author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | procedural protection under the Due Process Clause beyond that afforded here by the statute and related agency regulations. We also conclude that the post-termination hearing procedures provided by the Civil Service Commission and the OEO adequately protect those federal employees' liberty interest, recognized in in not being wrongfully stigmatized by untrue and unsupported administrative charges. Finally, we hold that *164 the standard of employment protection imposed by Congress in the Lloyd-La Follette Act, is not impermissibly vague or overbroad in its regulation of the speech of federal employees and therefore unconstitutional on its face. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the District Court on both grounds on which it granted summary judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in part and concurring in the result in part. For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, I agree that the provisions of 5 U.S. C. ง 7501 (a) are neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. I also agree that appellee's discharge did not contravene the Fifth Amendment guarantee of procedural due process. Because I reach that conclusion on the basis of different reasoning, I state my views separately. I The applicability of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process depends in the first instance on the presence of a legitimate "property" or "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Governmental deprivation of such an interest must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and a hearing.[1]*165 The Court's decisions in Board of and provide the proper framework for analysis of whether appellee's employment constituted a "property" interest under the Fifth Amendment. In the Court stated: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims. "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state lawโrules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." The Court recognized that the "wooden distinction" between "rights" and "privileges" was not determinative of the applicability of procedural due process and that a property interest may be created by statute as well as by contract. In particular, the Court stated that a person may have a protected property interest in public employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued employment absent "sufficient cause" for discharge. In the Court again emphasized that a person may have a protected property interest in continued *166 public employment. There, a state college teacher alleged that the college had established a de facto system of tenure and that he had obtained tenure under that system. The Court stated that proof of these allegations would establish the teacher's legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent "sufficient cause" for discharge. In these circumstances, the teacher would have a property interest safeguarded by due process, and deprivation of that interest would have to be accompanied by some form of notice and a hearing. Application of these precedents to the instant case makes plain that appellee is entitled to invoke the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process. Appellee was a nonprobationary federal employee, and as such he could be discharged only for "cause." 5 U.S. C. ง 7501 (a). The federal statute guaranteeing appellee continued employment absent "cause" for discharge conferred on him a legitimate claim of entitlement which constituted a "property" interest under the Fifth Amendment. Thus termination of his employment requires notice and a hearing. The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee's interest in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and limited by the statutory procedures for discharge and that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process accords to appellee no procedural protections against arbitrary or erroneous discharge other than those expressly provided in the statute. The plurality would thus conclude that the statute governing federal employment determines not only the nature of appellee's property interest, but also the extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It seems to me that this approach is incompatible with the principles laid down in and Indeed, it would lead directly to the conclusion that whatever the nature *167 of an individual's statutorily created property interest, deprivation of that interest could be accomplished without notice or a hearing at any time. This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment,[2] it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently recognized, the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms. ;[3], ; Board of II Having determined that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process applies to appellee's discharge from public employment, the question arises whether an evidentiary hearing, including the right to present favorable witnesses and to confront and examine adverse witnesses, must be accorded before removal. The resolution of this issue depends on a balancing process in which the Government's interest in expeditious removal * of an unsatisfactory employee is weighed against the interest of the affected employee in continued public employment. As the Court stated in Cafeteria & Restaurant "consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." In the present case, the Government's interest, and hence the public's interest, is the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline. Such factors are essential if the Government is to perform its responsibilities effectively and economically. To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency. Moreover, a requirement of a prior evidentiary hearing would impose additional administrative costs, create delay, and deter warranted discharges. Thus, the Government's interest in being able to act expeditiously to remove an unsatisfactory employee is substantial.[4] *169 Appellee's countervailing interest is the continuation of his public employment pending an evidentiary hearing. Since appellee would be reinstated and awarded backpay if he prevails on the merits of his claim, appellee's actual injury would consist of a temporary interruption of his income during the interim. To be sure, even a temporary interruption of income could constitute a serious loss in many instances. But the possible deprivation is considerably less severe than that involved in Goldberg, for example, where termination of welfare benefits to the recipient would have occurred in the face of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | to the recipient would have occurred in the face of "brutal need." Indeed, as the Court stated in that case, "the crucial factor in this contextโa factor not present in the case of the discharged government employeeโis that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits." By contrast, a public employee may well have independent resources to overcome any temporary hardship, and he may be able to secure a job in the private sector. Alternatively, he will be eligible for welfare benefits. *170 Appellee also argues that the absence of a prior evidentiary hearing increases the possibility of wrongful removal and that delay in conducting a post-termination evidentiary hearing further aggravates his loss. The present statute and regulations, however, already respond to these concerns. The affected employee is provided with 30 days' advance written notice of the reasons for his proposed discharge and the materials on which the notice is based. He is accorded the right to respond to the charges both orally and in writing, including the submission of affidavits. Upon request, he is entitled to an opportunity to appear personally before the official having the authority to make or recommend the final decision. Although an evidentiary hearing is not held, the employee may make any representations he believes relevant to his case. After removal, the employee receives a full evidentiary hearing, and is awarded backpay if reinstated. See 5 CFR งง 771.208 and 772.305; 5 U.S. C. ง 5596. These procedures minimize the risk of error in the initial removal decision and provide for compensation for the affected employee should that decision eventually prove wrongful.[5] *171 On balance, I would conclude that a prior evidentiary hearing is not required and that the present statute and regulations comport with due process by providing a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests.[6] MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U.S. C. ง 7501 (a), provides that "[a]n individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."[1] The * regulations of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), at which appellee was employed, give content to "cause" by specifying grounds for removal which include "any action which might result in [a]ffecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of [OEO and] the Government" and any "criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | "criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government."[2] Aside from specifying the standards for discharges, Congress has also established the procedural frame-work in which the discharge determinations are to be made. The employee is to receive 30 days' advance written notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him, a copy of the charges, and a *173 reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges. Before being terminated he may also make a personal appearance before an agency official, and implementing Civil Service Commission regulations provide that "[t]he right to answer personally includes the right to answer orally in person by being given a reasonable opportunity to make any representations which the employee believes might sway the final decision on his case, but does not include the right to a trial or a formal hearing with examination of witnesses." The regulations further provide that the "representative or representatives designated to hear the answer shall be persons who have authority either to make a final decision on the proposed adverse action or to recommend what final decision should be made." The employee is entitled to notice of the agency's decision in writing, and the notice must inform the employee "[w]hich of the reasons in the notice of proposed adverse action have been found sustained and which have been found not sustained."[3] The employee *174 may appeal from an adverse decision and is entitled to an evidentiary trial-type hearing at this stage.[4] This later hearing affords the employee certain rights not available within OEO at the pretermination stage, particularly *175 the taking of testimony under oath and the cross-examination of witnesses. Appellee Kennedy was a nonprobationary federal employee in the competitive civil service and held the position of field representative in the Chicago Regional Office of OEO. As such, he was entitled to the protection of the statutes and regulations outlined above. On February 18, 1972, Kennedy received a "Notification of Proposed Adverse Action" from the Regional Director of OEO, Wendell Verduin. The notice charged, among other things, that Kennedy had made slanderous statements about Verduin and another coworker charging them with bribing or attempting to bribe a potential OEO grantee and had thereby caused disharmony in his office by preventing its smooth functioning. Verduin then ruled on March 20, 1972, after Kennedy had filed a written answer objecting to the lack of certain procedures furnished at this pretermination hearing, but had declined to appear personally, that Kennedy be removed from his job with OEO, effective March 27, 1972.[5] *176 |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | from his job with OEO, effective March 27, 1972.[5] *176 Kennedy then appealed directly to the Civil Service Commission and also instituted the present action. The first count of his complaint alleged that the discharge procedure of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, and the attendant Civil Service Commission regulations, deprived him of due process by failing to provide for a full hearing prior to termination. The second count alleged that he was discharged because of certain conversations, in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. The single judge who reviewed the complaint convened a three-judge court to hear the first count, and dismissed the second, without prejudice to refiling after the Civil Service Commission ruled on his appeal. It was the court's view that it should not act until the agency had the opportunity to review the merits of appellee's First Amendment claim. After the convening of the three-judge court, appellee amended his complaint, then limited to the due process claim, to include a challenge to the Lloyd-La Follette Act on the grounds that it was vague and overbroad and violated the First Amendment. The three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. งง 2282 and 2284, granted summary judgment for appellee. It held that the discharge procedures violated due process because "[t]here was no provision for the decision on removal or suspension to be made by an impartial agency *177 official, or for Kennedy (by his own means) to present witnesses; or for his right to confront adverse witnesses." The court also held that ง 7501 was unconstitutional on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. The Government was ordered to reinstate Kennedy to his former position with backpay and to conduct any future removal proceedings with a hearing consistent with its Appellants were also enjoined from further enforcement of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, and implementing regulations, as "construed to regulate the speech of competitive service employees." I In my view, three issues must be addressed in this case. First, does the Due Process Clause require that there be a full trial-type hearing at some time when a Federal Government employee in the competitive service is terminated? Secondly, if such be the case, must this hearing be held prior to the discharge of the employee, and, if so, was the process afforded in this case adequate? Third, and as an entirely separate matter, are the Lloyd-La Follette Act and its attendant regulations void for vagueness or overbreadth? I join the Court as to the third issue. II I differ basically with the plurality's view that "where the grant of a substantive |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | the plurality's view that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet," and that "the property interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest." Ante, at 153-154, 155. The rationale of this position quickly leads to the conclusion that even though *178 the statute requires cause for discharge, the requisites of due process could equally have been satisfied had the law dispensed with any hearing at all, whether pretermination or post-termination. The past cases of this Court uniformly indicate that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.[6] The principles of due process "come to us from the law of England and their requirement was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the crown and place him under the protection of the law." 1 U.S. 1, The "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Anti-Fascist 341 U.S. This basic principle has unwaveringly been applied when private property has been taken by the State. A fundamental requirement of due process is "the opportunity to be heard." "It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Where the Court has rejected the need for a hearing prior to the initial "taking," a principal rationale has been that a hearing would be provided before the taking became final. See North American Cold Storage ; Central Trust ; Corn Exchange ; ; ; ; While these cases indicate that the particular interests involved might not have demanded a hearing immediately, they also reaffirm the principle that property may not be taken without a hearing at some time. This principle has also been applied in situations where the State has licensed certain activities. Where the grant or denial of a license has been involved, and the "right" to engage in business has been legitimately limited by the interest of the State in protecting its citizens from inexpert or unfit performance, the decision of the State to grant or deny a license has been subject to a hearing requirement. See, e. g., ; ; The Court has put particular stress |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | e. g., ; ; The Court has put particular stress on the fact that the absence of a hearing would allow the State to be arbitrary in its grant or denial, and to make judgments on grounds other than the fitness of a particular person to pursue his chosen profession. In the context of admission to the bar, the Court has stated: "Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no *180 basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory." The hearing requirement has equally been applied when the license was to be removed, In re Ruffalo, or a licensee has been subject to state regulation, Ohio Bell Telephone 301 U.S. 2 Similar principles prevail when the State affords its process and mechanism of dispute settlement, its law enforcement officers, and its courts, in aiding one person to take property from another. Where there is a "taking" before a final determination of rights, as in some cases when the State seizes property, to protect one of the parties pendente lite, the Court has acted on the assumption that at some time a full hearing will be available, as when there is an attachment of property preliminary to resolution of the merits of a dispute, ; Coffin 277 U.S. ; (19). The opportunity to defend one's property before it is finally taken is so basic that it hardly bears repeating. Adequate notice of the court proceeding must be furnished, and there must be jurisdiction over the person, Since there is a need for some kind of hearing before a person is finally deprived of his property, the argument in the instant case, and that adopted in the plurality opinion, is that there is something different about a final taking from an individual of property rights which have their origin in the public rather than the private sector of the economy, and, as applied here, that there is no need for any hearing at any time when the Government *181 discharges a person from his job, even though good cause for the discharge is required. In cases involving employment by the Government, the earliest cases of this Court have distinguished between two situations, where the entitlement to the job is conditioned "at the pleasure" of the employer and where the job is to be held subject to certain requirements being met |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | is to be held subject to certain requirements being met by the employee, as when discharge must be for "cause." The Court has stated: "The inquiry is therefore whether there were any causes of removal prescribed by law If there were, then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient." ; The Court has thus made clear that Congress may limit the total discretion of the Executive in firing an employee, by providing that terminations be for cause, and only for cause, and, if it does so, notice and a hearing are "essential." Where Executive discretion is not limited, there is no need for a hearing. In the latter event, where the statute has provided that employment was conditioned on " `maintain[ing] the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers,' " Ex parte Secombe, or was subject to no conditions at all, Ex parte Hennen, no hearing is required. See also ; ; 177 U.S. 0 To like effect is Cafeteria where the Court held that no hearing need be provided to a cook employed by a private concessionaire of the Navy before the Government revoked her security clearance. The revocation of security clearances was within the "unfettered control" of the Navy in order "to manage the internal operation of an important federal military establishment." The Court there assumed that "Rachel Brawner could not constitutionally have been excluded from the Gun Factory if the announced grounds for her exclusion had been patently arbitrary or discriminatory" Where the Congress has confined Executive discretion, notice and hearing have been required. In Anti-Fascist 341 U.S. an organization was put on the Attorney General's list, as disloyal to the United States, without a hearing before the Attorney General. The Executive Order, as defined by implementing regulations, required the Executive to make an "appropriate determination" of disloyalty. It was apparent that members of organizations employed by the Government who belonged to an organization on the Attorney General's list would be in danger of losing their jobs. The Court held, assuming the facts as alleged by the complaints were true, that it would be arbitrary, and not consistent with an "appropriate determination," to deny a hearing on the matter to the affected organizations. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurring opinion, "[t]he heart of the matter is that democracy implies |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | opinion, "[t]he heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights." *183 To some extent, McGrath, and like cases, see Greene v. depended on statutory constructionโthe intent of Congress to require that procedural fairness be observed in making decisions on security clearances or status, which affected employmentโ but it is obvious that the constitutional requirements of fairness were a guiding hand to the Court's statutory interpretation. "Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process," and it has been "the Court's concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation's lawmakers" The concern of the Court that fundamental fairness be observed when the State deals with its employees has not been limited to action which is discriminatory and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, as in ; v. Board of ; ; See also It has been observed that "constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." ; v. Board of (Emphasis added.) In New York law provided that a tenured employee taking the Fifth Amendment before a legislative committee inquiring into his official conduct could be fired. Quite apart from the Fifth Amendment "penalty" assessed by the State, the Court was concerned with the arbitrariness of drawing a conclusion, without a hearing, that any employee who *184 took the Fifth Amendment was guilty or unfit for employment. The Court stated: "This is not to say that has a constitutional right to be an associate professor of German at Brooklyn College. The State has broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show 's continued employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State. But there has been no such inquiry here." The Court's decisions in Board of and reiterate the notion that the Executive Branch cannot be arbitrary in depriving a person of his job, when the Legislative Branch has provided that a person cannot be fired except for cause, and, if anything, extend the principles beyond the facts of this case. In a teacher who had held his position for a number of years but was not tenured under contract, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | a number of years but was not tenured under contract, alleged that he had de facto tenure under contract law due to "the existence of rules or understandings" with the college which employed him, The Court held that if the professor could prove the existence of a property interest it would "obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency." In an assistant professor was hired for a fixed term of one academic year, and had no tenure. The Court held that the teacher had no property interest in the job, since the terms of employment allowed that his contract not be renewed. The critical consideration was that the terms "did not provide for contract renewal absent `sufficient cause.' " The rights to continued employment were determined by state law. The Court took great pains, *185 however, to point out that a tenured appointment, providing for entitlement to a job, absent cause, would be a far different case. These cases only serve to emphasize that where there is a legitimate entitlement to a job, as when a person is given employment subject to his meeting certain specific conditions, due process requires, in order to insure against arbitrariness by the State in the administration of its law, that a person be given notice and a hearing before he is finally discharged. As the Court stated in 7 U.S. 167, : "If [the administrative officer] is authorized to determine questions of fact his decision must be accepted unless he exceeds his authority by failing to follow a procedure which satisfies elementary standards of fairness and reasonableness essential to the due conduct of the proceeding which Congress has authorized." To be sure, to determine the existence of the property interest, as for example, whether a teacher is tenured or not, one looks to the controlling law, in this case federal statutory law, the Lloyd-La Follette Act, which provides that a person can only be fired for cause. The fact that the origins of the property right are with the State makes no difference for the nature of the procedures required. While the State may define what is and what is not property, once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due process, and as I understand it six members of the Court are in agreement on this fundamental proposition. I conclude, therefore, that as a matter of due process, a hearing must be held at some time before a competitive civil service employee may be finally terminated |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | before a competitive civil service employee may be finally terminated for misconduct. Here, the Constitution and the Lloyd-La Follette Act converge, because a full trial-type hearing *186 is provided by statute before termination from the service becomes final, by way of appeal either through OEO, the Civil Service Commission, or both.[7] A different case might be put, of course, if the termination were for reasons of pure inefficiency, assuming such a general reason could be given, in which case it would be at least arguable that a hearing would serve no useful purpose and that judgments of this kind are best left to the discretion of administrative officials. This is not such a case, however, since Kennedy was terminated on specific charges of misconduct. III The second question which must be addressed is whether a hearing of some sort must be held before any "taking" of the employee's property interest in his job occurs, even if a full hearing is available before that taking becomes final. I must resolve this question because in my view a full hearing must be afforded at some juncture and the claim is that it must occur prior to termination. If the right to any hearing itself is a pure matter of property definition, as the plurality opinion suggests, then that question need not be faced, for any kind of hearing, or no hearing at all, would suffice. As I have suggested, the State may not dispense with the minimum procedures defined by due process, but different considerations come into play when deciding whether a pretermination hearing is required and, if it is, what kind of hearing must be had. *187 In passing upon claims to a hearing before preliminary but nonfinal deprivations, the usual rule of this Court has been that a full hearing at some time suffices. "We have repeatedly held that no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final administrative order becomes effective." "It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination." 599. See also ; Scottish Union & National Insurance ; This has seemingly been the rule whether the State was taking property from the person, as in the above-cited cases, or whether one person was taking it from another through the process of state courts. See ; Coffin 277 U.S. ; (19). In recent years, however, in a limited number of cases, the Court has held that a hearing must be |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | cases, the Court has held that a hearing must be furnished at the first stage of taking, even where a later hearing was provided. This has been true in the revocation of a state-granted license, and in suits between private parties, where summary replevin procedures, or garnishment procedures, were attacked, and when the State has sought to terminate welfare benefits,[8] *188 These conflicting lines of cases demonstrate, as the Court stated in Cafeteria & Restaurant that "consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." See also ; In assessing whether a prior hearing is required, the Court has looked to how the legitimate interests asserted by the party asserting the need for a hearing, and the party opposing it, would be furthered or hindered. In many cases, where the claim to a pretermination hearing has been rejected, it appears that the legitimate interest of the party opposing the hearing might be defeated outright if such hearing were to be held.[9] For example, when the Government or a private party lays claim to property there is often the danger that the person in possession of the property may alienate or waste it, and the Government or private party may be without recourse. Thus, the Court has held that there is no need for a prior hearing where the Government has taken preliminary custody of alleged enemy property before actual title to the property is determined, Central Trust ; 255 U.S. or where a private creditor has sought to attach property of a debtor. See Coffin Of course, such summary action must be authorized in such a manner as to minimize the possibilities of a mistaken deprivation, by a *189 public official in the case of administrative action, or a judge where the processes of the court are used. The danger that the purpose of the action may be defeated, or made exceedingly difficult, by requiring a prior hearing, is illustrated by North American Cold Storage where the Court sustained the constitutionality of an Illinois statute permitting health inspectors to enter cold-storage houses and "forthwith seize, condemn and destroy" unfit food. The defendants in the action claimed that while it may be necessary to seize the food pending a hearing, surely destruction of that food could not be justified. Nonetheless, the Court observed: "If a hearing were to be always necessary, even under the circumstances of this case, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | be always necessary, even under the circumstances of this case, the question at once arises as to what is to be done with the food in the meantime. Is it to remain with the cold storage company, and if so under what security that it will not be removed? To be sure that it will not be removed during the time necessary for the hearing, which might frequently be indefinitely prolonged, some guard would probably have to be placed over the subject-matter of the investigation, which would involve expense, and might not even then prove effectual." Similar inabilities of the party claiming a right to a prior hearing, to make the moving party in the suit whole, have appeared where incompetence and malfeasance in the administration of a bank could precipitate a financial collapse in the community, which would go uncompensated, see or where, in the absence of a jeopardy assessment by the Tax a taxpayer might waste or conceal his assets, see In all *190 such cases it is also significant that the party advancing the claim to a summary procedure stands ready to make whole the party who has been deprived of his property, if the initial taking proves to be wrongful, either by the credit of the public fisc or by posting a bond. Of course, this principle cannot be applied with success to explain the Court's decisions in cases holding that a pretermination hearing is required; it is not true that the party entitled to the hearing stands ready to compensate the adversary for what may be the wrongful possession of the property in question during the pendency of the litigation. This is vividly illustrated in where the Court observed that "the benefits paid to ineligible recipients pending decision at the hearing probably cannot be recouped, since these recipients are likely to be judgment proof." However, other considerations have proved decisive, such as: the risk that the initial deprivation may be wrongful; the impact on the claimant to a hearing of not having the property while he waits for a full hearing; the interest of the party opposing the prior hearing and asserting the need for immediate possession in not alerting the current possessor to the lawsuit; and the risk of leaving the property in possession of the current possessor between the time notice is supplied and the time of the preliminary hearing. In Goldberg and the Court observed that there was a substantial chance that the claimant to the property, be it the State or garnishor, would lose in the ultimate resolution of the controversy. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | garnishor, would lose in the ultimate resolution of the controversy. In Goldberg, the Court took note of the "welfare bureaucracy's difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility." 397 U.S., n. 12. Since the time of the decision in Goldberg, at least one study has shown that decisions to terminate benefits have been reversed with a fair degree of frequency.[10]*191 Concern was also expressed with the use of garnishment in a vast number of cases where the debt was fraudulent. In Fuentes, although no such empirical evidence was available, the risk of wrongful deprivations was unnecessarily increased by allowing a clerk, rather than a judge, to pass on the creditor's claim for summary replevin. In Bell, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute requiring summary suspension of a driver's license of any uninsured motorist who was unable after an accident to post security for the amount of the damages claimed against him. The only hearing held by the State on the issue of suspension excluded any consideration of fault, the standard on which the validity would ultimately turn. Without some kind of probable-cause determination of fault, it was obvious that many suspensions would prove to be unwarranted. As for the impact on the current property possessor of not having an early pretermination hearing, the Court has held that without possession of the property a person may be unable to exist at even a minimum standard of decency. In Goldberg, where the person would have lost the last source of support available, aside from charity, the Court observed that "termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate." 397 U.S., In fact, the magnitude of deprivation may be such as to prevent the welfare recipient from pursuing his right to a later full hearing. In the seizure of an individual's wages could "as a practical *192 matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." -342 In Bell, the petitioner was a clergyman whose ministry required him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia communities, and he was "severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by a suspension of his licenses." The impact of deprivation increases, of course, the longer the time period between the initial deprivation and the opportunity to have a full hearing. In Goldberg, the Court noted that although pertinent New York regulations provided that a "fair hearing" be held within 10 working days of the request, with decision |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | held within 10 working days of the request, with decision within 12 working days thereafter, "[i]t was conceded in oral argument that these time limits are not in fact observed." n. 5. In and Fuentes, there was no indication of the speed with which a court ruling on garnishment and possession would be rendered, and of course the ultimate issues on the merits in such cases must wait for a still later determination. In Bell, the issue of liability might not be determined until full trial proceedings in court. The last factor to be weighed in the balance is the danger to the party claiming possession occasioned by alerting the current possessor to the lawsuit, and then leaving the property in his hands pending the holding of the preliminary hearing. In Goldberg and the property right seized was a flow of income, in one case from the government, and in the other from the private employer, pending the preliminary hearing. The government ran no special risk by supplying notice in advance of the cutoff, since the government was in possession of the flow of income until it was turned over piecemeal to the welfare recipient. Further, though the government could assert in the welfare case that it would incur an uncompensated loss, that risk would only be *193 incurred from the time the last check is delivered until the pretermination hearing is held and the administrative agency certainly has the power to offer a speedy hearing before that time is reached. See In while it was true that the inability to garnish wages could leave the creditor uncompensated, if the debtor proved judgment proof, this was a risk the creditor assumed at the outset by being unsecured. Further, notice to the debtor of the pendency of the lawsuit is not likely to increase the risk that the debtor will prove to be judgment proof, since the debtor is not likely to leave his job due to the pendency of the suit. Likewise, the risk to the creditor of the debtor's drawing on his wages between the time of notice and the availability of a court hearing on the claim in no way interferes with the creditor's claim to the future flow of earnings after the hearing has been held. The garnishor, therefore, asserts not only the right to take the debtor's wages, but to take them before the controversy has been resolved. In Bell, the risk to the State of supplying notice to the licensee and of leaving the person in possession of the license until the hearing, was not |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | in possession of the license until the hearing, was not at issue, since the state statute provided for notice and a presuspension hearing. There were few costs attached to expanding the scope of that hearing to include a probable-cause determination of fault. With the above principles in hand, is the tenured civil-service employee entitled to a pretermination hearing, such as that provided by the Lloyd-La Follette Act? There would be a problem of uncompensated loss to the Government, if the employee were to draw wages without working for the period between notice of a discharge and a preliminary hearing. Yet, if the charge against the employee did not indicate that the employee should be *194 excluded from the workplace pending this hearing, some work could be exacted by the Government in exchange for its payment of salary. One must also consider another type of cost to the Government if preseparation hearings were providedโthe necessity of keeping a person on the scene who might injure the public interest through poor service or might create an uproar at the workplace. However, suspension with pay would obviate this problem. On the employee's side of the ledger, there is the danger of mistaken termination. Discharge decisions, made ex parte, may be reversed after full hearing. One study reveals that in fiscal year 1970, in agencies where full pretermination hearings were routine, employees contesting removal were successful almost 20% of the time. Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 204 n. 35 The impact on the employee of being without a job pending a full hearing is likely to be considerable because "[m]ore than 75 percent of actions contested within employing agencies require longer to decide than the 60 days prescribed by [Civil Service] Commission regulations. Over 50 percent take more than three months, and five percent are in process for longer than a year." Of course, the discharged civil servant, deprived of his source of income, can seek employment in the private sector and so cut or minimize his losses, opportunities largely unavailable to the welfare recipient in Goldberg or the debtor in Nonetheless, the employee may not be able to get a satisfactory position in the private sector, particularly a tenured one, and his marketability may be under a cloud due to the circumstances of his dismissal. See 4 U.S. 70, Cf. Board of n. 13. It should be stressed that *195 if such employment is unavailable the Government may truly be pursuing a partially counter-productive policy by forcing the employee onto the welfare rolls. Finally, by providing a pretermination hearing, the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | the welfare rolls. Finally, by providing a pretermination hearing, the Government runs no risk through providing notice, since the employee cannot run away with his job, and can surely minimize its risk of uncompensated loss by eliminating the provision for personal appearances and setting early dates for filing written objections. Altogether different considerations as to notice might be applicable, if the employee would be likely to do damage to the Government if provided with such notice. See 5 CFR ง 752.202 (c) (2) providing that an agency may dispense with the 30-day notice requirement "[w]hen there is reasonable cause to believe an employee is guilty of a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed." Perhaps partly on the basis of some of these constitutional considerations, Congress has provided for pretermination hearings. Certainly the debate on the Lloyd-La Follette Act indicates that constitutional considerations were present in the minds of Congressmen speaking in favor of the legislation.[11] In any event, I conclude that the statute and regulations, to the extent they require 30 days' advance notice and a right to make *196 a written presentation, satisfy minimum constitutional requirements. IV Appellee in this case not only asserts that he is entitled to a hearing at some time before his property interest is finally terminated, and to a pretermination hearing of some kind before his wages are provisionally cut off, which are currently provided to him, but also argues that he must be furnished certain procedures at this preliminary hearing not provided by Congress: an impartial hearing examiner, an opportunity to present witnesses, and the right to engage in cross-examination. In other words, his claim is not only to a pretermination hearing, but one in which full trial-type procedures are available. A The facts in this case show that the Regional Director, Verduin, who charged appellee Kennedy with making slanderous statements about him as to an alleged bribe offer, also ruled in the preliminary hearing that Kennedy should be terminated. The "Notification of Proposed Adverse Action," signed by Verduin, charged that appellee had "made statements knowingly against officials of this agency which could harm or destroy their authority, official standing or reputation" and that appellee had engaged "in a course of conduct intended to produce public notoriety and conclusions on the part of the public, without any proof whatsover and in reckless disregard of the actual facts known to you [appellee], or reasonably discoverable by you [appellee], that officials of this agency had committed or attempted to commit acts of misfeasance, nonfeasance and malfeasance." Facts were marshaled to support |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | of misfeasance, nonfeasance and malfeasance." Facts were marshaled to support the charges that appellee had spoken at a union *197 meeting "to the effect that [Verduin and his assistant] had attempted to bribe Mr. James White Eagle Stewart by offering him a $100,000 grant of OEO funds if he would sign a statement against you [appellee] and another employee," and that appellee had spoken of the bribe to a newspaper reporter and to a radio station. After appellee had received this notice, he made no response to the merits of the charges, but instead wrote to Verduin requesting that he was entitled to certain procedural rights at the hearing, one of which was to have "a genuinely impartial hearing officer," thus furnishing Verduin with the opportunity to recuse himself and provide an alternative hearing examiner. This was not done. In considering appellee's claim to have an impartial hearing examiner, we might start with a first principle: "[N]o man shall be a judge in his own cause." Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 1a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610). Verduin's reputation was certainly at stake in the charges brought against Kennedy. Indeed, the heart of the charge was that Kennedy had spoken of Verduin in reckless disregard of the truth. That Verduin almost seemed to be stating a libel complaint against Kennedy under New York Times dramatizes the personal conflict which precipitated the proposed termination. Our decisions have stressed, in situations analogous to the one faced here, that the right to an impartial decision-maker is required by due process. The Court has held that those with a substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes. ; The Court has observed that disqualification because of interest has been extended with equal force to administrative adjudications. *198 In the context of contempt before a judge, where a judge trying a defendant is the object of "efforts to denounce, insult, and slander the court," and "marked personal feelings were present on both sides," the Court has held that criminal contempt proceedings should be held before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor. See In re Oliver, ; cf. In re Murchison, We have also stressed the need for impartiality in administrative proceedings, stating in that an "impartial decision maker is essential," (Citations omitted.) To the same effect was involving revocation of parole. In both Goldberg and Morrissey, this requirement was held to apply to pretermination hearings.[12] It may be true that any hearing without an impartial hearing officer will reflect the bias of the adjudicator. The interest of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | will reflect the bias of the adjudicator. The interest of the Government in not so providing would appear slim. Given the pretermination hearing, it would seem in the Government's interest to avoid lengthy appeals occasioned by biased initial judgments, and it would be reasonable to expect more correct decisions at the initial stage at little cost if the hearing officer is impartial. *199 My view is a narrower one, however. Fairness and accuracy are not always threatened simply because the hearing examiner is the supervisor of an employee, or, as in this case, the Regional Director over many employees, including appellee. But here the hearing official was the object of slander that was the basis for the employee's proposed discharge. See In ruling that the employee was to be terminated, the hearing examiner's own reputation, as well as the efficiency of the service, was at stake; and although Mr. Verduin may have succeeded, in fact, in disassociating his own personal feelings from his decision as to the interests of OEO, the risk and the appearance that this was not the case were too great to tolerate. In such situations the official normally charged with the discharge decision need only recuse and transfer the file to a person qualified to make the initial decision. We need not hold that the Lloyd-La Follette Act is unconstitutional for its lack of provision for an impartial hearing examiner. Congress is silent on the matter. We would rather assume, because of the constitutional problems in not so providing, that, if faced with the question (at least on the facts of this case) Congress would have so provided. "Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process." Greene v.[13] *200 B Appellee also claims a right to a full trial-type hearing at the pretermination stage, particularly asserting that he is denied due process, if not given the opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses. While fully realizing the value of a full trial-type hearing as a method for ultimate resolution of the facts, see the pretermination hearing is not held for the purpose of making such an ultimate determination. This is provided for through the appeal procedure where the employee is afforded the procedural rights he now seeks at an earlier stage of the proceedings. The function of the pretermination hearing is, and no more is required by due process, to make a probable-cause determination as to whether the charges brought against the employee are |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | as to whether the charges brought against the employee are or are not true. Where the Court has held that pretermination hearings are required, in past decisions, it has spoken sparingly of the procedures to be required. was silent on the matter, and Fuentes merely required something more than an ex parte proceeding before a court clerk. In Bell, the Court held that the hearing must involve a probable-cause determination as to the fault of the licensee, and "need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability," realizing that "[a] procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy due process in every case." Thus, "procedural due process [was to] be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee." We think the clear implication of Bell to be that "full adjudication," including presentation of witnesses and cross-examination, need not be provided in every case where a pretermination *201 hearing of some kind is required by due process or provided by the statute. In the Court struck a different note on procedures. Although stating that the only function of the pretermination hearing was "to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments," and seemingly adopting a probable-cause standard, the Court required cross-examination of witnesses relied upon by the department. The Court was careful to observe, however, that these procedural rules were "tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard." 268-269. The decision to cut off AFDC welfare payments leaves the recipient literally without any means to survive or support a family. While this level of deprivation may not be insisted upon as a necessary condition for requiring some kind of pretermination hearing, it may well be decisive in requiring the Government to provide specific procedures at the pretermination stage. The greater the level of deprivation which may flow from a decision, the less one may tolerate the risk of a mistaken decision, cf. and thus the Court in Goldberg, while maintaining that the pretermination hearing was in the nature of a probable-cause determination, was less willing to allow a margin of error as to probable cause. Rules of procedure are often shaped by the risk of making an erroneous determination. See In re Winship, Indeed, all that was specifically not required in Goldberg was a complete record and a comprehensive In this case, the employee is not totally without prospect for |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | Arnett v. Kennedy | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109008/arnett-v-kennedy/ | this case, the employee is not totally without prospect for some form of support during the period between the pretermination and final hearing on appeal, though it may not be equivalent in earnings or tenure *202 to his prior competitive service position. Although the employee may not be entitled to unemployment compensation, see 4 U.S. 6 since he has been terminated for cause he may get some form of employment in the private sector, and, if necessary, may draw on the welfare system in the interim. Given this basic floor of need, which the system provides, we should not hold that procedural due process is so inflexible as to require the Court to hold that the procedural protections, of a written statement and oral presentation to an impartial hearing examiner provided by regulation, are insufficient. The Court stated in that new regulations of the Department of Health, and Welfare required that Social Security disability payments were not to be suspended in a pretermination hearing without "notice of a proposed suspension and the reasons therefor, plus an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence," but could be without an oral presentation, since "[i]n the context of a comprehensive complex administrative program, the administrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise." Cf. aff'd, Necessarily, to some extent, the Court must share with Congress, in an area where one is called upon to judge the efficacy of particular procedures, a role in defining constitutional requirements, and Congress explicitly left it to the discretion of the agency as to whether such procedures were required. I would not upset that judgment in this case. In accord with these views, I would affirm the judgment of the three-judge court, ordering reinstatement and backpay, due to the failure to provide an impartial hearing officer at the pretermination hearing. I would *203 reverse that part of the court's order enjoining the application of the statute on First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds. MR. |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | Lewis v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108118/lewis-v-martin/ | Appellants are mothers and children who receive welfare assistance under California law.[1] At the time these actions were commenced, California law provided[2] that *554 payments to a "needy child" who "lives with his mother and a stepfather or an adult male person assuming the role of spouse to the mother although not legally married to her"known in the vernacular as a MARS shall be computed after consideration is given to the income of the stepfather or MARS.[3] The California law conclusively presumes that the needs of the children are reduced by the amount of income available from the man in the house whether or not it is in fact available or actually used to meet the needs of the dependent children. Following our decision in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) promulgated a regulation reaffirming its earlier rulings that the income of a man not ceremonially married to the mother of the dependent children may not be treated as available to the children unless there is proof that he has made actual contributions.[4] Even where the man is ceremonially married to the mother but is not the real or adoptive father, his income may not be treated as available to the children unless he is legally obligated to support the children by state law.[5] These suits by appellants were brought in a three-judge District Court to have the California law and regulations declared invalid. That court dismissed the *555 complaints, holding the HEW regulations were invalid. The cases are here on appeal and we noted probable jurisdiction. The Social Security Act defines a dependent child as a "needy child who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with" a specified relative. 406(a), 42 U.S. C. 606 (a). This is the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program which we discussed in The federal statute provides that state agencies administering AFDC plans "shall, in determining need [of an eligible child], take into consideration any other income and resources [of the child] as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income." 42 U.S. C. 602 (a) (7) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). This directive was implemented by a regulation of HEW, effective July 1, 1967, which, as then worded, provided in part: "[O]nly income and resources that are, in fact, available to an applicant or recipient for current use on a regular basis will be taken into consideration in determining need and |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | Lewis v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108118/lewis-v-martin/ | basis will be taken into consideration in determining need and the amount of payment."[6] We stated in at 319 n. 16, that those regulations "clearly comport with" the Act. And as we have noted, shortly after HEW *556 promulgated a new regulation[7] which provided in pertinent part: "(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must provide that the determination whether a child has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent will be made only in relation to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to a child's stepparent who is ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the child under State law of general applicability which requires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children. "(b) The inclusion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a `substitute parent' or `man-in-the-house' or any individual other than one described in paragraph (a) of this section is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the State. [I]n the consideration of all income and resources in establishing financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment, only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and the income only of the parent described in paragraph (a) of this section will be considered available for children in the household in absence of proof of actual contributions." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the regulations explicitly negate the idea that in determining a child's needs, a stepfather (i. e., a man married to a child's mother but who has not *557 adopted the child and is not legally obligated to support the child under state law) or a MARS may be presumed to be providing support.[8] We said in that AFDC aid can be granted "only if `a parent' of the needy child is continually absent from the home." If the stepfather or MARS is a "parent" within the meaning of the federal Act, any federal matching assistance under the AFDC program for children living with a MARS or stepfather would not be available to appellants. The three-judge court said that "[t]he HEW regulation, by requiring proof of actual contributions from a MARS, reduces the expectation of Congress to a mere hope." 312. F. Supp., at 202. We disagree. We |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | Lewis v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108118/lewis-v-martin/ | mere hope." 312. F. Supp., at 202. We disagree. We traversed the entire spectrum of that question in and find it unnecessary to restate the legislative history of the relevant statutes. We concluded that Congress "intended the term `parent' in 406 (a) of the Act to include only those persons with a legal duty of support." And we went on to say: "It is clear, as we have noted, that Congress expected `breadwinners' who secured employment *558 would support their children. This congressional expectation is most reasonably explained on the basis that the kind of breadwinner Congress had in mind was one who was legally obligated to support his children. We think it beyond reason to believe that Congress would have considered that providing employment for the paramour of a deserted mother would benefit the mother's children whom he was not obligated to support. "By a parity of reasoning, we think that Congress must have intended that the children in such a situation remain eligible for AFDC assistance not-withstanding their mother's impropriety." That reasoning led us to invalidate Alabama's "substitute father" regulation.[9] Like reasoning leads us to hold, contrary to the three-judge District Court, that the HEW regulation is valid. We only add that HEW might reasonably conclude that only he who is as near as a real or adoptive father would be has that consensual relation to the family which makes it reliably certain that his income is actually available for support of the children in the household. HEW may, in other words, reasonably conclude that an obligation to support under *559 state law must be of "general applicability" to make that obligation in reality a solid assumption on which estimates of funds actually available to children on a regular basis may be calculated. Any lesser duty of support might merely be a device for lowering welfare benefits without guaranteeing that the child would regularly receive the income on which the reduction is based, that is to say, it would not approximate the obligation to support placed on and normally assumed by natural or adoptive parents. That reading of the Act and of certainly cannot be said to be impermissible. Our decision in held only that a legal obligation to support was a necessary condition for qualification as a "parent"; it did not also suggest that it would always be a sufficient condition. We find nothing in this regulation to suggest inconsistency with the Act's basic purpose of providing aid to "needy" children, except where there is a "breadwinner" in the house who can be expected to provide such |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | Lewis v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108118/lewis-v-martin/ | in the house who can be expected to provide such aid himself. HEW, the agency charged with administering the Act, has apparently concluded that as a matter of current, practical realities, the relationship of the MARS to the home is less stable than that of the stepfather who at least has the additional tie of the ceremonial marriage, and that the likelihood of the MARS' contributing his income to the childreneven if legally obligated to do sois sufficiently uncertain in the absence of the marriage tie, to prevent viewing him as a "breadwinner" unless the bread is actually set on the table. Nothing in this record shows that this administrative judgment does not correspond to the facts. We give HEW the deference due the agency charged with the administration of the Act, see, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co., ; U.S. 1, In the absence of proof of actual contribution, *560 California may not consider the child's "resources" to include either the income of a nonadopting stepfather who is not legally obligated to support the child as is a natural parent, or the income of a MARS whatever the nature of his obligation to support. California on remand is foreclosed from arguing that its assumption-of-income provisions are consistent with the Act as applied to MARS, the State is limited to demonstrating that those provisions may be retained under the Act as applied to nonadopting stepfathers by showing that the legal obligation placed on such step-parents is consistent with the obligation required by the federal regulation. Whether in that posture of the case California's laws and regulations are inconsistent with the federal standard is a question that the District Court did not reach. The case is therefore reversed and remanded so that such an adjudication can be made. It is so ordered. MR. |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Snyder v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145823/snyder-v-louisiana/ | Petitioner essentially asks this Court to second-guess the fact-based determinations *1213 of the Louisiana courts as to the reasons for a prosecutor's decision to strike two jurors. The evaluation of a prosecutor's motives for striking a juror is at bottom a credibility judgment, which lies "`peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'" ); (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); ante, at 1208. "[I]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, we [should] defer to state-court factual findings." None of the evidence in the record as to jurors Jeffrey Brooks and Elaine Scott demonstrates that the trial court clearly erred in finding they were not stricken on the basis of race. Because the trial court's determination was a "permissible view of the evidence," I would affirm the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Court begins by setting out the "deferential standard," ante, at 1209, that we apply to a trial court's resolution of a claim, noting that we will overturn a ruling on the question of discriminatory intent only if it is "clearly erroneous," ante, at 1208. Under this standard, we "will not reverse a lower court's finding of fact simply because we would have decided the case differently." Instead, a reviewing court must ask "whether, `on the entire evidence,' it is `left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" ). The Court acknowledges two reasons why a trial court "has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims." Ante, at 1208. First, the Court notes that the trial court is uniquely situated to judge the prosecutor's credibility because the best evidence of discriminatory intent "`often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.'" (quoting at ). Second, it recognizes that the trial court's "first-hand observations" of the juror's demeanor are of "grea[t] importance" in determining whether the prosecutor's neutral basis for the strike is credible. Ante, at 1208. The Court's conclusion, however, reveals that it is only paying lipservice to the pivotal role of the trial court. The Court second-guesses the trial court's determinations in this case merely because the judge did not clarify which of the prosecutor's neutral bases for striking Mr. Brooks was dispositive. But we have never suggested that a reviewing court should defer to a trial court's resolution of a Batson challenge only if the trial court made specific findings with respect to each of the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons. To the contrary, when the grounds for a trial court's decision are ambiguous, an appellate court should not presume that the lower court based its decision on an improper ground, particularly when |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Snyder v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145823/snyder-v-louisiana/ | court based its decision on an improper ground, particularly when applying a deferential standard of review. See Sprint/United Management L.Ed.2d The prosecution offered two neutral bases for striking Mr. Brooks: his nervous demeanor and his stated concern about missing class. App. 444. The trial court, in rejecting defendant's Batson challenge, stated only "All right. I'm going to allow the challenge. I'm going to allow the challenge." *1214 The Court concedes that "the record does not show" whether the trial court made its determination based on Mr. Brooks' demeanor or his concern for missing class, ante, at 1209, but then speculates as to what the trial court might have thought about Mr. Brooks' demeanor. As a result of that speculation, the Court concludes that it "cannot presume that the trial court credited the prosecutor's assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous." Inexplicably, however, the Court concludes that it can presume that the trial court impermissibly relied on the prosecutor's supposedly pretextual concern about Mr. Brooks' teaching schedule, even though nothing in the record supports that interpretation over the one the Court rejects. Indeed, if the record suggests anything, it is that the judge was more influenced by Mr. Brooks' nervousness than by his concern for missing class. Following an exchange about whether his desire to get back to class would make Mr. Brooks more likely to support a verdict on a lesser included offense because it might avoid a penalty phase, defense counsel offered its primary rebuttal to the prosecutor's proffered neutral reasons. Immediately after argument on the nervousness point, the judge ruled on the Batson challenge, even interrupting the prosecutor to do so: "MR. VASQUEZ: His main problem yesterday was the fact that he didn't know if he would miss some teaching time as a student teacher. The clerk called the school and whoever it was and the Dean said that wouldn't be a problem. He was told that this would go through the weekend, and he expressed that that was his only concern, that he didn't have any other problems. "As far as him looking nervous, hell, everybody out here looks nervous. I'm nervous. "MR. OLINDE: Judge, it's "MR. VASQUEZ: Judge, that'sYou know. "MR. OLINDE:a question of this: It's a peremptory challenge. We need 12 out of 12 people. Mr. Brooks was very uncertain and very nervous looking and "THE COURT: All right. I'm going to allow the challenge. I'm going to allow the challenge." App. 445. Although this exchange is certainly not hard-and-fast evidence of the trial court's reasoning, it undermines the Court's presumption that the trial judge relied |
Justice Thomas | 2,008 | 1 | dissenting | Snyder v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145823/snyder-v-louisiana/ | it undermines the Court's presumption that the trial judge relied solely on Mr. Brooks' concern for missing school. The Court also concludes that the trial court's determination lacked support in the record because the prosecutor failed to strike two other jurors with similar concerns. Ante, at 1211-1212. Those jurors, however, were never mentioned in the argument before the trial court, nor were they discussed in the filings or opinions on any of the three occasions this case was considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court.[*] Petitioner failed to suggest a comparison with those two jurors in his petition for certiorari, and apparently only discovered this "clear error" in the record when drafting his brief before this Court. We have no business overturning a conviction, years after the fact and after extensive intervening litigation, based on arguments not presented to the courts below. Cf. Because I believe that the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting petitioner's Batson challenge with respect to Mr. Brooks, I also must address the strike of Ms. Scott. The prosecution's neutral explanation for striking Ms. Scott was that she was unsure about her ability to impose the death penalty. Like the claims made about Mr. Brooks, there is very little in the record either to support or to undermine the prosecution's asserted rationale for striking Ms. Scott. But the trial court had the benefit of observing the exchange between the prosecutor and Ms. Scott, and accordingly was in the best position to judge whether the prosecutor's assessment of her response was credible. When asked if she could consider the death penalty, her first response was inaudible. App. 360. The trial court, with the benefit of contextual clues not apparent on a cold transcript, was better positioned to evaluate whether Ms. Scott was merely softspoken or seemed hesitant in her responses. Similarly, a firsthand observation of demeanor is the only thing that could give sufficient content to Ms. Scott's ultimate response "I think I could," at 361to determine whether the prosecution's concern about her willingness to impose the death penalty was well founded. Given the trial court's expertise in making credibility determinations and its firsthand knowledge of the voir dire exchanges, it is entirely proper to defer to its judgment. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment below. |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Egelhoff v. Egelhoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118416/egelhoff-v-egelhoff/ | A Washington statute provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce. We are asked to decide whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 14 (ERISA), 2 U.S. C. 1001 et seq., preempts that statute to the extent it applies to ERISA plans. We hold that it does. *144 I Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff was married to David A. Egelhoff. Mr. Egelhoff was employed by the Boeing Company, which provided him with a life insurance policy a pension plan. Both plans were governed by ERISA, Mr. Egelhoff designated his wife as the beneficiary under both. In April 14, the Egelhoffs divorced. Just over two months later, Mr. Egelhoff died intestate following an automobile accident. At that time, Mrs. Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary under both the life insurance policy the pension plan. The life insurance proceeds, totaling $46,000, were paid to her. Respondents Samantha David Egelhoff, Mr. Egelhoff's children by a previous marriage, are his statutory heirs under state law. They sued petitioner in Washington state court to recover the life insurance proceeds. Respondents relied on a Washington statute that provides: "If a marriage is dissolved or invalidated, a provision made prior to that event that relates to the payment or transfer at death of the decedent's interest in a nonprobate asset in favor of or granting an interest or power to the decedent's former spouse is revoked. A provision affected by this section must be interpreted, the nonprobate asset affected passes, as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent, having died at the time of entry of the decree of dissolution or declaration of invalidity." Wash. Rev. Code 11.07.010(2)(a) (14). That statute applies to "all nonprobate assets, wherever situated, held at the time of entry by a superior court of this state of a decree of dissolution of marriage or a declaration of invalidity." 11.07.010(1). It defines "nonprobate asset" to include "a life insurance policy, employee benefit plan, annuity or similar contract, or individual retirement account." 11.07.010(5)(a). *145 Respondents argued that they were entitled to the life insurance proceeds because the Washington statute disqualified Mrs. Egelhoff as a beneficiary, in the absence of a qualified named beneficiary, the proceeds would pass to them as Mr. Egelhoff's heirs. In a separate action, respondents also sued to recover the pension plan benefits. Respondents again argued that the Washington statute disqualified Mrs. Egelhoff as a beneficiary they were thus entitled to the benefits under the plan. The trial courts, concluding that both the insurance policy the pension plan "should |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Egelhoff v. Egelhoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118416/egelhoff-v-egelhoff/ | concluding that both the insurance policy the pension plan "should be administered in accordance" with ERISA, granted summary judgment to petitioner in both cases. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a, 48a. The Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the cases reversed. In re Estate of Egelhoff, It concluded that the Washington statute was not pre-empted by ERISA. Applying the statute, it held that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of both the insurance policy the pension plan. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. It held that the state statute, although applicable to "employee benefit plan[s]," does not "refe[r] to" ERISA plans to an extent that would require pre-emption, because it "does not apply immediately exclusively to an ERISA plan, nor is the existence of such a plan essential to operation of the statute." It also held that the statute lacks a "connection with" an ERISA plan that would compel pre-emption. It emphasized that the statute "does not alter the nature of the plan itself, the administrator's fiduciary duties, or the requirements for plan administration." Nor, the court concluded, does the statute conflict with any specific provision of ERISA, including the antialienation provision, 2 U.S. C. 1056(d)(1), because it "does not operate to divert benefit *146 plan proceeds from distribution under terms of the plan documents," but merely alters "the underlying circumstances to which the distribution scheme of [the] plan must be applied." Courts have disagreed about whether statutes like that of Washington are pre-empted by ERISA. Compare, e. g., cert. pending, No. 00-265,[*] Metropolitan Life Ins. with, e. g., To resolve the conflict, we granted certiorari. II Petitioner argues that the Washington statute falls within the terms of ERISA's express pre-emption provision that it is pre-empted by ERISA under traditional principles of conflict pre-emption. Because we conclude that the statute is expressly pre-empted by ERISA, we address only the first argument. ERISA's pre-emption section, 2 U.S. C. 1144(a), states that ERISA "shall supersede any all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA. We have observed repeatedly that this broadly worded provision is "clearly expansive." New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield ; see, e. g., But at the same time, we have recognized that the term "relate to" cannot be taken "to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy," or else "for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course." at *147 We have held that a state law relates to an ERISA plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Egelhoff v. Egelhoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118416/egelhoff-v-egelhoff/ | it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Petitioner focuses on the "connection with" part of this inquiry. Acknowledging that "connection with" is scarcely more restrictive than "relate to," we have cautioned against an "uncritical literalism" that would make pre-emption turn on "infinite connections." Instead, "to determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look both to `the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,' as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans." California Div. of Labor Stards (1), quoting Applying this framework, petitioner argues that the Washington statute has an impermissible connection with ERISA plans. We agree. The statute binds ERISA plan administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining beneficiary status. The administrators must pay benefits to the beneficiaries chosen by state law, rather than to those identified in the plan documents. The statute thus implicates an area of core ERISA concern. In particular, it runs counter to ERISA's comms that a plan shall "specify the basis on which payments are made to from the plan," 1102(b)(4), that the fiduciary shall administer the plan "in accordance with the documents instruments governing the plan," 1104(a)(1)(D), making payments to a "beneficiary" who is "designated by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan." 1002(8).[1] In other words, unlike generally applicable *148 laws regulating "areas where ERISA has nothing to say," which we have upheld notwithsting their incidental effect on ERISA plans, see, e. g., ibid., this statute governs the payment of benefits, a central matter of plan administration. The Washington statute also has a prohibited connection with ERISA plans because it interferes with nationally uniform plan administration. One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers "to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of stard procedures to guide processing of claims disbursement of benefits." Fort Packing Uniformity is impossible, however, if plans are subject to different legal obligations in different States. The Washington statute at issue here poses precisely that threat. Plan administrators cannot make payments simply by identifying the beneficiary specified by the plan documents.[2] Instead they must familiarize themselves with *14 state statutes so that they can determine whether the named beneficiary's status has been "revoked" by operation of law. And in this context the burden is exacerbated by the choiceof-law problems that may confront an administrator when the employer is located in one State, the plan participant lives in another, the participant's former spouse |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Egelhoff v. Egelhoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118416/egelhoff-v-egelhoff/ | the plan participant lives in another, the participant's former spouse lives in a third. In such a situation, administrators might find that plan payments are subject to conflicting legal obligations. To be sure, the Washington statute protects administrators from liability for making payments to the named beneficiary unless they have "actual knowledge of the dissolution or other invalidation of marriage," Wash. Rev. Code 11.07.010(3)(a) (14), it permits administrators to refuse to make payments until any dispute among putative beneficiaries is resolved, 11.07.010(3)(b). But if administrators do pay benefits, they will face the risk that a court might later find that they had "actual knowledge" of a divorce. If they instead decide to await the results of litigation before paying benefits, they will simply transfer to the beneficiaries the costs of delay uncertainty.[3] Requiring ERISA administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States to contend with litigation would undermine the *150 congressional goal of "minimiz[ing] the administrative financial burden[s]" on plan administratorsburdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries. Ingersoll-R 48 U.S. 133, (10). We recognize that all state laws create some potential for a lack of uniformity. But differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's "system for processing claims paying benefits" impose "precisely the burden that ERISA preemption was intended to avoid." Fort And as we have noted, the statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, benefits be paid, in accordance with plan documents. We conclude that the Washington statute has a "connection with" ERISA plans is therefore pre-empted. III Respondents suggest several reasons why ordinary ERISA pre-emption analysis should not apply here. First, they observe that the Washington statute allows employers to opt out. According to respondents, the statute neither regulates plan administration nor impairs uniformity because it does not apply when "[t]he instrument governing disposition of the nonprobate asset expressly provides otherwise." Wash. Rev. Code 11.07.010(2)(b)(i) (14). We do not believe that the statute is saved from pre-emption simply because it is, at least in a broad sense, a default rule. Even though the Washington statute's cancellation of private choice may itself be trumped by specific language in the plan documents, the statute does "dictate the choice[s] facing ERISA plans" with respect to matters of plan administration. Plan administrators must either follow Washington's beneficiary designation scheme or alter the terms of their plan so as to indicate that they will not follow it. The statute is not any less of a regulation of the terms of ERISA plans simply because there are two ways of complying with it. Of course, simple noncompliance *151 |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Egelhoff v. Egelhoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118416/egelhoff-v-egelhoff/ | ways of complying with it. Of course, simple noncompliance *151 with the statute is not one of the options available to plan administrators. Their only choice is one of timing, i. e., whether to bear the burden of compliance ex post, by paying benefits as the statute dictates ( in contravention of the plan documents), or ex ante, by amending the plan.[4] Respondents emphasize that the opt-out provision makes compliance with the statute less burdensome than if it were matory. That is true enough, but the burden that remains is hardly trivial. It is not enough for plan administrators to opt out of this particular statute. Instead, they must maintain a familiarity with the laws of all 50 States so that they can update their plans as necessary to satisfy the optout requirements of other, similar statutes. They also must be attentive to changes in the interpretations of those statutes by state courts. This "tailoring of plans employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction" is exactly the burden ERISA seeks to eliminate. IngersollR, at Second, respondents emphasize that the Washington statute involves both family law probate law, areas of traditional state regulation. There is indeed a presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such as family law. See, e. g., 43 U.S. 572, (1). But that presumption can be overcome where, as here, Congress has made clear its desire for pre-emption. Accordingly, we have not hesitated to find state family law pre-empted when it conflicts with ERISA or relates to ERISA plans. See, e. g., (1) Finally, respondents argue that if ERISA pre-empts this statute, then it also must pre-empt the various state statutes providing that a murdering heir is not entitled to receive property as a result of the killing. See, e. g., Cal. Prob. Code Ann. 250-25 ; 755 Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 755, 5/2-6 In the ERISA context, these "slayer" statutes could revoke the beneficiary status of someone who murdered a plan participant. Those statutes are not before us, so we do not decide the issue. We note, however, that the principle underlying the statuteswhich have been adopted by nearly every Stateis well established in the law has a long historical pedigree predating ERISA. See, e. g., (188). And because the statutes are more or less uniform nationwide, their interference with the aims of ERISA is at least debatable. * * * The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed, the case is remed for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Souter | 2,006 | 20 | second_dissenting | Kansas v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145632/kansas-v-marsh/ | I Kansas's capital sentencing statute provides that a defendant "shall be sentenced to death" if, by unanimous vote, "the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more aggravating circumstances exist and that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not out- weighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist." (e) (1995). The Su- preme Court of Kansas has read this provision to require imposition of the death penalty "[i]n the event of equi- poise, [that is,] the jury's determination that the balance of any aggravating circumstances and any mitigating circumstances weighed equal." ; see also Given this construction, the state court held the law un- constitutional on the ground that the Eighth Amendment requires that a " 'tie g[o] to the defendant' when life or death is at issue." Because I agree with the Kansas judges that the Constitution forbids a mandatory death penalty in what they describe as "doubtful cases," when aggravating and mitigating factors are of equal weight, I respectfully dissent.[1] II More than 30 years ago, this Court explained that the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment barred imposition of the death penalty under statutory schemes so inarticulate that sentencing discre- tion produced wanton and freakish results. See (Stew- art, J., concurring) ("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amend- ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be. wantonly and freakishly imposed" on a "capriciously selected random handful" of individuals). The Constitution was held to require, instead, a system structured to pro- duce reliable, rational, and rationally reviewable, determinations of sentence. Decades of back-and-forth between legislative experi- ment and judicial review have made it plain that the constitutional demand for rationality goes beyond the minimal requirement to replace unbounded discretion with a sentencing structure; a State has much leeway in devising such a structure and in selecting the terms for measuring relative culpability, but a system must meet an ultimate test of constitutional reliability in producing " 'a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime,'" ; cf. (sanctioning sentencing procedures that "focus the jury's attention on the particular- ized nature of the crime and the particularized characteris- tics of the individual defendant"). The Eighth Amendment, that is, demands both form and substance, both a system for decision and one geared to produce morally justifiable results. The State thinks its scheme is beyond questioning, whether as to form or substance, for it sees the tie-breaker law as equivalent to the provisions examined in and where we approved statutes that required |
Justice Souter | 2,006 | 20 | second_dissenting | Kansas v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145632/kansas-v-marsh/ | provisions examined in and where we approved statutes that required a death sentence upon a jury finding that aggra- vating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones. But the crucial fact in those systems was the predominance of the aggravators, and our recognition of the moral rationality of a mandatory capital sentence based on that finding is no authority for giving States free rein to select a different conclusion that will dictate death. Instead, the constitutional demand for a reasoned moral response requires the state statute to satisfy two criteria that speak to the issue before us now, one governing the character of sentencing evidence, and one going to the substantive justification needed for a death sentence. As to the first, there is an obligation in each case to inform the jury's choice of sentence with evidence about the crime as actually committed and about the specific individual who committed it. See Since the sentencing choice is, by definition, the attribution of particular culpability to a criminal act and defendant, as distinct from the general culpability necessarily implicated by committing a given offense, see ; at ; the sen- tencing decision must turn on the uniqueness of the indi- vidual defendant and on the details of the crime, to which any resulting choice of death must be "directly" related. at Second, there is the point to which the particulars of crime and criminal are relevant: within the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for "the worst of the worst." See, e.g., )). One object of the struc- tured sentencing proceeding required in the aftermath of Furman is to eliminate the risk that a death sentence will be imposed in spite of facts calling for a lesser penalty, and the essence of the sentenc- ing authority's responsibility is to determine whether the response to the crime and defendant "must be death," ; cf. Of course, in the moral world of those who reject capital punishment in principle, a death sentence can never be a moral im- perative. The point, however, is that within our legal and moral system, which allows a place for the death penalty, "must be death" does not mean "may be death." Since a valid capital sentence thus requires a choice based upon unique particulars identifying the crime and its perpetrator as heinous to the point of demanding death even within the class of potentially capital offenses, the State's provision for a tie breaker in favor of death fails on both counts. The dispositive fact under the tie breaker is not the details of the crime or |
Justice Souter | 2,006 | 20 | second_dissenting | Kansas v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145632/kansas-v-marsh/ | tie breaker is not the details of the crime or the unique identity of the individual defendant. The determining fact is not directly linked to a particular crime or particular criminal at all; the law operates merely on a jury's finding of equipoise in the State's own selected considerations for and against death. Nor does the tie breaker identify the worst of the worst, or even purport to reflect any evidentiary showing that death must be the reasoned moral response; it does the opposite. The statute produces a death sentence ex- actly when a sentencing impasse demonstrates as a mat- ter of law that the jury does not see the evidence as show- ing the worst sort of crime committed by the worst sort of criminal, in a combination heinous enough to demand death. It operates, that is, when a jury has applied the State's chosen standards of culpability and mitigation and reached nothing more than what the Supreme Court of Kansas calls a "tie," Kleypas, 272 Kan., at 40 P.3d, at It mandates death in what that court identifies as "doubtful cases," The statute thus addresses the risk of a morally unjustifiable death sentence, not by minimizing it as precedent unmistakably requires, but by guaranteeing that in equipoise cases the risk will be realized, by "plac- ing a 'thumb [on] death's side of the scale,'" ; alteration in original). In Kansas, when a jury applies the State's own stan- dards of relative culpability and cannot decide that a defendant is among the most culpable, the state law says that equivocal evidence is good enough and the defendant must die. A law that requires execution when the case for aggravation has failed to convince the sentencing jury is morally absurd, and the Court's holding that the Constitu- tion tolerates this moral irrationality defies decades of precedent aimed at eliminating freakish capital sentenc- ing in the United States. III That precedent, demanding reasoned moral judgment, developed in response to facts that could not be ignored, the kaleidoscope of life and death verdicts that made no sense in fact or morality in the random sentencing before Furman was decided in 1972. See 408 U. S., at Today, a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in practical terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for the period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences, in numbers never imag- ined before the development of DNA tests. We cannot face up to these facts and still hold that the guarantee of mor- ally justifiable sentencing |
Justice Souter | 2,006 | 20 | second_dissenting | Kansas v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145632/kansas-v-marsh/ | still hold that the guarantee of mor- ally justifiable sentencing is hollow enough to allow maximizing death sentences, by requiring them when juries fail to find the worst degree of culpability: when, by a State's own standards and a State's own characteriza- tion, the case for death is "doubtful." A few numbers from a growing literature will give a sense of the reality that must be addressed. When the Governor of Illinois imposed a moratorium on executions in 2000, 13 prisoners under death sentences had been released since 1977 after a number of them were shown to be innocent, as described in a report which used their examples to illustrate a theme common to all 13, of "rela- tively little solid evidence connecting the charged defen- dants to the crimes." State of Illinois, G. Ryan, Governor, Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punish- ment: Recommendations Only 7 (hereinafter Report); see also During the same period, 12 condemned convicts had been executed. Subsequently the Governor determined that 4 more death row inmates were innocent. See ; Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform, 95 J. Crim. L. & C. 381, 382, and n. 6[2] Illinois had thus wrongly convicted and con- demned even more capital defendants than it had exe- cuted, but it may well not have been otherwise unique; one recent study reports that between 1989 and 2003, 74 American prisoners condemned to death were exonerated, Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, & Patil, Exonera- tions in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & C. 523, 531 (2006) (hereinafter Gross), many of them cleared by DNA evidence, [3] Another report states that "more than 110" death row prisoners have been re- leased since 1973 upon findings that they were innocent of the crimes charged, and "[h]undreds of additional wrong- ful convictions in potentially capital cases have been docu- mented over the past century." Lanier & Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium Movement, and Empirical Questions, 10 Psychology, Public Policy & Law 577, 593 Most of these wrongful convictions and sentences resulted from eyewitness misidentification, false confes- sion, and (most frequently) perjury, Gross 544, 551-552, and the total shows that among all prosecutions homicide cases suffer an unusually high incidence of false convic- tion, at 552, probably owing to the combined difficulty of investigating without help from the victim, intense pressure to get convictions in homicide cases, and the corresponding incentive for the guilty to frame the innocent, at We are thus in a period of new empirical argument about how "death is different," : not only would these false verdicts |
Justice Souter | 2,006 | 20 | second_dissenting | Kansas v. Marsh | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145632/kansas-v-marsh/ | "death is different," : not only would these false verdicts defy correction after the fatal moment, the Illinois experience shows them to be remarkable in number, and they are probably dispropor- tionately high in capital cases. While it is far too soon for any generalization about the soundness of capital sentenc- ing across the country, the cautionary lesson of recent experience addresses the tie-breaking potential of the Kansas statute: the same risks of falsity that infect proof of guilt raise questions about sentences, when the circum- stances of the crime are aggravating factors and bear on predictions of future dangerousness. In the face of evidence of the hazards of capital prosecu- tion, maintaining a sentencing system mandating death when the sentencer finds the evidence pro and con to be in equipoise is obtuse by any moral or social measure. And unless application of the Eighth Amendment no longer calls for reasoned moral judgment in substance as well as form, the Kansas law is unconstitutional. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | concurring | Reichle v. Howards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/801500/reichle-v-howards/ | Were defendants ordinary law enforcement officers, I would hold that does not support their entitlement to qualified immunity. involved a charge of retaliatory prosecution. As the Court explains, the defendant in such a case cannot be the prosecutor who made the decision to pursue charges. See ante, at 9; (noting that prosecutors are “absolutely immune from liability for the decision to prosecute”). Rather, the defendant will be another government official who, motivated by retaliatory animus, convinced the prosecutor to act. See ibid.; ante, at 9. Thus, the “causal connection [a plaintiff must establish in a retaliatory-prosecution case] is not merely between the retaliatory animus of one person and that person’s own injurious action, but between the retaliatory animus of one person and the action of another.” 547 U. S., at 262. This “distinct problem of causation” justified the absence-of-probable-cause requirement we recognized in (Proof of an absence of probable cause to prosecute is needed “to bridge the gap between the nonprosecuting government agent’s motive and the prosecutor’s action.”). See also (“[T]he need to prove a chain of causation from animus to injury, with 2 REICHLE v. HOWARDS GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment details specific to retaliatory-prosecution cases, pro- vides the strongest justification for the no-probable-cause requirement.” (emphasis added)). A similar causation problem will not arise in the typi- cal retaliatory-arrest case. Unlike prosecutors, arresting officers are not wholly immune from suit. As a result, a plaintiff can sue the arresting officer directly and need only show that the officer (not some other official) acted with a retaliatory motive. Because, in the usual retaliatory- arrest case, there is no gap to bridge between one gov- ernment official’s animus and a second government offi- cial’s action, ’s no-probable-cause requirement is inapplicable. Nevertheless, I concur in the Court’s judgment. Officers assigned to protect public officials must make singularly swift, on the spot, decisions whether the safety of the person they are guarding is in jeopardy. In performing that protective function, they rightly take into account words spoken to, or in the proximity of, the person whose safety is their charge. Whatever the views of Secret Ser- vice Agents Reichle and Doyle on the administration’s policies in Iraq, they were duty bound to take the con- tent of Howards’ statements into account in determining whether he posed an immediate threat to the Vice Presi- dent’s physical security. Retaliatory animus cannot be inferred from the assessment they made in that regard. If rational, that assessment should not expose them to claims for civil damages. Cf. 18 U.S. C. (know- ingly and willfully resisting federal law |
Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | second_dissenting | Michael H. v. Gerald D. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112295/michael-h-v-gerald-d/ | California law, as the plurality describes it, ante, at 119, tells us that, except in limited circumstances, California declares it to be "irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived during, and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone other than the husband" (emphasis in original). This I do not accept, for the fact that Michael H. is the biological father of Victoria is to me highly relevant to whether he has rights, as a father or otherwise, with respect to the child. Because I believe that Michael H. has a liberty interest that cannot be denied without due process of the law, I must dissent. I Like JUSTICES BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, I do not agree with the plurality opinion's conclusion that a natural father can never "have a constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child's conception and birth." Ante, at 133 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Prior cases here have recognized the liberty interest of a father in his relationship with his child. In none of these cases did we indicate that the father's rights were dependent on the marital status of the mother or biological father. The basic principle enunciated *158 in the Court's unwed father cases is that an unwed father who has demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his paternity by way of personal, financial, or custodial responsibilities has a protected liberty interest in a relationship with his child.[1] We have not before faced the question of a biological father's relationship with his child when the child was born while the mother was married to another man. On several occasions however, we have considered whether a biological father has a constitutionally cognizable interest in an opportunity to establish paternity. recognized the biological father's right to a legal relationship with his illegitimate child, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled the biological father to a hearing on his fitness before his illegitimate children could be removed from his custody. We rejected the State's treatment of Stanley "not as a parent but as a stranger to his children." also expressly recognized due process rights in the biological father, even while holding that those rights were not impermissibly burdened by the State's application of a "best interests of the child" standard. invalidated on equal protection grounds a statute under which a man's children could be adopted by their natural mother and her husband without the natural father's consent. In though holding against the father |
Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | second_dissenting | Michael H. v. Gerald D. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112295/michael-h-v-gerald-d/ | the natural father's consent. In though holding against the father in that case, the Court said clearly that fathers who have participated in raising their illegitimate children and have developed a relationship with them have constitutionally protected parental rights. Indeed, the Court in suggested that States must provide a biological father of an illegitimate child the means by which he may establish his paternity so that he may have the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. The Court upheld a stepparent adoption over the natural father's objections, but acknowledged that "the existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child." There, however, the father had never established a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with his child. had never lived with the child or the child's mother after the birth of the child and had never provided any financial support. In the case now before us, Michael H. is not a father unwilling to assume his responsibilities as a parent. To the contrary, he is a father who has asserted his interests in raising and providing for his child since the very time of the child's birth. In contrast to the father in Michael had begun to develop a relationship with his daughter. There is no dispute on this point. Michael contributed to the child's support. Michael and Victoria lived together (albeit intermittently, given Carole's itinerant lifestyle). There is a personal and emotional relationship between Michael and Victoria, who grew up calling him "Daddy." Michael held Victoria out as his daughter and contributed to the child's financial support. (Even appellee concedes that Michael has "made greater efforts and had more success in establishing a *160 father-child relationship" than did Mr. Brief for Appellee 13, n. 6.) The mother has never denied, and indeed has admitted, that Michael is Victoria's father.[2] was predicated on the absence of a substantial relationship between the man and the child and emphasized the "difference between the developed parent-child relationship that was implicated in Stanley and and the potential relationship involved in Quilloin and []." "When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by `com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause." The facts in this case satisfy the criteria, which focused on the relationship between father and child, not on the relationship between father and mother. Under a "mere biological |
Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | second_dissenting | Michael H. v. Gerald D. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112295/michael-h-v-gerald-d/ | the relationship between father and mother. Under a "mere biological relationship" is not enough, but in light of Carole's vicissitudes, what more could Michael have done? It is clear enough that Michael more than meets the mark in establishing the constitutionally protected liberty interest discussed in and recognized in and He therefore has a liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. II California plainly denies Michael this protection, by refusing him the opportunity to rebut the State's presumption that the mother's husband is the father of the child. California law not only deprives Michael of a legal parent-child relationship with his daughter Victoria but even denies him the opportunity to introduce blood-test evidence to rebut the demonstrable *161 fiction that Gerald is Victoria's father.[3] Unlike Michael has not been denied notice. He has, most definitely, however, been denied any real opportunity to be heard. The grant of summary judgment against Michael was based on the conclusive presumption of Cal. Evid. Code Ann. 621 (West Supp. 1989), which denied him the opportunity to prove that he is Victoria's biological father. The Court gives its blessing to 621 by relying on the State's asserted interests in the integrity of the family (defined as Carole and Gerald) and in protecting Victoria from the stigma of illegitimacy and by balancing away Michael's interest in establishing that he is the father of the child. The interest in protecting a child from the social stigma of illegitimacy lacks any real connection to the facts of a case where a father is seeking to establish, rather than repudiate, paternity. The "stigma of illegitimacy" argument harks back to ancient common law when there were no blood tests to ascertain that the husband could not "by the laws of nature" be the child's father. Judicial process refused to declare that a child born in wedlock was illegitimate unless the proof was positive. The only such proof was physical absence or impotency. But we have now clearly recognized the use of blood tests as an authoritative means of evaluating allegations of paternity. See, e. g., I see no reason to debate the plurality's multilingual explorations into "spousal nonaccess" and ancient policy concerns behind bastardy laws. It may be true that a child conceived in an extramarital relationship would *162 be considered a "bastard" in the literal sense of the word, but whatever stigma remains in today's society is far less compelling in the context of a child of a married mother, especially when there is a father asserting paternity and seeking a relationship |
Justice White | 1,989 | 6 | second_dissenting | Michael H. v. Gerald D. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112295/michael-h-v-gerald-d/ | there is a father asserting paternity and seeking a relationship with his child. It is hardly rare in this world of divorce and remarriage for a child to live with the "father" to whom her mother is married, and still have a relationship with her biological father. The State's professed interest in the preservation of the existing marital unit is a more significant concern. To be sure, the intrusion of an outsider asserting that he is the father of a child whom the husband believes to be his own would be disruptive to say the least. On the facts of this case, however, Gerald was well aware of the liaison between Carole and Michael. The conclusive presumption of evidentiary rule 621 virtually eliminates the putative father's chances of succeeding in his effort to establish paternity, but it by no means prevents him from asserting the claim. It may serve as a deterrent to such claims but does not eliminate the threat. Further, the argument that the conclusive presumption preserved the sanctity of the marital unit had more sway in a time when the husband was similarly prevented from challenging paternity.[4] *163 "The emphasis of the Due Process Clause is on `process.' " I fail to see the fairness in the process established by the State of California and endorsed by the Court today. Michael has evidence which demonstrates that he is the father of young Victoria. Yet he is blocked by the State from presenting that evidence to a court. As a result, he is foreclosed from establishing his paternity and is ultimately precluded, by the State, from developing a relationship with his child. "A fundamental requirement of due process is `the opportunity to be heard.' I fail to see how Michael was granted any meaningful opportunity to be heard when he was precluded at the very outset from introducing evidence which would support his assertion of paternity. Michael has never been afforded an opportunity to present his case in any meaningful manner. As the Court has said: "The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development." It is as if this passage was addressed to Michael. Yet the plurality today recants. Michael eagerly grasped the opportunity to have a relationship with his daughter (he lived with her; he |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | The question presented by this case is whether a for feited claim that the Government has violated the terms of a plea agreement is subject to the plain-error standard of review set forth in Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. I In July 00, James Puckett was indicted by a grand jury in the Northern District of Texas on one count of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S. C. (d), and one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, He negotiated a plea agreement with the Government, which was filed with the District Court on September 3, 003. As part of that deal, Puckett agreed to plead guilty to both counts, waive his trial rights, and cooperate with the Government by being truth ful regarding his participation in criminal activities. App. 51a–53a. In exchange, the Government agreed to the following two terms: “8. The government agrees that Puckett has demon strated acceptance of responsibility and thereby quali PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court fies for a three-level reduction in his offense level. “. The government also agrees to request that Puckett’s sentence be placed at the lowest end of the guideline level deemed applicable by the Court.” at 54a. To satisfy the first of these obligations, the Government filed a motion in the District Court pursuant to of the United States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual (Nov. 003) (USSG). That provision directs sen tencing courts to decrease a defendant’s offense level under the Guidelines by two levels if he “clearly demon strates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,” and by a third level “upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty.” Two weeks later, the District Court held a plea colloquy, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(b), and accepted Puckett’s plea. Because of delays due to health problems experienced by Puckett, sentencing did not take place for almost three years. In the interim, Puckett assisted another man in a scheme to defraud the Postal Service, and confessed that assistance (under questioning) to a probation officer. The officer prepared an addendum to Puckett’s presentence report recommending that he receive no reduction for acceptance of responsibility, on the theory that true acceptance of responsibility requires termination of crimi nal conduct. See USSG comment., n. 1(b). When sentencing finally did take place on May 4, 006, Puckett’s counsel objected to the addendum, pointing out that the Government |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | counsel objected to the addendum, pointing out that the Government had filed a motion requesting that the full three-level reduction in offense level be granted. The District Judge turned to the prosecutor, who re sponded that the motion was filed “a long time ago,” App. 7a, before Puckett had engaged in the additional criminal Cite as: 556 U. S. (00) 3 Opinion of the Court behavior. She made clear that the Government opposed any reduction in Puckett’s offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The probation officer then added his view that under the Guidelines, a reduction would be improper. After hearing these submissions, the District Judge concluded that even assuming he had the discretion to grant the reduction, he would not do so. “[I]t’s so rare [as] to be unknown around here where one has committed a crime subsequent to the crime for which they appear before the court and for them even then to get the three points.” at 80a–81a. He agreed, however, to follow the recommendation that the Government made, pursuant to its commitment in the plea agreement, that Puckett be sentenced at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range, which turned out to be 6 months in prison for the armed bank robbery and a mandatory minimum consecu tive term of 84 months for the firearm crime. Had the District Court granted the three-level reduction for accep tance of responsibility, the bottom of the Guidelines range would have been 188 months for the robbery; the firearm sentence would not have been affected. Importantly, at no time during the exchange did Puckett’s counsel object that the Government was violat ing its obligations under the plea agreement by backing away from its request for the reduction. He never cited the relevant provision of the plea agreement. And he did not move to withdraw Puckett’s plea on grounds that the Government had broken its sentencing promises. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Puckett did argue, inter alia, that the Gov ernment violated the plea agreement at sentencing. The Government conceded that by objecting to the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, it had violated the obliga tion set forth in paragraph 8 of the agreement, but main tained that Puckett had forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the District Court. The Court of Appeals 4 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court agreed, and applied the plain-error standard that Rule 5(b) makes applicable to unpreserved claims of error. It held that although error had occurred and was obvious, Puckett |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | held that although error had occurred and was obvious, Puckett had not satisfied the third prong of the plain-error analysis by demonstrating that the error affected his substantial rights, i.e., caused him prejudice. Especially in light of the Dis trict Judge’s statement that granting a reduction when the defendant had continued to engage in criminal conduct was “so rare [as] to be unknown,” Puckett could not show that the Government’s breach had affected his ultimate sentence. The Court of Appeals accordingly affirmed the conviction and sentence. We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. (008), to consider a question that has divided the Federal Courts of Appeals: whether Rule 5(b)’s plain-error test applies to a forfeited claim, like Puckett’s, that the Government failed to meet its obligations under a plea agreement. See In re Sealed Case, (discussing conflict among the Circuits). Concluding that Rule 5(b) does apply and in the usual fashion, we now affirm. II If a litigant believes that an error has occurred (to his detriment) during a federal judicial proceeding, he must object in order to preserve the issue. If he fails to do so in a timely manner, his claim for from the error is forfeited. “No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to deter mine it.” (144). If an error is not properly preserved, appellate-court authority to remedy the error (by reversing the judgment, for example, or ordering a new trial) is strictly circum Cite as: 556 U. S. (00) 5 Opinion of the Court scribed. There is good reason for this; “anyone familiar with the work of courts understands that errors are a constant in the trial that most do not much mat ter, and that a reflexive inclination by appellate courts to reverse because of unpreserved error would be fatal.” United (Boudin, C. J., concurring). This limitation on appellate-court authority serves to induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the district court the opportunity to consider and resolve them. That court is ordinarily in the best position to determine the relevant facts and adjudicate the dispute. In the case of an actual or invited procedural error, the district court can often correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome. And of course the contemporaneous-objection rule prevents a litigant from “ ‘sandbagging’ ” the court—remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, ; see also United States v. Vonn, In federal criminal cases, Rule 51(b) tells parties how to preserve claims of error: “by informing the court—when the court ruling or order is made or sought—of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the party’s objection to the court’s action and the grounds for that objection.” Failure to abide by this contemporaneous-objection rule ordinarily precludes the raising on appeal of the unpre served claim of trial error. See United Rule 5(b), however, recognizes a limited exception to that preclusion. The Rule provides, in full: “A plain error that affects substan tial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” We explained in United 507 U.S. 5 (13), that Rule 5(b) review—so-called “plain-error 6 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court review”—involves four steps, or prongs. First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of “[d]eviation from a legal rule”—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. at 73–733. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. See Third, the error must have affected the appel lant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error “ ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceed ings.’ ” (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 7 U.S. 7, 160 (136)). Meeting all four prongs is difficult, “as it should be.” United 54 U.S. 74, n. We have repeatedly cautioned that “[a]ny unwarranted extension” of the authority granted by Rule 5(b) would disturb the careful balance it strikes between judicial efficiency and the redress of injustice, see at ; and that the creation of an unjustified exception to the Rule would be “[e]ven less appropriate,” The real question in this case is not whether plain-error review applies when a defendant fails to preserve a claim that the Government defaulted on its plea-agreement obligations, but rather what conceivable reason exists for disregarding its evident application. Such a breach is undoubtedly a violation of the defendant’s rights, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 57, 6 (171), but the defendant has the opportu nity to seek vindication of |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | the defendant has the opportu nity to seek vindication of those rights in district court; if he fails to do so, Rule 5(b) as clearly sets forth the conse quences for that forfeiture as it does for all others. Cite as: 556 U. S. (00) 7 Opinion of the Court III Puckett puts forward several possible reasons why plain-error review should not apply in the present context. We understand him to be making effectively four distinct arguments: two doctrinal, two practical. We consider each set in turn. A Puckett’s primary precedent-based argument proceeds as follows: When the Government breaks a promise that was made to a defendant in the course of securing a guilty plea, the knowing and voluntary character of that plea retroactively vanishes, because (as it turns out) the defen dant was not aware of its true consequences. Since guilty pleas must be knowing and voluntary to be valid, the guilty plea is thus void, along with the defendant’s corre sponding waiver of his right to trial. And because, under this Court’s precedents, a waiver of the right to trial must be made by the defendant personally, see no action by counsel alone could resurrect the voided waiver. There fore, Puckett concludes, counsel’s failure timely to object to a Government breach can have no effect on the analysis, and the court of appeals must always correct the error. This elaborate analysis suffers from at least two defects. First, there is nothing to support the proposition that the Government’s breach of a plea agreement retroactively causes the defendant’s agreement to have been unknowing or involuntary. Any more than there is anything to sup port the proposition that a mere breach of contract retro actively causes the other party’s promise to have been coerced or induced by fraud. Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts. See (184). When the consideration for a contract fails—that 8 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court is, when one of the exchanged promises is not kept—we do not say that the voluntary bilateral consent to the contract never existed, so that it is automatically and utterly void; we say that the contract was broken. See 3 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts (hereinafter Williston). The party injured by the breach will generally be entitled to some remedy, which might include the right to rescind the contract entirely, see 6 (4th ed. 003); but that is not the same thing as saying the con tract was never validly concluded. So too here. When a defendant agrees to a |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | concluded. So too here. When a defendant agrees to a plea bargain, the Government takes on certain obligations. If those obligations are not met, the defendant is entitled to seek a remedy, which might in some cases be rescission of the agreement, allowing him to take back the consideration he has furnished, i.e., to withdraw his plea. But rescission is not the only possible remedy; in Santobello we allowed for a resentencing at which the Government would fully comply with the agreement—in effect, specific perform ance of the In any case, it is entirely clear that a breach does not cause the guilty plea, when entered, to have been unknowing or involuntary. It is precisely because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain.1 —————— 1 Puckett points out that in (170), we quoted approvingly the Fifth Circuit’s statement that guilty pleas must stand unless induced by “misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises),” ; internal quotation marks omitted). But it is hornbook law that misrepresenta tion requires an intent at the time of contracting not to perform. 6 Williston It is more difficult to explain the other precedent relied upon by Puckett—our suggestion in 467 U.S. 504, 50 (184), that “when the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand.” That statement, Cite as: 556 U. S. (00) Opinion of the Court Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, Puckett’s argument confuses the concepts of waiver and forfeiture. Nobody contends that Puckett’s counsel has waived—that is, intentionally relinquished or abandoned, 507 U.S., at 733—Puckett’s right to seek from the Gov ernment’s breach. (If he had, there would be no error at all and plain-error analysis would add nothing.) The objection is rather that Puckett forfeited the claim of error through his counsel’s failure to raise the argument in the District Court. This Court’s precedents requiring that certain waivers be personal, knowing, and voluntary are thus simply irrelevant. Those holdings determine whether error occurred, but say nothing about the proper standard of review when the claim of error is not preserved. The question presented by this case assumes error; only the standard of review is in dispute. Puckett’s second doctrinal attack rests on our decision in Santobello. In that case, the State had promised in a plea deal that it would make no sentencing recommendation, but the prosecutor (apparently unaware of that commit ment) asked the state trial court to impose the maximum |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | ment) asked the state trial court to impose the maximum penalty of one year. Defense counsel immediately ob The trial judge proceeded any way to impose the 1-year sentence, reassuring Santobello that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not affect his decision. at 5–60. This Court vacated the convic tion and remanded the case because “the interests of justice” would thus be best served. Puckett maintains that if the “interests of justice” re quired a remand in Santobello even though the breach —————— like the one in Brady, was dictum. Its conclusion that the conviction cannot stand is only sometimes true (if that is the remedy the court prescribes for the breach). And even when the conviction is overturned, the reason is not that the guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. We disavow any aspect of the Mabry dictum that contradicts our holding today. 10 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court there was likely harmless, those same interests call for a remand whenever the Government reneges on a plea bargain, forfeiture or not. We do not agree. Whether an error can be found harmless is simply a different question from whether it can be subjected to plain-error review. Santobello (given that the error in that case was pre served) necessarily addressed only the former. B Doctrine and precedent aside, Puckett argues that practical considerations counsel against subjecting plea breach claims to the rule of plain-error review. Specifi cally, he contends that no purpose would be served by applying the rule; and that plea breaches will always satisfy its four prongs, making its application superfluous. Accepting, arguendo (and dubitante), that policy concerns can ever authorize a departure from the Federal Rules, both arguments are wrong. Puckett suggests that once the prosecution has broken its agreement, e.g., by requesting a higher sentence than agreed upon, it is too late to “unring” the bell even if an objection is made: The district judge has already heard the request, and under Santobello it does not matter if he was influenced by it. So why demand the futile objection? For one thing, requiring the objection means the defen dant cannot “game” the system, “wait[ing] to see if the sentence later str[ikes] him as satisfactory,” Vonn, 535 U.S., at 73, and then seeking a second bite at the apple by raising the claim. For another, the breach itself will not always be conceded. In such a case, the district court if —————— Indeed, in this case the Government might well have argued that it was excused from its obligation to assert “demonstrated acceptance of responsibility” because |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | from its obligation to assert “demonstrated acceptance of responsibility” because Puckett’s ongoing criminal conduct hindered performance. See 13 Williston (4th ed. 000). That argument might have convinced us had it been pressed, but the Government conceded the breach, and we analyze the case as it comes to us. Cite as: 556 U. S. (00) 11 Opinion of the Court apprised of the claim will be in a position to adjudicate the matter in the first instance, creating a factual record and facilitating appellate review. Thirdly, some breaches may be curable upon timely objection—for example, where the prosecution simply forgot its commitment and is willing to adhere to the agreement. And finally, if the breach is established but cannot be cured, the district court can grant an immediate remedy (e.g., withdrawal of the plea or resentencing before a different judge) and thus avoid the delay and expense of a full appeal. Puckett also contends that plain-error review “does no substantive work” in the context of the Government’s breach of a plea agreement. Brief for Petitioner He claims that the third prong, the prejudice prong, has no application, since plea-breach claims fall within “a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regard less of their effect on the outcome.” This Court has several times declined to resolve whether “structural” errors—those that affect “the frame work within which the trial proceeds,” —automatically satisfy the third prong of the plain-error test. ; ; United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 65, 63 Once again we need not answer that question, because breach of a plea deal is not a “struc tural” error as we have used that term. We have never described it as such, see at 468–46, and it shares no common features with errors we have held structural. A plea breach does not “necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehi cle for determining guilt or innocence,” ; it does not “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards” by affecting the entire adjudicatory framework, at 30; and the “difficulty of assessing the effect of the error,” United 14, n. 4 1 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court (006), is no greater with respect to plea breaches at sen tencing than with respect to other procedural errors at sentencing, which are routinely subject to harmlessness review, see, e.g., United 46 F.3d 05, 0–10 (CA1 006). Santobello did hold that automatic reversal is war ranted when objection to the Government’s breach of a plea agreement has been preserved,3 but that holding rested not upon the premise that plea-breach errors are |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | holding rested not upon the premise that plea-breach errors are (like “structural” errors) somehow not susceptible, or not amenable, to review for harmlessness, but rather upon a policy interest in establishing the trust between defen dants and prosecutors that is necessary to sustain plea bargaining—an “essential” and “highly desirable” part of the criminal –6. But the rule of contemporaneous objection is equally essential and desirable, and when the two collide we see no need to relieve the defendant of his usual burden of showing prejudice. See 507 U.S., The defendant whose plea agreement has been broken by the Government will not always be able to show preju dice, either because he obtained the benefits contemplated by the deal anyway (e.g., the sentence that the prosecutor promised to request) or because he likely would not have obtained those benefits in any event (as is seemingly the case here).4 —————— 3 We need not confront today the question whether Santobello’s automatic-reversal rule has survived our recent elaboration of harm less-error principles in such cases as and Neder. 4 Because, as we have explained, the breach consists of a wrongful denial of the rights obtained by the defendant through the plea agree ment and does not automatically invalidate the plea, we agree with the Government that the question with regard to prejudice is not whether Puckett would have entered the plea had he known about the future violation. Cf. United When the rights acquired by the defendant relate to sentenc ing, the “ ‘outcome’ ” he must show to have been affected is his sentence. Cite as: 556 U. S. (00) 13 Opinion of the Court On the dissent’s view, a defendant in Puckett’s position has always suffered an impairment of his “substantial rights” under ’s third prong, because he has been convicted “in the absence of trial or compliance with the terms of the plea agreement dispensing with the Govern ment’s obligation to prove its case.” Post, at 1 (opinion of SOUTER, J.). But that is simply an ipse dixit recasting the conceded error—breach of the plea agreement—as the effect on substantial rights. Any trial error can be said to impair substantial rights if the harm is defined as “being convicted at a trial tainted with [fill-in-the-blank] error.” Nor does the fact that there is a “protected liberty inter est” at stake render this case different, see post, at 3. That interest is always at stake in criminal cases. Eliminating the third plain-error prong through semantics makes a nullity of ’s instruction that a defendant normally “must make a specific showing of |
Justice Scalia | 2,009 | 9 | majority | Puckett v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145896/puckett-v-united-states/ | that a defendant normally “must make a specific showing of prejudice” in order to obtain 507 U.S., Puckett contends that the fourth prong of plain-error review likewise has no application because every breach of a plea agreement will constitute a miscarriage of justice. That is not so. The fourth prong is meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis. We have empha sized that a “per se approach to plain-error review is flawed.” n. 14. It is true enough that when the Government reneges on a plea deal, the integrity of the system may be called into question, but there may well be countervailing factors in particular cases. Puckett is again a good example: Given that he obviously did not cease his life of crime, receipt of a sen tencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility would have been so ludicrous as itself to compromise the public reputation of judicial proceedings. Of course the second prong of plain-error review also will often have some “bite” in plea-agreement cases. Not all breaches will be clear or obvious. Plea agreements are 14 PUCKETT v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court not always models of draftsmanship, so the scope of the Government’s commitments will on occasion be open to doubt. Moreover, the Government will often have a color able (albeit ultimately inadequate) excuse for its nonper formance. See n. * * * Application of plain-error review in the present context is consistent with our cases, serves worthy purposes, has meaningful effects, and is in any event compelled by the Federal Rules. While we recognize that the Government’s breach of a plea agreement is a serious matter, “the seri ousness of the error claimed does not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro cedure.” 50 U.S., at The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Cite as: 556 U. S. (00) 1 SOUTER, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 07–71 JAMES BENJAMIN PUCKETT, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | concurring | Connick v. Thompson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213505/connick-v-thompson/ | I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately only to address several aspects of the dissent. 1. The dissent’s lengthy excavation of the trial record is a puzzling exertion. The question presented for our re view is whether a municipality is liable for a single Brady violation by one of its prosecutors, even though no pattern or practice of prior violations put the municipality on notice of a need for specific training that would have pre vented it. See That question is a legal one: whether a Brady violation presents one of those rare circumstances we hypothesized in ’s footnote 10, in which the need for training in constitutional requirements is so obvious ex ante that the municipality’s failure to provide that training amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional violations. See The dissent defers consideration of this question until page 23 of its opinion. It first devotes considerable space to allegations that Connick’s prosecutors misunderstood Brady when asked about it at trial, see post, at 16–18 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.), and to supposed gaps in the Brady guidance provided by Connick’s office to prosecu tors, including deficiencies (unrelated to the specific Brady 2 CONNICK v. THOMPSON SCALIA, J., concurring violation at issue in this case) in a policy manual pub lished by Connick’s office three years after Thompson’s trial, see post, at 18–21. None of that is relevant. Thomp son’s failure-to-train theory at trial was not based on a pervasive culture of indifference to Brady, but rather on the inevitability of mistakes over enough iterations of criminal trials. The District Court instructed the jury it could find Connick deliberately indifferent if: “First: The District Attorney was certain that prosecu tors would confront the situation where they would have to decide which evidence was required by the constitution to be provided to an accused[;] “Second: The situation involved a difficult choice, or one that prosecutors had a history of mishandling, such that additional training, supervision, or monitor ing was clearly needed[; and] “Third: The wrong choice by a prosecutor in that situation will frequently cause a deprivation of an ac cused’s constitutional rights.” App. 828. That theory of deliberate indifference would repeal the law of Monell1 in favor of the Law of Large Numbers. Brady mistakes are inevitable. So are all species of error routinely confronted by prosecutors: authorizing a bad warrant; losing a Batson2 claim; crossing the line in clos ing argument; or eliciting hearsay that violates the Con frontation Clause. Nevertheless, we do not have “de facto respondeat superior liability,” for each such violation under the rubric |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | concurring | Connick v. Thompson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213505/connick-v-thompson/ | respondeat superior liability,” for each such violation under the rubric of failure-to-train simply because the municipality does not have a profes sional educational program covering the specific violation in sufficient depth.3 Were Thompson’s theory the law, —————— 1 Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 2 Batson v. Kentucky, 3 I do not share the dissent’s confidence that this result will be avoided by the instruction’s requirement that “ ‘more likely than not the Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 3 SCALIA, J., concurring there would have been no need for ’s footnote to confine its hypothetical to the extreme circumstance of arming police officers with guns without telling them about the constitutional limitations upon shooting fleeing felons; the District Court’s instructions cover every recur ring situation in which citizens’ rights can be violated. That result cannot be squared with our admonition that failure-to-train liability is available only in “limited cir cumstances,” and that a pattern of consti tutional violations is “ordinarily necessary to establish municipal culpability and causation,” Board of Comm’rs of Bryan These restrictions are indispensable because without them, “failure to train” would become a talismanic incantation producing municipal liability “[i]n virtually every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee”—which is what Monell re jects. Worse, it would “engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second guessing municipal employee-training programs,” thereby diminishing the autonomy of state and local governments. 2. Perhaps for that reason, the dissent does not seri ously contend that Thompson’s theory of recovery was proper. Rather, it accuses Connick of acquiescing in that theory at trial. See post, at 25. The accusation is false. Connick’s central claim was and is that failure-to-train —————— Brady material would have been produced if the prosecutors involved in his underlying criminal cases had been properly trained, supervised or monitored regarding the production of Brady evidence.’ ” Post, at 25, n. 17 (quoting Tr. 1100). How comforting that assurance is depends entirely on what proper training consists of. If it is not limited to training in aspects of Brady that have been repeatedly violated, but includes—as the dissent would have it include here—training that would avoid any one-time violation, the assurance is no assurance at all. 4 CONNICK v. THOMPSON SCALIA, J., concurring liability for a Brady violation cannot be premised on a single incident, but requires a pattern or practice of previ ous violations. He pressed that argument at the summary judgment stage but was rebuffed. At trial, when Connick offered a jury instruction to the |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | concurring | Connick v. Thompson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213505/connick-v-thompson/ | At trial, when Connick offered a jury instruction to the same effect, the trial judge effectively told him to stop bringing up the subject: “[Connick’s counsel]: Also, as part of that definition in that same location, Your Honor, we would like to include language that says that deliberate indiffer ence to training requires a pattern of similar viola tions and proof of deliberate indifference requires more than a single isolated act. “[Thompson’s counsel]: That’s not the law, Your Honor. “THE COURT: No, I’m not giving that. That was in your motion for summary judgment that I denied.” Tr. 1013. Nothing more is required to preserve a claim of error. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 51(d)(1)(B).4 3. But in any event, to recover from a municipality under 42 U.S. C. a plaintiff must satisfy a “rigor ous” standard of causation, Bryan ; he must “demonstrate a direct causal link between the —————— 4 The dissent’s contention that “[t]he instruction Connick proposed resembled the charge given by the District Court,” post, at 25, n. 18, disregards his requested instruction concerning the necessity of a pattern of prior violations. It is meaningless to say that after “the court rejected [Connick’s] categorical position,” as it did, he did not “assail the District Court’s formulation of the deliberate indifference instruction,” post, at 26, n. 18. The prior-pattern requirement was part of Connick’s requested formulation of deliberate indifference: “To prove deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘at least a pattern of similar violations arising from training that is so clearly inadequate as to be obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.’ ” Record, Doc. 94, p. 18 (emphasis added). Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 5 SCALIA, J., concurring municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Thompson cannot meet that standard. The withholding of evidence in his case was almost certainly caused not by a failure to give prosecutors specific train ing, but by miscreant prosecutor Gerry Deegan’s willful suppression of evidence he believed to be exculpatory, in an effort to railroad Thompson. According to Deegan’s colleague Michael Riehlmann, in 1994 Deegan confessed to him—in the same conversation in which Deegan revealed he had only a few months to live—that he had “suppressed blood evidence in the armed robbery trial of John Thomp son that in some way exculpated the defendant.” App. 367; see also (“[Deegan] told me that he had failed to inform the defense of exculpatory information”). I have no reason to disbelieve that account, particularly since Riehlmann’s testimony hardly paints a flattering picture of himself: Riehlmann kept silent about Deegan’s misconduct |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | concurring | Connick v. Thompson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213505/connick-v-thompson/ | flattering picture of himself: Riehlmann kept silent about Deegan’s misconduct for another five years, as a result of which he incurred professional sanctions. See In re Riehlmann, 2004–0680 (La. 1/19/05), And if Riehlmann’s story is true, then the “moving force,” Bryan behind the suppression of evidence was Deegan, not a failure of continuing legal education. 4. The dissent suspends disbelief about this, insisting that with proper Brady training, “surely at least one” of the prosecutors in Thompson’s trial would have turned over the lab report and blood swatch. Post, at 21. But training must consist of more than mere broad encomiums of Brady: We have made clear that “the identified defi ciency in a city’s training program [must be] closely re lated to the ultimate injury.” So even indulging the dissent’s assumption that Thompson’s prosecutors failed to disclose the lab report in good faith— in a way that could be prevented by training—what sort of 6 CONNICK v. THOMPSON SCALIA, J., concurring training would have prevented the good-faith nondisclo sure of a blood report not known to be exculpatory? Perhaps a better question to ask is what legally accurate training would have prevented it. The dissent’s sugges tion is to instruct prosecutors to ignore the portion of Brady limiting prosecutors’ disclosure obligations to evi dence that is “favorable to an accused,” Instead, the dissent proposes that “Connick could have communicated to Orleans Parish prosecutors, in no uncer tain terms, that, ‘[i]f you have physical evidence that, if tested, can establish the innocence of the person who is charged, you have to turn it over.’ ” Post, at 20, n. 13 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 34). Though labeled a training suggestion, the dissent’s proposal is better described as a sub silentio expansion of the substantive law of Brady. If any of our cases establishes such an obligation, I have never read it, and the dissent does not cite it.5 Since Thompson’s trial, however, we have decided a case that appears to say just the opposite of the training the dissent would require: In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), we held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” We acknowledged that “Brady makes the good or bad faith of the State irrele vant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence,” but concluded that “the —————— 5 What the dissent does cite in support of its theory comes from an |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | concurring | Connick v. Thompson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/213505/connick-v-thompson/ | does cite in support of its theory comes from an unexpected source: Connick’s testimony about what qualifies as Brady material. See post, at 20–21, n. 13. (“Or Connick could have told prosecutors what he told the jury when he was asked whether a prose cutor must disclose a crime lab report to the defense, even if the pros ecutor does not know the defendant’s blood type: ‘Under the law, it qualifies as Brady material.’ ” (quoting Tr. 872)). Given the effort the dissent has expended persuading us that Connick’s understanding of Brady is profoundly misguided, its newfound trust in his expertise on the subject is, to the say the least, surprising. Cite as: 563 U. S. (2011) 7 SCALIA, J., concurring Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Perhaps one day we will recognize a distinction between good-faith failures to preserve from destruction evidence whose inculpatory or exculpatory character is unknown, and good-faith failures to turn such evidence over to the de fense. But until we do so, a failure to train prosecutors to observe that distinction cannot constitute deliberate indif ference. 5. By now the reader has doubtless guessed the best kept secret of this case: There was probably no Brady violation at all—except for Deegan’s (which, since it was a bad-faith, knowing violation, could not possibly be attrib uted to lack of training).6 The dissent surely knows this, which is why it leans heavily on the fact that Connick conceded that Brady was violated. I can honor that con cession in my analysis of the case because even if it ex tends beyond Deegan’s deliberate actions, it remains irrelevant to Connick’s training obligations. For any Brady violation apart from Deegan’s was surely on the very frontier of our Brady jurisprudence; Connick could not possibly have been on notice decades ago that he was required to instruct his prosecutors to respect a right to untested evidence that we had not (and still have not) —————— 6 The dissent’s only response to this is that the jury must have found otherwise, since it was instructed that “ ‘[f]or liability to attach because of a failure to train, the fault must be in the training program itself, not in any particular prosecutor.’ ” Post, at 28, n. 20 (quoting Tr. 1098). But this instruction did not require the jury to find that Deegan |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | Hewitt v. Helms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110829/hewitt-v-helms/ | When respondent Helms was transferred to "administrative segregation," he was placed in solitary confinement in B-Block at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. The conditions in B-Block are significantly more restrictive than those experienced by inmates in the general prison population.[1] Indeed, in all material respects *480 conditions in administrative custody are the same as those in disciplinary segregation.[2] The reasons for placing one inmate in administrative and another in punitive segregation may be different, and the periods of confinement may vary, but the Court properly assumes for purposes of this case that "the conditions in the two types of confinement are substantially identical." Ante, at 463, n. 1. None of the three substantive charges against respondent Helms has ever been substantiated in a valid manner.[3]* Nevertheless, he was held in "administrative segregation" for over seven weeks from the evening of December 3, 178, until January 22, 17 before he received an evidentiary hearing, and he was then sentenced to six months in "disciplinary custody." Despite the severity of conditions in solitary confinement, and the admitted differences between segregated custody and the general prison population, petitioners urge us to hold that the transfer of an inmate into administrative segregation does not deprive him of any interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court correctly rejects this contention today. It does so, however, for reasons that do not withstand analysis. It then concludes that the procedures afforded by prison authorities in this case "plainly satisfied the due process requirements for continued confinement of Helms pending the outcome of the investigation." Ante, at 477. I cannot agree. I The principal contention advanced by petitioners in this Court is that the Federal Constitution imposes no procedural limitations on the absolute discretion of prison officials to place any inmate in administrative segregation and to keep him there, if they choose, for the entire period of his confinement.[4] Petitioners argue that a transfer into solitary confinement is merely one example of various routine decisions *482 made on a day-to-day basis by prison authorities, regarding "place of confinement, both as to which facility is appropriate and within the appropriate facility which cell block or housing unit is appropriate; his job assignment; the potential for freedom of movement; and the possibility and variety of educational and vocational opportunities available to him." Brief for Petitioners 11-12. According to petitioners, operational decisions such as these do not raise any constitutional question because prison officials need wide latitude to operate their institutions in a safe and efficient manner. The Court properly rejects the contention |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | Hewitt v. Helms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110829/hewitt-v-helms/ | safe and efficient manner. The Court properly rejects the contention that the Due Process Clause is simply inapplicable to transfers of inmates into administrative segregation. It holds that respondent's transfer from the general population into administrative confinement was a deprivation of liberty that must be accompanied by due process of law. The majority's reasoning in support of this conclusion suffers, however, from a fundamental flaw. In its view, a "liberty interest" exists only because Pennsylvania's written prison regulations[5] display a magical combination of "substantive predicates" and "explicitly mandatory language." Ante, at 472. This analysis attaches no significance either to the character of the conditions of confinement or to actual administrative practices in the institution. Moreover, the Court seems to assume that after his conviction a prisoner has, in essence, no liberty save that created, in writing, by the State which imprisons him. Under this view a prisoner crosses into limbo when he enters into penal confinement. He might have some minimal freedoms if the State chooses to bestow them; but such freedom as he has today may be taken away tomorrow. This approach, although consistent with some of the Court's recent cases,[6] is dramatically different from the analysis *483 in In Wolff, the Court squarely held that every prisoner retains a significant residuum of constitutionally protected liberty following his incarceration. Though the prisoner's "rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country. [Prisoners] may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The source of the liberty recognized in Wolff is not state law, nor even the Constitution itself. Rather, it is plain that "neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen Of course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source. "I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations."[7] *484 Identifying the "liberty" that survives in a closely controlled |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | Hewitt v. Helms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110829/hewitt-v-helms/ | *484 Identifying the "liberty" that survives in a closely controlled prison environment is understandably more difficult than in the world at large. For it is obvious that "[l]awful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, a `retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.' " Wolff, quoting But I remain convinced that an inmate "has a protected right to pursue his limited rehabilitative goals, or at the minimum, to maintain whatever attributes of dignity are associated with his status in a tightly controlled society. It is unquestionably within the power of the State to change that status, abruptly and adversely; but if the change is sufficiently grievous, it may not be imposed arbitrarily. In such case due process must be afforded." Meachum, Thus, the relevant question in this case is whether transfer into administrative segregation constitutes a "sufficiently grievous" change in a prisoner's status to require the protection of "due process." See quoting ; quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee In answering this question it is useful to consider the residuum of liberty that the ordinary citizen enjoys in any organized society. All general laws whether designed to protect the health of the community, to control urban traffic, to improve the environment, or to raise tax revenues curtail the individual's freedom to do as he pleases. Thus the residuum of liberty is far removed from a license to gratify every whim without restraint. It is more akin to the characteristic of "independence," which played a special role in our early history. Consider Professor Dworkin's discussion of this term: *485 "Mill saw independence as a further dimension of equality; he argued that an individual's independence is threatened, not simply by a political process that denies him equal voice, but by political decisions that deny him equal respect. Laws that recognize and protect common interests, like laws against violence and monopoly, offer no insult to any class or individual; but laws that constrain one man, on the sole ground that he is incompetent to decide what is right for himself, are profoundly insulting to him. They make him intellectually and morally subservient to the conformists who form the majority, and deny him the independence to which he is entitled. Mill insisted on the political importance of these moral concepts of dignity, personality, and insult. It was these complex ideas, not the simpler idea of license, that he tried to make available for political theory" R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 263 Ordinarily the mere fact that the existence of a general regulation may significantly impair individual liberty |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | Hewitt v. Helms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110829/hewitt-v-helms/ | existence of a general regulation may significantly impair individual liberty raises no question under the Due Process Clause.[8] But the Clause is implicated when the State singles out one person for adverse treatment significantly different from that imposed on the community at large. For an essential attribute of the liberty protected by the Constitution is the right to the same kind of treatment as the State provides to other similarly situated persons.[] A convicted felon, though he is *486 properly placed in a disfavored class, retains this essential right.[10] Thus, for a prisoner as for other persons, the grievousness of any claimed deprivation of liberty is, in part, a relative matter: one must compare the treatment of the particular prisoner with the customary, habitual treatment of the population of the prison as a whole. In general, if a prisoner complains of an adverse change in conditions which he shares with an entire class of his fellow prisoners as part of the day-to-day operations of the prison, there would be no reason to find that he has been deprived of his constitutionally protected liberty.[11] But if a prisoner is singled out for disparate treatment and if the disparity is sufficiently severe, his liberty is at stake.[12] *487 In this case, by definition, the institutional norm is confinement in the "general prison population."[13] The deprivation of which respondent complains is transfer to "administrative segregation" that is, solitary confinement which by its nature singles out individual prisoners. That confinement was not specified by the terms of his initial criminal sentence. Not only is there a disparity, the disparity is drastic.[14] It is concededly as serious as the difference between confinement in the general prison population and "disciplinary segregation." See and n. 2. As the District Court wrote in summarily aff'd, : *488 "When a prisoner is transferred from the general prison population to the grossly more onerous conditions of maximum security, be it for disciplinary or for administrative reasons, there is severe impairment of the residuum of liberty which he retains as a prisoner an impairment which triggers the requirement for due process safeguards."[15] In this case, the Court's exclusive focus on written regulations happens to lead it to the conclusion that there is a "liberty interest." I agree that the regulations are relevant: by limiting the substantive reasons for a transfer to administrative segregation and by establishing prescribed procedures, these regulations indicate that the State recognizes the substantiality of the deprivation. They therefore provide evidentiary support for the conclusion that the transfer affects a constitutionally protected interest in liberty. |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | Hewitt v. Helms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110829/hewitt-v-helms/ | that the transfer affects a constitutionally protected interest in liberty. But the regulations do not create that interest. Even in their absence due process safeguards would be required when an inmate's liberty is further curtailed by a transfer into administrative custody that is the functional equivalent of punitive isolation. II The "touchstone of due process," as we pointed out in is "protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." Pennsylvania may not arbitrarily place a prisoner in administrative segregation. The majority agrees with this general proposition, but I believe its standards guarding against arbitrariness fall short of what the Constitution requires. *48 First, the majority declares that the Constitution is satisfied by an initial proceeding[16] with minimal participation by the inmate who is being transferred into administrative custody. According to the Court: "An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where they believe a written statement would be ineffective." Ante, at 476. Applying this standard, it declares that the proceeding on December 8, 17, "plainly satisfied the due process requirements for continued confinement of Helms pending the outcome of the investigation," ante, at 477, even though the record does not clearly show whether respondent was present at the Hearing Committee review. I agree with the Court that the Constitution does not require a hearing with all of the procedural safeguards set forth in when prison officials initially decide to segregate an inmate to safeguard institutional security or to *40 conduct an investigation of an unresolved misconduct charge. But unlike the majority, I believe that due process does require that the inmate be given the opportunity to present his views in person to the reviewing officials. As many prisoners have little education, limiting an inmate to a written statement is unlikely to provide a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" in accordance with due process principles. See 37 U.S. 254, 267-26 (170).[17] Of greater importance, the majority's due process analysis fails to provide adequate protection against arbitrary continuation of an inmate's solitary confinement.[18] The opinion recognizes that "[p]rison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates." Ante, at 477, n. It thus recognizes that the deprivation of liberty in the prison setting is a continuous process rather than an isolated event.[1] But the Court |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | Hewitt v. Helms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110829/hewitt-v-helms/ | continuous process rather than an isolated event.[1] But the Court requires only minimal review *41 procedures; prison officials need not permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements and need not give the inmate a chance to present his position. It is constitutionally sufficient, according to the majority, that administrative segregation not be a pretext for indefinite confinement. In my view, the Due Process Clause requires a more searching review of the justifiability of continued confinement. The Court relies on two major justifications for respondent's transfer into solitary confinement: institutional security and the pendency of investigations into respondent's behavior on December 3, 178. Each of these justifications may serve important governmental interests. See 44 U. S., But it cannot fairly be assumed that either rationale, though it might initially be adequate, remains valid or sufficient indefinitely.[20] Nor can it * fairly be assumed that prison officials can properly judge the continued existence of either rationale without gathering fresh information and allowing the inmate to state his own case in person. The majority assumes that the facts needed to decide whether a particular prisoner remains a security risk "will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to administrative segregation." Ante, at 477, n. This assertion simply ignores the passage of time. Even if Helms was a threat to safety on December 8, 178, it cannot be taken for granted that he was still a threat to safety on January 8, 17 or that, if there had been no hearing on January 22, he would still have been a threat to safety a year later. Conditions including Helms' own attitudes, the attitudes of other prisoners toward him and toward each other, and the disruptions caused by the riot simply do not remain static. The majority acknowledges that periodic reviews should consider "the progress of the investigation." But it gives no guidance on the significance of this factor. In my view, the mere notation on a record, "there is an ongoing investigation," should not automatically validate the continuation of solitary confinement. As the Court held in the Due Process Clause does not countenance "automatic investigative segregation of all inmate suspects."[21] Investigations take varying forms. An active *43 investigation involving pursuit of leads among prisoners may justify continued segregation of the suspected inmate, in order to protect potential witnesses from intimidation or influence. But segregation might not be proper if the investigative file is merely being kept open in the hope that something else might turn up.[22] In such event there is a possibility that a prisoner might |
Justice Stevens | 1,983 | 16 | dissenting | Hewitt v. Helms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110829/hewitt-v-helms/ | such event there is a possibility that a prisoner might be kept in segregation simply because prison officials believe that he should be punished, even though there is insufficient evidence to support a misconduct charge at a disciplinary hearing.[23] The lengthier the period of administrative detention, the more likely it may be that "investigation" is merely a pretext. Therefore, due process demands periodic reviews that have genuine substance not mere paper-shuffling.[24] *44 At each periodic review, I believe due process requires that the prisoner be allowed to make an oral statement about the need for and the consequences of continued confinement. Concededly some of the information relevant to a decision whether to continue confinement will be beyond the reach of a prisoner who has been held in segregated custody, including conditions in the general prison population and the progress of an ongoing investigation. But the prisoner should have the right to be present in order to explain his current attitude toward his past activities and his present circumstances, and the impact of solitary confinement on his rehabilitation program and training.[25] These factors may change as the period of confinement continues. Further, if the decisionmaker decides to retain the prisoner in segregation, I believe he should be required to explain his reasons in a brief written statement which is retained in the file and given to the prisoner. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has written in a related prison context, this requirement would direct the decisionmaker's focus "to the relevant. criteria and promote more careful consideration of the evidence. It would also enable inmates to detect and correct inaccuracies that could have a decisive impact. And the obligation to justify a decision publicly would provide the *45 assurance, critical to the appearance of fairness, that the Board's decision is not capricious." (17) (footnote omitted). A written statement of reasons would facilitate administrative and judicial review[26] and might give the prisoner an opportunity to improve his conduct. Neither a right to personal appearance by the prisoner nor a requirement of written reasons would impose an undue burden on prison officials. It is noteworthy that these procedural safeguards are provided in regulations governing both the Pennsylvania and federal prison systems.[27] Given the *46 importance of the prisoner's interest in returning to the general prison population, the benefits of additional procedural safeguards, and the minimal burden on prison officials, I am convinced that the Due Process Clause requires more substantial periodic reviews than the majority acknowledges. III Unfortunately, today's majority opinion locates the due process floor at a level below existing procedures in Pennsylvania. The |
Justice Scalia | 2,002 | 9 | dissenting | US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118500/us-airways-inc-v-barnett/ | The question presented asks whether the "reasonable accommodation" mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act) requires reassignment of a disabled employee to a position that "another employee is entitled *412 to hold under the employer's bona fide and established seniority system." Pet. for Cert. i; Indulging its penchant for eschewing clear rules that might avoid litigation, see, e. g., ; TRW the Court answers "maybe." It creates a presumption that an exception to a seniority rule is an "unreasonable" accommodation, ante, at 403, but allows that presumption to be rebutted by showing that the exception "will not likely make a difference," ante, at 405. The principal defect of today's opinion, however, goes well beyond the uncertainty it produces regarding the relationship between the ADA and the infinite variety of seniority systems. The conclusion that any seniority system can ever be overridden is merely one consequence of a mistaken interpretation of the ADA that makes all employment rules and practiceseven those which (like a seniority system) pose no distinctive obstacle to the disabledsubject to suspension when that is (in a court's view) a "reasonable" means of enabling a disabled employee to keep his job. That is a far cry from what I believe the accommodation provision of the ADA requires: the suspension (within reason) of those employment rules and practices that the employee's disability prevents him from observing. I The Court begins its analysis by describing the ADA as declaring that an employer may not "`discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability.' " Ante, at 396 (quoting 42 U.S. C. 12112(a) (1994 ed.)). In fact the Act says more: an employer may not "discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S. C. 12112(a) (1994 ed.) It further provides that discrimination includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physi- *413 cal or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability." 12112(b)(5)(A) Read together, these provisions order employers to modify or remove (within reason) policies and practices that burden a disabled person "because of [his] disability." In other words, the ADA eliminates workplace barriers only if a disability prevents an employee from overcoming themthose barriers that would not be barriers but for the employee's disability. These include, for example, work stations that cannot accept the employee's wheelchair, or an assembly-line practice that requires long periods of standing. But they do not include rules and practices that bear no more heavily upon the disabled employee than upon otherseven though an exemption from such a rule or |
Justice Scalia | 2,002 | 9 | dissenting | US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118500/us-airways-inc-v-barnett/ | upon otherseven though an exemption from such a rule or practice might in a sense "make up for" the employee's disability. It is not a required accommodation, for example, to pay a disabled employee more than others at his grade leveleven if that increment is earmarked for massage or physical therapy that would enable the employee to work with as little physical discomfort as his co-workers. That would be "accommodating" the disabled employee, but it would not be "making accommodatio[n] to the known physical or mental limitations " of the employee, 12112(b)(5)(A), because it would not eliminate any workplace practice that constitutes an obstacle because of his disability. So also with exemption from a seniority system, which burdens the disabled and nondisabled alike. In particular cases, seniority rules may have a harsher effect upon the disabled employee than upon his co-workers. If the disabled employee is physically capable of performing only one task in the workplace, seniority rules may be, for him, the difference between employment and unemployment. But that does not make the seniority system a disability-related obstacle, any more than harsher impact upon the more needy disabled employee renders the salary system a disability-related obstacle. When one departs from this understanding, the *414 ADA's accommodation provision becomes a standardless grab bagleaving it to the courts to decide which workplace preferences (higher salary, longer vacations, reassignment to positions to which others are entitled) can be deemed "reasonable" to "make up for" the particular employee's disability. Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit in the present case, have accepted respondent's contention that the ADA demands accommodation even with respect to those obstacles that have nothing to do with the disability. Their principal basis for this position is that the definition of "reasonable accommodation" includes "reassignment to a vacant position." 12111(9)(B). This accommodation would be meaningless, they contend, if it required only that the disabled employee be considered for a vacant position. The ADA already prohibits employers from discriminating against the disabled with respect to "hiring, advancement, or discharge and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 12112(a). Surely, the argument goes, a disabled employee must be given preference over a nondisabled employee when a vacant position appears. See ; Accord, EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 3 BNA EEOC Compliance No. 246, p. N:2479 This argument seems to me quite mistaken. The right to be given a vacant position so long as there are no obstacles to that appointment (including another candidate who is better qualified, if "best qualified" is the workplace rule) |
Justice Scalia | 2,002 | 9 | dissenting | US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118500/us-airways-inc-v-barnett/ | is better qualified, if "best qualified" is the workplace rule) is of considerable value. If an employee is hired to fill a position but fails miserably, he will typically be fired. Few employers will search their organization charts for vacancies *415 to which the low-performing employee might be suited. The ADA, however, prohibits an employer from firing a person whose disability is the cause of his poor performance without first seeking to place him in a vacant job where the disability will not affect performance. Such reassignment is an accommodation to the disability because it removes an obstacle (the inability to perform the functions of the assigned job) arising solely from the disability. Cf. See also 3 BNA EEOC Compliance at N:2478 ("[A]n employer who does not normally transfer employees would still have to reassign an employee with a disability"). The phrase "reassignment to a vacant position" appears in a subsection describing a variety of potential "reasonable accommodation[s]": "(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and "(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 12111(9) Subsection (A) clearly addresses features of the workplace that burden the disabled because of their disabilities. Subsection (B) is broader in scope but equally targeted at disability-related obstacles. Thus it encompasses "modified work schedules" (which may accommodate inability to work for protracted periods), "modification of equipment and devices," and "provision of qualified readers or interpreters." *416 There is no reason why the phrase "reassignment to a vacant position" should be thought to have a uniquely different focus. It envisions elimination of the obstacle of the current position (which requires activity that the disabled employee cannot tolerate) when there is an alternate position freely available. If he is qualified for that position, and no one else is seeking it, or no one else who seeks it is better qualified, he must be given the position. But "reassignment to a vacant position" does not envision the elimination of obstacles to the employee's service in the new position that have nothing to do with his disabilityfor example, another employee's claim to that position under a seniority system, or another employee's superior qualifications. Cf. 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(o), p. 357 (explaining "reasonable accommodation" as "any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an |
Justice Scalia | 2,002 | 9 | dissenting | US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118500/us-airways-inc-v-barnett/ | in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities " ); (interpreting "reassignment to a vacant position" consistently with the other accommodations listed in 12111(9), none of which "even alludes to the possibility of a preference for the disabled over the nondisabled"). Unsurprisingly, most Courts of Appeals addressing the issue have held or assumed that the ADA does not mandate exceptions to a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy" such as a seniority system or a consistent policy of assigning the most qualified person to a vacant position. See, e. g., ; ; ; ; ; Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in at least some of its regulations, acknowledges that the ADA clears away only obstacles arising from a person's disability and nothing more. According to the agency, the term "reasonable accommodation" means "(i) [m]odifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or "(ii) [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or "(iii) [m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities." 29 CFR 1630.2(o) See also 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. 1630.9, at 364 ("reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to equal employment opportunity are removed or alleviated"). Sadly, this analysis is lost on the Court, which mistakenly and inexplicably concludes, ante, at 398, that my position here is the same as that attributed to US Airways. In rejecting the argument that the ADA creates no "automatic exemption" for neutral workplace rules such as "breakfrom-work" *418 and furniture budget rules, ante, at 397-398, the Court rejects an argument I have not made. II Although, as I have said, the uncertainty cast upon bona fide seniority systems is the least of the ill consequences produced by today's decision, a few words on that subject are nonetheless in order. Since, under the Court's interpretation of the ADA, all workplace rules are eligible to be used as vehicles of accommodation, the one means of saving seniority systems is a judicial finding that accommodation through the suspension of those workplace rules would be unreasonable. The Court is unwilling, however, to make that finding categorically, with respect to all seniority systems. Instead, it creates (and "creates" is the appropriate word) a rebuttable presumption that |
Justice Scalia | 2,002 | 9 | dissenting | US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118500/us-airways-inc-v-barnett/ | (and "creates" is the appropriate word) a rebuttable presumption that exceptions to seniority rules are not "reasonable" under the ADA, but leaves it free for the disabled employee to show that under the "special circumstances" of his case, an exception would be "reasonable." Ante, at 405. The employee would be entitled to an exception, for example, if he showed that "one more departure" from the seniority rules "will not likely make a difference." I have no idea what this means. When is it possible for a departure from seniority rules to "not likely make a difference"? Even when a bona fide seniority system has multiple exceptions, employees expect that these are the only exceptions. One more unannounced exception will invariably undermine the values ("fair, uniform treatment," "job security," "predictable advancement," etc.) that the Court cites as its reasons for believing seniority systems so important that they merit a presumption of exemption. See ante, at 404. One is tempted to impart some rationality to the scheme by speculating that the Court's burden-shifting rule is *419 merely intended to give the disabled employee an opportunity to show that the employer's seniority system is in fact a shama system so full of exceptions that it creates no meaningful employee expectations. The rule applies, however, even if the seniority system is "bona fide and established," Pet. for Cert. i. And the Court says that "to require the typical employer to show more than the existence of a seniority system might well undermine the employees' expectations of consistent, uniform treatment" Ante, at 404. How could deviations from a sham seniority system "undermine the employees' expectations"? I must conclude, then, that the Court's rebuttable presumption does not merely give disabled employees the opportunity to unmask sham seniority systems; it gives them a vague and unspecified power (whenever they can show "special circumstances") to undercut bona fide systems. The Court claims that its new test will not require exceptions to seniority systems "in the run of cases," ante, at 403, but that is belied by the disposition of this case. The Court remands to give respondent an opportunity to show that an exception to petitioner's seniority system "will not likely make a difference" to employee expectations, ante, at 405, despite the following finding by the District Court: "[T]he uncontroverted evidence shows that [petitioner's] seniority system has been in place for `decades' and governs over 14,000 Agents. Moreover, seniority policies such as the one at issue in this case are common to the airline industry. Given this context, it seems clear that [petitioner's] employees were justified in relying |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | The “persecutor bar” in the Immigration and National ity Act (INA) denies asylum and the withholding of re moval to any alien who has “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S. C. 1158(b)()(A), 131(b)(3)(B)(i). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), principally relying on this Court’s decision in v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (81), held that the statute does not require that the persecution be voluntarily inflicted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. According to the Court, which construed the similar text of a persecution bar in the Displaced Persons Act of 48 (DPA), is largely irrelevant to the question presented here. See ante, at 6–8, 9–10; see also ante, at (SCALIA, J., concurring). The majority further holds that the INA is ambiguous as to “whether coercion or duress is relevant in determining if an alien assisted or otherwise participated in persecution” and that the agency, there fore, should interpret the statute in the first instance to determine whether it reasonably can be read to include a voluntariness requirement. Ante, at 5, 10–1; see also ante, at 1 (SCALIA, J., concurring). I disagree with both of NEGUSIE v. HOLDER THOMAS, J., dissenting these conclusions. Because the INA unambiguously pre cludes any inquiry into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily, i.e., free from coercion or duress, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent. I Petitioner Daniel Girmai Negusie testified to the Immi gration Judge (IJ) that he was forced to work as an armed guard for four years at an Eritrean prison camp where prisoners were persecuted because of their religious be liefs. According to petitioner, part of his job was “to firmly control the prisoners, to punish the prisoners, too, by exposing them” to the extreme heat of the African sun. App. 58. The guards “would hold [a] stick [with] their hand” and follow prisoners who were being forced to “roll on the ground in the sun.” Because “it was extremely hot,” prisoners would quickly “get tired and [feel] shortness of breath and stop” rolling. They were then beaten. Prisoners typically could not survive this punishment for more than two hours. Indeed, at least one prisoner died from sun exposure while peti tioner stood guard. See ante, at 3 (majority opinion). Petitioner testified that, as a guard, he prevented the prisoners from showering and forbade them from leaving their rooms for fresh air. This form of punishment was particularly severe |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | for fresh air. This form of punishment was particularly severe because the prisons were “built from stone and bricks” with “no cooling system, no ventilation, no windows,” and intolerable heat. App. 0, 30. Petitioner also prevented prisoner escapes, for which the punishment was forced sun exposure. And, although petitioner never used “electricity to torture” prisoners, he was aware that his supervisor did. at 61–6. But petitioner, who had converted to Protestantism when he was confined as a prisoner at the camp, also testified that he did not want to persecute any of the Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting prisoners because his new religion taught him “to be merciful.” Thus, at times he disobeyed his orders. On one occasion, he gave water to a prisoner who was dying from sun exposure. On another occasion, he let female prisoners take showers after they had been denied that privilege “for a long time.” Petitioner also occasionally allowed some of the prisoners to “go outside during the night and during the evenings and refresh themselves in the fresh air.” –38. After four years as a prison guard, petitioner deserted his post, swam to a shipping container, and hid inside. See ante, at 3 (majority opinion). The container arrived in the United States with petitioner inside on December 0, 004. Petitioner applied for asylum and the withholding of removal under the INA, 8 U.S. C. et seq. He also applied for protection under the Convention Against Tor ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), under which it is “the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 98, –8, note following 8 U.S. C. p. 63 (United States Policy with Respect to Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture (hereinafter CAT Policy)). See also CAT, Dec. 10, 84, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–0, 1465 U. N. T. S. 85. Petitioner feared that, if returned to Eritrea, he would “be executed” because he had converted to Protestantism and deserted his military post. App. 65, 68. The INA provides the Executive with the discretion to grant asylum to aliens that are “unable or unwilling” to return to their home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, relig ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 4 NEGUSIE v. HOLDER |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | membership in a particular social group, 4 NEGUSIE v. HOLDER THOMAS, J., dissenting or political opinion.” 8 U.S. C. §(a)(4)(A), 1158(b)(1). The INA also requires the Executive to with hold removal of aliens to a country in which there is a “clear probability” that their “life or freedom would be threatened” because of their “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin ion.” However, the INA prohibits the Executive from granting asylum or withholding removal if an alien “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici pated in the persecution” of any person on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” (asy lum); (withholding of removal). Nonethe less, in light of the CAT’s requirement that “[n]o State Party shall return a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,” Art. 3, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–0, at 0, regulations implementing that convention provide “deferral of removal” to aliens subject to the INA persecutor bar who would more likely than not be tortured if removed to their home country.1 8 CFR (d)(), 108.17(a) (008); see also CAT Policy (b), at 63 (requiring federal agencies to “pre scribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the [CAT], subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos —————— 1 “Deferralof removal” was created to accommodate Congress’ direc tion to exclude those who fall within the INA persecutor bar “[t]o the maximum extent consistent with the obligations of the United States under the [CAT]” to not return an alien to a country in which he or she will be tortured. CAT Policy (c), at 63. To accomplish that goal, deferral of removal provides “a less permanent form of protection than withholding of removal and one that is more easily and quickly termi nated if it becomes possible to remove the alien consistent with Article 3” of the CAT, (99), while also “ensur[ing] that [such aliens] are not returned to a country where they would be tor tured,” id.¸ at 8481. Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 5 THOMAS, J., dissenting contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratifi cation of the Convention”). The IJ denied petitioner’s applications for asylum and the withholding of removal, but granted him deferral of removal. The BIA affirmed. In their view, petitioner’s conduct objectively qualified as assistance or participation in the persecution of others based on religion. See ante, at 3 (majority opinion). Relying on the IJ and BIA found |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | 3 (majority opinion). Relying on the IJ and BIA found that even if petitioner was “compelled to par ticipate as a prison guard” against his wishes, his “motiva tion and intent are irrelevant to the issue of whether he ‘assisted’ in persecution.” (some internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, petitioner was ineligible for asylum or the withholding of removal under the INA. The IJ and BIA agreed, however, that petitioner qualified for deferral of removal because it is “more likely than not that he would be tortured” if returned to Eritrea given that its “government has used deadly force and threatened to use deadly force against deserters.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a– 8a, 0a, a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See Negusie v. Gonzales, (per curiam). II As with all statutory interpretation questions, construc tion of the INA’s persecutor bar must begin with the plain language of the statute. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S. (009) (slip op., at 5) ). If the text of a statute governing agency action “ ‘directly addresse[s] the precise question at issue,’ ” then, “ ‘that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con gress.’ ” National Assn. of Home ). A A court must first “look to the particular statutory language at issue.” K mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 81, 91 (88). As the majority acknowledges, see ante, at 5–6, the text of the INA’s persecutor bar neither in cludes the term “voluntary” nor contains an exception for involuntary, coerced conduct. The statute instead applies to any alien “who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person” on account of a protected ground. 1158(b)()(A)(i), 131(b)(3)(B)(i). The statute’s key terms also do not imply any voluntari ness requirement for persecution. Under the ordinary meaning of the term “persecution” at the time of the stat ute’s enactment in 80 and its reenactment in 96, the act of persecution alone is sufficient to classify one’s con duct as persecution. See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 8 (91) (hereinafter Webster’s Ninth) (defin ing “persecution” as “the act or practice of persecuting esp. those who differ in origin, religion, or social outlook”); see also Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 855 (75) (here inafter Webster’s) (same). The term itself includes no intrinsic mens rea requirement. As a result, an individual can “persecute”—meaning “harass in a manner designed to injure, grieve, or afflict”—without having designed the act or intended for injury, grief, or affliction to occur. Webster’s Ninth 8; |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | for injury, grief, or affliction to occur. Webster’s Ninth 8; see also Webster’s 855 (same). The persecutor bar’s inclusion of those who “assist” or “participate” confirms that it does not include a voluntari ness requirement. The term “assist” is defined as “to give support or aid,” Webster’s Ninth 109, or “to help,” Oxford American Dictionary 36 (80) (hereinafter Oxford). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 111 (hereinaf Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting ter Black’s) (defining “assist” as “[t]o help; aid; succor; lend countenance or encouragement to; participate in as an auxiliary”). And “participate” means simply “to take part,” Webster’s Ninth 858, or “to have a share, to take part in something,” Oxford 487; see also Black’s 1007 (defining “participate” as “[t]o receive or have a part or share of; to partake of; experience in common with others; to have or enjoy a part or share in common with others”). Accord ingly, this Court has concluded that the ordinary mean ings of “assist” and “participate” do not “connote volun tariness.” Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 54 U.S. 06, 11 (98) (participate); see also 449 U.S., (assist). These are “terms and concepts of breadth,” 1– (83), that require only that an individual take “some part in” an activity, or help it to occur in some way. Reves v. Ernst & Young, (empha sis in original). Even if participation or assistance is coerced, it remains participation or assistance just the same. B In addition to the particular statutory section of the INA before the Court, “the language and design of the statute as a whole” is instructive in determining the provision’s plain meaning. K mart ; see also Amoco Production 55–553 (87). Here, the INA’s design and structure buttress the conclusion that the persecutor bar applies irrespective of voluntariness. First, Congress has evidenced its ability to both specifi cally require voluntary conduct and explicitly exclude involuntary conduct in other provisions of the INA. See infra, at 15–16. For example, Congress has barred admis sion to the United States of totalitarian party members unless their membership was “involuntary,” 8 U.S. C. 8 NEGUSIE v. HOLDER THOMAS, J., dissenting and it has provided for the termination of asylum when an alien “has voluntarily availed himself or herself” of another country’s protections, “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., U.S. 438, The absence of a |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | marks omitted); see, e.g., U.S. 438, The absence of a volun tariness requirement in the INA persecutor bar is no exception. Second, federal immigration law provides calibrated remedies, which include partial refuge for specified aliens who have both suffered from and inflicted persecution. Those who have been persecuted and have not engaged in persecution may receive both asylum and the withholding of removal. 1158(b)(1)(A). Those at the other end of the spectrum, who have not been persecuted but have persecuted others, may not receive either asylum or the withholding of removal. §(i), 1158(b)()(A)(i). And finally, for many individuals who (like petitioner) have both persecuted others and been persecuted, the scheme provides temporary refuge; they will receive deferral of removal under the CAT if they will face torture upon their return to their home country. CAT Policy (a), at 63; see also (a), 108.16(d)(). Where “Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with spe cific solutions,” courts should not read one part of the legislative regime (the INA) to provide a different, and conflicting, solution to a problem that has already been specifically addressed elsewhere in the federal immigra tion regime (regulations implementing the CAT). Varity v. Howe, (THOMAS, J., Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 9 THOMAS, J., dissenting dissenting); see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, Federal law provides only partial protection to a victim of persecution who has also engaged in persecution, voluntarily or not. There simply is no justification for writing into the INA’s perse cutor bar the greater protections of asylum and the with holding of removal for individuals who were coerced into engaging in persecution. That is, the “assumption of inadvertent omission” of a voluntariness requirement in the INA “is rendered especially suspect upon close consid eration of [a statute’s] interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme” that addresses the specific problem at issue in a conflicting way. Massachu setts Mut. Life Ins. 146–147 (85). C Finally, Congress is aware of a judicial interpretation of statutory language and “adopt[s] that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” (78); see also (88); B N. Singer & J. Singer, Suth erland on Statutory Construction pp. 17–133 (7th —————— It also is important to acknowledge that the object of the INA is to codify Congress’ policy decisions “ ‘pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain’ ” in the United States—decisions that are “ ‘en trusted exclusively to Congress.’ ” 766, 767 (7) (quoting 531–53 (54)). In fact, “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the decision of Congress to admit or to exclude aliens. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 14 U.S. 30, 339 (09). Courts therefore must enforce the immigration policy decision reflected in a statute’s plain terms, even if Congress has chosen “to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions” altogether, Fong Yue Likewise, here, where Congress has made a judgment about which persons to admit and exclude from the country, it is not for this Court to question the wisdom of that choice. 10 NEGUSIE v. HOLDER THOMAS, J., dissenting ed. 008). Here, the statutory and decisional backdrop against which Congress enacted the INA’s persecutor bar counsels against grafting a voluntariness requirement onto the statute. When Congress enacted the INA’s persecutor bar, it essentially retained the language used in similar prede cessor statutes. Under the 48 DPA persecutor bar, entry was denied to all who “ ‘assisted the enemy in perse cuting civil[ians].’ ” (quoting ). In 50, Congress added a second persecu tor bar to the DPA that applied “to any person who advo cated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national origin.” In the years that followed, Congress continued to use this same broad language in denying asylum to specific catego ries of persecutors. See, e.g., (denying permanent residence to aliens from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia “who ordered, assisted, or otherwise partici pated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or political opinion”); 8 U.S. C. 17(a)(4)(D)) (authorizing the exclusion of anyone who had been associated with Nazi forces and had “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecu tion of any person because of race, religion, national ori gin, or political opinion”); (imposing persecutor bar on “any person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of [a] group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin”). Congress then enacted the INA bar in 80. This stat ute comprehensively labeled as a persecutor “any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” –103. Congress reenacted the INA’s persecutor bar in 96 and retained its breadth. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 11 THOMAS, J., dissenting grant Responsibility Act of 96 (IIRIRA), 601(a)(1), 604(b)()(A)(i), – 60, 689, 691. Congress’ uninterrupted use of this broad statutory language, which parallels the persecutor bars dating back to |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | statutory language, which parallels the persecutor bars dating back to 48, was not accidental. By the time of the 96 reen actment, this Court had specifically interpreted the plain language of the predecessor bars to apply regardless of the voluntariness of a persecutor’s conduct. See (48 DPA bar); see also United States v. Koreh, (CA3 95) (50 DPA bar); United (CA7 91) (48 DPA bar); 445– 446 (CA 85) (8 U.S. C. §151(a)() (8 ed.), trans ferred to (006 ed.)). In particular, this Court had held that the phrase in the 48 DPA bar, “assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians],” contained no “ ‘involuntary assistance’ exception.” 449 U.S., Rather, the statute’s “plain language” made clear that “an individual’s service as a concentration camp armed guard—whether voluntary or involuntary—made him ineligible for a visa.” In light of this legal backdrop, Congress’ decisions in 80 and 96 to retain a persecutor bar that broadly applies to anyone who “assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution” of any person, §, 131(b)(3)(B), is significant evidence that Congress did not intend to include any involuntariness exception in the INA bar. This Court must assume, absent textual proof to the contrary, that Congress was aware of the deci sion when it reenacted the persecutor bar and thus “adopt[ed] that interpretation when it re-enact[ed the] statute without change,” at D In sum, the INA’s persecutor bar does not require that 1 NEGUSIE v. HOLDER THOMAS, J., dissenting assistance or participation in persecution be voluntary or uncoerced to fall within the statute’s reach. It instead “mandates precisely” what it says: “[A]n individual’s ser vice as a [prison] camp armed guard—whether voluntary or involuntary—ma[kes] him ineligible for” asylum or withholding of removal if the guard’s service involved assistance or participation in the persecution of another person on account of a protected ground. Here, it is undisputed that petitioner served at a prison camp where guards persecuted prison ers because of their religious beliefs. See ante, at –3 (majority opinion). It also is undisputed that petitioner carried out the persecution by preventing prisoners from escaping and by standing guard while at least one pris oner died from sun exposure. Petitioner, therefore, “assisted, or otherwise participated” in persecution and thus is statutorily disqualified from receiving asylum or withholding of removal under the INA. 3 —————— 3 JUSTICE STEVENS also finds the language of the INA’s persecutor bar “plain,” but concludes that it must incorporate a culpability require ment because the statute applies to those whose “acts are of a ‘criminal nature.’ ” See ante, 9 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | ” See ante, 9 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). I disagree. The decision to admit an alien is a matter of legisla tive grace, see n. for which judicial review has been “consis tently classified” as civil in nature, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 34 U.S. 594 (5); see also 70 (001) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (explaining that “ ‘an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative’ ” (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 1, 3 (8))). There is no warrant to read criminal-law requirements into a statute that is “nonpunitive in pur pose and effect.” Further, the conclusory pronouncement in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ¶16 (reedited Jan. 9), that “it has to be assumed, although this is not specifically stated, that the acts covered by the present clause must also be of a criminal nature,” is insufficient to require criminal proof to deny withholding of removal, contra, ante, at Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 13 THOMAS, J., dissenting III The majority nevertheless concludes the statute’s “si lence,” ante, at 6, creates ambiguity, and therefore re mands the case to the BIA for it to determine, in the first instance, whether persecution must be voluntary to fall within the terms of the INA’s persecutor bar. “The Court’s efforts to derive ambiguity from th[e] utmost clarity” of the persecutor bar, however, “are unconvincing” in every respect. 533 U.S. 89, 39 (001) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). The majority principally finds ambiguity in the statu tory text because it does not include either the word “vol untary” or the word “involuntary.” See ante, But a statute cannot be deemed ambiguous until the court “ex haust[s] the aid of the ‘traditional tools of statutory con struction’ ” and determines that Congress did not resolve the issue under consideration. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 40 (005) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting n. 9). Deeming a statute with broad terms to be ambiguous for that reason alone essen tially requires Congress either to obey a judicially imposed clear-statement rule or accept the risk that the courts may refuse to give full effect to a statute’s plain meaning in the name of deference. Not every difficult question of statutory construction amounts to a statutory gap for a federal agency to fill. See ante, at 1–4 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). And the Court should not, “in the name of |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | J.). And the Court should not, “in the name of deference, abdicate its responsibility to interpret a stat ute” simply because it requires some effort. Global Cross ing Telecommunications, (THOMAS, J., dissenting). —————— 9–10 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). The United Nations handbook “is not binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United States courts.” 56 U.S. 415, 47 (99). 14 NEGUSIE v. HOLDER THOMAS, J., dissenting The majority makes no attempt to apply the “traditional tools of statutory construction” to the persecutor bar be fore retreating to ambiguity. See ante, at 5–6. Rather, it merely observes that Congress could have spoken more directly to the issue, which it finds sufficient to render the statute ambiguous on this score. Ante, at 6. But the absence of a phrase specifying that the provision applies to both involuntary and voluntary conduct is not definitive proof of ambiguity. It is certainly correct that Congress “ ‘could have spoken in clearer terms,’ ” Clark, 543 U.S., at 40 (THOMAS, J., dissenting), as it almost always can in any statute. However, this “proves nothing” in evaluating whether the statute is ambiguous. The question before the Court instead is whether Congress has provided an unambiguous answer in the plain language that it chose to use. Here, for the reasons just explained, the traditional tools of statutory interpretation show with “utmost clarity,” St. at 39, that the statute applies regardless of the voluntariness of the alien who participates or assists in persecution.4 The majority also finds ambiguity based on differences between the INA and the DPA statutory bar considered in In particular, the majority points to the Fe dorenko Court’s reliance on a second part of the DPA persecutor bar, which applied to those who “ ‘voluntarily —————— 4 Because this Court should not delegate the interpretation of the persecutor bar’s plain meaning to a federal agency, see Board of Gover nors, FRS v. Dimension Financial (86), it is largely irrelevant whether the BIA properly relied on v. United States, (81), in interpreting the statute, see ante, at 9–11 (majority opinion); ante, at (SCALIA, J., concurring). In any event, the BIA’s construction of the INA’s persecutor bar correctly reflected the text of the provision. There is no reason to remand the question to the agency when only one construction of the statute is permissible and the agency’s original decision adopted that proper construction. See National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 98–985 (005). Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 15 THOMAS, J., dissenting assisted the enemy forces in their operations against the United Nations.’ |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | the enemy forces in their operations against the United Nations.’ ” and n. 3 (quoting 6 Stat. 305; emphasis added). The Court noted that “[u]nder traditional principles of statutory construction, the deliberate omission of the word ‘voluntary’ from §(a),” which addressed the assistance of persecution—but not from §(b)—“compel[led] the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.” According to the major ity, because the INA persecutor bar, unlike the DPA bar, does not include a provision limited by the word “voluntar ily” adjacent to the provision that is not so limited, the absence of the adverb here cannot carry the significance given it in See ante, The majority’s reasoning is flawed. The mere fact that the INA’s persecutor bar is not accompanied by a neighboring provision containing the word “voluntarily” does not negate the significance of the term’s absence when other INA provisions are explicitly limited to actions undertaken voluntarily. As noted above, see the INA imposes a voluntariness requirement in a host of statutory provisions, see, e.g., 8 U.S. C. §1158(c)()(D) (terminating asylum when alien has “voluntarily” availed himself of the protection of his country); §§118(a)(3)(D)(i)–(ii) (denying admission and naturaliza tion to those who have been members of, or affiliated with, “the Communist or any other totalitarian party” unless that membership or affiliation was “involuntary”); §118(d)(3)(B)(i) (denying admission to those who have “voluntarily and knowingly” engaged in, endorsed, es poused, or persuaded others to endorse, espouse, or sup port terrorist activity); §19c(a)(1) (allowing an alien to “voluntarily” depart the United States); §§144(a), (d) (precluding naturalization for members of certain totali tarian parties, unless membership was “involuntary”); (providing for loss of nationality by “voluntarily” 16 NEGUSIE v. HOLDER THOMAS, J., dissenting performing certain specified acts with the intention of relinquishing nationality).5 In the immigration and naturalization context, then, Congress is certainly capable of declaring its preference for a voluntariness requirement. That Congress’ explicit references to voluntariness appear in other sections of this particular statutory scheme, rather than in subsections of or 131, is immaterial. Cf. Rusello, 464 U.S., at 3; U.S., at And the fact that Congress, in the course of making structural revisions to the statutory regime, eliminated the specific dichotomy the Court noted in does not undermine the critical point: The INA expressly includes a voluntariness requirement in several places but does not impose such a requirement in the persecution bar. Thus, the omission of the word “voluntarily” from the persecutor bar in the INA is just as conclusive as its omission from the persecutor bar in the DPA. |
Justice Thomas | 2,009 | 1 | dissenting | Negusie v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145903/negusie-v-holder/ | as its omission from the persecutor bar in the DPA. With respect to both statutes, the delib erate omission “compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.” 449 U.S., Finally, the majority concludes that the DPA bar is distinguishable from the INA bar because the former was enacted in the context of the “ ‘ “crime against humanity that [was] involved in the concentration camp,” ’ ” which was so horrific that it is in a category all its own. Ante, at —————— 5 Moreover, in the Refugee Act of 80, which added the persecutor bar to the INA, Congress separately codified its desire to “promote opportunities for resettlement or voluntary repatriation.” 94 Stat. 10, note following 8 U.S. C. §151. In 96, when Congress reenacted the statutory text, it retained the persecution bar’s broad language while again restricting other sections to voluntary conduct. See IIRIRA, –587 (relating to “voluntary depar ture”), §40, at 3009–656 (relating to “voluntary” participation in pilot programs for confirming employment eligibility), at 3009–690 (providing for termination of asylum when alien “voluntarily” takes certain actions). Cite as: 555 U. S. (009) 17 THOMAS, J., dissenting 8 (quoting at 511, n. 3). In that unique context, the majority reasons, it made sense to exclude “even those involved in nonculpable, involuntary assis tance in Nazi persecution.” But the majority cannot intend to suggest that all acts of persecution during the Second World War were inherently more depraved or reprehensible than all acts of persecution that have oc curred in the decades since the INA’s enactment. Certainly, no such conclusion is compelled by the statu tory text. Congress has steadfastly condemned all acts of persecution. See U.S. C. (noting that “Congress has recognized and denounced acts of religious persecution,” which can be “severe and violent” and “par ticularly widespread, systematic, and heinous under to talitarian governments and in countries with militant politicized religious majorities”); (announcing that it is the “policy of the United States” to “stan[d] with the persecuted”); (“The Congress con demns the persecution of any persons because of their religion”); Refugee Act of 80, (“The Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands”). There is no reason to deny the INA persecutor bar its full meaning based on a speculative assumption that Congress, in 80, could not have meant to oppose persecution quite as in tensely as it did in the aftermath of World War II. Rather, the |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | This case presents the issue whether the federal courts have jurisdiction or should abstain in a case involving alleged torts committed by the former husband of petitioner and his female companion against petitioner's children, when the sole basis for federal jurisdiction is the diversity-ofcitizenship provision of 28 U.S. C. 332. I Petitioner Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, brought this lawsuit on September 26, 989, on behalf of her daughters L. R. and S. R. against respondents Jon A. Richards and Debra Kesler, citizens of Louisiana, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Alleging federal jurisdiction based on the diversity-ofcitizenship provision of 332, Ankenbrandt's complaint sought monetary damages for alleged sexual and physical abuse of the children committed by Richards and Kesler. Richards is the divorced father of the children and Kesler his female companion.[] On December 0, 990, the District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss this lawsuit. *692 Citing In re for the proposition that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States," the court concluded that this case fell within what has become known as the "domestic relations" exception to diversity jurisdiction, and that it lacked jurisdiction over the case. The court also invoked the abstention principles announced in to justify its decision to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. No. 89 4244 (ED La., Dec. 0, 990). The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. No. 9-3037 (CA5, May 3, 99), judgt. order reported at We granted certiorari limited to the following questions: "() Is there a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction? (2) If so, does it permit a district court to abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort action for damages?"[2] and "(3) Did the District Court in this case err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the doctrine *693 of ? " We address each of these issues in turn. II The domestic relations exception upon which the courts below relied to decline jurisdiction has been invoked often by the lower federal courts. The seeming authority for doing so originally stemmed from the announcement in that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the allowance of alimony. In that case, the Court heard a suit in equity brought by a wife (by her next friend) in Federal District Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction against her former husband. She sought to enforce a decree from a New York state court, which had |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | a decree from a New York state court, which had granted a divorce and awarded her alimony. The former husband thereupon moved to Wisconsin to place himself beyond the New York courts' jurisdiction so that the divorce decree there could not be enforced against him; he then sued for divorce in a Wisconsin court, representing to that court that his wife had abandoned him and failing to disclose the existence of the New York decree. In a suit brought by the former wife in Wisconsin Federal District Court, the former husband alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction. The court accepted jurisdiction and gave judgment for the divorced wife. On appeal, it was argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction on two grounds: first, that there was no diversity of citizenship because although divorced, the wife's citizenship necessarily remained that of her former husband; and second, that the whole subject of divorce and alimony, including a suit to enforce an alimony decree, was exclusively ecclesiastical at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and that the Constitution therefore placed the whole subject of divorce and alimony beyond the jurisdiction of the United States courts. Over the dissent of three Justices, the Court rejected both arguments. After an exhaustive survey of *694 the authorities, the Court concluded that a divorced wife could acquire a citizenship separate from that of her former husband and that a suit to enforce an alimony decree rested within the federal courts' equity jurisdiction. The Court reached these conclusions after summarily dismissing the former husband's contention that the case involved a subject matter outside the federal courts' jurisdiction. In so stating, however, the Court also announced the following limitation on federal jurisdiction: "Our first remark isand we wish it to be rememberedthat this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent that decree from being defeated by fraud. "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board." As a general matter, the dissenters agreed with these statements, but took issue with the Court's holding that the instant action to enforce an alimony decree was within the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The statements disclaiming jurisdiction over divorce and alimony decree suits, though technically dicta, formed the |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | divorce and alimony decree suits, though technically dicta, formed the basis for excluding "domestic relations" cases from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, a jurisdictional limitation those courts have recognized ever since. The Court, however, cited no authority and did not discuss the foundation for its announcement. Since that time, the Court has dealt only occasionally with the domestic relations limitation on federal-court jurisdiction, and it has never addressed the basis for such a limitation. Because we are unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been recognized for nearly *695 a century and a half, we feel compelled to explain why we will continue to recognize this limitation on federal jurisdiction. A Counsel argued in that the Constitution prohibited federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over domestic relations cases. Brief for Appellant in D. T. 858, No. 44, pp. 4-5. An examination of Article III, itself, and our cases since makes clear that the Constitution does not exclude domestic relations cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by statute to the federal courts. Article III, 2, of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;to Controversies between two or more States;between a State and Citizens of another State;between Citizens of different States;between Citizens of the same State claiming Land under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." This section delineates the absolute limits on the federal courts' jurisdiction. But in articulating three different terms to define jurisdiction"Cases, in Law and Equity," "Cases," and "Controversies"this provision contains no limitation on subjects of a domestic relations nature. Nor did purport to ground the domestic relations exception in these constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction. The Court's discussion of federal judicial power to hear suits *696 of a domestic relations nature contains no mention of the Constitution, see 2 How., and it is logical to presume that the Court based its statement limiting such power on narrower statutory, rather than broader constitutional, grounds. Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Subsequent decisions confirm that was not relying on constitutional limits in justifying the exception. In one such case, for instance, the Court stated the "long established rule" that federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain domestic relations |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | rule" that federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain domestic relations matters as having been based on the assumptions that "husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different States, so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value." De la Since Article III contains no monetary limit on suits brought pursuant to federal diversity jurisdiction, De la `s articulation of the "rule" in terms of the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction further supports the view that the exception is not grounded in the Constitution. Moreover, even while citing with approval the language purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts over domestic relations matters, the Court has heard appeals from territorial courts involving divorce, see, e. g., De la and has upheld the exercise of original jurisdiction by federal courts in the District of Columbia to decide divorce actions, see, e. g., Glidden Thus, even were the statements in De la referring to the statutory prerequisites of diversity jurisdiction alone not persuasive testament to the statutory origins of the rule, by hearing appeals from legislative, or Article I, courts, this Court implicitly has made clear its understanding *697 that the source of the constraint on jurisdiction from was not Article III; otherwise the Court itself would have lacked jurisdiction over appeals from these legislative courts. See National Mut. Ins. ("We can no more review a legislative court's decision of a case which is not among those enumerated in Art. III than we can hear a case from a state court involving purely state law questions"). We therefore have no difficulty concluding that when the Court "disclaim[ed] altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce," 2 How., it was not basing its statement on the Constitution.[3] B That Article III, 2, does not mandate the exclusion of domestic relations cases from federal-court jurisdiction, however, does not mean that such courts necessarily must retain and exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Other constitutional provisions explain why this is so. Article I, 8,cl. 9, for example, authorizes Congress "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" and Article III, states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The Court's cases state the rule that "if inferior federal courts were created, [Congress was not] required to invest them with |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | were created, [Congress was not] required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III." *698 This position has held constant since at least 845, when the Court stated that "the judicial power of the United States is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this Court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good." ; Plaquemines Tropical Fruit ; ; We thus turn our attention to the relevant jurisdictional statutes. The Judiciary Act of 789 provided that "the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and. an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State. " Act of Sept. 24, 789, The defining phrase, "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity," remained a key element of statutory provisions demarcating the terms of diversity jurisdiction until 948, when Congress amended the diversity jurisdiction provision to eliminate this phrase and replace in its stead the term "all civil actions." 948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 28 U.S. C. 332. The majority itself did not expressly refer to the diversity statute's use of the limitation on "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." The dissenters in however, implicitly made such a reference, for they suggested that the federal courts had no power over certain *699 domestic relations actions because the court of chancery lacked authority to issue divorce and alimony decrees. Stating that "[t]he origin and the extent of [the federal courts'] jurisdiction must be sought in the laws of the United States, and in the settled rules and principles by which those laws have bound them," the dissenters contended that "as the jurisdiction of the chancery in England does not extend to or embrace the subjects of divorce and alimony, and as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in chancery is bounded by that of the chancery in England, all power |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | bounded by that of the chancery in England, all power or cognizance with respect to those subjects by the courts of the United States in chancery is equally excluded." Hence, in the dissenters' view, a suit seeking such relief would not fall within the statutory language "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." Because the Court did not disagree with this reason for accepting the jurisdictional limitation over the issuance of divorce and alimony decrees, it may be inferred fairly that the jurisdictional limitation recognized by the Court rested on this statutory basis and that the disagreement between the Court and the dissenters thus centered only on the extent of the limitation. We have no occasion here to join the historical debate over whether the English court of chancery had jurisdiction to handle certain domestic relations matters, though we note that commentators have found some support for the majority's interpretation.[4] Certainly it was not unprecedented at the time for the Court to infer, from what it understood *700 to be English chancery practice, some guide to the meaning of the 789 Act's jurisdictional grant. See, e. g., We thus are content to rest our conclusion that a domestic relations exception exists as a matter of statutory construction not on the accuracy of the historical justifications on which it was seemingly based, but rather on Congress' apparent acceptance of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 948, when the statute limited jurisdiction to "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." As the court in Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & observed: "More than a century has elapsed since the dictum without any intimation of Congressional dissatisfaction. Whatever Article III may or may not permit, we thus accept the dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congressional grant." Considerations of stare decisis have particular strength in this context, where "the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." When Congress amended the diversity statute in 948 to replace the law/equity distinction with the phrase "all civil actions," we presume Congress did so with full cognizance of the Court's nearly century-long interpretation of the prior statutes, which had construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain an exception for certain domestic relations matters. With respect to the 948 amendment, the Court has previously stated that "no changes of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed." Fourco Glass ; |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | to make such changes is clearly expressed." Fourco Glass ; see also With respect to such a longstanding and well-known construction of the diversity statute, and where Congress made substantive changes to the statute in other *70 respects, see 28 U.S. C. 332 note, we presume, absent any indication that Congress intended to alter this exception, see ibid.; Advisory Committee's Note 3 to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 555, that Congress "adopt[ed] that interpretation" when it reenacted the diversity statute. 434 U.S.[5] III In the more than 00 years since this Court laid the seeds for the development of the domestic relations exception, the lower federal courts have applied it in a variety of circumstances. See, e. g., cases cited in n. Many of these applications go well beyond the circumscribed situations posed by and its progeny. itself disclaimed federal jurisdiction over a narrow range of domestic relations issues involving the granting of a divorce and a decree of alimony, see 2 How., and stated the limits on federalcourt power to intervene prior to the rendering of such orders: "It is, that when a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties decrees a divorce, and alimony to the wife as its incident, and is unable of itself to enforce the decree summarily upon the husband, that courts of equity will interfere to prevent the decree from being defeated by fraud. The interference, however, is limited to cases in which alimony has been decreed; then only to the extent of what is due, and always to cases in which no appeal is pending from the decree for the divorce or for alimony." at 59. The Court thus did not intend to strip the federal courts of authority to hear cases arising from the domestic *702 relations of persons unless they seek the granting or modification of a divorce or alimony decree. The holding of the case itself sanctioned the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the enforcement of an alimony decree that had been properly obtained in a state court of competent jurisdiction. Contrary to the dissenters' position, the enforcement of such validly obtained orders does not "regulate the domestic relations of society" and produce an "inquisitorial authority" in which federal tribunals "enter the habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of private families, and inquire into and pronounce upon the morals and habits and affections or antipathies of the members of every household." And from the conclusion that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to issue divorce and alimony decrees, there was no |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | jurisdiction to issue divorce and alimony decrees, there was no dissent. See (noting that "[u]pon questions of settlement or of contract connected with marriages, the court of chancery will undertake the enforcement of such contracts, but does not decree alimony as such, and independently of such contracts"). See also 75 U. S., at 67 (stating that "[i]t may therefore be assumed as indubitable that the Circuit Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction, either of suits for divorce, or of claims for alimony, whether made in a suit for divorce, or by an original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such alimony in a state court"). Subsequently, this Court expanded the domestic relations exception to include decrees in child custody cases. In a child custody case brought pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus, for instance, the Court held void a writ issued by a Federal District Court to restore a child to the custody of the father. "As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to which neither the Congress of the United States nor any authority of the United States has any special jurisdiction." In re 36 U. S., at 594. *703 Although In re technically did not involve a construction of the diversity statute, as we understand to have done, its statement that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States," at has been interpreted by the federal courts to apply with equal vigor in suits brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. See, e. g., Bennett v. Bennett, 22 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93, 682 F.2d 039, 042 (982); 56 F.2d 08, 025 (CA3 975); 373 F.2d 36, 37 (CA2 967); see generally 3B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3609, pp. 477-479, nn. 28-32 (984). This application is consistent with `s directive to limit federal courts' exercise of diversity jurisdiction over suits for divorce and alimony decrees. See 2 How.,[6] We conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. Given the long passage of time without any expression of congressional dissatisfaction, we have no trouble today reaffirming the validity of the exception as it pertains to divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders. Not only is our |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | alimony decrees and child custody orders. Not only is our conclusion rooted in respect for this longheld understanding, it is also supported by sound policy considerations. Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves retention of jurisdiction by the court and *704 deployment of social workers to monitor compliance. As a matter of judicial economy, state courts are more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. Moreover, as a matter of judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the rule that federal courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the special proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half in handling issues that arise in the granting of such decrees. See (CA7 982). By concluding, as we do, that the domestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, we necessarily find that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the District Court's invocation of this exception. This lawsuit in no way seeks such a decree; rather, it alleges that respondents Richards and Kesler committed torts against L. R. and S. R., Ankenbrandt's children by Richards. Federal subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to 332 thus is proper in this case.[7] We now address whether, even though subjectmatter jurisdiction might be proper, sufficient grounds exist to warrant abstention from the exercise of that jurisdiction. IV The Court of Appeals, as did the District Court, stated abstention as an alternative ground for its holding. The District Court quoted another federal court to the effect that "`[a]bstention, that doctrine designed to promote federalstate comity, is required when to render a decision would *705 disrupt the establishment of a coherent state policy.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. A-6 (quoting 530 F. Supp. 83, (WD Pa. 980)). It is axiomatic, however, that "[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule." Colorado River Water Conservation 83 (976). Abstention rarely should be invoked, because the federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligationto exercise the jurisdiction given them." at 87. The courts below cited to support their holdings to abstain in this case. In so doing, the courts clearly erred. Younger itself held that, absent unusual circumstances, a federal court could not interfere with a pending state criminal prosecution. Though we have extended Younger abstention to the civil context, see, e. g., Middlesex County |
Justice White | 1,992 | 6 | majority | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | abstention to the civil context, see, e. g., Middlesex County Ethics (982); Ohio Civil Rights 477 U.S. 69 (986); Pennzoil 48 U.S. (987), we have never applied the notions of comity so critical to Younger `s "Our Federalism" when no state proceeding was pending nor any assertion of important state interests made. In this case, there is no allegation by respondents of any pending state proceedings, and Ankenbrandt contends that such proceedings ended prior to her filing this lawsuit. Absent any pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous. It is not inconceivable, however, that in certain circumstances, the abstention principles developed in 39 U.S. 35 might be relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody. This would be so when a case presents "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case *706 then at bar." Colorado River Water Conservation at 84. Such might well be the case if a federal suit were filed prior to effectuation of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, and the suit depended on a determination of the status of the parties. Where, as here, the status of the domestic relationship has been determined as a matter of state law, and in any event has no bearing on the underlying torts alleged, we have no difficulty concluding that Burford abstention is inappropriate in this case.[8] V We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the District Court's rulings to decline jurisdiction based on the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction and to abstain under the doctrine of The exception has no place in a suit such as this one, in which a former spouse sues another on behalf of children alleged to have been abused. Because the allegations in this complaint do not request the District Court to issue a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, we hold that the *707 suit is appropriate for the exercise of 332 jurisdiction given the existence of diverse citizenship between petitioner and respondents and the pleading of the relevant amount in controversy. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Alito | 2,008 | 8 | majority | MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145818/meadwestvaco-corp-v-illinois-department-of-revenue/ | The Due Process and Commerce Clauses forbid the States to tax "`extraterritorial values.'" Container of ; see also ; Mobil Oil A State may, however, tax an apportioned share of the value generated by the intrastate and extrastate activities of a multistate enterprise if those activities form part of a "`unitary business.'" ; Mobil Oil We have been asked in this case to decide whether the State of Illinois constitutionally taxed an apportioned share of the capital gain realized by an out-of-state corporation on the sale of one of its business divisions. The Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the tax and affirmed a judgment in the State's favor. Because we conclude that the state courts misapprehended the principles that we have developed for determining whether a multistate business is unitary, we vacate the decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois. I A Mead Corporation (Mead), an Ohio corporation, is the predecessor in interest and a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner MeadWestvaco Corporation. From its founding in 1846, Mead has been in the business of producing and selling paper, packaging, and school and office supplies.[1] In Mead paid $6 million to acquire a company called Data Corporation, which owned an inkjet printing technology and a full-text information retrieval system, the latter of which had originally been developed for the U.S. Air Force. Mead was interested in the inkjet printing technology because it would have complemented Mead's paper business, but the information retrieval system proved to be the more valuable asset. Over the course of many years, Mead developed that asset into the electronic research service now known as Lexis/Nexis (Lexis). In 1994, it sold Lexis to a third party for approximately $1.5 billion, realizing just over $1 billion in capital gain, which Mead used to repurchase stock, retire debt, and pay taxes. Mead did not report any of this gain as business income on its Illinois tax returns for 1994. It took the position that the gain qualified as nonbusiness income that should be allocated to Mead's domiciliary State, Ohio, under Illinois' Income Tax Act (ITA). See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, 5/303(a) (West 1994). The State audited Mead's returns and issued a notice of deficiency. *13 According to the State, the ITA required Mead to treat the capital gain as business income subject to apportionment by Illinois.[2] The State assessed Mead with approximately $4 million in additional tax and penalties. Mead paid that amount under protest and then filed this lawsuit in state court. The case was tried to the bench. Although the court admitted expert testimony, reports, and other |
Justice Alito | 2,008 | 8 | majority | MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145818/meadwestvaco-corp-v-illinois-department-of-revenue/ | bench. Although the court admitted expert testimony, reports, and other exhibits into evidence, see App. D to Pet. for Cert. 29a-34a, the parties' stipulations supplied most of the evidence of record regarding Mead's relationship with Lexis, see App. 9-20. We summarize those stipulations here. B Lexis was launched in 1973. For the first few years it was in business, it lost money, and Mead had to keep it afloat with additional capital contributions. By the late 1970's, as more attorneys began to use Lexis, the service finally turned a profit. That profit quickly became substantial. Between 1988 and 1993, Lexis made more than $800 million of the $3.8 billion in Illinois income that Mead reported. Lexis also accounted for $680 million of the $4.5 billion in business expense deductions that Mead claimed from Illinois during that period. Lexis was subject to Mead's oversight, but Mead did not manage its day-to-day affairs. Mead was headquartered in Ohio, while a separate management team ran Lexis out of its headquarters in Illinois. The two businesses maintained separate manufacturing, sales, and distribution facilities, as well as separate accounting, legal, human resources, credit and collections, purchasing, and marketing departments. Mead's involvement was generally limited to approving Lexis' annual business plan and any significant corporate transactions (such as capital expenditures, financings, mergers and acquisitions, or joint ventures) that Lexis wished to undertake. In at least one case, Mead procured new equipment for Lexis by purchasing the equipment for its own account and then leasing it to Lexis. Mead also managed Lexis' free cash, which was swept nightly from Lexis' bank accounts into an account maintained by Mead. The cash was reinvested in Lexis' business, but Mead decided how to invest it. Neither business was required to purchase goods or services from the other. Lexis, for example, was not required to purchase its paper supply from Mead, and indeed Lexis purchased most of its paper from other suppliers. Neither received any discount on goods or services purchased from the other, and neither was a significant customer of the other. *14 Lexis was incorporated as one of Mead's wholly owned subsidiaries until when it was merged into Mead and became one of Mead's divisions. Mead engineered the merger so that it could offset its income with Lexis' net operating loss carryforwards. Lexis was separately reincorporated in 1985 before being merged back into Mead in 1993. Once again, tax considerations motivated each transaction. Mead also treated Lexis as a unitary business in its consolidated Illinois returns for the years 1988 through 1994, though it did so at the State's |
Justice Alito | 2,008 | 8 | majority | MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145818/meadwestvaco-corp-v-illinois-department-of-revenue/ | 1988 through 1994, though it did so at the State's insistence and then only to avoid litigation. Lexis was listed as one of Mead's "business segment[s]" in at least some of its annual reports and regulatory filings. Mead described itself in those reports and filings as "engaged in the electronic publishing business" and touted itself as the "developer of the world's leading electronic information retrieval services for law, patents, accounting, finance, news and business information." ; App. D to Pet. for Cert. 38a. C Based on the stipulated facts and the other exhibits and expert testimony received into evidence, the Circuit Court of Cook County concluded that Lexis and Mead did not constitute a unitary business. The trial court reasoned that Lexis and Mead could not be unitary because they were not functionally integrated or centrally managed and enjoyed no economies of scale. at 35a-36a, 39a. The court nevertheless concluded that the State could tax an apportioned share of Mead's capital gain because Lexis served an "operational purpose" in Mead's business: "Lexis/Nexis was considered in the strategic planning of Mead, particularly in the allocation of resources. The operational purpose allowed Mead to limit the growth of Lexis/Nexis if only to limit its ability to expand or to contract through its control of its capital investment." at 38a-39a. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. Mead v. Department of Revenue, The court cited several factors as evidence that Lexis served an operational function in Mead's business: (1) Lexis was wholly owned by Mead; (2) Mead had exercised its control over Lexis in various ways, such as manipulating its corporate form, approving significant capital expenditures, and retaining tax benefits and control over Lexis' free cash; and (3) Mead had described itself in its annual reports and regulatory filings as engaged in electronic publishing and as the developer of the world's leading information retrieval service. See -1136. Because the court found that Lexis served an operational function in Mead's business, it did not address the question whether Mead and Lexis formed a unitary business. See The Supreme Court of Illinois denied review in January Mead v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, (Table). We granted certiorari. 551 U.S. II Petitioner contends that the trial court properly found that Lexis and Mead were not unitary and that the Appellate Court of Illinois erred in concluding that Lexis served an operational function in Mead's business. According to petitioner, the exception for apportionment of income from nonunitary businesses serving an operational function is a narrow one that does not reach a purely passive investment *15 such as Lexis. We |
Justice Alito | 2,008 | 8 | majority | MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145818/meadwestvaco-corp-v-illinois-department-of-revenue/ | reach a purely passive investment *15 such as Lexis. We perceive a more fundamental error in the state courts' reasoning. In our view, the state courts erred in considering whether Lexis served an "operational purpose" in Mead's business after determining that Lexis and Mead were not unitary. A The Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause impose distinct but parallel limitations on a State's power to tax out-of-state activities. See Quill v. North Dakota, ; Mobil Oil n. 4, (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Norfolk & Western R. The Due Process Clause demands that there exist "`some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,'" as well as a rational relationship between the tax and the "`"values connected with the taxing State."'" Quill and Moorman Mfg. ). The Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce or that burden it by subjecting activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation. See Container -171, The "broad inquiry" subsumed in both constitutional requirements is "`whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state'"that is, "`whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.'" ASARCO Where, as here, there is no dispute that the taxpayer has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax. Cf. (distinguishing Quill To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle. Under that principle, a State need not "isolate the intrastate income-producing activities from the rest of the business" but "may tax an apportioned sum of the corporation's multistate business if the business is unitary." ; accord, 528 U.S., at ; Exxon v. Department of Revenue of Wis., ; Mobil Oil ; cf. 1 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation ¶ 8.07[1], p. 8-61 (3d ed.-2005) (hereinafter Hellerstein & Hellerstein). The court must determine whether "intrastate and extrastate activities formed part of a single unitary business," Mobil Oil -439, or whether the out-of-state values that the State seeks to tax "`derive[d] from "unrelated business activity" which constitutes a "discrete business enterprise."'" (quoting Exxon at in turn quoting Mobil Oil (alteration in original)). We traced the history of this venerable principle in and, because it figures prominently in this case, we retrace it briefly here. *16 B With the coming of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, the United States witnessed the emergence of its first truly multistate business enterprises. These railroad, telegraph, and express companies |
Justice Alito | 2,008 | 8 | majority | MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145818/meadwestvaco-corp-v-illinois-department-of-revenue/ | truly multistate business enterprises. These railroad, telegraph, and express companies presented state taxing authorities with a novel problem: A State often cannot tax its fair share of the value of a multistate business by simply taxing the capital within its borders. The whole of the enterprise is generally more valuable than the sum of its parts; were it not, its owners would simply liquidate it and sell it off in pieces. As we observed in 1876, "[t]he track of the road is but one track from one end of it to the other, and, except in its use as one track, is of little value." State Railroad Tax The unitary business principle addressed this problem by shifting the constitutional inquiry from the niceties of geographic accounting to the determination of the taxpayer's business unit. If the value the State wished to tax derived from a "unitary business" operated within and without the State, the State could tax an apportioned share of the value of that business instead of isolating the value attributable to the operation of the business within the State. E.g., Exxon (citing Moorman Mfg. at ). Conversely, if the value the State wished to tax derived from a "discrete business enterprise," Mobil Oil 445 U.S., then the State could not tax even an apportioned share of that value. E.g., Container We recognized as early as 1876 that the Due Process Clause did not require the States to assess trackage "in each county where it lies according to its value there." State Railroad Tax 92 U.S., at We went so far as to opine that "[i]t may well be doubted whether any better mode of determining the value of that portion of the track within any one county has been devised than to ascertain the value of the whole road, and apportion the value within the county by its relative length to the whole." We generalized the rule of the State Railroad Tax in Adams Express v. Ohio, State Auditor, There we held that apportionment could permissibly be applied to a multistate business lacking the "physical unity" of wires or rails but exhibiting the "same unity in the use of the entire property for the specific purpose," with "the same elements of value arising from such use." We extended the reach of the unitary business principle further still in later cases, when we relied on it to justify the taxation by apportionment of net income, dividends, capital gain, and other intangibles. See Underwood Typewriter v. Chamberlain, ; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, ; J.C. Penney (tax on the "privilege of |
Justice Alito | 2,008 | 8 | majority | MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145818/meadwestvaco-corp-v-illinois-department-of-revenue/ | & Gretton, ; J.C. Penney (tax on the "privilege of declaring dividends"); cf. ("[F]or constitutional purposes capital gains should be treated as no different from dividends"); see also 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein ¶ 8.07[1] (summarizing this history). As the unitary business principle has evolved in step with American enterprise, courts have sometimes found it difficult to identify exactly when a business is unitary. We confronted this problem most recently in The taxpayer there, a multistate enterprise, had realized capital gain on the disposition of its minority investment *17 in another business. The parties' stipulation left little doubt that the taxpayer and its investee were not unitary. See (observing that "the question whether the business can be called `unitary' is all but controlled by the terms of a stipulation"). The record revealed, however, that the taxpayer had used the proceeds from the liquidated investment in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to purchase a new asset that would have been used in its unitary business. See at 776-, From that wrinkle in the record, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the taxpayer's minority interest had represented nothing more than a temporary investment of working capital awaiting deployment in the taxpayer's unitary business. See Bendix v. Director, Div. of Taxation, The State went even further. It argued that, because there could be "no logical distinction between short-term investment of working capital, which all concede is apportionable, and all other investments," the unitary business principle was outdated and should be We rejected both contentions. We concluded that "the unitary business principle is not so inflexible that as new methods of finance and new forms of business evolve it cannot be modified or supplemented where appropriate." ; see also ("If lower courts have reached divergent results in applying the unitary business principle to different factual circumstances, that is because, as we have said, any number of variations on the unitary business theme `are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach'" (quoting Container )).[3] We explained that situations could occur in which apportionment might be constitutional even though "the payee and the payor [were] not engaged in the same unitary business." It was in that context that we observed that an asset could form part of a taxpayer's unitary business if it served an "operational rather than an investment function" in that business. "Hence, for example, a State may include within the apportionable income of a nondomiciliary corporation the interest earned on short-term deposits in a bank located in another State if that income forms part of the working capital of the corporation's unitary |
Justice Alito | 2,008 | 8 | majority | MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145818/meadwestvaco-corp-v-illinois-department-of-revenue/ | forms part of the working capital of the corporation's unitary business, notwithstanding the absence of a unitary relationship between the corporation and the bank." We observed that we had made the same point in Container where we noted that "capital transactions can serve either an investment function or an operational function." n. 19, ; cf. Corn Products Refining v. Commissioner, cited in Container C As the foregoing history confirms, our references to "operational function" in *18 Container and were not intended to modify the unitary business principle by adding a new ground for apportionment. The concept of operational function simply recognizes that an asset can be a part of a taxpayer's unitary business even if what we may term a "unitary relationship" does not exist between the "payor and payee." See (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles: and Beyond, 48 Tax L.Rev. 739, 790 (1993) (hereinafter Hellerstein). In the example given in the taxpayer was not unitary with its banker, but the taxpayer's deposits (which represented working capital and thus operational assets) were clearly unitary with the taxpayer's business. In Corn Products, the taxpayer was not unitary with the counterparty to its hedge, but the taxpayer's futures contracts (which served to hedge against the risk of an increase in the price of a key cost input) were likewise clearly unitary with the taxpayer's business. In each case, the "payor" was not a unitary part of the taxpayer's business, but the relevant asset was. The conclusion that the asset served an operational function was merely instrumental to the constitutionally relevant conclusion that the asset was a unitary part of the business being conducted in the taxing State rather than a discrete asset to which the State had no claim. Our decisions in Container and did not announce a new ground for the constitutional apportionment of extrastate values in the absence of a unitary business. Because the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted those decisions to the contrary, it erred. Where, as here, the asset in question is another business, we have described the "hallmarks" of a unitary relationship as functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale. See Mobil Oil 445 U.S., ); see also ; Container ; F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of N.M., The trial court found each of these hallmarks lacking and concluded that Lexis was not a unitary part of Mead's business. The appellate court, however, made no such determination. Relying on its operational function test, it reserved judgment on whether Mead and Lexis formed a unitary business. The appellate court |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.