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Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | not take part in deliberations. "Permitting an individual to attack a jury verdict based upon the jury's internal deliberations has long been recognized as unwise by the Supreme Court. "As it stands then, the rule would permit the harassment of former jurors by losing parties as well as the possible exploitation of disgruntled or otherwise badly-motivated ex-jurors. "Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness requires that absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts. Jurors will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in post-trial litigation. In the interest *125 of protecting the jury system and the citizens who make it work, rule 606 should not permit any inquiry into the internal deliberations of the jurors." The Conference Committee Report reaffirms Congress' understanding of the differences between the House and Senate versions of Rule 606(b): "[T]he House bill allows a juror to testify about objective matters occurring during the jury's deliberation, such as the misconduct of another juror or the reaching of a quotient verdict. The Senate bill does not permit juror testimony about any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, p. 8 The Conference Committee adopted, and Congress enacted, the Senate version of Rule 606(b). Thus, the legislative history demonstrates with uncommon clarity that Congress specifically understood, considered, and rejected a version of Rule 606(b) that would have allowed jurors to testify on juror conduct during deliberations, including juror intoxication. This legislative history provides strong support for the most reasonable reading of the language of Rule 606(b) that juror intoxication is not an "outside influence" about which jurors may testify to impeach their verdict. Finally, even if Rule 606(b) is interpreted to retain the common-law exception allowing postverdict inquiry of juror incompetence in cases of "substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency," Dioguardi, 492 F. 2d, at 80, the showing made by petitioners falls far short of this standard. The affidavits and testimony presented in support of the first new trial motion suggested, at worst, that several of the jurors fell asleep at times during the afternoons. The District Court Judge appropriately considered the fact that he had "an unobstructed view" of the jury, and did not see any juror sleeping. App. 147-, 167-168; see Government of the Virgin 759 F. 2d, at 1077 ("[I]t was appropriate for the trial judge to draw upon his personal *126 knowledge and recollection in considering the factual |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | his personal *126 knowledge and recollection in considering the factual allegations. that related to events that occurred in his presence"). The juror affidavit submitted in support of the second new trial motion was obtained in clear violation of the District Court's order and the court's local rule against juror interviews, MD Fla. Rule 2.04(c); on this basis alone the District Court would have been acting within its discretion in disregarding the affidavit. In any case, although the affidavit of juror Hardy describes more dramatic instances of misconduct, Hardy's allegations of incompetence are meager. Hardy stated that the alcohol consumption he engaged in with three other jurors did not leave any of them intoxicated. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47 ("I told [the prosecutor] that we would just go out and get us a pitcher of beer and drink it, but as far as us being drunk, no we wasn't"). The only allegations concerning the jurors' ability to properly consider the evidence were Hardy's observations that some jurors were "falling asleep all the time during the trial," and that his own reasoning ability was affected on one day of the trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46, 55. These allegations would not suffice to bring this case under the common-law exception allowing postverdict inquiry when an extremely strong showing of incompetency has been made. Petitioners also argue that the refusal to hold an additional evidentiary hearing at which jurors would testify as to their conduct "violates the sixth amendment's guarantee to a fair trial before an impartial and competent jury." Brief for Petitioners 34 This Court has recognized that a defendant has a right to "a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing." In this case the District Court held an evidentiary hearing in response to petitioners' first new trial motion at which the judge invited petitioners to introduce any admissible evidence in support of their allegations. At issue in this case is whether the Constitution compelled the District *127 Court to hold an additional evidentiary hearing including one particular kind of evidence inadmissible under the Federal Rules. As described above, long-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry. Petitioners' Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury, on the other hand, are protected by several aspects of the trial process. The suitability of an individual for the responsibility of jury service, of course, is examined during voir dire. Moreover, during the trial the jury is observable by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel. See United Moreover, jurors are observable by |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | by court personnel. See United Moreover, jurors are observable by each other, and may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict. See cert. denied sub nom. Finally, after the trial a party may seek to impeach the verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct. See United Indeed, in this case the District Court held an evidentiary hearing giving petitioners ample opportunity to produce nonjuror evidence supporting their allegations. In light of these other sources of protection of petitioners' right to a competent jury, we conclude that the District Court did not err in deciding, based on the inadmissibility of juror testimony and the clear insufficiency of the nonjuror evidence offered by petitioners, that an additional postverdict evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. *128 Title 18 U.S. C. 371 provides, in relevant part: "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United or to defraud the United or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Section 371 is the descendent of and bears a strong resemblance to conspiracy laws that have been in the federal statute books since 1867. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, 30, Neither the original 1867 provision nor its subsequent reincarnations were accompanied by any particularly illuminating legislative history. This case has been preceded, however, by decisions of this Court interpreting the scope of the phrase "to defraud in any manner or for any purpose." In those cases we have stated repeatedly that the fraud covered by the statute "reaches `any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.' " U.S. 855, quoting ; see also ; We do not reconsider that aspect of the scope of 371 in this case. Therefore, if petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the REA, no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under 371. The indictment against petitioners charged them with having conspired "to defraud the United by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful functions of the Rural Electrification Administration in its administration *129 and enforcement of its guaranteed loan program." App. 5. Petitioners argue that if the evidence adduced at trial established a conspiracy to defraud, then the target of that conspiracy was Seminole Electric, and a conspiracy to defraud |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | that conspiracy was Seminole Electric, and a conspiracy to defraud a private corporation receiving financial assistance from the Federal Government does not constitute a conspiracy to defraud the United The Government sets out two arguments in response to petitioners' challenge to the 371 convictions. The first, which we accept, is that a conspiracy to defraud the United may be effected by the use of third parties. The Government's second argument asserts that Seminole, as the recipient of federal financial assistance and the subject of federal supervision, may itself be treated as "the United " for purposes of 371. This second argument must be rejected. The Government observes, correctly, that under the common law a fraud may be established when the defendant has made use of a third party to reach the target of the fraud. 2 H. Brill, Cyclopedia of Criminal Law 1244, p. 1892 (1923). The Government also correctly observes that the broad language of 371, covering conspiracies to defraud "in any manner for any purpose," puts no limits based on the method used to defraud the United A method that makes uses of innocent individuals or businesses to reach and defraud the United is not for that reason beyond the scope of 371. In two cases interpreting the False Claims Act, which reaches "[e]very person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented" a false claim against the United Rev. Stat. 5438, we recognized that the fact that a false claim passes through the hands of a third party on its way from the claimant to the United does not release the claimant from culpability under the Act. United ; United ex rel. The Government's principal argument for affirmance of petitioners' 371 convictions, however, is a great deal broader *130 than the proposition stated above. The Government argues that, because Seminole received financial assistance and some supervision from the United a conspiracy to defraud Seminole is itself a conspiracy "to defraud the United" The conspiracies criminalized by 371 are defined not only by the nature of the injury intended by the conspiracy, and the method used to effectuate the conspiracy, but also and most importantly by the target of the conspiracy. Section 371 covers conspiracies to defraud "the United or any agency thereof," a phrase that the Government concedes fails to describe Seminole Electric. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26 ("We do not say they are federal agents"). The Government suggests, however, that Seminole served as an intermediary performing official functions on behalf of the Federal Government, and on this basis |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | on behalf of the Federal Government, and on this basis a conspiracy to defraud Seminole may constitute a conspiracy to defraud the United under 371. The Government suggests that this position is supported by the Court's reasoning in a decision involving the scope of the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S. C. 201(a). Far from supporting the Government's position in this case, the reasoning of the Court in illustrates why the argument is untenable. For the purpose of 201's provisions pertaining to bribery of public officials and witnesses, 201(a) defined "public official" to include "an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government." The question presented in was whether officers of a private, nonprofit corporation administering the expenditure of federal community development block grants were "public officials" under 201(a). Although the "on behalf of" language in 201(a) was open to an interpretation that covered the defendants in that case, it was not unambiguously so. Therefore, the Court found *131 201(a) applicable to the defendants only after it concluded that such an interpretation was supported by the section's legislative history. See -496. "If the legislative history fail[ed] to clarify the statutory language," the Court observed, "our rule of lenity would compel us to construe the statute in favor of petitioners, as criminal defendants in these cases." ; see Unlike the interpretation of the federal bribery statute adopted by the Court in the interpretation of 371 proposed by the Government in this case has not even an arguable basis in the plain language of 371. In the Court construed 201(a)'s reference to those acting "on behalf of the United" Rather than seeking a particular interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, the Government, in arguing that 371 covers conspiracies to defraud those acting on behalf of the United asks this Court to expand the reach of a criminal provision by reading new language into it. This we cannot do. Moreover, even if the Government's interpretation of 371 could be pegged to some language in that section, the Government has presented us with nothing to overcome our rule that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." at The Government has wrested no aid from 371's stingy legislative history. Neither has the Government suggested much to commend its interpretation in terms of clarity of application. Petitioners assert that the Government's logic would require any conspiracy to defraud someone who |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | Government's logic would require any conspiracy to defraud someone who receives federal assistance to fall within 371. The Government replies that "there must be substantial ongoing federal supervision of the defrauded intermediary or delegation of a distinctly federal function to that intermediary to render a fraud upon the intermediary a fraud upon the `United' " Brief for United 25-26. Yet the facts of this case demonstrate the difficulty of ascertaining *132 how much federal supervision should be considered "substantial." The Government emphasizes the supervisory powers granted the REA in the loan agreement; petitioners argue that the restrictions placed by the REA on Seminole were comparable to those "that a bank places on any borrower in connection with a secured transaction." Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. Given the immense variety of ways the Federal Government provides financial assistance, and the fact that such assistance is always accompanied by restrictions on its use, the inability of the "substantial supervision" test to provide any real guidance is apparent. "A criminal statute, after if not before it is judicially construed, should have a discernable meaning." Although the Government's sweeping interpretation of 371 which would have, in effect, substituted "anyone receiving federal financial assistance and supervision" for the phrase "the United or any agency thereof" in 371 must fail, the Government also charged petitioners with conspiring to manipulate Seminole in order to cause misrepresentations to be made to the REA, an agency of the United The indictment against petitioners stated that: "It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants would and did cause Seminole Electric to falsely state and represent to the Rural Electrification Administration that an REA-approved competitive bidding procedure had been followed in awarding the access road construction contracts." App. 7. If the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that petitioners conspired to cause Seminole to make misrepresentations to the REA, then petitioners' convictions may stand. Because the sufficiency of the evidence on this particular charge in the indictment was not passed on below, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings on this question. *133 IV Each mail fraud count of the indictment charged Tanner and Conover with acting in furtherance of "a scheme and artifice to defraud: "(a) the United by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful function of the Rural Electrification Administration in its administration and enforcement of its guaranteed loan program; and "(b) Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., of its right to have its process and procedures for the procurement of materials, equipment and services run honestly and |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | the procurement of materials, equipment and services run honestly and free from deceit, corruption and fraud, and of its right to the honest and faithful services of its employees." On appeal, petitioners argued that the evidence did not establish either a scheme to defraud the United or a scheme to defraud Petitioners' arguments on the scheme to defraud the United were raised in the context of the 371 convictions. If the 371 convictions were reversed, petitioners argued, then the mail fraud convictions could stand only if the Government proved a scheme to defraud The Court of Appeals discussion on this point is as follows: "Appellants argue that the convictions on counts II through V can be upheld only if the evidence establishes that they used the mails in effectuating a scheme to defraud This is so, appellants contend, because the indictment did not charge, and the evidence did not establish, a violation of 18 U.S. C. 371. We have already rejected this proposition. Thus, we need not reach the question of whether the evidence establishes the use of the mails for the purpose of effectuating a scheme to defraud " If, on remand, the premise on which the Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the mail fraud convictions that petitioners' *134 actions constituted a conspiracy to defraud the United under 371 is rejected, the Court of Appeals must consider petitioners' argument that the evidence did not establish a scheme to defraud Seminole under the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S. C. 1341. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by competent jurors. This Court has long recognized that "[d]ue process implies a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing," "a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." If, as is charged, members of petitioners' jury were intoxicated as a result of their use of drugs and alcohol to the point of sleeping through material portions of the trial, the verdict in this case must be set aside. In directing district courts to ignore sworn allegations that jurors engaged in gross and debilitating misconduct, this Court denigrates the precious right to a competent jury. Accordingly, I dissent from that part of the Court's opinion.[1] I At the outset, it should be noted that |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | opinion.[1] I At the outset, it should be noted that petitioners have not asked this Court to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to impeach the jury's verdict. The question before us is only whether an evidentiary hearing is required to explore *135 allegations of juror misconduct and incompetency. As the author of today's opinion for the Court has noted: "A hearing permits counsel to probe the juror's memory, his reasons for acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his actions. A hearing also permits the trial judge to observe the juror's demeanor under cross-examination and to evaluate his answers in light of the particular circumstances of the case."[2] The allegations of juror misconduct in this case are profoundly disturbing. A few weeks after the verdict was returned, one of the jurors, Vera Asbel, contacted defense counsel and told him she had something she wanted to get off her conscience. App. 247. She stated that at the trial some of the male jurors were drinking every day and then "slept through the afternoons." According to Asbel, another juror, Tina Franklin, could confirm these charges. Despite these revelations, the District Court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing. Like this Court, the District Judge believed that Asbel's statements to defense counsel were inadmissible under Rule 606(b). Several months later, Asbel's allegations were buttressed by a detailed report of rampant drug and alcohol abuse by jury members, volunteered by another juror, Daniel Hardy.[3] In a sworn statement, Hardy indicated that seven members *136 of the jury, including himself, regularly consumed alcohol during the noon recess. App. 210. He reported that four male jurors shared up to three pitchers of beer on a daily basis. Hardy himself "consumed alcohol all the time." The female juror selected as foreperson was described as "an alcoholic" who would drink a liter of wine at lunch. Two other female jurors regularly consumed one or two mixed drinks at lunch. The four male jurors did not limit themselves to alcohol, however. They smoked marijuana "[j]ust about every day." In addition, two of them ingested "a couple lines" of cocaine on several occasions. At times two of the jurors used all three substances alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana. Hardy also maintained that the principal drug user, identified as "John," used cocaine during breaks in the trial. "I knew he had that little contraption and he was going to the bathroom and come back down sniffing like he got a cold." Hardy's statement supported Asbel's assessment of the impact of alcohol and drug consumption; he noted that |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | the impact of alcohol and drug consumption; he noted that "[m]ost, some of the jurors," were "falling asleep all the time during the trial." At least as to John, the effects of drugs and alcohol went beyond inability to stay awake at trial: "John just talked about how he was flying," which Hardy understood to mean that "he was messed up." Ib Hardy admitted that on one day during the trial his reasoning ability was affected by his use of alcohol and marijuana. These allegations suggest that several of the jurors' senses were significantly dulled and distorted by drugs and alcohol.[4] In view of these charges, Hardy's characterization *137 of the jury as "one big party," is quite an understatement. II Despite the seriousness of the charges, the Court refuses to allow petitioners an opportunity to vindicate their fundamental right to a competent jury. The Court holds that petitioners are absolutely barred from exploring allegations of juror misconduct and incompetency through the only means available to them examination of the jurors who have already voluntarily come forward. The basis for the Court's ruling is the mistaken belief that juror testimony concerning drug and alcohol abuse at trial is inadmissible under Federal Rule of 606(b) and is contrary to the policies the Rule was intended to advance. I readily acknowledge the important policy considerations supporting the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict, now embodied in Federal Rule of 606(b): freedom of deliberation, finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against harassment by dissatisfied litigants. See, e. g., ; Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 606(b), 28 U.S. C. App., p. 700. It has been simultaneously recognized, however, that "simply putting verdicts beyond effective reach can only promote irregularity and injustice." If the above-referenced policy considerations seriously threaten the constitutional right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, they must give way. See ; In this case, however, we are not faced with a conflict between the policy considerations underlying Rule 606(b) and petitioners' Sixth Amendment rights. Rule 606(b) is not applicable *138 to juror testimony on matters unrelated to the jury's deliberations. By its terms, Rule 606(b) renders jurors incompetent to testify only as to three subjects: (i) any "matter or statement" occurring during deliberations; (ii) the "effect" of anything upon the "mind or emotions" of any juror as it relates to his or her "assent to or dissent from the verdict"; and (iii) the "mental processes" of the juror in connection with his "assent to or dissent from the verdict."[5] Even as |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | his "assent to or dissent from the verdict."[5] Even as to matters involving deliberations, the bar is not absolute.[6] It is undisputed that Rule 606(b) does not exclude juror testimony as to matters occurring before or after deliberations. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 290, p. 151 ; cf. Note, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors Rule of 606(b), But, more particularly, the Rule only "operates to prohibit testimony as to certain conduct by the jurors which has no verifiable manifestations," 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's [04], p. 606-28 ; as to other matters, jurors remain competent to testify. See Fed. Rule Evid. 601. Because petitioners' claim of juror misconduct and incompetency involves objectively verifiable conduct occurring prior to deliberations, juror testimony in support of the claims is admissible under Rule 606(b). *139 The Court's analysis of legislative history confirms the inapplicability of Rule 606(b) to the type of misconduct alleged in this case. As the Court emphasizes, the debate over two proposed versions of the Rule the more restrictive Senate version ultimately adopted and the permissive House version, reproduced ante, 3, n., focused on the extent to which jurors would be permitted to testify as to what transpired during the course of the deliberations themselves.[7] Similarly, the Conference Committee Report, quoted by the Court, ante, 5, compares the two versions solely in terms of the admissibility of testimony as to matters occurring during, or relating to, the jury's deliberations: "[T]he House bill allows a juror to testify about objective matters occurring during the jury's deliberation, such as the misconduct of another juror or the reaching of a quotient verdict. The Senate bill does not permit juror testimony about any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, p. 8 The obvious conclusion, and the one compelled by Rule 601, is that both versions of Rule 606(b) would have permitted jurors to testify as to matters not involving deliberations. The House Report's passing reference to *140 juror intoxication during deliberations, quoted ante, 2-123, is not to the contrary. Reflecting Congress' consistent focus on the deliberative process, it suggests only that the authors of the House Report believed that the Senate version of Rule 606(b) did not allow testimony as to juror intoxication during deliberations.[8] In this case, no invasion of the jury deliberations is contemplated. Permitting a limited postverdict inquiry into juror consumption of alcohol and drugs during trial would not "make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference." -268. "Allowing [jurors] to testify as to matters other than their own inner reactions involves no particular hazard to the values sought to be protected." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 606(b), 28 U.S. C. App., p. 701. Even if I agreed with the Court's expansive construction of Rule 606(b), I would nonetheless find the testimony of juror intoxication admissible under the Rule's "outside influence" exception.[9] As a common-sense matter, drugs and *141 alcohol are outside influences on jury members. Commentators have suggested that testimony as to drug and alcohol abuse, even during deliberations, falls within this exception. "[T]he present exception paves the way for proof by the affidavit or testimony of a juror that one or more jurors became intoxicated during deliberations. Of course the use of hallucinogenic or narcotic drugs during deliberations should similarly be provable." 3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal 289, pp. 143-145 (footnote omitted). See 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's [04], pp. XXX-XX-XXX-XX ("Rule 606(b) would not render a witness incompetent to testify to juror irregularities such as intoxication. regardless of whether the jury misconduct occurred within or without the jury room"). The Court suggests that, if these are outside influences, "a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack of sleep" would also qualify. Ante, 2. Distinguishing between a virus, for example, and a narcotic drug is a matter of line-drawing. Courts are asked to make these sorts of distinctions in numerous contexts; I have no doubt they would be capable of differentiating between the intoxicants involved in this case and minor indispositions not affecting juror competency. The Court assures us that petitioners' Sixth Amendment interests are adequately protected by other aspects of the trial process: voir dire; observation during trial by the court, counsel, and courtroom personnel; and observation by fellow jurors (so long as they report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before a verdict is rendered). Ante, 7. Reliance on these safeguards, to the exclusion of an evidentiary *142 hearing, is misguided. Voir dire cannot disclose whether a juror will choose to abuse drugs and alcohol during the trial. Moreover, the type of misconduct alleged here is not readily verifiable through nonjuror testimony. The jurors were not supervised by courtroom personnel during the noon recess, when they consumed alcoholic beverages and used drugs. Hardy reported that he and his three companions purposely avoided observation. They smoked marijuana and used cocaine first in a municipal parking garage and later "[d]own |
Justice O'Connor | 1,987 | 14 | majority | Tanner v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111936/tanner-v-united-states/ | cocaine first in a municipal parking garage and later "[d]own past the Hyatt Regency" because it was "away from everybody." App. 218, 222. Finally, any reliance on observations of the court is particularly inappropriate on the facts of this case. The District Judge maintained that he had a view of the jury during the trial, and "[y]ou might infer that if I had seen somebody sleeping I would have done something about that." However, as the portions of the trial transcript quoted ante, at 113-114, indicate, the judge had abdicated any responsibility for monitoring the jury. He stated: "I'm going to not going to take on that responsibility" and "I'm not going to sit here and watch. I'm among other things, I'm not going to see " Tr. XX-XXX-XX-XXX. III The Court acknowledges that "postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior," but maintains that "[i]t is not at all clear that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it." Ante, 0. Petitioners are not asking for a perfect jury. They are seeking to determine whether the jury that heard their case behaved in a manner consonant with the minimum requirements of the Sixth Amendment. If we deny them this opportunity, the jury system may survive, but the constitutional guarantee on which it is based will become meaningless. I dissent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), as amended, 20 U.S. C. 1401 et seq., requires participating state and local educational agencies "to assure that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education" to such handicapped children. 1415(a). These procedures include the right of the parents to participate in the development of an "individualized education program" (IEP) for the child and to challenge in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with which they disagree. 1401(19), 1415(b), (d), (e). Where as in the present case review of a contested IEP takes years to run its course years critical to the child's development important practical questions arise concerning interim placement of the child and financial responsibility for that placement. This case requires us to address some of those questions. Michael Panico, the son of respondent Robert Panico, was a first grader in the public school system of petitioner Town of Burlington, Mass., when he began experiencing serious difficulties in school. It later became evident that he had "specific learning disabilities" and thus was "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act, 20 U.S. C. 1401(1). This entitled him to receive at public expense specially designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as related transportation. 1401(16), 1401(17). The negotiations and other proceedings between the Town and the Panicos, thus far spanning more than eight years, are too involved to relate in full detail; the following are the parts relevant to the issues on which we granted certiorari. In the spring of 1979, Michael attended the third grade of the Memorial School, a public school in Burlington, Mass., under an IEP calling for individual tutoring by a reading specialist for one hour a day and individual and group counselling. Michael's continued poor performance and the fact that *362 Memorial School was not equipped to handle his needs led to much discussion between his parents and Town school officials about his difficulties and his future schooling. Apparently the course of these discussions did not run smoothly; the upshot was that the Panicos and the Town agreed that Michael was generally of above average to superior intelligence, but had special educational needs calling for a placement in a school other than Memorial. They disagreed over the source and exact nature of Michael's learning difficulties, the Town believing the source to be emotional and the parents believing it to be neurological. In late June, the Town presented the Panicos with a proposed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 academic year. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | a proposed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 academic year. It called for placing Michael in a highly structured class of six children with special academic and social needs, located at another Town public school, the Pine Glen School. On July 3, Michael's father rejected the proposed IEP and sought review under 1415(b)(2) by respondent Massachusetts Department of Education's Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). A hearing was initially scheduled for August 8, but was apparently postponed in favor of a mediation session on August 17. The mediation efforts proved unsuccessful. Meanwhile the Panicos received the results of the latest expert evaluation of Michael by specialists at Massachusetts General Hospital, who opined that Michael's "emotional difficulties are secondary to a rather severe learning disorder characterized by perceptual difficulties" and recommended "a highly specialized setting for children with learning handicaps. such as the Carroll School," a state-approved private school for special education located in Lincoln, Mass. App. 26, 31. Believing that the Town's proposed placement of Michael at the Pine Glen School was inappropriate in light of Michael's needs, Mr. Panico enrolled Michael in the Carroll School in mid-August at his own expense, and Michael started there in September. *363 The BSEA held several hearings during the fall of 1979, and in January 1980 the hearing officer decided that the Town's proposed placement at the Pine Glen School was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was "the least restrictive adequate program within the record" for Michael's educational needs. The hearing officer ordered the Town to pay for Michael's tuition and transportation to the Carroll School for the 1979-1980 school year, including reimbursing the Panicos for their expenditures on these items for the school year to date. The Town sought judicial review of the State's administrative decision in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 20 U.S. C. 1415(e)(2) and a parallel state statute, naming Mr. Panico and the State Department of Education as defendants. In November 1980, the District Court granted summary judgment against the Town on the state-law claim under a "substantial evidence" standard of review, entering a final judgment on this claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The court also set the federal claim for future trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment on the state-law claim, holding that review under the state statute was pre-empted by 1415(e)(2), which establishes a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of review and which permits the reviewing court to hear additional evidence. In the meantime, the Town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | the Town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the District Court had denied a stay of that order, and the Panicos and the State had moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The State also had threatened outside of the judicial proceedings to freeze all of the Town's special education assistance unless it complied with the BSEA order. Apparently in response to this threat, the Town agreed in February to pay for Michael's Carroll School placement and related transportation for the 1980- term, none of which had yet been paid, and to continue *364 paying for these expenses until the case was decided. But the Town persisted in refusing to reimburse Mr. Panico for the expenses of the 1979-1980 school year. When the Court of Appeals disposed of the state claim, it also held that under this status quo none of the parties could show irreparable injury and thus none was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that the Town had not shown that Mr. Panico would not be able to repay the tuition and related costs borne by the Town if he ultimately lost on the merits, and Mr. Panico had not shown that he would be irreparably harmed if not reimbursed immediately for past payments which might ultimately be determined to be the Town's responsibility. On remand, the District Court entered an extensive pretrial order on the Town's federal claim. In denying the Town summary judgment, it ruled that 20 U.S. C. 1415(e)(3) did not bar reimbursement despite the Town's insistence that the Panicos violated that provision by changing Michael's placement to the Carroll School during the pendency of the administrative proceedings. The court reasoned that 1415(e)(3) concerned the physical placement of the child and not the right to tuition reimbursement or to procedural review of a contested IEP. The court also dealt with the problem that no IEP had been developed for the 1980- or -1982 school years. It held that its power under 1415(e)(2) to grant "appropriate" relief upon reviewing the contested IEP for the 1979-1980 school year included the power to grant relief for subsequent school years despite the lack of IEPs for those years. In this connection, however, the court interpreted the statute to place the burden of proof on the Town to upset the BSEA decision that the IEP was inappropriate for 1979-1980 and on the Panicos and the State to show that the relief for subsequent terms was appropriate. After a 4-day trial, the District Court in August 1982 overturned the BSEA decision, holding that the appropriate 1979-1980 placement for |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | the BSEA decision, holding that the appropriate 1979-1980 placement for Michael was the one proposed by *365 the Town in the IEP and that the parents had failed to show that this placement would not also have been appropriate for subsequent years. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Town was "not responsible for the cost of Michael's education at the Carroll School for the academic years 1979-80 through -82." In contesting the Town's proposed form of judgment embodying the court's conclusion, Mr. Panico argued that, despite finally losing on the merits of the IEP in August 1982, he should be reimbursed for his expenditures in 1979-1980, that the Town should finish paying for the recently completed -1982 term, and that he should not be required to reimburse the Town for its payments to date, apparently because the school terms in question fell within the pendency of the administrative and judicial review contemplated by 1415(e)(2). The case was transferred to another District Judge and consolidated with two other cases to resolve similar issues concerning the reimbursement for expenditures during the pendency of review proceedings. In a decision on the consolidated cases, the court rejected Mr. Panico's argument that the Carroll School was the "current educational placement" during the pendency of the review proceedings and thus that under 1415(e)(3) the Town was obligated to maintain that placement. The court reasoned that the Panicos' unilateral action in placing Michael at the Carroll School without the Town's consent could not "confer thereon the imprimatur of continued placement," even though strictly speaking there was no actual placement in effect during the summer of 1979 because all parties agreed Michael was finished with the Memorial School and the Town itself proposed in the IEP to transfer him to a new school in the fall. The District Court next rejected an argument, apparently grounded at least in part on a state regulation, that the Panicos were entitled to rely on the BSEA decision upholding *366 their placement contrary to the IEP, regardless of whether that decision were ultimately reversed by a court. With respect to the payments made by the Town after the BSEA decision, under the State's threat to cut off funding, the court criticized the State for resorting to extrajudicial pressure to enforce a decision subject to further review. Because this "was not a case where the town was legally obliged under section 1415(e)(3) to continue payments preserving the status quo," the State's coercion could not be viewed as "the basis for a final decision on liability," and could only be "regarded as other than |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | on liability," and could only be "regarded as other than wrongful on the assumption that the payments were to be returned if the order was ultimately reversed." The court entered a judgment ordering the Panicos to reimburse the Town for its payments for Michael's Carroll placement and related transportation in 1980- and -1982. The Panicos appealed. In a broad opinion, most of which we do not review, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the case a second time. The court ruled, among other things, that the District Court erred in conducting a full trial de novo, that it gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and that in other respects it did not properly evaluate the IEP. The court also considered several questions about the availability of reimbursement for interim placement. The Town argued that 1415(e)(3) bars the Panicos from any reimbursement relief, even if on remand they were to prevail on the merits of the IEP, because of their unilateral change of Michael's placement during the pendency of the 1415(e)(2) proceedings. The court held that such unilateral parental change of placement would not be "a bar to reimbursement of the parents if their actions are held to be appropriate at final judgment." In dictum the court suggested, however, that a lack of parental consultation with the Town or "attempt to achieve a negotiated compromise and agreement on a private placement," as *367 contemplated by the Act, "may be taken into account in a district court's computation of an award of equitable reimbursement." To guide the District Court on remand, the court stated that "whether to order reimbursement, and at what amount, is a question determined by balancing the equities." The court also held that the Panicos' reliance on the BSEA decision would estop the Town from obtaining reimbursement "for the period of reliance and requires that where parents have paid the bill for the period, they must be reimbursed." The Town filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals on numerous issues, including the scope of judicial review of the administrative decision and the relevance to the merits of an IEP of violations by local school authorities of the Act's procedural requirements. We granted certiorari, only to consider the following two issues: whether the potential relief available under 1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to parents for private school tuition and related expenses, and whether 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to parents who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private school without the consent of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | a child in a private school without the consent of local school authorities. We express no opinion on any of the many other views stated by the Court of Appeals. Congress stated the purpose of the Act in these words: "to assure that all handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected." 20 U.S. C. 1400(c). The Act defines a "free appropriate public education" to mean "special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision *368 and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with [an] individualized education program." 20 U.S. C. 1401(18). To accomplish this ambitious objective, the Act provides federal money to state and local educational agencies that undertake to implement the substantive and procedural requirements of the Act. See Hendrick Hudson District Bd. of The modus operandi of the Act is the already mentioned "individualized educational program." The IEP is in brief a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs. 1401 (19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing the child's educational program and assessing its effectiveness. See 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR 300.345 Apparently recognizing that this cooperative approach would not always produce a consensus between the school officials and the parents, and that in any disputes the school officials would have a natural advantage, Congress incorporated an elaborate set of what it labeled "procedural safeguards" to insure the full participation of the parents and proper resolution of substantive disagreements. Section 1415(b) entitles the parents "to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child," to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement *369 of the child, and to present complaints with respect to any of the above. The parents are further entitled to "an impartial due process hearing," which in |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | further entitled to "an impartial due process hearing," which in the instant case was the BSEA hearing, to resolve their complaints. The Act also provides for judicial review in state or federal court to "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" made after the due process hearing. The Act confers on the reviewing court the following authority: "[T]he court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 1415(e)(2). The first question on which we granted certiorari requires us to decide whether this grant of authority includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. We conclude that the Act authorizes such reimbursement. The statute directs the court to "grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate." The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of relief is not further specified, except that it must be "appropriate." Absent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be "appropriate" in light of the purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to provide handicapped children with "a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." The Act contemplates that such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools, with the child participating as much as possible in the same activities as nonhandicapped children, but the Act also provides for placement in private schools at public expense where this is not possible. See 1412(5); 34 CFR 300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 300.347 *370 In a case where a court determines that a private placement desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that "appropriate" relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing the child in a private school. If the administrative and judicial review under the Act could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years, it would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so vividly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponderous. A final judicial |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | demonstrates, however, the review process is ponderous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances come a year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has passed. In the meantime, the parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who have adequate means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials. If that were the case, the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete. Because Congress undoubtedly did not intend this result, we are confident that by empowering the court to grant "appropriate" relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case. In this Court, the Town repeatedly characterizes reimbursement as "damages," but that simply is not the case. Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay *371 expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP. Such a post hoc determination of financial responsibility was contemplated in the legislative history: "If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at that parent's own expense, to seek private schooling for the child because an appropriate program does not exist within the local educational agency responsible for the child's education and the local educational agency disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who remains financially responsible is a matter to which the due process procedures established under [the predecessor to 1415] appl[y]." S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 32 (1975) (emphasis added). See 34 CFR 300.403(b) Regardless of the availability of reimbursement as a form of relief in a proper case, the Town maintains that the Panicos have waived any right they otherwise might have to reimbursement because they violated 1415(e)(3), which provides: "During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [ 1415], unless the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | the child shall remain in the then current educational placement of such child" We need not resolve the academic question of what Michael's "then current educational placement" was in the summer of 1979, when both the Town and the parents had agreed that a new school was in order. For the purposes of our decision, we assume that the Pine Glen School, proposed in the IEP, was Michael's current placement and, therefore, that the Panicos did "change" his placement after they had rejected the IEP and had set the administrative review in motion. In *372 so doing, the Panicos contravened the conditional command of 1415(e)(3) that "the child shall remain in the then current educational placement." As an initial matter, we note that the section calls for agreement by either the State or the local educational agency. The BSEA's decision in favor of the Panicos and the Carroll School placement would seem to constitute agreement by the State to the change of placement. The decision was issued in January 1980, so from then on the Panicos were no longer in violation of 1415(e)(3). This conclusion, however, does not entirely resolve the instant dispute because the Panicos are also seeking reimbursement for Michael's expenses during the fall of 1979, prior to the State's concurrence in the Carroll School placement. We do not agree with the Town that a parental violation of 1415(e)(3) constitutes a waiver of reimbursement. The provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver, or parental right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision is interpreted to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the principal purpose of the Act will in many cases be defeated in the same way as if reimbursement were never available. As in this case, parents will often notice a child's learning difficulties while the child is in a regular public school program. If the school officials disagree with the need for special education or the adequacy of the public school's program to meet the child's needs, it is unlikely they will agree to an interim private school placement while the review process runs its course. Thus, under the Town's reading of 1415(e)(3), the parents are forced to leave the child in what may turn out to be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for reimbursement. The Act was intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate education and a free one; it should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those objectives. *373 The legislative history supports this |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,985 | 19 | majority | Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Ed. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111420/burlington-school-comm-v-mass-dept-of-ed/ | other of those objectives. *373 The legislative history supports this interpretation, favoring a proper interim placement pending the resolution of disagreements over the IEP: "The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due process hearing may be required to assure that the rights of the child have been completely protected. We did feel, however, that the placement, or change of placement should not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious administrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the conference adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the needs of both the child and the State." 121 Cong. Rec. 37412 (1975) (Sen. Stafford). We think at least one purpose of 1415(e)(3) was to prevent school officials from removing a child from the regular public school classroom over the parents' objection pending completion of the review proceedings. As we observed in the impetus for the Act came from two federal-court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded and and which arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped children to prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children from the public schools. Congress was concerned about the apparently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children to private institutions or warehousing them in special classes. See 1400(b)(4); 34 CFR 300.347(a) We also note that 1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing procedural safeguards which are largely for the benefit of the parents and the child. This is not to say that 1415(e)(3) has no effect on parents. While we doubt that this provision would authorize a court to order parents to leave their child in a particular placement, we think it operates in such a way that parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of *374 review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk. If the courts ultimately determine that the IEP proposed by the school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in which their child's placement violated 1415(e)(3). This conclusion is supported by the agency's interpretation of the Act's application to private placements by the parents: "(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appropriate public education and the parents choose to place the child in a private school or facility, the public agency is not required by this part to pay for the child's education at the private school or facility. "(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public agency regarding the availability of a program appropriate for the child, and the question of financial responsibility, are subject to the due process |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | WisconsinDept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118481/wisconsindept-of-health-and-family-servs-v-blumer/ | The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), 42 U.S. C. 1396r5 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), provides important protections for married couples who need financial assistance when one spouse is institutionalized in a nursing home. Eligibility for financial assistance in paying nursing home costs is limited by a ceiling on the couple's resources and a ceiling on their income. The MCCA responded to pre-1988 eligibility rules that often required both spouses to deplete their combined resources before an institutionalized spouse became eligible for benefits. In order to prevent the "pauperization" of the spouse who remains at home (the "community spouse"), the 1988 Act gives couples two important rights that are implicated by this case. H. R. Rep. *499 No. 100-105, pt. 2, pp. 66-67 (1987). The first is a preeligibility right of the spouse who remains at home (the "community spouse") to retain a defined share of their joint resources, called the "community spouse resource allowance" (CSRA).[1] The second is a posteligibility right of the institutionalized spouse to use a defined share of her income for purposes other than paying for the cost of her care. The two statutory rights involved in this case are designed, in part, to assure that the community spouse's income may be maintained at a minimum levelthe "minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance" (MMMNA).[2] To safeguard these rights and this minimum level of subsistence for the community spouse, the statute provides for a "fair hearing," at which a couple seeking medical assistance for an institutionalized spouse may challenge several calculations that are used to determine eligibility for Medicaid. 42 U.S. C. 1396r5(e)(2) (1994 ed.). The determination of the CSRA is one such calculation that may be challenged. 1396r5(e)(2)(A)(v). During this preeligibility hearing, if the institutionalized spouse has income-producing resources and the community spouse's income is below the MMMNA, the provision in issue in this case, 1396r5(e)(2)(C), is applicable. By its terms, it allows the institutionalized spouse to transfer sufficient resources to the community spouse to provide him with an *500 income equal to the MMMNA. Since only those resources that remain with the institutionalized spouse are counted for eligibility purposes, 1396r5(e)(2)(C) enables some institutionalized spouses who would otherwise be ineligible to qualify for financial assistance. The text of 1396r5(e)(2)(C) is straightforward. As its caption indicates, it deals only with the "[r]evision of community spouse resource allowance" and it is applicable when an eligibility determination is made. It provides: "If either such spouse establishes that the community spouse resource allowance (in relation to the amount of income generated by such an allowance) is inadequate to raise |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | WisconsinDept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118481/wisconsindept-of-health-and-family-servs-v-blumer/ | income generated by such an allowance) is inadequate to raise the community spouse's income to the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance, there shall be substituted, for the community spouse resource allowance under subsection (f)(2) of this section, an amount adequate to provide such a minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance." Thus, under the plain language of the statute, if the CSRA that has been calculated in accordance with 1396r5(c) (1)(A) is insufficient to raise the community spouse's income to the MMMNA level, there "shall be substituted" a new CSRA that will produce sufficient income. 1396r 5(e)(2)(C). With respect to income, the sole provision in the federal statute that authorizes a transfer of income from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse applies only after the eligibility determination has been made. 1396r 5(d)(1). It authorizes the institutionalized spouse to use some of her income to take care of her own needs, to provide support for the community spouse when his income is below the MMMNA, and to help other family members before paying for her care. But as the text of the provision expressly states, it only applies "[a]fter an institutionalized *501 spouse is determined or redetermined to be eligible for medical assistance."[3] Wisconsin has passed a statute that prohibits the resource transfer authorized by 1396r5(e)(2)(C) unless the institutionalized spouse first transfers any available income to the community spouse.[4] Unless this prohibition is authorized by federal law, it is plainly invalid because it qualifies the federal right created by 1396r5(e)(2)(C). There are two possible bases for arguing that the Wisconsin statute is consistent with 1396r(e)(2)(C): first, that despite the express limitation in 1396r5(d) to deductions authorized "[a]fter an institutionalized spouse is determined or redetermined to be eligible," Congress really meant "before or after"; and second, that when Congress used the term "community spouse's income" in 1396r5(e)(2)(C), it really *502 meant "community spouse's income plus any deduction from the institutionalized spouse's income that may in the future be made available to him." As is clear, both of these arguments require altering the plain text of the statute. Rather than admitting that its reading strains the text of the MCCA, the Court engages in an analytical sleight of hand: It conceives of the transfer of income that is commanded by the Wisconsin statute as a condition of eligibility, not as a required transfer, but only as a prediction of things to come. Ante, at 491-492 ("In short, if the (e)(2)(C) hearing is properly comprehended as a preeligibility projection of the couple's posteligibility situation, as we think it is, we do not count it unreasonable |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | WisconsinDept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118481/wisconsindept-of-health-and-family-servs-v-blumer/ | we think it is, we do not count it unreasonable for a State to include in its estimation of the `community spouse's income' in that posteligibility period an income transfer that will then occur"). The Court's temporal manipulation of the 1396r5(e)(2)(C) hearing is innovative; but it is wrong for at least three reasons. First, in speculating that Wisconsin does not actually require a preeligibility transfer, but only predicts a future income transfer, the Court neglects to consider the text of the state statute in issue. In holding that Wisconsin's "income-first" approach is permissible, the Court states: "The theoretical incorporation of a CSMIA [Community Spouse Monthly Income Allowance] into the community spouse's future income at that hearing has no effect on the preeligibility allocation of income between the spouses. A CSMIA becomes part of the community spouse's income only when it is in fact transferred to that spouse, 1396r 5(d)(1)(B), which may not occur until `[a]fter [the] institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible. ` 1396r 5(d)(1)." Ante, at 493 (emphasis added). The Court's own statement, which replaces the statutory phrase "made available to" from 1396r5(d)(1)(B) with the phrase "transferred to," exposes precisely why the Wisconsin statute is in conflict with the MCCA. As the text of the Wisconsin statute makes clear, there is nothing "theoretical" about the income *503 transfer that it requires: "[T]he department may not [substitute an increased CSRA] unless the institutionalized spouse makes available to the community spouse the maximum monthly income allowance permitted." Wis. Stat. 49.455(8)(d) (emphasis added). The state statute requires that an institutionalized spouse "make available" income to the community spouse. In other words, Wisconsin requires a preeligibility transfer of income from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse. Because 42 U.S. C. 1396r5(d)(1) permits the income transfer to take place only after eligibility has been established, the Wisconsin statue is in conflict with the plain language of the MCCA.[5] Second, although the MCCA permits an institutionalized spouse to transfer income to the community spouse after eligibility has been established, it by no means requires that she do so.[6] Thus, by requiring the CSMIA transfer, and therefore not increasing the CSRA to meet the community spouse's income needs, the Wisconsin statute mandates an *504 income transfer that Congress left optional. Furthermore, if the Wisconsin statute could be interpreted to require only a prediction, rather than a mandatory preeligibility transfer, there are several plausible reasons why such a "prediction" may not ultimately come to fruition. For example, the institutionalized spouse might choose not to contribute to the support of the community spouse. Alternatively, the institutionalized |
Justice Stevens | 2,002 | 16 | dissenting | WisconsinDept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118481/wisconsindept-of-health-and-family-servs-v-blumer/ | to the support of the community spouse. Alternatively, the institutionalized spouse's income could fluctuate over time and may not in a given month be sufficient to augment the community spouse's monthly income. Finally, a hearing examiner's finding of ineligibilitybased on a fictional prediction that a posteligibility transfer of income would occurmight (as it did in this case) actually prevent the posteligibility transfer from occurring.[7] If any of these events occurs, a primary purpose of the statuteensuring the financial security of the community spousewill have been undermined. Thus, either the Wisconsin statute mandates the income transfer, in which case it contradicts the MCCA, or it diminishes the 1396r5(e)(2)(C) hearing into a thought experiment that is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. Third, an important posteligibility provision of the statute, which expresses the "name-on-the-check" policy of the MCCA, also exposes why the Wisconsin statute is in conflict with the federal one. Section 1396r5(b)(2)(A)(i) states: "[Posteligibility,] if payment of income is made solely in the name of the institutionalized spouse or the community spouse, the income shall be considered available only to that *505 respective spouse." By mandating an income transfer from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse, the Wisconsin statute effectively treats the institutionalized spouse's income as that of the community spouse, and, therefore, violates the prohibition of 1396r5(b)(2)(A)(i). As a final matter, the Court pays "respectful consideration" to an opinion letter and policy memoranda in which the Secretary of Health and Human Services "`in the spirit of Federalism' " has allowed the States to use either an income-first or a resources-first approach. Ante, at 497. The weight that should be accorded to such a document depends "`upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.' " United The Secretary has taken inconsistent positions on this issue over time, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 78a90a, and the current opinion letter offers no analysis of the potentially conflicting provisions in the federal and state statutes. It is devoid of any "`power to persuade.' " The Court concludes its opinion with an explanation of why the income-first rule may represent a better policy choice than the resources-first rule. It is not, however, a policy choice that Congress made. Indeed, the fact that the text of the federal statute expressly authorizes the resources-first approach without mentioning the income-first rule commanded by the Wisconsin statute, at the very least, identifies a congressional preference for the former. This statute is not ambiguous. The resource |
per_curiam | 1,973 | 200 | per_curiam | Fausner v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108866/fausner-v-commissioner/ | Petitioner Donald Fausner, a commercial airlines pilot, who regularly traveled by private automobile from his home to his place of employment and back again, a round trip of approximately 84 miles, sought to deduct the entire cost of commuting under 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, on the theory that his automobile expenses were incurred to transport his flight bag and overnight bag and thus constituted ordinary and necessary business expenses. It is not disputed that petitioner would have commuted by private automobile regardless of whether he had to transport his two bags. The Tax Court disallowed the deduction in toto. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court. This issue has been addressed by two other circuits, and Both of these circuits concluded that some allocable portion of the expenses incurred could be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow those cases on the *839 ground that there was no rational basis for any allocation between the nondeductible commuting component and the deductible business component of the total expense. As the Court of Appeals indicated, Congress has determined that all taxpayers shall bear the expense of commuting to and from work without receiving a deduction for that expense. We cannot read 262 of the Internal Revenue Code[1] as excluding such expense from "personal" expenses because by happenstance the taxpayer must carry incidentals of his occupation with him. Additional expenses may at times be incurred for transporting job-required tools and material to and from work.[2] Then an allocation of costs between "personal" and "business" expenses[3] may be feasible. But no such allocation can be made here. We grant the petition for certiorari and affirm the judgment below. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument. |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | The Court holds today—for the first time after plenary consideration of the question—that a criminal prosecution begins, and that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel therefore attaches, when an individual who has been placed under arrest makes an initial appearance before a magistrate for a probable-cause determination and the setting of bail. Because the Court’s holding is not sup- ported by the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment or any reaable interpretation of our precedents, I respect- fully dissent. I The Sixth Amendment provides that “i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The text of the Sixth Amendment thus makes clear that the right to counsel arises only upon initiation of a “criminal prosecu- tion].” For that rea, the Court has repeatedly stressed that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not attach until a prosecution is commenced.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, ; see also United (“T]he literal language of the Amendment requires the existence of both a ‘criminal prosecution]’ and an ‘accused’ ”). Echoing 2 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting this refrain, the Court today reiterates that “t]he Sixth Amendment right of the ‘accused’ to assistance of counsel in ‘all criminal prosecutions’ is limited by its terms.” Ante, at 5 (footnote omitted). Given the Court’s repeated insistence that the right to counsel is textually limited to “criminal prosecutions,” one would expect the Court’s jurisprudence in this area to be grounded in an understanding of what those words meant when the Sixth Amendment was adopted. Inexplicably, however, neither today’s decision nor any of the other numerous decisions in which the Court has construed the right to counsel has attempted to discern the original meaning of “criminal prosecution].” I think it appropriate to examine what a “criminal prosecution]” would have been understood to entail by those who adopted the Sixth Amendment. A There is no better place to begin than with Blackstone, “whose works constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.” Blackstone devoted more than 100 pages of his Commentaries on the Laws of England to a discussion of the “regular and ordinary method of pro- ceeding in the courts of criminal jurisdiction.” 4 W. Black- stone, Commentaries *289 (hereinafter Blackstone). At the outset of his discussion, Blackstone organized the various stages of a criminal proceeding “under twelve general heads, following each other in a progressive or- der.” The first six relate to pretrial events: “1. Ar- rest; 2. Commitment and bail; 3. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5. Arraignment, and it’s incidents; 6. Plea, and |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | 4. Process; 5. Arraignment, and it’s incidents; 6. Plea, and issue.” Thus, the first significant fact is that Blackstone did not describe the entire criminal process as a “prosecution,” but rather listed prosecution as the third step in a list of successive stages. For a more complete Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting understanding of what Blackstone meant by “prosecution,” however, we must turn to chapter 23, entitled “Of the Several Modes of Prosecution.” There, Black- stone explained that—after arrest and examination by a justice of the peace to determine whether a suspect should be discharged, committed to pri, or admitted to bail, at *296—the “next step towards the punishment of offenders is their prosecution, or the manner of their for- mal accusation,” Blackstone thus provides a definition of “prosecution”: the manner of an offender’s “formal accusation.” The modifier “formal” is significant because it distinguishes “prosecution” from earlier stages of the process involving a different kind of accusation: the allegation of criminal conduct necessary to justify arrest and detention. Black- stone’s discussion of arrest, commitment, and bail makes clear that a per could not be arrested and detained without a “charge” or “accusation,” i.e., an allegation, supported by probable cause, that the per had commit- ted a crime. See at *289–*300. But the accusation justifying arrest and detention was clearly preliminary to the “formal accusation” that Blackstone identified with “prosecution.” See By “formal accusation,” Blackstone meant, in most cases, “indictment, the most usual and effectual means of prosecution.” Blackstone defined an “indict- ment” as “a written accusation of one or more pers of a crime or misdemeanor, preferred to, and presented upon oath by, a grand jury.” If the grand jury was “satisfied of the truth of the accusation,” it endorsed the indictment, at *305–*306, which was then “publicly delivered into court,” “after- wards to be tried and determined,” “before an officer having power to punish the charged] offence,” 2 T. Cunningham, A New and Complete Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1771). 4 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting In addition to indictment, Blackstone identified two other “methods of prosecution at the suit of the king.” 4 Blackstone *312. The first was presentment, which, like an indictment, was a grand jury’s formal accusation “of an offence, inquirable in the Court where it was] presented.” 5 G. Jacob, The Law-Dictionary 278–279 (1811). The principal difference was that the accusation arose from “the notice taken by a grand jury of any offence from their own knowledge or observation” rather than from a “bill of indictment laid before them.” |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | rather than from a “bill of indictment laid before them.” 4 Blackstone *301. The second was information, “the only species of proceeding at the suit of the king, without a previous indictment or presentment by a grand jury.” After an information was filed, it was “tried,” in the same way as an indictment: “The same notice was given, the same process was issued, the same pleas were allowed, the same trial by jury was had, the same judgment was given by the same judges, as if the prosecution had origi- nally been by indictment,” From the foregoing, the basic elements of a criminal “prosecution” emerge with reaable clarity. “Prosecu- tion,” as Blackstone used the term, referred to “instituting a criminal suit,” by filing a formal charging document—an indictment, presentment, or information— upon which the defendant was to be tried in a court with power to punish the alleged offense. And, significantly, Blackstone’s usage appears to have accorded with the ordinary meaning of the term. See 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (defining “prosecution” as “t]he institution or commence- ment and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment,” and noting that “p]rosecutions may be by presentment, infor- mation or indictment”). Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 5 THOMAS, J., dissenting B With Blackstone as our guide, it is significant that the Framers used the words “criminal prosecutions” in the Sixth Amendment rather than some other formulation such as “criminal proceedings” or “criminal cases.” In- deed, elsewhere in the Bill of Rights we find just such an alternative formulation: In contrast to the Sixth Amend- ment, the Fifth Amendment refers to “criminal cases].” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5 (“No per shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”). In the Court indicated that the difference in phraseology was not accidental. There the Court held that the Fifth Amend- ment right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself “in any criminal case” could be invoked by a wit- ness testifying before a grand jury. The Court rejected the argument that there could be no “criminal case” prior to indictment, reaing that a “criminal case” under the Fifth Amendment is much broader than a “criminal prose- cution]” under the Sixth Amendment. The following Term, the Court construed the phrase “criminal prosecution” in a statutory context, and this time the Court squarely held that a “prosecution” does not encompass preindictment stages of the criminal process. |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | “prosecution” does not encompass preindictment stages of the criminal process. In the Court con- sidered Revised Statute which authorized removal to federal court of any “ ‘criminal prosecution’ ” “ ‘commenced in any court of a State’ ” against a federal officer. at 115. The respondent, a deputy marshal, had been ar- rested by Virginia authorities on a warrant for murder and was held in county jail awaiting his appearance before a justice of the peace “with a view to a commitment to await the action of the grand jury.” He filed a petition for removal of “ ‘said cause’ ” to federal court. The question before the Court was whether a “ ‘criminal prosecution’ ” had “ ‘commenced’ ” within the meaning of 6 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting the statute at the time the respondent filed his removal petition. The Court held that a criminal prosecution had not com- menced, and that removal was therefore not authorized by the terms of the statute. The Court noted that under Vir- ginia law murder could be prosecuted only “by indictment found in the county court,” and that “a justice of the peace, upon a previous complaint, could] do no more than to examine whether there was] good cause for believing that the accused was] guilty, and to commit him for trial before the court having jurisdiction of the offence.” Accord- ingly, where “no indictment was found, or other action taken, in the county court,” there was as yet no “ ‘criminal prosecution.’ ” The appearance before the jus- tice of the peace did not qualify as a “prosecution”: “Proceedings before a magistrate to commit a per to jail, or to hold him to bail, in order to secure his ap- pearance to answer for a crime or offence which the magistrate has no jurisdiction himself to try, before the court in which he may be prosecuted and tried, are but preliminary to the prosecution, and are no more a commencement of the prosecution, than is an arrest by an officer without a warrant for a felony committed in his presence.” C The foregoing historical summary is strong evidence that the term “criminal prosecution]” in the Sixth Amendment refers to the commencement of a criminal suit by filing formal charges in a court with jurisdiction to try and punish the defendant. And on this understanding of the Sixth Amendment, it is clear that petitioner’s initial appearance before the magistrate did not commence a “criminal prosecution].” No formal charges had been filed. The only document submitted to the magistrate was |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | been filed. The only document submitted to the magistrate was the arresting officer’s affidavit of probable cause. The Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting officer stated that he “had] good rea to believe” that petitioner was a felon and had been “walking around an] RV park with a gun belt on, carrying a pistol, handcuffs, mace spray, extra bullets and a knife.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. The officer therefore “charged]” that petitioner had “committed] the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon—3rd degree felony.” The magis- trate certified that he had examined the affidavit and “determined that probable cause existed for the arrest of the individual accused therein.” at 34a. Later that day, petitioner was released on bail, and did not hear from the State again until he was indicted six months later. The affidavit of probable cause clearly was not the type of formal accusation Blackstone identified with the com- mencement of a criminal “prosecution.” Rather, it was the preliminary accusation necessary to justify arrest and detention—stages of the criminal process that Blackstone placed before prosecution. The affidavit was not a plead- ing that instituted a criminal prosecution, such as an indictment, presentment, or information; and the magis- trate to whom it was presented had no jurisdiction to try and convict petitioner for the felony offense charged therein. See (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“The Texas Constitution requires that, unless waived by the defendant, the State must obtain a grand jury indictment in a felony case”); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann., Arts. 4.05, 4.11(a) (West 2005). That is most assuredly why the magistrate informed petitioner that charges “will be filed” in district court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a The original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, then, cuts decisively against the Court’s conclusion that peti- tioner’s right to counsel attached at his initial appearance before the magistrate. But we are not writing on a blank slate: This Court has a substantial body of more recent precedent construing the Sixth Amendment right to coun- 8 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting sel. II As the Court notes, our cases have “pegged commence- ment” of a criminal prosecution, ante, at 5, to “the initia- tion of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment,” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion). The Court has re- peated this formulation in virtually every right-to-counsel case decided since Because Kirby’s formulation of the attachment test has been accorded such precedential significance, it is important to |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | has been accorded such precedential significance, it is important to determine precisely what Kirby said: “In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stem- ming back to the Court’s landmark opinion in Powell v. ], it has been firmly established that a per’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. See Powell v. ]; Ham- ]; Gideon v. Wainwright, ]; ]; Massiah v. United States, ]; United States v. Wade, ]; ]; v. 399 U.S. 1 ]. “This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel only at the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches at the time of arraignment, and the Court has recently held that it exists also at the time of a preliminary hearing. v. But the point is that, while members of the Court Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 9 THOMAS, J., dissenting have differed as to existence of the right to counsel in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involved points of time at or after the ini- tiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings— whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hear- ing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” at 688–689 (footnote omitted). It is noteworthy that Kirby did not purport to announce anything new; rather, it simply catalogued what the Court had previously held. And the point of the plurality’s dis- cussion was that the criminal process contains stages prior to commencement of a criminal prosecution. The holding of the case was that the right to counsel did not apply at a station house lineup that took place “before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.” Kirby gave five examples of events that initiate “adver- sary judicial criminal proceedings”: formal charge, pre- liminary hearing, indictment, information, and arraign- ment. None of these supports the result the Court reaches today. I will apply them seriatim. No indictment or in- formation had been filed when petitioner appeared before the magistrate. Nor was there any other formal charge. Although the plurality in Kirby did not define “formal charge,” there is no rea to believe it would have in- cluded an affidavit of probable cause in that category. None of the cases on which it relied stood for that proposi- tion. Indeed, all of them—with the exception of v. Maryland, and v. —involved postindictment proceedings. See Powell v. ; ; Ham, ; ; 10 ROTHGERY |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | See Powell v. ; ; Ham, ; ; 10 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting (postin- dictment interrogation); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 219–220 (postindictment lineup); Gilbert v. California, (postindictment lineup). Nor was petitioner’s initial appearance a preliminary hearing. The comparable proceeding in Texas is called an “examining trial.” See ante, n. 12. More importantly, petitioner’s initial appearance was unlike the preliminary hearings that were held to constitute “critical stages” in and because it did not involve entry of a plea, cf. and was nonadversarial, cf. There was no prosecutor present, there were no witnesses to cross-examine, there was no case to discover, and the result of the proceeding was not to bind petitioner over to the grand jury or the trial court. Finally, petitioner’s initial appearance was not what Kirby described as an “arraignment.” An arraignment, in its traditional and usual sense, is a postindictment pro- ceeding at which the defendant enters a plea. See, e.g., W. J. Israel, & N. King, Criminal Procedure p. 19 (4th ed. 2004); 4 Blackstone *322. Although the word “arraignment” is sometimes used to describe an initial appearance before a magistrate, see at 16, that is not what Kirby meant when it said that the right to counsel attaches at an “arraignment.” Rather, it meant the traditional, postindictment arraign- ment where the defendant enters a plea. This would be the most reaable assumption even if there were noth- ing else to go on, since that is the primary meaning of the word, especially when used unmodified. But there is no need to assume. Kirby purported to describe only what the Court had already held, and none of the cases Kirby cited involved an initial appearance. Only two of the cases involved arraignments, and both were postindictment arraignments at which the defendant Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 11 THOMAS, J., dissenting entered a plea. at ; Powell, 287 U.S., at And the considerations that drove the Court’s analysis in those cases are not present here. See (emphasizing that “from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thor- oughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of coun- sel”); at 53–55 (emphasizing that the defendant entered a plea and was required to raise or waive certain defenses). Kirby’s inclusion of “arraign- ment” in the list of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger the right to counsel thus provides no support for the view that the right to counsel attaches at an initial appearance before a magistrate. III It is clear |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | an initial appearance before a magistrate. III It is clear that when Kirby was decided in 1972 there was no precedent in this Court for the conclusion that a criminal prosecution begins, and the right to counsel therefore attaches, at an initial appearance before a mag- istrate. The Court concludes, however, that two subse- quent and —stand for that proposition. Those decisions, which relied almost exclusively on Kirby, cannot bear the weight the Court puts on them.1 In Brewer, the defendant challenged his conviction for murdering a 10-year-old girl on the ground that his Sixth —————— 1 The Court also relies on to support its assertion that the right to counsel attaches upon an initial appearance before a magistrate. Ante, at 10–11. But in McNeil, the Court expressed no view whatsoever on the attachment issue. Rather, it noted that the issue was “undisputed,” and “accepted] for purposes of the present case, that the defendant’s] Sixth Amend- ment right had attached.” 501 U.S., at We do not ordinarily give weight to assumptions made in prior cases about matters that were not in dispute. 12 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting Amendment right to counsel had been violated when detectives elicited incriminating statements from him while transporting him from Davenport, Iowa, where he had been arrested on a warrant for abduction and “ar- raigned before a judge on the outstanding arrest war- rant,” to Des Moines, where he was to be tried. 430 U.S., at 390–391. The principal issue was whether the defen- dant had waived his right to have counsel present during police questioning when he voluntarily engaged one of the detectives in a “wide-ranging conversation.” He subsequently agreed to lead the detectives to the girl’s body in response to the so-called “ ‘Christian burial speech,’ ” in which one of the detectives told the defendant that “ ‘the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas E]ve and murdered.’ ” at 392–393. Not surprisingly, the parties vigorously disputed the waiver issue, and it sharply divided the Court. In contrast, the question whether the defendant’s right to counsel had attached was neither raised in the courts below nor disputed before this Court. Nonetheless, the Court, after quoting Kirby’s formulation of the test, offered its conclusory observations: “There can be no doubt in the present case that ju- dicial proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the start of the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. A warrant had been issued for his ar- |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | Des Moines. A warrant had been issued for his ar- rest, he had been arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a Davenport courtroom, and he had been committed by the court to confinement in jail. The State does not contend otherwise.” Brewer’s cursory treatment of the attachment issue demonstrates precisely why, when “an issue is] not ad- dressed by the parties,” it is “imprudent of us to address it with any pretense of settling it for all time.” Metro- Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 13 THOMAS, J., dissenting politan Stevedore As an initial matter, the Court’s discussion of the facts reveals little about what happened at the proceeding. There is no indication, for example, whether it was adver- sarial or whether the defendant was required to enter a plea or raise or waive any defenses—facts that earlier cases such as and had found significant. Even assuming, however, that the arraignment in Brewer was functionally identical to the initial appearance here, Brewer offered no reaing for its conclusion that the right to counsel attached at such a proceeding. One is left with the distinct impression that the Court simply saw the word “arraignment” in Kirby’s attachment test and concluded that the right must have attached because the defendant had been “arraigned.” There is no indication that Brewer considered the difference between an ar- raignment on a warrant and an arraignment at which the defendant pleads to the indictment. The Court finds it significant that Brewer expressed “ ‘no doubt’ ” that the right had attached. Ante, at 19 (quoting ). There was no need for a “lengthy dis- quisition],” the Court says, because Brewer purportedly “found the attachment issue an easy one.” Ante, at 18–19. What the Court neglects to mention is that Brewer’s at- tachment holding is indisputably no longer good law. That is because we have subsequently held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense specific,” meaning that it attaches only to those offenses for which the defen- dant has been formally charged, and not to “other offenses ‘closely related factually’ to the charged offense.” Texas v. Because the defendant in Brewer had been arraigned only on the abduction warrant, there is no doubt that, under his right to counsel had not yet attached with respect to the murder charges that were subsequently brought. See 14 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting (BREYER, J., dissenting) (noting that under the majority’s rule, “the defendant’s] murder conviction should have remained undisturbed”). But the Court in did not consider itself bound by Brewer’s implicit holding on |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | did not consider itself bound by Brewer’s implicit holding on the attachment question. See (“Constitu- tional rights are not defined by inferences from opinions which did not address the question at issue”). And here, as in Brewer did not address the fact that the ar- raignment on the warrant was not the same type of ar- raignment at which the right to counsel had previously been held to attach, and the parties did not argue the question. Brewer is thus entitled to no more precedential weight here than it was in Nor does control. In as in Brewer, the attachment issue was secondary. The question presented was “not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment, custodial interrogations,” 475 U.S., at 629, but “whether respondents validly waived their right to counsel,” And, as in Brewer, the Court’s waiver holding was vigorously disputed. See 475 U.S., at 637–642 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also at –177 (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (ques- tioning ’s vitality). Unlike in Brewer, however, the attachment question was at least contested in — but barely. With respect to respondent the State conceded the issue. And with respect to respondent Bladel, the State had conceded the issue below, see N.W.2d 56, 74 (Boyle, J., dissenting), and raised it for the first time before this Court, devoting only three pages of its brief to the question, see Brief for Petitioner in Michigan v. Bladel, O. T. 1985, No. 84–1539, pp. 24–26. The Court disposed of the issue in a footnote. See Jack- at 629–630, n. 3. As in Brewer, the Court did not describe the nature of the proceeding. It stated only that the respondents were “arraigned.” – Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 15 THOMAS, J., dissenting 628. The Court phrased the question presented in terms of “arraignment,” (“The question presented by these two cases is whether the same rule applies to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment”), and repeated the words “arraignment” or “postarraignment” no fewer than 35 times in the course of its opinion. There is no way to know from the Court’s opinion in whether the arraignment at issue there was the same type of arraignment at which the right to counsel had been held to attach in Powell and Only upon examination of the parties’ briefs does it become clear that the proceeding was in fact an initial appearance. But did not even acknowledge, much less “flatly reject] the distinction between initial arraignment and arraignment on the indictment.” Ante, Instead, |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | between initial arraignment and arraignment on the indictment.” Ante, Instead, it offered one sentence of analysis—“In view of the clear language in our decisions about the significance of ar- raignment, the State’s argument is untenable”—followed by a string citation to four cases, each of which quoted –630, n. 3. For emphasis, the Court italicized the words “or arraignment” in Kirby’s attachment 475 U.S., (internal quotation marks omitted). The only rule that can be derived from the face of the opinion in is that if a proceeding is called an “arraignment,” the right to counsel attaches.2 That rule —————— 2 The Court asserts that ’s “conclusion was driven by the same considerations the Court had endorsed in Brewer,” namely, that “by the time a defendant is brought before a judicial officer, is informed of a formally lodged accusation, and has restrictions imposed on his liberty in aid of the prosecution, the State’s relationship with the defendant has become solidly adversarial.” Ante, But said nothing of the sort. Moreover, even looking behind the opinion, does not sup- 16 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting would not govern this case because petitioner’s initial appearance was not called an “arraignment” (the parties refer to it as a “magistration”). And that would, in any case, be a silly rule. The Sixth Amendment consequences of a proceeding should turn on the substance of what happens there, not on what the State chooses to call it. But the Court in did not focus on the substantive distinction between an initial arraignment and an ar- raignment on the indictment. Instead, the Court simply cited Kirby and left it at that. In these circumstances, I would recognize for what it was—a cursory treatment of an issue that was not the primary focus of the Court’s opinion. Surely ’s footnote must yield to our reaed precedents. And our reaed precedents provide no support for the conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at an initial appearance before a magistrate. Kirby explained why the right attaches “after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings”: “The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our —————— port the result the Court reaches today. Respondent Bladel entered a “not guilty” plea at his arraignment, see Brief for Petitioner in Michi- gan v. Bladel, O. T. 1985, No. 84–1539, p. 4, and both v. and v. Maryland, had already held that a defendant has a right to counsel when he enters a plea. The Court suggests that this fact is irrelevant because the magistrate |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | Court suggests that this fact is irrelevant because the magistrate in Bladel’s case “had no jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty to a felony charge.” Ante, at 10, n. 13. But that distinction does not appear in either or See (“Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently”); (“P]etitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel”). Thus, the most that can possibly be made to stand for is that the right to counsel attaches at an initial appearance where the defendant enters a plea. And that rule would not govern this case because petitioner did not enter a plea at his initial appearance. Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 17 THOMAS, J., dissenting whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecu- torial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commence- ment of the ‘criminal prosecutions’ to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are ap- plicable.” –690 (plurality opinion). None of these defining characteristics of a “criminal prosecution” applies to petitioner’s initial appearance before the magistrate. The initial appearance was not an “adversary” proceeding, and petitioner was not “faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society.” Instead, he stood in front of a “little glass window,” filled out various forms, and was read his Miranda rights. Brief for Re- spondent 5. The State had not committed itself to prose- cute—only a prosecutor may file felony charges in Texas, see Tex. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. Arts. 2.01, 2.02 (West 2005), and there is no evidence that any prosecutor was even aware of petitioner’s arrest or appearance. The adverse positions of government and defendant had not yet solidified—the State’s prosecutorial officers had not yet decided whether to press charges and, if so, which charges to press. And petitioner was not immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law— shortly after the proceeding he was free on bail, and no further proceedings occurred until six months later when he was indicted. Moreover, the Court’s holding that the right to counsel attaches at an initial appearance is untethered from any interest that we have heretofore associated with the right to counsel. |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Rothgery v. Gillespie County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145785/rothgery-v-gillespie-county/ | that we have heretofore associated with the right to counsel. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that 18 ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY THOMAS, J., dissenting “t]he purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights.” John, The “core purpose” of the right, the Court has said, is to “assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused is] confronted with both the intri- cacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecu- tor.” United The Court has extended the right to counsel to pretrial events only when the absence of counsel would derogate from the defendant’s right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Wade, 388 U.S., at 227. Neither petitioner nor the Court identifies any way in which petitioner’s ability to receive a fair trial was under- mined by the absence of counsel during the period between his initial appearance and his indictment. Nothing during that period exposed petitioner to the risk that he would be convicted as the result of ignorance of his rights. Instead, the gravamen of petitioner’s complaint is that if counsel had been appointed earlier, he would have been able to stave off indictment by convincing the prosecutor that petitioner was not guilty of the crime alleged. But the Sixth Amendment protects against the risk of erroneous conviction, not the risk of unwarranted prosecution. See (rejecting the notion that the “purpose of the right to counsel is to provide a defendant with a preindictment private investigator”). Petitioner argues that the right to counsel is implicated here because restrictions were imposed on his liberty when he was required to post bail. But we have never suggested that the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel “for his defence” entails a right to use counsel as a sword to contest pretrial detention. To the contrary, we have flatly rejected that notion, reaing that a defen- dant’s liberty interests are protected by other constitu- tional guarantees. See (“While the right to Cite as: 554 U. S. (2008) 19 THOMAS, J., dissenting counsel exists to protect the accused during trial-type confrontations with the prosecutor, the speedy trial right exists primarily to protect an individual’s liberty interest,” including the interest in reducing the “ ‘impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail’ ”). IV In sum, neither the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel nor our precedents interpret- ing the scope of that right supports the Court’s holding that the right attaches at an initial appearance before |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | dissenting | American Dredging Co. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112930/american-dredging-co-v-miller/ | The Court gives a careful and comprehensive history of the forum non conveniens doctrine but, in my respectful view, draws the wrong conclusions from this account and from our precedents. Today's holding contradicts two just and well-accepted principles of admiralty law: uniformity and the elimination of unfair forum selection rules. When hearing cases governed by the federal admiralty and maritime law, the state courts, to be sure, have broad discretion to reject a forum non conveniens motion. They should not be permitted, however, to disregard the objection altogether. With due respect, I dissent. Neither the Court nor respondent is well positioned in this case to contend that the State has some convincing reason to outlaw the forum non conveniens objection. For the fact is, though the Court seems unimpressed by the irony, the State of Louisiana commands its courts to entertain the forum non conveniens objection in all federal civil cases except for admiralty, the very context in which the rule is most *463 prominent and makes most sense. Compare La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 123(B) (West Supp. 1993) ("Except as provided in Paragraph C, upon the contradictory motion of any defendant in a civil case filed in a district court of this state in which a claim or cause of action is predicated solely upon a federal statute and is based upon acts or omissions originating outside of this state, when it is shown that there exists a more appropriate forum outside of this state, taking into account the location where the acts giving rise to the action occurred, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the interest of justice, the court may dismiss the suit without prejudice") with Art. 123(C) ("The provisions of Paragraph B shall not apply to claims brought pursuant to 46 U.S. C. 688 [the Jones Act] or federal maritime law"). Louisiana's expressed interest is to reach out to keep maritime defendants, but not other types of defendants, within its borders, no matter how inconvenient the forum. This state interest is not the sort that should justify any disuniformity in our national admiralty law. In all events, the Court misapprehends the question it should confront. The issue here is not whether forum non conveniens originated in admiralty law, or even whether it is unique to that subject, but instead whether it is an important feature of the uniformity and harmony to which admiralty aspires. See Southern Pacific From the historical evidence, there seems little doubt to me that forum non conveniens is an essential and salutary feature of admiralty law. It gives shipowners |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | dissenting | American Dredging Co. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112930/american-dredging-co-v-miller/ | essential and salutary feature of admiralty law. It gives shipowners and ship operators a way to avoid vexatious litigation on a distant and unfamiliar shore. By denying this defense in all maritime cases, Louisiana upsets international and interstate comity and obstructs maritime trade. And by sanctioning Louisiana's law, a rule explicable only by some desire to disfavor maritime defendants, the Court condones the forum shopping and disuniformity that the admiralty jurisdiction is supposed to prevent. *464 In committing their ships to the general maritime trade, owners and operators run an unusual risk of being sued in venues with little or no connection to the subject matter of the suit. A wage dispute between crewman and captain or an accident on board the vessel may erupt into litigation when the ship docks in a faraway port. Taking jurisdiction in these cases, instead of allowing them to be resolved when the ship returns home, disrupts the schedule of the ship and may aggravate relations with the State from which it hales. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell L. Q. 12, 20-21 (1949) ("[H]olding a ship and its crew in an American port, to which they may have come to do no more than refuel, may, in the eyes of the nation of the flag be deemed an undue interference with her commerce, and a violation of that `comity and delicacy' which in the more courtly days of some of the earlier cases were considered normal among the nations" (footnote omitted)). From the beginning, American admiralty courts have confronted this problem through the forum non conveniens doctrine. As early as 11, a Pennsylvania District Court declined to take jurisdiction over a wage dispute between a captain and crewman of a Danish ship. (No. 17,682) (Pa.). "It has been my general rule," explained the court, "not to take cognizance of disputes between the masters and crews of foreign ships." "Reciprocal policy, and the justice due from one friendly nation to another, calls for such conduct in the courts of either country." Dismissals for reasons of comity and forum non conveniens were commonplace in the 19th century. See, e. g., The Infanta, (No. 7,030) (SDNY 1848) (dismissing claims for wages by two seamen from a British ship: "This court has repeatedly discountenanced actions by foreign seamen against foreign vessels not terminating their voyages at this port, as being calculated to embarrass commercial *465 transactions and relations between this country and others in friendly relations with it"); The Carolina, (dismissing seaman's claim |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | dissenting | American Dredging Co. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112930/american-dredging-co-v-miller/ | in friendly relations with it"); The Carolina, (dismissing seaman's claim that he was beaten by his crewmates while on board a British ship; "for courts to entertain this and similar suits during a voyage which the parties had agreed to make at intermediate points at which the vessel might touch, would impose delays which might seriously and uselessly embarrass the commerce of a friendly power"); The Montapedia, ; The Walter D. Wallet, The practice had the imprimatur of this Court. See (recognizing forum non conveniens doctrine but not applying it in that case); The Belgenland, ; Charter Shipping By 1932, Justice Brandeis was able to cite "an unbroken line of decisions in the lower federal courts" exercising "an unqualified discretion to decline jurisdiction in suits in admiralty between foreigners." Canada Malting and nn. 2-4 (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of maritime dispute between Canadian shipping companies). Long-time foreign trading partners also recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine. The Court notes the doctrine's roots in Scotland. See La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Français," [1926] Sess. Cas. 13 (H. L. 1925) (affirming dismissal of breach of contract claim brought by French manufacturer against French shipowner who had lost the manufacturer's cargo at sea). English courts have followed Scotland, although most often they stay the case rather than dismiss *466 it. See The Atlantic Star, [1974] App. Cas. 436 (H. L. 1973) (staying action between a Dutch barge owner and a Dutch shipowner whose vessels had collided in Belgian waters, pending the outcome of litigation in Antwerp); The Po, [] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 418 (refusing to stay action between Italian shipowner and American shipowner whose vessels had collided in Brazilian waters); The Lakhta, [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 269 (Q. B. Adm. 1992) (staying title dispute between Latvian plaintiffs and Russian defendant, so that plaintiffs could sue in Russian court). The Canadian Supreme Court has followed England and Scotland. See Antares Shipping Corp. v. Delmar Shipping Ltd. (The Capricorn), [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, 185 (1976) (citing Atlantic Star and Societe du Gaz). From all of the above it should be clear that forum non conveniens is an established feature of the general maritime law. To the main point, it serves objectives that go to the vital center of the admiralty pre-emption doctrine. Comity with other nations and among the States was a primary aim of the Constitution. At the time of the framing, it was essential that our prospective foreign trading partners know that the United States would uphold its treaties, respect the general |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | dissenting | American Dredging Co. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112930/american-dredging-co-v-miller/ | the United States would uphold its treaties, respect the general maritime law, and refrain from erecting barriers to commerce. The individual States needed similar assurances from each other. See The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143-145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ; Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, 2 Writings of James Madison 362-363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). Federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was the solution. See 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1672 (5th ed. 1833); The Federalist No. And so, when the States were allowed to provide common-law remedies for in personam maritime disputes through the saving to suitors clause, it did not follow that they were at liberty to set aside the fundamental features of admiralty law. "The confusion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled *467 to comply with the local statutes at every port, are not difficult to see. [T]he Union was formed with the very definite design of freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions incident to such control." U.S. 219, Accord, The Lottawanna, ; -217. Louisiana's open forum policy obstructs maritime commerce and runs the additional risk of impairing relations among the States and with our foreign trading partners. These realities cannot be obscured by characterizing the defense as procedural. See ante, at 452-454; but see Bickel, 35 Cornell L. Q., at 17 ("[T]he forum non conveniens problem is inescapably connected with the substantive rights of the parties in any given type of suit, rather than `merely' an `administrative' problem"). The reverse-Erie metaphor, while perhaps of use in other contexts, see Offshore Logistics, is not a sure guide for determining when a specific state law has displaced an essential feature of the general maritime law. See Exxon Procedural or substantive, the forum non conveniens defense promotes comity and trade. The States are not free to undermine these goals. It is true that in Missouri ex rel. Southern R. we held the state courts free to ignore forum non conveniens in Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) cases. But we did not consider the maritime context. Unlike FELA, a domestic statute controlling domestic markets, the admiralty law is international in its concern. A state court adjudicating a FELA dispute interposes no obstacle to our foreign relations. And while the Jones Act in turn makes FELA available to maritime claimants, that Act says nothing about forum non conveniens. See 46 U.S. C. App. 688. *468 In any event, the Court's ruling extends well beyond the Jones Act; it covers the whole spectrum of maritime litigation. Courts have recognized the forum non |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | dissenting | American Dredging Co. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112930/american-dredging-co-v-miller/ | spectrum of maritime litigation. Courts have recognized the forum non conveniens defense in a broad range of admiralty disputes: breach of marine insurance contract, Calavo Growers of (CA2 19); collision, Ocean Shelf Trading, ; products liability, Matson Navigation ; cargo loss, The Red Sea Ins. Co. v. S. S. Lucia Del Mar, 1983 A. M. C. 1630 (SDNY 1982), aff'd, 1983 A. M. C. 1631 (CA2 1983); and breach of contract for carriage, Galban Lobo Trading Co. v. Canadian Leader Ltd., 1963 A. M. C. 988 (SDNY 1958), to name a few. See Brief for Maritime Law Association of the United States as Amicus Curiae 12. In all of these cases, federal district courts will now hear forum non conveniens motions in the shadow of state courts that refuse to consider it. Knowing that upon dismissal a maritime plaintiff may turn around and sue in one of these state courts, see Chick Kam a federal court is now in a most difficult position. May it overrule a forum non conveniens motion it otherwise would have granted, because the state forum is open? See 1 (reversing the grant of plaintiff's voluntary dismissal motion, because the forum non conveniens defense was not available to defendants in the Louisiana court where plaintiff had also sued; refusing "to insist that these foreign appellants become guinea pigs in an effort to overturn Louisiana's erroneous rule"). Since the Court now makes forum non conveniens something of a derelict in maritime law, perhaps it is unconcerned that federal courts may now be required to alter their own forum non conveniens determinations to accommodate the policy of the State in which they sit. Under federal maritime principles, I should have *469 thought that the required accommodation was the other way around. The Supreme Court of Texas so understood the force of admiralty; it has ruled that its state courts must entertain a forum non conveniens objection despite a Texas statute mandating an open forum. Exxon 1994 A. M. C. 609. The Court does seem to leave open the possibility for a different result if those who raise the forum non conveniens objection are of foreign nationality. The Court is entitled, I suppose, to so confine its holding, but no part in its reasoning gives hope for a different result in a case involving foreign parties. The Court's substance-procedure distinction takes no account of the identity of the litigants, nor does the statement that forum non conveniens remains "nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision," ante, at 453. The Court ought to face up to the consequences |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Kelly v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118473/kelly-v-south-carolina/ | In the prevailing opinion said: "In a State in which parole is available, the Constitution does not require (or preclude) jury consideration of that fact. Likewise, if the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness, the State may appropriately decide that parole is not a proper issue for the jury's consideration even if the only alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. "When the State seeks to show the defendant's future dangerousness, however, the fact that he will never be released from prison will often be the only way that a violent criminal can successfully rebut the State's case. And despite our general deference to state decisions regarding what the jury should be told about sentencing, I agree that due process requires that the defendant be allowed to do so in cases in which the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole and the prosecution argues that the defendant will pose a threat to in the future." But today, while purporting to merely "apply" Simmons, the Court converts a tenable due process holding into a "truth in sentencing" doctrine which may be desirable policy, but *259 has almost no connection with the due process rationale of Simmons. In some StatesTexas, for example, see (b) and (g) (2001)"future dangerousness" is itself a ground for imposing the death penalty in a capital case. In we held that such a system was consistent with the Eighth Amendment. But South Carolina's capital punishment system does not work that way. There are 11 statutory aggravating factors which may be found by the jury that must be weighed against mitigating factors.[*] See S. C. Code Ann. *260 16-320(C) (2001). At the sentencing phase of petitioner's trial, the State argued, and the jury found, the statutory aggravators that the murder was committed while in the commission of: kidnaping; burglary; robbery while armed with a deadly weapon; larceny with use of a deadly weapon; and physical torture. Once a South Carolina jury has found the necessary aggravators, it may consider future dangerousness in determining what sentence to impose. In the present case, the prosecutor did not argue future dangerousnessas he did in Simmons in any meaningful sense of that term. But the Court says that he need not, in order for the defendant to invoke Simmons; it is enough if evidence introduced to prove other elements of the case has a tendency to prove future dangerousness as well. Gone is the due process basis for the rulethat where the State argues that the defendant will be dangerous in the |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Kelly v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118473/kelly-v-south-carolina/ | State argues that the defendant will be dangerous in the future, the defendant is entitled to inform the jury by way of rebuttal that he will be in prison for life. Thus, the Simmons rule is invoked, not in reference to any contention made by the State, but only by the existence of evidence from which a jury might infer future dangerousness. And evidence there will surely be in a case such as the present one, correctly described by the Court as "an extraordinarily brutal murder." Ante, at 248. *261 That today's decision departs from Simmons is evident from the Court's rejection of the South Carolina Supreme Court's distinction between evidence regarding danger to fellow inmates and evidence regarding danger to at large. Simmons itself recognized this distinction. Immediately after holding that the defendant should be allowed to show that "he never would be released on parole and thus, in his view, would not pose a future danger to " Simmons noted that "[t]he State is free to argue that the defendant will pose a danger to others in prison and that executing him is the only means of eliminating the threat to the safety of other inmates or prison staff," See also (noting that where a parole ineligibility instruction is given, "the prosecution is free to argue that the defendant would be dangerous in prison"). This makes eminent good sense, for when the State argues that the defendant poses a threat to his cell mates or prison guards, it is no answer to say that he never will be released from prison. But the test is no longer whether the State argues future dangerousness to ; the test is now whether evidence was introduced at trial that raises an "implication" of future dangerousness to Ante, at 253. It is difficult to envision a capital sentencing hearing where the State presents no evidence from which a juror might make such an inference. I would hazard a guess that many jurors found the sheer brutality of this crimepetitioner bound the hands of the victim (who was six months pregnant) behind her back, stabbed her over 30 times, slit her throat from ear to ear, and left dollar bills fastened to her bloodied bodyindicative of petitioner's future threat to Yet all of this evidence was introduced not to prove future dangerousness, but to prove other elements required by South Carolina law, including the statutory aggravating factor that the murder was committed while in the commission of physical torture. *262 To be sure, the prosecutor's arguments about the details of the murder, as |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110418/democratic-party-of-united-states-v-wisconsin-ex-rel-la-follette/ | The charter of the appellant Democratic Party of the United States (National Party) provides that delegates to its National Convention shall be chosen through procedures in which only Democrats can participate. Consistently with the charter, the National Party's Delegate Selection Rules provide that only those who are willing to affiliate publicly with the Democratic Party may participate in the process of selecting delegates to the Party's National Convention. The question on this appeal is whether Wisconsin may successfully insist that its delegates to the Convention be seated, even though those delegates are chosen through a process that includes a binding state preference primary election in which voters do not declare their party affiliation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the National Convention is bound by the Wisconsin primary election results, and cannot refuse to seat the delegates chosen in accord with Wisconsin law. I Rule 2A of the Democratic Selection Rules for the 1980 National Convention states: "Participation in the delegate selection process in primaries or caucuses shall be restricted to Democratic voters only who publicly declare their party preference and have that preference publicly recorded."[1] Under *110 National Party rules, the "delegate selection process" includes any procedure by which delegates to the Convention are bound to vote for the nomination of particular candidates.[2] The election laws of Wisconsin[3] allow non-Democratsincluding *111 members of other parties and independentsto vote in the Democratic primary without regard to party affiliation and without requiring a public declaration of party preference. The voters in Wisconsin's "open"[4] primary express their *112 choice among Presidential candidates for the Democratic Party's nomination; they do not vote for delegates to the National Convention. Delegates to the National Convention are chosen separately, after the primary, at caucuses of persons who have stated their affiliation with the Party.[5] But these delegates, under Wisconsin law, are bound to vote at the National Convention in accord with the results of the open primary election.[6] Accordingly, while Wisconsin's open Presidential preference primary does not itself violate National Party rules,[7] the State's mandate that the results of the primary shall determine the allocation of votes cast by the State's delegates at the National Convention does. In May 1979, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin (State Party) submitted to the Compliance Review Commission of the National Party its plan for selecting delegates to the 1980 National Convention. The plan incorporated the provisions of the State's open primary laws, and, as a result, the Commission disapproved it as violating Rule 2A.[8] Since compliance with Rule 2A was a condition of participation at *113 the Convention, for which |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110418/democratic-party-of-united-states-v-wisconsin-ex-rel-la-follette/ | a condition of participation at *113 the Convention, for which no exception could be made,[9] the National Party indicated that Wisconsin delegates who were bound to vote according to the results of the open primary would not be seated. The State Attorney General then brought an original action in the Wisconsin Supreme Court on behalf of the State. Named as respondents in the suit were the National Party and the Democratic National Committee, who are the appellants in this Court, and the State Party, an appellee here. The State sought a declaration that the Wisconsin delegate selection system was constitutional as applied to the appellants and that the appellants could not lawfully refuse to seat the Wisconsin delegation at the Convention. The State Party responded by agreeing that state law may validly be applied against it and the National Party, and cross-claimed against the National Party, asking the court to order the National Party to recognize the delegates selected in accord with Wisconsin law. The National Party argued that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments it could not be compelled to seat the Wisconsin delegation in violation of Party rules. The Wisconsin Supreme Court entered a judgment declaring that the State's system of selecting delegates to the Democratic National Convention is constitutional and binding on the appellants. The court assumed that the National Party's freedom of political association, protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, gave it the right to restrict participation in the process of choosing Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates to Democrats. It concluded, however, that the State had not impermissibly impaired that right. The court said that the State's primary election laws were themselves intended to permit persons to vote only for the candidates of the party they preferred, and *114 that, as a practical matter, requiring a public declaration of party affiliation would not prevent persons who are not Democrats from voting in the primary.[10] Moreover, the court reasoned that to whatever extent appellants' constitutional freedom of political association might be burdened by the Wisconsin election laws, the burden was justified by the State's "compelling interest in maintaining the special feature of its primary which permits private declaration of party preference." The court declared that the votes of the state delegation at the National Convention for Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates must be apportioned and cast as prescribed by Wisconsin law, and that the State's delegates could not for that reason be disqualified from being seated at the Convention.[11] The National Party and the Democratic National Committee then brought this appeal under 28 U.S. C. 12 |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110418/democratic-party-of-united-states-v-wisconsin-ex-rel-la-follette/ | Committee then brought this appeal under 28 U.S. C. 12 (2). Wisconsin held its primary on April 1, 1980, in accord with its election laws. Subsequently, the State Party chose delegates to the 1980 Democratic National Convention, in compliance with the order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Wis. Stat. 8.12 (3) (3) (c) 5 (1977). This Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal on July 2, 1980. On the same day, the Court stayed the judgment of *115 the Wisconsin Supreme Court. On July 20, 1980, the Credentials Committee of the National Convention decided to seat the delegates from Wisconsin, despite this Court's stay,[12] and despite the delegates' selection in a manner that violated Rule 2A.[13] II Rule 2A can be traced to efforts of the National Party to study and reform its nominating procedures and internal structure after the 1968 Democratic National Convention.[14]*116 The Convention, the Party's highest governing authority, directed the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to establish a Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (McGovern/Fraser Commission). This Commission concluded that a major problem faced by the Party was that rank-and-file Party members had been underrepresented at its Convention, and that the Party should "find methods which would guarantee every American who claims a stake in the Democratic Party the opportunity to make his judgment felt in the presidential nominating process." Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Mandate for Reform: A Report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee 8 (Apr. 1970) (emphasis added) (hereafter Mandate for Reform). The Commission stressed that Party nominating procedures should be as open and accessible as possible to all persons who wished to join the Party,[15] but expressed the concern that "a full opportunity for all Democrats to participate is diluted if members of other political parties are allowed to participate *117 in the selection of delegates to the Democratic National Convention."[16] The 1972 Democratic National Convention also established a Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure (Mikulski Commission). This Commission reiterated many of the principles announced by the McGovern/Fraser Commission, but went further to propose binding rules directing state parties to restrict participation in the delegate selection process to Democratic voters. Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, Democrats All: A Report of the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure 2, 15 (Dec. 6, 1973) (hereafter Democrats All). The DNC incorporated these recommendations into the Delegate Selection Rules for the 1976 Convention. In 1974, the National Party adopted its charter and by-laws. The charter set the following qualifications for delegates to |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110418/democratic-party-of-united-states-v-wisconsin-ex-rel-la-follette/ | by-laws. The charter set the following qualifications for delegates to the Party's national conventions: "The National Convention shall be composed of delegates who are chosen through processes which (i) assure all Democratic voters full, timely and equal opportunity to participate and include affirmative action programs toward that end, (ii) assure that delegations fairly reflect the division of preferences expressed by those who participate in the presidential nominating process, [and] (v) restrict participation to Democrats only" Democratic National Committee, Charter of the Democratic Party of the United States, Art. Two, 4 (emphasis added). *118 Rule 2A took its present form in 1976. Consistent with the charter, it restricted participation in the delegate selection process in primaries or caucuses to "Democratic voters only who publicly declare their party preference and have that preference publicly recorded." But the 1976 Delegate Selection Rules allowed for an exemption from any rule, including Rule 2A, that was inconsistent with state law if the state party was unable to secure changes in the law.[17] In 1975, the Party established yet another commission to review its nominating procedures, the Commission on Presidential Nomination and Party Structure (Winograd Commission). This Commission was particularly concerned with what it believed to be the dilution of the voting strength of Party members in States sponsoring open or "crossover" primaries.[18] Indeed, the Commission based its concern in part on a study of voting behavior in Wisconsin's open primary. See Adamany, Cross-Over Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, 70 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 536, 538-539 (1976). The Adamany study, assessing the Wisconsin Democratic primaries from 1964 to 1972, found that crossover voters comprised 26% to 34% of the primary voters; that the voting patterns of crossover voters differed significantly from those of participants who identified themselves as Democrats; and that crossover voters altered the composition of the delegate slate chosen from Wisconsin.[19] The Winograd Commission *119 thus recommended that the Party strengthen its rules against crossover voting, Openness, Participation and Party Building: Reforms for a Stronger Democratic Party 68 (Feb. 17, 1978) (hereafter Openness, Participation), predicting that continued crossover voting "could result in a convention delegation which did not fairly reflect the division of preferences among Democratic identifiers in the electorate." And it specifically recommended that "participation in the delegate selection process in primaries or caucuses be restricted to Democratic voters only who publicly declare their party preference and have that preference publicly recorded." Accordingly, the text of Rule 2A was retained, but a new Rule, 2B, was added, prohibiting any exemptions from *120 Rule 2A. Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110418/democratic-party-of-united-states-v-wisconsin-ex-rel-la-follette/ | *120 Rule 2A. Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic Convention, Rule 2B.[20] III The question in this case is not whether Wisconsin may conduct an open primary election if it chooses to do so, or whether the National Party may require Wisconsin to limit its primary election to publicly declared Democrats.[21] Rather, the question is whether, once Wisconsin has opened its Democratic Presidential preference primary to voters who do not publicly declare their party affiliation, it may then bind the National Party to honor the binding primary results, even though those results were reached in a manner contrary to National Party rules. The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the question before it to be the constitutionality of the "open" feature of the state primary election law, as such. Concluding that the *121 open primary serves compelling state interests by encouraging voter participation, the court held the state open primary constitutionally valid. Upon this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court may well be correct. In any event, there is no need to question its conclusion here. For the rules of the National Party do not challenge the authority of a State to conduct an open primary, so long as it is not binding on the National Party Convention. The issue is whether the State may compel the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way that violates the rules of the Party. And this issue was resolved, we believe, in In the Court reviewed the decision of an Illinois court holding that state law exclusively governed the seating of a state delegation at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, and enjoining the National Party from refusing to seat delegates selected in a manner in accord with state law although contrary to National Party rules. Certiorari was granted "to decide the important question whether the [a]ppellate [c]ourt was correct in according primacy to state law over the National Political Party's rules in the determination of the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to the Party's National Convention." The Court reversed the state judgment, holding that "Illinois' interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process cannot be deemed compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party Convention." That disposition controls here. The Court relied upon the principle that "[t]he National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association." See also, This First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any State. ; See also 3 U.S. 449, And |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110418/democratic-party-of-united-states-v-wisconsin-ex-rel-la-follette/ | by any State. ; See also 3 U.S. 449, And the freedom to associate for the "common advancement of political beliefs," necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people only.[22] "Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents." ; see Here, the members of the National Party, speaking through their rules, chose to define their associational rights by limiting those who could participate in the processes leading to the selection of delegates to their National Convention. On several occasions this Court has recognized that the inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective decisionsthus imparting the party's essential functionsand that political parties may accordingly protect themselves "from intrusion by those with adverse political principles." In for example, the Court sustained the constitutionality of a requirementthere imposed by a state statutethat a voter enroll in the party of his choice at least 30 days before the general election in order to vote in the next party primary. The purpose of that statute was "to inhibit party `raiding,' whereby voters in sympathy with one party designate themselves as voters of another party so as to influence or determine the results of the other party's primary."[23] See also *123 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized these constitutional doctrines in stating that the National Party could exclude persons who are not Democrats from the procedures through which the Party's national candidates are actually 287 N. W. 2d, at 530. But the court distinguished on the ground that this case "does not arise `in the context of the selection of delegations to the National Party Convention.'"[24] at The court's order, however, unequivocally obligated the National Party to accept the delegation to the National Convention chosen in accord with Wisconsin law, despite contrary National Party rules. The State argues that its law places only a minor burden on the National Party. The National Party argues that the burden is substantial, because it prevents the Party from "screen[ing] out those whose affiliation is slight, tenuous, or fleeting," and that such screening is essential to build a more effective and responsible Party. But it is not for the courts to mediate the merits of this dispute. For even if the State were correct.[25] a State, or a court, may not constitutionally *124 substitute its own judgment for that of the Party. A political party's choice among the various ways of determining the makeup of a State's delegation to the party's national convention |
Justice Stewart | 1,981 | 18 | majority | Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin Ex Rel. La Follette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110418/democratic-party-of-united-states-v-wisconsin-ex-rel-la-follette/ | makeup of a State's delegation to the party's national convention is protected by the Constitution.[26] And as is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or irrational.[27] IV We must consider, finally, whether the State has compelling interests that justify the imposition of its will upon the appellants. See[28] "Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute." The State asserts a compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy *125 of the ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters.[29] But all those interests go to the conduct of the Presidential preference primarynot to the imposition of voting requirements upon those who, in a separate process, are eventually selected as delegates.[30] Therefore, the interests advanced by the State[31] do not justify *126 its substantial[32] intrusion into the associational freedom of members of the National Party. V The State has a substantial interest in the manner in which its elections are conducted, and the National Party has a substantial interest in the manner in which the delegates to its National Convention are selected. But these interests are not incompatible, and to the limited extent they clash in this case, both interests can be preserved. The National Party rules do not forbid Wisconsin to conduct an open primary. But if Wisconsin does open its primary, it cannot require that Wisconsin delegates to the National Party Convention vote there in accordance with the primary results, if to do so would violate Party rules. Since the Wisconsin Supreme Court has declared that the National Party cannot disqualify delegates who are bound to vote in accordance with the results of the Wisconsin open primary, its judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Van Lare v. Hurley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109250/van-lare-v-hurley/ | The question presented is whether New York regulations reducing pro rata the shelter allowance provided recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to the extent there are nonpaying lodgers living *340 in the household conflict with the Social Security Act and federal regulations. We conclude that the state provisions conflict with federal law and are therefore invalid. ; ; I AFDC is a categorical public assistance program established by the Social Security Act of 1935. Its operation has been described in several recent opinions. See, e. g., ; AFDC provides federal funds to States on a matching funds basis to aid the "needy child who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with" any of the several listed relatives. 42 U.S. C. 606 States that seek to qualify for federal AFDC funding must operate a program not in conflict with the Social Security Act. Each of the petitioners in No. 74-5054 receives AFDC on behalf of herself and her minor children. This includes a shelter allowance computed as an item of need separate from other necessities such as food and clothing. N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law 131-a. Each petitioner's shelter allowance was reduced by New York officials because she allowed a person not a recipient of AFDC and who had no legal obligation to support her family to reside in the household.[1] The reduction was authorized by New York regulations which provide: "18 N.Y. C. R. R. 352.31: *341 " For applicant or recipient. "(3) When a female applicant or recipient is living with a man to whom she is not married, other than on an occasional or transient basis, his available income and resources shall be applied in accordance with the following: "(iv) When the man is unwilling to assume responsibility for the woman or her children, and there are no children of which he is the acknowledged or adjudicated father, he shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with section 352.30 (d)."[2] "18 N.Y. C. R. R. 352.30: "352.30 Persons included in the budget. "(d) A non-legally responsible relative or unrelated person in the household, who is not applying for nor receiving public assistance shall not be included in the budget and shall be deemed to be a *342 lodger or boarding lodger. The amount which the lodger or boarding lodger pays shall be verified and treated as income to the family. For the lodger, the amount in excess of $15 per |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Van Lare v. Hurley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109250/van-lare-v-hurley/ | For the lodger, the amount in excess of $15 per month shall be considered as income; for such boarding lodgers, the amount in excess of $60 per month shall be considered as income. In the event a lodger does not contribute at least $15 per month, the family's shelter allowance including fuel for heating, shall be a pro rata share of the regular shelter allowance." (Emphasis supplied.) No lodger of any petitioner contributed $15 a month, and pursuant to the italicized sentence, each petitioner's shelter allowance was therefore reduced by a pro rata share. For example, the shelter allowance of $150 monthly being paid to a family of four was reduced to $120 after the lodger moved in. Petitioners challenged the New York regulations in separate actions in two Federal District Courts.[3] They alleged that in making the presence of the lodger a basis for assuming the availability of income, the regulations were invalid for conflict with 42 U.S. C. 606 and the following regulation, 45 CFR 233.90 that implements that statute: "A State plan under title IV-A of the Social Security *343 Act [relating to the AFDC program] must provide that the determination whether a child has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, or (if the State plan includes such cases) the unemployment of his father, will be made only in relation to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to the child's stepparent who is ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the child under State law of general applicability which requires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extend [sic] that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children. Under this requirement, the inclusion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a `substitute parent' or `man-in-the-house' or any individual other than one described in this paragraph is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the State. In establishing financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment, only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and the income only of the parent described in the first sentence of this paragraph will be considered available for children in the household in the absence of proof of actual contributions." (Emphasis supplied.) Without reaching the recipients' constitutional challenges denial of due process and equal protection, and |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Van Lare v. Hurley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109250/van-lare-v-hurley/ | constitutional challenges denial of due process and equal protection, and infringement of rights of privacy and free association each District Court adjudged the state regulations to be invalid for conflict with 42 U.S. C. 606 and 45 CFR 233.90 and granted declaratory and *344 injunctive relief.[4] Both judgments were appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the New York rules were not in conflict with federal law, reversed the judgments, and remanded for convention of a three-judge court to decide the constitutional challenges. The three-judge court that was convened sustained the due process challenge to the New York rules. We noted probable jurisdiction of appellants' appeal from the three-judge court holding, and also granted certiorari to the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in No. 74-5054 and reverse. Since in that circumstance we need not address the constitutional decision in No. 74-453, we vacate the judgment in that case and remand with directions to dismiss as moot. Cf. United II Title 42 U.S. C. 606 was previously construed in That case involved an Alabama "substitute father" regulation, which denied AFDC benefits to children of a mother who cohabited in or outside her home with an able-bodied man. It was irrelevant under the state regulation whether the man was legally obligated to support the children or whether he did in fact contribute to their support. Alabama contended that its rule simply defined nonabsent "parent" under 42 U.S. C. 606 The regulation was claimed to be justified as having the purpose of *345 discouraging illicit sexual relationships and of putting "informal" families on a par with ordinary families. We concluded that this was an insufficient justification, holding that it is "inconceivable that Alabama is free to discourage immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute disqualification of needy children." For, in light of the purpose of AFDC to aid needy children, we held, on the statutory language and legislative history, that the term "parent" in 606 must be read to include "only those persons with a legal duty of support." A broader definition would fail to provide the economic security for needy children which was Congress' primary goal. Thus the Alabama regulation was invalid because its definition of "parent" conflicted with that of the Social Security Act. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) codified the holding of in 45 CFR 233.90 the regulation at issue in the instant case.[5] Its key provision specifies that in determining a child's financial eligibility and the amount |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Van Lare v. Hurley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109250/van-lare-v-hurley/ | that in determining a child's financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment, "the income only of the [legally obligated] parent will be considered available in the absence of proof of actual contributions." 45 CFR 233.90 We applied this regulation in Lewis presented the question of the validity of a California rule which provided that in computing payments to needy children who lived with their mother and stepfather or "an adult male person assuming the role of spouse" (MARS), consideration should be given to the income of the stepfather or MARS. We held the California rule invalid as in conflict with the Social Security Act, the HEW regulation, *346 45 CFR 233.90 and We said that "[i]n the absence of proof of actual contribution, California may not consider the child's `resources' to include either the income of a nonadopting stepfather who is not legally obligated to support the child as is a natural parent, or the income of a MARSwhatever the nature of his obligation to support." -560. In short, we held that the Social Security Act precludes treating a person who is not a natural or adoptive parent as a breadwinner "unless the bread is actually set on the table." III Thus the New York regulations at issue are also invalid. This is clearly so insofar as they are based on the assumption that the nonpaying lodger is contributing to the welfare household, without inquiry into whether he in fact does so. Section 352.31 (3), provides that "[w]hen a recipient is living with a man to whom she is not married his available income and resources shall be applied in accordance with the following (iv) he shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with section 352.30 (d)." (Emphasis supplied.) Plainly treating someone as a lodger is an impermissible means of "applying available income and resources." Under 352.30 (d), when a lodger pays less than $15 a month, the family's shelter allowance is reduced pro rata. Respondents themselves concede in this Court that the regulations are designed so that the lodger will not "be excused from providing his share of shelter cost." Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Pet. for Cert. 9. Thus under the New York regulations the nonpaying lodger's mere presence results in a decrease in benefits. Yet the lodger, like the Alabama "substitute father" or the California "MARS," may be contributing nothing to *347 the needy child. and construe the federal law and regulations as barring the States from assuming that nonlegally responsible persons will apply their resources to aid the welfare child. Those cases |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Van Lare v. Hurley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109250/van-lare-v-hurley/ | apply their resources to aid the welfare child. Those cases therefore compel a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Respondents argue, however, that in any event the New York regulations may be justified on other grounds. They argue first that the presence of the lodger is evidence that the AFDC family has excess room and therefore that its shelter allowance exceeds its needs. That, however, is not how the New York regulations are applied. When a nonpaying lodger moves in, the shelter allowance is reduced pro rata with no regard to space considerations. When the lodger moves out the allowance is returned to its original amount. That practice clearly reveals that the existence of excess space is not the basis of the reduction, because otherwise the allowance would remain reduced after the lodger leaves. Thus, the fact that the allowance varies with the lodger's presence demonstrates that it is keyed, as the regulations plainly imply, to the impermissible assumption that the lodger is contributing income to the family.[6] Another, somewhat related, justification asserted is that the shelter allowance is reduced to prevent lodgers, who by definition are ineligible for welfare, from receiving welfare benefits. The regulations, however, do not prohibit lodgers from living in welfare homes. The lodger may stay on after the allowance is reduced, and the State takes no further action.[7] The only victim of *348 the state regulations is thus the needy child who suffers reduced benefits. But States may not seek to accomplish policies aimed at lodgers by depriving needy children of benefits. ; The judgment in No. 74-5054 is reversed and the judgment in No. 74-453 is vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as moot. It is so ordered. MR. |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | The Court is today called upon to construe the provision of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S. C. 5005 et seq., defining the circumstances under which a youth offender may be sentenced as an adult. The Youth Corrections Act (YCA) provides a comprehensive sentencing scheme for offenders between the ages of 18 and 22, affording trial judges four options for sentencing such offenders. The judge may suspend imposition or execution of sentence and place the offender on probation. 18 U.S. C. 5010 (a). Alternatively, the judge may sentence the offender for treatment and supervision at a special youth facility, to be discharged in no more than 6 years, 18 U.S. C. 5010 (b), or he may commit the offender to a youth institution for a term which may exceed 6 years, up to the maximum period authorized by law for the offense. 18 U.S. C. 5010 (c).[1] Finally, the judge may sentence the offender as an adult, pursuant to 18 U.S. C. 5010 (d), which provides that: "If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision." I agree with the Court's holding that 5010 (d) requires an explicit finding of "no benefit" as a condition precedent to sentencing an eligible offender as an adult, *446 ante, at 444, but I find that holding patently inconsistent with the Court's assertion that a sentencing judge need only be aware of the applicability of the Act and choose to reject it in order to satisfy the clear admonition of 5010 (d). As construed by the Court, the "no benefit" finding is not a finding at all. I am convinced that the Act was meant to "provide a preferred sentencing alternative which must be used in sentencing a youthful offender unless, in the language of 5010 (d), `the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment' " under the Act. (emphasis added). And, I fundamentally disagree with the Court's holding that merely by tracking the statutory "no benefit" language a sentencing judge can satisfy the "finding" requirement of 5010 (d). I would require that the explicit "no benefit" finding be augmented by a statement of the reasons for imposing an adult sentence. I I find no basis in either the language or history of the YCA to support the Court's observation that the Act was intended to "preserve unfettered" the discretion of the sentencing judge. Ante, at 437. The YCA was the product |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | sentencing judge. Ante, at 437. The YCA was the product of more than 10 years of study by various groups and was modeled after the English Borstal system, which had achieved substantial success in rehabilitating young offenders.[2] The initial legislative proposal, an American Law Institute model Act, removed the power to sentence eligible offenders from the trial judges altogether and reposed that power in a correctional authority.[3] Not surprisingly, that proposal *447 brought swift and sharp criticism from the judges whose power was to be sharply curtailed. The next proposal, by the Judicial Conference, involved shared sentencing powers between trial judges and correctional authorities.[4] It met with similar criticism. The 1949 proposal, which was finally enacted into law, retained sentencing power in the trial judge. As the Court today points out, the drafters of the Act repeatedly emphasized that the legislation "`does not interfere with the [sentencing] power of the judge' " Ante, at 437. But even the very first Judicial Conference proposal contained a provision specifically requiring the trial judge to make a finding that a youth offender would not benefit from treatment and should not be committed under the Act, before sentencing him under any other penalty provisions.[5] This finding requirement was adapted from the similar Borstal provision which disallows a sentencing court to "impose imprisonment on a person under twenty-one years of age unless no other [Borstal] method of dealing with him is appropriate."[6] The finding requirement of the Judicial Conference draft was not subject to the same criticism as the provisions which actually removed, rather than limited, the exercise of trial judges' sentencing discretion, and the finding requirement was ultimately enacted into law as 5010 (d). The finding requirement is an integral part of the YCA scheme. The stated premise of the Act is that young people between the ages of 18 and 22, especially, are promising subjects for rehabilitation.[7] The purpose of the legislation was, for those offenders, *448 to "substitute for retributive punishment methods of training and treatment designed to correct and prevent antisocial tendencies. It departs from the mere punitive idea of dealing with criminals and looks primarily to the objective idea of rehabilitation." H. R. Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1950).[8] It is clear that from its very inception, the youth corrections program was intended to establish among the goals judges could consider in sentencing eligible offenders, one as paramount that of rehabilitation.[9] And, in this limited sense, the sentencing discretion of trial judges is necessarily circumscribed in regard to youth offenders. The finding requirement of 5010 (d) effectuates |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | to youth offenders. The finding requirement of 5010 (d) effectuates this policy by permitting eligible offenders to be deprived of the rehabilitative treatment provided under the Act only where they would not benefit therefrom. The Senate Report accompanying the bill explained the circumstances under which adult sentencing would be proper: "If the judge is convinced the youth is incorrigible and would derive no help from the program, he may sentence him under any applicable provision of law." S. Rep. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1949). Other aspects of the legislative history underscore Congress' intention that the Act provide a preferred sentencing alternative for eligible offenders. Senator Kilgore, one of the sponsors of the legislation, observed that given the requisite finding "only about 10 percent of [eligible *449 offenders would] eventually have to [be] sentence[d as adults], or less." Hearing on S. 895 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1943). The House Report concluded that even given the instances in which YCA rehabilitative treatment would fail "more than 70 percent [of eligible youth offenders] can be rehabilitated" under the Act. H. R. Rep. No. 2979, The panoply of treatment options[10] available under the Act is but further evidence that the YCA program was intended to be sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all but the "incorrigible" youth. This congressional intent finds clear expression in the words of the statute. Section 5010 (d) does not say the sentencing court must merely consider the treatment option provided by the Act; it says in the most uncompromising terms that the court must find the youth "will not benefit" from YCA treatment as a prerequisite to imposing an adult sentence. The use of the words "shall find" emphasizes the mandatory nature of that finding. The specific quality of the finding is underscored by 5010 (e) which provides for an eligible offender to be temporarily committed for observation and study for the purpose of providing the sentencing court with a report on the particular question defined by 5010 (d) whether the youth offender would benefit from treatment under the Act.[11] *450 Thus, while the Act does not remove a trial judge's responsibility or discretion for the sentencing determination, it does provide a preferred disposition for eligible offenders. A sentencing judge is not required to sentence a youth offender under the Act; the judge can still exercise his "sound discretion to deny such rehabilitative treatment to those youths in the exceptional cases where the judge determines that the special youth treatment afforded by the Act would be |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | the special youth treatment afforded by the Act would be of no value." United The legislative history relied on by the Court merely emphasizes this pointthat the Act was intended to be another sentencing alternative available to the trial judge and that the decision as to whether it should be employed in a particular case remains a decision committed to his discretion. That history is not, however, inconsistent with what seems to me the plain meaning of the words of the statute that the sentencing judge's discretion is circumscribed by the affirmative finding requirement of 5010 (d).[12] The YCA "provides a preferred sentencing alternative" which must be used in sentencing a youth unless the facts of the individual case meet the statutory requirement *451 unless, in the language of 5010 (d), the court finds that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.[13], 473 F. 2d, at ; United v. Waters, 141 U. S. App. D. C., at -726. Every Court of Appeals which has considered the issue, except the court below, has agreed that the manner in which the sentencing judge exercises his discretion is thus limited. ; United ; United ; United ; Williams v. United ; see United v. MacDonald, ;[14] cf. Small v. United In a sense, the Court today also recognizes the inherent limitation on the judge's discretion imposed by 5010 (d) by requiring an explicit "no benefit" finding as a prerequisite to adult sentencing. As conceived by the Court, however, the required "no benefit" finding is no finding at all, but merely a ritualistic invocation of the statutory language. In explaining why the "no benefit" finding *452 must be explicit, the Court notes that "[t]o hold that a `no benefit' finding is implicit each time a sentence under the Act is not chosen would render 5010 (d) nugatory." Ante, at 444. Despite these protestations, the Court today renders the finding requirement of 5010 (d) a nullity. By holding that the Act was intended to preserve "the unfettered sentencing discretion of federal district judges," ante, at 437, and that sentencing judges need only have "considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it," ante, at 443, the Court effectively reads the unambiguous mandate of a "no benefit" finding out of the Act. A mere parroting of the statutory language is hardly an affirmative finding. The Court's opinion seems to indicate that the sentencing judge need not mean what he says when he pronounces the "no benefit" litany. Although the Court requires him to go through the charade of saying |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | Court requires him to go through the charade of saying that the offender would not benefit from treatment under the Act, it apparently does not require that the judge actually find no benefit but only that he be aware of the Act and reject it. I think it remarkable that this Court should approve such an empty and duplicitous ritual. II If the Court were to hold that the Act limited a trial judge's discretion by requiring that he actually find a youth offender would not benefit from YCA treatment before sentencing him as an adult, I would think that more than a mere recitation of the conclusory finding of "no benefit" should be required. To say that simply invoking the words of the statute satisfies the mandate of 5010 (d) affords far too little credence both to Congress' deep concern for the rehabilitative potential of young offenders and to its obvious intention that eligible offenders be sentenced under the Act if they would benefit from its rehabilitative programs. To give effect to these concerns, I would require that the trial judge include, on the *453 record, a statement which makes clear that he considered the provisions of the Act, weighed the treatment option available, and decided in light of his familiarity with the offender that he would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.[15] The mere recitation of the "no benefit" litany can hardly bear the weight of demonstrating such compliance. By taking the unusual step of requiring a specific finding in this limited but highly important area of sentencing, Congress mandated a reasoned determination that the offender would not benefit from the rehabilitative treatment available under the Act. Accordingly, in my view, a statement of the factors which informed and shaped the sentencing decision must accompany the conclusory finding of "no benefit" if that congressional purpose is to be served. The Borstal system, which provided the model for the youth corrections scheme in general and the requirement of 5010 (d) in particular, envisions a trial judge stating his reasons for sentencing an eligible offender as an adult.[16] Similarly, most of the Courts of Appeals which *454 have faced the issue have required a statement of reasons as a necessary concomitant of the 5010 (d) finding. A unanimous en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and a near-unanimous en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit[17] have found a statement of reasons supporting the "no benefit" finding to be " `essential to a knowledgeable administration of the |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | to be " `essential to a knowledgeable administration of the Act' " United 491 F. 2d, at 1139; United v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C., at The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has, more recently, held that a statement of reasons accompanying adult sentencing is "necessary to insure that the sentencing court has deliberately considered whether a youth offender may benefit from the treatment provided for in the Act" 497 F. 2d, 63. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently remanded a case for consideration of whether treatment under the Act would be beneficial to the offender and specifically ordered the trial judge to state the reasons for his conclusion. 473 F. 2d, at In fact, the court below is the only Court of Appeals to specifically disavow a requirement of reasons for a 5010 (d) sentence.[18] *455 Contrary to the Court's assertion that appellate review is the only purpose to be served by a statement of reasons, that requirement serves a number of other important policies. First, it might well contribute to rationalizing the sentencing process and to decreasing disparities in sentences. Articulating reasons should assist a trial judge in developing for himself a consistent set of principles on which to base his sentencing decisions. Requiring "[s]uch a procedure would encourage the judge to clarify and justify, in his own mind, the grounds for the sentence he chooses. As a result, sentencing decisions would tend, on the whole, to be more carefully thought out." United v. Velazquez, ; accord, United v. Brown, The reasons may also be of use to correctional authorities in their handling of the prisoner after sentence. The kind of correctional and rehabilitative treatment an offender receives should take into account the reasons for his sentence. A disclosure of reasons may also aid the defendant's counsel to insure that the sentence is not premised on misinformation or inaccuracies in the material upon which the sentencing judge relies. "A Sphinx-like silence on the court's part precludes anyone (including the parties, [and] the judge) from learning whether he acted in error." ; cf. United v. Tucker, *456 Moreover, an articulation of reasons may actually contribute to the offender's rehabilitation by avoiding any feeling that his sentence was arbitrary.[19] As MR. JUSTICE (then Judge) STEWART observed: "Justice is measured in many ways, but to a convicted criminal its surest measure lies in the fairness of the sentence he receives. It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings against him should have so neglected this important dimension of fundamental justice." Shepard v. United If reasons were articulated for the sentencing decision, an offender would be less apt to perceive his fate as being arbitrarily determined.[20] Reasoned decisions may even enhance the legitimacy of the sentencing process as perceived by the general public for, as noted by the Report of the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice: "It is hardly commanding of public respect for our system on the one hand to increase the alternatives of the sentencing judge so that he can shape his sentence to fit each case, and on the other hand to *457 take the position that he need not explain why he selects a particular sentence"[21] Although these considerations apply to sentencing decisions generally,[22] I do not mean to suggest that reasons are required in any other sentencing context. Contrary to the majority's accusations, my view of the Act does not require wholesale abandonment of "traditional sentencing doctrine." Ante, at 440. We are concerned here with only a limited, albeit important, area of sentencing for which Congress has established special rules. Congress' urgent concern for the rehabilitative potential of young offenders and the specific-finding requirement of 5010 (d) make the need for reasons particularly compelling in this context. Requiring a statement of reasons would encourage trial judges to direct their attention to the crucial questions of benefit and treatment, to take a hard look at the relevant factors, and to focus on value judgments inherent in their sentencing decision. See United v. Phillips, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 217, 479 * It is clearly consonant with the Act to require such reasoned consideration. I must agree with the perceptive observations of Senior Judge Fahy of the District of Columbia Circuit that requiring a statement of reasons is essential to assure: "firstly, that the District Judge manifest not only an awareness that the Act is applicable to the case, but also an accurate understanding of the scope of his discretion under the Act; secondly, that the District Judge has been informed of the pertinent facts relating to the individual defendant before him, either by evidence coming to his attention in the trial, by a presentence report, or by a recommendation and report made under section 5010 (e); and thirdly, that the District Judge, by his statement of reasons where required, has given consideration and related the facts of the individual case to the applicable law." |
Justice Marshall | 1,974 | 15 | concurring | Dorszynski v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109093/dorszynski-v-united-states/ | the facts of the individual case to the applicable law." United v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C., at -211, -1158 Section 5010 (e) of the Act provides a mechanism for the trial judge to secure the expert assistance of correctional authorities in determining whether an eligible offender would benefit from treatment. I agree with the two Courts of Appeals which have passed on the issue that: "[W]hen a judge has availed himself of the assistance afforded by 5010 (e), that is to say, where he has ordered the youth offender committed for observation and study and the Division has made its report to the court, and after considering the report has followed its findings or recommendation in imposing sentence, additional reasons are not required to be stated, although, of course, the *459 judge is not prevented from stating his own reasons." United 491 F. 2d, at 1139. Accord, United v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C., at But the Act clearly intended that the ultimate sentencing decision remain with the trial judge. That decision should not pass by abdication to the correctional authorities who prepare the 5010 (e) study. Thus, where a trial judge secures a 5010 (e) report, he should adopt its reasons as his own only after assuring himself of the adequacy of the report and propriety of its recommendation.[23] I see no reason to reach here the issue of appellate review of the District Court's imposition of an adult sentence. I believe that the Youth Corrections Act provides a preferred-sentencing alternative which can only be abandoned on the basis of a finding that an eligible offender will not benefit from treatment under the Act. The District Court imposed sentence on the assumption that the YCA was not a preferred disposition and no finding was required. The Court today finds the District Court's sentence invalid only for failure to make the required "no benefit" finding. Under either the Court's view or my own, the appellate-review question is clearly not yet presented by this case.[24] Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court insofar as it reverses and remands because the District Court failed to make the requisite "no benefit" finding. I disagree, however, with the opinion of the Court insofar *460 far as it suggests that a merely conclusory statement of "no benefit" satisfies the statutory requirement and insofar as it purports to pass, albeit in dicta, on the question of appellate review of a 5010 (d) adult sentence, an issue not before this Court. |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | The question presented in this litigation is whether the reservation of Devil's Hole as a national monument reserved federal water rights in unappropriated water. Devil's Hole is a deep limestone cavern in Nevada. Approximately 50 feet below the opening of the cavern is a pool 65 feet long, 10 feet wide, and at least 200 feet deep, although its actual depth is unknown. The pool is a remnant of the prehistoric Death Valley Lake System and is situated on land owned by the United since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, By the Proclamation of January 17, 1952, President Truman withdrew from the public domain a 40-acre tract of land surrounding Devil's Hole, making it a detached component of the Death Valley National Monument. Proclamation No. 2961, 3 CFR 147 (1949-1953 Comp.).[1] The Proclamation was issued under the American Antiquities Preservation Act, 16 U.S. C. 431, which authorizes the President to declare as national monuments "objects of historic or scientific interest *132 that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United" The 1952 Proclamation notes that Death Valley was set aside as a national monument "for the preservation of the unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational interest therein contained." The Proclamation also notes that Devil's Hole is near Death Valley and contains a "remarkable underground pool." Additional preambulary statements in the Proclamation explain why Devil's Hole was being added to the Death Valley National Monument: "Whereas the said pool is a unique subsurface remnant of the prehistoric chain of lakes which in Pleistocene times formed the Death Valley Lake System, and is unusual among caverns in that it is a solution area in distinctly striated limestone, while also owing its formation in part to fault action; and "Whereas the geologic evidence that this subterranean pool is an integral part of the hydrographic history of the Death Valley region is further confirmed by the presence in this pool of a peculiar race of desert fish, and zoologists have demonstrated that this race of fish, which is found nowhere else in the world, evolved only after the gradual drying up of the Death Valley Lake System isolated this fish population from the original ancestral stock that in Pleistocene times was common to the entire region; and "Whereas the said pool is of such outstanding scientific importance that it should be given special protection, and such protection can be best afforded by making the said forty-acre tract containing the pool a part of the said monument" The Proclamation provides that Devil's Hole should be supervised, |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | monument" The Proclamation provides that Devil's Hole should be supervised, managed, and directed by the National *133 Park Service, Department of the Interior. Devil's Hole is fenced off, and only limited access is allowed by the Park Service. The Cappaert petitioners own a 12,000-acre ranch near Devil's Hole, 4,000 acres of which are used for growing Bermuda grass, alfalfa, wheat, and barley; 1,700 to 1,800 head of cattle are grazed. The ranch represents an investment of more than $7 million; it employs more than 80 people with an annual payroll of more than $340,000. In 1968 the Cappaerts began pumping groundwater on their ranch on land 2 1/2 miles from Devil's Hole; they were the first to appropriate ground water. The groundwater comes from an underground basin or aquifer which is also the source of the water in Devil's Hole. After the Cappaerts began pumping from the wells near Devil's Hole, which they do from March to October, the summer water level of the pool in Devil's Hole began to decrease. Since 1962 the level of water in Devil's Hole has been measured with reference to a copper washer installed on one of the walls of the hole by the United Geological Survey. Until 1968, the water level, with seasonable variations, had been stable at 1.2 feet below the copper marker. In 1969 the water level in Devil's Hole was 2.3 feet below the copper washer; in 1970, 3.17 feet; in 1971, 3.48 feet; and, in 1972, 3.93 feet. When the water is at the lowest levels, a large portion of a rock shelf in Devil's Hole is above water. However, when the water level is at 3.0 feet below the marker or higher, most of the rock shelf is below water, enabling algae to grow on it. This in turn enables the desert fish (cyprinodon diabolis, commonly known as Devil's Hole pupfish), referred to in President Truman's Proclamation, to spawn in the spring. As the rock shelf becomes *134 exposed, the spawning area is decreased, reducing the ability of the fish to spawn in sufficient quantities to prevent extinction. In April 1970 the Cappaerts, pursuant to Nevada law, Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.325 (1973), applied to the State Engineer, Roland D. Westergard, for permits to change the use of water from several of their wells. Although the United was not a party to that proceeding and was never served, employees of the National Park Service learned of the Cappaerts' application through a public notice published pursuant to Nevada law. 533.360. An official of the National Park Service filed a protest |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | An official of the National Park Service filed a protest as did a private firm. Nevada law permits interested persons to protest an application for a permit; the protest may be considered by the State Engineer at a hearing. 533.365. A hearing was conducted on December 16, 1970, and a field solicitor of the Department of the Interior appeared on behalf of the National Park Service. He presented documentary and testimonial evidence, informing the State Engineer that because of the declining water level of Devil's Hole the United had commissioned a study to determine whether the wells on the Cappaerts' land were hydrologically connected to Devil's Hole and, if so, which of those wells could be pumped safely and which should be limited to prevent lowering of the water level in Devil's Hole. The Park Service field solicitor requested either that the Cappaerts' application be denied or that decision on the application be postponed until the studies were completed. The State Engineer declined to postpone decision. At the conclusion of the hearing he stated that there was no recorded federal water right with respect to Devil's Hole, that the testimony indicated that the Cappaerts' pumping would not unreasonably lower the water table or adversely affect existing water rights, and that the *135 permit would be granted since further economic development of the Cappaerts' land would be in the public interest. In his oral ruling the State Engineer stated in part that "the protest to the applications that are the subject of this hearing are overruled and the applications will be issued subject to existing " The National Park Service did not appeal. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.450 (1973). In August 1971 the United invoking 28 U.S. C. 1345,[2] sought an injunction in the United District Court for the District of Nevada to limit, except for domestic purposes, the Cappaerts' pumping from six specific wells and from specific locations near Devil's Hole. The complaint alleged that the United in establishing Devil's Hole as part of Death Valley National Monument, reserved the unappropriated waters appurtenant to the land to the extent necessary for the requirements and purposes of the reservation. The complaint further alleged that the Cappaerts had no perfected water rights as of the date of the reservation. The United asserted that pumping from certain of the Cappaerts' wells had lowered the water level in Devil's Hole, that the lower water level was threatening the survival of a unique species of fish, and that irreparable harm would follow if the pumping were not enjoined. On June 2, 1972, the United filed |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | were not enjoined. On June 2, 1972, the United filed an amended complaint, adding two other specified wells to the list of those to be enjoined. The Cappaerts answered, admitting that their wells draw water from the same underlying sources supplying *136 Devil's Hole, but denying that the reservation of Devil's Hole reserved any water rights for the United The Cappaerts alleged that the United was estopped from enjoining use of water under land which it had exchanged with the Cappaerts. The State of Nevada intervened on behalf of the State Engineer as a party defendant but raised no affirmative defenses. On June 5, 1973, the District Court, by Chief Judge Roger D. Foley, entered a preliminary injunction limiting pumping from designated wells so as to return the level of Devil's Hole to not more than 3.0 feet below the marker. Detailed findings of fact were made and the District Judge then appointed a Special Master to establish specific pumping limits for the wells and to monitor the level of the water at Devil's Hole. The District Court found that the water from certain of the wells was hydrologically connected to Devil's Hole, that the Cappaerts were pumping heavily from those wells, and that pumping had lowered the water level in Devil's Hole. The court also found that the pumping could be regulated to stabilize the water level at Devil's Hole and that neither establishing an artificial shelf nor transplanting the fish was a feasible alternative that would preserve the species. The District Court further found that if the injunction did not issue "there is grave danger that the Devil's Hole pupfish may be destroyed, resulting in irreparable injury to the United" The District Court then held that in establishing Devil's Hole as a national monument, the President reserved appurtenant, unappropriated waters necessary to the purpose of the reservation; the purpose included preservation of the pool and the pupfish in it. The District Court also held that the federal water rights antedated those of the Cappaerts, that the United *137 was not estopped, and that the public interest required granting the injunction. On April 9, the District Court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law substantially unchanged in a final decree permanently enjoining pumping that lowers the level of the water below the 3.0-foot level. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,[3] in a thorough opinion by Senior District Judge Gus J. Solomon, sitting by designation, holding that the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine applied to groundwater as well as to surface water. The Court of Appeals held that |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | as to surface water. The Court of Appeals held that "[t]he fundamental purpose of the reservation of the Devil's Hole pool was to assure that the pool would not suffer changes from its condition at the time the Proclamation was issued in 1952" The Court of Appeals further held that neither the Cappaerts nor their successors in interest had any water rights in 1952, nor was the United estopped from asserting its water rights by exchanging land with the Cappaerts. In answer to contentions raised by the intervenor Nevada, the Court of Appeals held that "the United is not bound by state water laws when it reserves land from the public domain," and does not need to take steps to perfect its rights with the State; that the District Court had concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts to resolve this claim; and, that the state administrative procedures granting the Cappaerts' permit did not bar resolution of the United ' suit in Federal District Court. *138 We granted certiorari to consider the scope of the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine. We affirm. I Reserved-Water-Rights Doctrine This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams. Colorado River Water Cons. ; United ; ; ; United ; Nevada argues that the cases establishing the doctrine of federally reserved water rights articulate an equitable doctrine calling for a balancing of competing interests. However, an examination of those cases shows they do not analyze the doctrine in terms of a balancing test. For example, in the Court did not mention the use made of the water by the upstream landowners in sustaining an injunction barring *139 their diversions of the water. The "Statement of the Case" in Winters notes that the upstream users were homesteaders who had invested heavily in dams to divert the water to irrigate their land, not an unimportant interest. The Court held that when the Federal Government reserves |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | interest. The Court held that when the Federal Government reserves land, by implication it reserves water rights sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.[4] In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created. See, e. g., at 599-; Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the 1952 Proclamation expressed an intention to reserve unappropriated water, and we agree.[5] The *140 Proclamation discussed the pool in Devil's Hole in four of the five preambles and recited that the "pool should be given special protection." Since a pool is a body of water, the protection contemplated is meaningful only if the water remains; the water right reserved by the 1952 Proclamation was thus explicit, not implied.[6] Also explicit in the 1952 Proclamation is the authority of the Director of the Park Service to manage the lands of Devil's Hole Monument "as provided in the act of Congress entitled `An Act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes,' approved August 25, 1916 (; 16 U.S. C. 1-3)" The National Park Service Act provides that the "fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations" is *141 "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 16 U.S. C. 1. The implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. at 600-. Here the purpose of reserving Devil's Hole Monument is preservation of the pool. Devil's Hole was reserved "for the preservation of the unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational interest." The Proclamation notes that the pool contains "a peculiar race of desert fish which is found nowhere else in the world" and that the "pool is of outstanding scientific importance" The pool need only be preserved, consistent with the intention expressed in the Proclamation, to the extent necessary to preserve its scientific interest. The fish are one of the features of scientific interest. The preamble noting the scientific interest of the pool follows the preamble describing the fish as unique; the Proclamation must be read in its entirety. Thus, as the District Court has correctly determined, the level |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | Thus, as the District Court has correctly determined, the level of the pool may be permitted to drop to the extent that the drop does not impair the scientific value of the pool as the natural habitat of the species sought to be preserved. The District Court thus tailored its injunction, very appropriately, to minimal need, curtailing pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an adequate water level at Devil's Hole, thus implementing the stated objectives of the Proclamation. Petitioners in both cases argue that even if the intent of the 1952 Proclamation were to maintain the pool, the American Antiquities Preservation Act did not give the President authority to reserve a pool. Under that Act, according to the Cappaert petitioners, the President may *142 reserve federal lands only to protect archeologic sites. However, the language of the Act which authorizes the President to proclaim as national monuments "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government" is not so limited. The pool in Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitants are "objects of historic or scientific interest." See generally Cameron v. United II Groundwater No cases of this Court have applied the doctrine of implied reservation of water rights to groundwater. Nevada argues that the implied-reservation doctrine is limited to surface water. Here, however, the water in the pool is surface water. The federal water rights were being depleted because, as the evidence showed, the "[g]roundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle." C. Groundwater Law, Management and Administration, National Water Commission Legal Study No. 6, p. xxiv Here the Cappaerts are causing the water level in Devil's Hole to drop by their heavy pumping. See see also Water Policies for the Future Final Report to the President and to the Congress of the United by the National Water Commission 233 (1973). It appears that Nevada itself may recognize the potential interrelationship between surface and ground water since Nevada applies the law of prior appropriation to both. Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.010 et seq., 534.020, 534.080, 534.090 (1973). See generally F. Trelease, Water LawResource Use and Environmental Protection 457-552 ; C. Meyers & A. Tarlock, *143 Water Resource Management 553-634 Thus, since the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation, we hold that the United can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or ground water.[7] III State Law Petitioners in both cases |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | or ground water.[7] III State Law Petitioners in both cases argue that the Federal Government must perfect its implied water rights according to state law. They contend that the Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S. C. 321, and its predecessors[8] severed nonnavigable water from public land, subjecting it to state law. That Act, however, provides that patentees of public land acquire only title to land through the patent and must acquire water rights in nonnavigable water in accordance with state law. *144 Power ; see Federal-State Conflicts Over Western WatersA Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation,"[9] This Court held in that the Desert Land Act does not apply to water rights on federally reserved land.[10] *145 The Cappaert petitioners argue that must be overruled since, inter alia, the Court was unaware at the time that case was decided that there was no longer any public land available for homesteading. However, whether or not there was public land available for homesteading in 1955 is irrelevant to the meaning of the 1877 Act. The Desert Land Act still provides that the water rights of those who received their land from federal patents are to be governed by state law. That there may be no more federal land available for homesteading does not mean the Desert Land Act now applies to all federal land. Since the Act is inapplicable, determination of reserved water rights is not governed by state law but derives from the federal purpose of the reservation; the fact that the water rights here reserved apply to nonnavigable rather than navigable waters is thus irrelevant. Since was decided, several bills have been introduced in Congress to subject at least some federal water uses to state appropriation doctrines, but none has been enacted into law. The most recent bill, S. 28, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced on January 25, 1971, and reintroduced under the same number in the 93d Cong., 1st Sess., on January 4, 1973. See Federal water rights are not dependent upon state law or state procedures and they need not be adjudicated only in state courts; federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1345 to adjudicate the water rights claims of the United[11]Colorado River Water Cons. -809. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S. C. 666, did not repeal 1345 jurisdiction as applied to water -809. Nor, as Nevada suggests, *146 is the McCarran Amendment a substantive statute, requiring the United to "perfect its water rights in the state forum like all other land owners." Brief for Nevada 37. The McCarran Amendment waives United sovereign immunity should the United |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Cappaert v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109465/cappaert-v-united-states/ | The McCarran Amendment waives United sovereign immunity should the United be joined as a party in a state-court general water rights' adjudication, Colorado River Water Cons. and the policy evinced by the Amendment may, in the appropriate case, require the United to adjudicate its water rights in state forums. IV Res Judicata Finally, Nevada, as intervenor in the Cappaerts' suit, argued in the Court of Appeals that the United was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel from litigating its water-rights claim in federal court. Nevada bases this conclusion on the fact that the National Park Service filed a protest to the Cappaerts' pumping permit application in the state administrative proceeding. Since we reject that contention, we need not consider whether the issue was timely and properly raised. We note only that the United was not made a party to the state administrative proceeding;[12] nor was the United in privity with the Cappaerts. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., When the United appeared to protest in the state proceeding it did not assert any federal water-rights claims, nor did it seek to adjudicate any claims until the hydrological studies as to the effects of the Cappaerts' pumping *147 had been completed.[13] The fact that the United did not attempt to adjudicate its water rights in the state proceeding is not significant since the United was not a party. The State Water Engineer's decree explicitly stated that it was "subject to existing rights"; thus, the issue raised in the District Court was not decided in the proceedings before the State Engineer. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Cf. United v. Utah Constr. & Min. Co., We hold, therefore, that as of 1952 when the United reserved Devil's Hole, it acquired by reservation water rights in unappropriated appurtenant water sufficient to maintain the level of the pool to preserve its scientific value and thereby implement Proclamation No. 2961. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | dissenting | Florida Dept. of Rev. v. PICCADILLY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145791/florida-dept-of-rev-v-piccadilly/ | The Bankruptcy Code provides that the "transfer" of an asset "under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax." (a) (2000 ed., Supp V) (previously 1146(c)) (emphasis added). In this case, the debtor's reorganization "plan" provides for the "transfer" of assets. But the "plan" itself was not "confirmed under section 1129 of this title" (i.e., the Bankruptcy Judge did not formally approve the plan) *2340 until after the "transfer" of assets took place. See 1129 (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (detailing the requirements for bankruptcy court approval of a Chapter 11 plan). Hence we must ask whether the time of transfer matters. Do the statutory words "under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title" apply only where a transfer takes place "under a plan" that at the time of the transfer already has been "confirmed under section 1129 of this title"? Or, do they also apply where a transfer takes place "under a plan" that subsequently is "confirmed under section 1129 of this title"? The Court concludes that the statutory phrase applies only where a transfer takes place "under a plan" that at the time of transfer already has been "confirmed under section 1129 of this title." In my view, however, the statutory phrase applies "under a plan" that at the time of transfer either already has been or subsequently is "confirmed." In a word, the majority believes that the time (pre- or post-transfer) at which the bankruptcy judge confirms the reorganization plan matters. I believe that it does not. (And construing the provision to refer to a plan that simply "is" confirmed would require us to read fewer words into the statute than the Court's construction, which reads the provision to refer only to a plan "that has been" confirmed, ante, at 2339.) The statutory language itself is perfectly ambiguous on the point. Linguistically speaking, it is no more difficult to apply the words "plan confirmed" to instances in which the "plan" subsequently is "confirmed" than to restrict their application to instances in which the "plan" already has been "confirmed." See In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., ("[T]he statute can plausibly be read either as describing eligible transfers to include transfers `under a plan confirmed' regardless of when the plan is confirmed, or imposing a temporal restriction on when the confirmation of the plan must occur" (emphasis in original)). Cf. In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., (noting more than one "plausible interpretation"); In re NVR, LP, ("equally possible that the provision requires |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | dissenting | Florida Dept. of Rev. v. PICCADILLY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145791/florida-dept-of-rev-v-piccadilly/ | In re NVR, LP, ("equally possible that the provision requires only that the transfer occur `under'i.e., that it be inferior or subordinate to`a plan' that is ultimately `confirmed'"). But cf. ante, at 2332-2333 (majority believes its reading is "clearly the more natural"). Nor can I find any text-based argument that points clearly in one direction rather than the other. Indeed, the majority, after methodically combing the textualist beaches, finds that a comparison with other somewhat similar phrases in the Bankruptcy Code sheds little light. For example, on the one hand, if Congress thought the time of confirmation mattered, why did it not say so expressly as it has done elsewhere in the Code? See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 1127(b) ; 1104(a) ("[a]t any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation" (emphasis added)); 1104(c) ("at any time before the confirmation of a plan" (emphasis added)); 1114(e)(2) ("before a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title is effective" (emphasis added)). On the other hand, if Congress thought the time of confirmation did not matter, why did it place this provision in a subchapter entitled "POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS"? See 11 U.S.C., ch. 11, subch. III. (And yet one could also argue that the tax exemption provision appears under the "postconfirmation matters" title because the trigger for the exemption is plan confirmation. *2341 Thus, the exemption is a "postconfirmation matter," regardless of when the transfer occurs.) The canons of interpretation offer little help. And the majority, for the most part, seems to agree. It ultimately rests its interpretive conclusion upon this Court's statement that courts "must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed." California State Bd. of See ante, at 2338. But when, as here, we interpret a provision the express point of which is to exempt some category of state taxation, how can the statement in Sierra Summit prove determinative? See 1146(a) ("The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax" (emphasis added)). Neither does Florida's related claim, protesting federal interference in the administration of a State's taxation scheme seem plausible. See Brief for Petitioner 32-33 (noting the "additional difficulties and complexities that will proliferate" under the lower court's decision). If Florida now requires transferees to file a pre-existing confirmed plan in order to avoid payment of the stamp tax, then why could Florida not require a transferee |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | dissenting | Florida Dept. of Rev. v. PICCADILLY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145791/florida-dept-of-rev-v-piccadilly/ | stamp tax, then why could Florida not require a transferee under a not-yet-confirmed plan to pay the stamp tax and then file the plan after its confirmation in order to obtain a refund? (If there is some other, less curable, practical problem, Florida has not explained what it is.) Given these difficulties, I suspect that the majority's reliance upon Sierra Summit's "canon," ante, at 2336-2337, reflects no more than an effort to find the proverbial "any port" in this interpretive storm. The absence of a clear answer in text or canons, however, should not lead us to judicial despair. Consistent with Court precedent, we can and should ask a further question: Why would Congress have insisted upon temporal limits? What reasonable purpose might such limits serve? See, e.g., ; In fact, the majority's reading of temporal limits in 1146(a) serves no reasonable congressional purpose at all. The statute's purpose is apparent on its face. It seeks to further Chapter 11's basic objectives: (1) "preserving going concerns" and (2) "maximizing property available to satisfy creditors." Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. See also As an important bankruptcy treatise notes, "[i]n addition to tax relief, the purpose of the exemption of [ 1146(a)] is to encourage and facilitate bankruptcy asset sales." 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1146.02, p. 1146-3 (15th ed. rev.2005). It furthers these objectives where, e.g., asset transfers are at issue, by turning over to the estate (for *2342 the use of creditors or to facilitate reorganization) funds that otherwise would go to pay state stamp taxes on plan-related transferred assets. The requirement that the transfers take place pursuant to a reorganization "plan" that is "confirmed" provides the bankruptcy judge's assurance that the transfer meets with creditor approval and the requirements laid out in 1129. How would the majority's temporal limitation further these statutory objectives? It would not do so in any way. From the perspective of these purposes, it makes no difference whether a transfer takes place before or after the plan is confirmed. In both instances the exemption puts in the hands of the creditors or the estate money that would otherwise go to the State in the form of a stamp tax. In both instances the confirmation of the related plan assures the legitimacy (from bankruptcy law's perspective) of the plan that provides for the assets transfer. Moreover, one major reason why a transfer may take place before rather than after a plan is confirmed is that the preconfirmation bankruptcy process takes time. As the Administrative Office of the United States Courts recently reported, "[a] Chapter |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | dissenting | Florida Dept. of Rev. v. PICCADILLY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145791/florida-dept-of-rev-v-piccadilly/ | Office of the United States Courts recently reported, "[a] Chapter 11 case may continue for many years." Bankruptcy Basics online at http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter11.html (as visited June 13, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Accord, In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., (Bkrtcy.D.Del.2000) (noting it may run "a year or two"). And a firm (or its assets) may have more value (say, as a going concern) where sale takes place quickly. As the District Court in this case acknowledged, "there are times when it is more advantageous for the debtor to begin to sell as many assets as quickly as possible in order to insure that the assets do not lose value." In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., (internal quotations marks and alteration omitted). See, e.g., In re Webster Classic Auctions, Inc., (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.2004) (recognizing "the inestimable benefit to a Chapter 11 estate to sell a piece of property at the most opportune timewhether pre- or postconfirmationas opposed to requiring all concerned to wait for a postconfirmation sale in order to receive the tax relief Congress obviously intended"); In re Medical Software Solutions, Thus, an immediate sale can often make more revenue available to creditors or for reorganization of the remaining assets. Stamp taxes on related transfers simply reduce the funds available for any such legitimate purposes. And insofar as the Court's interpretation of the statute reduces the funds made available, that interpretation inhibits the statute's efforts to achieve its basic objectives. Worse than that, if the potential loss of stamp tax revenue threatens delay in implementing any such decision to sell, then creditors (or the remaining reorganized enterprise) could suffer far more serious harm. They could lose the extra revenues that a speedy sale might otherwise produce. See, e.g., In re Met-L-Wood Corp., In the present case, for example, Piccadilly, by selling assets quickly after strategic negotiation, realized $80 million, considerably more than the $54 million originally offered before Piccadilly *2343 filed for bankruptcy. That fact, along with the Bankruptcy Court's finding of "sound business reasons" for the prompt sale of Piccadilly's assets and that the expeditious sale was "in the best interests of creditors of [Piccadilly] and other parties in interest," App. 32a, suggest that considerably less would have been available for creditors had Piccadilly waited until after the plan's confirmation to execute the sale plan. What conceivable reason could Congress have had for silently writing into the statute's language a temporal distinction with such consequences? The majority can find none. It simply says that the result is not "`absurd'" and notes the advantages of a "bright-line rule." Ante, |
Justice Breyer | 2,008 | 2 | dissenting | Florida Dept. of Rev. v. PICCADILLY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145791/florida-dept-of-rev-v-piccadilly/ | "`absurd'" and notes the advantages of a "bright-line rule." Ante, at 2339. I agree that the majority's interpretation is not absurd and do not dispute the advantages of a clear rule. But I think the statute supplies a clear enough ruletransfers are exempt when there is confirmation and are not exempt when there is no confirmation. And I see no reason to adopt the majority's preferred construction (that only transfers completed after plan confirmation are exempt), where it conflicts with the statute's purpose. Of course, we should not substitute "`"our view of policy"'" for the statute that Congress enacted. Ante, at 2339 (emphasis added). But we certainly should consider Congress' view of the policy for the statute it created, and that view inheres in the statute's purpose. "Statutory interpretation is not a game of blind man's bluff. Judges are free to consider statutory language in light of a statute's basic purposes." Dole Food It is the majority's failure to work with this important tool of statutory interpretation that has led it to construe the present statute in a way that, in my view, runs contrary to what Congress would have hoped for and expected. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110508/gulf-oil-co-v-bernard/ | This is a class action involving allegations of racial discrimination in employment on the part of petitioners, the Gulf Oil Co. (Gulf) and one of the unions at its Port Arthur, Tex., refinery. We granted a writ of certiorari to determine the scope of a district court's authority to limit communications from named plaintiffs and their counsel to prospective class members, during the pendency of a class action. We hold that in the circumstances of this case the District Court exceeded its authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I In April 1976, Gulf and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) entered into a conciliation agreement involving alleged discrimination against black and female employees at the Port Arthur refinery. Gulf agreed to cease various allegedly discriminatory practices, to undertake an affirmative-action program covering hiring and promotion, and to offer backpay to alleged victims of discrimination based on a set formula. Gulf began to send notices to the 643 employees eligible for backpay, stating the exact amount available to each person in return for execution within 30 days of a full release of all discrimination claims dating from the relevant time period.[1] Approximately one month after the signing of the conciliation *92 agreement. On May 18, 1976, respondents filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, on behalf of all black present and former employees, and rejected applicants for employment, at the refinery.[2] They alleged racial discrimination in employment and sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S. C. 1981. The defendants named were Gulf and Local 4-23 of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union. Plaintiffs' counsel included three lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund.[3] Through this lawsuit, the named plaintiffs sought to vindicate the alleged rights of many of the employees who were receiving settlement offers from Gulf under the conciliation agreement. On May 27, Gulf filed a motion in the District Court seeking an order limiting communications by parties and their counsel with class members. An accompanying brief described the EEOC conciliation agreement, asserting that 452 of the 643 employees entitled to backpay under that agreement had signed releases and been paid by the time the class action was filed. Gulf stated that after it was served in the case, it ceased sending backpay offers and release forms to class members. It then asserted that a lawyer for respondents, *93 Ulysses |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110508/gulf-oil-co-v-bernard/ | It then asserted that a lawyer for respondents, *93 Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, had attended a meeting of 75 class members on May 22, where he had discussed the case and recommended that the employees not sign the releases sent under the conciliation agreement. Gulf added that Thibodeaux reportedly had advised employees to return checks they already had received, since they could receive at least double the amounts involved through the class action. The court entered a temporary order prohibiting all communications concerning the case from parties or their counsel to potential or actual class members. The order listed several examples of communications that were covered, but stated that it was not limited to these examples. It was not based on any findings of fact. On June 8, Gulf moved for a modification of the order that would allow it to continue mailings to class members, soliciting releases in exchange for the backpay amounts established under the conciliation agreement. Respondents filed a brief in opposition, arguing that the ban on their communications with class members violated the First Amendment. On June 11, the court heard oral argument, but took no evidence. Gulf then filed a supplemental memorandum proposing that the court adopt the language of "Sample Pretrial Order No. 15" in the Manual for Complex Litigation App. 1.41.[4] Respondents replied with another memorandum, accompanied by sworn affidavits of three lawyers. In these affidavits counsel stated that communications with class members *94 were important in order to obtain needed information about the case and to inform the class members of their rights. Two affidavits stated that lawyers had attended the May 22 meeting with employees and discussed the issues in the case but neither advised against accepting the Gulf offer nor represented that the suit would produce twice the amount of backpay available through the conciliation agreement. On June 22, another District Judge issued a modified order adopting Gulf's proposal.[5] This order imposed a complete *95 ban on all communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without the prior approval of the court. It gave examples of forbidden communications, including any solicitation of legal representation of potential or actual class members, and any statements "which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the class action" or "create impressions tending without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice." The order exempted attorney-client communications initiated by the client, and communications in the regular course of business. |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110508/gulf-oil-co-v-bernard/ | the client, and communications in the regular course of business. It further stated that if any party or counsel "assert[ed] a constitutional right to communicate without prior restraint," and did so communicate, he should file with the court a copy or summary of the communication within five days. The order, finally, exempted communications from Gulf involving the conciliation agreement and its settlement process. *96 The court made no findings of fact and did not write an explanatory opinion. The only justification offered was a statement in the final paragraph of the order: "It is Plaintiff's [sic] contention that any such provisions as hereinbefore stated that limit communication with potential class members are constitutionally invalid, citing cert. denied, This Court finds that the Rodgers case is inapplicable, and that this order comports with the requisites set out in the Manual for Complex Litigation which specifically exempts constitutionally protected communication when the substance of such communication is filed with the Court." On July 6, pursuant to the court's order respondents submitted for court approval a proposed leaflet to be sent to the class members.[6] This notice urged the class to talk to a lawyer *97 before signing the releases sent by Gulf. It contained the names and addresses of respondents' counsel and referred to this case. Respondents argued that the notice was constitutionally protected and necessary to the conduct of the lawsuit. Gulf opposed the motion. The court waited until August 10 to rule on this motion. On that date, 2 days after the expiration of the 45-day deadline established by the court for acceptance of the Gulf offer by class members,[7] the court denied the motion in a one-sentence order containing no explanation. As a result, the named plaintiffs and their counsel were prevented from undertaking any communication with the class members prior to the deadline. On appeal from a subsequent final order,[8] respondents argued that the limitations on communications imposed by the District Court were beyond the power granted the court in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (d) and were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court. The panel majority reasoned that orders limiting communications are within the extensive powers of district courts in managing class litigation. It held that the District Court could easily have concluded that the need to limit communications outweighed any competing interests of respondents, especially since the order merely required prior approval of communications, rather than prohibiting them altogether. *98 Turning to respondents' First Amendment argument, the majority |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110508/gulf-oil-co-v-bernard/ | altogether. *98 Turning to respondents' First Amendment argument, the majority held that the order was not a prior restraint because it exempted unapproved communications whenever the parties or their counsel asserted a constitutional privilege in good faith. The court also found no serious "chill" of protected speech. Judge Godbold wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the order limiting communications was not "appropriate" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (d) because the court did not make any finding of actual or imminent abuse. He reasoned that Gulf's unsworn allegations of misconduct could not justify this order, and that a court could not impose such a limitation routinely in all class actions. He added that it was improper in this context for the District Court to encourage compliance with the conciliation agreement through such an order. Judge Godbold also found that the order violated respondents' First Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, and reversed the panel decision concerning the order limiting communications. A majority opinion joined by 13 judges held that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression accorded First Amendment protection.[9] The court held that there was no sufficient particularized showing of need to justify such a restraint, that the restraint was overbroad, and that it was not accompanied by the requisite procedural safeguards. Eight *99 judges concurred specially on the theory that it was unnecessary to reach constitutional issues because the order was not based on adequate findings and therefore was not "appropriate" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (d). One judge would have affirmed the District Court. We granted a writ of certiorari to review the question whether the order limiting communications was constitutionally permissible. II Rule 23 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "(d) ORDERS IN CONDUCT OF ACTIONS. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors [and] (5) dealing with similar procedural matters."[10] As the concurring judges below 619 F.2d, prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision. See As a result, in this case we first consider the authority of district courts under the Federal Rules to impose sweeping limitations on communications by named plaintiffs and their counsel to prospective class members. More specifically, the question for decision is whether the limiting order entered in this case is consistent with the general policies embodied in Rule 23, which governs class actions in federal court. Class actions serve an |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110508/gulf-oil-co-v-bernard/ | governs class actions in federal court. Class actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice.[11] They present, however, *100 opportunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and counsel in the management of cases.[12] Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties. But this discretion is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules. Moreover, petitioners concede, as they must, that *101 exercises of this discretion are subject to appellate review. Brief for Petitioners 21, n. 15; see Oppenheimer Fund, In the present case, we are faced with the unquestionable assertion by respondents that the order created at least potential difficulties for them as they sought to vindicate the legal rights of a class of employees.[13] The order interfered with their efforts to inform potential class members of the existence of this lawsuit, and may have been particularly injuriousnot only to respondents but to the class as a wholebecause the employees at that time were being pressed to decide whether to accept a backpay offer from Gulf that required them to sign a full release of all liability for discriminatory acts.[14] In addition, the order made it more difficult for respondents, as the class representatives, to obtain information about the merits of the case from the persons they sought to represent. Because of these potential problems, an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.[15] Only such *102 a determination can ensure that the court is furthering, rather than hindering, the policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23.[16] In addition, such a weighingidentifying the potential abuses being addressed should result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstances. As the court stated in (CA3), cert. denied, : "[T]o the extent that the district court is empowered to restrict certain communications in order to prevent frustration of the policies of Rule 23, it may not exercise the power without a specific record showing by the moving party of the particular abuses by which it is threatened. Moreover, the district court must find that the showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110508/gulf-oil-co-v-bernard/ | the showing provides a satisfactory basis for relief and that the relief sought would be consistent with the policies of Rule 23 giving explicit consideration to the narrowest possible relief which would protect the respective parties." III In the present case, one looks in vain for any indication of a careful weighing of competing factors. Indeed, in this respect, the District Court failed to provide any record useful for appellate review. The court made neither factual findings nor legal arguments supporting the need for this sweeping restraint order. Instead, the court adopted in toto the order suggested by the Manual for Complex Litigationon *103 the apparent assumption that no particularized weighing of the circumstances of the case was necessary. The result was an order requiring prior judicial approval of all communications, with the exception of cases where respondents chose to assert a constitutional right. Even then, respondents were required to preserve all communications for submission to the court within five days.[17] The scope of this order is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the court refused to permit mailing of the one notice respondents submitted for approval. See This notice was intended to encourage employees to rely on the class action for relief, rather than accepting Gulf's offer. The court identified nothing in this notice that it thought was improper and indeed gave no reasons for its negative ruling. We conclude that the imposition of the order was an abuse of discretion. The record reveals no grounds on which the District Court could have determined that it was necessary or appropriate to impose this order.[18] Although we do not *104 decide what standards are mandated by the First Amendment in this kind of case, we do observe that the order involved serious restraints on expression. This fact, at minimum, counsels caution on the part of a district court in drafting such an order, and attention to whether the restraint is justified by a likelihood of serious abuses. We recognize the possibility of abuses in class-action litigation, and agree with petitioners that such abuses may implicate communications with potential class members.[19] But the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the prosecution of a class action in accordance with the Rules. There certainly is no justification for adopting verbatim the form of order recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation, in the absence of a clear record and specific findings of need. Other, less burdensome remedies may be appropriate.[20] Indeed, in many cases there will |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | concurring | American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Los Angeles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/902267/american-trucking-assns-inc-v-los-angeles/ | I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to highlight a constitutional concern regarding of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), a statute the Court has now considered twice this Term. See Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U. S. (2013). The Constitution grants Congress authority “[t]o regu- late Commerce among the several States.” Art. I, cl. 3 (emphasis added). Section 14501 of Title 49 is titled “Federal authority over intrastate transportation.” (Em- phasis added.) The tension between and the Constitution is apparent, because the Constitution does not give Congress power to regulate intrastate commerce. United (THOMAS, J., concurring). Nevertheless, (c)(1) purports to pre-empt any state or local law “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property.” By its terms, (c) would pre-empt even a city ordinance establish- ing a uniform rate for most transportation services origi- nating and ending inside city limits, so long as the services were provided by a motor carrier. Such an extraordinary assertion of congressional authority cannot be reconciled 2 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. LOS ANGELES THOMAS, J., concurring with our constitutional system of enumerated powers. The Supremacy Clause provides the constitutional basis for the pre-emption of state laws. Art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof shall be the su- preme Law of the Land”). Because the Constitution and federal laws are supreme, conflicting state laws are with- out legal effect. See However, the constitu- tional text leaves no doubt that only federal laws made “in Pursuance” of the Constitution are supreme. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, (“As long as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitu- tion, Congress may impose its will on the States” (empha- sis added)); (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Given this limitation, Congress cannot pre-empt a state law merely by promulgating a conflicting statute—the pre- empting statute must also be constitutional, both on its face and as applied. As relevant here, if Congress lacks authority to enact a law regulating a particular intrastate activity, it follows that Congress also lacks authority to pre-empt state laws regulating that activity. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 10 (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”). In this case, the Court concludes that “[s]ection 14501(c)(1) preempts the placard and parking provi- sions of the Port’s concession agreement.” Ante, at 12. |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | concurring | American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Los Angeles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/902267/american-trucking-assns-inc-v-los-angeles/ | provi- sions of the Port’s concession agreement.” Ante, at 12. Although respondents waived any argument that Con- gress lacks authority to regulate the placards and parking arrangements of drayage trucks using the port, I doubt that Congress has such authority. The Court has iden- tified three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the use of the Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 3 THOMAS, J., concurring channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) “activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce i.e., those activities that sub- stantially affect interstate commerce.” at 558–559. Drayage trucks that carry cargo into and out of the Port of Los Angeles undoubtedly operate within the “channels of interstate commerce”—for that is what a port is. Congress can therefore regulate conduct taking place within the port. But it is doubtful whether Congress has the power to decide where a drayage truck should park once it has left the port or what kind of placard the truck should display while offsite. Even under the “substantial effects” test, which I have rejected as a “ ‘rootless and malleable standard’ at odds with the constitutional de- sign,” (dissenting opin- ion) (THOMAS, J., concurring)), it is difficult to say that placards and parking arrangements substantially af- fect interstate commerce. Congress made no findings indicating that offsite parking—conduct that falls within the scope of the States’ traditional police powers— substantially affects interstate commerce. And I doubt that it could. Nevertheless, because respondents did not preserve a constitutional challenge to the FAAAA and because I agree that the provisions in question have the “force and effect of law,” I join the Court’s opinion |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | Under 16 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 26, private parties "threatened [with] loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws" may seek injunctive relief. This case presents two questions: whether a tiff seeking relief under 16 must prove a threat of antitrust injury, and, if so, whether loss or damage due to increased competition constitutes such injury. *106 I Respondent Monfort of Colorado, (Monfort), the tiff below, owns and operates three integrated beef-packing plants, that is, plants for both the slaughter of cattle and the fabrication of beef.[1] Monfort operates in both the market for fed cattle (the input market) and the market for fabricated beef (the output market). These markets are highly competitive, and the profit margins of the major beef packers are low. The current markets are a product of two decades of intense competition, during which time packers with modern integrated plants have gradually displaced packers with separate slaughter and fabrication plants. Monfort is the country's fifth-largest beef packer. Petitioner Excel Corporation (Excel), one of the two defendants below, is the second-largest packer. Excel operates five integrated plants and one fabrication plant. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cargill, the other defendant below, a large privately owned corporation with more than 150 subsidiaries in at least 35 countries. On June 17, 1983, Excel signed an agreement to acquire the third-largest packer in the market, Spencer Beef, a division of the Land O'Lakes agricultural cooperative. Spencer Beef owned two integrated plants and one slaughtering plant. After the acquisition, Excel would still be the second-largest packer, but would command a market share almost equal to that of the largest packer, IBP, (IBP).[2] *107 Monfort brought an action under 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 26, to enjoin the prospective merger.[3] Its comt alleged that the acquisition would "violat[e] Section 7 of the Clayton Act because the effect of the proposed acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in several different ways" Monfort described the injury that it allegedly would suffer in this way: "(f) Impairment of tiff's ability to compete. The proposed acquisition will result in a concentration of economic power in the relevant markets which threatens Monfort's supply of fed cattle and its ability to compete in the boxed beef market." Upon agreement of the parties, the District Court consolidated the motion for a preliminary injunction with a full trial *108 on the merits. On the second day of trial, Excel moved for involuntary dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that Monfort had |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | involuntary dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that Monfort had failed to allege or show that it would suffer antitrust injury as defined in The District Court denied the motion. After the trial, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order enjoining the proposed merger. The court held that Monfort's allegation of "price-cost `squeeze' " that would "severely narro[w]" Monfort's profit margins constituted an allegation of antitrust injury. It also held that Monfort had shown that the proposed merger would cause this profit squeeze to occur, and that the merger violated 7 of the Clayton Act.[4] at 709-710. On appeal, Excel argued that an allegation of lost profits due to a "price-cost squeeze" was nothing more than an allegation of losses due to vigorous competition, and that losses from competition do not constitute antitrust injury. It also argued that the District Court erred in analyzing the facts relevant to the 7 inquiry. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in all respects. It held that Monfort's allegation of a "price-cost squeeze" was not simply an allegation of injury from competition; in its view, the alleged "price-cost squeeze" was a claim that Monfort would be injured by what the Court of Appeals "consider[ed] to be a form of predatory pricing in which Excel will drive other companies out of the market by paying more to its cattle suppliers and charging less for boxed beef that it sells to institutional buyers and consumers." On the 7 issue, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court's decision was not clearly erroneous. We granted certiorari, *109 II This case requires us to decide, at the outset, a question we have not previously addressed: whether a private tiff seeking an injunction under 16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury. To decide the question, we must look first to the source of the antitrust injury requirement, which lies in a related provision of the Clayton Act, 4, 15 U.S. C. 15. Like 16, 4 provides a vehicle for private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Under 4, "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S. C. 15. In we held that tiffs seeking treble damages under 4 must show more than simply an "injury causally linked" to a particular merger; instead, "tiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | particular merger; instead, "tiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful." The tiffs in did not prove such injury. The tiffs were 3 of the 10 bowling centers owned by a relatively small bowling chain. The defendant, one of the two largest bowling chains in the country, acquired several bowling centers located in the tiffs' market that would have gone out of business but for the acquisition. The tiffs sought treble damages under 4, alleging as injury "the loss of income that would have accrued had the acquired centers gone bankrupt" and had competition in their markets consequently been reduced. We held that this injury, although causally related to a merger alleged to violate 7, was not an antitrust injury, since "[i]t is inimical to [the antitrust] laws to award damages" for losses stemming *110 from continued competition. This reasoning in was consistent with the principle that "the antitrust laws were enacted for `the protection of competition, not competitors.' " Ib quoting Brown Shoe Subsequent decisions confirmed the importance of showing antitrust injury under 4. In Blue Shield of we found that a health-plan subscriber suffered antitrust injury as a result of the plan's "purposefully anticompetitive scheme" to reduce competition for psychotherapeutic services by reimbursing subscribers for services provided by psychiatrists but not for services provided by psychologists. We noted that antitrust injury, "as analyzed in is one factor to be considered in determining the redressability of a particular form of injury under 4," n. 19, and found it " that McCready's injury was of a type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of the antitrust laws." Similarly, in Associated General Contractors of California, v. Carpenters, we applied "the test," and found that the petitioner had failed to allege antitrust injury.[5] Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in part that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief against threatened loss *111 or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws" 15 U.S. C. 26. It is that 16 and 4 do differ in various ways. For example, 4 requires a tiff to show actual injury, but 16 requires a showing only of "threatened" loss or damage; similarly, 4 requires a showing of injury to "business or property," cf. while 16 contains no such limitation.[6] Although these differences do affect the nature of the injury cognizable under each section, the lower courts, |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | of the injury cognizable under each section, the lower courts, including the courts below, have found that under both 16 and 4 the tiff must still allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.[7] We agree. *112 The wording concerning the relationship of the injury to the violation of the antitrust laws in each section is comparable. Section 4 requires proof of injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"; 16 requires proof of "threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." It would be anomalous, we think, to read the Clayton Act to authorize a private tiff to secure an injunction against a threatened injury for which he would not be entitled to compensation if the injury actually occurred. There is no indication that Congress intended such a result. Indeed, the legislative history of 16 is consistent with the view that 16 affords private tiffs injunctive relief only for those injuries cognizable under 4. According to the House Report: "Under section 7 of the act of July 2, 1890 [revised and incorporated into Clayton Act as 4], a person injured in his business and property by corporations or combinations acting in violation of the Sherman antitrust law, may recover loss and damage for such wrongful act. There is, however, no provision in the existing law authorizing a person, firm, corporation, or association to enjoin threatened loss or damage to his business or property by the commission of such unlawful acts, and the purpose of this section is to remedy such defect in the law." H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 21 (1914) (emphasis added).[8] *113 Sections 4 and 16 are thus best understood as providing complementary remedies for a single set of injuries. Accordingly, we conclude that in order to seek injunctive relief under 16, a private tiff must allege threatened loss or damage "of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 429 U. S., We therefore turn to the question whether the proposed merger in this case threatened respondent with antitrust injury. III Initially, we confront the problem of determining what Monfort alleged the source of its injury to be. Monfort's comt is of little assistance in this regard, since the injury *114 alleged therein "an impairment of tiff's ability to compete" is alleged to result from "a concentration of economic power." The pretrial order largely restates these general allegations. Record 37. At trial, however, Monfort did present |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | general allegations. Record 37. At trial, however, Monfort did present testimony and other evidence that helped define the threatened loss. Monfort alleged that after the merger, Excel would attempt to increase its market share at the expense of smaller rivals, such as Monfort. To that end, Monfort claimed, Excel would bid up the price it would pay for cattle, and reduce the price at which it sold boxed beef. Although such a strategy, which Monfort labeled a "price-cost squeeze," would reduce Excel's profits, Excel's parent corporation had the financial reserves to enable Excel to pursue such a strategy. Eventually, according to Monfort, smaller competitors lacking significant reserves and unable to match Excel's prices would be driven from the market; at this point Excel would raise the price of its boxed beef to supracompetitive levels, and would more than recoup the profits it lost during the initial 591 F. Supp., at From this scenario two theories of injury to Monfort emerge: (1) a threat of a loss of profits stemming from the possibility that Excel, after the merger, would lower its prices to a level at or only slightly above its costs; (2) a threat of being driven out of business by the possibility that Excel, after the merger, would lower its prices to a level below its costs.[9] We discuss each theory in turn. A Monfort's first claim is that after the merger, Excel would lower its prices to some level at or slightly above its costs in order to compete with other packers for market share. *115 Excel would be in a position to do this because of the multi-plant efficiencies its acquisition of Spencer would provide, -75, 369-370. To remain competitive, Monfort would have to lower its prices; as a result, Monfort would suffer a loss in profitability, but would not be driven out of business.[10] The question is whether Monfort's loss of profits in such circumstances constitutes antitrust injury. To resolve the question, we look again to v. Pueblo In we evaluated the antitrust significance of several competitors' loss of profits resulting from the entry of a large firm into its market. We concluded: "[T]he antitrust laws are not merely indifferent to the injury claimed here. At base, respondents com that by acquiring the failing centers petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of increased concentration. The damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits they would have realized had competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for `the protection of competition, not competitors,' Brown Shoe 370 U. S., at |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | of competition, not competitors,' Brown Shoe 370 U. S., at It is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award damages for the type of injury claimed here." The loss of profits to the competitors in was not of concern under the antitrust laws, since it resulted only from continued competition. Respondent argues that the losses in can be distinguished from the losses alleged here, since the latter will result from an increase, rather than from a mere continuation, of competition. The range of actions *116 unlawful under 7 of the Clayton Act is broad enough, respondent claims, to support a finding of antitrust injury whenever a competitor is faced with a threat of losses from increased competition.[11] We find respondent's proposed construction of 7 too broad, for reasons that illustrates. holds that the antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws. The kind of competition that Monfort alleges here, competition for increased market share, is not activity forbidden by the antitrust laws. It is simply, as petitioners claim, vigorous competition. To hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share. The antitrust laws require no such perverse result, for "[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price competition." Arthur S. Langenderfer, v. S. E. Johnson Co., (CA6), cert. denied, The logic of *117 compels the conclusion that the threat of loss of profits due to possible price competition following a merger does not constitute a threat of antitrust injury. B The second theory of injury argued here is that after the merger Excel would attempt to drive Monfort out of business by engaging in sustained predatory pricing. Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long run.[12] It is a practice *118 that harms both competitors and competition. In contrast to price cutting aimed simply at increasing market share, predatory pricing has as its aim the elimination of competition. Predatory pricing is thus a practice "inimical to the purposes of [the antitrust] laws," 429 U. S., and one capable of inflicting antitrust injury.[13] The Court of Appeals held that Monfort had alleged "what we consider |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | of Appeals held that Monfort had alleged "what we consider to be a form of predatory pricing" 761 F.2d, at The court also found that Monfort "could only be harmed by sustained predatory pricing," and that "it is impossible to tell in advance of the acquisition" whether Excel would in fact engage in such a course of conduct; because it could not rule out the possibility that Excel would engage in predatory pricing, it found that Monfort was threatened with antitrust injury. Although the Court of Appeals did not explicitly define what it meant by predatory pricing, two interpretations are plausible. First, the court can be understood to mean that Monfort's allegation of losses from the above-cost "price-cost squeeze" was equivalent to an allegation of injury from predatory conduct. If this is the proper interpretation, then the court's judgment is clearly erroneous because (a) Monfort made no allegation that Excel would act with predatory intent after the merger, and (b) price competition is not predatory activity, for the reasons discussed in Part III-A, Second, the Court of Appeals can be understood to mean that Monfort had shown a credible threat of injury from below-cost pricing. To the extent the judgment rests on this ground, however, it must also be reversed, because Monfort *119 did not allege injury from below-cost pricing before the District Court. The District Court twice noted that Monfort had made no assertion that Excel would engage in predatory pricing. See ;[14] Monfort argues that there is evidence in the record to support its view that it did raise a claim of predatory pricing below. This evidence, however, consists only of four passing references, three in deposition testimony, to the possibility that Excel's prices might dip below costs. See ; Such references fall far short of establishing an allegation of injury from predatory pricing. We conclude that Monfort neither raised nor proved any claim of predatory pricing before the District Court.[15] *120 IV In its amicus brief, the United argues that the "danger of allowing a competitor to challenge an acquisition *121 on the basis of necessarily speculative claims of post-acquisition predatory pricing far outweighs the danger that any anticompetitive merger will go unchallenged." Brief for United as Amicus Curiae 25. On this basis, the United invites the Court to adopt in effect a per se rule "denying competitors standing to challenge acquisitions on the basis of predatory pricing theories." We decline the invitation. As the foregoing discussion makes predatory pricing is an anticompetitive practice forbidden by the antitrust laws. While firms may engage in the practice only |
Justice Brennan | 1,986 | 13 | majority | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | antitrust laws. While firms may engage in the practice only infrequently, there is ample evidence suggesting that the practice does occur.[16] It would be novel indeed for a court to deny standing to a party seeking an injunction against threatened injury merely because such injuries rarely occur.[17] In any case, nothing in *122 the language or legislative history of the Clayton Act suggests that Congress intended this Court to ignore injuries caused by such anticompetitive practices as predatory pricing. V We hold that a tiff seeking injunctive relief under 16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury, and that a showing of loss or damage due merely to increased competition does not constitute such injury. The record below does not support a finding of antitrust injury, but only of threatened loss from increased competition. Because respondent has therefore failed to make the showing 16 requires, we need not reach the question whether the proposed merger violates 7. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | 1 This case presents the question whether private individuals may sue to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2 * The Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department), of which petitioner James Alexander is the Director, accepted grants of financial assistance from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Transportation (DOT) and so subjected itself to the restrictions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq. Section 601 of that Title provides that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity" covered by Title VI. 42 U.S.C. 2000d. Section 602 authorizes federal agencies "to effectuate the provisions of [601] by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability," 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1, and the DOJ in an exercise of this authority promulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to "utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin" 28 CFR 42.104(b)(2) See also 49 CFR 21.5(b)(2) (similar DOT regulation). 3 The State of Alabama amended its Constitution in 1990 to declare English "the official language of the state of Alabama." Amdt. 509. Pursuant to this provision and, petitioners have argued, to advance public safety, the Department decided to administer state driver's license examinations only in English. Respondent Sandoval, as representative of a class, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to enjoin the English-only policy, arguing that it violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. The District Court agreed. It enjoined the policy and ordered the Department to accommodate non-English speakers. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed. Both courts rejected petitioners' argument that Title VI did not provide respondents a cause of action to enforce the regulation. 4 We do not inquire here whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by 602, or whether the courts below were correct to hold that the English-only policy had the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. The petition for writ of certiorari raised, and we agreed to review, only the question posed in the first paragraph of this opinion: whether there is a private cause of action to enforce the regulation. II 5 Although Title VI has often come |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | the regulation. II 5 Although Title VI has often come to this Court, it is fair to say (indeed, perhaps an understatement) that our opinions have not eliminated all uncertainty regarding its commands. For purposes of the present case, however, it is clear from our decisions, from Congress's amendments of Title VI, and from the parties' concessions that three aspects of Title VI must be taken as given. First, private individuals may sue to enforce 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages. In the Court held that a private right of action existed to enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. The reasoning of that decision embraced the existence of a private right to enforce Title VI as well. "Title IX," the Court noted, "was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." And, "[i]n 1972 when Title IX was enacted, the [parallel] language in Title VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy." That meant, the Court reasoned, that Congress had intended Title IX, like Title VI, to provide a private cause of action. Congress has since ratified Cannon's holding. Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 42 U.S.C. 2000d-7, expressly abrogated States' sovereign immunity against suits brought in federal court to enforce Title VI and provided that in a suit against a State "remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available to the same extent as such remedies are available in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State," 2000d-7(a)(2). We recognized in that 2000d-7 "cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon's holding." ; see also (same). It is thus beyond dispute that private individuals may sue to enforce 6 Second, it is similarly beyond dispute-and no party disagrees-that 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination. In Regents of Univ. of the Court reviewed a decision of the California Supreme Court that had enjoined the University of California Medical School from "according any consideration to race in its admissions process." Essential to the Court's holding reversing that aspect of the California court's decision was the determination that 601 "proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." ; see also In the Court made clear that under only intentional discrimination was forbidden by -611 ; ; What we said in is true today: "Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination."1 7 Third, we must assume for purposes of deciding this case that |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | majority | Hunt, Governor of North Carolina v. Cromartie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118421/hunt-governor-of-north-carolina-v-cromartie/ | we must assume for purposes of deciding this case that regulations promulgated under 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under Though no opinion of this Court has held that, five Justices in voiced that view of the law at least as alternative grounds for their decisions, see -592 ; ; and dictum in is to the same effect, see 469 U.S., at 295, n. 11. These statements are in considerable tension with the rule of and that 601 forbids only intentional discrimination, see, e.g., -613 but petitioners have not challenged the regulations here. We therefore assume for the purposes of deciding this case that the DOJ and DOT regulations proscribing activities that have a disparate impact on the basis of race are valid. 8 Respondents assert that the issue in this case, like the first two described above, has been resolved by our cases. To reject a private cause of action to enforce the disparate-impact regulations, they say, we would "[have] to ignore the actual language of and Cannon." Brief for Respondents 13. The language in Cannon to which respondents refer does not in fact support their position, as we shall discuss at length below, see infra, at 12-13. But in any event, this Court is bound by holdings, not language. Cannon was decided on the assumption that the University of had intentionally discriminated against petitioner. See (noting that respondents "admitted arguendo" that petitioner's "application for admission to medical school was denied by the respondents because she is a woman"). It therefore held that Title IX created a private right of action to enforce its ban on intentional discrimination, but had no occasion to consider whether the right reached regulations barring disparate-impact discrimination.2 In the Court held that private individuals could not recover compensatory damages under Title VI except for intentional discrimination. Five Justices in addition voted to uphold the disparate-impact regulations (four would have declared them invalid, see n. 5 ; -614 ), but of those five, three expressly reserved the question of a direct private right of action to enforce the regulations, saying that "[w]hether a cause of action against private parties exists directly under the regulations [is a] questio[n] that [is] not presented by this case."3 Thus, only two Justices had cause to reach the issue that respondents say the "actual language" of resolves. Neither that case,4 nor any other in this Court, has held that the private right of action exists. 9 Nor does it follow straightaway from the three |
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