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Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | exists. 9 Nor does it follow straightaway from the three points we have taken as given that Congress must have intended a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations. We do not doubt that regulations applying 601's ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce that section. Such regulations, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself, see NationsBank of N. C., N. ; Chevron U.S. and it is therefore meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the statute to be enforced through a private cause of action intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well. The many cases that respondents say have "assumed" that a cause of action to enforce a statute includes one to enforce its regulations illustrate (to the extent that cases in which an issue was not presented can illustrate anything) only this point; each involved regulations of the type we have just described, as respondents conceded at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. See National Collegiate Athletic ; School Bd. of Nassau ; (regulation interpreting Title VI to require "affirmative action" remedying effects of intentional discrimination); 309 Our decision in falls within the same category. The Title VI regulations at issue in Lau, similar to the ones at issue here, forbade funding recipients to take actions which had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Unlike our later cases, however, the Court in Lau interpreted 601 itself to proscribe disparate-impact discrimination, saying that it "rel[ied] solely on 601 to reverse the Court of Appeals," and that the disparate-impact regulations simply "[made] sure that recipients of federal aid conduct[ed] any federally financed projects consistently with 601,"5 10 We must face now the question avoided by Lau, because we have since rejected Lau's interpretation of 601 as reaching beyond intentional discrimination. See It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply 601-since they indeed forbid conduct that 601 permits-and therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations. See Central Bank of Denver, N. That right must come, if at all, from the independent force of 602. As stated earlier, we assume for purposes of this decision that 602 confers the authority to promulgate disparate-impact regulations6; the question remains whether it confers a private right of action to enforce them. If not, we must conclude that a failure to |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | them. If not, we must conclude that a failure to comply with regulations promulgated under 602 that is not also a failure to comply with 601 is not actionable. 11 Implicit in our discussion thus far has been a particular understanding of the genesis of private causes of action. Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. Touche Ross & The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, ; Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, ; Touche Ross & "Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals." Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & 12 Respondents would have us revert in this case to the understanding of private causes of action that held sway 40 years ago when Title VI was enacted. That understanding is captured by the Court's statement in J. I. Case that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose" expressed by a statute. We abandoned that understanding in -which itself interpreted a statute enacted under the ancien regime-and have not returned to it since. Not even when interpreting the same Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that was at issue in Borak have we applied Borak's method for discerning and defining causes of action. See Central Bank of Denver, N. ; Musick, Peeler & 291- ; Virginia Bankshares, at -1103; Touche Ross & at 576-. Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not accept respondents' invitation to have one last drink. 13 Nor do we agree with the Government that our cases interpreting statutes enacted prior to have given "dispositive weight" to the "expectations" that the enacting Congress had formed "in light of the 'contemporary legal context.' " Brief for United States 14. Only three of our legion implied-right-of-action cases have found this sort of "contemporary legal context" relevant, and two of those involved Congress's enactment (or reenactment) of the verbatim statutory text that courts had |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | (or reenactment) of the verbatim statutory text that courts had previously interpreted to create a private right of action. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 3-379 ; -699. In the third case, this sort of "contemporary legal context" simply buttressed a conclusion independently supported by the text of the statute. See We have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of text. In determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, see 4 legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text. 14 We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress's intent with the text and structure of Title VI.7 Section 602 authorizes federal agencies "to effectuate the provisions of [601] by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability." 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1. It is immediately clear that the "rights-creating" language so critical to the Court's analysis in Cannon of 601, see n. 13, is completely absent from 602. Whereas 601 decrees that "[n]o person shall be subjected to discrimination," 42 U.S.C. 2000d the text of 602 provides that "[e]ach Federal department and agency is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of [601]," 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1. Far from displaying congressional intent to create new rights, 602 limits agencies to "effectuat[ing]" rights already created by And the focus of 602 is twice removed from the individuals who will ultimately benefit from Title VI's protection. Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create "no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons." Section 602 is yet a step further removed: it focuses neither on the individuals protected nor even on the funding recipients being regulated, but on the agencies that will do the regulating. Like the statute found not to create a right of action in Universities Research Assn., Coutu, 602 is "phrased as a directive to federal agencies engaged in the distribution of public funds," When this is true, "[t]here [is] far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons," So far as we can tell, this authorizing portion of 602 reveals no congressional intent to create a private right of action. Nor do the methods that 602 goes on to provide for enforcing its authorized regulations manifest an intent to create a private remedy; if anything, they suggest the opposite. Section 602 empowers agencies to enforce their regulations either by terminating funding to the "particular program, or part thereof," that has violated the regulation or "by any other means authorized by law," 42 |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | regulation or "by any other means authorized by law," 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1. No enforcement action may be taken, however, "until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means." And every agency enforcement action is subject to judicial review. 2000d-2. If an agency attempts to terminate program funding, still more restrictions apply. The agency head must "file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action." 2000d-1. And the termination of funding does not "become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report." Whatever these elaborate restrictions on agency enforcement may imply for the private enforcement of rights created outside of 602, compare ; Regents of Univ. of 438 U.S., 19, n. 26 with -610 ; Regents of Univ. of they tend to contradict a congressional intent to create privately enforceable rights through 602 itself. The express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others. See, e.g., ; Northwest Airlines, Transport Workers, ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, -20. Sometimes the suggestion is so strong that it precludes a finding of congressional intent to create a private right of action, even though other aspects of the statute (such as language making the would-be plaintiff "a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted") suggest the contrary. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. ; see And as our Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S.C. 1983 cases show, some remedial schemes foreclose a private cause of action to enforce even those statutes that admittedly create substantive private rights. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage In the present case, the claim of exclusivity for the express remedial scheme does not even have to overcome such obstacles. The question whether 602's remedial scheme can overbear other evidence of congressional intent is simply not presented, since we have found no evidence anywhere in the text to suggest that Congress intended to create a private right to enforce regulations promulgated under 602. 16 Both the Government and respondents argue that the regulations contain rights-creating language and so must be privately enforceable, see Brief for United States ; Brief for Respondents 31, but that argument skips an analytical step. Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not. Touche Ross & n. 18 Thus, when a statute has provided a general authorization for private enforcement of regulations, it may perhaps be correct that the intent displayed in each regulation can determine whether or not it is privately enforceable. But it is most certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself. 17 The last string to respondents' and the Government's bow is their argument that two amendments to Title VI "ratified" this Court's decisions finding an implied private right of action to enforce the disparate-impact regulations. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1003, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7; Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 6, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-4a. One problem with this argument is that, as explained above, none of our decisions establishes (or even assumes) the private right of action at issue here, see which is why in three Justices were able expressly to reserve the question. See 463 U.S., Incorporating our cases in the amendments would thus not help respondents. Another problem is that the incorporation claim itself is flawed. Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of on which only respondents rely, by its terms applies only to suits "for a violation of a statute," 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7(a)(2) (emphasis added). It therefore does not speak to suits for violations of regulations that go beyond the statutory proscription of Section 6 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 is even less on point. That provision amends Title VI to make the term "program or activity" cover larger portions of the institutions receiving federal financial aid than it had previously covered, see Grove It is impossible to understand what this has to do with implied causes of action-which is why we declared in that 6 did not "in any way alte[r] the existing rights of action and the corresponding remedies permissible under Title VI." Respondents point to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, -382, which inferred congressional intent to ratify lower court decisions regarding a particular statutory provision when Congress comprehensively revised the statutory scheme but did not amend that provision. But we recently criticized 's reliance on congressional inaction, saying that "[a]s a general matter [the] argumen[t] deserve[s] little weight in the interpretive process." Central Bank of Denver, N. And when, as here, Congress has not comprehensively revised a statutory scheme but has made only isolated amendments, we have spoken |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | scheme but has made only isolated amendments, we have spoken more bluntly: "It is 'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." ). 18 Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under 602.8 We therefore hold that no such right of action exists. Since we reach this conclusion applying our standard test for discerning private causes of action, we do not address petitioners' additional argument that implied causes of action against States (and perhaps nonfederal state actors generally) are inconsistent with the clear statement rule of Pennhurst State School and See 19 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 20 It is so ordered. NOTES: 1 Since the parties do not dispute this point, it is puzzling to see Justice Stevens go out of his way to disparage the decisions in Regents of Univ. of and as "somewhat haphazard," post, at 16, particularly since he had already accorded stare decisis effect to the former 18 years ago, see -642 and since he participated in creating the latter, see Nor does Justice Stevens' reliance on Chevron U.S. see post, at 17-18, explain his aboutface, since he expressly reaffirms, see post, at 17-18, n. 18, the settled principle that decisions of this Court declaring the meaning of statutes prior to Chevron need not be reconsidered after Chevron in light of agency regulations that were already in force when our decisions were issued, Lechmere, NLRB, ; Maislin Industries, U.S., Primary Steel, Inc., ; see also ("It is, of course, of no importance that [an opinion] predates Chevron As we made clear in Chevron, the interpretive maxims summarized therein were 'well-settled principles' "). 2 Although the dissent acknowledges that "the breadth of [Cannon's] precedent is a matter upon which reasonable jurists may differ," post, at 21, it disagrees with our reading of Cannon's holding because it thinks the distinction we draw between disparate-impact and intentional discrimination was "wholly foreign" to that opinion, see post, at 5. Cannon, however, was decided less than one year after the Court in had drawn precisely that distinction with respect to Title VI, see and it is absurd to think that Cannon meant, without discussion, to ban under Title IX the very disparate-impact discrimination that said Title VI permitted. The only discussion in Cannon of Title IX's scope is found in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, which simply assumed that the conclusion that Title IX |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | opinion, which simply assumed that the conclusion that Title IX would be limited to intentional discrimination was "forgone in light of our holding" in The dissent's additional claim that Cannon provided a private right of action for "all the discrimination prohibited by the regulatory scheme contained in Title IX," post, at 5, n. 4 (emphasis added), simply begs the question at the heart of this case, which is whether a right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations must be independently identified, see infra, at 7-10. 3 We of course accept the statement by the author of the dissent that he "thought" at the time of that disparate-impact regulations could be enforced "in an implied action against private parties," post, at 9, n. 6. But we have the better interpretation of what our colleague wrote in In the closing section of his opinion, Justice Stevens concluded that because respondents in that case had "violated the petitioners' rights under [the] regulations [t]he petitioners were therefore entitled to the compensation they sought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and were awarded by the District Court." The passage omits any mention of a direct private right of action to enforce the regulations, and the footnote we have quoted in text-which appears immediately after this concluding sentence, see -makes clear that the omission was not accidental. 4 Ultimately, the dissent agrees that "the holding in does not compel the conclusion that a private right of action exists to enforce the Title VI regulations against private parties" Post, at 9. 5 It is true, as the dissent points out, see post, at 3-4, that three Justices who concurred in the result in Lau relied on regulations promulgated under 602 to support their position, see But the five Justices who made up the majority did not, and their holding is not made coextensive with the concurrence because their opinion does not expressly preclude (is "consistent with," see post, ) the concurrence's approach. The Court would be in an odd predicament if a concurring minority of the Justices could force the majority to address a point they found it unnecessary (and did not wish) to address, under compulsion of Justice Stevens' new principle that silence implies agreement. 6 For this reason, the dissent's extended discussion of the scope of agencies' regulatory authority under 602, see post, at 13-, is beside the point. We cannot help observing, however, how strange it is to say that disparate-impact regulations are "inspired by, at the service of, and inseparably intertwined with" 601, post, at when 601 permits the very behavior that the regulations forbid. |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | when 601 permits the very behavior that the regulations forbid. See ("If, as five members of the Court concluded in the purpose of Title VI is to proscribe only purposeful discrimination regulations that would proscribe conduct by the recipient having only a discriminatory effect do not simply 'further' the purpose of Title VI; they go well beyond that purpose"). 7 Although the dissent claims that we "adop[t] a methodology that blinds itself to important evidence of congressional intent," see post, at 21, our methodology is not novel, but well established in earlier decisions ), which explain that the interpretive inquiry begins with the text and structure of the statute, see and ends once it has become clear that Congress did not provide a cause of action. 8 The dissent complains that we "offe[r] little affirmative support" for this conclusion. Post, at 24. But as Justice Stevens has previously recognized in an opinion for the Court, "affirmative" evidence of congressional intent must be provided for an implied remedy, not against it, for without such intent "the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist," Northwest Airlines, Inc., The dissent's assertion that "petitioners have marshaled substantial affirmative evidence that a private right of action exists to enforce Title VI and the regulations validly promulgated thereunder," post, at 24-25, n. 26 (second emphasis added), once again begs the question whether authorization of a private right of action to enforce a statute constitutes authorization of a private right of action to enforce regulations that go beyond what the statute itself requires. Stevens, J., |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | In Oklahoma the defendant in a criminal prosecution is presumed to be competent to trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, 1175.4(B) (1991). Under that ard a defendant may be put to trial even though it is more likely than not that he is incompetent. The question we address in this case is whether the application of that ard to petitioner violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. I In 19 petitioner was charged with the brutal killing of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Petitioner's competence was the focus of significant attention both before and during his trial. On five separate occasions a judge considered whether petitioner had the ability to under the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. On the first occasion, a pretrial judge relied on the opinion of a clinical psychologist employed by the State to find petitioner incompetent. Based on that determination, he committed petitioner to a state mental health facility for treatment. *351 Upon petitioner's release from the hospital some three months later, the trial judge heard testimony concerning petitioner's competence from two state-employed psychologists. These experts expressed conflicting opinions regarding petitioner's ability to participate in his defense. The judge resolved the dispute against petitioner, ordering him to proceed to trial. At the close of a pretrial hearing held one week before the trial was scheduled to begin, the lead defense attorney raised the issue of petitioner's competence for a third time. Counsel advised the court that petitioner was behaving oddly and refusing to communicate with him. Defense counsel opined that it would be a serious matter "if he's not faking." App. 6. After listening to counsel's concerns, however, the judge declined to revisit his earlier determination that petitioner was competent to trial. Petitioner's competence was addressed a fourth time on the first day of trial, when petitioner's bizarre behavior prompted the court to conduct a further competency hearing at which the judge observed petitioner and heard testimony from several lay witnesses, a third psychologist, and petitioner himself.[1] The expert concluded that petitioner was * presently incompetent and unable to communicate effectively with counsel, but that he could probably achieve competence within six weeks if treated aggressively. While stating that he did not dispute the psychologist's diagnosis, the trial judge ruled against petitioner. In so |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | psychologist's diagnosis, the trial judge ruled against petitioner. In so holding, however, the court voiced uncertainty: "Well, I think I've used the expression in the past that normal is like us. Anybody that's not like us is not normal, so I don't think normal is a proper definition that we are to use with incompetence. My shirtsleeve opinion of Mr. Cooper is that he's not normal. Now, to say he's not competent is something else. "But you know, all things considered, I suppose it's possible for a client to be in such a predicament that he can't help his defense and still not be incompetent. I suppose that's a possibility, too. "I think it's going to take smarter people than me to make a decision here. I'm going to say that I don't believe he has carried the burden by clear and convincing evidence of his incompetency and I'm going to say we're going to go to trial." *353 Incidents that occurred during the trial,[2]as well as the sordid history of petitioner's childhood that was recounted during the sentencing phase of the proceeding, were consistent with the conclusions expressed by the expert. In a final effort to protect his client's interests, defense counsel moved for a mistrial or a renewed investigation into petitioner's competence. After the court summarily denied these motions, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death. In the Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner contended that Oklahoma's presumption of competence, combined with its statutory requirement that a criminal defendant establish incompetence by clear and convincing evidence, Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, 1175.4(B) (1991),[3] placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate his right to due process of law. The appellate court rejected this argument. After noting that it can be difficult to determine whether a defendant is malingering, given "the inexactness and uncertainty attached to [competency] proceedings," the court held that the ard was justified because the "State has great interest in assuring its citizens a thorough and speedy judicial process," and because a "truly incompetent criminal defendant, through his attorneys and experts, can prove incompetency with relative ease." We granted certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that application *354 of the clear and convincing evidence ard does not violate due process. II No one questions the existence of the fundamental right that petitioner invokes. We have repeatedly and consistently recognized that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." ; ; Nor is the significance of this right open to dispute. As Justice Kennedy recently emphasized: "Competence to trial is rudimentary, for |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | Justice Kennedy recently emphasized: "Competence to trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so."[4] The test for incompetence is also well settled. A defendant may not be put to trial unless he "`has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational undering [and] a rational as well as factual undering of the proceedings against him.' "[5] *355 Our recent decision in establishes that a State may presume that the defendant is competent and require him to shoulder the burden of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. In reaching that conclusion we held that the relevant inquiry was whether the presumption "`offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " ). We contrasted the "deep roots in our common-law heritage" underlying the prohibition against trying the incompetent with the absence of any settled tradition concerning the allocation of the burden of proof in a competency Our conclusion that the presumption of competence offends no recognized principle of "fundamental fairness" rested in part on the fact that the procedural rule affects the outcome "only in a narrow class of cases where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence that he is incompetent."[6] The question we address today is quite different from the question posed in Petitioner's claim requires us to consider whether a State may proceed with a criminal trial after the defendant has demonstrated that he is more likely than not incompetent. Oklahoma does not contend that it may require the defendant to prove incompetence beyond a reasonable doubt.[7] The State maintains, however, that the clear and convincing ard provides a reasonable accommodation *356 of the opposing interests of the State and the defendant. We are persuaded, by both traditional and modern practice and the importance of the constitutional interest at stake, that the State's argument must be rejected. "Historical practice is probative of whether a procedural rule can be characterized as fundamental," In this case, unlike in there is no indication that the rule Oklahoma seeks to defend has any roots in prior practice. Indeed, it appears that a rule significantly more favorable to the defendant |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | appears that a rule significantly more favorable to the defendant has had a long and consistent application. We turn first to an examination of the relevant commonlaw traditions of England and this country. The prohibition against trying the incompetent defendant was well established by the time Hale and Blackstone wrote their famous commentaries. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24 ("[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence [a]nd if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make his defence?"); 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *34-*35 (same). The English cases which predate our Constitution provide no guidance, however, concerning the applicable ard of proof in competency determinations. See Trial of Charles Bateman (1685), reported in 11 How. St. Tr. 464, 467 and Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 How. St. Tr. 474, 476 (noting that the court in the 1685 trial incurred "censure" for proceeding to trial with a doubt as to the defendant's competence); Kinloch's Case (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 395, 411 (1813); King v. Steel, 1 Leach 452, 168 Eng. Rep. 328 (1787). Beginning in the late 18th century, cases appear which provide an inkling of the proper ard. In King v. Frith, 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790), for example, the court instructed *357 the jury to "diligently inquire whether John Frith, the now prisoner at the bar be of sound mind and undering or not" at 311. Some 50 years later the jurors received a nearly identical admonition in Queen v. Goode, 7 Ad. & E. 536, 112 Eng. Rep. 572 (K. B. 1837): "`You shall diligently inquire, and true presentment make whether John Goode be insane or not' " n. (a), 112 Eng. Rep., at 572-573, n. (a) 2.[8] Similarly, in King v. Pritchard, 7 Car. & P. 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836), the court empaneled a jury to consider "whether the prisoner is mute of malice or not; secondly, whether he can plead to the indictment or not; thirdly, whether he is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial" See also King v. Dyson, 73 Car. & P. 305, n. (a), 173 Eng. Rep. 135-136, n. (a) (1831); Queen v. Southey, 4 F. & F. 864, 5, 176 Eng. Rep. 825, 838 (1865); Queen v. Berry, 1 Q. B. Rep. 447, 449 (1876). [9] These authorities, while still speaking less clearly than we might wish, are instructive. By phrasing the inquiry in a simple disjunctive, Frith, Goode, and Pritchard suggest that |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | in a simple disjunctive, Frith, Goode, and Pritchard suggest that traditional practice required the jury to determine whether the defendant was "more likely than not" incompetent. Nothing in the jury instructions of these cases will bear the interpretation of a clear and convincing ard. What is more, the cases contain no indication that the use of a preponderance *358 ard represented a departure from earlier (pre-Constitution) practice.[10] Modern English authority confirms our interpretation of these early cases as applying a preponderance ard. Relying on "principles laid down in a number of cases," including Pritchard and King v. Dyson, 7 Car. & P. 305, n. (a), 173 Eng. Rep. 135, n. (a) (1831), the court in Queen v. Podola, 43 Crim. App. 220, 3 All E. R. 418 (1959), ruled: "If the contention that the accused is insane is put forward by the defence and contested by the prosecution, there is, in our judgment, a burden upon the defence of satisfying the jury of the accused's insanity. In such a case, as in other criminal cases in which the onus of proof rests upon the defence, the onus is discharged if the jury are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the accused's insanity has been made out." 3 All E. R., at 429.[11] *359 Likewise, we are aware of no decisional law from this country suggesting that any State employed Oklahoma's heightened ard until quite recently. Rather, the earliest available sources typically refer to English authorities, see, e. g., (adopting procedures outlined in King v. Dyson, 7 Car. & P. 305, n. (a), 173 Eng. Rep. 135, n. (a) (1831), and King v. Pritchard, 7 Car. & P. 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836)), and employ the disjunctive language used by the English courts, see, e. g., ; ; ; United[12] By the turn of the 20th century, however, American courts were explicitly applying a preponderance ard. In Ohio juries were instructed that "[t]he burden is upon the prisoner to show by a preponderance of the proof that he is insane."[13] Some years later, the Tennessee Supreme Court described the competency determination as *360 "controlled by the preponderance of the proof," and the highest court of Pennsylvania held that competence is "decided by a preponderance of the evidence," 242 Pa. A. 562,[14] These early authorities are bereft of language susceptible of supporting a clear and convincing evidence ard.[] Contemporary practice demonstrates that the vast majority of jurisdictions remain persuaded that the heightened ard of proof imposed on the accused in Oklahoma is not necessary to vindicate the State's interest in prompt |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | is not necessary to vindicate the State's interest in prompt and orderly disposition of criminal cases. Only 4 of the 50 presently require the criminal defendant to prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence.[16] None of the remaining *361 46 jurisdictions imposes such a heavy burden on the defendant.[17] Indeed, a number of place no burden on the defendant at all, but rather require the prosecutor to *362 prove the defendant's competence to trial once a question about competency has been credibly raised.[18] The situation is no different in federal court. Congress has directed that the accused in a federal prosecution must prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S. C. 4241. The near-uniform application of a ard that is more protective of the defendant's rights than Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence rule supports our conclusion that the heightened ard offends a principle of justice that is deeply "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people." 505 U. S., We turn next to a consideration of whether the rule exhibits "`fundamental fairness' in operation." ). IV Contemporary and historical procedures are fully consistent with our evaluation of the risks inherent in Oklahoma's practice of requiring the defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. In we explained that: "The function of a ard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to `instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' In re Winship," The "more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision." *363 For that reason, we have held that due process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the "individual interests at stake are both `particularly important' and `more substantial than mere loss of money.' " (quoting ).[19] Far from "jealously guard[ing]," 3 U.S. 752, an incompetent criminal defendant's fundamental right not to trial, Oklahoma's practice of requiring the defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence imposes a significant risk of an erroneous determination that the defendant is competent. In we found no comparable risk because the presumption would affect only the narrow class of cases in which the evidence on either side was equally balanced. *364 "Once a State provides a defendant access to procedures for making a competency evaluation," we stated, there is "no basis for holding that due process further |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | there is "no basis for holding that due process further requires the State to assume the burden of vindicating the defendant's constitutional right by persuading the trier of fact that the defendant is competent to trial." 505 U.S., Unlike the presumption at issue in however, Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence ard affects a class of cases in which the defendant has already demonstrated that he is more likely than not incompetent. For the defendant, the consequences of an erroneous determination of competence are dire. Because he lacks the ability to communicate effectively with counsel, he may be unable to exercise other "rights deemed essential to a fair trial." After making the "profound" choice whether to plead guilty, 509 U.S. 3, the defendant who proceeds to trial "will ordinarily have to decide whether to waive his `privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,' Boy- by taking the witness ; if the option is available, he may have to decide whether to waive his `right to trial by jury,' ibid.; and, in consultation with counsel, he may have to decide whether to waive his `right to confront [his] accusers,' ib by declining to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution." With the assistance of counsel, the defendant also is called upon to make myriad smaller decisions concerning the course of his defense. The importance of these rights and decisions demonstrates that an erroneous determination of competence threatens a "fundamental component of our criminal justice system"[20]the basic fairness of the trial itself. *365 By comparison to the defendant's interest, the injury to the State of the opposite errora conclusion that the defendant is incompetent when he is in fact malingeringis modest. To be sure, such an error imposes an expense on the state treasury and frustrates the State's interest in the prompt disposition of criminal charges. But the error is subject to correction in a subsequent proceeding and the State may detain the incompetent defendant for "the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain [competence] in the foreseeable future." 406 U.S. 7,[21] The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals correctly observed that the "inexactness and uncertainty" that characterize competency proceedings may make it difficult to determine whether a defendant is incompetent or 8 P.2d, at We presume, however, that it is unusual for even the most artful malingerer to feign incompetence successfully for a period of time while under professional care.[22] In this regard it is worth reiterating that only four jurisdictions currently consider it necessary to impose on the criminal defendant the burden of proving incompetence by clear |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | the criminal defendant the burden of proving incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the art of dissimilation is new. Eighteenth and nineteenth century courts, for example, warned jurors charged with making competency determinations that "`there may be great fraud in this matter,' " King v. Dyson, 7 Car. & P. 305, n. (a), 173 Eng. Rep., at 136, n. (a) (quoting *366 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, at *35), and that "[i]t would be a reproach to justice if a guilty man postponed his trial upon a feigned condition of mind, as to his inability to aid in his defense," United[23] Although they recognized this risk, the early authorities did not resort to a heightened burden of proof in competency proceedings. See Part More fundamentally, while the difficulty of ascertaining where the truth lies may make it appropriate to place the burden of proof on the proponent of an issue, it does not justify the additional onus of an especially high ard of proof. As the Court continued, "[I]t would be likewise a reproach to justice and our institutions, if a human being were compelled to go to trial at a time when he is not sufficiently in possession of his mental faculties to enable him to make a rational and proper defense. The latter would be a more grievous error than the former; since in the one case an individual would go unwhipped of justice, while in the other the great safeguards which the law adopts in the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice would be rudely invaded by the tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the law in all its integrity." A heightened ard does not decrease the risk of error, but simply reallocates that risk between the parties. See 497 U. S., at In cases in which competence is at issue, we perceive no sound basis for allocating to the criminal defendant the large share of the risk which accompanies a clear and convincing evidence ard. We assume that questions of competence will arise in a range of cases including not only those in which one side will prevail with relative ease, but also those in which it is more likely than not that the defendant *367 is incompetent but the evidence is insufficiently strong to satisfy a clear and convincing ard. While important state interests are unquestionably at stake, in these latter cases the defendant's fundamental right to be tried only while competent outweighs the State's interest in the efficient operation of its |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | outweighs the State's interest in the efficient operation of its criminal justice system. V Oklahoma makes two additional arguments in support of its procedural rule that warrant discussion. First, Oklahoma correctly reminds us that it is normally within the power of the State to establish the procedures through which its laws are given effect, including those related to the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion. See -. In Patterson we upheld New 's requirement that in a prosecution for second-degree murder the defendant must bear the burden of proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter. After observing that the rule was consistent with common-law practice, at we held that "[t]he Due Process Clause does not put New to the choice of abandoning [statutory] defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment," Although we found no violation in Patterson, we noted that the State's power to regulate procedural burdens was subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause if it "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," at 201- This case involves such a rule. Unlike Patterson, which concerned procedures for proving a statutory defense, we consider here whether a State's procedures for guaranteeing a fundamental constitutional right are sufficiently protective *368 of that right. The deep roots and fundamental character of the defendant's right not to trial when it is more likely than not that he lacks the capacity to under the nature of the proceedings against him or to communicate effectively with counsel mandate constitutional protection. Finally, Oklahoma suggests that our decision in in which we held that due process requires a clear and convincing ard of proof in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding, supports imposition of such a rule in competency proceedings. The argument is unpersuasive because commitment and competency proceedings address entirely different substantive issues. Although we have not had the opportunity to consider the outer limits of a State's authority to civilly commit an unwilling individual, 422 U.S. our decision in Donaldson makes clear that due process requires at a minimum a showing that the person is mentally ill and either poses a danger to himself or others or is incapable of "surviving safely in freedom," at 573 576. The test for competence to trial, by contrast, is whether the defendant has the present ability to under the charges against him and |
Justice Stevens | 1,996 | 16 | majority | Cooper v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118018/cooper-v-oklahoma/ | the present ability to under the charges against him and communicate effectively with defense counsel. 362 U. S., at Even if we were to uphold Oklahoma's imposition of the clear and convincing evidence rule in competency proceedings, the comparable ards in the two proceedings would not guarantee parallel results.[24] More importantly, our decision today is in complete accord with the basis for our ruling in Both cases concern the proper protection of fundamental rights in circumstances in which the State proposes to take drastic action against an individual. The requirement that the grounds for civil commitment be shown by clear and convincing evidence *369 protects the individual's fundamental interest in liberty. The prohibition against requiring the criminal defendant to demonstrate incompetence by clear and convincing evidence safeguards the fundamental right not to trial while incompetent. Because Oklahoma's procedural rule allows the State to put to trial a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent, the rule is incompatible with the dictates of due process.[25] VI For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Thomas | 2,002 | 1 | second_dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | I join The Chief Justice's dissent. I write separately to address the majority's conclusion that the temporary moratorium at issue here was not a taking because it was not a "taking of `the parcel as a whole.' " Ante, at 332. While this questionable rule[*] has been applied to various alleged regulatory takings, it was, in my view, rejected in the context of temporal deprivations of property by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of which held that temporary and permanent takings "are not different in kind" when a landowner is deprived of all beneficial use of his land. I had thought that First English put to rest the notion that the "relevant denominator" is land's infinite life. Consequently, a regulation effecting a total deprivation of the use of a so-called "temporal slice" of property is compensable under the Takings Clause unless background principles of state property law prevent it from being deemed a taking; "total deprivation of use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." A taking is exactly what occurred in this case. No one seriously doubts that the land-use regulations at issue rendered petitioners' land unsusceptible of any economically beneficial use. This was true at the inception of the moratorium, *356 and it remains true today. These individuals and families were deprived of the opportunity to build singlefamily homes as permanent, retirement, or vacation residences on land upon which such construction was authorized when purchased. The Court assures them that "a temporary prohibition on economic use" cannot be a taking because "[l]ogically the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted." Ante, at 332. But the "logical" assurance that a "temporary restriction merely causes a diminution in value," ibid., is cold comfort to the property owners in this case or any other. After all, "[i]n the long run we are all dead." J. Keynes, Monetary Reform 88 (1924). I would hold that regulations prohibiting all productive uses of property are subject to Lucas' per se rule, regardless of whether the property so burdened retains theoretical useful life and value if, and when, the "temporary" moratorium is lifted. To my mind, such potential future value bears on the amount of compensation due and has nothing to do with the question whether there was a taking in the first place. It is regrettable that the Court has charted a markedly different path today. |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | Reetz v. Bozanich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108078/reetz-v-bozanich/ | This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S. C. 2281, 2284, declaring certain fishing laws of Alaska and regulations under them unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement. We noted probable jurisdiction. The laws in question, passed in 1968, concern salmon net gear licenses for commercial fishing, not licenses for other types of salmon fishing. They are challenged because they limit licensees to a defined group of persons. The Act in material part provides:[1] "Persons eligible for gear licenses. (a) Except in cases of extreme hardship as defined by the Board of Fish and Game, a salmon net gear license for a specific salmon registration area may be issued only to a person who "(1) has previously held a salmon net gear license for that specific salmon registration area; or "(2) has, for any three years, held a commercial fishing license and while so licensed actively engaged in commercial fishing in that specific area." The regulations[2] provide that except in cases of "extreme hardship[3] a salmon net gear license for a *84 specific salmon registration area may be issued only to a person who: "(A) has held in 1965 or subsequent years a salmon net gear license for that specific salmon registration area; or "(B) has, for any three years since January 1, 1960, held a commercial fishing license and while so licensed actively engaged in commercial fishing in that specific area." Appellees are nonresident who applied for commercial salmon net gear licenses. They apparently are experienced net gear salmon fishermen but they cannot qualify for a salmon net gear license to fish in any of the 12 regions or areas described in the Act and the regulations.[4] Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Act and regulations deprived them of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and also their rights under the Alaska Constitution. That constitution provides in Art. VIII, 3: "Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use." And it provides in Art. VIII, 15: "No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State." Appellants filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively to stay the proceedings in the District Court pending *85 the determination of the Alaska constitutional question by an Alaska court. Appellants' motion to dismiss or to stay was denied. Appellees' motion for summary judgment was granted, the three-judge District Court holding that the Act and regulations in question |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | Reetz v. Bozanich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108078/reetz-v-bozanich/ | District Court holding that the Act and regulations in question were unconstitutional both under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Constitution of -307. This case is virtually on all fours with City of where a single district judge in construing a Mississippi statute held that it violated both the Federal and the State Constitutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed and we vacated its judgment and remanded to the District Court with directions to hold the case while the parties repaired to a state tribunal "for an authoritative declaration of applicable state law." We said: "Proper exercise of federal jurisdiction requires that controversies involving unsettled questions of state law be decided in the state tribunals preliminary to a federal court's consideration of the underlying federal constitutional questions. That is especially desirable where the questions of state law are enmeshed with federal questions. Here, the state law problems are delicate ones, the resolution of which is not without substantial difficulty certainly for a federal court. In such a case, when the state court's interpretation of the statute or evaluation of its validity under the state constitution may obviate any need to consider its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision unnecessarily." -641. *86 We are advised that the provisions of the Alaska Constitution at issue have never been interpreted by an Alaska court. The District Court, feeling sure of its grounds on the merits, held, however, that this was not a proper case for abstention, saying that "if the question had been presented to an Alaska court, it would have shared our conviction that the challenged gear licensing scheme is not supportable." The three-judge panel was a distinguished one, two being former Alaska lawyers. And they felt that prompt decision was necessary to avoid the "grave and irreparable" injury to the "economic livelihood" of the appellees which would result, if they could not engage in their occupation "during this year's forthcoming fishing season." It is, of course, true that abstention is not necessary whenever a federal court is faced with a question of local law, the classic case being where federal jurisdiction was based on diversity only. Abstention certainly involves duplication of effort and expense and an attendant delay. See That is why we have said that this judicially created rule which stems from Railroad should be applied only where "the issue of state law is uncertain." Moreover, we said in that abstention was applicable "only in narrowly limited `special circumstances,' " citing In Zwickler, a |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | Reetz v. Bozanich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108078/reetz-v-bozanich/ | in narrowly limited `special circumstances,' " citing In Zwickler, a state statute was attacked on the ground that on its face it was repugnant to the First Amendment; and it was conceded that state court construction could not render unnecessary a decision of the First Amendment A state court decision here, however, *87 could conceivably avoid any decision under the Fourteenth Amendment and would avoid any possible irritant in the federal-state relationship. The Pullman doctrine was based on "the avoidance of needless friction" between federal pronouncements and state The instant case is the classic case in that tradition, for here the nub of the whole controversy may be the state constitution. The constitutional provisions relate to fish resources, an asset unique in its abundance in The statute and regulations relate to that same unique resource, the management of which is a matter of great state concern. We appreciate why the District Court felt concern over the effect of further delay on these plaintiffs, the appellees here; but we have concluded that the first judicial application of these constitutional provisions should properly be by an Alaska court. We think the federal court should have stayed its hand while the parties repaired to the state courts for a resolution of their state constitutional questions. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | Over two centuries ago, just after the Bill of Rights was ratified, Justice Chase wrote: "An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it." Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on government power. Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgradedi. e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the publicin the process. To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development takings "for public use" is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of propertyand thereby effectively to delete the words "for public use" from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly I respectfully dissent. I Petitioners are nine resident or investment owners of 15 homes in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood of New London, Connecticut. Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery, for example, lives in a house on Walbach Street that has been in her family for over 100 years. She was born in the house in 1918; her husband, petitioner Charles Dery, moved into the house when they married in 1946. Their son lives next door with *5 his family in the house he received as a wedding gift, and joins his parents in this suit. Two petitioners keep rental properties in the neighborhood. In February 1998, Pfizer Inc., the pharmaceuticals manufacturer, announced that it would build a global research facility near the Fort Trumbull neighborhood. Two months later, New London's city council gave initial approval for the New London Development Corporation (NLDC) to prepare the development plan at issue here. The NLDC is a private, nonprofit corporation whose mission is to assist the city council in economic development planning. It is not elected by popular vote, and its directors and employees are privately appointed. Consistent with its mandate, the NLDC generated an ambitious plan for redeveloping 90 acres of Fort Trumbull in order to "complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of the city's waterfront, and eventually `build momentum' for the revitalization of the rest of the city." App. to Pet. for Cert. 5. Petitioners own properties in two of the plan's seven parcelsParcel 3 and Parcel 4A. Under the plan, Parcel 3 is slated for the construction of research and office space as a market develops for such space. It will also retain the existing Italian Dramatic Club (a private cultural organization) though the homes of three plaintiffs in that parcel are to be demolished. Parcel 4A is slated, mysteriously, for "`park support.'" At oral argument, counsel for respondents conceded the vagueness of this proposed use, and offered that the parcel might eventually be used for parking. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. To save their homes, petitioners sued New London and the NLDC, to whom New London has delegated eminent domain power. Petitioners maintain that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the NLDC from condemning their properties for the sake of an economic development plan. Petitioners are not holdouts; they do not seek increased compensation, and *6 none is opposed to new development in the area. Theirs is an objection in principle: They claim that the NLDC's proposed use for their confiscated property is not a "public" one for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. While the government may take their homes to build a road or a railroad or to eliminate a property use that harms the public, say petitioners, it cannot take their property for the private use of other owners simply because the new owners may make more productive use of the property. II The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." When interpreting the Constitution, we begin with the unremarkable presumption that every word in the document has independent meaning, "that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added." In keeping with that presumption, we have read the Fifth Amendment's language to impose two distinct conditions on the exercise of eminent domain: "[T]he taking must be for a `public use' and `just compensation' must be paid to the owner." These two limitations serve to protect "the security of Property," which Alexander Hamilton described to the Philadelphia Convention as one of the "great obj[ects] of Gov[ernment]." 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 302 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). Together they ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards against |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | Together they ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's eminent domain powerparticularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons, may be unable to protect themselves in the political process against the majority's will. *7 While the Takings Clause presupposes that government can take private property without the owner's consent, the just compensation requirement spreads the cost of condemnations and thus "prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government." Monongahela Nav. ; see also The public use requirement, in turn, imposes a more basic limitation, circumscribing the very scope of the eminent domain power: Government may compel an individual to forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the benefit of another private person. This requirement promotes fairness as well as security. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Where is the line between "public" and "private" property use? We give considerable deference to legislatures' determinations about what governmental activities will advantage the public. But were the political branches the sole arbiters of the public-private distinction, the Public Use Clause would amount to little more than hortatory fluff. An external, judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this constraint on government power is to retain any meaning. See Our cases have generally identified three categories of takings that comply with the public use requirement, though it is in the nature of things that the boundaries between these categories are not always firm. Two are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. First, the sovereign may transfer private property to public ownershipsuch as for a road, a hospital, or a military base. See, e. g., Old Dominion *8 Land ; Rindge Second, the sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, often common carriers, who make the property available for the public's usesuch as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium. See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger ; Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck But "public ownership" and "use-by-the-public" are sometimes too constricting and impractical ways to define the scope of the Public Use Clause. Thus we have allowed that, in certain circumstances and to meet certain exigencies, takings that serve a public purpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the property is destined for subsequent private use. See, e. g., ; Hawaii Housing This case returns us for the first time in over 20 years to the hard question of when a purportedly "public purpose" taking meets the public use requirement. It presents an issue of first impression: |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | public use requirement. It presents an issue of first impression: Are economic development takings constitutional? I would hold that they are not. We are guided by two precedents about the taking of real property by eminent domain. In we upheld takings within a blighted neighborhood of Washington, D. C. The neighborhood had so deteriorated that, for example, 64.3% of its dwellings were beyond repair. It had become burdened with "overcrowding of dwellings," "lack of adequate streets and alleys," and "lack of light and air." Congress had determined that the neighborhood had become "injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare" and that it was necessary to "eliminat[e] all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate for the purpose," including eminent domain. Mr. 's department store was not itself blighted. Having approved *9 of Congress' decision to eliminate the harm to the public emanating from the blighted neighborhood, however, we did not second-guess its decision to treat the neighborhood as a whole rather than lot-by-lot. -35; see also In we upheld a land condemnation scheme in Hawaii whereby title in real property was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. At that time, the State and Federal Governments owned nearly % of the State's land, and another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners. Concentration of land ownership was so dramatic that on the State's most urbanized island, Oahu, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles. The Hawaii Legislature had concluded that the oligopoly in land ownership was "skewing the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare," and therefore enacted a condemnation scheme for redistributing title. In those decisions, we emphasized the importance of deferring to legislative judgments about public purpose. Because courts are ill equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative initiatives, we rejected as unworkable the idea of courts' "`deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields.'" ); see ; see also Likewise, we recognized our inability to evaluate whether, in a given case, eminent domain is a necessary means by which to pursue the legislature's ends. ; *500 Yet for all the emphasis on deference, and hewed to a bedrock principle without which our public use jurisprudence would collapse: "A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void." ; )); see also Missouri Pacific R. To protect that principle, those decisions reserved "a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use [though] the Court in made clear that it is `an extremely narrow' one." (quoting ). The Court's holdings in and were true to the principle underlying the Public Use Clause. In both those cases, the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on societyin through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the harm. -29; Thus a public purpose was realized when the harmful use was eliminated. Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use. Here, in contrast, New London does not claim that Susette Kelo's and Wilhelmina Dery's well-maintained homes are the source of any social harm. Indeed, it could not so claim without adopting the absurd argument that any single-family home that might be razed to make way for an apartment building, or any church *501 that might be replaced with a retail store, or any small business that might be more lucrative if it were instead part of a national franchise, is inherently harmful to society and thus within the government's power to condemn. In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the publicsuch as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure. But nearly any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitutional, then the words "for public use" do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power. There is a sense in which this troubling result follows from errant language in and In discussing whether takings within a blighted neighborhood were for a public use, began by observing: "We deal, in other words, with what |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | began by observing: "We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power." 348 U. S., From there it declared that "[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear." Following up, we said in that "[t]he `public use' requirement is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." 467 U. S., This language was unnecessary to the specific holdings of those decisions. and simply did not put such language to the constitutional test, because the takings in those cases were within the police power but also for "public use" for the reasons I have described. The case before us now demonstrates why, when deciding if a taking's purpose is *502 constitutional, the police power and "public use" cannot always be equated. The Court protests that it does not sanction the bare transfer from A to B for B's benefit. It suggests two limitations on what can be taken after today's decision. First, it maintains a role for courts in ferreting out takings whose sole purpose is to bestow a benefit on the private transferee without detailing how courts are to conduct that complicated inquiry. Ante, at 477-478. For his part, JUSTICE KENNEDY suggests that courts may divine illicit purpose by a careful review of the record and the process by which a legislature arrived at the decision to takewithout specifying what courts should look for in a case with different facts, how they will know if they have found it, and what to do if they do not. Ante, at 1-2 (concurring opinion). Whatever the details of JUSTICE KENNEDY's as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the "stupid staff[er]" failing it. See The trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing. In this case, for example, any boon for Pfizer or the plan's developer is difficult to disaggregate from the promised public gains in taxes and jobs. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 275-277. Even if there were a practical way to isolate the motives behind a given taking, the gesture toward a purpose test is theoretically flawed. If it is true that incidental public benefits from new private use are enough to ensure the "public purpose" in a taking, why should it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking in the first place? How much the government does or does not desire to benefit a favored private party has |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | does not desire to benefit a favored private party has no bearing on whether an economic development taking will or will not generate secondary benefit for the public. And whatever the reason for a given condemnation, the effect is the same *503 from the constitutional perspectiveprivate property is forcibly relinquished to new private ownership. A second proposed limitation is implicit in the Court's opinion. The logic of today's decision is that eminent domain may only be used to upgradenot downgradeproperty. At best this makes the Public Use Clause redundant with the Due Process Clause, which already prohibits irrational government action. See Lingle, The Court rightfully admits, however, that the judiciary cannot get bogged down in predictive judgments about whether the public will actually be better off after a property transfer. In any event, this constraint has no realistic import. For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive possible use of her property? The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory. Cf. (taking the homes and farm of four owners in their 70's and 's and giving it to an "industrial park"); 99 Cents Only ; Poletown Neighborhood overruled by County of ; Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae 4-11 (describing takings of religious institutions' properties); Institute for Justice, D. Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five-Year, State-by-State Report Examining the Abuse of Eminent Domain (collecting accounts of economic development takings). The Court also puts special emphasis on facts peculiar to this case: The NLDC's plan is the product of a relatively careful deliberative process; it proposes to use eminent domain *504 for a multipart, integrated plan rather than for isolated property transfer; it promises an array of incidental benefits (even esthetic ones), not just increased tax revenue; it comes on the heels of a legislative determination that New London is a depressed municipality. See, e. g., ante, at 487 ("[A] one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in this case"). JUSTICE KENNEDY, too, takes great comfort in these facts. Ante, at 3 (concurring opinion). But none has legal significance to blunt the force of today's holding. If legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefits of a new use can legitimate a taking, there is nothing in the Court's rule or in JUSTICE KENNEDY's gloss on that rule to prohibit property transfers generated with less care, |
Justice O'Connor | 2,005 | 14 | dissenting | Kelo v. New London | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799984/kelo-v-new-london/ | that rule to prohibit property transfers generated with less care, that are less comprehensive, that happen to result from less elaborate process, whose only projected advantage is the incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an already prosperous city into an even more prosperous one. Finally, in a coda, the Court suggests that property owners should turn to the States, who may or may not choose to impose appropriate limits on economic development takings. Ante, at 489. This is an abdication of our responsibility. States play many important functions in our system of dual sovereignty, but compensating for our refusal to enforce properly the Federal Constitution (and a provision meant to curtail state action, no less) is not among them. * * * It was possible after and to imagine unconstitutional transfers from A to B. Those decisions endorsed government intervention when private property use had veered to such an extreme that the public was suffering as a consequence. Today nearly all real property is susceptible to condemnation on the Court's theory. In the prescient words of a dissenter from the infamous decision in Poletown, "[n]ow that we have authorized local legislative *505 bodies to decide that a different commercial or industrial use of property will produce greater public benefits than its present use, no homeowner's, merchant's or manufacturer's property, however productive or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation for the benefit of other private interests that will put it to a `higher' use." -645, 304 N.W. 2d, at 464 (opinion of Fitzgerald, J.). This is why economic development takings "seriously jeopardiz[e] the security of all private property ownership." 304 N.W. 2d, at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result. "[T]hat alone is a just government," wrote James Madison, "which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own." For the National Gazette, Property (Mar. 27, 1792), reprinted in 14 Papers of James Madison 266 (R. Rutland et al. eds. 1983). I would hold that the takings in both Parcel 3 and Parcel 4A are unconstitutional, reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, and remand for further proceedings. |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | In 1970 Congress enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S. C. App., pp. 1395-1398 ( ed.), joining the United States and the District of Columbia as parties to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement).[1] The Agreement, which has also been enacted by 46 States, is designed "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of.charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." Art. I. It prescribes procedures by which a member State may obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against him in another jurisdiction. In either case, however, the provisions of the Agreement are triggered only when a "detainer" is filed with the custodial (sending) State by another State (receiving) having untried charges pending against the prisoner; to obtain *344 temporary custody, the receiving State must also file an appropriate "request" with the sending State. The present cases concern the scope of the United States' obligations under the Agreement, and in particular pose the question whether a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, used by the United States to secure the presence in federal court of state prisoners, may be considered either a "detainer" or a "request" within the meaning of the Agreement. I A Respondents in No. 76-1596, Mauro and Fusco, were indicted for criminal contempt in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on. November 3, 1975.[2] At the time of their indictments, both men were serving state sentences at New York correctional facilities.[3] On November 5, 1975, the District Court issued separate writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, directing the wardens of the prisons where Mauro and Fusco were incarcerated to produce them before the District Court on November 19, 1975. Mauro and Fusco were arraigned in the District Court on November 24, 1975, at which time they both entered pleas of not guilty. Following their arraignment, they were retained in federal custody at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City. On December 2, 1975, respondents again appeared before the District Court, this time for the purpose of setting a trial date. After trial dates had been established, the court, noting *345 the overcrowded conditions at the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center, directed that Mauro and Fusco be returned to their respective state prisons until shortly before their trials. On April 26, Mauro was again removed from state prison and taken before the District Court pursuant to a |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | prison and taken before the District Court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, as was Fusco on April 29, Prior to these appearances, respondents had moved for dismissal of their indictments on the ground that the United States had violated Art. IV (e) of the Agreement by returning them to state custody without first trying them on the federal indictment.[4] The District Court granted their motions to dismiss the indictments, finding that the Agreement governed their removal from state custody by means of the writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and that the Government had violated the provisions of Art. IV (e). On appeal a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissals of respondents' indictments. It held that a "writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a detainer entitling the state inmate to the protection provided in Article IV [of the Agreement] and specifically to a trial before his return to the state institution." To hold that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was not a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement, reasoned the court, would permit the United States to circumvent its obligations under the Agreement. B Respondent in No. 77-52, Ford, was arrested in Chicago on October 11, 1973, on two federal warrants.[5] Shortly after his *346 arrest, he was turned over to Illinois authorities for extradition to Massachusetts on older, unrelated state charges. While in the custody of the Illinois authorities, Ford requested a speedy trial on the federal bank robbery charge by means of letters sent to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the United States District Court for that District.[6] After he was transferred to Massachusetts, federal officials lodged the federal bank robbery warrant as a detainer against him with the state prison authorities. Following Ford's conviction on the Massachusetts charges, an indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, charging Ford with bank robbery and aggravated bank robbery. On April 1, 1974, he was produced from Massachusetts for arraignment before the District Court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by the court on March 25, 1974. Because Ford was not represented by counsel, the proceedings were adjourned until April 15, at which time he pleaded not guilty to a superseding indictment.[7] Trial was set for May 28, 1974. The trial did not commence, however, until September 2, 1975, having been postponed on five separate occasions either at the request of the Government or on |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | occasions either at the request of the Government or on the court's own initiative.[8]*347 During the period while he was awaiting his federal trial, Ford was incarcerated in the Massachusetts state prison; he had requested and received permission to return there in order to facilitate preparation for trial. On November 4, 1974, in response to the Government's motion to postpone the trial for a third time, Ford moved in the District Court for the dismissal of his indictment on the ground that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial.[9] In support of his motion, he alleged that he was being denied furlough privileges at the state prison as a result of the federal detainer that remained lodged against him. His motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. On August 8, 1975, the Government secured Ford's presence for trial from the Massachusetts prison authorities by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by the District Court. At the beginning of his trial, Ford again moved unsuccessfully for a dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds. His jury trial resulted in verdicts of guilty on all counts. *348 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ford argued, among other things, that his indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice because he was not tried within 120 days of his initial arrival in the Southern District of New York, in violation of Art. IV (c) of the Agreement,[10] and because he was returned to state prison without first being tried on the federal charges, in violation of Art. IV (e). The panel,[11] with one judge dissenting, agreed with Ford's contention that dismissal of the indictment was required as a result of the Government's failure to comply with the speedy trial provisions of Art. IV (c).[12] The court reasoned that, regardless of whether a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by a federal court to obtain a state prisoner is by itself sufficient to trigger the provisions of the Agreement, the Agreement clearly governs situations such as Ford's, in which a federal detainer is first filed with the state authorities and the writ is then used to secure the prisoner's presence in federal court. In the view of the Court of Appeals, the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum utilized to bring Ford to federal court was a "written request for temporary custody or availability" within the meaning of Art. IV (a). Having concluded that the Agreement was applicable and that the provisions of Art. IV (c) had been violated, the Court |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | provisions of Art. IV (c) had been violated, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for the dismissal of Ford's indictment with prejudice, as required by Art. V (c) of the Agreement.[13] *349 C Because there is a conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals on the issue,[14] we granted certiorari[15] in these cases to consider whether the Agreement governs the use of writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by the United States to obtain state prisoners. In No. 76-1596 we hold that such a writ issued by a federal court to state authorities, directing the production of a state prisoner for trial on criminal charges, is not a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement and thus does not trigger the application of the Agreement. In No. 77-52 we hold that the United States is bound by the Agreement when it activates its provisions by filing a detainer against a state prisoner and then obtains his custody by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. II The origins of the Agreement date back to 1948, when a group known as the Joint Committee on Detainers[16] issued a report concerning the problems arising from the use of detainers and expressing five aims or principles for the guidance of *350 prosecuting authorities, prison officials, and parole authorities. These guiding principles, which later served as the underpinnings of the Agreement, were as follows: "1. Every effort should be made to accomplish the disposition of detainers as promptly as possible. "2. There should be assurance that any prisoner released to stand trial in another jurisdiction will be returned to the institution from which he was released. "3. Prison and parole authorities should take prompt action to settle detainers which have been filed by them. "4. No prisoner should be penalized because of a detainer pending against him unless a thorough investigation of the detainer has been made and it has been found valid. "5. All jurisdictions should observe the principles of interstate comity in the settlement of detainers, and each should bear its own proper burden of the expenses and effort involved in disposing of the charges and settling detainers." Bennett, The Last Full Ounce, 23 Fed. Prob. 20, 22 (June 1959). The Joint Committee on Detainers was later reconstituted under the auspices of the Council of State Governments. Then known as the Committee on Detainers and Sentencing and Release of Persons Accused of Multiple Offenses, it held meetings in 1955 and 1956, which resulted in the development and approval of several proposals concerning detainers. Among the proposals was a draft |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | several proposals concerning detainers. Among the proposals was a draft version of the Agreement. In April 1956 this proposal was reviewed and approved by a conference jointly sponsored by the American Correctional Association, the Council of State Governments, the National Probation and Parole Association, and the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation.[17] Following *351 the endorsement of the Agreement by this conference, the Council of State Governments included it within its Suggested State Legislation Program for 1957. The Agreement, in the form adopted by the United States and other member jurisdictions, sets forth the findings upon which it is based and its purpose in Art. I. It notes that "charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation." Accordingly, its purpose is to encourage the expeditious disposition of such charges and to provide cooperative procedures among member States to facilitate such disposition. The central provisions of the Agreement are Art. III and Art. IV. Article III provides a procedure by which a prisoner against whom a detainer has been filed can demand a speedy disposition of the charges giving rise to the detainer. The warden of the institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated is required to inform him promptly of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and of his right to request final disposition of the charges. Art. III (c). If the prisoner does make such a request, the jurisdiction that filed the detainer must bring him to trial within 180 days.[18] Art. III (a). The prisoner's request operates as a request for the final disposition of all untried charges underlying detainers filed against him by that State, Art. III (d), and is deemed to be a waiver of extradition. Art. III (e). Article IV provides the means by which a prosecutor who has lodged a detainer against a prisoner in another State can secure the prisoner's presence for disposition of the outstanding charges. Once he has filed a detainer against the prisoner, *352 the prosecutor can have him made available by presenting to the officials of the State in which the prisoner is incarcerated "a written request for temporary custody or availability."[19] Art. IV (a). Two important limitations, previously referred to, are placed on a prosecuting authority once it has obtained the presence of a prisoner pursuant to Art. IV. Article IV (c) states that "[i]n respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | "[i]n respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." And Art. IV (e) requires the receiving State to try the prisoner on the outstanding charge before returning him to the State in which he was previously imprisoned: "If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V (e) hereof, such indictment, information, *353 or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice." Article V (c) similarly provides that the "indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged" shall be dismissed if the prisoner is not brought to trial within the period specified in Art. IV (c). III Congress enacted the Agreement into law and entered into it on behalf of the United States and the District of Columbia with relatively little discussion and no apparent opposition. See 116 Cong. Rec. 13997-14000, 38840-38842 (1970). The legislation had been previously introduced in the 90th Congress at the request of the Attorney General; on that occasion, it had passed the House, but the Senate had failed to approve it. When it was introduced again in the 91st Congress, the need for the legislation was noted in both the House and Senate Reports: "The Attorney General has advised the committee that a prisoner who has had a detainer lodged against him is seriously disadvantaged by such action. He is in custody and therefore in no position to seek witnesses or to preserve his defense. He must often be kept in close custody and is ineligible for desirable work assignments. What is more, when detainers are filed against a prisoner he sometimes loses interest in institutional opportunities because he must serve his sentence without knowing what additional sentences may lie before him, or when, if ever, he will be in a position to employ the education and skills he may be developing." H. R. Rep. No. p. 3 (1970); S. Rep. No. p. 3 (1970). The Government now vigorously argues that when Congress enacted the Agreement into law, the United States became a *354 party to the Agreement only in its capacity as a "sending State." |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | the Agreement only in its capacity as a "sending State." It contends that "Congress intended the United States to participate in the Agreement only for the purposes of allowing states more readily to obtain federal prisoners and allowing such prisoners to seek trial on outstanding detainers lodged against them with their federal custodian." Brief for United States in No. 77-52, p. 16. Thus, it argues, the Agreement has no relevance to the present cases, for here the Federal Government was the recipient of state prisoners. We have considered the grounds offered by the Government in support of this contention and conclude, as have all of the Courts of Appeals that have considered the question,[20] that the United States is a party to the Agreement as both a sending and a receiving State. As even the Government concedes, the Agreement as enacted by Congress expressly includes the United States within the definition of "State"[21] and defines "Receiving State" as "the State in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information, or complaint pursuant to article III or article IV hereof." Art. II (c). The statute itself gives no indication that the United States is to be exempted from the category of receiving States. To the contrary, Art. VIII states that "[t]his agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party State when such State has enacted the same into law" (emphasis added).[22] *355 The brief legislative history that exists provides no further support for the Government's contention. It is true, as the Government points out, that most of the comment on the proposed legislation referred to problems encountered by States in obtaining federal prisoners, but there is no indication whatsoever that the United States' participation in the Agreement was to be a limited one. Senator Hruska, for example, spoke in favor of the Agreement on the floor of the Senate, saying: "By enactment of this bill the United States and the District of Columbia would become signatories to this agreement which has already been adopted by 28 States. By approving this measure today we can insure that the United States will become part of this vitally needed system of simplified and uniform rules for the disposition of pending criminal charges and the exchange of prisoners." 116 Cong. Rec. 38840 (1970). Neither he nor anyone else in Congress drew a distinction between the extent of the United States' participation in the Agreement and that of the other member States, an, observation that one would expect had the Federal Government entered into the Agreement as only a sending |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | Federal Government entered into the Agreement as only a sending State. Nor are we persuaded by the Government's argument that, because the United States already had an efficient means of obtaining prisonersthe writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum Congress could not have intended to join the United States as a receiving State. Although the United States perhaps did not gain as much from its entry into the Agreement as did some of the other member States,[23] the fact remains that *356 Congress did enact the Agreement into law in its entirety, and it placed no qualification upon the membership of the United States. The reference in the Committee Reports to the recommendation of the Attorney General, see indicates that Congress was motivated, not only by the desire to aid States in obtaining federal prisoners, but also by the desire to alleviate the problems encountered by prisoners and prison systems as a result of the lodging of detainers. There is no reason to assume that Congress was any less concerned about the effects of federal detainers filed against state prisoners than it was about state detainers filed against federal prisoners. While the Government argues that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum leads to none of the problems about which the drafters of the Agreement were concerned, we think that this argument is more properly addressed to the question whether such a writ constitutes a detainer for purposes of the Agreement, which we discuss below.[24] *357 IV A United States district courts are authorized by 28 U.S. C. 2241 (a) to grant writs of habeas corpus; expressly included within this authority is the power to issue such a writ when it is necessary to bring a prisoner into court to testify or for trial. 2241 (c) (5). This Court has previously examined in great detail the history of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, observing that 14 of the first Judiciary Act, authorized courts of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus. Although 14 did not expressly state that the courts could issue ad prosequendum writs, the Court in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, Ex parte Bollman, interpreted the words "habeas corpus" as being a generic term including the writ "necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute him in the proper jurisdiction wherein the offense was committed." Since the time of Ex parte Bollman, *358 the statutory authority of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to secure the presence, for purposes of trial, of defendants in federal criminal cases, including |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | purposes of trial, of defendants in federal criminal cases, including defendants then in state custody, has never been doubted. In 1948 this authority was made explicit with the enactment of 28 U.S. C. 2241, and in 1961 the Court held that this authority was not limited by the territorial boundaries of the federal district court. The role and functioning of the ad prosequendum writ are rooted in history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer which activates the provisions of the Agreement. Unlike a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by a federal district court, a detainer may be lodged against a prisoner on the initiative of a prosecutor or law enforcement officer.[25] Rather than requiring the immediate presence of the prisoner, a detainer merely puts the officials of the institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in another jurisdiction for trial upon his release from prison. Further action must be taken by the receiving State in order to obtain the prisoner. Before it was made clear that a prosecuting authority is not relieved of its obligation to provide a defendant a speedy trial just because he is in custody elsewhere, see detainers were allowed to remain lodged against prisoners for lengthy periods of time, quite often for the duration of a prisoner's sentence. B The Agreement itself contains no definition of the word "detainer." The House and Senate Reports, however, explain that "[a] detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction." H. R. Rep. No. p. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. p. 2 (1970). While the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that this definition is broad enough to include within its scope a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the concerns expressed by the drafters of the Agreement and by the Congress that enacted it demonstrate that the word "detainer" was not so intended. In recommending the adoption of the Agreement, the Council of State Governments outlined some of the problems caused by detainers that the Agreement was designed to address. It noted that prison administrators were "thwarted in [their] effort[s] toward rehabilitation [because t]he inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not respond to a training program." Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1957, p. 74 (1956). Furthermore, the prisoner was often deprived of the ability to take advantage of many |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | often deprived of the ability to take advantage of many of the prison's programs aimed at rehabilitation, merely because there was a detainer lodged against him. This problem was noted by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, who in 1959 stated that he "remember[ed] the day when the presence of a detainer automatically guaranteed that the inmate would be held in close custody and denied training and work experiences in more relaxed situations, such as the farm, which frequently represent a valuable resource in treating prisoners and testing their progress." Bennett, The Last *360 Full Ounce, 23 Fed. Prob. 20, 21 (June 1959). The Council of State Governments also pointed out that the existence of detainers presented problems in sentencing; when detainers had previously been filed against the defendant, the sentencing judge would hesitate to give as long a sentence as he thought might otherwise be indicated, there being a possibility that the defendant would be required to serve subsequent sentences. The Council stated that "proper sentencing, as well as proper correctional treatment, is not possible until the detainer system is modified." Council of State Governments, Similar concerns were expressed by the Attorney General in his recommendation to Congress. See The adverse effects of detainers that prompted the drafting and enactment of the Agreement are thus for the most part the consequence of the lengthy duration of detainers. Because a detainer remains lodged against a prisoner without any action being taken on it, he is denied certain privileges within the prison, and rehabilitation efforts may be frustrated. For these reasons the stated purpose of the Agreement is "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." Art. I (emphasis added). Because writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by a federal court pursuant to the express authority of a federal statute are immediately executed, enactment of the Agreement was not necessary to achieve their expeditious disposition. Furthermore, as noted above, the issuance of ad prosequendum writs by federal courts has a long history, dating back to the first Judiciary Act. We can therefore assume that Congress was well aware of the use of such writs by the Federal Government to obtain state prisoners and that when it used the word "detainer," it meant something quite different from a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Contrary *361 to the contention of the Court of Appeals in No. 76-1596, it is not necessary to construe "detainer" as including these writs in |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | not necessary to construe "detainer" as including these writs in order to keep the United States from evading its duties under the Agreement. When the United States obtains state prisoners by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the problems that the Agreement seeks to eliminate do not arise;[26] accordingly, the Government is in no sense circumventing the Agreement by means of the writ. We therefore conclude that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of the Agreement. Because in No. 76-1596 the Government never filed a detainer against Mauro and Fusco, the Agreement never became applicable and the United States was never bound by its provisions. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in affirming the dismissal of the indictments against the respondents. V Our analysis of the purposes of the Agreement and the reasons for its adoption by Congress leads us to reject the Government's argument in No. 77-52 that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum may not be considered a "written request for temporary custody" within the meaning of Art. IV of the Agreement. Once the Federal Government lodges a detainer *362 against a prisoner with state prison officials, the Agreement by its express terms becomes applicable and the United States must comply with its provisions. And once a detainer has been lodged, the United States has precipitated the very problems with which the Agreement is concerned. Because at that point the policies underlying the Agreement are fully implicated, we see no reason to give an unduly restrictive meaning to the term "written request for temporary custody." It matters not whether the Government presents the prison authorities in the sending State with a piece of paper labeled "request for temporary custody" or with a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum demanding the prisoner's presence in federal court on a certain day; in either case the United States is able to obtain temporary custody of the prisoner. Because the detainer remains lodged against the prisoner until the underlying charges are finally resolved, the Agreement requires that the disposition be speedy and that it be obtained before the prisoner is returned to the sending State. The fact that the prisoner is brought before the district court by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in no way reduces the need for this prompt disposition of the charges underlying the detainer. In this situation it clearly would permit the United States to circumvent its obligations under the Agreement to hold that an ad prosequendum writ may not be considered a |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | that an ad prosequendum writ may not be considered a written request for temporary custody.[27] The Government points to two provisions of the Agreement *363 which it contends demonstrate that "written request" was not meant to include ad prosequendum writs; neither argument is persuasive. First the Government notes that under Art. IV (a) there is to be a 30-day waiting period after the request is presented during which the Governor of the sending State may disapprove the receiving State's request. Because a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a federal-court order, it would be contrary to the Supremacy Clause, the United States argues, to permit a State to refuse to obey it. We are unimpressed. The proviso of Art. IV (a) does not purport to augment the State's authority to dishonor such a writ. As the history of the provision makes clear, it was meant to do no more than preserve previously existing rights of the sending States, not to expand them.[28] If a State has never had authority to dishonor an ad prosequendum writ issued by a federal court, then this provision could not be read as providing such authority. Accordingly, we do not view the provision as being inconsistent with the inclusion of writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum within the meaning of "written requests." The Government also points out that the speedy trial requirement of Art. IV (c) by its terms applies only to a "proceeding made possible by this article" When a prisoner is brought before a district court by means of an ad prosequendum writ, the Government argues, the subsequent proceedings are not made possible by Art. IV because the United States was able to obtain prisoners in that manner long before it entered into the Agreement. We do not accept the Government's *364 narrow reading of this provision; rather we view Art. IV (c) as requiring commencement of trial within 120 days whenever the receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a detainer it has previously lodged against a state prisoner. Any other reading of this section would allow the Government to gain the advantages of lodging a detainer against a prisoner[29] without assuming the responsibilities that the Agreement intended to arise from such an action.[30] Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in No. 77-52 that respondent Ford's failure to invoke the Agreement in specific terms in his speedy trial motions before the District Court did not result in a waiver of his claim that the Government violated Art. IV (c). The record shows that from the time he was |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | (c). The record shows that from the time he was arrested Ford persistently requested that he *365 be given a speedy trial. After his trial date had been continued for the third time, he sought the dismissal of his indictment on the ground that the delay in bringing him to trial while the detainer remained lodged against him was causing him to be denied certain privileges at the state prison. We deem these actions on Ford's part sufficient to put the Government and the District Court on notice of the substance of his claim. The United States does not challenge the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that, if Art. IV (c) was applicable, it was violated by the extensive delay in bringing Ford to trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the judgment of the District Court and ordered that the indictment against Ford be dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 76-1596 is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In No. 77-52, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the judgment in No. 76-1596 and dissenting in No. 77-52. I agree with the Court's conclusion in No. 76-1596 that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. As the Court observes, ante, at 360: "[T]he issuance of ad prosequendum writs by federal courts has a long history, dating back to the first Judiciary Act. We can therefore assume that Congress was well aware of the use of such writs by the Federal Government to obtain state prisoners and that when it used the word `detainer,' it meant something quite different from a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum." Indeed, there is simply nothing in the language or legislative history of the Agreement to indicate that Congress intended to cut *366 back in any way on the scope and use of the writ. But for these very reasons I cannot agree with the result in No. 77-52. I am first struck by the Court's interesting approach to statutory construction, the significance of which cannot be lost on even the most casual reader. The Court considers ad prosequendum writs to be "written requests for temporary custody" not because the language of the Agreement compels, or indeed even supports, that result, but rather because the "purposes of the Agreement and the reasons for its adoption by Congress" supposedly |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | Agreement and the reasons for its adoption by Congress" supposedly lead to that result. Ante, at 361. One certainly may find it necessary to resort to interpretative aids other than the language of the statute when difficult questions of construction arise. I would have thought, however, that one would first turn to the language of the statute before resorting to such extra-statutory interpretative aids. See United The reason, indeed the necessity, for the Court's pursuing the opposite course in this case is readily apparent, however. The language of the Agreement simply does not support the Court's conclusion. The Agreement speaks only of "requests" for custody. In the writ in the instant case, on the other hand, the warden of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole was "HEREBY COMMANDED to have the body of RICHARD THOMSON FORD before the Judges of our District Court" on a date certain. App. in No. 77-52, p. 8. The Massachusetts warden would no doubt be surprised to hear that the United States had only "requested" the custody of his prisoner. But even if the language of the Agreement were broad enough to encompass a writ of habeas corpus, it seems to me that for the same reasons the Court does not consider a writ to be a "detainer" it cannot view a writ as a request. The writ has a long history, of which Congress must have been aware when it enacted the Agreement. It is inconceivable to me that Congress intended to include the writ in the operation *367 of the Agreement, and thereby make new and different conditions flow from its use, simply by use of the phrase "written request for temporary custody." In fact, the intimations in the legislative history are to the contrary. The Reports of both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees suggest that Congress did not intend the procedures established by the Agreement to be the exclusive means of effecting a transfer of a prisoner for purposes of prosecution. "The agreement also provides a method whereby prosecuting authorities may secure prisoners serving sentences in other jurisdictions for trial before the expiration of their sentences and before the passage of time has dulled the memory or made witnesses unavailable." H. R. Rep. No. p. 2 (1970); S. Rep. No. p. 2 (1970). (Emphasis added.) A draft of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 1 in 1975 also leaves no doubt that many of the Congressmen directly involved in the passage of the Agreement did not think they were in any way limiting the scope or application of the writ. |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | any way limiting the scope or application of the writ. The Report states: "Federal prosecution authorities and all Federal defendants have always had and continue to have recourse to a speedy trial in a Federal court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2241 (c) (5), the Federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The Committee does not intend, nor does it believe that the Congress in enacting the Agreement in 1970 intended, to limit the scope and applicability of that writ." S. Rep. No. 94-00, p. 984 (1975).[*] *368 I likewise find myself at a loss to discover exactly what problems the United States has "precipitated" by lodging a detainer against a prisoner and then securing his custody by use of the writ or how this process allows the Government "to circumvent its obligations under the Agreement" Ante, at 362. The Court correctly recognizes that the primary purpose of the Agreement was to provide a solution to the problems encountered by prisoners and prison systems as a result of the lodging of detainers. Ante, at 356, 359-360. Upon the mere filing of a detainer by the United States, however, the prisoner clearly has the right under the Agreement to request speedy disposition of the underlying charges if he so desires. Ante, at 351. The Government in no way excuses itself from this obligation by later using a writ of habeas corpus to secure the prisoner's custody. But by the same token, when the Government chooses not to take advantage of the remaining procedures specified in the Agreement after it files a detainer, I see nothing in the Agreement to suggest that the Government is still bound by all of the conditions which attach when it does choose to take full advantage of those procedures. Neither do I see anything in this procedure which precipitates any of the problems the Agreement was intended to alleviate. And to the extent any of the concerns expressed by the Court relate to the possibility of pretrial delay, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S. C. 1361 et seq. ( ed.), which creates specific time limits within which all federal defendants must be tried, must lessen if not totally dissipate those concerns. Neither can I shrug off as cavalierly as the Court the Government's arguments with respect to other related language of the Agreement. The Government argues that since *369 Art. IV (a) gives the Governor of a sending State the opportunity to disapprove the receiving State's "request," the term "request" cannot include the writ of habeas corpus, with which a State clearly has no |
Justice White | 1,978 | 6 | majority | United States v. Mauro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109867/united-states-v-mauro/ | of habeas corpus, with which a State clearly has no right to refuse to comply. The Court responds that this provision was meant to do no more than preserve existing rights, and if the States did not previously have the right to refuse writs, then this provision cannot be read as providing such authority. Ante, at 363. But that is no response at all. The Court is simply picking and choosing which provisions it will apply to the United States and which it will not, in order to consistently construe a statutory scheme which has been made facially inconsistent by the Court's wrong turn at the outset. I see no justification, and, perhaps more importantly, no standards, for engaging in this sort of gerrymandering of a statute. Rather, if, as the Court admits, this statutory provision was intended only to "preserve" a Governor's right to refuse a "request," then the only logical and consistent inference therefrom is that the term "request" does not include writs of habeas corpus, which cannot be refused. The Government also argues that the speedy trial provision of Art. IV (c) applies only to "proceeding [s] made possible by this article" Since proceedings against a prisoner whose presence has been secured by an ad prosequendum writ are not "made possible" by Art. IV, the speedy trial provision contained therein must not be applicable in this case. The Court's response to this argument is even less persuasive. It primly refuses to "accept the Government's narrow reading of this provision," ante, at 363-364, but ventures no alternative reading, narrow or broad, which is a defensible alternative to that offered by the Government. Finally, the Court admits that the Agreement was introduced into Congress by, and, one can fairly surmise given the paucity of legislative history, enacted into law largely at the behest of, the Department of Justice, which unequivocally endorsed *370 the legislation. S. Rep. No. ; H. R. Rep. No. Thereafter, the Department has consistently taken the position through its actions, though perhaps not its words, that writs of habeas corpus do not fall within the terms of the Agreement. This administrative construction certainly may be entitled to less weight than if it had been accompanied by a contemporaneous, well-reasoned explanation. But I would have thought, at least until today, that it was entitled to some weight, particularly in a case such as this where the language of the statute is not entirely clear on its face or, to the extent it is, supports, rather than undermines, the administrative construction. Cf. United In sum, I am left |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | dissenting | Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109861/flagg-bros-inc-v-brooks/ | Although I join my Brother STEVENS' dissenting opinion, I write separately to emphasize certain aspects of the majority opinion that I find particularly disturbing. I cannot remain silent as the Court demonstrates, not for the first time, an attitude of callous indifference to the realities of life for the poor. See, e. g., ; United It blandly asserts that "respondent Jones could have sought to replevy her goods at any time under state law." Ante, at 160. In order to obtain replevin in New York, however, respondent Jones would first have had to present to a sheriff an "undertaking" from a surety by which the latter would be bound to pay "not less than twice the value" of the goods involved and perhaps substantially more, depending in *167 part on the size of the potential judgment against the debtor. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law 7102 (e) Sureties do not provide such bonds without receiving both a substantial payment in advance and some assurance of the debtor's ability to pay any judgment awarded. Respondent Jones, according to her complaint, took home $87 per week from her job, had been evicted from her apartment, and faced a potential liability to the warehouseman of at least $335, an amount she could not afford. App. 44a-46a. The Court's assumption that respondent would have been able to obtain a bond, and thus secure return of her household goods, must under the circumstances be regarded as highly questionable.[*] While the Court is technically correct that respondent "could have sought" replevin, it is also true that, given adequate funds, respondent could have paid her rent and remained in her apartment, thereby avoiding eviction and the seizure of her household goods by the warehouseman. But we cannot close our eyes to the realities that led to this litigation. Just as respondent lacked the funds to prevent eviction, it seems clear that, once her goods were seized, she had no practical choice but to leave them with the warehouseman, where they were subject to forced sale for nonpayment of storage charges. I am also troubled by the Court's cavalier treatment of the place of historical factors in the "state action" inquiry. While we are, of course, not bound by what occurred centuries ago in England, see ante, at 163 n. 13, the test adopted by the Court itself requires us to decide what functions have been "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State," Such an issue plainly cannot be resolved in a historical vacuum. New York's highest court has stated that "[i]n *168 [New York] the execution of a lien |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | dissenting | Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109861/flagg-bros-inc-v-brooks/ | that "[i]n *168 [New York] the execution of a lien traditionally has been the function of the Sheriff." Numerous other courts, in New York and elsewhere, have reached a similar conclusion. See, e. g., ; Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F. 2d. 132, 141 (en banc) ("Pennsylvania has quite literally delegated to private individuals, [forced-sale] powers `traditionally exclusively reserved' to sheriffs and constables"); Cox Bakeries, (by giving a warehouseman forced-sale powers, "the state has delegated the traditional roles of judge, jury and sheriff"); By ignoring this history, the Court approaches the question before us as if it can be decided without reference to the role that the State has always played in lien execution by forced sale. In so doing, the Court treats the State as if it were, to use the Court's words, "a monolithic, abstract concept hovering in the legal stratosphere." Ante, at 160 n. 10. The state-action doctrine, as developed in our past cases, requires that we come down to earth and decide the issue here with careful attention to the State's traditional role. I dissent. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. |
per_curiam | 1,981 | 200 | per_curiam | Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110420/florida-dept-of-health-and-rehabilitative-servs-v-florida-nursing-home/ | Petitioners, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and its Secretary, seek review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordering them to make payments to various nursing homes These payments represent the amount that Florida was found to have underpaid these nursing homes in the course of its Medicaid reimbursements from July 1, 1976, to October 18, Because we conclude that the court below misapplied the prevailing standard for finding a waiver of the State's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, we grant a writ of certiorari and reverse *148 I In 1972, Congress amended the Medicaid Program to provide that every "skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility" must be reimbursed by participating States on a "cost related basis" 42 US C 1396a (13) (E) This amendment was to take effect on July 1, 1976, ibid, and had the effect of altering some reimbursement arrangements based on "flat rates" established by the States Regulations implementing this change were not promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) until 1976 As a result, the regulations provided that HEW would not enforce the new "cost related" reimbursement requirement until January 1, 1978 45 CFR 25030 (3) (iv) (1976)[1] In March respondents, an association of Florida nursing homes and various individual nursing homes in southern Florida, brought suit in federal court against the Secretary of HEW and petitioners They argued that the delay in enforcement created by the implementing regulations was inconsistent with the statutory directive that cost-related reimbursements begin on July 1, 1976 In addition to prospective relief, they sought retroactive relief in the form of payments by the State of the difference between the reimbursement they had received since July 1, 1976, and the amounts they would have received under a cost-related system The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held the regulations invalid, relying on its previous decision in Golden Isles Convalescent Center, aff'd, (CA5), cert denied sub nom These two cases were consolidated for consideration of the availability of retroactive relief, and the District Court held that such relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling that the regulations were invalid, but reversed the District Court's determination that retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment [2] The court acknowledged that retroactive monetary relief against a State in federal court is forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment "if not consented to by the state" It found the requisite consent, however, based |
per_curiam | 1,981 | 200 | per_curiam | Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110420/florida-dept-of-health-and-rehabilitative-servs-v-florida-nursing-home/ | by the state" It found the requisite consent, however, based on two acts of the State First, Florida law provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is a "body corporate" with the capacity to "sue and be sued," Fla Stat 40234 (1979) In addition to this general waiver of sovereign immunity, the court found a specific waiver of the Eleventh Amendment's immunity from suit in federal court in an agreement under the Medicaid Program in which the Department agreed to "recognize and abide by all State and Federal Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines applicable to participation in and administration of, the Title XIX Medicaid Program" Ibid "By contracting with appellants to be bound by all federal laws applicable to the Medicaid program, the state has expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to suit in federal court regarding any action by providers alleging a breach of these laws" Ibid II The analysis in this case is controlled by our decision in Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651 There we applied *150 the Eleventh Amendment to retroactive grants of welfare benefits and discussed the proper standard for a waiver of this immunity by a State On the latter issue we stated that "we will find waiver only where stated `by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction'" quoting Murray v Wilson Distilling Co, 213 US 151, We added that the "mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts" 415 US, The holding below, finding a waiver in this case, cannot be reconciled with the principles set out in Edelman As the Court of Appeals recognized, the State's general waiver of sovereign immunity for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services "does not constitute a waiver by the state of its constitutional immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court" See Smith v Reeves, 178 US 436, And the fact that the Department agreed explicitly to obey federal law in administering the program can hardly be deemed an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity This agreement merely stated a customary condition for any participation in a federal program by the State, and Edelman already established that neither such participation in itself, nor a concomitant agreement to obey federal law, is sufficient to waive the |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | Califoria imposes two isurace taxes o isurace compaies doig busiess i the State. A premiums tax, set at a fixed percetage of premiums paid o isurace policies issued *650 i the State, is imposed o both foreig ad domestic isurace compaies ad a "retaliatory" tax, set i respose to the isurace tax laws of the isurer's home State, is imposed o some foreig isurace compaies. This case presets the questio of the costitutioality of retaliatory taxes assessed by the State of Califoria agaist appellat Wester & Souther Life Isurace a Ohio corporatio, ad paid uder protest for the years 1965 through 1971. I Sectio 685 of the Califoria Isurace Code imposes a retaliatory tax o out-of-state isurers doig busiess i Califoria, whe the isurer's State of icorporatio imposes higher taxes o Califoria isurers doig busiess i that State tha Califoria would otherwise impose o that State's isurers doig busiess i Califoria.[1] I computig the retaliatory *651 tax owed by a give out-of-state isurer, Califoria subtracts the Califoria taxes otherwise due from the total taxes that would be imposed o a hypothetical similar Califoria compay doig busiess i the out-of-state isurer's State of icorporatio. If the other State's taxes o the hypothetical Califoria isurer would be greater tha Califoria's taxes o the other State's isurer, a retaliatory tax i the amout of the differece is imposed. If the other State's taxes o the hypothetical Califoria isurer would be less tha or equal to Califoria's taxes, however, Califoria exacts o retaliatory tax from the other State's isurer. Wester & Souther, a Ohio corporatio headquartered i Ohio, has egaged i the busiess of isurace i Califoria sice 1955. Durig the years i questio, the compay paid a total of $977,853.57 to the State i retaliatory taxes. After usuccessfully filig claims for refuds with appellee Board of Equalizatio, Wester & Souther iitiated this refud suit i Superior Court, arguig that Califoria's retaliatory tax violates the Commerce ad Equal Protectio Clauses of the Uited States Costitutio.[2] *652 The Superior Court tried the case o stipulated facts without a jury, ad ruled that the retaliatory tax is ucostitutioal. It ordered a full refud of retaliatory taxes paid, plus iterest ad costs. App. 78-79. The Califoria Court of Appeal reversed, upholdig the retaliatory tax. We affirm. The Commerce Clause provides that "The Cogress shall have Power To regulate Commerce amog the several States." U. S. Cost., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. I terms, the Clause is a grat of authority to Cogress, ot a explicit limitatio o the power of the States. I a log lie of |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | the power of the States. I a log lie of cases stretchig back to the early days of the Republic, however, this Court has recogized that the Commerce Clause cotais a implied limitatio o the power of the States to iterfere with or impose burdes o iterstate commerce.[3] Eve i the absece of cogressioal actio, the courts may decide whether state regulatios challeged uder the Commerce Clause impermissibly burde iterstate commerce. See, e. g., ; Our decisios do ot, however, limit the authority of Cogress to regulate commerce amog the several States as it sees fit. I the exercise of this pleary authority, Cogress may "cofe[r] upo the States a ability to restrict the flow of iterstate commerce that they would ot otherwise ejoy." ; see H. P. Hood & Sos, If Cogress ordais that the States *653 may freely regulate a aspect of iterstate commerce, ay actio take by a State withi the scope of the cogressioal authorizatio is redered ivulerable to Commerce Clause challege. Cogress removed all Commerce Clause limitatios o the authority of the States to regulate ad tax the busiess of isurace whe it passed the McCarra-Ferguso Act, 15 U.S. C. 1011 et seq., as this Court ackowledged i State Board of See also Group Life & Health Is. 0 U.S. 205, ; Wilbur Boat Nevertheless, Wester & Souther, joied by the Solicitor Geeral as amicus curiae, argues that the McCarra-Ferguso Act does ot permit "ati-competitive state taxatio that discrimiates agaist out-of-state isurers." Brief for Appellat 28; Brief for Uited States as Amicus Curiae 16. We fid o such limitatio i the laguage or history of the Act. Sectio 1 of the Act, 15 U.S. C. 1011, cotais a declaratio of policy: "Cogress declares that the cotiued regulatio ad taxatio by the several States of the busiess of isurace is i the public iterest, ad that silece o the part of the Cogress shall ot be costrued to impose ay barrier to the regulatio or taxatio of such busiess by the several States." Sectio 2 (a), 15 U.S. C. 1012 (a), declares: "The busiess of isurace shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulatio or taxatio of such busiess." The uequivocal laguage of the Act suggests o exceptios. The McCarra-Ferguso Act was passed i the wake of Uited (19), which held that isurace is "commerce" withi the meaig of the Commerce Clause. Prior to South-Easter *65 Uderwriters, isurace was ot cosidered to be commerce withi the meaig of the Commerce Clause, New York Life Is. ; ad thus "egative |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | Commerce Clause, New York Life Is. ; ad thus "egative implicatio from the commerce clause was held ot to place ay limitatio upo state power over the [isurace] busiess." Prudetial Is. Believig that the busiess of isurace is "a local matter, to be subject to ad regulated by the laws of the several States," H. R. Rep. No. 79th Cog., 1st Sess., 2 Cogress explicitly iteded the McCarra-Ferguso Act to restore state taxig ad regulatory powers over the isurace busiess to their pre-South-Easter Uderwriters scope. H. R. Rep. No. ; see ; Marylad Casualty The Court has squarely rejected the argumet that discrimiatory state isurace taxes may be challeged uder the Commerce Clause despite the McCarra-Ferguso Act. Prudetial Is. Prudetial Is. I the Court cosidered a South Carolia isurace premiums tax imposed solely o foreig isurace compaies. The Court foud it uecessary to decide whether the tax "would be valid i the dormacy of Cogress' power," or whether the tax "would be discrimiatory i the sese of a exactio forbidde by the commerce clause," Expressly assumig that the tax would be discrimiatory, the Court held that eactmet of the McCarra-Ferguso Act "put the full weight of [Cogress'] power behid existig ad future state legislatio to sustai it from ay attack uder the commerce clause to whatever extet this may be doe with the force of that power behid it, subject oly to the exceptios expressly provided for." I this Court sustaied agaist a Commerce Clause challege a Kasas retaliatory isurace tax idistiguishable *655 from Califoria's.[] The Kasas Supreme Court, upholdig the retaliatory tax, had held that the McCarra-Ferguso Act "left the matter of regulatio ad taxatio of isurace compaies to the states." I re Isurace Tax Cases, This Court summarily affirmed, citig ad its compaio case, 328 U.S. 0 Prudetial Is.[5] We must therefore reject Wester & Souther's Commerce Clause challege to the Califoria retaliatory tax: the McCarra-Ferguso Act removes etirely ay Commerce Clause restrictio upo Califoria's power to tax the isurace busiess. I Ordiarily, there are three provisios of the Costitutio uder which a taxpayer may challege a allegedly discrimiatory state tax:[6] the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., Complete *656 Auto Trasit, ; the Privileges ad Immuities Clause of Art. IV, 2, see, e. g., ; ad the Equal Protectio Clause, see, e. g., Wheelig Steel[7] This case assumes a uusual posture, however, because the Commerce Clause is iapplicable to the busiess of isurace, see Part ad the Privileges ad Immuities Clause is iapplicable to corporatios, see Oly the Equal Protectio Clause remais as a possible groud for ivalidatio |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | Equal Protectio Clause remais as a possible groud for ivalidatio of the Califoria tax.[8] The Fourteeth Amedmet forbids the States to "dey to ay perso withi [their] jurisdictio the equal protectio *657 of the laws," but does ot prevet the States from makig reasoable classificatios amog such persos. See ; Allied Stores of Thus, Califoria's retaliatory isurace tax should be sustaied if we fid that its classificatio is ratioally related to achievemet of a legitimate state purpose. But as appellee poits out, state tax provisios directed agaist out-of-state parties have ot always bee subjected to such scrutiy. Rather, a lie of Supreme Court cases most recetly exemplified by Licol Natioal Life Is. holds that a State may impose a tax o out-of-state corporatios for the "privilege" of doig busiess i the State, without ay requiremet of a ratioal basis. Sice the Califoria courts have defied the retaliatory tax as a "privilege" tax, Wester & Souther Life Is. applicatio of the reasoig of these cases would require us to sustai the tax without further iquiry ito its ratioal basis. We must therefore decide first whether Califoria's retaliatory tax is subject to such further iquiry. Some past decisios of this Court have held that a State may exclude a foreig corporatio from doig busiess or acquirig or holdig property withi its borders. E. g., Asbury ; Bak of From this priciple has arise the theory that a State may attach such coditios as it chooses upo the grat of the privilege to do busiess withi the State. While this theory would suggest that a State may exact ay coditio, o matter how oerous or otherwise ucostitutioal, from a foreig corporatio desirig to do busiess withi it, this Court has also held that a State may ot impose ucostitutioal coditios o the grat of a privilege. *658 E. g., ; 3 U.S. 183, ; Frost & Frost Truckig (6). These two priciples are i obvious tesio. If a State caot impose ucostitutioal coditios o the grat of a privilege, the its right to withhold the privilege is less tha absolute. But if the State's right to withhold the privilege is absolute, the o oe has the right to challege the terms uder which the State chooses to exercise that right. I view of this tesio, it is ot surprisig that the Court's attempt to accommodate both priciples has produced results that seem icosistet or illogical. Compare 9 U.S. 5 with Isurace 20 Wall. 5 ; ad compare Licol Natioal Life Is. with Haover Fire Is. (6). The doctrie that a State may impose |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | Fire Is. (6). The doctrie that a State may impose taxes ad coditios at its ufettered discretio o foreig corporatios, i retur for gratig the "privilege" of doig busiess withi the State, origiated i a case decided oly 15 moths after the effective date of the Fourteeth Amedmet. A statute required foreig isurace compaies to purchase ad file a specified amout of bods as security for the protectio of persos isured. No such requiremet was imposed o domestic isurers. Several New York isurace compaies refused to comply, ad their aget was accordigly deied a licese to egage i the isurace busiess i The aget was prosecuted for sellig isurace without a licese; he defeded o the groud that the statute was ucostitutioal uder the Privileges ad Immuities Clause of Art. IV, 2, ad the Commerce Clause.[9] *659 This Court sustaied the statute. Viewig corporatios as recipiets of "special privileges," ad believig that "it might be of the highest public iterest that the umber of corporatios i the State should be limited," the Court held that a State's asset to the creatio of a domestic corporatio or the etry of a foreig corporatio "may be grated upo such terms ad coditios as those States may thik proper to impose."[10] Uder this view, there was o eed for the Court to cosider whether the statute was arbitrary, irratioal, or discrimiatory. "[The States] may exclude the foreig corporatio etirely; they may restrict its busiess to particular localities, or they may exact such security for the performace of its cotracts with their citizes as i their judgmet will best promote the public iterest. The whole matter rests i their discretio." I two importat respects, the legal uderpiigs of were soo eroded. First, the advet of laws of geeral icorporatio, which swept the coutry i the late 19th cetury, see Louis K. Liggett altered the very ature of the corporatio. Such laws, stimulated largely by "the desire for equality ad the dread of special privilege[s]," permitted persos to form corporatios freely, subject oly to geerally applicable requiremets ad limitatios. Icorporatio lost its status as a special privilege. See *660 Hederso 68.[11] Secod, the Fourteeth Amedmet, ratified i 1868, itroduced the costitutioal requiremet of equal protectio, prohibitig the States from actig arbitrarily or treatig similarly situated persos differetly, eve with respect to privileges formerly dispesed at the State's discretio. The combiatio of geeral icorporatio laws ad equal protectio ecessarily udermied the doctrie of If the right to icorporate or to do busiess withi a State ceases to be a privilege to be dispesed by the State |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | to be a privilege to be dispesed by the State as it sees fit, ad becomes a right geerally available to all o equal terms, the the argumet for special exactios as "privilege taxes" is destroyed. The Court was slow to recogize the cosequeces of these developmets. I Philadelphia Fire the first relevat decisio govered by the Fourteeth Amedmet, the Court uhesitatigly applied the doctrie of to sustai a New York retaliatory isurace tax agaist a equal protectio challege. The Court held that a corporatio is ot a "perso withi [the State's] jurisdictio," for purposes of the Equal Protectio Clause uless it is i compliace with the coditios placed upo its etry ito the State, ad that a corporatio assets to all state laws i effect at the time of its etry.[12] "The State, havig the power to exclude etirely, has *661 the power to chage the coditios of admissio at ay time, for the future, ad to impose as a coditio the paymet of a ew tax, or a further tax, as a licese fee. If it imposes such licese fee as a prerequisite for the future, the foreig corporatio, util it pays such licese fee, is ot admitted withi the State or withi its jurisdictio. It is outside, at the threshold, seekig admissio, with coset ot yet give. By goig ito the State of New York i 1872, [the Philadelphia Fire Associatio] asseted to such prerequisite as a coditio of its admissio withi the jurisdictio of New York." -120. Justice Harla disseted. Ackowledgig that a State may prescribe certai coditios upo the etry of a foreig corporatio, he isisted "that it is the settled doctrie of this court, that the terms ad coditios so prescribed must ot be repugat to the Costitutio of the Uited States, or icosistet with ay right grated or secured by that istrumet." "Ca it be," he asked, "that a corporatio is estopped to claim the beefit of the costitutioal provisio securig to it the equal protectio of the laws simply because it volutarily etered ad remaied i a State which has eacted a statute deyig such protectio to it ad to like corporatios from the same State?" Although dicta i several cases supported Justice Harla's view that a State may ot impose coditios repugat to the Costitutio upo the grat of a privilege, see, e. g., ; Doyle v. Cotietal *662 Is. the Court cotiued to reject costitutioal claims by corporatios challegig coditios to etry. E. g., New ; Hor Silver Miig v. New York, U.S. 305, ; Pembia Cosol. Silver Miig & |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | New York, U.S. 305, ; Pembia Cosol. Silver Miig & Millig v. Pesylvaia, Noetheless, the first quarter of this cetury saw "a almost complete disitegratio" of the doctrie of Hederso 111. The chage became evidet i the October Term 1909, whe the Court decided four cases i coflict with the priciple that the States possess ulimited power to coditio the etry of foreig corporatios.[13] The most sigificat of these decisios for our purposes is Souther R. v. Greee, which expressly rejected the cotetio "that the impositio of special taxes upo foreig corporatios for the privilege of doig busiess withi the State is sufficiet to justify such differet taxatio."[1] *663 The plaitiff, Souther Railway, had bee admitted to do busiess i Alabama ad had ivested i permaet facilities i the State. At that time, frachise taxes imposed o domestic corporatios were equal to privilege taxes imposed o foreig corporatios. Later, Alabama imposed a additioal privilege tax o foreig corporatios, which Souther Railway challeged o equal protectio grouds. The Court held that classificatios amog corporatios for purposes of taxatio are costitutioal uder the Equal Protectio Clause oly if they bear a "reasoable ad just relatio" to the purpose for which they are imposed. Notig that there were domestic corporatios i Alabama whose busiess was idistiguishable from that of Souther Railway, the Court stated that "[i]t would be a faciful distictio to say that there is ay real differece i the burde imposed because the oe is taxed for the privilege of a foreig corporatio to do busiess i the State ad [the] other for the right to be a corporatio." -18. The Court held that "to tax the foreig corporatio for carryig o busiess uder the circumstaces show, by a differet ad much more oerous rule tha is used i taxig domestic corporatios for the same privilege, is a deial of the equal protectio of the laws."[15] *66 I Haover Fire Is. (6), the Court exteded the protectios of Souther Railway agaist discrimiatory taxatio to corporatios holdig short-term liceses, ad to those without substatial permaet property i the State.[16] 509, 51-515. With respect to the geeral tax burde o busiess, "the foreig corporatio stads equal, ad is to be classified with domestic corporatios of the same kid."[17] After Haover Fire Is. little was left of the doctrie of ad Philadelphia Fire It was replaced by a ew doctrie: "It is ot ecessary to challege the propositio that, as a geeral rule, the state, havig power to dey a privilege altogether, may grat it upo such coditios as it sees fit to impose. |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | it upo such coditios as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state i that respect is ot ulimited; ad oe of the limitatios is that it may ot impose coditios which require the reliquishmet of costitutioal rights. If the state may compel the surreder of oe costitutioal right as a coditio of its favor, it may, i like maer, compel a surreder of all. It is icoceivable that guaraties embedded i the Costitutio of the Uited States may *665 thus be maipulated out of existece." Frost & Frost Truckig -59. See also Power Maufacturig v. Sauders, (7). The decisio i Licol Natioal Life Is. thus stads as a surprisig throwback to the doctrie of ad Philadelphia Fire There, the Court seemed to adopt precisely the argumet that was rejected i Haover Fire Is. : "that a State may discrimiate agaist foreig corporatios by admittig them uder more oerous coditios tha it exacts from domestic compaies" ;[18] The Court stated that the argumet that a State may ot impose ucostitutioal coditios to etry "proves too much." "If it were adopted," the Court said, "the the log-established rule that a State may discrimiate agaist foreig corporatios by admittig them uder more oerous coditios tha it exacts from domestic compaies would go ito the discard." [19] So log as a tax is "levied upo the privilege of eterig the State ad egagig i busiess there," it may ot be challeged uder the Equal Protectio Clause, eve though it may impose a burde greater ad more discrimiatory tha was imposed at the date of the corporatio's etry ito the State. The holdig i Licol Natioal has bee implicitly rejected *666 i at least three subsequet cases. I Wheelig Steel the Court struck dow a provisio of Ohio's ad valorem tax law that subjected certai itagible property of o-Ohio corporatios to a tax ot applied to idetical property of Ohio corporatios. The Court cocluded that the provisio violated the Equal Protectio Clause o the groud that the iequality of treatmet was "ot because of the slightest differece i Ohio's relatio to the decisive trasactio, but solely because of the differet residece of the ower."[20] The decisio i Wheelig Steel was ot directly i coflict with that i Licol Natioal, because the Ohio courts had held the tax i Wheelig Steel a "ad valorem property tax, ad i o sese a frachise, privilege, occupatio, or icome tax." 337 U.S., However, the Wheelig Steel decisio rejected the priciple of Licol Natioal: the opiio declared that a State's power to exclude out-of-state corporatios is |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | declared that a State's power to exclude out-of-state corporatios is limited by the Costitutio; the State may ot "exac[t] surreder of rights derived from the Costitutio of the Uited States." (citig Haover Fire Is. ). I Allied Stores of Ohio, Ic. v. Bowers, U. S. 522 this Court sustaied a Ohio statute exemptig o-residets from a ad valorem tax o certai property held i a storage warehouse, but ot exemptig Ohio residets from the tax. Without alludig to ay possibility that legislative classificatios based o State of icorporatio should be subject to a differet stadard from other classificatios, the Court held that state tax laws "must proceed upo a ratioal *667 basis ad may ot resort to a classificatio that is palpably arbitrary."[21] Fially, i WHYY, Ic. v. Glassboro, this Court struck dow a New Jersey statute exemptig oprofit corporatios icorporated i New Jersey from tax, but deyig a similar exemptio to oprofit corporatios icorporated i other States. Disregardig Licol Natioal, the Court stated the applicable priciple of law as follows: "This Court has cosistetly held that while a State may impose coditios o the etry of foreig corporatios to do busiess i the State, oce it has permitted them to eter, `the adopted corporatios are etitled to equal protectio with the state's ow corporate progey, at least to the extet that their property is etitled to a equally favorable ad valorem tax basis.' Wheelig Steel See Reserve Life Is. v. Bowers, ; Haover Fire Is. ; Souther R. v. Greee," 393 U. S., -120. I view of the decisios of this Court both before ad after Licol Natioal, it is difficult to view that decisio as other tha a aachroism. We cosider it ow established that, whatever the extet of a State's authority to exclude foreig corporatios from doig busiess withi its boudaries, that *668 authority does ot justify impositio of more oerous taxes or other burdes o foreig corporatios tha those imposed o domestic corporatios, uless the discrimiatio betwee foreig ad domestic corporatios bears a ratioal relatio to a legitimate state purpose. As we held i Power Maufacturig v. Sauders, -9: "No doubt there are subjects as to which foreig corporatios may be classified separately from both idividuals ad domestic corporatios ad dealt with differetly. But there are other subjects as to which such a course is ot admissible, the distiguishig priciple beig that classificatio must rest o differeces pertiet to the subject i respect of which the classificatio is made." IV I determiig whether a challeged classificatio is ratioally related to achievemet of a legitimate state purpose, |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | is ratioally related to achievemet of a legitimate state purpose, we must aswer two questios: (1) Does the challeged legislatio have a legitimate purpose? ad (2) Was it reasoable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challeged classificatio would promote that purpose? See 9 U. S., at 61-63; Vace v. 0 U.S. 93, The legislative purpose of Califoria's retaliatory tax is ot difficult to discer, for such taxes have bee a commo feature of isurace taxatio for over a cetury. Although variously expressed, the pricipal purpose of retaliatory tax laws is to promote the iterstate busiess of domestic isurers by deterrig other States from eactig discrimiatory or excessive taxes. A survey of state retaliatory tax laws summarized: "[W]hatever their character, it is obvious that their ultimate object is ot to puish foreig corporatios doig busiess i the state, or retort the actio of the foreig state i placig upo corporatios of the eactig *669 state doig busiess therei burdes heavier tha those imposed upo corporatios of such foreig state doig busiess i the eactig state, but to iduce such foreig state to show the same cosideratio to corporatios of the eactig state doig busiess therei as is show to corporatios of such foreig state doig busiess i the eactig state." Aot., 91 A. L. R. 795 (193). Accord, Bakers Life v. Richardso, Cal. 113, (3); State ex rel. Critteberger v. Cotietal Is. 67 Id. App. 536, ; Phoeix Is. v. Welch, 29 Ka. 672, ; Life & Cas. Is. v. Colema, 233 Ky. 0, 1-2, ; State v. Is. of North America, ; Massachusetts Mut. Is. v. Kowlto, 9 N. H. 09, 12, ; Commowealth v. Firema's Fud Is. ; Pacific Mut. Life Is. v. State, 161 Wash. 1, 137-1,[22] Califoria's retaliatory tax is based upo a model statute drafted by the isurace idustry, ad is virtually idetical to that eacted by may other States. Califoria Assembly Iterim Committee o Reveue ad Taxatio, The Isurace Tax, No. 15, pp. 6, 66 (196) (hereafter Isurace Tax). Sice the amout of reveue raised by the retaliatory tax is relatively modest, ad the impetus for passage of the tax comes from the atiowide isurace idustry, it is clear that the purpose is ot to geerate reveue at the expese of out-of-state isurers, but to apply pressure o other *670 States to maitai low taxes o Califoria isurers. As a committee of the Califoria Assembly has said: "The actual ratioale for the provisio is that the applicatio of the retaliatory laws acts as a deterret to state taxatio o the isurace idustry."[23] |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | as a deterret to state taxatio o the isurace idustry."[23] Decisios by the Califoria courts led weight to this aalysis. The Court of Appeal i the istat case held that the purpose of the retaliatory tax "is to put pressure o the several states to impose the same tax burde o all isurace compaies, foreig or domestic, ad thereby ecourage the doig of iterstate busiess." Accord, Wester & Souther Life Is. Cal. App. 3d, ; Atlatic Is. 62 Cal. Rptr. 78, cert. deied ad appeal dism'd, May may doubt the wisdom of Califoria's retaliatory tax; ideed, the retaliatory tax has ofte bee criticized as a distortio of the tax system ad a impedimet to the raisig of reveue from the taxatio of isurace. See, e. g., Coucil of State Govermets, State Retaliatory Taxatio of the Isurace Idustry 12-13 ; Task Force Statemet of Policy o Isurace Premium Taxatio, 1 Proc. Nat. Ass. of Is. Comm'rs 71 (1971); of New Jersev Tax Policy Comm., Pt. V, pp. 7-8 (1972); Strickler, The Mess i State Premium Taxatio of Isurace Compaies, 69 Best's Rev. 3, But the courts are ot empowered to secod-guess the wisdom of state policies. Ferguso v. Skrupa, Our review is cofied to the legitimacy of the purpose. *671 There ca be o doubt that promotio of domestic idustry by deterrig barriers to iterstate busiess is a legitimate state purpose. This Court has recogized the legitimacy of state efforts to maitai the profit level of a domestic idustry, Parker v. Brow, 317 U.S. 31, (193), ad of efforts to "protect ad ehace the reputatio" of a domestic idustry so that it might compete more effectively i the iterstate market, Pike v. Bruce Church, Ic., Califoria's effort o behalf of its domestic isurace idustry is o less legitimate. The mere fact that Califoria seeks to promote its isurace idustry by ifluecig the policies of other States does ot reder the purpose illegitimate. As we said i Uited States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm', 3 U.S. 78 : "Ay time a State adopts a fiscal or admiistrative policy that affects the programs of a sister State, pressure to modify those programs may result. Uless that pressure trasgresses the bouds of the Commerce Clause or the Privileges ad Immuities Clause of Art. IV, 2, see, e.g., Austi v. New Hampshire, 20 U.S. 656 it is ot clear how our federal structure is implicated." Havig established that the purpose of Califoria's lawmakers i eactig the retaliatory tax was legitimate, we tur to the secod elemet i our aalysis: whether it was reasoable for |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | secod elemet i our aalysis: whether it was reasoable for Califoria's lawmakers to believe that use of the challeged classificatio would promote that purpose. We ackowledge at the outset that may persos believe that retaliatory taxes are ot a effective meas for accomplishmet of the goal of deterrig discrimiatory ad excessive taxatio of isurace compaies by the various States. See, e. g., Bodily, The Effects of Retaliatio o the State Taxatio of Life Isurers, J. of Risk & Is. 21 ; Isurace Retaliatory Laws, 39 Notre Dame Law. 23, (196); Task Force But whether *672 i fact the provisio will accomplish its objectives is ot the questio: the Equal Protectio Clause is satisfied if we coclude that the Califoria Legislature ratioally could have believed that the retaliatory tax would promote its objective. 9 U. S., at 66; Vace v. 0 U. S., at 111; Uited States v. Carolece Products 30 U.S. 1, 15 (19). The Iterim Committee o Reveue ad Taxatio of the Califoria Assembly coducted a major study of the State's tax system before recommedig passage of a costitutioal amedmet permittig eforcemet of the preset retaliatory tax.[2] That study foud: "It is true that isurers are disadvataged by retaliatory taxatio provisios i the short ru, for they usually result i some isurers payig more i taxes i retaliatig states. But, i the log ru, isurers as a group pay less i taxes because of these provisios, sice legislators, whe cosiderig measures affectig isurers, do cosider retaliatory effects i istace after istace." Isurace Tax, The study cocluded that retaliatory taxes "have kept premiums lower ad isurers' profits higher tha would otherwise have bee the case." It therefore recommeded passage of the proposed costitutioal amedmet. See We caot say that the Califoria Legislature's coclusios were irratioal, or eve ureasoable. Assumig that the lawmakers of each State are motivated i part by a desire to promote the iterests of their domestic isurace idustry, it is reasoable to suppose that Califoria's retaliatory tax will iduce other States to lower the burdes o Califoria isurers i order to spare their domestic isurers the cost of the retaliatory tax i Califoria. *673 I ay evet, we do ot fid the evidece agaist the retaliatory tax overwhelmig. The Califoria Departmet of Fiace evaluated the effect of the retaliatory laws: "Whether the isurace compaies have sposored this legislatio or ot, i their resistace to tax chage they have beefitted by it. The home-owed compaies i all but a half doze states are able to say, `Do't raise our taxes. If you do, we will have to pay |
Justice Brennan | 1,981 | 13 | majority | Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110485/western-southern-life-ins-co-v-state-bd-of-equalization-of-cal/ | our taxes. If you do, we will have to pay more i other states.' The effectiveess of this barrier is demostrated by the fact that of the 8 states, oly 9 icreased their isurace tax rates i the last twelve years. Noe of these is a outstadig isurace state." State Departmet of Fiace, Budget Div., Highlights of Proposal for Quarterly Isurace Tax Paymets 3 The Califoria courts examied the issue, ad foud: "The commo purpose of [retaliatory tax] legislatio i the several states has bee to discourage ay state from imposig discrimiatory taxes or other burdes upo out-of-state compaies. The effort seems to have bee very largely successful; i ay evet taxes o isurace premiums have stayed close to 2 percet i most states, for both domestic ad out-of-state isurers." Atlatic Is. 255 Cal. App. 2d, at 62 Cal. Rptr., at Authorities i the field have foud the evidece mixed. The leadig empirical study of the effect of retaliatory tax laws examied tax rates o life isurace premiums from 19 through 1972, ad foud: (1) that tax rates have ot icreased sigificatly i absolute terms over the period; (2) that life isurace premiums taxes have declied as a percetage of total state tax reveues;[25] ad (3) that discrimiatio *67 agaist foreig isurace compaies has declied over the period. Bodily, J. of Risk & Is. at 27-32. These results are precisely those that advocates of the retaliatory tax would predict, ad thus provide some support for that theory. Statistical aalysis of the available data, however, failed to verify this coclusio: the correlatio betwee retaliatory tax laws ad the observed results was ot foud to be statistically sigificat. 0-31. The author therefore cocluded that retaliatory taxes have bee "of questioable value." Cf. -269; Felto, Retaliatory Isurace Compay Taxatio: A Evaluatio, 28 J. of Is. 71, 77-78 (1961). Parties challegig legislatio uder the Equal Protectio Clause caot prevail so log as "it is evidet from all the cosideratios preseted to [the legislature], ad those of which we may take judicial otice, that the questio is at least debatable." Uited States v. Carolee Products at 15. O this stadard, we caot but coclude that the Califoria retaliatory isurace tax withstads the strictures of the Fourteeth Amedmet. Affirmed. |
Justice White | 1,987 | 6 | dissenting | NLRB v. Electrical Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111881/nlrb-v-electrical-workers/ | The majority has once again substituted its judgment for a fair and reasonable interpretation by the National Labor Relations Board of 8(b)(1)(B), and I, once again, respectfully dissent. See & Light *599 The Board concluded that a union violates 8(b)(1)(B) when it disciplines a member, who serves as an employer representative,[1] for working for an employer which does not have a collective-bargaining agreement with the union. The purpose of such discipline is to force the member to leave his or her job and its effect is to deprive the employer of the services of the representative which it has selected. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 340 (Royal Electric Co.), 271 N. L. R. B. 995, 1000 (1984). The Board's interpretation of 8(b)(1)(B) is longstanding. New Mexico District Council of Carpenters and Joiners of America (A. S. Horner, ), 177 N. L. R. B. 500 (1969), enf'd, As we have often stated, "[t]he function of striking [the] balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review." American Broadcasting (internal quotations omitted). We do not sit as a "super-Board authorized to overrule an agency's choice between reasonable constructions of the controlling statute. We should not impose *600 our views on the Board as long as it stays within the outer boundaries of the statute it is charged with administering." The Board has done so here. By its plain language, 8(b)(1)(B) protects an employer's right to select grievance-adjustment and collective-bargaining representatives, and does not merely ensure that union control does not affect the manner in which a selected representative thereafter performs his or her duties. And I see nothing in the language or legislative history of the NLRA which indicates congressional intent to foreclose the Board from applying 8(b)(1)(B) to the type of union interference with an employer's right to select its representatives which is presented here. The section was primarily intended to prevent unions from forcing employers into multi-employer bargaining units and from dictating the identity of employers' representatives for collective bargaining and grievance adjusting. ; There is no reason why the Board cannot fairly interpret the interdiction against dictating an employer's choice of representative to encompass both requiring an employer to select Mr. Y, see and preventing an employer from selecting anyone who is a member of a union which does not have a collective-bargaining agreement with the employer.[2] Moreover, we traveled this road previously in ABC. We stated there: "Union pressure on supervisors can affect either their willingness to |
Justice White | 1,987 | 6 | dissenting | NLRB v. Electrical Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111881/nlrb-v-electrical-workers/ | "Union pressure on supervisors can affect either their willingness to serve as grievance adjustors or collective bargainers, or the manner in which they fulfill these functions; and either effect impermissibly coerces the *601 employer in his choice of " The majority mischaracterizes this statement as "dictum," "unnecessary to the disposition of ABC." Ante, at 591-592, n. 15. The union discipline threatened in that case was found to have kept some supervisor-members from reporting to work during the strike and to have adversely affected those who reported to work in the performance of their grievance-adjustment duties. 437 U.S., at -436. As to the former group, we agreed with the Board that ABC was "restrained and coerced within the meaning of 8(b)(1)(B) by being totally deprived of the opportunity to choose these particular supervisors as [its] collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives during the strike." The manner in which these supervisor-members performed their duties was obviously not affected since they performed no duties during the strike; as here, it was their willingness to serve as employer representatives that was at issue. We cited approvingly the Board's disposition of an unfair labor practice claim analogous to the claim asserted in ABC and virtually identical to the one asserted here. In A. S. Horner, the Board held that union discipline imposed on a member who worked as a supervisor for an employer which had no contract with the union violated 8(b)(1)(B) because it would have required the supervisor to leave his job and thus would have deprived the employer of the services of its selected n. 36. Also at issue in ABC was a group of employees directors who were members of the striking union but who performed grievance-adjustment duties only with respect to members of other unions. That fact did not lead us to a different analysis or result under 8(b)(1)(B). "A union may no more interfere with the employer's choice of a grievance representative with respect to employees represented by other unions than with respect to those employees whom it itself represents. International Organization of Masters, Mates *602 and Pilots, International Marine Division, 197 N. L. R. B. 400 enf'd, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 11, 14, cert. denied, and International Organization of Masters, Mates and" The majority seeks to distinguish ABC on the ground that respondent here has no collective-bargaining relationship at all with Royal and Nutter, ante, at 590-591, n. 14, but this fact is without significance. The harm is the same in both cases the union discipline would deprive the employer of the services of its selected |
Justice White | 1,987 | 6 | dissenting | NLRB v. Electrical Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111881/nlrb-v-electrical-workers/ | would deprive the employer of the services of its selected [3] The majority further attempts to distance itself from ABC by asserting that Pattern in which we held that union members have a right to resign from a union during a strike or when a strike is imminent and avoid imposition of union discipline, undercuts the force of ABC. Ante, at 594-595. But Pattern Makers does not significantly affect the rationale of ABC. Although ABC at the time could not have required its supervisor-members to renounce union membership when it received notice that the union was calling a strike, it could have required them to renounce their union membership when they were first promoted to a supervisory -437. Nevertheless, the Board concluded that this employer option did not render 8(b)(1)(B) inapplicable and we accepted that decision. Clearly, the position of a supervisor-member creates some tension in the administration of labor relations. Both unions and employers have the power to resolve the tension, however. Unions can expel members who *603 serve as supervisors[4] and employers can forbid supervisors to retain their union membership. Unions and employers do not always do so, however, obviously because each believes that there is some benefit to be gained from accepting supervisor-members. The Board has interpreted 8(b)(1)(B) to require unions that choose to accept the benefits of supervisor-members to bear the burden of their immunity from certain disciplinary rules, in furtherance of the federal policy that employers should select their representatives free of union coercion. The majority simply disagrees with this judgment by the Board and would place the burden on employers; that is, if an employer chooses to accept the benefits of supervisor-members, it must bear the risk that it may be deprived of their services as representatives for collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. But this choice between reasonable constructions of the statute has been entrusted to the NLRB, not to this Court. Hence, I dissent. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,979 | 11 | dissenting | Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110163/vaughn-v-vermilion-corp/ | Since the canals involved in this case are entirely artificial in their construction, applicability of the federal navigational servitude is a somewhat closer question than in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, ante, p. 164. Nevertheless, for the reasons given in my dissenting opinion in that case, ante, p. 180, I would reverse the judgment of the Louisiana Court of Appeal. There is no question that the canals are navigable in fact, or that they give access to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, a waterway used for interstate navigation and subject to plenary federal control. The canals are currently used for commercial navigation. they are, thus, "navigable waters of the United States." If the United States had condemned respondent's fast land in order to construct the canals, I would agree that compensation would be required, although the valuation of the land could not include its potential use as a canal. Cf. United But the Government did not initiate the construction. Rather, respondent's predecessors in interest voluntarily undertook to transform land into navigable water for purposes of obtaining access to a highway of waterborne commerce. In doing so, they subjected their former fast land to the dominant federal interest in navigation and surrendered the right to control access to the canals. As in Kaiser Aetna, I would hold that the public interest in free navigation predominates, and that, if restrictions on access are warranted, they should be accomplished through the *211 auspices of the Army Corps of Engineers. While I agree with the Court that it would be inappropriate on this record to decide the first question presented for review, my answer to the second question obviates the necessity of reaching the first. I thus perceive no need to remand the case for further proceedings. |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | dissenting | Vance v. Terrazas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110168/vance-v-terrazas/ | The Court holds that one may lose United States citizenship if the Government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that certain acts, specified by statute, were done with the specific intent of giving up citizenship. Accordingly, the Court, in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holds that the District Court applied the correct evidentiary standards in determining that appellee was properly stripped of his citizenship. Because I would hold that one who acquires United States citizenship by virtue of being born in the United States, U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1, can lose that citizenship only by formally renouncing it, and because I would hold that the act of which appellee is accused in this case cannot be an expatriating act, I dissent. I This case is governed by Afroyim, emphasizing the crucial importance of the right of citizenship, held unequivocally that a citizen has "a constitutional right to remain a citizen unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship." "[T]he only way the citizenship could be lost was by the voluntary renunciation or abandonment by the citizen himself." The Court held that because Congress could not "abridge," "affect," "restrict the effect of," or "take away" citizenship, Congress was "without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship" because he voted in a foreign election. The same clearly must be true of the Government's attempt to strip appellee of citizenship because he swore an oath of allegiance to Mexico.[1] Congress has provided for a procedure by which one may formally renounce citizenship.[2] In this case the appellant concedes that appellee has not renounced his citizenship under that procedure.[3] Brief for Appellant 56. Because one can lose citizenship only by voluntarily renouncing it and because appellee has not formally renounced his, I would hold that he remains a citizen. Accordingly, I would remand the case with orders that appellee be given a declaration of United States nationality.[4] *276 II I reach the same result by another, independent line of reasoning. Appellee was born a dual national. He is a citizen of the United States because he was born here and a citizen of Mexico because his father was Mexican. The only expatriating act of which appellee stands accused is having sworn an oath of allegiance to Mexico. If dual citizenship, per se, can be consistent with United States citizenship,[5] then I cannot see why an oath of allegiance to the other country of which one is already a citizen should create inconsistency. One owes allegiance to any country of which one is a citizen, especially when one is living |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 allows debtors and their creditors to negotiate a plan for dividing an estate’s value. See 11 U.S. C. 1129, 114 But sometimes the parties cannot agree on a plan. If so, the bankruptcy court may decide to dismiss the case. The Code then ordinarily provides for what is, in effect, a restoration of the prepetition financial status quo. In the case before us, a Bankruptcy Court dismissed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. But the court did not simply restore the prepetition status quo. Instead, the court ordered a distribution of estate assets that gave money to high-priority secured creditors and to low-priority general unsecured creditors but which skipped certain dissenting mid-priority creditors. The skipped creditors would have been entitled to payment ahead of the general unsecured creditors in a Chapter 11 plan (or in a Chapter 7 liquida- tion). See 725, 726, 1129. The question before us is whether a bankruptcy court has the legal power to order this priority-skipping kind of distribution scheme in con- nection with a Chapter 11 dismissal. 2 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court In our view, a bankruptcy court does not have such a power. A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies. I A 1 We begin with a few fundamentals: A business may file for bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 1 In Chapter 7, a trustee liquidates the debtor’s assets and distributes them to creditors. See et seq. In Chapter 11, debtor and creditors try to negotiate a plan that will govern the distribution of valuable assets from the debt- or’s estate and often keep the business operating as a going concern. See, e.g., 1, 1129, 1141 (setting out the framework in which the parties negotiate). Filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy has several relevant legal consequences. First, an estate is created comprising all property of the debtor. Second, a fiduciary is installed to manage the estate in the interest of the creditors. 1107(a). This fiduciary, often the debt- or’s existing management team, acts as “debtor in posses- sion.” 1104. It may operate the business, 1108, and perform certain bankruptcy-related functions, such as seeking to recover for the estate prefer- ential or fraudulent transfers made to other persons, (transfers made before bankruptcy that unfairly preferred particular creditors); (fraudulent transfers, including transfers made before bankruptcy for which the |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | (fraudulent transfers, including transfers made before bankruptcy for which the debtor did not receive fair value). Third, an “automatic stay” of all collection proceedings against the debtor takes effect. Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 3 Opinion of the Court It is important to keep in mind that Chapter 11 foresees three possible outcomes. The first is a bankruptcy-court- confirmed plan. Such a plan may keep the business oper- ating but, at the same time, help creditors by providing for payments, perhaps over time. See 1129, 114 The second possible outcome is conversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding for liquidation of the business and a distribution of its remaining assets. (b), 726. That conversion in effect confesses an inability to find a plan. The third possible outcome is dismissal of the Chap- ter 11 case. A dismissal typically “revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case”—in other words, it aims to return to the prepetition financial status quo. Nonetheless, recognizing that conditions may have changed in ways that make a perfect restoration of the status quo difficult or impossible, the Code permits the bankruptcy court, “for cause,” to alter a Chapter 11 dis- missal’s ordinary restorative consequences. A dismissal that does so (or which has other special condi- tions attached) is often referred to as a “structured dismis- sal,” defined by the American Bankruptcy Institute as a “hybrid dismissal and confirmation order that typically dismisses the case while, among other things, approving certain distributions to creditors, granting certain third-party releases, enjoining cer- tain conduct by creditors, and not necessarily vacating orders or unwinding transactions undertaken during the case.” American Bankruptcy Institute Commis- sion To Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 2012– Final Report and Recommendations 270 Although the Code does not expressly mention structured dismissals, they “appear to be increasingly common.” n. 973. 4 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court 2 The Code also sets forth a basic system of priority, which ordinarily determines the order in which the bank- ruptcy court will distribute assets of the estate. Secured creditors are highest on the priority list, for they must receive the proceeds of the collateral that secures their debts. 11 U.S. C. Special classes of creditors, such as those who hold certain claims for taxes or wages, come next in a listed order. 726(a)(1). Then come low- priority creditors, including general unsecured creditors. The Code places equity holders at the bottom of the priority list. They receive nothing until all |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | bottom of the priority list. They receive nothing until all previ- ously listed creditors have been paid in full. The Code makes clear that distributions of assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation must follow this prescribed order. 726. It provides somewhat more flexibility for distributions pursuant to Chapter 11 plans, which may impose a different ordering with the consent of the af- fected parties. But a bankruptcy court cannot confirm a plan that contains priority-violating distributions over the objection of an impaired creditor class. 1129(b)(2). The question here concerns the interplay between the Code’s priority rules and a Chapter 11 dismissal. Here, the Bankruptcy Court neither liquidated the debtor under Chapter 7 nor confirmed a Chapter 11 plan. But the court, instead of reverting to the prebankruptcy status quo, ordered a distribution of the estate assets to creditors by attaching conditions to the dismissal (i.e., it ordered a structured dismissal). The Code does not explicitly state what priority rules—if any—apply to a distribution in these circumstances. May a court consequently provide for distributions that deviate from the ordinary priority rules that would apply to a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 plan? Can it approve conditions that give estate assets to members of a lower priority class while Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 5 Opinion of the Court skipping objecting members of a higher priority class? B In 2006, Sun Capital Partners, a private equity firm, acquired Jevic Transportation Corporation with money borrowed from CIT Group in a “leveraged buyout.” In a leveraged buyout, the buyer (B) typically borrows from a third party (T) a large share of the funds needed to pur- chase a company (C). B then pays the money to C’s share- holders. Having bought the stock, B owns C. B then pledges C’s assets to T so that T will have security for its loan. Thus, if the selling price for C is $50 million, B might use $10 million of its own money, borrow $40 mil- lion from T, pay $50 million to C’s shareholders, and then pledge C assets worth $40 million (or more) to T as secu- rity for T’s $40 million loan. If B manages C well, it might make enough money to pay T back the $40 million and earn a handsome profit on its own $10 million investment. But, if the deal sours and C descends into bankruptcy, beware of what might happen: Instead of C’s $40 million in assets being distributed to its existing creditors, the money will go to T to pay back T’s loan—the loan |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | will go to T to pay back T’s loan—the loan that allowed B to buy C. (T will receive what remains of C’s assets because T is now a secured creditor, putting it at the top of the priority list). Since C’s shareholders receive money while C’s creditors lose their claim to C’s remaining assets, unsuccessful leveraged buyouts often lead to fraudulent conveyance suits alleging that the purchaser (B) transferred the company’s assets without receiving fair value in return. See Lipson & Vandermeuse, Stern, Seri- ously: The Article I Judicial Power, Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 1220– 122 This is precisely what happened here. Just two years after Sun’s buyout, Jevic (C in our leveraged buyout ex- ample) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the time of 6 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court filing, it owed $53 million to senior secured creditors Sun and CIT (B and T in our example), and over $20 million to tax and general unsecured creditors. The circumstances surrounding Jevic’s bankruptcy led to two lawsuits. First, petitioners, a group of former Jevic truckdrivers, filed suit in bankruptcy court against Jevic and Sun. Petitioners pointed out that, just before entering bankruptcy, Jevic had halted almost all its operations and had told petitioners that they would be fired. Petitioners claimed that Jevic and Sun had thereby violated state and federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Acts—laws that require a company to give work- ers at least 60 days’ notice before their termination. See 29 U.S. C. N. J. Stat. Ann. (West 2011). The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment for petitioners against Jevic, leaving them (and this is the point to remember) with a judgment that petitioners say is worth $12.4 million. See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 496 B.R. 151 Some $8.3 million of that judgment counts as a priority wage claim under 11 U.S. C. and is therefore entitled to payment ahead of general unsecured claims against the Jevic estate. Petitioners’ WARN suit against Sun continued through- out most of the litigation now before us. But eventually Sun prevailed on the ground that Sun was not the work- ers’ employer at the relevant times. See In re Jevic Hold- ing Corp., Second, the Bankruptcy Court authorized a committee representing Jevic’s unsecured creditors to sue Sun and CIT. The Bankruptcy Court and the parties were aware that any proceeds from such a suit would belong not to the unsecured creditors, but to the bankruptcy estate. See (6); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 552–553 (CA3 2003) (en banc) (holding that a creditor’s |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | of 552–553 (CA3 2003) (en banc) (holding that a creditor’s committee can Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 7 Opinion of the Court bring a derivative action on behalf of the estate). The committee alleged that Sun and CIT, in the course of their leveraged buyout, had “hastened Jevic’s bankruptcy by saddling it with debts that it couldn’t service.” In re Jevic Holding Corp., In 2011, the Bankruptcy Court held that the committee had ade- quately pleaded claims of preferential transfer under and of fraudulent transfer under In re Jevic Hold- ing Corp., (Bkrtcy. Ct. Del., Sept. 15, 2011). Sun, CIT, Jevic, and the committee then tried to negoti- ate a settlement of this “fraudulent-conveyance” lawsuit. By that point, the depleted Jevic estate’s only remaining assets were the fraudulent-conveyance claim itself and $7 million in cash, which was subject to a lien held by Sun. The parties reached a settlement agreement. It pro- vided (1) that the Bankruptcy Court would dismiss the fraudulent-conveyance action with prejudice; (2) that CIT would deposit $2 million into an account earmarked to pay the committee’s legal fees and administrative expenses; (3) that Sun would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $7 million to a trust, which would pay taxes and administra- tive expenses and distribute the remainder on a pro rata basis to the low-priority general unsecured creditors, but which would not distribute anything to petitioners (who, by virtue of their WARN judgment, held an $8.3 million mid- level-priority wage claim against the estate); and (4) that Jevic’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy would be dismissed. Apparently Sun insisted on a distribution that would skip petitioners because petitioners’ WARN suit against Sun was still pending and Sun did not want to help fi- nance that litigation. See –178, n. 4 (Sun’s counsel acknowledging before the Bankruptcy Court that “ ‘Sun probably does care where the money goes because you can take judicial notice that there’s a pending 8 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court WARN action against Sun by the WARN plaintiffs. And if the money goes to the WARN plaintiffs, then you’re fund- ing someone who is suing you who otherwise doesn’t have funds and is doing it on a contingent fee basis’ ”). The essential point is that, regardless of the reason, the pro- posed settlement called for a structured dismissal that provided for distributions that did not follow ordinary priority rules. Sun, CIT, Jevic, and the committee asked the Bank- ruptcy Court to approve the settlement and dismiss the case. Petitioners and the U. S. Trustee objected, arguing that the |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | Petitioners and the U. S. Trustee objected, arguing that the settlement’s distribution plan violated the Code’s priority scheme because it skipped petitioners—who, by virtue of their WARN judgment, had mid-level priority claims against estate assets—and distributed estate money to low-priority general unsecured creditors. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with petitioners that the settlement’s distribution scheme failed to follow ordinary priority rules. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. But it held that this did not bar approval. That, in the Bankruptcy Court’s view, was because the proposed payouts would occur pursuant to a structured dismissal of a Chapter 11 petition rather than an approval of a Chapter 11 plan. The court accordingly decided to grant the motion in light of the “dire circumstances” facing the estate and its creditors. at 57a. Specifically, the court predicted that without the settlement and dismissal, there was “no realistic prospect” of a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured creditors. at 58a. A confirm- able Chapter 11 plan was unattainable. And there would be no funds to operate, investigate, or litigate were the case converted to a proceeding in Chapter 7. The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. It recognized that the settlement distribution violated ordi- nary priority rules. But those rules, it wrote, were “not a bar to the approval of the settlement as [the settlement] is Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 9 Opinion of the Court not a reorganization plan.” In re Jevic Holding Corp., The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court by a vote of 2 to ; (Scirica, J., concur- ring in part and dissenting in part). The majority held that structured dismissals need not always respect prior- ity. Congress, the court explained, had only “codified the absolute priority rule in the specific context of plan confirmation.” As a result, courts could, “in rare instances like this one, approve structured dismissals that do not strictly adhere to the Bankruptcy Code’s prior- ity scheme.” Petitioners (the workers with the WARN judgment) sought certiorari. We granted their petition. II Respondents initially argue that petitioners lack stand- ing because they have suffered no injury, or at least no injury that will be remedied by a decision in their favor. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. (slip op., at 6) (explaining that, for Article III standing, a plain- tiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision”). Respondents concede that the structured dis- missal approved by the |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | Respondents concede that the structured dis- missal approved by the Bankruptcy Court contained distribution conditions that skipped over petitioners, ensur- ing that petitioners received nothing on their multimillion- dollar WARN claim against the Jevic estate. But respond- ents still assert that petitioners suffered no loss. The reason, respondents say, is that petitioners would have gotten nothing even if the Bankruptcy Court had never approved the structured dismissal in the first place, and will still get nothing if the structured dismissal is undone now. Reversal will eliminate the settlement of the committee’s fraudulent-conveyance lawsuit, which was 10 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court conditioned on the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the priority-violating structured dismissal. If the Bankruptcy Court cannot approve that dismissal, respondents con- tend, Sun and CIT will no longer agree to settle. Nor will petitioners ever be able to obtain a litigation recovery. Hence there will be no lawsuit money to distribute. And in the absence of lawsuit money, Jevic’s assets amount to about $7 million, all pledged to Sun, leaving nothing for anyone else, let alone petitioners. Thus, even if petition- ers are right that the structured dismissal was impermis- sible, it cost them nothing. And a judicial decision in their favor will gain them nothing. No loss. No redress. This argument, however, rests upon respondents’ claims (1) that, without a violation of ordinary priority rules, there will be no settlement, and (2) that, without a settle- ment, the fraudulent-conveyance lawsuit has no value. In our view, the record does not support either of these propositions. As to the first, the record indicates that a settlement that respects ordinary priorities remains a reasonable possibility. It makes clear (as counsel made clear before our Court, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 58) that Sun insisted upon a settlement that gave petitioners nothing only because it did not want to help fund petitioners’ WARN lawsuit against it. See –178, n. 4. But, Sun has now won that lawsuit. See If Sun’s given reason for opposing distributions to petitioners has disappeared, why would Sun not settle while permitting some of the settlement money to go to petitioners? As to the second, the record indicates that the fraudulent- conveyance claim could have litigation value. CIT and Sun, after all, settled the lawsuit for $3.7 million, which would make little sense if the action truly had no chance of success. The Bankruptcy Court could convert the case to Chapter 7, allowing a Chapter 7 trustee to pursue the suit against Sun and CIT. Or the court could Cite as: 580 U. |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | and CIT. Or the court could Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 11 Opinion of the Court simply dismiss the Chapter 11 bankruptcy, thereby allow- ing petitioners to assert the fraudulent-conveyance claim themselves. Given these possibilities, there is no reason to believe that the claim could not be pursued with counsel obtained on a contingency basis. Of course, the lawsuit— like any lawsuit—might prove fruitless, but the mere possibility of failure does not eliminate the value of the claim or petitioners’ injury in being unable to bring it. Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the structured dismissal cost petitioners something. They lost a chance to obtain a settlement that respected their prior- ity. Or, if not that, they lost the power to bring their own lawsuit on a claim that had a settlement value of $3.7 million. For standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an “injury.” See, e.g., (finding that appellants fined $5 plus costs had standing to assert an Establishment Clause challenge). And the ruling before us could well have cost petitioners consider- ably more. See (1998) (imposition of a “substantial contingent liability” qualifies as an injury). A decision in petitioners’ favor is likely to redress that loss. We accordingly con- clude that petitioners have standing. III We turn to the basic question presented: Can a bank- ruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the affected creditors’ consent? Our simple an- swer to this complicated question is “no.” The Code’s priority system constitutes a basic under- pinning of business bankruptcy law. Distributions of estate assets at the termination of a business bankruptcy normally take place through a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 plan, and both are governed by priority. In 12 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court Chapter 7 liquidations, priority is an absolute command— lower priority creditors cannot receive anything until higher priority creditors have been paid in full. See 11 U.S. C. 726. Chapter 11 plans provide somewhat more flexibility, but a priority-violating plan still cannot be confirmed over the objection of an impaired class of creditors. See The priority system applicable to those distributions has long been considered fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code’s operation. See H. R. Rep. No. 103–835, p. 33 (1994) (explaining that the Code is “designed to enforce a distri- bution of the debtor’s assets in an orderly manner in accordance with established principles rather than on the basis of the inside influence or economic leverage of a particular creditor”); |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | the inside influence or economic leverage of a particular creditor”); Roe & Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends The Creditors’ Bar- gain, (arguing that the first principle of bankruptcy is that “distribution conforms to predetermined statutory and contractual priorities,” and that priority is, “quite appropriately, bank- ruptcy’s most important and famous rule”); Markell, Own- ers, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reor- ganizations, (stating that a fixed priority scheme is recognized as “the cornerstone of reorganization practice and theory”). The importance of the priority system leads us to expect more than simple statutory silence if, and when, Congress were to intend a major departure. See (“Con- gress does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes”). Put somewhat more directly, we would expect to see some affirmative indication of intent if Con- gress actually meant to make structured dismissals a backdoor means to achieve the exact kind of nonconsen- sual priority-violating final distributions that the Code prohibits in Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 plans. Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 13 Opinion of the Court We can find nothing in the statute that evinces this intent. The Code gives a bankruptcy court the power to “dismiss” a Chapter 11 case. But the word “dismiss” itself says nothing about the power to make nonconsensual priority-violating distributions of estate value. Neither the word “structured,” nor the word “condi- tions,” nor anything else about distributing estate value to creditors pursuant to a dismissal appears in any relevant part of the Code. Insofar as the dismissal sections of Chapter 11 foresee any transfer of assets, they seek a restoration of the pre- petition financial status quo. See (dismissal ordinarily reinstates a variety of avoided transfers and voided liens); (dismissal ordinarily vacates certain types of bankruptcy orders); (dismissal ordinarily “revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case”); see also H. R. Rep. No. 95– 595, p. 338 (1977) (dismissal’s “basic purpose is to undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable, and to restore all property rights to the position in which they were found at the commencement of the case”). Section 349(b), we concede, also says that a bankruptcy judge may, “for cause, orde[r] otherwise.” But, read in context, this provision appears designed to give courts the flexibility to “make the appropriate orders to protect rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 338; cf., e.g., (upholding, under a Bankruptcy Court’s decision not to rein- state a debtor’s claim against a bank |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | not to rein- state a debtor’s claim against a bank that gave up a lien in reliance on the claim being released in the debtor’s reor- ganization plan). Nothing else in the Code authorizes a court ordering a dismissal to make general end-of-case distributions of estate assets to creditors of the kind that normally take place in a Chapter 7 liquidation or Chapter 14 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court 11 plan—let alone final distributions that do not help to restore the status quo ante or protect reliance interests acquired in the bankruptcy, and that would be flatly im- permissible in a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 plan because they violate priority without the impaired creditors’ consent. That being so, the word “cause” is too weak a reed upon which to rest so weighty a power. See United Sav. Assn. of (noting that “[s]tatutory construction is a holistic endeavor” and that a court should select a “meanin[g that] produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law”); (in inter- preting a statute, a court “must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provi- sions of the whole law, and to its object and policy” (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)); cf. In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (“ ‘Cause’ under means an acceptable reason. Desire to make an end run around a statute is not an adequate reason”). We have found no contrary precedent, either from this Court, or, for that matter, from lower court decisions reflecting common bankruptcy practice. The Third Circuit referred briefly to In re Buffet Partners, L. P., WL 3735804 The court in that case approved a structured dismissal. (We express no view about the legality of structured dismissals in general.) But at the same time it pointed out “that not one party with an economic stake in the case has objected to the dismissal in this manner.” The Third Circuit also relied upon In re Iridium Operat- ing LLC, But Iridium did not involve a structured dismissal. It addressed an interim distribution of settlement proceeds to fund a litigation trust that would press claims on the estate’s behalf. See at 459–460. The Iridium court observed that, when Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 15 Opinion of the Court evaluating this type of preplan settlement, “[i]t is difficult to employ the rule of priorities” because “the nature and extent of the Estate and the claims against it are not yet fully resolved.” The decision does not state or |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | not yet fully resolved.” The decision does not state or suggest that the Code authorizes noncon- sensual departures from ordinary priority rules in the context of a dismissal—which is a final distribution of estate value—and in the absence of any further unre- solved bankruptcy issues. We recognize that Iridium is not the only case in which a court has approved interim distributions that violate ordinary priority rules. But in such instances one can generally find significant Code-related objectives that the priority-violating distributions serve. Courts, for example, have approved “first-day” wage orders that allow payment of employees’ prepetition wages, “critical vendor” orders that allow payment of essential suppliers’ prepetition invoices, and “roll-ups” that allow lenders who continue financing the debtor to be paid first on their prepetition claims. See n. 8; D. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy 2–234 ; Roe, 99 Va. L. Rev., at 1250–1264. In doing so, these courts have usually found that the distributions at issue would “enable a successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off.” In re Kmart Corp., (CA7 2004) (discussing the justifications for critical-vendor orders); see also 163–164 (recognizing “permitting business debtors to reor- ganize and restructure their debts in order to revive the debtors’ businesses” and “maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate” as purposes of the Code). By way of contrast, in a structured dismissal like the one ordered below, the priority-violating distribution is attached to a final disposition; it does not preserve the debtor as a going concern; it does not make the disfavored creditors better off; it does not promote the possibility of a confirmable 16 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court plan; it does not help to restore the status quo ante; and it does not protect reliance interests. In short, we cannot find in the violation of ordinary priority rules that oc- curred here any significant offsetting bankruptcy-related justification. Rather, the distributions at issue here more closely resemble proposed transactions that lower courts have refused to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code’s procedural safeguards. See, e.g., In re Braniff Airways, Inc., (prohibiting an attempt to “short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establish- ing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets”); In re Lionel Corp., (reversing a Bankruptcy Court’s approval of an asset sale after holding that does not “gran[t] the bankruptcy judge carte blanche” or “swallo[w] up Chapter 11’s safeguards”); In re Biolitec, Inc., (rejecting a structured dismissal because it “seeks to alter parties’ rights without |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | structured dismissal because it “seeks to alter parties’ rights without their consent and lacks many of the Code’s most important safeguards”); cf. In re Chrysler LLC, (approving a asset sale because the bank- ruptcy court demonstrated “proper solicitude for the prior- ity between creditors and deemed it essential that the [s]ale in no way upset that priority”), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (CA2 2010) (per curiam). IV We recognize that the Third Circuit did not approve nonconsensual priority-violating structured dismissals in general. To the contrary, the court held that they were permissible only in those “rare case[s]” in which courts could find “sufficient reasons” to disregard priority. 787 F.3d, at 175, 186. Despite the “rare case” limitation, we still cannot agree. Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 17 Opinion of the Court For one thing, it is difficult to give precise content to the concept “sufficient reasons.” That fact threatens to turn a “rare case” exception into a more general rule. Consider the present case. The Bankruptcy Court feared that (1) without the worker-skipping distribution, there would be no settlement, (2) without a settlement, all the unsecured creditors would receive nothing, and consequently (3) its distributions would make some creditors (high- and low- priority creditors) better off without making other (mid- priority) creditors worse off (for they would receive noth- ing regardless). But, as we have pointed out, the record provides equivocal support for the first two propositions. See at 9–1 And, one can readily imagine other cases that turn on comparably dubious predictions. The result is uncertainty. And uncertainty will lead to similar claims being made in many, not just a few, cases. See Rudzik, A Priority Is a Priority Is a Priority—Except When It Isn’t, 34 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 16, 79 (“[O]nce the floodgates are opened, debtors and favored creditors can be expected to make every case that ‘rare case’ ”). The consequences are potentially serious. They include departure from the protections Congress granted particu- lar classes of creditors. See, e.g., United (Congress estab- lished employee wage priority “to alleviate in some degree the hardship that unemployment usually brings to work- ers and their families” when an employer files for bank- ruptcy); H. R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 187 (explaining the importance of ensuring that employees do not “abandon a failing business for fear of not being paid”). They include changes in the bargaining power of different classes of creditors even in bankruptcies that do not end in struc- tured dismissals. See Warren, A Theory of Absolute Prior- ity, 1991 Ann. Survey Am. L. 9, 30. |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | majority | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | Absolute Prior- ity, 1991 Ann. Survey Am. L. 9, 30. They include risks of collusion, i.e., senior secured creditors and general unse- cured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority unse- 18 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. Opinion of the Court cured creditors. See Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 4, 444 (1999) (discussing how the absolute priority rule was developed in response to “concern with ‘the ability of a few insiders, whether representatives of management or major creditors, to use the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage’ ” (quoting H. R. Doc. No. 93–137, pt. I, p. 255 (1973))). And they include making settlement more difficult to achieve. See Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. Law & Econ. 249, 271 (1976) (arguing that “the ratio of lawsuits to settlements is mainly a function of the amount of uncertainty, which leads to divergent estimates by the parties of the probable outcome”); see also RadLAX Gate- way Hotel, (2012) (noting the importance of clarity and predictability in light of the fact that the “Bankruptcy Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”). For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Part III, we conclude that Congress did not authorize a “rare case” exception. We cannot “alter the balance struck by the statute,” Law v. Siegel, 571 U. S. (slip op., at 11), not even in “rare cases.” Cf. Norwest Bank (explain- ing that courts cannot deviate from the procedures “speci- fied by the Code,” even when they sincerely “believ[e] that creditors would be better off ”). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15– CASIMIR CZYZEWSKI, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP., ET AL. |
per_curiam | 1,988 | 200 | per_curiam | Patterson v. McLean Credit Union | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112044/patterson-v-mclean-credit-union/ | This case is restored to the calendar for reargument. The parties are requested to brief and argue the following question: "Whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S. C. 1981 adopted by this Court in should be reconsidered?" One might think from the dissents of our colleagues from the above order that our decision to hear argument as to whether the decision in should be reconsidered is a "first" in the history of the Court. One would also think from the language of the dissents that we have decided today to overrule We have of course done no such thing, but have decided, in light of the difficulties posed by petitioner's argument for a fundamental extension of liability under 42 U.S. C. 1981, to consider whether Runyon should be overruled. It is surely no affront to settled jurisprudence to request argument on whether a particular precedent should be modified or overruled. Three Terms ago, for example, we requested the parties to reargue the validity of our decision in National League of Two Terms before that we requested the parties to reargue and brief the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should apply where the evidence was obtained reasonably and in good faith. In 1975, we ordered the parties in Alfred Dunhill of London, to address whether we should reconsider our holding in Banco Nacional de which had reaffirmed the Court's adherence to the "act of state" doctrine. And in the Court requested reargument on the question whether the "concurrent sentence doctrine" had continuing validity. In addition, we have explicitly overruled statutory precedents in a host of cases. See, e. g., overruling ; Continental T. V., overruling United ; overruling Auto ; overruling ; overruling ; Boys overruling Sinclair Refining ; overruling These actions do not mean that the Court has been insensitive to considerations of stare decisis, but only that we recognize it as " `a principle of *619 policy and not a mechanical formula,' " Boys ). Both of the dissents intimate that the statutory question involved in should not be subject to the same principles of stare decisis as other decisions because it benefited civil rights plaintiffs by expanding liability under the statute. We do not believe that the Court may recognize any such exception to the abiding rule that it treat all litigants equally: that is, that the claim of any litigant for the application of a rule to its case should not be influenced by the Court's view of the worthiness of the litigant in terms of extralegal criteria. We think this is what Congress |
Justice White | 1,972 | 6 | dissenting | Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108493/lynch-v-household-finance-corp/ | I agree with the Court that federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1343 is not limited to the adjudication of personal rights and if the disposition of this case turned solely on that issue I would without reservation join in the majority opinion. But I cannot agree either with the approach that the majority takes to the anti-injunction *557 statute, 28 U.S. C. 2283, or its conclusion that the statute does not bar this suit. I do not mean to suggest that appellants' due process attack on the Connecticut garnishment statute is not substantial. It obviously is. Nevertheless, in my view, appellants should be required to press their constitutional attack in the state courts. In Connecticut, garnishment or attachment is one method of beginning a lawsuit. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 52-32; 1 E. Connecticut Civil Procedure 156-157, 232-237 (2d ed. 170). Of course, the requisite personal service upon a defendant is necessary to obtain in personam jurisdiction, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 52-54, as well as to secure an effective garnishment, but as a matter of right in certain kinds of civil actions a plaintiff may simultaneously garnish a defendant's bank account and serve a summons upon the defendant, together with a complaint stating the nature of the underlying action. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 52-32. A state court obtains jurisdiction of the action and of questions concerning the garnishment when return of process is made to that court. Garnishment is "ancillary to the main action for damages and cannot exist without such action." Its purpose, as the majority notes, is to secure property that will thus be made available for the satisfaction of a judgment. A writ of garnishment may be issued by a judge of the court of jurisdiction, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 52-8 but because garnishment in Connecticut, unlike most other States, is a matter of right and requires no prior judicial determination, the writ may also be issued by a court clerk or licensed attorney. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 51-85. In either *558 case, the matter is accomplished simply by completing a form. Appellant Lynch brought this federal action to enjoin the garnishment more than seven months after the writ had been executed, the summons and complaint served, process returned, and the case docketed in Connecticut court. At the earliest moment that a federal injunction could have issued the state court proceeding was well under way. Despite this, the majority purports to sever the garnishment from the action that underlies it. The Court reasons that Connecticut garnishment is not a proceeding in state court because it is carried |
Justice White | 1,972 | 6 | dissenting | Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108493/lynch-v-household-finance-corp/ | not a proceeding in state court because it is carried out by private parties not acting pursuant to a court order. Ante, at 554-555. If the majority means that garnishment is a severable matter, independent of the main suit and for that reason outside of 2283, then I would suppose it permissible for a federal court to enjoin any garnishment or attachment, whether obtained at the inception of a lawsuit, while it is in progress, or after judgment and for the purpose of execution. This approach to the anti-injunction statute, articulated in was, I thought, laid to rest in where the Court construed "proceedings in any court of a State" comprehensively and as embracing "all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from the institution to the close of the final process. It applies to appellate as well as to original proceedings; and is independent of the doctrine of res judicata. It applies alike to action by the court and by its ministerial officers; applies not only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or ancillary *55 taken with a view to making the suit or judgment effective." (Footnotes omitted.) The Court today embarks on quite a different course and rejects not only but also a substantial body of federal court of appeals law to the effect that 2283 bars federal court interference with executions on state court judgments. E. g., Manufacturers Record Publishing (CA5), cert. denied, ; (CA), cert. denied, ; cert. denied,[1] The Court also suggests that 2283 is inapplicable here because no Connecticut court authorized the garnishment. Its view apparently is that a federal injunction would therefore not interfere with state court processes. Until now, however, it has been reasonably clear that 2283 cannot be avoided by the simple expedient of enjoining parties instead of judges. Oklahoma Packing Moreover, the Court's rationale proves too much. Contrary to the views expressed in state court ministerial officers could be enjoined at any time and for any purpose in the course of a litigation and without regard to 2283. In addition, parties to state court litigation could be enjoined from performing any one or all of the tasks essential to the orderly progress of litigation so long as the acts in question are not carried out pursuant to court order. Depositions of parties and witnesses, interrogatories to parties, and subpoenas for witnesses are commonly pursued *560 without resort to a judge. Are these and other functions not performed under court order now subject to attack in federal |
Justice White | 1,972 | 6 | dissenting | Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108493/lynch-v-household-finance-corp/ | performed under court order now subject to attack in federal court at the option of the offended state court litigant? Today's decision will, I fear, create confusion by making the applicability of 2283 turn on rules that are difficult to apply. The potential for conflict between state and federal courts will increase and the price for judicial errors will be paid by litigants and courts alike. The common sense of the matter, it seems to me, is that the garnishment at issue here is part and parcel of a state court proceeding now under way. Garnishment in Connecticut may be characterized as separate from the underlying action, but it is nonetheless a proceeding and derives its legitimacy from the suit it accompanies. At the time this federal action was brought, return of process had long since been completed and the state court had acquired jurisdiction of a straightforward cause of action, including questions of the legitimacy and constitutionality of the garnishment. It also seems to me that, quite apart from 2283, today's holding departs from such cases as (151), and (171), which counsel against atomizing state litigation by enjoining, for example, the introduction of illegally obtained evidence, as well as from the more general admonitions of (171); (171); (171); and against improvident exercise of a federal court's equitable powers to frustrate or interfere with the operations of state courts by adjudicating federal questions that are involved in state court litigation and which can be adjudicated there. As the Court said in Stefanelli, if such interventions were to be permitted, "[e]very question of procedural due process *561 of lawwith its far-flung and undefined range would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to this Court, to determine the issue." Such resort, if permitted, "would provide ready opportunities, which conscientious counsel might be bound to employ, to subvert the orderly, effective prosecution of local crime in local courts." Appellee Barrett invokes Younger and companion cases as a ground for affirming the judgment of the District Court. Of course, those cases involved federal injunctions against state criminal proceedings, but the relevant considerations, in my view, are equally applicable where state civil litigation is in progress, as is here the case.[2] I would affirm the judgment of the court below. |
Justice Thomas | 1,999 | 1 | concurring | West Covina v. Perkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118255/west-covina-v-perkins/ | I agree with the holding of the majority's opinion, ante, at 240, that the Due Process Clause does not compel the city to provide respondents with detailed notice of state-law postdeprivation remedies. I write separately, however, because I cannot endorse the suggestion, in dicta, that "when law enforcement agents seize property pursuant to warrant, due process requires them to take reasonable steps to give notice that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for its return." In my view, the majority's conclusion represents an unwarranted extension of procedural due process principles developed in civil cases into an area of law that has heretofore been governed exclusively by the Fourth Amendment. As far as I am aware, we have never before suggested that procedural due process governs the execution of a criminal search warrant. Indeed, we have assumed that "[t]he Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the `process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases" In my view, if the Constitution imposes a "notice" requirement on officers executing a search warrant, it does so because the failure to provide such notice renders an otherwise-lawful search "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.[1] *247 We have previously suggested that the procedure for executing the common-law warrant for stolen goods "furnished the model for a `reasonable' search under the Fourth Amendment." At common law, officers executing a warrant for stolen goods were required to furnish an inventory of property seized. T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 82 (1969); see also 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 137 (6th ed. 1787) ("The officer executing such warrant, if required, shall shew the same to the person whose goods and chattels are distrained, and shall suffer a copy thereof to be taken"). Furthermore, the failure to adhere to this procedure was denounced in Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K. B. 1763), and Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765), two celebrated cases that profoundly influenced the Founders' view of what a "reasonable" search entailed.[2] In both cases, Lord Camden criticized the fact that the officers executing the general warrants were not constrained by the safeguards built up around the warrant for stolen goods. He specifically complained that the officers did not provide an inventory of the property seized.[3] In light of this historical evidence, I would be open to considering, in an appropriate case, whether the Fourth Amendment *248 mandates |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | At issue in this case are the meaning and validity of 1903(f) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1396b(f). As applied in Massachusetts, that provision results in a distribution of Medicaid benefits to recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) a class of aged, blind, or disabled persons who lack sufficient income to meet their basic needs that is more generous than the distribution of such benefits to persons who are self-supporting. Appellees are members of the latter class. Because they must incur medical expenses for which they are never reimbursed before they become eligible for Medicaid, they have less income available for their nonmedical needs than the recipients of SSI. The District Court concluded that this discrimination was irrational and held that 1903(f) was unconstitutional. We disagree and reverse. The statutory provisions governing the Medicaid program are complex. See 42 U.S. C. 1396 et seq. (196 ed. and Supp. IV). We first consider the history of the specific provisions at issue in this case, then relate the circumstances that gave rise to the present controversy, and finally address the two legal issues that are presented. I Section 1903(f) of the Social Security Act (Act) was enacted in 1968. To understand the present controversy, however, it is necessary to consider amendments to the Act made in 1965, 196, and 192. A The Medicaid program was established in 1965 in Title XIX of the Act "for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons." Section 1902(a)() of the Act, 42 *52 U. S. C. 1396a(a)(), sets forth the basic scope of the program, which has not changed significantly from its enactment in 1965. See Participating States are required to provide Medicaid coverage to certain individuals now described as the "categorically needy"; at their option States also may provide coverage (and receive partial federal reimbursement) to other individuals described as the "medically needy." See[1] These classes are defined by reference to other federal assistance programs. In 1965, federal assistance programs existed for the aged, the blind, the disabled, and families with dependent children.[2] At that time, each of these programs was administered by the States, which established both the "standard of need" and the "level of benefits." See ;[3] In establishing the Medicaid program, Congress required participating States to provide medical assistance to individuals who received cash payments under one of these assistance programs. as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a) ()(A). The House Report explained: "These people are the most |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | ()(A). The House Report explained: "These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for *53 medical care costs to be met, first, for these people."[4] They are the "categorically needy." Congress also provided that a participating State could offer Medicaid benefits to individuals who fell within one of the categories for which federal assistance was available but whose income made them ineligible for aid under those programs. These individuals were deemed "less needy"[5] and could receive assistance only if their income and resources were insufficient "to meet the costs of necessary medical or remedial care and services." as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)()(C). In 1965, no limit was placed on the extent to which federal reimbursement was available for optional coverage that States elected to provide to these persons who might become "medically needy."[6] *54 Since States established the income limits for the categorical assistance programs, they also established the income limits for the "categorically needy" under the Medicaid program. In addition, participating States established the eligibility standards for the optional coverage provided to the "medically needy." In 1902(a)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 1396a (a)(1), however, Congress set forth certain requirements governing state standards for determining eligibility. In particular, Congress required States to "provide for flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law." ; see 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(1).[] *55 Most States promptly elected to participate in the Medicaid program.[8] Many of these States also chose to provide Medicaid coverage to the "medically needy." Within a year, Congress recognized that it was fiscally improvident to rely exclusively on the States to set income limits for both aspects *56 of the Medicaid program. See H. R. Rep. No. 2224, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1966). It cautioned States "to avoid unrealistic levels of income and resources for title XIX eligibility purposes." B In 196, Congress placed a limit on federal participation in the Medicaid program. Representative Mills introduced a bill, sponsored by the Johnson administration, that would have made significant changes in both the Medicaid program and the categorical assistance programs. H. R. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (196). Under 220 of H. R. 5, a State participating in the Medicaid program would have been entitled to receive federal financial assistance for providing Medicaid benefits only to those persons whose income, after deduction |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | Medicaid benefits only to those persons whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than 150% of the highest of the State's categorical assistance standards of need.[9] Section 202 of the bill would have required States to revise annually the standards of need under each of the categorical assistance programs to reflect changes in the costs of living and, in some circumstances, to pay 0% of the standard of need established under the programs. In support of this provision, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare explained that "33 States provide less support for needy children [under the AFDC program] than the standards the States themselves have set as necessary to meet basic human needs."[] *5 After extensive consideration, the House Ways and Means Committee reported out a substantially revised bill. H. R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (196). The Committee Report described its primary proposed limitation on federal participation: "Your committee is proposing that Federal sharing will not be available for families whose income exceeds 133 1/3 percent of the highest amount ordinarily paid to a family of the same size (without any income and resources) in the form of money payments under the AFDC program. (AFDC income limits are, generally speaking, the lowest that are used in the categorical assistance programs)." 196 House Report, at 119. As noted, see n. the amount of benefits paid in many States was less than the qualifying standard of need.[11] The Committee Report explained the reasons for the move to limit federal participation in the Medicaid program. After noting that a few States had provided benefits beyond that anticipated by Congress, it stated: "Your committee expected that the State plans submitted under title XIX would afford better medical care and services to persons unable to pay for adequate care. *58 It neither expected nor intended that such care would supplant health insurance presently carried or presently provided under collective bargaining agreements for individuals and families in or close to an average income range. Your committee is also concerned that the operation of some State plans may greatly reduce the incentives for persons aged 65 or over to participate in the supplementary medical insurance program [Medicare] of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, which was also established by the Social Security Amendments of 1965. The provisions of the bill are directed toward eliminating, insofar as Federal sharing is concerned, these clearly unintended and, in your committee's judgment, undesirable actual and potential effects of the legislation." In States that paid less than 5% of the AFDC standard of |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | that paid less than 5% of the AFDC standard of need, the House provision would have provided Medicaid benefits only to persons whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than the AFDC standard of need.[12] The Committee proposal was severely criticized on the House floor.[13] It nevertheless was passed by the House and *59 sent to the Senate.[14] The Senate returned a substantially different bill and the matter was referred to conference.[15] The Conference Committee adopted the House 133 1/3% *580 AFDC payment standard. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (196). It added, however, an express exception for the categorically needy. Opposition to the Conference proposal was voiced in both the House and the Senate.[16] The 133 1/3% AFDC payment standard nevertheless was approved by Congress and enacted into law as 1903(f) of the Social Security Act. See as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1396b(f).[1] *581 C In 192, Congress replaced three of the four state-administered categorical assistance programs with a new federal program entitled Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), 42 U.S. C. 1381 et seq. (196 ed. and Supp. IV).[18] The SSI program establishes a federally *582 guaranteed minimum income for the aged, blind, and disabled. See Under the program, however, the States may (and in some cases must) raise that minimum standard and supplement the benefits provided by the Federal Government. See 42 U.S. C. 1382e (196 ed. and Supp. IV). Moreover, if supplemental payments are made to persons who would be eligible for SSI benefits except for the amount of their income, the State also may provide Medicaid benefits to those persons. See 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)()(C)(ii).[19] II The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has chosen to participate in the Medicaid program and to provide benefits to the extent that federal financial assistance is available to the "medically needy." The State also has elected to make supplementary payments to individuals who are eligible for SSI benefits or who would be eligible except for their income. Finally, the State has chosen to provide Medicaid benefits to those persons who receive supplemental payments. In Massachusetts, 133 1/3% of the appropriate state AFDC *583 payment amount is less in some cases than the combined federal SSI and state supplementary payment level.[20] Appellees filed this suit in 1980 in federal court, contending that 1903(f) of the Act as applied in Massachusetts violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.[21] Each of the appellees is either aged, blind, or disabled, but they are not categorically needy. For each |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | or disabled, but they are not categorically needy. For each appellee or his spouse was employed at one time and paid "Social Security" taxes. Each appellee (or his spouse) currently receives Social Security benefits (Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, 42 U.S. C. 401 et seq. (196 ed. and Supp. IV)) in an amount that renders him ineligible for either SSI benefits or state supplementary payments. Appellees challenged the fact that, since 133 1/3% of the Massachusetts AFDC payment level is for them lower than the SSI payment level, they are ineligible for Medicaid until their income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, is less than that of SSI payment recipients. By reason of the Social Security benefits that they receive, appellees thus have less income available for nonmedical expenses than individuals who possibly because they never worked and receive no Social Security benefits are dependent upon public assistance for support.[22] *584 The District Court granted appellees' motion for partial summary judgment.[23] It ruled that the Massachusetts Medicaid program was unconstitutional insofar as it forced Social Security recipients to incur medical expenses that reduced their remaining income to an amount below SSI payment levels. The court later declared explicitly that 1903(f) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 1396b(f), is unconstitutional as applied in Massachusetts. App. to Juris. Statement 25a. We noted probable jurisdiction. III In this Court, for the first time, appellees contend that the Social Security Act itself compels the conclusion that, if Medicaid services are provided to the "medically needy," those persons may not be forced to incur medical expenses that *585 would reduce their remaining income below the applicable public assistance standard. Although appellees did not advance this argument in the District Court, they are not precluded from asserting it as a basis on which to affirm that court's judgment.[24] "Where a party raises both statutory and constitutional arguments in support of a judgment, ordinarily we first address the statutory argument in order to avoid unnecessary resolution of the constitutional issue." Blum v. Bacon, ante, at 1. See 448 U. S., 06-. Appellees contend that a "fundamental Congressional purpose in the creation of the medically needy feature of Title XIX was to achieve equity between public assistance recipients and others similarly situated." Brief for Appellees 12. In support of this contention, appellees cite the requirement first imposed in 1965 that States "include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all groups) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan" as amended, 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(1), and note the statements in |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | amended, 42 U.S. C. 1396a(a)(1), and note the statements in the legislative history that a State could not require an individual to use, for medical expenses, income "which would bring the individual below the test of eligibility under the State plan." See n. Moreover, appellees contend that this "comparability requirement" was not changed by the enactment of 1903(f) in 1968. Appellees argue that the separate bills passed in both the House and the Senate would have affected both the categorically and the medically needy.[25] Only when the Conference *586 Committee accepted the House provision and added an exception for the categorically needy, appellees argue, did the 1968 modification potentially change the comparability requirement between the two groups. Appellees assert that such a change was not intended; rather, they argue that the exception for the categorically needy was added only to ensure that they would not be adversely affected by 1903(f). Appellees assert that the medically needy were not similarly excepted from the 133 1/3% rule in those States in which that figure was less than the applicable standard of need because, in 196, those States did not have medically needy programs. Thus, appellees urge that we construe 1903(f) to require the medically needy to incur medical expenses until their income is 133 1/3% of the AFDC payment amount or to maintain comparability 0% of the combined SSI-state supplementary payment level if that figure is higher. Appellees argue that the legislative history of the 1965 and 196 Amendments to the Social Security Act justifies a departure from the literal language of 1903(f) and the Secretary's interpretation of that provision. We cannot agree. Congress explicitly stated in 1903(f) that federal reimbursement for benefits provided to the medically needy was available only if the income of those persons, after the deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than 133 1/3% of the state AFDC payment level. In specifically excepting the categorically needy from this rule, Congress recognized that this amount could be lower than categorical assistance eligibility levels. There is no basis in either the statute or the legislative history for appellees' argument that Congress implicitly "assumed" that those States in which 133 1/3% of the AFDC payment level was less than the applicable standard of need simply would not provide assistance to the medically needy. Even if this were *58 true in 196, the Medicaid program then was less than two years old; Congress was aware that many States were in the process of adopting Medicaid programs.[26] To assume that Congress was unaware that 1903(f) which applied only to |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | Congress was unaware that 1903(f) which applied only to the medically needy could operate in those States which Congress knew existed in which 133 1/3% of the AFDC payment amount was less than the applicable standard of need is to demean the intelligence of the Congress. We are not prepared to interpret a statute on the basis of an unsupported assumption that Congress had little idea of what it was doing.[2] The literal and clear language of 1903(f) does not conflict with any other provision of the Act. In both 1902(a)() and 1902(a)(1), see -346, Congress required comparability among the various "categories" for which federal assistance was available, but these provisions did not require that the medically needy be treated comparably to the categorically needy in all respects. See n. 6, [28] Indeed, *588 such a broad comparability requirement would be inconsistent with the fact that Congress provided in 1965 that the medically needy could be excluded entirely from the Medicaid program. Moreover, 1903(f) is not inconsistent with the congressional intent, see n. that medical expenses be considered in determining, where appropriate, an individual's eligibility for Medicaid. In 1903(f) Congress determined that federal assistance would not be available for payments made to individuals whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was greater than 133 1/3% of applicable state AFDC payments. Congress determined that, so long as an individual retained that level of income to meet basic needs, he need not receive reimbursement for medical expenses. That income level might appear unreasonably low, but it is the level that Congress chose. We find no inconsistency between 1903(f) and 1902(a)(1). In sum, we see no reason to ignore the literal language of 1903(f). Moreover, this analysis is consistent with the Secretary's interpretation of that statutory provision. "We have often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference." Blum v. Bacon, ante, at 141. We hold that the discrimination challenged in this case is required by the Social Security Act. IV Appellees also contend and the District Court held that 1903(f), as applied in Massachusetts, irrationally discriminates between the categorically and the medically needy.[29]*589 The unfairness of the statute stems from the fact that appellees receive less medical assistance, and have less income remaining for their nonmedical needs, than do SSI recipients. The unfairness is accentuated by the fact that the disfavored class consists largely of persons who worked and paid taxes to provide for their retirement while the favored class includes persons who may |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | their retirement while the favored class includes persons who may never have done so. Powerful equities unquestionably support the appellees' claim of unfair treatment. A belief that an Act of Congress may be inequitable or unwise is of course an insufficient basis on which to conclude that it is unconstitutional. Moreover, the validity of a broad legislative classification is not properly judged by focusing solely on the portion of the disfavored class that is affected most harshly by its terms. 434 U.S. 4. In this case, Congress has differentiated between the categorically needy a class of aged, blind, disabled, or dependent persons who have very little income and other persons with similar characteristics who are self-supporting. Members of the former class are automatically entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter class are not eligible unless a State elects to provide benefits to the medically needy and unless their income, after consideration of medical expenses, is below state standards of eligibility.[] According to the congressional scheme, then, the medically needy may be excluded entirely from the Medicaid program. Before considering the constitutional constraints that may exist if a State chooses to provide benefits to that class, it is appropriate to confront the more basic question whether the *590 optional character of the program for the medically needy is itself constitutionally permissible. In establishing public assistance programs, Congress often has determined that the Federal Government cannot finance a program that provides meaningful benefits in equal measure to everyone. Both federal and state funds available for such assistance are limited. In structuring the Medicaid program, Congress chose to direct those limited funds to persons who were most impoverished and who because of their physical characteristics were often least able to overcome the effects of poverty. The legislative history of the 1965 Amendments makes clear that this group was not chosen for administrative convenience. "These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for medical care costs to be met, first, for these people."[31] A decision to allocate medical assistance benefits only to the poor does not itself violate constitutional principles of equality; in terms of their ability to provide for essential medical services, the wealthy and the poor are not similarly situated and need not be treated the same. It is rational to distribute public assistance benefits on the basis of the income and resources available to potential recipients. In choosing to require coverage only for the categorically needy, Congress permitted States to exclude from the program many persons who by reason of large |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | the program many persons who by reason of large medical expenses often were just as much in need of medical assistance as the categorically needy. Yet Congress found these persons "less needy." 1965 House Report, at 66. By reason of the greater income available to them, as a class these persons generally are better able to provide for their medical needs. In the legislative history of the 196 Amendments, see at 5-580, and n. 14, Congress noted that these persons often are able to prepare for future medical expenses *591 through private insurance or through participation in the Medicare program. In this Court affirmed a decision of a three-judge District Court holding that it was constitutional for the State of Colorado to provide benefits to the categorically needy but not to the medically needy. We decided Fullington summarily. It is clear that a decision to allocate scarce assistance benefits on the basis of an assumption that persons with greater incomes generally are better able to prepare for future medical needs is not inconsistent with constitutional principles of equal treatment. In other words, it is rational to define need on the basis of income, even though some persons with greater income who have been unable or unwilling to save enough of their earnings to prepare for future medical needs may actually be in greater need of assistance than those with less gross income. Although some "medically needy" persons have less income available for nonmedical expenses than those who receive categorical assistance, the broad legislative classification does not involve the type of arbitrariness that is constitutionally offensive.[32] Appellees do not challenge the decision in Fullington. They do not contend that it is irrational to deny benefits entirely to the medically needy. Thus, they do not challenge the line drawn by Congress to separate the class that receives favored treatment from the class that does not. Appellees attack only the manner in which one of the separate *592 classes is affected by the program. They argue that if medical benefits are made available to a class of persons who are not categorically needy, it is constitutionally impermissible to deny them benefits if their income, after the deduction of incurred medical expenses, is lower than that of an individual who receives public assistance. In view of the unchallenged decision in Fullington, appellees' constitutional argument is self-defeating. The injury that they regard as inconsistent with constitutional principles of equal treatment could be avoided by denying them all Medicaid benefits, thus placing them in a worse position financially than they are in |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Schweiker v. Hogan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110755/schweiker-v-hogan/ | them in a worse position financially than they are in now. No interest in "equality" could be furthered by such a result. If a State may deny all benefits to the medically needy while providing benefits to the categorically needy and rendering some persons who are on public assistance better off than others who are not a State surely may narrow the gap between the two classes by providing partial benefits to the medically needy, even though certain members of that class may remain in a position less fortunate than those on public assistance. The validity of the distinction between the categorically needy and the medically needy is not undermined by 1903(f), because the impact of that provision falls entirely on persons who are not within the categorically needy class. See n. The function of the 133 1/3% AFDC payment rule is to place a limit on the availability of reimbursement for potential members of the "medically needy" class. That rule prevents some persons (although not the appellees) from qualifying as medically needy; it also determines the extent to which the medically needy are reimbursed for their medical expenses. Yet appellees do not challenge the fact that, among persons who do not receive public assistance, some are treated differently from others. In other words, they do not complain of any discrimination within the class (all persons who are not categorically needy) *593 in which the rule performs its entire function.[33] Nor do they argue that Congress chose an eligibility level that is unrelated to ability to provide for medical needs. The fact that Massachusetts, unlike the State of Colorado in Fullington, has provided Medicaid benefits to the medically needy and in doing so has defined eligibility for persons who are not categorically needy on the basis of incurred medical expenses does not force it to make immediate medical need the sole standard in its entire Medicaid program. Massachusetts in essence has determined that those individuals whose gross income is greater than public assistance levels are ineligible for Medicaid, unless medical expenses in any computation period reduce available income to 133 1/3% of the state AFDC payment level. By adding the qualifying clause, which the State of Colorado did not, Massachusetts did not offend any constitutional interest in equality. Accordingly, without endorsing the wisdom of the particular standard that Congress selected a matter that is not for us to consider we conclude that it violates no constitutional command. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | Today the Court affirms what is perhaps the most radi cal injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history: an order requiring California to release the staggering num ber of 46,000 convicted criminals. There comes before us, now and then, a case whose proper outcome is so clearly indicated by tradition and common sense, that its decision ought to shape the law, rather than vice versa. One would think that, before allowing the decree of a federal district court to release 46,000 convicted felons, this Court would bend every effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous result. Today, quite to the contrary, the Court disregards stringently drawn provisions of the governing statute, and traditional constitutional limitations upon the power of a federal judge, in order to uphold the absurd. The proceedings that led to this result were a judicial travesty. I dissent because the institutional reform the District Court has undertaken violates the terms of the gov erning statute, ignores bedrock limitations on the power of Article III judges, and takes federal courts wildly beyond their institutional capacity. 2 BROWN v. PLATA SCALIA, J., dissenting I A The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) states that “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs”; that such relief must be “narrowly drawn, [and] exten[d] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right”; and that it must be “the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S. C. In deciding whether these multiple limitations have been complied with, it is necessary to identify with precision what is the “violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs” that has been alleged. What has been alleged here, and what the injunction issued by the Court is tailored (narrowly or not) to remedy is the running of a prison system with inadequate medical facilities. That may result in the denial of needed medical treatment to “a particular [prisoner] or [prisoners],” thereby violating (ac cording to our cases) his or their Eighth Amendment rights. But the mere existence of the inadequate system does not subject to cruel and unusual punishment the entire prison population in need of medical care, including those who receive it. The Court acknowledges that the plaintiffs “do not base their case on deficiencies in care provided on any one occasion”; rather, “[p]laintiffs rely on systemwide deficien cies in the |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | occasion”; rather, “[p]laintiffs rely on systemwide deficien cies in the provision of medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill pris oners in California to ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ and cause the delivery of care in the prisons to fall below the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Ante, at 7, n. 3. But our judge empowering “evolving standards of decency” jurisprudence (with which, by the way, I heartily disagree, see, e.g., Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 SCALIA, J., dissenting (SCALIA, J., dissenting)) does not prescribe (or at least has not until today prescribed) rules for the “decent” running of schools, prisons, and other government institutions. It forbids “indecent” treatment of individuals—in the context of this case, the denial of medical care to those who need it. And the persons who have a constitutional claim for denial of medical care are those who are denied medical care—not all who face a “substantial risk” (whatever that is) of being denied medical care. The Coleman litigation involves “the class of seriously mentally ill persons in California prisons,” ante, at 8, and the Plata litigation involves “the class of state prisoners with serious medical conditions,” ante, at 9. The plaintiffs do not appear to claim—and it would absurd to suggest— that every single one of those prisoners has personally experienced “torture or a lingering death,” ante, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted), as a consequence of that bad medical system. Indeed, it is inconceivable that anything more than a small proportion of prisoners in the plaintiff classes have personally received sufficiently atrocious treatment that their Eighth Amendment right was violated—which, as the Court recognizes, is why the plaintiffs do not premise their claim on “deficiencies in care provided on any one occasion.” Ante, at 7, n. 3. Rather, the plaintiffs’ claim is that they are all part of a medical system so defective that some number of prisoners will inevitably be injured by incompetent medical care, and that this number is sufficiently high so as to render the system, as a whole, unconstitutional. But what procedural principle justifies certifying a class of plaintiffs so they may assert a claim of systemic uncon stitutionality? I can think of two possibilities, both of which are untenable. The first is that although some or most plaintiffs in the class do not individually have viable Eighth Amendment claims, the class as a whole has collec 4 BROWN v. PLATA SCALIA, J., dissenting tively suffered an Eighth Amendment violation. That theory is |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | dissenting tively suffered an Eighth Amendment violation. That theory is contrary to the bedrock rule that the sole purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims that are individually viable. “A class action, no less than tradi tional joinder (of which it is a species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits. And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.” Shady Grove Or thopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. (2010) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 14). The second possibility is that every member of the plain tiff class has suffered an Eighth Amendment violation merely by virtue of being a patient in a poorly-run prison system, and the purpose of the class is merely to aggregate all those individually viable claims. This theory has the virtue of being consistent with procedural principles, but at the cost of a gross substantive departure from our case law. Under this theory, each and every prisoner who happens to be a patient in a system that has systemic weaknesses—such as “hir[ing] any doctor who had a li cense, a pulse and a pair of shoes,” ante, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted)—has suffered cruel or unusual punishment, even if that person cannot make an individu alized showing of mistreatment. Such a theory of the Eighth Amendment is preposterous. And we have said as much in the past: “If a healthy inmate who had suf fered no deprivation of needed medical treatment were able to claim violation of his constitutional right to medi cal care simply on the ground that the prison medical facilities were inadequate, the essential distinction be tween judge and executive would have disappeared: it would have become the function of the courts to assure adequate medical care in prisons.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). Whether procedurally wrong or substantively wrong, Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 5 SCALIA, J., dissenting the notion that the plaintiff class can allege an Eighth Amendment violation based on “systemwide deficiencies” is assuredly wrong. It follows that the remedy decreed here is also contrary to law, since the theory of systemic unconstitutionality is central to the plaintiffs’ case. The PLRA requires plaintiffs to establish that the systemwide injunction entered by the District Court was “narrowly drawn” and “extends no further than necessary” to correct “the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” If (as is the case) the only viable constitu tional |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | dissenting | Brown v. Plata | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/217287/brown-v-plata/ | If (as is the case) the only viable constitu tional claims consist of individual instances of mistreat ment, then a remedy reforming the system as a whole goes far beyond what the statute allows. It is also worth noting the peculiarity that the vast majority of inmates most generously rewarded by the re lease order—the 46,000 whose incarceration will be ended— do not form part of any aggrieved class even under the Court’s expansive notion of constitutional violation. Most of them will not be prisoners with medical conditions or severe mental illness; and many will undoubtedly be fine physical specimens who have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym. B Even if I accepted the implausible premise that the plaintiffs have established a systemwide violation of the Eighth Amendment, I would dissent from the Court’s endorsement of a decrowding order. That order is an example of what has become known as a “structural in junction.” As I have previously explained, structural injunctions are radically different from the injunctions traditionally issued by courts of equity, and presumably part of “the judicial Power” conferred on federal courts by Article III: “The mandatory injunctions issued upon termination of litigation usually required ‘a single simple act.’ H. 6 BROWN v. PLATA SCALIA, J., dissenting McClintock, Principles of Equity pp. 32–33 (2d ed. 1948). Indeed, there was a ‘historical prejudice of the court of chancery against rendering decrees which called for more than a single affirmative act.’ at 160. And where specific performance of contracts was sought, it was the categorical rule that no decree would issue that required ongoing supervision. Compliance with these ‘single act’ mandates could, in addition to being simple, be quick; and once it was achieved the contemnor’s relationship with the court came to an end, at least insofar as the subject of the order was concerned. Once the document was turned over or the land conveyed, the litigant’s obligation to the court, and the court’s coercive power over the liti gant, ceased. The court did not engage in any on going supervision of the litigant’s conduct, nor did its order continue to regulate its behavior.” Mine Work (SCALIA, J., concurring). Structural injunctions depart from that historical prac tice, turning judges into long-term administrators of complex social institutions such as schools, prisons, and police departments. Indeed, they require judges to play a role essentially indistinguishable from the role ordinarily played by executive officials. Today’s decision not only affirms the structural injunction but vastly expands its use, by holding that an entire system is unconstitutional because it may produce constitutional |
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