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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
Nearly 40 years ago Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act,[1] and required employers covered by the Act to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage[2] and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular *836 rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 during a workweek.[3] By this Act covered employers were required to keep certain records to aid in the enforcement of the Act,[4] and to comply with specified child labor standards.[5] This Court unanimously upheld the Act as a valid exercise of congressional authority under the commerce power in United observing: "Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 specifically excluded the States and their political sub-divisions from its coverage.[6] In however, Congress enacted the most recent of a series of broadening amendments to the Act. By these amendments Congress has extended the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all public employees employed by the States and by their various political subdivisions. Appellants in these cases include individual cities and States, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors' Conference;[7] brought an action in the District *837 Court for the District of Columbia which challenged the validity of the amendments. They asserted in effect that when Congress sought to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions virtually across the board to employees of state and municipal governments it "infringed a constitutional prohibition" running in favor of the States as States. The gist of their complaint was not that the conditions of employment of such public employees were beyond the scope of the commerce power had those employees been employed in the private sector but that the established constitutional doctrine of inter-governmental immunity consistently recognized in a long series of our cases affirmatively prevented the exercise of this authority in the manner which Congress chose in the amendments. I In a series of amendments beginning in 1961 Congress began to extend the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to some types of public employees. The 1961 amendments to the Act[8] extended its coverage to persons who were employed in "enterprises" engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.[9] And in 1966, with the amendment of the definition of employers under the Act, the exemption heretofore extended to the States and their political subdivisions was *838 removed with respect to employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools.[10] We nevertheless sustained
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools.[10] We nevertheless sustained the validity of the combined effect of these two amendments in In Congress again broadened the coverage of the Act, The definition of "employer" in the Act now specifically "includes a public agency," 29 U.S. C. 203 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In addition, the critical definition of "[e]nterprise[s] engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" was expanded to encompass "an activity of a public agency," and goes on to specify that "[t]he employees of an enterprise which is a public agency shall for purposes of this subsection be deemed to be employees engaged in commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce." 29 U.S. C. 203 (s) (5) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Under the amendments "[p]ublic agency" is in turn defined as including "the Government of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States (including the United States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." 29 U.S. C. 203 (x) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). By its amendments, then, Congress has now entirely removed the exemption previously afforded States and their political subdivisions, substituting only the Act's general exemption for executive, administrative, or professional *839 personnel, 29 U.S. C. 213 (a) (1), which is supplemented by provisions excluding from the Act's coverage those individuals holding public elective office or serving such an officeholder in one of several specific capacities. 29 U.S. C. 203 (e) (2) (C) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act thus imposes upon almost all public employment the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements previously restricted to employees engaged in interstate commerce. These requirements are essentially identical to those imposed upon private employers, although the Act does attempt to make some provision for public employment relationships which are without counterpart in the private sector, such as those presented by fire protection and law enforcement personnel. See 29 U.S. C. 207 (k) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Challenging these amendments in the District Court, appellants sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the amendments' application to them, and a three-judge court was accordingly convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2282. That court, after hearing argument on the law from the parties, granted appellee Secretary of Labor's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. The District Court stated it was "troubled" by appellants' contentions that the amendments would intrude upon the States' performance of essential governmental functions. The court went on to say that it considered their contentions. "substantial and that it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it appropriate to draw back from the far-reaching implications of [, but that is a decision that only the Supreme Court can make, and as a Federal district court we feel obliged to apply the opinion as it stands." National League of *840 We noted probable jurisdiction in order to consider the important questions recognized by the District Court.[11] We agree with the District Court that the appellants' contentions are substantial. Indeed upon full consideration of the question we have decided that the "far-reaching implications" of should be overruled, and that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed. II It is established beyond peradventure that the Commerce Clause of Art. I of the Constitution is a grant of plenary authority to Congress. That authority is, in the words of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in "the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." When considering the validity of asserted applications of this power to wholly private activity, the Court has made it clear that "[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations." Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result which has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has been held to be limited only by the requirement that "the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta *841 Appellants in no way challenge these decisions establishing the breadth of authority granted Congress under the commerce power. Their contention, on the contrary, is that when Congress seeks to regulate directly the activities of States as public employers, it transgresses an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power akin to other commerce power affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution. Congressional enactments which may be fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the Commerce Clause may nonetheless be invalid because found to offend against the right to trial by jury contained in the Sixth Amendment, United or the Due Process Clause of
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
the Sixth Amendment, United or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Appellants' essential contention is that the amendments to the Act, while undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause, encounter a similar constitutional barrier because are to be applied directly to the States and subdivisions of States as employers.[12] *842 This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution. In for example, the Court took care to assure the appellants that it had "ample power to prevent `the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity,' " which feared. 392 U.S., Appellee Secretary in this case, both in his brief and upon oral argument, has agreed that our federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the States as States by means of the commerce power. See, e. g., Brief for Appellee 30-41; Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-43. In the Court recognized that an express declaration of this limitation is found in the Tenth Amendment: "While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a `truism,' stating merely that `all is retained which has not been surrendered,' United it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." 421 U.S., at n. 7. In New Mr. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for four Members of an eight-Member Court[13] in rejecting the proposition that Congress could impose taxes on the States so long as it did so in a nondiscriminatory manner, observed: "A State may, like a private individual, own real property and receive income. But in view of our former decisions we could hardly say that a general non-discriminatory real estate tax (apportioned), or an income tax laid upon citizens and States alike could be constitutionally applied to the State's capitol, its State-house, its public school houses, public parks, or its revenues from taxes or school lands, even though all real property and all income of the citizen is taxed."[14] *844 The expressions in these more recent cases trace back to earlier decisions of this Court recognizing the essential role of the States in our federal system of government. Mr. Chief Justice Chase, perhaps because of the particular time at which he occupied that office, had occasion more than once to
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
he occupied that office, had occasion more than once to speak for the Court on this point. In he declared that "[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States." In Lane his opinion for the Court said: "Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States. But in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized." In Metcalf & the Court likewise observed that "neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers." Appellee Secretary argues that the cases in which this Court has upheld sweeping exercises of authority by Congress, even though those exercises pre-empted state regulation *845 of the private sector, have already curtailed the sovereignty of the States quite as much as the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. We do not agree. It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States. We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner. In the Court gave this example of such an attribute: "The power to locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers. That one of the original thirteen States could now be shorn of such powers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained." One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the State's power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may be
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
what compensation will be provided where these employees may be called upon to work overtime. The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations are " `functions essential to separate and independent existence,' " quoting from Lane so that Congress *846 may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary authority to make them. In their complaint appellants advanced estimates of substantial costs which will be imposed upon them by the amendments. Since the District Court dismissed their complaint, we take its well-pleaded allegations as true, although it appears from appellee's submissions in the District Court and in this Court that resolution of the factual disputes as to the effect of the amendments is not critical to our disposition of the case. Judged solely in terms of increased costs in dollars, these allegations show a significant impact on the functioning of the governmental bodies involved. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., for example, asserted that the Act will increase its costs of providing essential police and fire protection, without any increase in service or in current salary levels, by $938,000 per year. Cape Girardeau, Mo., estimated that its annual budget for fire protection may have to be increased by anywhere from $250,000 to $400,000 over the current figure of $350,000. The State of Arizona alleged that the annual additional expenditures which will be required if it is to continue to provide essential state services may total $2.5 million. The State of California, which must devote significant portions of its budget to fire-suppression endeavors, estimated that application of the Act to its employment practices will necessitate an increase in its budget of between $8 million and $16 million. Increased costs are not, of course, the only adverse effects which compliance with the Act will visit upon state and local governments, and in turn upon the citizens who depend upon those governments. In its complaint in intervention, for example, California asserted that it could not comply with the overtime costs (approximately *847 $750,000 per year) which the Act required to be paid to California Highway Patrol cadets during their academy training program. California reported that it had thus been forced to reduce its academy training program from 2,080 hours to only 960 hours, a compromise undoubtedly of substantial importance to those whose safety and welfare may depend upon the preparedness of the California Highway Patrol. This type of forced relinquishment of important governmental activities is further reflected in the complaint's allegation that the city of Inglewood, Cal., has been forced to curtail its affirmative action program for providing employment
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
forced to curtail its affirmative action program for providing employment opportunities for men and women interested in a career in law enforcement. The Inglewood police department has abolished a program for police trainees who split their week between on-the-job training and the classroom. The city could not abrogate its contractual obligations to these trainees, and it concluded that compliance with the Act in these circumstances was too financially burdensome to permit continuance of the classroom program. The city of Clovis, Cal., has been put to a similar choice regarding an internship program it was running in cooperation with a California state university. According to the complaint, because the interns' compensation brings them within the purview of the Act the city must decide whether to eliminate the program entirely or to substantially reduce its beneficial aspects by doing away with any pay for the interns. Quite apart from the substantial costs imposed upon the States and their political subdivisions, the Act displaces state policies regarding the manner in which will structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens require. The Act, speaking directly to the States qua States, requires that shall pay *848 all but an extremely limited minority of their employees the minimum wage rates currently chosen by Congress. It may well be that as a matter of economic policy it would be desirable that States, just as private employers, comply with these minimum wage requirements. But it cannot be gainsaid that the federal requirement directly supplants the considered policy choices of the States' elected officials and administrators as to how wish to structure pay scales in state employment. The State might wish to employ persons with little or no training, or those who wish to work on a casual basis, or those who for some other reason do not possess minimum employment requirements, and pay them less than the federally prescribed minimum wage. It may wish to offer part-time or summer employment to teenagers at a figure less than the minimum wage, and if unable to do so may decline to offer such employment at all. But the Act would forbid such choices by the States. The only "discretion" left to them under the Act is either to attempt to increase their revenue to meet the additional financial burden imposed upon them by paying congressionally prescribed wages to their existing complement of employees, or to reduce that complement to a number which can be paid the federal minimum wage without increasing revenue.[15] This dilemma presented by the minimum wage restrictions may seem not immediately different from that faced
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
wage restrictions may seem not immediately different from that faced by private employers, who have long been covered by the Act and who must find ways to increase their gross income if are to pay higher wages while *849 maintaining current earnings. The difference, however, is that a State is not merely a factor in the "shifting economic arrangements" of the private sector of the economy, but is itself a coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union. The degree to which the FLSA amendments would interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty can be seen even more clearly upon examining the overtime requirements of the Act. The general effect of these provisions is to require the States to pay their employees at premium rates whenever their work exceeds a specified number of hours in a given period. The asserted reason for these provisions is to provide a financial disincentive upon using employees beyond the work period deemed appropriate by Congress. According to appellee: "This premium rate can be avoided if the [State] uses other employees to do the overtime work. This, in effect, tends to discourage overtime work and to spread employment, which is the result Congress intended." Brief for Appellee 43. We do not doubt that this may be a salutary result, and that it has a sufficiently rational relationship to commerce to validate the application of the overtime provisions to private employers. But, like the minimum wage provisions, the vice of the Act as sought to be applied here is that it directly penalizes the States for choosing to hire governmental employees on terms different from those which Congress has sought to impose. This congressionally imposed displacement of state decisions may substantially restructure traditional ways in which the local governments have arranged their affairs. Although at this point many of the actual effects *850 under the proposed amendments remain a matter of some dispute among the parties, enough can be satisfactorily anticipated for an outline discussion of their general import. The requirement imposing premium rates upon any employment in excess of what Congress has decided is appropriate for a governmental employee's workweek, for example, appears likely to have the effect of coercing the States to structure work periods in some employment areas, such as police and fire protection, in a manner substantially different from practices which have long been commonly accepted among local governments of this Nation. In addition, appellee represents that the Act will require that the premium compensation for overtime worked must be paid in cash, rather than with
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
overtime worked must be paid in cash, rather than with compensatory time off, unless such compensatory time is taken in the same pay period. Supplemental Brief for Appellee 9-10; see cert. pending sub nom. New Jersey v. Usery, No. 75-532. This, too, appears likely to be highly disruptive of accepted employment practices in many governmental areas where the demand for a number of employees to perform important jobs for extended periods on short notice can be both unpredictable and critical. Another example of congressional choices displacing those of the States in the area of what are without doubt essential governmental decisions may be found in the practice of using volunteer firemen, a source of manpower crucial to many of our smaller towns' existence. Under the regulations proposed by appellee, whether individuals are indeed "volunteers" rather than "employees" subject to the minimum wage provisions of the Act are questions to be decided in the courts. See Brief for Appellee 49, and n. 41. It goes without saying that provisions such as these contemplate a significant reduction of traditional *851 volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn on to complement the operation of many local governmental functions. Our examination of the effect of the amendments, as sought to be extended to the States and their political subdivisions, satisfies us that both the minimum wage and the maximum hour provisions will impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bodies. We earlier noted some disagreement between the parties regarding the precise effect the amendments will have in application. We do not believe particularized assessments of actual impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented, however. For even if we accept appellee's assessments concerning the impact of the amendments, their application will nonetheless significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services.[16] Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States' " `separate and independent existence.' " Coyle, 221 U. S., Thus, even if appellants may have overestimated the effect which the Act will have
|
Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
may have overestimated the effect which the Act will have upon *852 their current levels and patterns of governmental activity, the dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their capacities as sovereign governments. In so doing, Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States' "ability to function effectively in a federal system," 421 U. S., at n. 7. This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution. We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, 8, cl. 3.[17] III One final matter requires our attention. Appellee has vigorously urged that we cannot, consistently with the Court's decisions in and rule against him here. It is important to examine this contention so that it will be clear what we hold today, and what we do not. With regard to we disagree with appellee. There the Court held that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 was constitutional as applied to temporarily freeze the wages of state and local government employees. The Court expressly noted that the degree of intrusion upon the protected area of state sovereignty was in that case *853 even less than that worked by the amendments to the FLSA which were before the Court in The Court recognized that the Economic Stabilization Act was "an emergency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national economy." We think our holding today quite consistent with The enactment at issue there was occasioned by an extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the component parts of our federal system and which only collective action by the National Government might forestall. The means selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere with the States' freedom beyond a very limited, specific period of time. The effect of the across-the-board freeze authorized by that Act, moreover, displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured, nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves. Instead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained during the period of the emergency. Finally, the Economic Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pressures upon state budgets rather than increase them. These factors distinguish the statute in from
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Justice Rehnquist
| 1,976 | 19 |
majority
|
National League of Cities v. Usery
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109499/national-league-of-cities-v-usery/
|
than increase them. These factors distinguish the statute in from the provisions at issue here. The limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency. "[A]lthough an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." With respect to the Court's decision in we reach a different conclusion. Both appellee and the District Court thought that decision required rejection of appellants' *854 claims. Appellants, in turn, advance several arguments by which seek to distinguish the facts before the Court in from those presented by the amendments to the Act. There are undoubtedly factual distinctions between the two situations, but in view of the conclusions expressed earlier in this opinion we do not believe the reasoning in may any longer be regarded as authoritative. relied heavily on the Court's decision in United The opinion quotes the following language from that case: " `[We] look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.'" But we have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. We think the dicta[18] from *855 United simply wrong.[19] Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made. We agree that such assertions of power, if unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in allow "the National Government [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty," and would therefore transgress the bounds of the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause. While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens.[20] We are therefore persuaded that must be overruled. *856 The judgment of the District Court is accordingly reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. MR.
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per_curiam
| 1,977 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Harris v. Oklahoma
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109736/harris-v-oklahoma/
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A clerk in a Tulsa, Okla., grocery store was shot and killed by a companion of petitioner in the course of a robbery of the store by the two men. Petitioner was convicted of felony-murder in Oklahoma State court. The opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in this case states that "[i]n a felony murder case, the proof of the underlying felony [here robbery with firearms] is needed to prove the intent necessary for a felony murder conviction." Petitioner nevertheless was thereafter brought to trial and convicted on a separate information charging the robbery with firearms, after denial of his motion to dismiss on the ground that this prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he had been already convicted of the offense in the felony-murder trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. When, as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one.[*]In re *683 ; cf. "[A] person [who] has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offence." In re See also ; The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Reversed. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
|
Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S. C. 13(b), provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers "was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."[1] The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has concluded that the "meeting-competition" defense of 2(b) is available only if the defendant sets its lower price on a customer-by-customer basis and creates the price discrimination by lowering rather than by raising prices. We conclude that 2(b) is not so inflexible. I From July 1, 1972, through November 30, 1978, petitioner Falls City Industries, Inc., sold beer f.o.b. its Louisville, Ky., brewery to wholesalers throughout Indiana, Kentucky, and 11 other States. Respondent Vanco Beverage, Inc., was the sole wholesale distributor of Falls City beer in Vanderburgh County, Ind. That county includes the city of Evansville. Directly across the state line from Vanderburgh County is Henderson County, Ky., where Falls City's only wholesale distributor was Dawson Springs, Inc. The city of Henderson, Ky., located in Henderson County, is less than 10 miles from Evansville. The two cities are connected by a four-lane interstate highway. The two counties generally are considered to be a single metropolitan area. App. 124. *432 Vanco and Dawson Springs each purchased beer from Falls City and other brewers and resold it to retailers in Vanderburgh County and Henderson County, respectively. The two distributors did not compete for sales to the same retailers. This was because Indiana wholesalers were prohibited by state law from selling to out-of-state retailers, Ind. Code 7.1-3-3-5 and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers. See 7.1-3-4-6. Indiana law also affected beer sales in two other ways relevant to this case. First, Indiana required brewers to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price. 7.1-5-5-7. Second, although it was ignored and virtually unenforced, see Tr. 122-123, 135-136, state law prohibited consumers from importing alcoholic beverages without a permit. 7.1-5-11-1. In December 1976, Vanco sued Falls City in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, alleging, among other things, that Falls City had discriminated in price against Vanco, in violation of 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S. C. 13(a),[2] by charging Vanco a higher price than it charged Dawson Springs. Vanco also claimed that Falls City had violated 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. 1 and 2, by conspiring
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
|
Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. 1 and 2, by conspiring with other brewers and unnamed wholesalers to maintain higher prices in Indiana than in Kentucky. After trial, the District Court dismissed Vanco's Sherman Act claims, finding no evidence to support the allegations of *433 conspiracy or monopolization. The court held, however, that Vanco had made out a prima facie case of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. The District Court found that Vanco competed in a geographic market that spanned the state border and included Vanderburgh and Henderson Counties. Although Vanco and Dawson Springs did not sell to the same retailers, they "competed for sale of [Falls City's] beer to consumers of beer from retailers situated in [that] market area." Falls City charged a higher price for beer sold to Indiana distributors than it charged for the same beer sold to distributors in other States, including Kentucky. [3] This pricing policy resulted in lower retail prices for Falls City beer in Kentucky than in Indiana, because Kentucky distributors passed on their savings to retailers who in turn passed them on to consumers. Finding that many customers living in the Indiana portion of the geographic market ignored state law to purchase cheaper Falls City beer from Henderson County retailers, the court concluded that Falls City's pricing policies prevented Vanco from competing effectively with Dawson Springs, and caused it to sell less beer to Indiana retailers. -75,817, 75,818.[4] *434 The District Court rejected Falls City's 2(b) meeting-competition defense. The court reasoned that, instead of reducing its prices to meet those of a competitor, Falls City had created the price disparity by raising its prices to Indiana wholesalers more than it had raised its Kentucky prices. Instead of "adjusting prices on a customer to customer basis to meet competition from other brewers," Falls City charged a single price throughout each State in which it sold beer. The court concluded that Falls City's higher Indiana price was not set in good faith; instead, it was raised "for the sole reason that it followed the other brewers for its profit." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed the finding of liability.[5] The court held that Vanco had established a prima facie case of illegal price discrimination and that Falls City had not demonstrated that the discrimination "was a good faith effort to defend against competitors." We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' holdings respecting injury to competition and the "meeting-competition" defense. II To establish a prima facie violation of 2(a), one of the elements a
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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prima facie violation of 2(a), one of the elements a plaintiff must show is a reasonable possibility that a *435 price difference may harm Corn Refining In keeping with the Robinson-Patman Act's prophylactic purpose, 2(a) "does not `require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed ' " J. Truett Payne quoting Corn 324 U. S., at This reasonable possibility of harm is often referred to as competitive injury. Unless rebutted by one of the Robinson-Patman Act's affirmative defenses, a showing of competitive injury as part of a prima facie case is sufficient to support injunctive relief, and to authorize further inquiry by the courts into whether the plaintiff is entitled to treble damages under 4 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 15 (1976 ed., Supp. V). J. Truett Payne U. S., at[6] Falls City contends that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on to uphold the District Court's finding of competitive injury. In Morton this Court held that, for the purposes of 2(a), injury to competition is established prima facie by proof of a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers over 50-51; see In the absence of direct evidence of displaced sales, this may be overcome by evidence breaking the causal connection between a price differential and lost sales or profits. F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 1 (Rowe); see Chrysler Credit v. J. Truett Payne *436 According to Falls City, the Morton rule should be applied only in cases involving "large buyer preference or seller predation." Brief for Petitioner 31. Falls City does not, however, suggest any economic reason why Morton 's "self-evident" should not apply when the favored competitor is not extraordinarily large. Although concerns about the excessive market power of large purchasers were primarily responsible for passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, see generally Rowe, at 3-23; U. S. Dept. of Justice, Report on the Robinson-Patman Act 101-139 (1977) (1977 Report), the Act "is of general applicability and prohibits discriminations generally," The determination whether to alter the scope of the Act must be made by Congress, not this Court, as is recognized by the commentators on which Falls City relies. See 1977 Report, at 221-228 and 290-291; ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 4, The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and Law, Vol. I, 102-103 (1980). The Morton rule was not misapplied in this case. In a strictly literal sense, this case differs from Morton because Vanco and Dawson Springs did not compete with each other at the wholesale level; Vanco sold only to Indiana retailers and Dawson Springs sold only to Kentucky retailers.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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Indiana retailers and Dawson Springs sold only to Kentucky retailers. But the competitive injury component of a Robinson-Patman Act violation is not limited to the injury to competition between the favored and the disfavored purchaser; it also encompasses the injury to competition between their customers in this case the competition between Kentucky retailers and Indiana retailers who, under a District Court finding not challenged in this Court, were selling in a single, interstate retail market.[7] *437 After observing that Falls City had maintained a substantial price difference between Vanco and Dawson Springs over a significant period of time, the Court of Appeals, like the District Court, considered the evidence that Vanco's loss of Falls City beer sales was attributable to factors other than the price difference, particularly the marketwide decline of Falls City beer. Both courts found it likely that this overall decline accounted for some or even most of Vanco's lost sales. Nevertheless, if some of Vanco's injury was attributable to the price discrimination, Falls City is responsible to that extent. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's findings that "the major reason for the higher Indiana retail beer prices was the higher prices charged Indiana distributors," and "the lower retail prices in Henderson County attracted Indiana customers away from Indiana retailers, thereby causing the retailers to curtail purchases from Vanco." These findings were supported by direct evidence of diverted sales,[8] and more than established the competitive *438 injury required for a prima facie case under 2(a). See J. Truett Payne -; Morton -51. We therefore turn to Falls City's "meeting-competition" defense. III When proved, the meeting-competition defense of 2(b) exonerates a seller from Robinson-Patman Act liability. Standard Oil This Court consistently has held that the meeting-competition defense " `at least requires the seller, who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor.' " United quoting ; see Great A&P Tea The seller must show that under the circumstances it was reasonable to believe that the quoted price or a lower one was available to the favored purchaser or purchasers from the seller's competitors. See United States Gypsum 438 U. S., at Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the question whether Falls City had shown information that would have led a reasonable and prudent person to believe that its lower Kentucky
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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reasonable and prudent person to believe that its lower Kentucky price would meet competitors' equally low prices there; indeed, no findings whatever were made regarding competitors' Kentucky prices, or *439 the information available to Falls City about its competitors' Kentucky prices. Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Falls City had otherwise failed to show that its pricing "was a good faith effort" to meet 654 F.2d, The Court of Appeals considered it sufficient to defeat the defense that the price difference "resulted from price increases in Indiana, not price decreases in Kentucky," ib and that the higher Indiana price was the result of Falls City's policy of following the Indiana prices of its larger competitors in order to enhance its profits. The Court of Appeals also suggested that Falls City's defense failed because it adopted a "general system of competition," rather than responding to "individual situations." The court believed that supported this 654 F.2d, A On its face, 2(b) requires more than a showing of facts that would have led a reasonable person to believe that a lower price was available to the favored purchaser from a competitor. The showing required is that the "lower price. was made in good faith to meet" the competitor's low price. 15 U.S. C. 13(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the defense requires that the seller offer the lower price in good faith for the purpose of meeting the competitor's price, that is, the lower price must actually have been a good-faith response to that competing low price. See Rowe, at 234-235. See generally Kuenzel & Schiffres, Making Sense of Robinson-Patman: The Need to Revitalize Its Affirmative Defenses, In most situations, a showing of facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that equally low prices were available to the favored purchaser from a competitor will be sufficient to establish that the seller's lower price was offered in good faith to meet that price. In others, however, despite the availability from other sellers of a low price, it may be apparent that the defendant's low offer was not a good-faith response. *440 In this Court applied that principle. The Federal Trade Commission () had proceeded against and six competing manufacturers of glucose, all of whom adhered to the same Chicago basing-point pricing system. See C. Edwards, Price Discrimination Law 372-379 (1959). See generally Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices, 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶¶ 3601.27, 3601.40-3601.42, pp. 5346, 5351-5352 (10th ed. 1959). Like its competitors, whose plant was located in Decatur, Ill., sold glucose to candy and syrup manufacturers at a delivered price that included the
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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and syrup manufacturers at a delivered price that included the freight rate from Chicago to the point of delivery. Purchasers nearer Decatur thus were charged an element of "phantom" freight, while "absorbed" an element of freight in sales to buyers nearer Chicago. Customers located near 's Decatur plant were harmed because, despite being located closer to the plant, they were forced to pay more for glucose than did their Chicago area competitors. The eventually charged all seven manufacturers individually with price discrimination and jointly under the Federal Trade Commission Act with price fixing. See Corn Refining 47 F. T. C. 587 (1950). At the time of the decision, both the and this Court had determined that use of the pricing system by 's competitors was illegal under 2(a). See Corn Refining 737-739. And, although neither the nor this Court directly relied on the fact in finding price discrimination, itself had been found to be a party to an interseller conspiracy aimed at maintaining "oppressive and uniform net delivered prices" throughout the country. See A. E. Mfg. 4 F. T. C. Stat. & Dec. 795, 805 (1943). The Court observed that 2(b) could exonerate only if that section permitted a seller to establish "an otherwise unlawful system of discriminatory prices" in order to benefit from "a like unlawful system maintained by his competitors." * could not claim that its low Chicago prices were set for the purpose of meeting the equally low prices of competitors there; the Chicago prices could be seen only as part of a collusive pricing system designed to exact artificially high prices throughout the country. Since the low prices were set "in order to establish elsewhere the artificially high prices whose discriminatory effect permeates respondents' entire pricing system," the Court sustained the 's finding "that respondents' price discriminations were not made to meet a `lower' price and consequently were not in good faith," Thus, even had been able to show that its prices throughout the country did not undercut those of its competitors, its lower price in the Chicago area was not a good-faith response to the lower prices there. had not priced in response to competitors' discrete pricing decisions, but from the outset had followed an industrywide practice of setting its prices according to a single, arbitrary scheme that by its nature precluded independent pricing in response to normal competitive forces. B Almost 20 years ago, the set forth the standard that governs the requirement of a "good-faith response". "At the heart of Section 2(b) is the concept of `good faith'. This is a flexible and
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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the concept of `good faith'. This is a flexible and pragmatic, not a technical or doctrinaire, concept. The standard of good faith is simply the standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a situation of competitive necessity." Continental Baking 63 F. T. C. 2071, 2163 Whether this standard is met depends on " `the facts and circumstances of the particular case, not abstract theories or remote conjectures.' " United quoting Continental Baking 63 F. T. C., at 2163. * The "facts and circumstances" present in differ markedly from those present here. Although the District Court characterized the Indiana prices charged by Falls City and its competitors as "artificially high," there is no evidence that Falls City's lower prices in Kentucky were set as part of a plan to obtain artificially high profits in Indiana rather than in response to competitive conditions in Kentucky. Falls City did not adopt an illegal system of prices maintained by its competitors.[9] The District Court found that Falls City's prices rose in Indiana in response to competitors' price increases there; it did not address the crucial question whether Falls City's Kentucky prices remained lower in response to competitors' prices in that State. Vanco attempts to liken this case to by arguing that the existence of industrywide price discrimination within the single geographic retail market itself indicates "tacit or explicit collusion, or market power" inconsistent with a good-faith response. Brief for Respondent 39. By its terms, however, the meeting-competition defense requires a seller to justify only its lower price. See Thus, although the Sherman Act would provide a remedy if Falls City's higher Indiana price were set collusively, collusion is relevant to Vanco's Robinson-Patman Act claim only if it affected Falls City's lower Kentucky price. If Falls City set its lower price in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, it did not violate the Robinson-Patman Act. *443 Moreover, the collusion argument founders on a complete lack of proof. Persistent, industrywide price discrimination within a geographic market should certainly alert a court to a substantial possibility of collusion.[10] See Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1, Here, however, the persistent interstate price difference could well have been attributable, not to Falls City, but to extensive state regulation of the sale of beer. Indiana required each brewer to charge a single price for its beer throughout the State, and barred direct competition between Indiana and Kentucky distributors for sales to retailers. In these unusual circumstances, the prices charged to Vanco
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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retailers. In these unusual circumstances, the prices charged to Vanco and other wholesalers in Vanderburgh County may have been influenced more by market conditions in distant Gary and Fort Wayne than by conditions in nearby Henderson County, Ky. Moreover, wholesalers in Henderson County competed directly, and attempted to price competitively, with wholesalers in neighboring Kentucky counties. App. 52-53. A separate pricing structure might well have evolved in the two States without collusion, notwithstanding *444 the existence of a common retail market along the border. Thus, the sustained price discrimination does not itself demonstrate that Falls City's Kentucky prices were not a good-faith response to competitors' prices there. C The Court of Appeals explicitly relied on two other factors in rejecting Falls City's meeting-competition defense: the price discrimination was created by raising rather than lowering prices, and Falls City raised its prices in order to increase its profits. Neither of these factors is controlling. Nothing in 2(b) requires a seller to lower its price in order to meet On the contrary, 2(b) requires the defendant to show only that its "lower price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor." A seller is required to justify a price difference by showing that it reasonably believed that an equally low price was available to the purchaser and that it offered the lower price for that reason; the seller is not required to show that the difference resulted from subtraction rather than addition. A different rule would not only be contrary to the language of the statute, but also might stifle the only kind of legitimate price competition reasonably available in particular industries. In a period of generally rising prices, vigorous price competition for a particular customer or customers may take the form of smaller price increases rather than price cuts. Thus, a price discrimination created by selective price increases can result from a good-faith effort to meet a competitor's low price. Nor is the good faith with which the lower price is offered impugned if the prices raised, like those kept lower, respond to competitors' prices and are set with the goal of increasing the seller's profits. A seller need not choose between "ruinously cutting its prices to all its customers to match the price offered to one, [and] refusing to meet the competition and *445 then ruinously raising its prices to its remaining customers to cover increased unit costs." Standard Oil Nor need a seller choose between keeping all its prices ruinously low to meet the price offered to one, and ruinously raising its prices
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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the price offered to one, and ruinously raising its prices to all customers to a level significantly above that charged by its competitors. A seller is permitted "to retain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that customer, without necessarily changing the seller's price to its other customers." The plain language of 2(b) also permits a seller to retain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that customer, without necessarily freezing his price to his other customers. Section 2(b) does not require a seller, meeting in good faith a competitor's lower price to certain customers, to forgo the profits that otherwise would be available in sales to its remaining customers. The very purpose of the defense is to permit a seller to treat different competitive situations differently. The prudent businessman responding fairly to what he believes in good faith is a situation of competitive necessity might well raise his prices to some customers to increase his profits, while meeting competitors' prices by keeping his prices to other customers low. The Court in said that the meeting-competition defense "presupposes that the person charged with violating the Act would, by his normal, non-discriminatory pricing methods, have reached a price so high that he could reduce it in order to meet the competitor's equally low price." In that case, however, the Court was not dealing with a seller whose "normal, non-discriminatory pricing methods" called for a price increase but who wished to exempt certain customers from the increase in order to meet prices, lower than the increased price, available to those customers from competitors. Of course, a seller could accomplish the same result within the guidelines the Court of Appeals *446 would impose by instituting across-the-board price increases followed by selective reductions. But far from being flexible and pragmatic, a rule requiring such costly behavior would be nonsensical.[11] D Vanco also contends that Falls City did not satisfy 2(b) because its price discrimination "was not a defensive response to " Brief for Respondent 47 (emphasis supplied). According to Vanco, the Robinson-Patman Act permits price discrimination only if its purpose is to retain a customer. We agree that a seller's response must be defensive, in the sense that the lower price must be calculated and offered in good faith to "meet not beat" the competitor's low price. See United States Gypsum Section 2(b), however, does not distinguish between one who meets a competitor's lower price to retain an old customer and one who meets a competitor's lower price in an attempt to gain new
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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a competitor's lower price in an attempt to gain new customers.[12] See Stevens, Defense of Meeting the Lower Price of a Competitor, in Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law, University of Michigan Law School, Lectures on Federal Antitrust Laws 129, 135-136 (1953). Such a distinction would be *447 inconsistent with that section's language and logic, see Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. "would not be in keeping with elementary principles of competition, and would in fact foster tight and rigid commercial relationships by insulating them from market forces." Report, at 184; see 1977 Report, at 26, 265.[13] IV The Court of Appeals also relied on for the proposition that the meeting-competition defense " `places emphasis on individual [competitive] situations, rather than upon a general system of competition,' " 654 F.2d, (quoting ), and "does not justify the maintenance of discriminatory pricing among classes of customers that results merely from the adoption of a competitor's discriminatory pricing structure," 654 F.2d, The Court of Appeals was apparently invoking the District Court's findings that Falls City set prices statewide rather than on a "customer to customer basis," and the District Court's conclusion that this practice disqualified Falls City from asserting the meeting-competition defense. 1980-2 Trade Cases, at 75,817. At least two other Courts of Appeals have read to hold that the defense is unavailable to sellers pricing on other than a customer-by-customer basis, while two Courts of Appeals have held that a customer-by-customer response is not required.[14] *448 There is no evidence that Congress intended to limit the availability of 2(b) to customer-specific responses. Section 2(b)'s predecessor, 2 of the original Clayton Act, stated that "nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet " The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, which drafted the clause that became the current 2(b), see Standard Oil -248, n. 14, explained the new section's anticipated function: "It should be noted that while the seller is permitted to meet local competition, [ 2(b)] does not permit him to cut local prices until his competitor has first offered lower prices, and then he can go no further than to meet those prices." H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1936) (emphasis supplied). Congress intended to allow reasonable pricing responses on an area-specific basis where competitive circumstances warrant them. The purpose of the amendment was to "restric[t] the proviso to price differentials occurring in actual " Standard Oil We conclude that Congress did not intend to bar territorial price differences that are in fact responses
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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to bar territorial price differences that are in fact responses to competitive conditions. Section 2(b) specifically allows a "lower price to any purchaser or purchasers" made in good faith to meet a competitor's equally low price. A single low price surely may be extended to numerous purchasers if the seller has a reasonable basis for believing that the competitor's lower price is available to them.[15] Beyond the requirement that the lower *449 price be reasonably calculated to "meet not beat" the competition, Congress intended to leave it a "question of fact whether the way in which the competition was met lies within the latitude allowed." 80 Cong. Rec. 9418 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Utterback). Once again, this inquiry is guided by the standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably believes are the competitive necessities. A seller may have good reason to believe that a competitor or competitors are charging lower prices throughout a particular region. See William Inglis & Sons Baking v. ITT Continental Baking cert. denied, 459 U.S. 5 ; Balian Ice Cream v. Arden Farms cert. denied, ; Rowe, at 235-236. In such circumstances, customer-by-customer negotiations would be unlikely to result in prices different from those set according to information relating to competitors' territorial prices. A customer-by-customer requirement might also make meaningful price competition unrealistically expensive for smaller firms such as Falls City, which was attempting to compete with larger national breweries in 13 separate States. Cf. Callaway Mills In as in each of the later cases in which this Court has contrasted a "general system of competition" with "individual competitive situations," see, e. g., v. National Lead ; v. Cement Institute, the seller's lower *450 price was quoted not "because of lower prices by a competitor," but "because of a preconceived pricing scale which [was] operative regardless of variations in competitor's prices." Rowe, at 234 In those cases, the contested lower prices were not truly "responsive to rivals' competitive prices," and therefore were not genuinely made to meet competitors' lower prices. Territorial pricing, however, can be a perfectly reasonable method sometimes the most reasonable method of responding to rivals' low prices.[16] We choose not to read into 2(b) a restriction that would deny the meeting-competition defense to one whose areawide price is a well-tailored response to competitors' low prices. Of course, a seller must limit its lower price to that group of customers reasonably believed to have the lower price available to it from competitors. A response that is not reasonably tailored to the competitive situation as known to the seller,
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,983 | 11 |
majority
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Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110887/falls-city-industries-inc-v-vanco-beverage-inc/
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tailored to the competitive situation as known to the seller, or one that is based on inadequate verification, would not meet the standard of good faith. Similarly, the response may continue only as long as the competitive circumstances justifying it, as reasonably known by the seller, persist.[17] One choosing to price on a territorial basis, rather than on a * customer-by-customer basis, must show that this decision was a genuine, reasonable response to prevailing competitive circumstances. See International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior cert. denied, ; Callaway Mills 362 F. 2d, at -. See generally 1977 Report, at 265. Unless the circumstances call into question the seller's good faith, this burden will be discharged by showing that a reasonable and prudent businessman would believe that the lower price he charged was generally available from his competitors throughout the territory and throughout the period in which he made the lower price available. See William Inglis & Sons Baking v. ITT Continental Baking 668 F. 2d, at 1045-. V In summary, the meeting-competition defense requires the seller at least to show the existence of facts that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the seller's lower price would meet the equally low price of a competitor; it also requires the seller to demonstrate that its lower price was a good-faith response to a competitor's lower price. Falls City contends that it has established its meeting-competition defense as a matter of law. In the absence of further findings, we do not agree. The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not decide whether Falls City had shown facts that would have led a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that its lower price would meet the equally low price of its competitors in Kentucky throughout the period at issue in this suit. Nor did they apply the proper standards to the question whether Falls City's decision to set a single statewide price in Kentucky was a good-faith, well-tailored response to the competitive circumstances prevailing there. The absence of allegations to the contrary is not controlling; the statute places the burden of establishing the defense on Falls City, not Vanco. There is evidence *452 in the record that might support an that these requirements were met,[18] but whether to draw that is a question for the trier of fact, not this Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
|
Justice Souter
| 1,996 | 20 |
concurring
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Carlisle v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118021/carlisle-v-united-states/
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In Part I of his dissenting opinion, JUSTICE STEVENS makes a persuasive argument that, absent a rule to the contrary, district judges have an "inherent authority" to enter a judgment of acquittal, although, for the reasons offered by the majority, ante, at 426, I am not persuaded that this inherent authority extends to the power to act sua sponte to grant a judgment of acquittal after the jury has returned a verdict. In any event, I accept the received view that inherent power generally is subject to legislative abrogation, see Bank of Nova ; ante, at 426, and although Congress's power is not necessarily plenary, its limits are not implicated here. While there may be some point at which legislative interference with a court's inherent authority would run afoul of Article III, see ("Some elements of that inherent authority are so essential to `[t]he judicial Power,' U. S. Const., Art. III, 1, that they are indefeasible"), it is not seriously contended that Rule 29(c) is an unconstitutional interference with the court's inherent authority. I therefore join the Court's opinion.
|
per_curiam
| 1,974 | 200 |
per_curiam
|
Secretary of Navy v. Avrech
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109100/secretary-of-navy-v-avrech/
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Appellee Mark Avrech was convicted by a special court-martial on charges of having violated Art. 80 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S. C. 880. The specification under Art. 80, which punishes attempts to commit offenses otherwise punishable under the UCMJ, charged an attempt to commit an offense under the first and second clauses of Art. 134, 10 U.S. C. 934, namely, an attempt to publish a statement disloyal *677 to the United States to members of the Armed Forces "with design to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the troops." Upon conviction, appellee was sentenced to reduction in rank to the lowest enlisted grade, forfeiture of three months' pay, and confinement at hard labor for one month. The commanding officer suspended the confinement, but the remainder of the sentence was sustained by the Staff Judge Advocate and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Appellee was subsequently given a bad-conduct discharge after an unrelated second court-martial conviction. In December 1970, appellee brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting jurisdiction under 5 U.S. C. 701-706, 28 U.S. C. 1331, and 28 U.S. C. 1361. He claimed that Art. 134 was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face and as applied, that his statement was protected speech, and that he was convicted without sufficient evidence of criminal intent. He sought an order declaring his Art. 80 conviction invalid and requiring the Secretary of the Navy to expunge any record of his conviction and to restore all pay and benefits lost because of the conviction. After the District Court denied relief, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Art. 134 is unconstitutionally vague. 155 U. S. App. D. C. 352, We noted probable jurisdiction. Following oral argument on the merits, we directed counsel to file supplemental briefs on the issues of the jurisdiction of the District Court and the exhaustion of remedies. Without the benefit of further oral argument, we are unwilling to decide the difficult jurisdictional issue which the parties have briefed. Assuming, arguendo, that the District Court had jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case to review the decision of the court-martial, our *678 decision in would require reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision on the merits of appellee's constitutional challenge to Art. 134. We believe that even the most diligent and zealous advocate could find his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue where the decision on the merits is thus foreordained. We accordingly leave to a future case the resolution of the jurisdictional issue, and reverse the
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Justice Alito
| 2,008 | 8 |
concurring
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Cuellar v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145803/cuellar-v-united-states/
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I join the opinion of the Court but write briefly to summarize my understanding of the deficiency in the Government's proof. As the Court notes, ante, at 2002, the Government was required in this case to prove that petitioner knew that the plan to transport the funds across the Mexican border was designed at least in part to "conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control" of the funds. (a)(2)(B)(i). Transporting the funds across the border would have had the effect of achieving this objective if, once the funds made it into Mexico, it would have been harder for law enforcement authorities in this country (1) to ascertain that the funds were drug proceeds ("nature"), (2) to find the funds ("location"), (3) to determine where they came from ("source"), (4) to ascertain who owned them ("ownership"), or (5) to find out who controlled them ("control"). But as the Court notes, ante, at 2005, the prosecution had to prove, not simply that the transportation of the funds from the United States to Mexico would have had one of these effects, ibid., but that petitioner knew that achieving one of these effects was a design (i.e., purpose) of the transportation. As the Court also notes, ante, at 2005, n. 8, a criminal defendant's intent is often inferred. Here, proof of petitioner's knowledge and of the intent of the person or persons who "designed" the transportation would have been sufficient if the prosecution had introduced evidence showing, not only that taking "dirty" money across the border has one or more of the effects noted above, but that it is commonly known in the relevant circles (that is, among those who design and carry out "such transportation," 1956(a)(2)(B)) that taking "dirty" money to Mexico has one of the effects noted above. Such evidence would permit a trier of fact to infer (1) that the person or persons who "designed" the plan to have the funds taken to Mexico intended to achieve the effect in question and (2) that a person like petitioner (that is, a person who is recruited to transport the funds) knew that this was the design. *2007 Of course, if the prosecution had introduced such evidence, the defense could have countered with any available proof showing (1) that in fact the achievement of these effects was not a design of the transportation or (2) that petitioner in fact did not know that achieving one of these effects was a purpose of the plan. It would have then been up to the trier of fact to
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Justice White
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/
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In Pension Benefit Guaranty the Court held that retroactive application of the withdrawal liability provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In these cases, we address the question whether the withdrawal liability provisions of the Act are valid under the Clause of the Fifth Amendment that forbids the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. I A The background and legislative history of both the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S. C. 1001 et seq., and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA or Act), 29 U.S. C. 181-1461, are set forth in detail in We therefore only summarize the *214 relevant portions of that description for purposes of our discussion here. Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to provide comprehensive regulation for private pension plans. In addition to prescribing standards for the funding, management, and benefit provisions of these plans, ERISA also established a system of pension benefit insurance. This "comprehensive and reticulated statute" was designed "to ensure that employees and their beneficiaries would not be deprived of anticipated retirement benefits by the termination of pension plans before sufficient funds have been accumulated in the plans. Congress wanted to guarantee that `if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit he will actually receive it.' " quoting Nachman To achieve this goal of protecting "anticipated retirement benefits," Congress created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a wholly owned Government corporation, to administer an insurance program for participants in both single-employer and multiemployer pension plans. 29 U.S. C. 102 ( ed.). For single-employer plans that were in default, ERISA immediately obligated the PBGC to pay benefits. 181. With respect to multiemployer plans, ERISA delayed mandatory payment of guaranteed benefits until January 1, Until that date, Congress gave the PBGC discretionary authority to pay benefits upon the termination of multiemployer pension plans. 181(c)(2)-(4). As with single-employer plans, all contributors to covered multiemployer plans were assessed insurance premiums payable to the PBGC. If the PBGC exercised its discretion to pay benefits upon a plan's termination, all employers that had contributed to the plan during the five years preceding its termination were liable to the PBGC in amounts proportional *215 to their shares of the plan's contributions during that period, subject to the limitation that any individual employer's liability could not exceed 0% of the employer's net worth. 162(b)(2). During the period
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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0% of the employer's net worth. 162(b)(2). During the period between the enactment of ERISA and when mandatory multiemployer guarantees were due to go into effect, the PBGC extended coverage to numerous plans. "Congress became concerned that a significant number of plans were experiencing extreme financial hardship," and that implementation of mandatory guarantees for multiemployer plans might induce several large plans to terminate, thus subjecting the insurance system to liability beyond its means. As a result, Congress delayed the effective date for the mandatory guarantees for 18 months, Stat. 1501, and directed the PBGC to prepare a report analyzing the problems of multiemployer plans and recommending possible solutions. See S. Rep. No. 95-570, pp. 1-4 (1977); H. R. Rep. No. 95-706, p. 1 (1977). The PBGC's Report found, inter alia, that "ERISA did not adequately protect plans from the adverse consequences that resulted when individual employers terminate their participation in, or withdraw from, multiemployer plans." The "basic problem," the Report found, was the threat to the solvency and stability of multiemployer plans caused by employer withdrawals, which existing law actually encouraged. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Multiemployer Study Required by P. L. 95-214, pp. 96-97 (PBGC Report).[1] As the PBGC's Executive Director explained: *216 "A key problem of ongoing multiemployer plans, especially in declining industries, is the problem of employer withdrawal. Employer withdrawals reduce a plan's contribution base. This pushes the contribution rate for remaining employers to higher and higher levels in order to fund past service liabilities, including liabilities generated by employers no longer participating in the plan, so-called inherited liabilities. The rising costs may encourage or force further withdrawals, thereby increasing the inherited liabilities to be funded by an ever decreasing contribution base. This vicious downward spiral may continue until it is no longer reasonable or possible for the pension plan to continue." Pension Plan Termination Insurance Issues: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 22 (statement of Matthew M. Lind) (hereinafter Hearings). "To alleviate the problem of employer withdrawals, the PBGC suggested new rules under which a withdrawing employer would be required to pay whatever share of the plan's unfunded liabilities was attributable to that employer's participation." citing PBGC Report, at 97-114 (footnote omitted). Again, the PBGC Executive Director explained: "To deal with this problem, our report considers an approach under which an employer withdrawing from a multiemployer plan would be required to complete funding its fair share of the plan's unfunded liabilities. In *217 other words, the plan would have a claim against the
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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other words, the plan would have a claim against the employer for the inherited liabilities which would otherwise fall upon the remaining employers as a result of the withdrawal. "We think that such withdrawal liability would, first of all, discourage voluntary withdrawals and curtail the current incentives to flee the plan. Where such withdrawals nonetheless occur, we think that withdrawal liability would cushion the financial impact on the plan." Hearings, at 2 (statement of Matthew M. Lind). After 17 months of discussion, Congress agreed with the analysis put forward in the PBGC Report, and drafted legislation which implemented the Report's recommendations. "As enacted, the Act requires that an employer withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan pay a fixed and certain debt to the pension plan. This withdrawal liability is the employer's proportionate share of the plan's `unfunded vested benefits,' calculated as the difference between the present value of the vested benefits and the current value of the plan's assets." quoting 29 U.S. C. 181, 1. B Appellant Trustees administer the Operating Engineers Pension Plan according to a written Agreement Establishing the Operating Engineers Pension Trust, executed in 1960, pursuant to 02(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S. C. 186(c)(5). App. 29. The Trust receives contributions from several thousand employers under written collective-bargaining agreements covering employees in the construction industry throughout southern California and southern Nevada. Under these collective-bargaining agreements, the employers agree to contribute a certain amount to the Pension Plan, with the actual amount contributed by each employer determined by multiplying their employees' hours of service by a rate specified in the current agreement. See *218 By the express terms of the Trust Agreement, and the Plan, the employer's sole obligation to the Pension Trust is to pay the contributions required by the collective-bargaining agreement. The Trust Agreement clearly states that the employer's obligation for pension benefits to the employee is ended when the employer pays the appropriate contribution to the Pension Trust.[2] This is true even though the contributions agreed upon are insufficient to pay the benefits under the Plan.[] *219 In 1975, the Trustees filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Pension Plan is a "defined contribution plan" as defined by ERISA, and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the PBGC.[4] Alternatively, the Trustees argued that if the Plan was subject to the provisions of ERISA requiring premium payments and imposing contingent termination liability, the statute was unconstitutional, as it deprived the Trustees, the employers, and the plan participants of property without due process and without proper compensation. The District
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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property without due process and without proper compensation. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Trustees, finding that the Plan was a "defined contribution plan," and enjoining the PBGC from treating it in any other manner. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the constitutional issues. cert. denied, On remand, the District Court denied the Trustees' motion to convene a three-judge court on the ground that the Trustees' constitutional challenges were insubstantial. App. 55-56. The Trustees sought a petition of mandamus on the issue, but their petition was denied by both the Ninth Circuit and this Court. Connolly v. Williams, No. 79-7580 ; On the merits, the District Court granted summary judgment to the PBGC, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court could not agree with the District Court that the constitutional claims raised by the Trustees were so "insubstantial" that a three-judge panel could be summarily denied. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case with directions to convene a three-judge court. During the course of the litigation to convene the three-judge court, Congress enacted the MPPAA. The District Court permitted the Trustees to file an amended complaint to include a challenge to the constitutionality of the new Act. The court also permitted appellant Woodward Sand an employer that had been assessed withdrawal liability by the Trustees, to intervene in the action. App. 82.[5] After oral argument, the three-judge panel granted summary judgment in favor of the PBGC. The court rejected appellants' argument that the Act violated the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, holding that "the contractual right which insulates employers from further liability to the pension plans in which they participate is not `property' within the meaning of the takings clause." Because the court resolved this issue "on the basis that no `property' is affected by the MPPAA," it did not discuss whether a "taking" had occurred, or whether the taking would have been for a "public purpose." Ibid.[6] *221 Both the Trustees and Woodward Sand invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S. C. 125. We noted probable jurisdiction, and now affirm. II Appellants challenge the District Court's conclusion that the Act does not effect a taking of "property" within the meaning of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rather than specifically asserting that the contractual limitation of liability is property, however, appellants argue that the imposition of noncontractual withdrawal liability violates the Taking Clause by requiring employers to transfer their assets for the private use of pension trusts and, in any event, by requiring an uncompensated transfer.[7] *222 We agree that
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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event, by requiring an uncompensated transfer.[7] *222 We agree that an employer subject to withdrawal liability is permanently deprived of those assets necessary to satisfy its statutory obligation, not to the Government, but to a pension trust. If liability is assessed under the Act, it constitutes a real debt that the employer must satisfy, and it is not an obligation which can be considered insubstantial. In the present litigation, for example, appellant Woodward Sand 's withdrawal liability, after the Trustees' assessment was reduced by an arbitrator, was approximately $200,000, or nearly 25% of the firm's net worth. Juris. Statement in No. 84-1567, p. 7, n. 7. But appellants' submission that such a statutory liability to a private party always constitutes an uncompensated taking prohibited by the Fifth Amendment if accepted, would *22 prove too much. In the course of regulating commercial and other human affairs, Congress routinely creates burdens for some that directly benefit others. For example, Congress may set minimum wages, control prices, or create causes of action that did not previously exist. Given the propriety of the governmental power to regulate, it cannot be said that the Taking Clause is violated whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another. In we sustained a statute requiring coal mine operators to compensate former employees disabled by pneumoconiosis, even though the operators had never contracted for such liability, and the employees involved had long since terminated their connection with the industry. We said: "[O]ur cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts." Relying on Turner Elkhorn, we also rejected a due process attack on the imposition, under the statute now before us, of withdrawal liability on employers who withdrew before the effective date of the amendments. We held that Congress had acted within its powers and for sound reasons. Pension Benefit Guaranty Although both and Turner Elkhorn were due process cases, it would be surprising indeed to discover now that in both cases Congress unconstitutionally had taken the assets of the employers there involved. Appellants' claim of an illegal taking gains nothing from the fact that the employer in the present litigation was protected by the terms of its contract from any liability beyond the specified contributions to which it had agreed. See nn. 2, "Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/
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cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject *224 matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them." 07-08 (195). If the regulatory statute is otherwise within the powers of Congress, therefore, its application may not be defeated by private contractual provisions. For the same reason, the fact that legislation disregards or destroys existing contractual rights does not always transform the regulation into an illegal taking. 21 U.S. 50, ; Omnia Commercial (192). This is not to say that contractual rights are never property rights or that the Government may always take them for its own benefit without compensation. But here, the United States has taken nothing for its own use, and only has nullified a contractual provision limiting liability by imposing an additional obligation that is otherwise within the power of Congress to impose. That the statutory withdrawal liability will operate in this manner and will redound to the benefit of pension trusts does not justify a holding that the provision violates the Taking Clause and is invalid on its face. This conclusion is not inconsistent with our prior Taking Clause cases. See, e. g., ; ; ; Kaiser ; Penn Central Transportation 48 U.S. 104 In all of these cases, we have eschewed the development of any set formula for identifying a "taking" forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case. Monsanto ; Kaiser To aid in this determination, however, we have identified *225 three factors which have "particular significance": (1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and () "the character of the governmental action." Penn Central Transportation Accord, Monsanto ; PruneYard Shopping 82-8 Examining the MPPAA in light of these factors reinforces our belief that the imposition of withdrawal liability does not constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. First, with respect to the nature of the governmental action, we already have noted that, under the Act, the Government does not physically invade or permanently appropriate any of the employer's assets for its own use. Instead, the Act safeguards the participants in multiemployer pension plans by requiring a withdrawing employer to fund its share of the plan obligations incurred during its association with the plan. This interference with the property rights of an employer
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Justice White
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/
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plan. This interference with the property rights of an employer arises from a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good and, under our cases, does not constitute a taking requiring Government compensation. Penn Central Transportation ; See ; Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 9, 41 Next, as to the severity of the economic impact of the MPPAA, there is no doubt that the Act completely deprives an employer of whatever amount of money it is obligated to pay to fulfill its statutory liability. The assessment of withdrawal liability is not made in a vacuum, however, but directly depends on the relationship between the employer and the plan to which it had made contributions. Moreover, there are a significant number of provisions in the Act that moderate and mitigate the economic impact of an individual *226 employer's liability.[8] There is nothing to show that the withdrawal liability actually imposed on an employer will always be out of proportion to its experience with the plan, and the mere fact that the employer must pay money to comply with the Act is but a necessary consequence of the MPPAA's regulatory scheme. The final inquiry suggested for determining whether the Act constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment is whether the MPPAA has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Appellants argue that the only monetary obligations incurred by each employer involved in the Operating Engineers Pension Plan arose from the specific terms of the Plan and Trust Agreement between the employers and the union, and that the imposition of withdrawal liability upsets those reasonable expectations. Pension plans, however, were the objects of legislative concern long before the passage of ERISA in 1974, and *227 surely as of that time, it was clear that if the PBGC exercised its discretion to pay benefits upon the termination of a multiemployer pension plan, employers who had contributed to the plan during the preceding five years were liable for their proportionate share of the plan's contributions during that period. 29 U.S. C. 164. It was also plain enough that the purpose of imposing withdrawal liability was to ensure that employees would receive the benefits promised them. When it became evident that ERISA fell short of achieving this end, Congress adopted the 1980 amendments. Prudent employers then had more than sufficient notice not only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations. See 467 U. S., at 72. "Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme
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Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/
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in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." 58 U.S. 84, See also 428 U. S., and cases cited therein. The purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of private property for public use is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 64 U.S. 40, We are far from persuaded that fairness and justice require the public, rather than the withdrawing employers and other parties to pension plan agreements, to shoulder the responsibility for rescuing plans that are in financial trouble. The employers in the present litigation voluntarily negotiated and maintained a pension plan which was determined to be within the strictures of ERISA. We do not know, as a fact, whether this plan was underfunded, but Congress determined that unregulated withdrawals from multiemployer plans could endanger their financial vitality and deprive workers of the vested rights they were entitled to anticipate would be theirs upon retirement. For this reason, Congress *228 imposed withdrawal liability as one part of an overall statutory scheme to safeguard the solvency of private pension plans. We see no constitutionally compelled reason to require the Treasury to assume the financial burden of attaining this goal. The judgment of the three-judge court is Affirmed.
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Justice Thomas
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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2758569/integrity-staffing-solutions-inc-v-busk/
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The employer in this case required its employees, ware- house workers who retrieved inventory and packaged it for shipment, to undergo an antitheft security screen- ing before leaving the warehouse each day. The question presented is whether the employees’ time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing those security screenings is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S. C. et seq., as amended by the Portal- to-Portal Act of 1947, et seq. We hold that the time is not compensable. We therefore reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I Petitioner Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., provides warehouse staffing to Amazon.com throughout the United States. Respondents Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro worked as hourly employees of Integrity Staffing at ware- houses in Las Vegas and Fenley, Nevada, respectively. As warehouse employees, they retrieved products from the shelves and packaged those products for delivery to Ama- zon customers. 2 INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK Opinion of the Court Integrity Staffing required its employees to undergo a security screening before leaving the warehouse at the end of each day. During this screening, employees removed items such as wallets, keys, and belts from their persons and passed through metal detectors. In 2010, Busk and Castro filed a putative class action against Integrity Staffing on behalf of similarly situated employees in the Nevada warehouses for alleged violations of the FLSA and Nevada labor laws. As relevant here, the employees alleged that they were entitled to compensation under the FLSA for the time spent waiting to undergo and actually undergoing the security screenings. They alleged that such time amounted to roughly 25 minutes each day and that it could have been reduced to a de minimis amount by adding more security screeners or by stagger- ing the termination of shifts so that employees could flow through the checkpoint more quickly. They also alleged that the screenings were conducted “to prevent employee theft” and thus occurred “solely for the benefit of the em- ployers and their customers.” App. 19, 21. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that the time spent waiting for and undergoing the security screenings was not compensable under the FLSA. It explained that, because the screenings occurred after the regular work shift, the employees could state a claim for compensation only if the screenings were an integral and indispensable part of the principal activi- ties they were employed to perform. The District Court held that these screenings were not integral and indispen- sable but instead
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Justice Thomas
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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2758569/integrity-staffing-solutions-inc-v-busk/
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these screenings were not integral and indispen- sable but instead fell into a noncompensable category of postliminary activities. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir- cuit reversed in relevant part. The Court of Appeals asserted that postshift activities that would ordinarily be classified as noncompensable postlim- inary activities are nevertheless compensable as integral Cite as: 574 U. S. (2014) 3 Opinion of the Court and indispensable to an employee’s principal activities if those postshift activities are necessary to the principal work performed and done for the benefit of the employer. Accepting as true the allegation that Integrity Staffing required the security screenings to prevent em- ployee theft, the Court of Appeals concluded that the screenings were “necessary” to the employees’ primary work as warehouse employees and done for Integrity Staffing’s benefit. We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. (2014), and now reverse. II A Enacted in 1938, the FLSA established a minimum wage and overtime compensation for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. 7(a)(3), 52 Stat. 1062–1063. An employer who violated these provi- sions could be held civilly liable for backpay, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees. But the FLSA did not define “work” or “workweek,” and this Court interpreted those terms broadly. It defined “work” as “physical or mental exertion (whether burden- some or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” Tennessee Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, Similarly, it defined “the statutory workweek” to “includ[e] all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty or at a pre- scribed workplace.” Applying these expansive definitions, the Court found compensable the time spent traveling between mine portals and underground work areas, Tennessee at and the time spent walking from timeclocks to work benches, Anderson, su- 4 INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK Opinion of the Court pra, at 691–692. These decisions provoked a flood of litigation. In the six months following this Court’s decision in Anderson, unions and employees filed more than 1,500 lawsuits under the FLSA. S. Rep. No. 37, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2–3 (1947). These suits sought nearly $6 billion in back pay and liquidated damages for various preshift and postshift activities. Congress responded swiftly. It found that the FLSA had “been interpreted judicially in disregard of long- established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unex- pected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers.” 29 U.S. C.
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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2758569/integrity-staffing-solutions-inc-v-busk/
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amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers.” 29 U.S. C. (a). Declar- ing the situation to be an “emergency,” Congress found that, if such interpretations “were permitted to stand, the payment of such liabilities would bring about financial ruin of many employers” and “employees would receive windfall payments for activities performed by them without any expectation of reward beyond that included in their agreed rates of pay.” §(a)–(b). Congress met this emergency with the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Portal-to-Portal Act exempted employers from liability for future claims based on two categories of work- related activities as follows: “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) [which covers work compensable by contract or custom], no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following activities of such em- ployee engaged in on or after the date of the enact- ment of this Act— “(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the ac- Cite as: 574 U. S. (2014) 5 Opinion of the Court tual place of performance of the principal activity or ac- tivities which such employee is employed to perform, and “(2) activities which are preliminary to or postlimi- nary to said principal activity or activities, “which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or sub- sequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.” –87 (codified at 29 U.S. C. At issue here is the exemption for “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.” B This Court has consistently interpreted “the term ‘prin- cipal activity or activities’ [to] embrac[e] all activities which are an ‘integral and indispensable part of the prin- cipal activities.’ ” 29–30 (2005) (quoting 252–253 (1956)). Our prior opinions used those words in their ordinary sense. The word “integral” means “[b]elonging to or making up an integral whole; constituent, component; spec[ifically] necessary to the completeness or integrity of the whole; forming an intrinsic portion or element, as distinguished from an adjunct or appendage.” 5 Oxford English Dictionary 366 (1933) (OED); accord, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (Brief for United States); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary 1290 (2d ed. 1954) (Webster’s Second) (“[e]ssential to completeness; constituent, as a part”). And, when used to describe a duty, “indispensable” means a duty “[t]hat cannot be dispensed with, remitted, set aside, disregarded,
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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
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duty “[t]hat cannot be dispensed with, remitted, set aside, disregarded, or neglected.” 5 OED 219; accord, Brief for United States 19; see also Webster’s Second 1267 (“[n]ot capable of being dispensed with, set aside, neglected, or pronounced nonob- 6 INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK Opinion of the Court ligatory”). An activity is therefore integral and indispen- sable to the principal activities that an employee is em- ployed to perform if it is an intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dis- pense if he is to perform his principal activities. As we describe below, this definition, as applied in these circum- stances, is consistent with the Department of Labor’s regulations. Our precedents have identified several activities that satisfy this test. For example, we have held compensable the time battery-plant employees spent showering and changing clothes because the chemicals in the plant were “toxic to human beings” and the employer conceded that “the clothes-changing and showering activities of the employees [were] indispensable to the performance of their productive work and integrally related thereto.” And we have held compensa- ble the time meatpacker employees spent sharpening their knives because dull knives would “slow down production” on the assembly line, “affect the appearance of the meat as well as the quality of the hides,” “cause waste,” and lead to “accidents.” 262 (1956). By contrast, we have held noncompensable the time poultry-plant employees spent waiting to don protective gear because such waiting was “two steps re- moved from the productive activity on the assembly line.” The Department of Labor’s regulations are consistent with this approach. See (b) (“The term ‘principal activities’ includes all activities which are an integral part of a principal activity”); (“Among the activities included as an integral part of a principal activity are those closely related activities which are indispensable to its performance”). As an illustration, those regulations explain that the time spent by an em- ployee in a chemical plant changing clothes would be Cite as: 574 U. S. (2014) 7 Opinion of the Court compensable if he “c[ould not] perform his principal activi- ties without putting on certain clothes” but would not be compensable if “changing clothes [were] merely a conven- ience to the employee and not directly related to his prin- cipal activities.” See As the regulations explain, “when performed under the conditions normally present,” activities including “checking in and out and waiting in line to do so, changing clothes, washing up or showering, and waiting in line to receive pay checks” are “ ‘prelimi- nary’ ” or “ ‘postliminary’ ” activities.
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Justice Thomas
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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2758569/integrity-staffing-solutions-inc-v-busk/
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are “ ‘prelimi- nary’ ” or “ ‘postliminary’ ” activities. III A The security screenings at issue here are noncompensa- ble postliminary activities. To begin with, the screenings were not the “principal activity or activities which [the] employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S. C. Integrity Staffing did not employ its workers to undergo security screenings, but to retrieve products from ware- house shelves and package those products for shipment to Amazon customers. The security screenings also were not “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ duties as warehouse workers. As explained above, an activity is not integral and indispensable to an employee’s principal activities unless it is an intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to per- form those activities. The screenings were not an intrinsic element of retrieving products from warehouse shelves or packaging them for shipment. And Integrity Staffing could have eliminated the screenings altogether without impairing the employees’ ability to complete their work. The Solicitor General, adopting the position of the De- partment of Labor, agrees that these screenings were noncompensable postliminary activities. See Brief for United States 10. That view is fully consistent with an 8 INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK Opinion of the Court Opinion Letter the Department issued in 1951. The letter found noncompensable a preshift security search of em- ployees in a rocket-powder plant “ ‘for matches, spark producing devices such as cigarette lighters, and other items which have a direct bearing on the safety of the employees,’ ” as well as a postshift security search of the employees done “ ‘for the purpose of preventing theft.’ ” Opinion Letter from Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Div., to Dept. of Army, Office of Chief of Ordnance (Apr. 18, 1951), pp. 1–2 (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The Department drew no distinction between the searches conducted for the safety of the employees and those con- ducted for the purpose of preventing theft—neither were compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. B The Court of Appeals erred by focusing on whether an employer required a particular activity. The integral and indispensable test is tied to the productive work that the employee is employed to perform. See, e.g., 546 U.S., ; ; – 251; see also (a) (explaining that the term “principal activities” was “considered sufficiently broad to embrace within its terms such activities as are indispen- sable to the performance of productive work” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added)); (“Among the activities included as an integral part of a principal activity are those closely
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Justice Thomas
| 2,014 | 1 |
majority
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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2758569/integrity-staffing-solutions-inc-v-busk/
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an integral part of a principal activity are those closely related activities which are indispensable to its performance” (emphasis added)). If the test could be satisfied merely by the fact that an employer required an activity, it would sweep into “princi- pal activities” the very activities that the Portal-to-Portal Act was designed to address. The employer in Anderson, for instance, required its employees to walk “from a timeclock near the factory gate to a workstation” so that they could “begin their work,” “but it is indisputable that Cite as: 574 U. S. (2014) 9 Opinion of the Court the Portal-to-Portal Act evinces Congress’ intent to repu- diate Anderson’s holding that such walking time was compensable under the FLSA.” A test that turns on whether the activity is for the benefit of the employer is similarly overbroad. Finally, we reject the employees’ argument that time spent waiting to undergo the security screenings is com- pensable under the FLSA because Integrity Staffing could have reduced that time to a de minimis amount. The fact that an employer could conceivably reduce the time spent by employees on any preliminary or postliminary activity does not change the nature of the activity or its relation- ship to the principal activities that an employee is em- ployed to perform. These arguments are properly present- ed to the employer at the bargaining table, see 29 U.S. C. not to a court in an FLSA claim. * * * We hold that an activity is integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform—and thus compensable under the FLSA—if it is an intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his prin- cipal activities. Because the employees’ time spent wait- ing to undergo and undergoing Integrity Staffing’s security screenings does not meet these criteria, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Cite as: 574 U. S. (2014) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–433 INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., PETITIONER v. JESSE BUSK ET AL.
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
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Ardestani v. INS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112665/ardestani-v-ins/
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The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Service) put petitioner Ardestani through the ordeal of a deportation proceeding and attempted to return her to a land in which, the State Department had already determined, she had a well-founded fear of persecution for her religious convictions. The Service has since abandoned its argument that its position in this matter was "substantially justified." Instead, it now argues only that deportation proceedings are not among the class of proceedings for which the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S. C. 504 and 28 U.S. C. 2412, authorizes awards of attorney's fees. The Court today accepts this contention, relying on the purportedly "plain" meaning of the statute and the canon that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed strictly. I do not find the meaning of the relevant EAJA provisions "plain," nor do I agree that the Court's canon is applicable *140 to the EAJA. In my view, deportation proceedings exemplify the kind of adjudications for which Congress authorized fee awards: The alien's stake in the proceeding is enormous (sometimes life or death in the asylum context); the legal rules surrounding deportation and asylum proceedings are very complex; specialized counsel are necessary but in short supply; and evidence suggests that some conduct on the part of the Government in deportation and asylum proceedings has been abusive. The Court's opinion is all the more troubling for me, because it suggests that the Court has forgotten its recent admonition that the EAJA must be construed "in light of its purpose to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action." Indeed, notably absent in the Court's opinion is any account of the statutory purpose that could be advanced by excluding deportation proceedings from EAJA coverage. Proper application of established principles entitles Ardestani to a fee award. Accordingly, I dissent. I The Court correctly observes that petitioner Ardestani's eligibility for EAJA fees depends upon whether a deportation proceeding qualifies as an "adversary adjudication." The Act defines that key term in 504(b)(1)(C)(i): "`[A]dversary adjudication' means an adjudication under [5 U.S. C.] section 554 in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise." Because all agree that the position of the United States in fact was represented by counsel, the only issue is whether a deportation proceeding can be construed as "an adjudication under section 554," which is a part of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Respondent INS argues that the phrase "adjudication under section 554" is unambiguous and can refer only to an *141 adjudication "governed by"
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Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
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Ardestani v. INS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112665/ardestani-v-ins/
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and can refer only to an *141 adjudication "governed by" or "conducted under the authority of" 554. The Service emphasizes this Court's holding in that deportation proceedings are governed by the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, rather than by 554 or other provisions of the APA. Accordingly, the INS contends, a deportation proceeding is not an adjudication "under section 554" and therefore is not an "adversary adjudication" within the meaning of the EAJA. The Court accepts this conclusion because it accepts the Service's crucial assumption that the statutory words "under section 554" have a single, "plain" meaningthe one that the INS urges. The statutory words might be given the interpretation the INS recommends, at least if those words are considered in isolation. That is not to say, however, that the statutory language is "plain" or "unambiguous." In my view, the statutory context of the words "adjudication under section 554" suggests a very plausible alternative interpretation. These words appear as part of a definition for the compound term "adversary adjudication," namely, "an adjudication under section 554 in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise." This provision establishes a definition for both components of the term "adversary adjudication": The reference to representation of the Government's position "by counsel or otherwise" defines what makes an administrative proceeding adversary; the reference to 554 defines what makes a procedure an adjudication. The EAJA could have been drafted to specify explicitly the features that constitute an "adjudication" for fees purposes. The term "adjudication," however, already had an accepted meaning at the time the EAJA was enacted. Rather than reproduce that definition, Congress simply referred the reader, shorthand, to the features described in 554, the APA section that defines a generic adjudication. The words "adjudication under section 554" plausibly mean *142 "adjudication, as defined in section 554," or "adjudication, within the meaning of section 554," or, more literally, "adjudication, as defined under the heading of section 554." Because the meaning of "adjudication under section 554" is ambiguous, we consult the EAJA's legislative history and decide between the two interpretations "in light of [the EAJA's] purpose to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action." 490 U. S., at II The EAJA's purposes are clearly stated. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary notes that the high cost of legal assistance and the superior resources and expertise of the Federal Government precluded private parties from challenging or defending against unreasonable governmental action. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1418, pp. 9-10 (1980) (House
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
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Ardestani v. INS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112665/ardestani-v-ins/
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action. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1418, pp. 9-10 (1980) (House Report). Fee awards were intended to address this problem: "When there is an opportunity to recover costs," the Committee noted, "a party does not have to choose between acquiescing to an unreasonable Government order or prevailing to his financial detriment." Nor, the Committee observed, would the availability of attorney's fees vindicate only private interests. Because "a party who chooses to litigate an issue against the Government is not only representing his or her own vested interest but is also refining and formulating public policy," the Committee recognized, adjudication may ensure the "legitimacy and fairness of the law." Thus, removing disincentives to adjudication when the Government acts unreasonably both vindicates individual rights and curbs governmental excesses. Congress' description of the scope of "adversary adjudication" focuses on the "adversariness" requirementthe presence or absence of Government representationrather than on whether or not 554 technically governs an adjudication. *143 Two of the three definitions offered in the EAJA Conference Report state only that an adversary adjudication is an adjudication where the agency has taken a position or is represented by counsel; they omit altogether any mention of 554. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1434, pp. 21, 23 (1980) (Conference Report). According to the third definition: "The conference substitute defines adversary adjudication as an agency adjudication defined under the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act where the agency takes a position through representation by counsel or otherwise. It is intended that this definition precludes an award in a situation where an agency, e. g., the Social Security Administration, does not take a position in the adjudication. If, however, the agency does take a position at some point in the adjudication, the adjudication would then become adversarial" (emphasis added). This definition repeats the Report's earlier focus on the presence or absence of counsel as the decisive factor in determining whether an adjudication is adversary. More important, in its use of the words "defined under," the Report suggests that an adjudication need not be governed by the APA, but onlyas deportation proceedings surely docorrespond to the definition of an adjudication given in the APA. Nowhere in the Committee Reports or in the floor debates is there any suggestion that the words "under section 554" were intended to exclude any particular agency's adjudications (let alone the INS') from EAJA coverage. Nor was it ever discussed whether a particular agency's adjudications were or were not technically governed by 554 or other provisions of the APA. Indeed, Congress seems to have given no attention whatsoever to whether particular administrative proceedings were
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
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Ardestani v. INS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112665/ardestani-v-ins/
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given no attention whatsoever to whether particular administrative proceedings were adjudications, as opposed to, for example, rulemaking, ratemaking, or licensing proceedings. Instead, Congress' focus was on whether certain proceedings, *144 universally assumed to be adjudications, were adversary that is, whether the Government was represented by counsel or had otherwise staked out a position. In short, the reference to 554 seems to be nothing but a statutory "hook"a convenient way to signal, in the statutory text, the essential and uncontroversial characteristics of an "adjudication." This interpretation is confirmed by the one special case of agency proceedings that Congress examined with any particularity: Social Security Administration proceedings. This Court had refrained from deciding whether such proceedings are governed by 554. See The EAJA Conference Report makes clear that, notwithstanding this uncertainty, Congress considered a Social Security Act administrative proceeding to be covered by the EAJA if the adjudication was "adversary," that is, if the United States had staked out a position. See Conference Report, The House Judiciary Committee Report on the EAJA's 1985 reenactment is to similar but stronger effect: "As enacted in 1980, the Act covers `adversary adjudication'i. e., an adjudication under section 554 of [5 U.S. C.] `in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise'. While this language generally excludes Social Security administrative hearings from the Act, Congress made clear in 1980 that `If the agency does take a position at some point in the adjudication, the adjudication would then become adversarial,' and thus be subject to the Act. It is the committee's understanding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services has implemented an experiment in five locations in which the Secretary is represented at the hearing before the administrative law judge. This is precisely the type of situation covered by section 504(b)(1)(C). While, generally, Social Security administrative *145 hearings remain outside the scope of this statute, those in which the Secretary is represented are covered by the Act " (footnote omitted; first emphasis in original; others supplied). H. R. Rep. No. 99-120, pp. 10-11 (1985). Thus, despite this Court's demurral regarding whether Social Security proceedings are technically governed by 554, and without expressing any view whatsoever on this issue, Congress nevertheless stated that EAJA fees were appropriate. This circumstance strongly indicates that Congress did not intend EAJA coverage to depend upon whether 554, rather than some functionally equivalent provision, technically governs the proceeding. III As noted above, this Court recently held in that the EAJA is to be "read in light of its purpose `to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
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Ardestani v. INS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112665/ardestani-v-ins/
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its purpose `to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action.' " 490 U.S., at In particular, the Court held that while Social Security Administration proceedings on remand from federal district courts were not adversary adjudications, because the Government's position was not represented by counsel or otherwise, they were nevertheless "part and parcel" of the civil action, and thus were covered by the "civil action" provisions of the EAJA. In so holding, the Court rejected a plain meaning argument stronger than the one advanced here. The Government had argued that the term "civil action" unambiguously excluded administrative proceedings, and that the specific exclusion of Social Security provisions from administrative EAJA coverage precluded, by the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, their coverage under civil action *146 EAJA.[1] The Court conceded that this contention was "not without some force," but went on to say that it did not "ris[e] to the level necessary to oust what we think is the most reasonable interpretation of the statute in light of its manifest purpose." at The Court recognizes that there is no question that application of the EAJA to deportation proceedings would advance the Act's manifest purposes of protecting individuals' rights, deterring unjustified governmental action, and "help[ing] assure that administrative decisions reflect informed deliberation." House Report, Indeed, unjustified INS deportation proceedings are a classic example of a situation in which persons "may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved" and the "disparity between the resources and expertise of these individuals and their government." House Report, at 5 and 6. An alien facing deportation generally is unfamiliar with the arcane system of immigration law, is often unskilled in the English language, and sometimes is uneducated; for these reasons, "deportation hearings are difficult for aliens to fully comprehend, let alone conduct, and individuals subject to such proceedings frequently require the assistance of counsel." Escobar In many areas, competent counsel is difficult to obtain. See Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States, 2 Int'l J. of Refugee Law 252, 261 Evidence indicates that the INS has engaged in abusive litigation tactics. See Watson, No More "Independent Operators," Legal Times, May 14, 1990, p. 2 (quoting remark of William P. Cook, then INS General Counsel, that "I have been told that some *147 of my offices appeal every adverse decision regardless of the merits, [and]that others refuse to have stipulations"); Note, Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97 Yale L. J. 1459, 1471 (describing an INS
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Ardestani v. INS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112665/ardestani-v-ins/
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Hearings, 97 Yale L. J. 1459, 1471 (describing an INS pattern of "vigorous opposition to adjudicated asylum claims, often irrespective of the merits"). Finally, the stakes for the alien involved in deportation proceedingsparticularly in asylum casesare enormous. See, e. g., Under these circumstances, application of the EAJA to deportation proceedings clearly would fulfill the statute's purposes. The Court states two reasons, however, for recanting on its recent recognition in that EAJA is to be read "in light of its manifest purpose." The first is its argument that "the plain language of the statute" compels the Court to deny fees to Ardestani. This argument, as I already have suggested above, is not persuasive, and is in any event less persuasive than the similar argument rejected in The additional reason the Court gives for departing from is the canon of statutory interpretation that waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. For good reason, this argument has not been accepted in any other EAJA case decided by this Court. The purposes of the canon are to protect the public fisc and to provide breathing space for legitimate Government action that might be deterred by litigation. But these purposes are already fulfilled by the EAJA's requirement that even prevailing parties may not be awarded fees unless the Government's position lacked substantial justification. The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary makes clear that this provision was adopted precisely in order to reduce the bill's cost and to prevent "a `chilling effect' on proper Government enforcement efforts." S. Rep. No. 96-253, p. 2 (1979). Congress therefore, in effect, already has applied the maxim on which the Court relies. The Court's reapplication of that *148 maxim to restrict EAJA's scope still further is not merely superfluous, but is inconsistent with congressional intent.[2] IV Because the Court accepts the INS' "plain meaning" and sovereign immunity arguments, it has no cause to address the Government's two remaining arguments. Both are easily resolved against the Government. The INS suggests, first, that the Court owes deference to the Attorney General's determination that the EAJA does not apply to deportation proceedings. This Court has indicated, however, that reviewing courts do not owe deference to an agency's interpretation of statutes outside its particular expertise and special charge to administer. See Adams Fruit ; see also Professional Reactor Operator Because the EAJA, like the APA, applies to all agencies and is not administered by any one in particular, deference to the interpretation by any particular agency is inappropriate. The INS argues, second, that a fee award in this case is proscribed
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,991 | 11 |
dissenting
|
Ardestani v. INS
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112665/ardestani-v-ins/
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second, that a fee award in this case is proscribed by 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act *149 of 1952, which provides that a person involved in a deportation proceeding "shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel. as he shall choose." 8 U.S. C. 1362. The INS argues that this provision is a specific bar on fee shifting in deportation proceedings that necessarily overrides the EAJA's general fee-shifting policy. The legislative history of the EAJA clearly states, however, that the statute "applies to all civil actions except those already covered by existing fee-shifting statutes." House Report, at 18. There is no reason to think that Congress would have held a different view regarding the EAJA's administrative provisions. Because the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 contains no fee-shifting provisions, it cannot bar the EAJA's application. Nor is the Government correct that this interpretation would effectively repeal 292. The purpose of 292 is to relieve the Government of any general obligation to appoint and pay counsel for indigent aliens. See Escobar 838 F. 2d, 28. The purpose of the EAJA, on the other hand, is to reimburse persons who prevail in those cases where the Government's action was not substantially justified. By virtue of their different purposes, the two statutes may coexist. No alien has an automatic right to Government-appointed and Government-paid counsel. And in all cases where the Government's action is substantially justifiedthe vast majority of cases, one would hopethe alien has no claim against the Government for attorney's fees. V In sum, EAJA's ambiguous definition of the term "adversary adjudication" can be read to support Ardestani's position; the legislative history confirms her interpretation; and the purposes of the EAJA, in whose light the Court heretofore has interpreted the statute, strongly favor the availability of attorney's fees in deportation proceedings. I can only *150 hope that the Court's departure from its approach in signals no permanent change in its EAJA jurisprudence. I would hold that Ardestani is entitled to a fee award and would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
|
Justice Blackmun
| 1,972 | 11 |
concurring
|
NLRB v. International Van Lines
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108626/nlrb-v-international-van-lines/
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The result mandated by the narrow factual situation presented in this case need not be automatically imposed *54 whenever an economic striker is discharged before being permanently replaced. Although the Court's opinion speaks only of permanent replacement as a justification for refusal to reinstate an economic striker, the Court has recognized in the past that, in addition to permanent replacement, other "legitimate and substantial business justifications" for not reinstating an economic striker may exist. The Court is not faced in the present case with other "legitimate and substantial business justifications" because the employer, who bears the burden of proof, asserted only the permanent-replacement justification. The finding of an unfair labor practice here is not to be read, therefore, as necessarily precluding an employer from reliance on appropriate justifications other than permanent replacement. Since the employer failed to show any business justification arising before the discharges, these workers enjoyed reinstatement rights when they were discriminatory discharged. I concur in the reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment because preservation of the rights existing before the workers were discharged is the appropriate remedy to provide "a restoration of the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination." Phelps Dodge
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
|
McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
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This case requires us to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the conviction of petitioner, an elected public official, for extorting property under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S. C. 1951. We also must address the affirmance of petitioner's conviction for filing a false income tax return. I Petitioner Robert L. McCormick was a member of the West Virginia House of Delegates in 1984. He represented a district that had long suffered from a shortage of medical doctors. For several years, West Virginia had allowed foreign medical school graduates to practice under temporary permits while studying for the state licensing exams. Under this program, some doctors were allowed to practice under temporary permits for years even though they repeatedly failed the state exams. McCormick was a leading advocate and supporter of this program. In the early 1980's, following a move in the House of Delegates to end the temporary permit program, several of the temporarily licensed doctors formed an organization to press their interests in Charleston. The organization hired a lobbyist, John Vandergrift, who in 1984 worked for legislation *260 that would extend the expiration date of the temporary permit program. McCormick sponsored the House version of the proposed legislation, and a bill was passed extending the program for another year. Shortly thereafter, Vandergrift and McCormick discussed the possibility of introducing legislation during the 1985 session that would grant the doctors a permanent medical license by virtue of their years of experience. McCormick agreed to sponsor such legislation. During his 1984 reelection campaign, McCormick informed Vandergrift that his campaign was expensive, that he had paid considerable sums out of his own pocket, and that he had not heard anything from the foreign doctors. Tr. 167-168. Vandergrift told McCormick that he would contact the doctors and see what he could do. Vandergrift contacted one of the foreign doctors and later received from the doctors $1,200 in cash. Vandergrift delivered an envelope containing nine $100 bills to McCormick. Later the same day, a second delivery of $2,000 in cash was made to McCormick. During the fall of 1984, McCormick received two more cash payments from the doctors. McCormick did not list any of these payments as campaign contributions,[1] nor did he report the money as income on his 1984 federal income tax return. And although the doctors' organization kept detailed books of its expenditures, the cash payments were not listed as campaign contributions. Rather, the entries for the payments were accompanied only by initials or other codes signifying that the money was for McCormick.
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Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
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McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
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or other codes signifying that the money was for McCormick. In the spring of 1985, McCormick sponsored legislation permitting experienced doctors to be permanently licensed without passing the state licensing exams. McCormick spoke at length in favor of the bill during floor debate, and the bill ultimately was enacted into law. Two weeks after the legislation was enacted, McCormick received another cash payment from the foreign doctors. *261 Following an investigation, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging McCormick with five counts of violating the Hobbs Act,[2] by extorting payments under color of official right, and with one count of filing a false income tax return in violation of 26 U.S. C. 7206(1),[3] by failing to report as income the cash payments he received from the foreign doctors. At the close of a 6-day trial, the jury was instructed that to establish a Hobbs Act violation the Government had to prove that McCormick induced a cash payment and that he did so knowingly and willfully by extortion. As set out in the margin, the court defined "extortion" and other terms and elaborated on the proof required with respect to the extortion counts.[4] *262 The next day the jury informed the court that it "would like to hear the instructions again with particular emphasis on the definition of extortion under the color of official right *263 and on the law as regards the portion of moneys received that does not have to be reported as income." App. 27. The court then reread most of the extortion instructions to the *264 jury, but reordered some of the paragraphs and made the following significant addition: "Extortion under color of official right means the obtaining of money by a public official when the money *265 obtained was not lawfully due and owing to him or to his office. Of course, extortion does not occur where one who is a public official receives a legitimate gift or a voluntary political contribution even though the political contribution may have been made in cash in violation of local law. Voluntary is that which is freely given without expectation of benefit." It is also worth noting that with respect to political contributions, the last two paragraphs of the supplemental instructions on the extortion counts were as follows: "It would not be illegal, in and of itself, for Mr. McCormick to solicit or accept political contributions from foreign doctors who would benefit from this legislation. "In order to find Mr. McCormick guilty of extortion, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment alleged in a
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
|
McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment alleged in a given count of the indictment was made by or on behalf of the doctors with the expectation that such payment would influence Mr. McCormick's official conduct, and with knowledge on the part of Mr. McCormick that they were paid to him with that expectation by virtue of the office he held." The jury convicted McCormick of the first Hobbs Act count (charging him with receiving the initial $900 cash payment) and the income tax violation but could not reach verdicts on the remaining four Hobbs Act counts. The District Court declared a mistrial on those four counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, observing that nonelected officials may be convicted under the Hobbs Act without proof that they have granted or agreed to grant some benefit or advantage in exchange for money paid to them and that elected officials should be held to the same standard when they receive money other than "legitimate" campaign contributions. After stating that McCormick could not be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act for receiving voluntary campaign contributions, the court rejected *266 McCormick's contention that conviction of an elected official under the Act requires, under all circumstances, proof of a quid pro quo, i. e., a promise of official action or inaction in exchange for any payment or property received, Rather, the court interpreted the statute as not requiring such a showing where the parties never intended the payments to be "legitimate" campaign contributions. After listing seven factors to be considered in making this determination and canvassing the record evidence, the court concluded: "Under these facts, a reasonable jury could find that McCormick was extorting money from the doctors for his continued support of the 1985 legislation. Further, the evidence supports the conclusion that the money was never intended by any of the parties to be a campaign contribution. Therefore, we refuse to reverse the jury's verdict against McCormick for violating the Hobbs Act." The Court of Appeals also affirmed the income tax conviction. Because of disagreement in the Courts of Appeals regarding the meaning of the phrase "under color of official right" as it is used in the Hobbs Act,[5] we granted certiorari. *267 We reverse and remand for further proceedings. *268 II McCormick's challenge to the judgment below affirming his conviction is limited to the Court of Appeals' rejection of his claim that the payments made to him by or on behalf of the doctors were campaign contributions, the receipt of which did not violate the Hobbs Act. Except for a belated claim not properly
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
|
McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
|
the Hobbs Act. Except for a belated claim not properly before us,[6] McCormick does not challenge any rulings of the courts below with respect to the application of the Hobbs Act to payments made to nonelected officials or to payments made to elected officials that are properly determined not to be campaign contributions. Hence, we do not consider how the "under color of official right" phrase is to be *269 interpreted and applied in those contexts. In two respects, however, we agree with McCormick that the Court of Appeals erred. A First, we are quite sure that the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on legal and factual grounds that were never submitted to the jury. Although McCormick challenged the adequacy of the jury instructions to distinguish between campaign contributions and payments that are illegal under the Hobbs Act, the Court of Appeals' opinion did not examine or mention the instructions given by the trial court. The court neither dealt with McCormick's submission that the instructions were too confusing to give adequate guidance to the jury, nor, more specifically, with the argument that although the jury was instructed that voluntary campaign contributions were not vulnerable under the Hobbs Act, the word "voluntary" as used "in several places during the course of these instructions," App. 30, was defined as "that which is freely given without expectation of benefit." Neither did the Court of Appeals note that the jury was not instructed in accordance with the court's holding that the difference between legitimate and illegitimate campaign contributions was to be determined by the intention of the parties after considering specified factors.[7] Instead, the Court of Appeals, after announcing a rule of law for determining when payments are made under color of official right, *270 went on to find sufficient evidence in the record to support findings that McCormick was extorting money from the doctors for his continued support of the 1985 legislation, and further that the parties never intended any of the payments to be a campaign contribution. It goes without saying that matters of intent are for the jury to consider. It is also plain that each of the seven factors that the Court of Appeals thought should be considered in determining the parties' intent presents an issue of historical fact. Thus even assuming the Court of Appeals was correct on the law, the conviction should not have been affirmed on that basis but should have been set aside and a new trial ordered. ; Cf. ; ; If for no other reason, therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
|
McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
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other reason, therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.[8] *271 B We agree with the Court of Appeals that in a case like this it is proper to inquire whether payments made to an elected official are in fact campaign contributions, and we agree that the intention of the parties is a relevant consideration in pursuing this inquiry. But we cannot accept the Court of Appeals' approach to distinguishing between legal and illegal campaign contributions. The Court of Appeals stated that payments to elected officials could violate the Hobbs Act without proof of an explicit quid pro quo by proving that the payments "were never intended to be legitimate campaign contributions." 896 F.2d,[9] This issue, as we read the Court of Appeals' opinion, actually involved two inquiries; for after applying the factors the Court of Appeals considered relevant, it arrived at two conclusions: first, that McCormick was extorting money for his continued support of the 1985 legislation and "[f]urther," that the money was never intended by the parties to be a campaign contribution at all. The first conclusion, especially when considered in light of the second, asserts that the campaign contributions were illegitimate, extortionate payments. *272 This conclusion was necessarily based on the factors that the court considered, the first four of which could not possibly by themselves amount to extortion. Neither could they when considered with the last three more telling factors, namely, whether the official acted in his official capacity at or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor; whether the official had supported legislation before the time of the payment; and whether the official had directly or indirectly solicited the payor individually for the payment. Even assuming that the result of each of these seven inquiries was unfavorable to McCormick, as they very likely were in the Court of Appeals' view, we cannot agree that a violation of the Hobbs Act would be made out, as the Court of Appeals' first conclusion asserted. Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will benefit the district and individuals and groups therein is the everyday business of a legislator. It is also true that campaigns must be run and financed. Money is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on platforms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what they intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit
|
Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
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McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
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federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain property from another, with his consent, "under color of official right." To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation. It would require statutory language more explicit *273 than the Hobbs Act contains to justify a contrary conclusion. Cf. United This is not to say that it is impossible for an elected official to commit extortion in the course of financing an election campaign. Political contributions are of course vulnerable if induced by the use of force, violence, or fear. The receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable under the Act as having been taken under color of official right, but only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act. In such situations the official asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertaking. This is the receipt of money by an elected official under color of official right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. This formulation defines the forbidden zone of conduct with sufficient clarity. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed in United : "A moment's reflection should enable one to distinguish, at least in the abstract, a legitimate solicitation from the exaction of a fee for a benefit conferred or an injury withheld. Whether described familiarly as a payoff or with the Latinate precision of quid pro quo, the prohibited exchange is the same: a public official may not demand payment as inducement for the promise to perform (or not to perform) an official act." The United States agrees that if the payments to McCormick were campaign contributions, proof of a quid pro quo would be essential for an extortion conviction, Brief for United States 29-30, and quotes the instruction given on this subject in 9 Department of Justice Manual 9-85A.306, p. 9-1938.134 (Supp. 1988-2): "[C]ampaign contributions will not be authorized as the subject of a Hobbs Act prosecution unless they
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Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
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McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
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as the subject of a Hobbs Act prosecution unless they can be proven to have been given in return for the performance of or abstaining from an official act; otherwise any campaign contribution might constitute a violation." *274 We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding in this case that a quid pro quo is not necessary for conviction under the Hobbs Act when an official receives a campaign contribution.[10] By the same token, we hold, as McCormick urges, that the District Court's instruction to the same effect was error.[11] III The Government nevertheless insists that a properly instructed jury in this case found that the payment at issue was not a campaign contribution at all and that the evidence amply supports this finding. The instructions given here are not a model of clarity, and it is true that the trial court instructed that the receipt of voluntary campaign contributions did not violate the Hobbs Act. But under the instructions a contribution was not "voluntary" if given with any expectation of benefit; and as we read the instructions, taken as a whole, the jury was told that it could find McCormick guilty of extortion if any of the payments, even though a campaign contribution, was made by the doctors with the expectation that McCormick's official action would be influenced for their benefit and if McCormick knew that the payment was made with that expectation. It may be that the jury found that none of the payments was a campaign contribution, but it is mere speculation that the jury convicted on this basis rather than on the impermissible basis that even though the first payment was such a contribution, McCormick's receipt of it was a violation of the Hobbs Act. The United States submits that McCormik's conviction on the tax count plainly shows that the jury found that the first *275 payment was not a campaign contribution. Again, we disagree, for the instruction on the tax count told the jury, among other things, that if the money McCormick received "constituted voluntary political contributions it was not taxable income," App. 25 and failure to report it was not illegal. The jury must have understood "voluntary" to mean what the court had said it meant, i. e., as "that which is freely given without expectation of benefit." The jury might well have found that the payments were campaign contributions but not voluntary because they were given with an expectation of benefit. They might have inferred from this fact, although they were not instructed to do so, that the payments were taxable even
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Justice White
| 1,991 | 6 |
majority
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McCormick v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112596/mccormick-v-united-states/
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instructed to do so, that the payments were taxable even though they were contributions. Furthermore, the jury was instructed that if it found that McCormick did not use the money for campaign expenses or to reimburse himself for such expenses, then the payments given him by the doctors were taxable income even if the jury found that the doctors intended the payments to be campaign contributions. See Contrary to the Government's contention, therefore, by no means was the jury required to determine that the payments from the doctors to McCormick were not campaign contributions before it could convict on the tax count. The extortion conviction cannot be saved on this theory. IV The Court of Appeals affirmed McCormick's conviction for filing a false return on the sole ground that the jury's finding that McCormick violated the Hobbs Act "under these facts implicitly indicates that it rejected his attempts to characterize at least the initial payment as a campaign contribution." 896 F.2d, This conclusion repeats the error made in affirming the extortion conviction. The Court of Appeals did not examine the record in light of the instructions given the jury on the extortion charge but considered the evidence in light of its own standard under which it found that the payments *276 were not campaign contributions. Had the court focused on the instructions actually given at trial, it would have been obvious that the jury could have convicted McCormick of the tax charge even though it was convinced that the payments were campaign contributions but was also convinced that the money was received knowing that it was given with an expectation of benefit and hence was extorted. The extortion conviction does not demonstrate that the payments were not campaign contributions and hence taxable. Of course, the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the extortion conviction and erred in relying on that conviction in affirming the tax conviction does not necessarily exhaust the possible grounds for affirming on the tax count. But the Court of Appeals did not consider the verdict on that count in light of the instructions thereon and then decide whether, in the absence of the Hobbs Act conviction, McCormick was properly convicted for filing a false income tax return. That option will be open on remand. V Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
dissenting
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O'Gilvie v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118070/ogilvie-v-united-states/
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Section 104(a)(2), as it stood at the time relevant to these cases, provided an exclusion from income for "any damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness." 26 U.S. C. 104(a)(2) (1988 ed.). The Court is of the view that this phrase, in isolation, is just as susceptible of a meaning that includes only compensatory damages as it is of a broader meaning that includes punitive damages as well. Ante, at 82-83. I do not agree. The Court greatly understates the connection between an award of punitive damages and the personal injury complained of, describing it as nothing more than "but-for" causality, ante, at 82. It seems to me that the personal injury is as proximate a cause of the punitive damages as it is of the compensatory damages; in both cases it is the reason the damages are awarded. That is why punitive damages are called damages. To be sure, punitive damages require intentional, blameworthy conduct, which can be said to be a coequal reason they are awarded. But negligent (or intentional) conduct occupies the same role of coequal causality with regard to compensatory damages. Both types of damages are "received on account of" the personal injury. The nub of the matter, it seems to me, is this: If one were to be asked, by a lawyer from another legal system, "What damages can be received on account of personal injuries in *95 the United States?" surely the correct answer would be "Compensatory damages and punitive damagesthe former to compensate for the inflicting of the personal injuries, and the latter to punish for the inflicting of them." If, as the Court asserts, the phrase "damages received on account of personal injuries" can be used to refer only to the former category, that is only because people sometimes can be imprecise. The notion that Congress carefully and precisely used the phrase "damages received on account of personal injuries" to segregate out compensatory damages seems to me entirely fanciful. That is neither the exact nor the ordinary meaning of the phrase, and hence not the one that the statute should be understood to intend. What I think to be the fair meaning of the phrase in isolation becomes even clearer when the phrase is considered in its statutory context. The Court proceeds too quickly from its erroneous premise of ambiguity to analysis of the history and policy behind 104(a)(2). Ante, at 84-87. Ambiguity in isolation, even if it existed, would not end the textual inquiry. Statutory construction, we have said, is a "holistic endeavor." United Sav. Assn. of "A provision
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
dissenting
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O'Gilvie v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118070/ogilvie-v-united-states/
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is a "holistic endeavor." United Sav. Assn. of "A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme." Section 104(a)(2) appears immediately after another provision, 104(a)(1), which parallels 104(a)(2) in several respects but does not use the critical phrase "on account of": "(a) [G]ross income does not include "(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness; "(2) the amount of any damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness." (Emphasis added.) Although 104(a)(1) excludes amounts received "as compensation for" personal injuries or sickness, while 104(a)(2) excludes amounts received "on account of" personal injuries or *96 sickness, the Court reads the two phrases to mean precisely the same thing. That is not sound textual interpretation. "[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended." 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 46.07 (5th ed. 1992 and Supp. 1996). See, e. g., This principle of construction has its limits, of course: Use of different terminology in differing contexts might have little significance. But here the contrasting phrases appear in adjoining provisions that address precisely the same subject matter and that even have identical grammatical structure. The contrast between the two usages is even more striking in the original statute that enacted them. The Revenue Act of combined subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 104, together with (a)(3) (which provides an exclusion from income for amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness), into a single subsection, which provided: "`Gross income' [d]oes not include : "(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compen- sation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received on account of such injuries or sickness." 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of -1066 (emphasis added). The contrast between the first exclusion and the second could not be more clear. Had Congress intended the latter provision to cover only damages received "as compensation for" personal injuries or sickness, it could have written "amounts received, through accident or health insurance, under workmen's compensation acts, or in damages, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness." Instead, it tacked on an additional phrase "plus the amount of[, etc.]" *97 with no apparent purpose except to make clear that not only compensatory damages were covered by the exclusion. The Court maintains, however, that the Government's reading of 104(a)(2) is "more faithful to [its] history." Ante, at 84. The "history" to which
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
dissenting
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O'Gilvie v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118070/ogilvie-v-united-states/
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to [its] history." Ante, at 84. The "history" to which the Court refers is not statutory history of the sort just discussedprior enactments approved by earlier Congresses and revised or amended by later ones to produce the current text. Indeed, it is not "history" from within even a small portion of Congress, since the House Committee Report the Court cites, standing by itself, is uninformative, saying only that "[u]nder the present law it is doubtful whether damages received on account of [personal] injuries or sickness are required to be included in gross income." H. R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 9-10 The Court makes this snippet of legislative history relevant by citing as pertinent an antecedent Treasury Department decision, which concludes on the basis of recent judicial decisions that amounts received from prosecution or compromise of a personal-injury suit are not taxable because they are a return of capital. Ante, at 85 ). One might expect the Court to conclude from this that the Members of Congress (on the unrealistic assumption that they knew about the Executive Branch opinion) meant the statutory language to cover only return of capital, the source of the "doubt" to which the Committee Report referred. But of course the Court cannot draw that logical conclusion, since even if it is applied only to compensatory damages the statute obviously and undeniably covers more than mere return of "human capital," namely, reimbursement for lost income, which would be a large proportion (indeed perhaps the majority) of any damages award. The Court concedes this is so, but asserts that this inconsistency is not enough "to support cutting the statute totally free from its original moorings," ante, at 86, by which I assume it means the Treasury Decision, however erroneous it might have been as *98 to the "capital" nature of compensatory damages. But the Treasury Decision was no more explicitly limited to compensatory damages than is the statute before us. It exempted from taxation "an amount received by an individual as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries." T. D. 2747, The Court's entire thesis of taxability rests upon the proposition that this Treasury Decision, which overlooked the obvious fact that "an amount received as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injuries" almost always includes compensation for lost future income, did not overlook the obvious fact that such an amount sometimes includes "smart money." So, to trace the Court's reasoning: The statute must exclude punitive damages because the Committee Report must have had in mind a Treasury Decision, whose text
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
dissenting
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O'Gilvie v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118070/ogilvie-v-united-states/
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must have had in mind a Treasury Decision, whose text no more supports exclusion of punitive damages than does the text of the statute itself, but which must have meant to exclude punitive damages since it was based on the "return-ofcapital" theory, though, inconsistently with that theory, it did not exclude the much more common category of compensation for lost income. Congress supposedly knew all of this, and a reasonably diligent lawyer could figure it out by mistrusting the inclusive language of the statute, consulting the Committee Report, surmising that the Treasury Decision of underlay that Report, mistrusting the inclusive language of the Treasury Decision, and discerning that Treasury could have overlooked lost-income compensatories, but could not have overlooked punitives. I think not. The sure and proper guide, it seems to me, is the language of the statute, inclusive by nature and doubly inclusive by contrast with surrounding provisions. The Court poses the question, ante, at 86, "why Congress might have wanted the exclusion [in 104(a)(2)] to have coveredpunitive damages." If an answer is needed (and the text being as clear as it is, I think it is not), surely it suffices to surmise that Congress was following the Treasury *99 Decision, which had inadvertently embraced punitive damages just as it had inadvertently embraced future-income compensatory damages. Or if some reason free of human error must be found, I see nothing wrong with what the Court itself suggests but rejects out of hand: Excluding punitive as well as compensatory damages from gross income "avoids such administrative problems as separating punitive from compensatory portions of a global settlement." Ante, at 88. How substantial that particular problem is is suggested by the statistics which show that 73 percent of tort cases in state court are disposed of by settlement, and between 92 and 99 percent of tort cases in federal court are disposed of by either settlement or some other means (such as summary judgment) prior to trial. See B. Ostrom & N. Kauder, Examining the Work of State Courts, 1994, p. 34 (1996); Administrative Office of the United States Courts, L. Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the Director 162-164. What is at issue, of course, is not just imposing on the parties the necessity of allocating the settlement between compensatory and punitive damages (with the concomitant suggestion of intentional wrongdoing that any allocation to punitive damages entails), but also imposing on the Internal Revenue Service the necessity of reviewing that allocation, since there would always be strong incentive to inflate the tax-free compensatory portion. The
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
dissenting
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O'Gilvie v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118070/ogilvie-v-united-states/
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be strong incentive to inflate the tax-free compensatory portion. The Court's only response to the suggestion that this is an adequate reason (if one is required) for including punitive damages in the exemption is that "[t]he administrative problem of distinguishing punitive from compensatory elements is likely to be less serious than, say, distinguishing among the compensatory elements of a settlement." Ante, at 88. Perhaps so; and it may also be more simple than splitting the atom; but that in no way refutes the point that it is complicated enough to explain the inclusion of punitive damages in an exemption that has already abandoned the purity of a "return-of-capital" rationale. *100 The remaining argument offered by the Court is that our decision in 515 U.S. 3 came "close to resolving"in the Government's favorthe question whether 104(a)(2) permits the exclusion of punitive damages. Ante, at 83. I disagree. In Schleier we were faced with the question whether backpay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) were "damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness" for purposes of 104(a)(2)'s exclusion. As the dissent accurately"the key to the Court's analysis" was the determination that an ADEA cause of action did not necessarily entail "personal injury or sickness," so that the damages awarded for that cause of action could hardly be awarded "on account of personal injuries or sickness." See In the case at hand, we said, "respondent's unlawful termination may have caused some psychological or `personal' injury comparable to the intangible pain and suffering caused by an automobile accident," but "it is clear that no part of respondent's recovery of back wages is attributable to that injury." The respondent countered that at least "the liquidated damages portion of his settlement" could be linked to that psychological injury. And it was in response to that argument that we made the statement which the Court seeks to press into service for today's opinion. ADEA liquidated damages, we said, were punitive in nature, rather than compensatory. -332, and n. 5. The Court recites this statement as though the point of it was that punitive damages could not be received "on account of" personal injuries, whereas in fact the point was quite different: Since the damages were punishment for the conduct that gave rise to the (non-personal-injury) cause of action, they could not be "linked to" the incidental psychological injury. In the present cases, of course, there is no question that a personal injury occurred and that this personal *101 injury is what entitled petitioners to compensatory and punitive damages. We
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Justice Scalia
| 1,996 | 9 |
dissenting
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O'Gilvie v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118070/ogilvie-v-united-states/
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is what entitled petitioners to compensatory and punitive damages. We neither decided nor intimated in Schleier whether punitive damages that are indisputably "linked to" personal injuries or sickness are received "on account of" such injuries or sickness. Indeed, it would have been odd for us to resolve that question (or even come "close to resolving" it) without any discussion of the numerous considerations of text, history, and policy highlighted by today's opinion. If one were to search our opinions for a dictum bearing upon the present issue, much closer is the statement in United that a statute confers "tort or tort type rights" (qualifying a plaintiff's recovery for the 104(a)(2) exemption) if it entitles the plaintiff to "a jury trial at which `both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages' may be awarded." ). But all of this is really by the way. Because the statutory text unambiguously covers punitive damages that are awarded on account of personal injuries, I conclude that petitioners were entitled to deduct the amounts at issue here. This makes it unnecessary for me to reach the question, discussed ante, at 90-92, whether the Government's refund action against the O'Gilvie children was commenced within the 2-year period specified by 26 U.S. C. 6532(b). I note, however, that the Court's resolution of these cases also does not demand that this issue be addressed, except to the extent of rejecting the proposition that the statutory period begins to run with the mailing of a refund check. So long as that is not the trigger, there is no need to decide whether the proper trigger is receipt of the check or some later event, such as the check's clearance. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court.
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,994 | 1 |
majority
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United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087948/united-states-v-alvarez-sanchez/
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This case concerns the scope of 18 U.S. C. 3501, the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions. Respondent contends that 3501(c), which provides that a custodial confession made by a person within six hours following his arrest "shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person" before a *352 federal magistrate, rendered inadmissible the custodial statement he made more than six hours after his arrest on state criminal charges. We conclude, however, that 3501(c) does not apply to statements made by a person who is being held solely on state charges. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I On Friday, August 5, 1988, officers of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department obtained a warrant to search respondent's residence for heroin and other evidence of narcotics distribution. While executing the warrant later that day, the officers discovered not only narcotics, but $2,260 in counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes. Respondent was arrested and booked on state felony narcotics charges at approximately 5:40 p.m. He spent the weekend in custody. On Monday morning, August 8, the Sheriff's Department informed the United States Secret Service of the counterfeit currency found in respondent's residence. Two Secret Service agents arrived at the Sheriff's Department shortly before midday to take possession of the currency and to interview respondent. Using a deputy sheriff as an interpreter, the agents informed respondent of his rights under After waiving these rights, respondent admitted that he had known that the currency was counterfeit. The agents arrested respondent shortly thereafter, took him to the Secret Service field office for booking, and prepared a criminal complaint. Due to congestion in the Federal Magistrate's docket, respondent was not presented on the federal complaint until the following day.[1] Respondent was indicted for unlawful possession of counterfeit currency in violation of 18 U.S. C. 472. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the statement he had made during *353 his interview with the Secret Service agents. He argued that his confession was made without a voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights, and that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible under 18 U.S. C. 3501(c).[2] The District Court rejected *354 both contentions and denied the motion. Respondent subsequently was convicted after a jury trial at which the statement was admitted into evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the conviction. The court first outlined the exclusionary rule developed by this Court in a line of cases including and The so-called
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Justice Thomas
| 1,994 | 1 |
majority
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United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087948/united-states-v-alvarez-sanchez/
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Court in a line of cases including and The so-called - rule, adopted by this Court "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts," generally rendered inadmissible confessions made during periods of detention that violated the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Rule 5(a) provides that a person arrested for a federal offense shall be taken "without unnecessary delay" before the nearest federal magistrate, or before a state or local judicial officer authorized to set bail for federal offenses under 18 U.S. C. 3041, for a first appearance, or presentment. The Ninth Circuit went on to discuss the interrelated provisions of 18 U.S. C. 3501 and the decisions of the Courts of Appeals that have sought to discern the extent to which this statute curtailed the - rule. Section 3501(a), the court observed, states that a confession "shall be admitted in evidence" if voluntarily made, and 3501(b) lists several nonexclusive factors that the trial judge should consider when making the voluntariness determination, including "the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment." Section 3501(c) provides *355 that a confession made by a person within six hours following his arrest or other detention "shall not be inadmissible" solely because of delay in presenting the person to a federal magistrate. The Ninth Circuit construed 3501(c) as precluding suppression under - of any confession made during this "safe harbor" period following arrest. 975 F. 2d, at 1399. The court then reasoned that, by negative implication, 3501(c) must in some circumstances allow suppression of a confession made more than six hours after arrest solely on the basis of pre-presentment delay, "regardless of the voluntariness of the confession." The court thus concluded that the - rule, in either a pure or slightly modified form, applies to confessions made after the expiration of the safe harbor period. Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court determined that 3501(c) applied to respondent's statement because respondent was in custody and had not been presented to a magistrate at the time of the interview. The court concluded that the statement fell outside the subsection's safe harbor because it was not made until Monday afternoon, nearly three days after respondent's arrest on state charges. 975 F. 2d, at 1405, and n. 8 ). Because the statement was not made within the 3501(c) safe harbor period, the court applied both its pure and modified versions of the -
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,994 | 1 |
majority
|
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087948/united-states-v-alvarez-sanchez/
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applied both its pure and modified versions of the - rule and held that, under either approach, the confession should have been suppressed. 975 F. 2d, at 1405-. We granted the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari in order to consider the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of 3501. II The parties argue at some length over the proper interpretation of subsections (a) and (c) of 18 U.S. C. 3501, and, in particular, over the question whether 3501(c) requires *356 suppression of a confession that is made by an arrestee prior to presentment and more than six hours after arrest, regardless of whether the confession was voluntarily made. The Government contends that through 3501, Congress repudiated the - rule in its entirety. Under this theory, 3501(c) creates a safe harbor that prohibits suppression on grounds of pre-presentment delay if a confession is made within six hours following arrest, but says nothing about the admissibility of a confession given beyond that 6-hour period. The admissibility of such a confession, the Government argues, is controlled by 3501(a), which provides that voluntary confessions "shall be admitted in evidence." Largely agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, respondent contends that 3501(c) codified a limited form of the ruleone that requires the suppression of a confession made before presentment but after the expiration of the safe harbor period. A contrary interpretation of 3501(c), respondent argues, would render that subsection meaningless in the face of 3501(a). As the parties recognize, however, we need not address subtle questions of statutory construction concerning the safe harbor set out in 3501(c), or resolve any tension between the provisions of that subsection and those of 3501(a), if we determine that the terms of 3501(c) were never triggered in this case. We turn, then, to that threshold inquiry. When interpreting a statute, we look first and foremost to its text. Connecticut Nat. Section 3501(c) provides that in any federal criminal prosecution, "a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a *357 magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention." Respondent contends that he was under "arrest
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,994 | 1 |
majority
|
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087948/united-states-v-alvarez-sanchez/
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or other detention." Respondent contends that he was under "arrest or other detention" for purposes of 3501(c) during the interview at the Sheriff's Department, and that his statement to the Secret Service agents constituted a confession governed by this subsection. In respondent's view, it is irrelevant that he was in the custody of the local authorities, rather than that of the federal agents, when he made the statement. Because the statute applies to persons in the custody of "any " law enforcement officer or law enforcement agency, respondent suggests that the 3501(c) 6-hour time period begins to run whenever a person is arrested by local, state, or federal officers. We believe respondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to "any" law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute. Section 3501(c) provides that, if certain conditions are met, a confession made by a person under "arrest or other detention" shall not be inadmissible in a subsequent federal prosecution "solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia." 18 U.S. C. 3501(c) (emphasis added). Clearly, the terms of the subsection can apply only when there is some "delay" in presentment. Because "delay" is not defined in the statute, we must construe the term "in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." To delay is "[t]o postpone until a later time" or to "put off an action"; a delay is a "postponement." American Heritage Dictionary *358 493 The term presumes an obligation to act. Thus, there can be no "delay" in bringing a person before a federal magistrate until, at a minimum, there is some obligation to bring the person before such a judicial officer in the first place. Plainly, a duty to present a person to a federal magistrate does not arise until the person has been arrested for a federal offense. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(a) (requiring initial appearance before a federal magistrate).[3] Until a person is arrested or detained for a federal crime, there is no duty, obligation, or reason to bring him before a judicial officer "empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States," and therefore, no "delay" under 3501(c) can occur. In short, it is evident "from the context in which [the phrase] is used," that the "arrest or other detention" of which the subsection speaks must be an "arrest or other detention" for a violation of federal
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,994 | 1 |
majority
|
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087948/united-states-v-alvarez-sanchez/
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an "arrest or other detention" for a violation of federal law. If a person is arrested and held on a federal charge by "any" law enforcement officerfederal, state, or localthat person is under "arrest or other detention" for purposes of 3501(c) and its 6-hour safe harbor period. If, instead, the person is arrested and held on state charges, 3501(c) does not apply, and the safe harbor is not implicated. This is true even if the arresting officers (who, when the arrest is for a violation of state law, almost certainly will be agents of the State or one of its subdivisions) believe or have cause to believe that the person also may have violated federal law. Such a belief, which may not be uncommon given that many activities are criminalized under both state and federal law, does not alter the underlying basis for the arrest and subsequent custody. As long as a person is arrested and held only on state charges by state or local authorities, the provisions of 3501(c) are not triggered. *359 In this case, respondent was under arrest on state narcotics charges at the time he made his inculpatory statement to the Secret Service agents. The terms of 3501(c) thus did not come into play until respondent was arrested by the agents on a federal chargeafter he made the statement. Because respondent's statement was made voluntarily, as the District Court found, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a, nothing in 3501 authorized its suppression. See 18 U.S. C. 3501(a), (d). The State's failure to arraign or prosecute respondent does not alter this conclusion. Although Congress could have provided that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the State in this scenario retroactively transforms time spent in the custody of state or local officers into time spent under "arrest or other detention" for purposes of 3501(c), it did not do so in the statute as written. Cf. 503 U. S., at Although we think proper application of 3501(c) will be as straightforward in most cases as it is here, the parties identify one presumably rare scenario that might present some potential for confusion; namely, the situation that would arise if state or local authorities, acting in collusion with federal officers, were to arrest and detain someone in order to allow the federal agents to interrogate him in violation of his right to a prompt federal presentment. Long before the enactment of 3501, we held that a confession obtained during such a period of detention must be suppressed if the defendant could demonstrate the existence of improper collaboration between federal
|
Justice Thomas
| 1,994 | 1 |
majority
|
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087948/united-states-v-alvarez-sanchez/
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defendant could demonstrate the existence of improper collaboration between federal and state or local officers. See[4] In this *360 case, however, we need not address 3501's effect, if any, on the rule announced in Anderson. The District Court concluded that there was "no evidence" that a "collusive arrangement between state and federal agents caused [respondent's] confession to be made," App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a, and we see no reason to disturb that factual finding. It is true that the Sheriff's Department informed the Secret Service agents that counterfeit currency had been found in respondent's possession, but such routine cooperation between local and federal authorities is, by itself, wholly unobjectionable: "Only by such an interchange of information can society be adequately protected against crime." United aff'd, Cf.[5] III For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,011 | 1 |
concurring
|
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215694/att-mobility-llc-v-concepcion/
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Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that an arbitration provision “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S. C. The question here is whether California’s Discover Bank rule, see Discover is a “groun[d] for the revocation of any contract.” It would be absurd to suggest that requires only that a defense apply to “any contract.” If means anything, it is that courts cannot refuse to enforce arbitration agree ments because of a state public policy against arbitration, even if the policy nominally applies to “any contract.” There must be some additional limit on the contract de fenses permitted by Cf. ante, at 17 (opinion of the Court) (state law may not require procedures that are “not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA” and “lac[k] its bene fits”); post, at 5 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (state law may require only procedures that are “consistent with the use of arbitration”). I write separately to explain how I would find that limit in the FAA’s text. As I would read it, the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration 2 AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION THOMAS, J., concurring agreement, such as by proving fraud or duress. 9 U.S. C. §, 4. Under this reading, I would reverse the Court of Appeals because a district court cannot follow both the FAA and the Discover Bank rule, which does not relate to defects in the making of an agreement. This reading of the text, however, has not been fully developed by any party, cf. Brief for Petitioner 41, n. 12, and could benefit from briefing and argument in an ap propriate case. Moreover, I think that the Court’s test will often lead to the same outcome as my textual interpreta tion and that, when possible, it is important in interpret ing statutes to give lower courts guidance from a majority of the Court. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 411 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, although I adhere to my views on purposes-and-objectives pre-emption, see (opinion concurring in judgment), I reluctantly join the Court’s opinion. I The FAA generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written. Section 2 provides that “[a] writ ten provision in a contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,011 | 1 |
concurring
|
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215694/att-mobility-llc-v-concepcion/
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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Significantly, the statute does not paral lel the words “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” by refer encing the grounds as exist for the “invalidation, revoca tion, or nonenforcement” of any contract. Nor does the statute use a different word or phrase entirely that might arguably encompass validity, revocability, and enforce ability. The use of only “revocation” and the conspicuous omission of “invalidation” and “nonenforcement” suggest that the exception does not include all defenses applicable to any contract but rather some subset of those defenses. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 THOMAS, J., concurring See (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Concededly, the difference between revocability, on the one hand, and validity and enforceability, on the other, is not obvious. The statute does not define the terms, and their ordinary meanings arguably overlap. Indeed, this Court and others have referred to the concepts of revoca bility, validity, and enforceability interchangeably. But this ambiguity alone cannot justify ignoring Congress’ clear decision in to repeat only one of the three concepts. To clarify the meaning of it would be natural to look to other portions of the FAA. Statutory interpretation focuses on “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). “A provision that may seem am biguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme because only one of the permissi ble meanings produces a substantive effect that is com patible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 3, 371 (1988). Examining the broader statutory scheme, can be read to clarify the scope of ’s exception to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. When a party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement in federal court, requires that “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,” the court must order arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Reading § and 4 harmoniously, the “grounds for the revocation” preserved in would mean grounds re lated to the making of the agreement. This would require enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate unless a party 4 AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION THOMAS, J., concurring successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation of the agreement to
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,011 | 1 |
concurring
|
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215694/att-mobility-llc-v-concepcion/
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asserts a defense concerning the formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mu tual mistake. See Prima Paint (interpreting to permit federal courts to adjudicate claims of “fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself” because such claims “g[o] to the ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate”). Contract defenses unrelated to the making of the agree ment—such as public policy—could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.* —————— * The interpretation I suggest would be consistent with our prece dent. Contract formation is based on the consent of the parties, and we have emphasized that “[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of con sent.” Volt Information Sciences, The statement in suggesting that preserves all state-law defenses that “arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally,” is dicta. This statement is found in a footnote concerning a claim that the Court “decline[d] to address.” at 392, n. 9. Similarly, to the extent that statements in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. n. 1 (2010) (slip op. at n. 1), can be read to suggest anything about the scope of state-law defenses under those statements are dicta, as well. This Court has never addressed the question whether the state-law “grounds” referred to in are narrower than those applicable to any contract. Moreover, every specific contract defense that the Court has ac knowledged is applicable under relates to contract formation. In Doctor’s Associates, this Court said that fraud, duress, and unconscionability “may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening ” All three defenses historically concern the making of an agreement. See Morgan Stanley Capital Group (describing fraud and duress as “traditional grounds for the abrogation of [a] contract” that speak to “unfair dealing at the contract formation stage”); 411, 414 (1889) (describing an unconscionable contract as one “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make” and suggest ing that there may be “contracts so extortionate and unconscionable on their face as to raise the presumption of fraud in their inception” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 5 THOMAS, J., concurring II Under this reading, the question here would be whether California’s Discover Bank rule relates to the making of an agreement. I think it does not. In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court held that “class action waivers are, under certain circumstances, unconscionable as unlaw fully exculpatory.” ; see (“[C]lass action waivers [may be] substantively unconscionable inasmuch as they may operate effectively as exculpatory contract clauses
|
Justice Thomas
| 2,011 | 1 |
concurring
|
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/215694/att-mobility-llc-v-concepcion/
|
inasmuch as they may operate effectively as exculpatory contract clauses that are contrary to public policy”). The court concluded that where a class-action waiver is found in an arbitration agreement in certain consumer contracts of adhesion, such waivers “should not be enforced.” 113 P.3d, at 1110. In practice, the court explained, such agreements “operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be imposed under California law.” 113 P.3d, at 1108, 1109. The court did not conclude that a customer would sign such an agreement only if under the influence of fraud, duress, or delusion. The court’s analysis and conclusion that the arbitration agreement was exculpatory reveals that the Discover Bank rule does not concern the making of the arbitration agreement. Exculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic ex ample of contracts that will not be enforced because of public policy. 15 G. Giesel, Corbin on Contracts 85.17, 85.18 (rev. ed. 2003). Indeed, the court explained that it would not enforce the agreements because they are “ ‘against the policy of the law.’ ” 36 Cal. 4th, 113 P.3d, at 1108 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code Ann. see (“Agreements to arbitrate may not be used to harbor terms, conditions and practices that undermine public policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Refusal to enforce a contract for public-policy reasons does not concern whether the 6 AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION THOMAS, J., concurring contract was properly made. Accordingly, the Discover Bank rule is not a “groun[d] for the revocation of any contract” as I would read of the FAA in light of Under this reading, the FAA dic tates that the arbitration agreement here be enforced and the Discover Bank rule is pre-empted. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 1 BREYER, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 09–893 AT&T MOBILITY LLC, PETITIONER v. VINCENT CONCEPCION ET UX.
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,003 | 4 |
majority
|
Massaro v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127915/massaro-v-united-states/
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Petitioner, Joseph Massaro, was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S. C. 196(d), in connection with the shooting death of Joseph Fiorito. He was tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The day before Massaro's trial was to begin, prosecutors learned of what appeared to be a critical piece of evidence: a bullet allegedly recovered from the car in which the victim's body was found. They waited for several days, however, to inform defense counsel of this development. Not until the trial was underway and the defense had made its opening statement did they make this disclosure. After the trial court and the defense had been informed of the development but still during the course of trial, defense counsel more than once declined the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Massaro was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal new counsel for Massaro argued the District Court had erred in admitting the bullet in evidence, but he did not raise any claim relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. Judgt. order reported at Massaro later filed a motion under 8 U.S. C. 55, seeking to vacate his conviction. As relevant here, he claimed that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to accept the trial court's offer to grant a continuance. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found this claim procedurally defaulted because Massaro could have raised it on direct appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court acknowledged that ineffective-assistance claims usually should be excused from procedural-default rules because an attorney who handles both trial and appeal is unlikely to raise an ineffective-assistance *503 claim against himself. Nevertheless, it adhered to its decision in Under when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the record made at trial, the claim must be raised on direct appeal; failure to do so results in procedural default unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice. Finding that Massaro was represented by new counsel on appeal, that his trial counsel's ineffectiveness was evident from the record, and that he had failed to show cause or prejudice, the Court of Appeals held him procedurally barred from bringing the ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review. We granted certiorari. Petitioner now urges us to hold that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel need not
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,003 | 4 |
majority
|
Massaro v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127915/massaro-v-united-states/
|
hold that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel need not be raised on direct appeal, whether or not there is new counsel and whether or not the basis for the claim is apparent from the trial record. The Federal Courts of Appeals are in conflict on this question, with the Seventh Circuit joining the Second Circuit, see and 10 other Federal Courts of Appeals taking the position that there is no procedural default for failure to raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, see, e. g., United cert. denied, 56 U.S. 1059 ; United 81 F.3d n. 7 ; United 119 F.3d 90, 95 ; United ; United 41 F.3d 460, (CA6), cert. denied, (001); United 7 F.3d 1069, (CA8 001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 109 ; United 889 F.d 836, cert. denied, ; United 56 F.3d 9, 140 ; United 699 F.d 110, ; United 1 F.3d 61, 66 (CADC), cert. denied, 58 U.S. 895 *504 We agree with the majority of the Courts of Appeals, and we reverse. The background for our discussion is the general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice. See United 456 U.S. 15, (198); 53 U.S. 614, 61-6 The procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law's important interest in the finality of judgments. We conclude that requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal does not promote these objectives. As Judge Easterbrook has noted, "[r]ules of procedure should be designed to induce litigants to present their contentions to the right tribunal at the right time." at Applying the usual procedural-default rule to ineffective-assistance claims would have the opposite effect, creating the risk that defendants would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop the factual predicate for the claim. Furthermore, the issue would be raised for the first time in a forum not best suited to assess those facts. This is so even if the record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel's performance. The better-reasoned approach is to permit ineffective-assistance claims to be brought in the first instance in a timely motion in the district court under 55. We hold that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under 55, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal. In light of the way our system has developed,
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,003 | 4 |
majority
|
Massaro v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127915/massaro-v-united-states/
|
appeal. In light of the way our system has developed, in most cases a motion brought under 55 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance. When an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate *505 counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose. Under a defendant claiming ineffective counsel must show that counsel's actions were not supported by a reasonable strategy and that the error was prejudicial. The evidence introduced at trial, however, will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting record in many cases will not disclose the facts necessary to decide either prong of the Strickland analysis. If the alleged error is one of commission, the record may reflect the action taken by counsel but not the reasons for it. The appellate court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel's alternatives were even worse. See ("No matter how odd or deficient trial counsel's performance may seem, that lawyer may have had a reason for acting as he did. Or it may turn out that counsel's overall performance was sufficient despite a glaring omission"). The trial record may contain no evidence of alleged errors of omission, much less the reasons underlying them. And evidence of alleged conflicts of interest might be found only in attorney-client correspondence or other documents that, in the typical criminal trial, are not introduced. See, e. g., Without additional factual development, moreover, an appellate court may not be able to ascertain whether the alleged error was prejudicial. Under the rule we adopt today, ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily will be litigated in the first instance in the district court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial. The court may take testimony from witnesses for the defendant and the prosecution and from the counsel alleged to have rendered the deficient performance. *506 See, e. g., Griffin, 699 F. d, at 1109 (In a 55 proceeding, the defendant "has a full opportunity to prove facts establishing ineffectiveness of counsel, the government has a full opportunity to present evidence to the contrary, the district court hears spoken words we can see only in print and sees expressions we will never see, and a factual record bearing precisely on the issue is created"); 930 F.d 805 In addition,
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,003 | 4 |
majority
|
Massaro v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127915/massaro-v-united-states/
|
on the issue is created"); 930 F.d 805 In addition, the 55 motion often will be ruled upon by the same district judge who presided at trial. The judge, having observed the earlier trial, should have an advantageous perspective for determining the effectiveness of counsel's conduct and whether any deficiencies were prejudicial. The Second Circuit's rule creates inefficiencies for courts and counsel, both on direct appeal and in the collateral proceeding. On direct appeal it puts counsel into an awkward position vis-à-vis trial counsel. Appellate counsel often need trial counsel's assistance in becoming familiar with a lengthy record on a short deadline, but trial counsel will be unwilling to help appellate counsel familiarize himself with a record for the purpose of understanding how it reflects trial counsel's own incompetence. Subjecting ineffective-assistance claims to the usual cause-and-prejudice rule also would create perverse incentives for counsel on direct appeal. To ensure that a potential ineffective-assistance claim is not waived and to avoid incurring a claim of ineffective counsel at the appellate stage counsel would be pressured to bring claims of ineffective trial counsel, regardless of merit. Even meritorious claims would fail when brought on direct appeal if the trial record were inadequate to support them. Appellate courts would waste time and resources attempting to address some claims that were meritless and other claims that, though colorable, would be handled more efficiently if addressed in the first instance by the district court on collateral *507 review. See, e. g., United at 141 This concern is far from speculative. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in light of its rule applying procedural default to ineffective-assistance claims, has urged counsel to "err on the side of inclusion on direct appeal," On collateral review, the Second Circuit's rule would cause additional inefficiencies. Under that rule a court on collateral review must determine whether appellate counsel is "new." Questions may arise, for example, about whether a defendant has retained new appellate counsel when different lawyers in the same law office handle trial and appeal. The habeas court also must engage in a painstaking review of the trial record solely to determine if it was sufficient to support the ineffectiveness claim and thus whether it should have been brought on direct appeal. A clear rule allowing these claims to be brought in a proceeding under 55, by contrast, will eliminate these requirements. Although we could "require the parties and the district judges to search for needles in haystacks to seek out the rare claim that could have been raised on direct appeal, and
|
Justice Kennedy
| 2,003 | 4 |
majority
|
Massaro v. United States
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127915/massaro-v-united-states/
|
claim that could have been raised on direct appeal, and deem it waived," we do not see the wisdom in requiring a court to spend time on exercises that, in most instances, will produce no benefit. It is a better use of judicial resources to allow the district court on collateral review to turn at once to the merits. The most to be said for the rule in the Second Circuit is that it will speed resolution of some ineffective-assistance claims. For the reasons discussed, however, we think few such claims will be capable of resolution on direct appeal and thus few will benefit from earlier resolution. And the benefits of the Second Circuit's rule in those rare instances are outweighed by the increased judicial burden the rule would *508 impose in many other cases, where a district court on collateral review would be forced to conduct the cause-and-prejudice analysis before turning to the merits. The Second Circuit's rule, moreover, does not produce the benefits of other rules requiring claims to be raised at the earliest opportunity such as the contemporaneous objection rule because here, raising the claim on direct appeal does not permit the trial court to avoid the potential error in the first place. A growing majority of state courts now follow the rule we adopt today. For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently changed its position to hold that "a claim raising trial counsel ineffectiveness will no longer be considered waived because new counsel on direct appeal did not raise a claim related to prior counsel's ineffectiveness." 57 Pa. 48, 8 A.d 76, ; see also at 6-, and n. 8 A.d, at 735-, and n. (cataloging other States' case law adopting this position). Although the Government now urges us to adopt the rule of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Government took the opposite approach in some previous cases, arguing not only that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could be brought in the first instance in a motion under 55, but that they must be brought in such a motion proceeding and not on direct appeal. See, e. g., United 6, n. 4 We do not go this far. We do not hold that ineffective-assistance claims must be reserved for collateral review. There may be cases in which trial counsel's ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record that appellate counsel will consider it advisable to raise the issue on direct appeal. There may be instances, too, when obvious deficiencies in representation will be addressed by an appellate court
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,991 | 9 |
majority
|
Ylst v. Nunnemaker
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112642/ylst-v-nunnemaker/
|
In this case we decide whether the unexplained denial of a petition for habeas corpus by a state court lifts a state procedural bar imposed on direct appeal, so that a state prisoner may then have his claim heard on the merits in a federal habeas proceeding. I In 1975, respondent Nunnemaker was tried in California state court for murder. He raised a defense of diminished capacity and introduced psychiatric testimony in support. In response, the State introducedwithout objection from respondentthe testimony of a psychiatrist based upon a custodial interview. The jury found respondent guilty. He appealed, claiming for the first time that the State's psychiatric testimony was inadmissible because the interview had not been preceded by a Miranda warning, see In addition, he alleged that his attorney's failure to object to the psychiatric testimony amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, and raised other claims not relevant here. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. The sole basis for its rejection of the Miranda claim was the state procedural rule that "an objection based upon a Miranda violation cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." App. 15. See ; In re Dennis M., The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review on September 27, 1978. *800 In 1985, respondent filed a petition for collateral relief in California Superior Court. The petition was denied without opinion. Respondent then filed a similar petition for relief in the California Court of Appeal, invoking that court's original jurisdiction. That petition was also denied without opinion. Finally, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, invoking the original jurisdiction of that tribunal. That petition was denied on December 3, 1986, with citation of In re Swain, and In re App. 82. No opinion or other explanation accompanied these citations. Respondent next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The court dismissed the petition without prejudice, ruling that it was not clear whether respondent had exhausted his state remedies with respect to all his claims.[1] See Respondent then filed a second petition for habeas relief in the California Supreme Court, again invoking that court's original jurisdiction. That petition was denied, without opinion or case citation, on April 7, 1988. Respondent then filed a second petition for habeas relief in the Northern District of California, raising the Miranda claim and the ineffectiveness claim. The court rejected the ineffectiveness claim on the merits. As to the Miranda claim, the court found that respondent's state procedural default barred federal review.
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,991 | 9 |
majority
|
Ylst v. Nunnemaker
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112642/ylst-v-nunnemaker/
|
court found that respondent's state procedural default barred federal review. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court agreed that the ineffective-assistance claim was *801 meritless. However, relying upon our intervening opinion in the court held that the California Supreme Court's "silent denial" of respondent's second state habeas petition to that court lifted the procedural bar arising from the decision on direct review. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that because the California Supreme Court did not "clearly and expressly state its reliance on Nunnemaker's procedural default," the federal court could not say that the Supreme Court's order "was based on a procedural default rather than on the underlying merits of Nunnemaker's claims." We granted certiorari, II The last state court to render a judgment on the Miranda claim as of 1978, the California Court of Appeal, expressly found a procedural default. When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court. ; Thus, had respondent proceeded to federal habeas on the basis of the Miranda claim upon completing his direct review in 1978, federal review would have been barred by the state-law procedural default. State procedural bars are not immortal, however; they may expire because of later actions by state courts. If the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal-court review that might otherwise have been available. See We consider, therefore, whether the California Supreme Court's unexplained order denying his second habeas petition to that court, which according to the Ninth Circuit sought relief on the basis of his Miranda claim, constituted a "decision on the merits" of that claim sufficient to lift the procedural bar imposed on direct appeal. *802 The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did constitute a decision on the merits by applying a presumption that when a federal claim is denied without explicit reliance on state grounds, the merits of the federal claim are the basis for the judgment. Petitioner argues that that was error,[2] and we agree. The Ninth Circuit thought itself to be following our decision in As we have since made clear, however, see Coleman v. Thompson, ante, p. 722, the presumption is to be applied only after it has been determined that "the relevant state court decision. fairly appear[s] to rest primarily on federal law or [is] interwoven with [federal] law." Ante, at 740. The consequent question presented by the present case, therefore, is how federal
|
Justice Scalia
| 1,991 | 9 |
majority
|
Ylst v. Nunnemaker
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112642/ylst-v-nunnemaker/
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question presented by the present case, therefore, is how federal courts in habeas proceedings are to determine whether an unexplained order (by which we mean an order whose text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the judgment) rests primarily on federal law. The question is not an easy one. In Coleman itself, although the order was unexplained, the nature of the disposition ("dismissed" rather than "denied") and surrounding circumstances (in particular the fact that the State had rested its argument entirely upon a procedural bar), indicated that the basis was procedural default. But such clues *803 will not always, or even ordinarily, be available. Indeed, sometimes the members of the court issuing an unexplained order will not themselves have agreed upon its rationale, so that the basis of the decision is not merely undiscoverable but nonexistent. The problem we face arises, of course, because many formulary orders are not meant to convey anything as to the reason for the decision. Attributing a reason is therefore both difficult and artificial. We think that the attribution necessary for federal habeas purposes can be facilitated, and sound results more often assured, by applying the following presumption: Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion "fairly appear[s] to rest primarily upon federal law," Coleman, ante, at 740, we will presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgment or its consequences in place. Similarly where, as here, the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits. This approach accords with the view of every Court of Appeals to consider the matter, save the court below. See ; ; ; This presumption assists, as we have said, not only administrability but accuracy as well unlike the application of to unexplained orders, which achieves the former at the expense of the latter. As applied to an unexplained order leaving in effect a decision (or, in the case of habeas, the consequences of a decision) that expressly relies upon procedural bar, the presumption would interpret the order as rejecting that bar and deciding the federal question *804 on the merits. That is simply a most improbable assessment of what actually occurred. The maxim is that silence implies consent, not the opposite and courts generally behave accordingly, affirming
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Ylst v. Nunnemaker
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not the opposite and courts generally behave accordingly, affirming without further discussion when they agree, not when they disagree, with the reasons given below. The essence of unexplained orders is that they say nothing. We think that a presumption which gives them no effect which simply "looks through" them to the last reasoned decision most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.[3] Respondent poses various hypotheticals in which this presumption would not produce a correct assessment of the state-court disposition. We need not consider them, because we do not suggest that the presumption is irrebuttable; strong evidence can refute it. It might be shown, for example, that even though the last reasoned state-court opinion had relied upon a procedural default, a retroactive change in law had eliminated that ground as a basis of decision, and the court which issued the later unexplained order had directed extensive briefing limited to the merits of the federal claim. Or it might be shown that, even though the last reasoned state-court opinion had relied upon a federal ground, the later appeal to the court that issued the unexplained order was plainly out of time, and that the latter court did not ordinarily waive such a procedural default without saying so. *805 While we acknowledge that making the presumption rebuttable will make it less efficient than the categorical approach taken by the Courts of Appeals that have adopted the "look-through" methodology, see at ; at ; ; at we think it will still simplify the vast majority of cases. The details of state law need not be inquired into unless, if they should be as the habeas petitioner asserts, they would constitute strong evidence that the presumption, as applied, is wrong. To decide the present case, therefore, we begin by asking which is the last explained state-court judgment on the Miranda claim. Obviously it is not the second denial of habeas by the California Supreme Court; although that was the last judgment, it said absolutely nothing about the reasons for the denial. The first denial of habeas by that court, on December 3, 1986, did cite (without any elaboration) two state cases, Swain and The former holds that facts relied upon in a habeas petition must be alleged with particularity, and the latter that claims presented on direct review ordinarily may not be relitigated on state habeas. Even if we knew that the court intended to apply both of these cases to the Miranda claim (as opposed to the other claims raised by the same petition), that would be
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other claims raised by the same petition), that would be irrelevant to the point before us here. Respondent had exhausted his Miranda claim by presenting it on direct appeal, and was not required to go to state habeas at all, see ; state rules against that superfluous recourse have no bearing upon his ability to raise the Miranda claim in federal court. Thus, although the California Supreme Court's denial of respondent's first habeas petition to it was not utterly silent, neither was it informative with respect to the question before us. The prior denials of respondent's state habeas petitions by the two lower California courts were silent; and, as discussed above, the discretionary denial of review on direct appeal by *806 the California Supreme Court is not even a "judgment." Thus, the last state opinion on the Miranda claim is that of the Court of Appeal on direct review, and that opinion unequivocally rested upon a state procedural default. We look through the subsequent unexplained denials to that opinion, unless respondent has carried his burden of adducing strong evidence that one of the subsequent courts reached the merits of the federal claim. He has not done so. He claims to be able to show that California habeas courts could have allowed him to relitigate his Miranda claim, in spite of the ordinary state rule barring relitigation of claims raised on direct appeal. See, e. g., 62 Cal. 2d, at 397 P.2d, at But even if he established that, to prove that they could do so is not to prove that they did do so much less to prove that, having done so, they decided the relitigated point on the merits rather than on the basis of the procedural default relied upon in 1978. Respondent has adduced nothing to show that any California court actually reached the merits of his federal claim. The presumption that the California Supreme Court's last unexplained order did not reach the merits, and that the bar of procedural default subsists, has not been overcome. Federal-court review of the claim is therefore barred unless respondent can establish "cause and prejudice" for the default, see 495-496. The District Court specifically found no cause and prejudice, but, since the Court of Appeals had no occasion to review that holding, we remand for that purpose. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.
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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
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* The question before us is the meaning of the phrase “changing clothes” as it appears in the Fair Labor Stand- ards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S. C. et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. V). I. Facts and Procedural History Petitioner Clifton Sandifer, among others, filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act against respondent United States Steel Corporation in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs in this putative collective action are a group of current or former employees of respondent’s steelmaking facilities.1 As —————— * JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins this opinion except as to footnote 7. 1 Petitioners filed this action under 29 U.S. C. which estab- lishes a cause of action that may be maintained “by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employ- ees similarly situated.” Pending resolution of the instant summary- judgment dispute, a Magistrate Judge set aside a motion to certify the suit as a collective action, see No. 2:07–CV–443 RM, *1, n. 1 but petitioners assert that their ranks are about 800 strong. 2 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. Opinion of the Court relevant they seek backpay for time spent donning and doffing various pieces of protective gear. Petitioners assert that respondent requires workers to wear all of the items because of hazards regularly encountered in steel plants. Petitioners point specifically to 12 of what they state are the most common kinds of required protective gear: a flame-retardant jacket, pair of pants, and hood; a hardhat; a “snood”; “wristlets”; work gloves; leggings; “metatarsal” boots; safety glasses; earplugs; and a respirator.2 At bot- tom, petitioners want to be paid for the time they have spent putting on and taking off those objects. In the ag- gregate, the amount of time—and thus money—involved is likely to be quite large. Because this donning-and-doffing time would otherwise be compensable under the Act, U. S. Steel’s contention of noncompensability stands or falls upon the validity of a provision of its collective-bargaining agreement with petitioners’ union, which says that this time is noncompensable.3 The validity of that provision depends, in turn, upon the applicability of 29 U.S. C. to the time at issue. That subsection allows par- ties to decide, as part of a collective-bargaining agreement, that “time spent in changing clothes at the beginning or end of each workday” is noncompensable. The District Court granted summary judgment in perti- nent part to U. S. Steel, holding that donning and doffing —————— 2 The opinions below include descriptions of some of the items. See ;
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below include descriptions of some of the items. See ; And the opinion of the Court of Appeals provides a photograph of a male model wearing the jacket, pants, hardhat, snood, gloves, boots, and glasses. 3 The District Court concluded that the collective-bargaining agree- ment provided that the activities at issue were noncompensable, and the Seventh Circuit upheld that conclusion, That issue was not among the questions on which we granted certiorari, and we take the import of the collective-bargaining agreement to be a given. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 3 Opinion of the Court the protective gear constituted “changing clothes” within the meaning of No. 2:07–CV–443 RM, WL 3430222, *4– The District Court further assumed that even if certain items—the hardhat, glasses, and earplugs—were not “clothes,” the time spent donning and doffing them was “de minimis” and hence noncompensable. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld those conclusions.4 We granted certiorari, 568 U. S. (2013), and now affirm. II. Legal Background The Fair Labor Standards Act, enacted in 1938, governs minimum wages and maximum hours for non-exempt “employees who in any workweek [are] engaged in com- merce or in the production of goods for commerce, or [are] employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” 29 U.S. C. (minimum wages); (maximum hours); see (exemptions). The Act provides that “employee” generally means “any individual employed by an employer,” and, in turn, provides that to “employ” is “to suffer or permit to work,” The Act did not, however, define the key terms “work” and “workweek”—an omission that soon let loose a land- slide of litigation. See IBP, 25–26 (2005). This Court gave those terms a broad read- ing, culminating in its holding in that “the statutory —————— 4 Petitioners also sought, inter alia, backpay for time spent traveling between the locker rooms w they don and doff at least some of the protective gear and their workstations. The District Court denied that portion of respondent’s motion for summary judgment, WL 3430222, *11, and the Seventh Circuit –598. That issue is not before this Court, so we express no opinion on it. 4 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. Opinion of the Court workweek includes all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace.” at 690–691. That period, Anderson explained, encompassed time spent “pursu[ing] certain preliminary activities after arriving such as putting on aprons and overalls [and] remov- ing shirts.” at 692–693. “These activities,” the Court declared, “are clearly
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shirts.” at 692–693. “These activities,” the Court declared, “are clearly work” under the Act. Organized labor seized on the Court’s expansive con- struction of compensability by filing what became known as “portal” actions (a reference to the “portals” or entranc- es to mines, at which workers put on their gear). “PORTAL PAY SUITS EXCEED A BILLION,” announced a newspaper headline in late 1946. N. Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1946, p. 1. Stating that the Fair Labor Standards Act had been “interpreted judicially in disregard of long- established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees,” Congress responded by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S. C. et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. V). (a). The Portal-to-Portal Act limited the scope of employers’ liability in various ways. As relevant it excluded from mandatorily compensable time “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to [the] principal activity or activities [that an employee is employed to perform], which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such prin- cipal activity or activities.” 29 U.S. C. The Department of Labor promulgated a regulation explaining that the Portal-to-Portal Act did not alter what is known as the “continuous workday rule,” under which compensable time comprises “the period between the Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 5 Opinion of the Court commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities [,] whether or not the employee engages in work throughout all of that period.” (1947); (b) (2013). Of particular importance to this case, a Labor Department interpretive bulletin also specified that was “changing clothes” and “washing up or shower- ing” “would be considered ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activities” when “performed outside the workday and under the conditions normally present,” those same activi- ties “may in certain situations be so directly related to the specific work the employee is employed to perform that [they] would be regarded as an integral part of the em- ployee’s ‘principal activity.’ ” and n. 49; and n. 49. In 1949, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to address the conduct discussed in that interpretive bulletin—changing clothes and washing—by adding the provision presently at issue: “Hours Worked.—In determining for the purposes of [the minimum-wage and maximum-hours sections] of this title the hours for which an employee is em- ployed, t shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured
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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
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or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the par- ticular employee.” 29 U.S. C. Simply put, the statute provides that the compensability of time spent changing clothes or washing is a subject appropriately committed to collective bargaining. In the Court echoed the Labor Department’s 1947 regulations by hold- ing that “changing clothes and showering” can, under 6 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. Opinion of the Court some circumstances, be considered “an integral and indis- pensable part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are employed,” reasoning that “clear[ly] impli[ed]” as much. at 254–256. And in IBP, we applied to treat as compensable the donning and doffing of protective gear somewhat similar to that at issue We said that “any activity that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to a ‘principal activity’ is itself a ‘principal activity’ ” under As relevant to the question before us, U. S. Steel does not dispute the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that “[h]ad the clothes-changing time in this case not been rendered noncompensable pursuant to it would have been a principal activity.” Petitioners, how- ever, quarrel with the premise, arguing that the donning and doffing of protective gear does not qualify as “chang- ing clothes.” III. Analysis A. “Clothes” We begin by examining the meaning of the word “clothes.”5 It is a “fundamental canon of statutory con- struction” that, “unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, com- mon meaning.” (1979). Dictionaries from the era of ’s enactment indicate that “clothes” denotes items that are both designed and used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress. See Webster’s New International Dic- tionary of the English Language 507 (2d ed. 1950) (Web- ster’s Second) (defining “clothes” as “[c]overing for the —————— 5 Althoughthe Labor Department has construed on a number of occasions, the Government has expressly declined to ask us to defer to those interpretations, which have vacillated considerably over the years. Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 7 Opinion of the Court human body; dress; vestments; vesture”); see also, e.g., 2 Oxford English Dictionary 524 (1933) (defining “clothes” as “[c]overing for the person; wearing apparel; dress, raiment, vesture”). That is what we hold to be the mean- ing of the word as used in Although a statute may make “a departure from the natural and popular acceptation of language,” Greenleaf v. Goodrich, 101 U.S. 278, 284–285 (1880) (citing Maillard v.
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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
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v. Goodrich, 101 U.S. 278, 284–285 (1880) (citing Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251 (1854)), nothing in the text or context of sug- gests anything other than the ordinary meaning of “clothes.” Petitioners argue that the word “clothes” is too indeter- minate to be ascribed any general meaning but that, whatever it includes, it necessarily excludes items de- signed and used to protect against workplace hazards. That position creates a distinction between “protection,” on the one hand, and “decency or comfort,” on the other—a distinction that petitioners appear to have derived from Webster’s Second, which elaborates that “clothes” is “a general term for whatever covering is worn, or is made to be worn, for decency or comfort.” Webster’s Second 507 (emphasis added). But that definition does not exclude, either explicitly or implicitly, items with a protective function, since “protection” and “comfort” are not incom- patible, and are often synonymous. A parasol protects against the sun, enhancing the comfort of the bearer—just as work gloves protect against scrapes and cuts, enhanc- ing the comfort of the wearer. Petitioners further assert that protective items of apparel are referred to as “cloth- ing” rather than “clothes.” They point out that, when introduced by the adjective “protective,” the noun “cloth- ing” is used more commonly than “clothes.” That is true enough, but it seems to us explained by euphonic prefer- ence rather than difference in meaning. We see no basis for the proposition that the unmodified term “clothes” somehow omits protective clothing. 8 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. Opinion of the Court Petitioners’ proffered distinction, moreover, runs the risk of reducing to near nothingness. The statutory compensation requirement to which provides an exception embraces the changing of clothes only when that conduct constitutes “an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are employed.” But protective gear is the only clothing that is integral and indispensable to the work of factory workers, butchers, longshoremen, and a host of other occupations. Petitioners’ definition of “clothes” would largely limit the application of to what might be called workers’ costumes, worn by such employees as waiters, doormen, and train conductors. Petitioners insist that their definition excludes only items with some specific work-hazard-related protective func- tion, but that limitation essentially abandons the asser- tion that clothes are for decency or comfort, leaving no basis whatever for the distinction. Petitioners’ position is also incompatible with the histor- ical context surrounding ’s passage, since it flatly contradicts an illustration provided by the Labor Depart- ment’s 1947 regulations to show how “changing clothes” could be intimately
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1947 regulations to show how “changing clothes” could be intimately related to a principal activity. See 29 CFR and n. 49. Those regulations cited the situa- tion in which “an employee in a chemical plant cannot perform his [job] without putting on certain clothes” and specified that “[s]uch a situation may exist w the changing of clothes on the employer’s premises is required by law, by rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work.” and n. 65; (c), and n. 65. And petitioners’ position contradicts this Court’s only prior opinion purporting to interpret announced less than a decade after the statute’s passage, suggested in dictum that, were t a pertinent provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, would have applied to the facts of that case—w work- Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 9 Opinion of the Court ers “ma[d]e extensive use of dangerously caustic and toxic materials, and [we]re compelled by circumstances, includ- ing vital considerations of health and hygiene, to change clothes” on the job 254–255. Petitioners contend that any attempt at a general defi- nition of “clothes” will cast a net so vast as to capture all manner of marginal things—from bandoliers to barrettes to bandages. Yet even acknowledging that it may be impossible to eliminate all vagueness when interpreting a word as wide-ranging as “clothes,” petitioners’ fanciful hypotheticals give us little pause. The statutory context makes clear that the “clothes” referred to are items that are integral to job performance; the donning and doffing of other items would create no claim to compensation under the Act, and hence no need for the exception. Moreover, even with respect to items that can be regarded as integral to job performance, our definition does not embrace the view, adopted by some Courts of Appeals, that “clothes” means essentially anything worn on the body—including accessories, tools, and so forth. See, e.g., 1139–1140 (CA10 2011) (“clothes” are “items or garments worn by a person” and include “knife holders”). The construction we adopt today is considerably more contained. Many accessories—necklaces and knapsacks, for instance—are not “both designed and used to cover the body.” Nor are tools “commonly regarded as articles of dress.” Our definition leaves room for distinguishing between clothes and wear- able items that are not clothes, such as some equipment and devices.6 Respondent and its amici, by contrast, give the term in —————— 6 Petitioners and their amici insist that equipment can never be clothes. While we do not believe that every wearable piece of equip- ment qualifies—for example, a wristwatch—our construction of “clothes” does not exclude all objects
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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
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a wristwatch—our construction of “clothes” does not exclude all objects that could conceivably be charac- terized as equipment. 10 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. Opinion of the Court question a capacious construction, effectively echoing the Courts of Appeals mentioned above. On this view, “clothes” encompasses the entire outfit that one puts on to be ready for work. That interpretation is, to be sure, more readily administrable, but it is even more devoid of a textual foundation than petitioners’ offering. Congress could have declared bargainable under “time spent in changing outfits,” or “time spent in putting on and off all the items needed for work.” For better or worse, it used the narrower word “clothes.” “The role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other approach might accord with good policy.” Burrage v. United States, ante at 14 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). B. “Changing” Having settled upon the meaning of “clothes,” we must now consider the meaning of “changing.” Petitioners assert that when used with certain objects—such as “tire,” “diaper,” or, indeed, “clothes”—the term “changing” connotes substitution. That is undoubtedly true. See Webster’s Second 448 (defining “change” as “to make substitution of, for, or among, often among things of the same kind ; as, to change one’s clothes”). One would not normally say he has changed clothes when he puts on an overcoat. Petitioners conclude from this that items of protective gear that are put on over the employee’s street clothes are not covered by We disagree. Although it is true that the normal mean- ing of “changing clothes” connotes substitution, the phrase is certainly able to have a different import. The term “changing” carried two common meanings at the time of ’s enactment: to “substitute” and to “alter.” See, e.g., 2 Oxford English Dictionary 268 (defining “change,” among other verb forms, as “to substitute another (or others) for, replace by another (or others)” and “[t]o make Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 11 Opinion of the Court (a thing) other than it was; to render different, alter, modify, transmute”). We think that despite the usual meaning of “changing clothes,” the broader statutory context makes it plain that “time spent in changing clothes” includes time spent in altering dress. The object of is to permit collective bargaining over the compensability of clothes-changing time and to promote the predictability achieved through mutually beneficial negotiation. T can be little predictability, and hence little meaningful negotiation, if “changing” means only “substituting.” Whether one actually ex- changes street clothes for work clothes or
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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2651114/sandifer-v-united-states-steel-corp/
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one actually ex- changes street clothes for work clothes or simply layers garments atop one another after arriving on the job site is often a matter of purely personal choice. That choice may be influenced by such happenstances and vagaries as what month it is, what styles are in vogue, what time the em- ployee wakes up, what mode of transportation he uses, and so on. As the Fourth Circuit has put it, if the statute imposed a substitution requirement “compensation for putting on a company-issued shirt might turn on some- thing as trivial as whether the employee did or did not take off the t-shirt he wore into work that day.” v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., W another reading is textually permissible, should not be read to allow workers to opt into or out of its coverage at random or at will.7 —————— 7 This Court has stated that “exemptions” in the Fair Labor Stand- ards Act “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them.” We need not disapprove that statement to resolve the present case. The exemptions from the Act generally reside in which is entitled “Exemptions” and classifies certain kinds of workers as uncovered by various provisions. Thus, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U. S. –, n. 21 (slip op., at 19–20, n. 21), we de- clared the narrow-construction principle inapplicable to a provision appearing in entitled “Definitions.” 12 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. Opinion of the Court C. Application Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, we hold that petitioners’ donning and doffing of the protective gear at issue qualifies as “changing clothes” within the meaning of Petitioners have pointed to 12 particular items: a flame- retardant jacket, pair of pants, and hood; a hardhat; a snood; wristlets; work gloves; leggings; metatarsal boots; safety glasses; earplugs; and a respirator. The first nine clearly fit within the interpretation of “clothes” elaborated above: they are both designed and used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress. That proposition is obvious with respect to the jacket, pants, hood, and gloves. The hardhat is simply a type of hat. The snood is basically a hood that also covers the neck and upper shoulder area; on the ski slopes, one might call it a “balaclava.” The wristlets are essentially detached shirt- sleeves. The leggings look much like traditional legwarm- ers, but with straps. And the metatarsal boots—more commonly known as “steel-toed” boots—are just a special kind of shoe. The remaining three items, by contrast, do not
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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
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of shoe. The remaining three items, by contrast, do not satisfy our standard. Was glasses and earplugs may have a covering function, we do not believe that they are commonly regarded as articles of dress. And a respirator obviously falls short on both grounds. The question is whether the time devoted to the putting on and off of these items must be deducted from the noncompensable time. If so, federal judges must be assigned the task of separating the minutes spent clothes-changing and washing from the minutes devoted to other activities during the period in question. Some Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals in this case, have sought to avoid, or at least mitigate, this difficulty by invoking the doctrine de minimis non curat lex (the law does not take account of trifles). This, they Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 13 Opinion of the Court hold, enables them to declare noncompensable a few minutes actually spent on something other than clothes- changing—to wit, donning and doffing non-clothes items. Although the roots of the de minimis doctrine stretch to ancient soil, its application in the present context began with Anderson. T, the Court declared that because “[s]plit-second absurdities are not justified by the actuali- ties of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act,” such “trifles” as “a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours” may be “disregarded.” “We [thus] do not preclude the application of a de minimis rule.” We doubt that the de minimis doctrine can properly be applied to the present case. To be sure, Anderson included “putting on aprons and overalls” and “removing shirts” as activities to which “it is appropriate to apply a de minimis doctrine.” at 692–693. It said that, however, in the context of determining what preliminary activities had to be counted as part of the gross workweek under of the Fair Labor Standards Act.8 A de minimis doctrine does not fit comfortably within the statute at issue which, it can fairly be said, is all about trifles—the rela- tively insignificant periods of time in which employees wash up and put on various items of clothing needed for their jobs. Or to put it in the context of the present case, t is no more reason to disregard the minute or so necessary to put on glasses, earplugs, and respirators, than t is to regard the minute or so necessary to put on a snood. If the statute in question requires courts to —————— 8 We note, moreover, that even in that context,
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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2651114/sandifer-v-united-states-steel-corp/
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—————— 8 We note, moreover, that even in that context, the current regula- tions of the Labor Department apply a stricter de minimis standard than Anderson expressed. They specify that “[a]n employer may not arbitrarily fail to count as hours worked any part, however small, of the employee’s fixed or regular working time or practically ascertainable period of time he is regularly required to spend on duties assigned to him.” 14 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. Opinion of the Court select among trifles, de minimis non curat lex is not Latin for close enough for government work. That said, we nonetheless agree with the basic percep- tion of the Courts of Appeals that it is most unlikely Congress meant to convert federal judges into time-study professionals. That is especially so since the conse- quence of dispensing with the intricate exercise of separat- ing the minutes spent clothes-changing and washing from the minutes devoted to other activities is not to prevent compensation for the uncovered segments, but merely to leave the issue of compensation to the process of collective bargaining. We think it is possible to give the text of a meaning that avoids such relatively inconse- quential judicial involvement in “a morass of difficult, fact- specific determinations,” The forerunner of —the Portal-to-Portal Act provision whose interpretation by the Labor Department prompted its enactment—focused narrowly on the activi- ties involved: “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to [the employee’s] principal activity or activ- ities.” Section 203(o), by contrast, is addressed not to certain “activities,” but to “time spent” on certain activities, viz., “changing clothes or washing.” Just as one can speak of “spending the day skiing” even when less- than-negligible portions of the day are spent having lunch or drinking hot toddies, so also one can speak of “time spent changing clothes and washing” when the vast pre- ponderance of the period in question is devoted to those activities. To be sure, such an imprecise and colloquial usage will not ordinarily be attributed to a statutory text, but for the reasons we have discussed we think that ap- propriate The question for courts is whether the period at issue can, on the whole, be fairly characterized as “time spent in changing clothes or washing.” If an em- ployee devotes the vast majority of the time in question to putting on and off equipment or other non-clothes items Cite as: 571 U. S. (2014) 15 Opinion of the Court (perhaps a diver’s suit and tank) the entire period would not qualify as “time spent in changing clothes” under even if
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per_curiam
| 1,973 | 200 |
per_curiam
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Burns v. Fortson
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108742/burns-v-fortson/
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By statute, Georgia registrars are required to close their voter registration books 50 days prior to November general elections, except for those persons who seek to register to vote for President or Vice President. and 34-602.[*] The District Court upheld the registration cutoff against appellants' constitutional attack based upon this Court's decision in This appeal followed. The State offered extensive evidence to establish "the need for a 50-day registration cut-off point, given the vagaries and numerous requirements of the Georgia election laws." Plaintiffs introduced no evidence. On the basis of the record before it, the District Court concluded that the State had demonstrated "that the 50-day period is necessary to promote the orderly, accurate, and efficient administration of state and local elections, free *687 from fraud." (Footnote omitted.) Although the 50-day registration period approaches the outer constitutional limits in this area, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. What was said today in Marston v. Lewis, ante, p. 679, at 681, is applicable here: "In the present case, we are confronted with a recent and amply justifiable legislative judgment that 50 days rather than 30 is necessary to promote the State's important interest in accurate voter lists. The Constitution is not so rigid that that determination and others like it may not stand." The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the result. I concur only in the result, for I hesitate to join what, for me, is the Court's unnecessary observation that "the 50-day registration period approaches the outer constitutional limits in this area." I also concurred in the result in and said, "It is, of course, a matter of line drawing, as the Court concedes, ante, at 348. But if 30 days pass constitutional muster, what of 35 or 45 or 75? The resolution of these longer measures, less than those today struck down, the Court leaves, I suspect, to the future." I am not prepared to intimate at this point that a period of time in excess of 50 days cannot be sustained, no matter how supportive the record may be. In Blumstein, the Court struck down Tennessee's 90-day county durational residency requirement in part, I suppose, because it exceeded the State's 30-day registration period. Had the latter been 60 days, rather than 30, I suspect the Court would have indicated approval of a corresponding 60-day *688 durational residency requirement. See -349. I feel that each case in this area should be decided on its own record unrestricted by an arbitrary number-of-days figure. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS
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Justice White
| 1,973 | 6 |
majority
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United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.
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https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108711/united-states-v-glaxo-group-ltd/
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The United States appeals pursuant to 2 of the Expediting Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 29, from portions of a decision by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a civil antitrust suit. We are asked to decide whether the Government may challenge the validity of patents involved in illegal restraints of trade, when the defendants do not rely upon the patents in defense of their conduct, and whether the District Court erred in refusing certain relief requested by the Government. I Appellees, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) and Glaxo Group Ltd. (Glaxo), are British drug companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of griseofulvin. Griseofulvin is an antibiotic compound that may be cut with inert ingredients and administered *54 orally in the form of capsules or tablets to humans or animals for the treatment of external fungus infections. There is no substitute for dosage-form griseofulvin in combating certain infections. Griseofulvin itself is unpatented and unpatentable. ICI owns various patents on the dosage form of the drug.[1] Glaxo owns various patents on a method for manufacturing the drug in bulk form, as well as a patent on the finely ground, "microsize" dosage form of the drug.[2] On April 26, 1960, ICI and Glaxo entered into a formal agreement pooling their griseofulvin patents. At the time of the execution of the agreement, ICI held patents on the dosage form of the drug, and Glaxo held bulk-form manufacturing patents. Pursuant to the agreement, ICI acquired the right to manufacture bulk-form griseofulvin under Glaxo's patents, to sell bulk-form griseofulvin, and to sublicense under Glaxo's patents. Glaxo was authorized to manufacture dosage-form griseofulvin and to sublicense under ICI's patents. As part of the agreement, ICI undertook "not to sell and to use its best endeavors to prevent its subsidiaries and associates from selling any griseofulvin in bulk to any independent third party without Glaxo's express consent in writing." Subsequent to the pooling of the griseofulvin patents, ICI granted a sublicense to American Home Products *55 Corp. (AMHO), ICI's exclusive distributor in the United States. ICI agreed to sell bulk-form griseofulvin to AMHO. AMHO was authorized to process the bulk form into dosage form and to sell the drug in that form. With respect to bulk sales the agreement stated; "You [AMHO] will not, without first obtaining our [ICI's] consent, resell, or redeliver in bulk supplies of griseofulvin." Glaxo had previously entered into similar sublicensing agreements with two United States companies Schering Corp. (Schering) and Johnson & Johnson (J & J). The agreements contained a covenant on the part of
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Justice White
| 1,973 | 6 |
majority
|
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108711/united-states-v-glaxo-group-ltd/
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J). The agreements contained a covenant on the part of the licensees "not to sell or to permit its Affiliates to sell any griseofulvin in bulk to any independent third party without Glaxo's express consent in writing."[3] On March 4, 1968, the United States filed a civil antitrust suit against ICI and Glaxo, pursuant to 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. 4, to restrain alleged violations of 1 of the Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 1. The Government charged that the restrictions on the sale and resale of bulk-form griseofulvin, contained in the 1960 ICI-Glaxo agreement and the various sublicensing agreements, were unreasonable restraints of trade. The Government also challenged the validity of ICI's dosage-form patent.[4] *56 The District Court, citing this Court's decision in United held that the bulk-sales restrictions contained in the ICI-AMHO agreement were per se violations of 1 of the Sherman Act.[5] Because ICI had filed an affidavit disclaiming any desire to rely on its patent in defense of the antitrust claims, the District Court struck the claims of patent invalidity from the Government's complaint, ruling that the Government could not challenge ICI's patent when it was not relied upon as a defense to the antitrust claims. The District Court also denied the Government's motion to amend its complaint to allege the invalidity of Glaxo's patent on "microsize" griseofulvin.[6] Subsequently, in separate, unreported orders, the bulk-sales restrictions in the Glaxo-J & J, the Glaxo-Schering, and the Glaxo-ICI agreements were found to be per se violations of 1. The court enjoined future use of the bulk-sales restrictions, but refused the Government's request to order mandatory, nondiscriminatory sales of the bulk form of the drug and reasonable-royalty licensing of the ICI and Glaxo patents as part of the relief. The United States took a direct appeal under the Expediting Act and we noted probable jurisdiction. *57 II The major issue before us is whether the District Court erred in ruling that the United States could challenge the validity of a patent in the course of prosecuting an antitrust action only when the patent is relied on as a defense, which was not the case here. We agree with the United States that this was an unduly narrow view of the controlling cases. United acknowledged prior decisions permitting the United States to sue to set aside a patent for fraud or deceit associated with its issuance, but held that the federal courts should not entertain suits by the Government "to set aside a patent for an invention on the mere ground of error of judgment on
|
Justice White
| 1,973 | 6 |
majority
|
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108711/united-states-v-glaxo-group-ltd/
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invention on the mere ground of error of judgment on the part of the patent officials," at least where the United States "has no proprietary or pecuniary [interest] in the setting aside of the patent [and] is not seeking to discharge its obligations to the public" 265. Subsequently, United referred to Bell Telephone as holding that the United States was "without standing to bring a suit in equity to cancel a patent on the ground of invalidity," but went on to declare that, to vindicate the public interest in enjoining violations of the Sherman Act, the United States is entitled to attack the validity of patents relied upon to justify anticompetitive conduct otherwise violative of the law. The Court noted that, because of the public interest in free competition, it had repeatedly held that the private licensee-plaintiff in an antitrust suit may attack the validity of the patent under which he is licensed even though he has agreed not to do so in his license. The authorities for this proposition were Sola Electric ; Edward Katzinger ; and The essence of those cases is best revealed in Katzinger where the Court held that, although a patent licensee (under the then-controlling law) was normally foreclosed from questioning the validity of a patent he is privileged to use, the bar is removed when he alleges conduct by the patentee that would be illegal under the antitrust laws, absent the patent. The licensee was free to challenge the patent in these circumstances because the "federal courts must, in the public interest, keep the way open for the challenge of patents which are utilized for price-fixing" Katzinger and Gypsum were much in the tradition of Pope Mfg. : "It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly" a view most recently echoed in Lear, We think that the principle of these cases is sufficient authority for permitting the Government to raise and litigate the validity of the ICI-Glaxo patents in this antitrust case. According to the record, appellees had issued licenses under their patents that unreasonably restrained trade by prohibiting the licensees from selling or reselling bulk-form griseofulvin and had included in the pooling agreement a covenant to impose such restrictions on licensees. These charges were sustained, the court concluding that the covenant and the patent license provisions were per se restraints of trade in the griseofulvin product market. The District Court was then faced with the Government's attack on the pertinent
|
Justice White
| 1,973 | 6 |
majority
|
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108711/united-states-v-glaxo-group-ltd/
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was then faced with the Government's attack on the pertinent patents as well as its *59 demand for mandatory sales and reasonable-royalty licensing, the latter being well-established forms of relief when necessary to an effective remedy, particularly where patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed to the antitrust violation adjudicated. See for example, Besser Mfg. ; United ; International Salt ; Hartford-Empire Appellees opposed mandatory sales and compulsory licensing, asserting that the Government would "deny defendants an essential ingredient of their rights under the patent system," and that there was no warrant for "such a drastic forfeiture of their rights." In this context, where the court would necessarily be dealing with the future enforceability of the patents, we think it would have been appropriate, if it appeared that the Government's claims for further relief were substantial, for the court to have also entertained the Government's challenge to the validity of those patents. In arriving at this conclusion, we do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to attack a patent by basing an antitrust claim on the simple assertion that the patent is invalid. Cf. Walker Process Nor do we invest the Attorney General with a roving commission to question the validity of any patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case. But the district courts have jurisdiction to entertain and decide antitrust suits brought by the Government and, where a violation is found, to fashion effective relief. This often involves a substantial question as to whether it is necessary to limit the rights normally vested in the owners of patents, which in itself can be a complex *60 and difficult issue. The litigation would usually proceed on the assumption that valid patents are involved, but if this basic assumption is itself challenged, we perceive no good reason, either in terms of the patent system or of judicial administration, for refusing to hear and decide it. The District Court, therefore, erred in striking the allegations of the Government's complaint dealing with the patent validity issue and in refusing to permit the Government to amend its complaint with respect to this issue. On remand, the District Court should consider the validity of the ICI dosage-form patent and the Glaxo microsize patent. III The question remains whether the Government's case for additional relief was sufficient to provide the appropriate predicate for a consideration of its challenge to the validity of these patents. For this purpose, as we have said, its case need not be conclusive, but only substantial enough to warrant the court's undertaking what could be a large
|
Justice White
| 1,973 | 6 |
majority
|
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108711/united-states-v-glaxo-group-ltd/
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to warrant the court's undertaking what could be a large inquiry, one which could easily obviate other questions of remedy if the patent is found invalid and which, if the patent is not invalidated, would lend substance to a defendant's claim that a valid patent should not be limited, absent the necessity to provide effective relief for an antitrust violation to which the patent has contributed. Here, we think not only that the United States presented a substantial case for additional relief, but that it was sufficiently convincing that the District Court, wholly aside from the question of patent validity, should have ruled favorably on the demand for mandatory sales and compulsory licensing. In the first place, it is clear from the evidence that the ICI dosage-form patent, along with other ICI and Glaxo patents, gave the appellees the economic leverage with which to insist upon and enforce the bulk-sales *61 restrictions imposed on the licensees.[7] Glaxo apparently considered the bulk-sales restriction to be a prerequisite to the granting of a sublicense, for it rejected a draft of the ICI-AMHO agreement because, among other things, it would have permitted AMHO to sell griseofulvin in bulk form. There are indications, also, that Glaxo refused a sublicense to others than Schering and J & J because of fears that the companies would sell in bulk form or pressure Glaxo to allow such sales. The *62 source of the patent-pooling agreement pursuant to which such licenses were permitted and which contained the bulk-sales restriction was simple: Glaxo needed the ICI dosage-form patent to assure its licensees the right to use the patent and sell in dosage form. Pooling permitted ICI to engage in bulk manufacture, and, in exchange, ICI imposed the bulk-sales restrictions upon its licensees. There can be little question that the patents involved here were intimately associated with and contributed to effectuating the conduct that the District Court held to be a per se restraint of trade in griseofulvin. Secondly, we think that ICI and Glaxo should have been required to sell bulk-form griseofulvin on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and to grant patent licenses at reasonable-royalty rates to all bona fide applicants in order to "pry open to competition" the griseofulvin market that "has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints." International Salt The United States griseofulvin market consists of three wholesalers, all licensees of appellees, that account for nearly 100% of United States sales totaling approximately eight million dollars. Glaxo and ICI have never sold in bulk to others than the licensees and have prohibited bulk sales and resales by the
|
Justice White
| 1,973 | 6 |
majority
|
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.
|
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108711/united-states-v-glaxo-group-ltd/
|
licensees and have prohibited bulk sales and resales by the licensees. In practice, the licensees have not manufactured griseofulvin under the bulk-form patents, preferring instead to purchase in bulk form from ICI and Glaxo. The licensees sell the drug in dosage and microsize form to retail outlets at virtually identical prices. The effect of appellees' refusal to sell in bulk and prohibition of such sales by the licensees has been that bulk griseofulvin has not been available to any but appellees' three licensees and that these three are the only sources of dosage-form griseofulvin in the United States. There is little reason to think that the appellees or their licensees, now that the bulk-sales restrictions have been declared illegal, will begin selling in bulk. It is in *63 their economic self-interest to maintain control of the bulk form of the drug in order to keep the dosage-form, wholesale market competition-free. Bulk sales would create new competition among wholesalers, by enabling other companies to convert the bulk drug into dosage and microsize forms and sell to retail outlets, and would presumably lead to price reductions as the result of normal competitive forces. There is, in fact, substantial evidence in the record to the effect that other drug companies would not only have entered the market, had they been able to make bulk purchases, but also would have charged substantially lower wholesale prices for the dosage and microsize forms of the drug. Only by requiring the appellees to sell bulk-form griseofulvin on nondiscriminatory terms to all bona fide applicants will the dosage-form, wholesale market become competitive. Relief in the form of compulsory sales may not, however, alone insure a competitive market. Glaxo and ICI could choose to discontinue bulk-form manufacturing or the sale of griseofulvin in bulk form. The patent licensees might then begin to practice the bulk-form manufacturing patents pursuant to the patent licenses to fill their needs for the bulk drug. The licensees, of course, are not parties to this action, and a mandatory-sales order would not affect them. They would not be required to make the economically less advantageous bulk sales. The bulk form of the drug would be controlled by the licensees, and the appellees, because they would be required under the Government's proposed relief to sell to all applicants only so long as they sell to any United States purchasers, could easily avoid the mandatory-sales requirement. Unless other American firms are licensed to manufacture griseofulvin, competition in the United States market will depend entirely upon appellees' willingness to continue to supply their present licensees with the bulk
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