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Justice Powell | 1,976 | 17 | majority | Imbler v. Pachtman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109387/imbler-v-pachtman/ | his own potential liability in a *425 suit for damages. Such suits could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate. Cf. ; Further, if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal Moreover, suits that survived the pleadings would pose substantial danger of liability even to the honest prosecutor. The prosecutor's possible knowledge of a witness' falsehoods, the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense, the propriety of a closing argument, and ultimately in every casethe likelihood that prosecutorial misconduct so infected a trial as to deny due process, are typical of issues with which judges struggle in actions for post-trial relief, sometimes to differing conclusions.[22] The presentation of such issues in a 1983 action often would require a virtual retrial of the criminal offense in a new forum, and the resolution of some technical issues by the lay jury. It is fair to say, we think, that the honest prosecutor would face greater difficulty in meeting the standards of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials. Frequently acting under serious constraints of time and even information, a prosecutor inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation. Defending these decisions, often years after they were made, could impose unique *426 and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials. Cf. The affording of only a qualified immunity to the prosecutor also could have an adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system. Attaining the system's goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence.[23] The veracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt before and after they testify, as is illustrated by the history of this case. If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence.[24] *427 The ultimate fairness of the operation of the system itself could be weakened by subjecting prosecutors to 1983 liability. Various post-trial procedures are available to determine whether an accused has received a fair trial. These procedures include the remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate review, |
Justice Powell | 1,976 | 17 | majority | Imbler v. Pachtman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109387/imbler-v-pachtman/ | include the remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate review, and state and federal post-conviction collateral remedies. In all of these the attention of the reviewing judge or tribunal is focused primarily on whether there was a fair trial under This focus should not be blurred by even the subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might result in the prosecutor's being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment.[25] We conclude that the considerations outlined above dictate the same absolute immunity under 1983 that the prosecutor enjoys at common To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest. It would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning *428 of the criminal justice system.[26] Moreover, it often would prejudice defendants in criminal cases by skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice. With the issue thus framed, we find ourselves in agreement with Judge Learned Hand, who wrote of the prosecutor's immunity from actions for malicious prosecution: "As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." cert. denied, See 12 F. 2d, at 404; cf.[27] We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from *429 liability in suits under 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs. This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the strength of 18 U.S. C. 242,[28] the criminal analog of ; cf. The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful acts.[29] Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.[30] These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights |
Justice Powell | 1,976 | 17 | majority | Imbler v. Pachtman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109387/imbler-v-pachtman/ | to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime. *430 It remains to delineate the boundaries of our holding. As the Court of Appeals emphasized that each of respondent's challenged activities was an "integral part of the judicial process." The purpose of the Court of Appeals' focus upon the functional nature of the activities rather than respondent's status was to distinguish and leave standing those cases, in its Circuit and in some others, which hold that a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative activities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman's.[31] See We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent's activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.[32] We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative *431 officer rather than that of advocate.[33] We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under [34] The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accordingly is Affirmed. *432 MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in the judgment. |
per_curiam | 1,971 | 200 | per_curiam | Kitchens v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108309/kitchens-v-smith/ | Petitioner pleaded guilty to robbery in a Georgia state court in 1944. He was not represented by counsel at any time. While serving his sentence, petitioner escaped and did not return to Georgia until 1969, when he was returned to finish the remainder of his sentence. He then brought this habeas corpus action in county court, alleging that his conviction was void under The county court denied relief because Gideon was "recent law and under the law at the time of his sentence, the sentence met the requirements of the law at that time." This was error since as we have often noted, Gideon is fully retroactive. See, e. g., ; ; ; 88 U.S. 29, *848 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus on different grounds, saying that petitioner did not testify at the habeas corpus hearing that he "wanted a lawyer, asked for one, or made any effort to get one" or that "because of his poverty, or for any other reason, he was unable to hire a lawyer." As this Court has said, however, "[I]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request." 69 U.S. 506, 51 This applies to guilty pleas as well as to trials. 5 U.S. 47, Of course, to establish his right to appointed counsel in 1944, petitioner had the burden of proving his inability at that time to hire an attorney. His petition for habeas corpus specifically averred that he was unable to obtain counsel "because of his impoverished condition" at that time. The respondent denied this allegation and thus put the matter in issue. At the hearing, petitioner testified, "I was a lot younger and I didn't have any money and I didn't have a lawyer" (Emphasis added.) The State made no effort whatever to contradict petitioner's testimony that he was indigent; no part of its case went to the issue of indigency. In this light, the Georgia Supreme Court's finding that petitioner "did not testify that because of his poverty, or for any other reason, he was unable to hire a lawyer" is explicable only under the most rigid rules of testimonial construction. Though petitioner did not precisely testify that his failure to obtain a lawyer was a result of his indigency, this was the undeniable implication of his testimony, especially in view of the habeas corpus petition's allegation that petitioner was unable to hire an attorney "because of" his indigency. The hearing below, as the transcript shows, was |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | dissenting | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | I dissent. requires reversal of this conviction. As in that case, petitioner here was denied a fair trial. The risk that taint of widespread publicity regarding his criminal background, known to all members of the jury, infected the jury's deliberations is apparent, the trial court made no attempt to prevent discussion of the case or petitioner's previous criminal exploits among the prospective jurors, and one juror freely admitted that he was predisposed to convict petitioner. During voir dire, petitioner's counsel had the following colloquy with that juror: "Q. Now, when you go into that jury room and you decide upon Murphy's guilt or innocence, you are going to take into account that fact that he is a convicted murderer; aren't you? "A. Not if we are listening to the case, I wouldn't. "Q. But you know about it? "A. How can you not know about it? "Q. Fine, thank you. "When you go into the jury room, the fact that he is a convicted murderer, that is going to influence your verdict; is it not? "A. We are not trying him for murder. "Q. The fact that he is a convicted murderer and jewel thief, that would influence your verdict? *805 "A. I didn't know he was a convicted jewel thief. "Q. Oh, I see. "I am sorry I put words in your mouth. "Now, sir, after two or three weeks of being locked up in a downtown hotel, as the Court determines, and after hearing the State's case, and after hearing no case on behalf of Murphy, and hearing no testimony from Murphy saying, `I am innocent, Mr. [Juror]'when you go into the jury room, sir, all these facts are going to influence your verdict? "A. I imagine it would be. "Q. And in fact, you are saying if Murphy didn't testify, and if he doesn't offer evidence, `My experience of him is such that right now I would find him guilty.' "A. I believe so." I cannot agree with the Court that the obvious bias of this juror may be overlooked simply because the juror's response was occasioned by a "leading and hypothetical question," ante, at 801. Indeed, the hypothetical became reality when petitioner chose not to take the stand and offered no evidence. Thus petitioner was tried by a juror predisposed, because of his knowledge of petitioner's previous crimes, to find him guilty of this one. Others who ultimately served as jurors revealed similar prejudice toward petitioner on voir dire. One juror conceded that it would be difficult, during deliberations, to put out of his mind that |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | dissenting | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | difficult, during deliberations, to put out of his mind that petitioner was a convicted criminal. He also admitted that he did not "hold a convicted felon in the same regard as another person who has never been convicted of a felony," and admitted further that he had termed petitioner a "menace." A third juror testified that she knew from several *806 sources that petitioner was a convicted murderer,[1] and was aware that the community regarded petitioner as a criminal who "should be put away." She disclaimed having a fixed opinion about the result she would reach, but acknowledged that the fact that petitioner was a convicted criminal would probably influence her verdict: "Q. Now, if you go into that jury room and deliberate with your fellow jurors, in your deliberations, will you consider the fact that Murphy is a convicted murderer and jewel thief? "A. Well, he has been convicted of murder. So, I guess that is what I would "Q. You would consider that in your verdict, right? "A. Right. "Q. And that would influence your verdict; would it not? "A. If that is what you say, I guess it would. "Q. I am not concerned about what I say, because if I said it, they wouldn't print it. It would influence your verdict? "A. It probably would. "Q. When you go into that jury room, you cannot forget the fact that it is Murph the Surf; that he is a convicted murderer, and a jewel thiefyou can't put that out of your mind, no matter what they tell you; can you, ma'am? *807 "A. Probably not. "Q. And it would influence your verdict; right? "A. Probably." Still another juror testified that the comments of venire members in discussing the case had made him "sick to [his] stomach." He testified that one venireman had said that petitioner was "thoroughly rotten," and that another had said: "Hang him, he's guilty."[2] Moreover, the Court ignores the crucial significance of the fact that at no time before or during this daily buildup of prejudice against Murphy did the trial judge instruct the prospective jurors not to discuss the case among themselves. Indeed the trial judge took no steps to insulate the jurors from media coverage of the case or from the many news articles that discussed petitioner's last criminal exploits. It is of no moment that several jurors ultimately testified that they would try to exclude from their deliberations their knowledge of petitioner's past misdeeds and of his community reputation. Irvin held in like circumstances *808 that little weight could be attached |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | dissenting | Murphy v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109270/murphy-v-florida/ | in like circumstances *808 that little weight could be attached to such self-serving protestations: "No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight. As one of the jurors put it, `You can't forget what you hear and see.' " On the record of this voir dire, therefore, the conclusion is to me inescapable that the attitude of the entire venire toward Murphy reflected the "then current community pattern of thought as indicated by the popular news media," and was infected with the taint of the view that he was a "criminal" guilty of notorious offenses, including that for which he was on trial. It is a plain case, from a review of the entire voir dire, where "the extent and nature of the publicity has caused such a build up of prejudice that excluding the preconception of guilt from the deliberations would be too difficult for the jury to be honestly found impartial." United States ex rel. In my view, the denial of a change of venue was therefore prejudicial error, and I would reverse the conviction. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110222/united-states-v-clarke/ | We granted the petition for certiorari of the United States in this case, to decide the question "[w]hether 25 U.S. C. 357 authorizes a state or local government to `condemn' allotted Indian trust lands by physical occupation." Pet. for Cert. 2. That statute, in turn, provides in pertinent part: "[L]ands allotted in severalty to Indians may be condemned for any public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located in the same manner as land owned in fee may be condemned, and the money awarded as damages shall be paid to the allottee." We think this is a case in which the meaning of a statute may be determined by the admittedly old-fashioned but nonetheless still entirely appropriate "plain meaning" canon of statutory construction. We further believe that the word "condemned," at least as it was commonly used in 1901, when 25 U.S. C. 357 was enacted, had reference to a judicial proceeding instituted for the purpose of acquiring title to private property and paying just compensation for it. Both the factual and legal background of the case are complicated, but these complications lose their significance under our interpretation of 357. For it is conceded that neither the city of Glen Alps nor the city of Anchorage, both Alaska municipal corporations, ever brought an action to condemn the lands here in question in federal court as required by And since we hold that only in such a formal judicial proceeding may lands such as this be acquired, the complex factual and legal history of the dispute between the Government, respondents Glen M. Clarke et al., and respondent Bertha Mae Tabbytite need not be recited in detail.[1] *255 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 357 permits acquisition of allotted lands by what has come to be known as "inverse condemnation." In so holding, the court reasoned that "once the taking has been accomplished by the state it serves little purpose to interpret the statute to refuse to permit an inverse condemnation suit to be maintained on the groun[d] that the state should have filed an eminent domain action prior to the taking." We disagree with the Court of Appeals and accordingly reverse the judgment. There are important legal and practical differences between an inverse condemnation suit and a condemnation proceeding. Although a landowner's action to recover just compensation for a taking by physical intrusion has come to be referred to as "inverse" or "reverse" condemnation, the simple terms "condemn" and "condemnation" are not commonly used to describe such an action. Rather, a "condemnation" proceeding |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110222/united-states-v-clarke/ | used to describe such an action. Rather, a "condemnation" proceeding is commonly understood to be an action brought by a condemning authority such as the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. In United for example, which held that the Federal Government's permanent flooding of the plaintiff's land constituted a compensable "taking" under the Fifth Amendment, this Court consistently made separate reference to condemnation proceedings and to the landowner's cause of action to recover damages for the taking.[2] *256 More recent decisions of this Court reaffirm this well-established distinction between condemnation actions and physical takings by governmental bodies that may entitle a landowner to sue for compensation. Thus, in Ivanhoe Irrigation when discussing the acquisition by the Government of property rights necessary to carry out a reclamation project, this Court stated that such rights must be acquired by "paying just compensation therefor, either through condemnation or, if already taken, through action of the owners in the courts." And in United this Court referred to the Government's choice "not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by a continuous process of physical events." See also ;[3] *257 The phrase "inverse condemnation" appears to be one that was coined simply as a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted. As defined by one land use planning expert, "[i]nverse condemnation is `a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.'" D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law 328 (1971) (emphasis added). A landowner is entitled to bring such an action as a result of "the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation." See 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972). A condemnation proceeding, by contrast, typically involves an action by the condemnor to effect a taking and acquire title. The phrase "inverse condemnation," as a common understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is the "inverse" or "reverse" of a condemnation proceeding. There are also important practical differences between condemnation proceedings and actions by landowners to recover compensation for "inverse condemnation." Condemnation proceedings, depending on the applicable statute, require various affirmative action on the part of the condemning authority. To accomplish a taking by seizure, on the other hand, a condemning authority need only occupy |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,980 | 19 | majority | United States v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110222/united-states-v-clarke/ | on the other hand, a condemning authority need only occupy the land in question. Such a taking thus shifts to the landowner the burden to discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just compensation. And in the case of Indian trust *258 lands, which present the Government "`with an almost staggering problem in attempting to discharge its trust obligations with respect to thousands upon thousands of scattered Indian allotments,'" the United States may be placed at a significant disadvantage by this shifting of the initiative from the condemning authority to the condemnee. Likewise, the choice of the condemning authority to take property by physical invasion rather than by a formal condemnation action may also have important monetary consequences. The value of property taken by a governmental body is to be ascertained as of the date of taking. United In a condemnation proceeding, the taking generally occurs sometime during the course of the proceeding, and thus compensation is based on a relatively current valuation of the land. See 1 L. Orgel, Valuation in Eminent Domain 21, n. 29 (2d ed. 1953). When a taking occurs by physical invasion, on the other hand, the usual rule is that the time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking, and "[i]t is that event which gives rise to the claim for compensation and fixes the date as of which the land is to be valued." United Thus, even assuming that the term "inverse condemnation" were in use in 1901 to the same extent as it is today, there are sufficient legal and practical differences between "condemnation" and "inverse condemnation" to convince us that when 357 authorizes the condemnation of lands pursuant to the laws of a State or Territory, the term "condemned" refers not to an action by a landowner to recover compensation for a taking, but to a formal condemnation proceeding instituted by the condemning authority.[4] *259 Respondent municipality of Anchorage argues that the action authorized by the Court of Appeals here should be regarded as one in condemnation because Alaska law allows the "exercise of the power of eminent domain through inverse condemnation or a taking in the nature of inverse condemnation." Brief for Respondent Municipality of Anchorage 16. But we do not reach questions of Alaska law here because 25 U.S. C. 357, although prescribing that allotted lands "may be condemned for any public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located," requires that they nonetheless be "condemned." It is conceded that there has never been a formal condemnation action instituted in this case. |
per_curiam | 1,999 | 200 | per_curiam | Maryland v. Dyson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621047/maryland-v-dyson/ | In this case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a search warrant before searching a vehicle which they have probable cause to believe contains illegal drugs. Because this holding rests upon an incorrect interpretation of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse. At 11 a.m. on the morning of July 2, 1996, a St. Mary's County> (Maryland) Sheriff's Deputy received a tip from a reliable confidential informant that respondent had gone to New York to buy drugs, and would be returning to Maryland in a rented red Toyota, license number DDY 787, later that day with a large quantity of cocaine. The deputy investigated *467 the tip and found that the license number given to him by the informant belonged to a red Toyota Corolla that had been rented to respondent, who was a known drug dealer in St. Mary's County. When respondent returned to St. Mary's County in the rented car at 1 a.m. on July 3, the deputies stopped and searched the vehicle, finding 23 grams of crack cocaine in a duffel bag in the trunk. Respondent was arrested, tried, and convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. He appealed, arguing that the trial court had erroneously denied his motion to suppress the cocaine on the alternative grounds that the police lacked probable cause, or that even if there was probable cause, the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was sufficient time after the informant's tip to obtain a warrant. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to apply, there must not only be probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a separate finding of exigency precluding the police from obtaining a warrant. Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that although there was "abundant probable cause," the search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari. We grant certiorari and now reverse. The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search. As we recognized nearly 75 years ago in there is an exception to this requirement for searches of vehicles. And under our established precedent, the "automobile exception" has no separate exigency requirement. *467 We |
per_curiam | 1,999 | 200 | per_curiam | Maryland v. Dyson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2621047/maryland-v-dyson/ | the "automobile exception" has no separate exigency requirement. *467 We made this clear in United when we said that in cases where there was probable cause to search a vehicle "a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained. " (Emphasis added.) In a case with virtually identical facts to this one (even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of the car), we repeated that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: "If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more." In this case, the Court of Special Appeals found that there was "abundant probable cause" that the car contained contraband. This finding alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, a conclusion correctly reached by the trial court when it denied respondent's motion to suppress. The holding of the Court of Special Appeals that the "automobile exception" requires a separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable cause is squarely contrary to our holdings in Ross and Labron. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.[*] It is so ordered. |
Justice Burger | 1,973 | 12 | dissenting | Vlandis v. Kline | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108810/vlandis-v-kline/ | I find myself unable to join the action taken today because the Court in this case strays from what seem to me sound and established constitutional principles in order to reach what it considers a just result in a particular case; this gives meaning to the ancient warning that "hard cases make bad law." The Court permits this "hard" case to make some very dubious law. A state university today is an establishment with capital costs of many millions of dollars of investment. Its annual operating costs likewise may run into the millions. Parents and other taxpayers willingly carry this heavy burden because they believe in the values of higher education. It is not narrow provincialism for the State *460 to think that each State should carry its own educational burdens. Until we redefine our system of government as we are free to do by constitutionally prescribed meansthe States may restrict subsidized education to their own residents. This much the Court recognizes and it likewise recognizes that the statutory scheme under review reasonably tends to support that end. Commendably, the Court has tried to cast the opinion in the narrowest possible terms, but it seems nonetheless to accomplish a transferrence of the elusive and arbitrary "compelling state interest" concept into the orbit of the Due Process Clause. The Court categorizes the Connecticut statutory classification as a "permanent and irrebuttable presumption"; it explains that this "presumption" leads to unseemly results in this and other isolated cases; and it relies upon the State's stopgap guidelines for determining bona fide residency to demonstrate that "the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination." This is the language of strict scrutiny. We ought not try to correct "unseemly results" of state statutes by resorting to constitutional adjudication. Distressingly, the Court applies "strict scrutiny" and invalidates Connecticut's statutory scheme without explaining why the statute impairs a genuine constitutional interest truly worthy of the standard of close judicial scrutiny. The real issue here is not whether holes can be picked in the Connecticut scheme; of course, that is readily done with this "bad" statute. Whether we deal with statutes of Connecticut or of Congress, we can find flaws, gaps, and hard and unseemly results at times. But our function in constitutional adjudication is not to see whether there is some conceivably "less restrictive" alternative to the statutory classifications under review. The Court's task is to explain why the "strict scrutiny" test, *461 previously confined to other areas, should now in practical effect be read into the Due Process Clause. The drift of on which |
Justice Burger | 1,973 | 12 | dissenting | Vlandis v. Kline | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108810/vlandis-v-kline/ | into the Due Process Clause. The drift of on which the Court relies heavily, was to apply a similar test, but at least there the Court essayed to explain that the rights of fatherhood and family were regarded as " `essential' " and " `basic civil rights of man,' " and to provide an analytic basis for the result reached. To the same effect was where the Court noted that suspension of a driver's license might impair the pursuit of a livelihood, thereby infringing "important interests of the licensees." an equal protection case, involved deprivation of the right to vote, by the Court's, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART's own description, a matter "close to the core of our constitutional system."[*] *462 There will be, I fear, some ground for a belief that the Court now engrafts the "close judicial scrutiny" test onto the Due Process Clause whenever we deal with something like "permanent irrebuttable presumptions." But literally thousands of state statutes create classifications permanent in duration, which are less than perfect, as all legislative classifications are, and might be improved on by individualized determinations so as to avoid the untoward results produced here due to the very unusual facts of this case. Both the anomaly present here and the arguable alternatives to it do not differ from those present when, for example, a State provides that a person may not be licensed to practice medicine or law unless he or she is a graduate of an accredited professional graduate school; a perfectly capable practitioner may as a consequence be barred "permanently and irrebuttably" from pursuing his calling, without ever having an opportunity to prove his personal skills. The doctrinal difficulties of the Equal Protection Clause are indeed trying, but today the Court makes an uncharted drift toward complications for the Due Process Clause comparable in scope and seriousness with those we are encountering in the equal protection area. Can this be what we are headed for? The pressure of today's holding may well push the States to enact reciprocal statutes to the end that Connecticut will undertake to admit as "resident" students only those students from other States that give the same status to Connecticut residents. When a State allocates a large share of its resources to create and maintain a university whose quality is found attractive to many students from other States, its very success and stature may well operate to cripple it because then, not unnaturally, it will be flooded with applications from students from afar. Perhaps on less "high ground" students who favor winter sports will flock to |
Justice Burger | 1,973 | 12 | dissenting | Vlandis v. Kline | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108810/vlandis-v-kline/ | "high ground" students who favor winter sports will flock to the Northeast and *463 Northwest and the sun worshipers will head South. Is the Court willing to say that Connecticut may not grant partial scholarships to persons who have attended a Connecticut secondary school forlet us sayat least one full school year and then set nonresident tuition as it does now? We should not be surprised at the natural response of States which, having placed high value on universities, having developed great institutions at large cost, believe that other States should do the same and therefore seek ways to keep the institution in being for its own citizens. I do not suggest these things ought to be done or that they are desirable; rather, I submit, when we examine a statute of a State we should lay aside preferences for or against what the State does in a few particular or isolated cases and look only to what the Constitution forbids a State to do, so as to avoid putting pressure on the States to engage in legislative devices to escape from the hobbles we place on them on matters of purely state concern. The urge to cure every disadvantage human beings can experience exerts an inexorable pressure to expand judicial doctrine. But that urge should not move the Court to erect standards that are unrealistic and indeed unexplained for evaluating the constitutionality of state statutes. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. |
Justice Brennan | 1,972 | 13 | second_dissenting | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | The Court of Appeals held that a justiciable controversy exists and that respondents have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. 144 U. S. App. D. C. 72, 83, I agree with Judge Wilkey, writing for the Court of Appeals, that this conclusion is compelled for the following reasons stated by him: "[Respondents] contend that the present existence of this system of gathering and distributing information, allegedly far beyond the mission requirements of the Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on [respondents] and other persons similarly situated which exercises a present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights of free speech, etc. The baleful effect, if there is one, is thus a present *39 inhibition of lawful behavior and of First Amendment rights. "Under this view of [respondents'] allegations, under justiciability standards it is the operation of the system itself which is the breach of the Army's duty toward [respondents] and other civilians. The case is therefore ripe for adjudication. Because the evil alleged in the Army intelligence system is that of overbreadth, i. e., the collection of information not reasonably relevant to the Army's mission to suppress civil disorder, and because there is no indication that a better opportunity will later arise to test the constitutionality of the Army's action, the issue can be considered justiciable at this time." -956 (footnotes omitted). "To the extent that the Army's argument against justiciability here includes the claim that [respondents] lack standing to bring this action, we cannot agree. If the Army's system does indeed derogate First Amendment values, the [respondents] are persons who are sufficiently affected to permit their complaint to be heard. The record shows that most if not all of the [respondents] and/or the organizations of which they are members have been the subject of Army surveillance reports and their names have appeared in the Army's records. Since this is precisely the injury of which [respondents] complain, they have standing to seek redress for that alleged injury in court and will provide the necessary adversary interest that is required by the standing doctrine, on the issue of whether the actions complained of do in fact inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights. Nor should the fact that *40 these particular persons are sufficiently uninhibited to bring this suit be any ground for objecting to their standing." at 79 n. n. Respondents may or may not be able to prove the case they allege. But I agree with the Court of Appeals that they are entitled to try. I would therefore affirm the |
per_curiam | 1,973 | 200 | per_curiam | Hess v. Indiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108885/hess-v-indiana/ | Gregory Hess appeals from his conviction in the Indiana courts for violating the State's disorderly conduct statute.[1] Appellant contends that his conviction should be reversed because the statute is unconstitutionally vague, Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. *106 385 (1926), because the statute is overbroad in that it forbids activity that is protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and because the statute, as applied here, abridged his constitutionally protected freedom of speech, These contentions were rejected in the City Court, where Hess was convicted, and in the Superior Court, which reviewed his conviction.[2] The Supreme Court of Indiana, with one dissent, considered and rejected each of Hess' constitutional contentions, and accordingly affirmed his conviction. The events leading to Hess' conviction began with an antiwar demonstration on the campus of Indiana University. In the course of the demonstration, approximately 100 to 150 of the demonstrators moved onto a public street and blocked the passage of vehicles. When the demonstrators did not respond to verbal directions from the sheriff to clear the street, the sheriff and his deputies began walking up the street, and the demonstrators in their path moved to the curbs on either side, joining a large number of spectators who had gathered. Hess was standing off the street as the sheriff passed him. *107 The sheriff heard Hess utter the word "fuck" in what he later described as a loud voice and immediately arrested him on the disorderly conduct charge. It was later stipulated that what appellant had said was "We'll take the fucking street later," or "We'll take the fucking street again." Two witnesses who were in the immediate vicinity testified, apparently without contradiction, that they heard Hess' words and witnessed his arrest. They indicated that Hess did not appear to be exhorting the crowd to go back into the street, that he was facing the crowd and not the street when he uttered the statement, that his statement did not appear to be addressed to any particular person or group, and that his tone, although loud, was no louder than that of the other people in the area. Indiana's disorderly conduct statute was applied in this case to punish only spoken words. It hardly needs repeating that "[t]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within `narrowly limited classes of speech.' " The words here did not fall within any of these "limited classes." In the first place, it is clear that the Indiana court specifically abjured any suggestion that Hess' words could |
per_curiam | 1,973 | 200 | per_curiam | Hess v. Indiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108885/hess-v-indiana/ | Indiana court specifically abjured any suggestion that Hess' words could be punished as obscene under and its progeny. Indeed, after such a contention with regard to the language at issue would not be tenable. By the same token, any suggestion that Hess' speech amounted to "fighting words," could not withstand scrutiny. Even if under other circumstances this language could be regarded as a personal insult, the evidence is undisputed that Hess' statement was not directed to any person or group in particular. Although the sheriff testified that he was offended by the language, *108 he also stated that he did not interpret the expression as being directed personally at him, and the evidence is clear that appellant had his back to the sheriff at the time. Thus, under our decisions, the State could not punish this speech as "fighting words." ; In addition, there was no evidence to indicate that Hess' speech amounted to a public nuisance in that privacy interests were being invaded. "The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." The prosecution made no such showing in this case. The Indiana Supreme Court placed primary reliance on the trial court's finding that Hess' statement "was intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the crowd in the vicinity of appellant and was likely to produce such action." Ind. At best, however, the statement could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time. This is not sufficient to permit the State to punish Hess' speech. Under our decisions, "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." (Emphasis added.) See also Since the uncontroverted evidence showed that Hess' statement was not directed to any person or group of persons, it *109 cannot be said that he was advocating, in the normal sense, any action. And since there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had "a `tendency to lead to |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | Ball v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111384/ball-v-united-states/ | We granted certiorari to decide whether a felon possessing a firearm may be convicted and concurrently sentenced under 18 U.S. C. 922(h)(1) for receiving that firearm, and under 18 U.S. C. App. 1202(a)(1) for possessing the same weapon. I After driving around Honaker, Virginia, with several acquaintances, including petitioner Truman Ball, Hubert Romans discovered that his32-caliber nickel-plated Rossi revolver was missing from the back seat of his car.[1] He reported the incident to the Russell County Sheriff's Department. Subsequently, a neighbor notified the Sheriff that Ball had threatened him with a pistol matching the description of Romans' revolver. Later that same day, the police located Ball at another neighbor's home where Ball had tried unsuccessfully to sell the revolver. When the police told Ball he was under arrest, Ball fled but was promptly apprehended with Romans' revolver in his possession. Ball, a previously convicted felon,[2] was indicted on charges of receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce, 18 U.S. C. 922(h)(1) and 924(a), and possessing that firearm, 18 U.S. C. App. 1202(a)(1).[3] It is conceded that both counts rest on the same conduct. Ball was convicted on both *858 counts[4] by a jury in the Western District of Virginia and sentenced to consecutive terms of three years' imprisonment on the receipt count and two years' imprisonment on the possession count, the latter sentence suspended with two years' probation. On appeal Ball challenged the validity of the consecutive sentences. The Government conceded that under United cert. denied, consecutive sentences could not be imposed for unlawful receipt and unlawful possession of the same firearm, when the unlawful possession was incident to its unlawful receipt. The Court of Appeals accepted this concession and adhered to its statement in that "Congress in these firearms statutes created separate offenses, but did not authorize pyramiding penalties." The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to modify the sentences to make them concurrent. The application of the firearms statutes, 922(h)(1) and 1202(a)(1), charging a convicted felon with receiving and possessing the same gun, has produced conflicting decisions among the Courts of Appeals.[5] We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. We reverse. *859 II This case requires the Court once again to resolve the "partial redundancy" of 922(h) and 1202(a), provisions of Titles IV and VII, respectively, of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. E. g., United ; United In these two Titles of the Omnibus Act, Congress sought to control the interstate traffic and availability of firearms. Although Congress' purposes are obvious, courts understandably have had difficulty applying |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | Ball v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111384/ball-v-united-states/ | Congress' purposes are obvious, courts understandably have had difficulty applying the overlapping provisions of the Act. This case affords an opportunity to address the application of Titles IV and VII to one set of circumstances where a single act is relied upon to establish a convicted felon's unlawful receipt and his unlawful possession of the same firearm.[6] A It is clear that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for violations of 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same firearm. This Court has long acknowledged the Government's broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions, including its power to select the charges to be brought in a particular case. E. g., United ; Confiscation Cases, *860 In Batchelder, this Court recognized that 922(h) and 1202(a) proscribed similar conduct where the defendant is a convicted felon, but concluded that "each substantive statute, in conjunction with its own sentencing provision, operates independently of the other." 442 U.S., at This Court rejected the argument that 1202(a) impliedly repealed 922(h) with respect to acts covered by both provisions, noting that both the statutory language and the legislative history showed that the two provisions were to be applied independently. See at -121.[7] Under these circumstances there is no bar to the Government's proceeding with prosecution simultaneously under the two statutes.[8] *861 B To say that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for violation of 922(h) and 1202(a), however, is not to say that he may be convicted and punished for two offenses. Congress can be read as allowing charges under two different statutes with conviction and sentence confined to one. Indeed, "[a]ll guides to legislative intent," United show that Congress intended a felon in Ball's position to be convicted and punished for only one of the two offenses if the possession of the firearm is incidental to receiving it. This Court has consistently relied on the test of statutory construction stated in to determine whether Congress intended the same conduct to be punishable under two criminal provisions. The appropriate inquiry under Blockburger is "whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." See, e. g., United ; ; The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. For purposes of applying the Blockburger test in this setting as a means of ascertaining congressional intent, "punishment" must be the equivalent of a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence. Congress could not have intended to allow two convictions for the same conduct, even if sentenced under only one; |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | Ball v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111384/ball-v-united-states/ | for the same conduct, even if sentenced under only one; Congress does not create criminal offenses having no sentencing component. See United ; *862 Cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(b)(1), which provides that the sentence is a necessary component of a "judgment of conviction." Applying this rule to the firearms statutes, it is clear that Congress did not intend to subject felons to two convictions; proof of illegal receipt of a firearm necessarily includes proof of illegal possession of that weapon. "[W]hen received, a firearm is necessarily possessed." United[9] In other words, Congress seems clearly to have recognized that a felon who receives a firearm must also possess it, and thus had no intention of subjecting that person to two convictions for the same criminal act. The legislative history of 922(h) and 1202(a) supports this reading of congressional intent. Titles IV and VII, enacted together as components of the Omnibus Act,[10] disclose "Congress' worry about the easy availability of firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat to community peace." Accordingly, "[e]ach [Title] seeks to keep a firearm from `any person who has been convicted' of a felony" Section 922(h), the receipt statute, is part of a " `carefully constructed package of gun control legislation,' which had been in existence for many years." Batchelder, 442 U. S., at *863 120 ).[11] One principal purpose of Title IV was to make "it possible to keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency" S. Rep. No. 7, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 Section 1202(a), on the other hand, was a "last-minute Senate amendment" to the Omnibus Act, "hastily passed, with little discussion, no hearings, and no report." United 404 U. S., at 4 The circumstances surrounding consideration of Title VII and the haste in which it was enacted may well explain why it does not dovetail neatly with the prohibition that was, at the time of its passage, already contained in Title IV.[12] Title VII was enacted as supplementary legislation; Title VII filled the gaps in and expanded the coverage of Title IV.[13] In short, *864 we are persuaded that Congress had no intention of creating duplicative punishment for one limited class of persons falling within the overlap between the two Titles convicted felons who receive firearms and who, by definition, possess them. The independent but overlapping statutes simply are not "directed to separate evils" under the circumstances. Albernaz, 450 U. S., at 3.[14] C Having concluded that Congress did not intend petitioner's conduct to be punishable |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | Ball v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111384/ball-v-united-states/ | that Congress did not intend petitioner's conduct to be punishable under both 922(h) and 1202(a), the only remedy consistent with the congressional intent is for the District Court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exercise its discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions. The remedy of ordering one of the sentences to be served concurrently with the other cannot be squared with Congress' intention. One of the convictions, as well as its concurrent sentence, is unauthorized punishment for a separate offense. See The second conviction, whose concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not evaporate simply because of *865 the concurrence of the sentence. The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored. For example, the presence of two convictions on the record may delay the defendant's eligibility for parole or result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense. Moreover, the second conviction may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility and certainly carries the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction. See ; Thus, the second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment. We emphasize that while the Government may seek a multiple-count indictment against a felon for violations of 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same weapon where a single act establishes the receipt and possession, the accused may not suffer two convictions or sentences on that indictment. If, upon the trial, the district judge is satisfied that there is sufficient proof to go to the jury on both counts, he should instruct the jury as to the elements of each offense. Should the jury return guilty verdicts for each count, however, the district judge should enter judgment on only one of the statutory offenses. III We hold that Congress did not intend a convicted felon, in Ball's position, to be convicted of both receiving a firearm in violation of 18 U.S. C. 922(h), and possessing that firearm in violation of 18 U.S. C. App. 1202(a). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to have the District Court exercise its discretion to vacate one of the convictions. It is so ordered. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of this case. *8 APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Title 18 U.S. C. 922(h) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person "(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | Ball v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111384/ball-v-united-states/ | of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; "(2) is a fugitive from justice; "(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or narcotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); or "(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution; "to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Title 18 U.S. C. 924(a) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever violates any provision of this chapter shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and shall become eligible for parole as the Board of Parole shall determine." Title 18 U.S. C. App. 1202(a) provides: "Any person who "(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or "(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or "(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or "(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or "(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, "and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this *867 Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both." JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | dissenting | Rhode Island v. Innis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110254/rhode-island-v-innis/ | I am substantially in agreement with the Court's definition of "interrogation" within the meaning of In my view, the Miranda safeguards apply whenever police conduct is intended or likely to produce a response from a suspect in custody. As I read the Court's opinion, its definition of "interrogation" for Miranda purposes is equivalent, for practical purposes, to my formulation, since it contemplates that "where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect." Ante, at 302, n. 7. Thus, the Court requires an objective inquiry into the likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual, taking into account any special susceptibility of the suspect to certain kinds of pressure of which the police know or have reason to know. I am utterly at a loss, however, to understand how this objective standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the conclusion that there was no interrogation. Innis was arrested at 4:30 a. m., handcuffed, searched, advised of his rights, and placed in the back seat of a patrol car. Within a short time he had been twice more advised of his rights and driven away in a four-door sedan with three police officers. Two officers sat in the front seat and one sat beside Innis in the back seat. Since the car traveled no more than a mile before Innis agreed to point out the location of *306 the murder weapon, Officer Gleckman must have begun almost immediately to talk about the search for the shotgun. The Court attempts to characterize Gleckman's statements as "no more than a few offhand remarks" which could not reasonably have been expected to elicit a response. Ante, at 303. If the statements had been addressed to respondent, it would be impossible to draw such a conclusion. The simple message of the "talking back and forth" between Gleckman and McKenna was that they had to find the shotgun to avert a child's death. One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a suspectany suspectthan the assertion that if the weapon is not found an innocent person will be hurt or killed. And not just any innocent person, but an innocent childa little girla helpless, handicapped little girl on her way to school. The notion that such an appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect were known to have some special interest in handicapped children |
Justice Marshall | 1,980 | 15 | dissenting | Rhode Island v. Innis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110254/rhode-island-v-innis/ | were known to have some special interest in handicapped children verges on the ludicrous. As a matter of fact, the appeal to a suspect to confess for the sake of others, to "display some evidence of decency and honor," is a classic interrogation technique. See, e. g., F. Inbau & J. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 60-62 (2d ed. 1967). Gleckman's remarks would obviously have constituted interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to respondent, and the result should not be different because they were nominally addressed to McKenna. This is not a case where police officers speaking among themselves are accidentally overheard by a suspect. These officers were "talking back and forth" in close quarters with the handcuffed suspect,[*] traveling past the very place where they believed the weapon was located. They knew respondent would hear and attend to their conversation, and they are chargeable with knowledge *307 of and responsibility for the pressures to speak which they created. I firmly believe that this case is simply an aberration, and that in future cases the Court will apply the standard adopted today in accordance with its plain meaning. MR. |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | A longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civil War, provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens." Rev. Stat. 42 U.S.C. 1981(a). The basic question before us is whether the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person's contract-related "right." We conclude that it does. I The case before us arises out of a claim by respondent, Hedrick G. Humphries, a former assistant manager of a Cracker Barrel restaurant, that CBOCS West, Inc. (Cracker Barrel's owner) dismissed him (1) because of racial bias (Humphries is a black man) and (2) because he had complained to managers that a fellow assistant manager had dismissed another black employee, Venus Green, for race-based reasons. Humphries timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. e-5, and received a "right to sue" letter. He then filed a complaint in Federal District Court charging that CBOCS' actions violated both Title V of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. e et seq., and the older "equal contract rights" provision here at issue, 1981. The District Court dismissed Humphries' Title V claims for failure to pay necessary filing fees on a timely basis. It then granted CBOCS' motion for summary judgment on Humphries' two 1981 claims. Humphries appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled against Humphries and upheld the District Court's grant of summary judgment in respect to his direct discrimination claim. But it ruled in Humphries' favor and remanded for a trial in respect to his 1981 retaliation claim. In doing so, the Court of Appeals rejected CBOCS' argument that 1981 did not encompass a claim of retaliation. CBOCS sought certiorari, asking us to consider this last-mentioned legal question. And we agreed to do so. See 551 U.S. The question before us is whether 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. *1955 We conclude that it does. And because our conclusion rests in significant part upon principles of stare decisis, we begin by examining the pertinent interpretive history. A The Court first considered a comparable question in 1969, in The case arose under 42 U.S.C. a statutory provision that Congress enacted just after the Civil War, along with 1981, to protect the rights of black citizens. The provision was similar to 1981 except that it focused, not upon rights to make and to enforce contracts, but rights related |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | rights to make and to enforce contracts, but rights related to the ownership of property. The statute provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Paul E. Sullivan, a white man, had rented his house to T.R. Freeman, Jr., a black man. He had assigned Freeman a membership share in a corporation, which permitted the owner to use a private park that the corporation controlled. Because of Freeman's race, the corporation, Little Hunting Park, Inc., refused to approve the share assignment. And, when Sullivan protested, the association expelled Sullivan and took away his membership shares. Sullivan sued Little Hunting Park, claiming that its actions violated The Court upheld Sullivan's claim. It found that the corporation's refusal "to approve the assignment of the membership share was clearly an interference with Freeman's [the black lessee's] right to `lease.'" It added that Sullivan, the white lessor, "has standing to maintain this action," ib because, as the Court had previously said, "the white owner is at times `the only effective adversary' of the unlawful restrictive covenant." ). The Court noted that to permit the corporation to punish Sullivan "for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by " would give "impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property." And this Court has made clear that Sullivan stands for the proposition that encompasses retaliation claims. See ("[I]n Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination [in ] to cover retaliation against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition"). While the Sullivan decision interpreted our precedents have long construed 1981 and similarly. In the Court considered whether 1981 prohibits private acts of Citing Sullivan, along with and the Court reasoned that this case law "necessarily requires the conclusion that 1981, like reaches private conduct." 427 U.S., at See (Powell, J., concurring) ("Although [Sullivan and ] involved rather than 1981, I agree that their considered holdings with respect to the purpose and meaning of necessarily apply to both statutes in view of their common derivation"); (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("[I]t would be most *1956 incongruous to give those two sections [ 1981 and ] a fundamentally different construction"). See Shaare Tefila a case interpreting 1981). As indicated in Runyon, the Court has construed 1981 and alike because it has recognized the sister statutes' common language, origin, and purposes. Like 1981, traces its origin to 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | origin to 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, See General Building Contractors ; Like 1981, represents an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy. See General Building Contractors (noting strong purposive connection between the two provisions). Like 1981, uses broad language that says "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens" Compare 1981's language set forth at See (noting the close parallel language of the two provisions). Indeed, differs from 1981 only in that it refers, not to the "right to make and enforce contracts," 42 U.S.C. 1981(a), but to the "right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property," In light of these precedents, it is not surprising that following Sullivan, federal appeals courts concluded, on the basis of Sullivan or its reasoning, that 1981 encompassed retaliation claims. See, e.g., ; overruled, ; B In 20 years after Sullivan, this Court in significantly limited the scope of 1981. The Court focused upon 1981's words "to make and enforce contracts" and interpreted the phrase narrowly. It wrote that the statutory phrase did not apply to "conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions." The Court added that the word "enforce" does not apply to post-contract-formation conduct unless the discrimination at issue "infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights." Thus 1981 did not encompass the claim of a black employee who charged that her employer had violated her employment contract by harassing her and failing to promote her, all because of her race. Since victims of an employer's retaliation will often have opposed discriminatory conduct taking place after the formation of the employment contract, 's holding, for a brief time, seems in practice to have foreclosed retaliation claims. With one exception, we have found no federal court of appeals decision between the time we decided and that permitted *1957 a 1981 retaliation claim to proceed. See, e.g., ; ; See (questioning without deciding the viability of retaliation claims under 1981 after ). But see (allowing a claim for discriminatory discharge to proceed under 1981), vacated and remanded, which held that racially discriminatory discharge claims under 1981 are barred). In however, Congress weighed in on the matter. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 101, with the design to supersede v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | the design to supersede v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., Insofar as is relevant here, the new law changed 42 U.S.C. 1981 by reenacting the former provision, designating it as 1981(a), and adding a new subsection, (b), which, says: "`Make and enforce contracts' defined "For purposes of this section, the term `make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." An accompanying Senate Report pointed out that the amendment superseded by adding a new subsection (b) that would "reaffirm that the right `to make and enforce contracts' includes the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship." S.Rep. No. 101-315, p. 6 Among other things, it would "ensure that Americans may not be harassed, fired or otherwise discriminated against in contracts because of their race." An accompanying House Report said that in "cutting back the scope of the rights to `make' and `enforce' contracts[,] has been interpreted to eliminate retaliation claims that the courts had previously recognized under section 1981." H.R.Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, pp. 92-93, n. 92 It added that the protections that subsection (b) provided, in "the context of employment discrimination would include, but not be limited to, claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, retaliation, and hiring." It said that the new law "would restore rights to sue for such retaliatory conduct." After enactment of the new law, the Federal Courts of Appeals again reached a broad consensus that 1981, as amended, encompasses retaliation claims. See, e.g., ; ; ; ; ; ; The upshot is this: (1) in 1969, Sullivan, as interpreted by recognized that encompasses a retaliation action; (2) this Court has long interpreted 1981 *1958 and alike; (3) in without mention of retaliation, narrowed 1981 by excluding from its scope conduct, namely post-contract-formation conduct, where retaliation would most likely be found; but in Congress enacted legislation that superseded and explicitly defined the scope of 1981 to include post-contract-formation conduct; and (4) since the lower courts have uniformly interpreted 1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. C Sullivan, as interpreted and relied upon by as well as the long line of related cases where we construe 1981 and similarly, lead us to conclude that the view that 1981 encompasses retaliation claims is indeed well embedded in the law. That being so, considerations of stare decisis strongly support our adherence to that view. And those considerations impose a considerable burden upon those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. See, e.g., (describing importance of stare decisis); (considerations of stare decisis "have special force in the area of statutory interpretation"); John R. Sand & Gravel I In our view, CBOCS' several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from what we have just described as the well-embedded interpretation of 1981. First, CBOCS points to the plain text of 1981a text that says that "[a]ll persons shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts. as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. 1981(a) CBOCS adds that, insofar as Humphries complains of retaliation, he is complaining of a retaliatory action that the employer would have taken against him whether he was black or white, and there is no way to construe this text to cover that kind of deprivation. Thus the text's language, CBOCS concludes, simply "does not provide for a cause of action based on retaliation." Brief for Petitioner 8. We agree with CBOCS that the statute's language does not expressly refer to the claim of an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation because he has tried to help a different individual, suffering direct racial discrimination, secure his 1981 rights. But that fact alone is not sufficient to carry the day. After all, this Court has long held that the statutory text of 1981's sister statute, provides protection from retaliation for reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory right. See Moreover, the Court has recently read another broadly worded civil rights statute, namely, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., as including an antiretaliation remedy. In in the Court considered whether statutory language prohibiting "discrimination [on the basis of sex] under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 1681(a), encompassed claims of retaliation for complaints about sex 544 U.S., at -174, Despite the fact that Title IX does not use the word "retaliation," the Court held in that the statute's language encompassed such a claim, in part because: (1) "Congress enacted Title IX just three *1959 years after Sullivan was decided"; (2) it is "`realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar'" with Sullivan; and (3) Congress consequently "`expected its enactment'" of Title IX "`to be interpreted in conformity with'" Sullivan. at The Court in explicitly rejected the arguments the dissent advances here that Sullivan was merely a standing case, see post, at 1965-1967 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Compare 544 U.S., at n. 1, ("Sullivan's holding was not so limited. It plainly held that |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | ("Sullivan's holding was not so limited. It plainly held that the white owner could maintain his own private cause of action under if he could show that he was `punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities'" (emphasis in original)), with (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Regardless, the linguistic argument that CBOCS makes was apparent at the time the Court decided Sullivan. See (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the construction of in was "in no way required by [the statute's] language,"one of the bases of Justice Harlan's dissent in and further contending that the Court in Sullivan had gone "yet beyond" ). And we believe it is too late in the day in effect to overturn the holding in that case (nor does CBOCS ask us to do so) on the basis of a linguistic argument that was apparent, and which the Court did not embrace at that time. Second, CBOCS argues that Congress, in when it reenacted 1981 with amendments, intended the reenacted statute not to cover retaliation. CBOCS rests this conclusion primarily upon the fact that Congress did not include an explicit antiretaliation provision or the word "retaliation" in the new statutory language although Congress has included explicit antiretaliation language in other civil rights statutes. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(4); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3); Title V of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. e-3(a); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 623(d); Americans with Disabilities Act of 42 U.S.C. 12203(a)-(b); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. 2615. We believe, however, that the circumstances to which CBOCS points find a far more plausible explanation in the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying there was no need for Congress to include explicit language about retaliation. After all, the amendments themselves make clear that Congress intended to supersede the result in and embrace pre- law. And pre- law included Sullivan. See Part Nothing in the statute's text or in the surrounding circumstances suggests any congressional effort to supersede Sullivan or the interpretation that courts have subsequently given that case. To the contrary, the amendments' history indicates that Congress intended to restore that interpretation. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 102-40, (noting that 1981(b) in the "context of employment discrimination would include. claims of retaliation"). Third, CBOCS points out that 1981, if applied to employment-related retaliation actions, would overlap with Title V. It adds that Title V requires that those who invoke its remedial powers satisfy certain procedural and administrative requirements that 1981 does not |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | satisfy certain procedural and administrative requirements that 1981 does not contain. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. e-5(e)(1) (charge of discrimination must be brought before EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory act); e-5(f)(1) (suit must be filed *1960 within 90 days of obtaining an EEOC right-to-sue letter). And CBOCS says that permitting a 1981 retaliation action would allow a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title V's "specific administrative and procedural mechanisms," thereby undermining their effectiveness. Brief for Petitioner 25. This argument, however, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title V/ 1981 "overlap" and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct Yet Congress explicitly created the overlap in respect to direct employment Nor is it obvious how we can interpret 1981 to avoid employment-related overlap without eviscerating 1981 in respect to non-employment contracts where no such overlap exists. Regardless, we have previously acknowledged a "necessary overlap" between Title V and 1981. We have added that the "remedies available under Title V and under 1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent." We have pointed out that Title V provides important administrative remedies and other benefits that 1981 lacks. See (detailing the benefits of Title V to those aggrieved by race-based employment discrimination). And we have concluded that "Title V was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment " In a word, we have previously held that the "overlap" reflects congressional design. See We have no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case. Fourth, CBOCS says it finds support for its position in two of our recent cases, Burlington N. & S.F.R. and Domino's Pizza, In Burlington, a Title V case, we distinguished between discrimination that harms individuals because of "who they are, i.e., their status," for example, as women or as black persons, and discrimination that harms "individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct," for example, whistle-blowing that leads to retaliation. CBOCS says that we should draw a similar distinction here and conclude that 1981 only encompasses status-based In Burlington, however, we used the status/conduct distinction to help explain why Congress might have wanted its explicit Title V antiretaliation provision to sweep more broadly (i.e., to include conduct outside the workplace) than its substantive Title V (status-based) antidiscrimination provision. Burlington did not suggest that Congress must separate the two in all events. The dissent argues that the distinction made in Burlington is meaningful here because it purportedly "underscores the fact that status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation are distinct harms that call |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | majority | CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145806/cbocs-west-inc-v-humphries/ | status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation are distinct harms that call for tailored legislative treatment." Post, at 1964. The Court's construction of a general ban on discrimination such as that contained in 1981 to cover retaliation claims, the dissent continues, would somehow render the separate antiretaliation provisions in other statutes "superfluous." But the Court in Burlington did not find that Title V's antiretaliation provision was redundant; it found that the provision had a broader *1961 reach than the statute's substantive provision. And in any case, we have held that "legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against " Alexander, See Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Novotny, Accordingly, the Court has accepted overlap between a number of civil rights statutes. See (discussing interrelation of fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of and ; between 1981 and Title V). See (any overlap in reach between 1981 and Title V, the statute at issue in Burlington, is by congressional design). CBOCS highlights the second case, Domino's Pizza, along with and cites and to show that this Court now follows an approach to statutory interpretation that emphasizes text. And that newer approach, CBOCS claims, should lead us to revisit the holding in Sullivan, an older case, where the Court placed less weight upon the textual language itself. But even were we to posit for argument's sake that changes in interpretive approach take place from time to time, we could not agree that the existence of such a change would justify reexamination of well-established prior law. Principles of stare decisis, after all, demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so, those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon which the rule of law depends. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S., at 128 S.Ct., at IV We conclude that considerations of stare decisis strongly support our adherence to Sullivan and the long line of related cases where we interpret 1981 and similarly. CBOCS' arguments do not convince us to the contrary. We consequently hold that 42 U.S.C. 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111385/metropolitan-life-ins-co-v-ward/ | This case presents the question whether Alabama's domestic preference tax statute, and 27-4-5 (1975), that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause. I Since 1955,[1] the State of Alabama has granted a preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-state (foreign) companies.[2] Under the current statutory provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on their gross premiums received from business conducted in Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. (a) (1975). All domestic insurance companies, in contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. 27-4-5(a).[3] As a result, a foreign *872 insurance company doing the same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic competitor. Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 27-4-4(b). By investing 10 percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from 3 to 2 percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of smaller percentage of a company's assets. Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company places in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic companies. These are entitled to the one-percent tax rate even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax statute. II Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. *873 Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111385/metropolitan-life-ins-co-v-ward/ | to be unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting two claims as lead cases[4] to be tried and binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Life Ins. the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The court also found that the distinction the statute created between foreign and domestic companies was rationally related to those two purposes and that the Alabama Legislature reasonably could have believed that the classification would have promoted those purposes. at 21a. After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the Circuit Court's rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of *874 the remand order. Appellants then waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two purposes found by the Circuit Court to be legitimate, and they requested a final determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. We now reverse. III Prior to our decision in Western & Life Ins. the jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111385/metropolitan-life-ins-co-v-ward/ | foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do business within a State, were immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions in R. and Hanover Fire Ins. as well as to later decisions, in which the Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, ; Allied Stores of Ohio, ; Wheeling Steel In Western & we reviewed all of these cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal *875 protection challenge to a statute imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business within the State, when the home States of those companies imposed a similar tax on insurers entering their We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered We therefore rejected the longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its We held that "[w]e consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose." Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes upheld by the Circuit Court, the only question before us is whether those purposes are legitimate.[5] *87 A (1) The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a legitimate reason for the statute's classification between foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, contends that this Court has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western & that are said to have upheld discriminatory |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111385/metropolitan-life-ins-co-v-ward/ | including Western & that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes. See Bacchus Imports, ; ; Allied Stores of Ohio, ; Carmichael v. Coal & Coke Co., ; Board of The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's contention. In Western & the case principally relied upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis.[] Rather, we held that 's purpose *877 in enacting the retaliatory tax to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes was a legitimate one. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as did, to influence the policies of *878 other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. Alabama's purpose, contrary to 's, constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in Allied Stores of Ohio, this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by burdening "the residents of other state members of our federation." Unlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & which only burdens residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to do business within the State, no matter what they or their States do. The validity of the view that a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, -120; Wheeling Steel ; Hanover Fire Ins. ; R. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111385/metropolitan-life-ins-co-v-ward/ | stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." * In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing business within the State solely because of their residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within the State.[7] In relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by grossly discriminating against foreign competitors. The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio, shows that this principle has not always held true. In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The State contends that this case shows that promotion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis. We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied Stores that a State's goal of bringing in new business is legitimate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however, hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves instead a statute that encourages nonresidents who are not competitors of residents to build warehouses within the State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the *880 nonresident businesses an exemption that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic companies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did not even directly affect adversely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic business within a State, by discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See -533 (2) The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111385/metropolitan-life-ins-co-v-ward/ | it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S. C. 1011-1015, intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As noted above, our opinion in Western & expressly reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the insurance context.[8] *881 Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and the consequent different purposes those two constitutional provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See Western & ). The two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's power one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects persons[9] from unconstitutional discrimination by the States. See Bethlehem Motors The effect of the statute at issue here is to place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in Western & and see no reason now for reassessing that view. *882 In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business.[10] A discriminatory tax would stand or fall depending primarily on how a |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111385/metropolitan-life-ins-co-v-ward/ | tax would stand or fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose as benefiting one group or as harming another. This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last Term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, See n. We hold that under the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state purpose. B The second purpose found by the courts below to be legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state purpose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of *883A their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax than domestic companies. The State's investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose. IV We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | The State of New York requires that political parties select their nominees for Supreme Court Justice at a convention of delegates chosen by party members in a primary We consider whether this electoral system violates the First Amendment rights of prospective party candidates. I A The Supreme Court of New York is the State's trial court of general jurisdiction, with an Appellate Division that hears appeals from certain lower courts. See N.Y. Const., Art. VI, 7, 8. Under New York's current Constitution, the State is divided into 12 judicial districts, see Art. VI, 6(a); N.Y. Jud. Law Ann. 140 (West 2005), and Supreme Court Justices are elected to 14-year terms in each such district, see N.Y. Const., Art. VI, 6(c). The New York Legislature has provided for the election of a total of 328 Supreme Court Justices in this fashion. See N.Y. Jud. Law Ann. 140-a Over the years, New York has changed the method by which Supreme Court Justices are selected several times. Under the New York Constitution of 1821, Art. IV, 7, all judicial officers, except Justices of the Peace, were appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate. See 7 Sources and Documents of the U.S. Constitutions 181, 184 (W. Swindler ed.1978). In 1846, New York amended its Constitution to require popular election of the Justices of the Supreme Court (and also the Judges of the New York Court of Appeals). (N.Y. Const. of 1846, Art. VI, 12). In the early years under that regime, the State allowed political parties to choose their own method of *796 selecting the judicial candidates who would bear their endorsements on the general-election ballot. See, e.g., Report of Joint Committee of Senate and Assembly of New York, Appointed to Investigate Primary and Election Laws of This and Other States, S. Doc. No. 26, pp. 195-219 (1910). The major parties opted for party conventions, the same method then employed to nominate candidates for other state offices. Ibid.; see also P. Ray, An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics 94 (1913). In 1911, the New York Legislature enacted a law requiring political parties to select Supreme Court nominees (and most other nominees who did not run statewide) through direct primary elections. Act of Oct. 18, 1911, ch. 891, 45(4), 2682. The primary system came to be criticized as a "device capable of astute and successful manipulation by professionals," Editorial, The State Convention, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1917, p. 12, and the Republican candidate for Governor in 1920 campaigned against it as "a fraud" that "offered the opportunity for two things, |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | as "a fraud" that "offered the opportunity for two things, for the demagogue and the man with money," Miller Declares Primary a Fraud, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1920, p. 4. A law enacted in 1921 required parties to select their candidates for the Supreme Court by a convention composed of delegates elected by party members. Act of May 2, 1921, ch. 479, 45(1), 110, 1454, 1471. New York retains this system of choosing party nominees for Supreme Court Justice to this day. Section 6-106 of New York's election law sets forth its basic operation: "Party nominations for the office of justice of the supreme court shall be made by the judicial district convention." N.Y. Elec. Law Ann. 6-106 A "party" is any political organization whose candidate for Governor received 50,000 or more votes in the most recent 1-104(3). In a September "delegate primary," party members elect delegates from each of New York's 150 assembly districts to attend the party's judicial convention for the judicial district in which the assembly district is located. See N.Y. State Law Ann. 121 (West 2003); N.Y. Elec. Law Ann. 6-124, 8-100(1)(a) An individual may run for delegate by submitting to the Board of Elections a designating petition signed by 500 enrolled party members residing in the assembly district, or by five percent of such enrolled members, whichever is less. 6-136(2)(i), (3). These signatures must be gathered within a 37-day period preceding the filing deadline, which is approximately two months before the delegate primary. 6-134(4), 6-158(1). The delegates elected in these primaries are uncommitted; the primary ballot does not specify the judicial nominee whom they will support. 7-114. The nominating conventions take place one to two weeks after the delegate primary. 6-126, 6-158(5). Each of the 12 judicial districts has its own convention to nominate the party's Supreme Court candidate or candidates who will run at large in that district in the general 6-124, 6-156. The general election takes place in November. 8-100(1)(c). The nominees from the party conventions appear automatically on the general-election ballot. 7-104(5). They may be joined on the general-election ballot by independent candidates and candidates of political organizations that fail to meet the 50,000 vote threshold for "party" status; these candidates gain access to the ballot by submitting timely nominating petitions with (depending on the judicial district) 3,500 or 4,000 signatures from voters in that district or signatures from five percent of the number of votes cast for Governor *797 in that district in the prior election, whichever is less. 6-138, 6-142(2). B Respondent López Torres was elected in to the civil |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | B Respondent López Torres was elected in to the civil court for Kings Countya court with more limited jurisdiction than the Supreme Courthaving gained the nomination of the Democratic Party through a primary She claims that soon after her election, party leaders began to demand that she make patronage hires, and that her consistent refusal to do so caused the local party to oppose her unsuccessful candidacy at the Supreme Court nominating conventions in 7, 2002, and 2003. The following year, López Torrestogether with other candidates who had failed to secure the nominations of their parties, voters who claimed to have supported those candidates, and the New York branch of a public-interest organization called Common Causebrought suit in federal court against the New York Board of Elections, which is responsible for administering and enforcing the New York election law. See 3-102, 3-104. They contended that New York's election law burdened the rights of challengers seeking to run against candidates favored by the party leadership, and deprived voters and candidates of their rights to gain access to the ballot and to associate in choosing their party's candidates. As relevant here, they sought a declaration that New York's convention system for selecting Supreme Court Justices violates their First Amendment rights, and an injunction mandating the establishment of a direct primary election to select party nominees for Supreme Court Justice. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction granting the relief requested, pending the New York Legislature's enactment of a new statutory scheme. A unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It held that voters and candidates possess a First Amendment right to a "realistic opportunity to participate in [a political party's] nominating process, and to do so free from burdens that are both severe and unnecessary." New York's electoral law violated that right because of the quantity of signatures and delegate recruits required to obtain a Supreme Court nomination at a judicial convention, see and because of the apparent reality that party leaders can control delegates, see In the court's view, because "one-party rule" prevailed within New York's judicial districts, a candidate had a constitutional right to gain access to the party's convention, notwithstanding her ability to get on the general-election ballot by petition signatures. The Second Circuit's holding effectively returned New York to the system of electing Supreme Court Justices that existed before the 1921 amendments to the election law. We granted certiorari. 549 U.S. II A A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform. Democratic Party of United ; California Democratic These rights are circumscribed, however, when the State gives the party a role in the election processas New York has done *798 here by giving certain parties the right to have their candidates appear with party endorsement on the general-election ballot. Then, for example, the party's racially discriminatory action may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment. See And then also the State acquires a legitimate governmental interest in assuring the fairness of the party's nominating process, enabling it to prescribe what that process must be. That prescriptive power is not without limits. In for example, we invalidated on First Amendment grounds California's blanket primary, reasoning that it permitted non-party members to determine the candidate bearing the party's standard in the general ; In the present case, however, the party's associational rights are at issue (if at all) only as a shield and not as a sword. Respondents are in no position to rely on the right that the First Amendment confers on political parties to structure their internal party processes and to select the candidate of the party's choosing. Indeed, both the Republican and Democratic state parties have intervened from the very early stages of this litigation to defend New York's electoral law. The weapon wielded by these plaintiffs is their own claimed associational right not only to join, but to have a certain degree of influence in, the party. They contend that New York's electoral system does not go far enough does not go as far as the Constitution demandsin assuring that they will have a fair chance of prevailing in their parties' candidate-selection process. This contention finds no support in our precedents. We have indeed acknowledged an individual's associational right to vote in a party primary without undue state-imposed impediment. In we invalidated an Illinois law that required a voter wishing to change his party registration so as to vote in the primary of a different party to do so almost two full years before the primary date. But Kusper does not cast doubt on all state-imposed limitations upon primary voting. In we upheld a New York State requirement that a voter have enrolled in the party of his choice at least 30 days before the previous general election in order to vote in the next party primary. In any event, respondents do not claim that they have been excluded from voting |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | do not claim that they have been excluded from voting in the primary. Moreover, even if we extended Kusper to cover not only the right to vote in the party primary but also the right to run, the requirements of the New York law (a 500-signature petition collected during a 37-day window in advance of the primary) are entirely reasonable. Just as States may require persons to demonstrate "a significant modicum of support" before allowing them access to the general-election ballot, lest it become unmanageable, they may similarly demand a minimum degree of support for candidate access to a primary ballot. The signature requirement here is far from excessive. See, e.g., Norman ; (approving requirement of one percent of the vote cast for Governor in the preceding general election, which was about 22,000 signatures). Respondents' real complaint is not that they cannot vote in the election for delegates, nor even that they cannot run in that election, but that the convention process that follows the delegate election does not give them a realistic chance to secure the party's nomination. The party leadership, they say, inevitably garners more votes for its slate of delegates (delegates uncommitted to any judicial nominee) than the unsupported candidate can amass for himself. And thus the leadership effectively determines the nominees. But this says nothing more than that the party leadership has more widespread support than a candidate not supported by the leadership. No New York law compels election of the leadership's slateor, for that matter, compels the delegates elected on the leadership's slate to vote the way the leadership desires. And no state law prohibits an unsupported candidate from attending the convention and seeking to persuade the delegates to support her. Our cases invalidating ballot-access requirements have focused on the requirements themselves, and not on the manner in which political actors function under those requirements. See, e.g., ; ; Here respondents complain not of the state law, but of the voters' (and their elected delegates') preference for the choices of the party leadership. To be sure, we have, as described above, permitted States to set their faces against "party bosses" by requiring party-candidate selection through processes more favorable to insurgents, such as primaries. But to say that the State can require this is a far cry from saying that the Constitution demands it. None of our cases establishes an individual's constitutional right to have a "fair shot" at winning the party's nomination. And with good reason. What constitutes a "fair shot" is a reasonable enough question for legislative judgment, which we will accept so long |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | question for legislative judgment, which we will accept so long as it does not too much infringe upon the party's associational rights. But it is hardly a manageable constitutional question for judgesespecially for judges in our legal system, where traditional electoral practice gives no hint of even the existence, much less the content, of a constitutional requirement for a "fair shot" at party nomination. Party conventions, with their attendant "smoke-filled rooms" and domination by party leaders, have long been an accepted manner of selecting party candidates. "National party conventions prior to were generally under the control of state party leaders" who determined the votes of state delegates. American Presidential Elections: Process, Policy, and Political Change 14 (H. Schantz ed.6). Selection by convention has never been thought unconstitutional, even when the delegates were not selected by primary but by party caucuses. See The Second Circuit's judgment finesses the difficulty of saying how much of a shot is a "fair shot" by simply mandating a primary until the New York Legislature acts. This was, according to the Second *800 Circuit, the New York election law's default manner of party-candidate selection for offices whose manner of selection is not otherwise prescribed. Petitioners question the propriety of this mandate, but we need not pass upon that here. Even conceding its propriety, there is good reason to believe that the elected members of the New York Legislature remain opposed to the primary, for the same reasons their predecessors abolished it 86 years ago: because it leaves judicial selection to voters uninformed about judicial qualifications, and places a high premium upon the ability to raise money. Should the New York Legislature persist in that view, and adopt something different from a primary and closer to the system that the Second Circuit invalidated, the question whether that provides enough of a "fair shot" would be presented. We are not inclined to open up this new and excitingly unpredictable theater of election jurisprudence. Selection by convention has been a traditional means of choosing party nominees. While a State may determine it is not desirable and replace it, it is not unconstitutional. B Respondents put forward, as a special factor which gives them a First Amendment right to revision of party processes in the present case, the assertion that party loyalty in New York's judicial districts renders the general-election ballot "uncompetitive." They argue that the existence of entrenched "one-party rule" demands that the First Amendment be used to impose additional competition in the nominee-selection process of the parties. (The asserted "one-party rule," we may observe, is that of the |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | asserted "one-party rule," we may observe, is that of the Democrats in some judicial districts, and of the Republicans in others. See) This is a novel and implausible reading of the First Amendment. To begin with, it is hard to understand how the competitiveness of the general election has anything to do with respondents' associational rights in the party's selection process. It makes no difference to the person who associates with a party and seeks its nomination whether the party is a contender in the general election, an underdog, or the favorite. Competitiveness may be of interest to the voters in the general election, and to the candidates who choose to run against the dominant party. But we have held that those interests are well enough protected so long as all candidates have an adequate opportunity to appear on the general-election ballot. In Jenness we upheld a petition-signature requirement for inclusion on the general-election ballot of five percent of the eligible voters, see 403 U.S., at we upheld a petition-signature requirement of one percent of the vote in the State's primary. New York's general-election balloting procedures for Supreme Court Justice easily pass muster under this standard. Candidates who fail to obtain a major party's nomination via convention can still get on the general-election ballot for the judicial district by providing the requisite number of signatures of voters resident in the district. N.Y. Elec. Law Ann. 6-142(2). To our knowledge, outside of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment contexts, see 530 U.S., no court has ever made "one-party entrenchment" a basis for interfering with the candidate-selection processes of a party. (Of course, the lack of one-party entrenchment will not cause free access to the general-election ballot to validate an otherwise unconstitutional restriction upon participation in a party's nominating process. See -147,) *801 The reason one-party rule is entrenched may be (and usually is) that voters approve of the positions and candidates that the party regularly puts forward. It is no function of the First Amendment to require revision of those positions or candidates. The States can, within limits (that is, short of violating the parties' freedom of association), discourage party monopoly for example, by refusing to show party endorsement on the election ballot. But the Constitution provides no authority for federal courts to prescribe such a course. The First Amendment creates an open marketplace where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete without government interference. See It does not call on the federal courts to manage the market by preventing too many buyers from settling upon a single product. Limiting respondents' court-mandated |
Justice Scalia | 2,008 | 9 | majority | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | buyers from settling upon a single product. Limiting respondents' court-mandated "fair shot at party endorsement" to situations of one-party entrenchment merely multiplies the impracticable lines courts would be called upon to draw. It would add to those alluded to earlier the line at which mere party popularity turns into "one-party dominance." In the case of New York's election system for Supreme Court Justices, that line would have to be drawn separately for each of the 12 judicial districtsand in those districts that are "competitive" the current system would presumably remain valid. But why limit the remedy to one-party dominance? Does not the dominance of two parties similarly stifle competing opinions? Once again, we decline to enter the morass. * * * New York State has thrice (in 1846, 1911, and 1921) displayed a willingness to reconsider its method of selecting Supreme Court Justices. If it wishes to return to the primary system that it discarded in 1921, it is free to do so; but the First Amendment does not compel that. We reverse the Second Circuit's contrary judgment. It is so ordered. |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | The decree in this case is a perfect example of what the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 1 Stat. 1321–66, was enacted to prevent. The Constitution does not give federal judges the au thority to run state penal systems. Decisions regarding state prisons have profound public safety and financial implications, and the States are generally free to make these decisions as they choose. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987). The Eighth Amendment imposes an important—but limited—restraint on state authority in this field. The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from de- priving inmates of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” (1981). Federal courts have the responsibility to ensure that this constitutional standard is met, but undesirable prison conditions that do not violate the Constitution are beyond the federal courts’ reach. In this case, a three-judge court exceeded its authority under the Constitution and the PLRA. The court ordered a radical reduction in the California prison population 2 BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting without finding that the current population level violates the Constitution. Two cases were before the three-judge court, and neither targeted the general problem of overcrowding. Indeed, the plaintiffs in one of those cases readily acknowledge that the current population level is not itself unconstitutional. Brief for Coleman Appellees 56. Both of the cases were brought not on behalf of all inmates subjected to over crowding, but rather in the interests of much more limited classes of prisoners, namely, those needing mental health treatment and those with other serious medical needs. But these cases were used as a springboard to implement a criminal justice program far different from that chosen by the state legislature. Instead of crafting a remedy to attack the specific constitutional violations that were found—which related solely to prisoners in the two plain tiff classes—the lower court issued a decree that will at best provide only modest help to those prisoners but that is very likely to have a major and deleterious effect on public safety. The three-judge court ordered the premature release of approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions. The approach taken by the three-judge court flies in the face of the PLRA. Contrary to the PLRA, the court’s rem edy is not narrowly tailored to address proven and ongoing constitutional violations. And the three-judge court vio lated the PLRA’s critical command that any court con templating a prisoner release order must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety.” 18 U.S. C. The three-judge court would have us believe that the early release of |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | court would have us believe that the early release of 46,000 inmates will not imperil—and will actually improve—public safety. Juris. Statement App., O. T. 2009, No. 09–416, pp. 248a–249a (hereinafter Juris. App.). Common sense and experience counsel greater caution. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 ALITO, J., dissenting I would reverse the decision below for three interrelated reasons. First, the three-judge court improperly refused to consider evidence concerning present conditions in the California prison system. Second, the court erred in hold ing that no remedy short of a massive prisoner release can bring the California system into compliance with the Eighth Amendment. Third, the court gave inadequate weight to the impact of its decree on public safety. I Both the PLRA and general principles concerning in junctive relief dictate that a prisoner release order cannot properly be issued unless the relief is necessary to remedy an ongoing violation. Under the PLRA, a prisoner release may be decreed only if crowding “is the primary cause” of an Eighth Amendment violation and only if no other re lief “will remedy” the violation. (emphasis added). This language makes it clear that proof of past violations alone is insufficient to justify a court-ordered prisoner release. Similarly, in cases not governed by the PLRA, we have held that an inmate seeking an injunction to prevent a violation of the Eighth Amendment must show that prison officials are “knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm, and that they will continue to do so into the future.” The “deliberate indifference” needed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation must be examined “in light of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and conduct,” 36 (1993), which means “their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter,” Farmer, For these reasons, the propriety of the relief ordered here cannot be assessed without ascertaining the nature and scope of any ongoing constitutional violations. Proof 4 BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting of past violations will not do; nor is it sufficient simply to establish that some violations continue. The scope of permissible relief depends on the scope of any continuing violations, and therefore it was essential for the three judge court to make a reliable determination of the extent of any violations as of the time its release order was is sued. Particularly in light of the radical nature of its chosen remedy, nothing less than an up-to-date assess ment was tolerable. The three-judge court, however, relied heavily on out dated information and findings and refused to permit California to introduce new evidence. Despite |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | and refused to permit California to introduce new evidence. Despite evidence of improvement,1 the three-judge court relied on old findings made by the single-judge courts, see Juris. App. 76a–77a, including a finding made 14 years earlier, see at 170a (citing (ED Cal. 1995)). The three-judge court highlighted death statistics from 2005, see Juris. App. 9a, while ignoring the “significant and continuous decline since 2006,” California Prison Health Care Receivership Corp., K. Imai, Analysis of Year 2008 Death Reviews 31 (Dec. 2009) (hereinafter 2008 Death Reviews). And the court dwelled on conditions at a facility that has since been replaced. See Juris. App. 19a–20a, 24a, 89a–90a, 94a, 7a, 111a. Prohibiting the State from introducing evidence about conditions as of the date when the prisoner release order was under consideration, at 76a–78a, and n. 42, the three-judge court explicitly stated that it would not “evalu ate the state’s continuing constitutional violations.” at —————— 1 Before requesting the appointment of a three-judge court, the Dis trict Court in Coleman recognized “commendable progress” in the State’s effort to provide adequate mental health care, Juris. App. 294a, and the District Court in Plata acknowledged that “the Receiver has made much progress since his appointment,” at 280a. The report of the Special Master to which the Court refers, ante, at 18–19, identifies a “generally positive trend.” App. 803. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 5 ALITO, J., dissenting 77a. Instead, it based its remedy on constitutional defi ciencies that, in its own words, were found “years ago.” 2 The three-judge court justified its refusal to receive up to-date evidence on the ground that the State had not filed a motion to terminate prospective relief under a provision of the PLRA, See Juris. App. 77a. Today’s opinion for this Court endorses that reasoning, ante, at 26. But the State’s opportunity to file such a motion did not eliminate the three-judge court’s obligation to ensure that its relief was necessary to remedy ongoing violations.3 Moreover, the lower court’s reasoning did not properly take into account the potential significance of the evidence that the State sought to introduce. Even if that evidence did not show that all violations had ceased—the showing needed to obtain the termination of relief under evidence was highly relevant with respect to the nature and scope of permissible relief.4 —————— 2 For this reason, it is simply not the case that “evidence of current conditions informed every aspect of the judgment of the three-judge court,” as the majority insists, ante, at 25. 3 Because the Ninth Circuit places the burden on the State to prove |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | Ninth Circuit places the burden on the State to prove the absence of an ongoing violation when it moves to terminate pro spective relief, see (CA9 2000), even if the State had unsuccessfully moved to terminate pro spective relief under 18 U.S. C. there would still have been no determination that plaintiffs had carried their burden under the PLRA to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a prisoner release order is necessary to correct an ongoing rights violation. 4 It is also no answer to say, as the Court now does, ante, at 26, that the State had the opportunity to resist the convening of the three-judge court on the ground that there were no unremedied constitutional violations as of that date. See The District Courts granted plaintiffs’ motions to convene a three-judge court in 2007, three years before the remedial decree here was issued. Thus, the conditions in the prison system as of the date when the decree was issued were not necessarily the same as those that existed before the three-judge court proceedings began. Moreover, as noted above, even if all of the viola tions in the system had not been cured at the time of the remedial 6 BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting The majority approves the three-judge court’s refusal to receive fresh evidence based largely on the need for “[o]r derly trial management.” Ante, at 26. The majority rea sons that the three-judge court had closed the book on the question of constitutional violations and had turned to the question of remedy. As noted, however, the ex- tent of any continuing constitutional violations was highly relevant to the question of remedy. The majority also countenances the three-judge court’s reliance on dated findings. The majority notes that the lower court considered recent reports by the Special Mas ter and Receiver, ante, at 18–19, but the majority provides no persuasive justification for the lower court’s refusal to receive hard, up-to-date evidence about any continuing violations. With the safety of the people of California in the balance, the record on this issue should not have been closed. The majority repeats the lower court’s error of reciting statistics that are clearly out of date. The Court notes the lower court’s finding that as of 2005 “an inmate in one of California’s prisons needlessly dies every six to seven days.” See ante, at 9. Yet by the date of the trial before the three-judge court, the death rate had been trending downward for quarters, App. 2257, and the number of likely preventable deaths fell from 18 in 2006 to |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | of likely preventable deaths fell from 18 in 2006 to 3 in 2007, a decline of 83 percent.5 Between 2001 and 2007, the —————— decree, an accurate assessment of conditions as of that date was essen tial in order to ensure that the relief did not sweep more broadly than necessary. 5 2008 Death Reviews 22. The majority elides the improvement by combining likely preventable deaths with those that were “possibly preventable,” ante, at 7, n. 4, that is, cases in which “[i]n the judgment of the reviewer,” 2008 Death Reviews 3, “it’s fifty-fifty that better care would have possibly prevented the death,” App. 2277; As the majority acknowledges, even this class of cases is now dramatically diminished, and the three-judge court must take the current conditions into account when revising its remedy going forward. Ante, at 7, n. 4. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 7 ALITO, J., dissenting California prison system had the 13th lowest average mortality rate of all 50 state systems.6 The majority highlights past instances in which particu lar prisoners received shockingly deficient medical care. See ante, at 5, 6–7, (recounting five incidents). But such anecdotal evidence cannot be given undue weight in assessing the current state of the California system. The population of the California prison system (156,000 in mates at the time of trial) is larger than that of many medium-sized cities,7 and an examination of the medical care provided to the residents of many such cities would likely reveal cases in which grossly deficient treatment was provided. Instances of past mistreatment in the California system are relevant, but prospective relief must be tailored to present and future, not past, conditions. II Under the PLRA, a court may not grant any prospective relief unless the court finds that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the “violation of [a] Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” In addition, the PLRA prohibits the issuance of a prisoner release order unless the court —————— 6 Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Prison Deaths, 2001–2007, avail able at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2093 (Table 13) (all Internet materials as visited May 20, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); see also App. 2257–2258. California had the 14th lowest “ ‘average annual illness mortality [rate] per 0,000 state prisoners from 2001 to 2004.’ ” Juris. App. 125a. According to a 2007 report, state prisoners had a 19 percent lower death rate than the general U. S. adult population as of 2004. Bureau of Justice Statistics, |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | S. adult population as of 2004. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Medical Causes of Death in State Prisons, 2001–2004, p. 1, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mcdsp04.pdf. 7 For example, the population of the California prison system ex- ceeds that of Syracuse, New York; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Springfield, Massachusetts; Eugene, Oregon; and Savannah, Georgia. 8 BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting finds “by clear and convincing evidence that crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right” and that “no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.” These statutory restrictions largely reflect general standards for injunctive relief aimed at remedying consti tutional violations by state and local governments. “The power of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities is not plenary. Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.” Dayton Bd. of (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the majority and the court below maintain that no remedy short of a massive release of prisoners from the general prison population can remedy the State’s failure to provide constitutionally adequate health care. This argu ment is implausible on its face and is not supported by the requisite clear and convincing evidence. It is instructive to consider the list of deficiencies in the California prison health care system that are highlighted in today’s opinion for this Court and in the opinion of the court below. The deficiencies noted by the majority here include the following: “ ‘[e]xam tables and counter tops, where prisoners with communicable diseases are treated, [are] not routinely disinfected,’ ” ante, at ; medi cal facilities “ ‘are in an abysmal state of disrepair,’ ” ibid.; medications “ ‘are too often not available when needed,’ ” ante, at –11; “ ‘[b]asic medical equipment is often not available or used,’ ” ante, at ; prisons “would ‘hire any doctor who had “a license, a pulse and a pair of shoes,” ’ ” ibid.; and medical and mental health staff positions have high vacancy rates, ante, at 20. The three-judge court pointed to similar problems. See Juris. App. 93a–121a (citing, among other things, staffing vacancies, too few Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 9 ALITO, J., dissenting beds for mentally ill prisoners, and an outmoded records management system). Is it plausible that none of these deficiencies can be remedied without releasing 46,000 prisoners? Without taking that radical and dangerous step, exam tables and counter tops cannot properly be disinfected? None of the system’s dilapidated facilities |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | cannot properly be disinfected? None of the system’s dilapidated facilities can be repaired? Needed medications and equipment cannot be purchased and used? Staff vacancies cannot be filled? The qualifica tions of prison physicians cannot be improved? A better records management system cannot be developed and implemented? I do not dispute that general overcrowding contributes to many of the California system’s healthcare problems. But it by no means follows that reducing overcrowding is the only or the best or even a particularly good way to allevi ate those problems. Indeed, it is apparent that the pris oner release ordered by the court below is poorly suited for this purpose. The release order is not limited to prisoners needing substantial medical care but instead calls for a reduction in the system’s overall population. Under the order issued by the court below, it is not necessary for a single prisoner in the plaintiff classes to be released. Although some class members will presumably be among those who are discharged, the decrease in the number of prisoners needing mental health treatment or other forms of extensive medical care will be much smaller than the total number of prisoners released, and thus the release will produce at best only a modest improvement in the burden on the medical care system. The record bears this out. The Special Master stated dramatically that even releasing 0,000 inmates (two thirds of the California system’s entire inmate popula tion!) would leave the problem of providing mental health treatment “largely unmitigated.” App. 487. Similarly, the Receiver proclaimed that “ ‘those who think that popu BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting lation controls will solve California’s prison health care problems are simply wrong.’ ” Juris. App. 282a. The State proposed several remedies other than a mas sive release of prisoners, but the three-judge court, seem ingly intent on attacking the broader problem of general overcrowding, rejected all of the State’s proposals. In doing so, the court made three critical errors. First, the court did not assess those proposals and other remedies in light of conditions proved to exist at the time the release order was framed. Had more recent evidence been taken into account, a less extreme remedy might have been shown to be sufficient. Second, the court failed to distinguish between condi tions that fall below the level that may be desirable as a matter of public policy and conditions that do not meet the minimum level mandated by the Constitution. To take one example, the court criticized the California system because prison doctors must conduct intake exams in areas |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | system because prison doctors must conduct intake exams in areas separated by folding screens rather than in separate rooms, creating conditions that “do not allow for appropri ate confidentiality.” at 88a. But the legitimate pri vacy expectations of inmates are greatly diminished, see and this Court has never suggested that the failure to provide private consultation rooms in prisons amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Third, the court rejected alternatives that would not have provided “ ‘immediate’ ” relief. Juris. App. 148a. But nothing in the PLRA suggests that public safety may be sacrificed in order to implement an immediate remedy rather than a less dangerous one that requires a more extended but reasonable period of time. If the three-judge court had not made these errors, it is entirely possible that an adequate but less drastic reme dial plan could have been crafted. Without up-to-date information, it is not possible to specify what such a plan Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 11 ALITO, J., dissenting might provide, and in any event, that is not a task that should be undertaken in the first instance by this Court. But possible components of such a plan are not hard to identify. Many of the problems noted above plainly could be addressed without releasing prisoners and without in curring the costs associated with a large-scale prison construction program. Sanitary procedures could be im proved; sufficient supplies of medicine and medical equipment could be purchased; an adequate system of records management could be implemented; and the num ber of medical and other staff positions could be increased. Similarly, it is hard to believe that staffing vacancies cannot be reduced or eliminated and that the qualifica tions of medical personnel cannot be improved by any means short of a massive prisoner release. Without spe cific findings backed by hard evidence, this Court should not accept the counterintuitive proposition that these problems cannot be ameliorated by increasing salaries, improving working conditions, and providing better train ing and monitoring of performance. While the cost of a large-scale construction program may well exceed California’s current financial capabilities, a more targeted program, involving the repair and per haps the expansion of current medical facilities (as op posed to general prison facilities), might be manageable. After all, any remedy in this case, including the new pro grams associated with the prisoner release order and other proposed relief now before the three-judge court, will necessarily involve some state expenditures. Measures such as these might be combined with tar geted reductions in critical components of the State’s prison population. A certain |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | in critical components of the State’s prison population. A certain number of prisoners in the classes on whose behalf the two cases were brought might be transferred to out-of-state facilities. The three-judge court rejected the State’s proposal to transfer prisoners to 12 BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting out-of-state facilities in part because the number of pro posed transfers was too small. See at 160a. See also ante, at 30. But this reasoning rested on the court’s insis tence on a reduction in the State’s general prison popula tion rather than the two plaintiff classes. When the State proposed to make a targeted transfer of prisoners in one of the plaintiff classes (i.e., prisoners needing mental health treatment), one of the District Judges blocked the transfers for fear that the out-of-state facilities would not provide a sufficiently high level of care. See App. 434–440. The District Judge even refused to allow out-of-state transfers for prisoners who volunteered for relocation. See And the court did this even though there was not even an allegation, let alone clear evidence, that the States to which these prisoners would have been sent were violating the Eighth Amendment. The District Judge presumed that the receiving States might fail to provide constitutionally adequate care, but “ ‘in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public officers] have properly discharged their official duties.’ ” United States v. Armstrong, 7 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ); Postal Service v. Gregory, (“[A] presumption of regularity attaches to the actions of Government agen cies”); see also (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[W]e may assume that the prison is capable of controlling its inmates so that respondent’s personal safety is not jeopardizedat least in the absence of proof to the contrary”).8 Finally, as a last resort, a much smaller release of pris —————— 8 The Court rejects the State’s argument that out-of-state transfers offer a less restrictive alternative to a prisoner release order because “requir ing out-of-state transfers itself qualifies as a population limit under the PLRA.” Ante, at 29–30. But the PLRA does not apply when the State voluntarily conducts such transfers, as it has sought to do. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 13 ALITO, J., dissenting oners in the two plaintiff classes could be considered. Plaintiffs proposed not only a systemwide population cap, but also a lower population cap for inmates in specialized programs. Tr. 2915:12–15 (Feb. 3, 2009). The three-judge court rejected this proposal, and its response exemplified what went wrong in this case. One judge complained that this remedy would be deficient because |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | One judge complained that this remedy would be deficient because it would protect only the members of the plaintiff classes. The judge stated: “The only thing is we would be protecting the class members. And maybe that’s the appropriate thing to do. I mean, that’s what this case is about, but it would be difficult for me to say yes, and the hell with everybody else.” at 2915:23–2916:2. Overstepping his authority, the judge was not content to provide relief for the classes of plaintiffs on whose behalf the suit before him was brought. Nor was he content to remedy the only constitutional violations that were proved—which concerned the treatment of the members of those classes. Instead, the judge saw it as his responsibil ity to attack the general problem of overcrowding. III Before ordering any prisoner release, the PLRA com mands a court to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” This provision unmistakably reflects Congress’ view that pris oner release orders are inherently risky. In taking this view, Congress was well aware of the impact of previous prisoner release orders. The prisoner release program carried out a few years earlier in Phila delphia is illustrative. In the early 1990’s, federal courts enforced a cap on the number of inmates in the Philadel phia prison system, and thousands of inmates were set 14 BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting free. Although efforts were made to release only those prisoners who were least likely to commit violent crimes, that attempt was spectacularly unsuccessful. During an 18-month period, the Philadelphia police rearrested thou sands of these prisoners for committing 9,732 new crimes. Those defendants were charged with 79 murders, 90 rapes, 1,113 assaults, 959 robberies, 701 burglaries, and 2,748 thefts, not to mention thousands of drug offenses.9 Members of Congress were well aware of this experience. Despite the record of past prisoner release orders, the three-judge court in this case concluded that loosing 46,000 criminals would not produce a tally like that in Philadelphia and would actually improve public safety. Juris. App. 248a–249a. In reaching this debatable con clusion, the three-judge court relied on the testimony of selected experts, at 248a, and the majority now defers to what it characterizes as the lower court’s findings of fact on this controversial public policy issue, ante, at 15, 19–20, 24. This is a fundamental and dangerous error. When a —————— 9 Hearing on Prison Reform before the Senate Committee on the Ju diciary, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 (1995) |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | on the Ju diciary, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 (1995) (statement of Lynne Abraham, District Attorney of Philadelphia); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 4th Cong., 1st Sess., 259 (1995) (same); see also Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (2008) (statement of Sarah V. Hart, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office). Condemning the inappropriate imposition of prison population caps, Senator Sarbanes cited “the case of Philadelphia, where a court ordered prison cap has put thousands of violent criminals back on the city’s streets, often with disastrous consequences.” 141 Cong. Rec. 26549 (1995). Senator Abraham complained that “American citizens are put at risk every day by court decrees that cure prison crowding by declaring that we must free dangerous criminals before they have served their time.” “The most egregious example,” he added, “is the city of Philadelphia.” Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 15 ALITO, J., dissenting trial court selects between the competing views of experts on broad empirical questions such as the efficacy of preventing crime through the incapacitation of convicted criminals, the trial court’s choice is very different from a classic finding of fact and is not entitled to the same de gree of deference on appeal. The particular three-judge court convened in this case was “confident” that releasing 46,000 prisoners pursuant to its plan “would in fact benefit public safety.” Juris. App. 248a–249a. According to that court, “overwhelming evidence” supported this purported finding. at 232a. But a more cautious court, less bent on implementing its own criminal justice agenda, would have at least acknowl edged that the consequences of this massive prisoner release cannot be ascertained in advance with any degree of certainty and that it is entirely possible that this re lease will produce results similar to those under prior court-ordered population caps. After all, the sharp in crease in the California prison population that the three judge court lamented, see at 254a, has been accompa nied by an equally sharp decrease in violent crime.11 These California trends mirror similar developments at the national level,12 and “[t]here is a general consensus that the decline in crime is, at least in part, due to more and longer prison sentences.”13 If increased incarceration —————— 11 From 1992 to 2009, the violent crime rate in California per 0,000 residents fell from 1,119.7 to 472.0—a decrease of 57.8 percent. Simi larly, in the United States from 1992 to 2009, the violent crime rate per 0,000 residents fell |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | to 2009, the violent crime rate per 0,000 residents fell from 757.7 to 429.4—a decrease of 43.3 percent. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov. 12 According to the three-judge court, California’s prison population has increased by 750 percent since the mid-1970’s. Juris. App. 254a. From 1970 to 2005, the Nation’s prison population increased by 700 percent. Public Safety, Public Spending: Forecasting America’s Prison Population 2007–2011, 19 Fed. Sent. Rep. 234, 234 (2007). 13 Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deter 16 BROWN v. PLATA ALITO, J., dissenting in California has led to decreased crime, it is entirely possible that a decrease in imprisonment will have the opposite effect. Commenting on the testimony of an expert who stated that he could not be certain about the effect of the massive prisoner discharge on public safety, the three-judge court complained that “[s]uch equivocal testimony is not help ful.” at 247a. But testimony pointing out the diffi culty of assessing the consequences of this drastic remedy would have been valued by a careful court duly mindful of the overriding need to guard public safety. The three-judge court acknowledged that it “ha[d] not evaluated the public safety impact of each individual element” of the population reduction plan it ordered the State to implement. App. to Juris. Statement 3a. The majority argues that the three-judge court nevertheless gave substantial weight to public safety because its order left “details of implementation to the State’s discretion.” Ante, at 41. Yet the State had told the three-judge court that, after studying possible population reduction meas ures, it concluded that “reducing the prison population to 137.5% within a two-year period cannot be accomplished without unacceptably compromising public safety.” Juris. App. 317a. The State found that public safety required a 5-year period in which to achieve the ordered reduction. Thus, the three-judge court approved a population reduction plan that neither it nor the State found could be implemented without unacceptable harm to public safety. And this Court now holds that the three-judge court dis charged its obligation to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety,” by defer ring to officials who did not believe the reduction could be —————— rence? 0 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 765, (20) (citing research on this issue). Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 17 ALITO, J., dissenting accomplished in a safe manner. I do not believe the PLRA’s public-safety requirement is so trivial. The members of the three-judge court and the experts on whom they relied may disagree with key elements of |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959734/brown-v-plata/ | on whom they relied may disagree with key elements of the crime-reduction program that the State of California has pursued for the past few decades, including “the shift to inflexible determinate sentencing and the passage of harsh mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws.” at 254a. And experts such as the Receiver are entitled to take the view that the State should “re-thin[k] the place of incarceration in its criminal justice system,” App. 489. But those controversial opinions on matters of criminal justice policy should not be permitted to override the reasonable policy view that is implicit in the PLRA—that prisoner release orders present an inherent risk to the safety of the public. * * * The prisoner release ordered in this case is unprece dented, improvident, and contrary to the PLRA. In largely sustaining the decision below, the majority is gambling with the safety of the people of California. Before putting public safety at risk, every reasonable precaution should be taken. The decision below should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for this to be done. I fear that today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim roster of victims. I hope that I am wrong. In a few years, we will see. |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | Before a federally licensed firearms dealer may sell a gun, the would-be purchaser must provide certain per- sonal information, show photo identification, and pass a background check. To ensure the accuracy of those sub- missions, a federal statute imposes criminal penalties on any person who, in connection with a firearm’s acquisition, makes false statements about “any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale.” 8 U.S. C. In this case, we consider how that law applies to a so-called straw purchaser—namely, a person who buys a gun on someone else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself. We hold that such a misrepresentation is punishable under the statute, whether or not the true buyer could have purchased the gun without the straw. I A Federal law has for over 40 years regulated sales by licensed firearms dealers, principally to prevent guns from falling into the wrong hands. See Gun Control Act of 968, 8 U.S. C. et seq. Under certain classes 2 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court of people—felons, drug addicts, and the mentally ill, to list a few—may not purchase or possess any firearm. And to ensure they do not, forbids a licensed dealer from selling a gun to anyone it knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is such a prohibited buyer. See Huddle- (“[T]he focus of the federal scheme,” in controlling access to weap- ons, “is the federally licensed firearms dealer”). The statute establishes a detailed scheme to enable the dealer to verify, at the point of sale, whether a potential buyer may lawfully own a gun. Section 922(c) brings the would-be purchaser onto the dealer’s “business premises” by prohibiting, except in limited circumstances, the sale of a firearm “to a person who does not appear in person” at that location. Other provisions then require the dealer to check and make use of certain identifying information received from the buyer. Before completing any sale, the dealer must “verif[y] the identity of the transferee by examining a valid identification document” bearing a photograph. In addition, the dealer must procure the buyer’s “name, age, and place of residence.” And finally, the dealer must (with limited exceptions not at issue here) submit that information to the National Instant Background Check System (NICS) to determine whether the potential purchaser is for any reason disqualified from owning a firearm. See The statute further insists that the dealer keep certain records, to enable federal authorities both to enforce the law’s verification measures and to trace firearms used in crimes. See H. R. Rep. No. 577, 90th Cong., 2d |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | crimes. See H. R. Rep. No. 577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 —————— The principal exception is for any buyer who has a state permit that has been “issued only after an authorized government official has verified” the buyer’s eligibility to own a gun under both federal and state law. Cite as: 573 U. S. () 3 Opinion of the Court (968). A dealer must maintain the identifying infor- mation mentioned above (i.e., name, age, and residence) in its permanent files. See In addition, the dealer must keep “such records of sale[ ] or other disposi- tion of firearms as the Attorney General may by regu- lations prescribe.” And the Attorney Gen- eral (or his designee) may obtain and inspect any of those records, “in the course of a bona fide criminal investiga- tion,” to “determin[e] the disposition of or more fire- arms.” To implement all those statutory requirements, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) developed Form 4473 for gun sales. See Supp. App. –6. The part of that form to be completed by the buyer requests his name, birth date, and address, as well as certain other identifying information (for example, his height, weight, and race). The form further lists all the factors disqualifying a person from gun ownership, and asks the would-be buyer whether any of them apply (e.g., “[h]ave you ever been convicted of a felony?”). Most important here, Questiona. asks (with bolded emphasis appearing on the form itself): “Are you the actual transferee/buyer of the firearm(s) listed on this form? Warning: You are not the ac- tual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are not the ac- tual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the fire- arm(s) to you.” The accompanying instructions for that question provide: “Questiona. Actual Transferee/Buyer: For purposes of this form, you are the actual transferee/ buyer if you are purchasing the firearm for yourself or otherwise acquiring the firearm for yourself You are also the actual transferee/buyer if you are le- gitimately purchasing the firearm as a gift for a third 4 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court party. ACTUAL TRANSFEREE/BUYER EXAM- PLES: Mr. Smith asks Mr. Jones to purchase a fire- arm for Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith gives Mr. Jones the money for the firearm. Mr. Jones is NOT THE ACTUAL TRANSFEREE/BUYER of the firearm and must answer “NO” to questiona.” After responding to this and other questions, the customer must sign a certification declaring his answers “true, correct and complete.” That certification pro- vides that the signator “understand[s] |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | and complete.” That certification pro- vides that the signator “understand[s] that making any false statement” respecting the transaction—and, particularly, “answering ‘yes’ to questiona. if [he is] not the actual buyer”—is a crime “punishable as a felony under Federal law.” Two statutory provisions, each designed to ensure that the dealer can rely on the truthfulness of the buyer’s dis- closures in carrying out its obligations, criminalize certain false statements about firearms transactions. First and foremost, provides as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm or ammunition from [a licensed dealer] know- ingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement intended or likely to deceive such [dealer] with respect to any fact material to the law- fulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm or ammunition under the provisions of this chapter.” That provision helps make certain that a dealer will re- ceive truthful information as to any matter relevant to a gun sale’s legality. In addition, prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or representa- tion with respect to the information required by this chap- ter to be kept in the records” of a federally licensed gun dealer. The question in this case is whether, as the ATF declares in Form 4473’s certification, those statutory Cite as: 573 U. S. () 5 Opinion of the Court provisions criminalize a false answer to Questiona.— that is, a customer’s statement that he is the “actual transferee/buyer,” purchasing a firearm for himself, when in fact he is a straw purchaser, buying the gun on someone else’s behalf. B The petitioner here is Bruce Abramski, a former police officer who offered to buy a Glock 9 handgun for his uncle, Angel Alvarez. (Abramski thought he could get the gun for a discount by showing his old police identification, though the Government contends that because he had been fired from his job two years earlier, he was no longer authorized to use that card.) Accepting his nephew’s offer, Alvarez sent Abramski a check for $400 with “Glock 9 handgun” written on the memo line. Two days later, Abramski went to Town Police Supply, a federally licensed firearms dealer, to make the purchase. There, he filled out Form 4473, falsely checking “Yes” in reply to Questiona.—that is, asserting he was the “actual transferee/ buyer” when, according to the form’s clear definition, he was not. He also signed the requisite certification, ac- knowledging his understanding that a false answer to Questiona. is a federal crime. After Abramski’s name cleared the NICS background |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | a federal crime. After Abramski’s name cleared the NICS background check, the dealer sold him the Glock. Abramski then deposited the $400 check in his bank account, transferred the gun to Alvarez, and got back a receipt. Federal agents found that receipt while execut- ing a search warrant at Abramski’s home after he became a suspect in a different crime. A grand jury indicted Abramski for violating and 924(a)()(A) by falsely affirming in his response to Questiona. that he was the Glock’s actual buyer. Abramski moved to dismiss both charges. He argued that his misrepresentation on Questiona. was not “material to the lawfulness of the sale” under because 6 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Alvarez was legally eligible to own a gun. And he claimed that the false statement did not violate because a buyer’s response to Questiona. is not “re- quired to be kept in the records” of a gun dealer. After the District Court denied those motions, see 778 F. Supp. 2d 678 (WD Va. 20), Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge the rulings. The District Court then sentenced him to five years of probation on each count, running concurrently. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions. It noted a division among appellate courts on the question Abramski raised about ’s materiality requirement: Of three courts to have addressed the issue, one agreed with Abramski that a misrepresentation on Questiona. is immaterial if “the true purchaser [here, Alvarez] can lawfully pur- chase a firearm directly.” ).2 The Fourth Circuit, however, thought the majority position correct: “[T]he identity of the actual purchaser of a firearm is a constant that is always material to the lawfulness of a firearm acquisition under ” The court also held that Abramski’s conviction under was valid, finding that the statute required a dealer to maintain the information at issue in its records. We granted certiorari, 57 U. S. principally to resolve the Circuit split about In this Court, Abramski renews his claim that a false answer to Ques- tiona. is immaterial if the true buyer is legally eligible to purchase a firearm. But Abramski now focuses on a —————— 2 Compare 8 F.3d, 94–, with United (a misrepresentation about the true purchaser’s identity is material even when he can legally own a gun); United (same). Cite as: 573 U. S. () 7 Opinion of the Court new and more ambitious argument, which he concedes no court has previously accepted. See Brief for Petitioner i.3 In brief, he alleges that a false response |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | Petitioner i.3 In brief, he alleges that a false response to Questiona. is never material to a gun sale’s legality, whether or not the actual buyer is eligible to own a gun. We begin with that fundamental question, next turn to what has become Abramski’s back-up argument under and fi- nally consider the relatively easy question pertaining to separate false-statement prohibition. On each score, we affirm Abramski’s conviction. II Abramski’s broad theory (mostly echoed by the dissent) is that federal gun law simply does not care about ar- rangements involving straw purchasers: So long as the person at the counter is eligible to own a gun, the sale to him is legal under the statute. That is true, Abramski contends, irrespective of any agreement that person has made to purchase the firearm on behalf of someone else— including someone who cannot lawfully buy or own a gun himself. Accordingly, Abramski concludes, his “false statement that he was the [Glock 9’s] ‘actual buyer,’ ” as that term was “defined in Questiona., was not material” —indeed, was utterly irrelevant—“to the lawfulness of the sale.” ; see also post, (opinion of SCALIA, J.). In essence, he claims, Town Police Supply could legally have sold the gun to him even if he had truthfully answered Questiona. by disclosing that he was a straw—because, again, all the federal firearms law cares about is whether the individual standing at the —————— 3 Reflecting that prior consensus, neither of Abramski’s principal amici—the National Rifle Association and a group of 26 States—joins Abramski in making this broader argument. They confine themselves to supporting the more limited claim about straw purchases made on behalf of eligible gun owners, addressed infra, 9–22. 8 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court dealer’s counter meets the requirements to buy a gun.4 At its core, that argument relies on one true fact: Fed- eral gun law regulates licensed dealers’ transactions with “persons” or “transferees,” without specifically referencing straw purchasers. Section 922(d), for example, bars a dealer from “sell[ing] or otherwise dispos[ing] of ” a fire- arm to any “person” who falls within a prohibited category— felons, drug addicts, the mentally ill, and so forth. See –2; see also (before selling a gun to a “person,” the dealer must take down his name, age, and residence); (before selling a gun to a “person,” the dealer must run a background check). Similarly, (C) requires the dealer to verify the identity of the “transferee” by checking a valid photo See ; see also (spelling out circumstances in which a “transferee” may buy a gun without |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | circumstances in which a “transferee” may buy a gun without appearing at the dealer’s premises). Abramski contends that Congress’s use of such language alone, sans any mention of “straw purchasers” or “actual buyers,” shows that “[i]t is not illegal to buy a gun for someone else.” Brief for Petitioner 5–6; Reply Brief ; see also post, –6. —————— 4 The dissent reserves the question whether the false statement would be material if the straw purchaser knew that the true buyer was not eligible to own a firearm. Post, at 6, n. 2. But first, that reserva- tion is of quite limited scope: Unlike Abramski’s back-up argument, which imposes liability whenever the true purchaser cannot legally buy a gun, the dissent’s reservation applies only when the straw has knowledge of (or at least reasonable cause to believe) that fact. And as we will later note, straws often do not have such knowledge. See infra, 2–3. Second, the reservation (fairly enough for a reservation) rests on an uncertain legal theory. According to the dissent, a straw buyer might violate if a dealer’s sale to him aids and abets his violation of —a provision barring knowingly transferring a gun to an ineligible person, see infra, at 8, 7–8. But that reasoning presupposes that a firearms dealer acting in the ordinary course of business can ever have the intent needed to aid and abet a crime—a question this Court reserved not six months ago. See Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. () (slip op., 2, n. 8). Cite as: 573 U. S. () 9 Opinion of the Court But that language merely raises, rather than answers, the critical question: In a straw purchase, who is the “person” or “transferee” whom federal gun law addresses? Is that “person” the middleman buying a firearm on some- one else’s behalf (often because the ultimate recipient could not buy it himself, or wants to camouflage the trans- action)? Or is that “person” instead the individual really paying for the gun and meant to take possession of it upon completion of the purchase? Is it the conduit at the coun- ter, or the gun’s intended owner?5 In answering that in- quiry, we must (as usual) interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, “structure, history, and purpose.” Maracich v. Spears, U. S. (slip op., 6). All those tools of divining meaning—not to mention common sense, which is a fortunate (though not inevitable) side-benefit of constru- ing statutory terms fairly—demonstrate that in regulating licensed dealers’ gun sales, looks through the straw to |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | regulating licensed dealers’ gun sales, looks through the straw to the actual buyer.6 —————— 5 The dissent claims the answer is easy because “if I give my son $0 and tell him to pick up milk and eggs at the store, no English speaker would say that the store ‘sells’ the milk and eggs to me.” Post, But try a question more similar to the one the gun law’s text raises: If I send my brother to the Apple Store with money and instructions to purchase an iPhone, and then take immediate and sole possession of that device, am I the “person” (or “transferee”) who has bought the phone or is he? Nothing in ordinary English usage compels an answer either way. 6 Contrary to the dissent’s view, our analysis does not rest on mere “purpose-based arguments.” Post. at 7. We simply recognize that a court should not interpret each word in a statute with blinders on, refusing to look at the word’s function within the broader statutory context. As we have previously put the point, a “provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of 0 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court The overarching reason is that Abramski’s reading would undermine—indeed, for all important purposes, would virtually repeal—the gun law’s core provisions.7 As noted earlier, the statute establishes an elaborate system to verify a would-be gun purchaser’s identity and check on his background. See It also requires that the information so gathered go into a dealer’s permanent records. See –3. The twin goals of this com- prehensive scheme are to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and others who should not have them, and to assist law enforcement authorities in investigating serious crimes. See ; –3. And no part of that scheme would work if the statute turned a blind eye to straw purchases—if, in other words, the law addressed not the substance of a transaction, but only empty formalities. To see why, consider what happens in a typical straw purchase. A felon or other person who cannot buy or own a gun still wants to obtain one. (Or, alternatively, a per- son who could legally buy a firearm wants to conceal his purchase, maybe so he can use the gun for criminal pur- poses without fear that police officers will later trace it to him.) Accordingly, the prospective buyer enlists an inter- |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | it to him.) Accordingly, the prospective buyer enlists an inter- mediary to help him accomplish his illegal aim. Perhaps he conscripts a loyal friend or family member; perhaps more often, he hires a stranger to purchase the gun for a price. The actual purchaser might even accompany the straw to the gun shop, instruct him which firearm to buy, give him the money to pay at the counter, and take pos- session as they walk out the door. See, e.g., United States —————— 7 That reading would also, at a stroke, declare unlawful a large part of what the ATF does to combat gun trafficking by criminals. See Dept. of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers, p. xi (June 2000) (noting that in several prior years “[a]lmost half of all [ATF firearm] trafficking investigations involved straw purchasers”). Cite as: 573 U. S. () Opinion of the Court v. Bowen, (describing a straw purchase along those lines); United (same). What the true buyer would not do—what he would leave to the straw, who possesses the gun for all of a minute—is give his identifying information to the dealer and submit himself to a background check. How many of the statute’s provisions does that scenario—the lawful result of Abramski’s (and the dissent’s) reading of “transferee” and “person”—render meaningless? Start with the parts of enabling a dealer to verify whether a buyer is legally eligible to own a firearm. That task, as noted earlier, begins with identification— requesting the name, address, and age of the potential purchaser and checking his photo See §, (t)()(C); And that identification in turn per- mits a background check: The dealer runs the purchaser’s name through the NICS database to discover whether he is, for example, a felon, drug addict, or mentally ill person. See §, (t)(); All those provisions are designed to accomplish what this Court has previously termed Congress’s “principal purpose” in enacting the statute—“to curb crime by keeping ‘firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them.’ ” (quoting S. Rep. No. 50, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (968)). But under Abramski’s reading, the statutory terms would be utterly ineffectual, because the identification and background check would be of the wrong person. The provisions would evaluate the eligibility of mere conduits, while allowing every criminal (and drug addict and so forth) to escape that assessment and walk away with a weapon. Similarly, Abramski’s view would defeat the point of which tightly restricts the sale of guns “to a per- son who |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | restricts the sale of guns “to a per- son who does not appear in person at the licensee’s busi- ness premises.” See Only a narrow class of 2 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court prospective buyers may ever purchase a gun from afar— primarily, individuals who have already had their eligibil- ity to own a firearm verified by state law enforcement officials with access to the NICS database. See 27 CFR (), 8 U.S. C. (t)(3); n. And even when an individual fits within that category, he still must submit to the dealer a sworn statement that he can lawfully own a gun, as well as provide the name and ad- dress of the principal law enforcement officer in his com- munity. See (). The dealer then has to forward notice of the sale to that officer, in order to allow law enforcement authorities to investigate the legality of the sale and, if necessary, call a stop to it. See §(2)–(3). The provision thus prevents remote sales except to a small class of buyers subject to extraordinary procedures— again, to ensure effective verification of a potential pur- chaser’s eligibility. Yet on Abramski’s view, a person could easily bypass the scheme, purchasing a gun without ever leaving his home by dispatching to a gun store a hired deliveryman. Indeed, if Abramski were right, we see no reason why anyone (and certainly anyone with less- than-pure motives) would put himself through the proce- dures laid out in : Deliverymen, after all, are not so hard to come by. And likewise, the statute’s record-keeping provisions would serve little purpose if the records kept were of nominal rather than real buyers. As noted earlier, dealers must store, and law enforcement officers may obtain, information about a gun buyer’s identity. See §, 923(g); That information helps to fight serious crime. When police officers retrieve a gun at a crime scene, they can trace it to the buyer and consider him as a suspect. See National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. Jones, 76 F.3d 200, (describing law enforcement’s use of firearm tracing). Too, the required records enable dealers to identify certain suspicious pur- Cite as: 573 U. S. () 3 Opinion of the Court chasing trends, which they then must report to federal authorities. See (imposing a reporting obliga- tion when a person buys multiple handguns within five days). But once again, those provisions can serve their objective only if the records point to the person who took actual control of the gun(s). Otherwise, the police will at most learn the identity of an |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | the police will at most learn the identity of an intermediary, who could not have been responsible for the gun’s use and might know next to nothing about the actual buyer. See, e.g., United (straw purchaser bought military-style assault rifles, later found among Mexican gang members, for a buyer known “only as ‘El Mano’ ”). Abramski’s view would thus render the re- quired records close to useless for aiding law enforcement: Putting true numbskulls to one side, anyone purchasing a gun for criminal purposes would avoid leaving a paper trail by the simple expedient of hiring a straw. To sum up so far: All the prerequisites for buying a gun described above refer to a “person” or “transferee.” Read Abramski’s way (“the man at the counter”), those terms deny effect to the regulatory scheme, as criminals could always use straw purchasers to evade the law.8 Read the other way (“the man getting, and always meant to get, the firearm”), those terms give effect to the statutory provi- —————— 8 The dissent is mistaken when it says that the ATF’s own former view of the statute refutes this proposition. See post, –2. As we will later discuss, see infra, –22, the ATF for a time thought that did not cover cases in which the true purchaser could have legally purchased a gun himself. But Abramski’s principal argument extends much further, to cases in which straws buy weapons for crimi- nals, drug addicts, and other prohibited purchasers. For the reasons just stated, that interpretation would render the statute all but useless. And although the dissent appeals to a snippet of congressional testi- mony to suggest that ATF once briefly held that extreme view of the statute, it agrees that by at least 979 (well over three decades ago), ATF recognized the unlawfulness of straw purchases on behalf of prohibited persons. 4 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court sions, allowing them to accomplish their manifest objects. That alone provides more than sufficient reason to under- stand “person” and “transferee” as referring not to the fictitious but to the real buyer. And other language in confirms that construction, by evincing Congress’s concern with the practical realities, rather than the legal niceties, of firearms transactions. For example, itself bars material misrepresen- tations “in connection with the acquisition,” and not just the purchase, of a firearm. That broader word, we have previously held, does not focus on “legal title”—let alone legal title for a few short moments, until another, always intended transfer occurs. 45 U.S., at 820. Instead, the term signifies “com[ing] into possession, |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | U.S., at 820. Instead, the term signifies “com[ing] into possession, control, or power of disposal,” as the actual buyer in a straw purchase does. Similarly, we have reasoned that such a substance-over-form approach draws support from the statute’s repeated references to “the sale or other disposition” of a firearm. ; see (making it unlawful to “sell or otherwise dispose of ” a gun to a prohibited person). That term, we have stated, “was aimed at providing maximum coverage.” at 826–827. We think such expansive language inconsistent with Abramski’s view of the statute, which would stare myopi- cally at the nominal buyer while remaining blind to the person exiting the transaction with control of the gun. Finally, our reading of comports with courts’ standard practice, evident in many legal spheres and presumably known to Congress, of ignoring artifice when identifying the parties to a transaction. In United States v. One 936 Model Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach, Commercial Credit Co., 307 U.S. 29 (939), for example, we consid- ered the operation of a statute requiring forfeiture of any interest in property that was used to violate prohibition laws, except if acquired in good faith. There, a straw purchaser had bought a car in his name but with his Cite as: 573 U. S. () 5 Opinion of the Court brother’s money, and transferred it to the brother—a known bootlegger—right after driving it off the lot. See 22–223. The Court held the finance company’s lien on the car non-forfeitable because the company had no hint that the straw was a straw—that his brother would in fact be the owner. See 24. But had the com- pany known, the Court made clear, a different result would have obtained: The company could not have relied on the formalities of the sale to the “ ‘straw’ purchaser” when it knew that the “real owner and purchaser” of the car was someone different. 23–224. We have similarly emphasized the need in other contexts, involving both criminal and civil penalties, to look through a transac- tion’s nominal parties to its true participants. See, e.g., American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 83, 93 (focusing on “substance rather than form” in assessing when entities are distinct enough to be capable of conspiring to violate the antitrust laws); Gregory v. Helvering, (935) (disregarding an intermediary shell corporation created to avoid taxes because doing otherwise would “exalt artifice above reality”). We do no more than that here in holding, consistent with ’s text, structure, and purpose, that using a straw does not enable evasion of the firearms law. Abramski, |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | straw does not enable evasion of the firearms law. Abramski, along with the dissent, objects that such action is no circumvention—that Congress made an inten- tional choice, born of “political compromise,” to limit the gun law’s compass to the person at the counter, even if merely acting on another’s behalf. Reply Brief ; post, at 0–. As evidence, Abramski states that the statute does not regulate beyond the initial point of sale. Because the law mostly addresses sales made by licensed dealers, a purchaser can (within wide limits) subsequently decide to resell his gun to another private party. See Reply Brief And similarly, Abramski says, a purchaser can buy a gun for someone else as a gift. See Brief for Petitioner 26– 6 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 27, n. 3. Abramski lumps in the same category the trans- fer of a gun from a nominal to a real buyer—as something, like a later resale or gift, meant to fall outside the stat- ute’s (purported) standing-in-front-of-the-gun-dealer scope. See Reply Brief 3; see also post, at 7–9. But Abramski and the dissent draw the wrong conclu- sion from their observations about resales and gifts. Yes, Congress decided to regulate dealers’ sales, while leaving the secondary market for guns largely untouched. As we noted in Congress chose to make the dealer the “principal agent of federal enforcement” in “restricting [criminals’] access to firearms.” And yes, that choice (like pretty much everything Congress does) was surely a result of compromise. But no, straw arrangements are not a part of the secondary market, separate and apart from the dealer’s sale. In claiming as much, Abramski merely repeats his mistaken assumption that the “person” who acquires a gun from a dealer in a case like this one is the straw, rather than the individual who has made a prior arrangement to pay for, take pos- session of, own, and use that part of the dealer’s stock. For all the reasons we have already given, that is not a plausible construction of a statute mandating that the dealer identify and run a background check on the person to whom it is (really, not fictitiously) selling a gun. See at 9–5. The individual who sends a straw to a gun store to buy a firearm is transacting with the dealer, in every way but the most formal; and that distinguishes such a person from one who buys a gun, or receives a gun as a gift, from a private party.9 The line Congress drew —————— 9 The dissent responds: “That certainly distinguishes” the individual |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | —————— 9 The dissent responds: “That certainly distinguishes” the individual transacting with a dealer through a straw from an individual receiving a gun from a private party; “so would the fact that [the former] has orange hair.” Post, at 9. But that is an example of wit gone wrong. Whether the purchaser has orange hair, we can all agree, is immaterial to the statutory scheme. By contrast, whether the purchaser has Cite as: 573 U. S. () 7 Opinion of the Court between those who acquire guns from dealers and those who get them as gifts or on the secondary market, we suspect, reflects a host of things, including administrative simplicity and a view about where the most problematic firearm transactions—like criminal organizations’ bulk gun purchases—typically occur. But whatever the reason, the scarcity of controls in the secondary market provides no reason to gut the robust measures Congress enacted at the point of sale. Abramski claims further support for his argument from Congress’s decision in 986 to amend to prohibit a private party (and not just, as originally enacted, a li- censed dealer) from selling a gun to someone he knows or reasonably should know cannot legally possess one. See Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, §02(5)(A), 00 Stat. 45–452. According to Abramski, the revised should be understood as Congress’s exclusive response to the potential dangers arising from straw purchases. See Brief for Petitioner 26–27. The amendment shows, he claims, that “Congress chose to address this perceived problem in a way other than” by imposing liability under on a straw who tells a licensed dealer that he is the firearm’s actual buyer. Reply Brief 4, n. 2. But Congress’s amendment of says nothing about ’s application to straw purchasers. In en- acting that amendment, Congress left just as it was, undercutting any suggestion that Congress some- —————— transacted with a licensed dealer is integral to the statute—because, as previously noted, “the federal scheme controls access to weapons” through the federally licensed firearms dealer, who is “the principal agent of federal enforcement.” Huddle, 45 U.S. 84, 824, ; see 6. In so designing the statute, Congress chose not to pursue the goal of “controll[ing] access” to guns to the nth degree; buyers can, as the dissent says, avoid the statute’s background check and record-keeping requirements by getting a gun second-hand. But that possibility provides no justification for limiting the statute’s considered regulation of dealer sales. 8 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court how intended to contract that provision’s reach. The amendment instead performed a different function: Rather than ensuring that a |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | instead performed a different function: Rather than ensuring that a licensed dealer receives truthful information, it extended a minimal form of regulation to the secondary market. The revised prevents a private person from knowingly selling a gun to an ineligi- ble owner no matter when or how he acquired the weapon: It thus applies not just to a straw purchaser, but to an individual who bought a gun for himself and later decided to resell it. At the same time, has nothing to say about a raft of cases covers, including all the (many) straw purchases in which the frontman does not know that the actual buyer is ineligible. See 3. Thus, could not serve as an effective substitute for And the mere potential for some transactions to run afoul of both prohibitions gives no cause to read as limiting (or vice versa). See, e.g., United 442 U.S. 4, 8–26 (979).0 Abramski’s principal attack on his conviction therefore fails. Contrary to his contention, the infor- mation Questiona. requests—“[a]re you the actual transferee/buyer[?]” or, put conversely, “are [you] acquir- —————— 0 Nor do we agree with the dissent’s argument (not urged by Abramski himself) that the rule of lenity defeats our construction. See post, 2–4. That rule, as we have repeatedly emphasized, applies only if, “after considering text, structure, history and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.” Maracich v. Spears, U. S (slip op. 6) ). We are not in that position here: Although the text creates some ambiguity, the context, structure, history, and purpose resolve it. The dissent would apply the rule of lenity here because the statute’s text, taken alone, permits a narrower construction, but we have repeatedly emphasized that is not the appro- priate test. See, e.g., 524 U.S. 25, 38 (998); (993). Cite as: 573 U. S. () 9 Opinion of the Court ing the firearm(s) on behalf of another person[?]”—is relevant to the lawfulness of a gun sale. That is because, for all the reasons we have given, the firearms law con- templates that the dealer will check not the fictitious purchaser’s but instead the true purchaser’s identity and eligibility for gun ownership. By concealing that Alvarez was the actual buyer, Abramski prevented the dealer from transacting with Alvarez face-to-face, see record- ing his name, age, and residence, see inspect- ing his photo ID, see (C), submitting his identify- ing information to the background check system, see (B), and determining whether he was prohibited from receiving a firearm, see |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | determining whether he was prohibited from receiving a firearm, see In sum, Abramski thwarted application of essentially all of the firearms law’s requirements. We can hardly think of a misrepresentation any more material to a sale’s legality. III Abramski also challenges his conviction on a narrower ground. For purposes of this argument, he assumes that the Government can make its case when a straw hides the name of an underlying purchaser who is legally ineligible to own a gun. But, Abramski reminds us, that is not true here, because Alvarez could have bought a gun for himself. In such circumstances, Abramski claims that a false response to Questiona. is not material. See Brief for Petitioner 28–30. Essentially, Abramski con- tends, when the hidden purchaser is eligible anyway to own a gun, all’s well that ends well, and all should be forgiven. But we think what we have already said shows the fallacy of that claim: Abramski’s false statement was material because had he revealed that he was purchasing the gun on Alvarez’s behalf, the sale could not have pro- ceeded under the law—even though Alvarez turned out to be an eligible gun owner. The sale, as an initial matter, 20 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court would not have complied with ’s restrictions on absentee purchases. See –2. If the dealer here, Town Police Supply, had realized it was in fact selling a gun to Alvarez, it would have had to stop the transaction for failure to comply with those conditions. Yet more, the sale could not have gone forward because the dealer would have lacked the information needed to verify and record Alvarez’s identity and check his back- ground. See §, (t)()(B)–(C); 0–2. Those requirements, as we have explained, pertain to the real buyer; and the after-the-fact discovery that Alvarez would have passed the background check cannot somehow wipe them away. Accordingly, had Town Police Supply known Abramski was a straw, it could not have certified, as Form 4473 demands, its belief that the transfer was “not unlawful.” Supp. App. 3. An analogy may help show the weakness of Abramski’s argument. Suppose a would-be purchaser, Smith, lawfully could own a gun. But further suppose that, for reasons of his own, Smith uses an alias (let’s say Jones) to make the purchase. Would anyone say “no harm, no foul,” just because Smith is not in fact a prohibited person under ? We think not. Smith would in any event have made a false statement about who will own the gun, im- peding the dealer’s ability to carry out |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | the gun, im- peding the dealer’s ability to carry out its legal responsi- bilities. So too here. Abramski objects that because Alvarez could own a gun, the statute’s core purpose—“keeping guns out of the hands” of criminals and other prohibited persons—“is not even implicated.” Brief for Petitioner 29. But that argu- ment (which would apply no less to the alias scenario) misunderstands the way the statute works. As earlier noted, the federal gun law makes the dealer “[t]he princi- pal agent of federal enforcement.” 45 U.S., at 824, see 6. It is that highly regulated, legally knowledgeable entity, possessing access to the expansive Cite as: 573 U. S. () 2 Opinion of the Court NICS database, which has the responsibility to “[e]nsure that, in the course of sales or other dispositions weapons [are not] obtained by individuals whose posses- sion of them would be contrary to the public interest.” 45 U.S., at Nothing could be less consonant with the statutory scheme than placing that inquiry in the hands of an unlicensed straw purchaser, who is unlikely to be familiar with federal firearms law and has no ability to use the database to check whether the true buyer may own a gun. And in any event, keeping firearms out of the hands of criminals is not ’s only goal: The statute’s record-keeping provisions, as we have said, are also de- signed to aid law enforcement in the investigation of crime. See –3, 2–3. Abramski’s proposed limitation on would undercut that purpose because many would-be criminals remain legally eligible to buy firearms, and thus could use straws to purchase an endless stream of guns off-the-books. See, e.g., 8 F.3d, 89 (eligible gun buyer used straw purchasers to secretly accumulate an “arsenal of weapons” for a “mas- sive offensive” against the Federal Government). In addition, Abramski briefly notes that until 995, the ATF took the view that a straw purchaser’s misrepresen- tation counted as material only if the true buyer could not legally possess a gun. See Brief for Petitioner 7–8; n. 8, We may put aside that ATF has for almost two decades now taken the opposite position, after reflecting on both appellate case law and changes in the statute. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4; Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 993, §03, 07 Stat. 54 (codified 8 U.S. C. (t)). The critical point is that criminal laws are for courts, not for the Government, to construe. See, e.g., United States v. Apel, 57 U. S. () (slip op., at 9) (“[W]e have never held that the Government’s reading of a |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | (“[W]e have never held that the Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference”). We think ATF’s old position no more relevant than its current one— 22 ABRAMSKI v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court which is to say, not relevant at all. Whether the Govern- ment interprets a criminal statute too broadly (as it some- times does) or too narrowly (as the ATF used to in constru- ing ), a court has an obligation to correct its error. Here, nothing suggests that Congress—the entity whose voice does matter—limited its prohibition of a straw purchaser’s misrepresentation in the way Abramski proposes. IV Finally, Abramski challenges his conviction under which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement with respect to the information re- quired by this chapter to be kept in the records” of a feder- ally licensed dealer. That provision is broader than in one respect: It does not require that the false statement at issue be “material” in any way. At the same time, includes an element absent from : The false statement must relate to “infor- mation required by this chapter to be kept in [a dealer’s] records.” Abramski notes that the indictment in this case charged him with only one misrepresentation: his state- ment in response to Questiona. that he was buying the Glock on his own behalf rather than on someone else’s. And, he argues, that information (unlike the transferee’s “name, age, and place of residence,” which he plausibly reads the indictment as not mentioning) was not required “by this chapter”—but only by Form 4473 itself—to be kept in the dealer’s permanent records. Brief for Petitioner 32. We disagree. Included in “this chapter”—Chapter 44 of Title 8—is a provision, noted earlier, requiring a dealer to “maintain such records of sale, or other disposition of firearms at his place of business for such period, and in such form, as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe.” §923(g)()(A); Because of that statutory section, the information that the Attorney Gen- eral’s regulations compel a dealer to keep is information Cite as: 573 U. S. () 23 Opinion of the Court “required by this chapter.” And those regulations (the validity of which Abramski does not here contest) demand that every licensed dealer “retain as a part of [its] required records, each Form 4473 obtained in the course of ” selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm. 27 CFR §478.24(b). Accordingly, a false answer on that form, such as the one Abramski made, pertains to information a dealer is statutorily required to maintain. V No piece of information is |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Abramski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959747/abramski-v-united-states/ | statutorily required to maintain. V No piece of information is more important under federal firearms law than the identity of a gun’s purchaser—the person who acquires a gun as a result of a transaction with a licensed dealer. Had Abramski admitted that he was not that purchaser, but merely a straw—that he was asking the dealer to verify the identity of, and run a back- ground check on, the wrong individual—the sale here could not have gone forward. That makes Abramski’s misrepresentation on Questiona. material under And because that statement pertained to information that a dealer must keep in its permanent records under the firearms law, Abramski’s answer to Questiona. also violated Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Fourth Circuit. It is so ordered. —————— The dissent argues that our view would impose criminal liability for a false answer even to an “ultra vires question,” such as “the buyer’s favorite color.” Post, 5. We need not, and do not, opine on that hypothetical, because it is miles away from this case. As we have explained, see at 9–9, Questiona. is not ultra vires, but instead fundamental to the lawfulness of a gun sale. It is, indeed, part and parcel of the dealer’s determination of the (true) buyer’s “name, age, and place of residence,” which requires the dealer to keep. That section alone would justify Abramski’s conviction under if the indictment here had clearly alleged that, in addition to answering Questiona. falsely, he lied about that buyer’s “name, age, and place of residence.” Cite as: 573 U. S. () SCALIA, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 2–493 BRUCE JAMES ABRAMSKI, JR., PETITIONER v. |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | dissenting | Norton v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109524/norton-v-mathews/ | In this Court held, sub silentio, that a three-judge court was properly convened in a case raising the same jurisdictional issue this case raises. See In 1974 when this Court vacated the judgment of the three-judge court in this case and remanded for further consideration in light of the Jimenez case, the Court again implicitly held that the three-judge court had been properly convened. See ante, at 529 n. 3. Today the Court enters a judgment of affirmance which it has no power to enter unless the three-judge court was properly convened. For we have no jurisdiction over a direct appeal from a district court order denying an injunction unless a three-judge district court was required. 28 U.S. C. 1253. Since I believe such a court was required to consider the appellant's constitutional claim, I am satisfied that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. The jurisdictional statute, 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. 405 (g), authorizes the claimant to commence a "civil action" against the Secretary to obtain review of an adverse decision. In such an action the Secretary is a litigant. If the Secretary's decision rested on a statutory provision which is challenged as unconstitutional, the District Court has jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue. Before this Court raised the question on its own initiative in that opinion, at 763 n. 8, this Court, the lower federal courts,[1] and the Secretary himself,[2] had uniformly assumed that if the district court should hold the statute unconstitutional, it could then enter appropriate injunctive relief. I believe this uniform understanding of the meaning of the statute is correct. The Secretary argues, however, that injunctive relief is superfluous in an action by an individual plaintiff, since he can obtain all the relief to which he is entitled by an order "affirming, modifying, or reversing" the administrative decision. The Secretary also argues that the same reasoning applies to class actions, since an application for benefits by unnamed members of the plaintiff class and a denial of benefits are jurisdictional prerequisites to an action under 205 (g). Alternatively, the Secretary contends that a plaintiff class will never *535 be proper in a 205 (g) action, and in any event, that a plaintiff class could not properly be certified in this case. Even asuming that equitable relief is unavailable to a plaintiff suing only on his own behalf, the Secretary's conclusions with respect to class actions in general, and with respect to the present class action in particular, do not follow. Indeed, the Secretary's argument proves too much. Injunctive relief in a |
Justice Stevens | 1,976 | 16 | dissenting | Norton v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109524/norton-v-mathews/ | the Secretary's argument proves too much. Injunctive relief in a class action is so similar to that expressly authorized by 205 (g) that Congress could not have intended to allow one but not the other. The Secretary suggests only one distinction between an order reversing or modifying the denial of benefits to the members of a plaintiff class and an injunction requiring payment of benefits to all such persons: if an official disobeys an order reversing or modifying a decision of the Secretary, he cannot be held in contempt without issuance of mandamus or injunctive relief compelling compliance with the order; but if he disobeys an injunction, he may be held in contempt immediately.[3] Surely Congress did not intend 205 (g) to provide reluctant federal officials with a means of delay in the remote eventuality that they might not feel bound by the judgment of a federal court. Assuming a district court may issue classwide relief reversing or modifying a decision of the Secretary, I see no reason why it may not issue injunctive relief of equal breadth and virtually identical effect. Nor can I accept the Secretary's argument that a plaintiff class may never be properly certified in a 205 (g) action or that no class could properly be certified in this case. He contends that since 205 (g) permits review only of "any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which [the plaintiff] was a party," it manifests a congressional intent that judicial review proceed only on a case-by-case basis. I fail to see, however, *536 why the need for case-by-case adjudication is not fully satisfied by limiting the plaintiff class to those who have satisfied the prerequisites to an action under 205 (g).[4] By definition, such persons have been denied relief for failure to meet the statutory requirement under constitutional attack[5] and upon an administrative record sufficiently complete to permit judicial review. Once such persons are identified from their administrative records, relief may be granted expeditiously.[6] Although *537 the plaintiff class in this case was erroneously defined to include persons who did not satisfy the prerequisites for judicial review specified in 205 (g), the overbreadth of the class did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction over members of the class properly before it.[7] Nor would it prevent later certification of an appropriate, narrower class. Cf. 523 F. 2d, at 695.[8] *538 Accordingly, I would hold that the District Court had power to issue injunctive relief after certification of the plaintiff class and that an appeal from denial of such relief lies under 28 |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | I join the opinion of the Court and write separately to make three points: (1) No matter what mental state 10 (b) and 17 (a) were to require, it is clear that the District Court was correct here in entering an injunction against petitioner. Petitioner was informed by an attorney representing Lawn-A-Mat that two representatives of petitioner's firm were making grossly fraudulent statements to promote Lawn-A-Mat stock. Yet he took no steps to prevent such conduct from recurring. He neither discharged the salesmen nor rebuked them; he did nothing whatever to indicate that such salesmanship was unethical, illegal, and should stop. Hence, the District Court's findings (a) that petitioner "intentionally failed" to terminate the fraud and (b) that his conduct was reasonably likely to repeat itself find abundant support in the record. In my view, the Court of Appeals could well have affirmed on that ground alone. (2) I agree that 10 (b) and 17 (a) (1) require scienter but that 17 (a) (2) and 17 (a) () do not. I recognize, of course, that this holding "drives a wedge between [sellers and buyers] and says that henceforth only the seller's negligent misrepresentations may be enjoined." Post, at 5 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). But it is not this Court that "drives a *70 wedge"; Congress has done that. The Court's holding is compelled in large measure by Ernst & and gives effect to congressional intent as manifested in the language of the statutes and in their histories. If, as intimated, the result is "bad" public policy, that is the concern of Congress where changes can be made. () It bears mention that this dispute, though pressed vigorously by both sides, may be much ado about nothing. This is so because of the requirement in injunctive proceedings of a showing that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated." Accord, To make such a showing, it will almost always be necessary for the Commission to demonstrate that the defendant's past sins have been the result of more than negligence. Because the Commission must show some likelihood of a future violation, defendants whose past actions have been in good faith are not likely to be enjoined. See opinion of the Court, ante, at 701. That is as it should be. An injunction is a drastic remedy, not a mild prophylactic, and should not be obtained against one acting in good faith. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the Court's judgment that 17 (a) |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | part. I concur in the Court's judgment that 17 (a) (2) and () of the Securities Act of 19, 15 U.S. C. 77q (a) (2) and (), do not require a showing of scienter for purposes of an action for injunctive relief brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I dissent from the remainder of the Court's reasoning and judgment. I am of the view that neither 17 (a) (1) of the 19 Act, 15 U.S. C. 77q (a) (1), nor 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 194, 15 U.S. C. 78j (b), as elaborated by SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5 requires the Commission to prove scienter *704 before it can obtain equitable protection against deceptive practices in securities trading. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety. The issues before the Court in this case are important and critical. Sections 17 (a) and 10 (b) are the primary antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. They are the chief means through which the Commission, by exercise of its authority to bring actions for injunctive relief, can seek protection against deception in the marketplace. See 20 (b) of the 19 Act, 15 U.S. C. 77t (b); 21 (d) of the 194 Act, 15 U.S. C. 78u (d). As a result, they are key weapons in the statutory arsenal for securing market integrity and investor confidence. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 19, 4 Yale L. J. 1, 182 (19); Note, 57 Yale L. J. 10 If the Commission is denied the ability effectively to nip in the bud the misrepresentations and deceptions that its investigations have revealed, honest investors will be the ones who suffer. Often they may find themselves stripped of their investments through reliance on information that the Commission knew was misleading but lacked the power to stop or contain. Today's decision requires the Commission to prove scienter in many, if not most, situations before it is able to obtain an injunction. This holding unnecessarily undercuts the Commission's authority to police the marketplace. As I read the Court's opinion, it is little more than an extrapolation of the reasoning that was employed in Ernst & in imposing a scienter requirement upon private actions for damages implied under 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. Whatever the authority of may be in its own context, I perceive little reason to regard it as governing precedent here. I believe that there are sound reasons for distinguishing between private damages actions and public enforcement actions under these statutes, and for applying |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | and public enforcement actions under these statutes, and for applying a scienter standard, if one must be applied anywhere, only in the former class of cases. *705 I In keeping with the reasoning of the Court places much emphasis upon statutory language and its assertedly plain meaning. The words "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" in 17 (a) (1), and the words "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in 10 (b), are said to connote "knowing or intentional misconduct." Ante, at 690, 696. And this connotation, it is said, implicitly incorporates the requirement of scienter traditionally applicable in the common law of fraud. But there are at least two specific responses to this wooden analysis. First, it is quite unclear that the words themselves call for so restrictive a definition. Second, as the Court recognized in the common-law requirement of scienter generally observed in actions for fraud at law was often dispensed with in actions brought before chancery. A The words of a statute, particularly one with a remedial object, have a "`meaning imparted to them by the mischief to be remedied.'" St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. quoting Duparquet Thus, antifraud provisions of securities legislation are to be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes." ; Superintendent of ; Affiliated Ute 406 U.S. 8, See also ; United Housing Foundation, I have no doubt that the "mischief" confronting Congress in 19 and 194 included a large measure of intentional deceit and misrepresentation. The concern, however, ran deeper still, and Congress sought to develop a regulatory *706 framework that would ensure a free flow of honest, reliable information in the securities markets. This Court has recognized that it was Congress' desire "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor," and to place upon those in control of information the responsibility for misrepresentation. ; see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 85, 7d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (19); Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 7d Cong., 1st Sess., (19). This step was perceived as a fundamental prerequisite to restoration of investor confidence sorely needed after the market debacles that helped to plummet the Nation into a major economic depression. See United Reading the language of 17 (a) (1) and 10 (b) with these purposes in mind, I am not at all certainalthough the Court professes to bethat the language is incapable of being read to include misrepresentations that result from something less than willful behavior. The word "willfully," that Congress employed elsewhere in |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | willful behavior. The word "willfully," that Congress employed elsewhere in the securities laws when it wanted to specify a prerequisite of knowledge or intent, is conspicuously missing.[1] Instead, Congress employed a variety of *707 terms to describe the conduct that it authorized the Commission to prohibit. These operative terms are expressed in the disjunctive, and each should be given its separate meaning. Contrary to the Court's view, I would conclude that they identify a range of behavior, including but not limited to intentional misconduct, and that they admit an interpretation, in the context of Commission enforcement actions, that reaches deceptive practices whether the common-law condition of scienter is specifically present or not. For example, the word "device" that is common to both statutes may have a far broader scope than the Court suggests. The legislative history of the 194 Act used that term as a synonym for "practice," a word without any strong connotation of scienter, and it expressed a desire to confer upon the Commission authority under 10 (b) to prohibit "any manipulative or deceptive practices detrimental to the interests of the investor." S Rep. No. 792, 7d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (194). The term "device" also was used in 15 *708 (c) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S. C. 780 (c) (1), where it has been interpreted with congressional approval to apply to negligent acts and practices. See SEC Rule 15c-1-2, 17 CFR 240.15c1-2 ; H. R. Rep. No. 07, 75th Cong., d Sess., 10 (198). Moreover, "device" had been given broad definition in prior enactments. In Armour Packing the Court rejected the contention that its meaning in the Elkins Act, should be limited to conduct involving resort to underhanded, dishonest, or fraudulent means. In my view, this evidence provides a stronger indication of congressional understanding of the term "device" than the dictionary definition on which the Court relies. Ante, at 696, n. 1; cf. Ernst & n. 20.[2] At the very least, it fully counters the Court's bald assertion that the meaning of terms used in the antifraud provisions is sufficiently "plain" that statutory policy and administrative interpretation may be ignored in defining the scope of the legislation. See ante, at 695, 700, n. 19. Division in the lower courts over the issues before us is itself an indication that reasonable minds differ over the import of the terminology that Congress has used. I can agree with the Court that the language of the statutes is the starting point of analysis, but at least in present circumstances I strongly disagree with the conclusion that it |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | present circumstances I strongly disagree with the conclusion that it is the ending point as well. *709 B An additional and independent ground for disagreement with the Court's analysis is its utter failure to harmonize statutory construction with prevailing equity practice at the time the securities laws were enacted. On prior occasions, the Court has emphasized the relevance of common-law principles in the interpretation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. See, e. g., See also 479 F.2d 77, 89-91 Yet in this case, the Court oddly finds those principles inapplicable. It specifically casts aside the fact that proof of scienter was not required in actions seeking equitable relief against fraudulent practices. This position stands in stark contrast with the Court's clear recognition of this separate equity tradition in In Capital Gains, the Court was called upon to construe 206 (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 80b-6 (2). The statute is a general antifraud provision framed in language similar to that of 17 (a) () of the 19 Act. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, had decided by a close vote that the Commission could not obtain an injunction for violation of the statute unless it proved scienter. See This Court, rejecting the view of the lower court that scienter was required in all cases involving fraud, reversed. It said: "The content of common-law fraud has not remained static as the courts below seem to have assumed. It has varied, for example, with the nature of the relief sought, the relationship between the parties, and the merchandise in issue. It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages." *0 In particular, the Court observed that proof of scienter was one element of an action for damages that the equity courts omitted. See also 10 U.S. 2, 8 The Court does not now dispute the veracity of what it said in Capital Gains. Indeed, the different standards for fraud in law and at equity have been noted by commentators for more than a century. See, e. g., 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence 186-187 (6th ed. 185); G. Bower, The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation 250 (1911); 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 885 (4th ed. 1918); S. Williston, The Law of Contracts 1500 (1920); W. Walsh, Equity 109, p. 509 (190). See also Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 4 Yale L. J. 227, 1 (19). The difference originally may have been attributable more to historical accident than |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | originally may have been attributable more to historical accident than to any conscious policy. See Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation: Legal Fault as a Requirement (Part I), But as one commentator explained, it has survived because in equity "[i]t is not the cause but the fact, of injury, and the problem of its practical control through judicial action, which concern the court." 1 F. Lawrence, Substantive Law of Equity Jurisprudence 1 (1929) (emphasis in original); see also 17. As a consequence of this different focus, common-law courts consistently have held that in an action for rescission or other equitable relief the fact of material misrepresentation is sufficient, and the knowledge or purpose of the wrongdoer need not be shown. The Court purports to distinguish Capital Gains on the grounds that it involved a different statutory provision with somewhat different language, and that it stressed the confidential duties of investment advisers to their clients. Ante, at 69-695. These observations, in my view, do not weaken the relevance of the history on which the Court in Capital Gains relied. In fact, that history may be even more pertinent here. This case involves actual dissemination of material *1 false statements by a broker-dealer serving as market maker in the relevant security; Capital Gains involved an investment adviser's omission to state material facts. Because there was no affirmative misrepresentation in Capital Gains, the existence of a confidential duty arguably was necessary before the broker's silence could become the basis for a charge of fraud. Cf. Here, in contrast, the fraudulent nature of the underlying conduct is clear, and the only issue is whether the Commission may obtain the desired prophylactic relief. The significance of this common-law tradition, moreover, is buttressed by reference to state precursors of the federal securities laws. The problem of securities fraud was by no means new in 19, and many had attempted to deal with it by enactment of their own "blue-sky" statutes. When Congress turned to the problem, it explicitly drew from their experience. One variety of state statute, the so-called "fraud" laws of New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware, empowered the respective state attorneys general to bring actions for injunctive relief when fraudulent practices in the sale of securities were uncovered. See, e. g., Federal Securities Act, Hearings on H. R. 414 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 7d Cong., 1st Sess., 95 (19). Of these statutes, the most prominent was the Martin Act of New York, 1921 N. Y. Laws, ch. 649, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law 52-5 (Consol. 1921), which had been fairly actively |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | Bus. Law 52-5 (Consol. 1921), which had been fairly actively enforced. The drafters of the federal securities laws referred to these specific statutes as models for the power to seek injunctive relief that they requested for federal enforcement authorities. The experience of the State of New York, in particular, was repeatedly called to Congress' attention as an example for federal legislation to follow.[] *7 In light of this legislative history, I find it far more significant than does the Court that proof of scienter was not a prerequisite to relief under the Martin Act and other similar "blue-sky" laws. In the New York Court of Appeals held that lack of scienter was no defense to Martin Act liability. The court justified this decision by looking to the traditional equity practice to which I have referred. It held: "[I]ntentional misstatements, as in an action at law to recover damages for fraud and deceit need not be alleged. Material misrepresentations intended to influence the bargain, on which an action might be maintained in equity to rescind a consummated transaction, are enough." This decision was in keeping with the general tenor of state laws governing equitable relief in the context of securities transactions. See Note, 40 Yale L. J. 987, 988 (191). The Court dismisses all this evidence with the observation, ante, at 700, n. 18, that the specific holdings of cases like Federated Radio were not explicitly placed before Congress. Yet these were not isolated holdings or novel twists of law. They were part of an established, longstanding equity tradition the significance of which the Court has chosen simply to ignore. I am convinced that Congress was aware of this tradition, see n. and that if it had intended to depart from it, it would have left more traces of that intention than the Court has been able to find. Cf. Hecht 21 U.S. 21, 29 * II Although I disagree with the Court's textual exegesis and its assessment of history, I believe its most serious error may be a failure to appreciate the structural interrelationship among equitable remedies in the 19 and 194 Acts, and to accord that interrelationship proper weight in determining the substantive reach of the Commission's enforcement powers under 17 (a) and 10 (b). The structural considerations that were advanced in support of the decision to require proof of scienter in a private action for damages, see Ernst & -211, have no application in the present context. In the Court noted that Congress had placed significant limitations on the private causes of action for negligence that were available |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | the private causes of action for negligence that were available under provisions of the 194 Act other than 10 (b). It concluded that the effectiveness of these companion statutes might be undermined if private plaintiffs sustaining losses from negligent behavior also could sue for damages under 10 (b). Obviously, no such danger is created by Commission-initiated actions for injunctive relief, and the Court admits as much. Ante, at 691, n. 9.[4] In fact, the consistent pattern in both the 19 Act and the 194 Act is to grant the Commission broad authority to seek enforcement without regard to scienter, unless criminal punishments are contemplated. In both Acts, state of mind is treated with some precision. Congress used terms such as *4 "knowing," "willful," and "good faith," when it wished to impose a state-of-mind requirement. The omission of such terms in statutory provisions authorizing the Commission to sue for injunctive relief contrasts sharply with their inclusion in provisions authorizing criminal prosecution. Compare 20 (b) of the 19 Act, 15 U.S. C. 77t (b), and 21 (d) of the 194 Act, 15 U.S. C. 78u (d), with 24 of the 19 Act, 15 U.S. C. 77x, and 2 (a) of the 194 Act, 15 U.S. C. 78ff (a). Moreover, the Acts create other civil remedies that may be pursued by the Commission that do not include state-of-mind prerequisites.[5] This pattern comports with Congress' expressed intent to give the Commission maximum flexibility to deal with new or unanticipated problems, rather than to confine its enforcement efforts within a rigid statutory framework. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 18, 7d Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (194); S. Rep. No. 792, 7d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (194); 78 Cong. Rec. 811 (194). The Court's decision deviates from this statutory scheme. That deviation, of course, is only partial. After today's decision, it still will be possible for the Commission to obtain relief against some negligent misrepresentations under 17 (a) of the 19 Act. Yet this halfway-house approach itself highlights the error of the Court's decision. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated to fill a gap in federal securities legislation, and *5 to apply to both purchasers and sellers under 10 (b) the legal duties that 17 (a) had applied to sellers alone. See Ward La France Truck Corp., 1 S.E. C. 7, 81, n. 8 ; SEC Release No. 0 (May 21, 1942). As the Commission thus recognized, the two statutes should operate in harmony. The Court now drives a wedge between them, and says that henceforth only the seller's negligent misrepresentations may be enjoined. I have searched |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | concurring | Aaron v. SEC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110272/aaron-v-sec/ | the seller's negligent misrepresentations may be enjoined. I have searched in vain for any reason in policy or logic to support this division. Its only support, so far as I can tell, is to be found in the Court's technical linguistic analysis. Many lower courts have refused to go so far. Both before and after they have rejected the contention that the Commission must prove scienter under either 17 (a) or 10 (b) before it can obtain injunctive relief against deceptive practices.[6] Even those judges who anticipated by advocating a scienter requirement in private actions for money damages found no reason to place similar strictures on the Commission. See, e. g., 401 F.2d 8, cert. denied sub nom. 94 U.S. 976 cited with approval in Ernst & 211, 21, 214. *6 The reasons for this refusal to limit the Commission's authority are not difficult to fathom. As one court observed in the context of 17 (a), "[i]mpressive policies" support the need for Commission authority to seek prophylactic relief against misrepresentations that are caused by negligence, as well as those that are caused by deliberate swindling. cert. denied, False and misleading statements about securities "can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar." United v. Benjamin, 28 F.2d 854, 86 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Howard v. United 77 U.S. 95 And when misinformation causes loss, it is small comfort to the investor to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by fraudulent design, particularly when recovery of his loss has been foreclosed by this Court's decisions.[7] As the reported cases illustrate, injunctions against negligent dissemination of misinformation play an essential role in preserving market integrity and preventing serious financial loss. *7 See, e. g., 544 F.2d 55, ; ;[8] III I thus arrive at the conclusion that statutory language does not compel the judgment reached by the Court, while considerations of history, statutory structure, legislative purpose, and policy all strongly favor an interpretation of 17 (a) and 10 (b) that permits the Commission to seek injunctive relief without first having to prove scienter. In my view, this conclusion is fortified by the fact that Congress has approved it in a related context.[9] Because I find nothing *8 whatever in either Ernst & or today's decision that compels a different result, I dissent. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | Petitioners William Conover and Anthony Tanner were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United in violation of 18 U.S. C. 371, and of committing mail fraud in *110 violation of 18 U.S. C. 1341. The United Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in refusing to admit juror testimony at a postverdict hearing on juror intoxication during the trial; and that the conspiracy count of the indictment failed to charge a crime against the United We affirm in part and remand. I Conover was the procurement manager at Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Seminole), a Florida corporation owned and operated by 11 rural electric distribution cooperatives. Seminole generates and transmits electrical energy to the cooperatives. In Seminole borrowed over $1.1 billion from the Federal Financing Bank in order to construct a coal-fired power plant near Palatka, Florida. The loan was guaranteed by the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), a credit agency of the United Department of Agriculture that assists rural electric organizations by providing loans, guaranteeing loans from other sources, and approving other security arrangements that allow the borrower to obtain financing. REA, A Brief History of the Rural Electrification and Telephone Programs The loan agreement between Seminole and the REA provided for federal supervision of the construction project. Under the contract, the REA could supervise the construction and equipment of the electric system, and inspect, examine, and test all work and materials relating to the construction project. App. 61-62. REA Bulletins and REA memoranda required Seminole to obtain REA approval before letting out certain contracts, and required certain bidding procedures to be used depending on the type of contract. Construction of the Palatka plant began in September To provide access to an area where a transmission line would be run, the plans called for the construction of a 51-mile *111 patrol road. The road required materials that would support heavy trucks and resist flooding, and in March 1981, Conover was informed that Seminole's current construction contractor was having difficulty obtaining enough suitable fill material for the road. The contractor indicated that it had not attempted to locate alternative fill materials, and that the contract price would have to be increased substantially in order for them to complete the road. The contract was subsequently terminated. Following the March meeting at which Conover was informed of the difficulty with the patrol road, Conover called a friend, Anthony R. Tanner. Tanner owned a limerock mine, and the two discussed the possibility of using limerock and limerock overburden as an alternative fill material. At Conover's |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | and limerock overburden as an alternative fill material. At Conover's request, a Seminole engineer examined the material at Tanner's mine and determined that it would be suitable for the road. Seminole acquired limerock overburden from Tanner on an interim basis so that road construction could continue while bids were solicited for the remainder of the project. Seminole called for bids on a contract for provision of fill materials as well as a contract for building the road. Both contracts were to be paid with loan money guaranteed by the REA, and the contract for building the road required the REA's approval. The final specifications for the two contracts, which were prepared by Conover's procurement department, were favorable to Tanner's company in several respects. Tanner was awarded both contracts on May 14, 1981. The fill material contract paid approximately $1,041,800, and the road construction contract paid approximately $548,000. App. 10. Several problems developed after Tanner began working on the road. There was a dispute as to whether Seminole or Tanner was required to maintain access roads leading to the patrol road. Conover advised Seminole that the contract was ambiguous and that Seminole should pay for maintenance of the access road; ultimately Seminole did pay for the *112 access road. Later, the REA complained that the bond provided by Tanner was not from a bonding company approved by the Treasury Department. In two letters to another bonding company in July 1981, Conover represented the construction on the patrol road to be considerably more advanced than it was at that time. It was also discovered during the course of construction that limerock, which weakens when wet, could not be used in areas subject to flooding. For those areas Tanner's company provided and spread sand, at a higher price than the sand provided and spread by the first contractor. The patrol road was completed in October 1981. At the time Conover called Tanner about using limerock as a fill material for Seminole's patrol road, Tanner and Conover were friends and had engaged in several business deals together. In January 1981 Conover had obtained a contract from Tanner to perform landscaping work and install a sprinkler system at a condominium complex owned by Tanner. In early March 1981, Tanner paid Conover $10,035, allegedly in partial payment for the landscaping work; eventually Conover received a total of $15,000 for the work. In May 1981 Conover purchased a condominium from Tanner, and Tanner loaned Conover $6,000 so that Conover could close on the condominium. In June 1981, before the patrol road was finished, representatives of one of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | before the patrol road was finished, representatives of one of the members of the Seminole cooperative requested that Seminole end all business relations with Tanner. Seminole initiated an internal investigation, after which Seminole suspended and later demoted Conover for violation of the company's conflict of interest policies. Federal authorities also investigated the situation, and in June 1983 Conover and Tanner were indicted. A 6-week trial resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial was declared. The two were subsequently reindicted; the first count alleged conspiracy to defraud the United in violation of 18 U.S. C. 371, and the second through fifth counts alleged *113 separate instances of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S. C. 1341. Conover was convicted on all counts; Tanner was convicted on all but count three. The day before petitioners were scheduled to be sentenced, Tanner filed a motion, in which Conover subsequently joined, seeking continuance of the sentencing date, permission to interview jurors, an evidentiary hearing, and a new trial. According to an affidavit accompanying the motion, Tanner's attorney had received an unsolicited telephone call from one of the trial jurors, Vera Asbul. App. 246. Juror Asbul informed Tanner's attorney that several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks at various times throughout the trial, causing them to sleep through the afternoons. The District Court continued the sentencing date, ordered the parties to file memoranda, and heard argument on the motion to interview jurors. The District Court concluded that juror testimony on intoxication was inadmissible under Federal Rule of 606(b) to impeach the jury's verdict. The District Court invited petitioners to call any nonjuror witnesses, such as courtroom personnel, in support of the motion for new trial. Tanner's counsel took the stand and testified that he had observed one of the jurors "in a sort of giggly mood" at one point during the trial but did not bring this to anyone's attention at the time. Earlier in the hearing the judge referred to a conversation between defense counsel and the judge during the trial on the possibility that jurors were sometimes falling asleep. During that extended exchange the judge twice advised counsel to immediately inform the court if they observed jurors being inattentive, and suggested measures the judge would take if he were so informed: "MR. MILBRATH [defense counsel]: But, in any event, I've noticed over a period of several days that a couple of jurors in particular have been taking long naps during the trial. *114 "THE COURT: Is that right. Maybe I didn't notice because I was "MR. MILBRATH: I imagine |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | I didn't notice because I was "MR. MILBRATH: I imagine the Prosecutors have noticed that a time or two. "THE COURT: What's your solution? "MR. MILBRATH: Well, I just think a respectful comment from the Court that if any of them are getting drowsy, they just ask for a break or something might be helpful. "THE COURT: Well, here's what I have done in the past and, you have to do it very diplomatically, of course: I once said, I remember, `I think we'll just let everybody stand up and stretch, it's getting a little sleepy in here,' I said, but that doesn't sound good in the record. "I'm going to not going to take on that responsibility. If any of you think you see that happening, ask for a bench conference and come up and tell me about it and I'll figure out what to do about it, and I won't mention who suggested it. "MR. MILBRATH: All right. "THE COURT: But, I'm not going to sit here and watch. I'm among other things, I'm not going to see this is off the record. "(Discussion had off the record.) ". [T]his is a new thing to this jury, and I don't know how interesting it is to them or not; some of them look like they're pretty interested. "And, as I say, if you don't think they are, come up and let me know and I'll figure how either have a recess or which is more than likely what I would do." Tr. XX-XXX-XX-XXX. As the judge observed during the hearing, despite the above admonitions counsel did not bring the matter to the court again. App. 147. *115 The judge also observed that in the past courtroom employees had alerted him to problems with the jury. "Nothing was brought to my attention in this case about anyone appearing to be intoxicated," the judge stated, adding, "I saw nothing that suggested they were." Following the hearing the District Court filed an order stating that "[o]n the basis of the admissible evidence offered I specifically find that the motions for leave to interview jurors or for an evidentiary hearing at which jurors would be witnesses is not required or appropriate." The District Court also denied the motion for new trial. While the appeal of this case was pending before the Eleventh Circuit, petitioners filed another new trial motion based on additional evidence of jury misconduct. In another affidavit, Tanner's attorney stated that he received an unsolicited visit at his residence from a second juror, Daniel |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | unsolicited visit at his residence from a second juror, Daniel Hardy. Despite the fact that the District Court had denied petitioners' motion for leave to interview jurors, two days after Hardy's visit Tanner's attorney arranged for Hardy to be interviewed by two private investigators. The interview was transcribed, sworn to by the juror, and attached to the new trial motion. In the interview Hardy stated that he "felt like the jury was on one big party." Hardy indicated that seven of the jurors drank alcohol during the noon recess. Four jurors, including Hardy, consumed between them "a pitcher to three pitchers" of beer during various recesses. Of the three other jurors who were alleged to have consumed alcohol, Hardy stated that on several occasions he observed two jurors having one or two mixed drinks during the lunch recess, and one other juror, who was also the foreperson, having a liter of wine on each of three occasions. Juror Hardy also stated that he and three other jurors smoked marijuana quite regularly during the trial. Moreover, Hardy stated that during the trial he observed one juror ingest cocaine five times and another *116 juror ingest cocaine two or three times. One juror sold a quarter pound of marijuana to another juror during the trial, and took marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia into the courthouse. Hardy noted that some of the jurors were falling asleep during the trial, and that one of the jurors described himself to Hardy as "flying." Hardy stated that before he visited Tanner's attorney at his residence, no one had contacted him concerning the jury's conduct, and Hardy had not been offered anything in return for his statement. Hardy said that he came forward "to clear my conscience" and "[b]ecause I felt that the people on the jury didn't have no business being on the jury. I felt that Mr. Tanner should have a better opportunity to get somebody that would review the facts right." The District Court, stating that the motions "contain supplemental allegations which differ quantitatively but not qualitatively from those in the April motions," denied petitioners' motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, to consider whether the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing, including juror testimony, on juror alcohol and drug use during the trial, and to consider whether petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United within the meaning of 18 U.S. C. 371. II Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in not ordering an additional evidentiary hearing at |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | Court erred in not ordering an additional evidentiary hearing at which jurors would testify concerning drug and alcohol use during the trial. Petitioners assert that, contrary to the holdings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals, juror testimony on ingestion of drugs or alcohol during the trial is not barred by Federal Rule of 606(b). Moreover, petitioners argue that whether or not authorized by Rule 606(b), an evidentiary *117 hearing including juror testimony on drug and alcohol use is compelled by their Sixth Amendment right to trial by a competent jury. By the beginning of this century, if not earlier, the nearuniversal and firmly established common-law rule in the United flatly prohibited the admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict. See 8 J. Wigmore, 2352, pp. 696-697 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (common-law rule, originating from 1785 opinion of Lord Mansfield, "came to receive in the United an adherence almost unquestioned"). Exceptions to the common-law rule were recognized only in situations in which an "extraneous influence," was alleged to have affected the jury. In Mattox, this Court held admissible the testimony of jurors describing how they heard and read prejudicial information not admitted into evidence. The Court allowed juror testimony on influence by outsiders in and See also In situations that did not fall into this exception for external influence, however, the Court adhered to the common-law rule against admitting juror testimony to impeach a verdict. ; Lower courts used this external/internal distinction to identify those instances in which juror testimony impeaching a verdict would be admissible. The distinction was not based on whether the juror was literally inside or outside the jury room when the alleged irregularity took place; rather, the distinction was based on the nature of the allegation. Clearly a rigid distinction based only on whether the event took place inside or outside the jury room would have been *118 quite unhelpful. For example, under a distinction based on location a juror could not testify concerning a newspaper read inside the jury room. Instead, of course, this has been considered an external influence about which juror testimony is admissible. See United Similarly, under a rigid locational distinction jurors could be regularly required to testify after the verdict as to whether they heard and comprehended the judge's instructions, since the charge to the jury takes place outside the jury room. Courts wisely have treated allegations of a juror's inability to hear or comprehend at trial as an internal matter. See Government of the Virgin ; Most significant for the present case, however, is the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | ; Most significant for the present case, however, is the fact that lower federal courts treated allegations of the physical or mental incompetence of a juror as "internal" rather than "external" matters. In United the defendant Dioguardi received a letter from one of the jurors soon after the trial in which the juror explained that she had "eyes and ears that see things before [they] happen," but that her eyes "are only partly open" because "a curse was put upon them some years ago." Armed with this letter and the opinions of seven psychiatrists that the letter suggested that the juror was suffering from a psychological disorder, Dioguardi sought a new trial or in the alternative an evidentiary hearing on the juror's competence. The District Court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals noted "[t]he strong policy against any post-verdict inquiry into a juror's state of mind," and observed: "The quickness with which jury findings will be set aside when there is proof of tampering or external influence,. parallel the reluctance of courts to inquire into jury *119 deliberations when a verdict is valid on its face. Such exceptions support rather than undermine the rationale of the rule that possible internal abnormalities in a jury will not be inquired into except `in the gravest and most important cases.' " n. 12, quoting The Court of Appeals concluded that when faced with allegations that a juror was mentally incompetent, "courts have refused to set aside a verdict, or even to make further inquiry, unless there be proof of an adjudication of insanity or mental incompetence closely in advance of jury service," or proof of "a closely contemporaneous and independent post-trial adjudication of incompetency." See also ; United ; United aff'd, (CA3), cert. denied, This line of federal decisions was reviewed in Government of the Virgin in which the Court of Appeals concluded that a juror's allegation that a hearing impairment interfered with his understanding of the evidence at trial was not a matter of "external influence." Substantial policy considerations support the common-law rule against the admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict. As early as 1915 this Court explained the necessity of shielding jury deliberations from public scrutiny: "[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something *120 which might invalidate the finding. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | hope of discovering something *120 which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference." -268. See also The Court's holdings requiring an evidentiary hearing where extrinsic influence or relationships have tainted the deliberations do not detract from, but rather harmonize with, the weighty government interest in insulating the jury's deliberative process. See ; The Court's statement in Remmer that "[t]he integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions," could also be applied to the inquiry petitioners seek to make into the internal processes of the jury. There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it. Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process. See, e. g., Government of the Virgin Moreover, full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict, *121 and the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct. See Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, Federal Rule of 606(b) is grounded in the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception for juror testimony relating to extraneous influences. See Government of the Virgin n. 22 ; S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (observing that Rule 606(b) "embodied long-accepted Federal law"). Rule 606(b) states: "Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes." Petitioners have presented no argument that Rule 606(b) is inapplicable to the juror affidavits and the further inquiry they sought in this case, and, in fact, there appears to be virtually no support for such a proposition. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 287, pp. 121-125 (under Rule 606(b), "proof to the following effects is excludable : that one or more jurors was inattentive during trial or deliberations, sleeping or thinking about other matters"); cf. Note, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors *122 Rule of 606(b), and n. 88 (observing that under Rule 606(b), "juror testimony as to juror intoxication probably will be inadmissible"; note author suggests that "[o]ne possibility is for the courts to determine that certain acts, such as a juror becoming intoxicated outside the jury room, simply are not within the rule," but cites no authority in support of the suggestion). Rather, petitioners argue that substance abuse constitutes an improper "outside influence" about which jurors may testify under Rule 606(b). In our view the language of the Rule cannot easily be stretched to cover this circumstance. However severe their effect and improper their use, drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an "outside influence" than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack of sleep. In any case, whatever ambiguity might linger in the language of Rule 606(b) as applied to juror intoxication is resolved by the legislative history of the Rule. In following criticism of a proposed rule that would have allowed considerably broader use of juror testimony to impeach verdicts, the Advisory Committee drafted the present version of Rule 606(b). Compare 51 F. R. D. 315, 387 with 56 F. R. D. 183, 265 ; see 117 Cong. Rec. 33642, 33645 (letter from Sen. McClellan to Advisory Committee criticizing earlier proposal); at 35 This Court adopted the present version of Rule 606(b) and transmitted it to Congress. The House Judiciary Committee described the effect of the version of Rule 606(b) transmitted by the Court as follows: "As proposed by the Court, Rule 606(b) limited testimony by a juror in the course of an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment. He could testify as to the *123 influence of extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury's attention (e. g. a radio newscast |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | brought to the jury's attention (e. g. a radio newscast or a newspaper account) or an outside influence which improperly had been brought to bear upon a juror (e. g. a threat to the safety of a member of his family), but he could not testify as to other irregularities which occurred in the jury room. Under this formulation a quotient verdict could not be attacked through the testimony of juror, nor could a juror testify to the drunken condition of a fellow juror which so disabled him that he could not participate in the jury's deliberations." H. R. Rep. No. 93-650, pp. 9-10 (1973) (emphasis supplied). The House Judiciary Committee, persuaded that the better practice was to allow juror testimony on any "objective juror misconduct," amended the Rule so as to comport with the more expansive versions proposed by the Advisory Committee in earlier drafts,[*] and the House passed this amended version. The Senate Judiciary Committee did not voice any disagreement with the House's interpretation of the Rule proposed by the Court, or the version passed by the House. Indeed, the Senate Report described the House version as "considerably broader" than the version proposed by the Court, and noted that the House version "would permit the impeachment of verdicts by inquiry into, not the mental processes of the jurors, but what happened in terms of conduct in the jury room." S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 With *124 this understanding of the differences between the two versions of Rule 606(b) an understanding identical to that of the House the Senate decided to reject the broader House version and adopt the narrower version approved by the Court. The Senate Report explained: "[The House version's] extension of the ability to impeach a verdict is felt to be unwarranted and ill-advised. "The rule passed by the House embodies a suggestion by the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference that is considerably broader than the final version adopted by the Supreme Court, which embodied long-accepted Federal law. Although forbidding the impeachment of verdicts by inquiry into the jurors' mental processes, it deletes from the Supreme Court version the proscription against testimony `as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations.' This deletion would have the effect of opening verdicts up to challenge on the basis of what happened during the jury's internal deliberations, for example, where a juror alleged that the jury refused to follow the trial judge's instructions or that some of the jurors did not take part in deliberations. "Permitting an individual to attack |
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