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Justice Kennedy | 2,012 | 4 | majority | Arizona v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/803270/arizona-v-united-states/ | (West 20). Be- fore was added, that statute already permitted arrests without a warrant for felonies, misdemeanors committed in the arresting officer’s presence, petty offenses, and certain traffic-related criminal violations. See 3883(A)(1)–(4). Largely duplicating the authority already conferred by these prior subsections, added a new subsection, that au- thorizes officers to make warrantless arrests on probable cause that the arrestee has committed a “public offense” for which the arrestee is removable from the United States. A “public offense” is defined as conduct that is punishable by imprisonment or a fine according to the law of the State where the conduct occurred and that would be punishable under Arizona law had the conduct occurred in Arizona. See §13–5(27). In what way, if any, does enlarge the arrest authority of Arizona officers? It has been suggested that confers new authority in the following three circumstances: (1) where the arrestee committed but has not been charged with committing an offense in another State; (2) where the officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee commit- ted an offense for which he was previously arrested but not prosecuted; and (3) where the arrestee committed but has already served the sentence for a removable offense. These are exceedingly 16 ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of ALITO, J. narrow categories, involving circumstances that will rarely arise. But such cases are possible, and therefore we must decide whether there are circumstances under which fed- eral law precludes a state officer from making an arrest based on probable cause that the arrestee committed a removable offense. A The idea that state and local officers may carry out arrests in the service of federal law is not unprecedented. As previously noted, our cases establish that state and local officers may make warrantless arrests for violations of federal law and that “in the absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the state where an arrest with- out warrant takes place determines its validity.” Di Re, 332 U. S., at ; see also 357 U. S., 05 (stating that, where a state officer makes an arrest based on fed- eral law, “the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is to be determined by reference to state law”). Therefore, given the premise, which I understand both the United States and the ourt to accept, that state and local officers do have inherent authority to make arrests in aid of fed- eral law, we must ask whether ongress has done anything to curtail or pre-empt that authority in this particular case. Neither the United States nor the ourt goes so far |
Justice Kennedy | 2,012 | 4 | majority | Arizona v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/803270/arizona-v-united-states/ | Neither the United States nor the ourt goes so far as to say that state and local officers have no power to arrest criminal aliens based on their removability. To do so would fly in the face of 8 U.S. (). Under §(1)–(9), the Federal Government may enter into formal agreements with States and municipalities under which their officers may perform certain duties of a fed- eral immigration officer. But ()(B) makes clear that States and municipalities need not enter into those agreements “otherwise to cooperate in the identifica- tion, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not ite as: 5 U. S. (2012) 17 Opinion of ALITO, J. lawfully present in the United States.” It goes without saying that state and local officers could not provide meaningful cooperation in the apprehension, detention, and ultimate removal of criminal aliens without some power to make arrests. Although () contemplates state and local authority to apprehend criminal aliens for the purpose of removal, the ourt rejects out of hand any possibility that officers could exercise that authority without federal direction. Despite acknowledging that there is “ambiguity as to what constitutes cooperation,” the ourt says that “no coherent understanding of the term would incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government.” Ante, at 18. The ourt adopts an unnecessarily stunted view of coop- eration. No one would say that a state or local officer has failed to cooperate by making an on-the-spot arrest to enforce federal law. Unsolicited aid is not necessarily uncooperative. To be sure, were an officer to persist in making an ar- rest that the officer knows is unwanted, such conduct would not count as cooperation. But nothing in the rele- vant federal statutes suggests that ongress does not want aliens who have committed removable offenses to be arrested.2 To the contrary, commands that the Executive “shall take into custody any alien” who is de- portable for having committed a specified offense. And substantially limits the circumstances under which the Executive has discretion to release aliens held in custody under paragraph (1). So if an officer arrests an alien who is removable for having committed one of the crimes listed in the Federal Government is —————— 2 That goes for the Executive Branch as well, which has made the apprehension and removal of criminal aliens a priority. See App. 8. 18 ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of ALITO, J. obligated to take the alien into custody. That ongress generally requires the Executive to take |
Justice Kennedy | 2,012 | 4 | majority | Arizona v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/803270/arizona-v-united-states/ | into custody. That ongress generally requires the Executive to take custody of criminal aliens casts considerable doubt on the ourt’s concern that is an obstacle to the Federal Gov- ernment’s exercise of discretion. The ourt claims that the authority conferred by “could be exercised without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case” and that this “would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy,” resulting in the “unnecessary harassment of some aliens whom federal officials determine should not be removed.” Ante, at 17. But belies the ourt’s fear. In many, if not most, cases involving aliens who are removable for having committed criminal offenses, on- gress has left the Executive no discretion but to take the alien into custody. State and local officers do not frus- trate the removal process by arresting criminal The Executive retains complete discretion over whether those aliens are ultimately removed. And once the Fed- eral Government makes a determination that a particular criminal alien will not be removed, then Arizona officers are presumably no longer authorized under to arrest the alien. To be sure, not all offenses for which officers have au- thority to arrest under are covered by As for aliens who have committed those offenses, ongress has given the Executive discretion under over whether to arrest and detain them pending a decision on removal. But the mere fact that the Executive has en- forcement discretion cannot mean that the exercise of state police powers in support of federal law is automati- cally pre-empted. If that were true, then state and local officers could never make arrests to enforce any federal statute because the Executive always has at least some general discretion over the enforcement of federal law as a practical matter. But even assuming that the express ite as: 5 U. S. (2012) 19 Opinion of ALITO, J. statutory grant of discretion in somehow indi- cates a congressional desire to pre-empt unilateral state and local authority to arrest criminal aliens covered by that provision, is not pre-empted on its face given its substantial overlap with It bears emphasizing that does not mandate the warrantless apprehension of all aliens who have commit- ted crimes for which they are removable. Instead, it only grants state and local officers permission to make such arrests. The trouble with this premature, facial challenge is that it affords Arizona no opportunity to implement its law in a way that would avoid any potential conflicts with federal law. For example, Arizona could promulgate guidelines or regulations limiting the arrest authority |
Justice Kennedy | 2,012 | 4 | majority | Arizona v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/803270/arizona-v-united-states/ | Arizona could promulgate guidelines or regulations limiting the arrest authority conferred by to the crimes specified in And to the extent is unclear about which exact crimes are covered,3 Arizona could go even further and identify specific crimes for which there is no doubt an alien would be removable. The point is that there are plenty of permissible applications of and the ourt should not invalidate the statute at this point without at least some indication that Arizona has implemented it in a manner at odds with ongress’ clear and manifest intent. We have said that a facial challenge to a statute is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully” because “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” United ; see also 1, n. 6 (applying the Salerno standard in a pre-emption case). As to I do not believe the United States has carried that —————— 3I readily admit that it can be difficult to determine whether a particular conviction will necessarily make an alien removable. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 9 U.S. (20) (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., ). 20 ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of ALITO, J. heavy burden. B Finally, the ourt tells us that conflicts with federal law because it provides state and local officers with “even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than ongress has given to trained federal immigration officers.” Ante, at 16–17. The ourt points to 8 U.S. which empowers “authorized” offi- cers and employees of IE to make arrests without a fed- eral warrant if “the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” Because would allow Arizona officers to make arrests “regardless of whether a federal warrant has issued or the alien is likely to escape,” ante, at 17, the ourt concludes that is an obstacle to the accomplish- ment of ongress’ objectives. But is an obstacle only to the extent it conflicts with ongress’ clear and manifest intent to preclude state and local officers from making arrests except where a federal warrant has issued or the arrestee is likely to escape. By granting warrantless arrest authority to federal officers, ongress has not mani- fested an unmistakable intent to strip state and local officers of their warrantless arrest authority under state law. Likewise, limitations on federal arrest authority do not mean that the arrest authority of state and local officers must be similarly |
Justice Kennedy | 2,012 | 4 | majority | Arizona v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/803270/arizona-v-united-states/ | arrest authority of state and local officers must be similarly limited. Our opinion in 357 U.S. 301, is instructive. In that case, a District of olumbia officer, accompanied by a federal officer, made an arrest based on a suspected federal narcotics offense. at 303–304. The federal officer did not have statutory au- thorization to arrest without a warrant, but the local officer did. 05. We held that District of olumbia law dictated the lawfulness of the arrest. 05–306. ite as: 5 U. S. (2012) 21 Opinion of ALITO, J. Where a state or local officer makes a warrantless arrest to enforce federal law, we said that “the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is to be determined by reference to state law.” 05. Under an Arizona officer may be authorized to make an arrest that a federal officer may not be authorized to make under As makes clear, that fact alone does not render arrests by state or local officers pursuant to unlawful. Nor does it manifest a clear congressional intent to displace the exer- cise of state police powers that are brought to bear in aid of federal law |
Justice Kennedy | 2,000 | 4 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118343/united-states-v-johnson/ | An offender had been serving time in federal prison for multiple felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. As a result, he had served too much prison time and was at once set free, but a term of supervised release was yet to be served on the remaining convictions. The question becomes whether the excess prison time should be credited to the supervised release term, reducing its length. Bound by the text of the controlling statute, 18 U.S. C. 3624(e), we hold that the supervised release term remains unaltered. Respondent Roy Lee Johnson was convicted in 1990 on two counts of possession with an intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S. C. 841(a), on two counts of use of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S. C. 924(c) ( ed. and Supp. IV), *55 and on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 922(g). He received a sentence of 171 months' imprisonment, consisting of three concurrent 51-month terms on the 841(a) and 922(g) counts, to be followed by two consecutive 60-month terms on the 924(c) counts. In addition, the District Court imposed a mandatory 3-year term of supervised release for the drug possession offenses. See 21 U.S. C. 841(b)(1)(C) ( ed., Supp. III). The Court of Appeals, though otherwise affirming respondent's convictions and sentence, concluded the District Court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment for the two 924(c) firearm offenses. United On remand the District Court modified the prisoner's sentence to a term of 111 months. After our decision in respondent filed a motion under 28 U.S. C. 2255 to vacate his 924(c) convictions, and the Government did not oppose. On May 2, the District Court vacated those convictions, modifying respondent's sentence to 51 months. He had already served more than that amount of time, so the District Court ordered his immediate release. His term of supervised release then went into effect. This dispute concerns its length. In June respondent filed a motion requesting the District Court to reduce his supervised release term by 2.5 years, the extra time served on the vacated 924(c) convictions. The District Court denied relief, explaining that pursuant to 18 U.S. C. 3624(e) the supervised release commenced upon respondent's actual release from incarceration, not before. Granting respondent credit, the court observed, would undermine Congress' aim of using supervised release to assist convicted felons in their transitions to community life. A divided Court of Appeals reversed. The court accepted respondent's argument that his *56 term of supervised release commenced not on the day |
Justice Kennedy | 2,000 | 4 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118343/united-states-v-johnson/ | *56 term of supervised release commenced not on the day he left prison confines but earlier, when his lawful term of imprisonment expired. Awarding respondent credit for the extra time served, the court further concluded, would provide meaningful relief because supervised release, while serving rehabilitative purposes, is also "punitive in nature." Judge Gilman dissented, agreeing with the position of the District Court. The Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions on the question presented. Compare United with United ; United ; United We granted certiorari to resolve the question, and we now reverse. Section 3583(a) of Title 18 authorizes, and in some instances mandates, sentencing courts to order supervised release terms following imprisonment. On the issue presented for reviewwhether a term of supervised release begins on the date of actual release from incarceration or on an earlier date due to a mistaken interpretation of federal lawthe language of 3624(e) controls. The statute provides in relevant part: "A prisoner whose sentence includes a term of supervised release after imprisonment shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer who shall, during the term imposed, supervise the person released to the degree warranted by the conditions specified by the sentencing court. The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment and runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local term of probation or supervised *57 release or parole for another offense to which the person is subject or becomes subject during the term of supervised release. A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days." The quoted language directs that a supervised release term does not commence until an individual "is released from imprisonment." There can be little question about the meaning of the word "release" in the context of imprisonment. It means "[t]o loosen or destroy the force of; to remove the obligation or effect of; hence to alleviate or remove; [t]o let loose again; to set free from restraint, confinement, or servitude; to set at liberty; to let go." Webster's New International Dictionary 2103 (2d ed. 1949). As these definitions illustrate, the ordinary, commonsense meaning of release is to be freed from confinement. To say respondent was released while still imprisoned diminishes the concept the word intends to convey. The first sentence of 3624(e) supports our construction. A term of supervised release comes "after imprisonment," |
Justice Kennedy | 2,000 | 4 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118343/united-states-v-johnson/ | our construction. A term of supervised release comes "after imprisonment," once the prisoner is "released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer." Supervised release does not run while an individual remains in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. The phrase "on the day the person is released," in the second sentence of 3624(e), suggests a strict temporal interpretation, not some fictitious or constructive earlier time. The statute does not say "on the day the person is released or on the earlier day when he should have been released." Indeed, the third sentence admonishes that "supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned." The statute does provide for concurrent running of supervised release in specific cases. After the operative phrase "released from imprisonment," 3624(e) requires the concurrent *58 running of a term of supervised release with terms of probation, parole, or with other, separate terms of supervised release. The statute instructs that concurrency is permitted not for prison sentences but only for those other types of sentences given specific mention. The next sentence in the statute does address a prison term and does allow concurrent counting, but only for prison terms less than 30 days in length. When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have authority to create others. The proper inference, and the one we adopt here, is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth. The 30-day exception finds no application in this case; each of respondent's sentences, to which the term of supervised release attached, exceeded that amount of time. Finally, 3583(e)(3) does not have a substantial bearing on the interpretive issue, for this directive addresses instances where conditions of supervised release have been violated, and the court orders a revocation. Our conclusion finds further support in 18 U.S. C. 3583(a), which authorizes the imposition of "a term of supervised release after imprisonment." This provision, too, is inconsistent with respondent's contention that confinement and supervised release can run at the same time. The statute's direction is clear and precise. Release takes place on the day the prisoner in fact is freed from confinement. The Court of Appeals reasoned that reduction of respondent's supervised release term was a necessary implementation of 3624(a), which provides that "[a] prisoner shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration of the prisoner's term of imprisonment" All concede respondent's term of imprisonment should have ended earlier than it did. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,000 | 4 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118343/united-states-v-johnson/ | term of imprisonment should have ended earlier than it did. It does not follow, however, that the term of supervised release commenced, as a matter of law, once he completed serving his lawful sentences. It is true the prison term and the release term are related, for the latter cannot begin until the former expires. Though interrelated, *59 the terms are not interchangeable. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in holding otherwise, and the text of 3624(e) cannot accommodate the rule the Court of Appeals derived. Supervised release has no statutory function until confinement ends. Cf. United The rule of lenity does not alter the analysis. Absent ambiguity, the rule of lenity is not applicable to guide statutory interpretation. Cf. While the text of 3624(e) resolves the case, we observe that our conclusion accords with the statute's purpose and design. The objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release. Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration. See 3553(a)(2)(D); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 5D1.3(c), (d), (e) ; see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 124 (1983) (declaring that "the primary goal [of supervised release] is to ease the defendant's transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release"). Sentencing courts, in determining the conditions of a defendant's supervised release, are required to consider, among other factors, "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," "the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional *60 treatment." 18 U.S. C. 3553(a). In the instant case, the transition assistance ordered by the trial court required respondent, among other conditions, to avoid possessing or transporting firearms and to participate in a drug dependency treatment program. These conditions illustrate that supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides individuals with post confinement assistance. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz, The Court of Appeals erred in treating respondent's time in prison as interchangeable with his term of supervised release. There can be no doubt that equitable considerations of great weight exist when an individual is incarcerated beyond the proper expiration of his |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Pennsylvania v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109493/pennsylvania-v-new-jersey/ | The motions for leave to file bills of complaint in these cases are denied. The complaints, which seek to invoke our original jurisdiction, filed by Pennsylvania against New Jersey, and by Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont against New Hampshire, rely on our decision last Term in in which we held the New Hampshire Commuters Income Tax unconstitutional. In the Court held that the New Hampshire tax violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. That law imposed a 4% tax on the New Hampshire-derived income of nonresidents. Although the law also imposed a tax on the income earned by New Hampshire residents outside the State, it then exempted such income from the tax if the income were either taxed or not taxed by the State from which it was derived. Since New Hampshire also did not tax the domestic income of its residents, the net effect of the Commuters Income Tax was to tax only the incomes of nonresidents working in New Hampshire. The resident State of the plaintiff in was Maine, and it provided a credit for income taxes paid to other States. Thus, New Hampshire's beggar-thy-neighbor tax rendered the total state tax liability of nonresidents unchanged, but diverted to New Hampshire tax revenues from the treasury of Maine. We held New Hampshire's taxing scheme unconstitutional since the tax "[fell] exclusively on the income of nonresidents and [was] not offset even approximately by other taxes imposed upon residents alone." In No. 68, Original, Pennsylvania contends that the New Jersey Transportation Benefits Tax Act, N. J. Stat. Ann. 54:8A-58 et seq. (Supp. 76-77), is infirm under the Privileges and Immunities Clause as interpreted in and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the complaint filed by Pennsylvania, the New Jersey tax fatally resembles the tax we held unconstitutional in Like New Hampshire, New Jersey does not tax the domestic income of its residents. Under the Transportation *663 Benefits Tax Act, however, New Jersey does tax the New Jersey-derived income of nonresidents. And while that Act imposes an equivalent tax on the income of New Jersey residents earned outside the State, it exempts such income to the extent it is taxed by the State in which it is earned. Finally, like Maine in the case, Pennsylvania permits a tax credit to any of its residents for income taxes paid to other States, including, of course, New Jersey. Pennsylvania, suing on behalf of itself and as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and, apparently, an accounting for the taxes that New Jersey's allegedly |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Pennsylvania v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109493/pennsylvania-v-new-jersey/ | apparently, an accounting for the taxes that New Jersey's allegedly unconstitutional tax has diverted from the Pennsylvania treasury. The plaintiffs in No. 69, Original, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont, explicitly premise their suit on the decision in They seek on behalf of themselves an accounting for the taxes, alleged to amount to over $13.5 million, that New Hampshire's unconstitutional Commuters Income Tax diverted from their respective treasuries. It has long been the rule that in order to engage this Court's original jurisdiction, a plaintiff State must first demonstrate that the injury for which it seeks redress was directly caused by the actions of another State. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes noted on behalf of the Court in : "To constitute such a [justiciable] controversy, it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for judicial redress" In Massachusetts sought a declaration that only it could impose an inheritance tax on the estate of a Massachusetts domiciliary who had died with most of his assets located in *664 several revocable trusts. The assets located in Massachusetts were insufficient to pay that State's inheritance taxes. also claimed the exclusive right to impose its tax on the trusts. In language that is particularly appropriate for our disposition of these cases, the Court denied leave to file the complaint: ", in claiming a right to recover taxes from the trustees, or in taking proceedings for collection, is not injuring Massachusetts. By the allegations, the property held in is amply sufficient to answer the claims of both States and recovery by either does not impair the exercise of any right the other may have. It is not shown that there is danger of the depletion of a fund or estate at the expense of the complainant's interest. It is not shown that the tax claims of the two States are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the validity of each claim is wholly independent of that of the other" In neither of the suits at bar has the defendant State inflicted any injury upon the plaintiff States through the imposition of the taxes held, in No. 69, and alleged, in No. 68, to be unconstitutional. The injuries to the plaintiffs' fiscs were self-inflicted, resulting from decisions by their respective state legislatures. Nothing required Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont to extend a tax credit to their residents for income taxes paid to New Hampshire, and nothing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to New Jersey. No State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Pennsylvania v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109493/pennsylvania-v-new-jersey/ | No State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own hand. Pennsylvania, in attempting to establish its entitlement to taxes collected by New Jersey from its residents, has alleged that the New Jersey Transportation Benefits *665 Tax Act violates both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont claim that New Hampshire's withholding of taxes collected under its unconstitutional commuters tax violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The short answer to these contentions is that both Clauses protect people, not States. What has been said disposes of the claims brought by the plaintiff States on their own behalf. In addition, however, Pennsylvania has filed a claim against New Jersey as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens. The Court has recognized the legitimacy of parens patriae suits. See ; It has, however, become settled doctrine that a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens. Compare, e. g., Oklahoma ex rel. (38); (11); (07) with, e. g., North (23); (23); New (21); (07); (07) This rule is a salutary one. For if, by the simple expedient of bringing an action in the name of a State, this Court's original jurisdiction could be invoked to resolve what are, after all, suits to redress private grievances, our docket would be inundated. And, more important, the critical distinction, articulated in Art. III, 2, of *666 the Constitution, between suits brought by "Citizens" and those brought by "States" would evaporate. Pennsylvania's parens patriae suit against New Jersey represents nothing more than a collectivity of private suits against New Jersey for taxes withheld from private parties. No sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests of Pennsylvania are implicated. Accordingly, Pennsylvania's motion for leave to file suit as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens is also denied. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissent and would grant leave to file both bills of complaint. MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. MR. |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | The Bossier Parish School Board first sought preclearance of the redistricting plan at issue in this litigation almost seven years ago. The Justice Department and private appellants opposed that effort, arguing throughout this litigation that a "safe" majority-minority district is necessary to ensure the election of a black school board member. ronically, while this litigation was pending, three blacks were elected from majority-white districts to serve on the Bossier Parish School Board. Although these election results are not part of the record, they vividly illustrate the fact that the federal intervention that spawned this litigation was unnecessary. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Under 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S. C. 1973c, a jurisdiction required to obtain preclearance of changes to its voting laws must show that a proposed amendment will not have the effect, and does not reflect a purpose, to deny or abridge the vote on account of race. respectfully dissent[1] from the Court's holding that 5 is indifferent *342 to a racially discriminatory purpose so long as a change in voting law is not meant to diminish minority voting strength below its existing level. t is true that today's decision has a precursor of sorts in which holds that the only anticipated redistricting effect sufficient to bar preclearance is retrogression in minority voting strength, however dilutive of minority voting power a redistricting plan may otherwise be. But if today's decision achieves a symmetry with the achievement is merely one of well-matched error. The Court was mistaken in when it restricted the effect prong of 5 to retrogression, and the Court is even more wrong today when it limits the clear text of 5 to the corresponding retrogressive purpose. Although adhere to the strong policy of respecting precedent in statutory interpretation and so would not reexamine that policy does not demand that recognized error be compounded indefinitely, and the Court's prior mistake about the meaning of the effects requirement of 5 should not be expanded by an even more erroneous interpretation of the scope of the section's purpose prong. The Court's determination that Congress intended preclearance of a plan not shown to be free of dilutive intent (let alone a plan shown to be intentionally discriminatory) is not, however, merely erroneous. t is also highly unconvincing. The evidence in these very cases shows that the Bossier Parish School Board (School Board or Board) acted with intent to dilute the black vote, just as it acted with that same intent through decades |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | just as it acted with that same intent through decades of resistance to a judicial desegregation order. The record illustrates exactly the sort of relentless bad faith on the part of majority-white voters in covered jurisdictions that led to the enactment of 5. The evidence all but poses the question why Congress would ever have meant to permit preclearance of such a plan, and it all but invites the answer that Congress could hardly have intended any such thing. While the evidence goes substantially unnoticed on the Court's narrow reading of the purpose *343 prong of 5, it is not only crucial to my resolution of these cases, but insistent in the way it points up the implausibility of the Court's reading of purpose under 5. n Arlington this Court set out a checklist of considerations for assessing evidence going to discriminatory intent: the historical background of a challenged decision, its relative impact on minorities, specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of decision makers. We directed the District Court to follow that checklist in enquiring into discriminatory intent following remand in these cases, The Arlington Heights enquiry reveals the following account of the School Board's redistricting activity and of the character of the parish in which it occurred. The parish's institution of general governance is known as the Police Jury, a board of representatives chosen from districts within the parish. After the 1990 census showed a numerical malapportionment among those districts, the Police Jurors prepared a revised districting plan, which they submitted to the Attorney General of the United with a request for the preclearance necessary under 5 of the Voting Rights Act before the parish, a covered jurisdiction, could modify its voting district lines. Based on information then available to the Department of Justice, the Attorney General understood the parish to have shown that the new plan would not have the effect and did not have the purpose of abridging the voting rights of the parish's 20% black population, and the revised Police Jury plan received preclearance in the summer of 1991. n fact, as the parish's School Board has now admitted, the Police Jury plan thus approved dilutes the voting strength of the minority population, *344 Plaintiff's Brief on Remand 12; that is, the plan discriminates by abridging the rights of minority voters to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. The same population shifts that required the Police Jury to reapportion required the elected School Board to do the same. Although the Board had approached the Police Jury about |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | same. Although the Board had approached the Police Jury about the possibility of devising a joint plan of districts common to both Board and jury, the jury rebuffed the Board, see App. to Juris. Statement 172a (Stipulations 83-84), and the Board was forced to go it alone. History provides a good indication of what might have been expected from this endeavor. As the parties have stipulated, the School Board had applied its energies for decades in an effort to "limit or evade" its obligation to desegregate the parish schools. 6a (Stipulation 237). When the Board first received a court order to desegregate the parish's schools in the mid-1960's, it responded with the flagrantly defiant tactics of that era, see 6a217a (Stipulations 236-237), and the record discloses the Board's continuing obstructiveness down to the time covered by these cases. During the 1980's, the degree of racial polarization in the makeup of the parish's schools rose, 8a (Stipulations 241-243), and the disproportionate assignment of black faculty to predominantly black schools increased, 7a218a (Stipulation 240). While the parish's superintendent testified that the assignment of black faculty to predominantly black schools came in response to black parents' requests for positive black examples for their children, see App. 289, the black leaders who testified in these cases uniformly rejected that claim and insisted that, in accord with the parish's desegregation decree, black faculty were to be distributed throughout the parish's schools, to serve as models for white, as well as black, students, see ; 2 Tr. 126-128. *345 Other evidence of the Board's intransigence on race centers on the particular terms of the integration decree that since 1970 has required the Board to maintain a "Bi-Racial Advisory Review Committee" made up of an equal number of black and white members in order to "`recommend to the Board ways to attain and maintain a unitary system and to improve education in the parish.' " App. to Juris. Statement in No. 98-405, p. 182a (Stipulation 111) (hereinafter App. to Juris. Statement). Although the Board represented to the District Court overseeing desegregation that the committee was in place, see 2 Tr. 16 (testimony of Superintendent William T. Lewis), the committee actually met only two or three times in the mid-1970's and then with only its black members in attendance, see App. to Juris. Statement 183a (Stipulation 112). n 1993, the Board set up a short-lived "Community Affairs Committee" to replace the "Bi-Racial Committee." Despite the Board's resolution charging the committee "`with the responsibility of investigating, consulting and advising the court and school board periodically with respect to all |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | the court and school board periodically with respect to all matters pertinent to the retention [sic] of a unitary school system,' " the Board disbanded the committee after only three months because, as a leading Board member put it, "`the tone of the committee made up of the minority members of the committee quickly turned toward becoming involved in policy,' " at 184a (Stipulation 116). "Policy," however, was inevitably implicated by the committee's purpose, and the subjects of its recommendations (such as methods for more effective recruitment of black teachers and their placement throughout the school system in accord with the terms of the desegregation decree, see at 183a184a (Stipulation 115)) fell squarely within its mandate. t is thus unsurprising that the Board has not achieved a unitary school system and remains under court order to this day. See 7a (Stipulation 2); App. 1 *346 About the time the Board appointed its "Community Affairs Committee," it sought preclearance under 5 from the Attorney General for the redistricting plan before us now. The course of the Board's redistricting efforts tell us much about what it had in mind when it proposed its plan. Following the rebuff from the Police Jury, the Board was able to follow a relaxed redistricting timetable, there being no Board elections scheduled before 1994. While the Board could simply have adopted the Police Jury plan once the Attorney General had precleared it, the Board did not do so, App. to Juris. Statement 147a (Stipulation 11), despite just such a proposal from one Board member at the Board's September 5, 1991, meeting. No action was then taken on the proposal, a (Stipulations 89-90), and although the Board issued no explanation for its inaction, it is noteworthy that the jury plan ignored some of the Board's customary districting concerns. Whereas one of those concerns was incumbency protection, see App. 251; cf. App. to Juris. Statement 152a (Stipulation 26), the jury plan would have pitted two pairs of incumbents against each other and created two districts in which no incumbent resided, at 181a182a (Stipulation 109).[2] The jury plan disregarded school attendance zones, and even included two districts containing no schools. a, 151a, 191a (Stipulations 88, 24, 141). The jury plan, moreover, called for a total variation in district populations exceeding the standard normally used to gauge satisfaction of the "one person, one vote" principle, see at 162a163a (Stipulation 58); App. 231-2; 1 Tr. 147, four of its districts failed the standard measure of compactness used by the Board's own cartographer, *347 and one of its districts contained noncontiguous elements, App. |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | *347 and one of its districts contained noncontiguous elements, App. 234-235. n addressing the need to devise a plan of its own, the Board hired the same redistricting consultant who had advised the Police Jury, Gary Joiner. Joiner and the Board members (according to Joiner's testimony) were perfectly aware of their responsibility to avoid vote dilution in accordance with the Voting Rights Act, see Record, Doc. No. 38 (direct testimony of Joiner 5), and he estimated that it would take him between 200 to 250 hours to devise a plan for the Board. The Board then spent nearly a year doing little in public about redistricting, while its members met in private with Joiner to consider alternatives. n March 1992, George Price, president of the parish's branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), wrote to the superintendent of parish schools asking for a chance to play some role in the redistricting process. App. 184. Although the superintendent passed the letter on to the Board, the Board took no action, and neither the superintendent nor the Board even responded to Price's request. App. to Juris. Statement 175a (Stipulation 93). n August, Price wrote again, this time in concert with a number of leaders of black community organizations, again seeking an opportunity to express views about the redistricting process, as well as about a number of Board policies bearing on school desegregation. App. 187-189; see also App. to Juris. Statement 175a (Stipulation 94). Once again the Board made no response. Being frustrated by the Board's lack of responsiveness, Price then asked for help from the national NAACP's Redistricting Project, which sent him a map showing how two compact majority-black districts might be drawn in the parish. at 177a (Stipulation 98). When Price showed the map to a school district official, he was told it was unacceptable because it failed to show all 12 districts. At Price's request, the Redistricting Project then provided a *348 plan showing all 12 districts, which Price presented to the Board at its September 3, 1992, meeting, explaining that it showed the possibility of drawing majority-black districts. at 177a178a (Stipulations 99-100). Several Board members said they could not consider the NAACP plan unless it was presented on a larger map, at 178a (Stipulation 100), and both the Board's cartographer and its legal advisor, the parish district attorney, dismissed the plan out of hand because it required precinct splits, at 179a (Stipulation 102). There is evidence that other implications of the NAACP proposal were objectionable to the Board. According to one black leader, Board |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | objectionable to the Board. According to one black leader, Board member Henry Burns told him that while he personally favored black representation on the Board, a number of other Board members opposed the idea.[3] App. 142. According to George Price, Board member Barry Musgrove told him that the Board was hostile to the creation of a majority-black district.[4] Although the NAACP plan received no further public consideration, the pace of public redistricting activity suddenly speeded up. At the Board's September 17, 1992, meeting, without asking Joiner to address the possibility of creating any majority-black district, the Board abruptly passed a statement of intent to adopt the Police Jury plan. App. to Juris. Statement 179a180a (Stipulation 106). At a public *349 hearing on the plan one week later, attended by an overflow crowd, a number of black voters spoke against the plan, and Price presented the Board with a petition bearing over 500 signatures urging consideration of minority concerns. No one spoke in favor of the plan, Bossier Parish and Price explained to the Board that preclearance of the jury plan for use by the Police Jury was no guarantee of preclearance of the same plan for the Board. App. to Juris. Statement 180a181a (Stipulation 108). Nonetheless, at its October 1 meeting, the voting members of the Board unanimously adopted the Police Jury plan, with one member absent and the Board's only black member (who had been appointed just two weeks earlier to fill a vacancy) abstaining. at 181a182a (Stipulation 109). The Board did not submit the plan for preclearance by the Attorney General until January 4, 1993. a (Stipulation 110). The significance of the record under 5 is enhanced by examining in more detail several matters already mentioned as free from dispute, by testing some of the Board's stated reasons for refusing to consider any NAACP plan, and by looking critically at the District Court's reasons for resolving disputed issues in the School Board's favor. A The parties stipulate that for decades before this redistricting the Board had sought to "limit or evade" its obligation to end segregation in its schools, an obligation specifically imposed by Court order nearly 35 years ago and not yet fulfilled. The Board has also conceded the discriminatory impact of the Police Jury plan in falling "more heavily on blacks than on whites," Plaintiff's Brief on Remand in Civ. Action No. 94-1495 (D. D. C.), p. 12, and in diluting "black voting strength," Even without the stipulated history, the conceded dilution would be evidence of a correspondingly *350 discriminatory intent. With the history, the implication |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | a correspondingly *350 discriminatory intent. With the history, the implication of intent speaks louder, and it grows more forceful still after a closer look at two aspects of the dilutive impact of the Police Jury plan. First, the plan includes no majority-black districts even though residential and voting patterns in Bossier Parish meet the three conditions we identified in -51, as opening the door to drawing majority-minority districts to put minority voters on an equal footing with others. The first condition is that "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." The Board does not dispute that black voters in Bossier Parish satisfy this criterion. The Board joined in a stipulation of the parties that in 1991, "it was obvious that a reasonably compact black-majority district could be drawn within Bossier City," App. to Juris. Statement a155a (Stipulation 36); see also 1 Tr. 60 (statement of Board member Barry Musgrove), and that the NAACP plan demonstrated that two such districts could have been drawn in the parish, see App. to Juris. Statement 192a (Stipulation 143).[5] As to the second and third conditions, that the minority population be politically cohesive and that the majority-white block voting be enough to defeat the minority's preferred candidate, see the Government introduced expert testimony showing such polarization in Bossier Parish's voting patterns. See App. to Juris. Statement 201a *351 207a (Stipulations 181-196); App. 163-173 (declaration of Dr. Richard Engstrom). While acknowledging the somewhat limited data available for analysis, the expert concluded that "African American voters are likely to have a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to the Board only in districts in which they constitute a majority of the voting age population."[6] Second, the Police Jury plan diluted black votes by dividing neighboring black communities with common interests in and around at least two of the Parish's municipalities, thereby avoiding the creation of a majority-black district.[7] See ; Even the Board's own cartographer conceded that one of these instances "`appear[ed]' " to constitute "`fracturing,' " App. to Juris. Statement 191a (Stipulation 138), which he defined as "divid[ing] a `population that has a traditional cohesiveness, lives in the same general area, [and] has a lot of commonalties' with `[the] intent to fracture that population into adjoining white districts,' " at 189a190a (Stipulation 133). *352 B The Board's cartographer and lawyer objected that the NAACP plan was unacceptable because it split precincts in violation of state law. And yet the Board concedes that school boards were free to |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | yet the Board concedes that school boards were free to seek precinct changes from the police juries of their parishes, as they often successfully did. See at 150a151a (Stipulations 22-23). One of the Government's experts, see App. 214, 217, 354, and the Board's own cartographic consultant, see App. to Juris. Statement 151a (Stipulation 23), acknowledged this practice. ndeed, the parties agree that Joiner advised the Board about the option of going to the Police Jury for precinct changes, see a (Stipulation 89); see also at 179a (Stipulation 102), but that the Board never asked him to pursue that possibility, see at 188a (Stipulation 128).[8] Judge Kessler in the District Court was therefore surely correct that the Board's claimed inability to divide precincts was no genuine obstacle to a plan with a majority-black district. See Bossier Parish -461 *353 t becomes all the clearer that the prospect of splitting precincts was no genuine reason to reject the NAACP plan (or otherwise to refuse to consider creating any majorityblack districts) when one realizes that from early on in the Board's redistricting process it gave serious thought to adopting a plan that would have required just such precinct splits. When the Board hired Joiner as its cartographer in May 1991, his estimate of 200 to 250 hours to prepare a plan for the Board, see App. to Juris. Statement 173a (Stipulation 86), indicated that there was no intent simply to borrow the recently devised Police Jury plan or to build on the precincts established by the Police Jury, a possibility that Joiner thought could be explored in "[s]everal hours at least," App. 271. t seems obvious that from the start the Board expected its plan to require precinct splitting, and Joiner acknowledged in his testimony that any plan "as strong as" the Police Jury plan in terms of traditional districting criteria would require precinct splits. bid. Splitting precincts only became an insuperable obstacle once the NAACP made its proposal to create majority-black districts. C 1 Despite its stated view that the record would not support a conclusion of nonretrogressive discriminatory intent, the District Court majority listed a series of "allegedly dilutive impacts" said to point to discriminatory intent: "[t]hat some of the new districts have no schools, that the plan ignores attendance boundaries, that it does not respect communities of interest, that there is one outlandishly large district, that several of them are not compact, that there is a lack of contiguity, and that the population deviations resulting from the jury plan are greater than the limits (± 5%) imposed by Louisiana law." |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | greater than the limits (± 5%) imposed by Louisiana law." (Bossier Parish ). The District Court found this evidence *354 "too theoretical, and too attenuated," to be probative of retrogressive intent in the absence of corroborating evidence of a "deliberate attempt." bid. But whatever the force of such evidence may be on the issue of intent to cause retrogression, there is nothing "theoretical" or "attenuated" in its significance as showing intent to dilute generally. 2 f we take the District Court opinions in Bossier Parish and Bossier Parish together and treat the court's 5 discussions as covering nonretrogressive discriminatory intent, it is clear that the court rested on two reasons for finding that the plan's dilutive effect could not support an inference of nonretrogressive discriminatory intent. First, the court thought any such inference inconsistent with the view expressed in that a refusal to adopt a plan to maximize the number of majority-minority districts is insufficient alone to support an inference of intentional discrimination. Miller is not on point, however. n Miller, Georgia had already adopted a plan that clearly improved the position of minority voters by establishing two majority-black districts. The question was simply whether the State's refusal to create a third betrayed discriminatory intent. at 906-908, 923-. n these cases, the issue of inferred intent did not arise upon rejection of a plan maximizing the number of majorityblack districts after a concededly ameliorative plan had already been adopted; the issue arose on the Board's refusal to consider a plan with any majority-black districts when more than one such district was possible under The issue here is not whether Bossier Parish betrayed a discriminatory purpose in refusing to create the maximum number of majority-black districts, see Bossier Parish but simply whether it was significant that the parish refused to consider creating a majority-black district at all. The refusal points to a discriminatory *355 intent that the refusal to maximize in did not show. The District Court's second ground for discounting the evidence of intent inherent in the Police Jury plan's dilutive effect was its finding that the Board had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for approving the plan. The evidence, however, is powerful in showing that the Board had no such reasons. As have already noted, the Board's respect for existing precinct lines was apparently pretextual. The other supposedly legitimate reason for the Board's choice, that the Police Jury was a safe harbor under 5, is equally unlikely. f the Police Jury plan was a safe harbor, it had been safe from the day the Attorney General precleared it for the Police |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | the day the Attorney General precleared it for the Police Jury, whereas the Board ignored it for more than a year after that preclearance. nterest in the Police Jury plan developed only after pressure from Price and the NAACP had intensified to the point that the redistricting process would have to be concluded promptly if the minority proposals were not to be considered. The Police Jury, therefore, became an attractive harbor only when it seemed to offer safety from demands for a fair reflection of minority voting strength. t was chosen by a Board, described by the District Court majority as possessing a "tenacious determination to maintain the status quo," Bossier Parish at and the only fair inference is that when the Board suddenly embraced the Police Jury plan it was running true to form.[9] *356 D n sum, for decades the School Board manifested sedulous resistance to the constitutional obligation to desegregate parish schools, which have never attained unitary status and are still subject to court order. When faced with the need to act alone in redrawing its voting districts, the Board showed no interest in the Police Jury plan, which made no sense for school purposes and was at odds with normal districting principles applied by the Board. The Board hired a cartographer in anticipation of drawing district lines significantly different from the Police Jury lines, and the Attorney General's preclearance of the Police Jury plan for the jury's use produced no apparent Board interest in adopting that same plan. When minority leaders sought a role in proposing a plan, the Board ignored them and when they produced concrete proposals prepared by the NAACP, the Board sidestepped with successive technical reasons culminating in a patently pretextual objection. t was only then, as its pretexts for resisting the NAACP were wearing thin, that the Board evidently scrapped its intention to obtain an original plan tailored to school district concerns and acted with unwonted haste on the year-old proposal to adopt the manifestly unsuitable Police Jury plan. The proposal received no public hearing support and nothing but objection from minority voters, who pointed out what the Board now agrees, that the Police Jury plan dilutes minority voting strength. The objections were unavailing and the Board adopted the dilutive plan. There is no reasonable doubt on this record that the Board chose the Police Jury plan for no other reason than to squelch requests to adopt the NAACP plan or any other plan reflecting minority voting strength, and it would be incredible to suggest that the resulting submergence of the minority |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | incredible to suggest that the resulting submergence of the minority voters was unintended by the Board whose own expert testified that it understood the illegality of dilution. f, as conclude below, see Part infra, dilutive but nonretrogressive intent *357 behind a redistricting plan disqualifies it from 5 preclearance, then preclearance is impossible on this record. Since the burden to negate such intent (like the burden to negate retrogressive intent and effect) rests on the voting district asking for preclearance, nothing more is required to show the impossibility of preclearance. See, e. g., Pleasant t is worth noting, however, that the parish should likewise lose even if we assume, as the District Court majority seems to have done at one point, that the burden to show disqualifying intent is on the Government and the intervenors. Bossier Parish t is not only that Judge Kessler was correct in her conclusion that dilutive but nonretrogressive intent was shown; the contrary view of the District Court majority raises "`the definite and firm conviction that a mistake [has] been committed,' " Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., nc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., Regardless of the burden of persuasion, therefore, the parish should lose under the intent prong of 5, if the purpose that disqualifies under 5 includes an intent to dilute minority voting strength regardless of retrogression. A The legal issue here is the meaning of "abridging" in the provision of 5 that preclearance of a districting change in a covered jurisdiction requires a showing that the new plan does not "have the purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" The language tracks that of the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that "[t]he right of citizens to vote shall not be *358 denied or abridged on account of race [or] color" Since the Act is an exercise of congressional power under 2 of that Amendment, South 5-7 the choice to follow the Amendment's terminology is most naturally read as carrying the meaning of the constitutional terms into the statute. United ; cf. ("[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed"). Any construction of the statute, therefore, carries an implication about the meaning of the Amendment, absent some good reason to treat the parallel texts |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | Amendment, absent some good reason to treat the parallel texts differently on some particular point, and a reading of the statute that would not fit the Constitution is presumptively wrong.[10] *359 n each context, it is clear that abridgment necessarily means something more subtle and less drastic than the complete denial of the right to cast a ballot, denial being separately forbidden. Abridgment therefore must be a condition in between complete denial, on the one hand, and complete enjoyment of voting power, on the other. The principal concept of diminished voting strength recognized as actionable under our cases is vote dilution, defined as a regime that denies to minority voters the same opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice that majority voters enjoy. See, e. g., 478 U. S., at ; 42 U.S. C. 1973. The benchmark of dilution pure and simple is thus a system in which every minority voter has as good a chance at political participation and voting effectiveness as any other voter. Our cases have also recognized retrogression as a subspecies of dilution, the consequence of a scheme that not only gives a minority voter a lesser practical chance to participate and elect than a majority voter enjoys, but even reduces the minority voter's practical power from what a preceding scheme of electoral law provided. See 425 U. S., Although our cases have dealt with vote dilution only under the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e. g., know of no reason in text or history that dilution is not equally violative of the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee against abridgment. And while there has been serious dispute in the past over the Fourteenth Amendment's coverage of voting rights, see, e. g., know of no reason to doubt that "abridg[e]" in the Fifteenth Amendment includes dilutive discrimination. See Bossier Parish 520 *-495[11] The Court has never held (save in ) that the concept of voting abridgment covers only retrogressive dilution, and any such reading of the Fifteenth Amendment would be outlandish. The Amendment contains no textual limitation on abridgment, and when it was adopted, the newly emancipated citizens would have obtained practically nothing from a mere guarantee that their electoral power would not be further reduced. Since 5 of the Act is likewise free of any *361 language qualifying or limiting the terms of abridgment which it shares with the Amendment, abridgment under 5 presumably covers any vote dilution, not retrogression alone, and no redistricting scheme should receive preclearance without a showing that it is nondilutive. See Bossier Parish (use in 5 of Fifteenth |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | is nondilutive. See Bossier Parish (use in 5 of Fifteenth Amendment language indicates that 5 prohibits new plans with dilutive purposes). Such, in fact, was apparently just what Congress had in mind when it addressed 5 to the agility of covered jurisdictions in keeping one step ahead of dilution challenges under the Constitution (and previous versions of the Voting Rights Act) by adopting successive voting schemes, each with a distinctive feature that perpetuated the abridgment of the minority vote: "Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." South 383 U. S., at 8 This evil in Congress's sights was discrimination, abridgment of the right to vote, not merely discrimination that happens to cause retrogression, and Congress's intent to frustrate the unconstitutional evil by barring a replacement scheme of discrimination from being put into effect was not confined to any one subset of discriminatory schemes. The School Board's purpose thus seems to lie at the very center of what Congress meant to counter by requiring preclearance, and the Court's holding that any nonretrogressive purpose survives 5 is an exceedingly odd conclusion. *362 B The majority purports to shoulder its burden to justify a limited reading of "abridging" by offering an argument from the "context" of 5. Since 5 covers only changes in voting practices, this fact is said to be a reason to think that "abridging" as used in the statute is narrower than its cognate in the Fifteenth Amendment, which covers both changes and continuing systems. Ante, at 9-330, 333-334. n other words, on the majority's reading, the baseline in a 5 challenge is the status quo that is to be changed, while the baseline in a Fifteenth Amendment challenge (or one under 2 of the Voting Rights Act) is a nondiscriminatory regime, whether extant or not. From the fact that 5 applies only when a voting change is proposed, however, it does not follow that the baseline of abridgment is the status quo; Congress could perfectly well have decided that when a jurisdiction is forced to change its voting scheme (because of malapportionment shown by a new census, say), it ought to show that the replacement is constitutional. This, of course, is just what the unqualified language and |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | This, of course, is just what the unqualified language and its Fifteenth Amendment parallel would suggest. n fact, the majority's principal reason for reading intent to abridge as covering only intent to cause retrogression is not the peculiar context of changes in the law, but which limited the sort of "effect" that would be an abridgment to retrogressive effect. The strength of the majority's position, then, depends on the need for parallel limitations on the purpose and effect prongs of 5. The need, however, is very much to the contrary. 1 nsofar as is authority for defining the "effect" of a redistricting plan that would bar preclearance under 5, will of course respect it as precedent. The policy of stare decisis is at its most powerful in statutory interpretation *363 (which Congress is always free to supersede with new legislation), see and 5 presents no exception to the rule that when statutory language is construed it should stay construed. But it is another thing entirely to ignore error in extending discredited reasoning to previously unspoiled statutory provisions. That, however, is just what the Court does in extending from 5 effects to 5 purpose. was wrongly decided, and its error should not be compounded in derogation of clear text and equally clear congressional purpose. The provision in 5 barring preclearance of a districting plan portending an abridging effect is unconditional (and just as uncompromising as the bar to plans resting on a purpose to abridge). The Court nonetheless sought to justify the imposition of a nontextual limitation on the forbidden abridging effect to retrogression by relying on a single fragment of legislative history, a statement from a House Report that 5 would prevent covered jurisdictions from "`undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently won' " by blacks.[12] Relying on this one statement, however, was an act of distorting selectivity, for the legislative history is replete with references to the need to block changes in voting practices that would perpetuate existing discrimination and stand in the way of truly nondiscriminatory alternatives. n the House of Representatives, the Judiciary Committee noted that "even after apparent defeat[s] resisters seek new ways and means of discriminating. *364 Barring one contrivance too often has caused no change in result, only in methods," H. R. Rep. No. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 and the House Report described how jurisdictions had used changes in voting practices to stave off reform. By making trifling changes in registration requirements, for example, Dallas County, Alabama, was able to terminate litigation against it without registering more than a handful of minority voters, see |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | without registering more than a handful of minority voters, see and new practices were similarly effective devices for perpetuating discrimination in other jurisdictions as well, see S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, pp. 8-9 (Joint Statement of ndividual Views by Sens. Dodd, Hart, Long, Kennedy, Bayh, Burdick, Tydings, Dirksen, Hruska, Fong, Scott, and Javits). After losing voting rights cases, jurisdictions would adopt new voting requirements "`as a means for continuing the rejection of qualified Negro applicants.' " ). Thanks to the discriminatory traditions of the jurisdictions covered by 5, these new practices often avoided retrogression[13] even as they stymied improvements. n the days before 5, the ongoing litigation would become moot and minority litigants would be back at square one, shouldering the burden of new challenges with the prospect of further dodges to come. The intent of Congress to address the frustration of running to stay in place was manifest when it extended the Voting Rights Act in 1969: "Prior to the enactment of the 1965 act, new voting rules of various kinds were resorted to in several in order to perpetuate discrimination in the face of *365 adverse Federal court decrees and enactments by the Congress. n order to preclude such future State or local circumvention of the remedies and policies of the 1965 act, [ 5 was enacted]. "The record before the committee indicates that as Negro voter registration has increased under the Voting Rights Act, several jurisdictions have undertaken new, unlawful ways to diminish the Negroes' franchise and to defeat Negro and Negro-supported candidates. The U. S. Commission on Civil Rights has reported that these measures have taken the form of switching to at-large elections where Negro voting strength is concentrated in particular election districts and facilitating the consolidation of predominently [sic] Negro and predominently [sic] white counties. Other changes in rules or practices affecting voting have included increasing filing fees in elections where Negro candidates were running; abolishing or making appointive offices sought by Negro candidates; extending the term of office of incumbent white officials, and withholding information about qualifying for office from Negro candidates." H. R. Rep. No. 91-7, at 6-7. See also 115 Cong. Rec. 38486 (1969) (remarks of Rep. McCulloch) (listing "new methods by which the South achieves an old goal" of maintaining white control of the political process). Congress again expressed its views in 1975: "n recent years the importance of [ 5] has become widely recognized as a means of promoting and preserving minority political gains in covered jurisdictions. ". As registration and voting of minority citizens increases, other measures may |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | registration and voting of minority citizens increases, other measures may be resorted to which would dilute increasing minority voting strength. Such other measures may include switching to at-large elections, *366 annexations of predominantly white areas, or the adoption of discriminatory redistricting plans." S. Rep. No. 94-295, pp. 15-17 (citation omitted). Congress thus referred to 5 as a way to make the situation better ("promoting"), not merely as a stopgap to keep it from getting worse ("preserving"). t is all the more difficult to understand how the majority in could have been so oblivious to this clear congressional objective, when a decade before the Court had realized that modifying legal requirements was the way discriminatory jurisdictions stayed one jump ahead of the Constitution. n United v. Mississippi, the Court described a series of ingenious devices preventing minority registration, and in South the Court said that "Congress knew that some of the had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees. Congress had reason to suppose that these might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself." 5 ; see also Likewise, well before our nascent dilution jurisprudence addressed practices mentioned in the congressional lists of tactics targeted by 5. See, e. g., n fine, the full legislative history shows beyond any doubt just what the unqualified text of 5 provides. The statute contains no reservation in favor of customary abridgment grown familiar after years of relentless discrimination, and the preclearance requirement was not enacted to authorize covered jurisdictions to pour old poison into new bottles. See post, at 374-376 (Breyer, J., dissenting). was *367 wrong, and while it is entitled to stand under our traditional stare decisis in statutory interpretation, stare decisis does not excuse today's decision to compound `s error.[14] 2 Giving purpose-to-abridge the broader, intended reading while preserving the erroneously truncated interpretation of effect would not even result in a facially irrational scheme. This is so because intent to dilute is conceptually simple, whereas a dilutive abridgment-in-fact is not readily defined and identified independently of dilutive intent. A purpose to dilute simply means to subordinate minority voting power; exact calibration is unnecessary to identify what is intended. Any purpose to give less weight to minority participation in the electoral process than to majority participation is a purpose to discriminate and thus to "abridge" the right to vote. No further baseline is needed because the enquiry goes to |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | No further baseline is needed because the enquiry goes to the direction of the majority's aim, without reference to details of the existing system. Dilutive effect, for the reason the majority points out, is different. Dilutive effect requires a baseline against which to compare a proposed change. While the baseline is in theory the electoral effectiveness of majority voters, dilution is not merely a lack of proportional representation, see and we have held that the maximum number of possible majority-minority districts cannot be the standard, see, e. g., -926. Thus we have held that an enquiry into dilutive effect must rest on some *368 idea of a reasonable allocation of power between minority and majority voters; this requires a court to compare a challenged voting practice with a reasonable alternative practice. See ; ; see also v. De Grandy, Looking only to retrogression in effect, while looking to any dilutive or other abridgment in purpose, avoids the difficulty of baseline derivation. The distinction was not intended by Congress, but such a distinction is not irrational. ndeed, the Justice Department has always taken the position that is limited to the effect prong and puts no limitation on discriminatory purpose in 5. See Brief for Federal Appellant -33. The Justice Department's longstanding practice of refusing to preclear changes that it determined to have an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose, both before and after is entitled to "particular deference" in light of the Department's "central role" in administering 5. Dougherty County Bd. of U.S. ; see also United v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, -1 ; 0-1 Most significant here, the fact that the Justice Department has for decades understood to be limited to effect demonstrates that such a position is entirely consistent and coherent with the law as declared in even though it may not have been what Congress intended. 3 Giving wider scope to purpose than to effect under 5 would not only preserve the capacity of 5 to bar preclearance to all intended violations of the Fifteenth Amendment,[15] it would also enjoy the virtue of consistency with *369 prior decisions apart from n Richmond v. United the Court held that a city's territorial annexation reducing the percentage of black voters could not be recognized as a legal wrong under the effect prong of 5, but remanded for further consideration of discriminatory purpose. The majority distinguishes Richmond as "nothing more than an ex necessitate limitation upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexation." Ante, 0. But in fact, Richmond laid down no eccentric effect rule and is squarely at odds with the |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | eccentric effect rule and is squarely at odds with the majority's position that only an act taken with intent to produce a forbidden effect is forbidden under the intent prong. As to forbidden effect, the Richmond Court said this: "As long as the ward system fairly reflects the strength of the Negro community as it exists after the annexation, we cannot hold, without more specific legislative direction, that such an annexation is nevertheless barred by 5. t is true that the black community, if there is racial bloc voting, will command fewer seats on the city council; and the annexation will have effected a decline *370 in the Negroes' relative influence in the city. But a different city council and an enlarged city are involved after the annexation. Furthermore, Negro power in the new city is not undervalued, and Negroes will not be under represented on the council. "As long as this is true, we cannot hold that the effect of the annexation is to deny or abridge the right to vote." As Richmond `s references to "undervaluation" and "underrepresentation" make clear, the case involves application of standard Fifteenth Amendment principles to the annexation context, not an annexation exception. As long as the post annexation city allowed black voters to participate on equal terms with white voters, the annexation did not "abridge" their voting rights even if they thereafter made up a smaller proportion of the voting population. The Court also held, however, that in adopting the very plan whose effect had been held to be outside the scope of legal wrong, the city could have acted with an unlawful, discriminatory intent that would have rendered the annexation unlawful and barred approval under 5: "[]t may be asked how it could be forbidden by 5 to have the purpose and intent of achieving only what is a perfectly legal result under that section and why we need remand for further proceedings with respect to purpose alone. The answer is plain, and we need not labor it. An official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute. Section 5 forbids voting changes taken with the purpose of denying the vote on the grounds of race or color." *371 t follows from Richmond that a plan lacking any underlying purpose to cause disqualifying retrogression may be barred by a discriminatory intent. The majority's attempt to distinguish Pleasant is equally vain. Whereas Richmond dealt with the argument that law and |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | concurring | Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118334/reno-v-bossier-parish-school-bd/ | vain. Whereas Richmond dealt with the argument that law and logic barred finding a disqualifying intent when effect was lawful, Pleasant Grove dealt with the argument that finding a disqualifying intent was impossible in fact. The Court in Pleasant Grove denied preclearance to an annexation that added white voters to the city's electorate, despite the fact that at the time of the annexation minority voting strength was nonexistent and officials of the city seeking the annexation were unaware of any black voters whose votes could be diluted. One thing is clear beyond peradventure: the annexation in that case could not have been intended to cause retrogression. No one could have intended to cause retrogression because no one knew of any minority voting strength from which retrogression was n. 2. The fact that the annexation was nonetheless barred under the purpose prong of 5, 11 years after means that today's majority cannot hold as they do without overruling Pleasant Grove. The majority seeks to avoid Pleasant Grove by describing it as barring "future retrogression" by nipping any such future contingency even before the bud had formed. This gymnastic, however, not only overlooks the contradiction between Pleasant Grove `s holding that a voting change without possible retrogressive intent could fail under the purpose prong and the majority's reasoning today that the baseline for the purpose prong is the status quo; it even ignores what the Court actually said. While the Pleasant Grove Court said that impermissible purpose could relate to anticipated circumstances, -472, it said nothing about anticipated retrogression (a concept familiar to the Court *372 since the time of ). The Court found it "plausible" that the city had simply acted with "the impermissible purpose of minimizing future black voting strength." -472 The Court spoke of "minimizing," not "causing retrogression to." But there is more: "One means of thwarting [integration] is to provide for the growth of a monolithic white voting block, thereby effectively diluting the black vote in advance. This is just as impermissible a purpose as the dilution of present black voting strength. Cf. City of Richmond, [422 U. S.,]" That is, a nonretrogressive dilutive purpose is just as impermissible under 5 as a retrogressive one. Today's holding contradicts that. The majority is overruling Pleasant Grove. The majority proffers no justification for denying the precedential value of Pleasant Grove. nstead it observes that reading the purpose prong of 5 as covering more than retrogression (as Richmond and Pleasant Grove read it) would "exacerbate the `substantial' federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts." Ante, 6. But my reading, like |
Justice Stevens | 1,992 | 16 | dissenting | Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112742/morales-v-trans-world-airlines-inc/ | In cases construing the "virtually unique pre-emption provision" in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), see Franchise Tax Bd. of we have given the words "relate to" a broad reading. The construction of that unique provision was supported by a consideration of the relationship between different subsections of ERISA that have no parallel in other federal statutes, see and by the legislative history of the provision, at -99. Today we construe a pre-emption provision in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U.S. C. App. 1301 et seq., a statute containing similar, but by no means identical, language. Instead of carefully examining the language, structure, and history of the ADA, the Court decides that it is "appropriate," given the similarity in language, to give the ADA pre-emption provision a similarly broad reading. Ante, at 384. In so doing, the Court disregards established canons of statutory construction, and gives the ADA pre-emption provision a construction that is neither compelled by its text nor supported by its legislative history. I "In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue." Metropolitan Ins. (15) At the same time, our pre-emption analysis "must be guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental *420 authority preserved in our federalist system." (11). We therefore approach pre-emption questions with a "presum[ption] that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation." Metropolitan Section 105(a) of the ADA provides, in relevant part, "no State or political subdivision thereof shall enact or enforce any law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation." 49 U.S. C. App. 1305(a). By definition, a state law prohibiting deceptive or misleading advertising of a product "relates," "pertains," or "refers" first and foremost to the advertising (and, in particular, to the deceptive or misleading aspect of the advertising) rather than to the product itself. That is not to say, of course, that a prohibition of deceptive advertising does not also relate indirectly to the particular product being advertised. It clearly does, for one cannot determine whether advertising is misleading without knowing the characteristics of the product being advertised. But that does not alter the fact that the prohibition is designed to affect the nature of the advertising, not the nature of the product.[1] *421 Thus, although I agree that the plain language of 105(a) pre-empts any state law that relates directly to rates, routes, or services, the presumption against |
Justice Stevens | 1,992 | 16 | dissenting | Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112742/morales-v-trans-world-airlines-inc/ | relates directly to rates, routes, or services, the presumption against pre-emption of traditional state regulation counsels that we not interpret 105(a) to pre-empt every traditional state regulation that might have some indirect connection with, or relationship to, airline rates, routes, or services unless there is some indication that Congress intended that result. To determine whether Congress had such an intent, I believe that a consideration of the history and structure of the ADA is more illuminating than a narrow focus on the words "relating to." II The basic economic policy of the Nation is one favoring competitive markets in which individual entrepreneurs are free to make their own decisions concerning price and output. Since 1890 the Sherman Act's prohibition of collusive restrictions on production and pricing have been the central legislative expression of that policy. National Soc. of Professional In 1914 Congress sought to promote that policy by enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which created the Federal Trade Commission and gave it the power to prohibit "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce." codified as amended, 15 U.S. C. 45(a)(1). That type of prohibition is entirely consistent with a free market in which prices and production are not regulated by Government decree. In 1938 Congress enacted two statutes that are relevant to today's inquiry. In March it broadened 5 of the FTCA by giving the Commission the power to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" as well as "[u]nfair *422 methods of competition in commerce." codified at 15 U.S. C. 45(a)(1). Three months later it enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 411, That statute created the Civil Aeronautics Board and mandated that it regulate entry into the interstate airline industry, the routes that airlines could fly, and the fares that they could charge consumers.[2] 52 Stat. 7-994. Moreover, the statute contained a provision, patterned after 5 of the FTCA, giving the Civil Aeronautics Board the power to prohibit "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation." ; see also American Airlines, But the Board's power in this regard was not exclusive, for the statute also contained a "saving clause" that preserved existing common-law and statutory remedies for deceptive practices.[3] See ; 2-300 Although the 1938 Act was replaced by a similar regulatory scheme in 1958,[4] the principal provisions of the statute remained in effect until 1978. In that year, Congress decided to withdraw economic regulation of interstate airline rates, routes, and services. Congress therefore enacted the ADA "to encourage, develop, and attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive market |
Justice Stevens | 1,992 | 16 | dissenting | Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112742/morales-v-trans-world-airlines-inc/ | attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of air services." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1779, p. 53 Because that goal would obviously have been frustrated if state regulations *423 were substituted for the recently removed federal regulations, Congress thought it necessary to pre-empt such state regulation. Consequently, Congress enacted 105(a) of the Act, which pre-empts any state regulation "relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation." 49 U.S. C. App. 1305(a)(1). At the same time, Congress retained 411, which gave the Civil Aeronautics Board the power to prohibit "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation." 49 U.S. C. App. 1381(a). Congress also retained the saving clause that preserved common-law and statutory remedies for fraudulent and deceptive practices. See 1506; 426 U. S., at 2-300. Moreover, the state prohibitions against deceptive practices that had coexisted with federal regulation in the airline industry for 40 years, and had coexisted with federal regulation of unfair trade practices in other areas of the economy since 1914,[5] were not mentioned in either the ADA or its legislative history. In short, there is no indication that Congress intended to exempt airlines from state prohibitions of deceptive advertising. Instead, this history suggests that the scope of the *424 prohibition of state regulation should be measured by the scope of the federal regulation that was being withdrawn. This is essentially the position adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board, which interpreted the scope of 105 in light of its two underlying policiesto prevent state economic regulation from frustrating the benefits of federal deregulation, and to clarify the confusion under the prior law which permitted some dual state and federal regulation of the rates and routes of the same carrier. 9949 (1979). The Board thus explained: "Section 105 forbids state regulation of a federally authorized carrier's routes, rates, or services. Clearly, states may not interfere with a federal carrier's decision on how much to charge or which markets to serve. Similarly, a state may not interfere with the services that carriers offer in exchange for their rates. "Accordingly, we conclude that preemption extends to all of the economic factors that go into the provision of the quid pro quo for passenger's fare, including flight frequency and timing, liability limits, reservation and boarding practices, insurance, smoking rules, meal service, entertainment, bonding and corporate financing" See also Freeman, State Regulation of Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 766 767 |
Justice Stevens | 1,992 | 16 | dissenting | Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112742/morales-v-trans-world-airlines-inc/ | Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 766 767 (1979). Because Congress did not eliminate federal regulation of unfair or deceptive practices, and because state and federal prohibitions of unfair or deceptive practices had coexisted during the period of federal regulation, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended 105(a) to immunize the airlines from state liability for engaging in deceptive or misleading advertising. *425 III The Court finds in Congress' choice of the words "relating to" an intent to adopt a broad pre-emption provision, analogous to the broad ERISA pre-emption provision. See ante, at 383-384. The legislative history does not support that assumption, however. The bill proposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board provided that "[n]o State shall enact any law relating to rates, routes, or services in air transportation." Hearings on H. R. 8813 before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 200 (1977). Yet the Board's accompanying prepared testimony neither focused on the "relating to" language nor suggested that those words were intended to effect a broad scope of preemption; instead, the testimony explained that the preemption section was "added to make clear that no state or political subdivision may defeat the purposes of the bill by regulating interstate air transportation. This provision represents simply a codification of existing law and leaves unimpaired the states' authority over intrastate matters." The "relating to" language in the bill that was finally enacted by Congress came from the House bill. But the House Committee Reportlike the Civil Aeronautics Boarddid not describe the pre-emption provision in the broad terms adopted by the Court today; instead, the Report described the scope of the pre-emption provision more narrowly, saying that it "provid[ed] that when a carrier operates under authority granted pursuant to title IV of the Federal Aviation Act, no State may regulate that carrier's routes, rates or services." H. R. Rep. No. 95-1211, p. 16 The pre-emption section in the Senate bill, on the other hand, did not contain the "relating to" language. That bill provided, "[n]o State shall enact any law, establish any standard determining routes, schedules, or rates, fares, or charges in tariffs of, or otherwise promulgate economic regulations *426 for, any air carrier" S. 2493, 423(a)(1), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 95-631, p. 39 The Senate Report explained that this section "prohibits States from exercising economic regulatory control over interstate airlines." at The Conference Report explained that the Conference adopted the House bill (with an exception not relevant here), which it described in the more |
Justice Stevens | 1,992 | 16 | dissenting | Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112742/morales-v-trans-world-airlines-inc/ | exception not relevant here), which it described in the more narrow terms used in the House Report. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1779, pp. 94-95 There is, therefore, no indication that the conferees thought the House's "relating to" language would have a broader pre-emptive scope than the Senate's "determining. or otherwise promulgate economic regulation" language.[6] Nor is there any indication that the House and conferees thought that the pre-emption of state laws "relating to rates, routes, or services" pre-empted substantially more than state laws "regulating rates, routes, or services." IV Even if I were to agree with the Court that state regulation of deceptive advertising could "relat[e] to rates" within the meaning of 105(a) if it had a "significant impact" upon rates, ante, at 390, I would still dissent. The airlines' theoretical arguments have not persuaded me that the NAAG guidelines will have a significant impact upon the price of airline tickets. The airlines' argument (which the Court adopts, ante, at 388-390) is essentially that (1) airlines must engage in price discrimination in order to compete and operate efficiently; (2) a modest amount of misleading price advertising may facilitate that practice; (3) thus compliance with the NAAG guidelines might increase the cost of price advertising or reduce the sales generated by the advertisements; *427 (4) as the costs increase and revenues decrease, the airlines might purchase less price advertising; and (5) a reduction in price advertising might cause a reduction in price competition, which, in turn, might result in higher airline rates. This argument is not supported by any legislative or judicial findings. Even on the assumption that the Court's economic reasoning is sound and restrictions on price advertising could affect rates in this manner, the airlines have not sustained their burden of proving that compliance with the NAAG guidelines would have a "significant" effect on their ability to market their product and, therefore, on their rates.[7] Surely Congress could not have intended to pre-empt every state and local law and regulation that similarly increases the airlines' costs of doing business and, consequently, has a similar "significant impact" upon their rates. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | second_dissenting | Karcher v. Daggett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110980/karcher-v-daggett/ | I join JUSTICE WHITE's excellent dissenting opinion, and reaffirm my previously expressed doubt that "the Constitution a vital and living charter after nearly two centuries because of the wise flexibility of its key provisions could be read to require a rule of mathematical exactitude in legislative I write separately to express some additional thoughts on gerrymandering and its relation to apportionment factors that presumably were not thought relevant under I The Court, following today invalidates New Jersey's redistricting plan solely because various alternative plans, principally the one proposed by Professor Reock, had what the Court views as "appreciably smaller population deviations between the largest and smallest districts." Ante, at 728. Under all of the plans, the maximum population variances were under 1%. I view these differences as neither "appreciable" nor constitutionally significant. As JUSTICE WHITE demonstrates, ante, at 769-772 the Court's insistence on precise mathematical equality is self-deluding, given the inherent inaccuracies of the census data and the other difficulties in measuring the voting population of a district that will exist for a period of 10 years. See (pursuit of precise equality "is a search for a will-o'-the-wisp"). Moreover, it has become clear that leaves no room for proper legislative consideration of other factors, such as preservation of political and geographic boundaries, that plainly are relevant to rational reapportionment decisions,[1] see ; As JUSTICE WHITE correctly observes, ante, at 775-776, a decade of experience has confirmed the fears of the dissenters that an uncompromising emphasis on numerical equality would serve to encourage and legitimate even the most outrageously partisan gerrymandering, see -552 ; The plain fact is that in the computer age, this type of political and discriminatory gerrymandering can be accomplished entirely consistently with districts of equal population.[2] *786 I therefore continue to believe that the Constitution permits variations from "theoretical `exactitude' in recognition of the impracticality of applying the rule as well as in deference to legitimate state interests." White v. at Certainly when a State has adopted a districting plan with an average population deviation of 0.1384%, and a maximum deviation of 0.6%, it has complied with the Constitution's mandate that population be apportioned equally among districts. II The extraordinary map of the New Jersey congressional districts, see ante, following p. 744, prompts me to comment on the separate question of gerrymandering "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes," I am in full agreement with JUSTICE WHITE's observation more than a decade ago that gerrymandering presents "a far greater potential threat to equality of representation" |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | second_dissenting | Karcher v. Daggett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110980/karcher-v-daggett/ | presents "a far greater potential threat to equality of representation" than a State's failure to achieve *787 "precise adherence to admittedly inexact census figures." I also believe that the injuries that result from gerrymandering may rise to constitutional dimensions. As JUSTICE STEVENS observes, if a State's electoral rules "serve no purpose other than to favor one segment whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection." Ante, at 748 Moreover, most gerrymandering produces districts "without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines," a result that is profoundly destructive of the apportionment goal of "fair and effective representation," A legislator cannot represent his constituents properly nor can voters from a fragmented district exercise the ballot intelligently when a voting district is nothing more than an artificial unit divorced from, and indeed often in conflict with, the various communities established in the State.[3] The map attached to the Court's opinion illustrates this far better than words can describe. I therefore am prepared to entertain constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering that reaches the level of discrimination described by JUSTICE STEVENS. See ante, at 748 I do not suggest that the shape of a *788 districting map itself invariably is dispositive. Some irregularity in shape is inevitable, with the degree of irregularity depending primarily on the geographic and political boundaries within the State, as well as the distribution of its population. Moreover, political considerations, even partisan ones, are inherent in a democratic system. A court, therefore, should not "attemp[t] the impossible task of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political processes of the sovereign States." Finally, I do not suggest that a legislative reapportionment plan is invalid whenever an alternative plan might be viewed as less partisan or more in accord with various apportionment criteria. The state legislature necessarily must have discretion to accommodate competing considerations. I do believe, however, that the constitutional mandate of "fair and effective representation," proscribes apportionment plans that have the purpose and effect of substantially disenfranchising identifiable groups of voters. Generally, the presumptive existence of such unconstitutional discrimination will be indicated by a districting plan the boundaries of which appear on their face to bear little or no relationship to any legitimate state purpose. As JUSTICE STEVENS states, "dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation," ante, at 755 ; "drastic departures from compactness are a |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | second_dissenting | Karcher v. Daggett | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110980/karcher-v-daggett/ | ante, at 755 ; "drastic departures from compactness are a signal that something may be amiss," ante, at 758; and "[e]xtensive deviation from established political boundaries is another possible basis for a prima facie showing of gerrymandering," In such circumstances, a State should be required to provide a legitimate and nondiscriminatory explanation for the districting lines it has drawn. See In this case, one cannot rationally believe that the New Jersey Legislature considered factors other than the most *789 partisan political goals and population equality. It hardly could be suggested, for example, that the contorted Districts 3, 5, and 7 reflect any attempt to follow natural, historical, or local political boundaries.[4] Nor do these district lines reflect any consideration of the likely effect on the quality of representation when the boundaries are so artificial that they are likely to confound the Congressmen themselves. As Judge Gibbons stated eloquently in his dissent below: "The apportionment map produced by P. L. c. 1 leaves me, as a citizen of New Jersey, disturbed. It creates several districts which are anything but compact, and at least one district which is contiguous only for yachtsmen. While municipal boundaries have been maintained, there has been little effort to create districts having a community of interests. In some districts, for example, different television and radio stations, different newspapers, and different transportation systems serve the northern and southern localities. Moreover the harshly partisan tone of Speaker Christopher Jackman's letter to Ernest C. Reock, Jr. is disedifying, to say the least. It is plain, as well, that partisanship produced artificial bulges or appendages of two districts so as to place the residences of Congressmen Smith and Courter in districts where they would be running against incumbents." This summary statement by Judge Gibbons, a resident of New Jersey, is powerful and persuasive support for a conclusion *790 that the New Jersey Legislature's redistricting plan is an unconstitutional gerrymander. Cf. ante, at 764, n. 33 (STEVENS, J., concurring). Because this precise issue was not addressed by the District Court, however, it need not be reached here. As to the issue of population equality, I dissent for the reasons set forth above and in JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion. |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | concurring | TRW Inc. v. Andrews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118465/trw-inc-v-andrews/ | As the Court notes, ante, at 26, 27, the Court of Appeals based its decision on what it called the "general federal rule that a federal statute of limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know that she was injured," The Court declines to say whether that expression of the governing general rule is correct. See ante, at 27 ("To the extent such a *36 presumption exists, a matter this case does not oblige us to decide"). There is in my view little doubt that it is not, and our reluctance to say so today is inexplicable, given that we held, a mere four years ago, that a statute of limitations which says the period runs from "the date on which the cause of action arose," 29 U.S. C. 1451(f)(1) (1994 ed.), "incorporates the standard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action," Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust[1] *37 Bay Area Laundry quoted approvingly our statement in that "[a]ll statutes of limitation begin to run when the right of action is complete" This is unquestionably the traditional rule: Absent other indication, a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff "has the right to apply to the court for relief" 1 H. Wood, Limitation of Actions 122a, p. 684 (4th ed. 1916). "That a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue, or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not postpone the period of limitation." 2 276c(1), at 1411. The injury-discovery rule applied by the Court of Appeals is bad wine of recent vintage. Other than our recognition of the historical exception for suits based on fraud, e. g., we have deviated from the traditional rule and imputed an injury-discovery rule to Congress on only one occasion.[2] We did so there because we could not imagine that legislation as "humane" as the Federal Employers' Liability Act would bar recovery for latent medical injuries. We repeated this sentiment in saying that the "cry for a discovery rule is loudest" in the context of medical-malpractice suits; and we repeat it again today with the assertion that the present case does not involve "an area *38 of the law that cries out for application of a discovery rule," ante, at 28. These cries, however, are properly directed not to us, but to Congress, whose job it is to decide how "humane" legislation should beor (to put the point less tendentiously) to strike the balance |
Justice Scalia | 2,001 | 9 | concurring | TRW Inc. v. Andrews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118465/trw-inc-v-andrews/ | (to put the point less tendentiously) to strike the balance between remediation of all injuries and a policy of repose. See Congress has been operating against the background rule recognized in Bay Area Laundry for a very long time. When it has wanted us to apply a different rule, such as the injury-discovery rule, it has said so. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. 1030(g) (1994 ed., Supp. V).[3] See also, e. g., 15 U.S. C. 77m (1994 ed., Supp. V);[4] 42 U.S. C. 9612(d)(2) (1994 ed.).[5] To apply a new background rule to previously enacted legislation would reverse prior congressional judgments; and to display uncertainty regarding the current background rule makes all unspecifying new legislation a roll of the dice. Today's opinion, in clarifying the meaning of 15 U.S. C. 1681p, casts the meaning of innumerable other limitation periods in doubt. *39 Because there is nothing in this statute to contradict the rule that a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action is complete, I concur in the judgment of the Court. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | majority | United States v. Lorenzetti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111192/united-states-v-lorenzetti/ | The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S. C. 8101 et seq., provides a comprehensive system of compensation for federal employees who sustain work-related injuries. As part of that system, an employee who receives FECA payments is required to reimburse the United States for those payments, to a specified extent, when he obtains a damages award or settlement from a third party who is liable to the employee for his injuries. 8132. The question presented by this case is whether the United States may recover FECA payments for medical expenses and lost wages from an employee whose third-party tort recovery compensates him solely for noneconomic losses like pain and suffering. *169 I The facts are clear. Respondent Paul B. Lorenzetti is a special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On November 21, 1977, he was injured in an automobile accident in Philadelphia while on official business. Federal employees who are injured while engaged in the performance of their official duties are entitled under FECA to compensation for medical expenses, lost wages, and vocational rehabilitation. See 8102-8107. Respondent's injuries were not serious enough to require vocational rehabilitation, but he eventually received, from the Federal Employees' Compensation Fund, the sum of $1,970.81 for his medical expenses and lost wages. See 8147. Because the United States' liability for work-related injuries under FECA is exclusive, see 8116(c), respondent cannot recover from the United States for losses such as pain and suffering that are not compensated under FECA. Respondent subsequently instituted a tort action in a Pennsylvania state court against the driver of the other automobile. Respondent's action was subject to the terms of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (No-fault Act), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 40, 1009.101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), which substantially alters conventional tort liability for automobile accidents. Under the No-fault Act, an accident victim must look to his own insurance carrier to cover basic economic losses, including an unlimited amount of medical expenses and up to $15,000 in lost wages. 1009.104, 1009.106, 1009.202. The victim may maintain a tort action against the driver of the other automobile, but his recovery is generally limited to noneconomic losses like pain and suffering; he may recover damages for economic losses only to the extent that they are not otherwise compensated because they exceed statutory limits (such as the $15,000 lost-wage ceiling) under the No-fault Act. 1009.301(a)(4) and (a)(5). In this case, respondent's medical expenses and *170 lost wages had been compensated fully by the Federal Government under FECA. As a result, the driver of the other vehicle moved to exclude evidence |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | majority | United States v. Lorenzetti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111192/united-states-v-lorenzetti/ | the driver of the other vehicle moved to exclude evidence of medical expenses and lost wages from the trial. The trial court did not rule formally on that motion but indicated its agreement that respondent was confined to recovering damages for noneconomic losses. Respondent eventually settled the case for $8,500, a figure that represented compensation for noneconomic losses alone. The United States thereafter sought to be reimbursed for its FECA payments out of respondent's tort settlement.[1] FECA contains several provisions designed to shift the compensation burden from the United States to any third party who is independently liable for the employee's injuries. Under 8131, if an accident for which the United States is liable under FECA also creates a legal liability in a person other than the United States to pay damages, the Secretary of Labor may require the employee either to prosecute an action in his own name against the third party or to assign to the United States his right of action to enforce the liability. When an employee maintains an action in his own name, the United States is entitled to be reimbursed for its FECA payments in accordance with 8132. This statute in relevant part reads: "If an injury or death for which compensation is payable under [FECA] is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in a person other than the United States to pay damages, and a beneficiary entitled to compensation from the United States for that injury or death receives money or other property in satisfaction of that liability as the result of suit or settlement by him or in his behalf, the beneficiary, after deducting therefrom the costs of *171 suit and a reasonable attorney's fee, shall refund to the United States the amount of compensation paid by the United States and credit any surplus on future payments of compensation payable to him for the same injury."[2] The United States asserted that it was entitled to reimbursement for its FECA payments in this case pursuant to 8132. Respondent declined to pay over the requested sum and, instead, commenced a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He sought a declaration that the United States' right of reimbursement under 8132 was confined to recovery out of damages awards or settlements for economic losses of the sort covered by FECA, and that an award or settlement confined to noneconomic losses like pain and suffering was immune from recovery under 8132. In opposition, the United States took the position that 8132 created a general right of reimbursement |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | majority | United States v. Lorenzetti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111192/united-states-v-lorenzetti/ | the position that 8132 created a general right of reimbursement not conditioned on the nature of the loss for which an employee received payment in his tort action. The District Court granted summary judgment to the United States. The District Court relied principally on aff'g in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had been presented with the identical question by virtue of a similar Michigan *172 no-fault statute and had resolved the issue in favor of the Government. Like the courts in the District Court here looked to the language of 8132 itself. It observed: " `There is no language in Section 8132 delineating two classes of damages one of which gives rise to a duty to reimburse and one of which does not.' " quoting Instead, the duty to reimburse encompassed all damages recovered from third parties. The District Court found further support for its reading of 8132 both in the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under 8132 and in the legislative history, which indicated that Congress had been aware of the possibility of third-party tort recoveries for noneconomic harms yet had taken no action to confine the scope of the On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals made only passing references to the language of 8132. It reasoned that, because 8132 was enacted prior to the advent of no-fault statutes, "Congress could not have anticipated this scenario" and the statute "does not speak to this situation." The Court of Appeals addressed itself instead to what it deemed to be the underlying purposes of 8132 and FECA. In the Court of Appeals' view, the purpose of 8132 was twofold: to prevent federal employees from obtaining double recoveries and to minimize the cost of FECA to the Federal Government. These goals, in turn, were subject to FECA's overarching aim of treating federal employees " `in a fair and equitable manner.' " quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1081, p. 2 (1974). The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's reading of 8132 on the ground that it would not serve the purposes of the statute and would be "manifestly unfair" to federal employees subject to no-fault 710 F.2d, The goal of preventing double recovery does not require that the *173 United States be reimbursed when an employee's tort recovery under a no-fault statute is limited to noneconomic damages, since the Commonwealth's statutory scheme guarantees that the employee's recovery does not include payment for elements of loss covered by FECA. At the same |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | majority | United States v. Lorenzetti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111192/united-states-v-lorenzetti/ | for elements of loss covered by FECA. At the same time, allowing the United States to obtain reimbursement out of a tort recovery for noneconomic loss would frustrate the congressional goal of treating federal employees fairly and equitably, for the Pennsylvania workmen's compensation statute does not impose a parallel obligation on private employees to make reimbursements in the same circumstances. -986. The Court of Appeals found nothing in the legislative history of FECA or the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under 8132 that made it improper to read 8132 analogously to the Commonwealth's workmen's compensation The Court of Appeals recognized, however, that its interpretation of 8132 was squarely inconsistent with that of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 710 F. 2d, We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict over the scope of the United States' right of reimbursement under 8132. We now reverse. II The answer to the question presented here is evident on the face of the statute, it seems to us, for 8132 by its own terms requires respondent to reimburse the United States for the disputed sum. Section 8132 provides that whenever a federal employee suffers injury or death compensable under FECA "under circumstances creating a legal liability in a person other than the United States to pay damages," and the employee or his beneficiaries receive "money or other property in satisfaction of that liability," they "shall refund to the United States the amount of compensation paid by the United States." We find little room for confusion about the meaning of this language. Section 8132 imposes only two *174 conditions precedent to an employee's obligation to "refund. the amount of compensation paid by the United States." The first is that the employee must have suffered an injury or death under circumstances creating a legal liability in a third party to pay damages. The second is that the employee or his beneficiaries must have received money or other property in satisfaction of that liability. Here, both conditions have been met: respondent was injured in an automobile accident that gave rise to third-party liability, and he received $8,500 in satisfaction of his claim for damages. As a result, the United States is entitled to reimbursement for amounts paid to respondent for medical expenses and lost wages. Contrary to respondent's argument, 8132 does not confine the United States to the rights of a subrogee with respect to the specific classes of expenses paid by it to injured employees under FECA; instead, it expressly creates a general right of reimbursement that obtains without regard to whether |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | majority | United States v. Lorenzetti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111192/united-states-v-lorenzetti/ | general right of reimbursement that obtains without regard to whether the employee's third-party recovery includes losses that are excluded from FECA coverage.[3] *175 This reading of 8132 is reinforced by the parallel terms of 8131, which governs the right of the United States itself to prosecute an employee's third-party action. Section 8131(a)(1) requires an employee, at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, to "assign to the United States any right of action he may have to enforce [a third-party] liability" arising from the employee's accident (emphasis added). This obligation to assign causes of action arising from accidents covered by FECA is an unqualified one; the statute does not excuse an employee whose only cause of action is for elements of loss that are not compensable under FECA. See H. R. Rep. No. 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1916) (an injured employee or his beneficiary may be required to assign "any right of action" against a third party whose tortious conduct caused the injury (emphasis added)). In turn, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to prosecute or compromise any cause of action so assigned and to "deduct [from any recovery] and place to the credit of the Employees' Compensation Fund the amount of compensation already paid to the beneficiary," reserving for the employee or his beneficiaries not less than one-fifth of the award or settlement. 8131(c). There is no question but that the Secretary of Labor could have required respondent to assign his cause of action against the other driver to the United States, on pain of forfeiting his FECA compensation if he refused to do so, 8131(b), and could have maintained the action directly for the benefit of the United States. Respondent has not explained why this result is unwarranted under 8131 or why *176 8132 should be construed to diminish the scope of the United States' reimbursable interest when a third-party action is maintained by the employee himself.[4] Nothing in FECA's legislative history persuades us that 8132 means something less than what it says. FECA was enacted in 1916 as the first comprehensive injury-compensation statute for federal employees. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, repealed by Pub. L. 89-554, 8(a), 643. Section 27 of the original statute vested the United States with a right of reimbursement in terms that do not differ materially from the relevant portions of 8132 today.[5] The section was adopted "not for the purpose of increasing [FECA] compensation, but for the purpose of reimbursing the Government for payments made and indemnifying it against other amounts payable in the future." At no point did |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | majority | United States v. Lorenzetti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111192/united-states-v-lorenzetti/ | other amounts payable in the future." At no point did Congress suggest in its deliberations that the federal right of reimbursement was to be limited to particular categories of third-party recoveries for injury or death. While no-fault automobile insurance statutes were not in existence in 1916, the possibility that third-party recoveries might encompass *177 compensation for pain and suffering was well known, see, e. g., 53 Cong. Rec. 10909-10910 (1916) (remarks of Rep. Barkley); yet no effort was made to reduce the breadth of the statutory language to insulate such compensation from recovery by the United States. Congress subsequently provided added protection for employees under 8132, most notably by reserving one-fifth of the net third-party recovery for the employee, see Pub. L. 89-488, 10, but at no point has it acted to restrict the types of third-party recoveries from which the United States may obtain reimbursement. Neither do we find any inconsistency between the interpretation of 8132 rejected by the Court of Appeals and the underlying purposes of the provision. Admittedly, the goal of preventing double recoveries by injured employees does not demand that an employee in respondent's position turn over a third-party payment confined to compensation for pain and suffering. As the Court of Appeals itself recognized, however, the purpose of 8132 is not simply to prevent double recoveries but to minimize the cost of the FECA program to the Federal Government. See 258 U. S., at ; cf. H. R. Rep. No. It is self-evident that the latter goal is directly advanced by allowing the United States to obtain reimbursement out of any third-party recovery, regardless of whether the third-party recovery includes compensation for losses other than medical expenses and lost wages. When Congress has chosen to subordinate the goal of minimizing FECA expenditures to other concerns, as it did when it amended 8132 to reserve one-fifth of the net third-party recovery for the employee, it has done so explicitly. We are not at liberty to fashion an additional limitation on that goal without express authorization from Congress. The Court of Appeals believed that allowing the United States to recover in this case would be inconsistent with Congress' declared intent that federal employees "be treated in a fair and equitable manner" under FECA and that the United *178 States "strive to attain the position of being a model employer." S. Rep. No. 93-1081, p. 2 (1974). However useful these general statements of congressional intent may be in resolving ambiguities in the statutory scheme, they are not a license to ignore the plain meaning of a specific statutory provision. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,984 | 11 | majority | United States v. Lorenzetti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111192/united-states-v-lorenzetti/ | to ignore the plain meaning of a specific statutory provision. The language relied on by the Court of Appeals concerned a wide variety of amendments to FECA enacted in 1974, none of which materially altered the balance struck in 8132 between the interests of employees and the interests of the Federal Government. In addition, as this case amply demonstrates, any unfairness or inequity arises not from the operation of 8132 alone but from the provision's interaction with distinct state statutory schemes. Even if Congress' desire that the United States be "a model employer" were a sufficient basis for interpreting 8132 to avoid intrinsic inequities, it hardly would be a sufficient basis for inferring that Congress meant to sacrifice the substantial federal interest in reimbursement in order to avoid extrinsic complications introduced by independent state legislative actions. Nor it is true, as the Court of Appeals seemed to believe, that interpreting 8132 to require reimbursement here will leave federal employees systematically worse off than their counterparts in the private sector; the prevailing rule under state workmen's compensation statutes is that an employer is fully entitled to be reimbursed from third-party recoveries for pain and suffering, even when the portion of an award attributable to pain and suffering is clearly separable from the portion attributable to economic losses. See 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 74.35, pp. 14-476 to 14-478 The Court of Appeals also sought to justify its conclusion on the ground that Congress could not have anticipated the adoption of no-fault automobile insurance statutes and the attendant restriction on third-party tort liability for economic losses. As pointed out above, the fact that Congress could not foresee no-fault statutes does not mean that Congress did *179 not foresee the risk that federal reimbursement rights would trench on third-party recoveries for noneconomic losses. More important, the fact that changing state tort laws may have led to unforeseen consequences does not mean that the federal statutory scheme may be judicially expanded to take those changes into account. See Morrison-Knudsen Construction It is for Congress, not the courts, to revise longstanding legislation in order to accommodate the effects of changing social conditions. Congress simply has not done so here. III For these reasons, we hold that 8132 entitles the United States to be reimbursed for FECA compensation out of any damages award or settlement made in satisfaction of third-party liability for personal injury or death, regardless of whether the award or settlement is for losses other than medical expenses and lost wages. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Director of Revenue of Mo. v. COBANK ACB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118404/director-of-revenue-of-mo-v-cobank-acb/ | In this case we are asked to decide whether the National Bank for Cooperatives, which Congress has designated as a federally chartered instrumentality of the United States, is exempt from state income taxation. We hold that it is not. I In the Farm Credit Act of 1933, as amended, 12 U.S. C. 2001 et seq., Congress created various lending institutions within the Farm Credit System to meet the specific credit needs of farmers. Among these institutions were banks for cooperatives, one in each of 12 farm credit districts, and a Central Bank for Cooperatives. These banks were designed to make loans to cooperative associations engaged in marketing farm products, purchasing farm supplies, or furnishing farm services. Today, the Farm Credit System includes banks for cooperatives, production credit associations, farm credit banks, and federal land bank associations. 2002(a). By statute, each of these institutions is designated as a "federally chartered instrumentalit[y] of the United States." 2121 (banks for cooperatives and Central Bank for Cooperatives); 2141 (National Bank for Cooperatives); 2071(a) and (b)(7) (production credit associations); 2011(a) (farm credit banks); 2091(a) and (b)(4) (federal land bank associations). The Farm Credit Act also addresses the taxation of these institutions. The provision applicable to a bank for cooperatives, the institution at issue in this case, states: "Each bank for cooperatives and its obligations are instrumentalities of the United States and as such any and all notes, debentures, and other obligations issued by such bank shall be exempt, both as to principal and interest from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, *319 and gift taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States or any State, territorial, or local taxing authority, except that interest on such obligations shall be subject to Federal income taxation in the hands of the holder." 2134. Respondent CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives, which had been formed in 1989 through the consolidation of 10 district banks for cooperatives and the Central Bank for Cooperatives.[1] The National Bank for Cooperatives filed Missouri corporate income tax returns for the years 1991 through 1994 and paid the taxes shown on those returns. In March CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of the National Bank for Cooperatives, requesting an exemption from all state income taxes and refunds on the taxes paiderroneously, it allegedfor 1991 through 1994. Relying on the doctrine of implied tax immunity that originated in CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity. CoBank argued that, because |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Director of Revenue of Mo. v. COBANK ACB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118404/director-of-revenue-of-mo-v-cobank-acb/ | Congress has expressly waived this immunity. CoBank argued that, because the current version of the Farm Credit Act does not expressly waive this immunity, banks for cooperatives are exempt from Missouri's corporate income tax. The Director of Revenue of Missouri denied the request. On appeal, the Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the Director of Revenue's assessment of corporate income tax, because the National Bank for Cooperatives had not established that it was a federal instrumentality statutorily exempt from state taxation of its income. The commission determined that Congress did not provide expressly that *320 banks for cooperatives, in contrast to farm credit banks and federal land bank associations, would have immunity from state income taxation. The commission reasoned that had Congress intended to confer upon banks for cooperatives the same immunity that was provided to farm credit banks and federal land bank associations, it would have done so expressly. For jurisdictional reasons, the commission did not decide CoBank's constitutional claim. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the commission's decision and held that banks for cooperatives are exempt from state income taxation.[2]Production Credit Assn. of Southeastern The Missouri Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity. According to the Missouri Supreme Court, because the current version of the Farm Credit Act is silent as to such institutions' immunity from state taxation, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the institutions are exempt from state income taxes. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that other courts that had addressed the issue of state taxation of member institutions of the Farm Credit System also had concluded that the States could not tax such institutions. at -144 rev'd on other grounds, ; cert. denied, ; Northwest La. Production Credit ). The New Mexico Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court have reached the opposite conclusion with *321 respect to state taxation of production credit associations. See Production Credit Assn. of Eastern N. M. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., NMCA-021 ¶ 26, ; Indiana Dept. of State Since the statutory history and provisions regarding the taxation of production credit associations and banks for cooperatives are virtually identical, compare 12 U.S. C. 2077 with 2134; compare Farm Credit Act of 1971, 2.17, with 3.13, ; compare Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, 205(d)(16), with 205(e)(10),[3] we granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. II Congress has expressly designated banks for cooperatives as "instrumentalities of the United States." 12 U.S. C. 2121. We have held, in addressing |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Director of Revenue of Mo. v. COBANK ACB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118404/director-of-revenue-of-mo-v-cobank-acb/ | States." 12 U.S. C. 2121. We have held, in addressing state taxation of contractors conducting business with the United States, that an instrumentality is entitled to implied tax immunity only when it is "so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities." United Relying on New Mexico, the Director of Revenue argues that banks for cooperatives are not "so closely connected" to the United States as to be indistinguishable from the United States, and that banks for cooperatives thus are not entitled to immunity from state taxation. CoBank disagrees with this characterization and asks us to conclude that banks for cooperatives are indeed virtual arms of the United States, worthy of implied tax immunity under McCulloch. We need not, however, reach this implied immunity question. Implied immunity becomes an issue only when Congress has failed to indicate whether an instrumentality is *322 subject to state taxation. In this case, Congress has provided that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation. To be sure, Congress did not include an express statement in the current version of 2134. However, nothing in the statute indicates a repeal of the previous express approval of state taxation, and the structure of the Farm Credit Act indicates by negative implication that banks for cooperatives are not entitled to immunity. A Upon their creation in 1933, banks for cooperatives were subject to state income taxation except during periods when the United States held stock in the banks. Farm Credit Act of 1933, 63, ("Such banks, and their income, shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States or by any State, Territorial, or local taxing authority The exemption provided herein shall not apply with respect to any Bank for Cooperatives, or its property or income after the stock held in it by the United States has been retired"). Under this statute, as soon as governmental investment in a bank for cooperatives was repaid (as it was for all such banks by 1968), the bank had to pay state income taxes because the exemption from such taxation no longer applied. When Congress amended the Farm Credit Act in 1971, it did not change the rule that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation unless the United States holds stock in the banks. Farm Credit Act of 1971, 3.13, Although all banks for cooperatives were at the time privately owned, Congress provided that the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration had the authority on behalf of the United States to purchase stock in banks for |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Director of Revenue of Mo. v. COBANK ACB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118404/director-of-revenue-of-mo-v-cobank-acb/ | of the United States to purchase stock in banks for cooperatives "as a temporary investment in the stock of the institution to help one or several of the banks to meet emergency credit needs of borrowers." 4.0, The 1971 version of 2134 therefore provided, in relevant part: *323 "Such banks and their income shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States or by any State, territorial, or local taxing authority The exemption provided in the preceding sentence shall apply only for any year or part thereof in which stock in the bank for cooperatives is held by the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration." 3.13, -609. In 1985, Congress enacted various amendments to the Act. Among other things, these amendments eliminated the position of Governor of the Farm Credit Administration, discontinued the Farm Credit Administration's authority to own stock in banks for cooperatives, and included numerous "Technical and Conforming Amendments." Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, 201, ; 101, ; 205, -1707. One of these technical and conforming amendments was the deletion of the two sentences within 2134 that, first, exempted a bank for cooperatives from state taxation and, second, limited that exemption to periods when the Governor held stock in the bank. 205(e)(10), as amended, 12 U.S. C. 2134. CoBank argues that the deletion of these two sentences altered the States' ability to tax the income of banks for cooperatives. According to CoBank, because the deletion eliminated the express statutory authorization for such taxation, Congress intended banks for cooperatives to be immune from state taxation under McCulloch `s implied immunity doctrine. We do not share CoBank's interpretation as to the effect of this amendment, because there is no indication that Congress intended to change the taxation of banks for cooperatives with the 1985 amendments. Since 1933, the States could collect revenue from banks for cooperatives. Nothing in the 1985 amendments expressly changes this. And, it would be surprising, indeed, if Congress had eliminated this important fact sub silentio. *324 CoBank's interpretation would mean that Congress made a radicalbut entirely implicitchange in the taxation of banks for cooperatives with the 1985 amendment to 2134. The amendment to 2134 was merely one of numerous "technical and conforming amendments" to the Farm Credit Act. Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, 205, 1707 (section entitled "Technical and Conforming Amendments"). In fact, the deletion of the sentence within 2134 referring to the Governor was one of more than 30 deletions of references to the Governor, a position eliminated by the 1985 amendments to the Act. The more |
Justice Thomas | 2,001 | 1 | majority | Director of Revenue of Mo. v. COBANK ACB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118404/director-of-revenue-of-mo-v-cobank-acb/ | eliminated by the 1985 amendments to the Act. The more logical interpretation of this amendment to 2134 is that Congress merely deleted language that had become superfluous once the United States no longer owned, and no longer could own, stock in banks for cooperatives. This explanation accords with the more than 50-year history of the Farm Credit Act, permitting the States to tax banks for cooperatives except when there was governmental investment in the banks. Had Congress simply deleted the final sentence of 2134 that limited the exemption while retaining the sentence granting the exemption, we would have no trouble concluding that Congress had eliminated the States' ability to tax banks for cooperatives. Short of this act, however, we find Congress' silence insufficient to disrupt the 50-year history of state taxation of banks for cooperatives. B In addition, the structure of the Farm Credit Act confirms that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation. With respect to each lending institution in the Farm Credit System, the Act contains a taxation provision that specifically delineates the immunity from taxation enjoyed by that entity. For example, farm credit banks and federal land bank associations receive the type of immunity from state taxation that the Missouri Supreme Court held to be implied here for banks for cooperatives. See 12 U.S. C. 2023 ("The *325 Farm Credit Banks and the capital, reserves, and surplus thereof, and the income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation"); 2098 ("Each Federal land bank association and the capital, reserves, and surplus thereof, and the income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation"). By contrast, since their creation in 1933, banks for cooperatives have been granted only limited exemptions from taxation. Had Congress intended to confer upon banks for cooperatives the more comprehensive exemption from taxation that it had provided to farm credit banks and federal land bank associations, it would have done so expressly as it had done elsewhere in the Farm Credit Act. Thus, in light of the structure of the Farm Credit Actand the explicit grant of immunity to other institutions within the Farm Credit SystemCongress' silence with respect to banks for cooperatives indicates that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation. * * * The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | dissenting | Wise v. Lipscomb | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109912/wise-v-lipscomb/ | I agree with the majority's decision not to reach the Voting Rights Act question, since it was not presented to either of the courts below. I also agree with the analysis of our past decisions found in Part II of MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion. I cannot agree, however, that the actions of the Dallas City Council are distinguishable from those of the local governing body in East Carroll Parish School I therefore conclude that the plan ordered by the District Court here must be evaluated in accordance with the federal common law of remedies applicable to judicially devised reapportionment plans. I In East Carroll Parish School suit against the parish (county) was initially brought by a white resident who claimed that population disparities among the wards of the parish unconstitutionally denied him an equal vote in elections for members of the school board and the police jury, the governing body of the parish. Following a * finding of unconstitutionality, the District Court adopted a plan submitted by the police jury, which called for at-large elections of both bodies. Two years later (after the 1970 census), in response to the court's direction, the at-large plan was resubmitted by the police jury. Respondent then intervened, arguing that the at-large elections would dilute the Negro vote in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The District Court again accepted the police jury plan, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that multimember districts were unconstitutional. Although we did not reach the constitutional ground relied on by the Court of Appeals, we sustained its judgment. We concluded that the District Court had abused its equitable discretion in not requiring the division of the parish into single-member wards: "We have frequently reaffirmed the rule that when United States district courts are put to the task of fashioning reapportionment plans to supplant concededly invalid state legislation, single-member districts are to be preferred absent unusual circumstances." It is plain from the foregoing that we treated the plan submitted by the local legislative body in East Carroll as a judicially devised plan, to which the federal common law of remedies developed in reapportionment cases was applicable. It is equally plain that we did not treat the police jury's submission as a "legislatively enacted" plan, which would only have had to meet the strictures of the Constitution and would not necessarily have been subject to evaluation under the more stringent standards applicable to court-devised plans. See Indeed, in rejecting the argument of the United States (appearing as amicus curiae) that the East Carroll plan was subject to the preclearance |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | dissenting | Wise v. Lipscomb | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109912/wise-v-lipscomb/ | that the East Carroll plan was subject to the preclearance procedure of 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we expressly noted that the police jury "did not have the authority to reapportion itself," and that the plan, though submitted *552 by the police jury, was a "court-ordered pla[n] resulting from equitable jurisdiction over the adversary proceedings." -639, n. 6. There is no meaningful distinction between the facts here and the facts in East Carroll. Like the police jury in East Carroll, the City Council of Dallas did not act pursuant to any state enabling legislation governing the procedures for reapportioning itself when it first proposed the eight/three plan to the District Court in January Nor did it act pursuant to any state-derived authority when it "enacted" the plan following the District Court's first approval of it in March Under the terms of its Charter, the Dallas City Council could reapportion itself only by a popular referendum. See Tex. Const., Art. XI, 5; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1170 (Vernon Supp. 1978). The Council unquestionably failed to comply with the existing state procedures for enacting a reapportionment plan; indeed, the District Court itself noted that, were the Dallas City Council not responding to a judicial finding of unconstitutionality, it would have been acting unlawfully in unilaterally reapportioning itself. That this plan was not devised by the City Council in the usual course of its legislative responsibilities is further evidenced by the fact that the Council told a group of Mexican-American citizens, who wished to present for the Council's deliberations an alternative, single-member district plan, that they were in the "wrong forum" and should go to federal court. App. 43-44. It seems clear that the eight/three plan was proposed less as a matter of legislative judgment than as a response by a party litigant to the court's invitation to aid in devising a plan. Indeed, the District Court itself appeared at times to regard the eight/three plan as a court-devised plan in which at-large voting had to be justified by special and unique circumstances. See ante, at 543 (opinion of WHITE, J.). *553 It is suggested that the City Council here, unlike the police jury in East Carroll, purported to reapportion itself when it first submitted the eight/three plan. See ante, at 545 (opinion of WHITE, J.). But that simply is not the case. This plan was initially proposed not in the form of a formal, binding enactment but merely as an expression of the Council's "intention." App. 188. The Council did not even bother to go through the |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | dissenting | Wise v. Lipscomb | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109912/wise-v-lipscomb/ | The Council did not even bother to go through the formality of enacting a supposedly binding ordinance until after the District Court, following a full hearing, indicated that it approved of the plan as a remedy for the constitutional violations; the procedures followed prior to the time when the District Court ordered implementation of the eight/three plan, moreover, were insufficient under state law validly to change the structure of the Council. While our past decisions have held that a legislatively enacted reapportionment plan is the preferred response to a judicial finding of unconstitutional apportionment, I do not believe that these cases contemplated that a legislature could meet this responsibilityand thereby avoid the requirements applicable to court-devised plansby making a submission not in accordance with valid state procedures governing legislative enactments.[1] If the plan submitted in East Carroll was properly regarded as a judicially devised plan, *554 then the plan before us today must also be so regarded, and I see no reason to depart from the clear implications of this unanimous decision of the Court rendered only two Terms ago. I therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals properly evaluated this plan under the standards of the federal common law, which has for years recognized that multimember districts and at-large voting are presumptively disfavored. II Even if this plan were properly to be viewed as a "legislatively enacted" plan, however, the majority's apparent assumption that it represents a proper remedy would nonetheless be troubling. Where the very nature of the underlying violation is dilution of the voting power of a racial minority resulting from the effects of at-large voting in a particular political community, I believe that it is inappropriate either for the local legislative body or a court to respond with more of the same. Although we have refrained from holding that multi-member districts are unconstitutional per se, the presumption in favor of single-member districts as a matter of federal remedial law is a strong one. See, e. g., ; ; We have repeatedly explained this preference by virtue of the fact that multimember districts "tend to submerge electoral minorities and overrepresent electoral majorities." ; accord, See also In the instant case, it is essentially undisputed that the use of a multimember district (the city of Dallas) for the at-large election of all City Council members had "submerged" an electoral minority, the Negro voters of Dallas. In this respect the case is unlike East Carroll, where the original electoral scheme was invalidated solely on the ground of malapportionment *555 and where the "racial dilution" challenge was raised only in |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | dissenting | Wise v. Lipscomb | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109912/wise-v-lipscomb/ | and where the "racial dilution" challenge was raised only in objection to the proposed remedy. Multi-member districts, which are disfavored as court-devised remedies because of their "tendency" or potential to create racial dilution, should a fortiori be disfavored when they are proposed to cure a proved use of a "multi-member scheme to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial elements of the voting population."[2] Based on respondents' proof of a diluting effect on Negro voting strength in Dallasand of the long history of de jure discrimination contributing to itthe District Court held the Dallas scheme to be unconstitutional. Although the Council did not challenge the finding that the at-large election of all its members was unconstitutional, the plan it submitted to the District Court replicated the offending feature of its original scheme by providing for the at-large election of three Council members. To put the burden on respondents to prove that the submission, insofar as it perpetuates at-large voting for Council members, is as unconstitutional as the original plan seems contrary to logic and common sense. I cannot agree that either the Constitution or the remedial principles of equity require such a result. For both of these reasons, I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the use of at-large voting for City Council members in the city of Dallas should not have been approved as part of the remedy in this case by the District Court. I therefore dissent. |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | While I join the Court's opinion without reservation, the additional writing by my colleagues prompts this comment. The inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes has a historical basis that merits special mention. They governed territory on this continent long before Columbus arrived. In contrast, most of the States were never actually independent sovereigns, and those that were enjoyed that independent *211 status for only a few years. Given the fact that Congress can authorize the States to exerciseas their owninherent powers that the Constitution has otherwise placed off limits, see, e. g., Prudential Ins. I find nothing exceptional in the conclusion that it can also relax restrictions on an ancient inherent tribal power. JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. The amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) enacted after the Court's decision in demonstrates Congress' clear intention to restore to the tribes an inherent sovereign power to prosecute nonmember Indians. Congress was careful to rely on the theory of inherent sovereignty, and not on a delegation. JUSTICE SOUTER'S position that it was a delegation nonetheless, post, at 231 (dissenting opinion), is by no means without support, but I would take Congress at its word. Under that view, the first prosecution of Lara was not a delegated federal prosecution, and his double jeopardy argument must fail. That is all we need say to resolve this case. The Court's analysis goes beyond this narrower rationale and culminates in a surprising holding: "For these reasons, we hold that the Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians." Ante, at 210. The Court's holding is on a point of major significance to our understanding and interpretation of the Constitution; and, in my respectful view, it is most doubtful. Were we called upon to decide whether Congress has this power, it would be a difficult question. Our decision in United which the Court cites today but discusses very little, is replete with references to the inherent authority of the tribe over its own members. As I read that case, it is the historic possession of inherent power over "the relations among members of a *212 tribe" that is the whole justification for the limited tribal sovereignty the Court there It is a most troubling proposition to say that Congress can relax the restrictions on inherent tribal sovereignty in a way that extends that sovereignty beyond those historical limits. Cf., e. g., To conclude that a tribe's inherent sovereignty allows it to exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember in a criminal case is to |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | jurisdiction over a nonmember in a criminal case is to enlarge the "unique and limited character" of the inherent sovereignty that Lara, after all, is a citizen of the United States. To hold that Congress can subject him, within our domestic borders, to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution is a serious step. The Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent of the governed. Their consent depends on the understanding that the Constitution has established the federal structure, which grants the citizen the protection of two governments, the Nation and the State. Each sovereign must respect the proper sphere of the other, for the citizen has rights and duties as to both. See U. S. Term Limits, Here, contrary to this design, the National Government seeks to subject a citizen to the criminal jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct occurring wholly within the territorial borders of the Nation and one of the States. This is unprecedented. There is a historical exception for Indian tribes, but only to the limited extent that a member of a tribe consents to be subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe. See The majority today reaches beyond that limited exception. *2 The Court resolves, or perhaps avoids, the basic question of the power of the Government to yield authority inside the domestic borders over citizens to a third sovereign by using the euphemistic formulation that in amending the ICRA Congress merely relaxed restrictions on the tribes. See ante, at 196, 200, 202, 205, and 207. There is no language in the statute, or the legislative history, that justifies this unusual phrase, cf. 25 U.S. C. 01(2) (referring to "the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians"); and, in my respectful view, it obscures what is actually at stake in this case. The terms of the statute are best understood as a grant or cession from Congress to the tribes, and it should not be doubted that what Congress has attempted to do is subject American citizens to the authority of an extraconstitutional sovereign to which they had not previously been subject. The relaxing-restrictions formulation is further belied by the involvement of the United States in all aspects of the tribal prosecution of a nonmember Indian. Federal law defines the separate tribes, 01, the broader class of "Indians," the maximum penalty which the tribes may impose for crimes, and the procedural protections to which defendants are entitled in the trials, 02. This does not indicate |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | are entitled in the trials, 02. This does not indicate the sort of detachment from the exercise of prosecutorial authority implicit in the description of Congress' Act as having relaxed restrictions. In addition to trying to evade the important structural question by relying on the verbal formula of relaxation, the Court also tries to bolster its position by noting that due process and equal protection claims are still reserved. Ante, at 210. That is true, but it ignores the elementary principle that the constitutional structure was in place before the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted. To demean the constitutional structure and the consent upon which it rests by implying they are wholly dependent for their vindication on the Due Process and Equal Protection *214 Clauses is a further, unreasoned holding of serious import. The political freedom guaranteed to citizens by the federal structure is a liberty both distinct from and every bit as important as those freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Cf. The individual citizen has an enforceable right to those structural guarantees of liberty, a right which the majority ignores. Perhaps the Court's holding could be justified by an argument that by enrolling in one tribe Lara consented to the criminal jurisdiction of other tribes, but the Court does not mention the point. And, in all events, we should be cautious about adopting that fiction. The present case, however, does not require us to address these difficult questions of constitutional dimension. Congress made it clear that its intent was to recognize and affirm tribal authority to try Indian nonmembers as inherent in tribal status. The proper occasion to test the legitimacy of the Tribe's authority, that is, whether Congress had the power to do what it sought to do, was in the first, tribal proceeding. There, however, Lara made no objection to the Tribe's authority to try him. In the second, federal proceeding, because the express rationale for the Tribe's authority to try Larawhether legitimate or notwas inherent sovereignty, not delegated federal power, there can be no double jeopardy violation. Cf. For that reason, I concur in the judgment. JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. As this case should make clear, the time has come to reexamine the premises and logic of our tribal sovereignty cases. It seems to me that much of the confusion reflected *215 in our precedent arises from two largely incompatible and doubtful assumptions. First, Congress (rather than some other part of the Federal Government) can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity. See, e. g., |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | tribes without rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity. See, e. g., United Second, the Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own members. See, e. g., These assumptions, which I must accept as the case comes to us, dictate the outcome in this case, and I therefore concur in the judgment. I write separately principally because the Court fails to confront these tensions, a result that flows from the Court's inadequate constitutional I cannot agree with the Court, for instance, that the Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate the "metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty." Ante, at 202; see also ante, at 210 (holding that "the Constitution authorizes Congress" to regulate tribal sovereignty). Unlike the Court, ante, at 200-201, I cannot locate such congressional authority in the Treaty Clause, U. S. Const., Art. 2, cl. 2, or the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 3. Additionally, I would ascribe much more significance to legislation such as the Act of Mar. 3, 1871, Rev. Stat. 2079, codified at 25 U.S. C. 71, that purports to terminate the practice of dealing with Indian tribes by treaty. The making of treaties, after all, is the one mechanism that the Constitution clearly provides for the Federal Government to interact with sovereigns other than the States. Yet, if I accept that Congress does have this authority, I believe that the result in is questionable. In my view, the tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian law cases untenably hold both positions simultaneously. I In response to the Court's decision in Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA). Specifically, through this " fix," Congress amended ICRA's definition of the tribes' "powers of self-government" to "recogniz[e] and affir[m]" the existence of "inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians." 25 U.S. C. 01(2). There is quite simply no way to interpret a recognition and affirmation of inherent power as a delegation of federal power, as the Court explains. Ante, Delegated power is the very antithesis of inherent power. But even if the statute were less clear, I would not interpret it as a delegation of federal power. The power to bring federal prosecutions, which is part of the putative delegated power, is manifestly and quintessentially executive power. ; Congress cannot transfer federal executive power to individuals who are beyond "meaningful Presidential control." And this means that, at a minimum, the President must have some measure of "the power to appoint and remove" those exercising that power. ; see also It does |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | remove" those exercising that power. ; see also It does not appear that the President has any control over tribal officials, let alone a substantial measure of the appointment and removal power. Cf. Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae 27-29. Thus, at least until we are prepared to recognize absolutely independent agencies entirely outside of the Executive Branch with the power to bind the Executive Branch (for a tribal prosecution would then bar a subsequent federal prosecution), the tribes cannot be analogized to administrative agencies, as the dissent suggests, post, at 227 (opinion of SOUTER, J.). That is, reading the " fix" as a delegation of federal power (without also divining some adequate method of Presidential control) would create grave constitutional difficulties. Cf. ; Solid Waste *217 Agency of Northern Cook Accordingly, the Court has only two options: Either the " fix" changed the result in or it did nothing at all.[1] In -323, the Court explained that, prior to colonization, "the tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities." The Court acknowledged, however, that, after "[t]heir incorporation within the territory of the United States," the tribes could exercise their inherent sovereignty only as consistent with federal policy embodied in treaties, statutes, and Executive Orders. ; see also Examining these sources for potential conflict, the Court concluded that the tribes retained the ability to exercise their inherent sovereignty to punish their own members. -330. Although seems to be a sensible example of federal common lawmaking, I am not convinced that it was correctly decided. To be sure, it makes sense to conceptualize *218 the tribes as sovereigns that, due to their unique situation, cannot exercise the full measure of their sovereign powers. at times, seems to analyze the problem in just this way. See, e. g., -326; discussed infra). But I do not see how this is consistent with the apparently "undisputed fact that Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters, including their form of government." 435 U.S., at The sovereign is, by definition, the entity "in which independent and supreme authority is vested." Black's Law Dictionary 95 It is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty not to exist merely at the whim of an external government. Further, federal policy itself could be thought to be inconsistent with this residual-sovereignty theory. In 1871, Congress enacted a statute that purported to prohibit entering into treaties with the "Indian nation[s] or tribe[s]." codified at 25 U.S. C. 71. Although this Act is constitutionally suspect ), it nevertheless reflects the view of the political branches |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | ), it nevertheless reflects the view of the political branches that the tribes had become a purely domestic matter. To be sure, this does not quite suffice to demonstrate that the tribes had lost their sovereignty. After all, States retain sovereignty despite the fact that Congress can regulate States qua States in certain limited circumstances. See, e. g., ; cf. New ; But the States (unlike the tribes) are part of a constitutional framework that allocates sovereignty between the State and Federal Governments and specifically grants Congress authority to legislate with respect to them, see *219 U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, 5. And even so, we have explained that "the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States." New ; ; see also -915. The tribes, by contrast, are not part of this constitutional order, and their sovereignty is not guaranteed by it. As Chief Justice Marshall explained: "[T]he relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else. "[Y]et it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations." Cherokee Chief Justice Marshall further described the tribes as "independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights," and specifically noted that the tribes possessed the power to "mak[e] treaties." Although the tribes never fit comfortably within the category of foreign nations, the 1871 Act tends to show that the political branches no longer considered the tribes to be anything like foreign nations. And it is at least arguable that the United States no longer considered the tribes to be sovereigns.[2] Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And this confusion continues to infuse federal Indian law and our cases. *220 Nevertheless, if I accept I also must accept that the tribes do retain inherent sovereignty (at least to enforce their criminal laws against their own members) and the logical consequences of this fact. In the Court elaborated the dual sovereignty doctrine and explained that a single act that violates the "`peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each" constitutes two separate offenses. This, of course, is the reason that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns. But whether an act violates the "peace and dignity" of a sovereign depends not in the least on whether the perpetrator is a member (in the case of the |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | the perpetrator is a member (in the case of the tribes) or a citizen (in the case of the States and the Nation) of the sovereign. also instructs, relying on that the separate-sovereign inquiry "turns on whether the two entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct sources of power." at But makes clear that the tribes and the Federal Government do draw their authority to punish from distinct sources and that they are separate sovereigns. Otherwise, the subsequent federal prosecution in would have violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.[3] It follows from our case law that Indian tribes possess inherent sovereignty to punish anyone who violates their laws. In the Court held that the Indian tribes could no longer enforce their criminal laws against nonmember Indians. Despite the obvious tension, and are not necessarily inconsistent. Although and taken together, necessarily imply that the tribes retain inherent sovereignty to try anyone who violates their criminal laws, and make *221 clear that conflict with federal policy can operate to prohibit the exercise of this sovereignty. then, is not a case about "inherent sovereignty" (a term that we have used too imprecisely); rather, it is a case about whether a specific exercise of tribal sovereignty conflicts with federal policy. Indeed, the Court in relied primarily on which held that tribes could not enforce their criminal laws against non-Indians. In reaching that conclusion, the Court in carefully examined the views of Congress and the Executive Branch. ; at least rehearsed the same 495 U.S., at 6-692. Thus, although is sprinkled with references to various constitutional concerns, see, e. g., -694, and are classic federal-common-law decisions. See also County of I acknowledge that our cases have distinguished between "tribal power [that] is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations" and tribal power as it relates to the external world. ; see also ; South ; ; -325. This distinction makes perfect sense as a matter of federal common law: Purely "internal" matters are by definition unlikely to implicate any federal policy. But, critically, our cases have never drawn this line as a constitutional matter. That is why we have analyzed extant federal law (embodied in treaties, statutes, and Executive Orders) before concluding that particular tribal assertions of power were incompatible with the position of the tribes. *222 See, e. g., National Farmers Union Ins. ; ] that Congress consistently believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions").[4] As noted, in response to Congress amended ICRA. Specifically, Congress "recognized and affirmed" the existence of "inherent power to |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | Congress "recognized and affirmed" the existence of "inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians." 25 U.S. C. 01(2). President Bush signed this legislation into law. See 27 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1573-1574 (1991). Further, as this litigation demonstrates, it is the position of the Executive Branch that the tribes possess inherent authority to prosecute nonmember Indians. In my view, these authoritative pronouncements of the political branches make clear that the exercise of this aspect of sovereignty is not inconsistent with federal policy and therefore with the position of the tribes. Thus, while may have been a correct federal-common-law decision at the time, the political branches have subsequently made clear that the *223 tribes' exercise of criminal jurisdiction against nonmember Indians is consistent with federal policy. The potential conflicts on which must have been premised, according to the political branches, do not exist. See also ante, at 205. I therefore agree that, as the case comes to us, the Tribe acted as a separate sovereign when it prosecuted respondent. Accordingly, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the subsequent federal prosecution. I I believe that we must examine more critically our tribal sovereignty case law. Both the Court and the dissent, however, compound the confusion by failing to undertake the necessary rigorous constitutional I would begin by carefully following our assumptions to their logical conclusions and by identifying the potential sources of federal power to modify tribal sovereignty. The dissent admits that "[t]reaties and statutes delineating the tribal-federal relationship are properly viewed as an independent elaboration by the political branches of the fine details of the tribes' dependent position, which strips the tribes of any power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over those outside their own memberships." Post, at 228. To the extent that this is a description of the federal-common-law process, I agree. But I do not understand how the dissent can then conclude that "the jurisdictional implications [arising from this analysis are] constitutional in nature." By this I understand the dissent to mean that Congress cannot alter the result, though the dissent never quite says so. The analysis obviously has constitutional implications. It is, for example, dispositive of respondent's double jeopardy claim. But it does not follow that this Court's federal-common-law decisions limiting tribes' authority to exercise their inherent sovereignty somehow become enshrined as constitutional holdings that the political branches cannot *224 alter. When the political branches demonstrate that a particular exercise of the tribes' sovereign power is in fact consistent with federal policy, the underpinnings of a federal-common-law decision disabling the exercise of that tribal power |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | a federal-common-law decision disabling the exercise of that tribal power disappear. Although I do not necessarily agree that the tribes have any residual inherent sovereignty or that Congress is the constitutionally appropriate branch to make adjustments to sovereignty, see Part it is important to recognize the logical implications of these assumptions. Similarly unavailing is the dissent's observation that when we perform the separate-sovereign analysis "we are undertaking a constitutional analysis based on legal categories of constitutional dimension." Post, at 229. The dissent concludes from this that our double jeopardy analysis in this context "must itself have had constitutional status." This ipse dixit does not transform our common-law decisions into constitutional holdings. Cf. I do, however, agree that this case raises important constitutional questions that the Court does not begin to answer. The Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty. The Court cites the Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power. Ante, at 200. I cannot agree that the Indian Commerce Clause "`provide[s] Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.'" ). At one time, the implausibility of this assertion at least troubled the Court, see, e. g., United (16) and I would be willing to revisit the question. Cf., e. g., United States v. ; United ; *225 Next, the Court acknowledges that "[t]he treaty power does not literally authorize Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article power authorizing the President, not Congress, `to make Treaties.'" Ante, at 201 (quoting U. S. Const., Art. 2, cl. 2). This, of course, suffices to show that it provides no power to Congress, at least in the absence of a specific treaty. Cf. (0). The treaty power does not, as the Court seems to believe, provide Congress with free-floating power to legislate as it sees fit on topics that could potentially implicate some unspecified treaty. Such an assertion is especially ironic in light of Congress' enacted prohibition on Indian treaties. In the end, the Court resorts to citing past examples of congressional assertions of this or similar power. Ante, at 202-203. At times, such history might suffice. Cf. Dames & ; Youngstown Sheet & Tube But it does not suffice here for at least two reasons. First, federal Indian law is at odds with itself. I find it difficult to reconcile the result in with Congress' 1871 prospective prohibition on the making of treaties with the Indian tribes. The Federal Government cannot simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary |
Justice Stevens | 2,004 | 16 | concurring | United States v. Lara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134732/united-states-v-lara/ | to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain that the tribes possess anything resembling "sovereignty." See Part In short, the history points in both directions. Second, much of the practice that the Court cites does not actually help its argument. The "Insular Cases," which include the Hawaii and Puerto Rico examples, ante, at 203-204, involved Territories of the United States, over which Congress has plenary power to govern and regulate. See ; U. S. Const., Art. IV, 3, cl. 2. The existence of a textual source for congressional power distinguishes these cases. And, incidentally, although *226 one might think that Congress' authority over the tribes could be found in Article IV, 3, cl. 2, the Court has held that the Territories are the United States for double jeopardy purposes, see, e. g., -322; Puerto which would preclude the result in It is for this reason as well that the degree of autonomy of Puerto Rico is beside the point. See ; post, at 229. The Court should admit that it has failed in its quest to find a source of congressional power to adjust tribal sovereignty. Such an acknowledgment might allow the Court to ask the logically antecedent question whether Congress (as opposed to the President) has this power. A cogent answer would serve as the foundation for the analysis of the sovereignty issues posed by this case. We might find that the Federal Government cannot regulate the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and simultaneously maintain that the tribes are sovereigns in any meaningful sense. But until we begin to analyze these questions honestly and rigorously, the confusion that I have identified will continue to haunt our cases. |
Justice Souter | 1,998 | 20 | majority | Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118220/geissal-v-moore-medical-corp/ | The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), authorizes a qualified beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to obtain continued coverage under the plan when he might otherwise lose that benefit for certain reasons, such as the termination of employment. The issue in this case is whether 29 U.S. C. 1162(2)(D)(i) allows an employer to deny COBRA continuation coverage to a qualified beneficiary who is covered under another group health plan at the time he makes his COBRA election. We hold that it does not. I On July 16, 1993, respondent Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, who was suffering from cancer. While employed, Geissal was covered under Moore's group health plan as well as the health plan provided by his wife's employer, Trans World Airlines (TWA), through Aetna Life Insurance Company. According to Geissal, soon after he lost his job, Moore told him that he had a right under COBRA to elect to continue coverage under Moore's plan. Geissal so elected, and made the necessary premium payments for six months. On January 27, 1994, however, Moore informed Geissal it had been mistaken: he was not actually entitled to COBRA benefits *77 because on the date of his election he was already covered by another group health plan, through his wife's employer. Geissal then brought this suit against Moore, the Group Benefit Plan of Moore Medical Group, Herbert Walker (an administrator of the plan), and Sedgwick Lowndes (another administrator) (collectively, Moore).[1] Geissal charged Moore with violating COBRA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing health benefits coverage (Count I); he further claimed that Moore was estopped to deny him continuation coverage because it had misled him to think that he was entitled to COBRA coverage (Count II), that Moore's misrepresentation amounted to a waiver of any right to assert a reading of the plan provisions that would deprive him of continuation coverage (Count III), and, finally, that Walker had violated COBRA by failing to provide him with certain plan documents (Count IV). After limited discovery, Geissal moved for partial summary judgment on Counts I and II of the complaint. He argued that Moore's reliance upon 29 U.S. C. 1162(2)(D)(i) as authority to deny him COBRA continuation coverage was misplaced. Although that subsection provides that an employer may cancel COBRA continuation coverage as of "[t]he date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election covered under any other group health plan (as an employee or otherwise)," Geissal was first covered under the |
Justice Souter | 1,998 | 20 | majority | Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118220/geissal-v-moore-medical-corp/ | an employee or otherwise)," Geissal was first covered under the TWA plan before he elected COBRA continuation coverage, not after. In any event, Geissal maintained, Moore was estopped to deny him health benefits, because he had detrimentally relied upon its assurances that he was entitled to them. While the summary judgment motion was pending, Geissal died of cancer, and petitioner Bonnie Geissal, his wife and personal representative of his estate, replaced him as plaintiff. *78 The Magistrate Judge hearing the case[2] first rejected Moore's arguments that Geissal lacked standing and that Aetna was a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). The Magistrate concluded that even if Moore was correct that Geissal had no claim for compensatory damages because Aetna paid all of the medical bills, Geissal could seek statutory damages under 29 U.S. C. 1132(a)(1).[3] The Magistrate held that Aetna was not a necessary party to the suit, since complete relief could be granted between Moore and Geissal without joining Aetna, a verdict in Geissal's favor would not subject Moore to the risk of inconsistent or double obligations, and Aetna's joinder was not necessary to determine primacy as between the two plans. The Magistrate denied summary judgment for Geissal, however, and instead sua sponte granted partial summary judgment on Counts I and II in favor of Moore, concluding that an employee with coverage under another group health *79 plan as of the date he elects COBRA continuation coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 1162(2)(D)(i), and that James Geissal presented insufficient evidence of detrimental reliance on Moore's representation that he was entitled to benefits under COBRA. The Magistrate also found that there was no significant difference between the terms of coverage under Aetna's plan and Moore's; they differed only in the amount of their respective deductibles, and there was no evidence that Aetna's plan excluded or limited coverage for James Geissal's condition. The Magistrate then granted Geissal's unopposed motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for the entry of final judgment on Counts I and II, and so enabled Geissal to seek immediate review of the Magistrate's decision. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, and we granted certiorari, to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether an employer may deny COBRA continuation coverage under its health plan to an otherwise eligible beneficiary covered under another group health plan at the time he elects coverage under COBRA.[4] II A The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Stat. 82, 222-237, amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, among other statutes. *80 The amendments |
Justice Souter | 1,998 | 20 | majority | Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118220/geissal-v-moore-medical-corp/ | Retirement Income Security Act, among other statutes. *80 The amendments to ERISA require an employer[5] who sponsors a group health plan to give the plan's "qualified beneficiaries" the opportunity to elect "continuation coverage" under the plan when the beneficiaries might otherwise lose coverage upon the occurrence of certain "qualifying events," including the death of the covered employee, the termination of the covered employee's employment (except in cases of gross misconduct), and divorce or legal separation from the covered employee. 29 U.S. C. 1163. Thus, a "qualified beneficiary" entitled to make a COBRA election may be a "covered employee" (someone covered by the employer's plan because of his own employment), or a covered employee's spouse or dependent child who was covered by the plan prior to the occurrence of the "qualifying event." 1167(3). COBRA demands that the continuation coverage offered to qualified beneficiaries be identical to what the plan provides to plan beneficiaries who have not suffered a qualifying event. 1162(1). The statute requires plans to advise beneficiaries of their rights under COBRA both at the commencement of coverage and within 14 days of learning of a qualifying event,[6] 1166(a), after which qualified beneficiaries have 60 days to elect continuation coverage, 1165(1). If a qualified beneficiary makes a COBRA election, continuation coverage dates from the qualifying event, and when the event is termination or reduced hours, the maximum period of coverage is generally 18 months; in other cases, it is generally 36. 1162(2)(A). The beneficiary who makes the election must pay for what he gets, however, up to 102 percent of the "applicable premium" for the first 18 months of continuation coverage, and up to 150 percent thereafter. 1162(3). *81 The "applicable premium" is usually the cost to the plan of providing continuation coverage, regardless of who usually pays for the insurance benefit. 1164. Benefits may cease if the qualified beneficiary fails to pay the premiums, 1162(2)(C), and an employer may terminate it for certain other reasons, such as discontinuance of the group health plan entirely, 1162(2)(B). COBRA coverage may also cease on "[t]he date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election "(i) covered under any other group health plan (as an employee or otherwise), which does not contain any exclusion or limitation with respect to any preexisting condition of such beneficiary, or "(ii) entitled to benefits under title XVIII of the Social Security Act." 1162(2)(D).[7] *82 B Moore, like the Magistrate, believes that James Geissal's coverage under the TWA plan defeats the claim for COBRA coverage after his election to receive it. As Moore |
Justice Souter | 1,998 | 20 | majority | Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118220/geissal-v-moore-medical-corp/ | COBRA coverage after his election to receive it. As Moore reads 1162(2)(D)(i), it is not relevant when a qualified beneficiary first obtains other health insurance coverage; instead, Moore submits, all that matters is whether, at any time after the date of election, the beneficiary is covered by another group health plan. In any event, Moore claims, James Geissal first became covered under the TWA plan only after his COBRA election, because it was only at that moment that his TWA coverage became primary. Moore's reading, however, will not square with the text. Section 1162(2)(D)(i) does not provide that the employer is excused if the beneficiary "is" covered or "remains" covered on or after the date of the election. Nothing in 1162(2)(D)(i) says anything about the hierarchy of policy obligations, or otherwise suggests that it might matter whether the coverage of another group health plan is primary. So far as this case is concerned, what is crucial is that 1162(2)(D)(i) does not speak in terms of "coverage" that might exist or continue; it speaks in terms of an event, the event of "becom[ing] covered." This event is significant only if it occurs, and "first" occurs, at a time "after the date of the election." It is undisputed that both before and after James Geissal elected COBRA continuation coverage he was continuously a beneficiary of TWA's group health plan. Because he was thus covered before he made his COBRA election, and so did not "first become" covered under the TWA plan after the date of election, Moore could not cut off his COBRA coverage under the plain meaning of 1162(2)(D)(i). Moore argues, to the contrary, that there is a reasonable sense in which a beneficiary does "first becom[e]" covered under a pre-existing plan "after the date of the election," even when prior coverage can be said to persist after the election date: the first moment of coverage on the day following *83 the election is the moment of first being covered after the date of the election. See National Cos. Health Benefit ("[I]t is immaterial when the employee acquires other group health coverage; the only relevant question is when, after the election date, does that other coverage take effect. In the case of an employee covered by preexisting group health coverage, the first time after the election date that the employee becomes covered by a group health plan other than the employer's plan is the moment after the election date"). But that reading ignores the condition that the beneficiary must "first becom[e]" covered after election, robbing the modifier "first" of any consequence, |
Justice Souter | 1,998 | 20 | majority | Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118220/geissal-v-moore-medical-corp/ | covered after election, robbing the modifier "first" of any consequence, thereby equating "first becomes covered" with "remains covered." It transforms the novelty of becoming covered for the first time into the continuity of remaining covered over time. Moore argues, further, that even if our reading of the statute is more faithful to its plain language, Congress could not have meant to give a qualified beneficiary something more than the right to preserve the status quo as of the date of the qualifying event.[8] Moore points out that if the phrase "first becomes covered after" the date of election does not apply to any coverage predating election, then the beneficiary is quite free to claim continuation coverage even if he has obtained entirely new group coverage between the qualifying event and the election; in that case, on our reading, COBRA would not be preserving the circumstances as of the date of the qualifying event. *84 That the plain reading does not confine COBRA strictly to guardianship of the status quo is, of course, perfectly true, though it is much less certain whether this fact should count against the plain reading ). The statute is neither cast expressly in terms of the status quo, nor does it speak to the status quo on the date of the qualifying event except with reference to the coverage subject to election. Nor does a beneficiary's decision to take advantage of another group policy not previously in effect carry any indicia of the sort of windfall Congress presumably would have disapproved. Since the beneficiary has to pay for whatever COBRA coverage he obtains, there is no reason to assume that he will make an election for coverage he does not need, whether he is covered by another policy in place before the qualifying event or one obtained after it but before his election. Still, it is true that if during the interim between the qualifying event and election a beneficiary gets a new job, say, with health coverage (having no exclusion or limitation for his condition), he will have the benefit of COBRA, whereas he will not have it if his new job and coverage come after the election date. Do we classify this as an anomaly or merely a necessary consequence of the need to draw a line somewhere? For the sake of argument we might call it an anomaly, but that would only balance it against the anomaly of Moore's own position, which defies not only normal language usage but the expectations of common sense: since an election to continue coverage is retroactive to |
Justice Souter | 1,998 | 20 | majority | Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118220/geissal-v-moore-medical-corp/ | sense: since an election to continue coverage is retroactive to the date of the qualifying event, under Moore's reading of 1162(2)(D)(i) an election that is ineffective to bring about continuation coverage for the roughly 18 (or 36) month statutory period would nonetheless have the surprising effect of providing continuation coverage for the period of weeks, or even days, between *85 the event and the election. One wonders why Congress would have wanted to create such a strange scheme. Thus, assuming that our reading of 1162(2)(D)(i) produces an anomaly, so does Moore's. But this is not all, for the anomalous consequences of Moore's position are not exhausted without a look at the interpretative morass to which it has led in practice. To support its thesis that Congress meant individuals situated like James Geissal to be ineligible for COBRA benefits, Moore points to a statement in the House Reports on the original COBRA bill, that "[t]he Committee [on Ways and Means] is concerned with reports of the growing number of Americans without any health insurance coverage and the decreasing willingness of our Nation's hospitals to provide care to those who cannot afford to pay." H. R. Rep. No. 99-241, pt. 1, p. 44 (1985); see Of course, if this concern (expressed in one House Committee Report) were thought to be a legitimate limit on the meaning of the statute as enacted, there would be no COBRA coverage for any beneficiary who had "any health insurance" on the date of election, or obtained "any" thereafter. But neither Moore nor any court rejecting the plain reading has gone quite so far. Instead, that draconian alternative has been averted by a nontextual compromise. The compromise apparently alludes to the proviso that 1162(2)(D)(i) applies so as to authorize termination of COBRA coverage only if the coverage provided by the other group health plan "does not contain any exclusion or limitation with respect to any preexisting condition of such beneficiary." Moore urges us to hold, as some Courts of Appeals have done, that although Congress generally intended to deny COBRA coverage to individuals with other group insurance on the election date, there will still be COBRA eligibility in such cases if there is a "significant gap" between the coverage offered by the employer's plan and that offered by *86 the beneficiary's other group health plan.[9] See -1465; accord, National Cos. Health Benefit 929 F. 2d, ; When there is such a gap, some courts have explained, it cannot be said that the employee is truly "covered" by his pre-existing insurance coverage. See ; National Cos. Health Benefit |
Justice Souter | 1,998 | 20 | majority | Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118220/geissal-v-moore-medical-corp/ | his pre-existing insurance coverage. See ; National Cos. Health Benefit This "significant gap" approach to 1162(2)(D)(i) is plagued with difficulties, however, beginning with the sheer absence of any statutory support for it. Section 1162(2)(D)(i) makes no mention of what to do when a person's other coverage is generally inadequate or inferior; instead, it provides merely that coverage under a later acquired group health plan will not terminate COBRA rights when that plan limits or excludes coverage for a pre-existing condition of the beneficiary. The proviso applies not when there is a "gap" or difference between the respective coverages of the two policies, but when the later acquired group coverage excludes or limits coverage specific to the beneficiary's pre-existing condition. It is this "gap" between different coverage provisions of the non-COBRA plan, not a gap between the coverage provisions of the COBRA plan and the non-COBRA plan, that Congress was legislating about. But even leaving textual inadequacy aside, there is further trouble under the "significant gap" approach. Needless to say, when the proviso (as written) arguably does apply, its applicability is easy to determine. Once the beneficiary's pre-existing condition is identified, a court need only look among the terms of the later policy for an exclusion or limitation *87 peculiar to that condition. If either is found, COBRA continuation coverage is left undisturbed; if neither is found, the consequence of obtaining this later insurance is automatic. Applying the significant gap rule, on the other hand, requires a very different kind of determination, essentially one of social policy. Once a gap is found, the court must then make a judgment about the adequacy of medical insurance under the later group policy, for this is the essence of any decision about whether the gap between the two regimes of coverage is "significant" enough. This is a powerful point against the gap interpretation for two reasons. First, the required judgment is so far unsuitable for courts that we would expect a clear mandate before inferring that Congress meant to foist it on the judiciary.[10] What is even more strange, however, is that Congress would have meant to inject the courts into the policy arena, evaluating the adequacy of non-COBRA coverage that happened to be in place prior to the COBRA election, while at the same time intending to limit the judicial intrusion, and leave the beneficiary to the unmediated legal consequences of the terms of the nonCOBRA coverage that happened to become effective after the election. One just cannot credibly attribute such oddity to congressional intent. In sum, there is no justification for disparaging |
Justice Souter | 1,999 | 20 | concurring | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | I agree with the Court's strict holding that "the creation of a discretionary review system does not, without more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable" for purposes of federal habeas exhaustion. Ante, at 848. I understand the Court to have left open the question (not directly implicated by this case) whether we should construe the exhaustion doctrine to force a State, in effect, to rule on discretionary review applications when the State has made it plain that it does not wish to require such applications before its petitioners may seek federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, for example, has declared: "[I]n all appeals from criminal convictions or postconviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies." In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 321 S. C. 563, 564, The Court is clear that "nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requir[es] federal courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available." Ante, at 847-848. Its citation of In re Exhaustion of State Remedies, for the proposition that the increased burden on state courts may be unwelcome, should not be read to suggest something more: that however plainly a State may speak its *850 highest court must be subjected to constant applications for a form of discretionary review that the State wishes to reserve for truly extraordinary cases, or else be forced to eliminate that kind of discretionary review. In construing the exhaustion requirement, "[w]e have held that state prisoners do not have to invoke extraordinary remedies when those remedies are alternatives to the standard review process and where the state courts have not provided relief through those remedies in the past." Ante, at 844 ). I understand that we leave open the possibility that a state prisoner is likewise free to skip a procedure even when a state court has occasionally employed it to provide relief, so long as the State has identified the procedure as outside the standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for the purpose of exhaustion. It is not obvious that either comity or precedent requires otherwise. |
Justice Alito | 2,014 | 8 | concurring | Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2655597/lozano-v-montoya-alvarez/ | I concur fully in the opinion of the Court. I write sepa rately to explain why courts have equitable discretion under the Hague Convention to order a child’s return even after the child has become settled, and how that discretion prevents abuses that petitioner claims will follow from holding that Article 12’s 1-year period may not be equita bly tolled. The Convention is designed to protect the interests of children and their parents. uch of the Convention can be understood as an attempt to balance the various inter ests of children and non-abducting parents when a par- ent abducts a child from the child’s country of habitual residence. When a child has been absent from the country of ha bitual residence for less than a year, the Convention con clusively presumes that the child’s nascent attachment to the new country is outweighed by the non-abducting par ent’s interest in prompt return and the child’s own inter est in returning to the country from which he or she was removed just a few months previously. This is why Article 12 requires return “forthwith” if the petition for return is brought within a year of abduction, unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in Article 13 or applies. 2 LOZANO v. ONTOYA ALVAREZ ALITO, J., concurring Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11 (Treaty Doc.), p. 9. But, as the Convention recognizes, at some point the child will become accustomed to the new environment, making Article 12’s conclusive presumption inappropriate. Thus, if the petition for return is brought after a year has elapsed, the court must determine whether the child has become “settled” in the new country; and if this has occurred, the court need not order return. As the majority recognizes, this provision of the Conven tion “opens the door to consideration of the child’s interest in settlement.” Ante, at 13. But opening the door to consideration of the child’s attachment to the new country does not mean closing the door to evaluating all other interests of the child and the non-abducting parent. The fact that, after one year, a child’s need for stability requires a court to take into account the child’s attachment to the new country does not mean that such attachment becomes the only factor worth considering when evaluating a petition for return. Nothing in Article 12 prohibits courts from taking other factors into account. To the contrary, the Convention explicitly permits them to do so. |
Justice Alito | 2,014 | 8 | concurring | Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2655597/lozano-v-montoya-alvarez/ | the contrary, the Convention explicitly permits them to do so. Article 18 provides that “[t]he provisions of this Chapter [including Article 12] do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative author ity to order the return of the child at any time.” Hague Convention, Treaty Doc., at 11. A court thus has power to order the child’s return in the exercise of its sound discre tion even where Article 12’s obligation to order such re turn no longer applies. This provision makes eminent sense. Even after a year has elapsed and the child has become settled in the new environment, a variety of factors may outweigh the child’s interest in remaining in the new country, such as the child’s interest in returning to his or her original country Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 3 ALITO, J., concurring of residence (with which he or she may still have close ties, despite having become settled in the new country); the child’s need for contact with the non-abducting parent, who was exercising custody when the abduction occurred; the non-abducting parent’s interest in exercising the cus tody to which he or she is legally entitled; the need to discourage inequitable conduct (such as concealment) by abducting parents; and the need to deter international abductions generally. Article 12 places no limit on Article 18’s grant of discre tionary power to order return. Article 18 expressly states as much. See (Article 12 “do[es] not limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the re turn of the child”). Even without Article 18’s express language, it would be clear that Article 12 merely tells a court when it must order return, without telling it when it may do so. Article 12 states that, after the 1-year period has elapsed, a court “shall order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” The final clause indicates when the obligation imposed earlier in the sen tence terminates; it does not substitute for that obligation a prohibition on ordering return. When a mother tells her child, “Come straight home from school, unless one of your friends invites you to a movie,” the mother has not prohib ited her child from coming home immediately after school even if a friend proposes a film. Cf. Department of Com- merce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 339 (1999) (explaining that the meaning of a similar sentence structure in 13 U.S. C. “depends primarily on the broader context in which that structure appears”). Thus, |
Justice Alito | 2,014 | 8 | concurring | Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2655597/lozano-v-montoya-alvarez/ | on the broader context in which that structure appears”). Thus, nothing in Article 12 calls into question the discre tionary power of courts to order return after the 1-year period has expired and the child has become settled. Reading the Convention to impose a prohibition on return would be highly anomalous, given that the “Con 4 LOZANO v. ONTOYA ALVAREZ ALITO, J., concurring vention is based on the principle that the best interests of the child are well served when decisions regarding custody rights are made in the country of habitual residence.” Such a prohibi tion would run counter to other provisions of the Conven tion. For instance, Article 13(b) gives a court discretion to return or decline to return a child who has not become settled if “there is a grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Hague Convention, Treaty Doc., at 10. If a court has discretion to order return even where such return poses “a grave risk” of harm or threatens to place the child in an “intolerable situation,” surely it has discretion to order return when faced with the lesser risk attendant on re moving a child from the child’s present environment (espe cially given that the child will generally be returning to a known environment: her country of habitual residence). The State Department has adopted the view that the Convention empowers a court, in its equitable discretion, to return a child who has become settled. In the analysis that it provided to the Senate in connection with the rati fication process, the Department made clear that, even when a year has elapsed and the child has become settled, a court may still consider such factors as “evidence concerning the child’s contacts with and ties to his or her State of habitual residence,” “[t]he reason for the passage of time,” and any concealment by the abducting parent in determining whether to order return. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis (State Legal Analysis), 10509 (1986). The Department continues to endorse this view today. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. As this Court has previously explained (in the context of the Convention, in fact), the State Department’s interpreta tion of treaties “ ‘is entitled to great weight.’ ” Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 5 ALITO, J., concurring ). So, too, is the interpretation of the courts of our sister signatories. See The United King dom’s House of Lords (at the time that nation’s highest court) has |
Justice Alito | 2,014 | 8 | concurring | Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2655597/lozano-v-montoya-alvarez/ | of Lords (at the time that nation’s highest court) has held that “a settled child might nevertheless be returned” by a court in the exercise of its discretion— a conclusion driven in part by acknowledgment of the in equity of rewarding concealment. In re [08] 1 A. C. 1288, 1304, ¶31 (Eng. 07) (opinion of Baroness Hale of Richmond). Likewise, the Supreme Court of Ireland has concluded that courts have equitable discretion to order return of a child who has become settled. See P. v. B. (No. 2), [1999] 4 I. R. I am unaware of any high courts of states signatory that have concluded to the contrary. Given the foregoing, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Courts of Appeals to have considered the question have found that a court possesses equitable discretion to order return of a child despite the child’s having become settled in the new country. See (CA1 13); (CA2 01). And other Courts of Appeals have found more generally that none of the Convention’s exceptions prohibit return. See, e.g., 1004 (CA9 09); (CA4 01). Equitable discretion to order return of a settled child is particularly important in light of the fact that the Conven tion, as the Court correctly holds today, does not provide for equitable tolling of Article 12’s 1-year period. Peti tioner predicts dire consequences from the Court’s holding. He argues that, as a result of our decision, the United States will become an abduction haven, with parents concealing their children here until Article 12’s 1-year period has run and then claiming their children have become settled and hence ineligible for return. But such 6 LOZANO v. ONTOYA ALVAREZ ALITO, J., concurring inequitable conduct would weigh heavily in favor of re turning a child even if she has become settled. See, e.g., State Legal Analysis, (“If the alleged wrongdoer concealed the child’s whereabouts from the custodian necessitating a long search for the child and thereby delayed the commencement of a return proceeding by the applicant, it is highly questionable whether the respondent should be permitted to benefit from such con duct absent strong countervailing considerations”); In re (recognizing that a court may take concealment into account in considering whether to return a settled child). Given the courts’ discretion to order return in response to concealment, I do not believe the Court’s decision today risks incentivizing parents to flee with their children to this country and conceal them. Equitable discretion is also a far better tool than equita ble tolling with which to address the dangers of conceal ment. Equitable tolling would require return every |
Justice Alito | 2,014 | 8 | concurring | Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2655597/lozano-v-montoya-alvarez/ | dangers of conceal ment. Equitable tolling would require return every time the abducting parent conceals the child and thereby pre vents the non-abducting parent from filing a return peti tion within a year, regardless of how settled in the new country the child has become. Thus, on petitioner’s view, a court would be bound to return a 14-year-old child who was brought to the United States shortly after birth and had been concealed here ever since. By contrast, when a court exercises its equitable discretion, it may consider other factors in addition to concealment. While conceal ment is a significant factor and should weigh heavily in a court’s analysis, in appropriate cases it can be overcome by circumstances such as the extended length of the child’s residence in this country, any strong ties the child has formed here, and the child’s attenuated connections to his or her former country. In short, I believe the power of a court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to return even a settled child pre vents the inapplicability of equitable tolling to Article 12’s Cite as: 572 U. S. (14) 7 ALITO, J., concurring 1-year limit from encouraging parents to flee to the United States and conceal their children here. In light of this understanding, I have no difficulty joining the opinion of the Court |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112869/musick-peeler-garrett-v-employers-ins-of-wausau/ | In recognizing a private right to contribution under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934[1] and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b5,[2] the Court unfortunately nourishes "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to cultivate this new branch of Rule 10b5 law. *299 I I agree with the Court's description of its mission as an "attempt to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the 10b5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act." Ante, at 294. However, I do disagree with the Court's chosen method for pursuing this difficult quest. The words of 10(b) and Rule 10b5 scarcely "suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained" the existence of a private 10b5 action. Blue Chip 421 U. S., at Despite our conceded inability "to divine from the language of 10(b) the express `intent of Congress,' " ib we acquiesced in the lower courts' consensus that an implied right of action existed under 10(b) and Rule 10b5. Superintendent of Ins. of N. ; Affiliated Ute Citizens of See Such acquiescence was "entirely consistent" with J. I. Case which may have suggested a relatively permissive approach to the recognition of implied rights of action.[3]Blue Chip Although we later "decline[d] to read [Borak] so broadly that virtually every provision of the securities Acts gives rise to an implied private cause of action," Touche & we never repudiated the 10b5 action. We again have no cause to reconsider whether the 10b5 action should have been recognized at all. In summarizing its rationale, the Court states: "Having made no attempt to define the precise contours of the private cause of action under 10(b), Congress had no occasion to address how to *300 limit, compute, or allocate liability arising from it." Ante, at 295. Though this statement is an adequate description of how we came to infer the private right of action, it is not an adequate defense of the Court's reasoning. Unlike the majority, I do not assume that courts should accord different treatment to implied rights of action whose recognition may have been influenced by Borak. How a particular private cause of action may have emerged should not weaken our vigilance in the subsequent interpretation and application of that action. Our inquiries into statutory text, congressional intent, and legislative purpose remain intact. We have consistently declined to recognize an implied private cause of action "under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112869/musick-peeler-garrett-v-employers-ins-of-wausau/ | of action "under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act where it is `unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes' in adopting the Act." Santa Fe ). Accordingly, the 10b5 action must be "judicially delimited one way or another unless and until Congress addresses the question." Blue Chip In the absence of any compelling reason to allow contribution in private 10b5 suits, we should seek to keep "the breadth" of the 10b5 action from "grow[ing] beyond the scope congressionally intended." Virginia Bankshares, The Court's abandonment of this restrained approach to implied remedies stems from its mistaken assumption that a right to contribution is a mere "elemen[t] or aspec[t]" of Rule 10b5's private liability apparatus. Ante, at 295. Unlike a statute of limitations, a reliance requirement, or a defense to liability, however, contribution requires a wholly separate cause of action. This case does not require us to define the elements of a 10b5 claim or to clarify some other essential aspect of this liability scheme. Rather, we are asked to determine whether a 10b5 defendant enjoys a distinct right to recover from a joint tortfeasor. *301 The recent decision in which we established a limitations period for 10b5 actions, Lampf, Lipkind, Prupis & illustrates the difference that I find decisive. A limitations period is almost indispensable to a scheme of civil liability; even when federal law prescribes no express statute of limitations, we will not ordinarily assume that Congress intended no time limit. Rather, we "`borrow' the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source." Contribution, by contrast, was generally unavailable at common law. See Union Stock Yards Co. of Those jurisdictions that have seen fit to provide contribution have usually done so by resort to legislation. Northwest ; Texas A court that recognizes an implied right to contribution must endorse a remedy contrary to the common law and perhaps even the legislative policy of the relevant jurisdiction. Lampf, and like cases thus offer scant guidance when the question is not whether a right to contribution is an appropriate incident of the 10b5 action, but whether congressional intent or federal common law justifies an expansion of the class entitled to enforce 10(b) and Rule 10b5 through private lawsuits. In conducting this inquiry, we cannot safely rely on Congress' design of distinct statutory provisions. Indeed, inappropriate extension of 10b5 liability would "nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn. express actions" that Congress has provided through other sections of the 1934 Act. & However proper it may be to examine related portions of the Act when fleshing |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112869/musick-peeler-garrett-v-employers-ins-of-wausau/ | be to examine related portions of the Act when fleshing out details of the core 10b5 action, see Lampf, ; the Court errs in placing dispositive *302 weight on the existence of contribution rights under 9 and 18 of the Act. See ante, at 296-298. The proper analysis flows from our well-established approach to implied causes of action in general and to implied rights of contribution in particular. When deciding whether a statute confers a private right of action, we ask whether Congresseither expressly or by implicationintended to create such a remedy. Touche ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Where Congress did not expressly create a contribution remedy, we may infer that Congress nevertheless intended by clear implication to confer a right to contribution. Texas ; Northwest Through the exercise of their power to craft federal common law, federal courts may also fashion a right to contribution. Texas ; Northwest Application of this familiar analytical framework compels me to conclude that there is no right to contribution under 10(b) and Rule 10b5. With respect to fashioning a common-law right to contribution, the Court readily and correctly concludes that the right to contribution recognized in Cooper Stevedoring 7 U.S. 106 has no bearing on the availability of contribution under the elaborate federal statutory scheme governing purchases and sales of securities. Ante, at 290. See also Texas ; Northwest This case therefore depends exclusively on the interpretation of 10(b) and Rule 10b5. II "`The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' " & (quoting Blue Chip ). Nothing in the words of 10(b) and Rule *303 10b5 suggests that joint tortfeasors should enjoy a right to contribution. Section 10(b) makes it "unlawful for any person ". To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection of investors." 15 U.S. C. 78j(b). Rule 10b5 recasts this proscription in similar terms: "It shall be unlawful for any person "(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, "(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or "(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112869/musick-peeler-garrett-v-employers-ins-of-wausau/ | any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 CFR 240.10b5 (1992). The sweeping words of 10(b) and Rule 10b5 ban manipulation, deception, or fraud in the purchase or sale of securities. "[A]ny person" who engages in such activity merits condemnation under the statute and the rule. Far from being entitled to seek the protection of 10(b) and Rule 10b5, joint tortfeasors must confess that these provisions were "expressly directed to regulate their conduct for the benefit" of others. Northwest *304 Neither enactment suggests that Congress or the SEC intended to "softe[n] the blow on joint wrongdoers" by permitting contribution. Texas Quite the contrary: As private actors "whose activities Congress [and the SEC] intended to regulate for the protection and benefit of an entirely distinct class," joint tortfeasors "can scarcely lay claim to the status of `beneficiary' " under 10(b) and Rule 10b5. Piper v. Chris-Craft The "underlying structure of the [1934 Act's] statutory scheme" also negates the existence of a 10b5 contribution action. Northwest The Court notes the presence of express contribution rights under 9 and 18 of the Act, but it misconstrues the significance of these provisions. See ante, at 296-298. The ability to legislate express contribution remedies under the 1934 Act applies with no less force to 10(b) than to 9 and 18. "When Congress wished to provide a [contribution] remedy it had little trouble in doing so expressly." Blue Chip Nor has Congress lacked opportunities to modify the 10b5 action. Within the last five years, Congress has both preserved and altered the 10b5 action through amendments to the 1934 Act. Compare Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-704, 5, with 15 U.S. C. 78aa1 (1988 ed., Supp. III) ). See generally ante, at 293-294. Had Congress intended 10b5 defendants to sue joint tortfeasors, a single enactment could have given effect to this policy. Congress' failure to act does not justify further judicial elaboration of the 10b5 action. *305 Moreover, contribution is inconsistent with our established views of the 10b5 action. In Blue Chip we held that only actual purchasers and sellers of securities are entitled to press private 10b5 suits. We based this conclusion largely on the language of 10(b) and Rule 10b5, which by their terms govern only "the purchase or sale of any security." See -732; The merits of a contribution action in this case would turn on whether "the attorneys and accountants involved in [a] public |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112869/musick-peeler-garrett-v-employers-ins-of-wausau/ | on whether "the attorneys and accountants involved in [a] public offering" bore "joint responsibility for securities violations." Ante, at 288-289. Even if a court were to acknowledge respondents' status as the subrogees of securities sellers, the contribution action would be at least one level removed from the underlying exchange of securities. Blue Chip ` requirement of actual purchase or sale would virtually evaporate in a contribution dispute embroiling only separate groups of professionals who had merely advised or facilitated a tainted securities transaction. The rule adopted today thus undermines not only the discernible intent of Congress and the SEC, but also our own elaboration of this regulatory scheme. Such are the risks that inhere in the "hazardous enterprise" of recognizing a private right of action despite congressional silence. Touche III Once again we have been invited to join a "vigorous debate over the advantages and disadvantages of contribution and various contribution schemes." Texas 451 U. S., Consistent with our prior practice, I would adhere to the task of resolving the "dispositive threshold question: whether courts have the power to create a cause of action absent legislation." Whether the answer to that question is "most unfair" to those who litigate private 10b5 actions, ante, at 292, is irrelevant. Courts should not treat legislative and administrative silence as a tacit license to accomplish what Congress and the SEC are unable or unwilling *306 to do. In their current condition, 10(b) and Rule 10b5 afford no right to contribution. Congress has been, and remains free to, alter this state of affairs. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110266/andrus-v-glover-constr-co/ | The Buy Indian Act, as amended, 25 U.S. C. 47, directs the Secretary of the Interior to employ Indian labor "[s]o far as may be practicable," and permits him to purchase "the products of Indian industry in open market."[1] The question presented in this case is whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the Department of the Interior[2] may, on the authority of this legislation, enter into road construction contracts with Indian-owned companies without first advertising for bids pursuant to Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA), as amended, 41 U.S. C. 251-260. I In 1976, the BIA formally adopted the procurement policy that "all [BIA] purchases or contracts be made or entered into with qualified Indian contractors to the maximum practicable extent."[3] To effectuate this objective, the BIA announced that in every procurement situation it would consider dealing with non-Indian contractors only after it had determined that there were "no qualified Indian contractors within the normal competitive area that can fill or are interested in filling the procurement requirement."[4] *610 In early 1977, the BIA invited three Indian-owned construction companies to submit bids for the repair and improvement of a 5-mile segment of road in Pushmataha County, Okla. The road, commonly called the Honobia Road, is located within an area subject to BIA jurisdiction. The respondent, a non-Indian corporation engaged as a general contractor in roadbuilding and other forms of heavy construction, was not afforded an opportunity to bid.[5] On May 25, 1977, BIA awarded the contract to Indian Nations Construction Co., a corporation owned and controlled exclusively by Indians and the only Indian-owned company to have bid on the project. The final negotiated contract price amounted to approximately $1.2 million.[6] The respondent then filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, naming as defendants the Secretary of the Interior, the Department of the Interior, BIA, and the BIA contracting officer on the Honobia Road project (petitioners here). The respondent alleged that the petitioners were required by 3709 of the Revised Statutes, 41 U.S. C. 5, and Title III of the FPASA to advertise publicly for bids on the Honobia Road project. The respondent further claimed that the actions of the petitioners had denied it due process and equal protection in contravention of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As relief, the respondent requested *611 the District Court to set aside the Honobia Road contract and to enjoin the petitioners from engaging in the unadvertised negotiation of contracts on the purported authority |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110266/andrus-v-glover-constr-co/ | in the unadvertised negotiation of contracts on the purported authority of the Buy Indian Act. After the completion of discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the respondent. The court concluded that the procedure followed by the petitioners in awarding the Honobia Road project to the Indian Nations Construction Co. violated the advertising requirements of the FPASA, in particular 41 U.S. C. 252 (e) and The court rejected the Secretary's contrary administrative construction as inconsistent with the plain language of the FPASA. Deciding in favor of the respondent on these statutory grounds, the District Court found it unnecessary to reach the respondent's alternative arguments under the Constitution. The court thereupon declared the road construction contract that had been entered into between the petitioners and the Indian Nations Construction Co. to be null and void, and permanently enjoined the petitioners from circumventing the advertising requirements of 41 U.S. C. 253 in connection with the remainder of the Honobia Road project and future road construction[7] A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment. Relying in large part on the analysis of the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that, whatever might arguably be the breadth of the Buy Indian Act standing alone, it had been pre-empted by the advertising requirements of the FPASA with respect *612 to the procurement of road construction Alternatively, the Court of Appeals observed that it would "require a considerable `stretch of the imagination' to conclude that the Congress intended the Buy-Indian Act to apply to road construction " The appellate court believed, in short, that the Act's preference for Indian "products" could not easily be read to include the performance of a roadway construction contract by an Indian-owned firm. In response to the petitioners' contention that the Buy Indian Act should be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose, the court observed that "a primary, significant remedial feature of the advertisement and competitive bidding requirements of the [FPASA] is to obtain the best and lowest bid for the benefit of the American taxpayers in `high cost' construction categories." We granted certiorari, to decide a question of importance in the proper exercise by the BIA of its procurement responsibilities. II The Buy Indian Act was enacted in 1910 as part of legislation that subjected the purchase of Indian supplies by the Department of the Interior to the strictures of 3709 of the Revised Statutes.[8] Section 3709, which had been in existence *613 since 1861,[9] required agencies subject to its provisions to advertise for bids on all but a few |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110266/andrus-v-glover-constr-co/ | provisions to advertise for bids on all but a few Government procurements.[10] The purpose of the Buy Indian Act was clear. Purchases by the Department of the Interior of "the products of Indian industry" were to be exempt from any requirement of advertising for bids imposed by 3709 of the Revised Statutes.[11] The legislation of which the Buy Indian Act was a part was amended from time to time between 1910 and 1965, but none of these changes affected the substance of what had been enacted in 1910. The BIA, as was true of most other departments of the Government, continued to operate under a general mandate that contracts for supplies and services be let in conformity with 3709 of the Revised Statutes.[12] Section *614 3709, in turn, was recodified (41 U.S. C. 5) and amended, but its basic mandate remained the same.[13] Government procurement was to proceed through advertising for bids unless excepted by 3709 or "otherwise provided" by laws such as the Buy Indian Act.[14] In 1965, the law affecting BIA procurement was substantially modified. The regime of detailed contracting requirements contained in Title III of the FPASA, theretofore applicable only to the General Services Administration and to certain special procurements,[15] was extended to cover the purchasing procedures of the BIA and most other executive *615 agencies.[16] See 41 U.S. C. 252 (a); 40 U.S. C. 472 (a), 474. For covered agencies, one consequence of this legislation was to substitute the advertising requirements set out in Title III of the FPASA for those contained in 3709 of the Revised Statutes. See 41 U.S. C. 260; S. Rep. No. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 5 (1965); H. R. Rep. No. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 9 (1965); 111 Cong. Rec. 27198 (1965) (Rep. Brooks). Under Title III of the FPASA, the BIA must now adhere to the broad statutory mandate that "[a]II purchases and contracts for property and services shall be made by advertising." 41 U.S. C. 252 (c). From this directive, the statute specifically excepts only 15 types of procurements, the 15th covering situations where negotiated procurements are "otherwise authorized by law." 252 (c) (15) (subsection (c) (15)). The Buy Indian Act is clearly a "law" within the contemplation of subsection (c) (15). As 41 U.S. C. 260 expressly states: "Any provision of law which authorizes an executive agency to procure any property or services without advertising or without regard to [ 3709 of the Revised Statutes, 41 U.S. C. 5] shall be construed to authorize the procurement of such property or services pursuant to section 252 (c) |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110266/andrus-v-glover-constr-co/ | of such property or services pursuant to section 252 (c) (15) of this title without regard to the advertising requirements of this title." See also S. Rep. No. ; H. R. Rep. No. As noted above, the Buy Indian Act has from its inception authorized the BIA to "purchas[e] the products of Indian industry" without regard to the advertising requirements of 3709 of the Revised Statutes. Relying on subsection (c) (15) and 260, the petitioners argue that the BIA proceeded correctly in awarding the Honobia Road contract to the Indian Nations Construction Co. without prior public advertising for bids. They assert that *616 a road constructed or repaired by an Indian-owned corporation is a "product of Indian industry" within the meaning of the Buy Indian Act and, accordingly, that the Honobia Road project was exempt from the FPASA's advertising rules by operation of subsection (c) (15). It is fairly debatable, we think, simply as a matter of language, whether a road constructed or repaired by an Indian-owned enterprise is a "product of Indian industry" within the meaning of the Buy Indian Act. But even if that Act could in isolation be construed to embrace road construction or repair, the petitioners' argument must still be rejected because of another provision of Title III of the FPASA expressly relating to contracts of the sort at issue here. Title 41 U.S. C. 252 (e) (subsection (e)) states that 252 (c) "shall not be construed to permit any contract for the construction or repair of roads to be negotiated without advertising. unless negotiation of such contract is authorized by the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (10), (11), (12), or (14) of subsection (c) of this section."[17] Not contained in this list of exceptions is subsection (c) (15). From this omission only one inference can be drawn: Congress meant to bar the negotiation of road construction and repair projects under the authority of laws like the Buy Indian Act. Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a *617 general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent. See Continental Casualty[18] In an attempt to avoid the obvious import of subsection (e), the petitioners argue that the subsection does not apply at all to cases in which the Buy Indian Act is involved. The petitioners reason that subsection (e) is concerned solely with procurement contracts whose negotiation is "permitted" by 252, and that the negotiation authority afforded by the Buy Indian Act does not fit this description because that Act is a statute which of |
Justice Stewart | 1,980 | 18 | majority | Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110266/andrus-v-glover-constr-co/ | this description because that Act is a statute which of its own force operates independently of the FPASA. We read the pertinent statutes differently. In the absence of subsection (c) (15), the Buy Indian Act could independently confer no authority on the BIA to avoid public advertising for competitive bids. Title 40 U.S. C. 474 provides that "[t]he authority conferred by [the FPASA] shall be in addition and paramount to any authority conferred by any other law and shall not be subject to the provisions of any law inconsistent herewith." (Emphasis supplied.) In view of 252's broad directive that all procurement proceed *618 through advertising, the Buy Indian Act's contrary mandate would not have survived the 1965 amendments to the FPASA had Title III of the FPASA not contained subsection (c) (15). In short, 252 (c) "permits" negotiation pursuant to the Buy Indian Act and, therefore, such negotiation is limited by the special rule applicable to road construction contained in subsection (e).[19] We are, nonetheless, urged to disregard the plain meaning of subsection (e) because of the axiom that repeals by implication of longstanding statutory provisions are not favored. See Universal Interpretive Shuttle The maxim is said to be particularly compelling here because the older statute is "remedial" legislation for the benefit of Indians. See The 1965 amendments to the FPASA did not, however, "repeal" the Buy Indian Act. With the exception of the limited class of contracts enumerated in subsection (e), the FPASA did not in any manner displace the provisions of the Buy Indian Act. Moreover, "[t]he courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a *619 clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." 51. And, although the "rule by which legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians" is to be given "the broadest possible scope," "[a] canon of construction is not a license to disregard clear expressions of congressional intent." For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.[20] It is so ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | dissenting | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118491/hoffman-plastic-compounds-inc-v-nlrb/ | I cannot agree that the backpay award before us "runs counter to," or "trenches upon," national immigration policy. Ante, at 1, 149 (citing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)). As all the relevant agencies (including the Department of Justice) have told us, the National Labor Relations Board's limited backpay order will not interfere with the implementation of immigration policy. Rather, it reasonably helps to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent. Consequently, the order is lawful. See ante, at 142 (recognizing "broad" scope of Board's remedial authority). * * * The Court does not deny that the employer in this case dismissed an employee for trying to organize a uniona crude and obvious violation of the labor laws. See 29 U.S. C. 158(a)(3) (1994 ed.); And it cannot deny that the Board has especially broad discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy for addressing such violations. Nor can it deny that in such circumstances backpay awards serve critically important remedial purposes. Those purposes involve more than victim compensation; they also include deterrence, i. e., discouraging *154 employers from violating the Nation's labor laws. See ante, at 152 (recognizing the deterrent purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)); Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employersfor it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. Ante, at 152. And in the absence of the backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least once with impunity. See A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 320 N. L. R. B. 408, 415, n. 38 (1995) (without potential backpay order employer might simply discharge employees who show interest in a union "secure in the knowledge" that only penalties were requirements "to cease and desist and post a notice"); cf. Golden State Bottling ; cf. also ; Albemarle Paper Hence the backpay remedy is necessary; it helps make labor law enforcement credible; it makes clear that violating the labor laws will not pay. Where in the immigration laws can the Court find a "policy" that might warrant taking from the Board this critically important remedial power? Certainly not in any statutory language. The immigration statutes say that an employer may not knowingly employ an illegal alien, that an alien may not submit false documents, and that the employer must verify documentation. See 8 U.S. C. 4a(a)(1), 4a(b); 18 U.S. C. 1546(b)(1). They provide specific penalties, including criminal penalties, for violations. Ibid.; 8 U.S. C. 4a(e)(4), 4a(f)(1). But the |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | dissenting | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118491/hoffman-plastic-compounds-inc-v-nlrb/ | for violations. Ibid.; 8 U.S. C. 4a(e)(4), 4a(f)(1). But the statutes' language itself does not explicitly state how a violation is to effect the enforcement *155 of other laws, such as the labor laws. What is to happen, for example, when an employer hires, or an alien works, in violation of these provisions? Must the alien forfeit all pay earned? May the employer ignore the labor laws? More to the point, may the employer violate those laws with impunity, at least oncesecure in the knowledge that the Board cannot assess a monetary penalty? The immigration statutes' language simply does not say. Nor can the Court comfortably rest its conclusion upon the immigration laws' purposes. For one thing, the general purpose of the immigration statute's employment prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a "magnet" pulls illegal immigrants toward the United States. H. R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, p. 45 (1986). To permit the Board to award backpay could not significantly increase the strength of this magnetic force, for so speculative a future possibility could not realistically influence an individual's decision to migrate illegally. See A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, ; ; ; ; H. R. Rep. No. 99-682, at 45 To deny the Board the power to award backpay, however, might very well increase the strength of this magnetic force. That denial lowers the cost to the employer of an initial labor law violation (provided, of course, that the only victims are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the employer's incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees. Were the Board forbidden to assess backpay against a knowing employera circumstance not before us today, see this perverse economic incentive, which runs directly contrary to the immigration statute's basic objective, *156 would be obvious and serious. But even if limited to cases where the employer did not know of the employee's status, the incentive may prove significantfor, as the Board has told us, the Court's rule offers employers immunity in borderline cases, thereby encouraging them to take risks, i. e., to hire with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employment (given the Court's views) ultimately will lower the costs of labor law violations. See Brief for Respondent 30-32; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, ; cf. also General Accounting Office, Garment Industry: Efforts to Address the Prevalence and Conditions of Sweatshops 8 (noting a higher incidence of labor violations in areas with large populations of undocumented aliens). The Court has recognized these considerations in stating that the labor laws must |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | dissenting | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118491/hoffman-plastic-compounds-inc-v-nlrb/ | recognized these considerations in stating that the labor laws must apply to illegal aliens in order to ensure that "there will be no advantage under the NLRA in preferring illegal aliens" and therefore there will be "fewer incentives for aliens themselves to enter." The Court today accomplishes the precise opposite. The immigration law's specific labor-law-related purposes also favor preservation, not elimination, of the Board's backpay powers. See A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, ; cf. also As I just mentioned and as this Court has held, the immigration law foresees application of the Nation's labor laws to protect "workers who are illegal immigrants." ; H. R. Rep. No. 99-682, at 58. And a policy of applying the labor laws must encompass a policy of enforcing the labor laws effectively. Otherwise, as Justice Kennedy once put the matter, "we would leave helpless the very persons who most need protection from exploitative employer practices." *157 That presumably is why those in Congress who wrote the immigration statute stated explicitly and unequivocally that the immigration statute does not take from the Board any of its remedial authority. H. R. Rep. No. 99-682, at 58 (IRCA does not "undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law, or limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees"). Neither does precedent help the Court. Indeed, in ABF Freight System, this Court upheld an award of backpay to an unlawfully discharged employee guilty of a serious crime, namely, perjury committed during the Board's enforcement proceedings. See also The Court unanimously held that the Board retained "broad discretion" to remedy the labor law violation through a backpay award, while leaving enforcement of the criminal law to ordinary perjury-related civil and criminal penalties. See ; see also 18 U.S. C. 1621 (criminal penalties for perjury). The Court, trying to distinguish ABF Freight, says that the Court there left open "whether the Board could award backpay to an employee who engaged in `serious misconduct' unrelated to internal Board proceedings." Ante, at 146. But the Court does not explain why (assuming misconduct of equivalent seriousness) lack of a relationship to Board proceedings matters, nor why the Board should have to do more than take that misconduct into accountas it did here. 326 N. L. R. B. 1060, 1060-1062 (1998) (thoroughly discussing relevance of immigration policies); see also A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, 320 N. L. R. B., The Court adds that the Board order in ABF Freight "did not implicate federal statutes or policies |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | dissenting | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118491/hoffman-plastic-compounds-inc-v-nlrb/ | in ABF Freight "did not implicate federal statutes or policies administered by other *158 federal agencies." Ante, at 146. But it does not explain why this matters when, as here, the Attorney General, whose Departmentthrough the Immigration and Naturalization Serviceadministers the immigration statutes, supports the Board's order. Nor does it explain why the perjury statute at issue in ABF Freight was not a "statute administered by" another "agenc[y]." See (noting Department of Justice officials' responsibility for prosecuting perjury). The Court concludes that the employee misconduct at issue in ABF Freight, "though serious, was not at all analogous to misconduct that renders an underlying employment relationship illegal." Ante, at 146. But this conclusion rests upon an implicit assumptionthe assumption that the immigration laws' ban on employment is not compatible with a backpay award. And that assumption, as I have tried to explain, is not justified. See At the same time, the two earlier cases upon which the Court relies, and Southern S. S. offer little support for its conclusion. The Court correctly characterizes both cases as ones in which this Court set aside the Board's remedy (more specifically, reinstatement). Ante, at 142-144. But the Court does not focus upon the underlying circumstanceswhich in those cases were very different from the circumstances present here. In both earlier cases, the employer had committed an independent unfair labor practicein the one by creating a company union, in the other by refusing to recognize the employees' elected representative, Southern S. S. In both cases, the employees had responded with unlawful acts of their owna sit-in and a mutiny. ; Southern S. S. And in both cases, the Court held that the employees' own unlawful conduct provided the employer with "good cause" for discharge, severing any connection *159 to the earlier unfair labor practice that might otherwise have justified reinstatement and backpay. ; Southern S. S. at -49. By way of contrast, the present case concerns a discharge that was not for "good cause." The discharge did not sever any connection with an unfair labor practice. Indeed, the discharge was the unfair labor practice. Hence a determination that backpay was inappropriate in the former circumstances (involving a justifiable discharge) tells us next to nothing about the appropriateness as a legal remedy in the latter (involving an un justifiable discharge), the circumstances present here. The Court also refers to the statement in that "employees must be deemed `unavailable' for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States." The Court, |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | dissenting | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118491/hoffman-plastic-compounds-inc-v-nlrb/ | be present and employed in the United States." The Court, however, does not rely upon this statement as determining its conclusion. See ante, at 146-1. And it is right not to do so. See involved an order reinstating (with backpay) illegal aliens who had left the country and returned to -889. In order to collect the backpay to which the order entitled them, the aliens would have had to reenter the country illegally. Consequently, the order itself could not have been enforced without leading to a violation of criminal law. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that the Court intended its statement to reach to circumstances different from and not at issue in where an order, such as the order before us, does not require the alien to engage in further illegal behavior. Finally, the Court cannot reasonably rely upon the award's negative features taken together. The Court summarizes those negative features when it says that the Board "asks *160 that we award backpay to an illegal alien [1] for years of work not performed, [2] for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and [3] for a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud." Ante, at 148-149. The first of these features has little persuasive force, given the facts that (1) backpay ordinarily and necessarily is awarded to a discharged employee who may not find other work, and (2) the Board is able to tailor an alien's backpay award to avoid rewarding that alien for his legal inability to mitigate damages by obtaining lawful employment elsewhere. See, e. g., ; A. P. R. A. Fuel, 320 N. L. R. B., at 416 (providing backpay for reasonable period); 326 N. L. R. B., at 1062 (cutting off backpay when employer learned of unlawful status). Neither can the remaining two featuresunlawfully earned wages and criminal fraudprove determinative, for they tell us only a small portion of the relevant story. After all, the same backpay award that compensates an employee in the circumstances the Court describes also requires an employer who has violated the labor laws to make a meaningful monetary payment. Considered from this equally important perspective, the award simply requires that employer to pay an employee whom the employer believed could lawfully have worked in the United States, (1) for years of work that he would have performed, (2) for a portion of the wages that he would have earned, and (3) for a job that the employee would have heldhad that employer not unlawfully dismissed the employee for union organizing. In ignoring these latter features |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | dissenting | Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118491/hoffman-plastic-compounds-inc-v-nlrb/ | the employee for union organizing. In ignoring these latter features of the award, the Court undermines the public policies that underlie the Nation's labor laws. Of course, the Court believes it is necessary to do so in order to vindicate what it sees as conflicting immigration law policies. I have explained why I believe the latter policies do not conflict. See But even were I wrong, the law requires the Court to respect the Board's *161 conclusion, rather than to substitute its own independent view of the matter for that of the Board. The Board reached its conclusion after carefully considering both labor law and immigration law. 326 N. L. R. B., at 1060-1062; see A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, In doing so the Board has acted "with a discriminating awareness of the consequences of its action" on the immigration laws. Burlington Truck Lines, v. United States, The Attorney General, charged with immigration law enforcement, has told us that the Board is right. See 8 U.S. C. 4a(e) (Immigration and Naturalization Service placed within the Department of Justice, under authority of Attorney General who is charged with responsibility for immigration law enforcement); cf. United (Solicitor General's statements represent agency's position); 2 U.S. 846, And the Board's position is, at the least, a reasonable one. Consequently, it is lawful. Chevron U. S. A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Powell | 1,978 | 17 | dissenting | Presnell v. Georgia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109946/presnell-v-georgia/ | If, as the per curiam opinion for the Court states, the Supreme Court of Georgia had found petitioner guilty of kidnaping *18 with bodily injury in spite of a failure of the jury to return a proper guilty verdict for that crime, I would join this decision. My review of the record and the opinion of the Georgia court, however, has convinced me that petitioner's conviction for that crime might well have been upheld on the basis of the jury's proper verdict. Because the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia is fundamentally ambiguous on this point, I would remand the case for clarification rather than vacating petitioner's sentence of death. Accordingly, I dissent. Petitioner was indicted for five offenses: murder of Lori Ann Smith; kidnaping of Lori Ann Smith; rape of Andrea Furlong; aggravated sodomy of Andrea Furlong; and the kidnaping of Andrea Furlong "with bodily injury." The aggravated sodomy charge was not submitted to the jury, as the aggravated sodomy of Andrea was alleged to have supplied the bodily injury element of her kidnaping. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. It sentenced petitioner to death on three of the counts: (i) the murder of Lori Ann, with the kidnaping of Andrea with bodily injury as a specified aggravating circumstance; (ii) the rape of Andrea, with the murder of Lori Ann as a specified aggravating circumstance; and (iii) the kidnaping of Andrea with bodily injury, with the rape of Andrea as a specified aggravating circumstance. Petitioner also was sentenced to a term of years for the kidnaping of Lori Ann. On appeal, the Georgia court vacated the death sentences for the rape of Andrea and the kidnaping of Andrea with bodily injury. With respect to the rape of Andrea, the court noted that the jury was instructed on both forcible and statutory rape and returned a verdict that did not distinguish between the two crimes. As only forcible rape was a capital crime under Georgia law, petitioner had to be resentenced as *19 if he had been convicted only of statutory rape. With respect to the kidnaping of Andrea, the court did not indicate whether it vacated the sentence because it believed our recent opinion in so mandated, or because the specified aggravating circumstance for this offense, the rape of Andrea, also was tainted by the jury's failure to distinguish between forcible and statutory rape.[1] The court did not disturb, however, the conviction for the underlying offense of kidnaping with bodily injury. The Georgia court did affirm the sentence of death for the murder of Lori |
Justice Powell | 1,978 | 17 | dissenting | Presnell v. Georgia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109946/presnell-v-georgia/ | affirm the sentence of death for the murder of Lori Ann, the kidnaping of Andrea with bodily injury being the aggravating circumstance. The validity of that kidnaping conviction is the matter in issue here. According to the Court, the court below ruled that even though as a matter of state law the aggravated sodomy of Andrea could not provide the bodily-injury element of the kidnaping, that element was supplied by the evidence of forcible rape. The Court then holds that the Georgia court could not constitutionally rely on evidence of forcible rape as bodily injury, because the jury may have convicted petitioner only of statutory rape, which requires no finding of force. Statutory rape would therefore be insufficient to provide the bodily-injury element associated with the kidnaping, which in turn would render that offense insufficient as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty.[2] Although the opinion of the Georgia court is not a model of clarity, a careful reading of the decision persuades me that the Court has misconstrued a critical part of what was held below. The Court is correct that the Georgia Supreme Court was not entitled to rely upon the evidence in the record of forcible rape *20 to supply the bodily-injury component of the kidnaping.[3] But it is incorrect to say that the court below necessarily rejected the jury's unambiguous finding of aggravated sodomy[4]*21 as establishing the bodily injury that converted simple kidnaping into a capital offense under Georgia law. On this point the opinion of the state court is hopelessly obscure. As the Court observes, portions of the opinion may be read as indicating that aggravated sodomy, a crime that has as an element a forcible assault upon the victim, cannot constitute "bodily injury" with respect to the crime of kidnaping with bodily injury. Ante, at 15 n. 2. An equally plausible reading of the opinion, however, is that once the court determined that the evidence of harm inflicted during the rape established bodily injury, it did not think it necessary to decide the question whether aggravated sodomy, considered alone, also could establish that element. Certainly that question was not necessarily decided by the court, as it believed that bodily injury was proved, at least in part, by the evidence of forcible rape.[5] Moreover, the trial court expressly held that the sodomy did satisfy the bodily injury requirement, and the Georgia Supreme Court did not reverse that ruling.[6] *22 The validity of petitioner's conviction for kidnaping with bodily injury, and the use of that conviction as an aggravating circumstance for the |
Justice Powell | 1,978 | 17 | dissenting | Presnell v. Georgia | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109946/presnell-v-georgia/ | use of that conviction as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of sentencing, cannot be determined without resolution of this state-law question. If the court below meant to rule that as a matter of Georgia law evidence of forcible sodomy does not constitute proof of "bodily injury" for the purposes of the kidnaping offense, although proof of forcible rape would suffice, then the death sentence must be vacated and the conviction for kidnaping with bodily injury must be reversed. A criminal defendant is "entitled to have the validity of [his] convictio[n] appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court." Here, the jury was permitted to find petitioner guilty of kidnaping with bodily injury if he committed aggravated sodomy during the offense. The jury also was allowed to specify this kidnaping as an aggravating circumstance of the murder if it coincided with aggravated sodomy. If it was an error of state law so to instruct the jury, the court may not redeem the mistake by ruling that the jury could have believed other evidence indicating petitioner had injured his victim in other ways. Cf. This is particularly true here, as the Georgia court ruled that *23 the jury cannot be deemed to have returned a guilty verdict on the forcible rape charge itself. If, however, the aggravated sodomy, accomplished by force, did satisfy the bodily-injury element under state law, it would appear that the jury properly convicted petitioner of that crime and was permitted to use that conviction as an aggravating circumstance with respect to the murder conviction. Because the question is substantial and was not resolved by the court below, I would remand the case for clarification.[7] |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | This case concerns a criminal drug offender originally sentenced in accordance with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission lowered the applicable Guidelines sentencing range; the offender asked for a sentence reduction in light of the lowered range; and the District Judge reduced his original sentence from 135 months’ imprisonment to 114 months’. The offender, believing he should have obtained a yet greater reduction, argues that the District Judge did not adequately explain why he imposed a sentence of 114 months rather than a lower sentence. The Court of Ap- peals held that the judge’s explanation was adequate. And we agree with the Court of Appeals. I A The Sentencing Guidelines require a sentencing judge to consider certain listed characteristics of the offender and the offense for which he was convicted. Those characteris- tics (and certain other factors) bring the judge to a Guide- lines table that sets forth a range of punishments, for 2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court example, 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment. A sentencing judge often will choose a specific penalty from a Guidelines range. But a judge also has the legal authority to impose a sentence outside the range either because he or she “departs” from the range (as is permitted by certain Guidelines rules) or because he or she chooses to “vary” from the Guidelines by not applying them at all. See United (holding the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory). The judge, however, must always take account of certain statu- tory factors. See 18 U.S. C. (requiring the judge to consider the “seriousness of the offense” and the need to “afford adequate deterrence,” among other factors). And, of particular relevance here, the judge “shall state in open court the reasons for [the] imposition of the particular sentence.” If the sentence is outside the Guide- lines range (whether because of a “departure” or a “vari- ance”), the judge must state “the specific reason for the imposition of a different” sentence. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, and the Guide- lines range exceeds 24 months, the judge must also state “the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.” B We here consider one aspect of the judge’s obligation to provide reasons. In an earlier case, we set forth the law that governs the explanation requirement at sentencing. In the offender sought a downward departure from the Guidelines. The record, we said, showed that the sentencing judge “lis- tened to each argument[,] considered the supporting evidence[,] was fully aware of defendant’s various physical ailments[,]” imposed a sentence |
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