislative history in support of their reading of 6331, and to give the statute that reading would call its constitutionality into serious question. We therefore decline to read it as giving carte blanche for warrantless invasions of privacy. Rather, we give it its natural reading, namely, as an authorization for all forms of seizure, but as silent on the subject of intrusions into privacy. The intrusion into petitioner's office is therefore governed by the normal Fourth Amendment rule that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is `unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." 387 U. S., at As an alternative to their argument that a new exception to the warrant requirement should be recognized, the respondents assert that the facts of this case bring it within the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement.[21] The agents' own actions, however, in their *359 delay for two days following their first entry, and for more than one day following the observation of materials being moved from the office, before they made the entry during which they seized the records, are sufficient to support the District 's implicit finding that there were no exigent circumstances in this case. We therefore conclude that the warrantless entry into petitioner's office was in violation of the commands of the Fourth Amendment. III This takes us to the issue of remedy. Specifically, petitioner, by its second amended complaint, prayed for the return of the photocopies of the books and records; (b) the return of the automobiles; (c) a declaration that petitioner is not the alter ego of Norman or of Mrs. Norman; (d) the suppression of all evidence obtained from the books and records; (e) the suppression of the automobiles as evidence; (f) the release of all levies; and (g) general and punitive damages against the individual defendant-agents. App. 123-124. The alter ego issue, as has been noted, was denied review. The books and records were returned, and the photocopies concededly have been destroyed; that claim, thus, is moot. We have decided the issue of the legality of the seizure of the automobiles adversely to petitioner. The suppression issue, as to the books and records, obviously is premature and may be considered if and when proceedings arise in which the Government seeks to use the documents or information obtained from them. See Meister v. United ; Hill v. United (CA9), cert. denied, And the irreparable injury required to support a motion to suppress, under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (e), on equitable grounds in advance of any proceedings, has not been demonstrated. *360 cert. denied, This leaves only the issue of damages against the individual agents. The District found that Agent Clayton "maliciously committed said forced entry, and search and seizure," App. 138, and concluded that he and other individual defendants acted "knowing full well that they were violating the rights of" petitioner. It concluded that petitioner was entitled to judgment for those actions. The of Appeals, in the context of its holding that the entry and
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,977 | 11 |
majority
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GM Leasing Corp. v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109579/gm-leasing-corp-v-united-states/
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in the context of its holding that the entry and search were not illegal, ruled that the finding of maliciousness on the part of Clayton was unsupported by any evidence in the record and was clearly erroneous. -941. It also reversed the judgment awarding petitioner damages. We have held above, however, that a warrant should have been obtained, under the circumstances of this case, before the forcible entry was effected. This brings into focus and for consideration this 's decision in and the reservation there of the immunity question. The Government suggests that, assuming a violation of the Fourth Amendment by the agents, petitioner is not entitled to money damages if the agents acted in good faith; that good faith was supported by the "apparent fact" that the agents' conduct was in conformity with standard Service procedures based upon Murray's Lessee, and that the record justifies the conclusion that the agents acted in good faith. That may well be, but we conclude that this aspect of the facts, the existence of proof of any injury to petitioner resulting from the entry and the temporary seizure of the books and records, and the immunity issue all should be addressed in the first instance by the of Appeals and, if it so directs, by the District *361 The judgment of the of Appeals is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR.
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Justice Scalia
| 2,008 | 9 |
concurring
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Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145789/meacham-v-knolls-atomic-power-laboratory/
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I do not join the majority opinion because the Court answers for itself two questions that Congress has left to the sound judgment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As represented by the Solicitor General of the United States in a brief signed by the Commission's General Counsel, the Commission takes the position that the reasonable-factor-other-than-age provision is an affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof, and that, in disparate-impact suits brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), that provision replaces the business-necessity test of Wards Cove Packing Neither position was contrived just for this case. Indeed, the Commission has arguably held its view on the burden-of-proof point for nearly 30 years. See 44 Fed.Reg. 68858, 68861 (1979). Although its regulation applied only to cases involving "discriminatory treatment," (e) (2007), even if that covers only disparate treatment, see ante, at 2401-2402, n. 9, the logic of its extension to disparate-impact claims is obvious and unavoidable. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 1. At the very least, the regulation does not contradict the Commission's current position: It does not say that the employer bears the burden of proof only in discriminatory-treatment cases. The Commission's view on the business-necessity test is newly minted, but that does not undermine it. The Commission has never expressed the contrary view that the factfinder must consider both business necessity and reasonableness when an employer applies a factor that has a disparate impact on older workers. In fact, before the Commission had not even considered the relationship between the two standards, because it used to treat the two as identical. See (d). After City of rejected that equation, see Because administration of the ADEA has been placed in the hands of the Commission, and because the agency's positions on the questions before us are unquestionably reasonable (as the Court's opinion ably shows), I defer to the agency's views. See Raymond B. Yates, M. D., P.C. Profit Sharing I therefore concur in the Court's judgment to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I write separately to note that I continue to believe that disparate-impact claims are not cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, et seq. See 125 S.Ct. *2408 1536, Moreover, I disagree with the Court's statement that the "reasonable factors other than age" (RFOA) exception, 623(f)(1), is principally relevant in disparate-impact cases. Compare City of (opinion concurring in judgment), with ante, at 2402-2403 (citing City of (plurality opinion)). I therefore
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Justice Scalia
| 2,001 | 9 |
majority
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Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118439/norfolk-shipbuilding-drydock-corp-v-garris/
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The question presented in this case is whether the negligent breach of a general maritime duty of care is actionable when it causes death, as it is when it causes injury. I According to the complaint that respondent filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, her son, Christopher Garris, sustained injuries on April 8, 1997, that caused his death one day later. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53. The injuries were suffered while Garris was performing sandblasting work aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen W. Pless in the employ of Tidewater Temps, a subcontractor for Mid-Atlantic Coatings, which was in turn a subcontractor for petitioner Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation. And the injuries were caused, the complaint continued, by the negligence of petitioner and one of its other subcontractors, since dismissed from this case. Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of the United States when Garris was injured, respondent invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction, U. S. Const., Art. III, *813 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S. C. 1333, and prayed for damages under general maritime law. She also asserted claims under the Virginia wrongful-death statute, Va. Code Ann. 8.01-50 to 8.01-56 The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim, for the categorical reason that "no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death of a nonseaman in state territorial waters resulting from negligence." 1999 A. M. C. 769 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings, explaining that although this Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the principles contained in our decision in made such an action appropriate. Judge Hall concurred in the judgment because, in her view, had itself recognized the -2. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's suggestion for rehearing en banc, with two judges dissenting. We granted certiorari. II Three of four issues of general maritime law are settled, and the fourth is before us. It is settled that the general maritime law imposes duties to avoid unseaworthiness and negligence, see, e. g., ; that nonfatal injuries caused by the breach of either duty are compensable, see, e. g., ; Robins Dry Dock & Repair and that death caused by breach of the duty of seaworthiness is also compensable, Before us is the question whether death *814 caused by negligence should, or must under direction of a federal statute, be treated differently. A For more than 80 years, from 1886 until 1970, all four issues were
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Justice Scalia
| 2,001 | 9 |
majority
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Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118439/norfolk-shipbuilding-drydock-corp-v-garris/
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80 years, from 1886 until 1970, all four issues were considered resolved, though the third not in the manner we have just described. The governing rule then was the rule of The : Although the general maritime law provides relief for injuries caused by the breach of maritime duties, it does not provide relief for wrongful death. The said that rule was compelled by the existence of the same rule at common law, at -214although it acknowledged, that admiralty courts had held that damages for wrongful death were recoverable under maritime law, see also In 1969, however, we granted certiorari in for the express purpose of considering "whether The should any longer be regarded as acceptable law." 376. We inquired whether the rule of The was defensible under either the general maritime law or the policy displayed in the maritime statutes Congress had since -393, whether those statutes preempted judicial action The -403, whether stare decisis required adherence to The -405, and whether insuperable practical difficulties would accompany The `s -408. Answering every question no, we overruled the case and declared a new rule of maritime law: "We hold that an action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties." As we have noted in an earlier opinion, the wrongful-death rule of was not limited to any particular maritime duty, Yamaha Motor U. S. but `s facts were limited to the duty of seaworthiness, and so the issue of wrongful death for negligence has remained technically open. We are able to find no rational basis, however, for distinguishing negligence from seaworthiness. It is no less a distinctively maritime duty than seaworthiness: The common-law duties of care have not been adopted and retained unmodified by admiralty, but have been adjusted to fit their maritime context, see, e. g., -632 and a century ago the maritime law exchanged the common law's rule of contributory negligence for one of comparative negligence, see, e. g., The Max Morris, ; Pope & Talbot, v. Consequently the "tensions and discrepancies" in our precedent arising "from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts"which ultimately drove this Court in to abandon The see were no less pronounced with maritime negligence than with unseaworthiness. In fact, both cases cited by to exemplify those discrepancies involved maritime negligence, see ; ); see also (concluding that uniformity concerns required `s application to negligence). It is true, as petitioner observes, that we have held admiralty accommodation of state remedial statutes to be constitutionally permissible, see, e. g., Western Fuel ;
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Justice Scalia
| 2,001 | 9 |
majority
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Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118439/norfolk-shipbuilding-drydock-corp-v-garris/
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to be constitutionally permissible, see, e. g., Western Fuel ; The[1] but that does not resolve *816 the issue here: whether requiring such an accommodation by refusing to recognize a federal remedy is preferable as a matter of maritime policy. We think it is not. The choice-of-law anomaly occasioned by providing a federal remedy for injury but not death is no less strange when the duty breached is negligence than when it is seaworthiness. Of two victims injured at the same instant in the same location by the same negligence, only one would be covered by federal law, provided only that the other died of his injuries. See, e. g., aff'd, And cutting off the law's remedy at the death of the injured person is no less "a striking departure from the result dictated by elementary principles in the law of remedies," when the duty breached is negligence than when it is seaworthiness. "Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to cause death." Finally, the maritime policy favoring recovery for wrongful death that found implicit in federal statutory law cannot be limited to unseaworthiness, for both of the federal Acts on which relied permit recovery for negligence, see Jones Act, 46 U.S. C. App. 688(a); Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S. C. App. 761 et seq.; see also In sum, a negligent breach of a maritime duty of care being assumed *817 by the posture of this case,[2] no rational basis within the maritime law exists for denying respondent the recovery recognized by for the death of her son. B Weightier arguments against recognizing a wrongfuldeath action for negligence may be found not within general maritime law but without, in the federal statutes that provide remedies for injuries and death suffered in admiralty. As we explained in "[w]e no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from injury and death; Congress [has] legislated extensively in these areas." And, even in admiralty, "we have no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a duly statute." Mobil Oil Hence, when a statute resolves a particular issue, we have held that the general maritime law must comply with that resolution. See, e. g., We must therefore make careful study of the three statutes relevant here. 1 The Jones Act, 46 U.S.
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,001 | 9 |
majority
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Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118439/norfolk-shipbuilding-drydock-corp-v-garris/
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three statutes relevant here. 1 The Jones Act, 46 U.S. C. App. 688(a), establishes a cause of action for negligence for injuries or death suffered in the course of employment, but only for seamen. See generally Chandris, v. Latsis, Respondent's son, who was not a seaman, was not covered by the Jones Act, and we have held that the Jones Act bears no implication for actions brought *818 by nonseamen. See, e. g., American Export Lines, v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 4, Moreover, even as to seamen, we have held that general maritime law may provide wrongful-death actions predicated on duties beyond those that the Jones Act imposes. See, e. g., The Jones Act does not preclude respondent's negligence DOHSA creates wrongful-death actions for negligence and unseaworthiness, see but only by the personal representatives of people killed "beyond a marine league from the shore of any State," 46 U.S. C. App. 761. Respondent's son was killed in state territorial waters, where DOHSA expressly provides that its provisions "shall [not]" 767. In after discussing the anomalies that would result if DOHSA were interpreted to preclude federal maritime causes of action even where its terms do not 398 U.S., -396, we held that DOHSA "was not intended to preclude the availability of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in situations not covered by the Act," Or, "[t]o put it another way, no intention appears that the Act have the effect of foreclosing any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found appropriate to effectuate the policies of general maritime law." DOHSA therefore does not pre-empt respondent's negligence Finally, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), as amended, 33 U.S. C. 901 et seq., provides nonseaman maritime workers such as respondent's son, see 902(3) (defining covered employees), with no-fault workers' compensation claims (against their employer, 904(b)) and negligence claims (against the vessel, 905(b)) for injury and death. As to those two defendants, the LHWCA expressly pre-empts all other claims, 905(a), (b); but cf. Sun Ship, v. Pennsylvania, but it expressly *819 preserves all claims against third parties, 933(a), (i). And petitioner is a third party: It neither employed respondent's son nor owned the vessel on which he was killed. Petitioner argues, however, that 933's preservation-ofother-claims provisions express Congress's intent to reserve all other wrongful-death actions to the States. That argument cannot withstand our precedent, since we have consistently interpreted 933 to preserve federal maritime claims as well as state claims, see, e. g., Seas Shipping ; Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, including maritime negligence claims, see, e. g., Pope &
|
Justice Scalia
| 2,001 | 9 |
majority
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Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118439/norfolk-shipbuilding-drydock-corp-v-garris/
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Kopke, including maritime negligence claims, see, e. g., Pope & Talbot, v. -413 Petitioner's further contentionthat the policy implicit in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA bars a maritime action for wrongful death though the text of those amendments (which left 933 unchanged) permits itcannot succeed. We do not find, as petitioner does, an anti-maritime-wrongful-death policy implicit in the amendment to 905(b), see which eliminated covered workers' unseaworthiness claims against a vessel, see, e. g., "). That amendment was directed not at wrongful death in particular, but at unseaworthiness generally, see To the extent the amendment to 905(b) reflects any policy relevant here, it is in expressly ratifying longshore and harbor workers' claims against the vessel for negligence, see The LHWCA therefore does not preclude this negligence action for wrongful death. *820 Ginsburg, J., concurring in part 2 Even beyond the express pre-emptive reach of federal maritime statutes, however, we have acknowledged that they contain a further prudential effect. "While there is an established and continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress in the field." American Dredging Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, 5 U.S. 308, Because of Congress's extensive involvement in legislating causes of action for maritime personal injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that assert new claims beyond what those statutes have seen fit to allow, to leave further development to Congress. The cause of action we recognize today, however, is new only in the most technical sense. The general maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has been clear since that breaches of a maritime duty are actionable when they cause death, as when they cause injury. Congress's occupation of this field is not yet so extensive as to preclude us from recognizing what is already logically compelled by our precedents. * * * The maritime cause of action that established for unseaworthiness is equally available for negligence. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part. I join all but Part IIB-2 of the Court's opinion. Following the reasoning in the Court today holds that *821 the maritime cause of action established for unseaworthiness is equally available for negligence. I agree with the Court's clear opinion with one reservation. In Part IIB-2, the Court counsels: "Because of Congress's extensive involvement in legislating causes of action
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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Holt is a small, largely rural, unincorporated community located on the northeastern outskirts of Tuscaloosa, the fifth largest city in Alabama. Because the community is within the three-mile police jurisdiction circumscribing Tuscaloosa's corporate limits, its residents are subject to the city's "police [and] sanitary regulations."[1] Holt residents are also subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the city's court,[2] and to the city's *62 power to license businesses, trades, and professions,[3] Tuscaloosa, however, may collect from businesses in the police jurisdiction only one-half of the license fee chargeable to similar businesses conducted within the corporate limits. In 1973 appellants, an unincorporated civic association and seven individual residents of Holt, brought this statewide class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,[4] challenging the constitutionality of these Alabama statutes. They claimed that the city's extraterritorial exercise of police powers over Holt residents, without a concomitant extension of the franchise on an equal footing with those residing within the corporate limits, denies residents *63 of the police jurisdiction rights secured by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied appellants' request to convene a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2281 (1970 ed.) and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Characterizing the Alabama statutes as enabling Acts, the District Court held that the statutes lack the requisite statewide application necessary to convene a three-judge District Court. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered the convening of a three-judge court, finding that the police jurisdiction statute embodies " `a policy of statewide concern.' " Holt Civic quoting Spielman Motor Sales A three-judge District Court was convened, but appellants' constitutional claims fared no better on the merits. Noting that appellants sought a declaration that extraterritorial regulation is unconstitutional per se rather than an extension of the franchise to police jurisdiction residents, the District Court held simply that "[e]qual protection has not been extended to cover such contention." App. to Juris. Statement 2a. The court rejected appellants' due process claim without comment. Accordingly, appellees' motion to dismiss was granted. Unsure whether appellants' constitutional attack on the Alabama statutes satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S. C. 2281 (1970 ed.) for convening a three-judge district court we postponed consideration of the jurisdictional issue until the hearing of the case on the merits. We now conclude that the three-judge court was properly convened and that appellants' constitutional claims were properly rejected. I Before its repeal,[5] 28 U.S. C. 2281 (1970 ed.) required that
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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its repeal,[5] 28 U.S. C. 2281 (1970 ed.) required that a three-judge district court be convened in any case in *64 which a preliminary or permanent injunction was sought to restrain "the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute" Our decisions have interpreted 2281 to require the convening of a three-judge district court "where the challenged statute or regulation, albeit created or authorized by a state legislature, has statewide application or effectuates a statewide policy." Board of Relying on appellees contend, and the original single-judge District Court held, that Alabama's police jurisdiction statutes lack statewide impact. A three-judge court was improperly convened in Moody because the challenged state statutes had "limited application, concerning only a particular county involved in the litigation." In contrast, appellants' constitutional attack focuses upon a state statute that creates the statewide system under which Alabama cities exercise extraterritorial powers. In mandatory terms, the statute provides that municipal police and sanitary ordinances "shall have force and effect in the limits of the city or town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any property or rights-of-way belonging to the city or town."[6] Clearly, Alabama's police *65 jurisdiction statutes have statewide application. See, e. g., That the named defendants are local officials is irrelevant where, as here, those officials are "functioning pursuant to a statewide policy and performing a state function." ; Spielman Motor Sales at -95. The convening of a three-judge District Court was proper. II Appellants' amended complaint requested the District Court to declare the Alabama statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement insofar as they authorize the extraterritorial exercise of municipal powers. Seizing on the District Court's observation that "[appellants] do not seek extension of the franchise to themselves," appellants suggest that their complaint was dismissed because they sought the wrong remedy. The unconstitutional predicament in which appellants assertedly found themselves could be remedied in only two ways: (1) the city's extraterritorial power could be negated by invalidating the State's authorizing statutes or (2) the right to vote in municipal elections could be extended to residents of the police jurisdiction. We agree with appellants that a federal court should not dismiss a meritorious constitutional claim because the complaint seeks one remedy rather than another plainly appropriate one. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "every final judgment shall grant the relief *66 to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." Rule 54 (c). Thus, although the prayer for relief may be looked to for illumination when there is doubt as to the substantive theory under which a plaintiff is proceeding, its omissions are not in and of themselves a barrier to redress of a meritorious claim. See, e. g., 6 J. Moore. W. Taggart, & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 54.62, pp. 1261-1265 (2d ed. 1976). But while a meritorious claim will not be rejected for want of a prayer for appropriate relief, a claim lacking substantive merit obviously should be rejected. We think it is clear from the pleadings in this case that appellants have alleged no claim cognizable under the United States Constitution. A Appellants focus their equal protection attack on 11-40-10, the statute fixing the limits of municipal police jurisdiction and giving extraterritorial effect to municipal police and sanitary ordinances. Citing and cases following in its wake, appellants argue that the section creates a classification infringing on their right to participate in municipal elections. The State's denial of the franchise to police jurisdiction residents, appellants urge, can stand only if justified by a compelling state interest. At issue in Kramer was a New York voter qualification statute that limited the vote in school district elections to otherwise qualified district residents who (1) either owned or leased taxable real property located within the district, (2) were married to persons owning or leasing qualifying property, or (3) were parents or guardians of children enrolled in a local district school for a specified time during the preceding year. Without deciding whether or not a State may in some circumstances limit the franchise to residents primarily interested in or primarily affected by the activities of a *67 given governmental unit, the Court held that the statute was not sufficiently tailored to meet that state interest since its classifications excluded many bona fide residents of the school district who had distinct and direct interests in school board decisions and included many residents whose interests in school affairs were, at best, remote and indirect. On the same day, in the Court upheld an equal protection challenge to a Louisiana law providing that only "property taxpayers" could vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility system. Operation of the utility system affected virtually every resident of the city, not just property owners, and the bonds were in no way financed by property tax revenue. Thus, since the benefits and burdens of the bond issue fell
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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since the benefits and burdens of the bond issue fell indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner alike, the challenged classification impermissibly excluded otherwise qualified residents who were substantially affected by and directly interested in the matter put to a referendum. The rationale of Cipriano was subsequently called upon to invalidate an Arizona law restricting the franchise to property taxpayers in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation municipal bonds. Appellants also place heavy reliance on In Evans the Permanent Board of Registry of Montgomery County, Md., ruled that persons living on the grounds of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal enclave located within the geographical boundaries of the State, did not meet the residency requirement of the Maryland Constitution. Accordingly, NIH residents were denied the right to vote in Maryland elections. This Court rejected the notion that persons living on NIH grounds were not residents of Maryland: "Appellees clearly live within the geographical boundaries of the State of Maryland, and they are treated as state *68 residents in the census and in determining congressional apportionment. They are not residents of Maryland only if the NIH grounds ceased to be a part of Maryland when the enclave was created. However, that `fiction of a state within a state' was specifically rejected by this Court in and it cannot be resurrected here to deny appellees the right to vote." Thus, because inhabitants of the NIH enclave were residents of Maryland and were "just as interested in and connected with electoral decisions as they were prior to 1953 when the area came under federal jurisdiction and as their neighbors who live off the enclave," the State could not deny them the equal right to vote in Maryland elections. From these and our other voting qualifications cases a common characteristic emerges: The challenged statute in each case denied the franchise to individuals who were physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity concerned. See, e. g., ; ; cf. No decision of this Court has extended the "one man, one vote" principle to individuals residing beyond the geographic confines of the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its political subdivisions. On the contrary, our cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within its *69 borders. See, e. g., ; ; ; ; Bona fide residence alone, however, does not automatically confer the right to vote on all matters, for at least in the context of special interest elections the State
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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least in the context of special interest elections the State may constitutionally disfranchise residents who lack the required special interest in the subject matter of the election. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage ; Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Appellants' argument that extraterritorial extension of municipal powers requires concomitant extraterritorial extension of the franchise proves too much. The imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions. A city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders. The granting of building permits for high rise apartments, industrial plants, and the like on the city's fringe unavoidably contributes to problems of traffic congestion, school districting, and law enforcement immediately outside the city. A rate change in the city's sales or ad valorem tax could well have a significant impact on retailers and property values in areas bordering the city. The condemnation of real property on the city's edge for construction of a municipal garbage dump or waste treatment plant would have obvious implications for neighboring nonresidents. Indeed, the indirect extraterritorial effects of many purely internal municipal actions could conceivably have a heavier impact on surrounding environs than the direct regulation contemplated by Alabama's police jurisdiction statutes. Yet no one would suggest that nonresidents likely to be affected by this sort of municipal action have a constitutional right to participate in the political processes bringing it about. And unless one adopts the idea that the *70 Austinian notion of sovereignty, which is presumably embodied to some extent in the authority of a city over a police jurisdiction, distinguishes the direct effects of limited municipal powers over police jurisdiction residents from the indirect though equally dramatic extraterritorial effects of purely internal municipal actions, it makes little sense to say that one requires extension of the franchise while the other does not. Given this country's tradition of popular sovereignty, appellants' claimed right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections is not without some logical appeal. We are mindful, however, of Mr. Justice Holmes' observation in Hudson Water : "All rights tend to declare themselve absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached. The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side." The line heretofore marked by this Court's voting qualifications decisions coincides with the geographical boundary of the governmental unit at issue, and we hold that appellants' case, like their homes, falls on the farther side. B Thus stripped of its voting rights attire, the equal protection issue presented by appellants becomes whether the Alabama statutes giving extraterritorial force to certain municipal ordinances and powers bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. San Antonio Independent School v. Rodriguez, "The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation merely because *71 cause it is special, or limited in its application to a particular geographical or political subdivision of the state." Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving 3 Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the statute's classification "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." ; (17). Government, observed Mr. Justice Johnson, "is the science of experiment," and a State is afforded wide leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of state legislative power. This Court has often recognized that political subdivisions such as cities and counties are created by the State "as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them." See also, e. g., ; In the Court discussed at length the relationship between a State and its political subdivisions, remarking: "The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State." 207 U.S., at While the broad statements as to state control over municipal corporations contained in Hunter have undoubtedly been qualified by the holdings of later cases such as we think that the case continues to have substantial constitutional significance in emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them.[7] *72 The extraterritorial exercise of municipal powers is a governmental technique neither recent in origin nor unique to the State of Alabama. See R. Maddox, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities in the United States (1955). In this country 35 States authorize their municipal subdivisions to exercise governmental powers beyond their corporate limits. Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterritorial Powers by Municipalities, Although the extraterritorial municipal powers granted by these States vary widely, several States grant their cities more extensive or intrusive powers over bordering areas than those granted under the Alabama statutes.[8] *73 In
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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areas than those granted under the Alabama statutes.[8] *73 In support of their equal protection claim, appellants suggest a number of "constitutionally preferable" governmental alternatives to Alabama's system of municipal police jurisdictions. For example, exclusive management of the police jurisdiction by county officials, appellants maintain, would be more "practical." From a political science standpoint, appellants' suggestions may be sound, but this Court does not sit to determine whether Alabama has chosen the soundest or *74 most practical form of internal government possible. Authority to make those judgments resides in the state legislature, and Alabama citizens are free to urge their proposals to that body. See, e. g., Our inquiry is limited to the question whether "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" Alabama's system of police jurisdictions, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage and in this case it takes but momentary reflection to arrive at an affirmative answer. The Alabama Legislature could have decided that municipal corporations should have some measure of control over activities carried on just beyond their "city limit" signs, particularly since today's police jurisdiction may be tomorrow's annexation to the city proper. Nor need the city's interests have been the only concern of the legislature when it enacted the police jurisdiction statutes. Urbanization of any area brings with it a number of individuals who long both for the quiet of suburban or country living and for the career opportunities offered by the city's working environment. Unincorporated communities like Holt dot the rim of most major population centers in Alabama and elsewhere, and state legislatures have a legitimate interest in seeing that this substantial segment of the population does not go without basic municipal services such as police, fire, and health protection. Established cities are experienced in the delivery of such services, and the incremental cost of extending the city's responsibility in these areas to surrounding environs may be substantially less than the expense of establishing wholly new service organizations in each community. Nor was it unreasonable for the Alabama Legislature to require police jurisdiction residents to contribute through license fees to the expense of services provided them by the city. The statutory limitation on license fees to half the amount exacted within the city assures that police jurisdiction residents will not be victimized by the city government. *75 "Viable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions." -111. This observation in Sailors was doubtless as true at the turn of this century, when urban areas
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,978 | 19 |
majority
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Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109950/holt-civic-club-v-tuscaloosa/
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true at the turn of this century, when urban areas throughout the country were temporally closer to the effects of the industrial revolution. Alabama's police jurisdiction statute, enacted in 1907, was a rational legislative response to the problems faced by the State's burgeoning cities. Alabama is apparently content with the results of its experiment, and nothing in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that it try something new. C Appellants also argue that "governance without the franchise is a fundamental violation of the due process clause." Brief for Appellants 28. Support for this proposition is alleged to come from United (WD Tex.) (three-judge District Court), summarily aff'd, which held that conditioning the franchise of otherwise qualified voters on payment of a poll tax denied due process to many Texas voters. Appellants' argument proceeds from the assumption, earlier shown to be that they have a right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections. Their conclusion falls with their premise. III In sum, we conclude that Alabama's police jurisdiction statutes violate neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. MR.
|
Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
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Ford v. Georgia
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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Petitioner alleges that the State of Georgia applied the impermissible criterion of race to exclude venire members from the petit jury that convicted him. The Supreme Court of Georgia held petitioner's equal protection claim procedurally barred as untimely under Georgia law, and we are now called upon to review the adequacy of the State's procedural rule to bar consideration of the constitutional issue raised. We reverse. I In September 14, a grand jury in Coweta County, Georgia, indicted petitioner James A. Ford, a black man, for the kidnaping, rape, and murder of a white woman.[1] The State notified petitioner of its intent to seek the death penalty and identified the statutory aggravating circumstances it would try to prove. Before trial, petitioner filed a "Motion to Restrict Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges,"[2] alleging that the prosecutor *414 for Coweta County had "over a long period of time" excluded black persons from juries "where the issues to be tried involved members of the opposite race." The motion stated that petitioner "anticipated" the prosecutor would continue the pattern of racial exclusion in this case because of the different races of the accused and the victim. Petitioner requested an order forbidding the State to use "its peremptory challenges in a racially biased manner that would exclude members of the black race from serving on the Jury." App. 3-4. At a pretrial hearing on the motion, petitioner's counsel said that his experience had been, "and the Court is aware[,] that the district attorney and the other assistant district attorneys have a history and a pattern when you have a defendant who is black, of using their per-emptory [sic] challenges to excuse potential jurors who are also black." Petitioner's counsel asked the trial judge to discourage further resort to this alleged practice by requiring "the district attorney, if he does use his peremptory challenges to excuse potential black *415 jurors, to justify on the record the reason for his excusing them." Any failure of the prosecutor to offer such a justification on the record, petitioner's counsel argued, "would evidence the fact that he is using [his peremptory challenges] in a discriminatory manner." App. 10. The prosecution opposed the motion, denying that petitioner could prove that prosecutors in previous cases had challenged black jurors impermissibly. "[I]n practically every trial we have in this county," the prosecutor observed, "there are always blacks on trial juries, and an all white jury is rare in any county." He directed the judge's attention to this Court's decision in and argued that under Swain "it would be an unreasonable burden to require
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Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
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Ford v. Georgia
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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under Swain "it would be an unreasonable burden to require an attorney for either side to justify his use of peremptory challenges." App. 10-11. The trial judge responded that on "numerous or several" occasions "I've seen cases in which there are, have been black defendants and the district attorney's office has struck perspective (sic) white jurors and left perspective (sic) black jurors on the jury. I have seen it done and I can't sit here and document them and I have not documented them, but it's been on more than one occasion." The trial judge concluded that he was "taking that [observation] into consideration among other things and denying the motion to restrict racial use of peremptory challenges." The trial began 10 days later. Although the jury selection on the day was not transcribed, it is undisputed that the prosecution exercised 9 of its 10 peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors, leaving 1 black venire member seated on the jury. A black potential alternate juror was challenged not by the State but by petitioner.[3] *416 On the second day of the trial, both petitioner and respondent made their opening statements, after which the State presented eight witnesses before the noon recess. At the start of the afternoon session, the trial judge called a conference in chambers to discuss, among other things, petitioner's prior motion about "the State's using all their strikes to strike blacks from being on the jury."[4] Although the judge noted that the State had not used all of its peremptory challenges to strike black venire members and had left a black person on the jury, petitioner's counsel observed for the record that the State had used 9 of its 10 challenges to strike black venire members. The trial judge concurred: "That's what happened in the jury selection process. I just think that needs to be put in since that motion was made. Of course, the motion has been denied." The prosecutor asked the court whether he needed to make any showing of the reasons he had exercised the State's challenges. The trial judge answered that he was not asking for any, and none was made. After the jury had convicted petitioner on all counts and he had been sentenced to death, his counsel moved for a new trial claiming, inter alia, that petitioner's "right to an impartial jury as guaranteed by Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated by the prosecutor's exercise of his peremptory challenges on a racial basis." The motion was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia at one point
|
Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
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Ford v. Georgia
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia at one point interpreted petitioner's claim as one "that the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to remove 9 of 10 possible black jurors denied Ford his right to a jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the community." Although the court thereby *417 referred to the Sixth Amendment concept of a "fair cross-section of the community," see, e. g., it also found that petitioner had failed to prove the "`systematic exclusion of black jurors'" from service, and thus alluded to the standard for establishing an equal protection violation described in ). The court found no error and affirmed petitioner's conviction. Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with this Court on January 22, 16. While it was before us, we held in that a black criminal defendant could make a prima facie case of an equal protection violation with evidence that the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges in that case to strike members of the defendant's race from the jury. Although we soon held in that Batson's new evidentiary standard would not be applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that had reached finality before Batson was announced, we subsequently held in favor of the new standard's retroactive application to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final when Batson was decided. We then granted Ford's petition for certiorari and vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Griffith. On remand, the Supreme Court of Georgia held sua sponte, without briefing or arguments from the parties, that petitioner's equal protection claim was procedurally barred. The court concluded that before his trial petitioner had raised a Swain claim that was "decided adversely to him on appeal, [and] cannot be reviewed in this proceeding." 362 S. E. 2d, at 766. The court then suggested that a Batson claim was "never raised at trial," 362 S. E. 2d, at 765 *418 (emphasis omitted), but went on to consider whether any such claim raised either in petitioner's pretrial motion or during the chambers conference on the second day of the trial could be treated as timely. The court applied the state procedural rule announced in that a Batson claim must "be raised prior to the time the jurors selected to try the case are sworn." Reading Sparks as requiring a contemporaneous objection to a defendant's jury "after it was selected and before the trial commenced," the court concluded that petitioner had failed to make such an objection, with the result that any Batson claim was barred by a valid state procedural -, 362 S. E.
|
Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
|
Ford v. Georgia
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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barred by a valid state procedural -, 362 S. E. 2d, at 766. A dissenting opinion took issue with the court's conclusion that petitioner "never raised a Batson-type claim," and with the court's application of a state procedural rule that had not been announced when petitioner's motion was filed in 14. We granted certiorari to decide whether the rule of procedure laid down by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Sparks was an adequate and independent state procedural ground that would bar review of petitioner's Batson claim. II A The threshold issues are whether and, if so, when petitioner presented the trial court with a cognizable Batson claim that the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges rested on the impermissible ground of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think petitioner must be treated as having raised such a claim, although he certainly failed to do it with the clarity that appropriate citations would have promoted. The pretrial motion made no mention of the Equal Protection Clause, and the later motion for a new trial cited the Sixth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. *419 The pretrial motion did allege, however, that the prosecution had engaged in a pattern of excluding black persons from juries "over a long period of time," and petitioner argued to this effect at the hearing on this motion as well as at the hearing on his motion for a new trial. This allegation could reasonably have been intended and interpreted to raise a claim under the Equal Protection Clause on the evidentiary theory articulated in Batson's antecedent, The Court in Swain recognized that an equal protection violation occurs when the State uses its peremptory challenges for the purpose of excluding members of a black defendant's race from his petit jury, ; ; but Swain also established a rigorous standard for proving such a violation, holding it "permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying." That assumption could not be overcome, and the State required to justify its use of peremptory challenges in a particular case, without proof that the prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim [, was] responsible for the removal of Negroes who ha[d] been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who ha[d] survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Our interpretation of petitioner's
|
Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
|
Ford v. Georgia
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Our interpretation of petitioner's reference to a pattern of excluding black venire members "over a long period of time" as the assertion of a Swain claim was, in fact, adopted in the Georgia courts. The prosecutor himself cited Swain to the trial court in opposing the pretrial motion; the trial judge clearly implicated Swain in ruling that petitioner had failed to prove the systematic exclusion of blacks from petit juries; and the second opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia in this case explicitly stated that petitioner had raised a Swain *420 claim, upon the merits of which he had lost on his appeal. 362 S. E. 2d, at 765-766. The State, indeed, concedes that petitioner properly raised a Swain claim in his pretrial motion, Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, but in proceeding to argue that the motion was insufficient to raise a claim under Batson, the State assumes a distinction between the holdings in those two cases that does not exist. Both Swain and Batson recognized that a purposeful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the jury selected to try him would work a denial of equal protection. To prevail on such an equal protection claim under Swain, as just noted, this Court indicated that a defendant must show a pattern of racial discrimination in prior cases as well as in his own. Because the petitioner in Swain had failed to prove purposeful racial discrimination in prior instances of jury selection, we held that he had "not laid the proper predicate for attacking the peremptory strikes as they were used in [his] " Batson dropped the Swain requirement of proof of prior discrimination, holding it possible for a defendant to make out a prima facie equal protection violation entirely by reference to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in the circumstances of the defendant's own -. Because Batson did not change the nature of the violation recognized in Swain, but merely the quantum of proof necessary to substantiate a particular claim, it follows that a defendant alleging a violation of equal protection of the law under Swain necessarily states an equal protection violation subject to proof under the Batson standard of circumstantial evidence as well. Thus, from the determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia that petitioner raised a claim under Swain, it follows that he raised an equal protection claim subject to the more lenient burden of proof laid down in Batson.[5] *421 B We now face the question whether Georgia can bar consideration of that Batson claim as untimely
|
Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
|
Ford v. Georgia
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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Georgia can bar consideration of that Batson claim as untimely raised. If we were to focus only on the fact of the state court's conclusion that petitioner had raised a Swain claim, the issue of the Batson claim's timeliness under state law could be resolved with the simplicity of a syllogism. Under Georgia's precedent, its Supreme Court will review a constitutional claim on the merits only if the record is clear that the claim "was directly and properly made in the court below and distinctly passed upon by the trial judge." The fact that the court reviewed petitioner's Swain claim on the merits, as noted in the court's second opinion, therefore presupposes the claim's timeliness. Because Batson *422 merely modified the allegations and evidence necessary to raise and prove the equal protection claim in question, it would be reasonable to conclude that the state court's concession of timeliness under Swain must govern its treatment of the Batson claim as well. The Supreme Court of Georgia, nonetheless, rested its contrary conclusion on the rule announced in that "hereafter, any claim under Batson should be raised prior to the time the jurors selected to try the case are sworn." 257 Ga., at 355 S. E. 2d, at Although this language clearly sets the time after which a Batson claim would be too late, it did not so clearly set a time before which such a claim would be premature. The second Georgia opinion in this case, however, makes it obvious that the court understood Sparks to require an objection to be raised after the jurors are chosen. Thus, the court noted that petitioner made "no contemporaneous objection to the composition of the jury as selected," and "no objection to the composition of the jury after it was selected and before the trial commenced." We assume that these observations by the court announced no new refinement of Sparks, but merely reflected the better reading of its opinion as originally written. In any event, the Georgia court regarded Sparks as so interpreted to be a "valid state procedural bar" to petitioner's claim, citing our decision in thus apparently deciding the federal question whether the Sparks procedural rule bars federal review of petitioner's claim.[6] The requirement that any Batson claim be raised not only before trial, but in the period between the selection of the jurors and the administration of their oaths, is a sensible *423 The imposition of this rule is nevertheless subject to our standards for assessing the adequacy of independent state procedural grounds to bar all consideration of claims under the national
|
Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
|
Ford v. Georgia
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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grounds to bar all consideration of claims under the national Constitution. A review of these standards reveals the inadequacy of Georgia's rule in Sparks to foreclose consideration of the Batson claim in this The appropriateness in general of looking to local rules for the law governing the timeliness of a constitutional claim is, of course, clear. In Batson itself, for example, we imposed no new procedural rules and declined either "to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges," or to decide when an objection must be made to be timely. -100. Instead, we recognized that local practices would indicate the proper deadlines in the contexts of the various procedures used to try criminal cases, and we left it to the trial courts, with their wide "variety of jury selection practices," to implement Batson in the instance. Undoubtedly, then, a state court may adopt a general rule that a Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for the time on appeal, or after the jury is sworn, or before its members are selected. In any given case, however, the sufficiency of such a rule to limit all review of a constitutional claim itself depends upon the timely exercise of the local power to set procedure. "Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights." NAACP v. ex rel. Patterson, In the NAACP case, we declined to apply a state procedural rule, even though the rule appeared "in retrospect to form part of a consistent pattern of procedures," because the defendant in that case could not be "deemed to have been apprised of its existence." In James v. (14), we held that only a "firmly established *424 and regularly followed state practice" may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review by this Court of a federal constitutional claim. ; see also ; NAACP v. ex rel. Flowers, The Supreme Court of Georgia's application of its decision in Sparks to the case before us does not even remotely satisfy the requirement of James that an adequate and independent state procedural bar to the entertainment of constitutional claims must have been "firmly established and regularly followed" by the time as of which it is to be applied. At the time of petitioner's trial, Georgia's procedural law was just what it was when the Sparks defendant was tried, for Sparks was decided more than two years after petitioner in
|
Justice Souter
| 1,991 | 20 |
majority
|
Ford v. Georgia
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112530/ford-v-georgia/
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Sparks was decided more than two years after petitioner in this case filed his motion on the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges and long after petitioner's trial was over. When petitioner filed his pretrial motion, he was subject to the same law that had allowed the defendant in Sparks to object even after the jury had been sworn. The very holding in Sparks was that the defendant was not procedurally barred from raising a Batson claim after the jury had been sworn and given preliminary instructions, and after the trial court had held a lengthy hearing on an unrelated matter. The court entertained the claim as having been raised "relatively promptly" because no prior decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia had required an earlier objection. To apply Sparks retroactively to bar consideration of a claim not raised between the jurors' selection and oath would therefore apply a rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial and consequently inadequate to serve as an independent state ground within the meaning of James. Indeed, the Georgia court itself in Sparks disclaimed any such effect for *425 that decision. It was only as to cases tried "hereafter [that] any claim under Batson should be raised prior to the time the jurors selected to try the case are sworn." 257 Ga., at 355 S. E. 2d, at This case was not tried "hereafter," and the rule announced prospectively in Sparks would not, even by its own terms, apply to petitioner's Since the rule was not firmly established at the time in question, there is no need to dwell on the further point that the state court's inconsistent application of the rule in petitioner's case and Sparks would also fail the second James requirement that the state practice have been regularly followed.[7] III The Supreme Court of Georgia erred both in concluding that petitioner's allegation of an equal protection violation under Swain failed to raise a Batson claim, and in apparently relying on The Sparks rule, adopted long after petitioner's trial, cannot bar federal judicial review of petitioner's equal protection claim. The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
per_curiam
| 1,989 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Maleng v. Cook
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112262/maleng-v-cook/
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In 1958, respondent was convicted of robbery in Washington state court and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment; this sentence expired by its terms in 1978. In 1976, while on parole from that sentence, he was convicted of two counts of assault and one count of aiding a prisoner to escape; in 1978, the State sentenced him to two life terms and one 10-year term on those convictions. These sentences were maximum terms under Washington's then-indeterminate sentencing scheme, with the minimum term to be set by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. Under Washington law, the 1958 conviction will increase by several years the mandatory minimum term which respondent will have to serve on his 1978 sentences. In 1976 respondent was also convicted of bank robbery and conspiracy in federal court and sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment. He is currently serving his federal sentence in a federal penitentiary in California, but the State of Washington has lodged a detainer against him with federal prison authorities. Respondent is scheduled to begin serving the sentences imposed upon him by the Washington courts in 1978 at the expiration of his federal term. In 1985, while in federal prison, respondent filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Respondent's *490 petition listed the 1958 Washington conviction as the "conviction under attack," alleging that it was invalid because respondent had not been given a competency hearing, even though there was reasonable doubt as to his competency to stand trial. Respondent also alleged that the 1958 conviction had been used illegally to enhance his 1978 state sentences, which he had not yet begun to serve.[*] The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that respondent was not "in custody" for the purposes of a habeas attack on the 1958 conviction because the sentence imposed for that conviction had already expired. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that respondent was still "in custody" under the 1958 conviction, even though the sentence imposed for that conviction had expired, because it had been used to enhance the sentences imposed in 1978 for his 1976 state convictions, which he had yet to serve. We granted certiorari to review this interpretation of the "in custody" requirement. We conclude that respondent is not presently "in custody" under the 1958 sentence, but that he is "in custody" under the 1978 state sentences which he has not yet begun to serve. The federal habeas statute gives the
|
per_curiam
| 1,989 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Maleng v. Cook
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112262/maleng-v-cook/
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yet begun to serve. The federal habeas statute gives the United States district courts jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas relief only from persons who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S. C. 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S. C. 2254(a). We have interpreted the statutory language as requiring that the habeas petitioner be "in custody" under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition *491 is filed. See In this case, the Court of Appeals held that a habeas petitioner may be "in custody" under a conviction whose sentence has fully expired at the time his petition is filed, simply because that conviction has been used to enhance the length of a current or future sentence imposed for a subsequent conviction. We think that this interpretation stretches the language "in custody" too far. Our interpretation of the "in custody" language has not required that a prisoner be physically confined in order to challenge his sentence on habeas corpus. In for example, we held that a prisoner who had been placed on parole was still "in custody" under his unexpired sentence. We reasoned that the petitioner's release from physical confinement under the sentence in question was not unconditional; instead, it was explicitly conditioned on his reporting regularly to his parole officer, remaining in a particular community, residence, and job, and refraining from certain activities. ; see also ; We have never held, however, that a habeas petitioner may be "in custody" under a conviction when the sentence imposed for that conviction has fully expired at the time his petition is filed. Indeed, our decision in strongly implies the contrary. In Carafas, the petitioner filed his habeas application while he was actually incarcerated under the sentence he sought to attack, but his sentence expired and he was unconditionally discharged from custody while his appeal from the denial of habeas relief below was pending before this Court. The State argued that the unconditional discharge rendered the case moot. We rejected this argument, holding that the "collateral consequences" of the petitioner's conviction his inability to vote, engage in certain businesses, hold public office, or serve as a *492 juror prevented the case from being moot. at 237-. We went on to say, however, that the unconditional release raised a "substantial issue" as to the statutory "in custody" requirement. at While we ultimately found that requirement satisfied as well, we rested that holding not on the collateral consequences of the conviction, but on the fact that the
|
per_curiam
| 1,989 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Maleng v. Cook
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112262/maleng-v-cook/
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consequences of the conviction, but on the fact that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged conviction at the time the petition was filed. The negative implication of this holding is, of course, that once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual "in custody" for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it. The question presented by this case is whether a habeas petitioner remains "in custody" under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted. We hold that he does not. While we have very liberally construed the "in custody" requirement for purposes of federal habeas, we have never extended it to the situation where a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint from a conviction. Since almost all States have habitual offender statutes, and many States provide as Washington does for specific enhancement of subsequent sentences on the basis of prior convictions, a contrary ruling would mean that a petitioner whose sentence has completely expired could nonetheless challenge the conviction for which it was imposed at any time on federal habeas. This would read the "in custody" requirement out of the statute and be contrary to the clear implication of the opinion in In this case, of course, the possibility of a sentence upon a subsequent conviction being enhanced because of the prior conviction actually materialized, but we do not think that requires any different conclusion. When the second sentence *493 is imposed, it is pursuant to the second conviction that the petitioner is incarcerated and is therefore "in custody." We do think, however, that respondent may challenge the sentences imposed upon him by the State of Washington in 1978, even though he is not presently serving them. In we held that the "in custody" requirement meant present physical confinement under the conviction or sentence under attack. Were this rule still the law, respondent would not be "in custody" even under the 1978 sentences, because he has not yet begun to serve them. But in we overruled McNally and held that a petitioner who was serving two consecutive sentences imposed by the Commonwealth of Virginia could challenge the second sentence which he had not yet begun to serve. While in this case respondent is serving a federal sentence, rather than another sentence imposed by the State of Washington, we do not
|
per_curiam
| 1,989 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Maleng v. Cook
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112262/maleng-v-cook/
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sentence imposed by the State of Washington, we do not think this factual difference from requires a different result. The State of Washington has placed a detainer with the federal authorities to ensure that at the conclusion of respondent's federal sentence, he will be returned to the state authorities to begin serving his 1978 state sentences. In we held that a prisoner serving a sentence in Alabama, who was subject to a detainer filed with his Alabama jailers by Kentucky officials, was "in custody" for the purpose of a habeas attack on the outstanding Kentucky charge upon which the detainer rested. We think that Braden and Peyton together require the conclusion that respondent in this case was "in custody" under his 1978 state sentences at the time he filed. Since we think respondent's habeas petition, construed with the deference to which pro se litigants are entitled, can be read as asserting a challenge to the 1978 sentences, as enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior conviction, see United we affirm the Court of *494 Appeals' finding that respondent has satisfied the "in custody" requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction. Our holding is limited to the narrow issue of "custody" for subject-matter jurisdiction of the habeas court. We express no view on the extent to which the 1958 conviction itself may be subject to challenge in the attack upon the 1978 sentences which it was used to enhance. See 28 U.S. C. 2254 Rule 9(a). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.
|
per_curiam
| 1,973 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108817/dean-v-gadsden-times-publishing-corp/
|
Petitioner sued respondent, his employer, to recover compensation lost as a result of the employee's being required to serve as a juror. An Alabama statute provides that an employee excused for jury duty "shall be entitled to his usual compensation received from such employment less the fee or compensation he received for serving" as a juror. Ala. Code of 1940, Tit. 30, 7 (1) (Supp. 1971). It appears that petitioner served on a jury, received pay for the jury duty and submitted a bill of $63 to respondent, the difference between his regular wages and his jury pay. Respondent refused to pay; the trial court rendered a judgment for petitioner; but the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama held the state Act unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari to review that judgment. The case is here on petition for a writ of certiorari which we grant. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the Act deprives the employer of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, its main reliance *544 being on Coppage declared unconstitutional as violative of due process a state statute which made it a misdemeanor for an employer to require an employee to agree not to join or remain a member of a union during his employment. That was when substantive due process was in its heyday. We cited Coppage along with other decisions of like tenor in Day-Brite Lighting, where we sustained a state statute which made it a misdemeanor for an employer to deduct wages of an employee for four hours when the employee absents himself from his job in order to vote. We held that the requirement placed on the employer to pay wages for this brief period when the employee is voting stood constitutional muster. We said: "Most regulations of business necessarily impose financial burdens on the enterprise for which no compensation is paid. Those are part of the costs of our civilization. Extreme cases are conjured up where an employer is required to pay wages for a period that has no relation to the legitimate end. Those cases can await decision as and when they arise. The present law has no such infirmity. It is designed to eliminate any penalty for exercising the right of suffrage and to remove a practical obstacle to getting out the vote. The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept. The moral, social, economic, and physical well-being of the community is one part of it; the political well-being, another. The police power which is adequate to fix the financial
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,981 | 16 |
concurring
|
Watt v. Alaska
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110466/watt-v-alaska/
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My colleagues periodically criticize the way the Court manages its docket. Most frequently, such criticism takes the form of a dissent from the denial of certiorari. See, e. g., Brown Transport (WHITE, J., dissenting). Although I consider the practice of dissenting from denials of certiorari counterproductive, see (opinion of STEVENS, J.), in the context of the present cases it may be appropriate to suggest that the Court may misuse its scarce resources not only by occasionally denying certiorari in cases deserving plenary consideration, but also by granting certiorari *274 without adequate justification.[1] As long as the Court creates unnecessary work for itself in this manner, its expressions of concern about the overburdened federal judiciary will ring with a hollow echo. In these cases, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should have been permitted to provide the final answer to the unique question of statutory construction presented by the petitions for certiorari. The decision of the Court of Appeals did not conflict with any other judicial decision, and there is no reason to anticipate that a comparable issue will arise in another Circuit in the foreseeable future.[2] I fully agree with the majority's explanation of why the Court of Appeals correctly read these ambiguous statutes, but even if I were persuaded that JUSTICE STEWART had the better of the argument, I still would feel that the public interest would have been better served by allowing this litigation to terminate in the Court of Appeals. The question of how to divide the revenues from oil and gas leases on public lands in the Kenai Peninsula is clearly a matter for Congress to decide. If Congress is displeased with the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, it may promptly reverse them by revising the relevant statutes. If that is its view, it no doubt would have acted more promptly if we had simply denied certiorari.[3] On the other *275 hand, if we have correctly perceived the intent of the legislature, nothing has been gained by protracting this litigation. Admittedly, a significant amount of money was at stake, see ante, at 263, n. 6, but the offsetting costs associated with holding the funds in escrow pending our review, as well as the costs associated with the expenditure of this Court's material and human resources, are also significant. The federal judicial system is undergoing profound changes. Among the most significant is the increase in the importance of our courts of appeals. Today they are in truth the courts of last resort for almost all federal litigation. Like other courts of
|
Justice Stevens
| 1,981 | 16 |
concurring
|
Watt v. Alaska
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110466/watt-v-alaska/
|
resort for almost all federal litigation. Like other courts of last resortincluding this onethey occasionally render decisions that will not withstand the test of time. No judicial system is perfect and no appellate structure can entirely eliminate judicial error. Most certainly, this Court does not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other tribunals. Although our work is often accorded special respect because of its finality,[4] we possess no judicial monopoly on either finality or respect. The quality of the work done by the courts of appeals merits the esteem of the entire Nation, but, unfortunately, is not nearly as well or as widely recognized as it should be. Indeed, I believe that if we accorded those dedicated appellate judges the deference that their work merits, we would be better able to resist the temptation to grant certiorari for no reason other than a tentative prediction that our review of a case may produce an answer different from theirs. In my opinion, that is not a sufficient reason for granting certiorari.[5]*276 Because no other reason for reviewing this case is apparent, a simple denial of certiorari would have been an appropriate and efficient disposition. My disagreement in these cases with the Court's management of its docket does not, of course, prevent me from joining JUSTICE POWELL'S opinion for the Court on the merits.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
|
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111412/allis-chalmers-corp-v-lueck/
|
The Wisconsin courts have made the bad-faith handling of an insurance claim a tort under state law. Those courts have gone further and have applied this tort to the handling of a claim under a disability plan included in a collective-bargaining agreement. The question before us is whether, in the latter case, the state tort claim is pre-empted by the national labor laws. I A Respondent Roderick S. Lueck began working for petitioner Allis-Chalmers Corporation in February 1975. He is a member of Local 248 of the United Automobile, Aerospace *204 and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. Allis-Chalmers and Local 248 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement incorporates by reference a separately negotiated group health and disability plan fully funded by Allis-Chalmers but administered by Aetna Life & Casualty Company. The plan provides that disability benefits are available for nonoccupational illness and injury to all employees, such as petitioner, who are represented by the union. The collective-bargaining agreement also establishes a four-step grievance procedure for an employee's contract grievance. This procedure culminates in final and binding arbitration if the union chooses to pursue the grievance that far. App. 18-29. A separate letter of understanding that binds the parties creates a special three-part grievance procedure for disability grievances. The letter establishes a Joint Plant Insurance Committee composed of two representatives designated by the union and two designated by the employer. The Committee has the authority to resolve all disputes involving "any insurance-related issues that may arise from provisions of the [Collective-Bargaining] Agreement." An employee having an insurance-related complaint is to address it first to the Supervisor of Employee Relations. If the complaint is rejected or otherwise remains unresolved, the employee then may bring the dispute before the Insurance Committee. If the Committee does not resolve the matter, the employee may bring it to arbitration in the manner established under the collective-bargaining agreement. As indicated, that agreement permits the union or the employer to request that a grievance be submitted to final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator agreed upon by the parties.[1] *205 In July 1981, respondent Lueck suffered a nonoccupational back injury while carrying a pig to a friend's house for a pig roast. He notified Allis-Chalmers of his injury, as required by the claims-processing procedure, and subsequently filed a disability claim with Aetna, also in accordance with the established procedure. After evaluating physicians' reports submitted by Lueck, Aetna approved the claim. Lueck began to receive disability benefits effective from July 20, 1981, the day he filed his claim with Aetna. According to Lueck, however, Allis-Chalmers periodically
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
majority
|
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111412/allis-chalmers-corp-v-lueck/
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his claim with Aetna. According to Lueck, however, Allis-Chalmers periodically would order Aetna to cut off his payments, either without reason, or because he failed to appear for a doctor's appointment, or because he required hospitalization for unrelated reasons. After each termination, Lueck would question the action or supply additional information, and the benefits would be restored. In addition, according to Lueck, Allis-Chalmers repeatedly requested that he be reexamined by different doctors, so that Lueck believed that he was being harassed. All of Lueck's claims were eventually paid, although, allegedly, not until he began this litigation.[2] *206 B Lueck never attempted to grieve his dispute concerning the manner in which his disability claim was handled by Allis-Chalmers and Aetna. Instead, on January 18, 1982, he filed suit against both of them in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, Wis., alleging that they "intentionally, contemptuously, and repeatedly failed" to make disability payments under the negotiated disability plan, without a reasonable basis for withholding the payments. App. 4. This breached their duty "to act in good faith and deal fairly with [Lueck's] disability claims." Lueck alleged that as a result of these bad-faith actions he incurred debts, emotional distress, physical impairment, and pain and suffering. He sought both compensatory and punitive damages. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Allis-Chalmers and Aetna. The court held that Lueck stated a claim under 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S. C. 185(a), and that, in the alternative, if his claim "were deemed to arise under state law instead of Section 301," it was "preempted by federal labor law." App. to Pet. for Cert. 26-27. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in a decision "[n]ot recommended for publication in the official reports," affirmed the judgment in favor of Aetna on the ground that it owed no fiduciary duty to deal in good faith with Lueck's claim. The court agreed with the Circuit Court that federal law pre-empted the claim against Allis-Chalmers.[3] *207 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, with one justice dissenting, reversed. The court held, first, that the suit did not arise under 301 of the LMRA, and therefore was not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust the arbitration procedures established in the collective-bargaining agreement. The court reasoned that a 301 suit arose out of a violation of a labor contract, and that the claim here was a tort claim of bad faith. Under Wisconsin law, the tort of bad faith is distinguishable from a bad-faith breach-of-contract claim: though a breach of duty exists
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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a bad-faith breach-of-contract claim: though a breach of duty exists as a consequence of the relationship established by contract, it is independent of that contract. Therefore, it said, the violation of the labor contract was "irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendants exercised bad faith in the manner in which they handled Lueck's claim." The action, thus, was not a 301 suit. The court went on to address the question whether the state-law claims nevertheless were pre-empted by 8(a)(5) and (d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 158(a)(5) and (d). Applying the standard for determining NLRA pre-emption as enunciated in San Diego Building Trades and the court determined that the claims were not pre-empted. It found that the administration of disability-claim procedures under a collective-bargaining agreement is a matter only of peripheral concern to federal labor law, since payment of a disability claim is not a central aspect of labor relations. On the other hand, the court observed, the bad-faith insurance tort is of substantial significance to the State of Wisconsin, which has assumed a longstanding responsibility for assuring the prompt payment of disability claims. Permitting the state action to proceed would not have an adverse impact on the effective administration *208 of national labor policy, since the courts will make no determination as to whether the labor agreement has been breached. Finally, the court found that Aetna could be liable to Lueck for bad-faith administration of his disability claim since it was an agent of Allis-Chalmers for the purpose of administering claims. It thus reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for a determination whether Aetna played any role in the processing of Lueck's disability claim. Aetna has not sought review of that part of the judgment. We granted certiorari, to determine whether 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act pre-empts a state-law tort action for bad-faith delay in making disability-benefit payments due under a collective-bargaining agreement. II Congress' power to pre-empt state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution. Congressional power to legislate in the area of labor relations, of course, is long established. See Congress, however, has never exercised authority to occupy the entire field in the area of labor legislation.[4] Thus the question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. " `The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.' " quoting Retail Congress did not state explicitly whether and to what extent it intended 301 of the LMRA to pre-empt state law.
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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it intended 301 of the LMRA to pre-empt state law. *209 In such instances courts sustain a local regulation "unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States." 435 U. S., at The question posed here is whether this particular Wisconsin tort, as applied, would frustrate the federal labor-contract scheme established in 301. III A Section 301 of the LMRA states: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties." 29 U.S. C. 185(a). In Textile the Court ruled that 301 expresses a federal policy that the substantive law to apply in 301 cases "is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." 56. That seminal case understood 301 as a congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out of labor contracts.[5] The pre-emptive effect of 301 was first analyzed in where the Court stated that the "dimensions of 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute [so that] issues raised in suits of a kind covered by 301 [are] to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy." The Court concluded that "in enacting 301 Congress intended doctrines *210 of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." The Lucas Flour Court specified why the meaning given to terms in collective-bargaining agreements must be determined by federal law: "[T]he subject matter of 301(a) `is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.' The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation [and] might substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes." at -104 For those reasons the Court in Lucas Flour held that a suit in state court alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law. A state rule that purports to define the meaning or scope of a term in a contract suit therefore is pre-empted by federal labor law. B If the policies that animate 301 are to be given their proper range, however, the pre-emptive effect of 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations. These policies *211 require that "the relationships created by [a collective-bargaining] agreement" be defined by application of "an evolving federal common law grounded in national labor policy." The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract. Were state law allowed to determine the meaning intended by the parties in adopting a particular contract phrase or term, all the evils addressed in Lucas Flour would recur. The parties would be uncertain as to what they were binding themselves to when they agreed to create a right to collect benefits under certain circumstances. As a result, it would be more difficult to reach agreement, and disputes as to the nature of the agreement would proliferate. Exclusion of such claims "from the ambit of 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished under a uniform body of federal substantive law." Of course, not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law. Section 301 on its face says nothing about the substance of what private parties may agree to in a labor contract.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,985 | 11 |
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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what private parties may agree to in a labor contract. Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, *212 in adopting 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation.[6] Such a rule of law would delegate to unions and unionized employers the power to exempt themselves from whatever state labor standards they disfavored. Clearly, 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.[7] *2 Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those agreements. Cf. 435 U. S., at -505[8] Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied here confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. If the state tort law purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted. IV A The Wisconsin Supreme Court asserted that the tort claim is independent of any contract claim.[9] While the nature of *214 the state tort is a matter of state law, the question whether the Wisconsin tort is sufficiently independent of federal contract interpretation to avoid pre-emption is, of course, a question of federal law. Though the Wisconsin court held that the "specific violation of the labor contract, if there was one, is irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendants exercised bad faith in the manner in which they handled Lueck's claim," 1 Wis. 2d, upon analysis it appears that the court based this statement not solely on its unassailable understanding of the state tort, but also on assumptions about the scope of the contract provision which it had no authority to make under state law. The Wisconsin court attempted to demonstrate, by a proffered example, the way in which a bad-faith tort claim could be unrelated to any contract claim. It noted that an insurer ultimately could pay a claim as required under a contract, but still cause injury through "unreasonably delaying payment" of the claim. In
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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cause injury through "unreasonably delaying payment" of the claim. In such a situation, the court reasoned, the state tort claim would be adjudicated without reaching questions of contract interpretation. The court evidently assumed that the only obligations the parties assumed by contract are those expressly recited in the agreement, in this case the right to receive benefit payments for nonoccupational injuries. *215 Thus, the court reasoned, the good-faith behavior mandated in the labor agreement was independent of the good-faith behavior required by state insurance law because "[g]ood faith in the labor agreement context means [only] that parties must abide by the specific terms of the labor agreement." If this is all there is to the independence of the state tort action, that independence does not suffice to avoid the pre-emptive effect of 301. The assumption that the labor contract creates no implied rights is not one that state law may make. Rather, it is a question of federal contract interpretation whether there was an obligation under this labor contract to provide the payments in a timely manner, and, if so, whether Allis-Chalmers' conduct breached that implied contract provision. The Wisconsin court's assumption that the parties contracted only for the payment of insurance benefits, and that questions about the manner in which the payments were made are outside the contract is, moreover, highly suspect.[10] There is no reason to assume that the labor contract as interpreted by the arbitrator would not provide such relief. On its face, the agreement allows the Joint Plant Insurance Committee to resolve disputes involving "any insurance-related issues that may arise" (emphasis added), App. 43, and hardly suggests that only disputes involving the right to receive benefits were addressed in the contract. And if the arbitrator ruled that the labor agreement did not provide *2 such relief expressly or by implication, that too should end the dispute, for under Wisconsin law there is nothing that suggests that it is not within the power of the parties to determine what would constitute "reasonable" performance of their obligations under an insurance contract. In sum, the Wisconsin court's statement that the tort was independent from a contract claim apparently was intended to mean no more than that the implied duty to act in good faith is different from the explicit contractual duty to pay. Since the extent of either duty ultimately depends upon the terms of the agreement between the parties, both are tightly bound with questions of contract interpretation that must be left to federal law. B The conclusion that the Wisconsin court meant by "independent" that the tort
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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that the Wisconsin court meant by "independent" that the tort is unrelated to an explicit provision of the contract is buttressed by analysis of the genesis and operation of the state tort. Under Wisconsin law, the tort intrinsically relates to the nature and existence of the contract. Thus the tort exists for breach of a "duty devolv[ed] upon the insurer by reasonable implication from the express terms of the contract," the scope of which, crucially, is "ascertained from a consideration of the contract itself." 235 N.W., 15. In Hilker, the court specifically noted: "Generally speaking, good faith means being faithful to one's duty or obligation; bad faith means being recreant thereto. In order to understand what is meant by bad faith a comprehension of one's duty is generally necessary, and we have concluded that we can best indicate the circumstances under which the insurer may become liable to the insured by giving with some particularity our conception of the duty which the written contract of insurance imposes upon the carrier." 235 N.W., 14. *217 The duties imposed and rights established through the state tort thus derive from the rights and obligations established by the contract. In which established that in Wisconsin an insured may assert a cause of action in tort against an insurer for the bad-faith refusal to honor the insured's claim, the court stated that the tort duty was derived from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in every contract. It relied for that proposition on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 205 (1981), as well as on the adoption of the Restatement's position in 9 Cal. 3d 510 P.2d 2, 8 The Gruenberg court explicitly stated that the breach sounded in both tort and contract, and there is no indication in Wisconsin law that the tort is anything more than a way to plead a certain kind of contract violation in tort in order to recover exemplary damages not otherwise available under Wisconsin law. 271 N.W.2d, 74.[11] Therefore, under Wisconsin law it appears that the parties to an insurance contract are free to bargain about what "reasonable" performance of their contract obligation entails. That being so, this tort claim is firmly rooted in the expectations of the parties that must be evaluated by federal contract law. *218 Because the right asserted not only derives from the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will involve contract interpretation. The parties' agreement as to the manner in which a benefit claim would be handled will
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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manner in which a benefit claim would be handled will necessarily be relevant to any allegation that the claim was handled in a dilatory manner. Similarly, the question whether Allis-Chalmers required Lueck to be examined by an inordinate number of physicians evidently depends in part upon the parties' understanding concerning the medical evidence required to support a benefit claim.[12] These questions of contract interpretation, therefore, underlie any finding of tort liability, regardless of the fact that the state court may choose to define the tort as "independent" of any contract question.[] Congress has mandated that federal law govern *219 the meaning given contract terms. Since the state tort purports to give life to these terms in a different environment, it is pre-empted. C A final reason for holding that Congress intended 301 to pre-empt this kind of derivative tort claim is that only that result preserves the central role of arbitration in our "system of industrial self-government." Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation 363 U.S. If respondent had brought a contract claim under 301, he would have had to attempt to take the claim through the arbitration procedure established in the collective-bargaining agreement before bringing suit in court. Perhaps the most harmful aspect of the Wisconsin decision is that it would allow essentially the same suit to be brought directly in state court without first exhausting the grievance procedures established in the bargaining agreement. The need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration was one of the central reasons that underlay the Court's holding in Lucas Flour. See The parties here have agreed that a neutral arbitrator will be responsible, in the first instance, for interpreting the meaning of their contract. Unless this suit is pre-empted, their federal right to decide who is to resolve contract disputes will be lost. Since nearly any alleged willful breach of contract can be restated as a tort claim for breach of a good-faith obligation under a contract, the arbitrator's role in every case could be bypassed easily if 301 is not understood to pre-empt such claims. Claims involving vacation or overtime pay, work assignment, unfair discharge in short, the whole range of disputes traditionally resolved through arbitration could be *220 brought in the first instance in state court by a complaint in tort rather than in contract. A rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance procedures would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, Republic Steel v. as well as eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-contract law under 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who
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Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
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301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor contract in the first instance. V The right that Lueck asserts is rooted in contract, and the bad-faith claim he brings could have been pleaded as a contract claim under 301. Unless federal law governs that claim, the meaning of the health and disability-benefit provisions of the labor agreement would be subject to varying interpretations, and the congressional goal of a unified federal body of labor-contract law would be subverted. The requirements of 301 as understood in Lucas Flour cannot vary with the name appended to a particular cause of action. It is perhaps worth emphasizing the narrow focus of the conclusion we reach today. We pass no judgment on whether this suit also would have been pre-empted by other federal laws governing employment or benefit plans. Nor do we hold that every state-law suit asserting a right that relates in some way to a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement, or more generally to the parties to such an agreement, necessarily is pre-empted by 301. The full scope of the pre-emptive effect of federal labor-contract law remains to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis. We do hold that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a 301 claim, see Avco v. Aero Lodge 735, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law. This complaint should have been dismissed *221 for failure to make use of the grievance procedure established in the collective-bargaining agreement, Republic Steel v. or dismissed as pre-empted by 301. The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore is reversed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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Lane v. Franks
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679557/lane-v-franks/
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Almost 50 years ago, this Court declared that citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting public employment. Rather, the First Amendment protec- tion of a public employee’s speech depends on a careful balance “between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” In the Court struck the balance in favor of the public employee, extending First Amendment protection to a teacher who was fired after writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing the school board that employed him. Today, we consider whether the First Amendment similarly protects a public employee who 2 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by sub- poena, outside the course of his ordinary job responsibilities. We hold that it does. I In 2006, Central Alabama Community College (CACC) hired petitioner Edward Lane to be the Director of Com- munity Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a statewide program for underprivileged youth. CACC hired Lane on a probationary basis. In his capacity as Director, Lane was responsible for overseeing CITY’s day-to-day opera- tions, hiring and firing employees, and making decisions with respect to the program’s finances. At the time of Lane’s appointment, CITY faced signifi- cant financial difficulties. That prompted Lane to conduct a comprehensive audit of the program’s expenses. The audit revealed that Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting to her CITY office. After unfruitful discussions with Schmitz, Lane shared his finding with CACC’s president and its attorney. They warned him that firing Schmitz could have negative repercussions for him and CACC. Lane nonetheless contacted Schmitz again and in- structed her to show up to the Huntsville office to serve as a counselor. Schmitz refused; she responded that she wished to “ ‘continue to serve the CITY program in the same manner as [she had] in the past.’ ” (per curiam). Lane fired her shortly thereafter. Schmitz told another CITY employee, Charles Foley, that she intended to “ ‘get [Lane] back’ ” for firing her. 2012 WL 5289412, *1 (ND Ala., Oct. 18, 2012). She also said that if Lane ever requested money from the state legislature for the program, she would tell him, “ ‘[y]ou’re fired.’ ” Schmitz’ termination drew the attention of many, in- cluding agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 3 Opinion of the Court which initiated an
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S. (2014) 3 Opinion of the Court which initiated an investigation into Schmitz’ employment with CITY. In November 2006, Lane testified before a federal grand jury about his reasons for firing In January 2008, the grand jury indicted Schmitz on four counts of mail fraud and four counts of theft concerning a program receiving federal funds. See United States v. Schmitz, The indictment alleged that Schmitz had collected $177,251. in federal funds even though she performed “ ‘virtually no services,’ ” “ ‘generated virtually no work product,’ ” and “ ‘rarely even appeared for work at the CITY Program offices.’ ” It further alleged that Schmitz had submitted false statements concerning the hours she worked and the nature of the services she performed. at 1257. Schmitz’ trial, which garnered extensive press cover- age,1 commenced in August 2008. Lane testified, under subpoena, regarding the events that led to his terminating The jury failed to reach a verdict. Roughly six months later, federal prosecutors retried Schmitz, and Lane testified once again. This time, the jury convicted Schmitz on three counts of mail fraud and four counts of theft concerning a program receiving federal funds. The District Court sentenced her to 30 months in prison and ordered her to pay $177,251. in restitution and forfeiture. Meanwhile, CITY continued to experience considerable budget shortfalls. In November 2008, Lane began report- ing to respondent Steve Franks, who had become presi- dent of CACC in January 2008. Lane recommended that —————— 1 See, e.g., Lawmaker Faces Fraud Charge in June, Montgomery Ad- vertiser, May 6, 2008, p. 1B; Johnson, State Lawmaker’s Fraud Trial Starts Today, Montgomery Advertiser, Aug. 18, 2008, p. 1B; Faulk, Schmitz Testifies in Her Defense: Says State Job was Legitimate, Birmingham News, Feb. 20, p. 1A; Faulk, Schmitz Convicted, Loses her State Seat, Birmingham News, Feb. 25, p. 1A. 4 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court Franks consider layoffs to address the financial difficul- ties. In January Franks decided to terminate 29 probationary CITY employees, including Lane. Shortly thereafter, however, Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those of Lane and one other employee— because of an “ambiguity in [those other employees’] pro- bationary service.” Brief for Respondent Franks 11. Franks claims that he “did not rescind Lane’s termina- tion because he believed that Lane was in a fundamen- tally different category than the other employees: he was the director of the entire CITY program, and not simply an employee.” In September CACC eliminated the CITY program and terminated the program’s remain- ing employees. Franks later retired, and respondent Susan Burrow,
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Lane v. Franks
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remain- ing employees. Franks later retired, and respondent Susan Burrow, the current Acting President of CACC, replaced him while this case was pending before the Elev- enth Circuit. In January Lane sued Franks in his individual and official capacities under Rev. Stat. 42 U.S. C. alleging that Franks had violated the First Amendment by firing him in retaliation for his testimony against 2 Lane sought damages from Franks in his individual capacity and sought equitable relief, includ- ing reinstatement, from Franks in his official capacity.3 The District Court granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment. Although the court concluded that the record raised “genuine issues of material fact concerning [Franks’] true motivation for terminating [Lane’s] em- ployment,” it held that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity as to the damages claims —————— 2 Lane also brought claims against CACC, as well as claims under a state whistleblower statute, –26A–3 and 42 U.S. C. Those claims are not at issue here. 3 Because Burrow replaced Franks as President of CACC during the pendency of this lawsuit, the claims originally filed against Franks in his official capacity are now against Burrow. Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 5 Opinion of the Court because “a reasonable government official in [Franks’] position would not have had reason to believe that the Constitution protected [Lane’s] testimony,” The District Court relied on (2006), which held that “ ‘when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment pur- poses.’ ” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S., ). The court found no violation of clearly established law because Lane had “learned of the information that he testified about while working as Director at [CITY],” such that his “speech [could] still be considered as part of his official job duties and not made as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 523 Fed. Appx., at Like the District Court, it relied extensively on Garcetti. It reasoned that, “[e]ven if an employee was not required to make the speech as part of his official duties, he enjoys no First Amendment protection if his speech ‘owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional responsibilities’ and is ‘a product that the “employer himself has commis- sioned or created.” ’ ” ). The court concluded that Lane spoke as an employee and not as a citizen because he was acting pursuant to his official duties when he investigated Schmitz’ employment, spoke with Schmitz and CACC officials regarding the issue, and terminated “That Lane testified about his official activities pursuant to a
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Lane v. Franks
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“That Lane testified about his official activities pursuant to a sub- poena and in the litigation context,” the court continued, “does not bring Lane’s speech within the protection of the First Amendment.” The Eleventh Circuit also con- cluded that, “even if a constitutional violation of Lane’s First Amendment rights occurred in these circumstances, Franks would be entitled to qualified immunity in his personal capacity” because the right at issue had not been 6 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court clearly established. n. 2. We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. (2014), to resolve discord among the Courts of Appeals as to whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other adverse employ- ment consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary job respon- sibilities. with, e.g., (CA3 2008). II Speech by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment, which “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo- ple,” This remains true when speech concerns information related to or learned through public employment. After all, public employees do not renounce their citizenship when they accept employment, and this Court has cautioned time and again that public employers may not condition em- ployment on the relinquishment of constitutional rights. See, e.g., ; 391 U.S., at ; There is considerable value, moreover, in encouraging, rather than inhibiting, speech by public employees. For “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work.” “The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving in- formed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to dissem- inate it.” San (per curiam). Our precedents have also acknowledged the govern- ment’s countervailing interest in controlling the operation Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 7 Opinion of the Court of its workplaces. See, e.g., 391 U.S., at “Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.” Garcetti, 547 U.S., at 418. provides the framework for analyzing whether the employee’s interest or the government’s interest should prevail in cases where the government seeks to curtail the speech of its employees. It requires “bal- anc[ing] the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 391 U.S., at
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Lane v. Franks
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public services it performs through its employees.” 391 U.S., at In the Court held that a teacher’s letter to the editor of a local news- paper concerning a school budget constituted speech on a matter of public concern. And in balancing the employee’s interest in such speech against the gov- ernment’s efficiency interest, the Court held that the publication of the letter did not “imped[e] the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom” or “interfer[e] with the regular operation of the schools gen- erally.” at 572–573. The Court therefore held that the teacher’s speech could not serve as the basis for his dis- missal. In Garcetti, we described a two-step inquiry into whether a public employee’s speech is entitled to protection: “The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibil- ity of a First Amendment claim arises. The question becomes whether the relevant government entity had 8 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general pub- lic.” In describing the first step in this inquiry, Garcetti distinguished between employee speech and citizen speech. Whereas speech as a citizen may trigger protec- tion, the Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment pur- poses, and the Constitution does not insulate their communi- cations from employer discipline.” Applying that rule to the facts before it, the Court found that an internal memorandum prepared by a prosecutor in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities constituted unprotected employee speech. III Against this backdrop, we turn to the question pre- sented: whether the First Amendment protects a public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job respon- sibilities.4 We hold that it does. A The first inquiry is whether the speech in question— Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’ trials—is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. It clearly is. —————— 4 It is undisputed that Lane’s ordinary job responsibilities did not include testifying in court proceedings. See For that reason, Lane asked the Court to decide only whether truthful sworn testimony that is not a part of an employee’s ordinary job responsibili- ties is citizen speech on a matter of public concern.
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Lane v. Franks
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2679557/lane-v-franks/
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ties is citizen speech on a matter of public concern. Pet. for Cert. i. We accordingly need not address in this case whether truthful sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech under Garcetti when given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job duties, and express no opinion on the matter today. Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 9 Opinion of the Court 1 Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned during that employment. In rejecting Lane’s argument that his testimony was speech as a citizen, the Eleventh Circuit gave short shrift to the nature of sworn judicial statements and ignored the obligation borne by all witnesses testifying under oath. See (finding immaterial the fact that Lane spoke “pursuant to a subpoena and in the litiga- tion context”). Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a sim- ple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obliga- tion, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth. See, e.g., 18 U.S. C. (criminalizing false statements under oath in judicial proceedings); United (“Per- jured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concept of judicial proceedings”). When the person testifying is a public employee, he may bear separate obligations to his employer—for example, an obligation not to show up to court dressed in an unprofessional manner. But any such obligations as an employee are distinct and independent from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth. That independent obligation renders sworn testi- mony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from speech made purely in the capacity of an employee. In holding that Lane did not speak as a citizen when he testified, the Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far too broadly. It reasoned that, because Lane learned of the sub- ject matter of his testimony in the course of his employ- ment with CITY, Garcetti requires that his testimony be treated as the speech of an employee rather than that of a citizen. See It does not. 10 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court The sworn testimony in this case is far removed from the speech at issue in Garcetti—an internal memorandum prepared by a deputy district attorney for his supervisors recommending dismissal of a particular prosecution. The Garcetti Court held that such speech was made pursuant to the employee’s “official responsibilities” because
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Lane v. Franks
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speech was made pursuant to the employee’s “official responsibilities” because “[w]hen [the employee] went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, [he] acted as a government employee. The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean that his supervisors were prohib- ited from evaluating his performance.” 424. But Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course of public employment. The Garcetti Court made explicit that its holding did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue “concerned the subject matter of [the prosecutor’s] employment,” because “[t]he First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.” In other words, the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech. The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties. It bears emphasis that our precedents dating back to have recognized that speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their employment. In for example, the Court ob- served that “[t]eachers are the members of a commu- nity most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 11 Opinion of the Court speak out freely on such questions without fear of retalia- tory dismissal.” ; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S., (recognizing that “[t]he same is true of many other categories of public employees”). Most recently, in San the Court again ob- served that public employees “are uniquely qualified to comment” on “matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large.” The importance of public employee speech is especially evident in the context of this case: a public corruption scandal. The United States, for example, represents that because “[t]he more than 1000 prosecutions for federal corruption offenses that are brought in a typical year often depend on evidence about activities that government officials undertook while in office,” those prosecutions often “require testimony from other government employ- ees.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20. It would be antithetical to our jurisprudence to conclude that the very kind of speech necessary to prosecute corruption by public officials—speech
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Lane v. Franks
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kind of speech necessary to prosecute corruption by public officials—speech by public employees regarding information learned through their employment—may never form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation claim. Such a rule would place public employees who witness corruption in an impossible position, torn between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep their jobs. Applying these principles, it is clear that Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a citizen. 2 Lane’s testimony is also speech on a matter of public concern. Speech involves matters of public concern “when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the 12 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court public.’ ” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. (slip op., at 6–7) (citation omitted). The inquiry turns on the “content, form, and context” of the speech. Connick, 461 U.S., at 147–148. The content of Lane’s testimony—corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds—obviously involves a matter of significant public concern. See, e.g., Garcetti, (“Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance”). And the form and context of the speech—sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding—fortify that conclusion. “Unlike speech in other contexts, testimony under oath has the formality and gravity necessary to remind the witness that his or her statements will be the basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the rights and liberties of others.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. (2012) (slip op., at 8–9) * * * We hold, then, that Lane’s truthful sworn testimony at Schmitz’ criminal trials is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. B This does not settle the matter, however. A public employee’s sworn testimony is not categorically entitled to First Amendment protection simply because it is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Under if an employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the next question is whether the government had “an adequate justification for treating the employee differ- ently from any other member of the public” based on the government’s needs as an employer. Garcetti, 547 U.S., at 418. As discussed previously, we have recognized that gov- ernment employers often have legitimate “interest[s] in Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 13 Opinion of the Court the effective and efficient fulfillment of [their] responsibili- ties to the public,” including
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efficient fulfillment of [their] responsibili- ties to the public,” including “ ‘promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,’ ” and “ ‘main- tain[ing] proper discipline in public service.’ ” Connick, –151. We have also cautioned, however, that “a stronger showing [of government interests] may be necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially involve[s] matters of public concern.” Here, the employer’s side of the scale is entirely empty: Respondents do not assert, and cannot demon- strate, any government interest that tips the balance in their favor. There is no evidence, for example, that Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’ trials was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, or privileged information while testifying.5 In these cir- cumstances, we conclude that Lane’s speech is entitled to protection under the First Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit erred in holding otherwise and dismissing Lane’s claim of retaliation on that basis. IV Respondent Franks argues that even if Lane’s testimony is protected under the First Amendment, the claims against him in his individual capacity should be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. We agree. Qualified immunity “gives government officials breath- ing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. (slip op., at 12). Under this doctrine, courts may not award damages against a government official in his personal capacity unless “the official violated a statu- tory or constitutional right,” and “the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” at —————— 5 Of course, quite apart from balancing, wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termina- tion or other discipline. 14 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court (slip op., at 3). The relevant question for qualified immunity purposes is this: Could Franks reasonably have believed, at the time he fired Lane, that a government employer could fire an employee on account of testimony the employee gave, under oath and outside the scope of his ordinary job re- sponsibilities? Eleventh Circuit precedent did not pre- clude Franks from reasonably holding that belief. And no decision of this Court was sufficiently clear to cast doubt on the controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. In dismissing Lane’s claim, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its 1998 decision in F.3d 1379 (per curiam). There, a deputy sheriff sued the sheriff and two other officials, alleging that he had been fired in retalia- tion for statements he made in an accident report and later giving deposition testimony about his investigation of a fatal car crash between another officer
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Lane v. Franks
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his investigation of a fatal car crash between another officer and a citizen. In his accident report, the plaintiff noted that the officer was driving more than 130 mph in a 50 mph zone, without using his emergency blue warning light. See The plaintiff later testified to these facts at a deposition in a wrongful death suit against the sheriff ’s office. His superiors later fired him. The Eleventh Circuit, in a pre-Garcetti decision, con- cluded that the plaintiff ’s deposition testimony was un- protected. It held that a public employee’s speech is pro- tected only when it is “ ‘made primarily in the employee’s role as citizen,’ ” rather than “ ‘primarily in the role of employee.’ ” F.3d, at 13. And it found the plaintiff ’s deposition testimony to be speech as an em- ployee because it “reiterated the conclusions regarding his observations of the accident” that he “generated in the normal course of [his] duties.” Critically, the court acknowledged—and was unmoved by—the fact that al- though the plaintiff had investigated the accident and prepared the report pursuant to his official duties, there Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 15 Opinion of the Court was no “evidence that [he] gave deposition testimony for any reason other than in compliance with a subpoena to testify truthfully in the civil suit regarding the acci- dent.” The court further reasoned that the speech could not “be characterized as an attempt to make public comment on sheriff ’s office policies and procedures, the internal workings of the department, the quality of its employees or upon any issue at all.” Lane argues that two other Eleventh Circuit precedents put Franks on notice that his conduct violated the First Amendment: (per curiam), and Tindal v. Montgomery Cty. Comm’n, 32 F.3d 1535 Martinez involved a public employee’s subpoenaed testimony before the Opa-Locka City Com- mission regarding her employer’s procurement practices. 971 F.2d, at The Eleventh Circuit held that her speech was protected, reasoning that it addressed a mat- ter of public concern and that her interest in speaking freely was not outweighed by her employer’s interest in providing government services. at It held, fur- ther, that the relevant constitutional rules were so clearly established at the time that qualified immunity did not apply. Tindal, decided two years after Mar- tinez, involved a public employee’s subpoenaed testimony in her co-worker’s sexual harassment lawsuit. 32 F.3d, at 1537–1538. The court again ruled in favor of the em- ployee. It held that the employee’s speech touched upon a public concern and that her employer had not offered any
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public concern and that her employer had not offered any evidence that the speech hindered operations. at 1539–1540. Martinez, and Tindal represent the landscape of Eleventh Circuit precedent the parties rely on for qualified immunity purposes. If Martinez and Tindal were control- ling in the Eleventh Circuit in we would agree with Lane that Franks could not reasonably have believed that it was lawful to fire Lane in retaliation for his testimony. 16 LANE v. FRANKS Opinion of the Court But both cases must be read together with which reasoned—in declining to afford First Amendment protec- tion—that the plaintiff ’s decision to testify was motivated solely by his desire to comply with a subpoena. The same could be said of Lane’s decision to testify. Franks was thus entitled to rely on when he fired Lane.6 Lane argues that is inapplicable because it dis- tinguished Martinez, suggesting that Martinez survived See F.3d, at 13–1383. But this debate over whether Martinez or applies to Lane’s claim only highlights the dispositive point: At the time of Lane’s termination, Eleventh Circuit precedent did not provide clear notice that subpoenaed testimony concerning information acquired through public employment is speech of a citizen entitled to First Amendment protection. At best, Lane can demonstrate only a discrepancy in Elev- enth Circuit precedent, which is insufficient to defeat the defense of qualified immunity. Finally, Lane argues that decisions of the Third and Seventh Circuits put Franks on notice that his firing of Lane was unconstitutional. See 532 F.3d, at (CA3) (truthful testimony in court is citizen speech pro- tected by the First Amendment); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (CA7 2007) (similar). But, as the court below acknowledged, those precedents were in direct conflict with Eleventh Circuit precedent. See 523 Fed. Appx., at n. 3. There is no doubt that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly concluded that Lane’s testimony was not entitled to First —————— 6 There is another reason undermines Martinez and Tindal. In Martinez and Tindal, the Eleventh Circuit asked only whether the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern. which appeared to anticipate Garcetti, asked both whether the speech at issue was speech of an employee (and not a citizen) and whether it touched upon a matter of public concern. In this respect, one could read as cabining Martinez and Tindal. Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 17 Opinion of the Court Amendment protection. But because the question was not “beyond debate” at the time Franks acted, al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at (slip op., at 9), Franks is entitled to qualified immunity. V
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op., at 9), Franks is entitled to qualified immunity. V Lane’s speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, but because respondent Franks is entitled to qualified immunity, we affirm the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit as to the claims against Franks in his individual capacity. Our decision does not resolve, however, the claims against Burrow—initially brought against Franks when he served as President of CACC—in her official capacity. Although the District Court dismissed those claims for prospective relief as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit declined to consider that question on appeal, see 523 Fed. Appx., (“Because Lane has failed to estab- lish a prima facie case of retaliation, we do not decide about Franks’ defense of sovereign immunity”), and the parties have not asked us to consider it now. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit as to those claims and remand for further proceedings. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 573 U. S. (2014) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–483 EDWARD R. LANE, PETITIONER v.
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111419/commodity-futures-trading-commn-v-weintraub/
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The question here is whether the trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the power to waive the debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to communications that took place before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. I The case arises out of a formal investigation by petitioner Commodity Futures Trading Commission to determine whether Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), or persons associated with that firm, violated the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S. C. 1 et seq. CDCB was a discount commodity brokerage house registered with the Commission, pursuant to 7 U.S. C. 6d(1), as a futures commission merchant. On October 27, the Commission filed a complaint against CDCB in the United District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging violations of the Act. That same day, respondent Frank McGhee, acting as sole director and officer of CDCB, entered into a consent decree with the Commission, which provided for the appointment of a receiver and for the receiver to file a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of (Bankruptcy Code). The District Court appointed John K. Notz, Jr., as receiver. Notz then filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on behalf of CDCB. He sought relief under Subchapter IV of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for the *346 liquidation of bankrupt commodity brokers. 11 U.S. C. 761-766. The Bankruptcy Court appointed Notz as interim trustee and, later, as permanent trustee. As part of its investigation of CDCB, the Commission served a subpoena duces tecum upon CDCB's former counsel, respondent Gary Weintraub. The Commission sought Weintraub's testimony about various CDCB matters, including suspected misappropriation of customer funds by CDCB's officers and employees, and other fraudulent activities. Weintraub appeared for his deposition and responded to numerous inquiries but refused to answer 23 questions, asserting CDCB's attorney-client privilege. The Commission then moved to compel answers to those questions. It argued that Weintraub's assertion of the attorney-client privilege was inappropriate because the privilege could not be used to "thwart legitimate access to information sought in an administrative investigation." App. 44. Even though the Commission argued in its motion that the matters on which Weintraub refused to testify were not protected by CDCB's attorney-client privilege, it asked Notz to waive that privilege. In a letter to Notz, the Commission maintained that CDCB's former officers, directors, and employees no longer had the authority to assert the privilege. According to the Commission, that power was vested in Notz as the then-interim trustee. In response to the Commission's request, Notz waived "any interest I have in the attorney/client privilege possessed
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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waived "any interest I have in the attorney/client privilege possessed by that debtor for any communications or information occurring or arising on or before October 27, " the date of Notz' appointment as receiver. On April 26, a United Magistrate ordered Weintraub to testify. The Magistrate found that Weintraub had the power to assert CDCB's privilege. He added, however, that Notz was "successor in interest of all assets, rights and privileges of CDCB, including the attorney/client privilege at issue herein," and that Notz' waiver was therefore valid. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a-20a. The District Court *3 upheld the Magistrate's order on June 9. at 18a. Thereafter, Frank McGhee and his brother, respondent Andrew McGhee, intervened and argued that Notz could not validly waive the privilege over their objection. Record, Doc. No. 49, p. 7.[1] The District Court rejected this argument and, on July 27, entered a new order requiring Weintraub to testify without asserting an attorney-client privilege on behalf of CDCB. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a.[2] The McGhees appealed from the District Court's order of July 27 and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It held that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege with respect to communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The court recognized that two other Circuits had addressed the question and had come to the opposite conclusion. See In re O. P. M. Leasing Services, ; Citibank, N.[3] We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. We now reverse the Court of Appeals. *348 II It is by now well established, and undisputed by the parties to this case, that the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals. Upjohn Both for corporations and individuals, the attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice. See, e. g., Upjohn ; Trammel v. United ; Fisher v. United The administration of the attorney-client privilege in the case of corporations, however, presents special problems. As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals empowered to act on behalf of the corporation. In Upjohn Co., we considered whether the privilege covers only communications between counsel and top management, and decided that, under certain circumstances, communications between
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111419/commodity-futures-trading-commn-v-weintraub/
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top management, and decided that, under certain circumstances, communications between counsel and lower-level employees are covered. Here, we face the related question of which corporate actors are empowered to waive the corporation's privilege. The parties in this case agree that, for solvent corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with the corporation's management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors.[4] The managers, of *349 course, must exercise the privilege in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of themselves as individuals. See, e. g., The parties agree that when control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well. New managers installed as a result of a takeover, merger, loss of confidence by shareholders, or simply normal succession, may waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications made by former officers and directors. Displaced managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current managers, even as to statements that the former might have made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their corporate duties. See Brief for Petitioner 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See generally In re O. P. M. Leasing Services, ; Citibank v. ; In re Grand Jury Investigation, ; Diversified Industries, v. Meredith,[5] The dispute in this case centers on the control of the attorney-client privilege of a corporation in bankruptcy. The Government maintains that the power to exercise that privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications passes to the bankruptcy trustee. In contrast, respondents maintain that this power remains with the debtor's directors. III As might be expected given the conflict among the Courts of Appeals, the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly address *350 the question before us. Respondents assert that 11 U.S. C. 542(e) is dispositive, but we find reliance on that provision misplaced. Section 542(e) states: "Subject to any applicable privilege, after notice and a hearing, the court may order an attorney, accountant, or other person that holds recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs, to disclose such recorded information to the trustee" (emphasis added). According to respondents, the "subject to any applicable privilege" language means that the attorney cannot be compelled to turn over to the trustee materials within the corporation's attorney-client privilege. In addition, they claim, this language would be superfluous if the trustee had the power to waive the corporation's privilege. The statutory language does not support respondents' contentions. First, the statute
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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statutory language does not support respondents' contentions. First, the statute says nothing about a trustee's authority to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege. To the extent that a trustee has that power, the statute poses no bar on his ability to obtain materials within that privilege. Indeed, a privilege that has been properly waived is not an "applicable" privilege for the purposes of 542(e). Moreover, rejecting respondents' reading does not render the statute a nullity, as privileges of parties other than the corporation would still be "applicable" as against the trustee. For example, consistent with the statute, an attorney could invoke the personal attorney-client privilege of an individual manager. The legislative history makes clear that Congress did not intend to give the debtor's directors the right to assert the corporation's attorney-client privilege against the trustee. Indeed, statements made by Members of Congress regarding the effect of 542(e) "specifically deny any attempt to create an attorney-client privilege assertable on behalf of the debtor against the trustee." In re O. P. M. Leasing *3 Services, aff'd, ; see 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 542.06 (th ed. 1985). Rather, Congress intended that the courts deal with this problem: "The extent to which the attorney client privilege is valid against the trustee is unclear under current law and is left to be determined by the courts on a case by case basis." 124 Cong. Rec. 32400 (remarks of Rep. Edwards); The "subject to any applicable privilege" language is thus merely an invitation for judicial determination of privilege questions. In addition, the legislative history establishes that 542(e) was intended to restrict, not expand, the ability of accountants and attorneys to withhold information from the trustee. Both the House and the Senate Reports state that 542(e) "is a new provision that deprives accountants and attorneys of the leverage that they ha[d], under State law lien provisions, to receive payment in full ahead of other creditors when the information they hold is necessary to the administration of the estate." S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 84 ; H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 369-3 (1977). It is therefore clear that 542(e) was not intended to limit the trustee's ability to obtain corporate information. IV In light of the lack of direct guidance from the Code, we turn to consider the roles played by the various actors of a corporation in bankruptcy to determine which is most analogous to the role played by the management of a solvent corporation. See Butner v. United Because the attorney-client privilege is controlled, outside of bankruptcy, by a corporation's management, the actor whose duties
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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of bankruptcy, by a corporation's management, the actor whose duties most closely resemble those of management *352 should control the privilege in bankruptcy, unless such a result interferes with policies underlying the bankruptcy laws. A The powers and duties of a bankruptcy trustee are extensive. Upon the commencement of a case in bankruptcy, all corporate property passes to an estate represented by the trustee. 11 U.S. C. 323, 541. The trustee is "accountable for all property received," 4(2), 1106(a)(1), and has the duty to maximize the value of the estate, see 4(1); In re Washington Group, aff'd sub nom. cert. denied, He is directed to investigate the debtor's financial affairs, 4(4), 1106(a)(3), and is empowered to sue officers, directors, and other insiders to recover, on behalf of the estate, fraudulent or preferential transfers of the debtor's property, 5(b)(4)(B), 548. Subject to court approval, he may use, sell, or lease property of the estate, 363(b). Moreover, in reorganization, the trustee has the power to "operate the debtor's business" unless the court orders otherwise. 1108. Even in liquidation, the court "may authorize the trustee to operate the business" for a limited period of time. 721. In the course of operating the debtor's business, the trustee "may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate" without court approval. 363(c)(1). As even this brief and incomplete list should indicate, the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management authority over the debtor. See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 323.01 (th ed. 1985). In contrast, the powers of the debtor's directors are severely limited. Their role is to turn over the corporation's property to the trustee and to provide certain information to the trustee and to the creditors. 521, 343. Congress contemplated that when a trustee is appointed, he assumes control of the business, and *353 the debtor's directors are "completely ousted." See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 220-221 (1977).[6] In light of the Code's allocation of responsibilities, it is clear that the trustee plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation's management. Given that the debtor's directors retain virtually no management powers, they should not exercise the traditional management function of controlling the corporation's attorney-client privilege, see unless a contrary arrangement would be inconsistent with policies of the bankruptcy laws. B We find no federal interests that would be impaired by the trustee's control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications. On the other hand, the rule suggested by respondents that the debtor's directors have this power would frustrate an
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111419/commodity-futures-trading-commn-v-weintraub/
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the debtor's directors have this power would frustrate an important goal of the bankruptcy laws. In seeking to maximize the value of the estate, the trustee must investigate the conduct of prior management to uncover and assert causes of action against the debtor's officers and directors. See generally 11 U.S. C. 4(4), 5, 548. It would often be extremely difficult to conduct this inquiry if the former management were allowed to control the corporation's attorney-client privilege and therefore to control access to the corporation's legal files. To the extent that management had wrongfully diverted or appropriated corporate assets, it could use the privilege as a shield against the trustee's efforts to identify those assets. The Code's goal of uncovering insider fraud would be substantially defeated if the debtor's directors were to retain the one management power that might effectively thwart an investigation into their own *354 conduct. See generally In re Browy, Respondents contend that the trustee can adequately investigate fraud without controlling the corporation's attorney-client privilege. They point out that the privilege does not shield the disclosure of communications relating to the planing or commission of ongoing fraud, crimes, and ordinary torts, see, e. g., Clark v. United ; (CA5 19), cert. denied, Brief for Respondents 11. The problem, however, is making the threshold showing of fraud necessary to defeat the privilege. See Clark v. United at Without control over the privilege, the trustee might not be able to discover hidden assets or looting schemes, and therefore might not be able to make the necessary showing. In summary, we conclude that vesting in the trustee control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege most closely comports with the allocation of the waiver power to management outside of bankruptcy without in any way obstructing the careful design of the Bankruptcy Code. V Respondents do not seriously contest that the bankruptcy trustee exercises functions analogous to those exercised by management outside of bankruptcy, whereas the debtor's directors exercise virtually no management functions at all. Neither do respondents seriously dispute that vesting control over the attorney-client privilege in the trustee will facilitate the recovery of misappropriated corporate assets. Respondents argue, however, that the trustee should not obtain control over the privilege because, unlike the management of a solvent corporation, the trustee's primary loyalty goes not to shareholders but to creditors, who elect him and who often will be the only beneficiaries of his efforts. See 11 U.S. C. 2 (creditors elect trustee), 726(a) (shareholders *3 are last to recover in bankruptcy). Thus, they contend, as a practical matter bankruptcy trustees represent only the
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Justice Marshall
| 1,985 | 15 |
majority
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111419/commodity-futures-trading-commn-v-weintraub/
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contend, as a practical matter bankruptcy trustees represent only the creditors. Brief for Respondents 22. We are unpersuaded by this argument. First, the fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors. See, e. g., In re Washington Group, 6 F. Supp., at ; In re Ducker,[7] Second, respondents do not explain why, out of all management powers, control over the attorney-client privilege should remain with those elected by the corporation's shareholders. Perhaps most importantly, respondents' position ignores the fact that bankruptcy causes fundamental changes in the nature of corporate relationships. One of the painful facts of bankruptcy is that the interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors. In cases in which it is clear that the estate is not large enough to cover any shareholder claims, the trustee's exercise of the corporation's attorney-client privilege will benefit only creditors, but there is nothing anomalous in this result; rather, it is in keeping with the hierarchy of interests created by the bankruptcy laws. See generally 11 U.S. C. 726(a). Respondents ignore that if a debtor remains in possession that is, if a trustee is not appointed the debtor's directors bear essentially the same fiduciary obligation to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a debtor out of possession. Indeed, the willingness of courts to leave debtors in possession "is premised upon an assurance that the officers and managing employees can be depended upon to carry out the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee." at 6. Surely, then, the management of a debtor-in-possession *356 would have to exercise control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege consistently with this obligation to treat all parties, not merely the shareholders, fairly. By the same token, when a trustee is appointed, the privilege must be exercised in accordance with the trustee's fiduciary duty to all interested parties. To accept respondents' position would lead to one of two outcomes: (1) a rule under which the management of a debtor-in-possession exercises control of the attorney-client privilege for the benefit only of shareholders but exercises all of its other functions for the benefit of both shareholders and creditors, or (2) a rule under which the attorney-client privilege is exercised for the benefit of both creditors and shareholders when the debtor remains in possession, but is exercised for the benefit only of shareholders when a trustee is appointed. We find nothing in the bankruptcy laws that would suggest, much less compel, either of these implausible results. VI Respondents' other arguments are similarly unpersuasive. First, respondents maintain that the result we reach today
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Justice Marshall
| 1,985 | 15 |
majority
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Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111419/commodity-futures-trading-commn-v-weintraub/
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unpersuasive. First, respondents maintain that the result we reach today would apply to individuals in bankruptcy, a result that respondents find "unpalatable." Brief for Respondents 27. But our holding today has no bearing on the problem of individual bankruptcy, which we have no reason to address in this case. As we have stated, a corporation, as an inanimate entity, must act through agents. See When the corporation is solvent, the agent that controls the corporate attorney-client privilege is the corporation's management. Under our holding today, this power passes to the trustee because the trustee's functions are more closely analogous to those of management outside of bankruptcy than are the functions of the debtor's directors. An individual, in contrast, can act for himself; there is no "management" that controls a solvent individual's attorney-client privilege. If control over that privilege passes to a trustee, it must be *357 under some theory different from the one that we embrace in this case. Second, respondents argue that giving the trustee control over the attorney-client privilege will have an undesirable chilling effect on attorney-client communications. According to respondents, corporate managers will be wary of speaking freely with corporate counsel if their communications might subsequently be disclosed due to bankruptcy. See Brief for Respondents 37-42; see But the chilling effect is no greater here than in the case of a solvent corporation, where individual officers and directors always run the risk that successor management might waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prior management's communications with counsel. See -349. Respondents maintain that the result we reach discriminates against insolvent corporations. According to respondents, to prevent the debtor's directors from controlling the privilege amounts to "economic discrimination" given that directors, as representatives of the shareholders, control the privilege for solvent corporations. Brief for Respondents 42; see -343. Respondents' argument misses the point that, by definition, corporations in bankruptcy are treated differently from solvent corporations. "Insolvency is a most important and material fact, not only with individuals but with corporations, and with the latter as with the former the mere fact of its existence may change radically and materially its rights and obligations." Respondents do not explain why we should be particularly concerned about differential treatment in this context. Finally, respondents maintain that upholding trustee waivers would create a disincentive for debtors to invoke the protections of bankruptcy and provide an incentive for creditors to file for involuntary bankruptcy. According to respondents, "[i]njection of such considerations into bankruptcy *358 would skew the application of the bankruptcy laws in a manner not contemplated by Congress." Brief for Respondents
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per_curiam
| 1,974 | 200 |
per_curiam
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United States v. American Friends Service Comm.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109110/united-states-v-american-friends-service-comm/
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Appellee American Friends Service Committee (employer) is a religious corporation, whose principal operation is philanthropic work and many of whose employees are conscientious objectors to war, performing alternative civilian service. Appellees Lorraine Cleveland and Leonard Cadwallader (employees) are present or past employees of the employer. Because of their religious beliefs, the employees in 1969 requested their employer to cease withholding 51.6%[1]*8 of the portion of their wages required to be withheld under 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code.[2] Although they conceded that these amounts were legally due to the Government, they wished to bear witness to their beliefs by reporting the amounts as taxes owed on their annual income tax returns but refusing to pay such amounts. They would thus compel the Government to levy in order to collect the taxes. In response to the employees' request, the employer ceased withholding from the employees' salaries 51.6% of that amount required to be withheld under 3402, although it continued to pay the full amount required to be withheld under that provision to the Government. It then brought a suit for refund of the amount it had paid to the Government but not actually withheld from salaries. The appellee employees joined the employer's action, seeking on their own behalf an injunction barring the United States' enforcement of 3402 against the employer with regard to 51.6% of the required withholding. They argued that, even though they were liable for these amounts, 3402 as applied to this portion of their wages was unconstitutional as a deprivation of their right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment since it did not allow them to bear witness to their beliefs by refusing to voluntarily pay a portion of their taxes. The District Court ordered a refund of amounts tendered by the employer but not withheld by it, since the Government had also levied on the employees for these taxes and hence had received a double payment of the *9 amount due. The Government does not contest this portion of the District Court's judgment.[3] The District Court also enjoined the United States from enforcing 3402 against the employer with respect to 51.6% of the required withholding from the employees' salaries, holding that 3402 as applied to this amount constituted an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to free exercise of religion. The United States appeals this portion of the judgment.[4] The District Court's opinion and order were entered before this Court handed down its opinions in Bob and The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S. C. 7421 (a), provides that no suit for the purpose of restraining the
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per_curiam
| 1,974 | 200 |
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United States v. American Friends Service Comm.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109110/united-states-v-american-friends-service-comm/
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provides that no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed."[5] In Bob we rejected an appeal to create judicial exceptions to 7421 (a) other than that carved out in We noted that Williams Packing was *10 the "capstone" of judicial construction of the Act and spelled an end to cyclical departures from the Act's plain meaning. Bob In "Americans United" we stated that a pre-enforcement injunction against the assessment or collection of taxes could be granted only if it were clear that the Government could in no circumstances ultimately prevail on the merits, and that equity jurisdiction existed. "Unless both conditions are met, a suit for preventive injunctive relief must be dismissed." The employees concede, and the District Court found, that 3402 withholding is a method of collection of taxes within the meaning of 7421 (a).[6] They further concede, as they must, that they are not within the Williams Packing exception; far from the Government's defense in a refund suit being meritless, the employees concede that the Government would undoubtedly prevail in such a refund action. They contend, however, that since the District Court enjoined only one method of collection, and the Government is still free to assess and levy their taxes when due, the Act does not apply. But this contention ignores the plain wording of the Act which proscribes any "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax." The District Court's injunction against the collection of the tax by withholding enjoins the collection of the tax, and is therefore contrary to the express language of the Anti-Injunction Act. *11 The employees also argue that the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable because they have no alternative legal remedy available. They contend that a refund suit would be an inadequate remedy, in view of the concession on their part that the taxes are due, since they would surely lose such an action. But this ignores the fact that inadequacy of available remedies goes only to the existence of irreparable injury, an essential prerequisite for traditional equity jurisdiction, but only one of the two parts of the Williams Packing test. ; Bob Here as in "Americans United" the employees will have a "full opportunity to litigate" their tax liability in a refund 416 U.S., Even though the remitting of the employees to a refund action may frustrate their chosen method of bearing witness to their religious convictions, a
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per_curiam
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United States v. American Friends Service Comm.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109110/united-states-v-american-friends-service-comm/
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chosen method of bearing witness to their religious convictions, a chosen method which they insist is constitutionally protected, the bar of the Anti-Injunction Act is not removed: "[D]ecisions of this court make it unmistakably clear that the constitutional nature of a taxpayer's claim, as distinct from its probability of success, is of no consequence under the Anti-Injunction Act." See also In Bob we left open the question of whether injunctive relief as to future collection would be proper as a form of ancillary relief in a refund suit where the taxpayer prevailed on the merits, in order to avoid the necessity of continuous subsequent "backward-looking refund suits." n. 22. That situation is not presented here since the employees have never brought a refund action, much less prevailed on the merits of such an action. Their joinder in the employer's successful refund action, based on the receipt of double payment by *12 the Government, would afford no basis for injunctive relief based on their constitutional claim. The injunctive relief granted by the District Court in this case is plainly at odds with the dual objectives of the Act: efficient and expeditious collection of taxes with "a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interference," and protection of the collector from litigation pending a refund Bob[7] The judgment of the District Court is reversed insofar as it enjoins the collection of taxes by the Government and the withholding of wages by the employer. Reversed in part. MR.
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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The National Labor Relations Act (Act) affords employees the rights to organize and to engage in collective bargaining free from employer interference. The Act does not grant *573 those rights to supervisory employees, however, so the statutory definition of supervisor becomes essential in determining which employees are covered by the Act. In this case, we decide the narrow question whether the National Labor Relations Board's (Board's) test for determining if a nurse is a supervisor is consistent with the statutory definition. I Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, In the early years of its operation, the Act did not exempt supervisory employees from its coverage; as a result, supervisory employees could organize as part of bargaining units and negotiate with the employer. Employers complained that this produced an imbalance between labor and management, but in 1947 this Court refused to carve out a supervisory employee exception from the Act's broad coverage. The Court stated that "it is for Congress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with [the Act's] plain terms." Packard Car Later that year, Congress did just that, amending the statute so that the term "`employee' shall not include any individual employed as a supervisor." -138, codified at 29 U.S. C. 152(3). Congress defined a supervisor as: "[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." codified at 29 U.S. C. 152(11). As the Board has stated, the statute requires the resolution of three questions; and each must be answered in *574 the affirmative if an employee is to be deemed a supervisor. First, does the employee have authority to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities? Second, does the exercise of that authority require "the use of independent judgment"? Third, does the employee hold the authority "in the interest of the employer"? Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N. L. R. B. 491, 493 This case concerns only the third question, and our decision turns upon the proper interpretation of the statutory phrase "in the interest of the employer." In cases involving nurses, the Board admits that it has interpreted the statutory phrase in a unique manner. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52 (Board: "[t]he Board has
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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manner. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52 (Board: "[t]he Board has not applied a theory that's phrased in the same terms to other categories of professionals"). The Board has held that "a nurse's direction of less-skilled employees, in the exercise of professional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients, is not authority exercised `in the interest of the employer.' " Pet. for Cert. 15. As stated in reviewing its position on this issue in its recent decision in Northcrest Nursing Home, at 491 492, the Board believes that its special interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" in cases involving nurses is necessary because professional employees (including registered nurses) are not excluded from coverage under the Act. See 29 U.S. C. 152(12). Respondent counters that "[t]here is simply no basis in the language of the statute to conclude that direction given to aides in the interest of nursing home residents, pursuant to professional norms, is not `in the interest of the employer.' " Brief for Respondent 30. In this case, the Board's General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that respondent, the owner and operator of the Heartland Nursing Home in Urbana, Ohio, had committed unfair labor practices in disciplining four licensed practical nurses. At Heartland, the Director of Nursing has overall responsibility for the nursing department. There is also an Assistant Director of Nursing, 9 to 11 staff nurses *575 (including both registered nurses and the four licensed practical nurses involved in this case), and 50 to 55 nurses' aides. The staff nurses are the senior ranking employees on duty after 5 p.m. during the week and at all times on weekends approximately 75% of the time. The staff nurses have responsibility to ensure adequate staffing; to make daily work assignments; to monitor the aides' work to ensure proper performance; to counsel and discipline aides; to resolve aides' problems and grievances; to evaluate aides' performances; and to report to management. In light of these varied activities, respondent contended, among other things, that the four nurses involved in this case were supervisors, and so not protected under the Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, concluding that the nurses were not supervisors. The ALJ stated that the nurses' supervisory work did not "equate to responsibly direct[ing] the aides in the interest of the employer, " noting that "the nurses' focus is on the well-being of the residents rather than of the employer." 306 N. L. R. B. 68, 70 (emphasis added). The Board stated only that "[t]he judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent's staff nurses are employees within the
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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agree, that the Respondent's staff nurses are employees within the meaning of the Act." 306 N. L. R. B. 63, 63, n. 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals had decided in earlier cases that the Board's test for determining the supervisory status of nurses was inconsistent with the statute. See Beverly ; In Beverly, for example, the court had stated that "the notion that direction given to subordinate personnel to ensure that the employer's nursing home customers receive `quality care' somehow fails to qualify as direction given `in the interest of the employer' makes very little sense to us." 970 F. 2d, at 1552. Addressing the instant case, the court followed Beverly and again held the *576 Board's interpretation inconsistent with the statute. 987 F. 2d, The court further stated that "it is up to Congress to carve out an exception for the health care field, including nurses, should Congress not wish for such nurses to be considered supervisors." The court "remind[ed] the Board that it is the courts, and not the Board, who bear the final responsibility for interpreting the law." After concluding that the Board's test was inconsistent with the statute, the court found that the four licensed practical nurses involved in this case were supervisors. -1261. We granted certiorari, to resolve the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the validity of the Board's rule. See, e. g., Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center, ; ; Misericordia Hospital Medical II We must decide whether the Board's test for determining if nurses are supervisors is rational and consistent with the Act. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is not. A The Board's interpretation, that a nurse's supervisory activity is not exercised in the interest of the employer if it is incidental to the treatment of patients, is similar to an approach the Board took, and we rejected, in There, we had to determine whether faculty members at were "managerial employees." Managerial employees are those who "formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer." Like supervisory employees, managerial *577 employees are excluded from the Act's coverage. The Board in argued that the faculty members were not managerial, contending that faculty authority was "exercised in the faculty's own interest rather than in the interest of the university." To support its position, the Board placed much reliance on the faculty members' independent professional role in designing the curriculum and in discharging their professional obligations to the
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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the curriculum and in discharging their professional obligations to the students. We found the Board's reasoning unpersuasive: "In arguing that a faculty member exercising independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest and therefore does not represent the interest of his employer, the Board assumes that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member could not simultaneously be aligned. The Court of Appeals found no justification for this distinction, and we perceive none. In fact, the faculty's professional interestsas applied to governance at a university like cannot be separated from those of the institution. ". The `business' of a university is education." The Board's reasoning fares no better here than it did in As in the Board has created a false dichotomyin this case, a dichotomy between acts taken in connection with patient care and acts taken in the interest of the employer. That dichotomy makes no sense. Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and it follows that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who are the employer's customers, is in the interest of the employer. See Beverly We thus see no basis for the Board's blanket assertion that supervisory authority *578 exercised in connection with patient care is somehow not in the interest of the employer. Our conclusion is supported by the case that gave impetus to the statutory provision now before us. In Packard we considered the phrase "in the interest of an employer" contained in the definition of "employer" in the original 1935 Act. We stated that "[e]very employee, from the very fact of employment in the master's business, is required to act in his interest." We rejected the argument of the dissenters who, like the Board in this case, advanced the proposition that the phrase covered only "those who acted for management in formulating [and] executing its labor policies." ; cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 4 (nurses are supervisors when, "in addition to performing their professional duties and responsibilities, they also possess the authority to affect the job status or pay of employees working under them"). Consistent with the ordinary meaning of the phrase, the Court in Packard determined that acts within the scope of employment or on the authorized business of the employer are "in the interest of the employer." -489. There is no indication that Congress intended any different meaning when it included the phrase in the statutory definition of supervisor later in 1947. To be sure, Congress altered the result of Packard but it
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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be sure, Congress altered the result of Packard but it did not change the meaning of the phrase "in the interest of the employer" when doing so. And we of course have rejected the argument that a statute altering the result reached by a judicial decision necessarily changes the meaning of the language interpreted in that decision. See Public Employees Retirement System of Not only is the Board's test inconsistent with Packard and the ordinary meaning of the phrase "in the interest of the employer," it also renders portions of the statutory definition in 2(11) meaningless. Under 2(11), *579 an employee who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities, including responsible direction of other employees, is a supervisor. Under the Board's test, however, a nurse who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in responsible direction of other employees is not a supervisor. Only a nurse who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in one of the activities related to another employee's job status or pay can qualify as a supervisor under the Board's test. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 4 (nurses are supervisors when they affect "job status or pay of employees working under them"). The Board provides no plausible justification, however, for reading the responsible direction portion of 2(11) out of the statute in nurse cases, and we can perceive none. The Board defends its test by arguing that phrases in 2(11) such as "independent judgment" and "responsibly to direct" are ambiguous, so the Board needs to be given ample room to apply them to different categories of employees. That is no doubt true, but it is irrelevant in this particular case because interpretation of those phrases is not the underpinning of the Board's test. The Board instead has placed exclusive reliance on the "in the interest of the employer" language in 2(11). With respect to that particular phrase, we find no ambiguity supporting the Board's position. It should go without saying, moreover, that ambiguity in one portion of a statute does not give the Board license to distort other provisions of the statute. Yet that is what the Board seeks us to sanction in this case. The interpretation of the "in the interest of the employer" language mandated by our precedents and by the ordinary meaning of the phrase does not render the phrase meaningless in the statutory definition. The language ensures, for example, that union stewards who adjust grievances are not considered supervisory employees and deprived of the Act's
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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are not considered supervisory employees and deprived of the Act's protections. But the language cannot support the Board's *580 argument that supervision of the care of patients is not in the interest of the employer. The welfare of the patient, after all, is no less the object and concern of the employer than it is of the nurses. And the statutory dichotomy the Board has created is no more justified in the health care field than it would be in any other business where supervisory duties are a necessary incident to the production of goods or the provision of services. B Because the Board's test is inconsistent with both the statutory language and this Court's precedents, the Board seeks to shift ground, putting forth a series of nonstatutory arguments. None of them persuades us that we can ignore the statutory language and our case law. The Board first contends that we should defer to its test because, according to the Board, granting organizational rights to nurses whose supervisory authority concerns patient care does not threaten the conflicting loyalties that the supervisor exception was designed to avoid. Brief for Petitioner 25. We rejected the same argument in where the Board contended that there was "no danger of divided loyalty and no need for the managerial exclusion" for the faculty And we must reject that reasoning again here. The Act is to be enforced according to its own terms, not by creating legal categories inconsistent with its meaning, as the Board has done in nurse cases. Whether the Board proceeds through adjudication or rulemaking, the statute must control the Board's decision, not the other way around. See Florida Power & Light ; cf. Packard Even on the assumption, moreover, that the statute permits consideration of the potential for divided loyalties so that a unique interpretation is permitted in the health care field, we do not share the *581 Board's confidence that there is no danger of divided loyalty here. Nursing home owners may want to implement policies to ensure that patients receive the best possible care despite potential adverse reaction from employees working under the nurses' direction. If so, the statute gives nursing home owners the ability to insist on the undivided loyalty of its nurses notwithstanding the Board's impression that there is no danger of divided loyalty. The Board also argues that "[t]he statutory criterion of having authority `in the interest of the employer' must not be read so broadly that it overrides Congress's intention to accord the protections of the Act to professional employees." Brief for Petitioner 26; see 29
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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Act to professional employees." Brief for Petitioner 26; see 29 U.S. C. 152(12). The Act does not distinguish professional employees from other employees for purposes of the definition of supervisor in 2(11). The supervisor exclusion applies to "any individual" meeting the statutory requirements, not to "any nonprofessional employee." In addition, the Board relied on the same argument in but to no avail. The Board argued that "the managerial exclusion cannot be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional employees because those employees often appear to be exercising managerial authority when they are merely performing routine job duties." -684. Holding to the contrary, we said that the Board could not support a statutory distinction between the university's interest and the managerial interest being exercised on its behalf. There is no reason for a different result here. To be sure, as recognized in there may be "some tension between the Act's exclusion of [supervisory and] managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals," but we find no authority for "suggesting that that tension can be resolved" by distorting the statutory language in the manner proposed by the Board. Finally, as a reason for us to defer to its conclusion, the Board cites legislative history of the 1974 amendments to other sections of the Act. Those amendments did not alter *582 the test for supervisory status in the health care field, yet the Board points to a statement in a Committee Report expressing apparent approval of the Board's then-current application of its supervisory employee test to nurses. S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 6 ; see As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Board in fact had a consistent test for nurses before 1974. Compare Avon Convalescent Center, Inc., 200 N. L. R. B. 702 (1972), with Doctors' Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N. L. R. B. 950 (1970). In any event, the isolated statement in the 1974 Committee Report does not represent an authoritative interpretation of the phrase "in the interest of the employer," which was enacted by Congress in 1947. "[I]t is the function of the courts and not the Legislature, much less a Committee of one House of the Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means." Indeed, in American Hospital the petitioner pointed to isolated statements from the same 1974 Senate Report cited here and argued that they revealed Congress' intent with respect to a provision of the original 1935 Act. We dismissed the argument, stating that such statements do not have "the force of law, for the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
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NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress must follow in legislating." ; see also 492 U. S., at In this case as well, we must reject the Board's reliance on the 1974 Committee Report. If Congress wishes to enact the policies of the Board, it can do so without indirection. See generally Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., ante, at 185-188. III An examination of the professional's duties (or in this case the duties of the four nonprofessional nurses) to determine whether 1 or more of the 12 listed activities is performed in a manner that makes the employee a supervisor is, of course, part of the Board's routine and proper adjudicative function. *583 In cases involving nurses, that inquiry no doubt could lead the Board in some cases to conclude that supervisory status has not been demonstrated. The Board has not sought to sustain its decision on that basis here, however. It has chosen instead to rely on an industry wide interpretation of the phrase "in the interest of the employer" that contravenes precedents of this Court and has no relation to the ordinary meaning of that language. To be sure, in applying 2(11) in other industries, the Board on occasion reaches results reflecting a distinction between authority arising from professional knowledge and authority encompassing front-line management prerogatives. It is important to emphasize, however, that in almost all of those cases (unlike in cases involving nurses) the Board's decisions did not result from manipulation of the statutory phrase "in the interest of the employer," but instead from a finding that the employee in question had not met the other requirements for supervisory status under the Act, such as the requirement that the employee exercise one of the listed activities in a nonroutine manner. See That may explain why the Board did not cite in its submissions to this Court a single case outside the health care field approving the interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" the Board uses in nurse cases. That the Board sometimes finds a professional employee not to be a supervisor when applying other elements of the statutory definition of 2(11) cannot be shoehorned into the conclusion that the Board can rely on its strained interpretation of the phrase "in the interest of the employer" in all nurse cases. If we accepted the Board's position in this case, moreover, nothing would prevent the Board from applying this interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" to all professional employees. We note further that
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Justice Kennedy
| 1,994 | 4 |
majority
|
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087953/nlrb-v-health-care-retirement-corp-of-america/
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the employer" to all professional employees. We note further that our decision casts no doubt on Board or court decisions interpreting parts of 2(11) other than the specific phrase "in the interest of the employer." Because *584 the Board's interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" is for the most part confined to nurse cases, our decision will have almost no effect outside that context. Any parade of horribles about the meaning of this decision for employees in other industries is thus quite misplaced; indeed, the Board does not make that argument. In sum, the Board's test for determining the supervisory status of nurses is inconsistent with the statute and our precedents. The Board did not petition this Court to uphold its order in this case under any other theory. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 25. If the case presented the question whether these nurses were supervisors under the proper test, we would have given a lengthy exposition and analysis of the facts in the record. But as we have indicated, the Board made and defended its decision by relying on the particular test it has applied to nurses. Our conclusion that the Court of Appeals was correct to find the Board's test inconsistent with the statute therefore suffices to resolve the case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
concurring
|
California Democratic Party v. Jones
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118382/california-democratic-party-v-jones/
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Proposition 198, the product of a statewide popular initiative, is a strong and recent expression of the will of California's electorate. It is designed, in part, to further the object of widening the base of voter participation in California elections. Until a few weeks or even days before an election, many voters pay little attention to campaigns and even less to the details of party politics. Fewer still participate in the direction and control of party affairs, for most voters consider the internal dynamics of party organization remote, partisan, and of slight interest. Under these conditions voters tend to become disinterested, and so they refrain from voting altogether. To correct this, California seeks to make primary voting more responsive to the views and preferences of the electorate as a whole. The results of California's blanket primary system may demonstrate the efficacy *587 of its solution, for there appears to have been a substantial increase in voter interest and voter participation. See Brief for Respondents 45-46. Encouraging citizens to vote is a legitimate, indeed essential, state objective; for the constitutional order must be preserved by a strong, participatory democratic process. In short, there is much to be said in favor of California's law; and I might find this to be a close case if it were simply a way to make elections more fair and open or addressed matters purely of party structure. The true purpose of this law, however, is to force a political party to accept a candidate it may not want and, by so doing, to change the party's doctrinal position on major issues. Ante, at 581-582. From the outset the State has been fair and candid to admit that doctrinal change is the intended operation and effect of its law. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 40, 46. It may be that organized parties, controlled in fact or perceptionby activists seeking to promote their self-interest rather than enhance the party's long-term support, are shortsighted and insensitive to the views of even their own members. A political party might be better served by allowing blanket primaries as a means of nominating candidates with broader appeal. Under the First Amendment's guarantee of speech through free association, however, this is an issue for the party to resolve, not for the State. Political parties advance a shared political belief, but to do so they often must speak through their candidates. When the State seeks to direct changes in a political party's philosophy by forcing upon it unwanted candidates and wresting the choice between moderation and partisanship away from the party itself,
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
concurring
|
California Democratic Party v. Jones
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118382/california-democratic-party-v-jones/
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choice between moderation and partisanship away from the party itself, the State's incursion on the party's associational freedom is subject to careful scrutiny under the First Amendment. For these reasons I agree with the Court's opinion. I add this separate concurrence to say that Proposition 198 is doubtful for a further reason. In justification of its statute *588 California tells us a political party has the means at hand to protect its associational freedoms. The party, California contends, can simply use its funds and resources to support the candidate of its choice, thus defending its doctrinal positions by advising the voters of its own preference. To begin with, this does not meet the parties' First Amendment objection, as the Court well explains. Ante, at 580-581. The important additional point, however, is that, by reason of the Court's denial of First Amendment protections to a political party's spending of its own funds and resources in cooperation with its preferred candidate, see Colorado Federal Campaign the Federal Government or the State has the power to prevent the party from using the very remedy California now offers up to defend its law. Federal campaign finance laws place strict limits on the manner and amount of speech parties may undertake in aid of candidates. Of particular relevance are limits on coordinated party expenditures, which the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 deems to be contributions subject to specific monetary restrictions. See 2 U.S. C. 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) ("[E]xpenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate"). Though we invalidated limits on independent party expenditures in Colorado the principal opinion did not question federal limits placed on coordinated expenditures. See -625 Two Justices in dissent said that "all money spent by a political party to secure the election of its candidate" would constitute coordinated expenditures and would have upheld the statute as applied in that case. See Thus, five Justices of the Court subscribe to the position that Congress or a State may limit the amount a political party spends in direct collaboration with its preferred candidate for elected office. *589 In my view, as stated in both Colorado and in these recent cases deprive political parties of their First Amendment rights. Our constitutional tradition is one in which political parties and their candidates make common cause in the exercise of political speech, which is subject to First Amendment protection. There is a practical identity of interests between parties
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,000 | 4 |
concurring
|
California Democratic Party v. Jones
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118382/california-democratic-party-v-jones/
|
protection. There is a practical identity of interests between parties and their candidates during an election. Our unfortunate decisions remit the political party to use of indirect or covert speech to support its preferred candidate, hardly a result consistent with free thought and expression. It is a perversion of the First Amendment to force a political party to warp honest, straightforward speech, exemplified by its vigorous and open support of its favored candidate, into the covert speech of soft money and issue advocacy so that it may escape burdensome spending restrictions. In a regime where campaign spending cannot otherwise be limitedthe structure this Court created on its own in restricting the amounts a political party may spend in collaboration with its own candidate is a violation of the political party's First Amendment rights. Were the views of those who would uphold both California's blanket primary system and limitations on coordinated party expenditures to become prevailing law, the State could control political parties at two vital points in the election process. First, it could mandate a blanket primary to weaken the party's ability to defend and maintain its doctrinal positions by allowing nonparty members to vote in the primary. Second, it could impose severe restrictions on the amount of funds and resources the party could spend in efforts to counteract the State's doctrinal intervention. In other words, the First Amendment injury done by the Court's ruling in Colorado would be compounded were California to prevail in the instant case. *590 When the State seeks to regulate a political party's nomination process as a means to shape and control political doctrine and the scope of political choice, the First Amendment gives substantial protection to the party from the manipulation. In a free society the State is directed by political doctrine, not the other way around. With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
|
City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110998/city-of-revere-v-massachusetts-gen-hospital/
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The issue in this case is whether a municipality's constitutional duty to obtain necessary medical care for a person injured by the municipality's police in the performance of their duties includes a corresponding duty to compensate the provider of that medical care. I On September 20, 198, members of the police force of petitioner city of Revere, Mass., responded to a report of a breaking and entering in progress. At the scene they sought to detain a man named Patrick M. Kivlin, who attempted to flee. When repeated commands to stop and a warning shot failed to halt Kivlin's flight, an officer fired at Kivlin and wounded him. The officers summoned a private ambulance. It took Kivlin, accompanied by one officer, to the emergency room of respondent Massachusetts General *241 Hospital (MGH) in Boston.[1] Kivlin was hospitalized at MGH from September 20 until September 29. Upon his release, Revere police served him with an arrest warrant that had been issued on September 2. Kivlin was arraigned and released on his own recognizance. On October 18, MGH sent the Chief of Police of Revere a bill for $,948.50 for its services to Kivlin. The Chief responded immediately by a letter denying responsibility for the bill. On October 2, Kivlin returned to MGH for further treatment. He was released on November 10; the bill for services rendered during this second stay was $5,30.41.[2] In January 199, MGH sued Revere in state court to recover the full cost of its hospital services rendered to Kivlin. The Superior Court for the County of Suffolk dismissed the complaint. MGH appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its own docket. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding that "the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, embodied in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution [as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment], requires that Revere be liable to the hospital for the medical services rendered to Kivlin during his first stay at the hospital." The court apparently believed that such a rule was needed to ensure that persons in police custody receive necessary medical attention.[3] In view of this rather novel Eighth Amendment approach and the importance *242 of delineating governmental responsibility in a situation of this kind, we granted certiorari. II We first address two preliminary issues. A MGH suggests that we lack jurisdiction to decide this case because the state-court decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground. The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion, however, stated unequivocally that state contract law provided no basis for
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
|
City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110998/city-of-revere-v-massachusetts-gen-hospital/
|
stated unequivocally that state contract law provided no basis for ordering Revere to pay MGH for the hospital services rendered to Kivlin, 385 Mass., at 434 N. E. 2d, at and that MGH had not invoked the Commonwealth's Constitution in support of its claim, n. In a section of its opinion entitled "Eighth Amendment," the court premised Revere's liability squarely on the Federal Constitution.[4] Because the court's decision was based on an interpretation of federal law, we have jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the same decision, had it rested on state law, would be unreviewable here. See B The parties submit various arguments concerning MGH's "standing" to raise its constitutional claim in this Court. *243 MGH, however, clearly has standing in the Article III sense: it performed services for which it has not been paid, and through this action it seeks to redress its economic loss directly. Moreover, prudential reasons for refusing to permit a litigant to assert the constitutional rights of a third party are much weaker here than they were in (19), where the Court permitted a seller of beer to challenge a statute prohibiting the sale of beer to males, but not to females, between the ages of 18 and 21. In this case, as in Craig, the plaintiff's assertion of jus tertii was not contested in the lower court, see 385 Mass., at -, n. n. and that court entertained the constitutional claim on its merits. Unlike Craig, this case arose in state court and the plaintiff, MGH, prevailed. The Supreme Judicial Court, of course, is not bound by the prudential limitations on jus tertii that apply to federal courts. The consequence of holding that MGH may not assert the rights of a third party (Kivlin) in this Court, therefore, would be to dismiss the writ of certiorari, leaving intact the state court's judgment in favor of MGH, the purportedly improper representative of the third party's constitutional rights. See In these circumstances, invoking prudential limitations on MGH's assertion of jus tertii would "serve no functional purpose."[5] III A The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments is violated by "deliberate indifference to serious *244 medical needs of prisoners." 429 U.S. 9, (19). As MGH acknowledges, Brief for Respondent 3, on the facts of this case the relevant constitutional provision is not the Eighth Amendment but is, instead, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
|
City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110998/city-of-revere-v-massachusetts-gen-hospital/
|
[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." 430 U.S. 51, 1-2, n. 40 (19); see 535, n. 1 (199). Because there had been no formal adjudication of guilt against Kivlin at the time he required medical care, the Eighth Amendment has no application. B The Due Process Clause, however, does require the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to persons, such as Kivlin, who have been injured while being apprehended by the police. In fact, the due process rights of a person in Kivlin's situation are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner. See n. 1, 545.[] We need not define, in this case, Revere's due process obligation to pretrial detainees or to other persons in its care who require medical attention. See 45 U.S. 30, ; 118 (CA3 198); (CA4 198), cert. denied sub nom. 44 U.S. 928 Whatever the standard may be, Revere fulfilled its constitutional obligation by seeing that Kivlin was taken promptly to a hospital that provided the treatment necessary for his injury. And as long as the governmental entity ensures that the medical care needed is in fact provided, the Constitution does not dictate how the cost of that care should be allocated as between the entity and the provider of the care. That is a matter of state law. If, of course, the governmental entity can obtain the medical care needed for a detainee only by paying for it, then it must pay. There are, however, other means by which the entity could meet its obligation. Many hospitals are subject to federal or state laws that require them to provide care to indigents. Hospitals receiving federal grant money under the Hill-Burton Act, for example, must supply a reasonable amount of free care to indigents. See 42 U.S. C. 291c(e). In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts now, any hospital with an emergency facility must provide emergency services regardless of the patient's ability to pay. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 111, 0E(k) (West Supp. 1983-1984), added by 199 Mass. Acts, ch. 214, and amended by 199 Mass. Acts, ch. 20. Refusal to provide treatment would subject the hospital to malpractice liability. 0E. The governmental entity also may be able to satisfy its duty by operating its own hospital, or, possibly, by imposing on the willingness of hospitals and physicians to treat the sick regardless of the individual patient's ability to pay.[]
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