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Justice Stevens | 1,981 | 16 | dissenting | Diamond v. Diehr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110422/diamond-v-diehr/ | 101 and the "novelty" requirement in 102.[33] III The Court misapplies because, like the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, it fails to understand or completely disregards the distinction between the subject matter of what the inventor claims to have discoveredthe 101 issueand the question whether that claimed discovery is in fact novelthe 102 issue.[34] If there is not even a *212 claim that anything constituting patentable subject matter has been discovered, there is no occasion to address the novelty issue.[35] Or, as was true in if the only concept that the inventor claims to have discovered is not patentable subject matter, 101 requires that the application be rejected without reaching any issue under 102; for it is irrelevant that unpatentable subject matterin that case a formula for updating alarm limitsmay in fact be novel. Proper analysis, therefore, must start with an understanding of what the inventor claims to have discoveredor phrased somewhat differentlywhat he considers his inventive concept to be.[36] It seems clear to me that Diehr and *213 Lutton claim to have developed a new method of programming a digital computer in order to calculatepromptly and repeatedlythe correct curing time in a familiar process.[37] In the 101 analysis, we must assume that the sequence of steps in this programming method is novel, unobvious, and useful. The threshold question of whether such a method is patentable subject matter remains. If that method is regarded as an "algorithm" as that term was used in and in *214[38] and if no other inventive concept is disclosed in the patent application, the question must be answered in the negative. In both and the parties apparently agreed that the inventor's discovery was properly regarded as an algorithm; the holding that an algorithm was a "law of nature" that could not be *215 patented therefore determined that those discoveries were not patentable processes within the meaning of 101. As the Court recognizes today, also rejected the argument that patent protection was available if the inventor did not claim a monopoly on every conceivable use of the algorithm but instead limited his claims by describing a specific postsolution activityin that case setting off an alarm in a catalytic conversion process. In its effort to distinguish from the instant case, the Court characterizes that postsolution activity as "insignificant," ante, at 191, or as merely "token" activity, ante, at 192, 14. As a practical matter, however, the postsolution activity described in the application was no less significant than the automatic opening of the curing mold involved in this case. For setting off an alarm limit at the |
Justice Stevens | 1,981 | 16 | dissenting | Diamond v. Diehr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110422/diamond-v-diehr/ | this case. For setting off an alarm limit at the appropriate time is surely as important to the safe and efficient operation of a catalytic conversion process as is actuating the mold-opening device in a synthetic rubber-curing process. In both cases, the post-solution activity is a significant part of the industrial process. But in neither case should that activity have any legal significance because it does not constitute a part of the inventive concept that the applicants claimed to have discovered.[39] In we held that a program for the *216 solution by a digital computer of a mathematical problem was not a patentable process within the meaning of 101. In we further held that such a computer program could not be transformed into a patentable process by the addition of postsolution activity that was not claimed to be novel. That holding plainly requires the rejection of Claims 1 and 2 of the Diehr and Lutton application quoted in the Court's opinio Ante, at 179-180, 5. In my opinion, it equally requires rejection of Claim 11 because the presolution activity described in that claim is admittedly a familiar part of the prior art.[40] Even the Court does not suggest that the computer program developed by Diehr and Lutton is a patentable discovery. Accordingly, if we treat the program as though it were a familiar part of the prior artas well-established precedent requires[41]it is absolutely clear that their application contains no claim of patentable inventio Their application was therefore properly rejected under 101 by the Patent Office and the Board of Appeals. IV The broad question whether computer programs should be given patent protection involves policy considerations that *217 this Court is not authorized to address. See -73; 437 U. S., at -596. As the numerous briefs amicus curiae filed in and this case demonstrate, that question is not only difficult and important, but apparently also one that may be affected by institutional bias. In each of those cases, the spokesmen for the organized patent bar have uniformly favored patentability and industry representatives have taken positions properly motivated by their economic self-interest. Notwithstanding fervent argument that patent protection is essential for the growth of the software industry,[42] commentators have noted that "this industry is growing by leaps and bounds without it."[43] In addition, even *218 some commentators who believe that legal protection for computer programs is desirable have expressed doubts that the present patent system can provide the needed protectio[44] Within the Federal Government, patterns of decision have also emerged. Gottschalk, Dann, Parker, and Diamond were not ordinary litigantseach was serving as |
Justice Stevens | 1,981 | 16 | dissenting | Diamond v. Diehr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110422/diamond-v-diehr/ | Parker, and Diamond were not ordinary litigantseach was serving as Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks when he opposed the availability of patent protection for a program-related inventio No doubt each may have been motivated by a concern about the ability of the Patent Office to process effectively the flood of applications that would inevitably flow from a decision that computer programs are patentable.[45] The consistent concern evidenced by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and by the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office has not been shared by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which reversed the Board in Johnston, and and was in turn reversed by this Court in each of those cases.[46] *219 Scholars have been critical of the work of both tribunals. Some of that criticism may stem from a conviction about the merits of the broad underlying policy question; such criticism may be put to one side. Other criticism, however, identifies two concerns to which federal judges have a duty to respond. First, the cases considering the patentability of program-related inventions do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to determine with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions will be patentable. Second, the inclusion of the ambiguous concept of an "algorithm" within the "law of nature" category of unpatentable subject matter has given rise to the concern that almost any process might be so described and therefore held unpatentable. In my judgment, today's decision will aggravate the first concern and will not adequately allay the second. I believe both concerns would be better addressed by (1) an unequivocal holding that no program-related invention is a patentable process under 101 unless it makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely on the utilization of a computer, and (2) an unequivocal explanation that the term "algorithm" as used in this case, as in and is synonymous with the term "computer "[47] Because *220 the invention claimed in the patent application at issue in this case makes no contribution to the art that is not entirely dependent upon the utilization of a computer in a familiar process, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | In Nantahala Power & Light we held that for purposes of setting intrastate retail rates a State may not differ from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's allocations of wholesale power by imposing its own judgment of what would be just and reasonable. Last Term, in Mississippi Power & Light we held that FERC's allocation of the $3 billion-plus cost of the Grand Gulf 1 nuclear reactor among the operating companies that jointly agreed to finance its construction and operation pre-empted Mississippi's inquiry into the prudence of a utility retailer's decision to participate in the joint venture. Today we confront once again a legal issue arising from the question of who must pay for Grand Gulf 1. Here the state ratemaking authority deferred to FERC's implicit finding that New Orleans Public Service, 's decision to participate in the Grand Gulf venture was reasonable, but determined that the costs incurred thereby should not be completely reimbursed because, it asserted, the utility's management was negligent in failing later to diversify its supply portfolio by selling a *353 portion of its Grand Gulf power. Whether the State's decision to provide less than full reimbursement for the FERC-allocated wholesale costs conflicts with our holdings in Nantahala and Mississippi Power & Light is not at issue in this case. Rather, we address the threshold question whether the District Court, which the utility petitioned for declaratory and injunctive relief from the state ratemaking authority's order, properly abstained from exercising jurisdiction in deference to the state review process. I Because the abstention questions at stake here have little to do with the intricacies of the factual and procedural history underlying the controversy, we may sketch the background of this case in brief.[1] Petitioner New Orleans Public Service, (NOPSI), a producer, wholesaler, and retailer of electricity that provides retail electrical service to the city of New Orleans, is one of four wholly owned operating subsidiaries of Middle South Utilities, Middle South operates an integrated "power pool" in which each of the four operating companies transmits produced electricity to a central dispatch center and draws back from the dispatch center the power it needs to meet customer demand. In 1974, NOPSI and its fellow operating companies entered a contract with Middle South Energy, (MSE), another wholly owned Middle South subsidiary, whereby the operating companies agreed to finance MSE's construction and operation of two 150 megawatt nuclear reactors, Grand Gulf 1 and in return for the right to the reactors' electrical output. The estimated cost of completing the two reactors was $1. billion. During the late 1970's, consumer demand turned out |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | $1. billion. During the late 1970's, consumer demand turned out to be far lower than expected, and regulatory delays, enhanced construction requirements, and high inflation led to spiraling *354 costs. As a result, construction of Grand Gulf was suspended, and the cost of completing Grand Gulf 1 alone eventually exceeded $3 billion. Not surprisingly, the cost of the electricity produced by the reactor greatly exceeded that of power generated by Middle South's conventional facilities. Acting pursuant to its exclusive regulatory authority over interstate wholesale power transactions, as amended, 16 U.S. C. 84 et seq., FERC conducted extensive proceedings to determine "just and reasonable" rates for Grand Gulf 1 power and to prescribe a "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" allocation of Grand Gulf's costs and output. In June the Commission issued a final order, Middle South Energy, aff'd sub nom. Mississippi in which it concluded that, because the planned nuclear reactors had been designed "to meet overall System needs and objectives," 31 FERC, p. 61,655, the Middle South subsidiaries should pay for the Grand Gulf project "roughly in proportion to each company's share of System demand," The Commission allocated 17 percent of Grand Gulf costs (approximately $ million per month) to NOPSI, rejecting Middle South's proposal of 9.8 percent as well as the 9 percent figure favored by the respondent here, the New Orleans City Council. "Although it did not expressly discuss the `prudence' of constructing Grand Gulf and bringing it on line, FERC implicitly accepted the uncontroverted testimony of [Middle South] executives who explained why they believed the decisions to construct and to complete Grand Gulf 1 were sound, and approved the finding that `continuing construction of Grand Gulf Unit No. 1 was prudent because Middle South's executives believed Grand *355 Gulf would enable the Middle South system to diversify its base load fuel mix and, it was projected, at the same time, produce power for a total cost (capacity and energy) which would be less than existing alternatives on the system.' " Mississippi Power & Light quoting Middle South Energy, When NOPSI sought from the New Orleans City Council (Council) the local ratemaking body with final authority over the utility's retail rates, see 16 U.S. C. 84(b); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 33:45, 33:4495 ; Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans 4-1 as amended by Ordinance No. 864 M. C. S., as amended by Ordinance No. 103 M. C. S. a rate increase to cover the increase in wholesale rates resulting from FERC's allocation of Grand Gulf costs, the Council denied an immediate rate adjustment, explaining |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | Gulf costs, the Council denied an immediate rate adjustment, explaining that a public hearing was necessary to explore " `the legality and prudency [sic] of the [contracts relating to Grand Gulf 1, and] the prudency [sic] and reasonableness of the said expenses.' " Brief for United et al. as Amici Curiae 5, quoting Council Resolution R-85-43. NOPSI responded by filing an action for injunctive and declaratory relief in the United District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting that federal law required the Council to allow it to recover, through an increase in retail rates, its FERC-allocated share of the Grand Gulf expenses. The District Court granted the Council's motion to dismiss, holding that pursuant to the Johnson Act, 8 U.S. C. 4, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the action, and that even if it had jurisdiction it would be compelled by to abstain. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially reversed on both grounds, but later, on its own motion, vacated its earlier opinion in part and held that abstention was proper both under Burford and under *356 New Orleans Pub. Serv., cert. denied, By resolution of October 10, while NOPSI I was still pending before the Fifth Circuit, the Council initiated an investigation into the prudence of NOPSI's involvement in Grand Gulf 1. Resolution R-85-636 stated the Council's intention to examine all aspects of NOPSI's relationship with Grand Gulf, including NOPSI's " `efforts to minimize its total cost exposure for the purchase,' " and Grand Gulf's " `impact on its other power supply opportunities,' " " `for the purpose of determining what portion, if any, of NOPSI's Grand Gulf 1 expense shall be assumed by [NOPSI's] shareholders.' " App. 1-114. The resolution specifically provided, however, that in setting the appropriate retail rate, the Council would " `not seek to invalidate any of the agreements surrounding Grand Gulf 1 or to order NOPSI to pay MSE a rate other than that approved by the FERC.' " In November NOPSI filed a second suit in the United District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking to preclude the Council from requiring NOPSI or its shareholders to absorb any of NOPSI's FERC-allocated share of the Grand Gulf costs. The District Court dismissed the suit as unripe, but held in the alternative that abstention was appropriate. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment on ripeness grounds. New Orleans Pub. Serv., The Council completed its prudence review on February 4, and immediately entered a final order disallowing $5 million of the Grand Gulf costs. The order was based on the |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | the Grand Gulf costs. The order was based on the Council's determinations that "NOPSI's oversight and review of its Grand Gulf obligation was uncritical and severely deficient," App. 4, and that NOPSI acted imprudently in failing to reduce the risk of its Grand Gulf commitment, in the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear incident in *357 March 1979, "by selling all or part of its share off-system," Upon receipt of the Council's decree, NOPSI turned once again to the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that, in light of this Court's recent decision in Nantahala Power & Light the Council's rate order was pre-empted by federal law. Although the District Court expressed considerable doubt as to the merits of the Council's position on the pre-emption question,[] it concluded that, notwithstanding Nantahala, it should still abstain from deciding the suit. Anticipating that the District Court might again abstain, NOPSI had filed a petition for review of the Council's order in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. As filed, NOPSI's petition raised only state-law claims and federal due process and takings claims, but NOPSI informed *358 the state court by letter that it would amend to raise its federal pre-emption claim if the federal court once again dismissed its complaint. When that happened, it did so.[3] In the parallel federal proceedings, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal, agreeing that the case was effectively controlled by NOPSI I, i. e., that Burford and abstention applied. We granted certiorari. II Before proceeding to the merits of the abstention issues, it bears emphasis that the Council does not dispute the District Court's jurisdiction to decide NOPSI's pre-emption claim. Our cases have long supported the proposition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred. For example: "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution." " `[T]he courts of the United are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.' " Chicot "When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to *359 take such jurisdiction The right of a party plaintiff to choose a |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | jurisdiction The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied." Underlying these assertions is the undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds. That principle does not eliminate, however, and the categorical assertions based upon it do not call into question, the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief a discretion that was part of the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted. See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 570-577 Thus, there are some classes of cases in which the withholding of authorized equitable relief because of undue interference with state proceedings is "the normal thing to do," 1 U. S., at 45. We have carefully defined, however, the areas in which such "abstention" is permissible, and it remains " `the exception, not the rule.' " Hawaii Housing quoting Colorado River Water Conservation As recently as last Term we described the federal courts' obligation to adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction as " `virtually unflagging.' " With these principles in mind, we address the question whether the District Court, relying on and properly declined to exercise its jurisdiction in the present case. While we acknowledge that "[t]he various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases," Pennzoil the policy considerations supporting Burford *360 and are sufficiently distinct to justify independent analyses. A In a Federal District Court sitting in equity was confronted with a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the reasonableness of the Texas Railroad Commission's grant of an oil drilling permit. The constitutional challenge was of minimal federal importance, involving solely the question whether the commission had properly applied Texas' complex oil and gas conservation regulations. and n. 8. Because of the intricacy and importance of the regulatory scheme, Texas had created a centralized system of judicial review of commission orders, which "permit[ted] the state courts, like the Railroad Commission itself, to acquire a specialized knowledge" of the regulations and industry, We found the state courts' review of commission decisions "expeditious and adequate," and, because the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by comparatively unsophisticated Federal District Courts alongside state-court review had repeatedly led to "[d]elay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the state policy," we concluded that "a sound respect for the independence of state action requir[ed] the federal equity court to stay its hand," We applied these same principles in Alabama Pub. |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | its hand," We applied these same principles in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern R. where a railroad sought to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Alabama Public Service Commission refusing permission to discontinue unprofitable rail lines. According to the railroad, requiring continued operation of the lines amounted to confiscation of property in violation of federal due process rights. Under Alabama law, a party dissatisfied with a final order of the Public Service Commission had an absolute right of appeal to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, which was "empowered to set aside any Commission order found to be contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence or erroneous *361 as a matter of law." This right of statutory appeal "concentrated in one circuit court" which exercised "supervisory" powers was, we found, "an integral part of the regulatory process under the Alabama Code." Taking account of the unified nature of the state regulatory process, and emphasizing that "adequate state court review of [the] administrative order [was] available," and that the success of the railroad's constitutional challenge depended upon the "predominantly local factor of public need for the service rendered," we held that the District Court ought to have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction, From these cases, and others on which they relied, we have distilled the principle now commonly referred to as the "Burford doctrine." Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or () where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." Colorado River Water Conservation The present case does not involve a state-law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims are "in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed," The Fifth Circuit acknowledged as much in NOPSI I, but found "the absence of a state law claim. not fatal" because, it thought, "[t]he motivating force behind Burford abstention is a reluctance to intrude into state proceedings where there exists a complex state regulatory system." -86. Finding that this case *36 involved a complex regulatory scheme of "paramount local concern and a matter which demands local administrative expertise," it |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | concern and a matter which demands local administrative expertise," it held that the District Court appropriately applied Burford. While Burford is concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a "potential for conflict" with state regulatory law or policy. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., -816. Here, NOPSI's primary claim is that the Council is prohibited by federal law from refusing to provide reimbursement for FERC-allocated wholesale costs. Unlike a claim that a state agency has misapplied its lawful authority or has failed to take into consideration or properly weigh relevant state-law factors, federal adjudication of this sort of pre-emption claim would not disrupt the State's attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an "essentially local problem," Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, That Burford abstention is not justified in these circumstances is strongly suggested by our decision in Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas decided just four months prior to Burford, in which a District Court had enjoined on federal pre-emption grounds a State's attempt to fix interstate gas rates. After determining that the State's order impinged on the authority Congress had vested solely in the Federal Power Commission, we addressed the State's contention that the District Court had nonetheless abused its discretion by granting injunctive relief: "It is perhaps unnecessary at this late date to repeat the admonition that the federal courts should be wary of interrupting the proceedings of state administrative tribunals by use of the extraordinary writ of injunction. But this, too, is a rule of equity and not to be applied in blind disregard of fact. And what are the commanding circumstances *363 of the present case? First, and most important, the orders of the state Commission are on their face plainly invalid. No inquiry beyond the orders themselves and the undisputed facts which underlie them is necessary in order to discover that they are in conflict with the federal Act." -469 Similarly in the case at bar, no inquiry beyond the four corners of the Council's retail rate order is needed to determine whether it is facially pre-empted by FERC's allocative decree and relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act. Such an inquiry would not unduly intrude into the processes of state government or undermine the State's ability to maintain desired uniformity. It may, of course, result in an injunction against enforcement of the rate order, but "there is. no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of a federal question may |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | requiring abstention merely because resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy." It is true that in its initial complaint, NOPSI asserted, as an alternative to its facial pre-emption challenge, that the rate order's nominal emphasis on NOPSI's failure in 1979-1980 to diversify its power supply by selling off a portion of its Grand Gulf allocation was merely a cover for the determination that the original Grand Gulf investment was itself unwise. Unlike the facial challenge, this claim cannot be resolved on the face of the rate order, because it hinges largely on the plausibility of the Council's finding that NOPSI should have, and could have, diversified its supply portfolio and thereby lowered its average wholesale costs. See n. Analysis of this pretext claim requires an inquiry into industry practice, wholesale rates, and power availability during the relevant time period, an endeavor that demands some level of industry-specific expertise. But since, as the facts of this case amply demonstrate, wholesale electricity is not bought and sold within a predominantly local *364 market, it does not demand significant familiarity with, and will not disrupt state resolution of, distinctively local regulatory facts or policies. The principles underlying Burford are therefore not implicated. B In which involved a facial First Amendment-based challenge to the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, we held that absent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions. That far-from-novel holding was based partly on traditional principles of equity, but rested primarily on the "even more vital consideration" of comity, As we explained, this includes "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." The state-court proceeding at issue here is not a criminal prosecution, and one of the issues in the present case is whether the principle of can properly be extended to this type of suit. NOPSI argues that that issue does not have to be reached, however, for several reasons. First, NOPSI argues that does not require abstention in the face of a substantial claim that the challenged state action is completely pre-empted by federal law. Such a claim, NOPSI contends, calls into question the prerequisite of abstention that the State have a legitimate, substantial interest in its pending proceedings, Middlesex County Ethics 457 U.S. 43, 43 (198). Thus, it contends, a district |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | 457 U.S. 43, 43 (198). Thus, it contends, a district court presented with a pre-emption-based request for equitable relief should take a quick look at the merits; and if upon that look the claim appears substantial, the court should endeavor to resolve it. *365 We disagree. There is no greater federal interest in enforcing the supremacy of federal statutes than in enforcing the supremacy of explicit constitutional guarantees, and constitutional challenges to state action, no less than pre-emption-based challenges, call into question the legitimacy of the State's interest in its proceedings reviewing or enforcing that action. Yet it is clear that the mere assertion of a substantial constitutional challenge to state action will not alone compel the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See 1 U. S., at 53. That is so because when we inquire into the substantiality of the State's interest in its proceedings we do not look narrowly to its interest in the outcome of the particular case which could arguably be offset by a substantial federal interest in the opposite outcome. Rather, what we look to is the importance of the generic proceedings to the State. In for example, we did not consult California's interest in prohibiting John from distributing handbills, but rather its interest in "carrying out the important and necessary task" of enforcing its criminal laws. at 51-5. Similarly, in Ohio Civil Rights we looked not to Ohio's specific concern with Dayton Christian Schools' firing of Linda Hoskinson, but to its more general interest in preventing employers from engaging in sex discrimination. at 68. Because pre-emption-based challenges merit a similar focus, the appropriate question here is not whether Louisiana has a substantial, legitimate interest in reducing NOPSI's retail rate below that necessary to recover its wholesale costs, but whether it has a substantial, legitimate interest in regulating intrastate retail rates. It clearly does. "[T]he regulation of utilities is one of the most important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the" Arkansas Electric Cooperative Accord, Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 05-06 *366 ; Central Hudson Gas & Electric NOPSI attempts to avoid this conclusion by stressing that it challenges not only the result of the Council's deliberations, but the very right of the Council to conduct those deliberations. (This argument assumes, of course, that enjoining the Louisiana state courts can be equated with enjoining the Council proceedings, a point we shall address in due course.) But that is simply not true, if the reference to "the Council's deliberations" is as generic as it should be. |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | "the Council's deliberations" is as generic as it should be. NOPSI does not deny that the State has an interest affirmatively protected by federal law in conducting proceedings to set intrastate retail electricity rates; rather, it contends that under the particular facts of the present case its FERC-allocated wholesale costs are not a proper subject for such proceedings. That is no different from the contention in that the defendant's violation of the particular (allegedly unconstitutional) state statute was not a proper subject of prosecution. In other words, this argument of NOPSI ultimately reduces once again to insistence upon too narrow an analytical focus. NOPSI's second argument to the effect that abstention is improper even assuming the state proceedings here are the sort to which applies rests upon the principle that abstention is not appropriate if the federal plaintiff will "suffer irreparable injury" absent equitable relief. 1 U. S., ; see also Irreparable injury may possibly be established, suggested, by a showing that the challenged state statute is " `flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,' " quoting Relying on Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas where we upheld the order of a District Court enjoining the State Public Utilities Commission from attempting directly to regulate interstate gas prices because such actions were "on their face plainly invalid," NOPSI asserts that 's posited *367 exception for state statutes "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions" ought to apply equally to state proceedings and orders flagrantly and patently violative of federal pre-emption (which is unlawful only because it violates the express constitutional prescription of the Supremacy Clause). Thus, NOPSI argues, even if a substantial claim of federal pre-emption is not sufficient to render abstention inappropriate, at least a facially conclusive claim is. Perhaps so. But we do not have to decide the matter here, since the proceeding and order at issue do not meet that description. The Council has not sought directly to regulate interstate wholesale rates; nor has it questioned the validity of the FERC-prescribed allocation of power within the Grand Gulf system, or the FERC-prescribed wholesale rates; nor has it reexamined the prudence of NOPSI's agreement to participate in Grand Gulf 1 in the first place. Rather, the Council maintains that it has examined the prudence of NOPSI's failure, after the risks of nuclear power became apparent, to diversify its supply portfolio, and that finding that failure negligent, it has taken the normal ratemaking step of making NOPSI's shareholders rather than the ratepayers bear the consequences. Nothing in this is directly or even indirectly foreclosed |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | consequences. Nothing in this is directly or even indirectly foreclosed by the federal statute, the regulations implementing it, or the case law applying it. There may well be reason to doubt the Council's necessary factual finding that NOPSI would have saved money had it diversified. See n. But we cannot conclusively say it is wrong without further factual inquiry and what requires further factual inquiry can hardly be deemed "flagrantly" unlawful for purposes of a threshold abstention determination. We conclude, therefore, that NOPSI's challenge must stand or fall upon the answer to the question whether the Louisiana court action is the type of proceeding to which applies. Viewed in isolation, it plainly is not. Although our concern for comity and federalism has led us to *368 expand the protection of beyond state criminal prosecutions, to civil enforcement proceedings, 40 U.S. 59, ; ; v. 44 U.S. 415, 43 and even to civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions, see 430 U.S. 37, 336, n. 1 ; Pennzoil it has never been suggested that requires abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action. Such a broad abstention requirement would make a mockery of the rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the Colorado River Water Conservation 44 U. S., at 817; Moses H. Cone Memorial 5 ; cf. v. at 43, n. 8 ("[W]e do not remotely suggest `that every pending proceeding between a State and a federal plaintiff justifies abstention unless one of the exceptions to applies' " ). In asserting that is applicable, however, respondents focus not upon the Louisiana court action in isolation, but upon that action as a mere continuation of the Council proceeding. Their contention is that "[t]he Council's own ratemaking and prudence inquiry, even though complete, constitutes an `ongoing proceeding' because it is subject to state judicial review." Brief for Respondents 31. The proper question, they contend, is whether the Council proceeding qualified for treatment because if it did, the proceeding is not complete until judicial review is concluded. Respondents argue by analogy to the treatment of court proceedings, for purposes, as an uninterruptible whole. When, in a proceeding to which applies, a state trial court has entered judgment, the losing *369 party cannot, of course, pursue equitable remedies in federal district court while concurrently challenging the trial court's judgment on appeal. For purposes, the State's trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system, and |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | State's trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system, and for a federal court to disrupt its integrity by intervening in midprocess would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as sovereign. For the same reason, a party may not procure federal intervention by terminating the state judicial process prematurely forgoing the state appeal to attack the trial court's judgment in federal court. "[A] necessary concomitant of is that a party [wishing to contest in federal court the judgment of a state judicial tribunal] must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court." Respondents urge that these principles apply equally where the initial adjudicatory tribunal is an agency i. e., that the litigation, from agency through courts, is to be viewed as a unitary process that should not be disrupted, so that federal intervention is no more permitted at the conclusion of the administrative stage than during it. We will assume, without deciding, that this is correct.[4] Respondents' case for abstention still requires, however, that the Council proceeding be the sort of proceeding entitled to treatment. We think it is not. While we have expanded *370 beyond criminal proceedings, and even beyond proceedings in courts, we have never extended it to proceedings that are not "judicial in nature." See Middlesex County Ethics -434 See also Ohio Civil Rights 477 U. S., at 67 The Council's proceedings in the present case were not judicial in nature. In v. Atlantic Coast Line 11 U.S. 10 several railroads requested a Federal Circuit Court "to enjoin the Virginia State Corporation Commission from publishing or taking any steps to enforce a certain order fixing passenger rates," on the ground that the proposed rates were confiscatory. at 3. To decide whether the federal court was at liberty to issue the requested injunction, we examined first the nature of the challenged agency action. Under Virginia law the commission was invested with both legislative and judicial powers, and we assumed, without deciding, that "if it were proceeding against [a railroad] to enforce [the rate] order or to punish [the railroad] for a breach, "it then would be sitting as a court and would be protected from interference on the part of courts of the United" at 6. But, upon analysis, we found the proceedings in the case at hand to be legislative. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained as follows: "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future *371 and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative and not judicial in kind" He then considered and rejected the notion that the nature of the agency's proceedings might depend on their form: "[The proper characterization of an agency's actions] depends not upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings. And it does not matter what inquiries may have been made as a preliminary to the legislative act. Most legislation is preceded by hearings and investigations. But the effect of the inquiry, and of the decision upon it, is determined by the nature of the act to which the inquiry and decision lead up. The nature of the final act determines the nature of the previous inquiry. As the judge is bound to declare the law he must know or discover the facts that establish the law. So when the final act is legislative the decision which induces it cannot be judicial in the practical sense, although the questions considered might be the same that would arise in the trial of a case." at 6-7 We have since reaffirmed both the general mode of analysis of see District of Columbia Court of 460 U.S. 46, and its specific holding that ratemaking is an essentially legislative act, Colorado Interstate Gas v. FPC, 34 U.S. 581, Thus, the Council's proceedings here were plainly legislative. That characterization does not, however, end the inquiry. In while we found the challenged agency proceeding legislative in character, we nonetheless held equitable intervention inappropriate because, we determined, the attack on the rate order was premature. Although we made clear that those challenging the rates "were not bound to wait for proceedings *37 brought to enforce the rate and to punish them for departing from it," 11 U.S., at 8, because Virginia provided for legislative review of commission rates by appeal to the state courts, we concluded that the challengers "should make sure that the State in its final legislative action would not respect what they think their rights to be, before resorting to the courts of the United" at 30. We were as concerned, in other words, to preserve the integrity of a unitary and still-to-be-completed legislative process as we were, under 40 U.S. 59 to preserve the |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | majority | New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112302/new-orleans-public-service-inc-v-council-of-city-of-new-orleans/ | as we were, under 40 U.S. 59 to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings. Similarly in the present case, if the Louisiana courts' review of Council ratemaking was legislative in nature, NOPSI's challenge to the Council's order should have been dismissed as unripe. There is no contention here that the Louisiana courts' review involves anything other than a judicial act that is, not "the making of a rule for the future," but the declaration of NOPSI's rights vis-a-vis the Council "on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist," at 6. Nor does there seem to be room for such a contention. See State ex rel. 309 So. d 90, 94-96 Since the state-court review is not an extension of the legislative process, NOPSI's pre-emption claim was ripe for federal review when the Council's order was entered. See 307 U.S. 68, 74-75 ; Bacon v. Rutland R. 3 U.S. 4, 8 As a challenge to completed legislative action, NOPSI's suit represents neither the interference with ongoing judicial proceedings against which was directed, nor the interference with an ongoing legislative process against which our ripeness holding in was directed. It is, insofar as our policies of federal comity are concerned, no different in substance from a facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional statute or zoning ordinance which we would assuredly not require to be brought in state courts. See It is true, of course, that the federal court's disposition of such a case may well affect, or for practical purposes pre-empt, a future or, as in the present circumstances, even a pending state-court action. But there is no doctrine that the availability or even the pendency of state judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts. Viewed, as it should be, as no more than a state-court challenge to completed legislative action, the Louisiana suit comes within none of the exceptions that and later cases have established. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | I I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that this case can be appealed by the Government under the "motion in arrest" provision of the Criminal Appeals Act. In contrast to the rather clear remedial purpose of the Act, not a single passage in the legislative history indicates awareness by Congress that the words it was using had the effect of distinguishing cases where a congressional Act was held invalid on its face from cases where it was invalidated as applied to a sub-class within the Act's intended reach. In both cases, the indictment is "insufficient" to state a valid offense.[1] In both cases, any "factual findings" necessary to give the particular defendant the benefit of the constitutional ruling are little more than findings as to the defendant's standing to raise the constitutional issuethey are not findings as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the offense alleged in the indictment.[2] Thus, if Judge Wyzanski, without making any findings as to Sisson's sincerity, had held *326 the Selective Service Act unconstitutionally overbroad because it purported to subject to the draft in violation of the Free Exercise Clause sincere, nonreligious objectors, this Court would clearly have jurisdiction and would face the question whether Sisson could raise the claim without showing that he was a member of the allegedly protected class. Cf. If such a showing had to be made, as the judge here held it did, the question of standing and the facts relevant to that question are surely distinct from the question of whether the defendant committed the offense, or the question of the validity vel non of the statute.[3] Cf. Association of Data Processing Service ; II We asked the parties in this case to consider whether 18 U.S. C. 3731 confers jurisdiction on the ground that the lower court had sustained "a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy." The majority, after a lengthy discussion of the "motion in arrest" provision, condescends to address a few remarks to this question, with the suggestion that it really need not discuss the issue at all, since it has concluded that Judge Wyzanski's action amounted to "an acquittal." As MR. *327 JUSTICE BLACK's concurrence indicates, the lengthy discussion of the "motion in arrest" provision is equally superfluous if indeed it is so clear that Sisson has been "acquitted." In reality, the bald assertion that Sisson has been "acquitted" simply begs the matter at issue: until one knows what a "motion in bar" is, as well as a "motion in arrest," and how the granting of such |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | a "motion in arrest," and how the granting of such motions differs from granting a judgment of acquittal, one cannot confidently attach any label to Judge Wyzanski's action. The only reason the majority gives for concluding that Sisson has been acquitted is based, not on what actually happened, but on what might have happened. Since Judge Wyzanski could have submitted the case to the jury on instructions reflecting his view of the law, and since the jury so instructed could have returned a verdict of "not guilty," therefore we must pretend that that is what has actually happened. That suggestion is nonsense. One does not determine "what in legal effect [Judge Wyzanski's decision] actually was," ante, at 279 n. 7, by asking "what in legal effect the decision might have been." If that were the key question, then this Court should not have had jurisdiction in United There the trial judge accepted the defendant's argument that the Fifth Amendment prevented the Marihuana Tax Act from constitutionally being applied to him. Under the majority's view, that action would amount to an acquittal because the judge might have given the case to the jury under instructions that it should acquit if it found the facts necessary to sustain the defendant's privilegee. g., that he was not one of the registered marihuana dealers whose conduct was legal under state law. Indeed, if applied consistently the majority's theory would mean that there is no case that could be appealed to this Court under the *328 "motion in bar" provision of the Criminal Appeals Act. For it will always be true that a judge might have sent the case to the jury under instructions reflecting his view that the motion in bar was good, so that if the jury found the facts relied on in the motion, it should acquit.[4] *329 The difference between "what might have been" and what actually happened in this case is large and critical. Where the jury actually "acquits" under an erroneous instruction, a successful appeal leading to reversal and a new trial would raise serious constitutional problems by placing the defendant through the hazards of another trial for the same offense. In this case, however, there is no possibility of subjecting Sisson to another trial, or of overturning a factfinder's decision that, whatever the law, Sisson should go free. If Judge Wyzanski's legal theory is incorrect, the jury's verdict of guilty with judgment no longer "arrested"simply remains in effect. It was precisely this distinction that Senator Knox was referring to in the passage quoted in the majority opinion, ante, |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | to in the passage quoted in the majority opinion, ante, at 289: the defendant retains the benefit of any error whatever committed by the court "in the trial"; but the Government gets an appeal "upon questions *330 of law raised by the defendant to defeat the trial." The distinction is also reflected in the majority's quotation from United States v. Ball, ante, at 289-290, where the question of what constitutes an "acquittal" is tied to the question of whether the defendant would be put "twice in jeopardy" by an appeal. I suspect that the Court's reluctance to discuss the "motion in bar" provision and to distinguish the granting of such motions from an acquittal stems from the fact that, unlike the "motion in arrest," there is no doubt that a "motion in bar" properly sets forth an affirmative defense, which necessarily requires resort to facts not found in the indictment or on the face of the "record." Thus most of the majority's argument that this case is not appealable as a "motion in arrest" because "[t]he decision below rests on affirmative defenses," ante, at 287-288, is simply irrelevant as far as the "motion in bar" is concerned. In fact, as the majority seems to concede by its reluctance to reject square precedent on the issue, see ante, at 300 n. 53, our cases make clear that the phrase "motion in bar" would include a plea like Sisson's that the selective service laws are unconstitutional as applied to him. The Court has never adopted the view that a "motion in bar" encompasses only the common-law defenses of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon.[5] Neither did Congress when it passed the Act. The debates show that the plea in bar was thought to embrace such a variety of defenses as the statute of limitations, e. g., 41 Cong Rec. 2749, and a plea of Fifth Amendment *331 immunity, see 41 Cong. Rec. 2753. The most thorough discussion of the "motion in bar" in this Court occurs in the concurring and dissenting opinions in United MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN argued that a motion in bar would encompass every possible affirmative defense that would prevent retrial. MR. JUSTICE STEWART argued for a narrower interpretation, similar to the concept of a plea in confession and avoidance, i. e., a plea that "did not contest the facts alleged in the declaration, but relied on new matter which would deprive those facts of their ordinary legal effect." Even under the narrower interpretation of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, Sisson's plea qualifies as a "motion in bar." For as the majority's |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | qualifies as a "motion in bar." For as the majority's opinion makes clear, the crux of the case against Sisson was simply whether or not he had wilfully refused to submit to induction; the question of his sincerity was "new matter" relied on to deprive the fact of his wilfull refusal of its ordinary legal effect. See majority opinion, ante, at 276; United Just as our cases have permitted the "motion in bar" to embrace limitations pleas, see, e. g., United and pleas of constitutional privilege, see United so too they permit the "motion in bar" to reach cases of this sort, attacking the validity of the statute as applied to the defendant. See United ; United at Procedurally, the fact that the plea is sustained only after a jury verdict of convictionand the fact that the judge labeled his action as something other than a "motion in bar"does not prevent finding a "motion in bar." United (C. A. 2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, Even *332 the legislative history recognizes that such pleas could be sustained after the trial had begun. 41 Cong. Rec. 2749 (remarks of Senator Rayner). Nor is there any doubtunlike the case of a motion in arrest that a proper motion in bar results even though factual issues relevant to the motion have to be tried. See 41 Cong. Rec. 2194 (remarks of Senator Whyte); ; United Indeed, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN recently referred to the possibility of trying facts to the judge that were relevant to the motion in bar, and separate from the general issue. See United In his words, "[a] defense is thus `capable of determination' [without trial of the general issue] if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense." That description fits this case precisely since, as already noted, the majority itself takes careful pains to point out that the "general issue"whether Sisson wilfully refused induction was at all times separate from the issue raised by Sisson's constitutional claim.[6] *333 This case, then, is indistinguishable as far as the "motion in bar" provision is concerned from United which the majority cites with approval throughout its opinion. There, as here, the defendant *334 moved for dismissal of the indictment on the basis of an affirmative defensein that case the statute of limitations. There, as here, the judge reserved ruling on the motion until after the jury had returned a verdict of guilty. There, as here, the judge then granted the defendant's motion, relying on matters "outside the record." The |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | the defendant's motion, relying on matters "outside the record." The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the question became whether or not the appeal should have been taken directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act. Judge Learned Hand, in deciding that the trial court's action amounted to sustaining a motion in bar, made short shrift of the argument that the case was indistinguishable from the case of a directed verdict of acquittal. "Had the trial judge directed a verdict, so that it would have been necessary upon reversal to subject the defendant to trial before a second jury, that would be `double jeopardy,' but, although the Constitution gives an accused person the benefit of any mistakes in his favor of the first jury he encounters, whether it has passed upon his guilt or not, it does not extend that privilege to mistakes in his favor by judges. Indeed, were the opposite true, all appeals from decisions in arrest of judgment would be constitutionally futile because no judgment of conviction could be entered when they were reversed." *335 The sole question, then, in this case as in is whether the defendant has been "put in jeopardy" as that phrase is used in the Criminal Appeals Act. That question in turn centers on whether the phrase is to be read literally, in which case a defendant would be in jeopardy as soon as a jury was impaneled, or whether the phrase is to mean "constitutional" or "legal" jeopardy, in the sense that even if the Government were to succeed on appeal, it would be unable to take advantage of its success in new proceedings against the defendant. Although the Government has chosen to read the statute in the former, literal sense, this Court has never resolved the issue. Judge Learned Hand thought there was a "more than plausible argument" for the latter, "legal jeopardy" view, but the Government dismissed its appeal to this Court before the question could be decided. United at The legislative history of the 1907 Act unmistakably shows that Congress meant to allow the Government an appeal from a decision sustaining a motion in bar in every case except where the defendant was entitled to the protection of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. I find the debates so convincing on that point that I am at a loss to understand why the Government has so readily conceded the issue unless it be to maintain the appearance of consistency, and to protect its interests in securing new criminal appeals legislation before Congress.[7] Certainly that concession |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | securing new criminal appeals legislation before Congress.[7] Certainly that concession *336 does not bind this Court;[8] even more certainly it is no excuse for the majority's failure to conduct its own examination of the relevant debates. Out of three full days of debate in the Senate, covering more than 30 pages of the Congressional Record, see 41 Cong. Rec. 2190-2197, 2744-2763, 2818-2825, the majority finds a total of three passages to cite in a footnote as support for its interpretation, see ante, at 304-305, n. 57. In each case, the statements placed in context prove just the opposite of the majority's conclusion. The first reference, to a passage before debate even began, 40 Cong. Rec. 9033, is to Senator Spooner's *337 question whether the bill applied only to questions arising before the impaneling of the jury. As the majority acknowledges, Senator Nelson immediately corrected Senator Spooner, pointing out that the key question was "jeopardy," not the impaneling of the jury. The entire brief exchange occurred before the bill was debated, further consideration having immediately been postponed by the objection of other Senators to pursuing the matter at that time. See F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 117 n. 68 When debate was resumed at the next session of Congress, Senator Spooner unmistakably indicated that jeopardy was being used in the constitutional, legal sense, in direct opposition to the views the majority now tries to ascribe to him: "The question is whether it subjects a man under any aspect of it to the danger of double jeopardy. I am content to leave it, under the bill, if it shall become a law, to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is their function to determine what is jeopardy. It is their function to protect the citizens of the United States against any invasion of the constitutional guaranty as to double jeopardy. I think we can rely upon the court to protect as far as the Constitution requires it all defendants" 41 Cong. Rec. 2762-2763 (remarks of Sen. Spooner). In the second passage, 41 Cong. Rec. 2191, the majority quotes Senator Nelson for the proposition that no appeal would lie where a jury had been impaneled. The actual quotation is that no appeal would lie "where a jury has been impaneled and where the defendant has been tried" 41 Cong. Rec. 2191 (emphasis added). In context, it is clear that Senator Nelson is venturing an interpretation of "jeopardy" in the legal sense. The whole dispute at this point in the debate is *338 primarily between Senator |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | this point in the debate is *338 primarily between Senator Rayner who opposed the bill, and Senators Bacon and Nelson, who supported the bill. The proponents were at pains to show that a person could not be "put twice in jeopardy" under any of the provisions of the bill, 41 Cong. Rec. 2193 (remarks of Sen. McCumber; remarks of Sen. Bacon). Senator Rayner was intent on showing how difficult it was for anyone to give an adequate definition of just what "legal jeopardy" ishe supported a return to the House suggestion, which would have given the defendant the benefit of his favorable decision whether or not he had been "put in jeopardy." But not a single passage can be cited to show that either side had the slightest inkling that "jeopardy" was being used in any but its technical, legal sense as interpreted by this Court and state courts. That was the whole point of Senator Rayner's objection: "jeopardy" was too vague a term, because nobody could decide exactly when constitutional jeopardy had attached. How the majority can rely on Senator Nelson for the conclusion that "jeopardy" means "literal" jeopardy is particularly difficult to understand, given the Senator's own unambiguous explanation that as author of the bill, what he meant was "constitutional" jeopardy: "I aimed to put the bill in such a form that it would cover exactly those cases in which the defendant had not been put in jeopardy under the Constitution of the United States. I believe that the bill is limited strictly to that matter." 41 Cong. Rec. 2757 (emphasis added). Senator Bacon during this same exchange noted that the "jeopardy" provisions had been put in "out of abundance of caution," 41 Cong. Rec. 2191. He proceeded to explain by his remarks that he meant precisely what the majority today declares he could not have meant namely, that Congress was simply emphasizing that it was not attempting to subject a defendant to constitutional *339 double jeopardy by a successful government appeal. In fact, when one of the Senators asked whether "jeopardy" was to be taken in a possibly literal sense, Senator Bacon hastened to reply: "That is not what the law means by being put in jeopardy at all. The words `being in jeopardy' are entirely a technical phrase, which does not relate to the fact that a man is in danger as soon as an indictment is preferred against him." 41 Cong. Rec. 2191 (emphasis added). It is hardly "superfluous" for Congress to guard against a construction of an Act that might render the Act unconstitutional. |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | construction of an Act that might render the Act unconstitutional. And the fact that the majority would have written the statute differently to avoid what it calls a "superfluous" reading, is no excuse for ignoring the explicit indication that that is exactly the reading that Congress meant the phrase to bear.[9] *340 The majority's final passage refers to a remark by Senator Patterson suggesting that a motion in arrest was the only provision under the bill that could be raised after a trial had begun. As the majority concedes, one need only read on a bit further to discover that Senator Patterson immediately retracted that suggestion when challenged, insisting that a "motion in bar" could also be granted after trial had begun and that an appeal would lie as long as no problem of "constitutional jeopardy" was presented. Indeed, Senator Patterson argued vigorously that there would have been jurisdiction in the Beef Trust Casea case in which the motion in bar was not only granted after trial had begun, but was also reflected in the judge's instructions to the jury. Senator Patterson's remarks are particularly interesting because, apart from whether he is right on the question of constitutional jeopardy, he makes clear the distinction between a motion in bar and an acquittal which the majority blithely ignores: "A special plea in bar is a plea that does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in the sense as to whether he did or not commit the act for which he was indicted. A special plea in bar is that which is set up as a special defense notwithstanding the defendant may be guilty of the offenses with which he is charged; it is for some outside matter; yet it may have been connected with the case. The special plea in bar that was filed by the indicted Chicago packers is a very good illustration of that. Their plea in bar set forth the fact of their having been induced or led, whatever it may have been, to make communications to the *341 law officers of the Government with reference to their business that gave the district attorney information which enabled him to bring about the indictments and to help in their prosecution. That had no reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It was a pleading of fact that was independent of the crime for which those packers had been indicted. "Therefore, Mr. President, there could be no jeopardy in a case of that kind where there was a decision upon the special plea in |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | where there was a decision upon the special plea in bar, because it is not under a plea of guilty or not guilty that the insufficiency of a special plea in bar is determined; it is non obstante whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty." 41 Cong. Rec. 2753. It is obvious from these remarks that Senator Patterson did not think that the question of "jeopardy" under the motion-in-bar provision was simply a question of whether the jury had been impaneled.[10] This interpretation is made doubly clear by the remarks of Senator Nelson, the leading proponent of the bill. He also addressed himself to the Beef Trust Case and, unlike Senator Patterson, he suggested that that case could not have been appealed under the Act. But the reason he gave for that conclusion was not that the jury had been impaneled, but that the jury had been impaneled and had returned a verdict of not guilty under the judge's instructions, thus placing the defendants in "legal jeopardy": "In that case a jury was impaneled, and the question whether the defendants were entitled to immunity *342 under the immunity law because they had furnished Mr. Garfield and the officials of his Bureau information was submitted to the jury, and the jury under instructions of the court found for the defendants. In that case the defendants under the Constitution had been in jeopardy and in that beef-trust case no appeal could lie." 41 Cong. Rec. 2757 (emphasis added). See 41 Cong. Rec. 2750 (remarks of Senator Nelson). Senator Nelson was thus talking about the majority's "might have been case"the case where the judge gives the motion in bar issue to the jury under his novel view of the law, so that a successful government appeal would require retrying the defendant. In the immediately following passage, Senator Nelson makes clear that if the facts pleaded in the special issue are not submitted to the jury, but tried to the judge, there would be no bar to taking an appeal. But in both cases, Senator Nelson, like Senator Patterson, is quite obviously giving his views as to what "constitutional jeopardy" means. While the debates are replete with other indications that Congress' concern was with "double jeopardy," not "literal jeopardy," the clearest such indication occurs in this very exchange between Senator Rayner, who announced his opposition to the bill in any form, 41 Cong. Rec. 2745, and Senators Spooner, Patterson, and Nelsonproponents of the bill. The exchange occupied most of the second day of the three days of debate in the Senate and centered |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | the three days of debate in the Senate and centered almost entirely on Senator Rayner's proposed amendment. The example that Senator Rayner used to illustrate the difficulties he saw in the bill was a hypothetical case in which a plea in bara limitations pleawas sustained halfway through the trial. See 41 Cong. Rec. 2749. In that case, Senator Rayner argued, no one could say with certainty whether the defendant *343 had been put in jeopardy, and hence whether he could constitutionally be retried if the Government's appeal were successful. Senator Rayner did not want to leave the defendant's fate to depend on "this howling wilderness of confusion upon the subject of what constitutes legal jeopardy." 41 Cong. Rec. 2750 (emphasis added). His amendment would thus have guaranteed that a defendant could never be retriedwhatever the ultimate resolution of the "legal jeopardy" question. Those who opposed the amendment argued that if it had any substantive effect, it would make the question on any appeal "moot"; that it was enough to make sure that the Government was not allowed to secure a reversal and proceed again where the result would place the defendant in "double jeopardy"; and that the bill would leave to the Supreme Court the question of what is "jeopardy," and hence protection "against any invasion of the constitutional guaranty as to double jeopardy." 41 Cong. Rec. 2761-2763; see also 41 Cong. Rec. 2193. But it is clearindeed it was again crucial to Senator Rayner's argumentthat the Senators assumed that "jeopardy" was being used in the legal sense: "The question is whether it subjects a man under any aspect of it to the danger of double jeopardy. "The Senator [Rayner] says he does not care whether it is double jeopardy or not. Even if a man under the Constitution may properly and lawfully be put on trial again, if he has been tried once, even though it were a mistrial, if he had been for a moment in jeopardy, he insists that we shall provide by law, no matter what the case may be, that he shall not be tried again; that he shall go acquit. "The matter has been thoroughly argued. I am content to leave it, under the bill, if it shall become *344 a law, to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is their function to determine what is jeopardy. It is their function to protect the citizens of the United States against any invasion of the constitutional guaranty as to double jeopardy. I think we can rely upon the court to protect as far |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | we can rely upon the court to protect as far as the Constitution requires it all defendants, without supplementing the Constitution by the Senator's amendment to this bill." 41 Cong. Rec. 2762-2763 (remarks of Senator Spooner).[11] Senator Rayner's hypothetical example of a plea in bar sustained after trial had begunan example accepted without question by Senators Patterson, Nelson, and *345 Spooner, and every other Senator participating in the debatecompletely undercuts the majority's assertion that Congress thought there could be no appeal once the jury had been impaneled. Indeed, in the face of the arguments over the meaning of "jeopardy" and Senator Rayner's vigorous attack on the vagueness of that term, it is nothing short of incredible for the majority to suggest that Congress left that language in the Act, intending it to be interpreted as providing "a clear, easily administered test," ante, at 307. If Congress had intended the majority's interpretation it would have been both simple and logical to explicitly limit appeals to cases "where the jury has not yet been impaneled," thus avoiding the possibility of confusion which had been the very topic of discussion for three full days of debate. The plain fact of the matter is that the majority's post hoc rationalization of the Act simply was not that of Congress. While the debates show considerable disagreement about the meaning of "jeopardy" in the legal sense, there is not the slightest suggestion anywhere in the legislative history that "jeopardy" is being used in any other sense. Even where references occur to the impaneling of the jury as the moment when jeopardy attaches, it is clear that jeopardy is still being used in its legal senseafter all, as the majority itself notes, ante, at 305, the impaneling of the jury does in fact often become the constitutionally relevant point in determining that "legal jeopardy" has attached to prevent a reprosecution. But the one point on which there was unanimous agreementeven from Senator Rayner, see, e. g., 41 Cong. Rec. 2748about the meaning of "jeopardy," was that where a convicted defendant on his own motion had secured the arrest of a jury's verdict of guilty, he had not been placed in "jeopardy." "[T]he defendant could not complain, either if the judgment of the court shall be entered upon the verdict or a new trial *346 shall be ordered, because it is giving to the defendant a new opportunity to go acquit when, under the trial that was had, he had been convicted." 41 Cong. Rec. 2753. For this Court to hold that Sisson has been placed in jeopardy |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | Court to hold that Sisson has been placed in jeopardy under the motion-in-bar provisions, thus defeating jurisdiction, the Court must be prepared to hold that a successful appeal by the Government, resulting in an order that judgment be entered on the verdict, would violate Sisson's double jeopardy protection. Judge Learned Hand refused even to consider such a suggestion in : "So long as the verdict of guilty remains as a datum, the correction of errors of law in attaching the proper legal consequences to it [does] not trench upon the constitutional prohibition." III I find extremely peculiar the path that the Court follows in reaching its conclusion that we cannot hear this case. The "motion in arrest" provision is confined to its early common-law sense, although there is absolutely no indication that Congress was using the phrase in that sense, and we have never similarly limited the "motion in bar" provision to its common-law scope. The alleged trouble with the "motion in arrest" is not any problem of jeopardy, but the fact that Judge Wyzanski relied on facts outside the face of the "record." Conversely, the trouble with the "motion in bar" provision is not the use of outside facts, but solely the fear that Sisson was "put in jeopardy." If this were a motion in arrest, there would be no "jeopardy" problem; and if this were a motion in bar, resort to outside facts would pose no problem. The apparent inconsistency and the refusal to hear the case appear to be due to a dogged determination to fit Judge Wyzanski's action into one "common-law pigeonhole," United (BRENNAN, J., concurring), or the other *347 while paying scant attention to the reason for trying to make the fit in the first place, with the result that Judge Wyzanski's action is to be given the no less distorting label of "acquittal." The question in this case should simply be whether or not a judge who upholds a claim of constitutional privilege, thereby declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied, has entered a judgment that Congress intended this Court to be able to review. Surely in a statute as unclear and ambiguous as the majority says this unhappy Act is, the "words" of the statute are only the first place to start the task of interpretation. The primary guide to interpretation should be the statute's purpose, as indicated by the evil that prompted it, and by the legislative history. The Act was passed to remedy the situation that gave a single district judge the power to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government, |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | power to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government, and to annul as unconstitutional, attempts by Congress to reach a defendant's specified conduct through the use of the criminal machinery. Over and over, this theme is repeated in the debates on the bill, dominating every other topic of discussion except the concern for safeguarding the defendant's privilege against double jeopardy. AS THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S opinion details, it is difficult to imagine a case more closely fitting the type of case in which Congress intended to allow an appeal than the instant one. The majority suggests that we must remember that the Act was "a compromise," and that Congress was very concerned about not unduly encroaching on the rights of the defendant. But the "compromise" between the House and the Senate was only over the areas in which to allow appealthere was complete accord that constitutional cases of this sort constituted one of those areas; they were indeed the Act's raison d'être. Similarly *348 while Congress was concerned to protect the defendant's rights, it had no doubt that those rights were not invaded where a defendant had been found guilty, and the Government appealed the judge's decision that for legal reasons the verdict could not stand. The majority, in short, pays lip service to the policies of the Act without ever applying those policies to the question presented in the case before it. Judge Wyzanski, anxious to do his duty as he saw it, and yet aware that ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue properly belongs in this Court, had two means of passing on the issue while still protecting Sisson's rights: he could have granted Sisson's motion after a pretrial hearing, see United ; Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 12 (b) (1), 12 (b) (4), or he could, as here, grant the motion only after the jury's verdict of guilty forced him to reach the constitutional question. In either case, none of the interests reflected in the jeopardy provisions of the Constitution protecting defendants from repeated and harassing trials for the same offenseis in any way endangered. In fact, Sisson's interests if anything are less in jeopardy in the second case than the first where the Government's appeal would force a long delay in beginning the trial itself. The conclusion that Congress intended judgments of this kind to be reviewed seems to me so clear, that I suspect the majority's neglect of this aspect of the statute amounts to a tacit admission that policy and purpose point overwhelmingly toward finding jurisdiction. If that is the case, then to hang Congress |
Justice White | 1,970 | 6 | second_dissenting | United States v. Sisson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108195/united-states-v-sisson/ | jurisdiction. If that is the case, then to hang Congress on the technical meaning of the obscure legal terms it happened to use is not only inappropriate, but is strangely out of line with decisions that leap over the plain meaning of words in other contexts to reach conclusions claimed to be consistent with an Act's broader purposes. See ; Boys *349 Markets, ; ; United Compared to some of these examples of "statutory construction," it is child's play to conclude that Congress did not really mean to limit "motion in arrest" to its old common-law meaning, or that at least if it did, it thought decisions such as Judge Wyzanski's would have been appealable under some other provision, such as the "motion in bar" as long as there was no danger of encroaching on the defendant's jeopardy interests. Admittedly, the issues raised by Sisson are difficult and far-reaching ones, but they should be faced and decided. It is, to be sure, much more comfortable to be able to control the decision whether or not to hear a difficult issue by the use of our discretion to grant certiorari. But that is no excuse for ignoring Congress' clear intent that the Court was to have no choice in deciding whether to hear the issue in a case such as this. The fear expressed in the prevailing opinion that if we accept jurisdiction we shall be "cast adrift" to flounder helplessly, see ante, at 299, has a flavor of nothing so much as the long-discarded philosophy that inspired the old forms of action and that led to the solemn admonition in 1725 that "[W]e must keep up the boundaries of actions, otherwise we shall introduce the utmost confusion." Reynolds v. Clarke, 93 Eng. Rep. 747, 748 (K. B. 1725). I cannot agree. I would find jurisdiction. |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | concurring | Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109060/pittsburgh-v-alco-parking-corp/ | The opinion of the Court fully explicates the issue presented here, and I am in accord with its resolution. I write briefly only to emphasize my understanding that today's decision does not foreclose the possibility that some combination of unreasonably burdensome taxation and direct competition by the taxing authority might amount to a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To some extent, private business is inevitably handicapped by direct governmental competition, but the opinion of the Court makes plain that the legitimate exercise of the taxing power is not to be restrained on this account. It is conceivable, however, that punitive taxation of a private industry and direct economic competition through a governmental entity enjoying special competitive advantages would effectively expropriate a private business for public profit. Such a combination of unreasonably burdensome taxation and public competition would be the functional equivalent of a governmental taking of private property for public use and would be subject to the constitutional requirement of just compensation. As the opinion of the Court clearly reveals, ante, at 377-378, no such circumstance has been shown to exist in the instant case. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | concurring | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | My agreement with the Court is founded on two understandings. First, the challenged regulation is limited to significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed *709 to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals. Second, even setting aside difficult questions of scienter, the regulation's application is limited by ordinary principles of proximate causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability. These limitations, in my view, call into question and with it, many of the applications derided by the dissent. Because there is no need to strike a regulation on a facial challenge out of concern that it is susceptible of erroneous application, however, and because there are many habitat-related circumstances in which the regulation might validly apply, I join the opinion of the Court. In my view, the regulation is limited by its terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual animals. Justice Scalia disagrees, arguing that the harm regulation "encompasses injury inflicted, not only upon individual animals, but upon populations of the protected species." Post, at 716. At one level, I could not reasonably quarrel with this observation; death to an individual animal always reduces the size of the population in which it lives, and in that sense, "injures" that population. But by its insight, the dissent means something else. Building upon the regulation's use of the word "breeding," Justice Scalia suggests that the regulation facially bars significant habitat modification that actually kills or injures hypothetical animals (or, perhaps more aptly, causes potential additions to the population not to come into being). Because "[i]mpairment of breeding does not `injure' living creatures," Justice Scalia reasons, the regulation must contemplate application to "a population of animals which would otherwise have maintained or increased its numbers." Post, at 716, 734. I disagree. As an initial matter, I do not find it as easy as Justice Scalia does to dismiss the notion that significant impairment of breeding injures living creatures. To raze the last remaining ground on which the piping plover currently *710 breeds, thereby making it impossible for any piping plovers to reproduce, would obviously injure the population (causing the species' extinction in a generation). But by completely preventing breeding, it would also injure the individual living bird, in the same way that sterilizing the creature injures the individual living bird. To "injure" is, among other things, "to impair." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 623 (1983). One need not subscribe to theories of "psychic harm," cf. post, at 734-735, n. 5, to recognize that to make it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | concurring | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical functions and to render that animal, and its genetic material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is actual injury. In any event, even if impairing an animal's ability to breed were not, in and of itself, an injury to that animal, interference with breeding can cause an animal to suffer other, perhaps more obvious, kinds of injury. The regulation has clear application, for example, to significant habitat modification that kills or physically injures animals which, because they are in a vulnerable breeding state, do not or cannot flee or defend themselves, or to environmental pollutants that cause an animal to suffer physical complications during gestation. Breeding, feeding, and sheltering are what animals do. If significant habitat modification, by interfering with these essential behaviors, actually kills or injures an animal protected by the Act, it causes "harm" within the meaning of the regulation. In contrast to Justice Scalia, I do not read the regulation's "breeding" reference to vitiate or somehow to qualify the clear actual death or injury requirement, or to suggest that the regulation contemplates extension to nonexistent animals. There is no inconsistency, I should add, between this interpretation and the commentary that accompanied the amendment of the regulation to include the actual death or injury requirement. See (1981). Quite the contrary. It is true, as Justice Scalia observes, post, at 716, *711 that the Fish and Wildlife Service states at one point that "harm" is not limited to "direct physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife species," see (1981). But one could just as easily emphasize the word "direct" in this sentence as the word "individual."[*] Elsewhere in the commentary, the Service makes clear that "section 9's threshold does focus on individual members of a protected species." Moreover, the Service says that the regulation has no application to speculative harm, explaining that its insertion of the word "actually" was intended "to bulwark the need for proven injury to a species due to a party's actions." Ibid.; see also That a protected animal could have eaten the leaves of a fallen tree or could, perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches is not sufficient under the regulation. Instead, as the commentary reflects, the regulation requires demonstrable effect (i. e., actual injury or death) on actual, individual members of the protected species. By the dissent's reckoning, the regulation at issue here, in conjunction with 16 U.S. C. 1540(a)(1), imposes liability for any habitat-modifying conduct that ultimately results in the death of a protected animal, "regardless of whether that result |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | concurring | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | death of a protected animal, "regardless of whether that result is intended or even foreseeable, and no matter how long *712 the chain of causality between modification and injury." Post, at 715; see also post, at 719. Even if 1540(a)(1) does create a strict liability regime (a question we need not decide at this juncture), I see no indication that Congress, in enacting that section, intended to dispense with ordinary principles of proximate causation. Strict liability means liability without regard to fault; it does not normally mean liability for every consequence, however remote, of one's conduct. See generally W. D. Dobbs, R. & D. Owen, Prosser and on Law of Torts 559-560 (5th ed. 1984) (describing "practical necessity for the restriction of liability within some reasonable bounds" in the strict liability context). I would not lightly assume that Congress, in enacting a strict liability statute that is silent on the causation question, has dispensed with this well-entrenched principle. In the absence of congressional abrogation of traditional principles of causation, then, private parties should be held liable under 1540(a)(1) only if their habitat-modifying actions proximately cause death or injury to protected animals. Cf. ; New (noting that "[t]raditional tort law has often imposed strict liability while recognizing a causation defense," but that, in enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Congress "specifically rejected including a causation requirement"). The regulation, of course, does not contradict the presumption or notion that ordinary principles of causation apply here. Indeed, by use of the word "actually," the regulation clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects, and thus itself invokes principles of proximate causation. *713 Proximate causation is not a concept susceptible of precise definition. See It is easy enough, of course, to identify the extremes. The farmer whose fertilizer is lifted by a tornado from tilled fields and deposited miles away in a wildlife refuge cannot, by any stretch of the term, be considered the proximate cause of death or injury to protected species occasioned thereby. At the same time, the landowner who drains a pond on his property, killing endangered fish in the process, would likely satisfy any formulation of the principle. We have recently said that proximate causation "normally eliminates the bizarre," Jerome B. Grubart, and have noted its "functionally equivalent" alternative characterizations in terms of foreseeability, see Milwaukee & St. Paul R. and duty, see Consolidated Rail Proximate causation depends to a great extent on considerations of the fairness of imposing liability for remote consequences. The task of determining whether proximate causation exists in the limitless fact patterns sure |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | concurring | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | whether proximate causation exists in the limitless fact patterns sure to arise is best left to lower courts. But I note, at the least, that proximate cause principles inject a foreseeability element into the statute, and hence, the regulation, that would appear to alleviate some of the problems noted by the dissent. See, e. g., post, at 719 (describing "a farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby [injures] protected fish"). In my view, then, the "harm" regulation applies where significant habitat modification, by impairing essential behaviors, proximately (foreseeably) causes actual death or injury to identifiable animals that are protected under the Endangered Species Act. Pursuant to my interpretation, Palila II -under which the Court of Appeals held that a state *714 agency committed a "taking" by permitting mouflon sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that, when full grown, might have fed and sheltered endangered palilawas wrongly decided according to the regulation's own terms. Destruction of the seedlings did not proximately cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it merely prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently sustaining actual birds. This case, of course, comes to us as a facial challenge. We are charged with deciding whether the regulation on its face exceeds the agency's statutory mandate. I have identified at least one application of the regulation that is, in my view, inconsistent with the regulation's own limitations. That misapplication does not, however, call into question the validity of the regulation itself. One can doubtless imagine questionable applications of the regulation that test the limits of the agency's authority. However, it seems to me clear that the regulation does not on its terms exceed the agency's mandate, and that the regulation has innumerable valid habitat-related applications. Congress may, of course, see fit to revisit this issue. And nothing the Court says today prevents the agency itself from narrowing the scope of its regulation at a later date. With this understanding, I join the Court's opinion. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | dissenting | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | A growing problem in our Nation is the sanitary treatment and disposal of solid waste.[1] For many years, solid waste was *630 incinerated. Because of the significant environmental problems attendant on incineration, however, this method of solid waste disposal has declined in use in many localities, including New Jersey. "Sanitary" landfills have replaced incineration as the principal method of disposing of solid waste. In ch. 363 of the 1973 N. J. Laws, the State of New Jersey legislatively recognized the unfortunate fact that landfills also present extremely serious health and safety problems. First, in New Jersey, "virtually all sanitary landfills can be expected to produce leachate, a noxious and highly polluted liquid which is seldom visible and frequently pollutes ground and surface waters." App. 149. The natural decomposition process which occurs in landfills also produces large quantities of methane and thereby presents a significant explosion hazard. Landfills can also generate "health hazards caused by rodents, fires and scavenger birds" and, "needless to say, do not help New Jersey's aesthetic appearance nor New Jersey's noise or water or air pollution problems." Supp. App. 5. The health and safety hazards associated with landfills present appellees with a currently unsolvable dilemma. Other, hopefully safer, methods of disposing of solid wastes are still in the development stage and cannot presently be used. But appellees obviously cannot completely stop the tide of solid waste that its citizens will produce in the interim. For the moment, therefore, appellees must continue to use sanitary landfills to dispose of New Jersey's own solid waste despite the critical environmental problems thereby created. *631 The question presented in this case is whether New Jersey must also continue to receive and dispose of solid waste from neighboring States, even though these will inexorably increase the health problems discussed above.[2] The Court answers this question in the affirmative. New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to the serious problem of disposing of the waste generated within its own borders, or it must accept waste from every portion of the United States, thereby multiplying the health and safety problems which would result if it dealt only with such wastes generated within the State. Because past precedents establish that the Commerce Clause does not present appellees with such a Hobson's choice, I dissent. The Court recognizes, ante, at 621-622, that States can prohibit the importation of items "`which, on account of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such as rags or other substances infected with the germs |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | dissenting | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | such as rags or other substances infected with the germs of yellow fever or the virus of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit for human use or consumption.'" See ; ; ; Railroad As the Court points out, such "quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist measures, even though they were directed against out-of-state commerce." Ante, at 628 (emphasis added). *632 In my opinion, these cases are dispositive of the present one. Under them, New Jersey may require germ-infected rags or diseased meat to be disposed of as best as possible within the State, but at the same time prohibit the importation of such items for disposal at the facilities that are set up within New Jersey for disposal of such material generated within the State. The physical fact of life that New Jersey must somehow dispose of its own noxious items does not mean that it must serve as a depository for those of every other State. Similarly, New Jersey should be free under our past precedents to prohibit the importation of solid waste because of the health and safety problems that such waste poses to its citizens. The fact that New Jersey continues to, and indeed must continue to, dispose of its own solid waste does not mean that New Jersey may not prohibit the importation of even more solid waste into the State. I simply see no way to distinguish solid waste, on the record of this case, from germinfected rags, diseased meat, and other noxious items. The Court's effort to distinguish these prior cases is unconvincing. It first asserts that the quarantine laws which have previously been upheld "banned the importation of articles such as diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible because their very movement risked contagion and other evils." Ante, at 628-629. According to the Court, the New Jersey law is distinguishable from these other laws, and invalid, because the concern of New Jersey is not with the movement of solid waste but with the present inability to safely dispose of it once it reaches its destination. But I think it far from clear that the State's law has as limited a focus as the Court imputes to it: Solid waste which is a health hazard when it reaches its destination may in all likelihood be an equally great health hazard in transit. Even if the Court is correct in its characterization of New Jersey's concerns, I do not see why a State may ban the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | dissenting | Philadelphia v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109916/philadelphia-v-new-jersey/ | I do not see why a State may ban the importation of items whose movement risks contagion, but *633 cannot ban the importation of items which, although they may be transported into the State without undue hazard, will then simply pile up in an ever increasing danger to the public's health and safety. The Commerce Clause was not drawn with a view to having the validity of state laws turn on such pointless distinctions. Second, the Court implies that the challenged laws must be invalidated because New Jersey has left its landfills open to domestic waste. But, as the Court notes, ante, at 628, this Court has repeatedly upheld quarantine laws "even though they appear to single out interstate commerce for special treatment." The fact that New Jersey has left its landfill sites open for domestic waste does not, of course, mean that solid waste is not innately harmful. Nor does it mean that New Jersey prohibits importation of solid waste for reasons other than the health and safety of its population. New Jersey must out of sheer necessity treat and dispose of its solid waste in some fashion, just as it must treat New Jersey cattle suffering from hoof-and-mouth disease. It does not follow that New Jersey must, under the Commerce Clause, accept solid waste or diseased cattle from outside its borders and thereby exacerbate its problems. The Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly found that ch. 363 was passed "to preserve the health of New Jersey residents by keeping their exposure to solid waste and landfill areas to a minimum." 68 N. J. 451, 473, The Court points to absolutely no evidence that would contradict this finding by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Because I find no basis for distinguishing the laws under challenge here from our past cases upholding state laws that prohibit the importation of items that could endanger the population of the State, I dissent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | For over half a decade petitioners were prohibited from building homes, or any other structures, on their land. Because the Takings Clause requires the government to pay compensation when it deprives owners of all economically viable use of their land, see and because a ban on all development lasting almost six years does not resemble any traditional land-use planning device, I dissent. I "A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone `too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes." MacDonald, Sommer &[1] In failing to undertake this inquiry, the Court *344 ignores much of the impact of respondent's conduct on petitioners. Instead, it relies on the flawed determination of the Court of Appeals that the relevant time period lasted only from August 1981 until April Ante, at 312, 313-314. During that period, Ordinance 81-5 and Regulation 83-21 prohibited development pending the adoption of a new regional land-use plan. The adoption of the Regional Plan (hereinafter Plan or Plan) did not, however, change anything from petitioners' standpoint. After the adoption of the Plan, petitioners still could make no use of their land. The Court of Appeals disregarded this post-April deprivation on the ground that respondent did not "cause" it. In a 42 U.S. C. 1983 action, "the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury." Applying this principle, the Court of Appeals held that the Plan did not amount to a taking because the Plan actually allowed permits to issue for the construction of single-family residences. Those permits were never issued because the District Court immediately issued a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent injunction that lasted until 1987, prohibiting the approval of any building projects under the Plan. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the " Plan itself could not have constituted a taking," because it was the injunction, not the Plan, that prohibited development during this period. The Court of Appeals is correct that the Plan did not cause petitioners' injury. But that is the right answer to the wrong question. The causation question is not limited to whether the Plan caused petitioners' injury; the question is whether respondent caused petitioners' injury. We have never addressed the 1983 causation requirement in the context of a regulatory takings claim, though language in Penn Central Transp. suggests that ordinary principles of proximate cause *345 govern the causation inquiry for takings claims. The causation standard does not require much elaboration in this case, because respondent was undoubtedly the "moving force" behind petitioners' inability to build on their land from August |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | behind petitioners' inability to build on their land from August through 1987. ( 1983 causation established when government action is the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional violation). The injunction in this case issued because the Plan did not comply with the 1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (Compact) and regulations issued pursuant to the Compact. And, of course, respondent is responsible for the Compact and its regulations. On August 1982, respondent adopted Resolution 82-11. That resolution established "environmental thresholds for water quality, soil conservation, air quality, vegetation preservation, wildlife, fisheries, noise, recreation, and scenic resources." The District Court enjoined the Plan in part because the Plan would have allowed 42,000 metric tons of soil per year to erode from some of the single-family residences, in excess of the Resolution 82-11 threshold for soil conservation. ; see Another reason the District Court enjoined the Plan was that it did not comply with article V(g) of the Compact, which requires a finding, "with respect to each project, that the project will not cause the established [environmental] thresholds to be exceeded." Thus, the District Court enjoined the Plan because the Plan did not comply with the environmental requirements of respondent's regulations and of the Compact itself. Respondent is surely responsible for its own regulations, and it is responsible for the Compact as it is the governmental agency charged with administering the Compact. Compact, Art. I(c), It follows that respondent was the "moving force" behind petitioners' inability to develop *346 their land from April through the enactment of the 1987 plan. Without the environmental thresholds established by the Compact and Resolution 82-11, the Plan would have gone into effect and petitioners would have been able to build single-family residences. And it was certainly foreseeable that development projects exceeding the environmental thresholds would be prohibited; indeed, that was the very purpose of enacting the thresholds. Because respondent caused petitioners' inability to use their land from 1981 through 1987, that is the appropriate period of time from which to consider their takings claim. II I now turn to determining whether a ban on all economic development lasting almost six years is a taking. reaffirmed our "frequently expressed" view that "when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking." See The District Court in this case held that the ordinances and resolutions in effect between August 24, 1981, and April 25, "did in fact deny the plaintiffs all economically viable |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | 25, "did in fact deny the plaintiffs all economically viable use of their land." The Court of Appeals did not overturn this finding. And the injunction, issued because the environmental thresholds issued by respondent did not permit the development of single-family residences, forced petitioners to leave their land economically idle for at least another three years. The Court does not dispute that petitioners were forced to leave their land economically idle during this period. See ante, at 312. But the Court refuses to apply on the ground that the deprivation was "" Neither the Takings Clause nor our case law supports such a distinction. For one thing, a distinction between *347 "temporary" and "permanent" prohibitions is tenuous. The "temporary" prohibition in this case that the Court finds is not a taking lasted almost six years.[2] The "permanent" prohibition that the Court held to be a taking in lasted less than two years. See -1012. The "permanent" prohibition in lasted less than two years because the law, as it often does, changed. The South Carolina Legislature in 1990 decided to amend the 1988 Beach front Management Act to allow the issuance of "`special permits' for the construction or reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline." Landuse regulations are not irrevocable. And the government can even abandon condemned land. See United Under the Court's decision today, the takings question turns entirely on the initial label given a regulation, a label that is often without much meaning. There is every incentive for government to simply label any prohibition on development "temporary," or to fix a set number of years. As in this case, this initial designation does not preclude the government from repeatedly extending the "temporary" prohibition into a long-term ban on all development. The Court now holds that such a designation by the government is conclusive even though in fact the moratorium greatly exceeds the time initially specified. Apparently, the Court would not view even a 10-year moratorium as a taking under because the moratorium is not "permanent." Our opinion in First Evangelical Lutheran Church of rejects any distinction between temporary and permanent takings when a landowner is deprived of all economically beneficial use of his land. First stated that "`temporary takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent * takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation." Because of First `s rule that "temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the Takings Clause," the Court in found nothing problematic about the later developments that potentially made the ban on |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | about the later developments that potentially made the ban on development -1012 (citing First ); see ("It is well established that temporary takings are as protected by the Constitution as are permanent ones" (citing First )). More fundamentally, even if a practical distinction between temporary and permanent deprivations were plausible, to treat the two differently in terms of takings law would be at odds with the justification for the rule. The rule is derived from the fact that a "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." The regulation in was the "practical equivalence" of a long-term physical appropriation, i. e., a condemnation, so the Fifth Amendment required compensation. The "practical equivalence," from the landowner's point of view, of a "temporary" ban on all economic use is a forced leasehold. For example, assume the following situation: Respondent is contemplating the creation of a National Park around Lake Tahoe to preserve its scenic beauty. Respondent decides to take a 6-year leasehold over petitioners' property, during which any human activity on the land would be prohibited, in order to prevent any further destruction to the area while it was deciding whether to request that the area be designated a National Park. Surely that leasehold would require compensation. In a series of World War II-era cases in which the Government had condemned leasehold interests in order to support the war effort, the Government conceded that it was required *349 to pay compensation for the leasehold interest.[3] See United ; United From petitioners' standpoint, what happened in this case is no different than if the government had taken a 6-year lease of their property. The Court ignores this "practical equivalence" between respondent's deprivation and the deprivation resulting from a leasehold. In so doing, the Court allows the government to "do by regulation what it cannot do through eminent domaini. e., take private property without paying for it." Instead of acknowledging the "practical equivalence" of this case and a condemned leasehold, the Court analogizes to other areas of takings law in which we have distinguished between regulations and physical appropriations, see ante, at 321-324. But whatever basis there is for such distinctions in those contexts does not apply when a regulation deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his land. In addition to the "practical equivalence" from the landowner's perspective of such a regulation and a physical appropriation, we have held that a regulation denying all productive use of land does not implicate the traditional justification for differentiating between regulations and physical appropriations. |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | the traditional justification for differentiating between regulations and physical appropriations. In "the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted," it is less likely that "the legislature is simply *350 `adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life' in a manner that secures an `average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned," (quoting Penn Central Transp. 438 U. S., and Pennsylvania Coal 0 U. S., at ), and more likely that the property "is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm," The Court reads as being fundamentally concerned with value, ante, at 329-331, rather than with the denial of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land," But repeatedly discusses its holding as applying where "no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted." ; see ; ; ; ; Moreover, the Court's position that value is the sine qua non of the rule proves too much. Surely, the land at issue in retained some market value based on the contingency, which soon came to fruition (see ), that the development ban would be amended. *351 is implicated when the government deprives a landowner of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land." The District Court found, and the Court agrees, that the moratorium "temporarily" deprived petitioners of "`all economically viable use of their land.' " Ante, at 316. Because the rationale for the rule applies just as strongly in this case, the "temporary" denial of all viable use of land for six years is a taking. III The Court worries that applying here compels finding that an array of traditional, short-term, land-use planning devices are takings. Ante, at 334-335, 337-338. But since the beginning of our regulatory takings jurisprudence, we have recognized that property rights "are enjoyed under an implied limitation." Thus, in after holding that the regulation prohibiting all economically beneficial use of the coastal land came within our categorical takings rule, we nonetheless inquired into whether such a result "inhere[d] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." Because the regulation at issue in purported to be permanent, or at least long term, we concluded that the only implied limitation of state property law that could achieve a similar long-term deprivation of all economic use would be something "achieved in the courtsby adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise." When a regulation merely delays a final land-use decision, we have recognized that there are other background principles of state property law that prevent the delay from being deemed a taking. We thus noted in First that our discussion of temporary takings did not apply "in the case *352 of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like." We reiterated this last Term: "The right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use restrictions." Zoning regulations existed as far back as colonial Boston, see Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, and New York enacted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916, see 1 Anderson's American Law of Zoning 3.07, p. 92 Thus, the short-term delays attendant to zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law and part of a landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. See But a moratorium prohibiting all economic use for a period of six years is not one of the longstanding, implied limitations of state property law.[4] Moratoria are "interim controls on the use of land that seek to maintain the status quo with respect to land development in an area by either `freezing' existing land uses or by allowing the issuance of building permits for only certain land uses that would not be inconsistent with a contemplated zoning plan or zoning change." 1 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and *353 Planning 13:3, p. 13-6 Typical moratoria thus prohibit only certain categories of development, such as fast-food restaurants, see or adult businesses, see or all commercial development, see Arnold Bernhard & Such moratoria do not implicate because they do not deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of their land. As for moratoria that prohibit all development, these do not have the lineage of permit and zoning requirements and thus it is less certain that property is acquired under the "implied limitation" of a moratorium prohibiting all development. Moreover, unlike a permit system in which it is expected that a project will be approved so long as certain conditions are satisfied, a moratorium that prohibits all uses is by definition contemplating a new land-use plan that would prohibit all uses. But this case does not require us to decide as a categorical matter whether moratoria prohibiting all economic use are an implied limitation of state property law, because the duration |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,002 | 19 | dissenting | Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118498/tahoe-sierra-preservation-council-inc-v-tahoe-regional-planning-agency/ | an implied limitation of state property law, because the duration of this "moratorium" far exceeds that of ordinary moratoria. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 342, n. 37, state statutes authorizing the issuance of moratoria often limit the moratoria's duration. California, where much of the land at issue in this case is located, provides that a moratorium "shall be of no further force and effect 45 days from its date of adoption," and caps extension of the moratorium so that the total duration cannot exceed two years. Cal. Govt. Code Ann. 65858(a) (West Supp. 2002); see Minn. Stat. 462.355, subd. 4 (limiting moratoria to 18 months, with one permissible extension, for a total of two years). Another State limits moratoria to 120 days, with the possibility of a single 6-month extension. Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. 197.520(4) (1997). Others limit moratoria to six *354 months without any possibility of an extension. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 30-28-121 ; N. J. Stat. Ann. 40:55D-90(b) (1991).[5] Indeed, it has long been understood that moratoria on development exceeding these short time periods are not a legitimate planning device. See, e. g., Resolution 83-21 reflected this understanding of the limited duration of moratoria in initially limiting the moratorium in this case to 90 days. But what resulteda "moratorium" lasting nearly six yearsbears no resemblance to the short-term nature of traditional moratoria as understood from these background examples of state property law. Because the prohibition on development of nearly six years in this case cannot be said to resemble any "implied limitation" of state property law, it is a taking that requires compensation. * * * Lake Tahoe is a national treasure, and I do not doubt that respondent's efforts at preventing further degradation of the lake were made in good faith in furtherance of the public interest. But, as is the case with most governmental action that furthers the public interest, the Constitution requires that the costs and burdens be borne by the public at large, not by a few targeted citizens. Justice Holmes' admonition of 80 years ago again rings true: "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 0 U. S., at 416. |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | Federal sentencing law permits federal prison authori ties to award prisoners credit against prison time as a reward for good behavior. 18 U.S. C. Petition ers, two federal prisoners, challenge the method that the Federal Bureau of Prisons uses for calculating this “good time credit.” We conclude that the Bureau’s method re flects the most natural reading of the statute, and we reject petitioners’ legal challenge. I A A federal sentencing statute provides: “[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term [C]redit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.” 2 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) applies this statute using a methodology that petitioners in this case challenge as unlawful. In order to explain the BOP method, we shall use a simplified example that captures its essential ele ments. The unsimplified calculations described by the BOP in its policy statement, see App. 96–100, will reach approximately the same results as, and are essentially the mathematical equivalent of, the simplified system we describe (there may be other ways to describe the calcula tion as well). To the extent that there are any differences between the methodology employed by the BOP and that reflected in our example, they are of no consequence to the resolution of petitioners’ challenge and are therefore not before us. Similarly, although petitioners committed their crimes before the current version of was enacted and are therefore subject to a previous version that dif fered slightly in certain details, see 18 U.S. C. (1988 ed.), the differences between the two versions are immaterial to the questions presented by this case. The parties refer to the current version as the relevant provi sion of law, see Brief for Petitioners 2–3; Brief for Respon dent 8, n. 2, and we shall do the same. In our example we shall imagine a prisoner who has received a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. We shall assume that his behavior throughout his confinement is exemplary and that prison authorities will consequently consider him to merit the maximum good time credit that the statute will allow. And we shall ignore leap years. Thus, at the end of the first year (Year |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | years. Thus, at the end of the first year (Year 1) that prisoner would earn the statute’s maximum credit of 54 days. The relevant official (whom we shall call the “good time calcu lator”) would note that fact and, in effect, preliminarily put the 54 days to the side. At the end of Year 2 the pris oner would earn an additional 54 days of good time credit. The good time calculator would add this 54 days to the first 54 days, note the provisional total of 108 days, and Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 3 Opinion of the Court again put the 108 days’ credit to the side. By the end of Year 8, the prisoner would have earned a total of 432 days of good time credit (8 years times 54 days). At that time, the good time calculator would note that the difference between the time remaining in the sentence (2 years, or 730 days) and the amount of accumulated good time credit (432 days) is less than 1 year (730 minus 432 equals days, which is less than 365). The 432 days of good time credit that the prisoner has earned by the end of Year 8 are sufficient to wipe out all of the last year of the 10-year prison term and to shorten the prisoner’s 9th year of im prisonment by 67 days. Year 9 of the sentence will consequently become the prisoner’s last year of imprisonment. Further, because the prisoner has already earned 67 days of credit against that year (432 days already earned minus 365 days applied to Year 10 leaves 67 days to apply to Year 9), the prisoner will have no more than days left to serve in Year 9. Now the good time calculator will have to work out just how much good time the prisoner can earn, and credit against, these remaining days. As we said, the statute provides that “good time” for this “last year or portion” thereof shall be “prorated.” Thus, the good time calculator must divide the days into two parts: (1) days that the prisoner will have to serve in prison, and (2) credit for good behavior the prisoner will earn during the days served in Year 9. In other words, the number of days to be served in Year 9 plus the number of good time credit days earned will be equal to the number of days left in the sentence, namely, And to keep the award of credit in the last year proportional to awards in other years, the ratio of |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | year proportional to awards in other years, the ratio of these two parts of Year 9 (i.e., the number of good time days divided by the number of days served) must be 54/365, the same ratio that the BOP applies to full years served. We can use some elementary algebra, described in the Appendix, infra, to work out the 4 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court rest. The result is that if the prisoner serves 260 days, he can earn an additional 38 days of credit for good behavior. That is to say, of the days remaining in his sentence, the prisoner will have to serve 260 days in confinement, after which point, his sentence will be fully accounted for (given the additional 38 days’ credit earned), and he will be released. In sum, a prisoner subject to a 10-year (3,650-day) sentence who earns the maximum number of days the statute permits will serve 3,180 days in confine ment and receive 0 days of “good time” credit, about 15% of the prison time actually served. B In this case petitioners claim that the BOP’s calculation method is unlawful. They say that (b)(1) (2006 ed.) requires a straightforward calculation based upon the length of the term of imprisonment that the sentencing judge imposes, not the length of time that the prisoner actually serves. Thus, if a sentencing judge imposes a prison term of 10 years (as in our example), then, in peti tioners’ view, the statute permits a maximum good time award of 540 days (10 years times 54 days), not the 0 days that the method described above would allow. And if the judge imposes a prison term of 10 years and 6 months, then the statute permits 567 days (540 days for the 10 years plus 27 days for the extra 6 months), not the 494 days that the method above would allow. According to petitioners, the BOP’s method causes model prisoners to lose seven days of good time credit per year of imprison ment, and because their sentences are fairly long (one, Michael Barber, was sentenced to 26 years and 8 months; the other, Tahir Jihad-Black, was sentenced to 21 years and 10 months), the difference in their cases amounts to several months of additional prison time. The District Court in each of these cases rejected the prisoner’s challenge. Civ. No. 08–226 MO (D Ore., Oct. 27, Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 5 Opinion of the Court ), App. 13; Jihad-Black v. Thomas, Civ. No. 08–227 MO App. 25. And in each instance the Court of |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | MO App. 25. And in each instance the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. Tablada v. Thomas, No. 07–35538 (CA9, Apr. 10, 2009), App. 11; see also Because the BOP’s administration of good time credits affects the interests of a large number of federal prisoners, we granted the consolidated petition for certiorari to con sider petitioners’ challenge. II Having now considered petitioners’ arguments, we conclude that that we must reject their legal challenge. The statute’s language and its purpose, taken together, convince us that the BOP’s calculation method is lawful. For one thing, that method tracks the language of That provision says that a prisoner (serving a sentence of imprisonment of more than a year and less than life) “may receive credit of up to 54 days at the end of each year” subject to the “determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner” has behaved in an exemplary fashion. And it says that credit for the “last year or portion of a year shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.” As the example in Part I makes clear, the BOP’s interpretation provides a prisoner entitled to a maximum annual credit with 54 days of good time credit for each full year of imprisonment that he serves and a proportionally adjusted amount of credit for any additional time served that is less than a full year. And, as (b) directs, the BOP awards the credit at the end of each year of imprisonment (except, of course, for Year 9, which is subject to the statute’s special instruction requiring proration and crediting during the last six weeks of the sentence). We are unable similarly to reconcile petitioners’ ap 6 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court proach with the statute. Their system awards credit for the sentence imposed, regardless of how much time is actually served. Thus, a prisoner under petitioners’ sys tem could receive 54 days of credit for Year 10 despite the fact that he would be released after less than 81⁄2 years in prison. The good time calculation for Year 10 would not be made “at the end of” Year 10 (nor within the last six weeks of a sentence ending during that year). Neither could the BOP determine whether the prisoner had behaved in exemplary fashion “during that year.” 18 U.S. C. (b) ; see also v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 1001 (CA7 2004) (“The Bureau cannot evaluate a prisoner’s behavior and award credit for good conduct if the prisoner is not still in prison”); cf. |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | conduct if the prisoner is not still in prison”); cf. (“Where there is no evaluation by state officials and little or no rehabilitative participa tion for anyone to evaluate, there is a rational justification for declining to give good-time credit”). We cannot say that this language (“at the end of,” “dur ing that year”) found its way into the statute by accident. Under the previous good time provision, a prisoner was “entitled to a deduction from the term of his sentence beginning with the day on which the sentence commences to run.” 18 U.S. C. (1982 ed.) This deduction, granted at the outset of a prisoner’s sentence, was then made subject to forfeiture if the prisoner “com mit[ted] any offense or violate[d] the rules of the institu tion.” The present statute, (2006 ed.), in contrast, creates a system under which “credit” is “earned” “at the end of” the year based on an evaluation of behavior “during that year.” We agree with the Government that “[t]he textual differences between the two statutes reveal a purpose to move from a system of prospective entitlement to a system of retrospective award.” Brief for Respondent 33; see also at 1002, n. 3. Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 7 Opinion of the Court For another thing, the BOP’s method better furthers the statute’s basic purpose. The “good time” provision in is part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, 18 U.S. C. et seq., 28 U.S. C. 998, a comprehensive law that reformed federal sentenc ing practice and directed the newly created United States Sentencing Commission “to devise guidelines to be used for sentencing” in district courts, Under the previous regime, the United States Parole Commission, “as a gen eral rule, [could] conditionally release a prisoner any time after he serve[d] one-third of the judicially fixed term.” United If, for example, a judge imposed a prison term of 15 years, the Parole Commission might have released the prisoner after only 5 years. And it routinely did so. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual p. s., p. 1.2 (Oct. 1987) (USSG) (“[D]efendants often serv[ed] only about one-third of the sentence handed down by the court”). The result was “confusion and implicit deception.” With the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress sought to achieve both increased sentencing uniformity and greater honesty by “mak[ing] all sentences basically determinate,” at See USSG p. s., at 1.2 (statutory objectives included “honesty in sentencing,” “uniformity,” and “proportionality” (emphasis deleted)). Thereafter, the sentence the judge imposed would be the sentence the offender actually served, with a sole statutory exception |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | sentence the offender actually served, with a sole statutory exception for good time credits. at (a “prisoner is to be released at the completion of his sen tence reduced only by any credit earned by good behavior while in custody” (citing (b)). The reason for this exception is provided in (b) itself: to provide an incentive for prisoners to “compl[y] with institutional disciplinary regulations.” The good time exception is limited (to 54 days per year) and tailored to its purpose— 8 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court credit is earned at the end of the year after compliance with institutional rules is demonstrated and thereby rewards and reinforces a readily identifiable period of good behavior. The BOP’s approach furthers the objective of It ties the award of good time credits directly to good behav ior during the preceding year of imprisonment. By con trast, petitioners’ approach, insofar is it would award up to 54 days per year of time sentenced as opposed to time served, allows a prisoner to earn credit for both the portion of his sentence that he serves and the portion of his sen tence that he offsets with earned good time credit. In other words, petitioners argue that the BOP should award good time credit not only for the days a prisoner spends in prison and behaves appropriately, but also for days that he will not spend in prison at all, such as Year 10 in our example. By doing so, it loosens the statute’s connection between good behavior and the award of good time and transforms the nature of the exception to the basic sen tence-imposed-is-sentence-served rule. And to that extent, it is inconsistent with the statute’s basic purpose. III A We are not convinced by petitioners’ several arguments against the BOP’s methodology. First, petitioners point to the statement in (b) that a prisoner “may receive credit at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) The words “term of imprisonment,” they say, must refer to the years of the term that the sentencing judge imposed (10 years in our example), not the (less-than-10) years of the term that the prisoner actually served once good time credits were taken into account. After all, the very first phrase of that provi sion makes eligible for good time credits “a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 9 Opinion of the Court than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the pris oner’s life.” The words “term |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | the duration of the pris oner’s life.” The words “term of imprisonment” in this phrase almost cer tainly refer to the sentence imposed, not to the time actu ally served (otherwise prisoners sentenced to a year and a day would become ineligible for credit as soon as they earned it). And, as petitioners emphasize, we have recog nized a “presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute,” The problem for petitioners, however, is that this pre sumption is not absolute. It yields readily to indications that the same phrase used in different parts of the same statute means different things, particularly where the phrase is one that speakers can easily use in different ways without risk of confusion. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, ; General Dynamics Land Systems, 595– 596 (2004). See, e.g., at 596–597 (“age” has different meanings in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); United (same for “ ‘wages paid’ ” in the Internal Revenue Code); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343–344 (1997) (same for “employee” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The phrase “term of imprisonment” is just such a phrase. It can refer to the sentence that the judge im poses, see, e.g., (a) (“A prisoner shall be released” at the end of “the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, less any time credited” for good behavior), but it also can refer to the time that the prisoner actually serves. Thus, (d) of the statute before us requires BOP to “furnish [a] pris oner with suitable clothing[,] money, and transportation” “[u]pon the release of [the] prisoner on the expiration of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” (Em phasis added.) The statute here means to assure that the 10 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court prisoner is provided with these necessities at the time of his actual release from prison (sometime during Year 9 in our example), not at the end of the term that the judge imposed (which would be over a year later). Since the statute uses the same phrase “term of imprisonment” in two different ways, the presumption cannot help petition ers here. And, for the reasons we have given, see Part II, context here indicates that the particular instance of the phrase “term of imprisonment” at issue refers to prison time actually served rather than the sentence imposed by the judge. Second, petitioners seek to draw support from the stat ute’s legislative history. But those who consider legisla tive history significant cannot find that history helpful to petitioners here. Petitioners |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | significant cannot find that history helpful to petitioners here. Petitioners point, for example, to a statement in the Senate Report accompanying the Sen tencing Reform Act, which says that the “method of calcu lation” of good time “will be considerably less complicated than under current law in many respects,” and that “credit toward early release is earned at a steady and easily determined rate that will have an obvious impact on the prisoner’s release date.” S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 146–1 (1983); see Brief for Petitioners 31–32. But these state ments are consistent with the BOP’s interpretation of the statute. Its method, as we understand it, is not particu larly difficult to apply and it is certainly less complex than prior law, which provided for the accumulation of two different kinds of good time credit (general and industrial), calculated in different manners (prospectively and retro spectively), and awarded at different rates, depending on the length of sentence imposed on the prisoner (5 to 10 days per month for general) or the year of employment (3 or 5 days per month for industrial). See 18 U.S. C. §, 4162 (1982 ed.). Petitioners also point to various statements contained in the Act’s Conference Report and made by individual legis Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 11 Opinion of the Court lators that describe good time credit as providing sentence reductions of 15%. See Brief for Petitioners 34–36 ; 131 Cong. Rec. 488 (1985) (remarks of Rep. Hamilton)). But there is nothing in the context of these statements to suggest that they amounted to anything other than rough approximations or that they were made with the present controversy in mind. See, e.g., H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98– 1159, at 415 (noting simply that an increase in the amount of maximum annual credit from 36 days to 54 days “in creases ‘good time’ that accrues from 10 percent to 15 percent”); 131 Cong. Rec. 488 (1985) (statement of Rep. Hamilton) (“Under [pre-Sentencing Reform Act] law, about 80% of all criminals are paroled after serving one third of their time. Now sentences will be reduced only 15% for good behavior”). And whatever interpretive force one attaches to legislative history, the Court normally gives little weight to statements, such as those of the individual legislators, made after the bill in question has become law. See, e.g., Third, petitioners rely on a statement in the United States Sentencing Commission’s Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements issued in 1987 (hereinafter Supplementary Report). In that Report, the Commission summarized its analysis of recent pre-Guidelines |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | that Report, the Commission summarized its analysis of recent pre-Guidelines sentencing practice, which it had used to help draft the Guidelines. The results of the analysis were presented in a table that permits compari son of the likely prison-time consequences of the new Guidelines with prison time actually served under pre- Guidelines practice (specifically, by identifying the Guide lines “offense level that is closest to the average time served by first-time offenders” convicted of a particular crime, Supplementary Report 23). Because the Guidelines “refer to sentences prior to the awarding of good time” (i.e., because a Guidelines sentence of, say, 30 months’ impris 12 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court onment does not necessarily mean that the offender will serve the entire 30 months in prison), the Commission adjusted the average time served “by dividing by 0.85 good time when the term exceeded 12 months.” This adjustment, the Commission explained, “made sentences in the [t]able comparable with those in the guidelines.” Pointing to this adjustment and a reference in later editions of the Guidelines to a potential credit of “ap proximately fifteen percent for good behavior,” see, e.g., USSG p. s., at 3 (Nov. 2009), petitioners maintain that the Commission set its Guideline ranges with the expectation that well-behaved prisoners would receive good time credit of up to 15% of the sentence imposed, not 15% of the time actually served. They add that, in setting the Guidelines ranges in this way, the Commission exer cised congressionally delegated power to interpret the Sentencing Reform Act, see – 379 (approving Congress’ delegation of the power to prom ulgate sentencing guidelines), and that as long as that interpretation is reasonable, courts must defer to it. See U. S. A. Again, however, we can find no indication that the Commission, in writing its Supplementary Report or in the Guidelines themselves, considered or referred to the particular question here before us, that is whether good time credit is to be based on time served or the sentence imposed. The Guidelines Manual itself, a more authorita tive account of the Commission’s interpretive views than the Supplementary Report, says nothing directly on that subject. Moreover, with respect to comparisons between Guidelines sentences and pre-Guidelines practice, the original 1987 Manual cautioned that the Guidelines did not “simply cop[y] estimates of existing practice as re vealed by the data,” but rather “departed from the data at Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 13 Opinion of the Court different points for various important reasons.” USSG p. s., at 1.4; see also p. s., at 1.11 (while “Guideline sentences in |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | see also p. s., at 1.11 (while “Guideline sentences in many instances will ap proximate existing [i.e., pre-Guidelines] practice,” the Commission did “not conside[r] itself bound by existing sentencing practice” ). Because the Commission has expressed no view on the question before us, we need not decide whether it would be entitled to deference had it done so. If it turns out that the calcula tion of good time credit based on prison time served rather than the sentence imposed produces results that are more severe than the Commission finds appropriate, the Com mission remains free to adjust sentencing levels accord ingly. See at 1.2 (acknowledging that “the guideline-writing process is evolutionary” and that the Commission functions “as a permanent agency to monitor sentencing practices in the federal courts throughout the nation”). Fourth, petitioners ask us to invoke the rule of lenity and construe (2006 ed.) in their favor, that is, in a way that will maximize the amount of available good time credit. We may assume for present purposes that (b) can be construed as imposing a criminal penalty. See 4 U.S. 381, (rule of lenity applies to “interpretations of the penalties” imposed by “criminal prohibitions”); but see (holding that (b) is not a criminal statute for the purposes of the rule of lenity). Even so, the rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute,” (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), such that the Court must simply “ ‘guess as to what Congress intended.’ ” at ). See United States v. Hayes, 14 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court 555 U. S. (2009) (slip op., at 13); United States v. R. L. C., Having so considered the statute, we do not believe that there remains a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” in the statutory provision before us. Nor need we now simply “guess” what the statute means. Finally, we note that petitioners urge us not to defer to the BOP’s implementation of In our view, the BOP’s calculation system applies that statute as its lan guage is most naturally read, and in accordance with what that language makes clear is its basic purpose. No one doubts that the BOP has the legal power to implement the statute in accordance with its language and purposes; hence we need not determine the extent to which Congress has granted the BOP authority to interpret the statute more broadly, or differently than it has done here. Cf. at 844–845. B Acknowledging that petitioners’ arguments cannot carry the day, the |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | B Acknowledging that petitioners’ arguments cannot carry the day, the dissent has proposed a “third possibility,” post, at 2 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.), not raised by either party nor, to our knowledge, used elsewhere in the Crimi nal Code. The dissent reads the statutory phrase “term of imprisonment” to refer to “the administrative period along which progress toward eventual freedom is marked.” Post, at 3. It derives from this reading the following method of calculation as applied to our 10-year example. First, “[t]he sentence is divided into 10 365-day segments.” At the end of the first segment, a prisoner may receive up to 54 days of credit for good behavior. These credits immedi ately “go toward completion of the next year” so that the prisoner need only serve “another 311 days behind bars before the second year of his term of imprisonment is at an end.” This process repeats itself until the “10th segment,” in which a prisoner receives an unspecified Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 15 Opinion of the Court “credit in a prorated amount.” In the end, the pris oner will have served 10 “administrative segments,” ib collectively comprising 3,117 days in prison and 533 days of credit. The dissent claims “[r]eading ‘term of imprisonment’ this way is consistent with all parts of the statute.” Post, at 4. We see at least four problems. First, the opening sentence of (a) instructs that “[a] prisoner shall be released” upon “the expiration of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, less any time credited” for good behavior. But if a prisoner’s “term of imprisonment” is the “period that a prisoner must complete in order to earn his free dom,” post, at 4, and it is “accounted for through a combi nation of prison time and credits,” post, at 3, then a pris oner should be released exactly at the end of his term of imprisonment (without any further adjustment). Because the dissent’s approach would require us to read words out of the statute, or give prisoners double credit, its definition cannot be used here. Second, (b)(1) tells us that a prisoner receives credit “at the end of each year” based on behavior “during that year.” Under the dissent’s approach, however, a prisoner may receive credit at the end of each “administra tive segmen[t]” presumably based on his behavior during that segment. And because an “administrative segmen[t]” is made up of some “combination of service and credits,” post, at 4, each one lasts less than a calendar year. We do not see how a system in which “a prisoner may complete a |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | how a system in which “a prisoner may complete a particular year of his term in less than 365 calendar days,” ib and receive full good time credit for doing so, can possibly represent the most natural reading of this statu tory language. Nor do we know, because the BOP has not had an opportunity to tell us, whether a system in which a “year” lasts anywhere from 311 to 365 calendar days (and in which the “years” of a single prisoner’s sentence may all be of different lengths), is easily administrable. (We doubt 16 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court that this system will be more comprehensible to prisoners than one, like the BOP’s, that provides credit for actual years.) Third, under the dissent’s approach, credit is earned at different rates during a single sentence. For the first “administrative segmen[t]” in its 10-year example, the prisoner serves 365 days and earns 54 days of credit. The ratio of credit earned to days served is148. For the sec ond “administrative segmen[t],” the prisoner serves 311 days and earns 54 days of credit. This time, the ratio of credit earned to days served is174. (For the last “admin istrative segmen[t],” the dissent tells us the prisoner will receive “credit in a prorated amount,” but it does not tell us which ratio should be used for the proration. Post, at 3.) The use of different rates finds no support in the stat ute. The dissent objects that the statute “prescribes no particular rate,” post, at 7, but in fact it does—54 days of credit per year of good behavior—and it further requires that credit for the last year be “prorated” using the same proportion. Moreover, the dissent’s application of different rates leads to odd results. For example, a model prisoner sentenced on two separate 5-year terms (with a break in between) will serve a different number of days from one sentenced to a single 10-year term. How can this be if both prisoners are earning 54 days of credit for each of their 10 years in prison? Fourth, (b)(2) provides that good time credit “shall vest on the date the prisoner is released from custody.” (This provision does not apply to prisoners, like petition ers, who committed their offenses before it was amended in 1996, but the dissent plainly intends for its approach to apply more broadly. See post, at 9 (noting the effect on “almost 200,000 federal prisoners”).) Yet under the dis sent’s approach, credit appears to vest immediately. See post, at 3 (Days of credit for the first year |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | post, at 3 (Days of credit for the first year “go toward completion of the next year” so that the prisoner “would Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 17 Opinion of the Court need another 311 days behind bars before the second year of his term of imprisonment is at an end”). And if it does not, then the situation quickly becomes complicated. What happens if, say, on the last day of the 10th “adminis trative segmen[t]” (somewhere in the 8th calendar year), a prisoner badly misbehaves and prison officials punish him by taking away all of his previously earned credit? Cf. 28 CFR (2009) (prescribing sanctions for prohibited acts). Does the BOP retroactively adjust the duration of all of his administrative segments to 365 days so that the prisoner now finds himself in the middle of the 8th “ad ministrative segmen[t]”? (Again we do not know if the BOP would find such a system administrable, and we doubt that this system would be more comprehensible to a prisoner.) If so, does the prisoner have a second opportu nity to earn credit for good behavior for the 9th “adminis trative segmen[t]” that he had previously completed but now must account for again? Cf. (b)(1) (“Credit that has not been earned may not later be granted”). Or, hav ing previously awarded (and taken away) credit for that segment, are prison authorities left without any incentive to offer for good behavior? Finally, the dissent, like petitioners, invokes the rule of lenity to support its interpretation. But, the best efforts of the dissent notwithstanding, we still see no “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” that would trigger the rule’s application. We remain convinced that the BOP’s ap proach reflects the most natural reading of the statutory language and the most consistent with its purpose. What ever the merits of the dissent’s policy arguments, the statute does not require the BOP to accept them. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the BOP’s methodology is lawful. The Ninth Circuit’s judgment is Affirmed. 18 BARBER v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court Appendix to opinion of the Court APPENDIX A fuller example of the BOP’s method for calculat ing “credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment” The defendant is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. As a prisoner he exhibits exemplary behavior and is awarded the maximum credit of 54 days at the end of each year served in prison. At the end of Year 8, the prisoner has 2 years remaining in his sentence and has accumu lated 432 |
Justice Breyer | 2,010 | 2 | majority | Barber v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/147954/barber-v-thomas/ | years remaining in his sentence and has accumu lated 432 days of good time credit. Because the difference between the time remaining in his sentence and the amount of accumulated credit (i.e., 730 - 432) is less than a year ( days), Year 9 is the last year he will spend in prison. (Year 10 has been completely offset by 365 of the 432 days of accumulated credit.) Further, Year 9 will be a partial year of days (the other 67 days of the year being offset by the remainder of the accumulated credit). Here is where the elementary algebra comes in. We know that x, the good time, plus y, the remaining time served, must add up to This gives us our first equa tion: x + y = We also know that the ratio of good time earned in the portion of the final year to the amount of time served in that year must equal the ratio of a full year’s good time credit to the amount of time served in a full year. The latter ratio is 54/365 or148. Thus, we know that x/y =148, or to put it another way, x =148y. Because we know the value of x in terms of y, we can make a substitu tion in our first equation to get148y + y = We then add the two y terms together (1.148y = ), and we solve for y, which gives us y = 260. Now we can plug that value into our first equation to solve for x (the good time credit). If we subtract 260 from we find that x = 38. The offender will have to serve 260 days in prison in Year 9, and he will receive 38 days additional good time Cite as: 560 U. S. (2010) 19 Opinion of the Court Appendix to opinion of the Court credit for that time served. The prisoner’s total good time is 0 days (432 + 38 = 0). His total time served is 3180 days. As a final matter, while we have described the foregoing as the method to calculate credit for the portion of the last year to more transparently track the relevant statutory language, we note that the mathematical formula can be used to calculate the amount of maximum available credit for an entire sentence. Using the equations supplied above, if we divide the total number of days in a sentence by 1.148, we get the minimum number of days that a defendant must serve in that sentence. If we then sub tract the number |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Beecher v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108604/beecher-v-alabama/ | In 1964 the petitioner was tried and convicted in an Alabama state court for first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death. The conviction was based in large part on written confessions that he had signed five days after his arrest. The petitioner objected to the introduction at trial of these confessions. But the trial court and the Alabama Supreme Court held that the confessions were made voluntarily and were properly received into evidence. In 1967 this Court summarily reversed that judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. We said: "The uncontradicted facts of record are these. Tennessee police officers saw the petitioner as he fled into an open field and fired a bullet into his right leg. He fell, and the local Chief of Police pressed a loaded gun to his face while another officer *235 pointed a rifle against the side of his head. The Police Chief asked him whether he had raped and killed a white woman. When he said that he had not, the Chief called him a liar and said, `If you don't tell the truth I am going to kill you.' The other officer then fired his rifle next to the petitioner's ear, and the petitioner immediately confessed. Later the same day he received an injection to ease the pain in his leg. He signed something the Chief of Police described as `extradition papers' after the officers told him that `it would be best to sign the papers before the gang of people came there and killed' him. He was then taken by ambulance from Tennessee to Kilby Prison in Montgomery, Alabama. By June 22, the petitioner's right leg, which was later amputated, had become so swollen and his wound so painful that he required an injection of morphine every four hours. Less than an hour after one of these injections, two Alabama investigators visited him in the prison hospital. The medical assistant in charge told the petitioner to `cooperate' and, in the petitioner's presence, he asked the investigators to inform him if the petitioner did not `tell them what they wanted to know.' The medical assistant then left the petitioner alone with the State's investigators. In the course of a 90-minute `conversation,' the investigators prepared two detailed statements similar to the confession the petitioner had given five days earlier at gunpoint in Tennessee. Still in a `kind of slumber' from his last morphine injection, feverish, and in intense pain, the petitioner signed the written confessions thus prepared for him." We were led to "the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner's confessions were involuntary." *236 For "[t]he |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Beecher v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108604/beecher-v-alabama/ | conclusion that the petitioner's confessions were involuntary." *236 For "[t]he petitioner, already wounded by the police, was ordered at gunpoint to speak his guilt or be killed. From that time until he was directed five days later to tell Alabama investigators `what they wanted to know,' there was `no break in the stream of events,' For he was then still in pain, under the influence of drugs, and at the complete mercy of the prison hospital authorities." Because the confessions "were the product of gross coercion," we held that their use at the petitioner's trial violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Only three months after this Court's decision, the petitioner was reindicted and retried for the same crime. Again, a confession was introduced in evidence. Again, it was a confession made by the petitioner shortly after he had been shot and arrested and shortly after he had been given a large does of morphine. Again, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death. The confession used at the second trial was not exactly the same as the ones that had been used against the petitioner at his first trial. It was not one of the written confessions made by the petitioner in an Alabama hospital five days after his arrest. Instead, it was an oral confession that the petitioner had made in a Tennessee hospital only one hour after his arrest. One hour after the arrest, in extreme pain from the gunshot that had blown most of the bone out of one leg, the petitioner was brought by police to a Tennessee hospital. There, a doctor gave him two large injections of morphine. The petitioner testified that the morphine "kinda made me feel like I wanted to love somebody; took the pain away; made me feel relaxed." From then on, the petitioner said, he could remember nothing. But the doctor testified at trial that he had asked the petitioner "why he did it [the crime]." According *237 to the doctor, the petitioner then made an oral confession. Although police were in the area guarding the petitioner, the confession was made only to the doctor. The Alabama Supreme Court held that this oral confession was made voluntarily and was admissible in evidence against the petitioner. We do not agree. We held five years ago that the confession elicited from the petitioner at the scene of his arrest was plainly involuntary.[*] We also held that his written confessions five days later, while in custody and under the influence of morphine, were part of the "stream of events" beginning with |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | City of Rome v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110248/city-of-rome-v-united-states/ | Two years ago this Court held that the term "State" in 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act includes all political subdivisions that control election processes, and that those subdivisions *194 are subject to the requirement in 5 of the Act that federal authorities preclear changes in voting procedures. United Today the Court concludes that those subdivisions are not within the term "State" when it comes to an action to "bail out" from the preclearance requirement. Because this decision not only conflicts with Sheffield but also raises grave questions as to the constitutionality of the Act, I dissent. I Although I dissent on statutory and constitutional grounds, the need to examine closely the Court's treatment of the Voting Rights Act is sharply illustrated by the facts of this case. In Rome, a city of about 30,000, approximately 15% of the registered voters are black. This case involves two types of local action affecting First, in 1966 the Georgia Assembly established a majority vote requirement for the City Commission and the Board of Education, and reduced the number of election wards from nine to three. Under the new arrangement, three city commissioners and two members of the Board of Education are chosen from each ward for numbered posts.[1] Second, between 1964 and 1975 Rome completed 60 territorial annexations, 13 of which are at issue in this case. The annexations allegedly diluted the black vote in Rome by disproportionately adding white voters. But 9 of the 13 relevant tracts of land were completely unpopulated when they were taken over by the city. By 1978 the additional white voters in the annexed land had caused a net decline of 1% in the black share of Rome's electorate.[2] *195 There is substantial conflict between the ultimate ruling of the three-judge District Court in this case and its findings of fact. That court made a finding that Rome has not employed a "literacy test or other device as a prerequisite to voter registration during the past seventeen years," and that "in recent years there have been no other direct barriers to black voting in Rome." The court observed that white officials have encouraged blacks to run for office, that there was no evidence of obstacles to political candidacy by blacks, and that a recent black contender for the Board of Education narrowly lost a runoff with 45% of the vote (in a city where blacks make up only 15% of the voters). Although no black has been elected to the municipal government, the court stated that the "white elected officials of Rome are responsive to |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | City of Rome v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110248/city-of-rome-v-united-states/ | that the "white elected officials of Rome are responsive to the needs and interests of the black community," and actively seek black political support.[3] at 225. Indeed, the District Court concluded that in Rome "the black community, if it chooses to vote as a group, can probably determine the outcome of many if not most contests." Despite these findings, the District Court refused to approve the annexations or the changes in voting procedures. The court held that the city had not proved that the annexations and voting changes did not reduce the political influence of Rome's blacks. I have many reservations about that conclusion. I note in particular that a black candidate running under the challenged election rules commanded *196 three times the share of votes that the black community holds. Moreover, nine of the annexations at issue were of vacant land and thus had no effect at all on voting when they occurred. Nevertheless, I need not consider whether the District Court's ruling on the evidence is clearly erroneous. Rather, I cite the apparent factual inconsistencies of the holding below because they highlight how far the courts, including this Court, have departed from the original understanding of the Act's purpose and meaning.[4] Against this background, I address the substantive questions posed by this case. II Under 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act a State or political subdivision can attempt to end its preclearance obligations through a declaratory judgment action (or "bailout") in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S. C. 1973b (a). Bailout must be granted if the District Court finds that in that jurisdiction no "test or device has been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." The District Court expressly found that the city of Rome meets this standard and that blacks participate actively in Rome's political life. See These findings demonstrate that the city has satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the bailout provision. Nevertheless, the District Court held that as long as Georgia is covered by 5 of the Act, the city of Rome may not alter any voting practice without the prior approval of federal authorities.[5] *197 The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, and holds that no subdivision may bail out so long as its State remains subject to preclearance. This conclusion can be reached only by disregarding the terms of the statute as we have interpreted them before. |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | City of Rome v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110248/city-of-rome-v-united-states/ | terms of the statute as we have interpreted them before. Section 4 (a) makes bailout available to "such State or subdivision," language that refers back to the provision's ban on the use of literacy tests (i) "in any State" reached by 4 (b) of the Act, or (ii) "in any political subdivision" which is covered "as a separate unit."[6] Because the entire State of Georgia is covered under 4 (b), this case concerns the first category in that definition.[7] Thus the crucial language here, as in Sheffield, is 4 (a)'s prohibition of tests or devices "in any State" covered under 4 (b). *198 The Sheffield Court emphasized the territorial content of this key phrase. The Court reasoned that by referring to discriminatory practices "in" a State, Congress extended the ban on tests and devices to all political subdivisions with any control over Since the same language in 4 (a) also defines the applicability of 5, the Court continued, subdivisions must also be subject to preclearance. Consequently, federal authorities now must review all changes in local voting rules and regulations in States covered by the -127. The availability of a bailout action is defined by exactly the same phrase that the Court interpreted in Sheffield. In the bailout context, however, the Court today finds that the language does not reach political subdivisions. The Court thus construes the identical words in 4 (a) to have one meaning in one situation and a wholly different sense when applied in another context. Such a protean construction reduces the statute to irrationality. This irrationality is evident in the contrast between the rights of localities like Rome that are in States covered by 4 (b), and those of covered local governments that are located in States not covered by the Twenty-eight subdivisions in the latter group have bailed out from the preclearance obligation in six separate actions.[8] Yet the only *199 difference between those governments and the city of Rome is that the State in which Rome is located is itself subject to the Voting Rights There is no reasoned justification for allowing a subdivision in North Carolina to bail out but denying a similar privilege to a subdivision in Georgia when both have been found to be in full compliance with the bail-out criteria. The District Court acknowledged, and the Court today does not deny, the "abstract force" of this argument. The argument nevertheless fails, according to the Court's opinion, for two reasons: (i) Sheffield "did not hold that cities such as Rome are `political subdivisions'" or "States," but merely subjected such entities to the |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | City of Rome v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110248/city-of-rome-v-united-states/ | subdivisions'" or "States," but merely subjected such entities to the preclearance requirement of 5; and (ii) congressional Reports accompanying the Voting Rights Act of 1965 state that bailout should not be available to a subdivision located in a State covered by the Ante, at 168-169. Neither reason supports the Court's decision. That Sheffield did not identify cities like Rome as "States" or "political subdivisions" as defined by the Act does not answer the point that the construction of "State" in Sheffield should control the availability of bailout. Both in terms of logic and of fairness, if Rome must preclear it must also be free to bail out. Second, it is elementary that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to look at its legislative history. We resort to legislative materials only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face. *200 Ex parte Collett, ; United (19). Although "committee reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning of ambiguous statutory language, even they must be disregarded if inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." After Sheffield, there can be little dispute over the meaning of "State" as used in 4 (a): It includes all political subdivisions that exercise control over elections.[9] Accordingly, there is no basis for the Court's reliance on congressional statements that are inconsistent with the terms of the statute. If 4 (a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome, the same section must also relieve that burden when the city can demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for bailout. III There is, however, more involved here than incorrect construction of the statute. The Court's interpretation of 4 (a) renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to the city of Rome. The preclearance requirement both intrudes on the prerogatives of state and local governments and abridges the voting rights of all citizens in States covered under the Under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may impose such constitutional deprivations only if it is acting to remedy violations of voting rights. See South ; In view of the District Court finding that Rome has not denied or abridged the voting rights of blacks, the *201 Fifteenth Amendment provides no authority for continuing those deprivations until the entire State of Georgia satisfies the bailout standards of 4 (a).[10] When this Court first sustained the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it conceded that the legislation was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power." South The Court recognized that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism -327. As |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | City of Rome v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110248/city-of-rome-v-united-states/ | that preclearance under the Act implicates serious federalism -327. As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS noted in Sheffield, the statute's "encroachment on state sovereignty is significant and undeniable."[11] That encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity.[12] Unless the federal structure provides *202 some protection for a community's ordering of its own democratic procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk. Preclearance also operates at an individual level to diminish the voting rights of residents of covered areas. Federal review of local voting practices reduces the influence that citizens have over policies directly affecting them, and strips locally elected officials of their autonomy to chart policy. The Court in South did not lightly approve these intrusions on federalism and individual rights. It upheld the imposition of preclearance as a prophylactic measure based on the remedial power of Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Court emphasized that preclearance, like any remedial device, can be imposed only in response to some harm. When Congress approved the Act, the Court observed, there was "reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of the States and political subdivisions affected by the new remedies of the " Since the coverage formula in 4 (b) purported to identify accurately those jurisdictions that had engaged in voting discrimination, the imposition of preclearance was held to be justified "at least in the absence of proof that [the state or local government has] been free of substantial voting discrimination in recent years."[13] *203 The Court in South emphasized, however, that a government subjected to preclearance could be relieved of federal oversight if voting discrimination in fact did not continue or materialize during the prescribed period. "Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act provides for termination of special statutory coverage at the behest of States and political subdivisions in which the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not materialized during the preceding [statutorily defined period]." Although this passage uses the term "overbreadth" in an unusual sense, the point is clear. As long as the bailout option is available, there is less cause for concern that the Voting Rights Act may overreach congressional powers by imposing preclearance on a nondiscriminating government. Without bailout, the problem of constitutional authority for preclearance becomes acute. The Court today decrees that the citizens of Rome will not have direct control over their city's voting practices until the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the |
Justice Powell | 1,980 | 17 | dissenting | City of Rome v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110248/city-of-rome-v-united-states/ | the entire State of Georgia can free itself from the Act's restrictions. Under the current interpretation of the word "State" in 4 (a), Georgia will have to establish not only that it has satisfied the standards in 4 (a), but also that each and every one of its political subdivisions meets those criteria. This outcome makes every city and county in Georgia a hostage to the errors, or even the deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.[14]*204 Since the statute was enacted, only one State has succeeded in bailing outAlaska in 1966, and again in 1971.[15] That precedent holds out little or no hope for more populous States such as Georgia. Demonstrating a right to bailout in 1966 for Alaska's 272,000 people and 56 political subdivisions, or in 1971 for that State's 302,000 people and 60 subdivisions, is a far cry from seeking bailout now on behalf of Georgia's approximately 5 million people and 877 local governments.[16]*205 Today's ruling therefore will seal off the constitutionally necessary safety valve in the Voting Rights The preclearance requirement enforces a presumption against voting changes by certain state and local governments. If that presumption is restricted to those governments meeting 4 (b)'s coverage criteria, and if the presumption can be rebutted by a proper showing in a bailout suit, the Act may be seen, as the South Court saw it, as action by Congress at the limit of its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. But if governments like the city of Rome may not bail out, the statute oversteps those limits. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court.[17] *206 IV If there were reason to believe that today's decision would protect the voting rights of minorities in any way, perhaps this case could be viewed as one where the Court's ends justify dubious analytical means. But the District Court found, and no one denies, that for at least 17 years there has been no voting discrimination by the city of Rome. Despite this record, the Court today continues federal rule over the most local decisions made by this small city in Georgia. Such an outcome must vitiate the incentive for any local government in a State covered by the Act to meet diligently the Act's requirements. Neither the Framers of the Fifteenth Amendment nor the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights Act could have intended that result. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | The majority concludes that a private litigant may sue in federal court despite having to "pass back all proceeds of the litigation," Brief for Respondents 9, thus depriving that party of any stake in the outcome of the litigation. The majority reaches this conclusion, in flat contravention of our cases interpreting the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, by reference to a historical tradition that is, at best, equivocal. That history does not contradict what common sense should tell us: There is a legal difference between something and nothing. Respondents have nothing to gain from their lawsuit. Under settled principles of standing, that fact requires dismissal of their complaint.[1] I Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of the federal courts to actual "Cases" and "Controversies." 2. As we have recently reaffirmed, "[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." DaimlerChrysler Unlike the political branches, directly elected by the people, the courts derive their authority under Article III, including the power of judicial review, from "the necessity of carrying out the judicial function of deciding cases." "If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so." at Given the importance of assuring a court's jurisdiction before deciding the merits of a case, "[w]e have always insisted on strict compliance with th[e] jurisdictional standing requirement." ; In recent years, we have elaborated the standing requirements of Article III in terms of a three-part test whether the plaintiff can demonstrate an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Steel But regardless of how the test is articulated, "the point has always been the same: whether a plaintiff `personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention.'" (quoting ; emphasis added). An assignee who has acquired the bare legal right to prosecute a claim but no right to the substantive recovery cannot show that he has a personal stake in the litigation. The Court's decision today is unprecedented. Vermont of Natural does not support it. Vermont in recognizing that a qui tam relator as assignee of the United States had standing to sue, did not dispense with the essential requirement of Article III standing that the plaintiff have a "concrete private interest in the outcome of [the] suit." (quoting at ; internal quotation marks omitted). |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | of [the] suit." (quoting at ; internal quotation marks omitted). In Vermont the qui tam relator's bounty was sufficient to establish standing because it represented a "partial assignment of the Government's damages claim," encompassing both a legal right to assert the claim and a stake in the Thus, it was clear that the False Claims Act gave the "relator himself an interest in the lawsuit," in addition to "the right to retain a fee out of the " Here, respondents are authorized to bring suit on behalf of the payphone operators, but they have no claim to the Indeed, their take is not tied to the recovery in any way. Respondents receive their compensation based on the number of payphones and telephone lines operated by their clients, see App. 198, not based on the measure of damages ultimately awarded by a court or paid by petitioners as part of a settlement. Respondents received the assignments only as a result of their willingness to assume the obligation of remitting any recovery to the assignors, the payphone operators. That is, after all, the entire point of the arrangement. The payphone operators assigned their claims to respondents "for purposes of collection," App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a; respondents never had any share in the amount collected. The absence of any right to the substantive recovery means that respondents cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack Article III standing. "When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose." Bob Dylan, Like A Rolling Stone, on Highway 61 Revisited (Columbia Records 1965). To be sure, respondents doubtless have more than just a passing interest in the litigation. As collection agencies, respondents *2551 must demonstrate that they are willing to make good on their threat to pursue their clients' claims in litigation. Even so, "an interest that is merely a `byproduct' of the suit itself cannot give rise to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes." Vermont The benefit respondents would receive the general business goodwill that would result from a successful verdict, the ability to collect dial-around compensation for their clients more effectively is nothing more than a byproduct of the current litigation. Such an interest cannot support their standing to sue in federal court. Cf. Steel (the costs of investigating and prosecuting a substantive claim do not give rise to standing to assert the claim); The undeniable consequence of today's decision is that a plaintiff need no longer demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Instead, the majority has replaced the personal stake |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | the litigation. Instead, the majority has replaced the personal stake requirement with a completely impersonal one. The right to sue is now the exact opposite of a personal claim it is a marketable commodity. By severing the right to recover from the right to prosecute a claim, the Court empowers anyone to bring suit on any claim, whether it be the first assignee, the second, the third, or so on. But, as we have said in another context, standing is not "commutative." Legal claims, at least those brought in federal court, are not fungible commodities. The source of the Court's mistake is easy to identify. The Court goes awry when it asserts that the standing inquiry focuses on whether the injury is likely to be redressed, not whether the complaining party's injury is likely to be redressed. See ante, at 2542-2543. That could not be more wrong. We have never approved federal-court jurisdiction over a claim where the entire relief requested will run to a party not before the court. Never. The Court commits this mistake by treating the elements of standing as separate strands rather than as interlocking and related elements meant to ensure a personal stake. Our cases do not condone this approach. The Court expressly rejected such an argument in Vermont where the relator argued that he was "suing to remedy an injury in fact suffered by the United States." We dismissed the argument out of hand, noting that "[t]he Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party." (quoting 422 U.S., at ; emphasis in Vermont ; internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court's analysis in that section of the opinion concerned the right of the relator to assert the United States' injury, the Court treated it as axiomatic that any "redress" must also redound to the benefit of the relator. In Steel the Court similarly rejected a basis for standing that turned on relief sought the imposition of civil penalties that was "payable to the United States Treasury," but not to the We observed that the plaintiff sought "not remediation of its own injury," but merely the "vindication of the rule of law." Importantly, the Court recognized that "[r]elief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very *2552 essence of the redressability requirement." Again, the Court's emphasis on the party's injury makes clear that the basis for rejecting standing in Steel was the fact that the remedy sought would not benefit the party |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | fact that the remedy sought would not benefit the party before the Court. The majority's view of the Article III redressability requirement is also incompatible with what we said in In that case, we held that individual Members of Congress lacked standing to contest the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. We observed that the Congressmen "do not claim that they have been deprived of something to which they personally are entitled." Rather, the Members sought to enforce a right that ran to their office, not to their person. "If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead. The claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with the Member's seat, a seat which the Member holds as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power." We therefore held that the individual Members did "not have a sufficient `personal stake' in th[e] dispute" to maintain their challenge. See also (denying standing where "the record is devoid of any indication" that the requested "relief would benefit petitioners"); (denying standing to plaintiffs who did not "stand to profit in some personal interest" because it was "purely speculative" whether the relief sought "would result in these respondents' receiving the hospital services they desire" ). The majority finds that respondents have a sufficient stake in this litigation because the substantive recovery will initially go to them, and "[w]hat does it matter what the aggregators do with the money afterward?" Ante, at 2543. The majority's assertion implies, incorrectly, that respondents have, or ever had, a choice of what to do with the It may be true that a plaintiff's independent decision to pledge his recovery to another, as in respondents' hypothetical of an "original owner of a claim who signs a collateral agreement with a charity obligating herself to donate every penny she recovers in [the] litigation," Brief for Respondents 21, would not divest the plaintiff of Article III standing. But respondents never had the right to direct the disposition of the recovery; they have only the right to sue. The hypothetical plaintiff who chooses to pledge her recovery to charity, by contrast, will secure a personal benefit from the Unlike respondents' claims, the hypothetical plaintiff's pre-existing claim is not tied in any way to her separate agreement to direct her recovery to charity. She has more than the right to sue; she has the right to exercise her independent authority to direct the proceeds as she sees fit. In that situation, the Article III requirement |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | she sees fit. In that situation, the Article III requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation is satisfied.[2] The Court believes that these standing principles, embodying a "core component *2553 derived directly from the Constitution," that is of "particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the proper and properly limited role of the courts in a democratic society," and that is "crucial in maintaining the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution," 547 U.S., at (internal quotation marks omitted), should yield "as a practical matter" to the prospect that a contrary "holding could easily be overcome," ante, at 2544. The Court chooses to elevate expediency above the strictures imposed by the Constitution. That is a tradeoff the Constitution does not allow. Cf. ("[W]e must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to `settle' it for the sake of convenience and efficiency"). Perhaps it is true that a "dollar or two," ante, at 2544, would give respondents a sufficient stake in the litigation. Article III is worth a dollar. And in any case, the ease with which respondents can comply with the requirements of Article III is not a reason to abandon our precedents; it is a reason to adhere to them. II Given all this, it is understandable that the majority opts to minimize its reliance on modern standing principles and to retreat to a broad, generalized reading of the historical tradition of assignments. But that history does not support the majority's conclusion. The first problem lies in identifying the relevant tradition. Much of the majority's historical analysis focuses on the generic (and undisputed) point that common law and equity courts eventually permitted assignees to sue on their assigned claims. See ante, at 2535-2539. I would treat that point as settled as much by stare decisis, see Vermont as by the historic practice of the King's Bench and Chancery. But the general history of assignments says nothing about the particular aspect of suits brought on assigned claims that is relevant to this case: whether an assignee who has acquired the legal right to sue, but no right to any substantive recovery, can maintain an action in court. On that precise question, the historical sources are either nonexistent or equivocal. A None of the English common-law sources on which the majority relies establishes that assignments of this sort would *2554 be permitted either at law or in equity. As the majority's discussion makes clear, both systems permitted suits brought |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | the majority's discussion makes clear, both systems permitted suits brought on assignments either in equity by an assignee having a beneficial interest in the litigation, or at law by an assignee who had a power of attorney and sued in the name of the assignor. See ante, at 2536-2537. But at all times, suits based on assignments remained subject to the prohibition on champerty and maintenance. See 7 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 535-536 (1926).[3] By the 18th century, an assignment no longer constituted maintenance per se, see but it appears to have been an open question whether an assignment of the "[b]are [r]igh[t] to [l]itigate" would fail as "[s]avouring" of champerty and maintenance, see M. Smith, Law of Assignment: The Creation and Transfer of Choses in Action 318, 321 In order to sustain an assignment of the right to sue, the assignment had to include the transfer of a property interest to which the right of action was incident or subsidiary. ; see also Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Exch. 481, 160 Eng. Rep. 196 (1835); Dickinson v. Burrell, 35 Beav. 257, 55 Eng. Rep. 894 (1866); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 1040h, pp. 234-235 (8th ed. 1861); R. Megarry & P. Baker, Snell's Principles of Equity 82 (25th ed.1960). American courts as well understood the common-law rule to require a transfer of interest to the assignee over and above the "naked right to bring a suit" that gave the assignee a "valuable right of property." A New York court, surveying the English sources, concluded that "an assignment to the plaintiff of the assignor's right to maintain and prosecute an action for the specific performance of defendants' agreement, amounts to nothing more than an assertion that the assignor has undertaken to assign to the plaintiff a bare right to litigate for the former's benefit exclusively." To secure standing in a court of equity, the court held, "it must appear that the assignee's successful prosecution of the action is susceptible of personal enjoyment by him." So while there is no doubt that at common law, courts of law and equity sought ways of protecting the rights of assignees, they did not do so to the exclusion of the age-long objection to maintenance, which could be found when the assignee lacked a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation. During the common-law period at least, it remained an open question whether an assignee for collection, who by agreement took nothing from the suit, had a sufficient interest in the assigned debt |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | the suit, had a sufficient interest in the assigned debt to support his right to sue. To be sure, the assignments at issue here purport to give respondents "all rights, title and interest" in the payphone operators' claims for dial-around compensation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a. But when severed from the right to retain any of the substantive recovery, it is not clear that common-law courts of law or equity would have treated the assigned right to *2555 litigate as incidental or subsidiary to the interest represented by the claim itself. Cf. 7 Holdsworth, ("[I]t was not till certain classes of rights became more freely assignable in equity, that it became necessary to distinguish between the cases in which assignment was permitted and cases in which it was not; and it is for this reason that we find very little clear authority on these questions till quite modern times").[4] I do not take the majority's point to be that the common-law tradition supplies the answer to this question. As the majority concedes, it was not until the 19th century that "courts began to consider the specific question presented here." Ante, at 2538. But even granting this starting point, the Court's recitation of the 19th-century tradition fails to account for the deep divergence in practice regarding the right of assignees with no stake in the substantive recovery to maintain an action in court. The majority concedes that "some States during this period of time refused to recognize assignee-for-collection suits," ante, at 2539, but that refusal was substantially more widespread than the majority acknowledges. See ; ; ; ; ; These courts concluded that assignees having no legal or beneficial interest to vindicate could not sue on the assigned claims. Several more States, including some enlisted by the majority, only eventually recognized the right of assignees for collection to sue after taking inconsistent positions on the issue. In fact, the rule regarding assignees for collection only was so unsettled that the Kansas Supreme Court reversed itself twice in the span of 19 years. Compare with with During this period, many other courts reversed course on the flinty problem posed by assignees for collection only. See overruled by ; State ex rel. overruled by The majority's survey of 19th-century judicial practice thus ignores a substantial contrary tradition during this period. That tradition makes clear that state courts did not regularly "entertai[n] suits virtually identical to the litigation before us." Ante, at 2538. In reality, all that the majority's cases show is that the question whether assignees for collection could *2556 maintain an |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | the question whether assignees for collection could *2556 maintain an action in court was hotly contested a live issue that spawned much litigation and diverse published decisions. The confusion was much remarked on by courts of this period, even those that ultimately sided with the Court's understanding of the prevailing practice. See, e.g., ; Commentators have also called attention to the divergent practice. As the majority notes, John Norton Pomeroy observed that "there is some conflict" on the question whether an assignee for collection obligated to "account for the whole proceeds is entitled to sue in his own name." Remedies and Remedial Rights 132, p. 159 (1876) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also M. Ferguson, Comment, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant's Interest in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 Cal. L.Rev. 1452, 1475 (1967) ("Nowhere do the courts manifest more confusion than in deciding whether an assignee for collection only is a real party in interest"); Note, 51 Mich. L.Rev. 587, 588 (observing that "[t]here is, however, little agreement among the courts as to the meaning and purpose of [real party in interest] provisions" and noting that they have been construed "to prevent the owner of the bare legal title to a chose in action from suing"). Indeed, notable legal commentators of the period argued against permitting suits by assignees for collection. See, e.g., 1 J. Kerr, Law of Pleading and Practice 586, pp. 791-792 (1919) ("[T]he party in whom the legal interest is vested is not always the real party in interest. The `real party in interest' is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment in the cause The rule should be restricted to parties whose interests are in issue, and are to be affected by the decree"). This unsettled and conflicting state of affairs is understandable given the transformation in the understanding of the common-law prohibition on suits by assignees with no beneficial interest. The immediate cause for this transformation was the merger of law and equity, and the creation of real party in interest provisions intended to reconcile the two forms of actions. v. Brown, (18) ; see ante, at 2538-2539. The fusion of law and equity forced courts to confront the novel question of what to do with assignees for collection only, who could not sue at law in their own name, and who could not recover on a bill in equity for the lack of any beneficial interest to enforce. Were such assignees, under the new system, real parties in interest who could bring suit? |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | new system, real parties in interest who could bring suit? It is not surprising that courts took conflicting positions on this question, a question for which the historical tradition did not provide an answer. Given this, it is difficult to characterize a practice as showing what sort of cases and controversies were "traditionally amenable to the judicial process," Steel when the practice was a self-conscious break in tradition. In Vermont by contrast, the Court relied on a long and unbroken tradition of informer statutes that reached back to the 14th century and prevailed up to the *2557 "period immediately before and after the framing of the Constitution." The Court noted that the American Colonies "pass[ed] several informer statutes expressly authorizing qui tam suits," and that the First Congress itself "enacted a considerable number of informer statutes." This tradition provided relevant evidence of what the Framers in 1787 would have understood the terms "case" and "controversy" to mean. See (the Article III "[j]udicial power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted `Cases' or `Controversies'").[5] There is certainly no comparable tradition here. The belated innovations of the mid- to late-19th-century courts come too late to provide insight into the meaning of Article III. Although we have sometimes looked to cases postdating the founding era as evidence of common-law traditions, we have never done so when the courts self-consciously confronted novel questions arising from a break in the received tradition, or where the practice of later courts was so divergent. A belated and equivocal tradition cannot fill in for the fundamental requirements of Article III where, as here, those requirements are so plainly lacking. B Nor do our own cases establish that we "long ago indicated that assignees for collection only can properly bring suit." Ante, at 2540. (If the majority truly believed that, one would expect the cases to be placed front and center in the Court's analysis, rather than as an afterthought.) None addressed the requirements of Article III, and so none constitutes binding precedent. See Steel ("[D]rive-by jurisdictional rulings of this sort have no precedential effect"); In we addressed the then-existing statutory provision that barred jurisdiction over suits "improperly or collusively made or joined. for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act." We held that a plaintiff who took legal title of multiple bonds "for purposes of collection" could not satisfy the statute when the bonds individually did not meet |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | satisfy the statute when the bonds individually did not meet the amount in controversy requirement. The Court did not say that the "suit could properly be brought in federal court," ante, at 2540, if the only objection was the limitation placed on the plaintiff's assignment; instead, the Court remarked that such a limited assignment would not violate the statutory prohibition on suits that are "improperly or collusively made or joined," Waite, *2558 In Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. the plaintiff, secretary of the Cattle Raisers' Association, sued to enforce an order of reparations issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which found that the defendant railroads had charged excessive shipping rates to the members of the association. The question before the Court was the validity of the lower court's ruling that the assignments to the plaintiff which reserved a beneficial interest in the assignors, the individual members of the association did not vest legal title in the secretary "so as [to] authorize the commission to make the award of damages in his name." We concluded that the agency was authorized to issue the reparations order in the name of the plaintiff because the assignments were "absolute in form." We then concluded that "beneficial or equitable title" was not necessary for the plaintiff "to claim an award of reparation" and enforce that award in his own name in court. In other words, the Court addressed merely the question whether it was appropriate for a federal agency (not bound by the constraints of Article III) to enter an award in the plaintiff's name. In no way did the Court endorse the right of an assignee for collection to sue as an initial matter in federal court. Nor did the Court address Article III standing requirements in There, we found that an assignment "for purposes of suit," where the assignee had an obligation to account for the proceeds (in part) to another, did not render the assignment invalid under New York state law. Thus, we held that the Ohio courts had failed to give full faith and credit to an earlier, valid New York court judgment. If we had been presented with the Article III question, we would likely have found it significant that the plaintiff-assignee stood to take the balance of any recovery after the proceeds were used to discharge the debts of the assignor (plaintiff's brother) and the plaintiff's wife. But in any event, the Court's conclusion that the assignment was valid under New York law, where the restrictions of Article III do not operate, does not support the |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC SERVICES | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145783/sprint-communications-co-v-apcc-services/ | of Article III do not operate, does not support the view that suits by assignees for collection are permissible in federal courts. C When we have looked to history to confirm our own Article III jurisdiction, we have relied on a firmly entrenched historical tradition that served to confirm the application of modern standing principles. See Vermont -778, The Court's decision today illustrates the converse approach. It relies on an equivocal and contradictory tradition to override the clear application of the case-or-controversy requirement that would otherwise bar respondents' suit. But perhaps we should heed the counsels of hope rather than despair. The majority, after all, purports to comply with our Article III precedents, see ante, at 2-2543, so those precedents at least live to give meaning to "the judiciary's proper role in our system of government" another day. 521 U.S., at. What is more, the majority expressly and repeatedly grounds its finding of standing on its conclusion that "history and precedent are clear" that these types of suits "have long been permitted," ante, at 2535-2536, and that there is "a strong tradition" of such suits "during the past two centuries," ante, at 2-2542, 2543. This conclusion is, for the reasons we have set forth, achingly wrong but at *2559 least the articulated test is clear and daunting. Finally, there is the majority's point that all this fuss could have been avoided for a dollar, see ante, at 2543-2544 a price, by this point, that most readers would probably be happy to contribute. The price will be higher in future standing cases. And when it is when standing really matters it would be surprising if the Court were to look to a case in which it did not. I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | concurring | Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111021/arizona-governing-comm-for-tax-deferred-annuity-and-deferred-compensation/ | This case requires us to determine whether Title VII prohibits an employer from offering an annuity plan in which the participating insurance company uses sex-based tables for calculating monthly benefit payments. It is important to stress that our judicial role is simply to discern the intent of the 88th Congress in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,[1] a statute covering only discrimination in employment. What we, if sitting as legislators, might consider wise legislative policy is irrelevant to our task. Nor, as JUSTICE MARSHALL notes, ante, at 1078-1079, n. 4, do we have before us any constitutional challenge. Finally, our decision must ignore (and our holding has no necessary effect on) the larger issue of whether considerations of sex should be barred from all insurance plans, including individual purchases of insurance, an issue that Congress is currently debating. See S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H. R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Although the issue presented for our decision is a narrow one, the answer is far from self-evident. As with many *1108 other narrow issues of statutory construction, the general language chosen by Congress does not clearly resolve the precise question. Our polestar, however, must be the intent of Congress, and the guiding lights are the language, structure, and legislative history of Title VII. Our inquiry is made somewhat easier by the fact that this Court, in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & analyzed the intent of the 88th Congress on a related question. The Court in found Title VII's focus on the individual to be dispositive of the present question. Congress in enacting Title VII intended to prohibit an employer from singling out an employee by race or sex for the purpose of imposing a greater burden or denying an equal benefit because of a characteristic statistically identifiable with the group but empirically false in many individual cases. See -710. Despite JUSTICE POWELL's argument, ultimately I am persuaded that the result in is not distinguishable from the present situation. did note that Title VII would allow an employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let the retiree purchase whatever annuity his or her accumulated contributions could command on the open market. In that situation, the employer is treating each employee without regard to sex. If an independent insurance company then classifies persons on the basis of sex, the disadvantaged female worker cannot claim she was denied a privilege of employment, any more than she could complain of employment discrimination when the employer pays equal wages in a community |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | concurring | Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111021/arizona-governing-comm-for-tax-deferred-annuity-and-deferred-compensation/ | discrimination when the employer pays equal wages in a community where local merchants charge women more than men for identical items. As I stressed above, Title VII covers only discrimination in employment, and thus simply does not reach these other situations. Unlike these examples, however, the employer here has done more than set aside equal lump sums for all employees. Title VII clearly does not allow an employer to offer a plan *1109 to employees under which it will collect equal contributions, hold them in a trust account, and upon retirement disburse greater monthly checks to men than women. Nor could an employer escape Title VII's mandate by using a third-party bank to hold and manage the account. In the situation at issue here, the employer has used third-party insurance companies to administer the plan, but the plan remains essentially a "privileg[e] of employment," and thus is covered by Title VII. 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2(a)(1).[2] For these reasons, I join Parts I, II, and III of JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion. Unlike JUSTICE MARSHALL, however, I would not make our holding retroactive. Rather, for reasons explained below, I agree with JUSTICE POWELL that our decision should be prospective. I therefore join Part III of JUSTICE POWELL's opinion. In Oil we set forth three criteria for determining when to apply a decision of statutory interpretation prospectively. First, the decision must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Ultimately, I find this case controlled by the same principles of Title VII articulated by the Court in If this first criterion were the sole consideration for prospectivity, I might find it difficult to make today's decision prospective. As reflected in JUSTICE POWELL's opinion, however, whether foreshadows today's decision is sufficiently debatable that the first criterion of the test does not compel retroactivity here. Therefore, we must examine the remaining criteria of the test as well. *1110 The second criterion is whether retroactivity will further or retard the operation of the statute. -107. See also Albemarle Paper held that a central purpose of Title VII is to prevent employers from treating individual workers on the basis of sexual or racial group characteristics. Although retroactive application will not retard the achievement of this purpose, that goal in no way requires retroactivity. I see no reason to believe that a retroactive holding is necessary to ensure that pension plan administrators, who may have thought until our decision today that Title VII did not extend to plans involving third-party insurers, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,983 | 14 | concurring | Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111021/arizona-governing-comm-for-tax-deferred-annuity-and-deferred-compensation/ | Title VII did not extend to plans involving third-party insurers, will not now quickly conform their plans to ensure that individual employees are allowed equal monthly benefits regardless of sex. See[3] In my view, the third criterion whether retroactive application would impose inequitable results compels a prospective decision in these circumstances. Many working men and women have based their retirement decisions on expectations of a certain stream of income during retirement. These decisions depend on the existence of adequate reserves to fund these pensions. A retroactive holding by this Court that employers must disburse greater annuity benefits than the collected contributions can support would jeopardize the entire pension fund. If a fund cannot meet its obligations, "[t]he harm would fall in large part on innocent third parties." This real danger of bankrupting pension funds requires that our decision be made prospective. Such a prospective holding is, of course, *1111 consistent with our equitable powers under Title VII to fashion an appropriate remedy. See 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5(g); -719. In my view, then, our holding should be made prospective in the following sense. I would require employers to ensure that benefits derived from contributions collected after the effective date of our judgment be calculated without regard to the sex of the employee.[4] For contributions collected before the effective date of our judgment, however, I would allow employers and participating insurers to calculate the resulting benefits as they have in the past. |
Justice Thomas | 2,012 | 1 | majority | Kawashima v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/623145/kawashima-v-holder/ | This case concerns whether aliens who commit certain federal tax crimes are subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony. We hold that violations of 26 U.S. C. and (2) are crimes “involv[ing] fraud or deceit” under 8 U.S. C. and are therefore aggravated felonies as that term is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. C. et seq., when the loss to the Govern- ment exceeds $10,000. I Petitioners, Akio and Fusako Kawashima, are natives and citizens of Japan who have been lawful permanent residents of the United States since June 21, In 1997, Mr. Kawashima pleaded guilty to one count of will- fully making and subscribing a false tax return in viola- tion of 26 U.S. C. Mrs. Kawashima pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and assisting in the prep- aration of a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S. C. Following their convictions, the Immigration and Natu- 2 KAWASHIMA v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court ralization Service charged the Kawashimas with being deportable from the United States as aliens who had been convicted of an aggravated felony.1 See 8 U.S. C. (“Any alien who is convicted of an ag- gravated felony at any time after admission is deporta- ble”).2 In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress listed categories of offenses that qualify as “aggravated felonies” for the purpose of deportation. See (a)(43). Here, the Government charged the Kawashimas with be- ing deportable for committing offenses under subpara- graph (M) of (a)(43). That subparagraph classifies as an aggravated felony an offense that either: “(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or vic- tims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.” Hereinafter, we refer to as “Clause (i)” and to (a)(43)(M)(ii) as “Clause (ii).” At their deportation hearing, the Kawashimas argued that their convictions under 26 U.S. C. did not qualify as aggravated felonies under subparagraph (M). The Immigration Judge disagreed and ordered removal, concluding that the Kawashimas’ convictions qualified as aggravated felonies under Clause (i). The Kawashimas appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Board to —————— 1 On March 1, 2003, most of the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased to exist. 2 Before there were two procedures for removing aliens from |
Justice Thomas | 2,012 | 1 | majority | Kawashima v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/623145/kawashima-v-holder/ | 2 Before there were two procedures for removing aliens from the country: “deportation” of aliens who were already present, and “exclu- sion” of aliens seeking entry or reentry into the country. Since the Government has used a unified procedure, known as “removal,” for both exclusion and deportation. See 8 U.S. C. 1229a. We use the terms “deportation” and “removal” interchangeably in this opinion. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of the Court reopen its decision, the Kawashimas filed petitions for review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that “convictions for violating and (2) in which the tax loss to the Government exceeds $10,000 constitute aggravated felonies under subsection (M)(i).” The court concluded that Mr. Kawashima’s conviction un- der (1) qualified as an aggravated felony within Clause (i)’s definition “because it involved ‘fraud or deceit’ and because his offense resulted in a loss to the govern- ment in excess of $10,000.” The Ninth Cir- cuit also determined that Mrs. Kawashima’s conviction under (2) “necessarily ‘involve[d] fraud or deceit.’ ” But because Mrs. Kawashima’s plea agree- ment was not in the administrative record, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the Board to determine whether Mrs. Kawashima’s conviction had caused a loss to the Govern- ment in excess of $10,000. at 1056–1057. We granted the Kawashimas’ petition for a writ of certi- orari to determine whether their convictions for violations of 26 U.S. C. and (2) respectively qualify as aggravated felonies under 8 U.S. C. 563 U. S. (2011). We now affirm. II The Kawashimas argue that they cannot be deported for commission of an “aggravated felony” because crimes under and (2) do not “involv[e] fraud or deceit” as required by Clause (i). The Kawashimas also assert that their convictions under are not “aggravated felonies” because tax crimes are not included within Clause (i) at all. We address each argument in turn. A The Kawashimas contend that their offenses of convic- 4 KAWASHIMA v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court tion do not fall within the scope of Clause (i) because neither “fraud” nor “deceit” is a formal element of a con- viction under (1) or The Government responds that the Kawashimas’ convictions necessarily in- volved deceit because they required a showing that the Kawashimas willfully made materially false statements. To determine whether the Kawashimas’ offenses “involv[e] fraud or deceit” within the meaning of Clause (i), we em- ploy a categorical approach by looking to the statute defin- ing the crime of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying |
Justice Thomas | 2,012 | 1 | majority | Kawashima v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/623145/kawashima-v-holder/ | crime of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime. See ). If the elements of the offenses establish that the Ka- washimas committed crimes involving fraud or deceit, then the first requirement of Clause (i) is satisfied.3 Mr. Kawashima was convicted of violating 26 U.S. C. (1), which provides that any person who “[w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written decla- ration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter,” shall be guilty of a felony. Mr. Ka- washima does not dispute that the elements of a violation of (1) include, inter alia, that the document in ques- tion was false as to a material matter, that the defendant did not believe the document to be true and correct as to every material matter, and that he acted willfully with the specific intent to violate the law. See, e.g., United States v. ; United States v. Kaiser, ; United States v. —————— 3 We note that the issue whether the Kawashimas’ offenses satisfy the second requirement of Clause (i)—that the loss to the victim ex- ceeded $10,000—is not before us. We address only whether their offenses of conviction qualify as crimes “involv[ing] fraud or deceit.” Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court Marabelles, ; United Although the words “fraud” and “deceit” are absent from the text of (1) and are not themselves formal elements of the crime, it does not follow that his offense falls outside of Clause (i). The scope of that clause is not limited to of- fenses that include fraud or deceit as formal elements. Rather, Clause (i) refers more broadly to offenses that “involv[e]” fraud or deceit—meaning offenses with ele- ments that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct. When subparagraph (M) was enacted, the term “deceit” meant a “the act or process of deceiving (as by falsification, concealment, or cheating).” Webster’s Third New Interna- tional Dictionary 584 (1993). Mr. Kawashima’s conviction under (1) establishes that he knowingly and willfully submitted a tax return that was false as to a material matter. He therefore committed a felony that involved “deceit.” Turning to Mrs. Kawashima, our analysis follows a similar path. Mrs. Kawashima was convicted of violating 26 U.S. C. (2), which declares that any person who “[w]illfully aids or assists in the preparation or presen- tation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, |
Justice Thomas | 2,012 | 1 | majority | Kawashima v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/623145/kawashima-v-holder/ | matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter,” has committed a felony. Mrs. Kawashima does not dispute that the elements of a viola- tion of (2) include, inter alia, that the document in question was false as to a material matter and that the defendant acted willfully. See at ; United ; United 788–789 (CA7 1988); United 1426– 1427 We conclude that Mrs. Kawashima’s conviction establishes that, by knowingly and willfully 6 KAWASHIMA v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court assisting her husband’s filing of a materially false tax return, Mrs. Kawashima also committed a felony that involved “deceit.” The language of Clause (i) is clear. Anyone who is con- victed of an offense that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000” has committed an aggravated felony and is subject to depor- tation pursuant to 8 U.S. C. The ele- ments of willfully making and subscribing a false corpo- rate tax return, in violation of 26 U.S. C. (1), and of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax re- turn, in violation of 26 U.S. C. (2), establish that those crimes are deportable offenses because they neces- sarily entail deceit. B The Kawashimas’ second argument is based on infer- ences drawn from the interaction of Clause (i) and Clause (ii). The full text of subparagraph (M) reads as follows: “(43) The term ‘aggravated felony’ means— “(M) an offense that— “(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or “(ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Govern- ment exceeds $10,000.” The Kawashimas argue that when Clause (i) is read to- gether with Clause (ii), Clause (i) must be interpreted as being inapplicable to tax crimes. In their view, subpara- graph (M), when considered in its entirety, demonstrates that Congress was addressing two mutually exclusive categories of crimes in subparagraph (M)’s two clauses: Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court general, non-tax crimes involving fraud or deceit that cause actual losses to real victims in Clause (i), and tax crimes involving revenue losses to the Government in Clause (ii). For the reasons discussed below, this argument cannot overcome the plain language of Clause (i), which encompasses the Kawashimas’ offenses of conviction. 1 The Kawashimas contend that textual differences be- tween Clauses (i) and (ii) indicate that Congress intended to |
Justice Thomas | 2,012 | 1 | majority | Kawashima v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/623145/kawashima-v-holder/ | tween Clauses (i) and (ii) indicate that Congress intended to exclude tax crimes from Clause (i). Specifically, they note that Clause (i) addresses “loss to the victim,” whereas Clause (ii) addresses “revenue loss to the Government.” This difference in language does not establish Congress’ intent to remove tax crimes from the scope of Clause (i). Clause (i) covers a broad class of offenses that involve fraud or deceit. Clause (i) thus uses correspondingly broad language to refer to the wide range of potential losses and victims. Clause (ii), on the other hand, is limited to the single type of offense “described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion),” which, by definition, can only cause one type of loss (revenue loss) to one type of victim (the Government). Congress’ decision to tailor Clause (ii)’s language to match the sole type of offense covered by Clause (ii) does not demonstrate that Congress also in- tended to implicitly circumscribe the broad scope of Clause (i)’s plain language. 2 Next, the Kawashimas argue that interpreting Clause (i) to include tax crimes violates the presumption against superfluities by rendering Clause (ii) completely redundant to Clause (i). Clause (ii) explicitly states that convictions for tax evasion pursuant to 26 U.S. C. that cause a revenue loss of at least $10,000 to the Gov- 8 KAWASHIMA v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court ernment are aggravated felonies. The Kawashimas assert that, if Clause (i) applies to tax crimes, then qualifying convictions for tax evasion under Clause (ii) would also qualify as aggravated felonies under Clause (i), because tax evasion is a crime involving fraud or deceit. To but- tress this argument, the Kawashimas point to a body of law providing that a conviction for tax evasion under collaterally estops the convicted taxpayer from contesting a civil penalty under 26 U.S. C. for “underpayment attributable to fraud.” See, e.g., Gray v. Commissioner, (“Numer- ous federal courts have held that a conviction for federal income tax evasion, either upon a plea of guilty, or upon a jury verdict of guilt, conclusively establishes fraud in a subsequent civil tax fraud proceeding through application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel”). Therefore, accord- ing to the Kawashimas, if Clause (i) covers tax offenses, then Clause (ii) is mere surplusage. We disagree with the Kawashimas’ contention that the specific mention of one type of tax crime in Clause (ii) impliedly limits the scope of Clause (i)’s plain language, which extends to any offense that “involves fraud or de- ceit.” We think it more likely that Congress specifically included tax evasion offenses |
Justice Thomas | 2,012 | 1 | majority | Kawashima v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/623145/kawashima-v-holder/ | it more likely that Congress specifically included tax evasion offenses under 26 U.S. C. in Clause (ii) to remove any doubt that tax evasion qualifies as an aggravated felony. Several considerations support this conclusion. Like and (2), does not, on its face, mention fraud or deceit. Instead, simply provides that “[a]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by [the Internal Revenue Code] or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony.” Accordingly, nei- ther fraud nor deceit is among the elements of a conviction under which include: (1) willfulness; (2) the exist- ence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act consti- Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court tuting an evasion or an attempted evasion of the tax. A conviction under therefore, only qualifies as an aggravated felony under Clause (i) if a willful, affirmative attempt to evade a tax necessarily entails fraud or deceit. This Court’s decision in United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 (1932), gave Congress good reason to doubt that a conviction under satisfies that condition. In Scharton, the defendant was indicted for attempting to evade income taxes by falsely understating his taxable income. The question before the Court was whether the crime was subject to the 3-year statute of limitations generally applicable to tax crimes, or whether it was instead subject to the 6-year statute of limitations appli- cable to “ ‘offenses involving the defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner.’ ” at 520, n. 2 (quoting 18 U.S. C. (1962 ed., Supp. V)). The Government argued that the 6-year statute of limita- tions applied because “fraud is implicit in the concept of evading or defeating” and because any effort to evade a tax is tantamount to an attempt to defraud the taxing body. –521. The Court rejected that argument, noting that, in an indictment for evasion, “an averment [of intent to defraud] would be surplusage, for it would be sufficient to plead and prove a willful attempt to evade or defeat.” Moreover, includes two offenses: “the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the assessment of a tax as well as the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the payment of a tax.” As the Government notes, it is possible to willfully evade or de- feat payment of a tax under without making any misrepresentation. For example, can be violated by a taxpayer who |
Justice Thomas | 2,012 | 1 | majority | Kawashima v. Holder | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/623145/kawashima-v-holder/ | misrepresentation. For example, can be violated by a taxpayer who files a truthful tax return, but who also 10 KAWASHIMA v. HOLDER Opinion of the Court takes affirmative steps to evade payment by moving his assets beyond the reach of the Internal Revenue Service. Although the Government concedes that evasion-of- payment cases will almost invariably involve some affirm- ative acts of fraud or deceit, it is still true that the ele- ments of tax evasion pursuant to do not necessarily involve fraud or deceit. Thus, we conclude that the specif- ic inclusion of tax evasion in Clause (ii) was intended to ensure that tax evasion pursuant to was a deporta- ble offense. Clause (ii) does not implicitly remove all other tax offenses from the scope of Clause (i)’s plain language. 3 The Kawashimas also assert that the separate treat- ment of tax crimes and crimes involving fraud and deceit in the United State Sentencing Guidelines supports their contention that Congress did not intend to include tax crimes within Clause (i). They point to the fact that, in 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission included within the Guidelines a category of “offenses involving fraud or deceit.” USSG to 2F1.2 The Commission simultaneously in- cluded “offenses involving taxation” as a separate category. et seq. (Nov. 2011). Although the Kawashimas acknowledge that they have found no evidence that Con- gress actually considered the Guidelines, they contend that “it is likely that the language of [Clause (i)] and [Clause (ii)] was taken from the Sentencing Guidelines” by the sponsors of the bill that expanded the definition of aggravated felony to include subparagraph (M). Brief for Petitioners 29. Therefore, the theory goes, we can infer from the similar language in the Guidelines that Congress did not intend Clause (i) to include tax crimes. We reject the Kawashimas’ reliance on the Guidelines. The Kawashimas’ argument is at odds with the fact that, unlike the Guideline that the Kawashimas cite, Clause (ii) Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court does not refer to all offenses “involving taxation.” Rather, Clause (ii) is expressly limited to tax evasion offenses under That textual difference undercuts any infer- ence that Congress was considering, much less incorporat- ing, the distinction drawn by the Guidelines. C Finally, the Kawashimas argue that subparagraph (M)’s treatment of tax crimes other than tax evasion is ambigu- ous, and that we should therefore construe the statute in their favor. It is true that we have, in the past, construed ambiguities in deportation statutes in the alien’s favor. See We think the application of |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | The False Claims Act, eliminates federal-court jurisdiction over actions under 3730 of the Act that are based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions "unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information." 3730(e)(4)(A). We decide whether respondent James Stone was an original source. I The mixture of concrete and pond sludge that is the subject of this case has taken nearly two decades to seep, so to speak, into this Court. Given the long history and the complexity of this litigation, it is well to describe the facts in some detail. A From 1975 through petitioner Rockwell International Corp. was under a management and operating contract with the Department of Energy (DOE) to run the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. The most significant portion of Rockwell's compensation came in the form of a semiannual "`award fee,'" the amount of which depended on DOE's evaluation of Rockwell's performance in a number of areas, including environmental, safety, and health concerns. United States ex rel. From November 1980 through March 1986, James Stone worked as an engineer at the Rocky Flats plant. In the early 1980's, Rockwell explored the possibility of disposing of the toxic pond sludge that accumulated in solar evaporation ponds at the facility, by mixing it with cement. The idea was to pour the mixture into large rectangular boxes, where it would solidify into "pondcrete" blocks that could be stored onsite or transported to other sites for disposal. Stone reviewed a proposed manufacturing process for pondcrete in 1982. He concluded that the proposal "would not work," App. 175, and communicated that conclusion to Rockwell management in a *1402 written "Engineering Order." As Stone would later explain, he believed "the suggested process would result in an unstable mixture that would later deteriorate and cause unwanted release of toxic wastes to the environment." He believed this because he "foresaw that the piping system" that extracted sludge from the solar ponds "would not properly remove the sludge and would lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge/waste and cement such that the `pond crete' blocks would rapidly disintegrate thus creating additional contamination problems." Notwithstanding Stone's prediction, Rockwell proceeded with its pondcrete project and successfully manufactured "concrete hard" pondcrete during the period of Stone's employment at Rocky Flats. It was only after Stone was laid off in March 1986 that what the parties have called "insolid" pondcrete blocks were discovered. According to respondents, Rockwell knew by October 1986 that a substantial number of pondcrete blocks were insolid, but |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | that a substantial number of pondcrete blocks were insolid, but DOE did not become aware of the problem until May 1988, when several pondcrete blocks began to leak, leading to the discovery of thousands of other insolid blocks. The media reported these discoveries, 3 Appellants' App. in Nos. 99-1351, 99-1352, 99-1353 (CA10), pp. 889-38 to 889-39; and attributed the malfunction to Rockwell's reduction of the ratio of concrete to sludge in the mixture. In June more than a year after he had left Rockwell's employ, Stone went to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with allegations of environmental crimes at Rocky Flats during the time of his employment. According to the court below, Stone alleged that "contrary to public knowledge, Rocky Flats accepted hazardous and nuclear waste from other DOE facilities; that Rockwell employees were `forbidden from discussing any controversies in front of a DOE employee'; that although Rocky Flats' fluid bed incinerators failed testing in 1981, the pilot incinerator remained on line and was used to incinerate wastes daily since 1981, including plutonium wastes which were then sent out for burial; that Rockwell distilled and fractionated various oils and solvents although the wastes were geared for incineration; that Stone believed that the ground water was contaminated from previous waste burial and land application, and that hazardous waste lagoons tended to overflow during and after `a good rain,' causing hazardous wastes to be discharged without first being treated." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Stone provided the FBI with 2,300 pages of documents, buried among which was his 1982 engineering report predicting that the pondcrete-system design would not work. Stone did not discuss his pondcrete allegations with the FBI in their conversations.[1] Based in part on information allegedly learned from Stone, the Government obtained a search warrant for Rocky Flats, and on June 6, 75 FBI and Environmental Protection Agency agents raided the facility. The affidavit in support of the warrant included allegations (1) that pondcrete blocks were insolid "due to an inadequate waste-concrete mixture," App. 429, (2) that Rockwell obtained award fees based on its alleged "`excellent'" management of Rocky Flats, and (3) *1403 that Rockwell made false statements and concealed material facts in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6928, and 18 U.S.C. 1001. Newspapers published these allegations. In March Rockwell pleaded guilty to 10 environmental violations, including the knowing storage of insolid pondcrete blocks in violation of RCRA. Rockwell agreed to pay $18.5 million in fines. B In July Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act.[2] |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act.[2] That Act prohibits false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a), and authorizes civil actions to remedy such fraud to be brought by the Attorney General, 3730(a), or by private individuals in the Government's name, 3730(b)(1). The Act provides, however, that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information." 3730(e)(4)(A). An "original source" is "an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information." 3730(e)(4)(B). Stone's complaint alleged that Rockwell was required to comply with certain federal and state environmental laws and regulations, including RCRA; that Rockwell committed numerous violations of these laws and regulations throughout the 1980's[3]; and that, in order to induce the Government to make payments or approvals under Rockwell's contract, Rockwell knowingly presented false and fraudulent claims to the Government in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). As required under the Act, Stone filed his complaint under seal and simultaneously delivered to the Government a confidential disclosure statement describing "substantially all material evidence and information" in his possession, 3730(b)(2). The statement identified 26 environmental and safety issues, only one of which involved pondcrete. With respect to that issue, Stone explained in his statement that he had reviewed the design for the pondcrete system and had foreseen that the piping mechanism would not properly remove the sludge, which in turn would lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge and cement. In December Rockwell moved to dismiss Stone's action for lack of subject-matter *1404 jurisdiction, arguing that the action was based on publicly disclosed allegations and that Stone was not an original source. The District Court denied the motion because, in its view, "Stone had direct and independent knowledge that Rockwell's compensation was linked to its compliance with environmental, health and safety regulations and that it allegedly concealed its deficient performance so that it would continue to receive payments." App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a. The Government initially declined to intervene in Stone's action, but later reversed course, and in November the District Court granted the Government's intervention. Several weeks later, at the suggestion of the District Court, the Government and Stone filed |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | suggestion of the District Court, the Government and Stone filed a joint amended complaint. As relevant here, the amended complaint alleged that Rockwell violated RCRA by storing leaky pondcrete blocks, but did not allege that any defect in the piping system (as predicted by Stone) caused insolid pondcrete.[4] Respondents clarified their allegations even further in a statement of claims which became part of the final pretrial order and which superseded their earlier pleadings. This said that the pondcrete's insolidity was due to "an incorrect cement/sludge ratio used in pondcrete operations, as well as due to inadequate process controls and inadequate inspection procedures." App. 470. It continued: "During the winter of 1986, Rockwell replaced its then pondcrete foreman, Norman Fryback, with Ron Teel. Teel increased pondcrete production rates in part by, among other things, reducing the amount of cement added to the blocks. Following the May 23, 1988 spill, Rockwell acknowledged that this reduced cement-to-sludge ratio was a major contributor to the existence of insufficiently solid pondcrete blocks on the storage pads." The statement of claims again did not mention the piping problem asserted by Stone years earlier. Respondents' False Claims Act claims went to trial in 1999. None of the witnesses Stone had identified during discovery as having relevant knowledge testified at trial. And none of the documents Stone provided to the Government with his confidential disclosure statement was introduced in evidence at trial. Nor did respondents allege at trial that the defect in the piping system predicted by Stone caused insolid pondcrete. To the contrary, during closing arguments both Stone's counsel and the Government's counsel repeatedly explained to the jury that the pondcrete failed because Rockwell's new foreman used an insufficient cement-to-sludge ratio in an effort to increase pondcrete production. The verdict form divided the False Claims Act count into several different claims corresponding to different award-fee periods. The jury found in favor of respondents for the three periods covering the pondcrete allegations (April 1, to September 30, 1988), and found for Rockwell as to the remaining periods. The jury awarded damages of $1,390,775.80, which the District Court trebled pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3729(a). Rockwell filed a postverdict motion to dismiss Stone's claims under 3730(e)(4), arguing that the claims were based on publicly disclosed allegations and that Stone was not an original source. In response, *1405 Stone acknowledged that his successful claims were based on publicly disclosed allegations, but asserted original-source status. The District Court agreed with Stone. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, but remanded the case for the District |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | in relevant part, but remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Stone had disclosed his information to the Government before filing his qui tam action, as 3730(e)(4)(B) required. On remand, the District Court found that Stone had produced the 1982 engineering order to the Government, but that the order was insufficient to communicate Stone's allegations. The District Court also found that Stone had not carried his burden of proving that he orally informed the FBI about his allegations before filing suit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the District Court's conclusion and held (over the dissent of Judge Briscoe) that the 1982 engineering order sufficed to carry Stone's burden of persuasion. to decide whether Stone was an original source. II Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information." (Footnote omitted.) As discussed above, 3730(e)(4)(B) defines "original source" as "an individual who [1] has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and [2] has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information." As this case comes to the Court, it is conceded that the claims on which Stone prevailed were based upon publicly disclosed allegations within the meaning of 3730(e)(4)(A). The question is whether Stone qualified under the original-source exception to the public-disclosure bar. We begin with the possibility that little analysis is required in this case, for Stone asserts that Rockwell conceded his original-source status. Rockwell responds that it conceded no such thing and that, even had it done so, the concession would have been irrelevant because 3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional. We agree with the latter proposition. It is true enough that the word "jurisdiction" does not in every context connote subject-matter jurisdiction. Noting that "jurisdiction" is "`a word of many, too many, meanings,'" we concluded in Steel that establishing the elements of an offense was not made a jurisdictional matter merely because the statute creating the cause of action was phrased as providing for "jurisdiction" over such suits. ). Here, however, the issue is not whether casting the creation of a cause of action in jurisdictional terms somehow limits the general grant of jurisdiction under |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | jurisdictional terms somehow limits the general grant of jurisdiction under which that cause of action would normally be brought, but rather whether a clear and explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction withdraws jurisdiction. It undoubtedly does so. Just last Term we stated that, "[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional, the courts and litigants will be duly instructed *1406 and will not be left to wrestle with the issue." Here the jurisdictional nature of the original-source requirement is clear ex visceribus verborum. Indeed, we have already stated that 3730(e)(4) speaks to "the power of a particular court" as well as "the substantive rights of the parties." Hughes Aircraft Stone's contrary position rests entirely on dicta from a single Court of Appeals decision, see United States ex rel. Accudyne thought it significant that jurisdiction over False Claims Act cases is conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1345 (the federal-question and United-States-as-plaintiff provisions of the Judicial Code) and 31 U.S.C. 3732(a) rather than 3730, which is the "section" referenced in 3730(e)(4). To eliminate jurisdiction, the court believed, it is those jurisdiction-conferring sections that would have to be referenced. We know of nothing in logic or authority to support this. The jurisdiction-removing provision here does not say "no court shall have jurisdiction under this section," but rather "no court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section." That is surely the most natural way to achieve the desired result of eliminating jurisdiction over a category of False Claims Act actionsrather than listing all the conceivable provisions of the United States Code whose conferral of jurisdiction is being eliminated. (In addition to the provisions cited by the Accudyne court, one might also have to mention the diversity-jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. 1332, and the supplemental-jurisdiction provision, 1367.) Accudyne next observed that the public-disclosure bar limits only who may speak for the United States on a subject and who if anyone gets a financial reward, not the "categories of disputes that may be resolved (a real `jurisdictional' limit)." But this is a classic begging of the question, which is precisely whether there has been removed from the courts' jurisdiction that category of disputes consisting of False Claims Act qui tam suits based on publicly disclosed allegations as to which the relator is not an original source of the information. Nothing prevents Congress from defining the "category" of excluded suits in any manner it wishes. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 1500 Lastly, Accudyne asserted that "the Supreme Court had held that a similar reference to jurisdiction in the Norris-LaGuardia |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | held that a similar reference to jurisdiction in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101, 104, limits remedies rather than subject-matter jurisdiction." ). But the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is in fact not similar. It provides that "[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute." 29 U.S.C. 104 It is facially a limitation upon the relief that can be accorded, not a removal of jurisdiction over "any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute." Here, by contrast, the text says "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section." Whether the point was conceded or not, therefore, we may, and indeed must, decide *1407 whether Stone met the jurisdictional requirement of being an original source. III We turn to the first requirement of original-source status, that the relator have "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based." 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(B). Because we have not previously addressed this provision, several preliminary questions require our attention. A First, does the phrase "information on which the allegations are based" refer to the information on which the relator's allegations are based or the information on which the publicly disclosed allegations that triggered the public-disclosure bar are based? The parties agree it is the former. See Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 13; Brief for United States 24, and n. 8; Brief for Respondent Stone 15, 21. But in view of our conclusion that 3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional, we must satisfy ourselves that the parties' position is correct. Though the question is hardly free from doubt,[5] we agree that the "information" to which subparagraph (B) speaks is the information upon which the relators' allegations are based. To begin with, subparagraph (B) standing on its own suggests that disposition. The relator must have "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based," and he must "provid[e] the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information." Surely the information one would expect a relator to "provide to the Government before filing an action based on the information" is the information underlying the relator's claims. Subparagraph (A) complicates matters. As described earlier, it bars actions based on the "public disclosure of allegations or transactions" and provides an exception for cases brought by "an original source of the information." If the allegations referred to in subparagraph (B)'s phrase requiring "direct and independent knowledge of the information on |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | phrase requiring "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based," are the same "allegations" referred to in subparagraph (A), then original-source status would depend on knowledge of information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations. The principal textual difficulty with that interpretation is that subparagraph (A) does not speak simply of "allegations," but of "allegations or transactions." Had Congress wanted to link original-source status to information underlying the public disclosure, it would surely have used the identical phrase, "allegations or transactions"; there is no conceivable reason to require direct and independent knowledge of publicly disclosed allegations but not of publicly disclosed transactions. The sense of the matter offers strong additional support for this interpretation. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) bars actions based on publicly disclosed allegations whether or not the information on which those allegations are based has been made public. It is difficult to understand why Congress would care whether a relator knows about the information underlying a publicly disclosed allegation (e.g., what a confidential source told a newspaper reporter about *1408 insolid pondcrete) when the relator has direct and independent knowledge of different information supporting the same allegation (e.g., that a defective process would inevitably lead to insolid pondcrete). Not only would that make little sense, it would raise nettlesome procedural problems, placing courts in the position of comparing the relator's information with the often unknowable information on which the public disclosure was based. Where that latter information has not been disclosed (by reason, for example, of a reporter's desire to protect his source), the relator would presumably be out of court. To bar a relator with direct and independent knowledge of information underlying his allegations just because no one can know what information underlies the similar allegations of some other person simply makes no sense. The contrary conclusion of some lower courts rests on the following logic: The term "information" in subparagraph (B) must be read in tandem with the term "information" in subparagraph (A), and the term "information" in subparagraph (A) refers to the information on which the publicly disclosed allegations are based. See, e.g., United States ex rel. The major premise of this reasoning seems true enough: "information" in (A) and (B) means the same thing. The minor premise, howeverthat "information" in (A) refers to the information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions is highly questionable. The complete phrase at issue is "unless the person bringing the action is an original source of the information." It seems to us more likely (in light of the analysis set forth above) that the information in question |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | the analysis set forth above) that the information in question is the information underlying the action referred to a few words earlier, to-wit, the action "based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions" referred to at the beginning of the provision. On this interpretation, "information" in subparagraph (A) and "information on which the allegations are based" in subparagraph (B) are one and the same, viz., information underlying the allegations of the relator's action. B Having determined that the phrase "information on which the allegations are based" refers to the relator's allegations and not the publicly disclosed allegations, we confront more textual ambiguity: Which of the relator's allegations are the relevant ones? Stone's allegations changed during the course of the litigation, yet he asks that we look only to his original complaint. Rockwell argues that Stone must satisfy the original-source exception through all stages of the litigation. In our view, the term "allegations" is not limited to the allegations of the original complaint. It includes (at a minimum) the allegations in the original complaint as amended. The statute speaks not of the allegations in the "original complaint" (or even the allegations in the "complaint"), but of the relator's "allegations" simpliciter. Absent some limitation of 3730(e)(4)'s requirement to the relator's initial complaint, we will not infer one. Such a limitation would leave the relator free to plead a trivial theory of fraud for which he had some direct and independent knowledge and later amend the complaint to include theories copied from the public domain or from materials in the Government's possession. Even the Government concedes that new allegations regarding a fundamentally different fraudulent scheme require reevaluation of the court's jurisdiction. See Brief for United States 40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. *1409 The rule that subject-matter jurisdiction "depends on the state of things at the time of the action brought," does not suggest a different interpretation. The state of things and the originally alleged state of things are not synonymous; demonstration that the original allegations were false will defeat jurisdiction. ; So also will the withdrawal of those allegations, unless they are replaced by others that establish jurisdiction. Thus, when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction. See Wellness ;[6] Here, we have not only an amended complaint, but a final pretrial order that superseded all prior pleadings and "controll[ed] the subsequent course of the action," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(e). See ; ; In these circumstances, we look to the allegations as amendedhere, the |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | these circumstances, we look to the allegations as amendedhere, the statement of claims in the final pretrial orderto determine original-source status. The Government objects that this approach risks driving a wedge between the Government and relators. It worries that future relators might decline to "acquiesc[e]" in the Government's tactical decision to narrow the claims in a case if that would eliminate jurisdiction with respect to the relator. Brief for United States 44. Even if this policy concern were valid, it would not induce us to determine jurisdiction on the basis of whether the relator is an original source of information underlying allegations that he no longer makes. IV Judged according to the principles set forth above, Stone's knowledge falls short. The only false claims ultimately found by the jury (and hence the only ones to which our jurisdictional inquiry is pertinent to the outcome) involved false statements with respect to environmental, safety, and health compliance over a one-and-a-half-year period between April 1, and September 30, 1988. As described by Stone and the Government in the final pretrial order, the only pertinent problem with respect to this period of time for *1410 which Stone claimed to have direct and independent knowledge was insolid pondcrete. Because Stone was no longer employed by Rockwell at the time, he did not know that the pondcrete was insolid; he did not know that pondcrete storage was even subject to RCRA; he did not know that Rockwell would fail to remedy the defect; he did not know that the insolid pondcrete leaked while being stored on-site; and, of course, he did not know that Rockwell made false statements to the Government regarding pondcrete storage. Stone's prediction that the pondcrete would be insolid because of a flaw in the piping system does not qualify as "direct and independent knowledge" of the pondcrete defect. Of course a qui tam relator's misunderstanding of why a concealed defect occurred would normally be immaterial as long as he knew the defect actually existed. But here Stone did not know that the pondcrete failed; he predicted it. Even if a prediction can qualify as direct and independent knowledge in some cases (a point we need not address), it assuredly does not do so when its premise of cause and effect is wrong. Stone's prediction was a failed prediction, disproved by Stone's own allegations. As Stone acknowledged, Rockwell was able to produce "concrete hard" pondcrete using the machinery Stone said was defective. According to respondents' allegations in the final pretrial order, the insolidity problem was caused by a new foreman's reduction of the |
Justice Scalia | 2,007 | 9 | majority | Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145751/rockwell-intern-corp-v-united-states/ | problem was caused by a new foreman's reduction of the cement-to-sludge ratio in the winter of 1986, long after Stone had left Rocky Flats. Stone counters that his original-source status with respect to his spray-irrigation claim (which related to a time period different from that for his pondcrete claim, App. 2) provided jurisdiction with respect to all of his claims. We disagree. Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit jurisdiction in gross just because a relator is an original source with respect to some claim. We, along with every court to have addressed the question, conclude that 3730(e)(4) does not permit such claim smuggling. See United States ex rel. ; ; Wang ex rel. United As then-Judge Alito explained, "[t]he plaintiffs decision to join all of his or her claims in a single lawsuit should not rescue claims that would have been doomed by section (e)(4) if they had been asserted in a separate action. And likewise, this joinder should not result in the dismissal of claims that would have otherwise survived." SmithKline Beecham, at Because Stone did not have direct and independent knowledge of the information upon which his allegations were based, we need not decide whether Stone met the second requirement of original-source status, that he have voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing his action. V Respondents contend that even if Stone failed the original-source test as to his pondcrete allegations, the Government's intervention in his case provided an independent basis of jurisdiction. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) permits jurisdiction over an action based on publicly disclosed allegations or transactions if the action is "brought by the Attorney General." Respondents say that any inquiry into Stone's original-source status with respect to amendments to the complaint was unnecessary because the Government had intervened, making this an "action brought by *1411 the Attorney General."[7] Even assuming that Stone was an original source of allegations in his initial complaint, we reject respondents'"intervention" argument. The False Claims Act contemplates two types of actions. First, under 3730(a), "[i]f the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this section against the person." Second, under 3730(b), "[a] person may bring an action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government." When a private person brings an action under 3730(b), the Government may elect to "proceed with the action," 3730(b)(4)(A), or it may "declin[e] to take over the action, in which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action," 3730(b)(4)(B). |
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