author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109705/united-airlines-inc-v-mcdonald/ | did not satisfy the numerosity requirement of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (a) (1).[3] As part of its order, however, the District Court allowed 12 married stewardesses who had protested the termination of their employment to intervene as additional parties plaintiff. Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1292 (b), the District Court certified for appeal its order striking the class allegations, but the Court of Appeals declined to accept this interlocutory appeal.[4] *389 The litigation proceeded as a joint suit on behalf of the original and the intervening plaintiffs, and the court ultimately determined that those plaintiffs not yet reinstated in their jobs were entitled to that remedy, and that every plaintiff was entitled to backpay. To aid in determining the amount of each backpay award, the court appointed as a Special Master the same person who had performed a similar task in the Sprogis litigation.[5] Following guidelines adopted in Sprogis, the parties eventually agreed upon the amounts to be awarded each plaintiff, and upon consummation of this agreement the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on October 3, 1975. The specific controversy before us arose only after the entry of that judgment. The respondent, a former United stewardess, had been discharged in 1968 on account of the no-marriage rule. She was thus a putative member of the class as defined in the original Romasanta complaint. Knowing that other stewardesses had challenged United's no-marriage rule, she had not filed charges with the EEOC or a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement.[6] *390 After learning that a final judgment had been entered in the Romasanta suit, and that despite their earlier attempt to do so the plaintiffs did not now intend to file an appeal challenging the District Court's denial of class certification, she filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the District Court's adverse class determination order. Her motion was filed 18 days after the District Court's final judgment, and thus was well within the 30-day period for an appeal to be taken.[7] The District Judge denied the motion, stating: "Well, in my judgment, gentlemen, this is five years now this has been in litigation, and this lady has not seen fit to come in here and seek any relief from this Court in any way during that period of time, and litigation must end. I must deny this motion. Of course, that is an appealable order itself, and if I am in error then the Court of Appeals can reverse me and we will grant a hearing, but in my judgment this is too late to come |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109705/united-airlines-inc-v-mcdonald/ | but in my judgment this is too late to come in." The respondent promptly appealed the denial of intervention as well as the denial of class certification to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed, holding that the District Court had been wrong in believing that the motion to intervene was untimely under Rule 24 (b),[8] and had also erred in refusing to certify the class as described in the Romasanta complainta class consisting of all United stewardesses discharged because of the no-marriage rule, whether or not they had formally protested the termination of their employment. *391 United's petition for certiorari did not seek review of the determination that its no-marriage rule violated Title VII, nor did it contest the merits of the Court of Appeals' decision on the class certification issue. Instead, it challenged only the Court of Appeals' ruling that the respondent's post-judgment application for intervention was timely. We granted the petition, to consider that single issue. In urging reversal, United relies primarily upon American & Construction That case involved a private antitrust class action that had been filed 11 days short of the expiration of the statutory limitations period.[9] The trial court later denied class certification because the purported class did not satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 (a) (1).[10] Neither the named plaintiffs nor any unnamed member of the class appealed that order, either then or at any later time. Eight days after entry of the order, a number of the putative class members moved to intervene as plaintiffs, but the trial court denied the motions as untimely. This Court ultimately reversed that decision, ruling that in those circumstances "the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status." Since 11 days remained when the statute of limitations again began to run after denial of class certification, and the motions to intervene as plaintiffs were filed only eight days after that denial, they were timely. It is United's position that, under American the relevant statute of limitations began to run after the denial of class certification in the Romasanta action. United thus reasons that the respondent's motion to intervene was time barred, and in support of this position makes alternative *392 arguments based on two different statutory periods of limitations prescribed by Title VII.[11] This argument might be persuasive if the respondent had sought to intervene in order to join the named |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109705/united-airlines-inc-v-mcdonald/ | had sought to intervene in order to join the named plaintiffs in litigating her individual claim based on the illegality of United's no-marriage rule, for she then would have occupied the same position as the intervenors in American But the later motion to intervene in this case was for a wholly different purpose. That purpose was to obtain appellate review of the District Court's order denying class action status in the Romasanta lawsuit,[12] and the motion complied with, as it was required to, the time limitation for lodging an appeal prescribed by Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4 (a). Success in that review would result in the certification of a class, the named members of which had complied with the statute of limitations; the respondent is a member of that class against whom the statute had not run at the time the class action was commenced. The lawsuit had been commenced by the timely filing of a complaint for classwide relief, providing United with "the essential information necessary to determine both the subject *393 matter and size of the prospective litigation" American[13] To be sure, the case was "stripped of its character as a class action" upon denial of certification by the District Court. Advisory Committee's Note on 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 7767. But "it does not follow that the case must be treated as if there never was an action brought on behalf of absent class members." Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F. R. D. 452, 461 (ED Pa.). The District Court's refusal to certify was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs, as United concedes.[14] And since the named *394 plaintiffs had attempted to take an interlocutory appeal from the order of denial at the time the order was entered, there was no reason for the respondent to suppose that they would not later take an appeal until she was advised to the contrary after the trial court had entered its final judgment. The critical fact here is that once the entry of final judgment made the adverse class determination appealable, the respondent quickly sought to enter the litigation. In short, as soon as it became clear to the respondent that the interests of the unnamed class members would no longer be protected by the named class representatives, she promptly moved to intervene to protect those interests.[15] United can hardly contend that its ability to litigate the issue was unfairly prejudiced simply because an appeal on behalf of putative class members was |
Justice Stewart | 1,977 | 18 | majority | United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109705/united-airlines-inc-v-mcdonald/ | because an appeal on behalf of putative class members was brought by one of their own, rather than by one of the original named plaintiffs. And it would be circular to argue that an unnamed member of the *395 putative class was not a proper party to appeal, on the ground that her interests had been adversely determined in the trial court. United was put on notice by the filing of the Romasanta complaint of the possibility of classwide liability, and there is no reason why Mrs. McDonald's pursuit of that claim should not be considered timely under the circumstances here presented. Our conclusion is consistent with several decisions of the federal courts permitting post-judgment intervention for the purpose of appeal.[16] The critical inquiry in every such case *396 is whether in view of all the circumstances the intervenor acted promptly after the entry of final judgment. Cf. Here, the respondent filed her motion within the time period in which the named plaintiffs could have taken an appeal. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the respondent's motion to intervene was timely filed and should have been granted. The judgment is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | California v. Arizona | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110018/california-v-arizona/ | Since the admission of California to the Union in 1850, the southeastern boundary of the State has been the middle of the channel of the Colorado River. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat 452. Neither the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 nor the admission of Arizona to statehood in 1912 changed the location of this 229-mile border. The location of the river did change, however, from causes both natural and artificial. These shifts created confusion about the location of the political boundary between California and Arizona. This problem was resolved through an interstate compact, ratified by the Congress in 16.[1] The Compact fixed the boundary by stations of longitude and latitude, divorced from the continuing shifts of the Colorado River. California has taken the position, however, that the Compact settled only questions of political jurisdiction, not questions of ownership of real property, since, under the "equal-footing doctrine," California holds title to all lands beneath the navigable waters within its boundaries at the time of its admission to the Union. Pollard's See Oregon ex rel. State Land In the early 1970's the California State Lands Commission made a study of a stretch of 11.3 miles along the river to determine what land California owns. Both Arizona and the United States have a direct interest in such a determination. Arizona, of course, has the same rights under the equal-footing doctrine as does California. The United States is the principal riparian owner in this region, and determination of the width and location of the old riverbed thus will necessarily affect its *61 property interests. California has presented the determinations of its Lands Commission to both Arizona and the United States; neither has acquiesced in the Commission's conclusions. California seeks to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction in this suit to quiet title to the lands it claims, and thus resolve its dispute with Arizona and the United States.[2] To sue Arizona, it relies on 28 U.S. C. 1251 (a), which confers on this Court "original and exclusive jurisdiction of [a]ll controversies between two or more States." To sue the United States, it relies on 28 U.S. C. 1251 (b), which confers on this Court "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of [a]ll controversies between the United States and a State." Both these heads of original jurisdiction find their source in Art. III, 2, of the Constitution: "In all Cases in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." It is undisputed that both Arizona and the United States are indispensable parties to this litigation, and it is California's need to |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | California v. Arizona | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110018/california-v-arizona/ | parties to this litigation, and it is California's need to sue both Arizona and the United States that creates the problem before us. Specifically, Arizona and the United States contend that the United States has not agreed to be a defendant in a quiet-title action in this Court Yet this is the only federal court in which California can sue Arizona, because Congress has conferred upon it "original and exclusive jurisdiction" (emphasis added) over controversies between States. 28 U.S. C. 1251 (a) (1). It is settled that the United States must give its consent to be sued even when one of the States invokes this Court's original jurisdiction: "It does not follow that because a State may be sued by the United States without its consent, therefore the * United States may be sued by a State without its consent. Public policy forbids that conclusion." See ; (dicta). But cf. United Yet the Court has recognized that an action in equity cannot be maintained without the joinder of indispensable ; Thus, if the United States has not consented to be sued in an action such as this, California's motion for leave to file a complaint must be denied. "A bill of complaint will not be entertained which, if filed, could only be dismissed because of the absence of the United States as a party." Arizona v. California, 298 U. S. *63 558, 572. See ; but see (Taney, C. J.). The suit, then, could not be maintained in any court. This Court could not hear the claims against the United States because it has not waived its sovereign immunity, and a district court could not hear the claims against Arizona, because this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. To resolve this asserted dilemma, the Solicitor General has made an undertaking on behalf of the United States. He has agreed that, if California is granted leave to file its complaint in this Court against Arizona, the United States will intervene with respect to the controversy over part of the area in question.[4] Because, however, we have concluded that the United States has already waived its sovereign immunity to suit in this case, we need not assess the wisdom or validity of the Solicitor General's suggestion. In 1972 Congress passed Stat. 1176. The Act made two relevant changes in Title 28 of the United States Code.[5] First, it created a new 2409a.[6] Subsection (a) of this new section provides: "The United States may be named as a party defendant *64 in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | California v. Arizona | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110018/california-v-arizona/ | a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights." The remainder of the section defines the procedures to be followed in such suits. Second, the Congress amended 28 U.S. C. 1346 to add a new subsection (f). That subsection provides: "The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction *65 of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States." It is thus clear that the United States has waived its immunity to suit in actions brought against it to quiet title to land. The question is whether suits brought under that waiver may be heard in this Court. The Solicitor General argues that they may not, that 1346 (f) operates both to confer original jurisdiction over such a case on the federal district courts and simultaneously to withdraw the original jurisdiction of this Court. If this contention were accepted, a grave constitutional question would immediately arise. That question, quite simply, is whether Congress can deprive this Court of original jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred not by the Congress but by the Constitution itself. This jurisdiction is self-executing, and needs no legislative implementation. ; ; It is clear, of course, that Congress could refuse to waive the Nation's sovereign immunity in all cases or only in some cases but in all courts. Either action would bind this Court even in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. It is similarly clear that the original jurisdiction of this Court is not constitutionally exclusivethat other courts can be awarded concurrent jurisdiction by statute. ; But once Congress has waived the Nation's sovereign immunity, it is far from clear that it can withdraw the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court over such suits. The constitutional grant to this Court of original jurisdiction is limited to cases involving the States and the envoys of foreign nations. The Framers seem to have been concerned *66 with matching the dignity of the parties to the status of the court: "The evident purpose [of the grant of original jurisdiction] was to open and keep open the highest court of the nation for the determination, in the first instance, of suits involving a State or a diplomatic or commercial representative of a foreign government. So much was due to the rank and dignity of those for whom the provision was made" See |
Justice Stewart | 1,979 | 18 | majority | California v. Arizona | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110018/california-v-arizona/ | dignity of those for whom the provision was made" See The Federalist No. 81, pp. 507-509 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). Elimination of this Court's original jurisdiction would require those sovereign parties to go to another court, in derogation of this constitutional purpose. Congress has broad powers over the jurisdiction of the federal courts and over the sovereign immunity of the United States but it is extremely doubtful that they include the power to limit in this manner the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution. Happily, we need not decide this constitutional question, for the statute in question can readily be construed in such a way as to obviate it. In so construing the statute, we no more than follow the long practice of the Court to forgo the resolution of constitutional issues except when absolutely necessary. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." The legislative history of 1346 (f) is sparse, but the intent of Congress seems reasonably clear. The congressional purpose was simply to confine jurisdiction to the federal courts and to exclude the courts of the States, which otherwise might be presumed to have jurisdiction over quiet-title suits against the United States, once its sovereign immunity had been *67 waived. Charles Dowd Box ;[7] The legislative history shows no intention to divest this Court of jurisdiction over quiet-title actions against the United States in cases otherwise within our original jurisdiction. We find, therefore, *68 that 1346 (f), by vesting "exclusive original jurisdiction" of quiet-title actions against the United States in the federal district courts, did no more than assure that such jurisdiction was not conferred upon the courts of any State. For these reasons we conclude that there is no bar to this original suit in the Supreme Court between California as plaintiff, and Arizona and the United States as defendants.[8] Accordingly, the motion of California for leave to file its complaint is granted, and the defendants are allowed 45 days in which to answer or otherwise respond. It is so ordered. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | dissenting | United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camden | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111097/united-building-constr-trades-council-of-camden-cty-v-mayor-and/ | For over a century the underlying meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution's Article *224 IV[1] has been regarded as settled: at least absent some substantial, noninvidious justification, a State may not discriminate between its own residents and residents of other States on the basis of state citizenship.[2] See generally ; ; ; Slaughter-House ; Today, however, the Court casually extends the scope of the Clause by holding that it applies to laws that discriminate among state residents on the basis of municipal residence, simply because discrimination on the basis of municipal residence disadvantages citizens of other States "ipso facto." Ante, at 216-217. This novel interpretation arrives accompanied by little practical justification and no historical or textual support whatsoever. Because I believe that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not intended to apply to the kind of municipal discrimination presented by this case, I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.[3] I The historical underpinnings of the Privileges and Immunities Clause are not in serious dispute. The Clause was derived from the fourth Article of Confederation[4] and was *225 designed to carry forward that provision's prescription of interstate comity. ; United ; Slaughter-House Both the text of the Clause and the historical record confirm that the Framers meant to foreclose any one State from denying citizens of other States the same "privileges and immunities" accorded its own citizens. See 420 U. S., at James Madison complained during the Constitutional Convention of "Acts of Virga. & Maryland which give a preference to their own citizens in cases where the Citizens [of other States] are entitled to equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation."[5] Alexander Hamilton, who deemed the Privileges and Immunities Clause "the basis of the Union," The Federalist No. 80, p. 502 (B. Wright ed. 1961), expressly linked the Clause with the concern over state parochialism that gave rise to the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction under Article III: "[I]n order to [ensure] the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial *226 between the different States and their citizens" While the Framers thus conceived of the Privileges and Immunities |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | dissenting | United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camden | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111097/united-building-constr-trades-council-of-camden-cty-v-mayor-and/ | While the Framers thus conceived of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as an instrument for frustrating discrimination based on state citizenship, there is no evidence of any sort that they were concerned by intrastate discrimination based on municipal residence. The most obvious reason for this is also the most simple one: by the time the Constitution was enacted, such discrimination was rarely practiced and even more rarely successful.[6] Even had attempts to practice the kind of economic localism at issue here been more widespread, moreover, there is little reason to believe that the Framers would have devoted their limited institutional resources to bringing such conduct within the ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Whatever the weaknesses of the new state governments in suppressing sectional conflicts that gave rise to outright physical violence, like Shays' Rebellion in 1786-1787, the States had more than adequate powers to prevent localities from disrupting the States' internal economic affairs through discriminatory ordinances and regulations. By the time the Constitution was adopted, most state legislatures had assumed the power to grant and alter municipal charters and the power to legislate with respect to municipal affairs.[7] Even before the Revolution, the colonial legislatures had shown themselves willing and able to exercise this authority to override local protectionist ordinances. In 1746, for example, the New York Assembly dismantled a cartel of New York City lawyers by requiring the city to open its Mayor's Court to qualified lawyers from *227 throughout the colony.[8] As a result, the Framers had every reason to believe that intrastate discrimination based on municipal residence could and would be dealt with by the States themselves in those instances where it persisted.[9] In light of the historical context in which the Privileges and Immunities Clause was adopted, it hardly is surprising that none of this Court's intervening decisions has suggested that the Clause applies to discrimination on the basis of municipal residence. To the contrary, while the Court never has addressed the question directly,[10] it repeatedly has proceeded on the assumption that the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens" to which the Clause refers are entitlements held equally by all citizens of a State. Thus, in *228 the Court stated that the Clause safeguards the enjoyment of "those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens [in a State] under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens." 8 Wall., at In the Court condemned a Tennessee statute that granted a priority to resident creditors over nonresident creditors on the assumption that the State's rules governing debtor-creditor relations "will be applied by |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | dissenting | United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camden | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111097/united-building-constr-trades-council-of-camden-cty-v-mayor-and/ | the State's rules governing debtor-creditor relations "will be applied by its courts in all appropriate cases between citizens of that State, without making any distinction between them." In Travellers' Insurance the Court rejected a Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge to a Connecticut statute that taxed nonresident stockholders at a nominally higher rate than resident stockholders, on the ground that the direct differential was roughly offset by municipal taxes paid only by residents. The Court recognized that the burden borne by nonresidents might exceed that borne by residents in a particular year, but pointed out that "a like inequality will exist between residents of different localities in the State by reason of the different rates of taxation in those localities"; the disparate burden was permissible under these circumstances because "[y]ou cannot put one resident against one non-resident stockholder and by a comparison of their different burdens determine the validity of the legislation any more than you can place a stockholder resident in one municipality over against a stockholder resident in another municipality, and by comparison of their different burdens determine the validity of the tax law in respect to resident stockholders." In each case, the underlying assumption has been that the constitutionality vel non of a particular statute under the Privileges and Immunities Clause turns on whether the statute deprives nonresidents of benefits enjoyed in common by state residents by virtue of their residence simpliciter. Indeed, I had understood the Court to have reaffirmed this principle only two Terms ago in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. *229 55 (1982). In Zobel, the Court held that an Alaska statute which allocated state treasury refunds to state residents on the basis of the length of their residence violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court declined, however, to hold that the statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. It observed that the statute "does not simply make distinctions between native-born Alaskans and those who migrate to Alaska from other states;" instead, it "also discriminates among long-time residents and even native-born residents." n. 5. As a result: "The statute does not involve the kind of discrimination which the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV was designed to prevent. That Clause `was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.' The Clause is thus not applicable to this case." I am somewhat at a loss to understand how the Court's decision today can be reconciled with its reasoning in Zobel.[11] The Alaska statute at issue in Zobel fell |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | dissenting | United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camden | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111097/united-building-constr-trades-council-of-camden-cty-v-mayor-and/ | in Zobel.[11] The Alaska statute at issue in Zobel fell outside the scope of *230 the Privileges and Immunities Clause for the elementary reason that it did not discriminate between state residents and nonresidents on the basis of state residence; rather, it discriminated among state residents in a way that disadvantaged nonresidents as well but did not thereby implicate the underlying concerns of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Camden ordinance presently before the Court occupies precisely the same position. The Court's decision clashes with other Privileges and Immunities Clause precedents as well. The Court recognizes, as it must, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not afford state residents any protection against their own State's laws. See, e. g., ; Slaughter-House 16 Wall., at When this settled rule is combined with the Court's newly fashioned rule concerning municipal discrimination, however, it has the perverse effect of vesting non-New Jersey residents with constitutional privileges that are not enjoyed by most New Jersey residents themselves. This result is directly contrary to the Court's longstanding position that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not give nonresidents "higher and greater privileges than are enjoyed by the citizens of the state itself." Bank of ; accord, ; When judicial alchemy transmutes gold into lead in this fashion, it is time for the Court to reexamine its reasoning. Finally, the Court fails to attend to the functional considerations that underlie the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Clause has been a necessary limitation on state autonomy not simply because of the self-interest of individual States, but because state parochialism is likely to go un-checked by state political processes when those who are disadvantaged are by definition disenfranchised as well. The Clause remedies this breakdown in the representative process by requiring state residents to bear the same burdens that they choose to place on nonresidents; "by constitutionally *231 tying the fate of outsiders to the fate of those possessing political power, the framers insured that their interests would be well looked after." J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 83 (1980). As a practical matter, therefore, the scope of the Clause may be measured by asking whether failure to link the interests of those who are disadvantaged with the interests of those who are preferred will consign the former group to "the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation." 334 U. S., at ; see Contrary to the Court's tacit assumption, discrimination on the basis of municipal residence is substantially different in this regard from discrimination on the basis of state citizenship. The distinction is simple but |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | dissenting | United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camden | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111097/united-building-constr-trades-council-of-camden-cty-v-mayor-and/ | the basis of state citizenship. The distinction is simple but fundamental: discrimination on the basis of municipal residence penalizes persons within the State's political community as well as those without. The Court itself points out that while New Jersey citizens who reside outside Camden are not protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, they may resort to the State's political processes to protect themselves. Ante, at 217. What the Court fails to appreciate is that this avenue of relief for New Jersey residents works to protect residents of other States as well; disadvantaged state residents who turn to the state legislature to displace ordinances like Camden's further the interests of nonresidents as well as their own.[12]*232 Nor is this mechanism for relief merely a theoretical one; in the past decade several States, including California and Georgia, have repealed or forbidden protectionist ordinances like the one at issue here.[13] In short, discrimination on the basis of municipal residence simply does not consign residents of other States, in the words of Toomer, to "the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official retaliation." The Court thus has applied the Privileges and Immunities Clause without regard for the political ills that it was designed to cure.[14] *233 It still might be possible to redeem the Court's decision if it were compelled by the language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court itself, however, concedes that its interpretation of the Clause does not attach readily to a constitutional provision phrased solely in terms of state citizenship. Ante, at 216. The Court seeks to defend its excursion beyond the frontiers of the constitutional language on the ground that it never has read the Privileges and Immunities Clause literally to apply only to classifications based on state citizenship. The examples it cites, however, are hardly compelling support. held not that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies ex proprio vigore to discrimination by a territorial legislature based on territorial residence, but rather that Congress had made the Privileges and Immunities Clause applicable to the Territory of Alaska by statute. See -420.[15] See also Even if set forth the proposition for which it is cited, moreover, the practical similarity between discrimination based on territorial residence and discrimination based on state residence has no parallel here. Similarly, while the Court unquestionably has come to treat the terms "citizen" and "resident" in this area as "essentially interchangeable," n. 8, it has done so not out of a general disregard for the Constitution's language, but rather because the practical relationship between residence and citizenship is close enough that discrimination on |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | dissenting | United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camden | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111097/united-building-constr-trades-council-of-camden-cty-v-mayor-and/ | between residence and citizenship is close enough that discrimination on the basis of the one criterion effectively amounts to discrimination based on the other. Cf. ; Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 Yale L. J. 1323, 1344 (1960). These decisions are not, therefore, license for the Court to set aside the language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as an inconvenient obstacle to a preferred result. Whenever this Court has departed from the literal language of the Clause in the past, it has remained faithful to the underlying purposes of the Clause. For the reasons already set forth, I believe that the Court's decision today does not satisfy that requirement. II Needless to say, my view of the constitutional question in this case does not depend on my personal opinion about the desirability of the course on which Camden has embarked. I do not find "beggar thy neighbor" economic policies any more *235 attractive when practiced by municipalities than when practiced by States or nations. The unedifying sight of localities fighting for parochial gain at one another's expense gives new urgency to Benjamin Franklin's reputed warning that "we must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately." R. Clark, Benjamin Franklin 286 (1983). At the risk of restating the obvious, however, the issue before us is not the desirability of the ordinance but its constitutionality more particularly, its constitutionality under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.[16] Because I believe that the Clause does not apply to discrimination based on municipal residence, I dissent. |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioner was tried "in violation of constitutional provisions guaranteeing the defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of persons representing a fair cross section of the community." Pet. for Cert. i. I Today the Court sets aside the peremptory challenge, a procedure which has been part of the common law for many centuries and part of our jury system for nearly 200 years. It does so on the basis of a constitutional argument that was rejected, without a single dissent, in Reversal of such settled principles would be unusual enough on its own terms, for only three years ago we said that "stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." What makes today's holding truly extraordinary is that it is based on a constitutional argument that the petitioner has expressly declined to raise, both in this Court and in the Supreme Court of Kentucky. In the Kentucky Supreme Court, petitioner disclaimed specifically any reliance on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pressing instead only a claim based on the Sixth Amendment. See Brief for Appellant 14 and Reply Brief for Appellant 1 in No. 84-SC-733-MR (Ky.). As petitioner explained at oral argument here: "We have not made an equal protection claim. We have not made a specific argument in the briefs that have been filed either in the Supreme Court of Kentucky or in this Court saying that we are attacking as such." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. Petitioner has not suggested any barrier prevented raising an equal protection claim in the Kentucky courts. In such circumstances, review of an equal protection argument is improper *113 in this Court: " `The Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional issues raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions' " ). Neither the Court nor JUSTICE STEVENS offers any justification for departing from this time-honored principle, which dates to and Even if the equal protection issue had been pressed in the Kentucky Supreme Court, it has surely not been pressed here. This provides an additional and completely separate procedural novelty to today's decision. Petitioner's "question presented" involved only the "constitutional provisions guaranteeing the defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of persons representing a fair cross section of the community." Pet. for Cert. i. These provisions are found in the Sixth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment relied upon by the Court. In his brief |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | Fourteenth Amendment relied upon by the Court. In his brief on the merits, under a heading distinguishing equal protection cases, petitioner noted "the irrelevance of the analysis to the present case," Brief for Petitioner 11; instead petitioner relied solely on Sixth Amendment analysis found in cases such as During oral argument, counsel for petitioner was pointedly asked: "QUESTION: Mr. Niehaus, was an equal protection challenge, was it not? "MR. NIEHAUS: Yes. "QUESTION: Your claim here is based solely on the Sixth Amendment? "MR. NIEHAUS: Yes. "QUESTION: Is that correct? "MR. NIEHAUS: That is what we are arguing, yes. *114 "QUESTION: You are not asking for a reconsideration of and you are making no equal protection claim here. Is that correct? "MR. NIEHAUS: We have not made an equal protection claim. I think that will have to be reconsidered to a certain extent if only to consider the arguments that are made on behalf of affirmance by the respondent and the solicitor general. "MR. NIEHAUS: We have not made a specific argument in the briefs that have been filed either in the Supreme Court of Kentucky or in this Court saying that we are attacking as such." Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7. A short time later, after discussing the difficulties attendant with a Sixth Amendment claim, the following colloquy occurred: "QUESTION: So I come back again to my question why you didn't attack head on, but I take it if the Court were to overrule you wouldn't like that result. "MR. NIEHAUS: Simply overrule without adopting the remedy? "QUESTION: Yes. "MR. NIEHAUS: I do not think that would give us much comfort, Your Honor, no. "QUESTION: That is a concession." Later, petitioner's counsel refused to answer the Court's questions concerning the implications of a holding based on equal protection concerns: "MR. NIEHAUS: [T]here is no state action involved where the defendant is exercising his peremptory challenge. *115 "QUESTION: But there might be under an equal protection challenge if it is the state system that allows that kind of a strike. "MR. NIEHAUS: I believe that is possible. I am really not prepared to answer that specific question." In reaching the equal protection issue despite petitioner's clear refusal to present it, the Court departs dramatically from its normal procedure without any explanation. When we granted certiorari, we could have as we sometimes do directed the parties to brief the equal protection question in addition to the Sixth Amendment question. See, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre ;[1] Even following oral argument, we could have as we sometimes do directed |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | we could have as we sometimes do directed reargument on this particular question. See, e. g., ; New[2] This step is particularly appropriate where reexamination *116 of a prior decision is under consideration. See, e. g., ; Alfred Dunhill of London, Alternatively, we could have simply dismissed this petition as improvidently granted. The Court today rejects these accepted courses of action, choosing instead to reverse a 21-year-old unanimous constitutional holding of this Court on the basis of constitutional arguments expressly disclaimed by petitioner. The only explanation for this action is found in JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence. JUSTICE STEVENS apparently believes that this issue is properly before the Court because "the party defending the judgment has explicitly rested on the issue in question as a controlling basis for affirmance." Ante, 9. Cf. 459 U. S., 29, n. 1 ("[T]here is no impediment to presenting a new argument as an alternative basis for affirming the decision below") (emphasis in original). To be sure, respondent and supporting amici did cite and the Equal Protection Clause. But their arguments were largely limited to explaining *117 that placed a negative gloss on the Sixth Amendment claim actually raised by petitioner. In any event, it is a strange jurisprudence that looks to the arguments made by respondent to determine the breadth of the questions presented for our review by petitioner. Of course, such a view is directly at odds with our Rule 21.1(a), which provides that "[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court." JUSTICE STEVENS does not cite, and I am not aware of, any case in this Court's nearly 200-year history where the alternative grounds urged by respondent to affirm a judgment were then seized upon to permit petitioner to obtain relief from that very judgment despite petitioner's failure to urge that ground. JUSTICE STEVENS also observes that several amici curiae address the equal protection argument. Ante, 9-110, and n. 3. But I thought it well settled that, even if a "point is made in an amicus curiae brief," if the claim "has never been advanced by petitioners we have no reason to pass upon it." When objections to peremptory challenges were brought to this Court three years ago, JUSTICE STEVENS agreed with JUSTICE MARSHALL that the challenge involved "a significant and recurring question of constitutional law." referred to with approval, Nonetheless, JUSTICE STEVENS wrote that the issue could be dealt with "more wisely at a later date." The same conditions exist here today. JUSTICE STEVENS concedes that reargument of this case "might |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | today. JUSTICE STEVENS concedes that reargument of this case "might enable some of us to have a better informed view of a problem that has been percolating in the courts for several years." Ante, at 110. Thus, at bottom his position is that we should overrule an extremely important prior constitutional decision of this Court on a claim not advanced here, even though briefing and oral *118 argument on this claim might convince us to do otherwise.[3] I believe that "[d]ecisions made in this manner are unlikely to withstand the test of time." United Before contemplating such a holding, I would at least direct reargument and briefing on the issue of whether the equal protection holding in should be reconsidered. II Because the Court nonetheless chooses to decide this case on the equal protection grounds not presented, it may be useful to discuss this issue as well. The Court acknowledges, albeit in a footnote, the " `very old credentials' " of the peremptory challenge and the " `widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury.' " Ante, at 91, n. 15 (quoting ). But proper resolution of this case requires more than a nodding reference to the purpose of the challenge. Long ago it was *119 recognized that "[t]he right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing perfect fairness and impartiality in a trial." W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 175 (1852). The peremptory challenge has been in use without scrutiny into its basis for nearly as long as juries have existed. "It was in use amongst the Romans in criminal cases, and the Lex Servilia (B. C. 104) enacted that the accuser and the accused should severally propose one hundred judices, and that each might reject fifty from the list of the other, so that one hundred would remain to try the alleged crime." Ibid.; see also J. Pettingal, An Enquiry into the Use and Practice of Juries Among the Greeks and Romans 115, 135 (1769). In JUSTICE WHITE traced the development of the peremptory challenge from the early days of the jury trial in England: "In all trials for felonies at common law, the defendant was allowed to challenge peremptorily 35 jurors, and the prosecutor originally had a right to challenge any number of jurors without cause, a right which was said to tend to `infinite delayes and danger.' Coke on Littleton 156 (14th ed. 11). Thus The Ordinance for Inquests, provided that if `they that sue for the King will challenge any Jurors, they shall assign. a |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | the King will challenge any Jurors, they shall assign. a Cause certain.' So persistent was the view that a proper jury trial required peremptories on both sides, however, that the statute was construed to allow the prosecution to direct any juror after examination to `stand aside' until the entire panel was gone over and the defendant had exercised his challenges; only if there was a deficiency of jurors in the box at that point did the Crown have to show cause in respect to jurors recalled to make up the required number. Peremptories on both sides became the settled law of England, continuing in the above form until after the separation of the Colonies." -213 *120 Peremptory challenges have a venerable tradition in this country as well: "In the federal system, Congress early took a part of the subject in hand in establishing that the defendant was entitled to 35 peremptories in trials for treason and 20 in trials for other felonies specified in the 10 Act as punishable by death, (10). In regard to trials for other offenses without the 10 statute, both the defendant and the Government were thought to have a right of peremptory challenge, although the source of this right was not wholly clear. "The course in the apparently paralleled that in the federal system. The defendant's right of challenge was early conferred by statute, the number often corresponding to the English practice, the prosecution was thought to have retained the Crown's common-law right to stand aside, and by 18, most if not all, had enacted statutes conferring on the prosecution a substantial number of peremptory challenges, the number generally being at least half, but often equal to, the number had by the defendant." The Court's opinion, in addition to ignoring the teachings of history, also contrasts with in its failure to even discuss the rationale of the peremptory challenge. observed: "The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed for them, and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that `to perform its high function in the best way, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." ' " ). *121 Permitting unexplained peremptories has long been regarded as a means to strengthen our jury system in other ways as well. One commentator has recognized: "The peremptory, made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes. |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes. Common human experience, common sense, psychosociological studies, and public opinion polls tell us that it is likely that certain classes of people statistically have predispositions that would make them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases. But to allow this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative terms necessary for challenges for cause would undercut our desire for a society in which all people are judged as individuals and in which each is held reasonable and open to compromise. [For example,] [a]lthough experience reveals that black males as a class can be biased against young alienated blacks who have not tried to join the middle class, to enunciate this in the concrete expression required of a challenge for cause is societally divisive. Instead we have evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expression of what we dare not say but know is true more often than not." Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," For reasons such as these, this Court concluded in that "the [peremptory] challenge is `one of the most important of the rights' " in our justice system. ). For close to a century, then, it has been settled that "[t]he denial or impairment of the right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice." ). Instead of even considering the history or function of the peremptory challenge, the bulk of the Court's opinion is spent recounting the well-established principle that intentional exclusion of racial groups from jury venires is a *122 violation of the Equal Protection Clause. I too reaffirm that principle, which has been a part of our constitutional tradition since at least But if today's decision is nothing more than mere "application" of the "principles announced in Strauder," as the Court maintains, ante, at 89-90, some will consider it curious that the application went unrecognized for over a century. The Court in had no difficulty in unanimously concluding that cases such as Strauder did not require inquiry into the basis for a peremptory challenge. See post, at 135-137 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). More recently we held that "[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition" A moment's reflection quickly reveals the vast differences between the racial exclusions involved in Strauder and the allegations before us today: "Exclusion from the venire summons process implies that the government (usually the legislative or judicial branch) has made the general determination that those excluded are unfit to try any case. Exercise of the peremptory challenge, by contrast, represents the discrete decision, made |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | the peremptory challenge, by contrast, represents the discrete decision, made by one of two or more opposed litigants in the trial phase of our adversary system of justice, that the challenged venireperson will likely be more unfavorable to that litigant in that particular case than others on the same venire. "Thus, excluding a particular cognizable group from all venire pools is stigmatizing and discriminatory in several interrelated ways that the peremptory challenge is not. The former singles out the excluded group, while individuals of all groups are equally subject to peremptory challenge on any basis, including their group affiliation. Further, venire-pool exclusion bespeaks a priori across-the-board total unfitness, while peremptory-strike exclusion merely suggests potential partiality in a particular *123 isolated case. Exclusion from venires focuses on the inherent attributes of the excluded group and infers its inferiority, but the peremptory does not. To suggest that a particular race is unfit to judge in any case necessarily is racially insulting. To suggest that each race may have its own special concerns, or even may tend to favor its own, is not." United Unwilling to rest solely on jury venire cases such as Strauder, the Court also invokes general equal protection principles in support of its holding. But peremptory challenges are often lodged, of necessity, for reasons "normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty." Moreover, in making peremptory challenges, both the prosecutor and defense attorney necessarily act on only limited information or hunch. The process cannot be indicted on the sole basis that such decisions are made on the basis of "assumption" or "intuitive judgment." Ante, at 97. As a result, unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised in any particular case. A clause that requires a minimum "rationality" in government actions has no application to " `an arbitrary and capricious right.' " (quoting ); a constitutional principle that may invalidate state action on the basis of "stereotypic notions," Mississippi University for does not explain the breadth of a procedure exercised on the " `sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another.' " That the Court is not applying conventional equal protection analysis is shown by its limitation of its new rule to allegations of impermissible challenge on the basis of race; the *124 Court's opinion clearly contains such a limitation. See ante, at 96 (to establish a prima facie case, "the defendant first must show that he is a member of |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group") (emphasis added); (emphasis added). But if conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not only race, but also sex, ; age, Massachusetts Bd. of ; religious or political affiliation, 462 U.S. ; mental capacity, ; number of children, ; living arrangements, Department of ; and employment in a particular industry, or profession,[4] In short, it is quite probable that every peremptory challenge could be objected to on the basis that, because it excluded a venireman who had some characteristic not shared by the remaining members of the venire, it constituted a "classification" subject to equal protection scrutiny. See cert. pending, No. 84-1426. Compounding the difficulties, under conventional equal protection principles some uses of peremptories would be reviewed under "strict scrutiny and sustained only if suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest," 473 *; others would be reviewed to determine if they were "substantially related to a sufficiently important government interest," ; and still others would be reviewed to determine whether they were "a rational means to serve a legitimate end." The Court never applies this conventional equal protection framework to the claims at hand, perhaps to avoid acknowledging that the state interest involved here has historically been regarded by this Court as substantial, if not compelling. Peremptory challenges have long been viewed as a means to achieve an impartial jury that will be sympathetic toward neither an accused nor witnesses for the State on the basis of some shared factor of race, religion, occupation, or other characteristic. Nearly a century ago the Court stated that the peremptory challenge is "essential to the fairness of trial by jury." 146 U. S., Under conventional equal protection principles, a state interest of this magnitude and ancient lineage might well overcome an equal protection objection to the application of peremptory challenges. However, the Court is silent on the strength of the State's interest, apparently leaving this issue, among many others, to the further "litigation [that] will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's equal protection holding today" Ante, 2 (WHITE, J., concurring).[5] The Court also purports to express "no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel." Ante, at 89, n. 12 (emphasis added). But the clear and inescapable import of this novel holding will inevitably be to limit the use of this valuable *126 tool to both prosecutors and defense attorneys alike. Once the Court has held |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | prosecutors and defense attorneys alike. Once the Court has held that prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory challenges, could we rationally hold that defendants are not?[6] "Our criminal justice system `requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.' " Ante, 7 (MARSHALL, J., concurring) ). Rather than applying straightforward equal protection analysis, the Court substitutes for the holding in a curious hybrid. The defendant must first establish a "prima facie case," ante, at 93-94, of invidious discrimination, then the "burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors." Ante, at 97. The Court explains that "the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules" is established in "[o]ur decisions concerning `disparate treatment'" Ante, at 94, n. 18. The Court then adds, borrowing again from a Title VII case, that "the prosecutor must give a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Ante, at 98, n. 20 ).[7] While undoubtedly these rules are well suited to other contexts, particularly where (as with Title VII) they are required by an Act of Congress,[8] they seem curiously out *127 of place when applied to peremptory challenges in criminal cases. Our system permits two types of challenges: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. Challenges for cause obviously have to be explained; by definition, peremptory challenges do not. "It is called a peremptory challenge, because the prisoner may challenge peremptorily, on his own dislike, without showing of any cause." H. Joy, On Peremptory Challenge of Jurors 1 (1844) (emphasis added). Analytically, there is no middle ground: A challenge either has to be explained or it does not. It is readily apparent, then, that to permit inquiry into the basis for a peremptory challenge would force "the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into the challenge for cause." United v. Clark, Indeed, the Court recognized without dissent in that, if scrutiny were permitted, "[t]he challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory, each and every challenge being open to examination, either at the time of the challenge or at a hearing afterwards." Confronted with the dilemma it created, the Court today attempts to decree a middle ground. To rebut a prima facie case, the Court requires a "neutral explanation" for the challenge, but is at pains to "emphasize" that the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." Ante, at 97. I am at a |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | challenge for cause." Ante, at 97. I am at a loss to discern the governing principles here. A "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenge will be difficult to distinguish from a challenge for cause. Anything *128 short of a challenge for cause may well be seen as an "arbitrary and capricious" challenge, to use Blackstone's characterization of the peremptory. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *353. Apparently the Court envisions permissible challenges short of a challenge for cause that are just a little bit arbitrary but not too much. While our trial judges are "experienced in supervising voir dire," ante, at 97, they have no experience in administering rules like this. An example will quickly demonstrate how today's holding, while purporting to "further the ends of justice," ante, at 99, will not have that effect. Assume an Asian defendant, on trial for the capital murder of a white victim, asks prospective jury members, most of whom are white, whether they harbor racial prejudice against Asians. See Turner v. Murray, ante, at 36-37. The basis for such a question is to flush out any "juror who believes that [Asians] are violence-prone or morally inferior" Ante, at 35.[9] Assume further that all white jurors deny harboring racial prejudice but that the defendant, on trial for his life, remains unconvinced by these protestations. Instead, he continues to harbor a hunch, an "assumption," or "intuitive judgment," ante, at 97, that these white jurors will be prejudiced against him, presumably based in part on race. The time-honored rule before today was that peremptory challenges could be exercised on such a basis. The Court explained in : "[H]ow necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom *129 he has conceived a prejudice even without being able to assign a reason for such his dislike." 146 U.S., The effect of the Court's decision, however, will be to force the defendant to come forward and "articulate a neutral explanation," ante, at 98, for his peremptory challenge, a burden he probably cannot meet. This example demonstrates that today's holding will produce juries that the parties do not believe are truly impartial. This will surely do more than "disconcert" litigants; it will diminish confidence in the jury system. A further painful paradox of the Court's holding is that it is likely to interject racial matters back into the jury selection |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | likely to interject racial matters back into the jury selection process, contrary to the general thrust of a long line of Court decisions and the notion of our country as a "melting pot." In for instance, the Court confronted a situation where the selection of the venire was done through the selection of tickets from a box; the names of whites were printed on tickets of one color and the names of blacks were printed on different color tickets. The Court had no difficulty in striking down such a scheme. Justice Frankfurter observed that "opportunity for working of a discriminatory system exists whenever the mechanism for jury selection has a component part, such as the slips here, that differentiates between white and colored" (emphasis added). Today we mark the return of racial differentiation as the Court accepts a positive evil for a perceived one. Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike will build records in support of their claims that peremptory challenges have been exercised in a racially discriminatory fashion by asking jurors to state their racial background and national origin for the record, despite the fact that "such questions may be offensive to some jurors and thus are not ordinarily asked on voir dire." 4 P. 2d *130 176, 180, modified, 40 Cal. 3d 4b[10] This process is sure to tax even the most capable counsel and judges since determining whether a prima facie case has been established will "require a continued monitoring and recording of the `group' composition of the panel present and prospective" 22 Cal. 3d 583 P.2d Even after a "record" on this issue has been created, disputes will inevitably arise. In one case, for instance, a conviction was reversed based on the assumption that no blacks were on the jury that convicted a defendant. See However, after the court's decision was announced, Carolyn Pritchett, who had served on the jury, called the press to state that the court was in error and that she was black. 71 A. B. A. J. 22 The California court nonetheless denied a rehearing petition.[11] The Court does not tarry long over any of these difficult, sensitive problems, preferring instead to gloss over them as swiftly as it slides over centuries of history: "[W]e make no attempt to instruct [trial] courts how best to implement *1 our holding today." Ante, at 99-100, n. 24. That leaves roughly 7,000 general jurisdiction state trial judges and approximately 500 federal trial judges at large to find their way through the morass the Court creates today. The Court essentially wishes these judges well as they begin |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | The Court essentially wishes these judges well as they begin the difficult enterprise of sorting out the implications of the Court's newly created "right." I join my colleagues in wishing the Nation's judges well as they struggle to grasp how to implement today's holding. To my mind, however, attention to these "implementation" questions leads quickly to the conclusion that there is no "good" way to implement the holding, let alone a "best" way. As one apparently frustrated judge explained after reviewing a case under a rule like that promulgated by the Court today, judicial inquiry into peremptory challenges "from case to case will take the courts into the quagmire of quotas for groups that are difficult to define and even more difficult to quantify in the courtroom. The pursuit of judicial perfection will require both trial and appellate courts to provide speculative and impractical answers to artificial questions." (footnote omitted). The Court's effort to "furthe[r] the ends of justice," ante, at 99, and achieve hoped-for utopian bliss may be admired, but it is far more likely to enlarge the evil "sporting contest" theory of criminal justice roundly condemned by Roscoe Pound almost 80 years ago to the day. See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, August 29, 1906, reprinted in The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future 337 (A. Levin & R. eds. 19). Pound warned then that "too much of the current dissatisfaction has a just origin in our judicial organization and procedure." I am afraid that today's newly created constitutional right will justly give rise to similar disapproval. *132 III I also add my assent to JUSTICE WHITE's conclusion that today's decision does not apply retroactively. Ante, 2 ; see also ante, at 111 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). We held in that " `[t]he criteria guiding resolution of the [retroactivity] question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.'" If we are to ignore Justice Harlan's admonition that making constitutional changes prospective only "cuts this Court loose from the force of precedent," Mackey v. United then all three of these factors point conclusively to a nonretroactive holding. With respect to the first factor, the new rule the Court announces today is not designed to avert "the clear danger of convicting the innocent." Tehan v. United ex rel. Shott, Second, it is readily apparent that "law enforcement authorities and state |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | dissenting | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | it is readily apparent that "law enforcement authorities and state courts have justifiably relied on a prior rule of law" -646. Today's holding clearly "overrule[s] [a] prior decision" and drastically "transform[s] standard practice." This fact alone "virtually compel[s]" the conclusion of nonretroactivity. United v. Johnson, Third, applying today's decision retroactively obviously would lead to a whole host of problems, if not utter chaos. Determining whether a defendant has made a "prima facie showing" of invidious intent, ante, at 97, and, if so, whether the state has a sufficient "neutral explanation" for its actions, ib essentially requires reconstructing *133 the entire voir dire, something that will be extremely difficult even if undertaken soon after the close of the trial.[12] In most cases, therefore, retroactive application of today's decision will be "a virtual impossibility." In sum, under our prior holdings it is impossible to construct even a calorable argument for retroactive application. The few that have adopted judicially created rules similar to that announced by the Court today have all refused full retroactive application. See n. n. ; at ; (19).[13] I therefore am persuaded by JUSTICE WHITE's position, ante, 2 that today's novel decision is not to be given retroactive effect. IV An institution like the peremptory challenge that is part of the fabric of our jury system should not be casually cast aside, especially on a basis not raised or argued by the petitioner. As one commentator aptly observed: "The real question is whether to tinker with a system, be it of jury selection or anything else, that has done the job for centuries. We stand on the shoulders of our ancestors, as Burke said. It is not so much that the past is always worth preserving, he argued, but rather that `it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice, which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes *134 of society.' " Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7 Litigation 23, 56 (Fall 1980). At the very least, this important case reversing centuries of history and experience ought to be set for reargument next Term. |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | In 1963, the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the Serbian (Mother ) *698 suspended and ultimately removed respondent Dionisije Milivojevich (Dionisije) as Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese of that and appointed petitioner Bishop Firmilian Ocokoljich (Firmilian) as Administrator of the Diocese, which the Mother then reorganized into three Dioceses. In 1964 the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod defrocked Dionisije as a Bishop and cleric of the Mother In this civil action brought by Dionisije and the other respondents in Illinois Circuit Court, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the proceedings of the Mother respecting Dionisije were procedurally and substantively defective under the internal regulations of the Mother and were therefore arbitrary and invalid. The State Supreme Court also invalidated the Diocesan reorganization into three Dioceses.[1] We granted certiorari to determine whether the actions of the Illinois Supreme Court constituted improper judicial interference with decisions of the highest authorities of a hierarchical church in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that the inquiries made by the Illinois Supreme Court into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity and the court's actions pursuant thereto contravened the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We therefore reverse. I The basic dispute is over control of the Serbian Eastern Diocese for the United States of America and Canada (American-Canadian Diocese), its property and assets. Petitioners are Bishops Firmilian, Gregory Udicki, and Sava Vukovich, and the Serbian Eastern *699 Diocese for the United States of America and Canada (the religious body in this country). Respondents are Bishop Dionisije, the Serbian Monastery of St. Sava, and the Serbian Eastern Diocese for the United States of America and Canada, an Illinois religious corporation. A proper perspective on the relationship of these parties and the nature of this dispute requires some background discussion. The Serbian one of the 14 autocephalous, hierarchical churches which came into existence following the schism of the universal Christian church in 1054, is an episcopal church whose seat is the Patriarchate in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Its highest legislative, judicial, ecclesiastical, and administrative authority resides in the Holy Assembly of Bishops, a body composed of all Diocesan Bishops presided over by a Bishop designated by the Assembly to be Patriarch. The 's highest executive body, the Holy Synod of Bishops, is composed of the Patriarch and four Diocesan Bishops selected by the Holy Assembly. The Holy Synod and the Holy Assembly have the exclusive power to remove, suspend, defrock, or appoint Diocesan Bishops. The Mother is governed according to the Holy Scriptures, Holy Tradition, Rules of the Ecumenical Councils, the Holy Apostles, |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | Holy Tradition, Rules of the Ecumenical Councils, the Holy Apostles, the Holy Faiths of the the Mother Constitution adopted in 1931, and a "penal code" adopted in 1961. These sources of law are sometimes ambiguous and seemingly inconsistent. Pertinent provisions of the Mother Constitution provide that the 's "main administrative division is composed of dioceses, both in regard to church hierarchical and church administrative aspect," Art. 12, and that "[d]ecisions of establishing, naming, liquidating, reorganizing, and the seat of the dioceses, and establishing or eliminating of position of vicar bishops, *700 is decided upon by the [Holy Assembly], in agreement with the Patriarchal Council," Art. 16. During the late 19th century, migrants to North America of Serbian descent formed autonomous religious congregations throughout this country and Canada. These congregations were then under the jurisdiction of the Russian but that was unable to care for their needs and the congregations sought permission to bring themselves under the jurisdiction of the Serbian In 1913 and 1916, Serbian priests and laymen organized a Serbian in North America. The 32 Serbian congregations were divided into 4 presbyteries, each presided over by a Bishop's Aide, and constitutions were adopted. In 1917, the Russian commissioned a Serbian priest, Father Mardary, to organize an independent Serbian Diocese in America. Four years later, as a result of Father Mardary's efforts, the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Mother created the Eastern Diocese for the United States of America and Canada and designated a Serbian Bishop to complete the formal organization of a Diocese. From that time until 1963, each Bishop who governed the American-Canadian Diocese was a Yugoslav citizen appointed by the Mother without consultation with Diocesan officials. In 1927, Father Mardary called a National Assembly embracing all of the known Serbian congregations in the United States and Canada. The Assembly drafted and adopted the constitution of the Serbian Diocese for the United States of America and Canada, and submitted the constitution to the Mother for approval. The Holy Assembly made changes to provide for appointment of the Diocesan Bishop by the Holy Assembly and to require Holy Assembly *701 approval for any amendments to the constitution, and with these changes approved the constitution. The American-Canadian Diocese was the only diocese of the Mother with its own constitution. Article 1 of the constitution provides that the American-Canadian Diocese "is considered ecclesiastically-judicially as an organic part of the Serbian Patriarchate in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia," and Art. 2 provides that all "statutes and rules which regulate the ecclesiastical-canonical authority and position of the Serbian in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | and position of the Serbian in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia are also compulsory for" the American-Canadian Diocese. Article 3 states that the "jurisdiction of the Diocese includes the entire political territory of the United States of America and Canada, which as such by its geographical location enjoys full administrative freedom and accordingly, it can independently regulate and rule the activities of its church, school and other diocesan institutions and all funds and beneficiencies, through its organs." Article 9 provides that the Bishop of the Diocese "is appointed by the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Patriarchate"; various provisions of the constitution accord that Bishop extensive powers with respect to both religious matters and control of Diocesan property. The constitution also provides for such Diocesan organs as a Diocesan National Assembly, which exercises considerable legislative and administrative authority within the Diocese. In 1927, Father Mardary also organized a not-for-profit corporation, the Serbian Eastern Council for the United States and Canada, under the laws of Illinois. The corporation was to hold title to 30 acres of land in Libertyville, Ill., that Father Mardary had personally purchased in 1924. The charter of that corporation was allowed to lapse, and Father Mardary organized *702 another Illinois not-for-profit corporation, respondent Serbian Eastern Diocese for the United States and Canada, under Illinois laws governing incorporation of hierarchical religious organizations. In 1945, respondent not-for-profit monastery corporation, the Monastery of St. Sava, was organized under these same Illinois laws, and title to the Libertyville property was transferred to it. Similar secular property-holding corporations were subsequently organized in New York, California, and Pennsylvania. Respondent Bishop Dionisije was elected Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese by the Holy Assembly of Bishops in 1939. He became a controversial figure; during the years before 1963, the Holy Assembly received numerous complaints challenging his fitness to serve as Bishop and his administration of the Diocese. During his tenure, however, the Diocese grew so substantially that Dionisije requested that the Patriarch and Holy Assembly appoint bishops to assist him but to serve under his supervision. Eventually, the Diocese sought its elevation by the Holy Assembly to the rank of Metropolia, that South America be added to the Diocese, and that several assistant bishops be appointed under Dionisije. Dionisije specifically recommended that petitioners Firmilian and Gregory Udicki, and one Stefan Lastavica be named assistant bishops. A delegation from the Diocese was sent to the May 1962 meeting of the Holy Assembly in Belgrade to urge adoption of these reorganization proposals, and on June 12, 1962, the Holy Synod appointed a delegation to visit the United |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | the Holy Synod appointed a delegation to visit the United States and study the proposals. The delegation was also directed to confer with Dionisije concerning the complaints made against him and his administration over the years. The delegation remained in the United States for three *703 months, visiting parishes throughout the Diocese and discussing both the reorganization proposals and the complaints against Dionisije. After completion of its survey, the delegation suggested to the Holy Synod the assignment of vicar bishops to the Diocese and recommended that a commission be appointed to conduct a thorough investigation into the complaints against Dionisije. However, the Holy Assembly on May 10, 1963, instead recommended that the Holy Synod institute disciplinary proceedings against Dionisije. The Holy Synod thereupon met immediately and suspended Dionisije pending investigation and disposition of the complaints. The Holy Synod appointed petitioner Firmilian, Dionisije's chief episcopal deputy since 1955 and one of Dionisije's candidates for assistant bishop, as Administrator of the Diocese pending completion of the proceedings. The Holy Assembly thereafter reconvened and, acting under Art. 16 of the constitution of the Mother reorganized the American-Canadian Diocese into three new diocesesthe Middle Western, the Western, and the Easternwhose boundaries were roughly those of the episcopal districts previously created by Dionisije.[2] The final fixing of boundaries for the new dioceses and all other organizational and administrative matters were left to be determined by the officials of the old American-Canadian Diocese. Dionisije was appointed Bishop of the Middle Western Diocese and, seven days later, petitioners Archimandrites Firmilian, Gregory, and Stefan[3] were appointed temporary administrators for the new Dioceses. *704 Dionisije's immediate reaction to these decisions of the Mother was to refuse to accept the reorganization on the ground that it contravened the administrative autonomy of the Diocese guaranteed by the Diocesan constitution, and to refuse to accept his suspension on the ground that it was not effectuated in compliance with the constitution and laws of the Mother On May 25, 1963, he prepared and mailed a circular to all American-Canadian parishes stating his refusal to recognize these actions, and on May 27 he issued a press release stating his refusal to recognize his suspension and his intent to litigate it in the civil courts. This refusal to recognize the Diocesan reorganization and his suspension as Bishop was again stated by Dionisije in a circular issued on June 3 and addressed to the Patriarch, the Holy Assembly, the Holy Synod, all clergy, congregations, Diocesan committees, and all Serbians in North America. He also continued to officiate as Bishop, refusing to turn administration of the Diocese |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | officiate as Bishop, refusing to turn administration of the Diocese over to Firmilian; in a May 30 letter to Firmilian, Dionisije repeated this refusal, asserted that he no longer recognized the decisions of the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod, and charged those bodies with being "communistic." The Diocesan Council met on June 6, and Dionisije reaffirmed his refusal to turn over administration of the Diocese to Firmilian; he also announced that he had discharged two of his vicars general because of their loyalty to the Mother The Council resolved at the meeting to advise the Holy Synod that the proposal to reorganize the Diocese into three dioceses would be submitted to the Diocesan National Assembly in August for acceptance or rejection. The Council also requested that the Holy Assembly promptly send a committee to investigate the complaints against Dionisije. On June 13, the Holy Synod appointed such a commission, *705 composed of two Bishops and the Secretary of the Holy Synod. On July 5, the commission met with Dionisije, who reiterated his refusal to recognize his suspension or the Diocesan reorganization, and who demanded all accusations in writing. The commission refused to give Dionisije the written accusations on the ground that defiance of decisions of higher church authorities itself established wrongful conduct, and advised him that the Holy Synod would appoint a Bishop as court prosecutor to prepare an indictment against him. On the basis of the commission's report and recommendations, which recited Dionisije's refusal to accept the decisions of the Holy Synod and Holy Assembly and his refusal to recognize the court of the Holy Synod or its competence to try him, the Holy Assembly met on July 27, 1963, and voted to remove Dionisije as Bishop. The minutes of the Holy Assembly meeting and the Patriarch's letter to Dionisije informing him of the Holy Assembly's actions made clear that the removal was based solely on his acts of defiance subsequent to his May 10, 1963, suspension, and his violation of his oath and loss of certain qualifications for Bishop under Art. 104 of the constitution of the Mother The Diocesan National Assembly, with Dionisije presiding despite his removal, met in August 1963 and issued a resolution repudiating the division of the Diocese into three Dioceses and demanding a revocation by the Mother of the decisions concerning that division. When the Holy Assembly refused to reconsider, the Diocesan National Assembly in November 1963 declared the Diocese completely autonomous and reinstated the provisions of the Diocesan constitution that provided for election of the Bishop of the Diocese itself and for |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | election of the Bishop of the Diocese itself and for amendments without the approval of the Holy Assembly. Meanwhile, the Holy Synod in October 1963 forwarded *706 to Dionisije a formal written indictment based on the charges of canonical misconduct. In November 1963, Dionisije responded with a demand for the verified reports and complaints referred to in the indictment and for a six-month extension to answer the indictment. The Holy Assembly granted a 30-day extension in which to answer, but declined to furnish verified charges on the grounds that they were described in the indictment, that additional details would be evidentiary in nature, and that there was no legal or canonical basis for forwarding such material to an accused Bishop. Dionisije returned the indictment in January, refusing to answer without the verified charges, denouncing the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod as schismatic and pro-Communist, and asserting that the Mother was proceeding in violation of its penal code and constitution. The Holy Synod, on February 25, 1964, declared that it could not proceed further without Dionisije and referred the matter to the Holy Assembly, which tried Dionisije as a default case on March 5, 1964, because of his refusal to participate. The indictment was also amended at that time to include charges based on Dionisije's acts of rebellion such as those committed at the November meeting of the National Assembly which had declared the Diocese separate from the Mother Considering the original and amended indictments, the Holy Assembly unanimously found Dionisije guilty of all charges and divested him of his episcopal and monastic ranks. Even before the Holy Assembly had removed Dionisije as Bishop, he had commenced what eventually became this protracted litigation, now carried on for almost 13 years. Acting upon the threat contained in his May 27, 1963, press release, Dionisije filed suit in *707 the Circuit Court of Lake County, Ill., on July 26, 1963, seeking to enjoin petitioners from interfering with the assets of respondent corporations and to have himself declared the true Diocesan Bishop. Petitioners countered with a separate complaint, which was consolidated with the original action, seeking declaratory relief that Dionisije had been removed as Bishop of the Diocese and that the Diocese had been properly reorganized into three Dioceses, and injunctive relief granting petitioner Bishops control of the reorganized Dioceses and their property. After the trial court granted summary judgment for respondents and dismissed petitioners' counter-complaint, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on the merits. Serbian[4] Following a lengthy trial, the trial court filed an unreported memorandum opinion and entered |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | the trial court filed an unreported memorandum opinion and entered a final decree which concluded that "no substantial evidence was produced that fraud, collusion or arbitrariness existed in any of the actions or decisions preliminary to or during the final proceedings of the decision to defrock Bishop Dionisije made by the highest Hierarchical bodies of the Mother" Pet. for Cert., App. 44; that the property held by respondent corporations is held in trust for all members of the American-Canadian Diocese; that it was "improper and beyond the power of the Mother to take its action in dividing the whole American Diocese into three new Dioceses, changing its boundaries, and in appointing new bishops for *708 said so-called new Dioceses," ; and that "Firmilian was validly appointed by the Holy Episcopal Synod as temporary Administrator of the whole American Diocese in place of the defrocked Bishop Dionisije," On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in part and reversed in part, essentially holding that Dionisije's removal and defrockment had to be set aside as "arbitrary" because the proceedings resulting in those actions were not conducted according to the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the 's constitution and penal code, and that the Diocesan reorganization was invalid because it was beyond the scope of the Mother 's authority to effectuate such changes without Diocesan approval. Although the court denied rehearing, it amended its original opinion to hold that, although Dionisije had been properly suspended, that suspension terminated by operation of church law when he was not validly tried within one year of his indictment. Thus, the court purported in effect to reinstate Dionisije as Diocesan Bishop. II The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that it rests upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes. Consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments "civil courts do not inquire whether the relevant [hierarchical] church governing body has power under religious law [to decide such disputes]. Such a determination frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. *709 To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide religious law [governing church polity]. would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine." Md. & Va. For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them. Resolution of the religious disputes at issue here affects the control of church property in addition to the structure and administration of the American-Canadian Diocese. This is because the Diocesan Bishop controls respondent Monastery of St. Sava and is the principal officer of respondent property-holding corporations. Resolution of the religious dispute over Dionisije's defrockment therefore determines control of the property. Thus, this case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution of which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals. Even when rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. Because of this danger, "the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes." Presbyterian "First Amendment *710 values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. [T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine." This principle applies with equal force to church disputes over church polity and church administration. The principles limiting the role of civil courts in the resolution of religious controversies that incidentally affect civil rights were initially fashioned in a diversity case decided before the First Amendment had been rendered applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.[5] With respect to hierarchical churches, Watson held: "[T]he rule of action which should govern the civil courts is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." In language having "a |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | application to the case before them." In language having "a clear constitutional ring," Presbyterian Watson reasoned: "The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the *711 support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for." -729 applied this principle in a case involving dispute over entitlement to certain income under a will that turned upon an ecclesiastical determination as to whether an individual would be appointed to a chaplaincy in the Roman Catholic The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, observed: "Because the appointment [to the chaplaincy] is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them. In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church *712 tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise." Thus, although Watson had left civil courts no role to play in reviewing ecclesiastical decisions during the course of resolving church property disputes, Gonzalez first adverted to the possibility of "marginal civil court review," Presbyterian in cases challenging decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals as products of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness." However, since there was "not even a suggestion that [the Archbishop] exercised his authority [in making the chaplaincy decision] arbitrarily," the suggested "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" exception to the Watson rule was dictum only. And although references to the suggested exception appear in opinions in cases decided since the Watson rule has been held to be mandated by the |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | Watson rule has been held to be mandated by the First Amendment,[6] no decision of this Court has given concrete content to or applied the "exception." However, it was the predicate for the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in this case, and we therefore turn to the question whether reliance upon it in the circumstances of this case was consistent with the prohibition of the First and Fourteenth Amendments against rejection of the decisions of the Mother upon the religious disputes in issue. The conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court that the decisions of the Mother were "arbitrary" was grounded upon an inquiry that persuaded the Illinois Supreme *713 Court that the Mother had not followed its own laws and procedures in arriving at those decisions. We have concluded that whether or not there is room for "marginal civil court review" under the narrow rubrics of "fraud" or "collusion" when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes,[7] no "arbitrariness" exception in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulationsis consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that sense "arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them. Watson itself requires our conclusion in its rejection of the analogous argument that ecclesiastical decisions of the highest church judicatories need only be accepted if the subject matter of the dispute is within their "jurisdiction." "But it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character,a matter over which the civil courts *714 exercise no jurisdiction,a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them,becomes the subject of its action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in a sense often used in the courts, all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church laws, would open the way to all the evils which we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of Lord Eldon, and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where property rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions." -734. (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith[8] whether or not rational or measurable by *715 objective criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of "fundamental fairness" or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. The constitutional evils that attend upon any "arbitrariness" exception in the sense applied by the Illinois Supreme Court to justify civil court review of ecclesiastical decisions of final church tribunals are manifest in the instant case. The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized that all parties agree that the Serbian is a hierarchical church, and that the sole power to appoint and remove Bishops of the resides in its highest ranking organs, the Holy Assembly and the Holy Synod.[9] Indeed, final authority with respect to the *716 promulgation and interpretation of all matters of church discipline and internal organization rests with the Holy Assembly, and even the written constitution of the Mother expressly provides: "The Holy Assembly of Bishops, as the highest hierarchical body, is legislative authority in the matters of faith, officiation, church order (discipline) and internal organization of the as well as the highest church juridical authority within its jurisdiction (Article 69 sec. 28)." Art. 57. "All the decisions of the Holy Assembly of Bishops *717 and of the Holy |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | the Holy Assembly of Bishops *717 and of the Holy Synod of Bishops of canonical and church nature, in regard to faith, officiation, church order and internal organization of the church, are valid and final." Art. 64. "The Holy Assembly of Bishops, whose purpose is noted in Article 57 of this Constitution: "9) interprets canonical-ecclesiastical rules, those which are general and obligatory, and particular ones, and publishes their collections; "12) prescribes the ecclesiastical-judicial procedure for all Ecclesiastical Courts; "26) settles disputes of jurisdiction between hierarchical and church-self governing organs; "27) ADJUDGES: "A) In first and in final instances: "a) disagreements between bishops and the Holy Synod, and between the bishops and the Patriarch; "b) canonical offenses of the Patriarch; "B) In the second and final instance: "All matters which the Holy Synod of Bishops judged in the first instance." Art. 69. Nor is there any dispute that questions of church discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern; the bishop of a church is clearly one of the central figures in such a hierarchy and the embodiment of the church within his Diocese, and the Mother constitution states that "[h]e is, according to the church canonical regulations, chief representative and guiding leader of all church spiritual life and church order in the diocese." Art. 13. Yet having recognized that the Serbian is hierarchical and that the decisions to suspend and *718 defrock respondent Dionisije were made by the religious bodies in whose sole discretion the authority to make those ecclesiastical decisions was vested, the Supreme Court of Illinois nevertheless invalidated the decision to defrock Dionisije on the ground that it was "arbitrary" because a "detailed review of the evidence discloses that the proceedings resulting in Bishop Dionisije's removal and defrockment were not in accordance with the prescribed procedure of the constitution and the penal code of the Serbian" Not only was this "detailed review" impermissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but in reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated conflicting testimony concerning internal church procedures and rejected the interpretations of relevant procedural provisions by the Mother 's highest tribunals. -280. The court also failed to take cognizance of the fact that the church judicatories were also guided by other sources of law, such as canon law, which are admittedly not always consistent, and it rejected the testimony of petitioners' five expert witnesses[10] that church procedures were properly followed, denigrating the testimony of one witness as "contradictory" and discounting that of another on the ground that it was "premised upon an assumption which did |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | ground that it was "premised upon an assumption which did not consider the penal code," even though there was some question whether that code even applied to discipline of Bishops.[11] The court *719 accepted, on the other hand, the testimony of respondents' sole expert witness that the 's procedures had been contravened in various specifics. We need not, and under the First Amendment cannot, demonstrate the propriety or impropriety of each of Dionisije's procedural claims, but we can note that the state court even rejected petitioners' contention that Dionisije's failure to participate in the proceedings undermined all procedural contentions because Arts. 66 and 70 of the penal code specify that if a person charged with a violation fails to participate or answer the indictment, the allegations are admitted and due process will be concluded without his participation; the court merely asserted that "application of this provision must be viewed from the perspective that Bishop Dionisije refused to participate because he maintained that the proceedings against him were in violation of the constitution and the penal code of the Serbian" The court found no support in any church dogma for this judicial rewriting of church law, and compounded further the error of this intrusion into a religious thicket by declaring that although Dionisije had, even under the court's analysis, been properly suspended and replaced by Firmilian as temporary administrator, he had to be reinstated as Bishop because church law mandated a trial on ecclesiastical charges within one year of the indictment. Yet the only reason more time than that had expired was due to Dionisije's decision to resort to the civil courts for redress without attempting to vindicate himself by pursuing available *720 remedies within the church. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court overlooked the clear substantive canonical violations for which the disciplined Dionisije, violations based on Dionisije's conceded open defiance and rebellion against the church hierarchy immediately after the Holy Assembly's decision to suspend him (a decision which even the Illinois courts deemed to be proper) and Dionisije's decision to litigate the Mother 's authority in the civil courts rather than participate in the disciplinary proceedings before the Holy Synod and the Holy Assembly. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court would sanction this circumvention of the tribunals set up to resolve internal church disputes and has ordered the Mother to reinstate as Bishop one who espoused views regarded by the church hierarchy to be schismatic and which the proper church tribunals have already determined merit severe sanctions. In short, under the guise of "minimal" review under the umbrella of "arbitrariness," the Illinois |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | of "minimal" review under the umbrella of "arbitrariness," the Illinois Supreme Court has unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church. And although the Diocesan Bishop controls respondent Monastery of St. Sava and is the principal officer of respondent property-holding corporations, the civil courts must accept that consequence as the incidental effect of an ecclesiastical determination that is not subject to judicial abrogation, having been reached by the final church judicatory in which authority to make the decision resides. III Similar considerations inform our resolution of the second question we must addressthe constitutionality of the Supreme Court of Illinois' holding that the Mother 's reorganization of the American-Canadian Diocese *721 into three Dioceses was invalid because it was " `in clear and palpable excess of its own jurisdiction.' " Essentially, the court premised this determination on its view that the early history of the Diocese "manifested a clear intention to retain independence and autonomy in its administrative affairs while at the same time becoming ecclesiastically and judicially an organic part of the Serbian" and its interpretation of the constitution of the American-Canadian Diocese as confirming this intention. It also interpreted the constitution of the Serbian which was adopted after the Diocesan constitution, in a manner consistent with this conclusion. -284. This conclusion was not, however, explicitly based on the "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" exception. Rather, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on purported "neutral principles" for resolving property disputes which would "not in any way entangle this court in the determination of theological or doctrinal matters." Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Illinois substituted its interpretation of the Diocesan and Mother constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals in which church law vests authority to make that interpretation. This the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid. We will not delve into the various church constitutional provisions relevant to this conclusion, for that would repeat the error of the Illinois Supreme Court. It suffices to note that the reorganization of the Diocese involves a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs; Arts. 57 and 64 of the Mother constitution commit such questions of church polity to the final province of the Holy Assembly. stated that religious freedom encompasses the *722 "power [of religious bodies] to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine." The subordination of the Diocese to the Mother in such matters, which are not only "administrative" but |
Justice Brennan | 1,976 | 13 | majority | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | Mother in such matters, which are not only "administrative" but also "hierarchical,"[12] was provided, and the power of the Holy Assembly to reorganize the Diocese is expressed in the Mother constitution.[13] Contrary to the interpretation of the Illinois court, the church judicatories interpreted the provisions of the Diocesan constitution not to interdict or govern this action, but only to relate to the day-to-day administration of Diocesan property.[14]*723 The constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian Diocese were not so express that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity. See Md. & Va. -370[15] The control of Diocesan property may be little affected by the changes; respondents' allegation that the reorganization was a fraudulent subterfuge to divert Diocesan property from its intended beneficiaries has been rejected by the Illinois courts. Formal title to the property remains in respondent property-holding corporations, to be held in trust for all members of the new Dioceses. The boundaries of the reorganized Dioceses generally conform to the episcopal districts which the American-Canadian Diocese had already employed for its internal government, and the appointed administrators of the new Dioceses were the same individuals nominated by Dionisije as assistant bishops to govern similar divisions under him. Indeed, even the Illinois courts' rationale that the reorganization would effectuate an abrogation of the Diocesan constitution has no support in the record, which establishes rather that the details of the reorganization and any decisions pertaining to a distribution of *724 the property among the three Dioceses were expressly left for the Diocesan National Assembly to determine. In response to inquiries from the Diocese, the Holy Assembly assured Bishop Firmilian: "1. That all the rights of the former American-Canadian Diocese, as they relate to the autonomy in the administrative sense, remain unchanged. The only exception is the forming of three dioceses and "2. That the Constitution of the former American-Canadian Diocese remains the same and that the Dioceses in America and Canada will not, in an administrative sense (the management (or direction) of the properties) be managed (or directed) in the same manner as those in Yugoslavia." App. 1446. As a practical matter the effect of the reorganization is a tripling of the Diocesan representational strength in the Holy Assembly and a decentralization of hierarchical authority to permit closer attention to the needs of individual congregations within each of the new Dioceses, a result which Dionisije and Diocesan representatives had already concluded was necessary. Whether corporate bylaws or other documents governing the individual property-holding corporations may affect any desired disposition of the Diocesan |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | Most States prohibit multiple-party, or "fusio," cadidacies for elected office.[1] The Miesota laws challeged i *354 this case prohibit a cadidate from appearig o the ballot as the cadidate of more tha oe party. Mi. Stat. 204B.06, subd. 1(b), ad 204B.04, subd. 2 We hold that such a prohibitio does ot violate the First ad Fourteeth Amedmets to the Uited States Costitutio. Respodet is a chartered chapter of the atioal New Party. Petitioers are Miesota electio officials. I April 1, Miesota State Represetative Ady Dawkis was ruig uopposed i the Miesota DemocraticFarmer-Labor Party's (DFL) primary.[2] That same moth, New Party members chose Dawkis as their cadidate for the same office i the November 1 geeral electio. Neither Dawkis or the DFL objected, ad Dawkis siged the required affidavit of cadidacy for the New Party. Mi. Stat. 204B.06 Miesota, however, prohibits fusio cadidacies.[3] Because Dawkis had already filed as a cadidate for the DFL's omiatio, local electio officials refused to accept the New Party's omiatig petitio.[4] *355 The New Party filed suit i Uited States District Court, cotedig that Miesota's atifusio laws violated the party's associatioal rights uder the First ad Fourteeth Amedmets. The District Court grated summary judgmet for the state defedats, cocludig that Miesota's fusio ba was "a valid ad o-discrimiatory regulatio of the electio process," ad otig that "issues cocerig the mechaics of choosig cadidates are, i large part, matters of policy best left to the deliberative bodies themselves." Twi Cities Area New The Court of Appeals reversed. Twi Cities Area New First, the court determied that Miesota's fusio ba "uquestioably" ad "severe[ly]" burdeed the New Party's "freedom to select a stadard bearer who best represets the party's ideologies ad prefereces" ad its right to "broade the base of public participatio i ad support for [its]activities." The court the decided that Miesota's absolute ba o multiple-party omiatios was "broader tha ecessary to serve the State's asserted iterests" i avoidig itraparty discord ad party spliterig, maitaiig a stable political system, ad avoidig voter cofusio, ad that the State's remaiig cocers about multiple-party omiatio were "simply ujustified i this case." The court oted, however, that the Court of Appeals for the Seveth Circuit had upheld Wiscosi's similar fusio ba i cert. deied, Noetheless, the court cocluded that Miesota's fusio-ba provisios, Mi. Stat. 204B.06, subd. 1(b), ad *356 204B.04, subd. 2 were ucostitutioal because they severely burdeed the New Party's associatioal rights ad were ot arrowly tailored to advace Miesota's valid iterests. We grated certiorari, ad ow reverse. Fusio was a regular feature of Gilded Age America politics. Particularly i the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | regular feature of Gilded Age America politics. Particularly i the West ad Midwest, cadidates of issue-orieted parties like the Gragers, Idepedets, Greebackers, ad Populists ofte succeeded through fusio with the Democrats, ad vice versa. Republicas, for their part, sometimes arraged fusio cadidacies i the South, as part of a geeral strategy of ecouragig ad exploitig divisios withi the domiat Democratic Party. See geerally "A Place o the Ballot": Fusio Politics ad Atifusio Laws, 85 Am. Hist. Rev. 287, -290 (0). Fusio was commo i part because political parties, rather tha local or state govermets, prited ad distributed their ow ballots. These ballots cotaied oly the ames of a particular party's cadidates, ad so a voter could drop his party's ticket i the ballot box without eve kowig that his party's cadidates were supported by other parties as well. But after the 1888 presidetial electio, which was widely regarded as havig bee plagued by fraud, may States moved to the "Australia ballot " Uder that system, a official ballot, cotaiig the ames of all the cadidates legally omiated by all the parties, was prited at public expese ad distributed by public officials at pollig places. ; (States' move to the Australia ballot system was a "progressive reform to reduce fraudulet electio practices"). By 1896, use of the Australia ballot was widespread. Durig the same period, may States eacted other electio-related reforms, icludig bas o fusio cadidacies. See at *357 295-298. Miesota baed fusio i 1901.[5] This tred has cotiued ad, i this cetury, fusio has become the exceptio, ot the rule. Today, multiple-party cadidacies are permitted i just a few States,[6] ad fusio plays a sigificat role oly i New York.[7] The First Amedmet protects the right of citizes to associate ad to form political parties for the advacemet of commo political goals ad ideas. Colorado Republica Federal Campaig ; ; (6). As a result, political parties' govermet, structure, ad activities ejoy costitutioal protectio. 489 U.S. (9) ; O the other had, it is also clear that States may, ad ievitably must, eact reasoable regulatios of parties, electios, ad ballots to reduce electio- ad campaigrelated disorder. ); (The Costitutio grats States "broad power to prescribe the `Time, Places ad Maer of holdig Electios for Seators ad Represetatives,' Art. I, 4, cl. 1, which power is matched by state cotrol over the electio process for state offices"). Whe decidig whether a state electio law violates First ad Fourteeth Amedmet associatioal rights, we weigh the "`character ad magitude' " of the burde the State's rule imposes o those rights agaist the iterests the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | State's rule imposes o those rights agaist the iterests the State coteds justify that burde, ad cosider the extet to which the State's cocers make the burde ecessary. (quotig (3)). Regulatios imposig severe burdes o plaitiffs' rights must be arrowly tailored ad advace a compellig state iterest. Lesser burdes, however, trigger less exactig review, ad a State's "`importat regulatory iterests' " will usually be eough to justify "`reasoable, odiscrimiatory restrictios.' " (quotig ); at 289 (requirig "correspodig iterest sufficietly weighty *359 to justify the limitatio"). No bright lie separates permissible electio-related regulatio from ucostitutioal ifrigemets o First Amedmet freedoms. at The New Party's claim that it has a right to select its ow cadidate is ucotroversial, so far as it goes. See, e. g., That is, the New Party, ad ot someoe else, has the right to select the New Party's "stadard bearer." It does ot follow, though, that a party is absolutely etitled to have its omiee appear o the ballot as that party's cadidate. A particular cadidate might be ieligible for office,[8] uwillig to serve, or, as here, aother party's cadidate. That a particular idividual may ot appear o the ballot as a particular party's cadidate does ot severely burde that party's associatioal rights. See 10 ; 12 ; The New Party relies o ad v. Republica Party of I we struck dow Califoria *360 electio provisios that prohibited political parties from edorsig cadidates i party primaries ad regulated parties' iteral affairs ad structure. Ad i we held that Coecticut's closed-primary statute, which required voters i a party primary to be registered party members, iterfered with a party's associatioal rights by limitig "the group of registered voters whom the Party may ivite to participate i the basic fuctio of selectig the Party's cadidates." -216 But while ad ivolved regulatio of political parties' iteral affairs ad core associatioal activities, Miesota's fusio ba does ot. The ba, which applies to major ad mior parties alike, simply precludes oe party's cadidate from appearig o the ballot, as that party's cadidate, if already omiated by aother party. Respodet is free to try to covice Represetative Dawkis to be the New Party's, ot the DFL's, cadidate. See Swamp, 950 F. 2d, at 385 ("[A] party may omiate ay cadidate that the party ca covice to be its cadidate"). Whether the party still wats to edorse a cadidate who, because of the fusio ba, will ot appear o the ballot as the party's cadidate, is up to the party. The Court of Appeals also held that Miesota's laws "keep the New Party from |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | also held that Miesota's laws "keep the New Party from developig cosesual political alliaces ad thus broadeig the base of public participatio i ad support for its activities." The burde o the party was, the court held, severe because "[h]istory shows that mior parties have played a sigificat role i the electoral system where multiple party omiatio is legal, but have o meaigful ifluece where multiple party omiatio is baed." I the view of the Court of Appeals, Miesota's fusio ba forces members of the New Party to make a "o-wi choice" betwee votig for "cadidates with o realistic chace of wiig, defect[ig] from their party ad vot[ig] for a major party cadidate who does, or decli[ig] to vote at all." *361 But Miesota has ot directly precluded mior political parties from developig ad orgaizig. Cf. Nor has Miesota excluded a particular group of citizes, or a political party, from participatio i the electio process. Cf. ; The New Party remais free to edorse whom it likes, to ally itself with others, to omiate cadidates for office, ad to spread its message to all who will liste. Cf. ; Colorado Republica Federal Campaig Comm', The Court of Appeals emphasized its belief that, without fusio-based alliaces, mior parties caot thrive. This is a predictive judgmet which is by o meas self-evidet.[9]*362 But, more importatly, the supposed beefits of fusio to mior parties do ot require that Miesota permit it. See (refusig to weigh merits of closed ad ope primaries). May features of our political systeme. g., sigle-member districts, "first past the post" electios, ad the high costs of campaigigmake it difficult for third parties to succeed i America politics. Burham Declaratio, App. 12-13. But the Costitutio does ot require States to permit fusio ay more tha it requires them to move to proportioal-represetatio electios or public fiacig of campaigs. See Mobile v. Bolde, (0) (plurality opiio) ("Whatever appeal the dissetig opiio's view may have as a matter of political theory, it is ot the law"). The New Party coteds that the fusio ba burdes its "right to commuicate its choice of omiees o the ballot o terms equal to those offered other parties, ad the right of the party's supporters ad other voters to receive that iformatio," ad isists that commuicatio o the ballot of a party's cadidate choice is a "critical source of iformatio for the great majority of voters who rely upo party `labels' as a votig guide." Brief for Respodet 22-23. It is true that Miesota's fusio ba prevets the New Party from usig the ballot to commuicate |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | prevets the New Party from usig the ballot to commuicate to the public that it supports a particular cadidate who is already aother party's cadidate. I additio, the ba shuts off oe possible aveue a party might use to sed a message to its preferred cadidate because, with fusio, a cadidate who wis a electio o the basis of two parties' votes will likely kow moreif the parties' votes are couted separatelyabout the particular wishes ad ideals of his costituecy. We are *363 upersuaded, however, by the party's cotetio that it has a right to use the ballot itself to sed a particularized message, to its cadidate ad to the voters, about the ature of its support for the cadidate. Ballots serve primarily to elect cadidates, ot as forums for political expressio. See ; Like all parties i Miesota, the New Party is able to use the ballot to commuicate iformatio about itself ad its cadidate to the voters, so log as that cadidate is ot already someoe else's cadidate. The party retais great latitude i its ability to commuicate ideas to voters ad cadidates through its participatio i the campaig, ad party members may campaig for, edorse, ad vote for their preferred cadidate eve if he is listed o the ballot as aother party's cadidate. See 460 U. S., ("[A] electio campaig is a effective platform for the expressio of views o the issues of the day"); Illiois Bd. of Electios v. Socialist Workers Party, ("[A] electio campaig is a meas of dissemiatig ideas"). I sum, Miesota's laws do ot restrict the ability of the New Party ad its members to edorse, support, or vote for ayoe they like. The laws do ot directly limit the party's access to the ballot. They are silet o parties' iteral structure, goverace, ad policymakig. Istead, these provisios reduce the uiverse of potetial cadidates who may appear o the ballot as the party's omiee oly by rulig out those few idividuals who both have already agreed to be aother party's cadidate ad also, if forced to choose, themselves prefer that other party. They also limit, slightly, the party's ability to sed a message to the voters ad to its preferred cadidates. We coclude that the burdes Miesota imposes o the party's First ad Fourteeth Amedmet associatioal rightsthough ot trivialare ot severe. The Court of Appeals determied that Miesota's fusio ba imposed "severe" burdes o the New Party's associatioal *364 rights, ad so it required the State to show that the ba was arrowly tailored to serve compellig state iterests. 73 F. 3d, at |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | tailored to serve compellig state iterests. 73 F. 3d, at We disagree; give the burdes imposed, the bar is ot so high. Istead, the State's asserted regulatory iterests eed oly be "sufficietly weighty to justify the limitatio" imposed o the party's rights. 502 U. S., at -289; (quotig ). Nor do we require elaborate, empirical verificatio of the weightiess of the State's asserted justificatios. See Muro v. Socialist Workers Party, (6) ("Legislatures. should be permitted to respod to potetial deficiecies i the electoral process with foresight rather tha reactively, provided that the respose is reasoable ad does ot sigificatly impige o costitutioally protected rights"). The Court of Appeals ackowledged Miesota's iterests i avoidig voter cofusio ad overcrowded ballots, prevetig party spliterig ad disruptios of the two-party system, ad beig able to clearly idetify the electio wier. Similarly, the Seveth Circuit, i Swamp, oted Wiscosi's "compellig" iterests i avoidig voter cofusio, preservig the itegrity of the electio process, ad maitaiig a stable political 950 F.2d, at ; cf. (Fairchild, J., cocurrig) (State has a compellig iterest i "maitaiig the distict idetity of parties"). Miesota argues here that its fusio ba is justified by its iterests i avoidig voter cofusio, promotig cadidate competitio (by reservig limited ballot space for opposig cadidates), prevetig electoral distortios ad ballot maipulatios, ad discouragig party spliterig ad "urestraied factioalism." Brief for Petitioers 41-50. States certaily have a iterest i protectig the itegrity, fairess, ad efficiecy of their ballots ad electio processes as meas for electig public officials. (State may prevet "frivolous or fraudulet *365 cadidacies") ); ; (States have a iterest i prevetig "misrepresetatio"); 410 U.S. 2, Petitioers coted that a cadidate or party could easily exploit fusio as a way of associatig his or its ame with popular slogas ad catchphrases. For example, members of a major party could decide that a powerful way of "sedig a message" via the ballot would be for various factios of that party to omiate the major party's cadidate as the cadidate for the ewly formed "No New Taxes," "Coserve Our Eviromet," ad "Stop Crime Now" parties. I respose, a opposig major party would likely istruct its factios to omiate that party's cadidate as the "Fiscal Resposibility," "Healthy Plaet," ad "Safe Streets" parties' cadidate. Whether or ot the putative "fusio" cadidates' ames appeared o oe or four ballot lies, such maeuverig would udermie the ballot's purpose by trasformig it from a meas of choosig cadidates to a billboard for political advertisig. The New Party respods to this cocer, iroically eough, by isistig that the State could avoid such maipulatio by |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | by isistig that the State could avoid such maipulatio by adoptig more demadig ballot-access stadards rather tha prohibitig multiple-party omiatio. Brief for Respodet 38. However, as we stated above, because the burdes the fusio ba imposes o the party's associatioal rights are ot severe, the State eed ot arrowly tailor the meas it chooses to promote ballot itegrity. The Costitutio does ot require that Miesota compromise the policy choices embodied i its ballot-access requiremets to accommodate the New Party's fusio strategy. See Mi. Stat. 204B.08, subd. 3 (sigature requiremets for omiatig petitios); at -762 (New York's time limitatio for erollmet i a political party was part of a overall scheme aimed at the preservatio of the itegrity of the State's electoral process). *366 Relatedly, petitioers urge that permittig fusio would udercut Miesota's ballot-access regime by allowig mior parties to capitalize o the popularity of aother party's cadidate, rather tha o their ow appeal to the voters, i order to secure access to the ballot. Brief for Petitioers 45-46. That is, voters who might ot sig a mior party's omiatig petitio based o the party's ow views ad cadidates might do so if they viewed the mior party as just aother way of omiatig the same perso omiated by oe of the major parties. Thus, Miesota fears that fusio would eable mior parties, by omiatig a major party's cadidate, to bootstrap their way to major-party status i the ext electio ad circumvet the State's omiatigpetitio requiremet for mior parties. See Mi. Stat. 200.02, subd. 7 (defiig "major party"), ad 204D.13 (describig ballot order for major ad other parties). The State surely has a valid iterest i makig sure that mior ad third parties who are grated access to the ballot are boa fide ad actually supported, o their ow merits, by those who have provided the statutorily required petitio or ballot support. 460 U. S., 9; 746. States also have a strog iterest i the stability of their political systems.[10], ; *367 This iterest does ot permit a State to completely isulate the two-party system from mior parties' or idepedet cadidates' competitio ad ifluece, ; or is it a pateralistic licese for States to protect political parties from the cosequeces of their ow iteral disagreemets. ; 479 U. S., That said, the States' iterest permits them to eact reasoable electio regulatios that may, i practice, favor the traditioal twoparty system, see Burham Declaratio, App. 12 (America politics has bee, for the most part, orgaized aroud two parties sice the time of Adrew Jackso), ad that temper the destabilizig effects of party |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | Adrew Jackso), ad that temper the destabilizig effects of party spliterig ad excessive factioalism. The Costitutio permits the Miesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party See Ruta v. Republica Party of Ill., (Scalia, J., dissetig) ("The stabilizig effects of such a [two-party] system are obvious"); Davis v. Bademer, (6) (O'Coor, J., cocurrig) ("There ca be little doubt that the emergece of a strog ad stable two-party system i this coutry has cotributed eormously to soud ad effective govermet"); Brati v. Fikel, (0) (Powell, J., dissetig) ("Broad-based political parties supply a essetial coherece ad flexibility to the America political scee"). Ad while a iterest i securig the perceived beefits of a stable two-party system will ot justify ureasoably exclusioary restrictios, see States eed ot remove all of the may hurdles third parties face i the America political area today. I we upheld a Califoria statute that deied ballot positios to idepedet cadidates who had voted i the immediately precedig primary electios or had a registered party affiliatio at ay time durig the year before the same *368 primary electios.[11] After surveyig the relevat case law, we "ha[d] o hesitatio i sustaiig" the party-disaffiliatio provisios. We recogized that the provisios were part of a "geeral state policy aimed at maitaiig the itegrity of the ballot," ad oted that the provisio did ot discrimiate agaist idepedet cadidates. We cocluded that while a "State eed ot take the course Califoria has, Califoria apparetly believes with the Foudig Fathers that splitered parties ad urestraied factioalism may do sigificat damage to the fabric of govermet. See The Federalist No. 10 (Madiso). It appears obvious to us that the oe-year disaffiliatio provisio furthers the State's iterest i the stability of its political " 415 U.S., ; see also Lippitt v. Cipolloe, (affirmig, without opiio, district-court decisio upholdig statute baig party-primary cadidacies of those who had voted i aother party's primary withi last four years).[12] *369 Our decisio i is also relevat. There, we upheld Hawaii's ba o write-i votig agaist a claim that the ba ureasoably ifriged o citizes' First ad Fourteeth Amedmet rights. I so holdig, we rejected the petitioer's argumet that the ba "deprive[d] him of the opportuity to cast a meaigful ballot," emphasizig that the fuctio of electios is to elect cadidates ad that "we have repeatedly upheld reasoable, politically eutral regulatios that have the effect of chaelig expressive activit[ies] at the polls." -438. Miesota's fusio ba is far less burdesome tha the disaffiliatio rule upheld i ad is justified by similarly weighty state iterests. By readig |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,997 | 19 | majority | Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118102/timmons-v-twin-cities-area-new-party/ | ad is justified by similarly weighty state iterests. By readig as dealig oly with "sore-loser cadidates," Justice Steves, i our view, fails to appreciate the case's teachig. Post, at 377 (dissetig opiio). Uder the Califoria disaffiliatio statute at issue i ay perso affiliated with a party at ay time durig the year leadig up to the primary electio was absolutely precluded from appearig o the ballot as a idepedet or as the cadidate of aother party. Miesota's fusio ba is ot early so restrictive; the challeged provisios say othig about the previous party affiliatio of would-be cadidates but oly require that, i order to appear o the ballot, a cadidate ot be the omiee of more tha oe party. Califoria's disaffiliatio rule limited the field of cadidates by thousads; Miesota's precludes oly a hadful who freely choose to be so limited. It is also worth otig that while Califoria's disaffiliatio statute absolutely baed may cadidacies, Miesota's fusio ba oly prohibits a cadidate from beig amed twice. We coclude that the burdes Miesota's fusio ba imposes o the New Party's associatioal rights are justified by "correspodigly weighty" valid state iterests i ballot *370 itegrity ad political stability.[13] I decidig that Miesota's fusio ba does ot ucostitutioally burde the New Party's First ad Fourteeth Amedmet rights, we express o views o the New Party's policy-based argumets cocerig the wisdom of fusio. It may well be that, as support for ew political parties icreases, these argumets will carry the day i some States' legislatures. But the Costitutio does ot require Miesota, ad the approximately 40 other States that do ot permit fusio, to allow it. The judgmet of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | Today, the Court rejects a Fourth Amendment challenge to a sobriety checkpoint policy in which police stop all cars and inspect all drivers for signs of intoxication without any individualized suspicion that a specific driver is intoxicated. The Court does so by balancing "the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped." Ante, at 455. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE STEVENS in Parts I and II of his dissenting opinion, I agree that the Court misapplies that test by undervaluing the nature of the intrusion and exaggerating the law enforcement need to use the roadblocks to prevent drunken driving. See also United I write separately to express a few additional points. The majority opinion creates the impression that the Court generally engages in a balancing test in order to determine *457 the constitutionality of all seizures, or at least those "dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways." Ante, at 450. This is not the case. In most cases, the police must possess probable cause for a seizure to be judged reasonable. See Only when a seizure is "substantially less intrusive," than a typical arrest is the general rule replaced by a balancing test. I agree with the Court that the initial stop of a car at a roadblock under the Michigan State Police sobriety checkpoint policy is sufficiently less intrusive than an arrest so that the reasonableness of the seizure may be judged, not by the presence of probable cause, but by balancing "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." But one searches the majority opinion in vain for any acknowledgment that the reason for employing the balancing test is that the seizure is minimally intrusive. Indeed, the opinion reads as if the minimal nature of the seizure ends rather than begins the inquiry into reasonableness. Once the Court establishes that the seizure is "slight," ante, at 4, it asserts without explanation that the balance "weighs in favor of the state program." Ante, at 455. The Court ignores the fact that in this class of minimally intrusive searches, we have generally required the government to prove that it had reasonable suspicion for a minimally intrusive seizure to be considered reasonable. See, e. g., ; United ; Some level of individualized suspicion is a core component of the protection the Fourth Amendment |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | is a core component of the protection the Fourth Amendment provides against arbitrary government action. See ; ("Action based merely on *458 whatever may pique the curiousity of a particular officer is the antithesis of the objective standards requisite to reasonable conduct and to avoiding abuse and harassment"). By holding that no level of suspicion is necessary before the police may stop a car for the purpose of preventing drunken driving, the Court potentially subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing conduct by the police. I would have hoped that before taking such a step, the Court would carefully explain how such a plan fits within our constitutional framework. Presumably, the Court purports to draw support from which is the only case in which the Court has upheld a program that subjects the general public to suspicionless seizures. But as JUSTICE STEVENS demonstrates, post, at 463-466, 471-472, the Michigan State Police policy is sufficiently different from the progam at issue in that such reliance is unavailing. Moreover, even if the policy at issue here were comparable to the program at issue in it does not follow that the balance of factors in this case also justifies abandoning a requirement of individualized suspicion. In the Court explained that suspicionless stops were justified since "[a] requirement that stops be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens." There has been no showing in this case that there is a similar difficulty in detecting individuals who are driving under the influence of alcohol, nor is it intuitively obvious that such a difficulty exists. See at That stopping every car might make it easier to prevent drunken driving, but see post, at 469-471, is an insufficient justification for abandoning the requirement of individualized suspicion. "The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections *459 of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards." 3 Without proof that the police cannot develop individualized suspicion that a person is driving while impaired by alcohol, I believe the constitutional balance must be struck in favor of protecting the public against even the "minimally intrusive" seizures involved in this case. I do not dispute the immense social cost caused by drunken drivers, nor do I slight the government's efforts to prevent such tragic losses. Indeed, |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | slight the government's efforts to prevent such tragic losses. Indeed, I would hazard a guess that today's opinion will be received favorably by a majority of our society, who would willingly suffer the minimal intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint stop in order to prevent drunken driving. But consensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis. "The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some `balancing test' than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only where the `reasonable' requirements of the probable-cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens may be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between the individual and society depends on the recognition of `the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.' 7 U.S. 438," New Jersey (footnote omitted). In the face of the "momentary evil" of drunken driving, the Court today abdicates its role as the protector of that fundamental right. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | In the course of an election, Local 82 violated a number of the rights of respondent union members secured by Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S. C. 401 et seq. Specifically, Local 82 restricted respondents' ability to nominate candidates of their choice for union office in violation of 101(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 411(a)(1), and prevented respondents from freely expressing their views at a union nominations meeting in violation of 101(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 411(a)(2). After the suit was filed, the union indicated that it was willing to rerun the election which had been conducted subsequent to the tainted nominations meeting. The District Court preliminarily enjoined the union to do exactly that, exercising its authority under 102 of the Act, which provides in pertinent part: "Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate." 29 U.S. C. 412 (emphasis supplied). Today the Court agrees that respondents have established violations of Title I, and that the District Court had jurisdiction to fashion a remedy under 102. However, the Court reverses the issuance of the preliminary injunction, holding that it did not constitute "appropriate relief" within the meaning of 102. The Court so holds not because of anything in 102 or its legislative history, but rather because of a provision in Title IV of the Act which was written long before 102 was added to the LMRDA, and which was designed to *553 limit the remedies available in state courts, rather than the remedy a federal court may provide for a violation of Title I. It must be conceded that there is an inconsistency between Titles I and IV of the LMRDA. While 102 in Title I grants district courts seemingly unqualified power to grant "such relief (including injunctions), as may be appropriate," 403 of Title IV provides: "The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." 29 U.S. C. 483. As the Court points out, the legislative history contains nothing that directly addresses this apparent inconsistency. Ante, at 542-543. I agree with the Court that the question presented by this case can be answered only by reference to the underlying purposes of the Act. Ante, at 541-542. However, I do not agree that those purposes support today's holding. Title I was "aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | I was "aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution," By securing these rights, Congress hoped to ensure unions would function in a more democratic manner.[1] We have previously construed 102 of Title I to have a broad sweep, consistent with its broad remedial purposes. In we wrote: " 102 was intended to afford the courts `a wide latitude to grant relief according to the necessities of the case,' and `to give such relief as [the court] deems equitable under all the circumstances.' " (quoting 105 Cong. Rec. 15548 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Elliott), and ). Employing this broad construction of the power conferred by 102, we then held that an award of attorney's fees was consistent with the statute.[2] *554 The Court concedes that 102 authorizes the issuance of limited injunctions that would not substantially delay or invalidate an election, ante, at 546. The anomaly that results is that only the most serious violations of Title I go unremedied as a result of today's holding. It is only when a violation takes place in the midst of an election, produces the kind of irreparable injury that only an injunction can remedy, and is of a magnitude such that it taints the entire election and the results thereof, that the Court's holding precludes a remedy. Such an approach is plainly inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of Title I. There is no instance in which Title I rights are of greater importance, and hence the need for their effective vindication a more compelling necessity, than in the midst of an election. We wrote in Hall that "Title I of the LMRDA was specifically designed to protect the union member's right to seek higher office within the union." The reason for this is clear enough: "Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision in order to promote union democracy. It recognized that democracy would be assured only if union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal. Congress also recognized that this freedom is particularly critical, and deserves vigorous protection, in the context of [union] election campaigns. For it is in elections that members can wield their power, and directly express their approval or disapproval of the union leadership." By ensuring that Title I violations which go to the heart of the electoral process will not be effectively remedied, the majority seriously undermines the core purpose of Title I. *555 The underlying purposes of 403, in contrast, provide no justification for limiting the relief available under |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | contrast, provide no justification for limiting the relief available under 102. Section 403 was written before Title I was added to the LMRDA on the floor of the Senate. Thus, as the majority acknowledges ante, at 542-543, there is little in Title IV's history or purpose to suggest that it was directed at limiting the relief available under Title I. At the time 403 was drafted and discussed, its only effect was to limit the ability of state courts to invalidate union elections; that is certainly the only purpose or policy identified in the legislative history. For example, the Senate Report states: "Section [4]03 of the bill specifically preserves rights and remedies which union members have under existing law to insure compliance with provisions of a union's constitution and bylaws relating to elections prior to the conduct of an election. However, since the bill provides an effective and expeditious remedy for overthrowing an improperly held election and holding a new election, the Federal remedy is made the sole remedy and private litigation would be precluded." S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1959).[3] *556 In fact, this Court has previously acknowledged this very point: "The debates reflect great concern with the proper relationship between state and federal remedies, and much less concern with the relationship between private and public enforcement." Thus, the policies underlying 403 are a slender reed on which to support today's holding. Moreover, what limited relevance the original intent and purpose of Title IV has is undermined by the subsequent addition of Title I on the floor of the Senate. The precise reason Title I was added to the LMRDA was because Congress concluded that Title IV did not go far enough in protecting the rights of individual union members.[4] In particular, Congress added 102 because it felt that these rights had to be enforced through a private right of action. n. 10. The original version of Title I, offered as an amendment to the LMRDA by Senator McClellan, provided that the rights contained therein would be enforced through suits brought by the Secretary of Labor. See 105 Cong. Rec. 6469-6492 (1959). The amendment passed only narrowly, with the Vice President casting the tie-breaking vote. See One of the arguments made against this version of Title I by a number of Senators was that the rights it created were individual *557 in nature and should be enforced through a private right of action rather than by the Secretary of Labor.[5] Three days later, Senator Kuchel offered a compromise version of Title I. He explained: "[I]n |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | offered a compromise version of Title I. He explained: "[I]n several major points the McClellan amendment would be changed by our amendment. In one case our amendment provides for deleting from the McClellan amendment the provision for the right of the Secretary of Labor to seek an injunction when any of the rights enumerated are alleged to have been violated. In such circumstances, our amendment gives a union member who alleges such a grievance the right to go into the Federal court for appropriate relief." This change resulted from dissatisfaction with leaving Title I rights in the hands of the Secretary of Labor. Senator Kuchel explained: "[H]ere is one of the major changes in the proposal. The amendment of the Senator from Arkansas provided that the Secretary of Labor might, on behalf of the injured or aggrieved member, have the right to litigate the alleged grievance and to seek an injunction or other relief. We believe that giving this type of right to the aggrieved employee member himself is in the interest of justice, and therefore we propose to eliminate from the bill the right of the Secretary of Labor to sue in his behalf." Senator Kefauver congratulated Senator Kuchel on removing the Secretary of Labor from "the middle of the actions of every labor union in the United States," and Senator Clark noted that the new version of Title I "takes the Federal bureaucracy out of this bill of rights and leaves *558 its enforcement to union members, aided by courts," Senator Curtis said that according the individual union member a private right of action "represents the finest means by which his rights may be protected." There are numerous other statements in the legislative history to similar effect.[6] Thus, whatever may have been its belief when Title IV was originally drafted, the legislative history of Title I demonstrates that Congress rejected reliance on the Secretary of Labor to vindicate Title I rights. Yet that is the precise effect of today's holding in those cases where the seriousness of the violation and the irreparability of the remedy would justify an injunction overturning the results of an election, the Court has decreed that union members' ability to obtain a remedy for violations of their Title I rights is left to the discretion of the Secretary, a result at odds with the fundamental reason 102 was added to the statute.[7] the case on which the majority principally relies, does not require the Court to adopt its parsimonious construction of 102. In Calhoon, the Court began its analysis with a simple proposition: |
Justice Stevens | 1,984 | 16 | dissenting | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | Calhoon, the Court began its analysis with a simple proposition: "Jurisdiction of the District Court under 102 of Title I depends entirely upon whether this complaint showed a violation of rights guaranteed by 101(a)(1)," 8. In stating its *559 holding, the Court never mentioned 403, much less hold that it limited the scope of relief available under 102. The Court simply held that the complaint in that case did not fall under 102 because it challenged the eligibility requirements for union office, and "Title IV, not Title I, sets standards for eligibility and qualifications of candidates and officials," In this case, since the Court concedes that respondents established the probable existence of violations of 101, it follows that under Calhoon there is jurisdiction to issue an "appropriate" remedy for those violations.[8] In sum, the Court's conclusion that 403 is a limitation on the power granted district courts in 102 turns the statute and its legislative history on their head. The majority reads the statute as if Title IV had been added to the statute to limit the scope of Title I, when in reality the reverse is true. Congress wanted union members to be able to protect their own Title I rights rather than to rely on the Secretary of Labor. Because the Court's holding means that the most serious violations of Title I cannot be adequately remedied except in the discretion of the Secretary, I cannot join the Court's holding or judgment. I recognize that in practice the question whether a new election is an appropriate remedy will not be free from difficulty. In shaping a remedy, the exercise of the district court's discretion should be informed by the national labor policies discussed by the Court ante, at 544, n. 19, 548-549: *560 courts should be wary of unjustified or excessive interference in union elections and of the difficulties inherent in supervising an election; they should also accord due deference to the views of the Secretary of Labor.[9] However, it is unnecessary to confront any question concerning the meaning of "appropriate" relief in this case, for two reasons. First, petitioners themselves do not press the point. The questions presented in their petition for certiorari, and the thrust of their briefs, are that 403 precluded the District Court from acting as it did. Petitioners do not argue that the District Court abused its discretion even if 403 were not applicable here. Second, in large part petitioners stipulated to the appropriateness of the relief in the District Court, by filing stipulations indicating that they were willing to rerun the allegedly tainted |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | second_dissenting | Jefferson County Pharm. Assn. v. Abbott Labs. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110878/jefferson-county-pharm-assn-v-abbott-labs/ | The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory construction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers purchases of commodities by state and local governments for resale in competition with private retailers.[1] The Court's *175 task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 136 Congress which enacted the Robinson-Patman I do not agree with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reliance on the broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws generally. The 136 Congress simply did not focus on this issue. The business and legal communities have assumed for the past four decades that such purchases are not covered. For these reasons, as explained more fully below, I respectfully dissent. I A The majority relies extensively on the interpretation this Court has given to the term "person" under the Sherman Act and other statutes as a guide to whether the terms "person" and "purchasers," as used in 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (Act), 15 U.S. C. 13, include state and local governmental entities. See ante, at 155-156. In my view, such reliance is misplaced. The question of the Robinson-Patman Act's treatment of governmental purchases requires an independent examination of the legislative history of that Act to ascertain congressional intent.[2] Indeed, the cases cited by the majority *176 emphasize that the key question regarding coverage or noncoverage of governmental entities is the intent of Congress in enacting the statute in question.[3] Resolution of the statutory construction question cannot be made to depend upon the abstract assertion that the term "person" is broad enough to embrace States and municipalities.[4] For these *177 reasons, the mere fact that in City of a Sherman Act case, the Court referred to the Robinson-Patman Act in its discussion of the breadth of the term "person" cannot resolve the question now before us. Further, the majority opinion propounds a misleading syllogism when it (1) suggests that the term "person" in the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed similarly, (2) cites for the proposition that the Clayton Act applies to States, and (3) then opines that the terms "person" and "purchasers" under 2 therefore should be construed to include state purchases. Ante, at 155-156. Because, as the majority observes, ante, at 156, n. 13, the definitional section of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 12, was intended to apply to the Robinson-Patman Act, I do not dispute the first proposition. However, stated only that a State is a "person" for purposes of bringing a treble damages |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | second_dissenting | Jefferson County Pharm. Assn. v. Abbott Labs. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110878/jefferson-county-pharm-assn-v-abbott-labs/ | is a "person" for purposes of bringing a treble damages action under 4 of the Clayton[5] Conspicuously absent from the majority's discussion is any authority holding that States or local governments are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers under the provisions of the Clayton [6] Although Congress *178 might now decide that the purchasing activities of States and local governments should be subject to the limitations imposed by 2, that is a policy judgment appropriately left to legislative determination. B Nor do I find persuasive the majority's invocation of presumptions regarding the liberal construction and broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws generally. Without derogating the usefulness of those principles or suggesting that they should never play a role in the Robinson-Patman context, one may nevertheless candidly acknowledge that the Court also has identified a certain tension between the Robinson-Patman Act, on the one hand, and the Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes, on the other. The Court frequently has recognized that strict enforcement of the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the former may lead to price rigidity and uniformity in direct conflict with the goals of the latter. See, e. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea ; Automatic Canteen ; Standard Oil[7] *17 At the very least, this recognition raises doubts that the Court should liberally construe the Robinson-Patman Act in favor of broader coverage. Those doubts are enhanced by the fact that Congress' principal aim in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act was to protect small retailers from the competitive injury suffered at the hands of large chain stores.[8] It is consistent with that intent for Congress also to have displayed special solicitude for the well-established, below-trade price-buying practices of governmental institutions. II As the majority documents, ante, at 160, n. 1, the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly indicates that Congress envisioned some sort of immunity for governmental bodies.[] The question before the Court is the extent *180 of that immunity in particular, whether the purchase of goods by state and local governments for resale in competition with private retailers is within the intended scope of the Robinson-Patman As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 15, the 136 Congress that enacted the Robinson-Patman Act did not focus on the precise issue before the Court. Notwithstanding this admission, the majority announces the surprising conclusion that "[t]o create an exemption here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress." Ante, at 171 (emphasis added). The majority is correct in stating that it is not the business of this Court to engage in " `policy-making in the field of |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | second_dissenting | Jefferson County Pharm. Assn. v. Abbott Labs. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110878/jefferson-county-pharm-assn-v-abbott-labs/ | Court to engage in " `policy-making in the field of antitrust legislation' " in order to fill gaps where Congress has not clearly expressed its intent. Ante, at 170 ). It is precisely because I concur in that admonition that I would refrain from attributing to Congress an intent to cover the state and local governmental purchases in question here.[10] *181 A In attempting to supply the unexpressed intent of Congress, the majority fails to offer satisfactory guidelines for determining the scope of the Act's coverage of governmental agencies.[11] The majority assumes, "without deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions" and suggests that state purchases of pharmaceuticals for the purpose of resale to indigent citizens may not expose the State to antitrust liability. Ante, at 154, and n. 7. The majority's assumption, however, is inconsistent with the principles of statutory construction upon which it purports to rely. If, absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, the plain language of the statute controls, then by the majority's own assertions one would have to conclude that even purchases for the State's own use or for resale to indigents would fall within the Act's proscriptions. For, as the majority remarks, ante, at 155, the terms "person" and "purchasers" are broad enough to include governmental entities, and the legislative history is "ambiguous on the application of the Act to state purchases for consumption." Ante, at 160-161. Moreover, to the extent the majority implies that a State's coverage or noncoverage under the Act turns on the distinction between purchases for resale and purchases for consumption,[12] that distinction is inconsistent with the competition *182 rationale elsewhere suggested, ante, at 170, to underlie the prohibitions of 2(a). For example, a state university hospital might limit the use of its pharmacy to its own faculty and staff, thereby falling within the "for their own use" exception.[13] Nevertheless, the university pharmacy may be inflicting competitive injury on private pharmacies that the university's faculty and staff might otherwise patronize.[14] Thus, the majority's conflicting suggestions leave in doubt what principle the presence of functional competition or the consumption/resale dichotomy guides the determination whether a state or local government's purchases fall within the Act's proscriptions. B Against the backdrop of a legislative history that even the majority concedes does not focus on the issue before us stands the general consensus in the legal and business communities that sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-Patman The majority devotes considerable effort to distinguishing or |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | second_dissenting | Jefferson County Pharm. Assn. v. Abbott Labs. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110878/jefferson-county-pharm-assn-v-abbott-labs/ | the Robinson-Patman The majority devotes considerable effort to distinguishing or undercutting the authorities cited by the respondents. In so doing, and in observing that these authorities cannot reveal Congress' intent in 136, ante, at 165, n. 27, the majority misunderstands the significance of this evidence. These authorities simply illustrate the virtually unanimous assumption over the past 47 years of noncoverage of governmental entities an assumption that has served as the basis of well-established governmental purchasing *183 practices and marketing relationships. In the past the Court has relied upon the widespread understanding of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act in limiting the scope of the Act's prohibitions.[15] To do so here is no less appropriate. Despite its attempt to discount the significance of the judicial authorities cited by the respondents, the majority cannot dispute that no court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either 2(a) or 2(f), 15 U.S. C. 13(a) and (f), in a case involving an alleged price discrimination in favor of a federal, state, or municipal governmental purchaser.[16]*184 Commentators confirm the general judicial consensus that sales to States and municipalities are not covered by the [17] Moreover, Congress' failure to enact bills extending *185 Robinson-Patman coverage to these entities buttresses this interpretation of the See n. This same understanding has been expressed in testimony before Congress. In 167 and 168 a congressional Subcommittee conducted public hearings on the problems of small businesses in the pharmaceutical industry. The Subcommittee heard testimony from both representatives of pharmaceutical manufacturers and retail pharmacists regarding the industrywide practice of price discrimination in sales of pharmaceuticals to governmental purchasers federal, state, county, and municipal.[18] Several witnesses also directly expressed their assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply to such sales.[1] *186 In 16 and 170, the same House Subcommittee investigated the problems of small businessmen under the Robinson-Patman In these hearings witnesses again expressed the view that governmental purchases at any level are not covered, highlighting the problem of favorable prices on governmental purchases for resale and making a plea for a change in the law.[20] *187 III The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly reveals that Congress intended to exclude governmental entities from the Act's proscriptions to some extent. However, Congress did not focus on the issue before us and therefore did not provide a clear rationale governing coverage and noncoverage. In an area in which bright lines are needed to guide state and local governments in their purchasing practices, the majority fails to identify any principle triggering inclusion or exclusion. *188 Moreover, one cannot doubt |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | second_dissenting | Jefferson County Pharm. Assn. v. Abbott Labs. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110878/jefferson-county-pharm-assn-v-abbott-labs/ | principle triggering inclusion or exclusion. *188 Moreover, one cannot doubt that state, county, and municipal governments and manufacturers of commodities have structured their marketing relationships with each other on the longstanding assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply to those transactions. That understanding finds substantial support among the courts and commentators. State and local governments have developed programs for providing services to the public, including medical care to the indigent and the medically needy,[21] based on the same assumption. The majority's holding that sales of commodities to state and local governments for resale in competition with private enterprise are covered by the Act will engender significant disruption not only through government and industry reexamination and restructuring of marketing relationships, but also, unfortunately, through possible termination of services and supplies to needy citizens[22] and through litigation associated with the process of reexamination.[23] The Court rests its decision primarily on one statement in the legislative history,[24] taken in isolation from other remarks designed to assure concerned House Members that *18 the Act would not force the abandonment of governmental below-market buying practices which the majority's holding now calls into question. Given Congress' failure to delineate the extent of the Robinson-Patman Act's coverage or noncoverage of state and local governments, I would allow Congress to speak on this issue rather than disrupt longstanding practices and programs and judicially arm private litigants with a powerful treble-damages action against these governments. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment below. |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | A federal statute, 18 U.S. C. makes it a crime to “knowingly procure[ ], contrary to law, the naturaliza- tion of any person.” And when someone is convicted under of unlawfully procuring her own naturalization, her citizenship is automatically revoked. See 8 U.S. C. In this case, we consider what the Government must prove to obtain such a conviction. We hold that the Government must establish that an illegal act by the defendant played some role in her acquisition of citizen- ship. When the illegal act is a false statement, that means demonstrating that the defendant lied about facts that would have mattered to an immigration official, because they would have justified denying naturalization or would predictably have led to other facts warranting that result. I Petitioner Divna Maslenjak is an ethnic Serb who re- sided in Bosnia during the 1990’s, when a civil war between Serbs and Muslims divided the new country. In 1998, she and her family (her husband Ratko Maslenjak and their two children) met with an American immigration official MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court to seek refugee status in the United States. Interviewed under oath, Maslenjak explained that the family feared persecution in Bosnia from both sides of the national rift. Muslims, she said, would mistreat them because of their ethnicity. And Serbs, she testified, would abuse them because her husband had evaded service in the Bosnian Serb Army by absconding to Serbia—where he remained hidden, apart from the family, for some five years. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a–60a. Persuaded of the Maslen- jaks’ plight, American officials granted them refugee status, and they immigrated to the United States in 000. Six years later, Maslenjak applied for naturalization. Question 3 on the application form asked whether she had ever given “false or misleading information” to a government official while applying for an immigration benefit; question 4 similarly asked whether she had ever “lied to a[ ] government official to gain entry or admission into the United States.” at 7a. Maslenjak answered “no” to both questions, while swearing under oath that her replies were true. at 7a, 74a. She also swore that all her written answers were true during a subsequent inter- view with an immigration official. In August 007, Maslenjak was naturalized as a U. S. citizen. But Maslenjak’s professions of honesty were false: In fact, she had made up much of the story she told to immi- gration officials when seeking refuge in this country. Her fiction began to unravel at around the same time she applied for citizenship. In 006, |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | around the same time she applied for citizenship. In 006, immigration officials confronted Maslenjak’s husband Ratko with records show- ing that he had not fled conscription during the Bosnian civil war; rather, he had served as an officer in the Bos- nian Serb Army. And not only that: He had served in a brigade that participated in the Srebrenica massacre—a slaughter of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians. Within a year, the Government convicted Ratko on charges of making false statements on immigration documents. The Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 3 Opinion of the Court newly naturalized Maslenjak attempted to prevent Ratko’s deportation. During proceedings on that matter, Maslen- jak admitted she had known all along that Ratko spent the war years not secreted in Serbia but fighting in Bosnia. As a result, the Government charged Maslenjak with knowingly “procur[ing], contrary to law, [her] naturaliza- tion,” in violation of 18 U.S. C. According to the Government’s theory, Maslenjak violated be- cause, in the course of procuring her naturalization, she broke another law: 18 U.S. C. which prohibits knowingly making a false statement under oath in a natu- ralization proceeding. The false statements the Govern- ment invoked were Maslenjak’s answers to questions 3 and 4 on the citizenship application (stating that she had not lied in seeking refugee status) and her corresponding statements in the citizenship interview. Those state- ments, the Government argued to the District Court, need not have affected the naturalization decision to support a conviction under The court agreed: Over Maslenjak’s objection, it instructed the jury that a convic- tion was proper so long as the Government “prove[d] that one of the defendant’s statements was false”—even if the statement was not “material” and “did not influence the decision to approve [her] naturalization.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. The jury returned a guilty verdict; and the District Court, based on that finding, stripped Maslenjak of her citizenship. See 8 U.S. C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. As relevant here, the Sixth Cir- cuit upheld the District Court’s instructions that Maslen- jak’s false statements need not have influenced the natu- ralization decision. If, the Court of Appeals held, Maslenjak made false statements violating and she procured naturalization, then she also violated —irrespective of whether the false statements 4 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court played any role in her obtaining citizenship. See 81 F.3d 675, That decision created a conflict in the Circuit Courts.1 We granted certiorari to resolve it, 580 U. S. (017), and we now vacate the |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | it, 580 U. S. (017), and we now vacate the Sixth Circuit’s judgment. II A Section 145(a), the parties agree, makes it a crime to commit some other illegal act in connection with naturali- zation. But the parties dispute the nature of the required connection. Maslenjak argues that the relationship must be “causal” in kind: A person “procures” her naturalization “contrary to law,” she contends, only if a predicate crime in some way “contribut[ed]” to her gaining citizenship. Brief for Petitioner 1. By contrast, the Government proposes a basically chronological link: Section 145(a), it urges, “punishes the commission of other violations of law in the course of procuring naturalization”—even if the illegality could not have had any effect on the naturalization deci- sion. Brief for United States 14 (emphasis added). We conclude that Maslenjak has the better of this argument. We begin, as usual, with the statutory text. In ordinary usage, “to procure” something is “to get possession of ” it. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1809 (00); accord, Black’s Law Dictionary 1401 (10th ed. 014) (defining “procure” as “[t]o obtain (something), esp. by special effort or means”). So to “procure naturaliza- tion” means to obtain naturalization with United (requiring the Government to make some showing that a misrepresentation mattered to the naturalization decision); United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 71–715 (CA7 009) ; United States v. 433 F.3d 1148, 1154–1156 (CA9 006) ; United Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 5 Opinion of the Court word, citizenship). The adverbial phrase “contrary to law,” wedged in between “procure” and “naturalization,” then specifies how a person must procure naturalization so as to run afoul of the statute: in contravention of the law—or, in a word, illegally. Putting the pieces together, someone “procure[s], contrary to law, naturalization” when she obtains citizenship illegally. What, then, does that whole phrase mean? The most natural understanding is that the illegal act must have somehow contributed to the obtaining of citizenship. Consider if someone said to you: “John obtained that painting illegally.” You might imagine that he stole it off the walls of a museum. Or that he paid for it with a forged check. Or that he impersonated the true buyer when the auction house delivered it. But in all events, you would imagine illegal acts in some kind of means-end relation—or otherwise said, in some kind of causal rela- tion—to the painting’s acquisition. If someone said to you, “John obtained that painting illegally, but his unlawful acts did not play any role in his obtaining it,” you would not have a clue what |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | his obtaining it,” you would not have a clue what the statement meant. You would think it nonsense—or perhaps the opening of a riddle. That is because if no illegal act contributed at all to get- ting the painting, then the painting would not have been gotten illegally. And the same goes for naturalization. If whatever illegal conduct occurring within the naturaliza- tion process was a causal dead-end—if, so to speak, the ripples from that act could not have reached the decision to award citizenship—then the act cannot support a charge that the applicant obtained naturalization illegally. The conduct, though itself illegal, would not also make the obtaining of citizenship so. To get citizenship unlawfully, we understand, is to get it through an unlawful means— and that is just to say that an illegality played some role 6 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court in its acquisition. The Government’s contrary view—that re- quires only a “violation[ ] of law in the course of procuring naturalization”—falters on the way language naturally works. Brief for United States 14. Return for a moment to our artwork example. Imagine this time that John made an illegal turn while driving to the auction house to purchase a painting. Would you say that he had “procured the painting illegally” because he happened to violate the —————— Tobe fair, the idea of “obtaining citizenship illegally” has one other possible meaning, but no one defends it here because it does not fit with the rest of On this alternative reading, a person would violate by obtaining citizenship without the requisite legal qualifica- tions—regardless of whether she committed another illegal act in the naturalization process. To vary our earlier example, suppose someone told you that John procured a gun illegally. You might think that meant John got the gun through independently unlawful conduct (e.g., he held up a gun store), as in the case of the painting. But you might instead think that John was just not legally qualified to take possession of a gun—because, for example, he once committed a felony. That alternative interpretation is plausible with respect to goods that not everyone is eligible to obtain, like guns—or like naturalization. And indeed, we have interpreted a civil statute closely resembling —which authorizes denaturalization when, inter alia, citizenship is “illegally procured,” 8 U.S. C. cover that qualifications- based species of illegality. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981). But neither party urges that reading here, and for good reason. Unlike its civil analogue, has a companion makes it a crime to “procure or |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | has a companion makes it a crime to “procure or obtain naturalization” for “[one]self or another person not entitled thereto.” If obtaining citizenship without legal entitlement were enough to violate then that highly specific language in would be superfluous. Rather than reading those words to do no work, in viola- tion of ordinary canons of statutory construction, we understand Congress to have defined two separate crimes in Assuming the appropriate mens rea, subsection (a) covers illegal means of procure- ment, as described above, while subsection (b) covers simple lack of qualifications. As we will explain, however, questions relating to citizenship qualifications play a significant role when applying ’s causal standard in cases (like this one) predicated on false statements. See infra, at 10–11. Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 7 Opinion of the Court law in the course of obtaining it? Not likely. And again, the same is true with respect to naturalization. Suppose that an applicant for citizenship fills out the necessary paperwork in a government office with a knife tucked away in her handbag (but never mentioned or used). She has violated the law—specifically, a statute criminalizing the possession of a weapon in a federal building. See 18 U.S. C. And she has surely done so “in the course of ” procuring citizenship. But would you say, using Eng- lish as you ordinarily would, that she has “procure[d]” her citizenship “contrary to law” (or, as you would really speak, “illegally”)? Once again, no. That is because the violation of law and the acquisition of citizenship are in that example merely coincidental: The one has no causal relation to the other. The Government responds to such examples by seeking to define them out of the statute, but that effort falls short for multiple reasons. According to the Government, the laws to which speaks are only laws “pertaining to naturalization.” Brief for United States 0. But to begin with, that claim fails on its own terms. The Government’s proposed limitation has no basis in ’s text (which refers to “law” generally); it is a deus ex machina— rationalized only by calling it “necessary,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, and serving only to get the Government out of a tight interpretive spot. Indeed, the Government does not really buy its own argument: At another point, it asserts that an applicant for citizenship can violate by bribing a government official, see Brief for United States 16—even though the law against that conduct has nothing in par- ticular to do with naturalization. See 18 U.S. C. And still more important, the Government’s (sometime) |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | 18 U.S. C. And still more important, the Government’s (sometime) carve-out does nothing to alter the linguistic understanding that gives force to the examples the Gov- ernment would exclude—and that applies just as well to every application that would remain. Laws pertaining to 8 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court naturalization, in other words, are subject to the same rules of language usage as laws concerning other subjects. And under those rules, as we have shown, de- mands a means-end connection between a legal violation and naturalization. See at 5–6. Take ’s bar on making false statements in connection with natu- ralization—the prototypical predicate, and the one at issue here. If such a statement (in an interview, say) has no bearing at all on the decision to award citizen- ship, then it cannot render that award—as re- quires—illegally gained. The broader statutory context reinforces that point, because the Government’s reading would create a pro- found mismatch between the requirements for naturaliza- tion on the one hand and those for denaturalization on the other. See West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, (“[I]t is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris”). The immi- gration statute requires all applicants for citizenship to have “good moral character,” and largely defines that term through a list of unlawful or unethical behaviors. 8 U.S. C. 1(f ).3 On the Government’s theory, some legal violations that do not justify denying citizenship under that definition would nonetheless justify revoking it later. Again, false statements under offer an apt illustration. The statute’s description of “good moral character” singles out a specific class of lies—“false testimony for the purpose of obtaining [immigration] benefits”—as a reason to deny naturalization. 8 U.S. C. §1(f )(6). By contrast, “[w]illful misrepresentations made for other reasons, such as embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy, were not deemed sufficiently culpable to —————— 3 The list of disqualifying conduct is wide-ranging. See, e.g., 8 U.S. C. §1(f)(4) (illegal gambling); §1(f)(8) (aggravated felony conviction); §1(f)(9) (participation in genocide). Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 9 Opinion of the Court brand the applicant as someone who lacks good moral character”—and so are not generally disqualifying. (quot- ing Supplemental Brief for United States 1). But under the Government’s reading of a lie told in the naturalization process—even out of embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy—would always provide a basis for rescinding citizenship. The Government could thus take away on one day what it was required to give the day before. And by so wholly unmooring the revocation of citizen- ship from its |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | so wholly unmooring the revocation of citizen- ship from its award, the Government opens the door to a world of disquieting consequences—which we would need far stronger textual support to believe Congress intended. Consider the kinds of questions a person seeking citizen- ship confronts on the standard application form. Says one: “Have you EVER been in any way associated with[ ] any organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society, or similar group[?]” Form N–400, Applica- tion for Naturalization 1 online at http://www. uscis.gov/n-400 (as last visited June 0, 017) (bold in original). Asks another: “Have you EVER committed a crime or offense for which you were NOT arrested?” at 14. Suppose, for reasons of embarrassment or what- have-you, a person concealed her membership in an online support group or failed to disclose a prior speeding viola- tion. Under the Government’s view, a prosecutor could scour her paperwork and bring a charge on that meager basis, even many years after she became a citizen. That would give prosecutors nearly limitless leverage— and afford newly naturalized Americans precious little security. Small wonder that Congress, in enacting did not go so far as the Government claims. The statute it passed, most naturally read, strips a person of citizenship not when she committed any illegal act during the naturalization process, but only when that act played 10 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court some role in her naturalization. B That conclusion leaves us with a more operational ques- tion: How should ’s requirement of causal influ- ence apply in practice, when charges are brought under that law?4 Because the proper analysis may vary with the nature of the predicate crime, we confine our discussion of that issue to the kind of underlying illegality alleged here: a false statement made to government officials. Such conduct can affect a naturalization decision in a single, significant way—by distorting the Government’s under- standing of the facts when it investigates, and then adju- dicates, an application. So the issue a jury must decide in a case like this one is whether a false statement sufficiently altered those processes as to have influenced an award of citizenship. The answer to that question, like the naturalization decision itself, turns on objective legal criteria. Congress —————— 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH would stop before answering that question, see post, at (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), but we think that such a halfway-decision would fail to fulfill our responsi- bility to both parties and courts. The Government needs to know what prosecutions to bring; defendants need to know what defenses |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | what prosecutions to bring; defendants need to know what defenses to offer; and district courts need to know how to instruct juries. Telling them only “ has something to do with causation” would not much help them make those decisions. And we are well-positioned to provide further guidance. The parties have had every opportunity to address the nature of the statute’s causal standard, and both gave us consid- ered views about how the law should work in practice. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 3–4, 30; Brief for United States 17–18, 48; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14–16, 3–5, 39–46. Moreover, many lower courts have already addressed those same issues—including one that has called this Court’s failure to provide clear guidance “maddening[ ].” Latchin, 554 F.3d, at 713; see, e.g., at 713–714; 781 F.3d, at –538; ; –; United WL 96113, *–*3 ; United *7–*8 (ED Mich., Oct. 7, 014). Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 11 Opinion of the Court has prescribed specific eligibility standards for new citi- zens, respecting such matters as length of residency and “physical[ ] presen[ce],” understanding of English and American government, and (as previously mentioned) “good moral character,” with all its many specific compo- nents. See 8 U.S. C. 147(a); Government officials are obligated to apply that body of law faithfully—granting naturalization when the appli- cable criteria are satisfied, and denying it when they are not. See n. 9 ; And to ensure right results are reached, a court can reverse such a determination, at an applicant’s request, based on its “own findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 8 U.S. C. The entire system, in other words, is set up to provide little or no room for subjective preferences or personal whims. Because that is so, the question of what any individual decisionmaker might have done with accu- rate information is beside the point: The defendant in a case should neither benefit nor suffer from a wayward official’s deviations from legal requirements. Accordingly, the proper causal inquiry under is framed in objective terms: To decide whether a defendant acquired citizenship by means of a lie, a jury must evalu- ate how knowledge of the real facts would have affected a reasonable government official properly applying naturali- zation law. If the facts the defendant misrepresented are them- selves disqualifying, the jury can make quick work of that inquiry. In such a case, there is an obvious causal link between the defendant’s lie and her procurement of citi- zenship. To take an example: An applicant for citizenship must be physically present in the United States for more |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | must be physically present in the United States for more than half of the five-year period preceding her application. See 8 U.S. C. Suppose a defendant misrepre- sented her travel history to convey she had met that re- 1 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court quirement, when in fact she had not. The Government need only expose that lie to establish that she obtained naturalization illegally—for had she told the truth in- stead, the official would have promptly denied her applica- tion. Or consider another, perhaps more common case stemming from the “good moral character” criterion. See That phrase is defined to exclude any person who has been convicted of an aggravated fel- ony. See §1(f )(8). If a defendant falsely denied such a conviction, she too would have gotten her citizenship by means of a lie—for otherwise the outcome would have been different. In short, when the defendant misrepre- sents facts that the law deems incompatible with citizen- ship, her lie must have played a role in her naturalization. But that is not the only time a jury can find that a defendant’s lie had the requisite bearing on a naturaliza- tion decision. For even if the true facts lying behind a false statement would not “in and of themselves justify denial of citizenship,” they could have “led to the discovery of other facts which would” do so. We previously addressed that possibility when considering the civil statute that authorizes the Government to revoke natural- ization. See –777 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (interpreting 8 U.S. C. As we ex- plained in that context, a person whose lies throw investi- gators off a trail leading to disqualifying facts gets her citizenship by means of those lies—no less than if she had denied the damning facts at the very end of the trail. See When relying on such an investigation-based theory, the —————— 5 concerned the part of that statute providing for the revoca- tion of citizenship “procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” As noted earlier, the same statute includes a prong covering citizenship that is “illegally pro- cured.” See n. Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 13 Opinion of the Court Government must make a two-part showing to meet its burden. As an initial matter, the Government has to prove that the misrepresented fact was sufficiently rele- vant to one or another naturalization criterion that it would have prompted reasonable officials, “seeking only evidence concerning citizenship qualifications,” to under- take further investigation. If that much is true, the inquiry turns to the prospect |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | that much is true, the inquiry turns to the prospect that such an investigation would have borne disqualifying fruit. As to that second link in the causal chain, the Government need not show definitively that its investigation would have unearthed a disqualifying fact (though, of course, it may). Rather, the Government need only establish that the investigation “would predictably have disclosed” some legal disqualification. ; see (Brennan, J., concurring). If that is so, the defendant’s misrepresen- tation contributed to the citizenship award in the way we think requires. That standard reflects two real-world attributes of cases premised on what an unhindered investigation would have found. First is the difficulty of proving that a hypothetical inquiry would have led to some disqualifying discovery, often several years after the defendant told her lies. As witnesses and other evidence disappear, the Government’s effort to reconstruct the course of a “could have been” investigation confronts ever-mounting obstacles. See at 779 Second, and critical to our analysis, is that the defendant—not the Government— bears the blame for that evidentiary predicament. After all, the inquiry cannot get this far unless the defendant made an unlawful false statement and, by so doing, ob- structed the normal course of an investigation. See at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “the citizen’s misrepresentation [in a naturalization proceed- ing] necessarily frustrated the Government’s investigative efforts”); see also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 37 14 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court U. S. 51, 65 (1946) (“The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created”). Section 145(a) is best read to take those exigencies and equities into account, by enabling the Government (as just described) to rest on disqualifications that a thwarted investigation predictably would have uncovered. A yet- stricter causal requirement, demanding proof positive that a disqualifying fact would have been found, sets the bar so high that “we cannot conceive that Congress intended” that result. (opinion of Scalia, J.). And nothing in the statutory text requires that ap- proach. While clearly imports some kind of causal or means-end relation, see at 5–9, Congress left that relation’s precise character unspecified. Cf. Bur- rage v. United States, 571 U. S. (014) (slip op., at 10) (noting that courts have not always construed criminal statutes to “require[ ] strict but-for causality,” and have greater reason to reject such a reading when the laws do not use language like “results from” or “because of ”). The open-endedness of the statutory language allows, indeed |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | of ”). The open-endedness of the statutory language allows, indeed supports, our adoption of a demanding but still practicable causal standard. Even when the Government can make its two-part showing, however, the defendant may be able to overcome it. Section 145(a) is not a tool for denaturalizing people who, the available evidence indicates, were actually quali- fied for the citizenship they obtained. When addressing the civil denaturalization statute, this Court insisted on a similar point: We provided the defendant with an oppor- tunity to rebut the Government’s case “by showing, through a preponderance of the evidence, that the statutory requirement as to which [a lie] had a natural tendency to produce a favorable decision was in fact met.” (emphasis deleted); Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 15 Opinion of the Court accord, –784 (Brennan, J., concurring). Or said otherwise, we gave the defendant a chance to establish that she was qualified for citizenship, and held that she could not be denaturalized if she did so—even though she concealed or misrepresented facts that suggested the opposite. And indeed, all our denaturalization decisions share this crucial feature: We have never read a statute to strip citizenship from someone who met the legal criteria for acquiring it. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505–507 (1981); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 65, 69–7 (1961); 30 U.S. 118, 1–13 We will not start now. Whatever the Government shows with respect to a thwarted investigation, qualification for citizenship is a complete defense to a prosecution brought under III Measured against all we have said, the jury instructions in this case were in error. As earlier noted, the District Court told the jury that it could convict based on any false statement in the naturalization process (i.e., any violation of ), no matter how inconsequential to the ulti- mate decision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a; But as we have shown, the jury needed to find more than an unlawful false statement. Recall that Maslenjak’s lie in the naturalization process concerned her prior state- ments to immigration officials: She swore that she had been honest when applying for admission as a refugee, but in fact she had not. See at –3. The jury could have convicted if that earlier dishonesty (i.e., the thing she misrepresented when seeking citizenship) were itself a reason to deny naturalization—say, because it counted as “false testimony for the purpose of obtaining [immigration] benefits” and thus demonstrated bad moral character. See at 11–1. Or else, the jury could have convicted if (1) knowledge of that prior dishonesty would |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Maslenjak v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4403803/maslenjak-v-united-states/ | have convicted if (1) knowledge of that prior dishonesty would have led a 16 MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court reasonable official to make some further investigation (say, into the circumstances of her admission), () that inquiry would predictably have yielded a legal basis for rejecting her citizenship application, and (3) Maslenjak failed to show that (notwithstanding such an objective likelihood) she was in fact qualified to become a U. S. citizen. See at 1–15. This jury, however, was not asked to—and so did not—make any of those determina- tions. Accordingly, Maslenjak was not convicted by a properly instructed jury of “procur[ing], contrary to law, [her] naturalization.” The Government asserts that any instructional error in this case was harmless. “Had officials known the truth,” the Government asserts, “it would have affected their decision to grant [Maslenjak] citizenship.” Brief for United States 1. Unsurprisingly, Maslenjak disagrees. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–8; Reply to Brief in Opposition 9–10. In keeping with our usual practice, we leave that dispute for resolution on remand. See, e.g., (010). For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceed- ings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 58 U. S. (017) 1 Opinion of GORSUCH, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 16–309 DIVNA MASLENJAK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [June 017] JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | second_dissenting | California Ex Rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110580/california-ex-rel-cooper-v-mitchell-brothers-santa-ana-theater/ | Without the benefit of full briefs and arguments I would not answer the question whether the First Amendment requires that obscenity be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in *95 a public nuisance abatement action.[1] JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion in in which Justice Stewart and JUSTICE MARSHALL joined, demonstrates the substantiality of the question. It is distressing to find that the Court considers novel questions of this character so easy as not even to merit argument.[2] It is also surprising to find the Court reaching out to decide such a question when its jurisdiction to do so is doubtful and when the absence of conflict on the question normally would call for a routine denial of certiorari. I In this public nuisance abatement action the California Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal concluded that obscenity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See People ex rel. Without deciding whether the First Amendment imposes any special standard of proof on the censorship of allegedly obscene materials, the Court today opines that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not constitutionally required. The Court has no jurisdiction to express that opinion unless the California courts imposed that standard because they understood it to be required by federal law. It is by no means clear that they did so. State courts surely know the difference between opinions that merely contain persuasive reasoning and opinions that are authoritative because they explain a ruling that is binding on lower courts. Moreover, absent a definitive ruling from a higher tribunal, state courts are entitled to fashion state rules of procedure to govern the conduct of civil trials in state courts. Until today, this Court has never expressed an opinion on the standard of proof that a trial court should impose on a civil litigant seeking to prove that a motion picture film is obscene. The explanation by the California Court of Appeal of its ruling on the standard-of-proof issue does not indicate that the court considered itself bound to follow any decision by this Court. As the Court of Appeal explained, the trial judge "established the high burden of proof based on the reasoning of Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in[3] and rejecting the City Attorney's argument that the standard of proof required in normal public nuisance abatement actions should be applied in an obscenity case, the California Court of Appeal stated that it "agree[d]" with the burden of proof portion of JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion and found one passage *97 "particularly persuasive."[4] The state court's opinion may be construed in either of two ways. On the one |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | second_dissenting | California Ex Rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110580/california-ex-rel-cooper-v-mitchell-brothers-santa-ana-theater/ | be construed in either of two ways. On the one hand, because the Court of Appeal agreed with the reasoning in JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion, it may merely have established the procedural rule to be followed in the state courts subject to its jurisdiction.[5] On the other hand, it may have assumed that a lesser burden would have complied with state law but nevertheless ruled as it did because it believed the Federal Constitution required that result. When this sort of ambiguity is present, our jurisdiction is doubtful and we have a duty to withhold decision on the merits until we are able "to say with requisite assurance that this Court has jurisdiction in the premises." Mental Hygiene Dept. of As Justice Harlan emphasized in that case: "This Court is always wary of assuming jurisdiction of a case from a state court unless it is plain that a federal *98 question is necessarily presented, and the party seeking review here must show that we have jurisdiction of the case. Were we to assume that the federal question was the basis for the decision below, it is clear that the California Supreme Court, either on remand or in another case presenting the same issues, could inform us that its opinion was in fact based, at least in part, on the California Constitution, thus leaving the result untouched by whatever conclusions this Court might have reached on the merits of the federal question." Later in the opinion, Justice Harlan emphasized that we must be able to say with "certainty that the California judgment rested solely on [a federal ground]," before we may take jurisdiction of a case coming from a state court. Unless a case presents a question of unusual importance, jurisdictional doubt of this character normally leads to the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, or to its denial if the petition is still pending. -201. If the issue is sufficiently important, our practice is to remand to the state court to make sure that its decision rested solely on a state ground before we proceed further. See, e. g., Whether one regards this as an important or an unimportant case, surely we should not simply ignore the customary restraints on the exercise of our limited jurisdiction over state courts. II Entirely apart from the jurisdictional question, adherence to the Court's traditional practice of avoiding the unnecessary and premature adjudication of constitutional questions counsels denial of this certiorari petition. As a practical matter, what is at stake is the City Attorney's request for a retrial of the question whether |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | California Ex Rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110580/california-ex-rel-cooper-v-mitchell-brothers-santa-ana-theater/ | Although I adhere to my view that a State may not constitutionally suppress sexually oriented films except perhaps as necessary to shield juveniles or unconsenting adults, see, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre since the State alone has petitioned for review in this case, I concur in limiting the grant of certiorari to consideration of whether the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that communication it seeks to suppress is obscene. I share, however, JUSTICE STEVENS' concern, post, at 97, that we lack the requisite assurance of our jurisdiction to consider this question and join his suggestion that we adhere to our ordinary practice of denying the writ or of remanding to the state court for a determination of whether the decision below rests on a federal or a state ground. Alternatively, assuming we have jurisdiction in this case, I dissent from the Court's holding that the First Amendment does not require the State when it seeks to suppress otherwise constitutionally protected material to prove that material obscene beyond a reasonable doubt. My reasons are stated in my concurring opinion in |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Ramsey v. Mine Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108278/ramsey-v-mine-workers/ | Petitioners, coal mine operators in southeastern Tennessee, were plaintiffs in the trial court, where their complaint accused respondent United Mine Workers of America of violating the Sherman Act by conspiring with various coal producers to drive petitioners out of business. The major thrust of the claim was that the Union had expressly or impliedly agreed with the major producers to impose the provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA), first executed by the Union and certain companies in 1950, on all coal mine operators, knowing that small and nonmechanized operators would be unable to meet the contract's terms. The purpose of this alleged conspiracy was to eliminate the marginal operators, control production, and reserve the market for larger concerns. The claim of express agreement rested on the so-called Protective Wage Clause (PWC) added to the NBCWA by amendment in 1958. The PWC, after reciting that the parties agreed that coal mines "shall be so operated as not to debase or lower the standards of wages, hours, safety requirements and other conditions of work, established by this contract," provided as follows: "During the period of this Contract, the United Mine Workers of America will not enter into, be a party to, nor will it permit any agreement or understanding covering any wages, hours or other conditions of work applicable to employees covered by this Contract on any basis other than those specified in this Contract or any applicable District Contract. The United Mine Workers of America will diligently perform and enforce without discrimination or favor the conditions of this paragraph and all other terms and conditions of this Contract and will use and *305 exercise its continuing best efforts to obtain full compliance therewith by each and all the parties signatory thereto."[1] Petitioners in any event claimed that a conspiratorial arrangement between the Union and the major operators could be implied from the PWC, the course of negotiations between the Union and those operators from 1950 forward,[2] and the ensuing organizational and strike activity against petitioners and other southeastern Tennessee operators aimed at securing agreement to and compliance with the National Agreement as amended from time to time, as well as from the Union's purchase of a controlling interest in West Kentucky Coal Co. and the latter's allegedly predatory pricing in the TVA coal market. *306 Following a trial to the court on a voluminous record, the trial judge wrote an extensive opinion containing his findings and conclusions leading to a dismissal of the case for failure of proof. He interpreted the PWC as forbidding departure from the contract |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Ramsey v. Mine Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108278/ramsey-v-mine-workers/ | He interpreted the PWC as forbidding departure from the contract terms by the Union only where signatories were concerned; the court found nothing in the contract obligating the Union to insist on comparable terms when dealing with employers outside the bargaining unit. As for an implied conspiracy to standardize employment terms throughout the industry aimed at destroying marginal producers, the trial court said that "[w]ere this case being tried upon the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable to civil cases, the Court would conclude that the U. M. W. did so impliedly agree," but that "the standard of proof where a labor union is involved is `clear proof,' as required by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a standard different from the ordinary civil burden of persuasion."[3] Judged by this stricter standard, proof of conspiracy was found wanting and the case against the Union failed. A panel of the Court of Appeals ruled the trial court had erred in applying the clear-evidence standard but rehearing en banc was granted. The Court of Appeals then agreed with the District Court's construction of the PWC but with respect to the clear-evidence standard, four judges agreed with the trial judge and four disagreed. The latter insisted that the ordinary preponderance-of-evidence standard was applicable in civil antitrust actions against labor unions except with respect to proving the authority of individual members, officers, and agents of *307 the Union to perform the acts complained of on behalf of the Union. The District Court's judgment was therefore affirmed by an equally divided court. We granted certiorari. I In a section of his opinion entitled "Legal Guidelines," the District Judge inquired as to "the standard of proof that must govern a proceeding involving a Sherman Act charge against a labor union." His answer was: "The burden of proof borne by the plaintiff is not the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable in civil cases generally. The requirement imposed by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is that of `clear proof' where a labor organization is a party to an action such as this. That the `clear proof' standard applies to an action wherein a labor organization is sought to be charged with a Sherman Act violation settled." In this and other passages in the trial judge's opinion,[4] he apparently demanded clear proof rather than a preponderance of the evidence not only with respect to the authority of the individuals who were alleged to have performed certain illegal acts on behalf of unions, but also as to whether the acts themselves occurred, whether the acts proved |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Ramsey v. Mine Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108278/ramsey-v-mine-workers/ | to whether the acts themselves occurred, whether the acts proved amounted to a conspiracy and whether plaintiffs' businesses had been injured. The eight judges of the Court of Appeals also seemed to read the trial court as having given unlimited application to the clear-proof standard in this action. Apparently they were also convinced that the standard applied by the trial court had made a critical difference in the case, for the issue that equally divided them was whether the clear-proof standard should be *308 applied to any matters other than the Union's authorization of the conduct alleged and proved.[5] The reasoning of the lower courts in departing from the usual preponderance-of-evidence rule generally applicable to civil actions in federal courts[6] was rooted in 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S. C. 106. But the trial judge and four judges of the Court of Appeals read far too much into 6, which provides as follows: "No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be *309 held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof." Judge O'Sullivan cogently observed in the Court of Appeals that: "This is plain language which clearly exposes the Section's limitation." On its face 6 is not addressed to the quantum of evidence required to prove the occurrence of the alleged "unlawful acts." It is concerned only with requiring "clear proof" that the person or organization charged actually participated in, authorized, or ratified "such acts." Nothing in the words of the section suggests that a new and different standard of proof was being prescribed for all issues in actions against a union, its members or its officers involved in a labor dispute. The section neither expressly nor by implication requires satisfaction of the clear-proof standard in deciding factual issues concerning the commission vel non of acts by union officers or by members alleged to constitute a conspiracy, or the inferences to be drawn from such acts, or concerning overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, the impact on the relevant market or the injury to plaintiffs' businesses. The legislative history of 6 was reviewed at length in United Brotherhood of We have reviewed it again and we find nothing to suggest that the section means something different from what its language seems to say.[7] Without laboring the mattersince |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Ramsey v. Mine Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108278/ramsey-v-mine-workers/ | what its language seems to say.[7] Without laboring the mattersince nothing to the contrary in the legislative history has been presented to us *310 the simple concern of Congress was that unions had been found liable for violence and other illegal acts occurring in labor disputes which they had never authorized or ratified and for which they should not be held responsible. Congress discerned a tendency in courts to blame unions for everything occurring during a strike. Nor was the problem necessarily limited to labor unions.[8] The straightforward answer was 6, with its requirement that when illegal acts of any individual are charged against one of the major antagonists in a labor dispute whether employer or unionthe evidence must clearly prove that the individual's acts were authorized or ratified. See We find no support in the legislative material for the notion that Congress intended broadly to modify the standard of proof where union and employer are sued separately or together in civil actions for damages incurred in the course of labor disputes. Prior cases in this Court relied on by the courts below are not to the contrary. Carpenters' major concern was 6. The Court there said that "[t]he limitations of that section are upon all courts of the United States in all matters growing out of labor disputes, covered by the Act, which may come before them." The statement is unexceptionablethe federal courts, of course, must heed 6 in all cases arising out of labor disputes in which the section is applicable.[9] However, the limitations the section imposes are those that the section describes. It is clear from the remainder of *311 the Carpenters opinion that 6 deals only with proving the authority of individuals or organizations who act for another. Indeed, the Court there reversed a judgment against a union because the trial court had failed to instruct that illegal acts could not be proved against the union unless the evidence clearly showed the union had authorized, participated in, or ratified the commission of those acts. United Mine insofar as it dealt with 6, was concerned only with the failure of the evidence clearly to show union responsibility for illegal acts of violence. There was no suggestion in that case that 6 had broader scope. And 6 was not even involved in United Mine as it came to this Court. The section was neither cited nor discussed and there were no indications that our passing to forfeiture of union exemption from antitrust liability when union connivance with employers is clearly shown was intended to establish a stricter standard |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Ramsey v. Mine Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108278/ramsey-v-mine-workers/ | is clearly shown was intended to establish a stricter standard of proof in actions charging labor unions with violations of the Sherman Act. In our view, 6 requires clear and convincing evidence only as to the Union's authorization, participation in, or ratification of the acts allegedly performed on its behalf. Nor do we discern any basis for our fashioning a new standard of proof applicable in antitrust actions against labor unions. Accordingly, the District Court erred in requiring petitioners' compliance with the standard of 6 in proving other elements of their treble-damage case against the Union. II Petitioners argue two other matters. We are urged to construe the PWC as itself being an illegal bargain for which the Union is not exempt under the antitrust *312 laws. The thrust of the argument in this Court is that by 1958, when the PWC was first agreed to by the Union and the BCOA, the Union had executed the national contract with hundreds of different bargaining units in addition to those represented by the BCOA. Even if the PWC bound the Union only to insist on identical contract terms as against "signatories," the effect of the clause, it is urged, was to bind the Union to the same contract, ad infinitum, with many and different bargaining units; the Union was no longer free to agree to different terms with any previous signatory to the NBCWA.[10] We find no to this aspect of the case in the opinions in the District Court and the Court of Appeals. We are unsure whether it was presented below and whether, in any event, there is record support for it. Accordingly, we deem it inappropriate to consider it in the first instance. Finally, petitioners in effect ask us to reconsider our holding in Pennington and other cases that under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts the Union incurs no liability under the antitrust laws when it concludes "a *313 wage agreement with the multi-employer bargaining unit and as a matter of its own policy, and not by agreement with all or part of the employers of that unit, seek[s] the same wages from other employers." This we decline to do. The Court made it unmistakably clear in Allen Bradley that unilateral conduct by a union of the type protected by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts does not violate the Sherman Act even though it may also restrain trade. "[T]hese congressionally permitted union activities may restrain trade in and of themselves. There is no denying the fact that many of them do so, both directly and indirectly." But "the |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Ramsey v. Mine Workers | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108278/ramsey-v-mine-workers/ | of them do so, both directly and indirectly." But "the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is a question for the determination of Congress." We adhere to this view. But neither do we retreat from the "one line which we can draw with assurance that we follow the congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared the concentrated power of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act." at Hence we also adhere to the decision in Pennington: "[T]he relevant labor and antitrust policies compel us to conclude that the alleged agreement between UMW and the large operators to secure uniform labor standards throughout the industry, if proved, was not exempt from the antitrust laws." Where a union, by agreement with one set of employers, insists on maintaining in other bargaining units specified wage standards ruinous to the business of those employers, it is liable under the antitrust laws for the damages caused by its agreed-upon conduct. *314 We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, and MR. |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Class v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4469603/class-v-united-states/ | Does a guilty plea bar a criminal defendant from later appealing his conviction on the ground that the statute of conviction violates the Constitution? In our view, a guilty plea by itself does not bar that appeal. I In September 2013, a federal grand jury indicted peti- tioner, Rodney Class, for possessing firearms in his locked jeep, which was parked in a lot on the grounds of the United States Capitol in Washington, D. C. See 40 U.S. C. (“An individual may not carry on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a fire- arm”). Soon thereafter, Class, appearing pro se, asked the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to dismiss the indictment. As relevant here, Class alleged that the statute, violates the Second Amend- ment. App. in No. 15–3015 (CADC), pp. 32–33. He also raised a due process claim, arguing that he was denied fair notice that weapons were banned in the parking lot. Following a hearing, the District Court denied both claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. Several months later, Class pleaded guilty to “Posses- 2 CLASS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court sion of a Firearm on U. S. Capitol Grounds, in violation of 40 U.S. C. App. 30. The Government agreed to drop related charges. A written plea agreement set forth the terms of Class’ guilty plea, including several categories of rights that he expressly agreed to waive. Those express waivers included: (1) all defenses based upon the statute of limitations; (2) several specified trial rights; (3) the right to appeal a sentence at or below the judicially determined, maximum sentencing guideline range; (4) most collateral attacks on the conviction and sentence; and (5) various rights to request or receive information concerning the investiga- tion and prosecution of his criminal case. at 38–42. At the same time, the plea agreement expressly enumer- ated categories of claims that Class could raise on appeal, including claims based upon (1) newly discovered evi- dence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) certain statutes providing for sentence reductions. Finally, the plea agreement stated under the heading “Complete Agreement”: “No agreements, promises, understandings, or repre- sentations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any such agreements be made unless committed to writing and signed” The agreement said nothing about the right to raise on direct appeal a claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional. The District Court held a plea hearing during which it reviewed the terms of the plea agreement (with Class |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Class v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4469603/class-v-united-states/ | it reviewed the terms of the plea agreement (with Class present and under oath) to ensure the validity of the plea. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(b); United States v. 536 U.S. 622, 629 (defendant’s guilty plea must be “ ‘voluntary’ ” and “related waivers” must be made “ ‘know- ing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court the relevant circumstances and likely consequences’ ”). After providing Class with the required information and warnings, the District Court accepted his guilty plea. Class was sentenced to 24 days imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release. Several days later, Class appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Class was appointed an amicus to aid him in presenting his arguments. He repeated his constitutional claims, namely, that the statute violates the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause because it fails to give fair notice of which areas fall within the Capitol Grounds where firearms are banned. The Court of Appeals held that Class could not raise his constitutional claims be- cause, by pleading guilty, he had waived them. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a–5a. Class filed a petition for certiorari in this Court asking us to decide whether in pleading guilty a criminal defendant inherently waives the right to chal- lenge the constitutionality of his statute of conviction. We agreed to do so. The question is whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitu- tionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. We hold that it does not. Class did not relinquish his right to appeal the District Court’s constitutional determinations simply by pleading guilty. As we shall explain, this hold- ing flows directly from this Court’s prior decisions. Fifty years ago this Court directly addressed a similar claim (a claim that the statute of conviction was unconsti- tutional). And the Court stated that a defendant’s “plea of guilty did not waive his previous [constitutional] claim.” (1968). Though Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in offered little explanation for this statement, sub- 4 CLASS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court sequent decisions offered a rationale that applies here. In North Caro- lina indicted and convicted Jimmy Seth Perry on a mis- demeanor assault charge. When Perry exercised his right under a North Carolina statute to a de novo trial in a higher court, the State reindicted him, but this time the State charged a felony, which carried a heavier penalty, for the same conduct. Perry |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Class v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4469603/class-v-united-states/ | which carried a heavier penalty, for the same conduct. Perry pleaded guilty. He then sought habeas relief on the grounds that the reindictment amounted to an unconstitutional vindictive prosecution. The State argued that Perry’s guilty plea barred him from raising his constitutional challenge. But this Court held that it did not. The Court noted that a guilty plea bars appeal of many claims, including some “ ‘antecedent constitutional viola- tions’ ” related to events (say, grand jury proceedings) that had “ ‘occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.’ ” (quoting 266– 267 (1973)). While claims were “of constitutional dimension,” the Court explained that “the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity is markedly different” from a claim of vindictive prosecution, which implicates “the very power of the State” to prosecute the defendant. Accordingly, the Court wrote that “the right” Perry “asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge” since “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against Perry “operated to deprive him due process of law.” –31. A year and a half later, in v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam), this Court repeated what it had said and held in After served a 30-day jail term for refusing to testify before the grand jury on November 7, 1968, the State of New York charged him once again for (what argued was) the same crime. pleaded guilty, but subsequently appealed arguing Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court that the new charge violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. The lower courts held that ’s constitutional claim had been “waived” by his guilty plea. This Court reversed. Citing the Court held that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” and n. 2. ’s claim amounted to a claim that “the State may not convict” him “no matter how validly his factual guilt is established.” ’s “guilty plea, therefore, [did] not bar the claim.” These holdings reflect an understanding of the nature of guilty pleas which, in broad outline, stretches back nearly 150 years. In 1869 Justice Ames wrote for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: “The plea of guilty is, of course, a confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the evil intent imputed to the defendant. It is a waiver also of all merely technical and formal objections of which the defendant could |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Class v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4469603/class-v-united-states/ | merely technical and formal objections of which the defendant could have availed himself by any other plea or motion. But if the facts alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled to be dis- charged.” 210. Decisions of federal and state courts throughout the 19th and 20th centuries reflect a similar view of the na- ture of a guilty plea. See United States v. Ury, 106 F.2d 28 (CA2 1939) (holding the “plea of guilty did not foreclose the appellant,” who argued that a statute was unconstitu- tional, “from the review he now seeks” (citing earlier cases)); Hocking Valley R. (CA6 1914) (holding that a defendant may raise the claim that, because the indictment did not charge an offense no 6 CLASS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court crime has been committed, for it is “the settled rule that,” despite a guilty plea, a defendant “may urge” such a con- tention “in the reviewing court”); Carper v. State, 27 Ohio St. 572, 575 (1875) (same). We refer to these cases be- cause it was against this background that Justice Harlan in his opinion for the Court made the statement to which we originally referred, namely, that a defendant’s “plea of guilty did not, of course, waive his previous [constitution- al] claim.” 390 U.S., at (citing Ury, su- pra, at 28). In more recent years, we have reaffirmed the - doctrine and refined its scope. In United States v. the defendants pleaded guilty to two separate indictments in a single proceeding which “on their face” described two separate bid-rigging conspiracies. They later sought to challenge their convictions on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that they had only admitted to one conspiracy. Citing Black- ledge and this Court repeated that a guilty plea does not bar a claim on appeal “where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence.” However, be- cause the defendants could not “prove their claim by rely- ing on those indictments and the existing record” and “without contradicting those indictments,” this Court held that their claims were “foreclosed by the admissions in- herent in their guilty pleas.” Unlike the claims in Class’ constitutional claims here, as we understand them, do not contradict the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement. They are consistent with Class’ knowing, voluntary, and intelligent admission that he did what the indictment alleged. Those claims can be “resolved without any need to venture be- yond that record.” Nor do Class’ claims |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Class v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4469603/class-v-united-states/ | to venture be- yond that record.” Nor do Class’ claims focus upon case-related constitu- tional defects that “ ‘occurred prior to the entry of the Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court guilty plea.’ ” They could not, for example, “have been ‘cured’ through a new indictment by a properly selected grand jury.” (citing ). Because the defendant has admitted the charges against him, a guilty plea makes the latter kind of constitutional claim “irrelevant to the constitu- tional validity of the conviction.” v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983). But the cases to which we have referred make clear that a defendant’s guilty plea does not make irrelevant the kind of constitutional claim Class seeks to make. In sum, the claims at issue here do not fall within any of the categories of claims that Class’ plea agreement forbids him to raise on direct appeal. They challenge the Gov- ernment’s power to criminalize Class’ (admitted) conduct. They thereby call into question the Government’s power to “ ‘constitutionally prosecute’ ” him. (quoting at 61–62, n. 2). A guilty plea does not bar a direct appeal in these circumstances. I We are not convinced by the three basic arguments that the Government and the dissent make in reply. First, the Government contends that by entering a guilty plea, Class inherently relinquished his constitu- tional claims. The Government is correct that a guilty plea does implicitly waive some claims, including some constitutional claims. However, as we explained in Part Class’ valid guilty plea does not, by itself, bar direct appeal of his constitutional claims in these circumstances. As an initial matter, a valid guilty plea “forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” –629. While those “simultaneously” relinquished rights include the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the jury trial right, 8 CLASS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court and the right to confront accusers, they do not include “a waiver of the privileges which exist beyond the confines of the trial.” (1999). Here, Class’ statutory right directly to appeal his conviction “cannot in any way be characterized as part of the trial.” A valid guilty plea also renders irrelevant—and thereby prevents the defendant from appealing—the constitution- ality of case-related government conduct that takes place before the plea is entered. See, e.g., (holding a valid guilty plea “results in the defendant’s loss of any meaningful opportunity he might otherwise have had to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). Neither can the defendant later complain that the indicting grand jury |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Class v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4469603/class-v-united-states/ | can the defendant later complain that the indicting grand jury was unconstitutionally selected. But, as we have said, those kinds of claims are not at issue here. Finally, a valid guilty plea relinquishes any claim that would contradict the “admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.” at 573– 574. But the constitutional claim at issue here is con- sistent with Class’ admission that he engaged in the con- duct alleged in the indictment. Unlike the defendants in Class’ challenge does not in any way deny that he engaged in the conduct to which he admitted. Instead, like the defendants in and he seeks to raise a claim which, “ ‘judged on its face’ ” based upon the existing record, would extinguish the government’s power to “ ‘constitutionally prosecute’ ” the defendant if the claim were successful. (quoting 423 U.S., at 62–63, and n. 2). Second, the Government and the dissent point to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs “conditional” guilty pleas. The Rule states: Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 9 Opinion of the Court “Conditional Plea. With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. A de- fendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea.” The Government and the dissent argue that Rule 11(a)(2) means that “a defendant who pleads guilty cannot challenge his conviction on appeal on a forfeitable or waivable ground that he either failed to present to the district court or failed to reserve in writing.” Brief for United States 23; see also post, at 3–4, 17–18 (opinion of ALITO, J.). They support this argument by pointing to the notes of the Advisory Committee that drafted the text of Rule 11(a)(2). See Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1983 Amendments to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, 18 U.S. C. App., p. 911 (hereinafter Advisory Committee’s Notes). In par- ticular, the dissent points to the suggestion that an un- conditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of “nonjuris- dictional defects,” while the Government points to the drafters’ statement that they intended the Rule’s “condi- tional plea procedure to conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources and advance speedy trial objectives,” while ensuring “much needed uniformity in the federal system on this matter.” ; see United (approving of Advisory Com- mittee’s Notes as relevant evidence of the drafters’ intent). The Government adds that its interpretation of the Rule furthers these basic |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Class v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4469603/class-v-united-states/ | adds that its interpretation of the Rule furthers these basic purposes. And, the argument goes, just as defendants must use Rule 11(a)(2)’s procedures to preserve, for instance, Fourth Amendment unlawful search-and-seizure claims, so must they use it to preserve the constitutional claims at issue here. The problem with this argument is that, by its own 10 CLASS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court terms, the Rule itself does not say whether it sets forth the exclusive procedure for a defendant to preserve a constitu- tional claim following a guilty plea. At the same time, the drafters’ notes acknowledge that the “Supreme Court has held that certain kinds of constitutional objections may be raised after a plea of guilty.” Advisory Committee’s Notes, at 912. The notes then specifically refer to the “- doctrine.” They add that the Rule “should not be interpreted as either broadening or narrow- ing [that] doctrine or as establishing procedures for its application.” And the notes state that Rule 11(a)(2) “has no application” to the “kinds of constitutional objec- tions” that may be raised under that doctrine. The applicability of the - doctrine is at issue in this case. Cf. (acknowledging and as covering claims “where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence”). We therefore hold that Rule 11(a)(2) cannot resolve this case. Third, the Government argues that Class “expressly waived” his right to appeal his constitutional claim. Brief for United States 15. The Government concedes that the written plea agreement, which sets forth the “Complete Agreement” between Class and the Government, see App. 45–46, does not contain this waiver. at 48–49. Rather, the Government relies on the fact that during the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the District Court Judge stated that, under the written plea agreement, Class was “giving up [his] right to appeal [his] conviction.” And Class agreed. We do not see why the District Court Judge’s statement should bar Class’ constitutional claims. It was made to ensure Class understood “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(b)(1)(N). It does not expressly refer to a waiver of the appeal right Cite as: 583 U. S. (2018) 11 Opinion of the Court here at issue. And if it is interpreted as expressly includ- ing that appeal right, it was wrong, as the Government acknowledged at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35– 36. Under these circumstances, Class’ acquiescence nei- ther expressly nor implicitly waived his right to appeal |
Justice Blackmun | 1,979 | 11 | concurring | Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110023/illinois-bd-of-elections-v-socialist-workers-party/ | Although I join the Court's opinion and its strict-scrutiny approach for election cases, I add these comments to record purposefully, and perhaps somewhat belatedly, my unrelieved discomfort with what seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as "compelling [state] interest" and "least drastic [or restrictive] means." See, ante, at 184, 185, and 186. I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a "compelling state interest" is. If it means "convincingly controlling," or "incapable of being overcome" upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me, "least drastic means" is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less "drastic" or a little less "restrictive" in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to *189 vote to strike legislation down. This is reminiscent of the Court's indulgence, a few decades ago, in substantive due process in the economic area as a means of nullification. I feel, therefore, and have always felt, that these phrases are really not very helpful for constitutional analysis. They are too convenient and result oriented, and I must endeavor to disassociate myself from them. Apart from their use, however, the result the Court reaches here is the correct one. It is with these reservations that I join the Court's opinion. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Placing additional names on a ballot adds to the cost of conducting elections and tends to confuse voters. The State therefore has a valid interest in limiting access to the ballot to serious candidates. If that interest is adequately served by a 25,000-signature requirement in a statewide election, the same interest cannot justify a larger requirement in a smaller election. Nonetheless, I am not sure that the disparity evidences a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The constitutional requirement that Illinois govern impartially would be implicated by a rule that discriminates, for example, between Socialists and Republicans or between Catholics and Protestants. But I question whether it has any application to rules prescribing different qualifications for different political offices. Rather than deciding that question, I would simply hold that legislation imposing a significant interference with access to the ballot must rest on a rational predicate. This legislative remnant is without any such support. It is either a product of a malfunction of the legislative process |
Justice Blackmun | 1,979 | 11 | concurring | Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110023/illinois-bd-of-elections-v-socialist-workers-party/ | either a product of a malfunction of the legislative process or merely a by-product of this Court's decision in see post, at 190-191 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). In either event, I believe it has deprived appellees of their liberty without the "due process of lawmaking" that the *190 Fourteenth Amendment requires. Cf. Delaware Tribal Business (STEVENS, J., dissenting). For these reasons I concur in the Court's judgment and in Parts I, II, and IV of its opinion. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment. I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I cannot join its opinion: It employs an elaborate analysis where a very simple one would suffice. The disparity between the state and city signature requirements does not make sense, and this Court is intimately familiar with the reasons why. In 1968, Illinois had a coherent set of petition requirements for obtaining a place on the ballot. In order to appear on the ballot in a county or city election, it was necessary for independent candidates and new political parties to obtain voter signatures equal in number to 5% of the voters who voted in the political subdivision at the last general election. Requirements for statewide office put greater emphasis on geographical balance: Independent candidates and new political parties needed 25,000 signatures, and at least 200 signatures had to be obtained from each of 50 counties within the State. Thus, a candidate for statewide office at that time could get on the ballot with fewer signatures than a candidate for office in Cook County, but he was also subject to special restrictions. It was reasonable for Illinois to conclude that this scheme best vindicated its interest in "protect[ing] the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies." Cook County is not Illinois, and all the State asked was that candidates and political parties interested in statewide office produce this minimal evidence of statewide support. In 1969, this Court held that the 200 voters per county requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause because different *191 counties had different populations. That decision led to a holding by the Seventh Circuit that the statute, as amended by the legislature after Moore to place a 13,000-signature limit on new political party signatures from any one county, was likewise a denial of equal protection. Communist Party of (CA7), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 6 The courts having knocked out key panels in an otherwise symmetrical mosaic, it is not surprising that little sense can be made of what is left. Given this history, I cannot subscribe to my Brother STEVENS' |
Justice Roberts | 2,007 | 0 | majority | Hinck v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145733/hinck-v-united-states/ | Bad things happen if you fail to pay federal income taxes when due. One of them is that interest accrues on the unpaid amount. Sometimes it takes a while for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to determine that taxes should have been paid that were not. Section 6404(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code permits the Secretary of the Treasury to abate interest to forgive it, partially or in whole if the assessment of interest on a deficiency is attributable to unreasonable error or delay on the part of the IRS. Section 6404(h) allows for judicial review of the Secretary's decision not to grant such relief. The question presented in this case is whether this review may be obtained only in the Tax Court, or may also be secured in the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims. We hold that the Tax Court provides the exclusive forum for judicial review of a refusal to abate interest under 6404(e)(1), and affirm. I The Internal Revenue Code provides that if any amount of assessed federal *2014 income tax is not paid "on or before the last date prescribed for payment," interest "shall be paid for the period from such last date to the date paid." 26 U.S.C. 6601(a). Section 6404 of the Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to abate any tax or related liability in certain circumstances. As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress amended 6404 to add subsection (e)(1), which, as enacted, provided in pertinent part: "In the case of any assessment of interest on any deficiency attributable in whole or in part to any error or delay by an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service (acting in his official capacity) in performing a ministerial act. the Secretary may abate the assessment of all or any part of such interest for any period." 26 U.S.C. 6404(e)(1) ( ed.). In the years following passage of 6404(e)(1), the federal courts uniformly held that the Secretary's decision not to grant an abatement was not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., ; ; Horton Homes, ; see also These decisions recognized that 6404(e)(1) gave the Secretary complete discretion to determine whether to abate interest, "neither indicating] that such authority should be used universally nor providing] any basis for distinguishing between the instances in which abatement should and should not be granted." Any decision by the Secretary was accordingly "committed to agency discretion by law" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), and thereby insulated from judicial review. See, e.g., ; In 1996, as part |
Justice Roberts | 2,007 | 0 | majority | Hinck v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145733/hinck-v-united-states/ | from judicial review. See, e.g., ; In 1996, as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Congress again amended 6404, adding what is now subsection (h). As relevant, that provision states: "Review of denial of request for abatement of interest. "(1) In general. The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction over any action brought by a taxpayer who meets the requirements referred to in section 7(c)(4)(A)(ii) to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of discretion, and may order an abatement, if such action is brought within 180 days after the date of the mailing of the Secretary's final determination not to abate such interest." 26 U.S.C. 6404(h)(1) ( ed., Supp. IV). Section 7(c)(4)(A)(ii) in turn incorporates 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(B), which refers to individuals with a net worth not exceeding $2 million and businesses with a net worth not exceeding $7 million. Congress made subsection (h) effective for all requests for abatement submitted to the IRS after July 30, 1996, regardless of the tax year involved. 302(b), 110 Stat. 14.[1] II In 1986, petitioner John Hinck was a limited partner in an entity called Agri-Cal Venture Associates (ACVA). Along *2015 with his wife, petitioner Pamela Hinck, Hinck filed a joint return for 1986 reporting his share of losses from the partnership. The IRS later examined the tax returns for ACVA and proposed adjustments to deductions that the partnership had claimed for 1984, and 1986. In 1990, the IRS issued a final notice regarding the partnership's returns, disallowing tens of millions of dollars of deductions. While the partnership sought administrative review of this decision, the Hincks, in May 1996, made an advance remittance of $93,890 to the IRS toward any personal deficiency that might result from a final adjustment of ACVA's returns. In March 1999, the Hincks reached a settlement with the IRS concerning the ACVA partnership adjustments, to the extent they affected the Hincks' return. Shortly thereafter, as a result of the adjustments, the IRS imposed additional liability against the Hincks: $16,409 in tax and $21,669.22 in interest. The IRS applied the Hincks' advance remittance to this amount and refunded them the balance of $55,1.78. The Hincks filed a claim with the IRS contending that, because of IRS errors and delays, the interest assessed against them for the period from March 21, 1989, to April 1, should be abated under 6404(e)(1). The IRS denied the request. The Hincks then filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims seeking review of the refusal to abate. That court granted the Government's |
Justice Roberts | 2,007 | 0 | majority | Hinck v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145733/hinck-v-united-states/ | of the refusal to abate. That court granted the Government's motion to dismiss, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that 6404(h) vests exclusive jurisdiction to review interest abatement claims under 6404(e)(1) in the Tax Court. Because this decision conflicted with the Fifth Circuit's decision in (holding that 6404(h) grants concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction to the Tax Court), we granted certiorari, U.S. III Our analysis is governed by the well-established principle that, in most contexts, "`a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.'" EC Term of Years ; see also 103 S. Ct. 11, We are also guided by our past recognition that when Congress enacts a specific remedy when no remedy was previously recognized, or when previous remedies were "problematic," the remedy provided is generally regarded as exclusive. 103 S. Ct. 11; Section 6404(h) fits the bill on both counts. It is a "precisely drawn, detailed statute" that, in a single sentence, provides a forum for adjudication, a limited class of potential plaintiffs, a statute of limitations, a standard of review, and authorization for judicial relief. And Congress enacted this provision against a backdrop of decisions uniformly rejecting the possibility of any review for taxpayers wishing to challenge the Secretary's 6404(e)(1) determination. Therefore, despite Congress's failure explicitly to define the Tax Court's jurisdiction as exclusive, we think it quite plain that the terms of 6404(h) a "precisely drawn, detailed statute" filling a perceived hole in the law control all requests for review of 6404(e)(1) determinations. Those terms include the forum for adjudication. *2016 The Hincks' primary argument against exclusive Tax Court jurisdiction is that by providing a standard of review abuse of discretion in 6404(h), Congress eliminated the primary barrier to judicial review that courts had previously recognized; accordingly, they maintain, taxpayers may seek review of 6404(e)(1) determinations under statutes granting jurisdiction to the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims to review tax refund actions. See 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), 1491(a)(1); 26 U.S.C. 7422(a). Or, as the Fifth Circuit reasoned: "[T]he federal district courts have always possessed jurisdiction over challenges brought to section 6404(e)(1) denials[;] they simply determined that the taxpayers had no substantive right whatever to a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion[I]n enacting section 6404(h), Congress indicated that such is no longer the case, and thereby removed any impediment to district court review." It is true that by providing an abuse of discretion standard, Congress removed one of the obstacles courts had held foreclosed judicial review of 6404(e)(1) determinations. See, e.g., 35 F.3d, at |
Justice Roberts | 2,007 | 0 | majority | Hinck v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145733/hinck-v-united-states/ | judicial review of 6404(e)(1) determinations. See, e.g., 35 F.3d, at (noting an absence of "`judicially manageable standards'" (quoting 470 U.S., at )). But in enacting 6404(h), Congress did not simply supply this single missing ingredient; rather, it set out a carefully circumscribed, time-limited, plaintiff-specific provision, which also precisely defined the appropriate forum. We cannot accept the Hincks' invitation to isolate one feature of this "precisely drawn, detailed statute" the portion specifying a standard of review and use it to permit taxpayers to circumvent the other limiting features Congress placed in the same statute restrictions such as a shorter statute of limitations than general refund suits, compare 6404(h) (180-day limitations period) with 6532(a)(1) (2-year limitations period), or a net-worth ceiling for plaintiffs eligible to bring suit. Taxpayers could "effortlessly evade" these specific limitations by bringing interest abatement claims as tax refund actions in the district courts or the Court of Federal Claims, disaggregating a statute Congress plainly envisioned as a package deal. EC Term of Years at -68; see also 103 S. Ct. 11; -833, The Hincks' other contentions are equally unavailing. First, they claim that reading 6404(h) to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Tax Court impliedly repeals the preexisting jurisdiction of the district courts and Court of Federal Claims, despite our admonition that "repeals by implication are not favored." But the implied-repeal doctrine is not applicable here, for when Congress passed 6404(h), 6404(e)(1) had been interpreted not to provide any right of review for taxpayers. There is thus no indication of any "language on the statute books that [Congress] wishe[d] to change," United 98 L. Ed. 2d implicitly or explicitly. Congress simply prescribed a limited form of review where none had previously been found to exist. Second, the Hincks assert that vesting jurisdiction over 6404(e)(1) abatement decisions exclusively in the Tax Court runs contrary to the "entire structure of tax controversy jurisdiction," Brief for Petitioners 30, under which the Tax Court generally hears prepayment challenges to tax liability, see 6213(a), while postpayment actions are brought in the district *2017 courts or Court of Federal Claims. In a related vein, the Hincks point out that the Government's position would force taxpayers seeking postpayment review of their tax liabilities to separate their 6404(e)(1) abatement claims from their refund claims and bring each in a different court. Even assuming, arguendo, that we were inclined to depart from the face of the statute, these arguments are undercut on two fronts. To begin with, by expressly granting to the Tax Court some jurisdiction over 6404(e)(1) decisions, Congress has already broken with the |
Justice Roberts | 2,007 | 0 | majority | Hinck v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145733/hinck-v-united-states/ | jurisdiction over 6404(e)(1) decisions, Congress has already broken with the general scheme the Hincks identify. No one doubts that an action seeking review of a 6404(e)(1) determination may be maintained in the Tax Court even if the interest has already been paid, see, e.g., ¶ -195 RIA Memo TC, p. 1120-, WL 863155, and the Hincks point to no case where the Tax Court has refused to exercise jurisdiction under such circumstances. In addition, an interest abatement claim under 6404(e)(1) involves no questions of substantive tax law, but rather is premised on issues of bureaucratic administration (whether, for example, there was "error or delay" in the performance of a "ministerial" act, 6404(e)(1)(A)). Judicial review of decisions not to abate requires an evaluation of the internal processes of the IRS, not the underlying tax liability of the taxpayer. We find nothing tellingly awkward about channeling such discrete and specialized questions of administrative operations to one particular court, even if in some respects it "may not appear to be efficient" as a policy matter to separate refund and interest abatement claims.[2] Last, the Hincks contend that Congress would not have intended to vest jurisdiction exclusively in the Tax Court because it would lead to the "unreasonable" result that taxpayers with net worths greater than $2 million (for individuals) or $7 million (for businesses) would be foreclosed from seeking judicial review of 6404(e)(1) refusals to abate. Brief for Petitioners 46; see also 336 F.3d, at But we agree with the Federal Circuit that this outcome "was contemplated by Congress." The net-worth limitation in 6404(h) reflects Congress's judgment that wealthier taxpayers are more likely to be able to pay a deficiency before contesting it, thereby avoiding accrual of interest during their administrative and legal challenges. In contrast, taxpayers with comparatively fewer resources are more likely to contest their assessed deficiency before first paying it, thus exposing themselves to interest charges if their challenge is ultimately unsuccessful. There is nothing "unreasonable" about Congress's decision to grant the possibility of judicial relief only to those taxpayers most likely to be in need of it.[3] *2018 The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,992 | 4 | dissenting | Burdick v. Takushi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112743/burdick-v-takushi/ | The question before us is whether Hawaii can enact a total ban on write-in voting. The majority holds that it can, finding that Hawaii's ballot access rules impose no serious limitations on the right to vote. Indeed, the majority in effect adopts a presumption that prohibitions on write-in voting are permissible if the State's ballot access laws meet constitutional standards. I dissent because I disagree with the presumption, as well as the majority's specific conclusion that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting is constitutional. The record demonstrates the significant burden that Hawaii's write-in ban imposes on the right of voters such as petitioner to vote for the candidates of their choice. In the election that triggered this lawsuit, petitioner did not wish to vote for the one candidate who ran for state representative in his district. Because he could not write in the name of a candidate he preferred, he had no way to cast a meaningful vote. Petitioner's dilemma is a recurring, frequent phenomenon in Hawaii because of the State's ballot access rules and the circumstance that one party, the Democratic Party, is predominant. It is critical to understand that petitioner's case is not an isolated example of a restriction on the free choice of candidates. The very ballot access rules the Court cites as mitigating his injury in fact compound it systemwide. Democratic candidates often run unopposed, especially in state legislative races. In the 1986 general election, 33 percent of the elections for state legislative offices involved single candidate races. Reply Brief for Petitioner 2-3, n. 2. The comparable figures for 1984 and 1982 were 39 percent and 37.5 percent. Large numbers of voters cast *443 blank ballots in uncontested races, that is, they leave the ballots blank rather than vote for the single candidate listed. In 1990, 27 percent of voters who voted in other races did not cast votes in uncontested state Senate races. Brief for Common Cause/Hawaii as Amicus Curiae 15-16. Twentynine percent of voters did not cast votes in uncontested state House races. Even in contested races in 1990, 12 to 13 percent of voters cast blank ballots. -17. Given that so many Hawaii voters are dissatisfied with the choices available to them, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that at least some voters would cast write-in votes for other candidates if given this option. The write-in ban thus prevents these voters from participating in Hawaii elections in a meaningful manner. This evidence also belies the majority's suggestion that Hawaii voters are presented with adequate electoral choices because Hawaii makes it easy to get |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.