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Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110047/fcc-v-midwest-video-corp/ | (1965), the Commission promulgated rules requiring CATV systems[6] to carry the signals of broadcast stations into whose service area they brought competing signals, to avoid duplication of local station programming on the same day such programming was broadcast, and to refrain from bringing new distant signals into the 100 largest television markets unless first demonstrating that the service would comport with the public interest. See Second Report and 2 F. C. C. 2d 725 (1966).[7] The Commission's assertion of jurisdiction was based on its view that "the successful performance" of its duty to ensure "the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting" depended upon regulation of cable Against the background of the administrative undertaking at issue, the Court construed 2 of the Act as granting the Commission jurisdiction over cable television "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." 392 U.S., at Soon after our decision in Southwestern, the Commission *698 resolved "to condition the carriage of television broadcast signals upon a requirement that the CATV system also operate to a significant extent as a local outlet by originating." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F. C. C. 2d 417, 422 It stated that its "concern with CATV carriage of broadcast signals [was] not just a matter of avoidance of adverse effects, but extend[ed] also to requiring CATV affirmatively to further statutory policies." Accordingly, the Commission promulgated a rule providing that CATV systems having 3,500 or more subscribers may not carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the system also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by originating its own programsor cablecastingand maintains facilities for local production and presentation of programs other than automated services. 47 CFR 74.1111 (1970). This Court, by a 5-to-4 vote but without an opinion for the Court, sustained the Commission's jurisdiction to issue these regulations in United Four Justices, in an opinion by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, reaffirmed the view that the Commission has jurisdiction over cable television and that such authority is delimited by its statutory responsibilities over television broadcasting. They thought that the reasonably-ancillary standard announced in Southwestern permitted regulation of CATV "with a view not merely to protect but to promote the objectives for which the Commission had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting." The Commission had reasonably determined, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion declared, that the origination requirement would " `further the achievement of long-established regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110047/fcc-v-midwest-video-corp/ | increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services.' " quoting First Report and 20 F. C. C. 2d 201, 202 (1969). *699 The conclusion was that the "program-origination rule [was] within the Commission's authority recognized in Southwestern." THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in a separate opinion concurring in the result, admonished that the Commission's origination rule "strain[ed] the outer limits" of its jurisdiction. Though not "fully persuaded that the Commission ha[d] made the correct decision in [the] case," he was inclined to defer to its judgment. [8] B Because its access and capacity rules promote the long-established regulatory goals of maximization of outlets for local expression and diversification of programmingthe objectives promoted by the rule sustained in Midwest Video the Commission maintains that it plainly had jurisdiction to promulgate them. Respondents, in opposition, view the access regulations as an intrusion on cable system operations that is qualitatively different from the impact of the rule upheld in Midwest Video. Specifically, it is urged that by requiring the allocation of access channels to categories of users specified by *700 the regulations and by depriving the cable operator of the power to select individual users or to control the programming on such channels, the regulations wrest a considerable degree of editorial control from the cable operator and in effect compel the cable system to provide a kind of common-carrier service. Respondents contend, therefore, that the regulations are not only qualitatively different from those heretofore approved by the courts but also contravene statutory limitations designed to safeguard the journalistic freedom of broadcasters, particularly the command of 3 (h) of the Act that "a person engaged in broadcasting shall not be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S. C. 153 (h). We agree with respondents that recognition of agency jurisdiction to promulgate the access rules would require an extension of this Court's prior decisions. Our holding in Midwest Video sustained the Commission's authority to regulate cable television with a purpose affirmatively to promote goals pursued in the regulation of television broadcasting; and the plurality's analysis of the origination requirement stressed the requirement's nexus to such goals. But the origination rule did not abrogate the cable operators' control over the composition of their programming, as do the access rules. It compelled operators only to assume a more positive role in that regard, one comparable to that fulfilled by television broadcasters. Cable operators had become enmeshed in the field of television broadcasting, and, by requiring them to engage in the functional equivalent of broadcasting, the Commission had sought "only |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110047/fcc-v-midwest-video-corp/ | the functional equivalent of broadcasting, the Commission had sought "only to ensure that [they] satisfactorily [met] community needs within the context of their undertaking." With its access rules, however, the Commission has transferred control of the content of access cable channels from cable operators to members of the public who wish to communicate by the cable medium. Effectively, the Commission has relegated cable systems, pro tanto, to common-carrier *701 status.[9] A common-carrier service in the communications context[10] is one that "makes a public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing" Report and Industrial Radiolocation Service, Docket No. 16106, 5 F. C. C. 2d 197, 202 (1966); see National Association of Regulatory Utility ; Multipoint Distribution Service, 45 F. C. C. 2d 616, 618 (1974). A common carrier does not "make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal." National Association of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. 525 F.2d, at The access rules plainly impose common-carrier obligations on cable operators.[11] Under the rules, cable systems are required to hold out dedicated channels on a first-come, *702 nondiscriminatory basis. 47 CFR 76.254 76.256 (d) (1977).[12] Operators are prohibited from determining or influencing the content of access programming. 76.256 (b). And the rules delimit what operators may charge for access and use of equipment. 76.256 (c). Indeed, in its early consideration of access obligationswhereby "CATV operators [would] furnish studio facilities and technical assistance [but] have no control over program content except as may be required by the Commission's rules and applicable law"the Commission acknowledged that the result would be the operation of cable systems "as common carriers on some channels." First Report and in Docket No. 18397, 20 F. C. C. 2d, at 207; see ; Cable Television Report and 36 F. C. C. 2d 143, 197 In its the Commission did not directly deny that its access requirements compelled common carriage, and it has conceded before this Court that the rules "can be viewed as a limited form of common carriage-type obligation." Brief for Petitioner in No. 77-1575, p. 39. But the Commission continues to insist that this characterization of the obligation imposed by the rules is immaterial to the question of its power to issue them; its authority to promulgate the rules is assured, in the Commission's view, so long as the rules promote statutory objectives. Congress, however, did not regard the character of regulatory obligations as irrelevant to the determination of whether they might permissibly be |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110047/fcc-v-midwest-video-corp/ | irrelevant to the determination of whether they might permissibly be imposed in the context of broadcasting itself. The Commission is directed explicitly by 3 (h) of the Act not to treat persons engaged in broadcasting as common carriers. We considered the genealogy and the meaning of this provision in Columbia Broadcasting System, *703 The issue in that case was whether a broadcast licensee's general policy of not selling advertising time to individuals or groups wishing to speak on issues important to them violated the Communications Act of 1934 or the First Amendment. Our examination of the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927the precursor to the Communications Act of 1934 prompted us to conclude that "in the area of discussion of public issues Congress chose to leave broad journalistic discretion with the licensee." We determined, in fact, that "Congress specifically dealt withand firmly rejectedthe argument that the broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues." The Court took note of a bill reported to the Senate by the Committee on Interstate Commerce providing in part that any licensee who permits " `a broadcasting station to be used for the discussion of any question affecting the public shall make no discrimination as to the use of such broadcasting station, and with respect to said matters the licensee shall be deemed a common carrier in interstate commerce: Provided, that such licensee shall have no power to censor the material broadcast.' " quoting 67 Cong. Rec. 12503 (1926). That bill was amended to eliminate the common-carrier obligation because of the perceived lack of wisdom in " `put[ting] the broadcaster under the hampering control of being a common carrier' " and because of problems in administering a nondiscriminatory right of 412 U.S., ; see 67 Cong. Rec. 12502, 12504 (1926). The Court further observed that, in enacting the 1934 Act, Congress rejected still another proposal "that would have imposed a limited obligation on broadcasters to turn over their microphones to persons wishing to speak out on certain public issues." -108.[13] "Instead," the Court noted, *704 "Congress after prolonged consideration adopted 3 (h), which specifically provides that `a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.' " "Congress' flat refusal to impose a `common carrier' right of access for all persons wishing to speak out on public issues," was perceived as consistent with other provisions of the 1934 Act evincing "a legislative desire to preserve values of private journalism." Notable among them was |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110047/fcc-v-midwest-video-corp/ | to preserve values of private journalism." Notable among them was 326 of the Act, which enjoins the Commission from exercising " `the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,' " and commands that " `no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.' " 412 U.S., quoting 47 U.S. C. 326. The holding of the Court in Columbia Broadcasting was in accord with the view of the Commission that the Act itself did not require a licensee to accept paid editorial advertisements. Accordingly, we did not decide the question whether the Act, though not mandating the claimed access, would nevertheless permit the Commission to require broadcasters to extend a range of public access by regulations similar to those at issue here. The Court speculated that the Commission might have flexibility to regulate access, and that *705 "[c]onceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission or the broadcastersmay devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable," But this is insufficient support for the Commission's position in the present case. The language of 3 (h) is unequivocal; it stipulates that broadcasters shall not be treated as common carriers. As we see it, 3 (h), consistently with the policy of the Act to preserve editorial control of programming in the licensee, forecloses any discretion in the Commission to impose access requirements amounting to common-carrier obligations on broadcast systems.[14] The provision's background manifests a congressional belief that the intrusion worked by such regulation on the journalistic integrity of broadcasters would overshadow any benefits associated with the resulting public It is difficult to deny, then, that forcing broadcasters to develop a "nondiscriminatory system for controlling access is precisely what Congress intended to avoid through 3 (h) of the Act." n. 9 (STEWART, J., concurring); see and n. 2 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment).[15] *706 Of course, 3 (h) does not explicitly limit the regulation of cable systems. But without reference to the provisions of the Act directly governing broadcasting, the Commission's jurisdiction under 2 would be unbounded. See United Though afforded wide latitude in its supervision over communication by wire, the Commission was not delegated unrestrained The Court regarded the Commission's regulatory effort at issue in Southwestern as consistent with the Act because it had been found necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission's statutory responsibilities.[16] Specifically, regulation was imperative to prevent *707 interference with the Commission's work in the broadcasting area. And |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110047/fcc-v-midwest-video-corp/ | interference with the Commission's work in the broadcasting area. And in Midwest Video the Commission had endeavored to promote long-established goals of broadcasting regulation. Petitioners do not deny that statutory objectives pertinent to broadcasting bear on what the Commission might require cable systems to do. Indeed, they argue that the Commission's authority to promulgate the access rules derives from the relationship of those rules to the objectives discussed in Midwest Video. But they overlook the fact that Congress has restricted the Commission's ability to advance objectives associated with public access at the expense of the journalistic freedom of persons engaged in broadcasting. That limitation is not one having peculiar applicability to television broadcasting. Its force is not diminished by the variant technology involved in cable transmissions. Cable operators now share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their programming will include. As the Commission, itself, has observed, "both in their signal carriage decisions and in connection with their origination function, cable television systems are afforded considerable control over the content of the programming they provide." Report and in Docket No. 20829, 69 F. C. C. 2d 1324, 1333[17] *708 In determining, then, whether the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting," United 392 U. S., at we are unable to ignore Congress' stern disapprovalevidenced in 3 (h)of negation of the editorial discretion otherwise enjoyed by broadcasters and cable operators alike. Though the lack of congressional guidance has in the past led us to deferalbeit cautiouslyto the Commission's judgment regarding the scope of its authority, here there are strong indications that agency flexibility was to be sharply delimited. The exercise of jurisdiction in Midwest Video, it has been said, "strain[ed] the outer limits" of Commission 406 U.S., In light of the hesitancy with which Congress approached the access issue in the broadcast area, and in view of its outright rejection of a broad right of public access on a common-carrier basis, we are constrained to hold that the Commission exceeded those limits in promulgating its access rules.[18] The *709 Commission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose such obligations on television broadcasters. We think authority to compel cable operators to provide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must come specifically from Congress.[19] Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. |
Justice Douglas | 1,973 | 10 | dissenting | Hurtado v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108734/hurtado-v-united-states/ | In my view, petitioners, all indigents, have been subject to discrimination "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Petitioners, citizens of Mexico allegedly brought into the United States illegally, belong to that class of persons who as material witnesses can be subpoenaed to testify. Each must suffer at least limited invasion of his personal liberty to fulfill his public obligation to provide evidence. See United ; Petitioners, however, also belong to a discrete subclass those whose presence it might be impractical to secure by subpoena and thus were subject to detention pursuant *601 to former Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 46 (b)[1] if they could not post bail. The deprivation they suffer is longer and more extensive than that of the witness merely subject to a subpoena. They may spend months in jail awaiting the few minutes or hours they will spend testifying. Unlike other witnesses, they are not free to come or go while the trial is not actually in progress. Nevertheless, the justification for infringing their liberty remains the same. Former Rule 46 (b) was conceived as a tool[2] to insure *602 that the witness is available to testify, and any time spent incarcerated is spent as a direct result of the obligation that burdens all material witnesses. The comparison we are concerned with, then, is between the compensation paid to the incarcerated witness during the entire period his freedom to come or go is curtailed and the compensation paid to a nonincarcerated witness during the entire period he is subject to restraint. Although it is true, as the majority notes, that the nonincarcerated witness is paid nothing at all while court is not in session, the two classes are hardly comparably situated at the time, for the nonincarcerated witness is not subject to any substantial restraint as a result of his subpoena. Congress has seen fit to compensate all material witnesses at the per diem rate of $20 for each day's attendance "in any court" (as defined by the majority) and for the necessary travel time. 28 U.S. C. 1821. Yet, Congress compensates those incarcerated pursuant to former Rule 46 (b) at the per diem rate of only $1. Thus, not only are petitioners subject to more extensive deprivation of personal freedom, they also are denied equivalent compensation while waiting to testify.[3] Because former *603 Rule 46 (b) provided that only witnesses who failed to post bail might be incarcerated, this discrimination in practice affected just the indigent and resulted, therefore, in a suspect classification based upon wealth. This invidious discrimination against the poverty-stricken cannot be |
Justice Douglas | 1,973 | 10 | dissenting | Hurtado v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108734/hurtado-v-united-states/ | upon wealth. This invidious discrimination against the poverty-stricken cannot be supported by some speculative rational justification. Ortwein v. Schwab, post, p. 661 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); United (opinion of DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ.); (DOUGLAS, J., concurring in result). Surely, the Government's desire to avoid the costs of compensation in addition to the increased costs of food, lodging, and security does not rise above that level.[4] See ; U.S. 618, 633. The majority "cannot say that there is no reasonable basis for distinguishing the compensation paid for pretrial detention from the fees paid for attendance at trial." I am not certain I can agree even with that position. The magic transition period under the statute[5]*604 as construed by the majority is the beginning of trial. I find the distinction wholly arbitrary. I do not see how it bears any relevance to the quality of confinement; petitioners sacrifice their time waiting to testify whether or not court is in session. held that an indigent defendant is denied equal protection of the laws if he is barred from appealing on equal terms with other defendants solely because of his indigence. In (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers), I concluded that "no man should be denied release [pending trial or judicial review] because of indigence." This principle seems ever clearer and more forceful to me in circumstances where the imprisoned have not been charged with or convicted of a crime. We cannot allow the Government's insistent reference to these Mexican citizens as "deportable aliens" to obscure the fact that they come before us as innocent persons who have not been charged with a crime or incarcerated in anticipation of a criminal prosecution. It is true, of course, that petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of confining a material witness. But, in their prayer for relief, they seek to enjoin the Government "from any further incarceration of any person under such rule under the present interpretation of 28 U.S. C. 1821 at one dollar ($1.00) per day total payment." I conclude that petitioners are entitled to this relief unless they are released on their personal recognizance. |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | concurring | Freeman v. Pitts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112718/freeman-v-pitts/ | The District Court in the present case found that the imbalances in student assignment were attributable to private demographic shifts rather than governmental action. Without disturbing this finding, and without finding that revision of student assignments was necessary to remedy some other unlawful government action, the Court of Appeals ordered DeKalb County to institute massive busing and other programs to achieve integration. The Court convincingly demonstrates that this cannot be reconciled with our cases, and join its opinion. Our decision will be of great assistance to the citizens of DeKalb County, who for the first time since 1969 will be able to run their own public schools, at least so far as student assignments are concerned. t will have little effect, however, upon the many other school districts throughout the country that are still being supervised by federal judges, since it turns upon the extraordinarily rare circumstance of a finding that no portion of the current racial imbalance is a remnant of prior de jure discrimination. While it is perfectly appropriate for the Court to decide this case on that narrow basis, we must resolve if not today, then soon what is to be done in the vast majority of other districts, where, though our cases continue to profess that judicial oversight of school operations is a temporary expedient, democratic processes remain suspended, with no prospect of restoration, 38 years after *501 Almost a quarter century ago, in this Court held that school systems which had been enforcing de jure segregation at the time of Brown had not merely an obligation to assign students and resources on a race-neutral basis but also an "affirmative duty" to "desegregate," that is, to achieve insofar as practicable racial balance in their schools. This holding has become such a part of our legal fabric that there is a tendency, reflected in the Court of Appeals opinion in this case, to speak as though the Constitution requires such racial balancing. Of course it does not: The Equal Protection Clause reaches only those racial imbalances shown to be intentionally caused by the State. As the Court reaffirms today, if "desegregation" (i. e., racial balancing) were properly to be ordered in the present case, it would be not because the extant racial imbalance in the DeKalb County School System offends the Constitution, but rather because that imbalance is a "lingering effect" of the pre-1969 de jure segregation that offended the Constitution. For all our talk about "unitary status," "release from judicial supervision," and "affirmative duty to desegregate," the sole question in school desegregation cases (absent |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | concurring | Freeman v. Pitts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112718/freeman-v-pitts/ | to desegregate," the sole question in school desegregation cases (absent an allegation that current policies are intentionally discriminatory) is one of remedies for past violations. dentifying and undoing the effects of some violations of the law is easy. Where, for example, a tax is found to have been unconstitutionally imposed, calculating the funds derived from that tax (which must be refunded), and distinguishing them from the funds derived from other taxes (which may be retained), is a simple matter. That is not so with respect to the effects of unconstitutionally operating a legally segregated school system; they are uncommonly difficult to identify and to separate from the effects of other causes. But one would not know that from our instructions to the lower courts on this subject, which tend to be at a level of generality that assumes facile reduction to specifics. *502 "`[Desegregation] decrees,' " we have said, "`exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation,' " Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public ; We have never sought to describe how one identifies a condition as the effluent of a violation, or how a "vestige" or a "remnant" of past discrimination is to be recognized. ndeed, we have not even betrayed an awareness that these tasks are considerably more difficult than calculating the amount of taxes unconstitutionally pa t is time for us to abandon our studied disregard of that obvious truth and to adjust our jurisprudence to its reality. Since parents and school boards typically want children to attend schools in their own neighborhood, "[t]he principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in public schools across the country North and South is the imbalance in residential patterns." Austin ndependent School That imbalance in residential patterns, in turn, "doubtless result[s] from a mélange of past happenings prompted by economic considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school assignments, or a desire to reside near people of one's own race or ethnic background." Columbus Bd. of ; see also Pasadena Bd. of Consequently, residential segregation "is a national, not a southern[,] phenomenon" which exists "`regardless of the character of local laws and policies, and regardless of the extent of other forms of segregation or discrimination.' " quoting K. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities 36 (1965). *503 Racially imbalanced schools are hence the product of a blend of public and private actions, and any assessment that they would not be segregated, or would not be as segregated, in the absence of a particular one of |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | concurring | Freeman v. Pitts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112718/freeman-v-pitts/ | as segregated, in the absence of a particular one of those factors is guesswork. t is similarly guesswork, of course, to say that they would be segregated, or would be as segregated, in the absence of one of those factors. Only in rare cases such as this one and Spangler see 427 U.S., at where the racial imbalance had been temporarily corrected after the abandonment of de jure segregation, can it be asserted with any degree of confidence that the past discrimination is no longer playing a proximate role. Thus, allocation of the burden of proof foreordains the result in almost all of the "vestige of past discrimination" cases. f, as is normally the case under our equal protection jurisprudence (and in the law generally), we require the plaintiffs to establish the asserted facts entitling them to relief that the racial imbalance they wish corrected is at least in part the vestige of an old de jure system the plaintiffs will almost always lose. Conversely, if we alter our normal approach and require the school authorities to establish the negative that the imbalance is not attributable to their past discrimination the plaintiffs will almost always win. See Since neither of these alternatives is entirely palatable, an observer unfamiliar with the history surrounding this issue might suggest that we avoid the problem by requiring only that the school authorities establish a regime in which parents are free to disregard neighborhood-school assignment, and to send their children (with transportation paid) to whichever school they choose. So long as there is free choice, he would say, there is no reason to require that the schools be made identical. The constitutional right is equal racial access to schools, not access to racially equal schools; whatever racial imbalances such a free-choice system might produce would be the product of private forces. We apparently *504 envisioned no more than this in our initial post-Brown cases.[*] t is also the approach we actually adopted in which concerned remedies for prior de jure segregation of state university-operated clubs and services. But we ultimately charted a different course with respect to public elementary and secondary schools. We concluded in that a "freedom of choice" plan was not necessarily -440, and later applied this conclusion to all jurisdictions with a history of intentional segregation: "`Racially neutral' assignment plans proposed by school authorities to a district court may be inadequate; such plans may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school sites or distortion of school size in order |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | concurring | Freeman v. Pitts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112718/freeman-v-pitts/ | of school sites or distortion of school size in order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation. When school authorities present a district court with a `loaded game board,' affirmative action in the form of remedial altering of attendance zones is proper to achieve truly nondiscriminatory assignments." *505 Thus began judicial recognition of an "affirmative duty" to desegregate, at 15; at achieved by allocating the burden of negating causality to the defendant. Our post- cases provide that, once state-enforced school segregation is shown to have existed in a jurisdiction in 1954, there arises a presumption, effectively irrebuttable (because the school district cannot prove the negative), that any current racial imbalance is the product of that violation, at least if the imbalance has continuously existed, see, e. g., ; -210. n the context of elementary and secondary education, the presumption was extraordinary in law but not unreasonable in fact. "Presumptions normally arise when proof of one fact renders the existence of another fact `so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of [the inferred] fact until the adversary disproves it.' " quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 343, p. 969 (3d ed. 1984). The extent and recency of the prior discrimination, and the improbability that young children (or their parents) would use "freedom of choice" plans to disrupt existing patterns "warrant[ed] a presumption [that] schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition" were remnants of the de jure system. But granting the merits of this approach at the time of it is now 25 years later. "From the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." 498 U. S., at We envisioned it as temporary partly because "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools," and because no one's interest is furthered by subjecting the Nation's educational system to "judicial tutelage for the indefinite future," ; see also *506 Bd. of ; But we also envisioned it as temporary, think, because the rational basis for the extraordinary presumption of causation simply must dissipate as the de jure system and the school boards who produced it recede further into the past. Since a multitude of private factors has shaped school systems in the years after abandonment of de jure segregation normal migration, population growth (as in this case), "white flight" from the inner cities, increases in the costs of new facilities the percentage of the current makeup of school systems attributable to the prior, government-enforced |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | concurring | Freeman v. Pitts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112718/freeman-v-pitts/ | current makeup of school systems attributable to the prior, government-enforced discrimination has diminished with each passing year, to the point where it cannot realistically be assumed to be a significant factor. At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without any further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon current operation of schools. We are close to that time. While we must continue to prohibit, without qualification, all racial discrimination in the operation of public schools, and to afford remedies that eliminate not only the discrimination but its identified consequences, we should consider laying aside the extraordinary, and increasingly counterfactual, presumption of We must soon revert to the ordinary principles of our law, of our democratic heritage, and of our educational tradition: that plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations must prove intent and causation and not merely the existence of racial disparity, see at ; ; that public schooling, even in the South, should be controlled by locally elected authorities acting in conjunction with parents, see, e. g., ; at ; Milliken at *507 -742; and that it is "desirable" to permit pupils to attend "schools nearest their homes," 402 U. S., at |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | concurring | Connecticut v. Barrett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111796/connecticut-v-barrett/ | I concur in the judgment that the Constitution does not require the suppression of Barrett's statements to the police, but for reasons different from those set forth in the opinion of the Court. Barrett's contemporaneous waiver of his right to silence and limited invocation of his right to counsel (for the *531 purpose of making a written statement) suggested that he did not understand that anything he said could be used against him. However, the State eliminated this apparent ambiguity when it demonstrated that Barrett's waiver of his right to silence was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Barrett testified at trial that he understood his rights, i. e., he knew that he need not talk to the police without a lawyer present and that anything he said could be used against him. Under these circumstances, the waiver of the right to silence and the limited invocation of the right to counsel were valid. I In the Court held that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and that a defendant must receive detailed warnings that he or she has the rights to remain silent and to receive assistance of counsel before and during questioning. A statement obtained from a defendant during custodial interrogation is admissible only if the State carries its "heavy burden" of establishing that a defendant has executed a valid waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. To do so, the State must demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." ; see -479. In making this determination, courts must examine "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." at The language and tenor of the opinion suggested that the Court would require that a waiver of the rights at stake be "specifically made." See While the Court retreated from that position in North I continue to believe that the Court should require the police to obtain an " `affirmative waiver' " of rights before proceeding with interrogation. *532 See ). In this case, Barrett affirmatively waived his rights. Unlike the defendant in Barrett orally expressed his willingness to talk with the police and willingly signed a form indicating that he understood his rights. The police obtained an explicit oral waiver of the right to silence. Furthermore, the officer who administered the warnings to Barrett testified that the latter understood his rights "[c]ompletely": "I asked [Barrett] several times during my administration of those rights, if, in fact, he understood them; if there were points he wanted me to clarify, and he indicated to me, |
Justice Brennan | 1,987 | 13 | concurring | Connecticut v. Barrett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111796/connecticut-v-barrett/ | he wanted me to clarify, and he indicated to me, no, he understood everything fairly well." Tr. 452. At trial, one issue was whether Barrett voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights, and Barrett himself testified that he understood his rights as they were read to him.[1] Had the State been without Barrett's testimony at trial, where he was represented by counsel, I could not reach this conclusion. Barrett's statement to police that he would talk to them, but allow nothing in writing without counsel created doubt about whether he actually understood that anything he said could be used against him. In other words, the statement is not, on its face, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to silence.[2] As a general matter, I believe *533 that this odd juxtaposition (a willingness to talk and an unwillingness to have anything preserved) militates against finding a knowing or intelligent waiver of the right to silence. See[3] But Barrett's testimony revealed that he understood that he had rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present, and that anything he said could be used against him; nevertheless he chose to speak. In sum, the State has carried its "heavy burden" of demonstrating waiver. It has shown that Barrett received the warnings, that he had the capacity to understand them[4] and in fact understood them, and that he expressly *534 waived his right to silence, saying that he "had no problem in talking about the incident." Tr. 452; see also In my view, each of these findings was essential to the conclusion that a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the rights occurred. II Barrett argues that his refusal to make a written statement without an attorney present constituted an invocation of the right to counsel for all purposes and that any further interrogation after this mention of his desire for an attorney was impermissible under It is settled that any plain reference, however glancing, to a need or a desire for representation must result in the cessation of questioning. See -445 ; I believe that a partial invocation of the right to counsel, without more, invariably will be ambiguous. It gives rise to doubts about the defendant's precise wishes regarding representation and about his or her understanding of the nature and scope of the right to counsel. Thus, the police may not infer from a partial invocation of the right to counsel alone that the defendant has waived any of his or her rights not specifically invoked. However, circumstances may clarify an otherwise ambiguous situation. If the |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | second_dissenting | National Ass'n v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145703/national-assn-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | I join Justice STEVENS' dissent, while reserving judgment as to whether 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), really covers every possible agency action even of totally unrelated agenciessuch as, say, a discretionary determination by the Internal Revenue Service whether to prosecute or settle a particular tax liability, see 26 U.S.C. 7121. At the same time I add one additional consideration in support of his (and my own) dissenting views. The Court emphasizes that "[b]y its terms, the statutory language [of 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1342(b)] is mandatory and the list exclusive; if the nine specified criteria are satisfied, the EPA does not have the discretion to deny a transfer application." Ante, at 2531 My own understanding of agency action leads me to believe that the majority cannot possibly be correct in concluding that the structure of 402(b) precludes application of 7(a)(2) to the EPA's discretionary action. See ante, at 2548-2549 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). That is because grants of discretionary authority always come with some implicit limits attached. See L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 359 (1965) (discretion is "a power to make a choice" from a "permissible class of actions"). And there are likely numerous instances in which, prior to, but not after, the enactment of 7(a)(2), the statute might have implicitly placed "species preservation" outside those limits. To take one example, consider the statute that once granted the old Federal Power Commission (FPC) the authority to grant a "certificate of public convenience *2553 and necessity" to permit a natural gas company to operate a new pipeline. See 15 U.S.C. 717f(c)(1)(A). It says that "a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor if it is found that the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed and that the proposed service. is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity." 717f(e). Before enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, it is at least uncertain whether the FPC could have withheld a certificate simply because a natural gas pipeline might threaten an endangered animal, for given the Act's language and history, species preservation does not naturally fall within its terms. But we have held that the Endangered Species Act changed the regulatory landscape, "indicat[ing] beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." Indeed, the Endangered Species Act demonstrated "a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the `primary missions' of federal agencies." And given a new |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | second_dissenting | National Ass'n v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145703/national-assn-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | the `primary missions' of federal agencies." And given a new pipeline's potential effect upon habitat and landscape, it seems reasonable to believe, once Congress enacted the new law, the FPC's successor (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) would act within its authority in taking species-endangering effects into account. To take another example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has, by statute, an "exclusive" list of criteria to consider in reviewing applications for approval of a new drug. See 21 U.S.C. 355(d) Preservation of endangered species is not on this "exclusive" list of criteria. Yet I imagine that the FDA now should take account, when it grants or denies drug approval, of the effect of manufacture and marketing of a new drug upon the preservation or destruction of an endangered species. The only meaningful difference between the provision now before us, 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, and the energy- and drug-related statutes that I have mentioned is that the very purpose of the former is to preserve the state of our natural environmenta purpose that the Endangered Species Act shares. That shared purpose shows that 7(a)(2) must apply to the Clean Water Act a fortiori. |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | Our task in these cases is to interpret and enforce a federal statute that specifies the limits of the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA waives the immunity of the United States for certain tort claims but provides that any “tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless” it is filed with the appropriate agency “within two years after such claim accrues” and in federal court “within six months after” the agency’s final decision. 28 U.S. C. The statutory text, its historical roots, and more than a century of precedents show that this absolute bar is not subject to equitable tolling. I would enforce the statute as Congress intended and reverse. I The FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity and must be understood in that context. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress was reluctant to allow individual tort 2 UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG ALITO, J., dissenting claims against the United States. Instead, it granted relief to individuals through private laws enacted solely for those individuals’ benefit. These waivers of sovereign immunity were surgical and sporadic, but “notoriously clumsy,” and by 1946 Congress thought it better to adopt a “simplified” approach. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1953). The FTCA thus waived sovereign im- munity for tort claims against the Government and set out a procedure for adjudicating those claims. This waiver of sovereign immunity was no trivial mat- ter. Long before the FTCA, Congress authorized suits against the Government for contract and property claims under the Tucker Act and a number of predecessor stat- utes, but the Tucker Act excluded tort claims from its waiver of sovereign immunity. The concern was obvious: As opposed to the more predictable nature of contractual and property claims, tort-based harms are sometimes unperceived and open-ended. Even frivolous claims re- quire the Federal Government to expend administrative and litigation costs, which ultimately fall upon society at- large. For every dollar spent to defend against or to sat- isfy a tort claim against the United States, the Government must either raise taxes or shift funds originally allocated to different public programs. To reduce these risks, Congress placed strict limits on the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The statute “exempts from [its] waiver certain categories of claims,” and includes a broad exemption for claims “arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali- cious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrep- resentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” 28 U.S. C. see also In addition, in order to limit |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | U.S. C. see also In addition, in order to limit the scope and unpredictability of the Government’s potential liability, the Act exempts from the waiver of sovereign immunity certain types of recovery, Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 ALITO, J., dissenting such as prejudgment interest and punitive damages. See Most relevant here, the FTCA “condition[s]” its waiver of sovereign immunity on strict filing deadlines. United As enacted in 1946, the Act granted district courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims against the Government, “[s]ubject to the [other] provisions of ” the Act. FTCA, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 843–844. One of those provisions stated that “[e]very claim against the United States cognizable under this title shall be forever barred, unless within one year after such claim accrued it is presented in writing to the [rele- vant] Federal agency or an action is begun” in federal court. The current version pro- vides in full as follows: “A tort claim against the United States shall be for- ever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” 28 U.S. C. II The question presented in these two cases is whether the FTCA’s filing deadlines are subject to equitable tolling. We must therefore decide (1) whether the deadlines are “jurisdictional” in nature, so that courts are without power to adjudicate claims filed outside their strict limits and (2) if they are not jurisdictional, whether the statute nonethe- less prohibits equitable tolling. Both of these inquiries require close attention to the text, context, and history of the Act. And both lead to the conclusion that the FTCA allows no equitable tolling. 4 UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG ALITO, J., dissenting A The FTCA’s filing deadlines are jurisdictional. The statute’s plain text prohibits adjudication of untimely claims. Once the Act’s filing deadlines have run, all un- timely claims “shall be forever barred.” These words are not qualified or aspirational. They are absolute. If not filed with the agency within two years, or with a federal court within six months, a claim “shall be” “barred” “for- ever.” “Shall be forever barred” is not generally understood to mean “should be allowed sometimes.” The statute brooks no exceptions. And because the filing deadlines restrict the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, they impose a limit on the courts’ jurisdiction that “we should not take it |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | on the courts’ jurisdiction that “we should not take it upon ourselves to extend.” at –118. For over 130 years, we have understood these terms as jurisdictional. When crafting the FTCA’s limitations provision, Congress did not write on a clean slate. Rather, it borrowed language from limitations provisions in the Tucker Act and its predecessor statutes. The 1911 version of the Tucker Act included language that was nearly identical to that in the 1946 version of the FTCA: “Every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the court within six years after the claim first accrues.” That statutory language came, in turn, from the 1863 predecessor to the Tucker Act. See As early as 1883, we interpreted these precise terms to impose a “jurisdiction[al]” requirement that the “court may not disregard.” 107 U.S. 123, We emphasized that, when waiving sovereign immunity, Congress “may restrict the jurisdiction of the [courts] to certain classes of demands.” And we held that “[t]he express words of the statute leave no room for contention.” The Court thus had no “authority to Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 5 ALITO, J., dissenting engraft” an equitable tolling provision where Congress had so clearly constrained the judiciary’s authority. Over the ensuing decades, we repeatedly reaffirmed our interpretation of the phrase. In Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 232 (1887), we held that the Government could not waive the jurisdictional time bar and thus that the “duty of the court” was “to dismiss the petition” when a plaintiff raised an untimely claim. We reached the same conclusion in De 495–496 (1894). We reaffirmed the rule in United States v. New York, while holding that there was jurisdiction where the plaintiff presented its claim before the statutory deadline. And in Munro v. United States, we held that a District Court lacked jurisdiction to resolve un- timely claims, even if the Government waived any objection, under a different statute that incorporated the Tucker Act’s time limits. All the while, the lower courts similarly enforced the deadline as “a jurisdictional requirement, compliance with which is necessary to enable suit to be maintained against the sovereign.” Compagnie Generale (CA2 1931). Thus, by 1946, the phrase “shall be forever barred” was well understood to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over untimely claims.1 The FTCA’s statutory terms must be understood in this context. When Congress crafted the FTCA as a tort-based —————— 1 At times in the past we have too loosely conferred the “jurisdic- |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | in the past we have too loosely conferred the “jurisdic- tional” label. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). But our use of the term in this context was conscious, as we recognized in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 )). And it was correct. 6 UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG ALITO, J., dissenting analogue to the Tucker Act, it consciously borrowed the well-known wording of the Tucker Act’s filing deadline. Then, as now, it was settled that “[i]n adopting the lan- guage used in an earlier act, Congress must be considered to have adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a part of the enactment.” ; see also ; Sekhar v. United States, 570 U. S. – (2013) (slip op., at 3– 4) )). Indeed, Congress considered departing from the Tucker Act’s prohibition on equitable tolling, but decided against it. Proposals to include an equitable tolling provision were “included in nine of the thirty-one bills prior to the enact- ment of the FTCA,” but “the Act passed by the 1946 Con- gress did not provide for any equitable tolling of the limi- tations periods.” Colella & Bain, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 174, 195–196 (2000). Instead, it was understood that individuals with claims outside those deadlines could turn to Congress for relief through private bills, as they did before the FTCA’s enactment. See2 —————— 2 Congress has occasionally modified the FTCA’s limitations provi- sion. Initially, the Act required plaintiffs to file suit within one year of a claim’s accrual, or if the claim was for less than $1,000 to present the claim to the appropriate agency within one year of accrual. FTCA In 1949, to relieve the hardship of the 1-year deadline, Congress enlarged the filing deadline to two years. Act of Apr. 25, ch. 92, Then, in 1966, it made the filing of an administra- tive claim with the appropriate agency a prerequisite to filing suit, and it shortened the litigation filing deadline to six months from the agen- cy’s denial of the claim. Act of July 18, 7, 307. But Congress has never suggested that the deadlines could be excused or Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 ALITO, J., dissenting The evidence of statutory meaning does not end there. We reaffirmed the phase’s jurisdictional nature in the decades following the FTCA’s enactment. In v. United States, we rejected a request to allow equitable tolling under the |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | we rejected a request to allow equitable tolling under the Tucker Act. Confirm- ing the connection between the Tucker Act and the FTCA, we noted that “statutes permitting suits for tax refunds, tort actions, alien property litigation, patent cases, and other claims against the Government would be affected” if the Court allowed equitable tolling under the Tucker Act. And in 444 U.S., at –118, we cited ’s warning while emphasizing that the FTCA’s time limits are a condition of the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The lower courts also quickly recognized the statutes’ common heritage and enforced as a jurisdictional requirement. In 128 (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit cited Finn and Munro while holding that the FTCA’s filing deadline is a jurisdictional limit that the Government cannot waive. The Fifth Circuit, in Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703, 705, n. 4 held that the FTCA’s deadline is a jurisdictional condition on the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity and cited Carpenter v. United States, 56 F.2d 8, 9 (CA2 1932), a Tucker Act case, to support its holding. And in Humphreys v. United States, 272 F.2d 411 (1959), the Ninth Circuit similarly relied on Tucker Act precedents to hold that “the District Court has no jurisdiction over [an untimely FTCA] action,” because no waiver of sovereign immunity exists once the filing dead- line “has run.” at 412 in turn citing Finn and Munro). When Congress amended the FTCA in 1966, it readopted the “forever barred” language against the —————— enlarged by the courts. 8 UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG ALITO, J., dissenting backdrop of and the lower courts’ interpretation of the phrase. We must therefore assume that Congress meant to keep the universally recognized meaning of those words. See, e.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, That meaning, of course, cannot change over time. But even if there were any doubt, we recently reaffirmed our view in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 We explained that, unlike run-of-the- mill statutes of limitation, jurisdictional time limits “seek to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, or pro- moting judicial efficiency.” Recounting our decisions in Kendall, Finn, De Arnaud, New York, and we “reiterated” our understanding of the “absolute nature of the court of claims limitations statute.” And we rejected an invitation to abandon that interpretation, noting that Congress has long accepted our interpretation of the statute. The same must be said of the FTCA. As we have often |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | must be said of the FTCA. As we have often explained, “[w]hen a long line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by Congress has treated a similar require- ment as ‘jurisdictional,’ we will presume that Congress intended to follow that course.” (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted); Reed Elsevier, 8 ; Union Pacific R. Every single deci- sion from this Court interpreting the Tucker Act’s “similar requirement” has treated it as jurisdictional. And there is strong historical evidence that Congress “intended to follow that course.” That should be the end of the matter: Section 2410(b)’s filing deadlines are jurisdictional limits that are not subject to equitable tolling. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 9 ALITO, J., dissenting B Even if the FTCA’s filing deadlines are not jurisdic- tional, they still prohibit equitable tolling. To be sure, in recent years, we have grown reluctant to affix the “juris- dictional” label. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006); at 434–. “But calling a rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. (2012) (slip op., at 10). Where Congress imposes an inflexible claims processing rule, it is our duty to enforce the law and prohibit equitable tolling, whether it is jurisdictional or not. Here, Congress’ intent is clear. The words of the statute leave no doubt that untimely claims are never allowed: They are “forever barred.” This is no weak-kneed com- mand. The history underlying the text only bolsters its apparent meaning, and our repeated reaffirmation of the phrase’s meaning should remove any doubt. Congress never meant for equitable tolling to be available under the FTCA. The only factor pointing in the opposite direction is our suggestion in v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990), that we would thenceforth apply a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling in suits against the Government. But it is beyond me how ’s judge-made presumption announced in 1990 can trump the obvious meaning of a statute enacted many decades earlier. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In any event, ’s rebuttable presumption is overcome in this case. For well over a century, we have recognized the inflexible nature of the Tucker Act’s provision. Since its adoption, we have recognized that the FTCA’s language bears the same meaning as its Tucker Act companion. See ; And in John R. Sand & Gravel, we held that our “definitive ear- 10 UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG ALITO, J., dissenting lier interpretation of the” |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | KWAI FUN WONG ALITO, J., dissenting lier interpretation of the” Tucker Act is a “sufficient rebut- tal” to ’s There is no principled way to distinguish this case. Section 2401(b) allows no equitable tolling. III The Court’s contrary conclusion is wrong at every step. In its view, ’s statutory text is “mundane” lan- guage that “ ‘reads like an ordinary, run-of-the-mill statute of ’ ” Ante, at 8. But “ordinary” nonjurisdic- tional time limits are typically directed at claimants. The deadline in for example, required that “a person adversely affected by [a Board of Veterans’ Ap- peals] decision shall file a notice of appeal within 120 days after” the decision. 38 U.S. C. (emphasis added); 562 U. S, at 438. The “run-of-the-mill” limitations provision in likewise applied to the “person” responsible for filing: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S. C. ; And the provision at issue in was similar, if not an even weaker com- mand. It provided that “ ‘[w]ithin thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission an employee or applicant for employment may file a civil action.’ ” (quoting 42 U.S. C. §2000e–(c) (1998 ed.); emphasis added). Section 2401(b), by contrast, never mentions the claim- ant, and it is phrased in emphatically absolute terms. It says unequivocally that untimely tort claims against the United States “shall be forever barred.” Although it does not use the word “jurisdiction,” it speaks at least as much to the courts (who are “forever barred” from considering untimely claims) as it does to claimants (who are “forever Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 11 ALITO, J., dissenting barred” from bringing stale claims). More important, though, the words in have a well-known meaning that ipse dixit labels cannot overcome.3 The majority tells us this “old ‘ad hoc,’ law-by-law ap- proach”—also known as statutory interpretation—has been replaced with a broad presumption in favor of equitable tolling and a judicial preference against jurisdictional labels. Ante, at 4. I dispute the premise. But in any event, as I explained above, and as six Members of the current Court held in John R. Sand & Gravel, the over- whelming evidence of congressional intent here easily overtakes ’s rebuttable Even if we would rather not call ’s deadlines “jurisdictional,” with all that label entails, we must nonetheless recognize that Congress never meant to allow equitable tolling. The majority avoids this latter point by declining to |
Justice Alito | 2,015 | 8 | dissenting | United States v. Kwai Fun Wong | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2797292/united-states-v-kwai-fun-wong/ | tolling. The majority avoids this latter point by declining to give it any separate attention. See ante, at 5, n. 2. But we cannot conflate the two questions because, though the relevant evidence is the same, the analysis is different. In particular, the majority is wrong to rely on when assessing the jurisdictional question, which is the only question it really decides. We do not indulge ’s pre- sumption when determining whether a requirement is jurisdictional. Instead, we typically invoke only after finding that a requirement is not jurisdictional, to decide whether Congress nonetheless intended to prohibit equitable tolling. In for instance, we never mentioned because the parties did not ask us to —————— 3 The majority relies on the fact that we have allowed equitable toll- ing under “forever barred” language in the Clayton Act. See ante, at 10. But there is no evidence that Congress meant to import that statute’s terms into the FTCA. Nor does the Clayton Act involve the waiver of sovereign immunity for money damages against the Government. The Tucker Act, by contrast, was clearly the blueprint for the FTCA’s time bar, it did involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, and our cases have uniformly held that its language is not subject to equitable tolling. 12 UNITED STATES v. KWAI FUN WONG ALITO, J., dissenting address whether the rule was “subject to equitable tolling if it [was] not jurisdictional.” n. 4. Likewise, in we held that the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is juris- dictional, without a word about4 In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. –, –, (2013) (slip op., at 6–7, 11–13), we considered only after deciding that a deadline was not jurisdic- tional. And in Holland, we held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s time limits are not jurisdictional, without relying on and then stated that “[w]e have previously made clear that a nonju- risdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a ‘rebuttable presumption’ in favor ‘of equitable tolling.’ ” –646 (quoting at 95–96) (emphasis deleted); cf. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002) (invoking after concluding that a limitations period was not a “substantive” compo- nent of the Bankruptcy Code).5 This error matters be- cause the majority’s jurisdictional analysis literally begins and ends with see ante, at 4–5, 18, and thus relies on a presumption that should have no bearing on the question. Without that presumption, the majority could not so readily ignore the unmistakable evidence that ’s limits are jurisdictional. * * * For these reasons, I |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Inadi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111613/united-states-v-inadi/ | With respect to the case before us, the majority takes but a small step. In the Court held: "[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examinion trial, the Confrontion Clause normally requires a showing th he is unavailable. Even then, his stement is admissible only if it bears adeque `indicia of reliability.' " ). The majority now assures us th "[t]he reliability of the out-of-court stements is not issue in this case." Ante, 391, n. 3. Respondent is thus free to return to the Court of Appeals and argue th the *401 co-conspiror declarions admitted against him lack the "indicia of reliability" demanded by the Confrontion Clause.[1] With respect to its constitutional analysis, however, the majority makes a giant leap. Even while conceding th the " `very mission' " of the Confrontion Clause is to " `advance "the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials," ' " ante, 396 (citions omitted), the Court today holds th the Clause is not offended when the prosecution fails to make even the slightest effort to produce for cross-examinion the authors of the out-of-court stements with which it hopes to convict a defendant. Because I cannot share the majority's implicit faith th the camaraderie of a criminal conspiracy can substitute for in-court cross-examinion to guarantee the reliability of conspirorial stements, I can neither accept the majority's analysis nor stand silent while the values embodied in the Sixth Amendment are so cavalierly subordined to prosecutorial efficiency. I A In after canvassing the many previous cases th had examined the relionship between the *402 Confrontion Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the many exceptions to the hearsay rule, the Court noted: "The Confrontion Clause operes in two separe ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusion, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examinion has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstre the unavailability of, the declarant whose stement it wishes to use against the defendant. "The second aspect operes once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness th `there is no merial departure from the reason of the general rule.' " ). This sweeping language was in no way limited to any particular variety of out-of-court declarions, and the Third Circuit panel th the Court reverses today was hardly alone in believing |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Inadi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111613/united-states-v-inadi/ | th the Court reverses today was hardly alone in believing the rule in to be applicable to all such declarions. See, e. g., United ; cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1 ; see also United The majority, however, now tells us th "simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule th applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony." Ante, 394. This effort to confine misconstrues both the meaning of th decision and the essential command of the Confrontion Clause. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, it is clear th the Court consciously sought to lay down an analytical *403 framework applicable to all out-of-court declarions introduced by the prosecution for the truth they contain. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, writing for the Court, introduced his affirmion of the Confrontion Clause's twin requirements of unavailability and reliability by noting: "The Court has not sought to `map out a theory of the Confrontion Clause th would determine the validity of all hearsay "exceptions." ' 399 U. S. [149,] 162 [1970]. But a general approach to the problem is discernible." -65. For its general principles, the Court of course turned to a number of cases involving former testimony, e. g., ; ; ; (all cited 448 U.S., ). But it also relied on (cited 448 U.S., n. 7, and 66), where the hearsay had been admitted pursuant to the Georgia co-conspiror exception, and (cited 448 U.S., 63), which involved an accomplice's confession. Indeed, it was on th relied for the proposition th "the Confrontion Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontion trial, and th a `primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examinion.' " 448 U.S., 63 (quoting 418). The absence of any language in confining its analysis to prior testimony is not surprising. The Court simply recognized th whenever the prosecution seeks to convict a defendant by relying on the truth asserted in out-of-court declarions, confrontion and cross-examinion of the declarant in open court are the most trusted guarantors of the reliability th is the primary concern of the Confrontion Clause. The need for these guarantors is as critical in cases involving the extrajudicial stements of co-conspirors as it is in cases involving the prior testimony of an absent declarant or the confession of an accomplice. *404 B When the prosecution introduces the stements of a co-conspiror merely to show wh the declarant might have been thinking or wh he wished his listeners to believe the time he spoke, neither the rule against hearsay nor the Confrontion Clause is impliced by their admission against a defendant. See However, when the prosecution invokes the co-conspiror exemption to the hearsay |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Inadi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111613/united-states-v-inadi/ | when the prosecution invokes the co-conspiror exemption to the hearsay rule, as it does in this case, it is urging the truth of the mters asserted in the extrajudicial stements. The question here must be whether we have so much confidence in the factual accuracy of stements made by conspirors in furtherance of their conspiracy th we deem the testing of these stements by cross-examinion unnecessary to guarantee the reliability of a trial's result. The majority is quite right to suggest th "[c]onspirors are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand." Ante, 395. However, the differences between an accomplice's conspirorial utterances and his testimony in court are not merely those of diction and demeanor. Th a stement was truly made "in furtherance" of a conspiracy cannot possibly be a guarantee, or even an indicium, of its reliability. See The Confrontion Clause and the Co-Conspiror Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, ; Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and the Confrontion Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility for Coconspiror Hearsay, 53 Ford. L. Rev. 1291, 1311-1312 As one commentor has noted: "Conspirors' declarions are good to prove th some conspiracy exists but less trustworthy to show its aims and membership. The conspiror's interest is likely to lie in misleading the listener into believing the conspiracy stronger with more members (and different *405 members) and other aims than in fact it has. It is no victory for common sense to make a belief th criminals are notorious for their veracity the basis for law." Hearsay and Conspiracy, The unreliability of co-conspiror declarions as trial evidence is not merely a product of the duplicity with which criminals often conduct their business. It also stems from the ambiguities th so often appear in all casual conversions, not just those of outlaws. See, e. g., 104 And the difficulties one has in making sense of slang and dialect can be compounded where conspirors use prive codes, as indeed they did in this case. Because of these problems, trained case agents are often hard pressed to piece together the facts of a criminal conspiracy from the confused tangle of conversions they have intercepted. The appearance of a co-conspiror declarant in court will allow the eliminion of ambiguity th neither side has a right to profit from. C Considerion of the reasons why co-conspiror declarions have been exempted from the rule against hearsay only confirms doubts as to the reliability of the truth asserted in those stements. In contrast to other |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Inadi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111613/united-states-v-inadi/ | the truth asserted in those stements. In contrast to other types of stements excepted from the rule, the co-conspiror declarions have not been admitted because of a belief in their special reliability. See 1384-1385; 1161-1167. Rher, the root of the exemption lies in substantive law. Under the agency theory th supports conspiracy law, "once the conspiracy or combinion is established, the act of one conspiror, in the prosecution of the enterprise, is considered the act of all, and is evidence against all." United Stes v. Gooding, 12 Whe. 460, Every stement of co-conspirors in furtherance of *406 their illegal scheme is thus a verbal act admissible against each conspiror as if it had been his own. This agency theory, which even the Advisory Committee on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence labeled " best a fiction," Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), 28 U.S. C. App., p. 718, might justify the exemption conferred upon co-conspiror declarions from the traditional rule against hearsay. But it speaks not all to the Confrontion Clause's concern for reliable factfinding. II Without even tempting to argue th co-conspiror declarions have an inherent reliability th might justify their admission trial when the declarant is not present in court for cross-examinion, the majority instead supports its holding by arguing th "it is extremely unlikely th in-court testimony will recapture the evidentiary significance of stements made when the conspiracy was opering in full force." Ante, 395. Indeed, the Court asserts, "co-conspiror stements derive much of their value from the fact th they are made in a context very different from trial, and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence." Ante, 395-396. I truly cannot understand the majority's fear th a rule requiring the prosecution to do its best to produce a co-conspiror declarant in court would somehow deprive triers of fact of valuable evidence. Under this rule, if the prosecution could not in all good faith produce the declarant, the extrajudicial stements could come in, so long as they could be shown to have "adeque `indicia of reliability,' " 448 U. S., The majority's fear must therefore stem from a notion th if the prosecution is able to produce the declarant in court, his presence will somehow prevent the jury from hearing the truth. This conclusion overlooks the critical importance of cross-examinion in the truth-seeking process. *407 If a declarant takes the stand, his out-of-court stements will still be admitted as evidence, so long as they are sufficiently reliable and there are no other grounds for their exclusion. And cross-examinion will only enhance their value to |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Inadi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111613/united-states-v-inadi/ | their exclusion. And cross-examinion will only enhance their value to the jury. The defendant will have a chance to inquire into the circumstances under which the stements were made and the motives th might have led the declarant to color their truth the time. Cross-examinion also may force the declarant to clarify ambiguous phrases and coded references. If anything he says is inconsistent with his prior stement, the declarant will no doubt advance some explanion for the inaccuracy of the extrajudicial stement "an explanion a jury may be expected to understand and take into account in deciding which, if either, of the stements represents the truth," Cf. Whether or not a co-conspiror produced in court affirms, denies, or qualifies the truth of his out-of-court stement, his presence will contribute to the accuracy of the factfinding enterprise, the accuracy th is the primary concern of the Confrontion Clause. Whever truth is contained in his extrajudicial declarions cannot be lost. It can only be supplemented by additional informion of no less use to the triers of fact. III Recognizing th there may well be cases in which the cross-examinion of a co-conspiror declarant is indispensable to a defendant's case, the Court reminds us th a defendant can always exercise his rights under the Compulsory Process Clause and call the declarant as his own witness. As long as this option remains open to a defendant, the Court reasons, "it is difficult to see wh, if anything, is gained by a rule th requires the prosecution to make th declarant `available.' " Ante, 398. However, even assuming, as the Court seems to do, th the "good faith standard governing *408 the ste's obligion to produce defense witnesses [pursuant to the Compulsory Process Clause] is precisely the same one th governs the ste's obligion to confront a defendant with the witnesses against him [pursuant to the Confrontion Clause]," Confrontion and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, this is not a sisfactory response to respondent's Confrontion Clause claim The short answer to the majority's argument is th the Confrontion Clause gives a defendant a right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, not merely an opportunity to seek out witnesses on his own. As one court once noted of a situion similar to th presented in this case: "Th [a co-conspiror declarant] was available to be called as a witness does not mitige the prosecution's misconduct here. The Ste sought to shift to the defendant the risk of calling [the declarant] to the stand. To accept the Ste's argument th |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Inadi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111613/united-states-v-inadi/ | declarant] to the stand. To accept the Ste's argument th the availability of [the declarant] is the equivalent of putting him on the stand and subjecting him to cross-examinion would severely alter the presumptions of innocence and the burdens of proof which protect the accused." rev'd on rehearing en banc, (CA5) (over dissent of seven judges), cert. denied, See also 400 U. S., 104 The disadvantages th the majority would impose upon a defendant are not merely theoretical. The Court notes the "significant practical burden" placed on the prosecution by a requirement th the Government identify co-conspiror declarants with specificity. Ante, 399. As an illustrion of the difficulties th the prosecution would be forced to face, the majority refers to United Stes v. Ordonez, where the court found a Confrontion Clause violion in the Government's failure to identify the *409 individuals who had made the entries in the "drug ledgers" introduced as evidence against the defendant. Ante, 399, n. 13. However, the Court now places this "significant practical burden" upon the defendant, who may well be in no better a position to make such identificions. Even were it proper to assume the defendant's guilt and impute to him knowledge regarding pending charges, it can hardly be claimed th a defendant who has played but a minor role in a complex conspiracy necessarily has an intime knowledge of the names and activities of his alleged co-conspirors.[2] "The prosecution therefore [should have] the burden of producing and calling to the witness stand the persons whose out-of-court stements it uses against the accused because, as between the two sides, the prosecution is in a better position to identify them and to initie their production th time." 616. Even when a defendant is in as good a position as the prosecution to subpoena available declarants, a rule requiring him to call those declarants as his own witnesses may deny the defendant certain tactical advantages vouchsafed him by the Confrontion Clause. Under the regime established today, the only cross-examinion th will tend the prosecution's introduction of co-conspiror declarions will be of whoever heard or recorded those stements and will focus merely on whether or not the stements were actually made. Any inquiry into the reliability of the stements must await the defendant's case. But if the defendant chooses to call the declarant as a defense witness, defendant risks bolstering in the jury's eyes the very conspiracy allegions he wishes to rebut. Th the witness is viewed as hostile by the defendant, and has possibly been certified as such by the trial judge, does not necessarily |
Justice Marshall | 1,986 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Inadi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111613/united-states-v-inadi/ | certified as such by the trial judge, does not necessarily mean th his relionship to the defendant will be so perceived by the jury, unless defense counsel *410 chooses to dramize the antagonism with hyperbole th might lose him the symphy of the jury. Moreover, even the harshest grilling of a declarant by the defense can occur only after the prosecution has rested its case. In a complex conspiracy trial, the time elapsing between the introduction of the hearsay and the cross-examinion of the declarant may be quite substantial. During this time, the declarions will be unrebutted in jurors' minds. And their effect may actually be enhanced should either the defense or prosecution repe the stements in the course of examining the declarant. In short, "[o]nly a lawyer without trial experience would suggest th the limited right to impeach one's own witness is the equivalent of th right to immedie cross-examinion which has always been regarded as the greest safeguard of American trial procedure." New York Life Ins. ; see United Stes v. Oes, In federal prosecutions, there is an additional drawback. When a defendant calls a declarant as his own witness, he has no stutory right to obtain any prior stements of th declarant in the Government's possession a right th taches only "[a]fter a witness called by the United Stes has testified on direct examinion," 18 U.S. C. 3500. In view of all the disadvantages th tend a defendant's decision to call a co-conspiror declarant as a witness, the majority's reliance on the defendant's right to compulsory process to justify a decision to deprive him of a critical aspect of his Confrontion Clause right cannot be supported. The two are simply not equivalent. Moreover, the majority's belief th an unavailability requirement would contribute nothing but a cast of unwanted supernumeraries has no basis in the realities of criminal prosecutions. There might be instances in which an available declarant is of so little value to either side th calling him as a witness would truly be an unnecessary exercise. See, e. g., Anderson v. United Stes, *411 But a defendant's failure to call a declarant as his own witness can in no way be taken as proof th such is the case. IV At bottom, today's decision rests upon the Court's judgment th a defendant's constitutional interest in subjecting the extrajudicial declarions of co-conspirors to the cross-examinion th has traditionally been the primary guarantee of reliability in trials must be subordined to considerions of prosecutorial efficiency. I do not believe the concerns of the Confrontion Clause should be |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | This is a private enforcement action under the citizen-suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 2 U.S. C. 1106(a)(1). The case presents the merits question, answered in the affirmative by the United Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, whether EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. It also presents the jurisdictional question whether respondent, plaintiff below, has standing to bring this action. I Respondent, an association of individuals interested in environmental protection, sued petitioner, a small manufacturing company in Chicago, for past violations of EPCRA. EPCRA establishes a framework of state, regional, and local agencies designed to inform the public about the presence of hazardous and toxic chemicals, and to provide for emergency response in the event of health-threatening release. Central to its operation are reporting requirements compelling users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to file annual *87 "emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms" and "toxic chemical release forms," which contain, inter alia, the name and location of the facility, the name and quantity of the chemical on hand, and, in the case of toxic chemicals, the waste-disposal method employed and the annual quantity released into each environmental medium. 2 U.S. C. 11022 and 11023. The hazardous-chemical inventory forms for any given calendar year are due the following March 1st, and the toxic-chemical release forms the following July 1st. 11022(a)(2) and 11023(a). Enforcement of EPCRA can take place on many fronts. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the most powerful enforcement arsenal: it may seek criminal, civil, or administrative penalties. 1105. State and local governments can also seek civil penalties, as well as injunctive relief. 1106(a)(2) and (c). For purposes of this case, however, the crucial enforcement mechanism is the citizen-suit provision, 1106(a)(1), which likewise authorizes civil penalties and injunctive relief, see 1106(c). This provides that "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against [a]n owner or operator of a facility for failure," among other things, to "[c]omplete and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a) of this title [and] section 11023(a) of this title." 1106(a)(1). As a prerequisite to bringing such a suit, the plaintiff must, 60 days prior to filing his complaint, give notice to the Administrator of the EPA, the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator. 1106(d). The citizen suit may not go forward if the Administrator "has commenced and is diligently pursuing an administrative order or civil action to enforce the requirement concerned or to impose a civil penalty." 1106(e). In respondent sent a notice to petitioner, the Administrator, |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | 1106(e). In respondent sent a notice to petitioner, the Administrator, and the relevant Illinois authorities, allegingaccurately, as it turns outthat petitioner had failed since 1988, the first year of EPCRA's filing deadlines, to complete and *88 to submit the requisite hazardous-chemical inventory and toxic-chemical release forms under 11022 and 11023. Upon receiving the notice, petitioner filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies. The EPA chose not to bring an action against petitioner, and when the 60-day waiting period expired, respondent filed suit in Federal District Court. Petitioner promptly filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), contending that, because its filings were up to date when the complaint was filed, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a present violation; and that, because EPCRA does not allow suit for a purely historical violation, respondent's allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed with petitioner on both points. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2A26. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that citizens may seek penalties against EPCRA violators who file after the statutory deadline and after receiving notice. We granted certiorari, II We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict between the interpretation of EPCRA adopted by the Seventh Circuit and the interpretation previously adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Atlantic Legal Foundation, a case relied on by the District Court, and acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit to be "factually indistinguishable," -122. Petitioner, however, both in its petition for certiorari and in its briefs on the merits, has raised the issue of respondent's standing to maintain the suit, and hence this Court's jurisdiction to entertain it. Though there is some dispute on this point, see Part III, infra, this would normally be considered a threshold question that must be resolved in respondent's favor before proceeding to the *89 merits. Justice Stevens' opinion concurring in the judgment, however, claims that the question whether 1106(a) permits this cause of action is also "jurisdictional," and so has equivalent claim to being resolved first. Whether that is so has significant implications for this case and for many others, and so the point warrants extended discussion. It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i. e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. See generally 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1350, p. 196, n. 8 and |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | Federal Practice and Procedure 1350, p. 196, n. 8 and cases cited As we stated in "[j]urisdiction is not defeated by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover." Rather, the district court has jurisdiction if "the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another," unless the claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." at -683; see also ; The Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Oneida Indian Nation of N. ; see also Here, respondent wins under one construction of EPCRA and loses under another, and Justice Stevens does not argue that respondent's claim is frivolous or immaterial *90 in fact, acknowledges that the language of the citizen-suit provision is ambiguous. Post, at 131. Justice Stevens relies on our treatment of a similar issue as jurisdictional in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Post, at 11. The statute at issue in that case, however, after creating the cause of action, went on to say that "[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, " to provide various forms of relief. 33 U.S. C. 1(a) (emphasis added). The italicized phrase strongly suggested (perhaps misleadingly) that the provision was addressing genuine subject-matter jurisdiction. The corresponding provision in the present case, however, reads as follows: "The district court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought under subsection (a) of this section against an owner or operator of a facility to enforce the requirement concerned and to impose any civil penalty provided for violation of that requirement." 2 U.S. C. 1106(c). It is unreasonable to read this as making all the elements of the cause of action under subsection (a) jurisdictional, rather than as merely specifying the remedial powers of the court, viz., to enforce the violated requirement and to impose civil penalties. "Jurisdiction," it has been observed, "is a word of many, too many, meanings," United and it is commonplace for the term to be used as it evidently was here. See, e. g., 7 U.S. C. 13a1(d) ("In any action brought under |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | g., 7 U.S. C. 13a1(d) ("In any action brought under this section, the Commission may seek and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose a civil penalty in the amount of not more than the higher of $100,000 or triple the monetary gain to the person for each violation"); 15 U.S. C. 2622(d) ("In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief, *91 including injunctive relief and compensatory and exemplary damages"); 2 U.S. C. 7622(d) ("In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages"). It is also the case that the Gwaltney opinion does not display the slightest awareness that anything turned upon whether the existence of a cause of action for past violations was technically jurisdictionalas indeed nothing of substance did. The District Court had statutory jurisdiction over the suit in any event, since continuing violations were also alleged. See It is true, as Justice Stevens points out, that the issue of Article III standing which is addressed at the end of the opinion should technically have been addressed at the outset if the statutory question was not jurisdictional. But that also did not really matter, since Article III standing was in any event found. The short of the matter is that the jurisdictional character of the elements of the cause of action in Gwaltney made no substantive difference (nor even any procedural difference that the Court seemed aware of), had been assumed by the parties, and was assumed without discussion by the Court. We have often said that drive-by jurisdictional rulings of this sort (if Gwaltney can even be called a ruling on the point rather than a dictum) have no precedential effect. See ; Federal Election ; United But even if it is authoritative on the point as to the distinctive statute there at issue, it is fanciful to think that Gwaltney revised our established jurisprudence that the failure of a cause of action does not automatically produce a failure of jurisdiction, or adopted the expansive principle that a statute saying "the district court shall have jurisdiction to remedy violations [in specified ways]" *92 renders the existence of a violation necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction. Justice Stevens' concurrence devotes a large portion of its discussion to cases in which a statutory standing question was decided before a question of constitutional standing. See post, at 115-117. They also are irrelevant here, because it is not a statutory standing question that Justice Stevens |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | it is not a statutory standing question that Justice Stevens would have us decide first. He wishes to resolve, not whether EPCRA authorizes this plaintiff to sue (it assuredly does), but whether the scope of the EPCRA right of action includes past violations. Such a question, we have held, goes to the merits and not to statutory standing. See Northwest Airlines, ; at ; Montana-Dakota Util. v. Northwestern Public Service Though it is replete with extensive case discussions, case citations, rationalizations, and syllogoids, see post, at 120, n. 12, and n. 2, infra Justice Stevens' opinion conspicuously lacks one central feature: a single case in which this Court has done what he proposes, to wit, call the existence of a cause of action "jurisdictional," and decide that question before resolving a dispute concerning the existence of an Article III case or controversy. Of course, even if there were not solid precedent contradicting Justice Stevens' position, the consequences are alone enough to condemn it. It would turn every statutory question in an EPCRA citizen suit into a question of jurisdiction. Under Justice Stevens' analysis, 1106(c)'s grant of "jurisdiction in actions brought under [ 1106(a)]" withholds jurisdiction over claims involving purely past violations if past violations are not in fact covered by 1106(a). By parity of reasoning, if there is a dispute as to whether the omission of a particular item constituted a failure to "complete" the form; or as to *93 whether a particular manner of delivery complied in time with the requirement to "submit" the form; and if the court agreed with the defendant on the point; the action would not be "brought under [ 1106(a)]," and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction rather than decided on the merits. Moreover, those statutory s, since they are "jurisdictional," would have to be considered by this Court even though not raised earlier in the litigationindeed, this Court would have to raise them sua sponte. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of (17); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel v. Congress of course did not create such a strange scheme. In referring to actions "brought under" 1106(a), 1106(c) means suits contending that 1106(a) contains a certain requirement. If Justice Stevens is correct that all cause-of-action questions may be regarded as jurisdictional questions, and thus capable of being decided where there is no genuine case or controversy, it is hard to see what is left of that limitation in Article III. III In addition to its attempt to convert the merits issue in this case into a jurisdictional one, Justice Stevens' concurrence proceeds, post, at |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | into a jurisdictional one, Justice Stevens' concurrence proceeds, post, at 117-12, to argue the bolder point that jurisdiction need not be addressed first anyway. Even if the statutory question is not "fram[ed] interms of `jurisdiction,' " but is simply "characterize[d] as whether respondent's complaint states a `cause of action,' " "it is also clear that we have the power to decide the statutory question first." Post, at 117-118. This is essentially the position embraced by several Courts of Appeals, which find it proper to proceed immediately to the merits question, despite jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied. See, e. g., cert. denied sub nom. ; ; ; Cross-Sound Ferry Services, ; United ; Browning-Ferris 15-159 The Ninth Circuit has denominated this practicewhich it characterizes as "assuming" jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the meritsthe "doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction." See, e. g., United 93, n. 1[1] We decline to endorse such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers. This conclusion should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a long and venerable line of our cases. "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 51 "On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it." Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel v. at The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter "spring[s] from the nature and limits of *95 the judicial power of the United " and is "inflexible and without exception." Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. v. Swan, 2 (188). This Court's insistence that proper jurisdiction appear begins at least as early as 180, when we set aside a judgment for the defendant at the instance of the losing plaintiff who had himself failed to allege the basis for federal jurisdiction. (180). Just last Term, we restated this principle in the clearest fashion, unanimously setting aside the Ninth Circuit's merits |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | the clearest fashion, unanimously setting aside the Ninth Circuit's merits decision in a case that had lost the elements of a justiciable controversy: "`[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to `satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,' even though the parties are prepared to concede it. 2 (193). See 30 U.S. 327, (17) `And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. [When the lower federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.' United 298 U.S. 35, 0' " Arizonans for Official 520 U.S. 3, quoting 75 U.S. 53, 51 Justice Stevens' s contradicting all this jurisprudenceand asserting that a court may decide the cause of action before resolving Article III jurisdictionare readily refuted. First, his concurrence seeks to convert into a case in which the causeof-action question was decided before an Article III standing *96 question. Post, at 118-119, n. 8. "Bell, " Justice Stevens asserts, "held that we have jurisdiction to decide [whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action] even when it is unclear whether the plaintiff's injuries can be redressed." Post, at 118. The italicized phrase (the italics are his own) invites the reader to believe that Article III redressability was at issue. Not only is this not true, but the whole point of Bell was that it is not true. In Bell, which was decided before 03 U.S. 8 (11), the District Court had dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds because it believed that (what we would now call) a Bivens action would not lie. This Court held that the nonexistence of a cause of action was no proper basis for a jurisdictional dismissal. Thus, the uncertainty about "whether the plaintiff's injuries can be redressed" to which Justice Stevens refers is simply the uncertainty about whether a cause of action existedwhich is precisely what Bell holds not to be an Article III "redressability" question. It would have been a different matter if the relief requested by the plaintiffs in Bell (money damages) would not have remedied their injury in fact; but it of course would. Justice Stevens used to understand the fundamental distinction between arguing no cause of action and arguing no Article III redressability, having written for the Court that the former is "not squarely directed at jurisdiction itself, |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | that the former is "not squarely directed at jurisdiction itself, but rather at the existence of a remedy for the alleged violation of federal rights," which issue is "`not of the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own motion.' " Lake Country Estates, 0 U.S. 391, (19) (quoting Mt. Healthy Bd. of 29 U. S., at 279). Justice Stevens also relies on National Railroad Passenger 1 U.S. Post, at 119-120. But in that case, we did not determine whether a cause of action existed before determining * that the plaintiff had Article III standing; there was no question of injury in fact or effectiveness of the requested remedy. Rather, National Railroad Passenger determined whether a statutory cause of action existed before determining whether (if so) the plaintiff came within the "zone of interests" for which the cause of action was 1 U.S., at 65, n. 13. The latter question is an issue of statutory standing. It has nothing to do with whether there is case or controversy under Article III.[2] *98 Much more extensive defenses of the practice of deciding the cause of action before resolving Article III jurisdiction have been offered by the Courts of Appeals. They rely principally upon two cases of ours, 27 U.S. 52 (16), and Secretary of 18 U.S. 676 Both are readily explained, we think, by their extraordinary procedural postures. In Norton, the case came to us on direct appeal from a three-judge District Court, and the jurisdictional question was whether the action was properly brought in that forum rather than in an ordinary district court. We declined to decide that jurisdictional question, because the merits question was decided in a companion case, 27 U.S. 95 (16), with the consequence that the jurisdictional question could have no effect on the outcome: If the three-judge court had been properly convened, we would have affirmed, and if not, we would have vacated and remanded for a fresh decree from which an appeal could be taken to the Court of Appeals, the outcome of which was foreordained by Lucas. Thus, Norton did not use the pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed. Moreover, the Court seems to have regarded the merits judgment that it entered on the basis of Lucas as equivalent to a jurisdictional dismissal for failure to present a substantial federal question. The Court said: "This disposition [Lucas] renders the merits in the present case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional sense." 27 U.S., |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional sense." 27 U.S., 30-531. We think it clear that this peculiar case, involving a merits issue dispositively resolved in a companion case, was not meant to overrule, sub silentio, two centuries of jurisprudence affirming the necessity of determining jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. See Clow, 98 F. 2d, at 627 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). also involved an instance in which an intervening Supreme Court decision definitively answered the merits *99 question. The jurisdictional question in the case had been raised by the Court sua sponte after oral and supplemental briefing had been ordered. Secretary of Before the Court came to a decision, however, the merits issue in the case had been conclusively resolved in 17 U.S. 3 a case argued the same day as The Court was unwilling to decide the jurisdictional question without oral 18 U.S., but acknowledged (with some understatement) that "even the most diligent and zealous advocate could find his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue where the decision on the merits is foreordained," Accordingly, the Court disposed of the case on the basis of the intervening decision in Parker, in a minimalist two-page per curiam opinion. The first thing to be observed about is that the supposed jurisdictional issue was technically not that. The issue was whether a courtmartial judgment could be attacked collaterally by a suit for backpay. Although like the earlier case of United 393 U.S. 38 characterized this question as jurisdictional, we later held squarely that it was not. See 20 U.S. 7, (15). In any event, the peculiar circumstances of hardly permit it to be cited for the precedent-shattering general proposition that an "easy" merits question may be decided on the assumption of jurisdiction. To the contrary, the fact that the Court ordered briefing on the jurisdictional question sua sponte demonstrates its adherence to traditional and constitutionally dictated requirements. See Cross-Sound Ferry Services, 93 F. 2d, at 3 35, and n. 10 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review). Other cases sometimes cited by the lower courts to support "hypothetical jurisdiction" are similarly distinguishable. United as we have discussed, did not involve a jurisdictional issue. In 21 U.S. 707, (15), the jurisdictional question was whether, *100 in a suit under 28 U.S. C. 133(3) against the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social Welfare for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law by denying payments under a federally funded welfare program, the plaintiff could join a similar claim against the Secretary of Health, Education, and |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | a similar claim against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The merits issue of statutory construction involved in the claim against the Secretary was precisely the same as that involved in the claim against the Commissioner, and the Secretary (while challenging jurisdiction) assured the Court that he would comply with any judgment entered against the Commissioner. The Court's disposition of the case was to dismiss the Secretary's appeal under what was then this Court's Rule 0(g), for failure to brief the jurisdictional question adequately. Normally, the Court acknowledged, its obligation to inquire into the jurisdiction of the District Court might prevent this disposition. But here, the Court concluded, "the substantive issue decided by the District Court would have been decided by that court even if it had concluded that the Secretary was not properly a party," and "the only practical difference that resulted was that its injunction was directed against him as well as against [the Commissioner]," which the Secretary "has [not] properly contended to be wrongful before this Court." 21 U.S., at -722. And finally, in U.S. 7 (10), we reserved the question whether we had jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition or mandamus because the petitioner had not exhausted all available avenues before seeking relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S. C. 1651, and because there was no record to U.S., -88. The exhaustion question itself was at least arguably jurisdictional, and was clearly treated as such.[3] *101 While some of the above cases must be acknowledged to have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question, none of them even approaches approval of a doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction" that enables a court to resolve contested questions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt. Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judgmentwhich comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning. 219 U.S. 36, ; Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 09 Much more than legal niceties are at stake here. The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects. See United 18 U.S. 166, ; 18 U.S. 208, For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction *102 to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires. IV Having reached the end of what |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | act ultra vires. IV Having reached the end of what seems like a long front walk, we finally arrive at the threshold jurisdictional question: whether respondent, the plaintiff below, has standing to sue. Article III, 2, of the Constitution extends the "judicial Power" of the United only to "Cases" and "Controversies." We have always taken this to mean cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process. Such a meaning is fairly implied by the text, since otherwise the purported restriction upon the judicial power would scarcely be a restriction at all. Every criminal investigation conducted by the Executive is a "case," and every policy issue resolved by congressional legislation involves a "controversy." These are not, however, the sort of cases and controversies that Article III, 2, refers to, since "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts." 50 U.S. 555, Standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case. 95 U.S. 19,[] The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" contains three requirements. *103 First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proved) an "injury in fact"a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.' " at 19, ). Second, there must be causationa fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. 26 U.S. 26, 1-2 (16). And third, there must be redressabilitya likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. -6; see also 22 U.S. 90, (15). This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability [5] constitutes the core of Article III's case-orcontroversy *10 requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence. See FW/PBS, 93 U.S. 215, We turn now to the particulars of respondent's complaint to see how it measures up to Article III's requirements. This case is on appeal from a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings, so we must presume that the general allegations in the complaint encompass the specific facts necessary to support those allegations. U.S. 871, The complaint contains claims "on behalf of both [respondent] itself and its members."[6] App. It describes respondent as an organization that seeks, uses, and acquires data reported under EPCRA. It says that respondent "reports to its members and the public about storage and releases of toxic chemicals into the environment, advocates changes in environmental regulations and statutes, prepares reports for its |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | changes in environmental regulations and statutes, prepares reports for its members and the public, seeks the reduction of toxic chemicals and further seeks to promote the effective enforcement of environmental laws." The complaint asserts that respondent's "right to know about [toxic-chemical] releases and its interests in protecting and improving the environment and the health of its members have been, are being, and will be adversely affected by [petitioner's] actions in failing to provide timely and required information under EPCRA." The complaint also alleges that respondent's members, who live in or frequent the area near petitioner's facility, use the EPCRA-reported information "to learn about *105 toxic chemical releases, the use of hazardous substances in their communities, to plan emergency preparedness in the event of accidents, and to attempt to reduce the toxic chemicals in areas in which they live, work and visit." The members' "safety, health, recreational, economic, aesthetic and environmental interests" in the information, it is claimed, "have been, are being, and will be adversely affected by [petitioner's] actions in failing to file timely and required reports under EPCRA." As appears from the above, respondent asserts petitioner's failure to provide EPCRA information in a timely fashion, and the lingering effects of that failure, as the injury in fact to itself and its members. We have not had occasion to decide whether being deprived of information that is supposed to be disclosed under EPCRAor at least being deprived of it when one has a particular plan for its useis a concrete injury in fact that satisfies Article III. Cf. 50 U. S., 78. And we need not reach that question in the present case because, assuming injury in fact, the complaint fails the third test of standing, redressability. The complaint asks for (1) a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPCRA; (2) authorization to inspect periodically petitioner's facility and records (with costs borne by petitioner); (3) an order requiring petitioner to provide respondent copies of all compliance reports submitted to the EPA; () an order requiring petitioner to pay civil penalties of $,000 per day for each violation of 11022 and 11023; (5) an award of all respondent's "costs, in connection with the investigation and prosecution of this matter, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, as authorized by Section 326(f) of [EPCRA]"; and (6) any such further relief as the court deems appropriate. App. 11. None of the specific items of relief sought, and none that we can envision as "appropriate" under the general request, would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by the late reporting, *106 or to eliminate |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | losses caused by the late reporting, *106 or to eliminate any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.[7] The first item, the request for a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPCRA, can be disposed of summarily. There being no controversy over whether petitioner failed to file reports, or over whether such a failure constitutes a violation, the declaratory judgment is not only worthless to respondent, it is seemingly worthless to all the world. See 9 U.S. 72, 79 Item (), the civil penalties authorized by the statute, see 1105(c), might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to respondent if they were payable to respondent. But they are not. These penaltiesthe only damages authorized by EPCRAare payable to the United Treasury. In requesting them, therefore, respondent seeks not remediation of its own injuryreimbursement for the costs it incurred as a result of the late filingbut vindication of the rule of lawthe "undifferentiated public interest" in faithful execution of EPCRA. 77; see also 8 U.S. 126, This does not suffice. Justice Stevens thinks it is enough that respondent will be gratified by seeing petitioner punished for its infractions and that the *107 punishment will deter the risk of future harm. Post, at 127-128. If that were so, our holdings in Linda R. 10 U.S. 61 (13), and 26 U.S. 26 (16), are inexplicable. Obviously, such a principle would make the redressability requirement vanish. By the mere bringing of his suit, every plaintiff demonstrates his belief that a favorable judgment will make him happier. But although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation's laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury. See, e. g., 68 U.S. 7, 75-755 (198); Valley Forge Christian 5 U.S. 6, 82 83 Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement. Item (5), the "investigation and prosecution" costs "as authorized by Section 326(f)," would assuredly benefit respondent as opposed to the citizenry at large. Obviously, however, a plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. The litigation must give the plaintiff some other benefit besides reimbursement of costs that are a by-product of the litigation itself. An "interest in attorney's fees is insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim." at 80 ). Respondent asserts that the "investigation costs" it seeks were incurred prior to the litigation, in digging up the emissions and storage information that petitioner should have filed, and that respondent needed for its own purposes. See Brief for Respondent 37-. The recovery of such expenses unrelated * to litigation would assuredly support Article III standing, but the problem is that 326(f), which is the entitlement to monetary relief that the complaint invokes, covers only the "costs of litigation."[8] 1106(f). Respondent finds itself, in other words, impaled upon the horns of a dilemma: For the expenses to be reimbursable under the statute, they must be costs of litigation; but reimbursement of the costs of litigation cannot alone support standing.[9] The remaining relief respondent seeks (item (2), giving respondent authority to inspect petitioner's facility and records, and item (3), compelling petitioner to provide respondent copies of EPA compliance reports) is injunctive in nature. It cannot conceivably remedy any past wrong but is aimed at deterring petitioner from violating EPCRA in the future. See Brief for Respondent 36. The latter objective can of course be "remedial" for Article III purposes, when threatened injury is one of the gravamens of the complaint. If respondent had alleged a continuing violation or the imminence of a future violation, the injunctive relief requested would remedy that alleged harm. But there is no such allegation hereand on the facts of the case, there seems no basis for it. Nothing supports the requested injunctive relief except respondent's generalized interest in deterrence, *109 which is insufficient for purposes of Article III. See Los 61 U. S., at 111. The United as amicus curiae, argues that the injunctive relief does constitute remediation because "there is a presumption of [future] injury when the defendant has voluntarily ceased its illegal activity in response to litigation," even if that occurs before a complaint is filed. Brief for United as Amicus Curiae 27-28, and n. 11. This makes a sword out of a shield. The "presumption" the Government refers to has been applied to refute the assertion of mootness by a defendant who, when sued in a complaint that alleges present or threatened injury, ceases the complained-of activity. See, e. g., United v. W. T. Grant 35 U.S. 629, It is an immense and unacceptable stretch to call the presumption into service as a substitute for the allegation of present or threatened injury upon which initial standing must be based. See Los To |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2620886/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment/ | upon which initial standing must be based. See Los To accept the Government's view would be to overrule our clear precedent requiring that the allegations of future injury be particular and concrete. 1 U.S. 88, 96- "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." at 95-96; see also Because respondent alleges only past infractions of EPCRA, and not a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its injury. * * * Having found that none of the relief sought by respondent would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, we must conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit, *110 and that we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it. However desirable prompt resolution of the merits EPCRA question may be, it is not as important as observing the constitutional limits set upon courts in our system of separated powers. EPCRA will have to await another day. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to direct that the complaint be dismissed. It is so ordered. |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | This case concerns the personal immunity of federal officials in the Executive Branch from claims for damages arising from their violations of citizens' constitutional Respondent[1] filed suit against a number of officials in the Department of Agriculture claiming that they had instituted an investigation and an administrative proceeding against him in retaliation for his criticism of that agency. The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the individual defendants, as federal officials, were entitled to absolute immunity for all discretionary acts within the scope of their authority. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled only to the qualified immunity available to their counterparts in state government. Because of *481 the importance of immunity doctrine to both the vindication of constitutional guarantees and the effective functioning of government, we granted certiorari. I Respondent controls Arthur N. Economou and Co., Inc., which was at one time registered with the Department of Agriculture as a commodity futures commission merchant. Most of respondent's factual allegations in this lawsuit focus on an earlier administrative proceeding in which the Department of Agriculture sought to revoke or suspend the company's registration. On February 70, following an audit, the Department of Agriculture issued an administrative complaint alleging that respondent, while a registered merchant, had willfully failed to maintain the minimum financial requirements prescribed by the Department. After another audit, an amended complaint was issued on June 22, 70. A hearing was held before the Chief Hearing Examiner of the Department, who filed a recommendation sustaining the administrative complaint. The Judicial Officer of the Department, to whom the Secretary had delegated his decisional authority in enforcement proceedings, affirmed the Chief Hearing Examiner's decision. On respondent's petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order of the Judicial Officer. It reasoned that "the essential finding of willfulness was made in a proceeding instituted without the customary warning letter, which the Judicial Officer conceded might well have resulted in prompt correction of the claimed insufficiencies." While the administrative complaint was pending before the Judicial Officer, respondent filed this lawsuit in Federal District Court. Respondent sought initially to enjoin the progress of the administrative proceeding, but he was unsuccessful in that regard. On March 31, 75, respondent filed a second *482 amended complaint seeking damages. Named as defendants were the individuals who had served as Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture during the relevant events; the Judicial Officer and Chief Hearing Examiner; several officials in the Commodity Exchange Authority;[2] the Agriculture Department attorney who had prosecuted the enforcement proceeding; and several |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | Department attorney who had prosecuted the enforcement proceeding; and several of the auditors who had investigated respondent or were witnesses against respondent.[3] The complaint stated that prior to the issuance of the administrative complaints respondent had been "sharply critical of the staff and operations of Defendants and carried on a vociferous campaign for the reform of Defendant Commodity Exchange Authority to obtain more effective regulation of commodity trading." App. 157-158. The complaint also stated that, some time prior to the issuance of the February complaint, respondent and his company had ceased to engage in activities regulated by the defendants. The complaint charged that each of the administrative complaints had been issued without the notice or warning required by law; that the defendants had furnished the complaints "to interested persons and others without furnishing respondent's answers as well"; and that following the issuance of the amended complaint, the defendants had issued a "deceptive" press release that "falsely indicated to the public that [respondent's] financial resources had deteriorated, when Defendants knew that their statement was untrue and so acknowledge[d] previously that said assertion was untrue." [4] The complaint then presented 10 "causes of action," some *483 of which purported to state claims for damages under the United States Constitution. For example, the first "cause of action" alleged that respondent had been denied due process of law because the defendants had instituted unauthorized proceedings against him without proper notice and with the knowledge that respondent was no longer subject to their regulatory jurisdiction. The third "cause of action" stated that by means of such actions "the Defendants discouraged and chilled the campaign of criticism [plaintiff] directed against them, and thereby deprived the [plaintiff] of [his] rights to free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution."[5] The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "as to the individual defendants it is barred by the doctrine of official immunity" The defendants relied on an affidavit submitted earlier in the litigation by the attorney who had prosecuted the original administrative complaint against respondent. He stated that the Secretary of Agriculture had had no involvement with the case and that each of the other named defendants had acted "within the course of his official duties." The District Court, apparently relying on the plurality opinion in held that the individual defendants would be entitled to immunity if they could show that "their alleged unconstitutional acts were *484 within the outer perimeter of their authority and discretionary." App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. After examining the nature of the acts alleged in |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | 25a. After examining the nature of the acts alleged in the complaint, the District Court concluded: "Since the individual defendants have shown that their alleged unconstitutional acts were both within the scope of their authority and discretionary, we dismiss the second amended complaint as to them."[6] at 28a. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment of dismissal with respect to the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals reasoned that did not "represen[t] the last word in this evolving area," because principles governing the immunity of officials of the Executive Branch had been elucidated in later decisions dealing with constitutional claims against state officials. E. g., ; ; These opinions were understood to establish that officials of the Executive Branch exercising discretionary functions did not need the protection of an absolute immunity from suit, but only a qualified immunity based on good faith and reasonable grounds. The Court of Appeals rejected a proposed distinction between suits against state officials sued pursuant to 42 U.S. C. 83 and suits against federal officials under the Constitution, noting that "[o]ther circuits have also concluded that the Supreme Court's development of official immunity doctrine in 83 suits against state officials applies with equal force to federal officers sued on a cause of action derived directly from the Constitution, since both types of suits serve the same function of protecting citizens against violations of their constitutional rights by government officials." n. 7. The Court of Appeals recognized *485 that under state prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity from 83 damages liability but reasoned that Agriculture Department officials performing analogous functions did not require such an immunity because their cases turned more on documentary proof than on the veracity of witnesses and because their work did not generally involve the same constraints of time and information present in criminal cases. n. 8. The court concluded that all of the defendants were "adequately protected by permitting them to avail themselves of the defense of qualified `good faith, reasonable grounds' immunity of the type approved by the Supreme Court in Scheuer and Wood." After noting that summary judgment would be available to the defendants if there were no genuine factual issues for trial, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings. II The single submission by the United States on behalf of petitioners is that all of the federal officials sued in this case are absolutely immune from any liability for damages even if in the course of enforcing the relevant statutes they infringed respondent's constitutional rights and even if the |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | statutes they infringed respondent's constitutional rights and even if the violation was knowing and deliberate. Although the position is earnestly and ably presented by the United States, we are quite sure that it is unsound and consequently reject it. In the victim of an arrest and search claimed to be violative of the Fourth Amendment brought suit for damages against the responsible federal agents. Repeating the declaration in that "`[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,'" and stating that "[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty," we rejected the claim *486 that the plaintiff's remedy lay only in the state court under state law, with the Fourth Amendment operating merely to nullify a defense of federal authorization. We held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal agents gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon the unconstitutional conduct. [7] Bivens established that compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts,[8] but we reserved the question whether the agents involved were "immune from liability by virtue of their official position," and remanded the case for that determination. On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as has every other Court of Appeals that has faced the question,[9] held that the agents were not absolutely immune and that the public interest would be sufficiently protected by according the agents and their superiors a qualified immunity. In our view, the Courts of Appeals have reached sound results. We cannot agree with the United States that our prior cases are to the contrary and support the rule it now urges us to embrace. Indeed, as we see it, the Government's *487 submission is contrary to the course of decision in this Court from the very early days of the Republic. The Government places principal reliance on In that case, the acting director of an agency had been sued for malicious defamation by two employees whose suspension for misconduct he had announced in a press release. The defendant claimed an absolute or qualified privilege, but the trial court rejected both and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. In the 58 Term,[10] the Court granted certiorari in Barr "to determine whether in the circumstances of this case petitioner's claim of absolute privilege should have stood as a bar to maintenance of the suit despite the allegations of malice |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | to maintenance of the suit despite the allegations of malice made in the complaint." The Court was divided in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and there was no opinion for the Court.[11] The plurality opinion inquired whether the conduct complained of was among those *488 "matters committed by law to [the official's] control" and concluded, after an analysis of the specific circumstances, that the press release was within the "outer perimeter of [his] line of duty" and was "an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively." The plurality then held that under the act was privileged and that the officer could not be held liable for the tort of defamation despite the allegations of malice.[12]Barr clearly held that a false and damaging publication, the issuance of which was otherwise within the official's authority, was not itself actionable and would not become so by being issued maliciously. The Court did not choose to discuss whether the director's privilege would be defeated by showing that he was without reasonable grounds for believing his release was true or that he knew that it was false, although the issue was in the case as it came from the Court of Appeals.[13] *489 Barr does not control this case. It did not address the liability of the acting director had his conduct not been within the outer limits of his duties, but from the care with which the Court inquired into the scope of his authority, it may be inferred that had the release been unauthorized, and surely if the issuance of press releases had been expressly forbidden by statute, the claim of absolute immunity would not have been upheld. The inference is supported by the fact that MR. JUSTICE STEWART, although agreeing with the principles announced by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented and would have rejected the immunity claim because the press release, in his view, was not action in the line of duty. It is apparent also that a quite different question would have been presented had the officer ignored an express statutory or constitutional limitation on his authority. Barr did not, therefore, purport to depart from the general rule, which long prevailed, that a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his powers. The immunity of federal executive officials began as a means of protecting them in the execution of their federal statutory duties from criminal or civil actions based on state law. See[14] A federal *490 |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | civil actions based on state law. See[14] A federal *490 official who acted outside of his federal statutory authority would be held strictly liable for his trespassory acts. For example, held the commander of an American warship liable in damages for the seizure of a Danish cargo ship on the high seas. Congress had directed the President to intercept any vessels reasonably suspected of being en route to a French port, but the President had authorized the seizure of suspected vessels whether going to or from French ports, and the Danish vessel seized was en route from a forbidden destination. The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, held that the President's instructions could not "change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which, without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass." Although there was probable cause to believe that the ship was engaged in traffic with the French, the seizure at issue was not among that class of seizures that the Executive had been authorized by statute to effect. See also was a similar case. The relevant statute directed seizures of alcoholic beverages in Indian country, but the seizure at issue, which was made upon the orders of a superior, was not made in Indian country. The "objection fatal to all this class of defenses is that in that locality [the seizing officers] were utterly without any authority in the premises" and hence were answerable in damages. As these cases demonstrate, a federal official was protected for action tortious under state law only if his acts were authorized by controlling federal law. "To make out his defence he must show that his authority was sufficient in law to protect him." ; Since an unconstitutional act, even if authorized by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of *491 law, there could be no immunity defense.[15] See United 106 U.S. 6, ; Virginia Coupon Cases,[16] In both Barreme and Bates, the officers did not merely mistakenly conclude that the circumstances warranted a particular seizure, but failed to observe the limitations on their authority by making seizures not within the category or type of seizures they were authorized to make. addressed a different situation. The case involved a suit against the Postmaster General for erroneously suspending payments to a creditor of the Post Office. Examining and, if necessary, suspending payments to creditors were among the Postmaster's normal duties, and it appeared that he had simply made a mistake in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon him. He was held not liable in damages since "a public |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | He was held not liable in damages since "a public officer, acting to the best of his judgment and from a sense of duty, in a matter of account with an individual [is not] liable in an action for an error of judgment." Having "the right to examine into this account" and the right to suspend it in the proper circumstances, the officer was not liable in damages if he fell into error, provided, however, that he acted "from a sense of public duty and without malice." Four years later, in a case involving military discipline, the Court issued a similar ruling, exculpating the defendant *492 officer because of the failure to prove that he had exceeded his jurisdiction or had exercised it in a malicious or willfully erroneous manner: "[I]t is not enough to show he committed an error of judgment, but it must have been a malicious and wilful error." In on which the Government relies, the principal issue was whether the malicious motive of an officer would render him liable in damages for injury inflicted by his official act that otherwise was within the scope of his authority. The Postmaster General was sued for circulating among the postmasters a notice that assertedly injured the reputation of the plaintiff and interfered with his contractual relationships. The Court first inquired as to the Postmaster General's authority to issue the notice. In doing so, it "recognize[d] a distinction between action taken by the head of a Department in reference to matters which are manifestly or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision." Concluding that the circular issued by the Postmaster General "was not unauthorized by law, nor beyond the scope of his official duties," the Court then addressed the major question in the casewhether the action could be "maintained because of the allegation that what the officer did was done maliciously?" Its holding was that the head of a department could not be "held liable to a civil suit for damages on account of official communications made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and in respect of matters within his authority," however improper his motives might have been. Because the Postmaster General in issuing the circular in question "did not exceed his authority, nor pass the line of his duty," it was irrelevant that he might have acted maliciously.[17] *493 made clear that a malicious intent will not subject a public officer to liability for performing his authorized duties as to which |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | to liability for performing his authorized duties as to which he would otherwise not be subject to damages liability.[18] But did not involve conduct manifestly or otherwise beyond the authority of the official, nor did it involve a mistake of either law or fact in construing or applying the statute.[] It did not purport to immunize officials *494 who ignore limitations on their authority imposed by law. Although the "manifestly or palpably" standard for examining the reach of official power may have been as a gloss on Barreme, Bates, and none of those cases was overruled.[20] It is also evident that presented no claim that the officer was liable in damages because he had acted in violation of a limitation placed upon his conduct by the United States Constitution. If any inference is to be drawn from in any of these respects, it is that the official would not be excused from liability if he failed to observe obvious statutory or constitutional limitations on his powers or if his conduct was a manifestly erroneous application of the statute. Insofar as cases in this Court dealing with the immunity or privilege of federal officers are concerned,[21] this is where the matter stood until There, as we have set out above, immunity was granted even though the publication contained a factual error, which was not the case in The plurality opinion and judgment in Barr also appear *495 although without any discussion of the matterto have extended absolute immunity to an officer who was authorized to issue press releases, who was assumed to know that the press release he issued was false and who therefore was deliberately misusing his authority. Accepting this extension of immunity with respect to state tort claims, however, we are confident that Barr did not purport to protect an official who has not only committed a wrong under local law, but also violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the Constitution.[22] Whatever level of protection from state interference is appropriate for federal officials executing their duties under federal law, it cannot be doubted that these officials, even when acting pursuant to congressional authorization, are subject to the restraints imposed by the Federal Constitution. The liability of officials who have exceeded constitutional limits was not confronted in either Barr or Neither of those cases supports the Government's position. Beyond that, however, neither case purported to abolish the liability of federal officers for actions manifestly beyond their line of duty; and if they are accountable when they stray beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability. Although it is true that the Court has not dealt with this *496 issue with respect to federal officers,[23] we have several times addressed the immunity of state officers when sued under 42 U.S. C. 83 for alleged violations of constitutional These decisions are instructive for present purposes. III decided that 83 was not intended to abrogate the immunity of state judges which existed under the common law and which the Court had held applicable to federal judges in Pierson also presented the issue "whether immunity was available to that segment of the executive branch of a state government that is most frequently exposed to situations which can give rise to claims under 83the local police officer." -245. Relying on the common law, we held that police officers were entitled to a defense of "good faith and probable cause," even though an arrest might subsequently be proved to be unconstitutional. We observed, however, that "[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity, and the officers in this case do not claim that they are entitled to one." In the issue was whether "higher officers of the executive branch" of state governments were immune from liability under 83 for violations of constitutionally protected There, the Governor of a State, the senior and subordinate officers of the state National Guard, and a state university president had been sued on the allegation that they had suppressed a civil disturbance *497 in an unconstitutional manner. We explained that the doctrine of official immunity from 83 liability, although not constitutionally grounded and essentially a matter of statutory construction, was based on two mutually dependent rationales: "(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good." The opinion also recognized that executive branch officers must often act swiftly and on the basis of factual information supplied by others, constraints which become even more acute in the "atmosphere of confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events" created by a civil disturbance. Although quoting at length from[24] we did not believe that there was a need for absolute immunity from 83 liability for these high-ranking state officials. Rather the considerations |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | 83 liability for these high-ranking state officials. Rather the considerations discussed above indicated: "[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the *498 existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct." -248. Subsequent decisions have applied the Scheuer standard in other contexts. In school administrators were held entitled to claim a similar qualified immunity. A school board member would lose his immunity from a 83 suit only if "he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student." In we applied the same standard to the superintendent of a state hospital. In (78), we held that prison administrators would be adequately protected by the qualified immunity outlined in Scheuer and Wood. We emphasized, however, that, at least in the absence of some showing of malice, an official would not be held liable in damages under 83 unless the constitutional right he was alleged to have violated was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. None of these decisions with respect to state officials furnishes any support for the submission of the United States that federal officials are absolutely immune from liability for their constitutional transgressions. On the contrary, with impressive unanimity, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded that federal officials should receive no greater degree of protection from constitutional claims than their counterparts in state government.[25] Subsequent to Scheuer, the *499 Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that "[a]lthough Scheuer involved a suit against state executive officers, the court's discussion of the qualified nature of executive immunity would appear to be equally applicable to federal executive officers." States Marine In the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, "it would be `incongruous and confusing, to say the least' to develop different standards of immunity for state officials sued under 83 and federal officers sued on similar grounds under causes of action founded directly on |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | on similar grounds under causes of action founded directly on the Constitution." Economou v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F. 2d, at 695 n. 7, quoting (CA2 72)[26] The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has reasoned: "[Defendants] offer no significant reason for distinguishing, as far as the immunity doctrine is concerned, between litigation under 83 against state officers and actions against federal officers alleging violation of constitutional rights under the general federal question statute. In contrast, the practical advantage of having just one federal *500 immunity doctrine for suits arising under federal law is self-evident. Further, the rights at stake in a suit brought directly under the Bill of Rights are no less worthy of full protection than the constitutional and statutory rights protected by 83." Other courts have reached similar conclusions. E. g., ; ; see ; ; ; G. M. Leasing (CA10 77).[27] We agree with the perception of these courts that, in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is no basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation under 83. The constitutional injuries made actionable by 83 are of no greater magnitude than those for which federal officials may be responsible. The pressures and uncertainties facing decisionmakers in state government are little if at all different from those affecting federal officials.[28] We see no sense *501 in holding a state governor liable but immunizing the head of a federal department; in holding the administrator of a federal hospital immune where the superintendent of a state hospital would be liable; in protecting the warden of a federal prison where the warden of a state prison would be vulnerable; or in distinguishing between state and federal police participating in the same investigation. Surely, federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers. The Government argues that the cases involving state officials are distinguishable because they reflect the need to preserve the effectiveness of the right of action authorized by 83. But as we discuss more fully below, the cause of action recognized in would similarly be "drained of meaning" if federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for their constitutional transgressions. Cf. Moreover, the Government's analysis would place undue emphasis on the congressional origins of the cause of action in determining the level of immunity. It has been observed more than once that the law of privilege |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | been observed more than once that the law of privilege as a defense to damages actions against officers of Government has "in large *502 part been of judicial making." 360 U. S., ; (73). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871[29]the predecessor of 83 said nothing about immunity for state officials. It mandated that any person who under color of state law subjected another to the deprivation of his constitutional rights would be liable to the injured party in an action at law.[30] This *503 Court nevertheless ascertained and announced what it deemed to be the appropriate type of immunity from 83 liability in a variety of contexts. ; ; The federal courts are equally competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity where the suit is a direct claim under the Federal Constitution against a federal officer. The presence or absence of congressional authorization for suits against federal officials is, of course, relevant to the question whether to infer a right of action for damages for a particular violation of the Constitution. In Bivens, the Court noted the "absence of affirmative action by Congress" and therefore looked for "special factors counselling hesitation." Absent congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think more carefully about whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages, and whether the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the plaintiff's claim, see But once this analysis is completed, there is no reason to return again to the absence of congressional authorization in resolving the question of immunity. Having determined that the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy in damages for a constitutional violation, the court then must address how best to reconcile the plaintiff's right to compensation with the need to protect the decisionmaking processes of an executive department. Since our decision in Scheuer was intended to guide the federal courts in resolving this tension in the myriad factual situations in which it might arise, we see no reason why it should not supply the governing principles for resolving this dilemma in the case of federal officials. The Court's opinion in Scheuer relied on precedents dealing with federal as well as state officials, analyzed the issue of executive immunity *504 in terms of general policy considerations, and stated its conclusion, quoted in the same universal terms. The analysis presented in that case cannot be limited to actions against state officials. Accordingly, without congressional directions to the contrary, we deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under 83 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials. The 83 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional That Congress decided, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact legislation specifically requiring state officials to respond in federal court for their failures to observe the constitutional limitations on their powers is hardly a reason for excusing their federal counterparts for the identical constitutional transgressions. To create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head. IV As we have said, the decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages against the responsible federal official. As Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment, pointed out, the action for damages recognized in Bivens could be a vital means of providing redress for persons whose constitutional rights have been violated. The barrier of sovereign immunity is frequently impenetrable.[31] Injunctive or declaratory relief is useless to a person who has already been injured. "For *505 people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." Our opinion in Bivens put aside the immunity question; but we could not have contemplated that immunity would be absolute.[32] If, as the Government argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs. Moreover, no compensation would be available from the Government, for the Tort Claims Act prohibits recovery for injuries stemming from discretionary acts, even when that discretion has been abused.[33] The extension of absolute immunity from damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional guarantees. The broad authority possessed by these officials enables them to direct their subordinates to undertake a wide range of projects including some which may infringe such important personal interests as liberty, property, and free speech. It makes *506 little sense to hold that a Government agent is liable for warrantless and forcible entry into a citizen's house in pursuit of evidence, but that an official of higher rank who actually orders such a burglary is immune simply because of his greater authority. Indeed, the greater power of such officials affords a |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | authority. Indeed, the greater power of such officials affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct. Extensive Government operations offer opportunities for unconstitutional action on a massive scale. In situations of abuse, an action for damages against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees. Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever their position in government, are subject to federal law: "No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it." United See also ; -240. In light of this principle, federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope. This is not to say that considerations of public policy fail to support a limited immunity for federal executive officials. We consider here, as we did in Scheuer, the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority. Yet Scheuer and other cases have recognized that it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not *507 unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment. We therefore hold that, in a suit for damages arising from unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion are entitled only to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer, subject to those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business.[34] The Scheuer principle of only qualified immunity for constitutional violations is consistent with and Federal officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law. But we see no substantial basis for holding, as the United States would have us do, that executive officers generally may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner that they should know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule. The principle should prove as workable in suits against federal officials as it has in the context of suits against state officials. Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | against state officials. Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should not survive *508 a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheuer that damages suits concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity.[35] See In responding to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits. V Although a qualified immunity from damages liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations, our decisions recognize that there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability. E. g., ; In each case, we have undertaken "a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it." In the Court analyzed the need for absolute immunity to protect judges from lawsuits claiming that their decisions had been tainted by improper motives. The Court began by noting that the principle of immunity for acts done by judges "in the exercise of their judicial functions" had been "the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country." The Court explained that the value of this rule was proved by experience. *509 Judges were often called to decide "[c]ontroversies involving not merely great pecuniary interests, but the liberty and character of the parties, and consequently exciting the deepest feelings." Such adjudications invariably produced at least one losing party, who would "accep[t] anything but the soundness of the decision in explanation of the action of the judge." "Just in proportion to the strength of his convictions of the correctness of his own view of the case is he apt to complain of the judgment against him, and from complaints of the judgment to pass to the ascription of improper motives to the judge." If a civil action could be maintained against a judge by virtue of an allegation of malice, judges would lose "that independence without which no judiciary can either be respectable or useful." Thus, judges were held to be immune from civil suit "for malice or corruption in their action whilst exercising their judicial functions within the general scope of their jurisdiction."[36] The principle of Bradley |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | the general scope of their jurisdiction."[36] The principle of Bradley was extended to federal prosecutors through the summary affirmance in (27), aff'g (CA2 26). The Court of Appeals in that case discussed in detail the common-law precedents extending absolute immunity to parties participating in the judicial process: judges, grand jurors, petit jurors, advocates, and witnesses. Grand jurors had received absolute immunity "`lest they should be biased with the fear of being *510 harassed by a vicious suit for acting according to their consciences (the danger of which might easily be insinuated where powerful men are warmly engaged in a cause and thoroughly prepossessed of the justice of the side which they espouse).'" quoting 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 349 (6th ed. 1787). The court then reasoned that "`[t]he public prosecutor, in deciding whether a particular prosecution shall be instituted or followed up, performs much the same function as a grand jury.'" quoting (17). The court held the prosecutor in that case immune from suit for malicious prosecution and this Court, citing affirmed. We recently reaffirmed the holding of in a suit against a state prosecutor under 83. The Court's examination of the leading precedents led to the conclusion that "[t]he common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties." -423. The prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system was likely to provoke "with some frequency" retaliatory suits by angry defendants. A qualified immunity might have an adverse effect on the functioning of the criminal justice system, not only by discouraging the initiation of prosecutions, see n. 24, but also by affecting the prosecutor's conduct of the trial. "Attaining the system's goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence. If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence." *511 In light of these and other practical considerations, the Court held that the defendant in that case was entitled to absolute immunity with respect to his activities as an advocate, "activities [which] were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force."[37] Despite these precedents, the Court of Appeals concluded that all of the defendants in this caseincluding the Chief |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | that all of the defendants in this caseincluding the Chief Hearing Examiner, Judicial Officer, and prosecuting attorney were entitled to only a qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reasoned that officials within the Executive Branch generally have more circumscribed discretion and pointed out that, unlike a judge, officials of the Executive Branch would face no conflict of interest if their legal representation was provided by the Executive Branch. The Court of Appeals recognized that "some of the Agriculture Department officials may be analogized to criminal prosecutors, in that they initiated the proceedings against [respondent], and presented evidence therein," n. 8, but found that attorneys in administrative proceedings did not face the same "serious constraints of time and even information" which this Court has found to be present frequently in criminal cases. See 424 U. S., We think that the Court of Appeals placed undue emphasis on the fact that the officials sued here arefrom an administrative perspectiveemployees of the Executive Branch. Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities. This point is underlined by the fact that prosecutorsthemselves members of the Executive *512 Branchare also absolutely immune. "It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as `quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities being termed `quasi-judicial' as well." at 423 n. 20. The cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location. As the Bradley Court 13 Wall., -349, controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree. The loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus. See Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation. At the same time, the safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious action by judges.[38] Advocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in open court. Jurors are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses are, of course, subject to the rigors of cross-examination and the penalty of perjury. Because these features of the judicial process tend to enhance the reliability of information and the impartiality of the decisionmaking process, there is a less pressing need for individual suits to correct constitutional error. We think that adjudication within a federal administrative *513 agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages. The conflicts which federal hearing examiners seek to resolve are every bit as fractious as those which come to court. As the Bradley opinion points out: "When the controversy involves questions affecting large amounts of property or relates to a matter of general public concern, or touches the interests of numerous parties, the disappointment occasioned by an adverse decision, often finds vent in imputations of [malice]." 13 Wall., Moreover, federal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same safeguards as are available in the judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in nature. See 5 U.S. C. (b) ( ed.). They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political influence. See 554 (d). A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence, 556 (d), and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision. 556 (e). The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record. 557 (c). There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions. See 556 (c). More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency. Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, there was considerable concern that persons hearing administrative cases at the trial level could not exercise independent judgment because *514 they were required to perform prosecutorial and investigative functions as well as their judicial work, see, e. g., Wong Yang (50), and because they were often subordinate to executive officials |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | (50), and because they were often subordinate to executive officials within the agency, see (53). Since the securing of fair and competent hearing personnel was viewed as "the heart of formal administrative adjudication," Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 46 (41), the Administrative Procedure Act contains a number of provisions designed to guarantee the independence of hearing examiners. They may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties as hearing examiners. 5 U.S. C. 3105 ( ed.). When conducting a hearing under 5 of the APA, 5 U.S. C. 554 ( ed.), a hearing examiner is not responsible to, or subject to the supervision or direction of, employees or agents engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecution functions for the agency. 5 U.S. C. 554 (d) (2) ( ed.). Nor may a hearing examiner consult any person or party, including other agency officials, concerning a fact at issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. 554 (d) (1). Hearing examiners must be assigned to cases in rotation so far as is practicable. 3105. They may be removed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission after a hearing on the record. 7521. Their pay is also controlled by the Civil Service Commission. In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment of these men and women. We therefore hold that persons subject to these restraints and performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts. Those who complain of error in such proceedings must seek agency or judicial review. *515 We also believe that agency officials performing certain functions analogous to those of a prosecutor should be able to claim absolute immunity with respect to such acts. The decision to initiate administrative proceedings against an individual or corporation is very much like the prosecutor's decision to initiate or move forward with a criminal prosecution. An agency official, like a prosecutor, may have broad discretion in deciding whether a proceeding should be brought and what sanctions should be sought. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, for example, may initiate proceedings whenever it has "reason to believe" that any person "is violating or has violated any of the provisions of this chapter or of the rules, regulations, or orders of the Commission." 7 U.S. C. 9 ( ed.). A range of sanctions is open to it. |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | ( ed.). A range of sanctions is open to it. The discretion which executive officials exercise with respect to the initiation of administrative proceedings might be distorted if their immunity from damages arising from that decision was less than complete. Cf. 424 U. S., n. 24. While there is not likely to be anyone willing and legally able to seek damages from the officials if they do not authorize the administrative proceeding, cf. there is a serious danger that the decision to authorize proceedings will provoke a retaliatory response. An individual targeted by an administrative proceeding will react angrily and may seek vengeance in the courts. A corporation will muster all of its financial and legal resources in an effort to prevent administrative sanctions. "When millions may turn on regulatory decisions, there is a strong incentive to counter-attack."[39] The defendant in an enforcement proceeding has ample opportunity to challenge the legality of the proceeding. An *516 administrator's decision to proceed with a case is subject to scrutiny in the proceeding itself. The respondent may present his evidence to an impartial trier of fact and obtain an independent judgment as to whether the prosecution is justified. His claims that the proceeding is unconstitutional may also be heard by the courts. Indeed, respondent in this case was able to quash the administrative order entered against him by means of judicial review. See We believe that agency officials must make the decision to move forward with an administrative proceeding free from intimidation or harassment. Because the legal remedies already available to the defendant in such a proceeding provide sufficient checks on agency zeal, we hold that those officials who are responsible for the decision to initiate or continue a proceeding subject to agency adjudication are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their parts in that decision. We turn finally to the role of an agency attorney in conducting a trial and presenting evidence on the record to the trier of fact. We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.[40] In either case, the evidence *517 will be subject to attack through cross-examination, rebuttal, or reinterpretation by opposing counsel. Evidence which is false or unpersuasive should be rejected upon analysis by an impartial trier of fact. If agency attorneys were held personally liable in damages as guarantors of the quality of their evidence, they might hesitate to bring forward some witnesses or documents. "This is particularly so because |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | forward some witnesses or documents. "This is particularly so because it is very difficult if not impossible for attorneys to be absolutely certain of the objective truth or falsity of the testimony which they present." Apart from the possible unfairness to agency personnel, the agency would often be denied relevant evidence. Cf. Administrative agencies can act in the public interest only if they can adjudicate on the basis of a complete record. We therefore hold that an agency attorney who arranges for the presentation of evidence on the record in the course of an adjudication is absolutely immune from suits based on the introduction of such evidence. VI There remains the task of applying the foregoing principles to the claims against the particular petitioner-defendants involved in this case. Rather than attempt this here in the first instance, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in that part of the Court's judgment which affords absolute immunity to those persons performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency, ante, at 514, *518 those who are responsible for the decision to initiate or continue a proceeding subject to agency adjudication, ante, at 516, and those agency personnel who present evidence on the record in the course of an adjudication, ante, at 517. I cannot agree, however, with the Court's conclusion that in a suit for damages arising from allegedly unconstitutional action federal executive officials, regardless of their rank or the scope of their responsibilities, are entitled to only qualified immunity even when acting within the outer limits of their authority. The Court's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, this decision seriously misconstrues our prior decisions, finds little support as a matter of logic or precedent, and perhaps most importantly, will, I fear, seriously "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties," (CA2 49) Most noticeable is the Court's unnaturally constrained reading of the landmark case of The Court in that case did indeed hold that the actions taken by the Postmaster General were within the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and went on to hold that even though he had acted maliciously in carrying out the duties conferred upon him by Congress he was protected by official immunity. But |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | him by Congress he was protected by official immunity. But the Court left no doubt that it would have reached the same result had it been alleged the official acts were unconstitutional. "We are of the opinion that the same general considerations of public policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. The interests of the people require that due protection be *5 accorded to them in respect of their official acts." The Court today attempts to explain away that language by observing that indicated no intention to overrule or See ante, n. 18. But as the Court itself observes, the Postmaster General was held not "liable in an action for an error of judgment" in The Court in likewise exonerated the defendant. The Court did indicate in dictum in both those cases that a federal officer might be liable if he acted with malice, ; at but the holding in was, as even the Court is forced to admit today, see ante, at 492-493, directly contrary to those cases on that point. In short, clearly and inescapably stands for the proposition that high-ranking executive officials acting within the outer limits of their authority are absolutely immune from suit. Indeed, the language from quoted above unquestionably applies with equal force in the case at bar. No one seriously contends that the Secretary of Agriculture or the Assistant Secretary, who are being sued for $32 million in damages, had wandered completely off the official reservation in authorizing prosecution of respondent for violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary for the regulation of "futures commission merchants," 7 U.S. C. 6 ( ed.). This is precisely what the Secretary and his assistants were empowered and required to do. That they would on occasion be mistaken in their judgment that a particular merchant had in fact violated the regulations is a necessary concomitant of any known system of administrative adjudication; that they acted "maliciously" gives no support to respondent's claim against them unless we are to overrule The Court's attempt to distinguish may be predicated *520 on a simpler but equally erroneous concept of immunity. At one point the Court observes that even under "an executive officer would be vulnerable if he took action `manifestly or palpably' beyond his authority or ignored |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | took action `manifestly or palpably' beyond his authority or ignored a clear limitation on his enforcement powers." Ante, n. 18. From that proposition, which is undeniably accurate, the Court appears to conclude that anytime a plaintiff can paint his grievance in constitutional colors, the official is subject to damages unless he can prove he acted in good faith. After all, Congress would never "authorize" an official to engage in unconstitutional conduct. That this notion in fact underlines the Court's decision is strongly by its discussion of numerous cases which supposedly support its position, but all of which in fact deal not with the question of what level of immunity a federal official may claim when acting within the outer limits of his authority, but rather with the question of whether he was in fact so acting. See ante, at 489-491. Putting to one side the illogic and impracticability of distinguishing between constitutional and common-law claims for purposes of immunity, which will be discussed shortly, this sort of immunity analysis badly misses the mark. It amounts to saying that an official has immunity until someone alleges he has acted unconstitutionally. But that is no immunity at all: The "immunity" disappears at the very moment when it is needed. The critical inquiry in determining whether an official is entitled to claim immunity is not whether someone has in fact been injured by his action; that is part of the plaintiff's case in chief. The immunity defense turns on whether the action was one taken "when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon [the official] by law," 161 U. S., or in other words, whether the official was acting within the outer bounds of his authority. Only if the immunity inquiry is approached in this manner does it have any meaning. That such a rule may occasionally result in individual injustices has never been doubted, but at least until *521 today, immunity has been accorded nevertheless. As Judge Learned Hand said in 177 F. 2d, at : "The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." Indeed, in that very case Judge Hand laid bare the folly of approaching the question of immunity in the manner today by the Court. "The decisions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation upon the immunity that the official's act must have been within the scope of his powers; and it can be argued that official powers, since they exist only for the public good, never cover occasions where the public good is not their aim, and hence that to exercise a power dishonestly is necessarily to overstep its bounds. A moment's reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning of the limitation without defeating the *522 whole doctrine. What is meant by saying that the officer must be acting within his power cannot be more than that the occasion must be such as would have justified the act, if he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was vested in him." unfortunately fares little better at the Court's hand than Here the Court at least recognizes and reaffirms the minimum proposition for which Barr standsthat executive officials are absolutely immune at least from actions predicated on common-law claims as long as they are acting within the outer limits of their authority. See ante, at 495. Barr is distinguished, however, on the ground that it did not involve a violation of "those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the Constitution." But if we allow a mere allegation of unconstitutionality, obviously unproved at the time made, to require a Cabinet-level official, charged with the enforcement of the responsibilities to which the complaint pertains, to lay aside his duties and defend such an action on the merits, the defense of official immunity will have been abolished in fact if not in form. The ease with which a constitutional |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | if not in form. The ease with which a constitutional claim may be pleaded in a case such as this, where a violation of statutory or judicial limits on agency action may be readily converted by any legal neophyte into a claim of denial of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment, will assure that. The fact that the claim fails when put to trial will not prevent the consumption of time, effort, and money on the part of the defendant official in defending his actions on the merits. The result can only be damage to the "interests of the people," which "require[s] that due protection be accorded to [Cabinet officials] in respect of their official acts." It likewise cannot seriously be argued that an official will be less deterred by the threat of liability for unconstitutional *523 conduct than for activities which might constitute a common-law tort. The fear that inhibits is that of a long, involved lawsuit and a significant money judgment, not the fear of liability for a certain type of claim. Thus, even viewing the question functionallyindeed, especially viewing the question functionallythe basis for a distinction between constitutional and common-law torts in this context is open to serious question. Even the logical justification for raising such a novel distinction is far from clear. That the Framers thought some rights sufficiently susceptible of legislative derogation that they should be enshrined in the Constitution does not necessarily indicate that the Framers likewise intended to establish an immutable hierarchy of rights in terms of their importance to individuals. The most heinous common-law tort surely cannot be less important to, or have less of an impact on, the aggrieved individual than a mere technical violation of a constitutional proscription. The Court purports to find support for this distinction, and therefore this result, in the principles supposedly underlying and and the fact that cognate state officials are not afforded absolute immunity for actions brought under 42 U.S. C. 83. Undoubtedly these rationales have some superficial appeal, but none withstands careful analysis. leaves no doubt that the high position of a Government official does not insulate his actions from judicial review. But that case, like numerous others which have followed, involved equitable-type relief by way of mandamus or injunction. In the present case, respondent sought damages in the amount of $32 million. There is undoubtedly force to the argument that injunctive relief, in these cases where a court determines that an official defendant has violated a legal right of the plaintiff, sets the matter right only as to the future. But there |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | the matter right only as to the future. But there is at least as much force to the argument *524 that the threat of injunctive relief without the possibility of damages in the case of a Cabinet official is a better tailoring of the competing need to vindicate individual rights, on the one hand, and the equally vital need, on the other, that federal officials exercising discretion will be unafraid to take vigorous action to protect the public interest. The Court also suggests in sweeping terms that the cause of action recognized in Bivens would be "`drained of meaning' if federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for their constitutional transgressions." Ante, at 501. But Bivens is a slender reed on which to rely when abrogating official immunity for Cabinet-level officials. In the first place, those officials most susceptible to claims under Bivens have historically been given only a qualified immunity. As the Court observed in "[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity." In any event, it certainly does not follow that a grant of absolute immunity to the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture requires a like grant to federal law enforcement officials. But even more importantly, on the federal side, when Congress thinks redress of grievances is appropriate, it can and generally does waive sovereign immunity, allowing an action directly against the United States. This allows redress for deprivations of rights, while at the same time limiting the outside influences which might inhibit an official in the free and considered exercise of his official powers. In fact, Congress, making just these sorts of judgments with respect to the very causes of action which the Court suggests require abrogation of absolute immunity, has amended the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S. C. 2680 (h) ( ed.), to allow suits against the United States on the basis of certain intentional torts if committed by federal "investigative or law enforcement officers." The Court also looks to the question of immunity of state officials for causes arising under 83 and, quoting a concurring *525 opinion in to the effect that there should not be "one law for Athens and another for Rome," finds no reason why those principles should not likewise apply when federal officers are the target. Homilies cannot replace analysis in this difficult area, however. And even a moment's reflection on the nature of the Bivens-type action and the purposes of 83, as made abundantly clear in this Court's prior cases, supplies a compelling reason for distinguishing between the two different situations. In |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | compelling reason for distinguishing between the two different situations. In the first place, as made clear above, a grant of absolute immunity to high-ranking executive officials on the federal side would not eviscerate the cause of action recognized in Bivens. The officials who are the most likely defendants in a Bivens-type action have generally been accorded only a qualified immunity. But more importantly, Congress has expressly waived sovereign immunity for this type of suit. This permits a direct action against the Government, while limiting those risks which might "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties." And the Federal Government can internally supervise and check its own officers. The Federal Government is not so situated that it can control state officials or strike this same balance, however. Hence the necessity of 83 and the differing standards of immunity. As the Court observed in District of (73): "Although there are threads of many thoughts running through the debates on the 1871 Act, it seems clear that 1 of the Act, with which we are here concerned, was designed primarily in response to unwillingness or inability of the state governments to enforce their own laws against those violating the civil rights of others." "[T]he [basic] rationale underlying Congress' decision not to enact legislation similar to 83 with respect to *526 federal officials [was] the assumption that the Federal Government could keep its own officers under control." The Court attempts to avoid the force of this argument by suggesting that the statute which vests federal courts with general federal-question jurisdiction is basically the equivalent of 83. Ante, at 502 n. 30. But that suggestion evinces a basic misunderstanding of the difference between a statute which vests jurisdiction in federal courts, which are, as a constitutional matter, courts of limited jurisdiction, and a statute, or even a constitutional provision, which creates a private right of action. As even the Court's analysis in Bivens made clear, a statute giving jurisdiction to federal courts does not, in and of itself, create a right of action. And to date, the Court has not held that the Constitution itself creates a private right of action for damages except when federal law enforcement officials arrest someone and search his premises in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Court's attempt to equate 83 and 28 U.S. C. 1331 ( ed.) simply fails, and its further observationthat there should be no difference in immunity between state and federal officials remains subject to serious doubt. My biggest concern, however, |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | officials remains subject to serious doubt. My biggest concern, however, is not with the illogic or impracticality of today's decision, but rather with the potential for disruption of Government that it invites. The steady increase in litigation, much of it directed against governmental officials and virtually all of which could be framed in constitutional terms, cannot escape the notice of even the most casual observer. From 61 to 77, the number of cases brought in the federal courts under civil rights statutes increased from 296 to 13,113. See Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep. 189, Table 11 (77); Ann. Rep. 173, Table 17 It simply defies logic and common experience to suggest that officials will not have this in the back of their minds when considering *527 what official course to pursue. It likewise strains credulity to suggest that this threat will only inhibit officials from taking action which they should not take in any event. It is the cases in which the grounds for action are doubtful, or in which the actor is timid, which will be affected by today's decision. The Court, of course, recognizes this problem and suggests two solutions. First, judges, ever alert to the artful pleader, supposedly will weed out insubstantial claims. Ante, at 507. That, I fear, shows more optimism than prescience. Indeed, this very case, unquestionably frivolous in the extreme, belies any hope in that direction. And summary judgment on affidavits and the like is even more inappropriate when the central, and perhaps only, inquiry is the official's state of mind. See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 493 (It "is not feasible to resolve on motion for summary judgment cases involving state of mind"); (CA2 55). The second solution offered by the Court is even less satisfactory. The Court holds that in those special circumstances "where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business," absolute immunity will be extended. Ante, at 507. But this is a form of "absolute immunity" which in truth exists in name only. If, for example, the Secretary of Agriculture may never know until inquiry by a trial court whether there is a possibility that vexatious constitutional litigation will interfere with his decisionmaking process, the Secretary will obviously think not only twice but thrice about whether to prosecute a litigious commodities merchant who has played fast and loose with the regulations for his own profit. Careful consideration of the rights of every individual subject to his jurisdiction is one thing; a timorous reluctance to prosecute |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | his jurisdiction is one thing; a timorous reluctance to prosecute any of such individuals who have a reputation for using litigation as a defense weapon is quite another. Since Cabinet officials are mortal, *528 it is not likely that we shall get the precise judgmental balance desired in each of them, and it is because of these very human failings that the principles of 161 U. S., dictate that absolute immunity be accorded once it be concluded by a court that a high-level executive official was "engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon [him] by law."[*] Today's opinion has shouldered a formidable task insofar as it seeks to justify the rejection of the views of the first Mr. Justice Harlan expressed in his opinion for the Court in and those of the second Mr. Justice Harlan expressed in his opinions in and its companion case of In terms of juridical jousting, if not in terms of placement in the judicial hierarchy, it has taken on at least as formidable a task when it disregards the powerful statement of Judge Learned Hand in (CA2 49). *529 History will surely not condemn the Court for its effort to achieve a more finely ground product from the judicial mill, a product which would both retain the necessary ability of public officials to govern and yet assure redress to those who are the victims of official wrongs. But if such a system of redress for official wrongs was indeed capable of being achieved in practice, it surely would not have been rejected by this Court speaking through the first Mr. Justice Harlan in 1896, by this Court speaking through the second Mr. Justice Harlan in 59, and by Judge Learned Hand speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 48. These judges were not inexperienced neophytes who lacked the vision or the ability to define immunity doctrine to accomplish that result had they thought it possible. Nor were they obsequious toadies in their attitude toward high-ranking officials of coordinate branches of the Federal Government. But they did see with more prescience than the Court does today, that there are inevitable trade-offs in connection with any doctrine of official liability and immunity. They forthrightly accepted the possibility that an occasional failure to redress a claim of official wrongdoing would result from the doctrine of absolute immunity which they espoused, viewing it as a lesser evil than the impairment of the ability of responsible public officials to govern. But while I believe that history will look approvingly on the motives of the |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | Butz v. Economou | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109932/butz-v-economou/ | that history will look approvingly on the motives of the Court in reaching the result it does today, I do not believe that history will be charitable in its judgment of the all but inevitable result of the doctrine espoused by the Court in this case. That doctrine seeks to gain and hold a middle ground which, with all deference, I believe the teachings of those who were at least our equals suggest cannot long be held. That part of the Court's present opinion from which I dissent will, I fear, result in one of two evils, either one of which is markedly worse than the effect of according absolute immunity to the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary in this *530 case. The first of these evils would be a significant impairment of the ability of responsible public officials to carry out the duties imposed upon them by law. If that evil is to be avoided after today, it can be avoided only by a necessarily unprincipled and erratic judicial "screening" of claims such as those made in this case, an adherence to the form of the law while departing from its substance. Either one of these evils is far worse than the occasional failure to award damages caused by official wrongdoing, frankly and openly justified by the rule of and |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | United States v. Villamonte-Marquez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110973/united-states-v-villamonte-marquez/ | Congress has provided that "[a]ny officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel at any place in the United States and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and to this end may hail and stop such vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance." as amended, 19 U.S. C. 1581(a).[1] We are asked to decide whether the Fourth Amendment is offended when customs officials, acting pursuant to this *581 statute and without any suspicion of wrongdoing, board for inspection of documents a vessel that is located in waters providing ready access to the open sea.[2] *582 Near midday on March 6, 1980, customs officers, accompanied by Louisiana state policemen, were patrolling the Calcasieu River Ship Channel, some 18 miles inland from the gulf coast, when they sighted the Henry Morgan II, a 40-foot sailboat, anchored facing east on the west side of the channel. The Calcasieu River Ship Channel is a north-south waterway connecting the Gulf of Mexico with Lake Charles, Louisiana. Lake Charles, located in the southwestern corner of Louisiana, is a designated Customs Port of Entry in the Houston, Texas Region. While there is access to the channel from Louisiana's Calcasieu Lake, the channel is a separate thoroughfare to the west of the lake which all vessels moving between Lake Charles and the open sea of the Gulf must traverse. Shortly after sighting the sailboat, the officers also observed a large freighter moving north in the channel. The freighter was creating a huge wake and as it passed the Henry Morgan II the wake caused the smaller vessel to rock violently from side to side. The patrol boat then approached the sailboat from the port side and passed behind its stern. *583 On the stern the name of the vessel, the "Henry Morgan II," was displayed along with its home port, "Basilea." The officers sighted one man, respondent Hamparian, on deck. Officer Wilkins twice asked if the sailboat and crew were all right. Hamparian shrugged his shoulders in an unresponsive manner. Officer Wilkins, accompanied by Officer Dougherty of the Louisiana State Police, then boarded the Henry Morgan II and asked to see the vessel's documentation. Hamparian handed Officer Wilkins what appeared to be a request to change the registration of a ship from Swiss registry to French registry, written in French and dated February 6, 1980. It subsequently was discovered that the home port designation of "Basilea" was Latin for Basel, Switzerland; the vessel was, however, of French registry. While examining the document, Officer Wilkins smelled what he thought |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | United States v. Villamonte-Marquez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110973/united-states-v-villamonte-marquez/ | While examining the document, Officer Wilkins smelled what he thought to be burning marihuana. Looking through an open hatch, Wilkins observed burlap-wrapped bales that proved to be marihuana. Respondent Villamonte-Marquez was on a sleeping bag atop of the bales. Wilkins arrested both Hamparian and Villamonte-Marquez and gave them Miranda warnings. A subsequent search revealed some 5,800 pounds of marihuana on the Henry Morgan II, stored in almost every conceivable place including the forward, mid, and aft cabins, and under the seats in the open part of the vessel. A jury found respondents guilty of conspiring to import marihuana in violation of 21 U.S. C. 963, importing marihuana in violation of 21 U.S. C. 952(a), conspiring to possess marihuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S. C. 846, and possessing marihuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S. C. 841(a)(1). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction, finding that the officers' boarding of the Henry Morgan II "was not reasonable under the fourth amendment" because the boarding occurred in the absence of "a reasonable *584 suspicion of a law violation." Because of a conflict among the Circuits and the importance of the question presented as it affects the enforcement of customs laws, we granted certiorari.[3] We now reverse. In 1790 the First Congress enacted a comprehensive statute "to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods, wares and merchandise imported into the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels." Act of Aug. 4, 1790, Section 31 of that Act provided in pertinent part as follows: "That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors, and the officers of the revenue cutters herein after mentioned, to go on board of ships or vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States, whether in or out of their respective districts, for the purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examining and searching the said ships or vessels." This statute appears to be the lineal ancestor of the provision of present law upon which the Government relies to sustain *585 the boarding of the vessel in this case. Title 19 U.S. C. 1581(a) provides that "[a]ny officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel at any place in the United States or within the customs waters and examine the manifest and other documents and papers" The Government insists that the language of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | United States v. Villamonte-Marquez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110973/united-states-v-villamonte-marquez/ | documents and papers" The Government insists that the language of the statute clearly authorized the boarding of the vessel in this case. The respondents do not seriously dispute this contention, but contend that even though authorized by statute the boarding here violated the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We of course agree with respondents' argument that "no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution." But we also agree with the Government's contention that the enactment of this statute by the same Congress that promulgated the constitutional Amendments that ultimately became the Bill of Rights gives the statute an impressive historical pedigree.[4]United *586 As long ago as the decision in this Court said: "The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As this *587 Act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as `unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment." at 623 (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). In holding that the boarding of the vessel without articulable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals relied on several of its own decisions and on our decision in United where we said: "Except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." We think that two later decisions also bear on the question before us. In United we upheld the authority of the Border Patrol to maintain permanent checkpoints at or near intersections of important roads leading away from the border at which a vehicle would be stopped for brief questioning of its occupants "even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens." Distinguishing our holding in United we said: "A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | United States v. Villamonte-Marquez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110973/united-states-v-villamonte-marquez/ | the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of *588 well-disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly." Three Terms later we held in that "persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers." We added that alternative methods, such as spot checks that involve less intrusion, or questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops, would just as readily accomplish the State's objectives in furthering compliance with auto registration and safety laws. Our focus in this area of Fourth Amendment law has been on the question of the "reasonableness" of the type of governmental intrusion involved. "Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." See also ; ; ; United United It seems clear that if the customs officers in this case had stopped an automobile on a public highway near the border, rather than a vessel in a ship channel, the stop would have run afoul of the Fourth Amendment because of the absence of articulable suspicion. See United But under the overarching principle of "reasonableness" embodied in the Fourth Amendment, we think that the important factual differences between vessels located in waters offering ready access to the open sea and automobiles on principal thoroughfares in the border area are sufficient to require a different result here. The difference in outcome between the roving patrol stop in and the fixed checkpoint stop in *589 was due in part to what the Court deemed the less intrusive and less awesome nature of fixed checkpoint stops when compared to roving patrol stops. And the preference for roadblocks as opposed to random spot checks expressed in reflects a like concern. But no reasonable claim can be made that permanent checkpoints would be practical on waters such as these where vessels can move in any direction at any time and need not follow established "avenues" as automobiles must do. Customs officials do not have as a practical alternative the option of spotting all vessels which might have come from the open sea and herding them into one or more canals or straits in order to make fixed checkpoint stops. Smuggling and illegal importation of aliens by land may, and undoubtedly usually does, take place |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | United States v. Villamonte-Marquez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110973/united-states-v-villamonte-marquez/ | aliens by land may, and undoubtedly usually does, take place away from fixed checkpoints or ports of entry, but much of it is at least along a finite number of identifiable roads. But while eventually maritime commerce on the inland waters of the United States may funnel into rivers, canals, and the like, which are more analogous to roads and make a "roadblock" approach more feasible, such is not the case in waters providing ready access to the seaward border, beyond which is only the open sea. Respondents have asserted that permanent checkpoints could be established at various ports. But vessels having ready access to the open sea need never come to harbor. Should the captain want to avoid the authorities at port, he could carry on his activity by anchoring at some obscure location on the shoreline, or, as may have been planned in this case, the captain could transfer his cargo from one vessel to another. In cases involving such endeavors as fishing or water exploration, the crew of the vessel can complete its mission without any assistance. Quite apart from the aforementioned differences between waterborne vessels and automobiles traveling on highways, the documentation requirements with respect to vessels are significantly different from the system of vehicle licensing *590 that prevails generally throughout the United States. A police officer patrolling a highway can often tell merely by observing a vehicle's license plate and other outward markings whether the vehicle is currently in compliance with the requirements of state law. See No comparable "license plates" or "stickers" are issued by the United States or by States to vessels. Both of the required exterior markings on documented vessels the name and hailing port as well as the numerals displayed by undocumented American boats, are marked on the vessel at the instance of the owner. Furthermore, in cases like this one where the vessel is of foreign registry it carries only the markings required by its home port. Here those markings indicated that the vessel was of Swiss registry, while in actuality it carried French documentation papers. The panoply of statutes and regulations governing maritime documentation are likewise more extensive and more complex than the typical state requirements for vehicle licensing; only some of the papers required need explicit mention here to illustrate the point. All American vessels of at least five tons and used for commercial purposes must have a "certificate of documentation." In addition, vessels engaged in certain trades must obtain special licenses. While pleasure vessels of this size are not required to be documented, they are |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | United States v. Villamonte-Marquez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110973/united-states-v-villamonte-marquez/ | this size are not required to be documented, they are eligible for federal registration. See 46 U.S. C. 65 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V). Many of these vessels must also submit to periodic inspection by the Coast Guard and a "certificate of inspection" must be kept on the vessel at all times. 46 U.S. C. 399, 400. Smaller American vessels cannot be issued federal documentation papers, but under federal law each such vessel with propulsion machinery must have a state-issued number displayed on a "certificate of number" that must be available for inspection at all times. 46 U.S. C. 1470. Vessels not required to carry federal documentation papers also may be required to carry a state-issued safety certificate. 46 U.S. C. 1471. *591 While foreign vessels are not required to carry federal documentation papers, they are required to have a "manifest," which must be delivered to customs officials immediately upon arrival in this country. 19 U.S. C. 1439. If a foreign vessel wants to visit more than one customs district, it must obtain a "permit to proceed" at its first port of call, with the exception that a foreign yacht need not obtain such a permit if it has been issued a "cruising license." 46 U.S. C. 313; 19 U.S. C. 1435. Any vessel departing American waters for a foreign port must deliver its "manifest" to Customs and obtain clearance. 46 U.S. C. 91. These documentation laws serve the public interest in many obvious ways and respondents do not suggest that the public interest is less than substantially furthered by enforcement of these laws. They are the linchpin for regulation of participation in certain trades, such as fishing, salvaging, towing, and dredging, as well as areas in which trade is sanctioned, and for enforcement of various environmental laws. The documentation laws play a vital role in the collection of customs duties and tonnage duties. They allow for regulation of imports and exports assisting, for example, Government officials in the prevention of entry into this country of controlled substances, illegal aliens, prohibited medicines, adulterated foods, dangerous chemicals, prohibited agricultural products, diseased or prohibited animals, and illegal weapons and explosives. These interests are, of course, most substantial in areas such as the ship channel in this case, which connects the open sea with a Customs Port of Entry. Cf. United Requests to check certificates of inspection play an obvious role in ensuring safety on American waterways. While inspection of a vessel's documents might not always conclusively establish compliance with United States shipping laws, more often than not it will.[5] *592 While |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,983 | 19 | majority | United States v. Villamonte-Marquez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110973/united-states-v-villamonte-marquez/ | shipping laws, more often than not it will.[5] *592 While the need to make document checks is great,[6] the resultant intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited. While it does intrude on one's ability to make " `free passage without interruption,' " United -558 ), it involves only a brief detention where officials come on board, visit public areas of the vessel, and inspect documents. Cf. United "Neither the [vessel] nor its occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the [vessel] is limited to what can be seen without a search." United Any interference with interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is, of course, intrusive to some degree. But in this case, the interference created only a modest intrusion. We briefly recapitulate the reasons, set forth above in greater detail, which lead us to conclude that the Government's boarding of the Henry Morgan II did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In a lineal ancestor to the statute at issue here the First Congress clearly authorized the suspicionless boarding of vessels, reflecting its view that such boardings are not contrary to the Fourth Amendment; this gives the statute before us an impressive historical pedigree. Random stops without any articulable suspicion of vehicles away from the border are not permissible under the Fourth Amendment, United Delaware *593 v. but stops at fixed checkpoints or at roadblocks are. The nature of waterborne commerce in waters providing ready access to the open sea is sufficiently different from the nature of vehicular traffic on highways as to make possible alternatives to the sort of "stop" made in this case less likely to accomplish the obviously essential governmental purposes involved. The system of prescribed outward markings used by States for vehicle registration is also significantly different from the system of external markings on vessels, and the extent and type of documentation required by federal law is a good deal more variable and more complex than are the state vehicle registration laws. The nature of the governmental interest in assuring compliance with documentation requirements, particularly in waters where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great, is substantial; the type of intrusion made in this case, while not minimal, is limited. All of these factors lead us to conclude that the action of the customs officers in stopping and boarding the Henry Morgan II was "reasonable," and was therefore consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. |
Justice Stevens | 1,981 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Prysock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110556/california-v-prysock/ | A juvenile informed by police that he has a right to counsel may understand that right to include one or more of three options: (1) that he has a right to have a lawyer represent him if he or his parents are able and willing to hire one; (2) that, if he cannot afford to hire an attorney, he has a right to have a lawyer represent him without charge at trial, even if his parents are unwilling to spend money on his behalf; or (3) that, if he is unable to afford an attorney, he has a right to consult a lawyer without charge before he decides whether to talk to the police, even if his parents decline to pay for such legal representation.[1] All three of these options are encompassed within the right to counsel possessed by a juvenile charged with a crime. In this case, the first two options were explained to respondent, but the third was not. In this Court held that in order to protect an accused's privilege against self-incrimination, certain procedural safeguards must be employed. *363 In particular, an individual taken into police custody and subjected to questioning must be given the Miranda warnings: "He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." See also Rhode This formulation makes it clear beyond any doubt that an indigent accused has the right to the presence of an attorney and the right to have that attorney appointed to represent him prior to any questioning. While it is certainly true, as the Court emphasizes today, that the Federal Constitution does not require a "talismanic incantation" of the language of the Miranda opinion, ante, at 359, it is also indisputable that it requires that an accused be adequately informed of his right to have counsel appointed prior to any police questioning. The California Court of Appeal in this case analyzed the warning given respondent, quoted ante, at 356-357, and concluded that he had not been adequately informed of this crucial right. The police sergeant informed respondent that he had the right to have counsel present during questioning and, after a brief interlude, informed him that he had the right to appointed counsel. See The Court of Appeal concluded that this warning was constitutionally inadequate, |
Justice Stevens | 1,981 | 16 | dissenting | California v. Prysock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110556/california-v-prysock/ | Court of Appeal concluded that this warning was constitutionally inadequate, not because it deviated from the precise language of Miranda, but because "[u]nfortunately, the minor was not given the crucial information that the services of the free attorney were available prior to the impending questioning." App. A to Pet. for Cert. 15 (emphasis in original).[2] *364 There can be no question that Miranda requires, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that an accused effectively be provided with this "crucial information" in some form. The Court's demonstration that the Constitution does not require that the precise language of Miranda be recited to an accused simply fails to come to terms with the express finding of the California Court of Appeal that respondent was not given this information. The warning recited by the police sergeant is sufficiently ambiguous on its face to provide adequate support for the California court's finding. That court's conclusion is at least reasonable, and is clearly not so patently erroneous as to warrant summary reversal. The ambiguity in the warning given respondent is further demonstrated by the colloquy between the police sergeant and respondent's parents that occurred after respondent was told that he had the "right to have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself." Because lawyers are normally "appointed" by judges, and not by law enforcement officers, the reference to appointed counsel could reasonably have been understood to refer to trial counsel.[3] That is what *365 respondent's parents must have assumed, because their ensuing colloquy with the sergeant related to their option "to hire a lawyer."[4] The judges on the California Court of Appeal and on the California Supreme Court, all of whom are presumably more familiar with the procedures followed by California police officers than we are, concluded that respondent was not adequately informed of his right to have a lawyer present without charge during the questioning. This Court is not at all fair to those judges when it construes their conscientious appraisal of a somewhat ambiguous record as requiring "a virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the *366 Miranda opinion." Ante, at 355. It seems clear to me that it is this Court, rather than the state courts, that is guilty of attaching greater importance to the form of the Miranda ritual than to the substance of the message it is intended to convey. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | majority | Massachusetts v. Oakes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112309/massachusetts-v-oakes/ | This case involves an overbreadth challenge to a Massachusetts criminal statute generally prohibiting adults from posing or exhibiting nude minors for purposes of visual representation or reproduction in any book, magazine, pamphlet, motion picture, photograph, or picture. I The statute at issue in this case, Mass. Gen. Laws 272:29A was enacted in 1982.[1] It provides as follows: "Whoever with knowledge that a person is a child under eighteen years of age, or whoever while in possession *579 of such facts that he should have reason to know that such person is a child under eighteen years of age, hires, coerces, solicits or entices, employs, procures, uses, causes, encourages, or knowingly permits such child to pose or be exhibited in a state of nudity or to participate or engage in any live performance or in any act that depicts, describes or represents sexual conduct for purpose of visual representation or reproduction in any book, magazine, pamphlet, motion picture film, photograph, or picture shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years, or by a fine of not less than ten thousand dollars nor more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such a fine and imprisonment. "It shall be a defense in any prosecution pursuant to this section that such visual representation or reproduction of any posture or exhibition in a state of nudity was produced, processed, published, printed or manufactured for a bona fide scientific or medical purpose, or for an educational or cultural purpose for a bona fide school, museum or library. "As used in this section, the term `performance' shall mean any play, dance or exhibit shown or presented to an audience of one or more persons." Another statute, Mass. Gen. Laws 272:31 defines "nudity" as "uncovered or less than opaquely covered post-pubertal human genitals, pubic areas, the post-pubertal human female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola, or the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. For purposes of this definition, a female breast is considered uncovered if the nipple or the nipple or areola only are covered. In the case of pre-pubertal persons nudity shall mean uncovered or less than opaquely covered pre-pubertal human genitals or pubic area." *580 In 198, respondent Douglas Oakes took approximately 10 color photographs of his partially nude and physically mature 1-year-old stepdaughter, L. S., who at the time was attending modeling school. Tr. 22-30. The photographs depict L. S. sitting, lying, and reclining on top of a bar, clad only in a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | majority | Massachusetts v. Oakes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112309/massachusetts-v-oakes/ | reclining on top of a bar, clad only in a red and white striped bikini panty and a red scarf. The scarf does not cover L. S.'s breasts, which are fully exposed in all the photographs. The dissent below described the photographs as "sexually provocative photographs of the type frequently found in magazines displayed by storekeepers in sealed cellophane wrappers." See also Brief for Law and Humanities Institute as Amicus Curiae 7 (referring to the photographs as "pin-up" art). Oakes was indicted and tried for violating 29A. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and Oakes was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Because the jury was not instructed on the "sexual conduct" portion of 29A, Tr. 101-10, its verdict rested on a finding that Oakes "hire[d], coerce[d], solicit[ed] or entice[d], employ[ed], procure[d], use[d], cause[d], encourage[d], or knowingly permit[ted]" L. S. to "pose or be exhibited in a state of nudity." The acts proscribed by 29A are listed disjunctively, so it is impossible to ascertain which of those acts the jury concluded Oakes had committed. The jury was instructed on the exemptions set forth in 29A, Tr. 10, but its guilty verdict indicates that the exemptions were found to be inapplicable. A divided Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed Oakes' conviction. The majority first held that Oakes' posing of L. S. was speech for First Amendment purposes because it could not "fairly be isolated" from the "expressive process of taking her picture." Without addressing whether 29A could be constitutionally applied to Oakes, the majority struck down the statute as substantially overbroad under the First Amendment. The majority concluded that 29A "criminalize[d] *581 conduct that virtually every person would regard as lawful," and would make "a criminal of a parent who takes a frontal view picture of his or her naked one-year-old running on a beach or romping in a wading pool." 518 N.E.2d, at The dissent argued that Oakes' conduct did not constitute speech for First Amendment purposes: "Soliciting, causing, or encouraging, or permitting a minor to pose for photographs is no more speech than is setting a house afire in order to photograph a burning house." The dissent also argued that even if the "nudity" portion of 29A was overbroad, that portion should have been severed from the remainder of the statute. n. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 86 U.S. 1022 and now vacate and remand. II The First Amendment doctrine of substantial overbreadth is an exception to the general rule that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | majority | Massachusetts v. Oakes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112309/massachusetts-v-oakes/ | a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others. Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los 82 U.S. 569, 57 ; 72 U.S. 91, -50 See generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 1. The doctrine is predicated on the danger that an overly broad statute, if left in place, may cause persons whose expression is constitutionally protected to refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions. U.S. 620, 63 Overbreadth doctrine has wide-ranging effects, for a statute found to be substantially overbroad is subject to facial invalidation. We have therefore referred to overbreadth as "manifestl[y] strong medicine" that is employed "sparingly, and only as a last resort." 13 U.S. 601, *582 We have addressed overbreadth only where its effect might be salutary. In 21 U.S. 809 the defendant argued that the criminal statute under which he was convicted was overbroad. After the defendant was convicted, the statute was amended. The amendment eliminated any possibility that the statute's former version would "be applied again to [the defendant] or [would] chill the rights of others." Because, "[a]s a practical matter," the question of the statute's "overbreadth ha[d] become moot for the future," we declined to "rest our decision on overbreadth," choosing instead to consider whether the former version of the statute had been constitutionally applied to the defendant. In our view, Bigelow stands for the proposition that overbreadth analysis is inappropriate if the statute being challenged has been amended or repealed. The statute in Bigelow was challenged on both overbreadth and as-applied grounds. There was no need for any comment on the overbreadth challenge, as the defendant's conviction could have been and indeed was reversed on a narrower and alternative ground, i. e., that the statute was unconstitutional as applied. See That overbreadth was discussed and rejected as a mode of analysis is, we think, evidence that application of Bigelow does not depend on whether other questions presented will be answered adversely to the defendant. Indeed, the Bigelow overbreadth analysis appears to have been based on the argument made by the State that the amendment of the statute being challenged eliminated the "justification for the application of the overbreadth doctrine." Brief for Appellee in O. T. 197, No. 73-1309, p. 19, n. 10. The procedural posture of the overbreadth question in this case is indistinguishable from that in Bigelow. After we granted certiorari, 29A was amended. See Mass. Acts, ch. 226. The current version of 29A, which is set *583 forth in |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | majority | Massachusetts v. Oakes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112309/massachusetts-v-oakes/ | current version of 29A, which is set *583 forth in the margin,[2] adds a "lascivious intent" requirement to the "nudity" portion, but not the "sexual conduct" portion, of the former version of 29A. In addition, the current version of 29A contains no exemptions. Because it has been repealed, the former version of 29A cannot chill protected expression in the future. Thus, as in Bigelow, the overbreadth *58 question in this case has become moot as a practical matter, and we do not address it. There is nothing constitutionally offensive about declining to reach Oakes' overbreadth challenge. Overbreadth is a judicially created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected expression. An overbroad statute is not void ab initio, but rather voidable, subject to invalidation notwithstanding the defendant's unprotected conduct out of solicitude to the First Amendment rights of parties not before the court. Because the special concern that animates the overbreadth doctrine is no longer present after the amendment or repeal of the challenged statute, we need not extend the benefits of the doctrine to a defendant whose conduct is not protected. See 81 U.S. 97, Cf. Upper Midwest Booksellers (Minn.) (amendment of ordinance rendered overbreadth challenge moot, but no conviction involved), aff'd, We also note that the amendment of a statute pending appeal to eliminate overbreadth is not different, in terms of applying the new law to past conduct, from a state appellate court adopting a limiting construction of a statute to cure overbreadth. We have long held that in such situations the statute, as construed, "may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the construction, provided such application affords fair warning to the defendants." 380 U.S. 79, 91, n. 7 See also 13 U. S., at III Massachusetts has not asked us to consider Oakes' as-applied challenge to the former version of 29A in its petition *585 for certiorari, and we took the case to decide the overbreadth question alone. When the sole question on which we granted certiorari has become moot, our usual course, in cases coming to us from state courts when part of the dispute remains alive, is to vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings. See 16 U.S. 312 (197). We have dismissed state court cases rather than vacate and remand them, but only in situations where no state or federal claim remained once the particular claim before us became moot, thereby making a remand unnecessary. See Attorney General of New 87 U.S. 1213 ; 78 U.S. 1017 ; Tiverton Board of License 69 U.S. 238 ; 06 U.S. 813 ; Here, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | majority | Massachusetts v. Oakes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112309/massachusetts-v-oakes/ | License 69 U.S. 238 ; 06 U.S. 813 ; Here, a live dispute remains as to whether the former version of 29A can constitutionally be applied to Oakes. Thus, we vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and remanded. JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, and with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join as to Part I, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. I I do not agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S conclusion that the overbreadth defense is unavailable when the statute alleged to run afoul of that doctrine has been amended to eliminate the *586 basis for the overbreadth challenge. It seems to me strange judicial theory that a conviction initially invalid can be resuscitated by postconviction alteration of the statute under which it was obtained. Indeed, I would even think it strange judicial theory that an act which is lawful when committed (because the statute that proscribes it is overbroad) can become retroactively unlawful if the statute is amended preindictment. Of course the reason we are tempted to create such curiosities is that the overbreadth doctrine allows a defendant to attack a statute because of its effect on conduct other than the conduct for which the defendant is being punished, thus protecting the right to engage in conduct not directly before the court. See 72 U.S. 91, And the argument is made that it is senseless to apply this doctrine when the protection of other conduct can no longer be achieved, which is the case when the statute has already been amended to eliminate any unconstitutional "chilling" of First Amendment rights. Even as a policy argument, this analysis fails. The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect constitutionally legitimate speech not merely ex post, that is, after the offending statute is enacted, but also ex ante, that is, when the legislature is contemplating what sort of statute to enact. If the promulgation of overbroad laws affecting speech was cost free, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR's new doctrine would make it that is, if no conviction of constitutionally proscribable conduct would be lost, so long as the offending statute was narrowed before the final appeal then legislatures would have significantly reduced incentive to stay within constitutional bounds in the first place. When one takes account of those overbroad statutes that are never challenged, and of the time that elapses before the ones that are challenged are amended to come within constitutional bounds, a substantial amount of legitimate speech would be "chilled" as a consequence of the rule JUSTICE O'CONNOR would adopt. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | majority | Massachusetts v. Oakes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112309/massachusetts-v-oakes/ | as a consequence of the rule JUSTICE O'CONNOR would adopt. *587 More fundamentally, however, even if JUSTICE O'CONNOR's policy analysis were correct, it seems to me that we are only free to pursue policy objectives through the modes of action traditionally followed by the courts and by the law. In my view we have the power to adopt a rule of law which says that the defendant's acts were lawful because the statute that sought to prohibit them was overbroad and therefore invalid. I do not think we have the power to pursue the policy underlying that rule of law more directly and precisely, saying that we will hold the defendant criminally liable or not, depending upon whether, by the time his last appeal is exhausted, letting him off would serve to eliminate any First Amendment "chill." Even if one were of the view that some of the uses of the overbreadth doctrine have been excessive, this would not be a legitimate manner in which to rein it in.[1] JUSTICE O'CONNOR *588 seeks to cloak its extravagant constitutional doctrine in conservative garb borrowed from an entirely different area of the law, saying that "[a]n overbroad statute is not void ab initio, but rather voidable." Ante, at 58. I have heard of a voidable contract, but never of a voidable law. The notion is bizarre. II Since I find that the subsequent amendment of the statute under which Oakes acted and was convicted does not eliminate the defense of overbreadth, I reach the question whether the statute is impermissibly overbroad. I do not believe that it is. Because the Court as a whole does not reach the question, I sketch my views on it only in brief. In order to be invalidated under our overbreadth doctrine, a statute's unconstitutional application must be substantial, not just in an absolute sense, but "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 13 U.S. 601, We held in New 58 U.S. 77, that the State has a "compelling" interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minor[s]" against harm of the sort at issue here. That case upheld against First Amendment attack a law directed against the use of children in pornographic (including nonobscene) materials. (Although the prohibition related to the distribution of pictures rather than the making of them, the former would seem to be even closer to the core of the First Amendment.) Thus, the scope of this statute has already been validated except as to nonpornographic depiction of preadolescent genitals, and postadolescent genitals and female breasts. On that basis alone, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,989 | 14 | majority | Massachusetts v. Oakes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112309/massachusetts-v-oakes/ | and postadolescent genitals and female breasts. On that basis alone, given the known extent of the so-called kiddie-porn industry, Act of May 21, 198, 98 Stat. 20, and of pornographic magazines that use young female models (to one of which the defendant here apparently intended to send his stepdaughter's photograph), I would estimate that the legitimate scope vastly exceeds the illegitimate. *589 But the statute is narrowed further still, since it excludes material "produced, processed, published, printed or manufactured for a bona fide scientific or medical purpose, or for an educational or cultural purpose for a bona fide school, museum or library." The only significant body of material that would remain, I estimate, consists of artistic depictions not "produced, processed, published, printed or manufactured. for a bona fide school, museum or library," and (the example posited by the Massachusetts court) family snapshots. As to the former: Even assuming that proscribing artistic depictions of preadolescent genitals and postadolescent breasts is impermissible,[2] the body of material that would be covered is, as far as I am aware, insignificant compared with the lawful scope of the statute. That leaves the family photos. The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the statute to cover "a parent who takes a frontal view picture of his or her naked one-year-old running on a beach or romping in a wading pool." 518 N. Ed. 2d 836, Assuming that it is unconstitutional (as opposed to merely foolish) to prohibit such photography, I do not think it so common as to make the statute substantially overbroad. We can deal with such a situation in the unlikely event some prosecutor brings an indictment. Cf. at 773-77, quoting at -616. Perhaps I am wrong in my estimation of how frequently the posings prohibited by this law are done for artistic purposes, or for family photographs or in some other legitimate *590 and constitutionally protected context I have not envisioned. My perception differs, for example, from JUSTICE BRENNAN's belief that there is an "abundance of baby and child photographs taken every day" depicting genitals, post, at 598. But it is the burden of the person whose conduct is legitimately proscribable, and who seeks to invalidate the entire law because of its application to someone else, to "demonstrate from the text of [the law] and from actual fact" that substantial overbreadth exists. New York State Club 87 U.S. 1, 1 That has not been done here. Having found the ground upon which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied to be in error, I would reverse and remand the case to permit that court |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109573/arlington-heights-v-metropolitan-housing-development-corp/ | In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village of Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.[1] They alleged that the denial was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S. C. 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for the Village, and respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the "ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory, and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted *255 the Village's petition for certiorari, and now reverse. I Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. The Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but, like other communities in northwest Cook County, its population of racial minority groups remained quite low. According to the census, only 27 of the Village's 64,000 residents were black. The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (Order), own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high school, and part by the Order's three-story novitiate building, which houses dormitories and a Montessori school. Much of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a single-family specification with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the Viatorian property directly adjoins the backyards of other single-family homes. The Order decided in to devote some of its land to low- and moderate-income housing. Investigation revealed that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use of federal housing subsidies under 236 of the National Housing Act, as added and amended, 12 U.S. C. 1715z-1.[2] *256 MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968 by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109573/arlington-heights-v-metropolitan-housing-development-corp/ | 1968 by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of building low- and moderate-income housing throughout the Chicago area. In MHDC was in the process of building one 236 development near Arlington Heights and already had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller scale in other parts of the Chicago area. After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into a 99-year lease and an accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the sale agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing zoning clearances from the Village and 236 housing assistance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuccessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal limitations governing land-acquisition costs for 236 housing. MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the project, *257 to be known as Lincoln Green. The plans called for 20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit having its own private entrance from the outside. One hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have two, three, or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes abutting the property to the east. The planned development did not conform to the Village's zoning ordinance and could not be built unless Arlington Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by supporting materials describing the development and specifying that it would be subsidized under 236. The materials made clear that one requirement under 236 is an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized development is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and analyzing the probable impact of the development. To prepare for the hearings before the Plan Commission and to assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regulations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the Village staff for preliminary review of the development. The parties have stipulated that every change recommended during such consultations was incorporated into the plans. During the spring of 1971, the Plan Commission considered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green, a number of individuals and representatives of |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109573/arlington-heights-v-metropolitan-housing-development-corp/ | to Lincoln Green, a number of individuals and representatives of community groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments, both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was referred to as the "social issue"the desirability or undesirability of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights *258 low- and moderate-income housing, housing that would probably be racially integrated. Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning aspects of the petition, stressing two arguments. First, the area always had been zoned single-family, and the neighboring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value for neighboring sites. Second, the Village's apartment policy, adopted by the Village Board in 1962 and amended in called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial or manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing district. At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated: "While the need for low and moderate income housing may exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Commission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed location." Two members voted against the motion and submitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good zoning." The Village Board met on September 28, 1971, to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the Plan Commission. After a public hearing, the Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals filed this lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.[3] A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plaintiffs. *259 The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. Assuming that MHDC had standing to bring the suit,[4] the District Court held that the petitioners were not motivated by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against low-income groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the Village's zoning plan." The District Court concluded also that the denial would not have a racially discriminatory effect. A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved the District Court's finding that the defendants were motivated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan, rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether their refusal to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109573/arlington-heights-v-metropolitan-housing-development-corp/ | their refusal to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more complex. The court observed that the refusal would have a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based upon family income, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area residents who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, although they composed a far lower percentage of total area population. The court reasoned, however, that under our decision in such a disparity in racial impact alone does not call for strict scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the construction of the low-cost housing.[5] There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy Park Homes cert. denied, the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate effect."[6] 517 F. 2d, at 413. Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth in employment opportunities and population, but it continued to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. The court held that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had been "exploiting" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly all-white community. The Village had no other current plans for building low- and moderate-income housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were available to MHDC at an economically feasible price. Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially discriminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire to protect property values met this exacting standard. The court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. II At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' standing to bring the suit. It is not clear that this challenge was pressed in the Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction to decide the case is implicated, we shall consider it. In a case similar in some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional limitations and prudential considerations that guide a court in determining a party's standing, and we need not repeat that discussion here. The essence of the standing question, *261 in its constitutional dimension, is "whether the plaintiff has `alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." quoting The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant. The injury may be indirect, see United |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109573/arlington-heights-v-metropolitan-housing-development-corp/ | of the defendant. The injury may be indirect, see United but the complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions. ; ; Linda R. A Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the constitutional standing requirements. The challenged action of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing the housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course, guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies,[7] and carry through with construction. But all housing developments are subject to some extent to similar uncertainties. When a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln Green, a court is not required to engage in undue speculation *262 as a predicate for finding that the plaintiff has the requisite personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Petitioners nonethless appear to argue that MHDC lacks standing because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC, they point out, is not the owner of the property in question. Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning.[8] MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied. We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place, it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Unless rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally attractive price. Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing requirements. It has long been clear that economic injury is not the only kind of injury that can support a plaintiff's *263 standing. United ; Sierra ; Data Processing MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain, but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas where such housing is scarce. This is not mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest. See Sierra The specific project MHDC intends to build, whether or not it will generate profits, provides that "essential dimension of specificity" that informs judicial decisionmaking. B Clearly MHDC has met the constitutional requirements, and it therefore |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109573/arlington-heights-v-metropolitan-housing-development-corp/ | Clearly MHDC has met the constitutional requirements, and it therefore has standing to assert its own rights. Foremost among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning actions. See ; ; Village of Belle But the heart of this litigation has never been the claim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead it has been the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons. But we need not decide whether the circumstances of this case would justify departure from that prudential limitation and permit MHDC to assert the constitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. See ; cf. ; For we have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his own.[9] Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20 miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks and would qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green were built he would probably move there, since it is closer to his job. The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action that is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," that the Lincoln Green project will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized grievance. Instead, as we suggested in 508 n. 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not before the court. See ; 426 U. S., at Unlike the individual plaintiffs in Ransom has adequately averred an "actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights' zoning practices and his asserted injury. We therefore proceed to the merits. III Our decision last Term in made it clear that official action will not be held *265 unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109573/arlington-heights-v-metropolitan-housing-development-corp/ | or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases,[10] the holding in reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety of contexts. E. g., ; ; does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.[11] In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose *266 has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.[12] Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another," may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick ; ; ; The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.[13] But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,[14] and the Court must look to other evidence.[15] *267 The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes. See ; v. Schnell, (SD Ala.), aff'd per curiam, ; cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker's purposes. ; For example, if the property involved here always had been zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect integrated housing,[16] we would have a far different case. Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.[17] *268 The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially |
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