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Justice Scalia | 1,993 | 9 | concurring | Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112820/itel-containers-intl-corp-v-huddleston/ | regard" for foreign-policy expertise) to the President. Ante, at I certainly agree that he is better able to decide than we are which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make that decision, but only Congress. Petitioner's Import-Export Clause challenge is, for me, a more difficult matter. It has firm basis in a constitutional text that cannot be avoided by showing that the tax on imports and exports is nondiscriminatory.[3] See Oil To come within this constitutional exemption, however, the taxed good must be either an import or an export "at the *82 time the tax accrued." I do not think a good can be an export when it will be used in this country, for its designed purpose, before being shipped abroad. In the Court held that California could not impose its nondiscriminatory sales tax on a shipment of oil that was being exported to New Zealand. The tax accrued upon the delivery of the oil to the purchaser, which was accomplished by pumping the oil into the hold of the vessel that would transport it overseas. The Court noted not only that no portion of the oil was "used or consumed in the United States," but also that "there was nothing equivocal in the transaction which created even a probability that the oil would be diverted to domestic use," With respect to the containers at issue in the present case, by contrast, it was entirely certain that after the time at which the tax accrued (viz., upon delivery of the empty containers to the lessee) they would be used in this country, to be loaded with goods for export. See Brief for Petitioner 7 ("[E]ach [leased] container initially was used to export American goods to foreign ports"). It could not be said, when the tax attached, that "the process of [their] exportation ha[d] started." Because I find that the containers at issue were not protected by the Import-Export Clause, I need not consider whether the Tennessee tax would satisfy the test set forth in Michelin Tire 423 U.S. 2 (19). For the reasons stated, I concur in the Court's conclusion that Tennessee's tax is not unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause or the Import-Export Clause. |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | concurring | North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4631842/north-carolina-dept-of-revenue-v-kimberley-rice-kaestner-1992-family/ | I join the opinion of the Court because it properly con- cludes that North Carolina’s tenuous connection to the income earned by the trust is insufficient to permit the State to tax the trust’s income. Because this connection is unusually tenuous, the opinion of the Court is circum- scribed. I write separately to make clear that the opinion of the Court merely applies our existing precedent and that its decision not to answer questions not presented by the facts of this case does not open for reconsideration any points resolved by our prior decisions. * * * Kimberley Rice Kaestner is the beneficiary of a trust established by her father. She is also a resident of North Carolina. Between 2005 and 2008, North Carolina re- quired the trustee, who is a resident of Connecticut, to pay more than $1.3 million in taxes on income earned by the assets in the trust. North Carolina levied this tax because of Kaestner’s residence within the State. States have broad discretion to structure their tax sys- tems. But, in a few narrow areas, the Federal Constitu- tion imposes limits on that power. See, e.g., McCulloch v. 2 NORTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF ; Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 575 U. S. (2015). The Due Process Clause creates one such limit. It imposes restrictions on the persons and property that a State can subject to its taxation authority. “The Due Process Clause ‘requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’ ” Quill (1992) (quoting Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–345 (1954)), overruled in part on other grounds by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U. S. (2018). North Carolina assesses this tax against the trustee and calculates the tax based on the income earned by the trust. N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (2017). Therefore we must look at the connections between the assets held in trust and the State. It is easy to identify a State’s connection with tangible assets. A tangible asset has a connection with the State in which it is located, and generally speaking, only that State has power to tax the asset. v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 364–365 (1939). Intangible assets—stocks, bonds, or other securities, for example—present a more difficult question. In the case of intangible assets held in trust, we have previously asked whether a resident of the State imposing the tax has control, possession, or the enjoyment of the asset. See v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 493–495 (1947); at 370–371; |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | concurring | North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4631842/north-carolina-dept-of-revenue-v-kimberley-rice-kaestner-1992-family/ | Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 493–495 (1947); at 370–371; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of 93–94 (1929); 28–29 (1928). Because a trustee is the legal owner of the trust assets and possesses the powers that accompany that status—power to manage the investments, to make and enforce contracts respecting the assets, to litigate on be- half of the trust, etc.—the trustee’s State of residence can tax the trust’s intangible assets. at Cite as: 588 U. S. (2019) 3 ALITO, J., concurring 494, 498. Here, we are asked whether the connection between a beneficiary and a trust is sufficient to allow the beneficiary’s State of residence to tax the trust assets and the income they earn while the assets and income remain in the trust in another State. Two cases provide a clear answer. In Brooke, Virginia assessed a tax on the assets of a trust whose beneficiary was a resident of Virginia. The trustee was not a resident of Virginia and administered the trust outside the Commonwealth. Under the terms of the trust, the beneficiary was entitled to all the income of the trust and had paid income taxes for the money that had been transferred to her. But the Court held that, despite the beneficiary’s present and ongoing right to receive income from the trust, Virginia could not impose taxes on the undistributed assets that remained within the trust because “the property is not within the State, does not belong to the petitioner and is not within her possession or control.” Even though the beneficiary was entitled to and received income from the trust, we observed that “she [wa]s a stranger” to the assets within the trust because she lacked control, possession, or enjoyment of them. In Safe Deposit, Virginia again attempted to assess taxes on the intangible assets held in a trust whose trus- tee resided in Maryland. The beneficiaries were children who lived in Virginia. Under the terms of the trust, each child was entitled to one half of the trust’s assets (both the original principal and the income earned over time) when the child reached the age of 25. Despite their entitlement to the entire corpus of the trust, the Court held that the beneficiaries’ residence did not allow Virginia to tax the assets while they remained in trust. “[N]obody within Virginia has present right to [the assets’] control or pos- session, or to receive income therefrom, or to cause them to be brought physically within her borders.” 280 U.S., at 4 NORTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF REVENUE v. KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER 1992 FAMILY TRUST ALITO, J., |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | concurring | North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4631842/north-carolina-dept-of-revenue-v-kimberley-rice-kaestner-1992-family/ | REVENUE v. KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER 1992 FAMILY TRUST ALITO, J., concurring 91.* The beneficiaries’ equitable ownership of the trust did not sufficiently connect the undistributed assets to Virginia as to allow taxation of the trust. The beneficiar- ies’ equitable ownership yielded to the “established fact of legal ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere.” Here, as in Brooke and Safe Deposit, the resident benefi- ciary has neither control nor possession of the intangible assets in the trust. She does not enjoy the use of the trust assets. The trustee administers the trust and holds the trust assets outside the State of North Carolina. Under Safe Deposit and Brooke, that is sufficient to establish that North Carolina cannot tax the trust or the trustee on the intangible assets held by the trust. * * * The Due Process Clause requires a sufficient connection between an asset and a State before the State can tax the asset. For intangible assets held in trust, our precedents dictate that a resident beneficiary’s control, possession, and ability to use or enjoy the asset are the core of the inquiry. The opinion of the Court rightly concludes that the assets in this trust and the trust’s undistributed in- come cannot be taxed by North Carolina because the resident beneficiary lacks control, possession, or enjoy- ment of the trust assets. The Court’s discussion of the peculiarities of this trust does not change the governing standard, nor does it alter the reasoning applied in our earlier cases. On that basis, I concur. —————— * Although the Court noted that no Virginian had a present right “to receive income therefrom,” Brooke—where the beneficiary was entitled to and received income from the trust—suggests that even if the chil- dren had such a right, it would not, alone, justify taxing the trust corpus |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | second_dissenting | Kastigar v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108541/kastigar-v-united-states/ | Today the Court holds that the United States may compel a witness to give incriminating testimony, and subsequently prosecute him for crimes to which that testimony relates. I cannot believe the Fifth Amendment permits that result. See The Fifth Amendment gives a witness an absolute right to resist interrogation, if the testimony sought would tend to incriminate him. A grant of immunity *468 may strip the witness of the right to refuse to testify, but only if it is broad enough to eliminate all possibility that the testimony will in fact operate to incriminate him. It must put him in precisely the same position, vis-à-vis the government that has compelled his testimony,[*] as he would have been in had he remained silent in reliance on the privilege. ; ; ; ; The Court recognizes that an immunity statute must be tested by that standard, that the relevant inquiry is whether it "leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege." Ante, at 462. I assume, moreover, that in theory that test would be met by a complete ban on the use of the compelled testimony, including all derivative use, however remote and indirect. But I cannot agree that a ban on use will in practice be total, if it remains open for the government to convict the witness on the basis of evidence derived from a legitimate independent source. The Court asserts that the witness is adequately protected by a rule imposing on the government a heavy burden of proof if it would establish the independent character of evidence to be used against the witness. But in light of the inevitable uncertainties of the factfinding process, see a greater margin of protection is required in order to provide a reliable guarantee that the witness *469 is in exactly the same position as if he had not testified. That margin can be provided only by immunity from prosecution for the offenses to which the testimony relates, i. e., transactional immunity. I do not see how it can suffice merely to put the burden of proof on the government. First, contrary to the Court's assertion, the Court's rule does leave the witness "dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities." Ante, at 460. For the information relevant to the question of taint is uniquely within the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. They alone are in a position to trace the chains of information and investigation that lead to the evidence |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | second_dissenting | Kastigar v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108541/kastigar-v-united-states/ | chains of information and investigation that lead to the evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. A witness who suspects that his compelled testimony was used to develop a lead will be hard pressed indeed to ferret out the evidence necessary to prove it. And of course it is no answer to say he need not prove it, for though the Court puts the burden of proof on the government, the government will have no difficulty in meeting its burden by mere assertion if the witness produces no contrary evidence. The good faith of the prosecuting authorities is thus the sole safeguard of the witness' rights. Second, even their good faith is not a sufficient safeguard. For the paths of information through the investigative bureaucracy may well be long and winding, and even a prosecutor acting in the best of faith cannot be certain that somewhere in the depths of his investigative apparatus, often including hundreds of employees, there was not some prohibited use of the compelled testimony. Cf. ; The Court today sets out a loose net to trap tainted evidence and prevent its use against the witness, but it accepts an intolerably great risk that tainted evidence will in fact slip through that net. *470 In my view the Court turns reason on its head when it compares a statutory grant of immunity to the "immunity" that is inadvertently conferred by an unconstitutional interrogation. The exclusionary rule of evidence that applies in that situation has nothing whatever to do with this case. Evidence obtained through a coercive interrogation, like evidence obtained through an illegal search, is excluded at trial because the Constitution prohibits such methods of gathering evidence. The exclusionary rules provide a partial and inadequate remedy to some victims of illegal police conduct, and a similarly partial and inadequate deterrent to police officers. An immunity statute, on the other hand, is much more ambitious than any exclusionary rule. It does not merely attempt to provide a remedy for past police misconduct, which never should have occurred. An immunity statute operates in advance of the event, and it authorizeseven encourages interrogation that would otherwise be prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. An immunity statute thus differs from an exclusionary rule of evidence in at least two critical respects. First, because an immunity statute gives constitutional approval to the resulting interrogation, the government is under an obligation here to remove the danger of incrimination completely and absolutely, whereas in the case of the exclusionary rules it may be sufficient to shield the witness from the fruits of the illegal |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | second_dissenting | Kastigar v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108541/kastigar-v-united-states/ | to shield the witness from the fruits of the illegal search or interrogation in a partial and reasonably adequate manner. For when illegal police conduct has occurred, the exclusion of evidence does not purport to purge the conduct of its unconstitutional character. The constitutional violation remains, and may provide the basis for other relief, such as a civil action for damages ), or a criminal prosecution of the responsible *471 officers (see 18 U.S. C. 241-242). The Constitution does not authorize police officers to coerce confessions or to invade privacy without cause, so long as no use is made of the evidence they obtain. But this Court has held that the Constitution does authorize the government to compel a witness to give potentially incriminating testimony, so long as no incriminating use is made of the resulting evidence. Before the government puts its seal of approval on such an interrogation, it must provide an absolutely reliable guarantee that it will not use the testimony in any way at all in aid of prosecution of the witness. The only way to provide that guarantee is to give the witness immunity from prosecution for crimes to which his testimony relates. Second, because an immunity statute operates in advance of the interrogation, there is room to require a broad grant of transactional immunity without imperiling large numbers of otherwise valid convictions. An exclusionary rule comes into play after the interrogation or search has occurred; and the decision to question or to search is often made in haste, under pressure, by an officer who is not a lawyer. If an unconstitutional interrogation or search were held to create transactional immunity, that might well be regarded as an excessively high price to pay for the "constable's blunder." An immunity statute, on the other hand, creates a framework in which the prosecuting attorney can make a calm and reasoned decision whether to compel testimony and suffer the resulting ban on prosecution, or to forgo the testimony. For both these reasons it is clear to me that an immunity statute must be tested by a standard far more demanding than that appropriate for an exclusionary rule fashioned to deal with past constitutional violations. Measured by that standard, the statute approved today by the Court fails miserably. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Souter | 1,995 | 20 | majority | Shalala v. Whitecotton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117917/shalala-v-whitecotton/ | The question in this case is whether a claimant who shows that she experienced symptoms of an injury after receiving a vaccination makes out a prima facie case for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S. C. 300aa-1 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), where the evidence fails to indicate that she had no symptoms of that injury before the vaccination. We hold that the claimant does not make out a case for compensation. I For injuries and deaths traceable to vaccinations, the Act establishes a scheme of recovery designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort system. H. R. Rep. *270 No. 99-908, pp. 3-7 (1986). Special masters in the Court of Federal Claims hear vaccine-related complaints, 42 U.S. C. 300aa-12(c) (1988 ed., Supp. V), which they adjudicate informally, 300aa-12(d)(2), within strict time limits, 300aa12(d)(3)(A), subject to similarly expeditious review, 300aa12(e)(2). A claimant alleging that more than $1,000 in damages resulted from a vaccination after the Act's effective date in 1988 must exhaust the Act's procedures and refuse to accept the resulting judgment before filing any de novo civil action in state or federal court. 42 U.S. C. 300aa11(a) (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The streamlining does not stop with the mechanics of litigation, but goes even to substantive standards of proof. While a claimant may establish prima facie entitlement to compensation by introducing proof of actual causation, 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(ii), she can reach the same result by meeting the requirements of what the Act calls the Vaccine Injury Table. The table lists the vaccines covered under the Act, together with particular injuries or conditions associated with each one. 42 U.S. C. 300aa-14 (1988 ed., Supp. V). A claimant who meets certain other conditions not relevant here makes out a prima facie case by showing that she (or someone for whom she brings a claim) "sustained, or had significantly aggravated, any illness, disability, injury, or condition set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table in association with [a] vaccine or died from the administration of such vaccine, and the first symptom or manifestation of the onset or of the significant aggravation of any such illness, disability, injury, or condition or the death occurred within the time period after vaccine administration set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table." 42 U.S. C. 300aa11(c)(1)(C)(i). Thus, the rule of prima facie proof turns the old maxim on its head by providing that if the post hoc event happens fast, ergo propter hoc. The Secretary of Health and Human Services may rebut a prima facie case by |
Justice Souter | 1,995 | 20 | majority | Shalala v. Whitecotton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117917/shalala-v-whitecotton/ | and Human Services may rebut a prima facie case by proving that the injury or death was in fact caused by "factors unrelated *271 to the administration of the vaccine" 300aa13(a)(1)(B). If the Secretary fails to rebut, the claimant is entitled to compensation. 42 U.S. C. 300aa-13(a)(1) (1988 ed. and Supp. V). Respondents, Margaret Whitecotton and her parents, filed a claim under the Act for injuries Margaret allegedly sustained as a result of vaccination against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (or DPT) on August 18, 1975, when she was nearly four months old. They alleged that Margaret (whom we will refer to as claimant) had suffered encephalopathy after the DPT vaccination, and they relied on the table scheme to make out a prima facie case. The Act defines encephalopathy as "any significant acquired abnormality of, or injury to, or impairment of function of the brain," 42 U.S. C. 300aa-14(b)(3)(A), and lists the condition on the Vaccine Injury Table in association with the DPT vaccine. Under the Act, a claimant who does not prove actual causation must show that "the first symptom or manifestation of the onset or of the significant aggravation" of encephalopathy occurred within three days of a DPT vaccination in order to make out a prima facie right to compensation. 300aa11(c)(1)(C)(i); 42 U.S. C. 300aa-14(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The Special Master found that claimant had suffered clonic seizures on the evening after her vaccination and again the following morning, App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, 27a, and accepted those seizures as symptoms of encephalopathy. He also found, however, that by the time claimant received the vaccination she was "clearly microcephalic" (meaning that she had a head size more than two standard deviations below the mean for a girl her age) and that her microcephaly was a symptom or evidence of encephalopathy that existed before the vaccination. at 32a-33a. Accordingly, the Master concluded that the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of claimant's encephalopathy had occurred before the vaccination and the ensuing 3-day period provided for in the table. at 34a. *272 The Master then considered whether the series of seizures was "the first symptom or manifestation of [a] significant aggravation" of the claimant's encephalopathy, 42 U.S. C. 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(i), and again decided that it was not. The Act defines "significant aggravation" as "any change for the worse in a preexisting condition which results in markedly greater disability, pain, or illness accompanied by substantial deterioration of health." 300aa-33(4). The Master found that "[t]here is nothing to distinguish this case from what would reasonably have been expected considering [claimant's] microcephaly. |
Justice Souter | 1,995 | 20 | majority | Shalala v. Whitecotton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117917/shalala-v-whitecotton/ | from what would reasonably have been expected considering [claimant's] microcephaly. [T]here was nothing that occurred in temporal relationship to the DPT vaccination which indicates that it is more likely than not that the vaccine permanently aggravated her condition. [T]he seizures did not continue and there was no dramatic turn for the worse in her condition Thus, there is no basis for implicating the vaccine as the cause of any aspect of [claimant's] present condition." App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-43a. Because he found that claimant had failed to satisfy the table requirements, and had not tried to prove actual causation, the Master denied her compensation for failure to make out a prima facie case. The Court of Federal Claims found the Master's decision neither arbitrary nor otherwise unlawful, see 42 U.S. C. 300aa-12(e)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. V), and affirmed. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit then reversed, holding that a claimant satisfies the table requirements for the "first symptom or manifestation of the onset" of an injury whenever she shows that any symptom or manifestation of a listed condition occurred within the time period after vaccination specified in the table, even if there was evidence of the condition before the vaccination. Because claimant here showed symptoms of encephalopathy during the 3-day period after her DPT vaccination, the Court of Appeals concluded for that reason alone that she had made out a prima facie entitlement to recovery. *273 The Court of Appeals went on to say that the Secretary had failed to rebut this prima facie case because she had not shown that claimant's encephalopathy was caused by "factors unrelated to the administration of the vaccine," 42 U.S. C. 300aa-13(a)(1)(B). The Court of Appeals relied on the provision that a "facto[r] unrelated" cannot include an "idiopathic" condition, 300aa-13(a)(2)(A), which the court read to mean that even when the Secretary can point to a specific factor, unrelated to the vaccine, as the source of a claimant's injury, she does not defeat a prima facie case when the cause of the identified factor is itself unknown. Taking the Secretary to have relied on claimant's microcephaly as the unrelated factor (or as associated with it), the court ruled the Secretary's evidence insufficient on the ground that the cause of microcephaly is unknown. -378.[*] We granted certiorari to address the Court of Appeals's construction of the Act's requirements for making and rebutting a prima facie case. Because we hold that the court erroneously construed the provisions defining a prima facie case under the Act, we reverse without reaching the adequacy of the Secretary's |
Justice Souter | 1,995 | 20 | majority | Shalala v. Whitecotton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117917/shalala-v-whitecotton/ | Act, we reverse without reaching the adequacy of the Secretary's rebuttal. II The Court of Appeals declared that nowhere does the Act "expressly state" that a claimant relying on the table to establish a prima facie case for compensation must show "that the child sustained no injury prior to administration of the vaccine," that is, that the first symptom of the injury *274 occurred after vaccination. This statement simply does not square with the plain language of the statute. In laying out the elements of a prima facie case, the Act provides that a claimant relying on the table (and not alleging significant aggravation) must show that "the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of [her table illness] occurred within the time period after vaccine administration set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table." 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(i). If a symptom or manifestation of a table injury has occurred before a claimant's vaccination, a symptom or manifestation after the vaccination cannot be the first, or signal the injury's onset. There cannot be two first symptoms or on sets of the same injury. Thus, a demonstration that the claimant experienced symptoms of an injury during the table period, while necessary, is insufficient to make out a prima facie case. The claimant must also show that no evidence of the injury appeared before the vaccination. In coming to the contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on language in the table, which contains the heading, "Time period for first symptom or manifestation of onset. after vaccine administration." 42 U.S. C. 300aa-14(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The Court of Appeals saw a "significant" between this language and that of 42 U.S. C. 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(i), which is set forth above. We do not. The key to understanding the heading is the word "onset." Since the symptom or manifestation occurring after the vaccination must be evidence of the table injury's onset, an injury manifested before the vaccination could qualify only on the theory that it could have two onsets, one before the vaccination, one after it. But it cannot: one injury, one onset. Indeed, even if the language of the heading did conflict with the text of 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(i), the latter would prevail, since the table heading was obviously meant to be a short form of the text preceding it. *275 The Court of Appeals sought to shore up the contrary conclusion with two further arguments. As the court read the Act, Congress "expressly made the absence of preexisting injury an element of the prima facie case" for residual seizure disorder (another table injury), ; thus, the court reasoned, Congress |
Justice Souter | 1,995 | 20 | majority | Shalala v. Whitecotton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117917/shalala-v-whitecotton/ | disorder (another table injury), ; thus, the court reasoned, Congress had implicitly rejected any need to negate the pre-existence of other injuries like encephalopathy. This argument rests on a misreading of the language in question. The statutory notes explaining the table provide that a claimant "may be considered to have suffered a residual seizure disorder if [she] did not suffer a seizure or convulsion unaccompanied by fever or accompanied by a fever of less than 102 degrees Fahrenheit before the first seizure or convulsion after the administration of the vaccine involved" 300aa-14(b)(2). But this is not the language that requires a claimant alleging a seizure disorder to demonstrate the absence of pre-existing symptoms. This provision specifies instead that certain types of seizures (those accompanied by a high fever) may not be considered symptoms of residual seizure disorder, and, so, do not preclude a prima facie case even when a claimant suffered them before vaccination. The language carries no implication about a claimant's burden generally and does nothing to undermine Congress's global provision that a claimant who has actually suffered symptoms of a listed injury before vaccination cannot make out a prima facie case of the injury's onset after vaccination. Finally, we cannot accept the Court of Appeals's argument that because the causal "factors unrelated" on which the Secretary may rely to defeat a prima facie case can include occurrences before vaccination, see 300aa-13(a)(2)(B), such occurrences cannot bar the establishment of a prima facie case in the first instance. The "factors unrelated" provision is wholly independent of the first-symptom and onset provisions, serving the distinct purpose of allowing the Secretary to defeat a claim even when an injury has not manifested *276 itself before vaccination. It does not relieve a claimant of the clear statutory requirements for making out a prima facie case. III The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | second_dissenting | Tennessee v. Lane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134743/tennessee-v-lane/ | Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that Congress "shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of that Amendmentincluding, of course, the Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. In we *555 decided that Congress could, under this provision, forbid English literacy tests for Puerto Rican voters in New York State who met certain educational criteria. Though those tests were not themselves in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we held that 5 authorizes prophylactic legislation that is, "legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct," Nevada Dept. of Human when Congress determines such proscription is desirable "`to make the amendments fully effective,'" ). We said that "the measure of what constitutes `appropriate legislation' under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" is the flexible "necessary and proper" standard of We described 5 as "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." The opinion followed close upon our decision in South which had upheld prophylactic application of the similarly worded "enforce" provision of the Fifteenth Amendment ( 2) to challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Fifteenth, is not limited to denial of the franchise and not limited to the denial of other rights on the basis of race. In City of we confronted Congress's inevitable expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in beyond the field of racial discrimination.[1] There Congress had sought, in the Religious Freedom Restoration *556 Act of 1993, 42 U.S. C. 2000bb et seq., to impose upon the States an interpretation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause that this Court had explicitly rejected. To avoid placing in congressional hands effective power to rewrite the Bill of Rights through the medium of 5, we formulated the "congruence and proportionality" test for determining what legislation is "appropriate." When Congress enacts prophylactic legislation, we said, there must be "proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved." I joined the Court's opinion in with some misgiving. I have generally rejected tests based on such malleable standards as "proportionality," because they have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual judges' policy preferences. See, e. g., (declining to apply a "proportionality" test to the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment); ); BMW of North America, (declining to apply a "reasonableness" test to punitive damages under the Due Process Clause). Even so, I signed on to the "congruence and proportionality" test in |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | second_dissenting | Tennessee v. Lane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134743/tennessee-v-lane/ | I signed on to the "congruence and proportionality" test in and adhered to it in later cases: Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense where we held that the provisions of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S. C. 271(h), 296(a), were "`so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,'" (quoting ); where we held that *557 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), imposed on state and local governments requirements "disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act," ; United where we held that a provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S. C. 139, lacked congruence and proportionality because it was "not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe," ; and Board of Trustees of Univ. of where we said that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S. C. 12111-12117, raised "the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of" But these cases were soon followed by Nevada Dept. of Human in which the Court held that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S. C. 2612 et seq., which required States to provide their employees up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave (for various purposes) annually, was "congruent and proportional to its remedial object [of preventing sex discrimination], and can be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." I joined JUSTICE KENNEDY'S dissent, which established (conclusively, I thought) that Congress had identified no unconstitutional state action to which the statute could conceivably be a proportional response. And now we have today's decision, holding that Title II of the ADA is congruent and proportional to the remediation of constitutional violations, in the face of what seems to me a compelling demonstration of the opposite by THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent. I yield to the lessons of experience. The "congruence and proportionality" standard, like all such flabby tests, is a *558 standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking. Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress's taskmaster. Under it, the courts (and ultimately this Court) must regularly check Congress's homework to make sure that it has identified sufficient constitutional violations to make its remedy congruent and proportional. As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | second_dissenting | Tennessee v. Lane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134743/tennessee-v-lane/ | general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal branch of Government. And when conflict is unavoidable, we should not come to do battle with the United States Congress armed only with a test ("congruence and proportionality") that has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively be shown to have been met or failed. As I wrote for the Court in an earlier case, "low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict." I would replace "congruence and proportionality" with another testone that provides a clear, enforceable limitation supported by the text of 5. Section 5 grants Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14 (emphasis added). notwithstanding, one does not, within any normal meaning of the term, "enforce" a prohibition by issuing a still broader prohibition directed to the same end. One does not, for example, "enforce" a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit by imposing a 45-mile-per-hour speed limiteven though that is indeed directed to the same end of automotive safety and will undoubtedly result in many fewer violations of the 55-mile-per-hour limit. And one does not "enforce" the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, see ante, at 531, by requiring that disabled persons be provided access to all of the "services, programs, or activities" furnished or conducted by the State, 42 U.S. C. 12132. That is simply not what the power to enforce meansor ever *559 meant. The 1860 edition of Noah Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language, current when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, defined "enforce" as: "To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as, to enforce the laws." See also J. Worcester, Dictionary of the English Language 484 (1860) ("To put in force; to cause to be applied or executed; as, `To enforce a law'"). Nothing in 5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or "remedy" conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. So-called "prophylactic legislation" is reinforcement rather than enforcement. asserted that this commonsense interpretation "would confine the legislative power to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the `majestic generalities' of 1 of the Amendment." 384 U.S., -649. That is not so. One must remember "that |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | second_dissenting | Tennessee v. Lane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134743/tennessee-v-lane/ | U.S., -649. That is not so. One must remember "that in 1866 the lower federal courts had no general jurisdiction of cases alleging a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution." R. Berger, Government By Judiciary 247 If, just after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, a State had enacted a law imposing racially discriminatory literacy tests (different questions for different races) a citizen prejudiced by such a test would have had no means of asserting his constitutional right to be free of it. Section 5 authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights. One of the first pieces of legislation passed under Congress's 5 power was the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." Section 1 of that Act, later codified as Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. 1983, authorized a cause of action against "any person who, under *560 color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States." Section 5 would also authorize measures that do not restrict the States' substantive scope of action but impose requirements directly related to the facilitation of "enforcement" for example, reporting requirements that would enable violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to be identified.[2] But what 5 does not authorize is so-called "prophylactic" measures, prohibiting primary conduct that is itself not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. The major impediment to the approach I have suggested is stare decisis. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since and many important and well-accepted measures, such as the Voting Rights Act, assume the validity of and South Carolina. As Prof. Archibald Cox put it in his Supreme Court Foreword: "The etymological meaning of section 5 may favor the narrower reading. Literally, `to enforce' means to compel performance of the obligations imposed; but the linguistic argument lost much of its force once the South Carolina and cases decided that the power to enforce embraces any measure appropriate to effectuating the performance of the state's constitutional duty." Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, *561 However, South Carolina and all of our later cases except that give an expansive meaning to "enforce" in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and all of our earlier cases that |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | second_dissenting | Tennessee v. Lane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134743/tennessee-v-lane/ | the Fourteenth Amendment, and all of our earlier cases that even suggest such an expansive meaning in dicta, involved congressional measures that were directed exclusively against, or were used in the particular case to remedy, racial discrimination. See ; Ex parte Virginia, ; ; See also City of (upholding as valid legislation under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment the most sweeping provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); (upholding a law, 42 U.S. C. 1982, banning public or private racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property as appropriate legislation under 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment). Giving 5 more expansive scope with regard to measures directed against racial discrimination by the States accords to practices that are distinctively violative of the principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment a priority of attention that this Court envisioned from the beginning, and that has repeatedly been reflected in our opinions. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court's first confrontation with the Fourteenth Amendment, we said the following with respect to the Equal Protection Clause: "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to *562 come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other." Racial discrimination was the practice at issue in the early cases (cited in ) that gave such an expansive description of the effects of 5. See 384 U.S., (citing Ex parte Virginia); (citing and ).[3] In those early days, bear in mind, the guarantee of equal protection had not been extended beyond race to sex, age, and the many other categories it now covers. Also still to be developed were the incorporation doctrine ) and the doctrine of so-called "substantive due process" ; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern ). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the many guarantees that it now provides. In such a seemingly limited context, it did not appear to be a massive expansion of congressional power to interpret 5 broadly. Broad interpretation was particularly appropriate with regard to racial discrimination, since that was the principal evil against which the Equal Protection Clause was directed, and the principal constitutional prohibition that some of the States stubbornly ignored. The former is still true, and the latter remained true at least as late as When congressional regulation has not been targeted at racial discrimination, we have given narrower scope to 5. |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | second_dissenting | Tennessee v. Lane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134743/tennessee-v-lane/ | at racial discrimination, we have given narrower scope to 5. In the Court upheld, under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, that provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, which barred literacy tests and similar voter-eligibility requirementsclassic tools of the racial discrimination in voting that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids; but found to be beyond the 5 power of the Fourteenth Amendment the provision that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 in state elections. See -130 ; ; A third provision, which forbade States from disqualifying voters by reason of residency requirements, was also upheld but only a minority of the Justices believed that 5 was adequate authority. Justice Black's opinion in that case described exactly the line I am drawing here, suggesting that Congress's enforcement power is broadest when directed "to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race." And of course the results reached in Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett are consistent with the narrower compass afforded congressional *564 regulation that does not protect against or prevent racial discrimination. Thus, principally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the permissive McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by the States. I would not, however, abandon the requirement that Congress may impose prophylactic 5 legislation only upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations. See -743 ; -627; -667, 669, 670-671[4] I would also adhere to the requirement that the prophylactic remedy predicated upon such state violations must be directed against the States or state actors rather than the public at large. See And I would not, of course, permit any congressional measures that violate other provisions of the Constitution. When those requirements have been met, however, I shall leave it to Congress, under constraints no tighter than those of the Necessary and Proper Clause, to decide what measures are appropriate under 5 to prevent or remedy racial discrimination by the States. *565 I shall also not subject to "congruence and proportionality" analysis congressional action under 5 that is not directed to racial discrimination. Rather, I shall give full effect to that action when it consists of "enforcement" of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, within the broad but not unlimited meaning of that term I have described above. When it goes beyond enforcement to prophylaxis, however, I shall consider it ultra vires. The present legislation is plainly of the latter sort. * * * Requiring access for disabled persons to all public buildings cannot remotely be considered a means of "enforcing" the |
Justice Scalia | 2,004 | 9 | second_dissenting | Tennessee v. Lane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134743/tennessee-v-lane/ | buildings cannot remotely be considered a means of "enforcing" the Fourteenth Amendment. The considerations of long accepted practice and of policy that sanctioned such distortion of language where state racial discrimination is at issue do not apply in this field of social policy far removed from the principal object of the Civil War Amendments. "The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or fifth `logical' extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This kind of gestative propensity calls for the `line drawing' familiar in the judicial, as in the legislative process: `thus far but not beyond.'" United (footnote omitted). It is past time to draw a line limiting the uncontrolled spread of a well-intentioned textual distortion. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court. JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent. I agree that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 cannot be a *566 congruent and proportional remedy to the States' alleged practice of denying disabled persons access to the courts. Not only did Congress fail to identify any evidence of such a practice when it enacted the ADA, ante, at 541-548, Title II regulates far more than the provision of access to the courts, ante, at 548-554. Because I joined the dissent in Nevada Dept. of Human and continue to believe that was wrongly decided, I write separately only to disavow any reliance on in reaching this conclusion. |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | concurring | Nordlinger v. Hahn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112763/nordlinger-v-hahn/ | In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal this Court struck down an assessment method used in Webster County, West Virginia, that operated precisely the same way as the California scheme being challenged today. I agree with the Court that Proposition 13 is constitutional. But I also agree with Justice Stevens that Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be distinguished. See post, at 31-32. To me Allegheny Pittsburgh represents a "needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on the State's legislative powers," New and I write separately because I see no benefit, and much risk, in refusing to confront it directly. I Allegheny Pittsburgh involved a county assessment scheme indistinguishable in relevant respects from Proposition 13. As the Court explains, California taxes real property at 1% of "full cash value," which means the "assessed value" as of 1975 (under the previous method) and after 1975-1976 the "appraised value of real property when purchased, *19 newly constructed, or a change in value has occurred after the 1975 assessment." The assessed value may be increased for inflation, but only at a maximum rate of 2% each year. See California Const., Art. XIIIA, 1(a), 2(a); ante, at 5. The property tax system worked much the same way in Webster County, West Virginia. The tax assessor assigned real property an "appraised value," set the "assessed value" at half of the appraised value, then collected taxes by multiplying the assessed value by the relevant tax rate. For property that had been sold recently, the assessor set the appraised value at the most recent price of purchase. For property that had not been sold recently, she increased the appraised price by 10%, first in 1976, then again in 1981 and 1983. The assessor's methods resulted in "dramatic differences in valuation between recently transferred property and otherwise comparable surrounding land." ; cf. Taxation and Equal Protection, ; State Law in Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County Commission, and n. 29 ; Hellerstein & Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Have Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. Taxation 308-310 Several coal companies that owned property in Webster County sued the county assessor, alleging violations of both the West Virginia and the United States Constitutions. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia upheld the assessment against the companies, but this Court reversed. The Allegheny Pittsburgh Court asserted that with respect to taxation, the Equal Protection Clause constrains the States as follows. Although "[t]he use of a general adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual reappraisal violates no constitutional command," the Clause requires that "general adjustments [be] accurate enough over a short period of time to |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | concurring | Nordlinger v. Hahn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112763/nordlinger-v-hahn/ | [be] accurate enough over a short period of time to equalize the differences in proportion between *20 the assessments of a class of property holders." "[T]he constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners." ). Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitution and laws of West Virginia "provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the State according to its estimated market value," and "[t]here [was] no suggestion that the State may have adopted a different system in practice from that specified by statute." "Indeed, [the assessor's] practice seems contrary to that of the guide published by the West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid to local assessors in the assessment of real property." ; see also The Court refused to decide "whether the Webster County assessment method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be." Finally, the Court declared: "`[I]ntentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his property.' " (quoting Sunday Lake Iron (18), and citing Sioux City Bridge ; Cumberland Coal ). The Court concluded that the assessments for the coal companies' properties had failed these requisites of the Equal Protection Clause. *21 II As the Court accurately states today, "this Court's cases"Allegheny Pittsburgh aside"are clear that, unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes [the] exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest." Ante, at 10; see also Burlington Northern R. ; The California tax system, like most, does not involve either suspect classes or fundamental rights, and the Court properly reviews California's classification for a rational basis. Today's review, however, differs from the review in Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court's analysis in Allegheny Pittsburgh is susceptible, I think, to at least three interpretations. The first is the one offered by petitioner. Under her reading of the case, properties are "similarly situated" or within the same "class" for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause when they are located in roughly the same types of neighborhoods, for example, are roughly the same size, and are roughly the same in other, unspecified ways. According to petitioner, the Webster County assessor's plan violated the Equal Protection Clause because |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | concurring | Nordlinger v. Hahn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112763/nordlinger-v-hahn/ | Webster County assessor's plan violated the Equal Protection Clause because she had failed to achieve a "seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment" of all the objectively comparable properties in Webster County, presumably those with about the same acreage and about the same amount of coal. Petitioner contends that Proposition 13 suffers from similar flaws. In 1989, she points out, "the long-time owner of a stately 7,800-square-foot, sevenbedroom mansion on a huge lot in Beverly Hills (among the most luxurious homes in one of the most expensive neighborhoods in Los Angeles County) paid less property tax annually than the new homeowner of a tiny 980-square-foot home on a small lot in an extremely modest Venice neighborhood." *22 Brief for Petitioner 5; see also Because California not only has not tried to repair this systematic, intentional, and gross disparity in taxation, but has enacted it into positive law, petitioner argues, Proposition 13 violates the Equal Protection Clause. This argument rests, in my view, on a basic misunderstanding of Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court there proceeded on the assumption of law (assumed because the parties did not contest it) that the initial classification, by the State, was constitutional, and the assumption of fact (assumed because the parties had so stipulated) that the properties were comparable under the State's classification. But cf. -272 In referring to the tax treatment of a "class of property holders," or "similarly situated property owners," the Court did not purport to review the constitutionality of the initial classification, by market value, drawn by the State, as opposed to the further subclassification within the initial class, by acquisition value, drawn by the assessor. Instead, Allegheny Pittsburgh assumed that whether properties or persons are similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as petitioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or location that serve as proxies for market value. Under that theory, market value would be the only rational basis for classifying property. But the Equal Protection Clause does not prescribe a single method of taxation. We have consistently rejected petitioner's theory, see, e. g., Ohio Oil ; Bell's Gap R. and the Court properly rejects it today. *23 Allegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of California from classifying properties on the basis of their value at acquisition, so long as the classification is supported by a rational basis. I agree with the Court that it is, both for the reasons given by this Court, see ante, at 11-14, and for the reasons given by the Supreme Court of California in Amador Valley Joint Union |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | concurring | Nordlinger v. Hahn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112763/nordlinger-v-hahn/ | the Supreme Court of California in Amador Valley Joint Union High School But the classification employed by the Webster County assessor, indistinguishable from California's, was rational for all those reasons as well. In answering petitioner's argument that Allegheny Pittsburgh controls here, respondents offer a second explanation for that case. Justice Stevens gives much the same explanation, see post, at 31-32, though he concludes in the end that Proposition 13, after Allegheny Pittsburgh, is unconstitutional. According to respondents, the Equal Protection Clause permits a State itself to determine which properties are similarly situated, as the State of California did here (classifying properties by acquisition value) and as the State of West Virginia did in Allegheny Pittsburgh (classifying properties by market value). But once a State does so, respondents suggest, the Equal Protection Clause requires after Allegheny Pittsburgh that properties in the same class be accorded seasonably equal treatment and not be intentionally and systematically undervalued. Proposition 13 provides for the assessment of properties in the same statedetermined class regularly and at roughly full value; this contrasts with the tax scheme in Webster County, where by dividing property in the same class (by market value) into a subclass (by acquisition value), the assessor regularly undervalued the property similarly situated. This, according to respondents, made the Webster County scheme unconstitutional, and distinguishes Proposition 13. Respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh is, in my view, as misplaced as petitioner's; their test, for starters, *24 comes with a dubious pedigree. In one of the cases cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh, Allied Stores, we upheld against an equal protection challenge a statute that exempted some corporations from ad valorem taxes imposed on others. Not only does Allied Stores not even hint that the Constitution "require[s] the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners," we took pains there to stress a very different proposition: "The States have very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value." Allied Stores, 358 U. S., at Two of the other cases cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh, Sunday Lake Iron and Sioux City Bridge, also rejected equal protection challenges, see also Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | concurring | Nordlinger v. Hahn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112763/nordlinger-v-hahn/ | equal protection challenges, see also Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan and the case in which the words intentional, systematic, and undervaluation first appeared, did not explain where the test came from or why. It is true that we applied the rule of Coulter to strike down a tax system in Cumberland Coal, also cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Cumberland Coal, however, reflects the most serious of the problems with respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh. As respondents understand these two cases, their rule is categorical: A tax scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause unless it provides for "the seasonable *25 attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment" or if it results in "`intentional systematic undervaluation' " of properties similarly situated by state law. 345. This would be so regardless of whether the inequality or the undervaluation, which may result (as in Webster County) from further classifications of properties within a class, is supported by a rational basis. But not since the coming of modern equal protection jurisprudence has this Court supplanted the rational judgments of state representatives with its own notions of "rough equality," "undervaluation," or "fairness." Cumberland Coal, which fails even to mention rational-basis review, conflicts with our current case law. Allegheny Pittsburgh did not, in my view, mean to return us to the era when this Court sometimes secondguessed state tax officials. In rejecting today respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court, as I understand it, agrees. This brings me to the third explanation for Allegheny Pittsburgh, the one offered today by the Court. The Court proceeds in what purports to be our standard equal protection framework, though it reapplies an old, and to my mind discredited, gloss to rational-basis review. The Court concedes that the "Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification." Ante, at 15 ). This principle applies, the Court acknowledges, not only to an initial classification but to all further classifications within a class. "Nevertheless, this Court's review does require that a purpose may conceivably or `may reasonably have been the purpose and policy' of the relevant governmental decisionmaker," the Court says, ante, at 15 (quoting Allied Stores, ), and "Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal *26 assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme," ante, at 16. Rather than obeying the "law of a State, generally applied," the county assessor had administered an "aberrational enforcement policy." |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | concurring | Nordlinger v. Hahn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112763/nordlinger-v-hahn/ | applied," the county assessor had administered an "aberrational enforcement policy." 488 U.S., See ante, at 15. According to the Court, therefore, the problem in Allegheny Pittsburgh was that the Webster County scheme, though otherwise rational, was irrational because it was contrary to state law. Any rational bases underlying the acquisition-value scheme were "implausible" (or "unreasonable") because they were made so by the Constitution and laws of the State of West Virginia. That explanation, like petitioner's and respondents', is in tension with settled case law. Even if the assessor did violate West Virginia law ), she would not have violated the Equal Protection Clause. A violation of state law does not by itself constitute a violation of the Federal Constitution. We made that clear in for instance, where a candidate for state office complained that members of the local canvassing board had refused to certify his name as a nominee to the Secretary of State, thus violating an Illinois statute. Because the plaintiff had not alleged, say, that the defendants had meant to discriminate against him on racial grounds, but merely that they had failed to comply with a statute, we rejected the argument that the defendants had thereby violated the Equal Protection Clause. "[N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law involves a denial of the equal protection of the laws, even though the denial of the right to one person may operate to confer it on another. [W]here the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not *27 without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws." See also Nashville, C. & St. L. R. The Court today promises not to have overruled Snowden, see ante, at 16, n. 8, but its disclaimer, I think, is in vain. 8, suggests, For if, as the Court what made the assessor's method unreasonable was her supposed violation of state law, the Court's interpretation of Allegheny Pittsburgh recasts in this case the proposition that we had earlier rejected. See -269; -94; Another Spin on Allegheny Pittsburgh, In repudiating Snowden, moreover, the Court threatens settled principles not only of the Fourteenth Amendment but of the Eleventh. We have held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering state actors to conform to the dictates of state law. Pennhurst State School and After today, however, a plaintiff might be able to invoke federal jurisdiction to have state actors obey state law, for a claim that the state actor has |
Justice Thomas | 1,992 | 1 | concurring | Nordlinger v. Hahn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112763/nordlinger-v-hahn/ | state law, for a claim that the state actor has violated state law appears to have become a claim that he has violated the Constitution. See ; I understand that the Court prefers to distinguish Allegheny Pittsburgh, but in doing so, I think, the Court has left our equal protection jurisprudence in disarray. The analysis appropriate to this case is straightforward. Unless a classification involves suspect classes or fundamental rights, judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause demands only a conceivable rational basis for the challenged state distinction. See This basis need not be one identified by the State itself; in fact, States need not articulate any reasons at all for their actions. See Proposition 13, I believe, satisfies this standardbut so, for the same reasons, did the scheme employed in Webster County. See Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 7, 9-10, Brief for National Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 9-13, and Brief for Respondent 31-32, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, O. T. 1988, Nos. 87-1303, 87-1310; ante, at 11-14. Allegheny Pittsburgh appears to have survived today's decision. I wonder, though, about its legacy. * * * I concur in the judgment of the Court and join Part IIA of its opinion. |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | We must decide whether federal law pre-empts the New Hampshire design-defect claim under which respondent Karen Bartlett recovered damages from petitioner Mutual Pharmaceutical, the manufacturer of sulindac, a generic nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID). New Hampshire law imposes a duty on manufacturers to en- sure that the drugs they market are not unreasonably unsafe, and a drug’s safety is evaluated by reference to both its chemical properties and the adequacy of its warn- ings. Because Mutual was unable to change sulindac’s composition as a matter of both federal law and basic chemistry, New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action effectively required Mutual to change sulindac’s labeling to provide stronger warnings. But, as this Court recog- nized just two Terms ago in Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. federal law prohibits generic drug manu- facturers from independently changing their drugs’ labels. Accordingly, state law imposed a duty on Mutual not to comply with federal Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that require a private party to violate federal 2 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court law are pre-empted and, thus, are “without effect.” Mary- The Court of Appeals’ solution—that Mutual should simply have pulled sulindac from the market in order to comply with both state and federal law—is no solution. Rather, adopting the Court of Appeals’ stop-selling ra- tionale would render impossibility pre-emption a dead letter and work a revolution in this Court’s pre-emption case Accordingly, we hold that state-law design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are pre- empted by federal law under We thus reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals below. I Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), ch. 675, as amended, 21 U.S. C. et seq., drug manufacturers must gain approval from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing any drug in interstate commerce. In the case of a new brand-name drug, FDA approval can be secured only by submitting a new-drug application (NDA). An NDA is a compilation of materials that must include “full reports of [all clinical] investiga- tions,” relevant nonclinical studies, and “any other data or information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug product obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any source,” 21 CFR and (5)(iv) (2012). The NDA must also include “the labeling proposed to be used for such drug,” 21 U.S. C. (c)(2)(i), and “a discussion of why the [drug’s] benefits exceed the risks under the conditions stated in the labeling,” 21 CFR The FDA may ap- prove an NDA only if it |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | The FDA may ap- prove an NDA only if it determines that the drug in question is “safe for use” under “the conditions of use pre- Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court scribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed label- ing thereof.” 21 U.S. C. In order for the FDA to consider a drug safe, the drug’s “probable therapeutic benefits must outweigh its risk of harm.” The process of submitting an NDA is both onerous and lengthy. See Report to Congressional Requesters, Gov- ernment Accountability Office, Nov. 2006, New Drug Development, 26 Biotechnology L. Rep. 82, 94 (2007) (A typical NDA spans thousands of pages and is based on clinical trials conducted over several years). In order to provide a swifter route for approval of generic drugs, Congress passed the Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, popularly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act.” Under Hatch-Waxman, a generic drug may be approved without the same level of clinical testing required for approval of a new brand- name drug, provided the generic drug is identical to the already-approved brand-name drug in several key respects. First, the proposed generic drug must be chemically equivalent to the approved brand-name drug: it must have the same “active ingredient” or “active ingredients,” “route of administration,” “dosage form,” and “strength” as its brand-name counterpart. 21 U.S. C. and (iii). Second, a proposed generic must be “bioequivalent” to an approved brand-name drug. That is, it must have the same “rate and extent of absorption” as the brand-name drug. Third, the generic drug manufacturer must show that “the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [approved brand-name] drug.” Once a drug—whether generic or brand-name—is ap- proved, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any major changes to the “qualitative or quantitative formula- tion of the drug product, including active ingredients, or in 4 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court the specifications provided in the approved application.” (b)(2)(i). Generic manufacturers are also prohibited from making any unilateral changes to a drug’s label. See 314.150(b)(10) (approval for a generic drug may be withdrawn if the generic drug’s label “is no longer consistent with that for [the brand- name] drug”). II In the FDA approved a nonsteroidal anti- inflammatory pain reliever called “sulindac” under the brand name Clinoril. When Clinoril’s patent expired, the FDA approved several generic sulindacs, including one manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceutical. 34 (CA1 2012) (case below); App. to Pet. for Cert. 144a– 145a. In a very small number of patients, NSAIDs— including |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | 145a. In a very small number of patients, NSAIDs— including both sulindac and popular NSAIDs such as ibuprofen, naproxen, and Cox2-inhibitors—have the seri- ous side effect of causing two hypersensitivity skin reac- tions characterized by necrosis of the skin and of the mucous membranes: toxic epidermal necrolysis, and its less severe cousin, Stevens-Johnson Syndrome. 6 F. 3d, at 34, 43–44; Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1872 (31st ed. 2007); Physicians’ Desk Reference 146–147, 597 (6th ed. 2013); Friedman, Orlet, Still, & Law, Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis Due to Administration of Celecobix (Celebrex), 95 Southern Medical J. 1213, 1213–1214 (2002). In December 2004, respondent Karen L. Bartlett was prescribed Clinoril for shoulder pain. Her pharmacist dispensed a generic form of sulindac, which was manufac- tured by petitioner Mutual Pharmaceutical. Respondent soon developed an acute case of toxic epidermal necrolysis. The results were horrific. Sixty to sixty-five percent of the surface of respondent’s body deteriorated, was burned off, or turned into an open wound. She spent months in a Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court medically induced coma, underwent 12 eye surgeries, and was tube-fed for a year. She is now severely disfigured, has a number of physical disabilities, and is nearly blind. At the time respondent was prescribed sulindac, the drug’s label did not specifically refer to Stevens-Johnson Syndrome or toxic epidermal necrolysis, but did warn that the drug could cause “severe skin reactions” and “[f]atalities.” App. 553; (NH 2010) However, Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis were listed as potential adverse reactions on the drug’s package n. 1. In 2005—once respondent was already suffering from toxic epidermal necrolysis—the FDA completed a “comprehensive review of the risks and benefits, [including the risk of toxic epidermal necrolysis], of all approved NSAID products.” Decision Letter, FDA Docket No. 2005P-0072/CP1, p. 2 (June 22, 2006), online at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ dockets/05p0072/05p-0072-pav0001-vol1.pdf (as visited June 18, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). As a result of that review, the FDA recommended changes to the labeling of all NSAIDs, including sulindac, to more explicitly warn against toxic epidermal necrolysis. App. 353–354, 364, 557–561, 580, and n. 8. Respondent sued Mutual in New Hampshire state court, and Mutual removed the case to federal court. Respondent initially asserted both failure-to-warn and design-defect claims, but the District Court dismissed her failure-to- warn claim based on her doctor’s “admi[ssion] that he had not read the box label or ” After a 2-week trial on respondent’s design-defect claim, a jury found Mutual liable and awarded respondent over $21 million in damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. As |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | $21 million in damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. As rele- vant, it found that neither the FDCA nor the FDA’s regu- 6 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court lations pre-empted respondent’s design-defect claims. It distinguished Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. —in which the Court held that failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers are pre-empted by the FDCA’s prohibition on changes to generic drug labels—by arguing that generic manufacturers facing design-defect claims could simply “choose not to make the drug at all” and thus comply with both federal and state We granted certiorari. 568 U. S. (2012). III The Supremacy Clause provides that the laws and treaties of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly, it has long been settled that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Mary, 451 U. S., at ; McCul- See also Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 108 (1992) (“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield” ). Even in the absence of an express pre-emption provi- sion, the Court has found state law to be impliedly pre- empted where it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” v. General Elec. Co., See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, – (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce”). Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court In the instant case, it was impossible for Mutual to comply with both its state-law duty to strengthen the warnings on sulindac’s label and its federal-law duty not to alter sulindac’s label. Accordingly, the state law is pre-empted. A We begin by identifying petitioner’s duties under state As an initial matter, respondent is wrong in assert- ing that the purpose of New Hampshire’s design- defect cause of action “is compensatory, not regulatory.” Brief for Respondent 19. Rather, New Hampshire’s design- defect cause of action imposes affirmative duties on manufacturers. Respondent is correct that New Hampshire has adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort as set forth in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See 2 Re- statement (Second) of Torts (1963 |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | of Torts. See 2 Re- statement (Second) of Torts (1963 and 1964) (here- inafter Restatement 2d). See 112–113 (1969). Under the Restatement—and consequently, under New Hampshire tort law—“[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused” even though he “has exer- cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.” Restatement 2d at 347–348. But respondent’s argument conflates what we will call a “strict-liability” regime (in which liability does not depend on negligence, but still signals the breach of a duty) with what we will call an “absolute-liability” regime (in which liability does not reflect the breach of any duties at all, but merely serves to spread risk). New Hampshire has adopted the former, not the latter. Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has consistently held that the manu- facturer of a product has a “duty to design his product 8 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court reasonably safely for the uses which he can foresee.” See also (19) (“In New Hampshire, the manufacturer is under a general duty to design his product reasonably safely for the uses which he can foresee” ); v. Saab-Scania AB, N. H. 73, 637 A.2d 148, 150 (1993) (“The duty to warn is part of the general duty to design, manufacture and sell products that are reasonably safe for their foreseeable uses”); cf. Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 130 N. H. 466, 469, 543 A.2d 407, 409 (“We limit the application of strict tort liability in this jurisdiction by continuing to emphasize that liability without negligence is not liability without fault”); v. BIC Corp., N. H. 386, 390, 702 A.2d 330, 333 (1997) (cautioning “that the term ‘unreasonably dangerous’ should not be interpreted so broadly as to impose absolute liability on manufacturers or make them insurers of their products”). Accordingly, respondent is incorrect in arguing that New Hampshire’s strict-liability system “imposes no substantive duties on manufacturers.” Brief for Respondent 19.1 —————— 1 Wecan thus save for another day the question whether a true absolute-liability state-law system could give rise to impossibility pre-emption. As we have noted, most common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability do not exist merely to spread risk, but rather impose affirmative duties. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–324 (2008) (“In [Medtronic, (1996)], five Justices concluded that common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability do impose ‘requirement[s]’ and would be pre-empted by federal requirements specific to a |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | and would be pre-empted by federal requirements specific to a medical device. We adhere to that view”); (“Absent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its common-law duties. As the plurality opinion said in Cipollone [v. Liggett Group, (1992)], common-law liability is ‘premised on the existence of a legal duty,’ and a tort judgment therefore establishes that the defendant has Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court B That New Hampshire tort law imposes a duty on manu- facturers is clear. Determining the content of that duty requires somewhat more analysis. As discussed below in greater detail, New Hampshire requires manufacturers to ensure that the products they design, manufacture, and sell are not “unreasonably dangerous.” The New Hamp- shire Supreme Court has recognized that this duty can be satisfied either by changing a drug’s design or by changing its labeling. Since Mutual did not have the option of changing sulindac’s design, New Hampshire law ultimately required it to change sulindac’s labeling. Respondent argues that, even if New Hampshire law does impose a duty on drug manufacturers, that duty does not encompass either the “duty to change sulindac’s de- sign” or the duty “to change sulindac’s labeling.” Brief for Respondent 30 (capitalization and emphasis deleted). That argument cannot be correct. New Hampshire imposes design-defect liability only where “the design of the product created a defective condition unreasonably dan- gerous to the user.” (2001); To determine whether a product is “unreasonably dangerous,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court employs a “risk- utility approach” under which “a product is defective as designed if the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product.” 4 A. 2d, at 1182 That risk- utility approach requires a “multifaceted balancing pro- cess involving evaluation of many conflicting factors.” ; see also Thi- 395 A. 2d, at While the set of factors to be considered is ultimately an —————— violated a state-law obligation”). 10 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court open one, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has repeat- edly identified three factors as germane to the risk-utility inquiry: “the usefulness and desirability of the product to the public as a whole, whether the risk of danger could have been reduced without significantly affecting either the product’s effectiveness or manufacturing cost, and the presence and efficacy of a warning to avoid an unreasona- ble risk of harm from hidden dangers or from foreseeable uses.” ; see also ; –, In the drug context, either increasing the “usefulness” of a product or reducing its “risk of danger” would require redesigning the |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | or reducing its “risk of danger” would require redesigning the drug: A drug’s usefulness and its risk of danger are both direct results of its chemical design and, most saliently, its active ingredients. See 21 CFR (2012) (“Active ingredient means any compo- nent that is intended to furnish pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitiga- tion, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure of any function of the body of humans” (italics deleted)). In the present case, however, redesign was not possible for two reasons. First, the FDCA requires a generic drug to have the same active ingredients, route of adminis- tration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the brand-name drug on which it is based. 21 U.S. C. –(v) and (8)(B); (c). Conse- quently, the Court of Appeals was correct to recognize that “Mutual cannot legally make sulindac in another composi- tion.” Indeed, were Mutual to change the composition of its sulindac, the altered chemical would be a new drug that would require its own NDA to be marketed in interstate commerce. See (h) (giving examples of when the FDA considers a drug to be new, including cases involving “newness for drug use of any Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court substance which composes such drug, in whole or in part”). Second, because of sulindac’s simple composition, the drug is chemically incapable of being redesigned. See 6 F. 3d, at 37 (“Mutual cannot legally make sulindac in another composition (nor it is apparent how it could alter a one- molecule drug anyway)”). Given the impossibility of redesigning sulindac, the only way for Mutual to ameliorate the drug’s “risk-utility” profile—and thus to escape liability—was to strengthen “the presence and efficacy of [sulindac’s] warning” in such a way that the warning “avoid[ed] an unreasonable risk of harm from hidden dangers or from foreseeable uses.” See also N. H., at (“The duty to warn is part of the general duty to design, manufacture and sell products that are reasonably safe for their fore- seeable uses. If the design of a product makes a warning necessary to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm from a foreseeable use, the lack of warning or an ineffective warn- ing causes the product to be defective and unreasonably dangerous” (citation omitted)). Thus, New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action imposed a duty on Mutual to strengthen sulindac’s warnings. For these reasons, it is unsurprising that allegations that sulindac’s label was inadequate featured prominently at trial. Respondent introduced into evidence both the label for Mutual’s sulindac at |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | introduced into evidence both the label for Mutual’s sulindac at the time of her injuries and the label as revised in 2005 (after respondent had suffered her injuries). App. 553–556. Her counsel’s opening statement informed the jury that “the evidence will show you that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous and had an inadequate warning, as well. You will hear much more evidence about why this label was inadequate in relation to this case.” Tr. 110–112 (Aug. 17, 2010). And, the District Court repeatedly instructed the jury that it should evaluate sulindac’s labeling in determining whether 12 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court Mutual’s sulindac was unreasonably dangerous. See App. 514 (jury instruction that the jury should find “a defect in design” only if it found that “Sulindac was unrea- sonably dangerous and that a warning was not present and effective to avoid that unreasonable danger”); (jury instruction that no design defect exists if “a warning was present and effective to avoid that unreasonable danger”). Finally, the District Court clarified in its order and opinion denying Mutual’s motion for judgment as a matter of law that the adequacy of sulindac’s labeling had been part of what the jury was instructed to consider. 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 231 (“if the jury found that sulin- dac’s risks outweighed its benefits, then it could consider whether the warning—regardless of its adequacy—re- duced those risks to such an extent that it eliminated the unreasonable danger”).2 Thus, in accordance with New Hampshire law, the jury was presented with evidence relevant to, and was in- —————— 2 That Mutual’s liability turned on the adequacy of sulindac’s warn- ings is not unusual. Rather, New Hampshire—like a large majority of States—has adopted comment k to of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognizes that it is “especially common in the field of drugs” for products to be “incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.” Restatement 2d, at 353; Under comment k, “[s]uch a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably danger- ous.” Restatement 2d, at 353–354. This Court has previously noted that, as of 1986, “a large number of courts” took comment k to mean that manufacturers “did not face strict liability for side effects of properly manufactured prescription drugs that were accompanied by adequate warnings.” Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. n. 41 (slip op., at 10, n. 41). Mutual withdrew its comment k defense “for purposes of the trial of this matter.” Defendant’s Notice of Withdrawal of Defenses, in Case No. |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | matter.” Defendant’s Notice of Withdrawal of Defenses, in Case No. 08–cv–358–JL (D NH), p. 1. However, as noted above, both respondent and the trial court injected the broader question of the adequacy of sulindac’s label into the trial proceedings. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court structed to consider, whether Mutual had fulfilled its duty to label sulindac adequately so as to render the drug not “unreasonably dangerous.” In holding Mutual liable, the jury determined that Mutual had breached that duty. C The duty imposed by federal law is far more readily apparent. As made clear, federal law prevents generic drug manufacturers from changing their labels. See 564 U. S., at (slip op., at 10) (“Federal drug regula- tions, as interpreted by the FDA, prevented the Manufac- turers from independently changing their generic drugs’ safety labels”). See also 21 U.S. C. (“[T]he labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [approved brand-name] drug”); 21 CFR 314.150(b)(10) (approval for a generic drug may be withdrawn if the generic drug’s label “is no longer consistent with that for [the brand-name] drug”). Thus, federal law prohibited Mutual from taking the remedial action required to avoid liability under New Hampshire D When federal law forbids an action that state law requires, the state law is “without effect.” Maryland, 451 U. S., at Because it is impossible for Mutual and other similarly situated manufacturers to comply with both state and federal law,3 New Hampshire’s —————— 3 JUSTICE BREYER argues that it is not “literally impossible” for Mutual to comply with both state and federal law because it could escape liability “either by not doing business in the relevant State or by paying the state penalty, say damages, for failing to comply with, as here, a state-law tort standard.” Post, at 1 (dissenting opinion). But, as dis- cussed below, infra, at 15–16—leaving aside the rare case in which state or federal law actually requires a product to be pulled from the market—our pre-emption cases presume that a manufacturer’s ability to stop selling does not turn impossibility into possibility. See, e.g., 14 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court warning-based design-defect cause of action is pre-empted with respect to FDA-approved drugs sold in interstate commerce.4 IV The Court of Appeals reasoned that Mutual could escape the impossibility of complying with both its federal- and state-law duties by “choos[ing] not to make [sulindac] at —————— Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, (1963) (There would be “impossibility of dual compliance” where “federal orders forbade the picking and |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | of dual compliance” where “federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado testing more than 7% oil, while the California test excluded from the State any avocado measuring less than 8% oil content”). And, of course, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. forecloses any argument that impossibility is defeated by the prospect that a manufacturer could “pa[y] the state penalty” for violating a state-law duty; that prospect would have defeated impossibility in as well. See at (slip op., at 12) (“[I]t was impossible for the Manufacturers to comply with both their state-law duty to change the label and their federal law duty to keep the label the same”). To hold otherwise would render impossibility pre-emption “all but meaningless.” at (slip op., at 14). 4 We do not address state design-defect claims that parallel the federal misbranding statute. The misbranding statute requires a manufac- turer to pull even an FDA-approved drug from the market when it is “dangerous to health” even if “used in the dosage or manner, or with the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.” 21 U.S. C. cf. (state-law pesticide labeling require- ment not pre-empted under express pre-emption provision, provided it was “equivalent to, and fully consistent with, [federal] misbranding provisions”). The parties and the Government appear to agree that a drug is misbranded under federal law only when liability is based on new and scientifically significant information that was not before the FDA. Because the jury was not asked to find whether new evidence concerning sulindac that had not been made available to the FDA rendered sulindac so dangerous as to be misbranded under the federal misbranding statute, the misbranding provision is not applicable here. Cf. (most of respondent’s experts’ testimony was “drawn directly from the medical literature or published FDA analyses”). Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court all.” We reject this “stop-selling” ra- tionale as incompatible with our pre-emption jurispru- dence. Our pre-emption cases presume that an actor seeking to satisfy both his federal- and state-law obliga- tions is not required to cease acting altogether in order to avoid liability. Indeed, if the option of ceasing to act de- feated a claim of impossibility, impossibility pre-emption would be “all but meaningless.” 564 U. S., at (slip op., at 14). The incoherence of the stop-selling theory becomes plain when viewed through the lens of our previous cases. In every instance in which the Court has found impossibility pre-emption, the “direct conflict” between federal- and state-law duties could easily have been avoided if the regulated actor had |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | could easily have been avoided if the regulated actor had simply ceased acting. is an obvious example: As discussed above, the Court held that state failure-to-warn claims were pre-empted by the FDCA because it was impossible for drug manufacturers like to comply with both the state-law duty to label their products in a way that ren- dered them reasonably safe and the federal-law duty not to change their drugs’ labels. at (slip op., at 11). It would, of course, have been possible for drug manufactur- ers like to pull their products from the market altogether. In so doing, they would have avoided liability under both state and federal law: such manufacturers would neither have labeled their products in a way that rendered them unsafe nor impermissibly changed any federally approved label. In concluding that “it was impossible for the Manufac- turers to comply with both their state-law duty to change the label and their federal law duty to keep the label the same,” at (slip op., at 12), the Court was unde- terred by the prospect that could have complied with both state and federal requirements by simply leav- ing the market. The Court of Appeals decision below had 16 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court found that Mensing’s state-law failure-to-warn claims escaped pre-emption based on the very same stop-selling rationale the First Circuit relied on in this case. See (“[G]eneric defendants were not compelled to market metoclopramide. If they realized their label was insuffi- cient they could have simply stopped selling the prod- uct”). Moreover, Mensing advanced the stop-selling rationale in its petition for rehearing, which this Court denied. Pet. for Reh’g in No. 09–993 etc., p. 2. Nonetheless, this Court squarely determined that it had been “impossible” for to comply with both its state and federal duties. 564 U. S., at (slip op., at 12).5 Adopting the First Circuit’s stop-selling rationale would mean that not only but also the vast majority—if not all—of the cases in which the Court has found impos- sibility pre-emption, were wrongly decided. Just as the prospect that a regulated actor could avoid liability under both state and federal law by simply leaving the market did not undermine the impossibility analysis in so it is irrelevant to our analysis here. V The dreadful injuries from which products liabilities —————— 5 Respondent attempts to distinguish this case from arguing that “[w]here, as in state law imposes an affirmative duty on a manufacturer to improve the product’s label, suspending sales does not comply with the state-law duty; it merely offers an indirect means |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | with the state-law duty; it merely offers an indirect means of avoiding liability for noncompliance with that duty.” Brief for Re- spondent 39. But that difference is purely semantic: the state-law duty in to amend metoclopramide’s label could just as easily have been phrased as a duty not to sell the drug without adequate warnings. At least where a State imposes liability based on a balancing of a product’s harms and benefits in light of its labeling—rather than directly prohibiting the product’s sale—the mere fact that a manufac- turer may avoid liability by leaving the market does not defeat a claim of impossibility. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 17 Opinion of the Court cases arise often engender passionate responses. Today is no exception, as JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s dissent (hereinaf- ter the dissent) illustrates. But sympathy for respondent does not relieve us of the responsibility of following the The dissent accuses us of incorrectly assuming “that federal law gives pharmaceutical companies a right to sell a federally approved drug free from common-law liability,” post, at 1, but we make no such assumption. Rather, as discussed at length above, see at 8–13, we hold that state-law design-defect claims like New Hampshire’s that place a duty on manufacturers to render a drug safer by either altering its composition or altering its labeling are in conflict with federal laws that prohibit manufacturers from unilaterally altering drug composition or labeling. The dissent is quite correct that federal law establishes no safe-harbor for drug companies—but it does prevent them from taking certain remedial measures. Where state law imposes a duty to take such remedial measures, it “actu- al[ly] conflict[s] with federal law” by making it “ ‘impos- sible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.’ ” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting 496 U. S., at – ). The dissent seems to acknowledge that point when it concedes that, “if federal law requires a particular product label to include a complete list of ingredients while state law specifically forbids that labeling practice, there is little question that state law ‘must yield.’ ” Post, at 6–7 ). What the dissent does not see is that that is this case: Federal law requires a very specific label for sulindac, and state law forbids the use of that label. The dissent responds that New Hampshire law “merely create[s] an incentive” to alter sulindac’s label or composi- tion, post, at 7, but does not impose any actual “legal obligation,” post, at 13. The contours of that argument are 18 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | 13. The contours of that argument are 18 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court difficult to discern. Perhaps the dissent is drawing a distinction between common-law “exposure to liability,” post, at 12, and a statutory “legal mandate,” But the distinction between common law and statutory law is irrelevant to the argument at hand: In violating a common- law duty, as surely as by violating a statutory duty, a party contravenes the While it is true that, in a certain sense, common-law duties give a manufacturer the choice “between exiting the market or continuing to sell while knowing it may have to pay compensation to con- sumers injured by its product,” post, at 16, statutory “mandate[s]” do precisely the same thing: They require a manufacturer to choose between leaving the market and accepting the consequences of its actions (in the form of a fine or other sanction). See generally Calabresi & Mela- med, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, (discussing liability rules). And, in any event, — which the dissent agrees involved a state-law “require- ment that conflicted with federal law,” post, at 13—dealt with common-law failure-to-warn claims, see at (slip op., at 4). Because controls the instant case, the dissent is reduced to fighting a rearguard action against its reasoning despite ostensibly swearing fealty to its holding. To suggest that v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 is to the contrary is simply misleading. The dissent is correct that held a Texas state-law design-defect claim not to be pre-empted. But, it did so because the design-defect claim in question was not a “requirement ‘for labeling or packaging ’ ” and thus fell outside the class of claims covered by the express pre- emption provision at issue in that case. –444 (emphasis in original). Indeed, contrary to the impression one might draw from the dissent, post, at 12–13, the Court actually blessed the lower court’s determination Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 19 Opinion of the Court that the State’s design-defect claim imposed a pre- emptable “requirement”: “The Court of Appeals did, how- ever, correctly hold that the term ‘requirements’ in reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law duties.” The dissent offers no compelling reason why the “common-law duty” in this case should not similarly be viewed as a “requirement.” We agree, of course, that “determining precisely what, if any, specific requirement a state common-law claim imposes is im- portant.” Post, at 12, n. 5. As makes clear, “[t]he proper inquiry calls for an examination of the elements |
Justice Alito | 2,013 | 8 | majority | Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931124/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/ | “[t]he proper inquiry calls for an examination of the elements of the common-law duty at issue; it does not call for specula- tion as to whether a jury verdict will prompt the manu- facturer to take any particular action.” (citation omitted). Here, as we have tried to make clear, the duty to ensure that one’s products are not “unreasona- bly dangerous” imposed by New Hampshire’s design-defect cause of action, 147 N. H., at 153, 4 A. 2d, at involves a duty to make one of several changes. In cases where it is impossible—in fact or by law—to alter a product’s design (and thus to increase the product’s “use- fulness” or decrease its “risk of danger”), the duty to ren- der a product “reasonably safe” boils down to a duty to ensure “the presence and efficacy of a warning to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm from hidden dangers or from foreseeable uses.” The duty to redesign sulindac’s label was thus a part of the common-law duty at issue—not merely an action Mutual might have been prompted to take by the adverse jury verdict here. Finally, the dissent laments that we have ignored “Congress’ explicit efforts to preserve state common-law liability.” Post, at 26. We have not. Suffice to say, the Court would welcome Congress’ “explicit” resolution of the difficult pre-emption questions that arise in the prescrip- 20 MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO. v. BARTLETT Opinion of the Court tion drug context. That issue has repeatedly vexed the Court—and produced widely divergent views—in recent years. See, e.g., ; 564 U.S. As the dissent concedes, however, the FDCA’s treatment of prescription drugs includes neither an express pre-emption clause (as in the vaccine context, 42 U.S. C. nor an express non- pre-emption clause (as in the over-the-counter drug con- text, 21 U.S. C. §§3r(e), 3s(d)). In the absence of that sort of “explicit” expression of congressional intent, we are left to divine Congress’ will from the duties the statute imposes. That federal law forbids Mutual to take actions required of it by state tort law evinces an intent to pre-empt. * * * This case arises out of tragic circumstances. A combina- tion of factors combined to produce the rare and devastat- ing injuries that respondent suffered: the FDA’s decision to approve the sale of sulindac and the warnings that accompanied the drug at the time it was prescribed, the decision by respondent’s physician to prescribe sulindac despite its known risks, and Congress’ decision to regulate the manufacture and sale of generic drugs in a way that reduces their cost to patients but leaves generic |
Justice Thomas | 1,995 | 1 | majority | National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117961/national-private-truck-council-inc-v-oklahoma-tax-commn/ | In the Oklahoma state courts, petitioners successfully challenged certain Oklahoma taxes as violating the "dormant" Commerce Clause. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered respondents to award refunds pursuant to *584 state law, it also held that petitioners were not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. 1983, and, accordingly, that they could not obtain attorney's fees under 42 U.S. C. 1988(b) (1988 ed., Supp. V). Petitioners argue that this holding violates the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. We affirm. I In 1983, Oklahoma imposed third-structure taxes against motor carriers with vehicles registered in any of 25 States.[1] It did so in order to retaliate against those States that had imposed discriminatory taxes against trucks registered in Oklahoma. In December 1984, petitioners filed a class action in an Oklahoma trial court, arguing that the taxes violated the dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2, cl. 1. Pursuant to state law and 1983, petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as refunds of taxes paid. In addition, they sought attorney's fees under both state law and 1988.[2] *585 The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the taxes, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and held that the taxes were invalid under our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Private Truck The court awarded refunds under state law, but declined to award relief under 1983 and declined to award attorney's fees under 1988. In so ruling, it relied on Consolidated Freightways (CA8), cert. denied, which held that 1983 may not be used to secure remedies for dormant Commerce Clause violations. After the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision, we held that one of the "rights, privileges or immunities" protected by 1983 was the right to be free from state action that violates the dormant Commerce Clause. See Accordingly, we granted the taxpayers' petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Dennis. On remand, the Oklahoma Supreme Court once again held that petitioners were not entitled to relief under 1983. The court noted that because adequate remedies existed under state law, the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S. C. 1341, would have precluded petitioners from seeking an injunction in federal -141. Although the Tax Injunction Act does not apply in state courts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied upon the principle of "intrastate uniformity" to conclude that a state court need not grant injunctive or declaratory relief under 1983 when such remedies would not be available in federal ). We granted certiorari to resolve a |
Justice Thomas | 1,995 | 1 | majority | National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117961/national-private-truck-council-inc-v-oklahoma-tax-commn/ | available in federal ). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state courts as to whether, in tax cases, state courts must provide *586 relief under 1983 when adequate remedies exist under state law.[3] II We have long recognized that principles of federalism and comity generally counsel that courts should adopt a hands-off approach with respect to state tax administration. Immediately prior to the enactment of 1983, the Court articulated the reasons behind the reluctance to interfere: "It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible." Since the passage of 1983, Congress and this Court repeatedly have shown an aversion to federal interference with state tax administration. The passage of the Tax Injunction Act in 1937 is one manifestation of this aversion. See 28 U.S. C. 1341 (prohibiting federal courts from enjoining the collection of any state tax "where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State"). We subsequently relied upon the Act's spirit to extend the prohibition from injunctions to declaratory judgments regarding the constitutionality of state taxes. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Later, we held that the Tax Injunction Act itself precluded district courts from awarding such declaratory judgments. See Cal- *587 The reluctance to interfere with state tax collection continued in McKesson in which we confirmed that the States are afforded great flexibility in satisfying the requirements of due process in the field of taxation. As long as state law provides a "`clear and certain remedy,' " ), the States may determine whether to provide predeprivation process (e. g., an injunction) or instead to afford postdeprivation relief (e. g., a refund), -37. See also Of particular relevance to this case, Fair in Real Estate Assn., held that because of principles of comity and federalism, Congress never authorized federal courts to entertain damages actions under 1983 against state taxes when state law furnishes an adequate legal remedy. Seeking to overcome the longstanding federal reluctance to interfere with state taxation, petitioners invoke the Supremacy Clause and the straightforward proposition that it requires state courts to enforce federal law, here 1983 and 1988. When they have jurisdiction, state courts have been compelled to provide federal remedies, notwithstanding the existence of less intrusive state-law remedies. See, e. g., Accordingly, petitioners argue that we should require the Oklahoma Supreme Court to award equitable |
Justice Thomas | 1,995 | 1 | majority | National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117961/national-private-truck-council-inc-v-oklahoma-tax-commn/ | we should require the Oklahoma Supreme Court to award equitable and declaratory relief under 1983 and attorney's fees under 1988. For purposes of this case, we will assume without deciding that state courts generally must hear 1983 suits.[4] But this *588 does not necessarily mean that, having found a violation of federal law, state courts must award declaratory and injunctive relief under 1983 in tax cases. Though federal courts are obliged to hear 1983 claims, it is clear that they may not award damages or declaratory or injunctive relief in state tax cases when an adequate state remedy exists. See Fair at ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock ; ; 28 U.S. C. 1341. As we explain more fully below, the background presumption that federal law generally will not interfere with administration of state taxes leads us to conclude that Congress did not authorize injunctive or declaratory relief under 1983 in state tax cases when there is an adequate remedy at law.[5] III Petitioners correctly point out that the Tax Injunction Act does not prohibit state courts from entertaining 1983 suits that seek to enjoin the collection of state taxes. Nor can a desire for "intrastate uniformity" permit state courts to refuse to award relief merely because a federal court could not grant such relief. As petitioners note, it was not until 1875 that Congress provided any kind of general federal-question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts. See "Until that time, the state courts provided the only forum for vindicating many important federal claims." Because of the Supremacy Clause, state courts could not have refused to hear cases arising under federal law merely to ensure "uniformity" *589 between state and federal courts located within a particular state. In determining whether Congress has authorized state courts to issue injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases, we must interpret 1983 in light of the strong background principle against federal interference with state taxation. Given this principle, we hold that 1983 does not call for either federal or state courts to award injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases when an adequate legal remedy exists. Petitioners do not dispute that Oklahoma has offered an adequate remedy in the form of refunds. Under these circumstances, the Oklahoma courts' denial of relief under 1983 was consistent with the long line of precedent underscoring the federal reluctance to interfere with state taxation. Our cases since Dows have uniformly concluded that federal courts cannot enjoin the collection of state taxes when a remedy at law is available. See, e. g., at (a "scrupulous regard for |
Justice Thomas | 1,995 | 1 | majority | National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117961/national-private-truck-council-inc-v-oklahoma-tax-commn/ | is available. See, e. g., at (a "scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that [injunctive] relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it"); Singer Sewing Machine Co. of N. ; Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Until Fair one could have construed these cases as concerning only the equitable powers of the federal courts. See -111. In Fair however, the principle of noninterference with state taxation led us to construe 1983 narrowly. We held that 1983 does not permit federal courts to award damages in state tax cases when state law provides an adequate remedy. See at Although there was much discussion of the limitations on equity power, that discussion was useful only insofar as it provided a background against which 1983 must be interpreted. Indeed, *590 because Fair considered whether damages were available under 1983, the principle of equitable restraint that we discussed could have no direct application in that case. In concluding that Congress did not authorize damages actions in state tax cases brought in federal court, we found no evidence that Congress intended 1983 to overturn the principle of federalism invoked in Dows and subsequently followed by the courts. Construing 1983, we held that the case was "controlled by principles articulated even before enactment of 1983 and followed in later decisions." at 115-. Just as Fair relied upon a background principle in interpreting 1983 to preclude damages actions in tax cases brought in federal court, so we rely on the same principle in interpreting 1983 to provide no basis for courts to award injunctive relief when an adequate legal remedy exists. Our interpretation is supported not only by the background principle of federal noninterference discussed in Fair but also by the principles of equitable restraint discussed at length in that case. See Whether a suit is brought in federal or state court, Congress simply did not authorize the disruption of state tax administration in this way. To be sure, the Tax Injunction Act reflects the congressional concern with federal court interference with state taxation, see 28 U.S. C. 1341, and there is no similar statute divesting state courts of the authority to enter an injunction under federal law when an adequate legal remedy exists. But this silence is irrelevant here, because we do not understand 1983 to call for courts (whether federal or state) to enjoin the collection of state taxes when an adequate remedy is available under state law. Given the |
Justice Thomas | 1,995 | 1 | majority | National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117961/national-private-truck-council-inc-v-oklahoma-tax-commn/ | an adequate remedy is available under state law. Given the strong background presumption against interference with state taxation, the Tax Injunction Act may be best understood as but a partial codification of the federal reluctance to interfere with state taxation. See Fair at ("[T]he principle *591 of comity which predated the Act [ 1341] was not restricted by its passage"). After all, an injunction issued by a state court pursuant to 1983 is just as disruptive as one entered by a federal The availability of an adequate legal remedy renders a declaratory judgment unwarranted as well. In Great Lakes, we observed that "considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure." The declaratory judgment procedure "may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation is ended," ib and thus must be treated as being no less potentially disruptive than an injunction. See also Grace Brethren Cf. U.S. 66 Declaratory relief in state tax cases might throw tax administration "into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law." U.S. 82, We simply do not read 1983 to provide for injunctive or declaratory relief against a state tax, either in federal or state court, when an adequate legal remedy exists.[6] *592 Of course, nothing we say prevents a State from empowering its own courts to issue injunctions and declaratory judgments even when a legal remedy exists. Absent a valid federal prohibition, state courts are free to issue injunctions and declaratory judgments under state law. When a litigant seeks declaratory or injunctive relief against a state tax pursuant to 1983, however, state courts, like their federal counterparts, must refrain from granting federal relief under 1983 when there is an adequate legal remedy. Because petitioners had an adequate legal remedy, the Oklahoma courts could not have awarded either declaratory or injunctive relief against the state taxes under 1983. It follows that when no relief can be awarded pursuant to 1983, no attorney's fees can be awarded under 1988. Accordingly, the judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court is Affirmed. |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | dissenting | Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118403/brentwood-academy-v-tennessee-secondary-school-athletic-assn/ | We have never found state action based upon mere "entwinement" Until today, we have found a private organization's acts to constitute state action only when the organization performed a public function; was created, coerced, or encouraged by the government; or acted in a symbiotic relationship with the government The majority's holding that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association's (TSSAA) enforcement of its recruiting rule is state action not only extends state-action doctrine beyond its permissible limits but also encroaches upon the realm of individual freedom that the doctrine was meant to protect I respectfully dissent I Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state-action element of 42 US C 1983 excludes from its coverage "merely private conduct, however *306 discriminatory or wrongful" American Mut Ins "Careful adherence to the `state action' requirement" thus "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power" The state-action doctrine also promotes important values of federalism, "avoid[ing] the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control" National Collegiate Athletic Although we have used many different tests to identify state action, they all have a common purpose Our goal in every case is to determine whether an action "can fairly be attributed to the State" ; American A Regardless of these various tests for state action, common sense dictates that the TSSAA's actions cannot fairly be attributed to the State, and thus cannot constitute state action The TSSAA was formed in 1925 as a private corporation to organize interscholastic athletics and to sponsor tournaments among its member schools Any private or public secondary school may join the TSSAA by signing a contract agreeing to comply with its rules and decisions Although public schools currently compose 84% of the TSSAA's membership, the TSSAA does not require that public schools constitute a set percentage of its membership, and, indeed, no public school need join the TSSAA The TSSAA's rules are enforced not by a state agency but by its own board of control, which comprises high school principals, assistant principals, and superintendents, none of whom must work at a public school Of course, at the time the recruiting rule was enforced in this case, all of the board members happened to be public school officials However, each board member acts in *307 a representative capacity on behalf of all the private and public schools in his region of Tennessee, and not simply his individual school The State of Tennessee did not create the TSSAA The State does not fund the TSSAA and does not |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | dissenting | Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118403/brentwood-academy-v-tennessee-secondary-school-athletic-assn/ | The State does not fund the TSSAA and does not pay its employees[1] In fact, only 4% of the TSSAA's revenue comes from the dues paid by member schools; the bulk of its operating budget is derived from gate receipts at tournaments it sponsors The State does not permit the TSSAA to use stateowned facilities for a discounted fee, and it does not exempt the TSSAA from state taxation No Tennessee law authorizes the State to coordinate interscholastic athletics or empowers another entity to organize interscholastic athletics on behalf of the State[2] The only state pronouncement acknowledging *308 the TSSAA's existence is a rule providing that the State Board of Education permits public schools to maintain membership in the TSSAA if they so choose[3] Moreover, the State of Tennessee has never had any involvement in the particular action taken by the TSSAA in this case: the enforcement of the TSSAA's recruiting rule prohibiting members from using "undue influence" on students or their parents or guardians "to secure or to retain a student for athletic purposes" App 115 There is no indication that the State has ever had any interest in how schools choose to regulate recruiting[4] In fact, the TSSAA's authority to enforce its recruiting rule arises solely from the voluntary membership contract that each member school signs, agreeing to conduct its athletics in accordance with the rules and decisions of the TSSAA B Even approaching the issue in terms of any of the Court's specific state-action tests, the conclusion is the same: The TSSAA's enforcement of its recruiting rule against Brentwood Academy is not state action In applying these tests, *309 courts of course must place the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff, not the defendant, because state action is an element of a 1983 claim American -; The TSSAA has not performed a function that has been "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State" The organization of interscholastic sports is neither a traditional nor an exclusive public function of the States Widespread organization and administration of interscholastic contests by schools did not begin until the 20th century See M Lee, A History of Physical Education and Sports in the U S A 73 (1983) (explaining that what little interscholastic athletics there was in the 19th century "came almost entirely in the closing decade of the century and was largely pupil inspired, pupil controlled, and pupil coached"); Certainly, in Tennessee, the State did not even show an interest in interscholastic athletics until 47 years after the TSSAA had been in existence and had been orchestrating athletic contests throughout the State |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | dissenting | Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118403/brentwood-academy-v-tennessee-secondary-school-athletic-assn/ | existence and had been orchestrating athletic contests throughout the State Even then, the State Board of Education merely acquiesced in the TSSAA's actions and did not assume the role of regulating interscholastic athletics 457 U S, at -1005 ; see also Flagg Bros, The TSSAA no doubt serves the public, particularly the public schools, but the mere provision of a service to the public does not render such provision a traditional and exclusive public function See *310 It is also obvious that the TSSAA is not an entity created and controlled by the government for the purpose of fulfilling a government objective, as was Amtrak in See also (holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor) Indeed, no one claims that the State of Tennessee played any role in the creation of the TSSAA as a private corporation in 1925 The TSSAA was designed to fulfill an objectivethe organization of interscholastic athletic tournamentsthat the government had not contemplated, much less pursued And although the board of control currently is composed of public school officials, and although public schools currently account for the majority of the TSSAA's membership, this is not required by the TSSAA's constitution In addition, the State of Tennessee has not "exercised coercive power or provided such significant encouragement [to the TSSAA], either overt or covert," 457 U S, at that the TSSAA's regulatory activities must in law be deemed to be those of the State The State has not promulgated any regulations of interscholastic sports, and nothing in the record suggests that the State has encouraged or coerced the TSSAA in enforcing its recruiting rule To be sure, public schools do provide a small portion of the TSSAA's funding through their membership dues, but no one argues that these dues are somehow conditioned on the TSSAA's enactment and enforcement of recruiting rules[5]*311 Likewise, even if the TSSAA were dependent on state funding to the extent of 90%, as was the case in instead of less than 4%, mere financial dependence on the State does not convert the TSSAA's actions into acts of the State See ; ; see also Moose No Furthermore, there is no evidence of "joint participation," -942, between the State and the TSSAA in the TSSAA's enforcement of its recruiting rule The TSSAA's board of control enforces its recruiting rule solely in accordance with the authority granted to it under the contract that each member signs Finally, there is no "symbiotic relationship" between the State and the TSSAA Moose ; cf Contrary to the majority's assertion, see ante, at |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | dissenting | Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118403/brentwood-academy-v-tennessee-secondary-school-athletic-assn/ | ; cf Contrary to the majority's assertion, see ante, at 299-300, the TSSAA's "fiscal relationship with the State is not different from that of many contractors performing services for the government" The TSSAA provides a servicethe organization of athletic tournamentsin exchange for membership dues and gate fees, just as a vendor could contract with public schools to sell refreshments at school events Certainly the public school could sell its own refreshments, yet the existence of that option does not transform the service performed by the contractor into a state action Also, there is no suggestion in this case that, as was the case in Burton, the State profits from the TSSAA's decision to enforce its recruiting rule *312 Because I do not believe that the TSSAA's action of enforcing its recruiting rule is fairly attributable to the State of Tennessee, I would affirm II Although the TSSAA's enforcement activities cannot be considered state action as a matter of common sense or under any of this Court's existing theories of state action, the majority presents a new theory Under this theory, the majority holds that the combination of factors it identifies evidences "entwinement" of the State with the TSSAA, and that such entwinement converts private action into state action Ante, at 296-297 The majority does not define "entwinement," and the meaning of the term is not altogether clear But whatever this new "entwinement" theory may entail, it lacks any support in our state-action jurisprudence Although the majority asserts that there are three examples of entwinement analysis in our cases, there is no case in which we have rested a finding of state action on entwinement alone Two of the cases on which the majority relies do not even use the word "entwinement" See Lebron concerned the status of Amtrak, a corporation that Congress created and placed under Government control for the specific purpose of achieving a governmental objective (namely, to avert the threatened extinction of passenger train service in the United States) 386 Without discussing any notion of entwinement, we simply held that, when "the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment" Id, Similarly, in *313 City Trusts, we did not consider entwinement when we addressed the question whether an agency established by state law was a state actor See 353 US, at 231 In that case, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a law creating a board |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | dissenting | Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118403/brentwood-academy-v-tennessee-secondary-school-athletic-assn/ | case, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a law creating a board of directors to operate a racially segregated school for orphans Ibid Without mentioning "entwinement," we held that, because the board was a state agency, its actions were attributable to the State Ibid The majority's third example, Evans v Newton, 382 US 296 lends no more support to an "entwinement" theory than do Lebron and City Trusts Although Evans at least uses the word "entwined," 382 US, at 299 we did not discuss entwinement as a distinct concept, let alone one sufficient to transform a private entity into a state actor when traditional theories of state action do not On the contrary, our analysis rested on the recognition that the subject of the dispute, a park, served a "public function," much like a fire department or a police department Id, A park, we noted, is a "public facility" that "serves the community" Id, at 301 302 Even if the city severed all ties to the park and placed its operation in private hands, the park still would be "municipal in nature," analogous to other public facilities that have given rise to a finding of state action: the streets of a company town in Marsh v Alabama, 326 US 1 the elective process in Terry v Adams, 345 US 461 and the transit system in Public Util Comm'n of D C v Pollak, 343 US 451 382 US, at 301-302 Because the park served public functions, the private trustees operating the park were considered to be state actors[6] *314 These cases, therefore, cannot support the majority's "entwinement" theory Only Evans speaks of entwinement at all, and it does not do so in the same broad sense as does the majority[7] Moreover, these cases do not suggest that the TSSAA's activities can be considered state action, whether the label for the state-action theory is "entwinement" or anything else * * * Because the majority never defines "entwinement," the scope of its holding is unclear If we are fortunate, the majority's fact-specific analysis will have little bearing beyond this case But if the majority's new entwinement test develops in future years, it could affect many organizations that foster activities, enforce rules, and sponsor extracurricular competition among high schoolsnot just in athletics, but in such diverse areas as agriculture, mathematics, music, marching bands, forensics, and cheerleading Indeed, this entwinement test may extend to other organizations that are composed of, or controlled by, public officials or public entities, such as firefighters, policemen, teachers, cities, or counties *315 I am not prepared to say that any private |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | concurring | Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109542/cantor-v-detroit-edison-co/ | I agree with the Court insofar as it holds that the fact that anticompetitive conduct is sanctioned, or even required, by state law does not of itself put that conduct beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. Since the opposite proposition is the ground on which the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of this suit, I also agree that its judgment must be reversed. My approach, however, is somewhat different from that of the Court. I As to the principal question in the case, that of the Sherman Act's pre-emptive effect upon inconsistent state laws, it is, as the dissent points out, one of congressional intent. No one denies that Congress could, if it wished, override those state laws whose operation would subvert the federal policy of free competition in interstate commerce. In discerning that intent, however, I find somewhat less assistance in the legislative history than does the dissent. It is true that the framers of the Sherman Act expressed the view that certain areas of economic activity were left entirely to state regulation. The dissent quotes several of these expressions. Post, at 632-634. A careful reading of those statements reveals, however, that they little more than reflect the then-prevailing view that Congress lacked the power, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate economic activity that was within the domain of the States. The Court since then has recognized a greatly expanded Commerce Clause *606 power. Arguably, the Sherman Act should have remained confined within the outlines of that power as it was thought to exist in 1890, on the theory that if Congress believed it could not regulate any more broadly, it must not have attempted to do so. But that bridge already has been crossed, for it has been held that Congress intended the reach of the Sherman Act to expand along with that of the commerce power. Hospital Building and cases cited. Our question in this case is one that the Sherman Act's framers did not directly confront or explicitly address: What was to be the result if the expanding ambit of the Sherman Act should bring it into conflict with inconsistent state law? But it seems to me that this bridge also has been crossed. In Schwegmann the issue was whether the Sherman Act permitted enforcement of a Louisiana statute requiring compliance by liquor retailers with resale price agreements to which they were not parties, but which had been entered into by other retailers with their wholesale suppliers. The Court held the Louisiana statute unenforceable; there is no plausible reading of that decision other than |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | concurring | Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109542/cantor-v-detroit-edison-co/ | there is no plausible reading of that decision other than that the statute was pre-empted by the Sherman Act.[1]Northern Securities is to the same effect. The defenders of the railroad holding company attacked in that case argued that it was beyond the Sherman Act's reach because it was lawful under the corporation *607 laws of New Jersey. The holding company was nonetheless held unlawful, and, to that extent, the law of New Jersey was forced to give way.[2] Indeed, I suppose that some degree of state-law pre-emption is implicit in the most fundamental operation of the Sherman Act. If a State had no antitrust policy of its own, anticompetitive combinations of all kinds would be sanctioned and enforced under that State's general contract and corporation law. Yet, there has never been any doubt that if such combinations offend the Sherman Act, they are illegal, and state laws to that extent are overridden.[3] Congress itself has given support to the view that inconsistent state laws are pre-empted by the Sherman Act. Were it the case that state statutes held complete sway, Congress would not have found it necessary in 1937 to pass the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, amending the Sherman Act, specifically exempting from the latter's operation certain price maintenance agreements sanctioned by state law. 15 U.S. C. 1. There are other instances of Congress' acting to protect state-sanctioned anticompetitive schemes from the Sherman *608 Act. In response to Schwegmann, see H. R. Rep. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2, Congress in 1952 passed the McGuire bill, extending the Miller-Tydings exemption to state statutes that enforced resale price agreements against nonsigners. 15 U.S. C. 45 (a) (2) to (5). A similar enactment is the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, exempting from federal statutes "any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance," with provision that the Sherman Act, and other named federal statutes, should apply to that business after a specified date "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." 15 U.S. C. 1012 (b).[4] These express grants of Sherman Act immunity seem significant to me. As the Court stated in United construing the immunity granted to certain agreements by the Agricultural Marketing *609 Agreement Act of 1937, "[i]f Congress had desired to grant any further immunity, Congress doubtless would have said so." II I also agree with MR. JUSTICE STEVENS that the particular anticompetitive scheme attacked in this case must fall despite the imprimatur it claims to have received from the State of Michigan. To say, as I have, that |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | concurring | Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109542/cantor-v-detroit-edison-co/ | the State of Michigan. To say, as I have, that the Sherman Act generally pre-empts inconsistent state laws is not to answer the much more difficult question as to which such laws are pre-empted and to what extent. I fear there are no easy solutions, though several suggest themselves. It cannot be decisive, for example, simply that a state law goes so far as to require, rather than simply to authorize, the anticompetitive conduct in question. The Court accepted this as a prerequisite to antitrust immunity in but it cannot alone be sufficient. The whole issue in Schwegmann was whether the State could require obedience to a fixed resale price arrangement. Similarly, compliance with an anticompetitive contract, or adherence to an illegal corporate combination, might well be "required" by a State's general contract and corporation law. Neither can it be decisive that a particular state-sanctioned scheme was initiated by the private actors rather than by the State. I see no difference in the degree of private initiation as between the marketing arrangement approved in and the resale price maintenance scheme disapproved in Schwegmann. In each case the particular scheme was initiated by the private actors at the invitation of a general statute, with which they may or may *610 not have had anything to do. The same was true in Northern Securities, and the same is true here. To be sure, there is a certain rough justice, as well as an appearance of simplicity, in a rule based upon who actually is responsible for the scheme in question, but I fear that both the justice and the simplicity would prove illusory in the rule's actual application. Every state enactment is initiated, in its way, by its beneficiaries. It would scarcely make sense to immunize only those powerful enough to speak entirely through their governmental representatives, or, for that matter, to stifle such speech with the threat that it will destroy antitrust immunity. Moreover, the process of enactment is likely to involve such a complex interplay between those regulating and those regulated that it will be impossible to identify the true "initiator." A final, ostensibly simple, solution that I find wanting would be to insist only on some degree of affirmative articulation by the State of its conscientious intent to sanction the challenged scheme, and its reasons therefor. This also is a tempting solution, particularly in this case, where there is little to suggest (at least in recent years) that the Michigan Public Service Commission has even actively considered the light-bulb tie-in, much less articulated a justification for it. Yet such |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | concurring | Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109542/cantor-v-detroit-edison-co/ | tie-in, much less articulated a justification for it. Yet such a solution would also lead to perverse results. A regulation whose justification was too plain to require explication would be vulnerable; a questionable one could be immunized if its proponents had the skill or influence to generate the proper legislative history. And, of course, deciding how much "affirmative articulation" of state policy is enough is not a simple matter. I would apply, at least for now, a rule of reason, taking it as a general proposition that state-sanctioned anti-competitive activity must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits. This does not mean *611 that state-sanctioned and private activity are to be treated alike. The former is different because the fact of state sanction figures powerfully in the calculus of harm and benefit. If, for example, the justification for the scheme lies in the protection of health or safety, the strength of that justification is forcefully attested to by the existence of a state enactment. I would assess the justifications of such enactments in the same way as is done in equal protection review, and where such justifications are at all substantial ), I would be reluctant to find the restraint unreasonable. A particularly strong justification exists for a state-sanctioned scheme if the State in effect has substituted itself for the forces of competition, and regulates private activity to the same ends sought to be achieved by the Sherman Act. Thus, an anticompetitive scheme which the State institutes on the plausible ground that it will improve the performance of the market in fostering efficient resource allocation and low prices can scarcely be assailed. One could not doubt the legality of Detroit Edison's electric power monopoly; the fear of such a monopoly is primarily its tendency to charge excessive prices, but its prices in this instance are controlled by the State. No doubt such a rule of reason will crystallize, as it is applied, into various per se rules relating to certain kinds of state enactments, such as the regulation of the classic natural monopoly, the public utility. We should not shrink in our general approach, however, from what seems to me our constitutionally mandated task, one often set for us by conflicting federal and state laws, and that is the balancing of implicated federal and state interests with a view to assuring that when these are truly in conflict, the former prevail. *612 The dissent's fears on this score appear to me to be exaggerated. The balancing of harm and benefit is, in general, a process with |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | concurring | Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109542/cantor-v-detroit-edison-co/ | of harm and benefit is, in general, a process with which federal courts are well acquainted in the antitrust field. The special problem of assessing state interests to determine whether they are strong enough to prevail against supreme federal dictates is also a familiar one to the federal courts. Indeed, a state action that interferes with competition not only among its own citizens but also among the States is already subject under the Commerce Clause to much the same searching review of state justifications as is proposed here. See, e. g., Dean Milk ; Southern Pacific III By these standards the present case does not seem a difficult one. The light-bulb tie-in presents the usual dangers of such a scheme, principally that respondent will extend its monopoly from the sale of electric power into that of light bulbs, not because it sells better light bulbs, but because its light bulbs are the ones customers must pay for if they are to have light at all. See P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 569-570 (2d ed. 1974). On the record before us the scheme appears to be unjustified. No doubt it originated as a means to promote electric power use, but it is difficult to see why a tie-in (rather than an optional, promotional light-bulb sale) was necessary *613 to that end even in the 19th century, laying aside the question whether the promotion of greater electric power use remains today a plausible public goal. Respondent would justify the scheme on the ground of consumer savings, its light bulbs assertedly being cheaper and better than those commercially available. Brief for Respondent 7-9, 41-42. But again, a tie-in is not necessary to pass along these savings. A tie-in is only necessary in order to force consumers to pay for light bulbs from Detroit Edison rather than someone else. But there is no indication that one light bulb does not fit the socket as well as another, or that the sale of light bulbs is in any way crucial to respondent's successful operation. Conceivably, Michigan's aim is the very extension of the monopoly, born of a preference for having light bulbs supplied by one whose prices are already regulated. But ending competition in the light-bulb market cannot be accepted as an adequate state objective without some evidenceof which there is not the least hint in this recordthat such competition is in some way ineffective. For all that appears, light-bulb marketing, unlike electric power production, is not a natural monopoly, nor does it implicate health or safety, nor is it beset with problems of instability or |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | The question presented by this case is whether the common-law in pari delicto defense bars a private damages action under the federal securities laws against corporate insiders and broker-dealers who fraudulently induce investors to purchase securities by misrepresenting that they are conveying material nonpublic information about the issuer. I The respondent investors filed this action in the United District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that they incurred substantial trading losses as a result of a conspiracy between Charles Lazzaro, a registered securities broker employed by the petitioner Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Bateman Eichler), and Leslie Neadeau, President of T. O. N. M. Oil & Gas Exploration Corporation (TONM), to induce them to purchase large quantities of TONM over-the-counter stock by divulging false and materially incomplete information about the company on the pretext that it was accurate inside information.[1] Specifically, Lazzaro is alleged to have told the respondents that he personally knew TONM insiders and had learned, inter alia, that (a) "[v]ast amounts of gold had been discovered in Surinam, and TONM had options on thousands of acres in gold-producing *302 regions of Surinam";[2] (b) the discovery was "not publically known, but would subsequently be announced"; (c) TONM was currently engaged in negotiations with other companies to form a joint venture for mining the Surinamese gold; and (d) when this information was made public, "TONM stock, which was then selling from $1.50 to $3.00/share, would increase in value from $10 to $15/share within a short period of time, and might increase to $100/share" within a year. Complaint ¶¶ 16-17, App. 10-12.[3] Some of the respondents aver that they contacted Neadeau and inquired whether Lazzaro's tips were accurate; Neadeau stated that the information was "not public knowledge" and "would neither confirm nor deny those claims," but allegedly advised that "Lazzaro was a very trustworthy and a good man." App. 12. The respondents admitted in their complaint that they purchased TONM stock, much of it through Lazzaro, "on the premise that Lazzaro was privy to certain information not otherwise available to the general public." App. 10. Their shares initially increased dramatically in price, but ultimately declined to substantially below the purchase price when the joint mining venture fell through. App. 13-14.[4] *303 Lazzaro and Neadeau are alleged to have made the representations set forth above knowing that the representations "were untrue and/or contained only half-truths, material omissions of fact and falsehoods,"[5] intending that the respondents would rely thereon, and for the purpose of "influenc[ing] and manipulat[ing] the price of TONM stock" so as "to profit themselves through the taking |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | TONM stock" so as "to profit themselves through the taking of commissions and secret profits." App. 13, 15-16.[6] The respondents contended that this scheme violated, inter alia, 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. 78j(b),[7] and Securities and Exchange Commission *304 () Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 CFR 240.10b-5[8] They sought capital losses and lost profits, punitive damages, and costs and attorney's fees. App. 26.[9] The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that "trading on insider information is itself a violation of rule 10b-5" and that the allegations in the complaint demonstrated that the respondents themselves had "violated the particular statutory provision under which recovery is sought." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2. Thus, the court concluded, the respondents were in pari delicto with Lazzaro and Neadeau and absolutely barred from recovery. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Although it *305 assumed that the respondents had violated the federal securities laws, the court nevertheless concluded that "securities professionals and corporate officers who have allegedly engaged in fraud should not be permitted to invoke the in pari delicto doctrine to shield themselves from the consequences of their fraudulent misrepresentation," The Court of Appeals noted that this Court had sharply restricted the availability of the in pari delicto defense in antitrust actions, see Perma Life Mufflers, and concluded that, essentially for three reasons, there was no basis "for creating a different rule for private actions initiated under the federal securities laws," First, the court reasoned that, in cases such as this, defrauded tippees are not in fact "equally responsible" for the violations they allege. Second, the court believed that allowing the defense in these circumstances would be "totally incompatible with the overall aims of the securities law" because the threat of a private damages action is necessary to deter "insider-tipster[s]" from defrauding the public. Finally, the court noted the availability of means other than an outright preclusion of suit to deter tippees from trading on inside information. n. 3. The lower courts have divided over the proper scope of the in pari delicto defense in securities litigation.[10] We granted certiorari. We affirm. *306 The common-law defense at issue in this case derives from the Latin, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis: "In a case of equal or mutual fault the position of the [defending] party is the better one."[11] The defense is grounded on two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers;[12] and second, that denying judicial relief |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | mediating disputes among wrongdoers;[12] and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality.[13] In its classic formulation, *307 the in pari delicto defense was narrowly limited to situations where the plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal responsibility for his injury, because "in cases where both parties are in delicto, concurring in an illegal act, it does not always follow that they stand in pari delicto; for there may be, and often are, very different degrees in their guilt." 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence 304-305 (13th ed. 1886) (Story). Thus there might be an "inequality of condition" between the parties, or "a confidential relationship between th[em]" that determined their "relative standing" before a court, 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 942a, p. 741 (Pomeroy). In addition, the public policy considerations that undergirded the in pari delicto defense were frequently construed as precluding the defense even where the plaintiff bore substantial fault for his injury: "[T]here may be on the part of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public policy in many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties may be." Notwithstanding these traditional limitations, many courts have given the in pari delicto defense a broad application to bar actions where plaintiffs simply have been involved generally in "the same sort of wrongdoing" as defendants. Perma Life Mufflers,[14] In Perma Life, we emphasized "the inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public purposes." That case involved a treble-damages action against a Midas Muffler franchisor by several of its dealers, who alleged that the franchise agreement created a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation *308 of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.[15] The lower courts barred the action on the grounds that the dealers, as parties to the agreement, were in pari delicto with the franchisor. In reversing that determination, the opinion for this Court emphasized that there was no indication that Congress had intended to incorporate the defense into the antitrust laws, which "are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating [illegal] business behavior." Accordingly, the opinion concluded that "the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action." The opinion reserved the question whether a plaintiff who engaged in "truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic scheme" one who "aggressively support[ed] and further[ed] the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and parcel of it" |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and parcel of it" could be barred from pursuing a damages action, finding that the muffler dealers had relatively little bargaining power and that they had been coerced by the franchisor into agreeing to many of the contract's provisions. In separate opinions, five Justices agreed that the concept of "equal fault" should be narrowly defined in litigation arising under federal regulatory statutes.[16] "[B]ecause of the strong public interest in eliminating restraints on competition,. many of the refinements of moral worth demanded of plaintiffs by many of the variations of in pari delicto should not be applicable in the antitrust field." The five Justices concluded, however, that where a plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal responsibility for the violation, a defense *309 based on such fault whether or not denominated in pari delicto should be recognized in antitrust litigation.[17] Bateman Eichler argues that Perma Life with its emphasis on the importance of analyzing the effects that fault-based defenses would have on the enforcement of congressional goals is of only marginal relevance to a private damages action under the federal securities laws. Specifically, Bateman Eichler observes that Congress expressly provided for private antitrust actions thereby manifesting a "desire to go beyond the common law in the antitrust statute in order to provide substantial encouragement to private enforcement and to help deter anticompetitive conduct" whereas private rights of action under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are merely implied from that provision[18] thereby, apparently, supporting a broader application of the in pari delicto defense. Brief for Petitioner 32. Bateman Eichler buttresses this argument by observing that, unlike the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the securities laws contain savings provisions directing that "[t]he rights and remedies provided by [those laws] shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity"[19] again, apparently, supporting a broader scope for fault-based defenses than recognized in Perma Life. *310 We disagree. Nothing in Perma Life suggested that public policy implications should govern only where Congress expressly provides for private remedies; the classic formulation of the in pari delicto doctrine itself required a careful consideration of such implications before allowing the defense. See Moreover, we repeatedly have emphasized that implied private actions provide "a most effective weapon in the enforcement" of the securities laws and are "a necessary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case ; see also Blue Chip In addition, we have eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | we have eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities laws. See, e. g., Herman & ; A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines[20] We therefore conclude that the views expressed in Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action under the federal securities laws. Accordingly, a private action for damages in these circumstances may be barred on the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only where (1) as a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks *311 to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the investing public. A The District Court and Court of Appeals proceeded on the assumption that the respondents had violated 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see at 304-305 an assumption we accept for purposes of resolving the issue before us. Cf. A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines[21]*312 Bateman Eichler contends that the respondents' delictum was substantially par to that of Lazzaro and Neadeau for two reasons. First, whereas many antitrust plaintiffs participate in illegal restraints of trade only "passively" or as the result of economic coercion, as was the case in Perma Life, the ordinary tippee acts voluntarily in choosing to trade on inside information. Second, 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply literally to "any person" who violates their terms, and do not recognize gradations of culpability. We agree that the typically voluntary nature of an investor's decision impermissibly to trade on an inside tip renders the investor more blameworthy than someone who is party to a contract solely by virtue of another's overweening bargaining power. We disagree, however, that an investor who engages in such trading is necessarily as blameworthy as a corporate insider or broker-dealer who discloses the information for personal gain. Notwithstanding the broad reach of 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there are important distinctions *313 between the relative culpabilities of tippers, securities professionals, and tippees in these circumstances. The Court has made clear in recent Terms that a tippee's use of material nonpublic information does not violate 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 unless the tippee owes a corresponding duty to disclose the information. ; That duty typically is "derivative from the insider's duty." ; see also In other words, "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty" toward corporate shareholders. at[22] In the context of insider trading, we do not believe that |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | the context of insider trading, we do not believe that a person whose liability is solely derivative can be said to be as culpable as one whose breach of duty gave rise to that liability in the first place.[23] Moreover, insiders and broker-dealers who selectively disclose material nonpublic information commit a potentially broader range of violations than do tippees who trade on the basis of that information. A tippee trading on inside information will in many circumstances be guilty of fraud against individual shareholders, a violation for which the tipper shares responsibility. But the insider, in disclosing such information, also frequently breaches fiduciary duties toward the issuer itself.[24] And in cases where the tipper *314 intentionally conveys false or materially incomplete information to the tippee, the tipper commits an additional violation: fraud against the tippee. Such conduct is particularly egregious when committed by a securities professional, who owes a duty of honesty and fair dealing toward his clients. Cf. 3 Pomeroy 942a, at 741. Absent other culpable actions by a tippee that can fairly be said to outweigh these violations by insiders and broker-dealers, we do not believe that the tippee properly can be characterized as being of substantially equal culpability as his tippers. There is certainly no basis for concluding at this stage of this litigation that the respondents were in pari delicto with Lazzaro and Neadeau. The allegations are that Lazzaro and Neadeau masterminded this scheme to manipulate the market in TONM securities for their own personal benefit, and that they used the purchasing respondents as unwitting dupes to inflate the price of TONM stock. The respondents may well have violated the securities laws, and in any event we place no "stamp of approval" on their conduct. But accepting the facts set forth in the complaint as true as we must in reviewing the District Court's dismissal on the pleadings Lazzaro and Neadeau "awakened in [the respondents] a desire for wrongful gain that might otherwise have remained dormant, inspired in [their] mind[s] an unfounded idea that [they were] going to secure it, and then by fraud and false pretenses deprived [them] of [their] money," (CA8), cert. denied, actions that, if they occurred, were far more culpable under any reasonable view than the respondents' alleged conduct.[25] *315 B We also believe that denying the in pari delicto defense in such circumstances will best promote the primary objective of the federal securities laws protection of the investing public and the national economy through the promotion of "a high standard of business ethics in every facet of |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | "a high standard of business ethics in every facet of the securities industry." v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., Although a number of lower courts have reasoned that a broad rule of caveat tippee would better serve this goal,[26] we believe the contrary position adopted by other courts represents the better view.[27] To begin with, barring private actions in cases such as this would inexorably result in a number of alleged fraudulent practices going undetected by the authorities and unremedied. The has advised us that it "does not have the resources to police the industry sufficiently to ensure that false tipping does not occur or is consistently discovered," and that "[w]ithout the tippees' assistance, the Commission could not effectively prosecute false tipping a difficult practice to detect." Brief for as Amicus Curiae 25. See also H. R. Rep. No. 93-355, p. 6 ("In recent years, the securities markets have grown dramatically in size and complexity, while Commission enforcement resources have declined"). Thus it is particularly important to permit *316 "litigation among guilty parties [that will serve] to expose their unlawful conduct and render them more easily subject to appropriate civil, administrative, and criminal penalties." Kuehnert v. Texstar The in pari delicto defense, by denying any incentive to a defrauded tippee to bring suit against his defrauding tipper, would significantly undermine this important goal.[28] Moreover, we believe that deterrence of insider trading most frequently will be maximized by bringing enforcement pressures to bear on the sources of such information corporate insiders and broker-dealers. "The true insider or the broker-dealer is at the fountainhead of the confidential information If the prophylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of all material inside information until it is made available to the investing public, then the most effective means of carrying out this policy is to nip in the bud the source of the information, the tipper, by discouraging him from `making the initial disclosure which is the first step in the chain of dissemination.' This can most readily be achieved by making unavailable to him the defense of in pari delicto when sued by his tippee upon charges based upon alleged misinformation." In addition, corporate insiders and broker-dealers will in many circumstances be more responsive to the deterrent pressure of potential sanctions; they are more likely than ordinary investors to be advised by counsel and thereby to be informed fully of the "allowable limits on their conduct." Kuehnert v. Texstar 412 F. 2d, at 706[29] Although situations might well arise in which the relative culpabilities of the tippee and |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | majority | Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111470/bateman-eichler-hill-richards-inc-v-berner/ | arise in which the relative culpabilities of the tippee and his insider source merit a different mix of deterrent incentives, we therefore conclude that in tipper-tippee situations such as the one before us the factors discussed above preclude recognition of the in pari delicto defense.[30] Lower courts reaching a contrary conclusion have typically asserted that, absent a vigorous allowance of the in pari delicto defense, tippees would have, "in effect, an enforceable *318 warranty that secret information is true," and thus no incentive not to trade on that information.[31] These courts have reasoned, in other words, that tippees in such circumstances would be in "the enviable position of `heads-I-win tails-you-lose,' " cert. denied, if the tip is correct, the tippee will reap illicit profits, while if the tip fails to yield the expected return, he can sue to recover damages. We believe the "enforceable warranty" theory is overstated and overlooks significant factors that serve to deter tippee trading irrespective of whether the in pari delicto defense is allowed. First, tippees who bring suit in an attempt to cash in on their "enforceable warranties" expose themselves to the threat of substantial civil and criminal penalties for their own potentially illegal conduct.[32] Second, plaintiffs in litigation under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may only recover against defendants who have acted with scienter. See Ernst & Thus "if the tip merely fails to `pan out' or if the information itself proves accurate but the stock fails to move in the anticipated direction, the investor stands to lose all of his investment. Only in the situation where the investor has been deliberately defrauded will he be able to maintain a private suit in an attempt to recoup his money." F.2d, n. 3.[33] *319 We therefore conclude that the public interest will most frequently be advanced if defrauded tippees are permitted to bring suit and to expose illegal practices by corporate insiders and broker-dealers to full public view for appropriate sanctions. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in this case, there is no warrant to giving corporate insiders and broker-dealers "a license to defraud the investing public with little fear of prosecution." Affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER concurs in the judgment. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the decision of this case. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | majority | Ludwig v. Massachusetts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109526/ludwig-v-massachusetts/ | The Commonwealth of Massachusetts long ago established a "two-tier" system of trial courts for certain *620 crimes. A person accused of such a crime is tried in the first instance in the lower tier. No trial by jury is available there. If convicted, the defendant may take a timely "appeal" to the second tier and, if he so desires, have a trial de novo by jury. The issues here presented are (1) whether, where the Constitution guarantees an accused a jury trial, it also requires that he be permitted to exercise that right at the first trial in the lower tier, and (2) whether the Massachusetts procedure violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. I Massachusetts is one of several States having a two-tier system of trial courts for criminal cases. See Some States provide a jury trial in each tier; others provide a jury only in the second tier but allow an accused to bypass the first; and still others, like Massachusetts, do not allow an accused to avoid a trial of some sort at the first tier before he obtains a trial by jury at the second. The first tier of the Massachusetts system is composed of district courts of the State's several counties, and the Municipal Court of the city of Boston. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 218, 1 (Supp. 1976-1977). These courts have jurisdiction over violations of municipal ordinances, over misdemeanors except criminal libel, over felonies having a maximum potential sentence of not more than five years, and over specified felonies having a maximum potential sentence in excess of five years. 26. A criminal proceeding in the first-tier court is begun with the issuance of a complaint. An accused then has two statutory alternatives. He may plead guilty at arraignment and be sentenced by the court. If he is dissatisfied *621 with the sentence, he may appeal. C. 278, 18. In that case, however, the accused is not entitled to a trial de novo respecting his guilt or innocence; he is limited, instead, to a challenge to his sentence. If, on the other hand, the accused pleads not guilty in the first tier, he is tried by the judge without a jury. An acquittal there terminates the proceeding. After a judgment of guilty, however, he may appeal either to the superior court, where a 12-person jury is available, c. 278, 2 and 18 (1972 and Supp. 1976-1977), or to the jury division of the district court where a jury of six is available. C. 218, 27A; |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | majority | Ludwig v. Massachusetts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109526/ludwig-v-massachusetts/ | where a jury of six is available. C. 218, 27A; c. 278, 18 (Supp. 1976-1977). See also ; ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 278, 18A Unlike the two-tier system under consideration in an accused in Massachusetts does not avoid trial in the first instance by pleading guilty. Nevertheless, he achieves essentially the same result by an established, informal procedure known as "admitting sufficient findings of fact." Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. See also This procedure is used "[i]f the defendant wishes to waive a trial in the District Court and save his rights for a trial in the Superior Court on the appeal." 30 K. Smith, Massachusetts Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure 754 The trial court then hears only enough evidence to assure itself that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the offense with which he is charged. The court, however, does make a finding of guilt and enter a judgment of conviction. Once a person convicted in the district court indicates *622 that he is going to appeal,[1] his conviction is vacated. He may suffer adverse collateral consequences from the conviction, such as revocation of parole or of his driver's license. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 90, 24 (1) (b) and (c) (1969 and Supp. 1976-1977). See (Mass.), summarily aff'd, ; Moreover, if the accused "fails to enter and prosecute his appeal, he shall be defaulted on his recognizance and the superior court may impose sentence upon him for the crime of which he was convicted, as if he had been convicted in said court." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 278, 24 If an accused does appeal and does not default, he may, upon request, be tried de novo by a jury. If, again, he is found guilty, he may appeal, as of right, to the Massachusetts Appeals Court or to the Supreme Judicial Court where he may raise both factual and legal claims of error. 28, 28B II On February 1, in the District Court of Northern Norfolk, appellant Ludwig was charged with operating a *623 motor vehicle "negligently so that the lives and safety of the public might be endangered," App. 3a, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 90, 24 (2) (a) (Supp. 1976-1977). This offense carries a maximum penalty of a fine of $200, or two years' imprisonment, or both. On the same day, Ludwig was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. At the commencement of trial on March 11, appellant moved for a "speedy trial by jury," citing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The motion was denied, and, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | majority | Ludwig v. Massachusetts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109526/ludwig-v-massachusetts/ | the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The motion was denied, and, after a brief trial, the court adjudged Ludwig guilty and imposed a fine of $20. Thereafter, appellant asserted his statutory right to a trial de novo before a six-man jury in the District Court. In the de novo proceeding, appellant filed a "motion to dismiss" on the grounds that he had been deprived of his federal constitutional right to a speedy jury trial in the first instance, and that he had been subjected to double jeopardy. App. 5a-6a. The motion was denied. At the second trial on April 5, appellant waived a jury and, after trial by the court, again was adjudged guilty, and again was fined $20. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the judgment of conviction. Mass. , Relying on its earlier decision in appeal dismissed, the court held that the denial of appellant's request to be tried by a jury at his first trial did not violate his right to a speedy trial or to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the Massachusetts procedure did not violate the constitutional prohibition against putting a person twice in jeopardy. The present appeal to this Court followed. We noted *624 probable jurisdiction, in order to consider the issues recited in the opening paragraph of this opinion.[2] See III The standard against which we judge whether the Massachusetts two-tier system violates an individual's constitutional right to trial by jury is the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no person may be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In giving content to this sweeping proscription in the jury trial context, the Court in the past has considered two distinct issues: Whether a State is ever obliged to grant an accused a jury trial, and whether certain features of the 18th century common-law jury are inherent in the right. In the Court resolved the first issue by reference to, and in the light of, the Sixth Amendment. It held that the right to a jury trial in a "serious" criminal case was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." Accordingly, it held that the "Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases whichwere they to be tried in a federal courtwould come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." Only when an accused is charged with a "petty" offense, usually defined by reference to the maximum *625 punishment that might be imposed, does the Constitution permit the Federal Government and the State to deprive him of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | majority | Ludwig v. Massachusetts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109526/ludwig-v-massachusetts/ | the Federal Government and the State to deprive him of his liberty without affording him an opportunity to have his guilt determined by a jury. In and in the Court dealt with the second issue by considering whether particular features of the 18th century common-law jury are essential, or merely incidental, to the central purpose of the jury trial requirement. The jury, it was observed, acts as " `an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.' " quoting The Court held in Williams that a jury of 12 is not required in order that this central purpose be served. Similar analysis led to the holding in Apodaca that the jury's verdict need not be unanimous. What is important is that the verdict reflect the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen; this it may do even if it is only a majority verdict "as long as [the jury] consists of a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the community who have the duty and the opportunity to deliberate, free from outside attempts at intimidation, on the question of a defendant's guilt." -411. These two issues are not again in controversy in the present case. It is indisputable that the Massachusetts two-tier system does afford an accused charged with a serious offense the absolute right to have his guilt determined by a jury composed and operating in accordance with the Constitution. Within the system, the jury serves its function of protecting against prosecutorial and *626 judicial misconduct. It does so directly at the second tier of the Massachusetts system, and it may also have an indirect effect on first-tier trials. "Even where defendants are satisfied with bench trials, the right to a jury trial very likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial unfairness less likely." This is not to say that we are unaware of a remote possibility that an accused in Massachusetts may be faced at his first trial with an overzealous prosecutor and a judge who is either unable or unwilling to control him. But in such a case, he may protect himself from questionable incarceration by appealing, and insisting upon a trial by jury. Even though the Massachusetts procedure does not deprive an accused of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury trial, the question remains whether it unconstitutionally burdens the exercise of that right: (1) by imposing the financial cost of an additional trial; (2) by subjecting an accused to a potentially harsher sentence if he seeks a trial de novo in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | majority | Ludwig v. Massachusetts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109526/ludwig-v-massachusetts/ | harsher sentence if he seeks a trial de novo in the second tier; and (3) by imposing the increased psychological and physical hardships of two trials. Appellant charges that the Massachusetts system financially burdens the accused by requiring that he twice defend himself and by causing a loss of wages if he is employed. Although these burdens are not unreal and although they may, in an individual case, impose a hardship, we conclude that they do not impose an unconstitutional burden on the exercise of the right to a trial by jury. In Massachusetts, the accused may enjoy his right to trial by jury expeditiously by invoking the above-described procedure of "admitting sufficient findings of fact." He, therefore, need not pursue, in any real sense, a defense at the lower tier. The accused, however, *627 may utilize that proceeding fruitfully as a discovery tool and find the strengths and the weaknesses of the State's case against him. And, of course, if an accused is indigent, the State is required to furnish him counsel without cost before he may be deprived of his liberty. The question whether the possibility of a harsher sentence at the second tier impermissibly burdens the exercise of an accused's right to a trial by jury is controlled by the decisions in North and These cases establish that the mere possibility of a harsher sentence does not unconstitutionally burden an accused's right to a trial by jury. In a new trial was sought, by taking an appeal, because of error at the first trial. In Colten, a new trial was sought in order to secure more ample safeguards available at the higher tier. We see no need to reach a different result here where a new trial is sought in order to obtain a jury.[3] Due process is violated only by the vindictive imposition of an increased sentence. The Court in Colten held that the danger of such sentencing does not inhere in the two-tier system.[4] -119. *628 We are not oblivious to the adverse psychological and physical effects that delay in obtaining the final adjudication of one's guilt or innocence may engender. Protection against unwarranted delay, with its concomitant side effects on the accused, of course, is primarily the function of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States by means of the Fourteenth. Appellant does not continue to press the contention, *629 made below, that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Further, it is nearly always true that an accused may obtain a faster adjudication of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | majority | Ludwig v. Massachusetts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109526/ludwig-v-massachusetts/ | true that an accused may obtain a faster adjudication of his guilt or innocence by waiving a jury trial even in those States where he may have one in the first instance. No one has seriously charged, however, that the fact that trials by jury are not scheduled so quickly as trials before a judge impermissibly burdens the constitutional right to trial by jury. Finally we are uncertain whether the delay in obtaining a jury trial is increased by the de novo procedure or decreased. Appellant has not presented any evidence to show that there is a greater delay in obtaining a jury in Massachusetts than there would be if the Commonwealth abandoned its two-tier system. We are reluctant to attribute to Massachusetts a perverse determination to maintain an inefficient system whose very purpose is to increase efficiency. Our disposition of this case does not require us to disturb the holding in In Callan, this Court considered the validity of a District of Columbia two-tier trial system that provided for trial by jury only in the second tier. The Court announced: "Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offence charged." Reconsideration of Callan is not required here for two reasons. First, as the Court there recognized, the sources *630 of the right to jury trial in the federal courts are several and include Art. III, 2, cl. 3, of the Constitution. That provision requires, in pertinent part, that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes shall be by Jury." This language, which might be read as prohibiting, in the absence of a defendant's consent, a federal trial without a jury is, of course, not applicable to the States. Second, to the extent that the decision in Callan may have rested on a determination that the right to trial by jury in a serious criminal case was unduly burdened by a requirement that an accused first be tried without a jury, it is not controlling here. Unlike the District of Columbia system, which apparently required that an accused be "fully tried" in the first tier, 127 U.S., Massachusetts permits an accused to circumvent trial in the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,976 | 11 | majority | Ludwig v. Massachusetts | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109526/ludwig-v-massachusetts/ | U.S., Massachusetts permits an accused to circumvent trial in the first tier by admitting to sufficient findings of fact. The modes of exercising federal constitutional rights have traditionally been left, within limits, to state specification. In this case, Massachusetts absolutely guarantees trial by jury to persons accused of serious crimes, and the manner it has specified for exercising this right is fair and not unduly burdensome. IV The final contention is that the Massachusetts procedure violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The basis of appellant's contention is that "the de novo procedure forces the accused to the `risk' of two trials." Brief for Appellant 66. Appellee responds by quoting from North -720: "At least since 1896, when United was decided, it has been settled that this constitutional guarantee imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside" (emphasis in original). Brief for Appellee 31. *631 We agree that there is no double jeopardy violation posed by the Massachusetts system. The history of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its interpretation were canvassed by the Court only last Term in United ; United ; and and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say: "Although the form and breadth of the prohibition varied widely, the underlying premise was generally that a defendant should not be twice tried or punished for the same offense. Writing in the 17th century, Lord Coke described the protection afforded by the principle of double jeopardy as a function of three related common-law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon." United -340. In this case, only the concept represented by the common-law plea of autrefois convict is presently at issue. The Massachusetts system presents no danger of prosecution after an accused has been pardoned; nor is there any doubt that acquittal at the first tier precludes reprosecution. Instead, the argument appears to be that because the appellant has been placed once in jeopardy and convicted, the State may not retry him when he informs the trial court of his decision to "appeal" and to secure a trial de novo. Appellant's argument is without substance. The decision to secure a new trial rests with the accused alone. A defendant who elects to be tried de novo in Massachusetts is in no different position than is a convicted defendant who successfully appeals on the basis of the trial record and gains a reversal of his conviction and a remand of his case for a new trial. Under these *632 circumstances, it long has been clear that the |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | From a time long before William Payton's trial, it has been clear law under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that a sentencing jury in a capital case must be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence a defendant offers for a sentence less than death. The prosecutor in Payton's case effectively negated this principle in arguing repeatedly to the jury that the law required it to disregard Payton's mitigating evidence of postcrime religious conversion and rehabilitation. The trial judge utterly failed to correct these repeated misstatements or in any other way to honor his duty to give the jury an accurate definition of legitimate mitigation. It was reasonably likely in these circumstances that the jury failed to consider Payton's mitigating evidence, and in concluding otherwise, the Supreme Court of California unreasonably applied settled law, with substantially injurious effect. The Court of Appeals was correct, and I respectfully dissent. I At the time the Supreme Court of California took up Payton's direct appeal of his death sentence for homicide, it was settled law that a capital defendant has a plenary right to present evidence going to any aspect of his character, background, *150 or record, as well as to any circumstance particular to the offense, that might justify a sentence less than death, ; ; including evidence of the defendant's behavior after the offense, The law was equally explicit that the sentencer may not refuse to consider any evidence in mitigation, or be precluded from giving it whatever effect it may merit. ; When Payton was tried, California's sentencing law was not well designed to satisfy the State's obligation to provide the sentencer with a way to give effect to all mitigating evidence including developments after commission of the crime. Trial courts were generally bound to charge a sentencing jury to take into account and be guided by a set of legislatively adopted pattern instructions that described relevant subjects of aggravation and mitigation in terms of 11 "factors." These factors ran the gamut from a defendant's age and state of mind at the time of the crime to a qualified catchall at the end: "`(k) [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.'" ; 1 Cal. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 8.84.1 (4th rev. ed. 19). This catchall provision, known as factor (k), was the subject of in which the capital defendant had presented extensive testimony of favorable character in struggling against great childhood -383. It was understood that the evidence was not open to |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | It was understood that the evidence was not open to the jury's consideration under any factor except possibly (k), and the question was whether the instruction to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime" adequately conveyed the idea that character was *151 such a circumstance, even though it was not a fact limited to the setting of the crime itself. The Court first laid down the general standard: "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." A "reasonable likelihood" is more than a mere possibility that the jury mistook the law, but a defendant "need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to have been impermissibly inhibited by the instruction." A majority of the Court then concluded on the facts of 's trial that there had been no showing that any ambiguity in the instruction had kept the jury from considering the character evidence. In support of its application of the general standard in 's case, the Court noted that not all of the other factors in the instruction were tied to the specifics of the crime; the defendant's youth at the time of commission could be considered, for example, along with prior criminal activity and prior felony record. It was, moreover, only natural for the jury to consider evidence of character in the face of hardships, since society generally holds people less culpable for bad acts related to disadvantages in life. and n. 5. The Court found it highly implausible that the jury would have thought it had to ignore testimony of such evidence, spanning four days and generating over 400 pages of transcript. -384. The pattern instructions as read by the judge included the admonition to make the penalty decision after considering "`all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial,'" and the prosecutor never claimed that the testimony was not relevant, Rather, "the prosecutor explicitly assumed that petitioner's character evidence was a proper factor in the weighing process, but argued that it was minimal in relation to the aggravating circumstances." *152 II Payton, too, was sentenced to death by a jury that had been given a version of the same pattern instructions, including factor (k). Both the nature of Payton's evidence, however, and the behavior of Payton's prosecutor contrasted sharply with their counterparts in and in a significant respect the version of the pattern instructions read to Payton's jury differed from the version the jury heard. Although the |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | jury differed from the version the jury heard. Although the penalty phase of Payton's trial stretched over three days, mitigation evidence offered through testimony on Payton's behalf came in during parts of two half days. App. 15-54. In the first such session, two witnesses, one a minister and the other her congregation's missions director, said that since the commission of his crimes Payton had made a "commitment to the Lord" that they believed to be sincere, ; that he had demonstrated remorse, ; and that he manifested his new faith in Bible study, writing, and spiritual help to fellow inmates, Because Payton's remaining witnesses were not available, the trial judge excused the jury after just "a short day." Following a weekend break, six witnesses appeared for Payton, including four former fellow inmates who testified that he frequently led religious discussions among prisoners, that he exerted "a very good influence" on others, and that he "always tr[ied] to help people out," See generally A fifth witness, a deputy sheriff at Payton's jail, corroborated this testimony, and said that he was glad to have Payton at the jail because he had a calming influence on other inmates, and because he occasionally informed the authorities of developing problems, Finally, Payton's mother testified that she had seen a change in him during incarceration and believed his religious conversion was sincere. Thus, Payton's evidence went entirely to his postcrime conversion and *153 his potential for rehabilitation and usefulness; the presentation of this evidence produced a transcript of only 50 pages. The trial court sent the case to the jury the next day, after meeting with the prosecutor and defense counsel to discuss the charge, including the factor (k) instruction to consider any other circumstance extenuating the gravity of the crime. had not been decided at that point, and defense counsel expressed concern that factor (k) could be understood to exclude consideration of Payton's mitigating evidence because the facts shown "have something to do with his potential for rehabilitation or his character or his background, but they don't have anything to do with the crime itself." App. 55. The prosecutor readily agreed with that reading. He responded that the language of factor (k) was intended to reach only circumstances extenuating the gravity of the crime, to the exclusion of character and background. Indeed, the prosecutor maintained that he did not see "any ambiguity" in factor (k), and that if the legislature had meant background or character to be considered under factor (k), it would have said so explicitly, The trial court agreed with defense counsel that |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | so explicitly, The trial court agreed with defense counsel that background and character (including the claimed conversion) should be subject to consideration under factor (k), but declined to alter the instruction because it was hesitant to depart from the statutory text. 61. Instead, the judge advised the lawyers that they were free to "argue [that] the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition, physical condition certainly fall into category `k' and certainly make a clear argument to the jury." After the judge said explicitly that he thought "`k' is the all encompassing one that includes what you want added," defense counsel lobbied one last time for a more accurate instruction, but was rebuffed: "[Defense counsel]: My only problem is I think we all agree that that's the law, but the jury's not going to know. *154 "The Court: I agree with you. But I'm going to deny [your request], and for the reasons stated." The trial court then brought in the jury for argument and charge. When the prosecutor's closing argument got to the subject of factor (k), this is what he said to the jury: "`K' says any other circumstance which extenuates or lessens the gravity of the crime. What does that mean? That to me means some fact okay? some factor[s] at the time of the offense that somehow operates to reduce the gravity for what the defendant did. It doesn't refer to anything after the fact or later. That's particularly important here because the only defense evidence you have heard has been about this new born Christianity." Payton's lawyer interrupted, both counsel approached the bench, and, out of the jury's hearing, defense counsel moved for mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor's statement was "completely contrary" to the previously agreed interpretation of factor (k). When the prosecutor replied that defense counsel was wrong and that Payton's mitigating evidence did not fall within factor (k), the trial court failed to resolve the matter, saying that "you can argue it either way," Upon return to open court, the judge instructed the jury that "the comments by both the prosecution and the defense are not evidence. You've heard the evidence and, as I said, this is argument. And it's to be placed in its proper perspective." -70. The prosecutor then took up exactly where he had left off, arguing that Payton's proffered mitigating evidence could not be considered in the jury's deliberations: "Referring back to `k' which I was talking about, any other circumstance which extenuates or lessens the gravity of the crime, the only defense evidence you've heard |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | gravity of the crime, the only defense evidence you've heard had to do with defendant's new Christianity and *155 that he helped the module deputies in the jail while he was in custody. "The problem with that is that evidence is well after the fact of the crime and cannot seem to me in any way to logically lessen the gravity of the offense that the defendant has committed. "[Defense counsel] will tell you that somehow that becoming a newborn Christian, if in fact he really believed that took place, makes it a less severe crime, but there is no way that can happen when under any other circumstance which extenuates or lessens the gravity of the crime, refers seems to refer to a fact in operation at the time of the offense. "What I am getting at, you have not heard during the past few days any legal evidence mitigation. What you've heard is just some jailhouse evidence to win your sympathy, and that's all. You have not heard any evidence of mitigation in this trial." After the prosecutor recounted the aggravating circumstances and argued for the death penalty, he turned to the evidence of Payton's religious conversion, questioned its sincerity, and argued that it did not warrant a sentence less than death when weighed against the aggravating factors. Throughout this discussion, he returned to his point that factor (k) authorizes consideration only of facts as of the time of the crime. He reminded the jurors again that they had "heard no evidence of any mitigating factors." And again: "I don't really want to spend too much time on [religion] because I don't think it's really applicable and I don't think it comes under any of the eleven factors." And again: "You haven't heard anything to mitigate what he's done." With the prosecutor arguing that Payton's mitigation evidence was not open to consideration under (k) or any other factor, and with the trial judge sitting on the fence, defense counsel was left to argue the law himself, stating that "section *156 (k) may be awkwardly worded, but it does not preclude or exclude the kind of evidence that was presented. It's a catch-all ph[r]ase. It was designed to include, not exclude, that kind of evidence," Defense counsel discussed the mitigating evidence at some length before concluding that "I think there are a lot of good reasons to keep Bill Payton alive, an awful lot of good reasons. And that's exactly what I think `k' is talking about." The trial court then gave the jury its final instructions: |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | The trial court then gave the jury its final instructions: "In determining the penalty to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial in this case, except as you may be hereafter instructed. You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, [including] (k), [which says] [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though not a legal excuse for the crime. "After having heard all of the evidence and after having heard and considered the argument of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. "If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. "However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole." The jury returned a death verdict. III The failure of the State to provide Payton with a process for sentencing that respected his clearly established right to *157 consideration of all mitigating evidence is plain at every step of the jury's instruction, starting with the trial court's reliance on the pattern jury charge adopted by the legislature. A It is undisputed that factor (k) was the instruction that comes closest to addressing the jury's obligation to consider Payton's evidence of postoffense conversion, and the prosecutor's remarks in the chambers colloquy both demonstrate the inadequacy of factor (k) to explain that responsibility and point to the seriousness of the trial court's failure to give a group of laypersons an intelligible statement of the controlling law. Factor (k) calls on the jury to consider evidence going to the "gravity of the crime," a notion commonly understood as the joint product of intent, act, and consequence: intentionally shooting a police officer through the heart is worse than knocking down a pedestrian by careless skateboarding. It is coherent with this understanding to say, as the Court did in that evaluating a defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense can include consideration of his general character and the experiences that affected its development, -382; as the Court explained, when society sits in judgment, it does not ignore the early hardships of those who turn out bad, But it would be more than a stretch to say that the seriousness of the crime itself is affected by a defendant's subsequent experience. |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | the crime itself is affected by a defendant's subsequent experience. A criminal's subsequent religious conversion is not a fact commonly accepted as affecting the gravity of the crime, and even jurors who could overcome their skepticism about the sincerity of the conversion claim would see it as addressed not to the nature of the crime but to other issues bearing on sentence: the moral argument for executing a defendant who claims to have realized the awfulness of what he had done, and the practical argument for protecting others in the future by taking a life of one who claims to have been transformed. See, e.g., 476 *158 U. S., at I will assume that a jury instructed by a judge to consider evidence of postoffense experience that extenuates the gravity of the crime could have given effect to the instruction, but without such an explanation it would have been unnatural to think of evidence of later events as affecting the seriousness of an earlier crime. Indications of the way factor (k) was understood in California at the time of Payton's trial, in fact, point this way. The prosecutor who spoke for the State at the trial repeatedly argued to judge and jury that a "circumstance which extenuates or lessens the gravity of the crime, refers seems to refer to a fact in operation at the time of the offense." App. 70. The prosecutor held this view in good faith, ante, at 146 (majority opinion), and, indeed, his view was shared by the state judiciary; even before the Supreme Court of California had found factor (k) inadequate to require consideration of all types of mitigating evidence. In 1983, following our discussion in Eddings, that court directed that factor (k) be adorned in future cases so as to inform the jury that it may consider "any other `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.'" (alterations in original). And, again before came down, the Legislature of California amended factor (k) to instruct the jury to consider "`[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record [that the defendant offers] as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.].'" n. 2 Without that amendment, any claim that factor (k) called for consideration of a defendant's personal development in the wake of his crime |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | a defendant's personal development in the wake of his crime *159 was simply at odds with common attitudes and the English language. B The next step in the process that failed to give the jury an intelligible instruction to consider all mitigating evidence consisted of the prosecutor's repeated statements telling the jury to ignore Payton's conversion evidence because it was not legally relevant: "[Defense counsel] will tell you that somehow that becoming a newborn Christian, if in fact he really believed that took place, makes it a less severe crime, but there is no way that can happen when under any other circumstance which extenuates or lessens the gravity of the crime, refers seems to refer to a fact in operation at the time of the offense. "What I am getting at, you have not heard during the past few days any legal evidence mitigation. What you've heard is just some jailhouse evidence to win your sympathy, and that's all. You have not heard any evidence of mitigation in this trial." App. 70. Although the prosecutor's argument rested on a perfectly fair reading of the text of the pattern instruction, its effect, in the absence of any further instruction, was to tell the jury that it could not consider the conversion evidence as mitigating. Payton's lawyer immediately objected. He expressed his understanding that the trial judge had agreed that consideration of the mitigating evidence was constitutionally required and meant to let respective counsel argue only about its probative value, even though the judge himself had refused to address this essential constitutional issue specifically in any particular instruction. One would reasonably suppose that the trial judge would have realized that the prosecutor's argument put him on the spot, forcing him to correct the misleading statement of law with an explicit instruction that the jury was free to treat the conversion evidence *160 as mitigating, evaluating its weight as the jury saw fit. It is, after all, elementary law, federal and state, that the judge bears ultimate responsibility for instructing a lay jury in the law. ; ; ; ; ; But the trial judge did no such thing. Instead, he merely told the jury that the prosecutor's argument was not evidence. This instruction cured nothing. The prosecutor's objectionable comment was not a statement about evidence but a statement of law. Telling the jury that a statement of law was not evidence did nothing to correct its functional error in misstating the law. It is true that the prosecutor argued that Payton's postcrime evidence was not only beyond the jury's |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | that Payton's postcrime evidence was not only beyond the jury's consideration legally, but also insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The prosecutor, however, minimized the significance even of these brief observations by saying, "I don't really want to spend too much time on it because I don't think it's really applicable and I don't think it comes under any of the eleven factors." App. 73. Far from "explicitly assum[ing]" that the jury's consideration of the evidence was proper, 494 U. S., the prosecutor's comments, interwoven with his clear statements on the scope of factor (k), could not have left the listener with any doubt about the prosecutor's view of the legal relevance of the evidence. Nothing could be further from the circumstances in There the prosecutor agreed that the character evidence was properly subject to the jury's consideration as mitigating, even under the ambiguous terms of factor (k). The jury heard argument about the weight of the evidence, but not a word denying its relevance. Indeed, the majority specifically distinguished the facts before *161 it from the facts confronting us here, in disclaiming any suggestion "that prosecutorial misrepresentations may never have a decisive effect on the jury," ; "arguments of counsel, like the instructions of the court, must be judged in the context in which they are made," If the majority thus anticipated a case like this one, with a possibility of substantial prejudice arising from misrepresentation of the law, the Court's prescience is attributable to the State's position in the argument: the Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California appearing for the State in urged the Court to see that case in a light favorable to the State, in contrast to Payton's case, to which counsel referred by name, as a case in which the prosecutor had "misled the jurors." Tr. of Oral Arg. in O. T. 1989, No. 88-6613, p. 29. is thus no authority for giving the State a pass here. The Court is faced with the prosecutor's conceded misstatement, ante, at 138 (majority opinion), misleading to the jury, which obliged the trial court, however "reluctant to strike out on its own" beyond the pattern instructions, to "do more than figuratively throw up its hands." at 806 P.2d, at C The final misstep that distinguishes this case from the authority of is the judge's charge, which must be understood against the background of the mitigating testimonial evidence that the jury did, after all, hear. At each stage of Payton's appeal and collateral challenge, the State has argued that it makes no sense to suggest the jury would have |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | it makes no sense to suggest the jury would have disregarded substantive evidence with no other purpose than mitigation, when ignoring it would have meant that Payton's mitigation witnesses were just putting on a pointless charade. An argument like this was one of the reasons for affirming the conviction in and both the Supreme Court of California and the majority today rely on a reprise of it to affirm here, ; ante, at 144 (majority opinion). This is, however, an argument to be entertained only with great caution in the best of circumstances, and while 's circumstances were good, this is a very different case from The need for caution is plain: the constitutional concern with mitigating evidence is not satisfied by the mere ability of a defendant to present it. The sentencing body must have a genuine opportunity to consider it and give effect to it. As the Court said in "[p]resentation of mitigating evidence alone does not guarantee that a jury will feel entitled to consider that evidence." 494 U.S., For this reason, the Court has found Eighth Amendment violations in circumstances precluding the sentencing body from considering the defendant's mitigating evidence, even where the evidence was extensive and where it accordingly might have been thought unnatural for the sentencer to disregard it. See, e. g., ; 113-114. What is equally plain is that is no authority for thinking the combination of evidence, argument, and charge passes muster here. 's mitigation evidence was extensive enough to take four days and produce over 400 pages of transcript. It addressed character and hardship, subjects recognized by the Court as commonly thought relevant to sentencing, and ignoring it would thus have ignored a large chunk of intuitively acceptable evidence. Payton's evidence, in contrast, required parts of two half days and generated only 50 pages, addressing a claim of dramatic self-reformation that most people would treat with considerable caution. While it would have been unnatural for the jury in to feel barred from considering the character evidence when no lawyer or judge had ever called it irrelevant, Payton's jury had plenty of reason to feel itself precluded: the prosecutor emphatically and repeatedly said that the evidence *163 did not count as the kind of evidence that could extenuate the crime, and the trial judge allowed the prosecutor's statements to go uncorrected. More significant even than those contrasts between and the facts here is the difference between the two sets of instructions from the trial judges. In this Court found it significant that "[t]he jury was instructed that it `shall consider all the |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | "[t]he jury was instructed that it `shall consider all the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case.'" 494 U.S., (emphasis added by majority). Reasonable jurors could therefore hardly "have felt constrained by the factor (k) instruction to ignore all of the evidence presented by [the] petitioner during the sentencing phase." -384 (emphasis again supplied by majority). Here, however, the instruction was different, a variant permitted by the legislature's pattern charge. Here the instruction was not simply to consider all the evidence, but rather, "you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial in this case, except as you may be hereafter instructed." App. 94. "Hereafter," of course, came the instruction to determine the penalty by applying the 11 enumerated factors, including factor (k). As to the factor (k) focus on the "gravity of the crime," the prosecutor repeatedly had said that evidence of postcrime conversion was irrelevant, and his mistaken and misleading statements of law had never been corrected by the trial judge. The upshot was this. The jury was told by the judge that some evidence could be excluded from its consideration. The judge presumably had some reason to say this. The only evidence that could reasonably have fallen within the exception was the evidence the prosecutor had just said was legally irrelevant, in a statement that was eminently plausible owing to the language of factor (k) and the subject matter of the evidence. The jurors could naturally have made sense of all they had heard by concluding they were required not *164 to scrutinize and discount the conversion evidence if they found it unpersuasive, but to skip the scrutiny altogether and ignore the evidence as legally beside the point. This case is nothing like But even if the case were closer to than it is, and even if the course of Payton's penalty trial were best viewed the way the majority suggests, that would not satisfy 's test. asks only whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury understood an instruction as foreclosing consideration of the defendant's mitigating evidence. 494 U.S., A defendant has no need to show it is "more likely than not" that the jury misunderstood. Accordingly, even if the best explanation for the jury's verdict were the one the majority offers, that would not resolve Payton's claim. Identifying the "most likely" interpretation of events at Payton's trial, ante, at 147 (majority opinion), falls short of negating the reasonably likely alternative that the jury believed it could not consider the |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | alternative that the jury believed it could not consider the story of Payton's postcrime conversion. The Court's oft-repeated conclusion that the state court did not unreasonably apply seems to rest on two assumptions. The first is a loose understanding of as holding that factor (k) "directs jurors to consider any other circumstance that might lessen a defendant's culpability," ante, at 147 (majority opinion). The second is that factor (k) as so understood directs jurors to consider circumstances that do not excuse a crime or lessen a defendant's culpability but nevertheless supply some different (even postcrime) reason to forgo a sentence of death. But held only that the factor (k) instruction tells jurors "to consider any other circumstance that might excuse the crime, which certainly includes a defendant's background and character," 494 U.S., did not purport to hold that factor (k) naturally called for consideration of postcrime changes of fundamental views. It is thus only by broadening to sanction a misreading of factor (k), a misreading *165 that the prosecutor himself rejected in good faith, that the Court can find a reasonable application of law in the state court's decision. The mistake will unfortunately reverberate even beyond this case, for the majority further obscures the necessarily inexact distinction between cases that are merely wrong and cases with objectively unreasonable error. Cf. (finding that a confusing jury instruction created a reasonable likelihood the jury would not feel free to consider mitigating evidence, and that the state court's contrary conclusion was "objectively unreasonable," even though the jury heard extensive mitigating evidence submitted without objection as to relevance, even though the judge took care to instruct the jury to consider "`any aspect of the defendant's character and record or circumstances of the crime which you believe could make a death sentence inappropriate,'" even though the prosecutor never questioned the relevance of the evidence when addressing the jury, and even though both counsel argued at length to the jury about the weight of the evidence). IV By the State's admission in this case, the prosecutor's argument was a "misstatement" of constitutional law. By the State's admission in the prosecutor here "misled" the jury. Despite objection by defense counsel, the trial judge refused to correct the misstatement, which the prosecutor proceeded to repeat. The judge's subsequent charge to consider all evidence was subject to a qualification that the jury could reasonably have understood only as referring to the mitigation evidence the prosecutor had branded as irrelevant under a straightforward reading of the pattern instructions. If a prosecutor had stood before a jury and denied that a |
Justice Souter | 2,005 | 20 | dissenting | Brown v. Payton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142880/brown-v-payton/ | prosecutor had stood before a jury and denied that a defendant was entitled to a presumption of innocence; if the judge refused to correct him and failed to give any instruction on the presumption of innocence; if the judge's instructions affirmatively suggested there might not be a presumption *166 of innocence; would anyone doubt that there was a reasonable possibility that the jury had been misled? There is no more room here to doubt the reasonable possibility that Payton's jurors failed to consider the postoffense mitigation evidence that the Constitution required them to consider. In a case that contrasts with at every significant step, the State Supreme Court's affirmance of Payton's conviction can only be seen as an unreasonable misapplication of the governing federal standard, not mere error. And since Payton's death sentence is subject to this reasonable possibility of constitutional error, since he may die as a consequence, the effect of the instruction failure is surely substantial and injurious, beyond any possible excuse as harmless error. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,007 | 5 | majority | Logan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145844/logan-v-united-states/ | Petitioner James D. Logan pleaded guilty in a United States District Court to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of (g)(1). Logan's record as a recidivist, which included three relevant state convictions, led the District Court to impose a 15-year prison term, the minimum sentence mandated by the *479 Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), (e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). For ACCA sentence-enhancement purposes, a prior conviction may be disregarded if the conviction "has been expunged, or set aside," or the offender "has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored." 921(a)(20) (2000 ed.). None of Logan's prior convictions have been expunged or set aside. Nor has he been pardoned for any past crime. And, bearing importantly on the instant petition, the three state-court convictions that triggered Logan's ACCA-enhanced sentence occasioned no loss of civil rights. Challenging his enhanced sentence, Logan presents this question: Does the "civil rights restored" exemption contained in 921(a)(20) encompass, and therefore remove from ACCA's reach, state-court convictions that at no time deprived the offender of civil rights? We hold that the 921(a)(20) exemption provision does not cover the case of an offender who retained civil rights at all times, and whose legal status, postconviction, remained in all respects unaltered by any state dispensation. Section 921(a)(20) sets out postconviction eventsexpungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of civil rightsthat extend to an offender a measure of forgiveness, relieving him from some or all of the consequences of his conviction. Congress might have broadened the 921(a)(20) exemption provision to cover convictions attended by no loss of civil rights. The national lawmakers, however, did not do so. Section 921(a)(20)'s failure to exempt convictions that do not revoke civil rights produces anomalies. But so does the extension of the 921(a)(20) exemption that Logan advances. We are not equipped to say what statutory alteration, if any, Congress would have made had its attention trained on offenders who retained civil rights; nor can we recast 921(a)(20) in Congress' stead. I Federal law generally prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." (g)(1). Ordinarily, the maximum felon-in-possession sentence is 10 years. See 924(a)(2). If the offender's prior criminal record includes at least three convictions for "violent felon[ies]" or "serious drug offense[s]," however, the maximum sentence increases to life, and ACCA mandates a minimum term of 15 years. 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Congress defined the term "violent felony" to include specified crimes "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 924(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,007 | 5 | majority | Logan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145844/logan-v-united-states/ | imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 924(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). An offense classified by a State as a misdemeanor, however, may qualify as a "violent felony" for ACCA-enhancement purposes (or as a predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction under 922(g)) only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in prison. 921(a)(20)(B). In we held that a State's expungement of a conviction did not nullify the conviction for purposes of the firearms disabilities Congress placed in 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). In so ruling, we noted that our decision would ensure greater uniformity in federal sentences. See Provisions for expungement "var[ied] widely from State to State," we observed, and yielded "nothing less than a national patchwork," In the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), (1986), Congress amended 921(a)(20) in response to Dickerson's holding that, for purposes of federal firearms disabilities, state law did *480 not determine the present impact of a prior conviction. The amended provision excludes from qualification as a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" (or a misdemeanor under state law punishable by more than two years in prison): "Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20).[1] While 921(a)(20) does not define the term "civil rights," courts have held, and petitioner agrees, that the civil rights relevant under the above-quoted provision are the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury. See Brief for Petitioner 13, n. 10; cf. II On May 31, 2005, police officers responded to a domestic disturbance complaint made by Logan's girlfriend, Asenath Wilson. App. 9, 12. Wilson told the officers, among other things, that she had seen Logan with a gun and that he usually kept it in the car. Logan, who was with Wilson when the police arrived, consented to a search of his car. In a hidden compartment behind the glove box, the officers found a 9-millimeter handgun. Logan pleaded guilty to the federal offense of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. (In 1991, he had been convicted in an Illinois court of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.) The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin sentenced Logan to imprisonment for 15 years, the mandatory minimum under ACCA. In imposing that enhanced sentence, the District Court took account of Logan's three Wisconsin misdemeanor battery convictions, each punishable by |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,007 | 5 | majority | Logan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145844/logan-v-united-states/ | of Logan's three Wisconsin misdemeanor battery convictions, each punishable by a maximum sentence of three years' imprisonment.[2] Both in the District Court and on appeal, Logan argued that his Wisconsin *481 misdemeanor convictions did not qualify as ACCA predicate offenses because they caused no loss of his civil rights. Rights retained, he urged, are functionally equivalent to rights revoked but later restored. If the exemption contained in 921(a)(20) covered the three state-court misdemeanor convictions, Logan's maximum sentence, in lieu of the 15-year mandatory minimum under ACCA, would have been 10 years, see 924(a)(2), and the United States Sentencing Guidelines would have indicated a sentence range of 37 to 46 months, see Brief for Petitioner 5. The District Court rejected Logan's argument, holding that the 921(a)(20) exemption provision "applies only to defendants whose civil rights were both lost and restored pursuant to state statutes." App. to Pet. for Cert. 11. ingly, the court sentenced Logan to imprisonment for 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that "an offender whose civil rights have been neither diminished nor returned is not a person who `has had civil rights restored.'" Logan's argument for treating retained rights the same way as restored rights, the appeals court observed, "go[es] in the teeth of [ 921(a)(20)'s] text." We granted certiorari, 549 U.S. to resolve a split among the Circuits as to whether 921(a)(20)'s exception for "civil rights restored" should be interpreted to include civil rights retained at all times. ("civil rights restored" does not include civil rights never revoked), and with United III Logan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 922(g)(1), and received a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence because he had at least three prior convictions for "violent felon[ies]." 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). He acknowledges his convictions in Wisconsin for three battery offenses that facially qualify as violent felonies under 921(a)(20)(B) (2000 ed.). See Brief for Petitioner 4-5. Thus the sole matter in dispute is whether Logan fits within the exemption from an ACCA-enhanced sentence for convictions "expunged, or set aside" or offenders who "ha[ve] been pardoned or ha[ve] had civil rights restored." 921(a)(20). None of Logan's battery convictions have been expunged, set aside, or pardoned. See Under Wisconsin law, felons lose but can regain their civil rights and can gain the removal of firearms disabilities. See Wis. Stat. 6.03(1)(b) ; Wis. Const., Art. XIII, 3(2); Wis. Stat. 756.02 (2001); 973.176(1) Persons convicted of misdemeanors, however, even if they are repeat offenders, generally retain their civil rights and are not subject |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,007 | 5 | majority | Logan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145844/logan-v-united-states/ | offenders, generally retain their civil rights and are not subject to firearms disabilities. With this background in view, we turn to the proper interpretation of the 921(a)(20) exemption from ACCA-enhanced sentencing for offenders who have had their "civil rights restored." Logan's misdemeanor convictions, we reiterate, did not result in any loss of the rights to vote, hold public office, or serve on juries. Should he nonetheless be ranked with offenders whose rights were terminated but *482 later restored? The ordinary meaning of the word "restored" affords Logan no aid. In line with dictionary definitions,[3] the Court of Appeals stated: "The word `restore' means to give back something that had been taken away." 453 F.3d, at ; cf. The context in which the word "restored" appears in 921(a)(20) counsels adherence to the word's ordinary meaning. Words in a list are generally known by the company they keep. E.g., ; U.S. 8, In 921(a)(20), the words "civil rights restored" appear in the company of the words "expunged," "set aside," and "pardoned." Each term describes a measure by which the government relieves an offender of some or all of the consequences of his conviction. In contrast, a defendant who retains rights is simply left alone. He receives no status-altering dispensation, no token of forgiveness from the government. Opposing a plain-meaning approach to the language Congress enacted, Logan relies dominantly on the harsh results a literal reading could yield: Unless retention of rights is treated as legally equivalent to restoration of rights, less serious offenders will be subject to ACCA's enhanced penalties while more serious offenders in the same State, who have had civil rights restored, may escape heightened punishment. E.g., Reply Brief 8 ("[I]ndividuals who have committed more serious crimes than Petitioner may nonetheless have their rights restored, whereas misdemeanants who never lost their rights must suffer enhanced sentencing."). Logan urges that this resulttreating those who never lost their civil rights more harshly than those who lost, then regained, those rightsis not merely anomalous; it rises to the level of the absurd, particularly in States where restoration of civil rights is automatic and occurs immediately upon release from prison. See (automatic restoration of rights qualifies for 921(a)(20)'s exemption). Logan's argument, we note, overlooks 921(a)(20)'s "unless" clause. Under that provision, an offender gains no exemption from ACCA's application through an expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of civil rights if the dispensation "expressly provides that the [offender] may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms." Many States that restore felons' civil rights (or accord another measure of forgiveness) nonetheless impose or retain firearms disabilities. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,007 | 5 | majority | Logan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145844/logan-v-united-states/ | another measure of forgiveness) nonetheless impose or retain firearms disabilities. See Brief for United States 30 (citing, inter alia, La. Stat. Ann. 14:95.1(C) under which felons' firearms disabilities are lifted only after 10 years and only if no further felony convictions intervene).[4] We *483 further note that Wisconsin has addressed, and prospectively eliminated, the anomaly Logan asserts he encountered: Wisconsin no longer punishes misdemeanors by more than two years of imprisonment, and thus no longer has any misdemeanors that qualify as ACCA predicates. See One can demur to Logan's argument that a literal reading of 921(a)(20) could produce anomalous results, for the resolution he proposesreading into the exemption convictions under which civil rights are retainedwould correct one potential anomaly while creating others. See Under Logan's proposed construction, the most dangerous recidivists in a State that does not revoke any offender's civil rights could fall within 921(a)(20)'s exemption. For example, Maine does not deprive any offenders of their civil rights. See Lodging for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae (NACDL Lodging), App. 1, pp. 23-24. As Logan would have us read 921(a)(20), all Maine crimes, including first-degree murder, would be treated as crimes for which "civil rights [have been] restored," while less serious crimes committed elsewhere would not. In the Second Circuit incisively identified Congress' response to Dickerson, see as the cause of the multiple anomalies 921(a)(20) may produce: "[Congress'] decision to have restoration triggered by events governed by state law insured anomalous results. The several states have considerably different laws governing pardon, expungement, and forfeiture and restoration of civil rights. Furthermore, states have drastically different policies as to when and under what circumstances such discretionary acts of grace should be extended. [Anomalies generated by 921(a)(20)] are the inevitable consequence of making access to the exemption depend on the differing laws and policies of the several states." See also M. Love, Relief from the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction: A State-by-State Resource Guide updated online at http://www.sentencing project.org/PublicationDetails.aspx? PublicationID=486 (as visited Nov. 27, and in Clerk of Court's case file) (surveying state practices). Were we to accept Logan's argument, it bears emphasis, we would undercut 921(a)(20)(B), which places within ACCA's reach state misdemeanor convictions punishable by more than two years' imprisonment. Because state-law misdemeanors generally entail no revocation of civil rights,[5] Logan's proposed reading of the word "restored" to include "retained" would yield this curiosity: An offender would fall within ACCA's reach if his three prior offenses carried potential prison terms of over two years, but that same offender would be released from ACCA's grip |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,007 | 5 | majority | Logan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145844/logan-v-united-states/ | but that same offender would be released from ACCA's grip by virtue of his retention of civil rights. We are disinclined to say that *484 what Congress imposed with one hand (exposure to ACCA) it withdrew with the other (exemption from ACCA). We may assume, arguendo, that when Congress revised 921(a)(20) in 1986, see it labored under the misapprehension that all offendersmisdemeanants as well as felonsforfeit civil rights, at least temporarily. Even indulging the further assumption that courts may repair such a congressional oversight or mistake,[6] we could hardly divine the revision the Legislature would favor. Perhaps Congress would choose to exempt offenders who never lost their civil rights. See But it is also plausible that Congress would remove the exemption for civil rights restoration as insufficiently indicative of official forgiveness. Or, Congress might elect to include restorations of civil rights along with expungements, set asides, and pardons only if the restoration was nonautomatic, i.e., granted on a case-by-case basis. Homing in on the disparities resulting from diverse state legislation, see Congress might even revise 921(a)(20) to provide, in accord with Dickerson, that federal rather than state law defines a conviction for purposes of 922 and 924. See -807. In all events, a measure adopted ten years after 921(a)(20) was given its current shape cautions against any assumption that Congress did not mean to deny that exemption to offenders who retained their civil rights. In Congress enacted 922(g)(9), which outlaws possession of a firearm by anyone "who has been convicted. of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." See Tit. VI, 658, - to 3009-372. Tailored to 922(g)(9), Congress adopted a definitional provision, corresponding to 921(a)(20), which reads: "A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of [a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) tracks 921(a)(20) in specifying expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of rights as dispensations that can cancel lingering effects of a conviction. But the emphasized parenthetical qualification shows that the words "civil rights restored" do not cover a person whose civil rights were never taken away. See Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) casts considerable doubt on Logan's hypothesis that, had Congress adverted to the issue when it drafted |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,007 | 5 | majority | Logan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145844/logan-v-united-states/ | that, had Congress adverted to the issue when it drafted 921(a)(20), it would have placed in the same category persons who regained civil rights and persons who retained civil rights. Congress' enactment of 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) is also relevant to Logan's absurdity argument. See Statutory terms, we have held, may be interpreted against their literal meaning where the words "could not conceivably have been intended to apply" to the case at hand. (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, ; *485 see In this case, it can hardly be maintained that Congress could not have meant what it said. Congress explicitly distinguished between "restored" and "retained" in 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). It is more than "conceivable" that the Legislature, albeit an earlier one, see meant to do the same in 921(a)(20). In sum, Congress framed 921(a)(20) to serve two purposes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. It sought to qualify as ACCA predicate offenses violent crimes that a State classifies as misdemeanors yet punishes by a substantial term of imprisonment, i.e., more than two years. See 921(a)(20)(B). Congress also sought to defer to a State's dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction. See Had Congress included a retention-of-rights exemption, however, the very misdemeanors it meant to cover would escape ACCA's reach. See -484. Logan complains of an anomalous result. Yet the solution he proposes would also produce anomalies. See Having no warrant to stray from 921(a)(20)'s text, we hold that the words "civil rights restored" do not cover the case of an offender who lost no civil rights. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is Affirmed. |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109702/third-nat-bank-in-nashville-v-impac-limited-inc/ | A federal statute enacted in 1873 provides that certain *313 prejudgment writs shall not be issued against national banks by state courts.[1] The question presented by this is whether that prohibition applies to a preliminary injunction restraining a national bank from holding a private foreclosure sale, pending adjudication of the mortgagor's claim that the loan is not in default. We conclude that the prohibition does not apply. I Only the essentials of the rather complex three-party transaction giving rise to this dispute need be stated. Respondents borrowed $700,000 from petitioner, a national bank, to finance the construction of an office building. The third party, a mortgage company, agreed to provide permanent financing to replace the bank loan upon completion of the building. The loan was secured by a deed of trust, which granted a first lien on respondents' property to the bank while the construction loan was outstanding. A dispute developed between respondents and the long-term lender over whether respondents had satisfied certain preconditions of the long-term loan. Petitioner contends that respondents are in default because of their failure to close the long-term loan. Respondents deny *314 that they are in default and contend that petitioner's remedy is against the long-term lender. On September 4, 1975, petitioner notified respondents that foreclosure proceedings would be commenced unless the loan, plus accrued interest and an extension fee, was paid in full in 10 days. On September 23, 1975, petitioner published a notice of foreclosure. Under Tennessee practice, foreclosure of a deed of trust is not a judicial proceeding, but is routinely consummated by private sale unless restrained by judicial action initiated by the mortgagor. On September 26, 1975, respondents commenced this litigation by filing a sworn complaint in the Chancery Court of Davidson Country, Tenn., seeking to restrain the foreclosure on the ground that the loan was not in default. The chancellor ordered the petitioner to show cause why an injunction should not issue. Petitioner's answer set forth the basis for its claim of default, but did not question the court's power to restrain the foreclosure. Based on the pleadings, the exhibits, and extensive arguments of counsel, the chancellor found "the existence of issues which should be determined upon a full hearing of this cause and that [respondents] would suffer irreparable harm if the foreclosure occurred prior to such full hearing." App. 56. He therefore temporarily enjoined the foreclosure. Two days later, petitioner filed a supplemental answer alleging that the state court lacked jurisdiction to enter a temporary injunction against a national bank. In due course, the chancellor concluded that 12 U.S. |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109702/third-nat-bank-in-nashville-v-impac-limited-inc/ | bank. In due course, the chancellor concluded that 12 U.S. C. 91 removed his jurisdiction to grant an injunction "prohibiting the foreclosure of property in which the bank has a security interest." App. 69. He therefore dissolved the preliminary injunction, granted an interlocutory appeal, and "stayed" the bank from foreclosure until the appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court could be perfected. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the federal statute was intended "to *315 secure the assets of a bank, whether solvent or insolvent, for ratable distribution among its general creditors and to protect national banks in general." It did not believe this purpose justified an application of the statute when "a debtor of a national bank is seeking, by interlocutory injunction, to protect his property from wrongful seizure and foreclosure sale by the bank." The court acknowledged that the bank had a security interest in respondents' property, but did not believe that the statute was intended to give additional protection to an interest of that kind which was already amply protected.[2] One member of the court read the statute as absolutely forbidding the issuance of any temporary injunction against the national bank before judgment, and therefore reluctantly dissented from what he described as the majority's "just result." We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tennessee Supreme Court's construction of the statute is consistent with the congressional mandate. We affirm. The critical statutory language reads as follows: "[N]o attachment, injunction, or execution, shall be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in any State, country, or municipal court." 12 U.S. C. 91. At least three different interpretations might be placed on that language. Most narrowly, because the rest of 91 relates *316 to insolvency, this language might be limited to s in which a national bank is insolvent, or at least on the verge of insolvency. Secondly, regardless of the bank's financial circumstances, it might be construed to prohibit any prejudgment seizure of bank assets. Most broadly, it might be given a completely literal reading and applied not merely as a shield for the bank's assets but also as a prohibition against prejudgment orders protecting the assets of third parties, including debtors of the bank. Although there is support for the narrowest reading in the history of the statute, both that reading and the broadest literal reading have been rejected by this Court's prior s. Before discussing those s, we shall review the available information about the origin and revisions of the statute. II The National Currency Act of |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109702/third-nat-bank-in-nashville-v-impac-limited-inc/ | revisions of the statute. II The National Currency Act of 1864 authorized the formation of national banks.[3] Section 52 of that Act contained the first part of what is now 12 U.S. C. 91. It prohibited any transfer of bank assets in contemplation of insolvency or with a view to preferring one creditor of the bank over another. The 1864 statute did not, however, include the prohibition against the issuance of prejudgment writs now found in 12 U.S. C. 91. That prohibition was enacted in 1873 as 2 of "An Act to require national Banks to restore their Capital when impaired, and to amend the National-currency Act." If the prohibition had been added to 52 of the 1864 Act,[4] the *317 amended section would have been virtually identical with the present 12 U.S. C. 91. It was, however, added to 57 of the 1864 Act, which authorized suits against national banks in the state courts. Petitioner therefore infers that the amendment was intended to qualify the jurisdiction of state courts over national banks and that the amendment should be given its full, literal meaning. There is no direct evidence of the reason for the amendment. It was passed without debate, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., 870, 2117-2118 (1873), and does not seem to have been recommended by the administration.[5] However, the historical context in which the bill was passed may offer some clue as to its purpose. We may take judicial notice of the historical fact that 1873 was the year of a financial panic. Moreover, a number of reported s involved attachments against national banks and attempts by creditors to obtain a preference by attaching assets of an insolvent bank.[6] When the first edition of the Revised Statutes of the United States was prepared in 1873, the prohibition against prejudgment writs was combined with the provision concerning preferential transfers and acts in contemplation of insolvency to *318 form 5242, which is now 12 U.S. C. 91.[7] Respondents argue that this revision placed the provision in the context which was originally intended. For the past century the prohibition against prejudgment writs has remained in the preferential-transfer section. III This Court has construed this prohibition only three times.[8] In two s, the Court held that assets of a national bank could not be attached; in the third, the Court held that property of a third party in the custody of the bank was subject to attachment by a creditor. None of the three involved a preliminary injunction. Petitioner contends that the earliest of the three, Pacific Nat. "squarely controls" this |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109702/third-nat-bank-in-nashville-v-impac-limited-inc/ | the earliest of the three, Pacific Nat. "squarely controls" this Brief for Petitioner 13. Actually, however, the holding Mixter was quite narrow. The question before the Court was "whether an attachment can issue against a national bank before judgment in a suit begun in the Circuit Court of the United States," Although the statutory prohibition was not directly applicable to federal suits, the federal courts were authorized to issue attachments only as provided by state law. The Court concluded: "In our opinion the effect of the act of Congress is to deny the state remedy altogether so far as suits against national banks are concerned, and in this way operates as *319 well on the courts of the United States as on those of the States. Although the provision was evidently made to secure equality among the general creditors in the division of the proceeds of the property of an insolvent bank, its operation is by no means confined to s of actual or contemplated insolvency. The remedy is taken away altogether and cannot be used under any circumstances."[9] The statement in Mixter that the remedy of attachment cannot be used against a national bank "under any circumstances" makes it clear that the statutory prohibition is applicable to solvent as well as insolvent national banks. The financial circumstances of the bank are not of controlling importance. That Mixter did so hold was settled by this Court's most recent decision concerning this statute, Van : "Since the rendition of that decision [Mixter] it has been generally followed as an authoritative construction of the statute holding that no attachment can issue from a state court before judgment against a national bank or its property. It is argued by the plaintiff in error that *320 the decision in the Mixter should be limited to s where the bank is insolvent; but the statement of facts in that shows that at the time when the attachment was issued the bank was a going concern and entirely solvent so far as the record discloses. The language of Chief Justice Waite, above quoted, is broad and applicable to all conditions of national banks, whether solvent or insolvent; and there is nothing in the statute, which is likewise specific in its terms, giving the right of foreign attachment as against solvent national banks." Between Mixter and Van Reed, this Court rendered its only other decision in this area, In that the Court held that an "attachment sued out against [a] bank as garnishee is not an attachment against the bank or its property, nor a suit against |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109702/third-nat-bank-in-nashville-v-impac-limited-inc/ | against the bank or its property, nor a suit against it, within the meaning of that section." The holding in Earle forecloses a completely literal reading of the statute.[10] It also demonstrates that the "under any circumstances" language in Mixter had reference to the financial condition of the bank, rather than to any possible in which a prejudgment writ issues against a national bank. Speaking for the Court in Earle, the first Mr. Justice Harlan stated that the ban on prejudgment writs must "be construed in connection with the previous parts of the same section" concerning preferential This statement was consistent with the Court's earlier comment in Mixter: "The fact that the amendment of 1873 in relation to attachments and injunctions in state courts was made a *321 part of 5242 shows the opinion of the revisers and of Congress that it was germane to the other provision incorporated in that section [concerning preferential transfers], and was intended as an aid to the enforcement of the principle of equality among the creditors of an insolvent bank."[11] Thus, the statute can be given its full intended effect if it is applied to actions by creditors of the bank. As always, "[t]he meaning of particular phrases must be determined in context";[12] read in context, the anti-injunction provision has only a limited scope.[13] Petitioner argues, however, that the Court erred in Earle by reading the anti-attachment and preferential-transfer provisions together. It contends that the two were simply combined by mistake in the Revised Statutes. The burden is on petitioner, we think, to show that the present form of the statutewhich, after all, constitutes the legal command of Congressdoes not reflect congressional intent. If any mistake occurred, it seems at least as likely that the 1873 *322 amendment was incorrectly added to 57 as that the revisers, that very year, made an error which has gone undetected for over a century.[14] But there are three stronger reasons for rejecting the argument. First, the historical evidence supports the revisers. It appears likely that when originally passed the provision barring prejudgment writs actually was aimed at preventing preferences by creditors. As noted earlier. the threat of insolvency was a serious national problem in 1873, and there had been a number of s just before in which state courts had allowed creditors to obtain preferences in this manner. There does not seem to have been any similar problem with actions by noncreditors. It seems improbable, for instance, that there were many actions by mortgagors to enjoin foreclosures by national banks, because at that time national banks were |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109702/third-nat-bank-in-nashville-v-impac-limited-inc/ | by national banks, because at that time national banks were allowed to accept mortgages only in very limited circumstances.[15] Second, the anti-injunction provision itself bears strong signs that it was meant to have a limited scope. It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.[16] The word "injunction" is sandwiched in between the words "attachment" and "execution." Both are writs used by creditors to seize bank property. On the other hand, the word "garnishment" *323 is conspicuously absent from the list.[17] That writ is directed at the bank, but is used to seize property belonging to others which happens to be in the hands of the bank. The implication is strong that Congress intended only to prevent state judicial action, prior to final judgment, which would have the effect of seizing the bank's property.[18] Third, petitioner completely fails to identify any national or local interests which its reading of the statute would serve. That reading would give national banks engaged in the business of making loans secured by mortgages on real estate a privilege unavailable to competing lenders. No reason has been advanced for assuming that Congress intended such disparate treatment. We cannot believe that Congress intended to give national banks a license to inflict irreparable injury on others, free from the normal constraints of equitable relief. It is true that Congress has consistently and effectively sought to minimize the risk of insolvency for national banks, and to protect bank creditors from disparate treatment. But those interests are fully vindicated by our construction of the Act. Even though petitioner's reading of the Act can be supported by its text and by fragments of history, accepted principles of construction require that the provision in question *324 be construed in its present context and given a rational reading. Fairly read, the statute merely prevents prejudgment seizure of bank property by creditors of the bank. It does not apply to an action by a debtor seeking a preliminary injunction to protect its own property from wrongful foreclosure. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. |
Justice Powell | 1,976 | 17 | concurring | Craig v. Boren | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109570/craig-v-boren/ | I join the opinion of the Court as I am in general agreement with it. I do have reservations as to some of the discussion concerning the appropriate standard for equal protection analysis and the relevance of the statistical evidence. Accordingly, I add this concurring statement. With respect to the equal protection standard, I agree that is the most relevant precedent. But I find it unnecessary, in deciding this case, to read that decision as broadly as some of the Court's language may imply. Reed and subsequent cases involving gender-based classifications make clear that the Court subjects such classifications to a more critical examination than is normally applied when "fundamental" constitutional rights and "suspect classes" are not present.[*] *211 I view this as a relatively easy case. No one questions the legitimacy or importance of the asserted governmental objective: the promotion of highway safety. The decision of the case turns on whether the state legislature, by the classification it has chosen, has adopted a means that bears a "`fair and substantial relation'" to this objective. quoting Royster Guano It seems to me that the statistics offered by appellees and relied upon by the District Court do tend generally to support the view that young men drive more, possibly are inclined to drink more, andfor various reasonsare involved in more accidents than young women. Even so, I am not persuaded that these facts and the inferences fairly drawn from them justify this classification based on a three-year age differential between the sexes, and especially one that is so easily circumvented as to be virtually meaningless. Putting it differently, this gender-based classification does not bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. MR. |
Justice Stevens | 1,980 | 16 | majority | Beck v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110313/beck-v-alabama/ | We granted certiorari to decide the following question: "May a sentence of death constitutionally be imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense, when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense, and when the evidence would have supported such a verdict?" We now hold that the death penalty may not be imposed under these circumstances. Petitioner was tried for the capital offense of "[r]obbery or attempts thereof when the victim is intentionally killed by the defendant."[1] Under the Alabama death penalty statute *628 the requisite intent to kill may not be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine.[2] Felony murder is thus a lesser included offense of the capital crime of robbery-intentional killing. However, under the statute the judge is specifically prohibited from giving the jury the option of convicting the defendant of a lesser included offense.[3] Instead, the jury is given the *629 choice of either convicting the defendant of the capital crime, in which case it is required to impose the death penalty, or acquitting him, thus allowing him to escape all penalties for his alleged participation in the crime. If the defendant is convicted and the death penalty imposed, the trial judge must then hold a hearing with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances; after hearing the evidence, the judge may refuse to impose the death penalty, sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.[4] In this case petitioner's own testimony established his participation in the robbery of an 80-year-old man named Roy Malone. Petitioner consistently denied, however, that he killed the man or that he intended his death. Under petitioner's version of the events, he and an accomplice entered *630 their victim's home in the afternoon, and, after petitioner had seized the man intending to bind him with a rope, his accomplice unexpectedly struck and killed him. As the has conceded, absent the statutory prohibition on such instructions, this testimony would have entitled petitioner to a lesser included offense instruction on felony murder as a matter of state law.[] Because of the statutory prohibition, the court did not instruct the jury as to the lesser included offense of felony murder. Instead, the jury was told that if petitioner was acquitted of the capital crime of intentional killing in the course of a robbery, he "must be discharged" and "he can never be tried for anything that he ever did to Roy Malone." Record 743. The jury subsequently convicted petitioner and imposed the death penalty; after holding a hearing with respect to aggravating and |
Justice Stevens | 1,980 | 16 | majority | Beck v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110313/beck-v-alabama/ | penalty; after holding a hearing with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court refused to overturn that penalty. In the courts below petitioner attacked the prohibition on lesser included offense instructions in capital cases, arguing that the Alabama statute was constitutionally indistinguishable from the mandatory death penalty statutes struck down in and[6] The Alabama Court of Criminal *631 Appeals rejected this argument on the ground that the jury's only function under the Alabama statute is to determine guilt or innocence and that the death sentence it is required *632 to impose after a finding of guilt is merely advisory.[7] In a brief opinion denying review, the Alabama Supreme Court also rejected petitioner's arguments, citing cert. denied, In this Court petitioner contends that the prohibition on giving lesser included offense instructions in capital cases violates both the Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by substantially increasing the risk of error in the factfinding process. Petitioner argues that, in a case in which the evidence clearly establishes the defendant's guilt of a serious noncapital crime such as felony murder, forcing the jury to choose between conviction on the capital offense and acquittal creates a danger that it will resolve any doubts in favor of conviction.[8]*633 In response, Alabama argues that the preclusion of lesser included offense instructions does not impair the reliability of the factfinding process or prejudice the defendant in any way. Rather, it argues that the apparently mandatory death penalty will make the jury more prone to acquit in a doubtful case and that the jury's ability to force a mistrial by refusing to return a verdict acts as a viable third option in a case in which the jury has doubts but is nevertheless unwilling to acquit. The also contends that prohibiting lesser included offense instructions is a reasonable way of assuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily and capriciously as a result of compromise verdicts. Finally, it argues that any error in the imposition of the death penalty by the jury can be cured by the judge after a hearing on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. I At common law the jury was permitted to find the defendant guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.[9] This rule originally developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases in which the proof failed to establish some element of the crime charged. See 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 1, n. 4 (1969). But it has long been |
Justice Stevens | 1,980 | 16 | majority | Beck v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110313/beck-v-alabama/ | Procedure 1, n. 4 (1969). But it has long been recognized that it can also be beneficial to the defendant because it affords the jury a less drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN explained in his opinion *634 for the Court in providing the jury with the "third option" of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard: "Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a defendant may be better off without such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction in this context or any otherprecisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. In the case before us, for example, an intent to commit serious bodily injury is a necessary element of the crime with which petitioner was charged, but not of the crime of simple assault. Since the nature of petitioner's intent was very much in dispute at trial, the jury could rationally have convicted him of simple assault if that option had been presented. But the jury was presented with only two options: convicting the defendant of assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, or acquitting him outright. We cannot say that the availability of a third optionconvicting the defendant of simple assault could not have resulted in a different verdict. Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an *63 instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions." Alabama's failure to afford capital defendants the protection provided by lesser included offense instructions is unique in American criminal law.[10] In the federal courts, it has long been "beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a |
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