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Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | fully aware of defendant’s various physical ailments[,]” imposed a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and, having considered the factors, said simply that the sentence was “ ‘appropriate.’ ” Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court We held that where “a matter is as conceptu- ally simple as in the case at hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.” We also discussed more generally the judge’s obligation to explain. We wrote that the statute calls “for the judge to ‘state’ his ‘reasons.’ And that re- quirement reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those rea- sons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust.” But, we continued, “we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as in- sisting upon a full opinion in every case. The appro- priateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circum- stances. Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a judge simply writes the word ‘granted’ or ‘denied’ on the face of a motion while relying upon context and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons clear. The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.” At bottom, the sentencing judge need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has consid- ered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” When a judge applies a sentence within the Guidelines range, he or she often does not need to provide a lengthy explanation. As we said in “[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the 4 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of and other con- gressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typical.” We have followed this same reasoning in other sentenc- ing cases, including which we decided the same year as Cf. Kim- (suggest- ing a district judge’s decision to vary from the Guidelines range may be entitled to greater respect when the judge finds a particular case “ ‘outside the “heartland” ’ ” of the Guidelines). Indeed, the case before us |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | ’ ” of the Guidelines). Indeed, the case before us differs from the Guidelines cases that describes in only one significant respect. It concerns a limited form of resentencing. C The relevant lower court proceedings are not complicated. In 2013, petitioner pleaded guilty to a federal crime, namely, possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. The judge reviewed the Guidelines, deter- mined that the applicable range was 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment and imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range: 135 months. Pursuant to its statutory author- ity, the Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the relevant Guidelines range from 135 to 168 months to 108 to 135 months. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012– Nov. 2016) (USSG); see also 28 U.S. C. Petitioner then sought and obtained a sentence modification. See 18 U.S. C. USSG He asked the judge to lower his sentence to the bottom of the new range, namely 108 months. But the judge instead lowered it to 114 months, not 108 months. The order was entered on a form issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The form certified the judge had “considered” Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court petitioner’s motion and “tak[en] into account” the factors and the relevant Guidelines policy statement. App. 106–107 (under seal). Petitioner appealed, claiming that the judge did not adequately explain why he rejected petitioner’s 108-month request. The Court of Appeals rejected his argument. 854 F.3d 655 (CA10 2017). In its view, “absent any indication the court failed to consider the factors, a district court need not explain choosing a particular guide- lines-range sentence.” Petitioner sought certiorari, and we granted his petition. II A The Government, pointing out that this is a sentence- modification case, argues that this fact alone should se- cure it a virtually automatic victory. That is because, unlike an ordinary Guidelines sentencing case, the statute governing sentence-modification motions does not insist that the judge provide a “reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.” Compare with It adds that sentence modifications also differ procedurally from sentencing in that the offender is not entitled to be present in court at the time the reduced sentence is imposed. See v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (citing Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43(b)(4)). As we have said before, “Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” at 826. These procedural features, the Government asserts, mean that “the |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | 826. These procedural features, the Government asserts, mean that “the court has no duty” to provide an “on-the- record explanation” of its reasons. Brief for United States 12, 19. We need not go so far. Even assuming (purely for ar- gument’s sake) district courts have equivalent duties when initially sentencing a defendant and when later modifying 6 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court the sentence, what the District Court did here was suffi- cient. At the original sentencing, the judge “must ade- quately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaning- ful appellate review.” ; see also 551 U.S., (“The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has consid- ered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority”). Just how much of an explanation this requires, however, de- pends, as we have said, upon the circumstances of the particular case. –357. In some cases, it may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the parties’ arguments and taken account of the factors, among others. But in other cases, more explanation may be necessary (depend- ing, perhaps, upon the legal arguments raised at sentenc- ing, see ). That may be the case even when there is little evidence in the record affirmatively showing that the sentencing judge failed to consider the factors. If the court of appeals considers an explanation inadequate in a particular case, it can send the case back to the district court for a more complete explanation. Cf. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 15) (“[A]ppellate courts retain broad discretion in determining whether a remand for resentencing is necessary”). B Petitioner argues that the judge should have explained more here because there is, or should be, some kind of presumption that the judge will choose a point within the new lower Guidelines range that is “proportional” to the point previously chosen in the older higher Guidelines range. We are not aware of any law or any convincing reason, however, suggesting that this is so. Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court As a technical matter, determining just what “propor- tionality” means in this context would often prove difficult when the sentence is somewhere in the middle of the Guidelines range. The Sentencing Table calculates pun- ishments according to a logarithmic scale. Take petition- er’s original and amended Guidelines ranges, for example. The original range was 135 to |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | Guidelines ranges, for example. The original range was 135 to 168 months, a difference of 33 months. The amended range, by comparison, is 108 to 135 months, a difference of 27 months. And viewed loga- rithmically, what may seem the middle of a new lower range is not necessarily proportionate to what may seem the middle of the old higher range. Nothing in the Guide- lines, or elsewhere, encourages arguments about such matters among lawyers or judges who are not experts in advanced mathematics. More importantly, the Guidelines ranges reflect to some degree what many, perhaps most, judges believed in the pre-Guidelines era was a proper sentence based upon the criminal behavior at issue and the characteristics of the offender. Thus, a judge’s choice among points on a range will often simply reflect the judge’s belief that the chosen sentence is the “right” sentence (or as close as possible to the “right” sentence) based on various factors, including those found in Insofar as that is so, it is unsur- prising that changing the applicable range may lead a judge to choose a nonproportional point on the new range. We see nothing that favors the one or the other. So, as is true of most Guidelines sentences, the judge need not provide a lengthy explanation if the “context and the record” make clear that the judge had “a reasoned basis” for reducing the defendant’s sentence. 359. C Turning to the facts of this case, we find that the Dis- trict Court’s explanation satisfies the standard we used in 8 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court and Gall, assuming it applies to sentence modifica- tions. In as we earlier said, we upheld as lawful a sentencing judge’s explanation that stated simply that the Guidelines sentence imposed was “ ‘appropriate.’ ” 551 U.S., We noted that, in respect to the brevity or length of the reasons the judge gives for imposing a par- ticular Guidelines sentence, the “law leaves much” to “the judge’s own professional judgment.” We pointed out that the sentencing judge in that case had “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he ha[d] considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking author- ity.” The same is true here. At petitioner’s original sentencing, he sought a variance from the Guidelines range (135 to 168 months) on the ground that his history and family circumstances war- ranted a lower sentence. The judge denied his request. In doing so, the judge noted that he had “consulted the sen- tencing factors of 18 |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | that he had “consulted the sen- tencing factors of 18 U.S. C. 3553(a)(1).” He explained that the “reason the guideline sentence is high in this case, even the low end of 135 months, is because of the [drug] quantity.” He pointed out that petitioner had “dis- tributed 1.7 kilograms of actual methamphetamine,” a “significant quantity.” And he said that “one of the other reasons that the penalty is severe in this case is because of methamphetamine.” He elaborated this latter point by stating that he had “been doing this a long time, and from what [he] gather[ed] and what [he had] seen, metham- phetamine, it destroys individual lives, it destroys fami- lies, it can destroy communities.” App. 25. This record was before the judge when he considered petitioner’s request for a sentence modification. He was the same judge who had sentenced petitioner originally. Petitioner asked the judge to reduce his sentence to 108 months, the bottom of the new range, stressing various educational courses he had taken in prison. The Govern- Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 9 Opinion of the Court ment pointed to his having also broken a moderately serious rule while in prison. The judge certified (on a form) that he had “considered” petitioner’s “motion” and had “tak[en] into account” the relevant Guidelines policy statements and the factors. at 106–107 (under seal). He then reduced the sentence to 114 months. The record as a whole strongly suggests that the judge originally believed that, given petitioner’s conduct, 135 months was an appropriately high sentence. So it is un- surprising that the judge considered a sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appro- priate. As in there was not much else for the judge to say. The dissent would have us ignore the record from the initial sentencing and consider only what the judge said when modifying petitioner’s sentence. See post, at 4-5 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). But, as we have made clear before, a sentence modification is “not a plenary resentenc- ing proceeding.” We therefore need not turn a blind eye to what the judge said at peti- tioner’s initial sentencing. The dissent suggests the judge’s failure to grant petitioner a proportional reduction “limits the relevance of the initial sentencing proceeding.” Post, at 5. To the contrary, the record of the initial sen- tencing sheds light on why the court picked a point slightly above the bottom of the reduced Guidelines range when it modified petitioner’s sentence. Our decision is not (as the dissent claims) based on mere “speculation.” Post, at 7. Rather, |
Justice Breyer | 2,018 | 2 | majority | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | dissent claims) based on mere “speculation.” Post, at 7. Rather, we simply find the record as a whole satisfies us that the judge “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal deci- sionmaking authority.” This is not to say that a disproportionate sentence re- duction never may require a more detailed explanation. It could be that, under different facts and a different record, the district court’s use of a barebones form order in re- 10 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court sponse to a motion like petitioner’s would be inadequate. As we said above, the courts of appeals are well suited to request a more detailed explanation when necessary. See The dissent asserts that appellate courts would not need to remand for further explanation if dis- trict courts provided an additional “short statement or check[ed] additional boxes” on the form order. Post, at 8. That may be so, and nothing in this decision prevents judges from saying more when, in their professional judg- ment, saying more is appropriate. Providing a more de- tailed statement of reasons often serves “a salutary pur- pose” separate and apart from facilitating appellate review. 551 U.S., But our task here is to decide the case before us. And given the simplicity of this case, the judge’s awareness of the arguments, his consid- eration of the relevant sentencing factors, and the intui- tive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bot- tom of the new range, the judge’s explanation (minimal as it was) fell within the scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing judge. See The Court of Appeals concluded the same. Its judgment is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 1 KENNEDY, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 17–5639 ADAUCTO CHAVEZ-MEZA, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Califano v. Boles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110137/califano-v-boles/ | The critical question in this dispute is whether 202 (g) of the Social Security Act, 2 U.S. C. 02 (g), discriminates against unmarried parents or against illegitimate children. The Court determines that the intended beneficiaries of 202 (g) are dependent spouses, and that the statute therefore distinguishes between categories of parents. Having thus characterized the statute, the Court concludes that the use of marital status as an index of dependency on a deceased wage earner is permissible under and If, however, as the District Court found, the statute benefits children, then it incorporates a distinction based on legitimacy which must be tested under the more rigorous standards of and Determining the proper classification for purposes of equal protection analysis is, to be sure, not "an exact science." Ante, at 29. But neither is it an exercise in statutory revision. And only by disregarding the clear legislative history, structure, and effect of the Mother's Insurance Benefits Program can the Court characterize dependent spouses, rather than children, as the intended beneficiaries of 202 (g). Just four Terms ago, a unanimous Court concluded that the clear purpose underlying 202 (g) "is to provide children deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the personal attention *298 of the other."[1] Indeed, the author of today's opinion for the Court concurred separately in on the ground that an examination of the legislative history and statutory context of 202 (g) "convincingly demonstrates that the only purpose of [ 202 (g)] is to make it possible for children of deceased contributing workers to have the personal care and attention of a surviving parent." (emphasis added). That same legislative history and statutory context now persuade the Court that the "animating concern" of 202 (g) is to assist a surviving spouse, and that any benefit to a child is merely "incidental." Ante, at 288-289, 29. I cannot agree. In my judgment, the history and structure of the Act establish as "convincingly" here as they did in that 202 (g) was designed to aid children. And because denial of support for illegitimates bears no substantial relationship to that purpose, I respectfully dissent. I The Court concedes, as it must, that Congress intended the Mother's Insurance Benefits Program to enable surviving spouses to stay at home and care for their children. Ante, at 288. Despite this concession, the Court manages to conclude that the sole beneficiaries of the program, for equal protection purposes, are the spouses who provide care, not the children who receive it. Unencumbered by any direct support from the legislative history, the Court reaches this conclusion by positing |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Califano v. Boles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110137/califano-v-boles/ | the legislative history, the Court reaches this conclusion by positing that the program was designed to aid surviving parents who "actually suffer economic dislocation upon the death of a wage earner." Ante, at 289. Given this asserted purpose, *299 the Court finds "obvious logic" in 202 (g)'s exclusion of unwed mothers, since "Congress could reasonably conclude that a women who has never been married to the wage earner is far less likely to be dependent upon the wage earner at the time of his death." Ante, at 289. However, neither the history nor structure of the statute supports the Court's determination that Congress enacted 202 (g) to assist dependent spouses rather than their children. Aid to surviving parents was first extended under the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 in the form of "widows' benefits." The Advisory Council on Social Security, which formulated the program, indicated that payments were "intended as supplements to the orphans' benefits with the purpose of enabling the widow to remain at home and care for the children." Final Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security 31 (1938). Proposals to grant benefits to dependent widows without minor children were rejected, on the apparent theory that young childless women could work and older widows would have savings or grown children able to assist them. Report of the Social Security Board, H. R. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1939). See also H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 36-37 (1939); Hearings on the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 (1939). Subsequent re-enactments of the program reflected no change in the underlying statutory objectiveto allow surviving parents "to stay home and care for [their] children instead of working." 1971 Advisory Council on Social Security, Reports on the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Medicare Programs 30 (1971). Moreover, the entire structure of the statute belies the Court's determination that Congress intended mother's insurance to aid a wage earner's economically dependent spouse rather than his children. Section 202 (g) imposes no express requirement of dependency. As the District Court noted, *300 mothers and their legitimate children may obtain benefits under 202 (g) "regardless of whether [the wage earner] was living with them or supporting them at the time of his death, or even if he never lived with or supported them." By contrast, an unmarried mother and her child who were fully dependent on the insured nonetheless remain ineligible for assistance under 202 (g). That divorced parents and their children qualify |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Califano v. Boles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110137/califano-v-boles/ | under 202 (g). That divorced parents and their children qualify for mother's insurance further undercuts the Court's attempted linkage between the marital requirement and dependency. A woman previously married to a deceased wage earner is eligible for benefits even if neither she nor her child ever received support from the father, and even if the father was excused from any legal support obligations in the divorce proceedings. Indeed, a mother whose second marriage terminates in death or divorce may claim benefits on the account of her first husband although in all likelihood, any entitlement to support terminated upon her remarriage. See[2] In short, nothing in the structure or history of the statute sustains the Court's conclusion that the purpose of 202 (g) is to benefit dependent spouses as opposed to children. Equally untenable is the Court's further determination that 202 (g) has insufficient discriminatory impact on illegitimates to warrant further analysis. See ante, at 29. In concluding *301 that 202 (g) has no such disparate effect, the Court reasons first that "[t]he benefit to a child as a result of the parent or guardian's receipt of mother's insurance benefits is incidental: mother's insurance benefit payments do not vary with the number of children within the recipient's care, they are not available in the foster care context, and they are lost on remarriage or if the surviving parent earns a substantial income" Ante, at 29. But none of these enumerated eligibility requirements support the Court's characterization of children as "incidental" rather than intended beneficiaries of 202 (g). On the contrary, these restrictions, together with two others the Court neglects to mention, are consistent with the stated purpose of the program to afford parents who would otherwise be forced to work the option of caring for their children at home. That objective is plainly served by eligibility limitations excluding individuals whose economic resources already permit such a choice. Factors including remarriage, outside income, and qualification for foster care payments directly or indirectly reflect such resources; the number of the recipient's children does not. Similarly, the conditions that mother's benefits cease when a child reaches 18 or leaves the parent's care and custody, see 202 (d) (5), 2 U.S. C. 02 (d) (5), also reinforce the conclusion that children are the actual beneficiaries of 202 (g). For the parent's eligibility continues "only so long as it is realistic to think that the children might need their parent at home." 20 U. S., at 6 n. 17. The Court further submits that the discriminatory impact of 202 (g) is not of constitutional dimension because |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Califano v. Boles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110137/califano-v-boles/ | impact of 202 (g) is not of constitutional dimension because an illegitimate child could conceivably obtain benefits if he leaves the home of his natural mother to live with his deceased father's wife. This suggestion, of course, presupposes both an extraordinary beneficence on the part of the wife, and no *302 strong attachment between the natural mother and her child, assumptions which the Court does not and could not defend.[3] And forcing a child to forgo living with his natural mother in order to obtain assistance under 202 (g) hardly comports with the articulated purpose of the program, to encourage parental care. In any event, as this Court's prior holdings amply demonstrate, a statute that disadvantages illegitimates as a class is not saved simply because not all members of that class are penalized under all conceivable circumstances. For example, in both and we rejected an argument that illegitimates suffered no discrimination under statutes extending benefits to legitimate children but only to certain categories of illegitimates.[] Similarly, in *303 the Court held unconstitutional a statute denying illegitimate children the right to inherit from their intestate fathers even though illegitimates whose fathers wrote wills were not disadvantaged by the provision. So too here, the Court cannot dismiss the discriminatory impact of 202 (g) by a "hypothetical reshuffling of the facts," particularly one that disregards the very relationship between a surviving single parent and child which the statute was intended to foster. Finally, the Court suggests that 202 (g) does not disadvantage illegitimates in any constitutionally cognizable sense because it is surviving spouses, not their children, who "exercise dominion over the benefits and whose freedom of choice [is] enhanced thereby." Ante, at 295. However, that the parent makes the decision to stay at home does not render the child any less the beneficiary of that choice. As a practical matter, the parent also exercises "dominion" over the children's insurance benefits afforded by 202 (d) of the Act, 2 U.S. C. 02 (d), but the child is nonetheless the recipient. Children now become "incidental" and "speculative" beneficiaries of 202 (g) only because the Court declares them to be so. I would adhere to the understanding, unanimously expressed in that the Mother's Insurance Program, both in purpose and effect, is a form of assistance to children. Thus, the statute's eligibility restrictions should be evaluated as they in fact operate, as discrimination based on legitimacy. II Statutes that foreclose opportunities solely because of a child's status at birth represent a particularly invidious form *30 of discrimination. ; To penalize an illegitimate child for conduct he could |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Califano v. Boles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110137/califano-v-boles/ | ; To penalize an illegitimate child for conduct he could not prevent and a status he cannot alter is both "illogical and unjust." Accordingly, classifications based on legitimacy violate the equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment[5] unless they bear a close and substantial relationship to a permissible governmental interest. See ; 9-510 In arguing that 202 (g) meets this test, the Secretary suggests that legitimate children as a class are more likely than illegitimates to be dependent on the insured wage earner at the time of his death. Therefore, because the statute establishes a maximum amount payable to any one wage earner's survivors, the Secretary contends that the exclusion of illegitimates is an appropriate means of allocating finite resources to those most likely to have suffered economically from the insured's death. Brief for Appellant 28. The threshold difficulty with this argument is that 202 (g)'s marital restriction bars recovery by illegitimates regardless of whether any other individuals are eligible to claim benefits on a particular wage earner's account. Thus, the restriction defended here as a rationing device withholds assistance to illegitimates even when there are no competing claimants among whom to ration. Insofar as the exclusion of illegitimates is designed to allocate limited funds on the basis of need, it is not carefully tailored to achieve that objective. See ;[6] *305 But even if 202 (g)'s marital restriction operated only in contexts of multiple claimants, it could not withstand scrutiny under and In both those cases, the Court recognized that the marital status of parents is not a sufficiently accurate index of the economic needs of their children to warrant conclusively denying assistance to illegitimates. At issue in Weber was a workmen's compensation scheme which provided that unacknowledged illegitimate children could recover on the account of an insured only if payments to other eligible claimants did not exhaust the maximum allowable benefits. Noting that an unacknowledged illegitimate child "may suffer as much from the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock," the Court declined to view status at birth as an adequate proxy for economic dependence. See also summarily aff'g (Md.); summarily aff'g (Conn.). Again in we struck down a statute granting social security benefits to a disabled worker's legitimate children born after the onset of disability but not to afterborn illegitimate children except under certain limited circumstances. See n. The constitutional infirmities identified in Jimenez are equally evident in this case; that statute, like 202 (g), was over inclusive to the extent it aided legitimate children not actually dependent on the insured wage earner, and |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | Califano v. Boles | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110137/califano-v-boles/ | children not actually dependent on the insured wage earner, and underinclusive to the extent it withheld assistance from illegitimate children who were in fact dependent. And here, as in Jimenez, it serves no purpose consistent with the aims of the Social Security Act to deny illegitimates all opportunity *306 to establish their dependence and their concomitant right to insurance benefits. See 17 U.S.,[7] We cannot, of course, expect perfect congruence between legislative ends and means in the administration of a complex statutory scheme. See ante, at 28-285. But neither should we give our imprimatur to distinctions needlessly predicated on a disfavored social status, particularly one beyond an individual's power to affect. Although a "blanket and conclusive exclusion" of illegitimate children may be an administratively expedient means of screening for dependence under 202 (g), see it is also inaccurate, unjust, and, under this Court's settled precedents, unconstitutional. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | We granted certiorari to reexamine the circumstances under which state prison regulations afford inmates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause I DeMont Conner was convicted of numerous state crimes, including murder, kidnaping, robbery, and burglary, for which he is currently serving an indeterminate sentence of *475 30 years to life in a Hawaii prison He was confined in the Halawa Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison in central Oahu In August 187, a prison officer escorted him from his cell to the module program area The officer subjected Conner to a strip search, complete with an inspection of the rectal area Conner retorted with angry and foul language directed at the officer Eleven days later he received notice that he had been charged with disciplinary infractions The notice charged Conner with "high misconduct" for using physical interference to impair a correctional function, and "low moderate misconduct" for using abusive or obscene language and for harassing employees[1] Conner appeared before an adjustment committee on August 28, 187 The committee refused Conner's request to present witnesses at the hearing, stating that "[w]itnesses were unavailable due to move [sic] to the medium facility and being short staffed on the modules" App to Pet for Cert A-67 At the conclusion of proceedings, the committee determined that Conner was guilty of the alleged misconduct It sentenced him to 30 days' disciplinary segregation *476 in the Special Holding Unit[2] for the physical obstruction charge, and four hours segregation for each of the other two charges to be served concurrent with the 30 days at A-66 to A-67 Conner's segregation began August 31, 187, and ended September 2, 187 Conner sought administrative review within 14 days of receiving the committee's decision Haw Admin Rule 17-201-20(a) Nine months later, the deputy administrator found the high misconduct charge unsupported and expunged Conner's disciplinary record with respect to that charge App 24 But before the deputy administrator decided the appeal, Conner had brought this suit against the adjustment committee chair and other prison officials in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii based on Rev Stat 17, 42 US C 183 His amended complaint prayed for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages for, among other things, a deprivation of procedural due process in connection with the disciplinary hearing The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment It concluded that Conner had a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation and that there was a disputed question of fact |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | segregation and that there was a disputed question of fact with respect to whether Conner received all of the process due under this Court's pronouncement in The Court of Appeals based its conclusion on a prison regulation *477 that instructs the committee to find guilt when a charge of misconduct is supported by substantial evidence Haw Admin Rule 17-201-18(b)(2) [3] The Court of Appeals reasoned from Kentucky Dept of Corrections v US 454 that the committee's duty to find guilt was nondiscretionary From the language of the regulation, it drew a negative inference that the committee may not impose segregation if it does not find substantial evidence of misconduct It viewed this as a state-created liberty interest, and therefore held that respondent was entitled to call witnesses by virtue of our opinion in supra We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 513 US 21 and now reverse II Our due process analysis begins with There, Nebraska inmates challenged the decision of prison officials to revoke good time credits without adequate procedures 418 US, at 3 Inmates earned good time credits under a state statute that bestowed mandatory sentence reductions for good behavior, id at 546, n 6, revocable only for "`flagrant or serious misconduct,' " id at 545, n 5 We held that the Due Process Clause itself does not create a liberty interest in credit for good behavior, but that the statutory provision created a liberty interest in a "shortened prison sentence" which resulted from good time *478 credits, credits which were revocable only if the prisoner was guilty of serious misconduct The Court characterized this liberty interest as one of "real substance" ibid and articulated minimum procedures necessary to reach a "mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution," id, Much of `s contribution to the landscape of prisoners' due process derived not from its description of liberty interests, but rather from its intricate balancing of prison management concerns with prisoners' liberty in determining the amount of process due Its short discussion of the definition of a liberty interest, -8, led to a more thorough treatment of the issue in v Fano, 427 US 215 Inmates in sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages by reason of transfers from a Massachusetts medium security prison to a maximum security facility with substantially less favorable conditions The transfers were ordered in the aftermath of arson incidents for which the transferred inmates were thought to be responsible, and did not entail a loss of good time credits or any period of disciplinary confinement at 222 The |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | credits or any period of disciplinary confinement at 222 The Court began with the proposition that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner at 224 It then held that the Due Process Clause did not itself create a liberty interest in prisoners to be free from intrastate prison transfers It reasoned that transfer to a maximum security facility, albeit one with more burdensome conditions, was "within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose" Ibid; see also Montanye v Haymes, 427 US 236, The Court distinguished by noting that there the protected liberty interest in good time credit had been created by state law; here no comparable Massachusetts law stripped officials of the discretion to transfer prisoners to alternative *47 facilities "for whatever reason or for no reason at all" [4] Shortly after the Court embarked on a different approach to defining state-created liberty interests Because dictum in distinguished by focusing on whether state action was mandatory or discretionary, the Court in later cases laid ever greater emphasis on this somewhat mechanical dichotomy Greenholtz v Inmates of Neb Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1 foreshadowed the methodology that would come to full fruition in v Helms, 45 US 460 The Greenholtz inmates alleged that they had been unconstitutionally denied parole Their claim centered on a state statute that set the date for discretionary parole at the time the minimum term of imprisonment less good time credits expired The statute ordered release of a prisoner at that time, unless one of four specific conditions were shown 442 US, at 11 The Court apparently accepted the inmates' argument that the word "shall" in the statute created a legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite finding that one of the justifications for deferral existed, since the Court concluded that some measure of constitutional protection was due Nevertheless, the State ultimately prevailed because the minimal process it had awarded the prisoners was deemed sufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment *480 The Court made explicit in what was implicit in Greenholtz In evaluating the claims of inmates who had been confined to administrative segregation, it first rejected the inmates' claim of a right to remain in the general population as protected by the Due Process Clause on the authority of Montanye, and The Due Process Clause standing alone confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken "`within the sentence imposed'" 45 US, at 468 It then concluded that the transfer |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | 45 US, at 468 It then concluded that the transfer to less amenable quarters for nonpunitive reasons was "ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence" Ibid Examination of the possibility that the State had created a liberty interest by virtue of its prison regulations followed Instead of looking to whether the State created an interest of "real substance" comparable to the good time credit scheme of the Court asked whether the State had gone beyond issuing mere procedural guidelines and had used "language of an unmistakably mandatory character" such that the incursion on liberty would not occur "absent specified substantive predicates" Finding such mandatory directives in the regulations before it, the Court decided that the State had created a protected liberty interest It nevertheless, held, as it had in Greenholtz, that the full panoply of procedures conferred in were unnecessary to safeguard the inmates' interest and, if imposed, would undermine the prison's management objectives As this methodology took hold, no longer did inmates need to rely on a showing that they had suffered a "`grievous loss' " of liberty retained even after sentenced to terms of imprisonment Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, For the Court had ceased to examine the "nature" of the interest with respect to interests allegedly created by the State See ibid; Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, In a series of cases since the Court has wrestled with the language of intricate, often rather routine prison guidelines * to determine whether mandatory language and substantive predicates created an enforceable expectation that the State would produce a particular outcome with respect to the prisoner's conditions of confinement In Olim v Wakinekona, 461 US 238 the claimants identified prison regulations that required a particular kind of hearing before the prison administrator could, in his discretion, effect an interstate transfer to another prison Parsing the language of the regulation led the Court to hold that the discretionary nature of the transfer decision negated any state-created liberty interest at 24-250 Kentucky Dept of Corrections v US 454 dealt with regulations governing the visitation privileges of inmates Asserting that a regulation created an absolute right to visitors absent a finding of certain substantive predicates, the inmates sought review of the adequacy of the procedures As in Wakinekona, the Court determined the regulation left visitor exclusion to the discretion of the officials, and refused to elevate such expectations to the level of a liberty interest 40 US, at 464-465 By shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one based on the language of a particular |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | inquiry to one based on the language of a particular regulation, and not the nature of the deprivation, the Court encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges Courts have, in response, and not altogether illogically, drawn negative inferences from mandatory language in the text of prison regulations The Court of Appeals' approach in this case is typical: It inferred from the mandatory directive that a finding of guilt "shall" be imposed under certain conditions the conclusion that the absence of such conditions prevents a finding of guilt Such a conclusion may be entirely sensible in the ordinary task of construing a statute defining rights and remedies available to the general public It is a good deal less sensible in the case of a prison regulation primarily designed to *4 guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison Not only are such regulations not designed to confer rights on inmates, but the result of the negative implication jurisprudence is not to require the prison officials to follow the negative implication drawn from the regulation, but is instead to attach procedural protections that may be of quite a different nature Here, for example, the Court of Appeals did not hold that a finding of guilt could not be made in the absence of substantial evidence Instead, it held that the "liberty interest" created by the regulation entitled the inmate to the procedural protections set forth in has produced at least two undesirable effects First, it creates disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment Prison administrators need be concerned with the safety of the staff and inmate population Ensuring that welfare often leads prison administrators to curb the discretion of staff on the front line who daily encounter prisoners hostile to the authoritarian structure of the prison environment Such guidelines are not set forth solely to benefit the prisoner They also aspire to instruct subordinate employees how to exercise discretion vested by the State in the warden, and to confine the authority of prison personnel in order to avoid widely different treatment of similar incidents The approach embraced by discourages this desirable development: States may avoid creation of "liberty" interests by having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring standardless discretion on correctional personnel Second, the approach has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone In so doing, it has run counter to the view expressed in several |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | it has run counter to the view expressed in several of our cases that federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment 418 U S, at 561-563; 45 U S, at 470-471; v North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc, 433 US 11, Such flexibility is especially warranted in the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life, a common subject of prisoner claims since See, e g, Klos v Haskell, 48 F3d 81, ; Segal v Biller, No 4-35448, 14 U S App LEXIS 30628 (unpublished) (claiming liberty interest in a waiver of the travel limit imposed on prison furloughs); Burgin v Nix, 8 F2d 733, ; Spruytte v Walters, 753 F2d 48, (finding liberty interest in receiving a paperback dictionary due to a rule that states a prisoner "`may receive any book which does not present a threat to the order or security of the institution' ") ; Lyon v Farrier, 727 F2d 766, ; United States v Michigan, 680 F Supp 270, In light of the above discussion, we believe that the search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were correctly established and applied in and [5] Following we recognize that States *484 may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause See also Board of Pardons v Allen, 4 US 36 But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e g, 445 U S, at 43 and 44 U S, at 221-222 nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life Conner asserts, incorrectly, that any state action taken for a punitive reason encroaches upon a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause even in the absence of any state regulation Neither Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520 nor Ingraham v Wright, 430 US 651 requires such a rule Bell dealt with the interests of pretrial detainees and not convicted prisoners See also United States v Salerno, US 73, The Court in Bell correctly noted that a detainee "may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law" 441 US, at 535 The |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | with due process of law" 441 US, at 535 The Court expressed concern that a State would attempt to punish a detainee for the crime for which he was indicted via preconviction holding conditions at 53 Such a course would improperly extend the legitimate reasons for which such persons are detainedto ensure their presence at trial[6] *485 The same distinction applies to Ingraham, which addressed the rights of schoolchildren to remain free from arbitrary corporal punishment The Court noted that the Due Process Clause historically encompassed the notion that the State could not "physically punish an individual except in accordance with due process of law" and so found schoolchildren sheltered 430 US, at 674 Although children sent to public school are lawfully confined to the classroom, arbitrary corporal punishment represents an invasion of personal security to which their parents do not consent when entrusting the educational mission to the State The punishment of incarcerated prisoners, on the other hand, serves different aims than those found invalid in Bell and Ingraham The process does not impose retribution in lieu of a valid conviction, nor does it maintain physical control over free citizens forced by law to subject themselves to state control over the educational mission It effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals See State v Alvey, 67 Haw 4, 678 P2d 5, Admittedly, prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, 418 U S, at 5, but "`[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system' " 433 U S, at 125, quoting Price v Johnston, 334 US 266, (148) Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law This case, though concededly punitive, does not present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of Conner's indeterminate sentence Although Conner points to dicta in cases implying that solitary confinement automatically triggers due process protection, at n 1; Baxter v Palmigiano, 425 US 308, this Court has not had the opportunity to address in an argued case the question whether disciplinary confinement of inmates itself implicates constitutional liberty interests We hold that Conner's discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest The record shows that, at the time of Conner's punishment, disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody[7] We note also |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,995 | 19 | majority | Sandin v. Conner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117957/sandin-v-conner/ | inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody[7] We note also that the State expunged Conner's disciplinary record with respect to the "high misconduct" charge nine months after Conner served time in segregation Thus, Conner's confinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of restriction Indeed, the conditions at Halawa involve significant amounts of "lockdown time" even for inmates in the general population[8] Based on a comparison between inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation, the State's actions in placing him there for 30 days did not work a major disruption in his environment[] *487 Nor does Conner's situation present a case where the State's action will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence Nothing in Hawaii's code requires the parole board to deny parole in the face of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its absence, Haw Rev Stat 353-68, 353-6 even though misconduct is by regulation a relevant consideration, Haw Admin Rule 23-700-33(b) (effective Aug 12) The decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations And, the prisoner is afforded procedural protection at his parole hearing in order to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct record Haw Admin Rule 23-700-31(a), 23-700-35(c), 23-700-36 The chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause The Court rejected a similar claim in 427 U S, at 22, n 8 [10] We hold, therefore, that neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the Due Process Clause itself, afforded Conner a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to the procedural protections set forth in The regime to which he was subjected as a result of the misconduct hearing was within the range of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life[11] *488 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | dissenting | Lane v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110670/lane-v-williams/ | The majority announces today that this case is moot because, in its view, no collateral consequences flow from respondents' parole revocations, which were based on findings that respondents had violated the conditions of parole terms declared void by the courts below. I dissent from this holding because I believe it is contrary to this Court's precedents and because it ignores the fact that the State of Illinois does attach collateral consequences to parole revocations, a fact recognized both in the State's brief to the Court of Appeals on the issue of mootness and in state-court decisions in analogous cases. I The majority recognizes that in habeas corpus challenges to criminal convictions, the case "is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." This Court has consistently refused to canvass state law to ascertain "the actual existence of specific collateral consequences," and has presumed that such consequences exist. at 55 *635 and (19). See also Today, the majority finds the Carafas doctrine inapplicable, arguing that because respondents did not seek to set aside their convictions, their situation is analogous to that of a defendant who seeks habeas corpus review to correct a sentence already served. See North Had respondents served the allegedly void mandatory parole term without incident, I might agree that North controls and join the majority's conclusion that the consequence of the constitutional violation "expired of its own accord." Ante, at 631. Here, however, respondents were found to have violated the conditions of their parole. Therefore, unlike the situation in North respondents seek more than a mere reduction in sentence after the sentence has been completed: they seek to have the parole term declared void, or expunged, in order to avoid the future consequences that attach to parole violations. If collateral consequences do attach to parole violations, both the State and respondents have a live interest in this Court's review of the lower courts' holdings that the alleged constitutional violations rendered the guilty pleas void and that respondents were entitled to specific performance of the pleas, in the form of a declaration that the mandatory parole terms were void and should be expunged. The existence of a live controversy in this case turns on whether collateral consequences attach to parole violations. Because this determination involves a difficult question of state law, I believe that the doctrine of Sibron and Carafas should be applied. This doctrine avoids placing a federal court in the awkward position of determining questions of state law not |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | dissenting | Lane v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110670/lane-v-williams/ | the awkward position of determining questions of state law not directly before it. By presuming the existence of collateral consequences, federal courts are not required to predict the manner in which a State may use convictions or *636 parole violations in future proceedings. An erroneous determination that collateral consequences do not attach not only injures the individuals challenging the constitutionality of the guilty pleas, but also hinders the State's ability to use these violations in future proceedings. Today's opinion is an unfortunate example of such an erroneous interpretation. II The majority's decision is apparently based on a cursory examination of Illinois statutes. Finding no statutory civil disabilities, the majority glibly dismisses nonstatutory consequences as "discretionary decisions" that would remain whether or not the parole terms were declared void or expunged. Ante, at 632-633.[1] This reasoning has no basis in *637 Illinois law and appears to derive from nothing more than judicial intuition. Several collateral consequences attach to parole violations under Illinois law.[2] First, a sentencing judge may consider parole violations in aggravation of sentence. The majority makes the unwarranted assumption that declaring void the parole term upon which a violation is based has no effect because a sentencing judge would consider the conduct underlying the violation, and not the violation itself, in deciding whether to enhance a sentence. However, as the majority recognizes, there is no way for this Court to determine the basis for respondents' parole revocation. Under Illinois law, the Prisoner Review Board is given substantial discretion in setting conditions of parole. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 1003-3-7[3] Conditions of parole may prohibit *638 conduct that is otherwise innocent and may affirmatively require the parolee to engage in specified work or rehabilitation programs. Parole may be revoked upon a finding that the parolee has violated any of these parole conditions. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 1003-3-9 ; Illinois Prisoner Review Board, Rules Governing Parole 9-10, 13-16 (1979), 3 Ill. Register 144, 162-166 (1979). Therefore, conduct giving rise to a parole violation may be completely innocuous but for the fact that it was prohibited or required as a condition of parole, and it may be entirely irrelevant to a sentencing decision once the parole term is declared void. Moreover, it is not clear under Illinois law whether a sentencing judge would consider the conduct underlying a parole violation, even if the conduct is not otherwise innocent, where the parole term itself is declared void. In a similar context, the Illinois appellate courts have held that trial courts may not consider a reversed conviction in aggravation |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | dissenting | Lane v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110670/lane-v-williams/ | trial courts may not consider a reversed conviction in aggravation of sentence, even where the court, in remanding for a new trial, noted that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt and the matter was never retried. See, e. g., Cf. The Illinois courts have also held that review of probation revocation is not rendered moot merely because the defendant has served his entire sentence. See, These cases do not conclusively demonstrate that a judge would not consider the conduct underlying the violation *639 of a void parole term in aggravation of sentence. However, they cast serious doubt on the validity of the majority's assumption to the contrary. Furthermore, the State argued to the Court of Appeals that the case was not moot because the State "is deeply interested in whether or not it can use the parole violation status of [respondents] for sentencing purposes should they ever again come into contact with the criminal justice system." Additional Memorandum for Appellants in Nos. 78-1321, 78-1322, 78-1323, 78-1380 (CA7), p. 5 (Mem. to Court of Appeals). This argument at least implies that the State would not use this status for sentencing purposes after a court had declared the parole terms void. Second, the majority completely overlooks an important collateral consequence that attaches to parole violations should the respondents ever have the misfortune of returning to prison. In rules promulgated by the Prisoner Review Board pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶¶ 1003-3-1, 1003-3-2 the State of Illinois has set forth fairly specific criteria upon which parole may be denied. See Illinois Prisoner Review Board, Rules Governing Parole (1979), 3 Ill. Register 144-169 (1979). The Rules provide in relevant part: "V. BASIS FOR DENYING PAROLE In accordance with statute, the Board shall not parole a candidate if it determines that: "A. There is a substantial risk that the candidate will not conform to reasonable conditions of parole based on one or more of the following factors: "1. Existence of prior adult felony convictions (mitigating as well as aggravating factors to be considered). "2. An apparent pattern of aggressive or assaultive behavior (misdemeanor offenses also considered). "3. Prior adult parole or probation violations within five years prior to the present offense. "4. Refusal to be supervised on parole. *640 "5. No means of financial support or no place of residence. (Continuance not to exceed six months to seek resolution of problem.) "6. A psychiatric examination determines the candidate is not likely to conform." Illinois Prisoner Review Board, Rules Governing Parole 6 (1979), 3 Ill. Register 153 (1979) |
Justice Marshall | 1,982 | 15 | dissenting | Lane v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110670/lane-v-williams/ | Rules Governing Parole 6 (1979), 3 Ill. Register 153 (1979) (emphasis added). Under these rules, parole may be denied simply on the basis of a prior parole violation; the conduct underlying the parole violation is apparently irrelevant unless it falls within one of the other criteria listed in that section. We have no reason to assume that the conduct underlying respondents' violations would fall within one of the other factors, or that the Prisoner Review Board would deny parole based on a parole violation notwithstanding the fact that the parole term had been declared void. In fact, the State argued to the Court of Appeals that the case was not moot because respondents "still have a substantial stake in ensuring that their parole terms are, indeed, expunged," because the parole violations would be burdensome if respondents were ever again considered for parole. Mem. to Court of Appeals 5. See also United States ex rel. Howell v. Wolff, No. 78 C 951 (ND Ill. Aug. 9, 1978) (unpublished opinion of Judge Leighton, reprinted in App. to Mem. to Court of Appeals) (finding case not moot due to potential burden on future parole decision from parole-violation status). III Today's decision, in which the majority undertakes a cursory and misleading examination of state law, starkly demonstrates the wisdom of applying the doctrine of Carafas and Sibron to the determination whether a State attaches collateral consequences to parole violations. I would apply that doctrine, presume the existence of collateral consequences, and reach the merits of this case. Even if the doctrine of *641 Carafas and Sibron does not apply, an examination of state law reveals that the majority is wrong in concluding that actual collateral consequences do not attach under state law; there are sufficient collateral consequences flowing from parole-violation status that both the State and the respondents have a live interest in this Court's resolution of the constitutional question. Therefore, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that this case is moot. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,971 | 11 | dissenting | Durham v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108288/durham-v-united-states/ | This case is here on Durham's petition for certiorari after his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals *484 for the Ninth Circuit resulted in the affirmance of his conviction for a violation of 18 U.S. C. 474. The Solicitor General now has suggested that the petitioner died on November 20, 1970, while his petition was pending but prior to this Court's taking any action upon it by way of grant or denial. The petition is untimely. The Ninth Circuit's opinion was filed on November 12, 1969, and rehearing was denied by that court on March 5, 1970. A petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the court of appeals in a criminal case is timely, under our Rule 22(2), only when it is filed here within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within such additional time, not exceeding 30 days, as is allowed by a Justice of this Court for good cause shown. The petition was filed only on September 26, 1970, and thus is out of time by more than five months. Further, the situation is not one where the decedent possessed, and had exercised, a right of appeal to this Court, and then died while his appeal was pending. That contrasting and very different situation is the typical one that confronts the federal courts of appeals and with which the Eighth Circuit was concerned in cited in the Court's per curiam opinion. I would merely dismiss the decedent's petition for certiorari, rather than direct the dismissal of the indictment. This disposition seems to me appropriately to reflect the rulings of American Tobacco ; ; and United In contrast, the dismissal of the indictment wipes the slate entirely clean of a federal conviction which was unsuccessfully *485 appealed throughout the entire appeal process to which the petitioner was entitled as of right. If, by chance, the suggestion of death has some consequence upon the survivor rights of a third party (a fact not apparent to this Court), the third party so affected is free to make his own timely suggestion of death to the court of appeals. |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | 1 The question presented is whether the Constitution permits the Government to administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant—in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, crimes. We conclude that the Constitution allows the Government to administer those drugs, even against the defendant's will, in limited circumstances, i.e., upon satisfaction of conditions that we shall describe. Because the Court of Appeals did not find that the requisite circumstances existed in this case, we vacate its judgment. 2 * A 3 Petitioner Charles Sell, once a practicing dentist, has a long and unfortunate history of mental illness. In September 1982, after telling doctors that the gold he used for fillings had been contaminated by communists, Sell was hospitalized, treated with antipsychotic medication, and subsequently discharged. App. 146. In June 1984, Sell called the police to say that a leopard was outside his office boarding a bus, and he then asked the police to shoot him. ; Forensic Report, p. 1 (June 20, 1997). Sell was again hospitalized and subsequently released. On various occasions, he complained that public officials, for example, a State Governor and a police chief, were trying to kill him. In April 1997, he told law enforcement personnel that he "spoke to God last night," and that "God told me every [Federal Bureau of Investigation] person I kill, a soul will be saved." 4 In May 1997, the Government charged Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. See 18 U.S. C. A Federal Magistrate Judge (Magistrate), after ordering a psychiatric examination, found Sell "currently competent," but noted that Sell might experience "a psychotic episode" in the future. App. 321. The judge released Sell on bail. A grand jury later produced a superseding indictment charging Sell and his wife with 56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of Medicaid fraud, and 1 count of money laundering. 2-22. 5 In early 1998, the Government claimed that Sell had sought to intimidate a witness. The Magistrate held a bail revocation hearing. Sell's behavior at his initial appearance was, in the judge's words, "`totally out of control,' " involving "screaming and shouting," the use of "personal insults" and "racial epithets," and spitting "in the judge's face." A psychiatrist reported that Sell could not sleep because he expected the FBI to " `come busting through the door,' " and concluded that Sell's condition had worsened. After considering that report and other testimony, the Magistrate revoked Sell's bail. 6 In April 1998, the grand jury issued a new indictment charging Sell with attempting to murder |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | issued a new indictment charging Sell with attempting to murder the FBI agent who had arrested him and a former employee who planned to testify against him in the fraud case. The attempted murder and fraud cases were joined for trial. 7 In early 1999, Sell asked the Magistrate to reconsider his competence to stand trial. The Magistrate sent Sell to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for examination. Subsequently the Magistrate found that Sell was "mentally incompetent to stand trial." He ordered Sell to "be hospitalized for treatment" at the Medical Center for up to four months, "to determine whether there was a substantial probability that [Sell] would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed." 8 Two months later, Medical Center staff recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medication. Sell refused to do so. The staff sought permission to administer the medication against Sell's will. That effort is the subject of the present proceedings. B 9 We here review the last of five hierarchically ordered lower court and Medical Center determinations. First, in June 1999, Medical Center staff sought permission from institutional authorities to administer antipsychotic drugs to Sell involuntarily. A reviewing psychiatrist held a hearing and considered Sell's prior history; Sell's current persecutional beliefs (for example, that Government officials were trying to suppress his knowledge about events in Waco, Texas, and had sent him to Alaska to silence him); staff medical opinions (for example, that "Sell's symptoms point to a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder but there well may be an underlying Schizophrenic Process"); staff medical concerns (for example, about "the persistence of Dr. Sell's belief that the Courts, FBI, and federal government in general are against him"); an outside medical expert's opinion (that Sell suffered only from delusional disorder, which, in that expert's view, "medication rarely helps"); and Sell's own views, as well as those of other laypersons who know him (to the effect that he did not suffer from a serious mental illness). 47-150. 10 The reviewing psychiatrist then authorized involuntary administration of the drugs, both (1) because Sell was "mentally ill and dangerous, and medication is necessary to treat the mental illness," and (2) so that Sell would "become competent for trial." 45. The reviewing psychiatrist added that he considered Sell "dangerous based on threats and delusions if outside, but not necessarily in[side] prison" and that Sell was "[a]ble to function" in prison in the "open population." 44. 11 Second, the Medical Center administratively reviewed the determination of its reviewing psychiatrist. A Bureau of Prisons official considered the evidence that |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | psychiatrist. A Bureau of Prisons official considered the evidence that had been presented at the initial hearing, referred to Sell's delusions, noted differences of professional opinion as to proper classification and treatment, and concluded that antipsychotic medication represents the medical intervention "most likely" to "ameliorate" Sell's symptoms; that other "less restrictive interventions" are "unlikely" to work; and that Sell's "pervasive belief" that he was "being targeted for nefarious actions by various governmental parties," along with the "current charges of conspiracy to commit murder," made Sell "a potential risk to the safety of one or more others in the community." 54-155. The reviewing official "upheld" the "hearing officer's decision that [Sell] would benefit from the utilization of antipsychotic medication." 57. 12 Third, in July 1999, Sell filed a court motion contesting the Medical Center's right involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs. In September 1999, the Federal Magistrate who had ordered Sell sent to the Medical Center held a hearing. The evidence introduced at the hearing for the most part replicated the evidence introduced at the administrative hearing, with two exceptions. First, the witnesses explored the question of the medication's effectiveness more thoroughly. Second, Medical Center doctors testified about an incident that took place at the Medical Center after the administrative proceedings were completed. In July 1999, Sell had approached one of the Medical Center's nurses, suggested that he was in love with her, criticized her for having nothing to do with him, and, when told that his behavior was inappropriate, added "`I can't help it.'" 68-170, 325. He subsequently made remarks or acted in ways indicating that this kind of conduct would continue. The Medical Center doctors testified that, given Sell's prior behavior, diagnosis, and current beliefs, boundary-breaching incidents of this sort were not harmless and, when coupled with Sell's inability or unwillingness to desist, indicated that he was a safety risk even within the institution. They added that he had been moved to a locked cell. 13 In August 2000, the Magistrate found that "the government has made a substantial and very strong showing that Dr. Sell is a danger to himself and others at the institution in which he is currently incarcerated"; that "the government has shown that anti-psychotic medication is the only way to render him less dangerous"; that newer drugs and/or changing drugs will "ameliorat[e]" any "serious side effects"; that "the benefits to Dr. Sell far outweigh any risks"; and that "there is a substantial probability that" the drugs will "retur[n]" Sell "to competency." The Magistrate concluded that "the government has shown in as strong a manner as |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | "the government has shown in as strong a manner as possible, that anti-psychotic medications are the only way to render the defendant not dangerous and competent to stand trial." The Magistrate issued an order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to Sell, but stayed that order to allow Sell to appeal the matter to the Federal District Court, 14 Fourth, the District Court reviewed the record and, in April 2001, issued an opinion. The court addressed the Magistrate's finding "that defendant presents a danger to himself or others sufficient" to warrant involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs. After noting that Sell subsequently had "been returned to an open ward," the District Court held the Magistrate's "dangerousness" finding "clearly erroneous." and n. 5. The court limited its determination to Sell's "dangerousness at this time to himself and to those around him in his institutional context." 15 Nonetheless, the District Court affirmed the Magistrate's order permitting Sell's involuntary medication. The court wrote that "anti-psychotic drugs are medically appropriate," that "they represent the only viable hope of rendering defendant competent to stand trial," and that "administration of such drugs appears necessary to serve the government's compelling interest in obtaining an adjudication of defendant's guilt or innocence of numerous and serious charges" (including fraud and attempted murder). The court added that it was "premature" to consider whether "the effects of medication might prejudice [Sell's] defense at trial." The Government and Sell both appealed. 16 Fifth, in March 2002, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. (CA8). The majority affirmed the District Court's determination that Sell was not dangerous. The majority noted that, according to the District Court, Sell's behavior at the Medical Center "amounted at most to an `inappropriate familiarity and even infatuation' with a nurse." The Court of Appeals agreed, "[u]pon review," that "the evidence does not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or others at the Medical Center." 17 The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Court's order requiring medication in order to render Sell competent to stand trial. Focusing solely on the serious fraud charges, the panel majority concluded that the "government has an essential interest in bringing a defendant to trial." It added that the District Court "correctly concluded that there were no less intrusive means." After reviewing the conflicting views of the experts, -571, the panel majority found antipsychotic drug treatment "medically appropriate" for Sell, It added that the "medical evidence presented indicated a reasonable probability that Sell will fairly be able to participate in his trial." One |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | will fairly be able to participate in his trial." One member of the panel dissented primarily on the ground that the fraud and money laundering charges were "not serious enough to warrant the forced medication of the defendant." 18 We granted certiorari to determine whether the Eighth Circuit "erred in rejecting" Sell's argument that "allowing the government to administer antipsychotic medication against his will solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses," Brief for Petitioner i, violated the Constitution—in effect by improperly depriving Sell of an important "liberty" that the Constitution guarantees, Amdt. 5. II 19 We first examine whether the Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to decide Sell's appeal. The District Court's judgment, from which Sell had appealed, was a pretrial order. That judgment affirmed a Magistrate's order requiring Sell involuntarily to receive medication. The Magistrate entered that order pursuant to an earlier delegation from the District Court of legal authority to conduct pretrial proceedings. App. 340; see 28 U.S. C. The order embodied legal conclusions related to the Medical Center's administrative efforts to medicate Sell; these efforts grew out of Sell's provisional commitment; and that provisional commitment took place pursuant to an earlier Magistrate's order seeking a medical determination about Sell's future competence to stand trial. Cf. ; 20 How was it possible for Sell to appeal from such an order? The law normally requires a defendant to wait until the end of the trial to obtain appellate review of a pretrial order. The relevant jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S. C. authorizes federal courts of appeals to review "final decisions of the district courts." (Emphasis added.) And the term "final decision" normally refers to a final judgment, such as a judgment of guilt, that terminates a criminal proceeding. 21 Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule. The Court has held that a preliminary or interim decision is appealable as a "collateral order" when it (1) "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question," (2) "resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," and (3) is "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & And this District Court order does appear to fall within the "collateral order" exception. 22 The order (1) "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question," namely, whether Sell has a legal right to avoid forced medication. The order also (2) "resolve[s] an important issue," for, as this Court's cases make clear, involuntary medical treatment raises questions of clear constitutional importance. See ; see also 33-134; ; At the same time, the basic issue—whether Sell must undergo medication against his will—is "completely separate from |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | Sell must undergo medication against his will—is "completely separate from the merits of the action," i.e., whether Sell is guilty or innocent of the crimes charged. Coopers & 437 U. S., 68. The issue is wholly separate as well from questions concerning trial procedures. Finally, the issue is (3) "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." By the time of trial Sell will have undergone forced medication—the very harm that he seeks to avoid. He cannot undo that harm even if he is acquitted. Indeed, if he is acquitted, there will be no appeal through which he might obtain review. Cf. at These considerations, particularly those involving the severity of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue, readily distinguish Sell's case from the examples raised by the dissent. See post, at 6 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). 23 We add that the question presented here, whether Sell has a legal right to avoid forced medication, perhaps in part because medication may make a trial unfair, differs from the question whether forced medication did make a trial unfair. The first question focuses upon the right to avoid administration of the drugs. What may happen at trial is relevant, but only as a prediction. See infra, 3. The second question focuses upon the right to a fair trial. It asks what did happen as a result of having administered the medication. An ordinary appeal comes too late for a defendant to enforce the first right; an ordinary appeal permits vindication of the second. 24 We conclude that the District Court order from which Sell appealed was an appealable "collateral order." The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. And we consequently have jurisdiction to decide the question presented, whether involuntary medication violates Sell's constitutional rights. III 25 We turn now to the basic question presented: Does forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render Sell competent to stand trial unconstitutionally deprive him of his "liberty" to reject medical treatment? U. S. Const., Amdt. 5 (Federal Government may not "depriv[e]" any person of "liberty without due process of law"). Two prior precedents, and set forth the framework for determining the legal answer. 26 In this Court recognized that an individual has a "significant" constitutionally protected "liberty interest" in "avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs." The Court considered a state law authorizing forced administration of those drugs "to inmates who are gravely disabled or represent a significant danger to themselves or others." The State had established "by a medical finding" that a mentally ill prison inmate, had "a mental disorder which |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | a mentally ill prison inmate, had "a mental disorder which is likely to cause harm if not treated." The treatment decision had been made "by a psychiatrist," it had been approved by "a reviewing psychiatrist," and it "ordered" medication only because that was "in the prisoner's medical interests, given the legitimate needs of his institutional confinement." 27 The Court found that the State's interest in administering medication was "legitima[te]" and "importan[t]," ; and it held that "the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." The Court concluded that, in the circumstances, the state law authorizing involuntary treatment amounted to a constitutionally permissible "accommodation between an inmate's liberty interest in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State's interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others." 28 In the Court repeated that an individual has a constitutionally protected liberty "interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs"—an interest that only an "essential" or "overriding" state interest might 504 U.S., 34, 135. The Court suggested that, in principle, forced medication in order to render a defendant competent to stand trial for murder was constitutionally permissible. The Court, citing noted that the State "would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of ' own safety or the safety of others." 504 U.S., 35 And it said that the State "[s]imilarly might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of ' guilt or innocence" of the murder charge "by using less intrusive means." Because the trial court had permitted forced medication of without taking account of his "liberty interest," with a consequent possibility of trial prejudice, the Court reversed ' conviction and remanded for further proceedings. 37-138. JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment, emphasized that antipsychotic drugs might have side effects that would interfere with the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. 45 29 These two cases, and indicate that the Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. 30 This standard will permit involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances. But those instances may be rare. That is because the standard says or fairly implies the following: 31 First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at stake. The Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important. That is so whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property. In both instances the Government seeks to protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for security. See 35-136 )). 32 Courts, however, must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution. Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest. The defendant's failure to take drugs voluntarily, for example, may mean lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious crime. We do not mean to suggest that civil commitment is a substitute for a criminal trial. The Government has a substantial interest in timely prosecution. And it may be difficult or impossible to try a defendant who regains competence after years of commitment during which memories may fade and evidence may be lost. The potential for future confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution. The same is true of the possibility that the defendant has already been confined for a significant amount of time (for which he would receive credit toward any sentence ultimately imposed, see 18 U.S. C. Moreover, the Government has a concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant's trial is a fair one. 33 Second, the court must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests. It must find that administration of the drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial. At the same time, it must find that administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair. See 42-145 34 Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests. The court |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests. The court must find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results. Cf. Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae 10-14 (nondrug therapies may be effective in restoring psychotic defendants to competence); but cf. Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 13-22 (alternative treatments for psychosis commonly not as effective as medication). And the court must consider less intrusive means for administering the drugs, e.g., a court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before considering more intrusive methods. 35 Fourth, as we have said, the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition. The specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as elsewhere. Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of success. 36 We emphasize that the court applying these standards is seeking to determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication for that kind of purpose, if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in related to the individual's dangerousness, or purposes related to the individual's own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at 494 U.S., -226. There are often strong reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration of drugs can be justified on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial competence question. 37 For one thing, the inquiry into whether medication is permissible, say, to render an individual nondangerous is usually more "objective and manageable" than the inquiry into whether medication is permissible to render a defendant competent. 504 U. S., 40 The medical experts may find it easier to provide an informed opinion about whether, given the risk of side effects, particular drugs are medically appropriate and necessary to control a patient's potentially dangerous behavior (or to avoid serious harm to the patient himself) than to try to balance harms and benefits related to the more quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and competence. 38 For another thing, courts typically address involuntary medical treatment as a civil matter, and justify it on these alternative, -type grounds. Every State provides avenues through which, for example, a doctor or institution can seek appointment of a guardian with the power to make |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | seek appointment of a guardian with the power to make a decision authorizing medication—when in the best interests of a patient who lacks the mental competence to make such a decision. E.g., -2A-102(a), 26-2A-105, 26-2A-108 ; (a), 13.26.116(b) (2002); 14-5312 (West 1995); 28-65-301 (1987). And courts, in civil proceedings, may authorize involuntary medication where the patient's failure to accept treatment threatens injury to the patient or others. See, e.g., (2002); cf. 18 U.S. C. 39 If a court authorizes medication on these alternative grounds, the need to consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear. Even if a court decides medication cannot be authorized on the alternative grounds, the findings underlying such a decision will help to inform expert opinion and judicial decisionmaking in respect to a request to administer drugs for trial competence purposes. At the least, they will facilitate direct medical and legal focus upon such questions as: Why is it medically appropriate forcibly to administer antipsychotic drugs to an individual who (1) is not dangerous and (2) is competent to make up his own mind about treatment? Can bringing such an individual to trial alone justify in whole (or at least in significant part) administration of a drug that may have adverse side effects, including side effects that may to some extent impair a defense at trial? We consequently believe that a court, asked to approve forced administration of drugs for purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily determine whether the Government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced administration of drugs on these other -type grounds; and, if not, why not. 40 When a court must nonetheless reach the trial competence question, the factors discussed 1-14, should help it make the ultimate constitutionally required judgment. Has the Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the individual's protected interest in refusing it? See ; 34-135. IV 41 The Medical Center and the Magistrate in this case, applying standards roughly comparable to those set forth here and in approved forced medication substantially, if not primarily, upon grounds of Sell's dangerousness to others. But the District Court and the Eighth Circuit took a different approach. The District Court found "clearly erroneous" the Magistrate's conclusion regarding dangerousness, and the Court of Appeals agreed. Both courts approved forced medication solely in order to render Sell competent to stand trial. 42 We shall assume that the Court of Appeals' |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | trial. 42 We shall assume that the Court of Appeals' conclusion about Sell's dangerousness was correct. But we make that assumption only because the Government did not contest, and the parties have not argued, that particular matter. If anything, the record before us, described in Part I, suggests the contrary. 43 The Court of Appeals apparently agreed with the District Court that "Sell's inappropriate behavior amounted at most to an `inappropriate familiarity and even infatuation' with a nurse." 282 F.3d, That being so, it also agreed that "the evidence does not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or others at the Medical Center." The Court of Appeals, however, did not discuss the potential differences (described by a psychiatrist testifying before the Magistrate) between ordinary "over-familiarity" and the same conduct engaged in persistently by a patient with Sell's behavioral history and mental illness. Nor did it explain why those differences should be minimized in light of the fact that the testifying psychiatrists concluded that Sell was dangerous, while Sell's own expert denied, not Sell's dangerousness, but the efficacy of the drugs proposed for treatment. 44 The District Court's opinion, while more thorough, places weight upon the Medical Center's decision, taken after the Magistrate's hearing, to return Sell to the general prison population. It does not explain whether that return reflected an improvement in Sell's condition or whether the Medical Center saw it as permanent rather than temporary. Cf. 494 U. S., and n. 10 (indicating that physical restraints and seclusion often not acceptable substitutes for medication). 45 Regardless, as we have said, we must assume that Sell was not dangerous. And on that hypothetical assumption, we find that the Court of Appeals was wrong to approve forced medication solely to render Sell competent to stand trial. For one thing, the Magistrate's opinion makes clear that he did not find forced medication legally justified on trial competence grounds alone. Rather, the Magistrate concluded that Sell was dangerous, and he wrote that forced medication was "the only way to render the defendant not dangerous and competent to stand trial." App. 335 46 Moreover, the record of the hearing before the Magistrate shows that the experts themselves focused mainly upon the dangerousness issue. Consequently the experts did not pose important questions—questions, for example, about trial-related side effects and risks—the answers to which could have helped determine whether forced medication was warranted on trial competence grounds alone. Rather, the Medical Center's experts conceded that their proposed medications had "significant" side effects and that "there has to be a cost benefit analysis." |
Justice Breyer | 2,003 | 2 | majority | Charles Thomas Sell v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/130140/charles-thomas-sell-v-united-states/ | and that "there has to be a cost benefit analysis." 85 ; And in making their "cost-benefit" judgments, they primarily took into account Sell's dangerousness, not the need to bring him to trial. 47 The failure to focus upon trial competence could well have mattered. Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with communication with counsel, prevent rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to express emotions are matters important in determining the permissibility of medication to restore competence, 504 U. S., 42-145 but not necessarily relevant when dangerousness is primarily at issue. We cannot tell whether the side effects of antipsychotic medication were likely to undermine the fairness of a trial in Sell's case. 48 Finally, the lower courts did not consider that Sell has already been confined at the Medical Center for a long period of time, and that his refusal to take antipsychotic drugs might result in further lengthy confinement. Those factors, the first because a defendant ordinarily receives credit toward a sentence for time served, 18 U.S. C. and the second because it reduces the likelihood of the defendant's committing future crimes, moderate— though they do not eliminate—the importance of the governmental interest in prosecution. See 2-13. V 49 For these reasons, we believe that the present orders authorizing forced administration of antipsychotic drugs cannot stand. The Government may pursue its request for forced medication on the grounds discussed in this opinion, including grounds related to the danger Sell poses to himself or others. Since Sell's medical condition may have changed over time, the Government should do so on the basis of current circumstances. 50 The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 51 It is so ordered. |
per_curiam | 1,987 | 200 | per_curiam | California v. Rooney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111943/california-v-rooney/ | We granted the State's petition for certiorari to decide whether respondent retained an expectation of privacy in a bag that he placed in the communal trash bin of a multi-unit apartment building. After briefing and oral argument on that issue, it has now become clear that the question is not properly presented in this case. *309 I Based upon an informant's tip that respondent was accepting wagers on professional football games at a specified telephone number, police began an investigation which eventually led to an application for a search warrant for 1 North Flores Street, Apartment No. 8, West Hollywood, California. In conjunction with the application, a police officer submitted an affidavit including at least five details in support of the warrant: (1) that the informant had named Rooney and had correctly specified when Rooney would be at the apartment; (2) that the telephone number and utilities were listed to one Peter Ryan, and that use of a pseudonym is common among bookmakers; (3) that Rooney had previously been arrested for bookmaking at the apartment; (4) that through a search of the communal trash bin in the apartment building's basement the police had retrieved a bag containing mail addressed to Rooney at Apartment No. 8, and containing evidence of gambling activity; and (5) that the police had dialed the telephone number the informant had given them and had overheard a conversation involving point spreads on professional football games. See App. 19-28. The Magistrate found probable cause for a search of Apartment No. 8, and issued a warrant. Incriminating evidence was found during the search, and respondent was arrested. After he was charged with a number of felony offenses, respondent brought a motion to quash the search warrant and to dismiss the felony charges against him. He argued that there was no probable cause to support the warrant because the earlier warrantless search of the communal trash bin had violated his Fourth Amendment rights under a number of California Supreme Court precedents, and that, without the incriminating evidence found in the trash, there was insufficient evidence to support the warrant. A Magistrate granted respondent's motion, agreeing that the evidence obtained from the trash bin could not be used to support the *310 search warrant for the apartment, and ruling that the other evidence offered in support of the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. The Superior Court reached the same conclusion. Pursuant to California procedural rules, the State then informed the court that it could not prosecute the case without the evidence seized in the search of the apartment, |
per_curiam | 1,987 | 200 | per_curiam | California v. Rooney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111943/california-v-rooney/ | without the evidence seized in the search of the apartment, and the case was dismissed, thus allowing the State to appeal the order quashing the warrant. The Court of Appeal reversed on the only issue before it to use the State's words, "the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the search warrant."[1] Although it concluded that the evidence found in the trash bin could not be used to support the search warrant, the Court of Appeal examined the other evidence offered in support of the warrant under the standards set forth in and held that there was sufficient other evidence to establish probable cause in support of the warrant. The Superior Court's order dismissing the case was therefore reversed, allowing the prosecution to proceed. The California Supreme Court denied *311 both petitioner's and respondent's petitions for review. The State then sought review in this Court, arguing that the California courts had erred in stating that the search of the trash was unconstitutional. We granted certiorari. II This Court "reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." ; see also Chevron U. S. A. ; Here, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was entirely in the State's favor the search warrant which was the sole focus of the litigation was deemed valid. The fact that the Court of Appeal reached its decision through analysis different than this Court might have used does not make it appropriate for this Court to rewrite the California court's decision, or for the prevailing party to request us to review it. That the Court of Appeal even addressed the trash bin issue is mere fortuity; it could as easily have held that since there was sufficient evidence to support the search even without the trash evidence, it would not discuss the constitutionality of the trash search. The Court of Appeal's use of analysis that may have been adverse to the State's long-term interests does not allow the State to claim status as a losing party for purposes of this Court's review.[2] *312 But, the State argues, if the case does come to trial, and if the State does wish to introduce the evidence, it will be barred from doing so because the reasoning in the Court of Appeal's decision will constitute the law of the case. There *313 are two too many "ifs" in that proposition to make our review appropriate at this stage. Even if everything the prosecution fears comes to bear, the State will still have the opportunity to appeal such an order,[3] and this Court will have the chance to review |
per_curiam | 1,987 | 200 | per_curiam | California v. Rooney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111943/california-v-rooney/ | order,[3] and this Court will have the chance to review it, with the knowledge that we are reviewing a state-court judgment on the issue, and that the State Supreme Court has passed upon or declined review in a case squarely presenting the issue. As it stands, we have no way of knowing what the California Supreme Court's position on the issue of trash searches currently is.[4] It is no answer to *314 say that the California Supreme Court already had its chance to review the matter and declined to do so when it denied the State's petition for review in this case. The denial of review may well have been based on that court's recognizing, as we now do, that the prosecution won below, and was therefore not in a position to appeal. Giving the California Supreme Court an opportunity to consider the issue in a case that properly raises it is a compelling reason for us to dismiss this petition.[5] Under these circumstances, our review of the trash-search issue, which has never been the subject of an actual judgment, would be most premature. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment. |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Dowling v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112352/dowling-v-united-states/ | At petitioner's trial for various offenses arising out of a bank robbery, testimony was admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, relating to an alleged crime *344 that the defendant had previously been acquitted of committing. We conclude that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Due Process Clause barred the use of this I On the afternoon of July 8, a man wearing a ski mask and armed with a small pistol robbed the First Pennsylvania Bank in Frederiksted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, taking over $7,000 in cash from a bank teller, approximately $5,000 in cash from a customer, and various personal and travelers' checks. The culprit ran from the bank, scurried around in the street momentarily, and then commandeered a passing taxi van. While driving away from the scene, the robber pulled off his ski mask. An eyewitness, who had slipped out of the bank while the robbery was taking place, saw the maskless man and at trial identified him as petitioner, Reuben Dowling. Other witnesses testified that they had seen Dowling driving the hijacked taxi van outside of Frederiksted shortly after the bank robbery. Following his arrest, Dowling was charged with the federal crimes of bank robbery, 18 U.S. C. 2113(a), and armed robbery, 2113(d), and with various crimes under Virgin Islands law. Dowling pleaded not guilty to all charges. Dowling's first trial ended with a hung jury. He was tried again and convicted, but the Third Circuit reversed this conviction on appeal. Government of Virgin After a third trial, Dowling was convicted on most of the counts; the trial judge sentenced him to 70 years' imprisonment. During petitioner's third trial, the Government, over petitioner's objection, called a woman named Vena Henry to the stand. Ms. Henry testified that a man wearing a knitted mask with cutout eyes and carrying a small handgun had, together with a man named Delroy Christian, entered her home in Frederiksted approximately two weeks after the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery. Ms. Henry testified that *345 a struggle ensued and that she unmasked the intruder, whom she identified as Dowling. Based on this incident, Dowling had been charged under Virgin Islands law with burglary, attempted robbery, assault, and weapons offenses, but had been acquitted after a trial held before his third trial in the bank robbery case. The Government assertedly elicited Henry's testimony for two purposes. First, it believed that Henry's description of Dowling as wearing a mask and carrying a gun similar to the mask worn and the gun carried by the robber of the First Pennsylvania Bank strengthened |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Dowling v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112352/dowling-v-united-states/ | carried by the robber of the First Pennsylvania Bank strengthened the Government's identification of Dowling as the bank robber. Second, the Government sought to link Dowling with Delroy Christian, the other man who entered Henry's home. The day before the bank robbery, Dowling had borrowed a white Volkswagen from a friend. At Dowling's trial for the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery, a police officer testified that, shortly before the bank robbery, she and her partner had come upon Christian and another man parked in a white Volkswagen in front of the bank with the car door open into the street; Christian was in the backseat. The officers told the two men to close the door, and the men drove away to the north. The police followed the Volkswagen for about a mile and, shortly thereafter, received a radio message that the bank had been robbed. The Government's theory was that Christian and his friend were to drive the getaway car after Dowling robbed the bank. Before opening statements, the Government disclosed its intention to call Ms. Henry and explained its rationale for doing so, relying on Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible against a defendant for purposes other than character evidence. After a hearing, the District Court characterized the testimony as highly probative circumstantial evidence and ruled that it was admissible under Rule 404(b). App. -. When Henry left the stand, the *346 District Court instructed the jury that petitioner had been acquitted of robbing Henry, and emphasized the limited purpose for which Henry's testimony was being offered. The court reiterated that admonition in its final charge to the jury. On appeal, the Third Circuit determined that the District Court should not have admitted Henry's testimony, but nevertheless affirmed Dowling's conviction. Relying on its decision in United the court held that petitioner's acquittal of the charges arising out of the incident at Henry's home collaterally estopped the Government from offering evidence of that incident at petitioner's trial for the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court noted that we had recently held in that "[i]n the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor." The Third Circuit found Henry's testimony inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because "when the prior act sought to be introduced was the subject of an acquittal by a jury, |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Dowling v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112352/dowling-v-united-states/ | introduced was the subject of an acquittal by a jury, a second jury should not be permitted to conclude `that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.' " The court also relied on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because, in the Third Circuit's opinion, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of Henry's The Third Circuit, however, held that the admission of Henry's testimony was harmless because it was highly probable that the error did not prejudice the petitioner. The Court of Appeals explicitly declined to apply the more stringent standard, see applicable to constitutional errors because, *347 according to the court, the District Court's mistake was merely evidentiary and not of constitutional -123. Having rejected petitioner's other objections, the court affirmed the conviction. at 1. Dowling claims that the Third Circuit was wrong when it found that the admission of Henry's testimony did not offend the Constitution and therefore declined to apply the harmless-error standard.[1] We granted certiorari to consider Dowling's contention that Henry's testimony was inadmissible under both the Double Jeopardy and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. II A There is no claim here that the acquittal in the case involving Ms. Henry barred further prosecution in the present case. The issue is the inadmissibility of Henry's In we recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In that case, a group of masked men had robbed six men playing poker in the basement of a home. The State unsuccessfully prosecuted Ashe for robbing one of the men. Six weeks later, however, the defendant was convicted for the robbery of one of the other players. Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel which we found implicit in the Double Jeopardy Clause, we reversed Ashe's conviction, holding that his acquittal in the first trial precluded the State from charging him for the second offense. We defined the collateral-estoppel doctrine as providing that "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe's acquittal in the first trial foreclosed the *348 second trial because, in the circumstances of that case, the acquittal verdict could only have meant that the jury was unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was one of the bandits. A second prosecution was impermissible because, to have convicted the defendant in the second trial, the second jury had to have reached a directly contrary conclusion. See Dowling contends |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Dowling v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112352/dowling-v-united-states/ | to have reached a directly contrary conclusion. See Dowling contends that, by the same principle, his prior acquittal precluded the Government from introducing into evidence Henry's testimony at the third trial in the bank robbery case. We disagree because, unlike the situation in the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case. This much Dowling concedes, and we decline to extend and the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances, as Dowling would have it, relevant and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted. For present purposes, we assume for the sake of argument that Dowling's acquittal established that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Dowling was the masked man who entered Vena Henry's home with Delroy Christian two weeks after the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery.[2] But to introduce evidence on this point at the bank robbery trial, the Government did not have to demonstrate that Dowling was the man who entered the home beyond a reasonable doubt: the Government sought to introduce Henry's testimony under Rule 404(b), and, as mentioned earlier, in we held that "[i]n the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor." Because a jury might *349 reasonably conclude that Dowling was the masked man who entered Henry's home, even if it did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Dowling committed the crimes charged at the first trial, the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapposite. Our decision is consistent with other cases where we have held that an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof. In United v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, for example, we unanimously agreed that a gun owner's acquittal on a charge of dealing firearms without a license did not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms, even though forfeiture was only appropriate if the jury in the forfeiture proceeding concluded that the defendant had committed the underlying offense. Because the forfeiture action was a civil proceeding, we rejected the defendant's contention that the Government was estopped from relitigating the issue of the defendant's alleged wrongdoing: "[The acquittal did] not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Dowling v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112352/dowling-v-united-states/ | innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [T]he jury verdict in the criminal action did not negate the possibility that a preponderance of the evidence could show that [the defendant] was engaged in an unlicensed firearms business. It is clear that the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel." In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United it was also held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar a forfeiture action subsequent to acquittal on the underlying offense because "the difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel." likewise observed that "[t]he difference in degree in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata." We thus cannot agree that the Government was constitutionally barred from using Henry's testimony at the bank robbery trial, and for the same reasons we find no merit in the Third Circuit's holding that the common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel in all circumstances bars the later use of evidence relating to prior conduct which the Government failed to prove violated a criminal law. B Even if we agree with petitioner that the lower burden of proof at the second proceeding does not serve to avoid the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, we agree with the Government that the challenged evidence was nevertheless admissible because Dowling did not demonstrate that his acquittal in his first trial represented a jury determination that he was not one of the men who entered Ms. Henry's home. In we stated that where a previous judgment of acquittal was based on a general verdict, courts must " `examine the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.' " U.S., at 444 The Courts of Appeals have unanimously placed the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding. United v. Citron, ; United v. Ragins, ; United v. Gentile, ; United v. Baugus, ; United v. Mock, ; United v. Hewitt, ; United v. Lasky, (CA9), cert. denied, We see no reason to depart from the majority rule in this case.[3] The only clue to the issues in the earlier case |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Dowling v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112352/dowling-v-united-states/ | The only clue to the issues in the earlier case was a discussion between the prosecutor, Dowling's attorney, and the District Judge that took place during the District Court's hearing on the admission of Henry's testimony under Rule 404(b). App. 18-. Arguing against the admission of Henry's testimony, Dowling's lawyer pointed out that Dowling had been acquitted of breaking into Ms. Henry's home. The trial judge, who had also presided at Dowling's first trial, recalled that Dowling "was not acquitted on the issue of identification." The prosecutor then contended that Dowling had not disputed identity, but rather had claimed that a robbery had not taken place because he and Christian allegedly "merely came to retrieve money from an individual in the house." The court then made the statement that "Mr. Dowling's presence in the house was not seriously contested in the case but he stated the general defense. Mr. Dowling, I don't think took the stand." *352 There are any number of possible explanations for the jury's acquittal verdict at Dowling's first trial. As the record stands, there is nothing at all that persuasively indicates that the question of identity was at issue and was determined in Dowling's favor at the prior trial; at oral argument, Dowling conceded as much. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. As a result, even if we were to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to this case, we would conclude that petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the first jury concluded that he was not one of the intruders in Ms. Henry's home. III Besides arguing that the introduction of Henry's testimony violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, petitioner also contends that the introduction of this evidence was unconstitutional because it failed the due process test of "fundamental fairness." We recognize that the introduction of evidence in circumstances like those involved here has the potential to prejudice the jury or unfairly force the defendant to spend time and money relitigating matters considered at the first trial. The question, however, is whether it is acceptable to deal with the potential for abuse through nonconstitutional sources like the Federal Rules of Evidence,[4] or whether the introduction of this type of evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission violates "fundamental conceptions of justice." United v. Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. We, therefore, have defined the category of infractions that violate "fundamental fairness" very narrowly. As we observed in at : *353 "Judges are not free, in defining `due process,' to impose on law |
Justice White | 1,990 | 6 | majority | Dowling v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112352/dowling-v-united-states/ | not free, in defining `due process,' to impose on law enforcement officials [their] `personal and private notions' of fairness and to `disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.' Rochin v. [They] are to determine only whether the action complained of violates those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,' and which define `the community's sense of fair play and decency,' Rochin v." Especially in light of the limiting instructions provided by the trial judge, we cannot hold that the introduction of Henry's testimony merits this kind of condemnation. Plainly Henry's testimony was at least circumstantially valuable in proving petitioner's guilt. Petitioner lists four reasons why, according to him, admission of Henry's testimony was fundamentally unfair. First, petitioner suggests that evidence relating to acquitted conduct is inherently unreliable. We disagree: the jury in this case, for example, remained free to assess the truthfulness and the significance of Henry's testimony, and petitioner had the opportunity to refute it. Second, Dowling contends that the use of this type of evidence creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury will convict the defendant on the basis of inferences drawn from the acquitted conduct; we believe that the trial court's authority to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence adequately addresses this possibility. Third, petitioner claims that the exclusion of acquitted conduct evidence furthers the desirable goal of consistent jury verdicts. We, however, do not find any inconsistency between Dowling's conviction for the First Pennsylvania Bank robbery and his acquittal on the charge of robbing Ms. Henry for the obvious reason that the jury's verdict in his second trial did not entail any judgment with respect to the offenses charged in his first. In any event, inconsistent verdicts are *354 constitutionally tolerable. See Standefer v. United Fourth, petitioner argues that the introduction of Henry's testimony in this case contravenes a tradition that the government may not force a person acquitted in one trial to defend against the same accusation in a subsequent proceeding. We acknowledge the tradition, but find it amply protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. We decline to use the Due Process Clause as a device for extending the double jeopardy protection to cases where it otherwise would not extend. IV Because we conclude that the admission of Ms. Henry's testimony was constitutional and the Court of Appeals therefore applied the correct harmless-error standard, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | These appeals present questions concerning the constitutionality of the so-called Bank Secrecy Act of 19 (Act), and the implementing regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Act, Stat. 1114, 12 U.S. C. 1730d, 1829b, *26 1951-1959, and 31 U.S. C. 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122, was enacted by Congress in 19 following extensive hearings concerning the unavailability of foreign and domestic bank records of customers thought to be engaged in activities entailing criminal or civil liability. Under the Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe by regulation certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements for banks and other financial institutions in this country. Because it has a bearing on our treatment of some of the issues raised by the parties, we think it important to note that the Act's civil and criminal penalties attach only upon violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone. The express purpose of the Act is to require the maintenance of records, and the making of certain reports, which "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." 12 U.S. C. 1829b (2), 1951; 31 U.S. C. 1051. Congress was apparently concerned with two major problems in connection with the enforcement of the regulatory, tax, and criminal laws of the United[1] First, there was a need to insure that domestic banks and financial institutions continue to maintain adequate records of their financial transactions with their customers. Congress found that the recent growth of financial institutions in the United had been paralleled by an increase in criminal activity which made use of *27 these institutions. While many of the records which the Secretary by regulation ultimately required to be kept had been traditionally maintained by the voluntary action of many domestic financial institutions, Congress noted that in recent years some larger banks had abolished or limited the practice of photocopying checks, drafts, and similar instruments drawn on them and presented for payment. The absence of such records, whether through failure to make them in the first instance or through failure to retain them, was thought to seriously impair the ability of the Federal Government to enforce the myriad criminal, tax, and regulatory provisions of laws which Congress had enacted. At the same time, it was recognized by Congress that such required records would "not be made automatically available for law enforcement purposes [but could] only be obtained through existing legal process." H. R. Rep. No. p. 10 (19); see S. Rep. No. p. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | Rep. No. p. 10 (19); see S. Rep. No. p. 5 (19). In addition, Congress felt that there were situations where the deposit and withdrawal of large amounts of currency or of monetary instruments which were the equivalent of currency should be actually reported to the Government. While reports of this nature had been required by previous regulations issued by the Treasury Department, it was felt that more precise and detailed reporting requirements were needed. The Secretary was therefore authorized to require the reporting of what may be described as large domestic financial transactions in currency or its equivalent. Second, Congress was concerned about a serious and widespread use of foreign financial institutions, located in jurisdictions with strict laws of secrecy as to bank activity, for the purpose of violating or evading domestic criminal, tax, and regulatory enactments. The House *28 Report on the bill, No. described the situation in these words: "Considerable testimony was received by the Committee from the Justice Department, the United Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Defense Department and the Agency for International Development about serious and widespread use of foreign financial facilities located in secrecy jurisdictions for the purpose of violating American law. Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have permitted proliferation of `white collar' crime; have served as the financial underpinning of organized criminal operations in the United ; have been utilized by Americans to evade income taxes, conceal assets illegally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans and others to avoid the law and regulations governing securities and exchanges; have served as essential ingredients in frauds including schemes to defraud the United ; have served as the ultimate depository of black market proceeds from Vietnam; have served as a source of questionable financing for conglomerate and other corporate stock acquisitions, mergers and takeovers; have covered conspiracies to steal from the U. S. defense and foreign aid funds; and have served as the cleansing agent for `hot' or illegally obtained monies. "The debilitating effects of the use of these secret institutions on Americans and the American economy are vast. It has been estimated that hundreds of millions in tax revenues have been lost. Unwarranted and unwanted credit is being pumped into *29 our markets. There have been some cases of corporation directors, officers and employees who, through deceit and violation of law, enriched themselves or endangered the financial soundness of their companies to the detriment of their stockholders. Criminals engaged in illegal gambling, skimming, and narcotics |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | their stockholders. Criminals engaged in illegal gambling, skimming, and narcotics traffic are operating their financial affairs with an impunity that approaches statutory exemption. "When law enforcement personnel are confronted with the secret foreign bank account or the secret financial institution they are placed in an impossible position. In order to receive evidence and testimony regarding activities in the secrecy jurisdiction they must subject themselves to a time consuming and ofttimes fruitless foreign legal process. Even when procedural obstacles are overcome, the foreign jurisdictions rigidly enforce their secrecy laws against their own domestic institutions and employees. "One of the most damaging effects of an American's use of secret foreign financial facilities is its undermining of the fairness of our tax laws. Secret foreign financial facilities, particularly in Switzerland, are available only to the wealthy. To open a secret Swiss account normally requires a substantial deposit, but such an account offers a convenient means of evading U. S. taxes. In these days when the citizens of this country are crying out for tax reform and relief, it is grossly unfair to leave the secret foreign bank account open as a convenient avenue of tax evasion. The former U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York has characterized the secret foreign bank account as the largest single tax loophole permitted by American law." While most of the recordkeeping requirements imposed *30 by the Secretary under the Act merely require the banks to keep records which most of them had in the past voluntarily kept and retained, and while much of the required reporting of domestic transactions had been required by earlier Treasury regulations in effect for nearly 30 years,[2] there is no denying the impressive sweep of the authority conferred upon the Secretary by the Bank Secrecy Act of 19. While an Act conferring such broad authority over transactions such as these might well surprise or even shock those who lived in an earlier era, the latter did not live to see the time when bank accounts would join chocolate, cheese, and watches as a symbol of the Swiss economy. Nor did they live to see the heavy utilization of our domestic banking system by the minions of organized crime as well as by millions of legitimate businessmen. The challenges made here to the Bank Secrecy Act are directed not to any want of legislative authority in Congress to treat the subject, but instead to the Act's asserted violation of specific constitutional prohibitions. I Title I of the Act, and the implementing regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Treasury, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | implementing regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary of the Treasury, require financial institutions to maintain records of the identities of their customers, to make microfilm copies of certain checks drawn on them, and to keep records of certain other items. Title II of the Act and its implementing regulations require reports of certain domestic and foreign currency transactions. A. TITLE ITHE RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS Title I of the Act contains the general record-keeping requirements for banks and other financial *31 institutions, as provided by the Secretary by regulation. Section 101 of the Act, 12 U.S. C. 1829b, applies by its terms only to federally insured banks. It contains congressional findings "that adequate records maintained by insured banks have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings." The major requirements of the section are that insured banks record the identities of persons having accounts with them and of persons having signature authority thereover, in such form as the Secretary may require. To the extent that the Secretary determines by regulation that such records would have the requisite "high degree of usefulness," the banks must make and maintain microfilm or other reproductions of each check, draft, or other instrument drawn on it and presented to it for payment, and must maintain a record of each check, draft, or other instrument received by it for deposit or collection, together with an identification of the party for whose account it is to be deposited or collected. Section 101 further authorizes the Secretary to require insured banks to maintain a record of the identity of all individuals who engage in transactions which are reportable by the bank under Title II of the Act, and authorizes the Secretary to prescribe the required retention period for such records. Section 102, 12 U.S. C. 1730d, amends the National Housing Act to authorize the Secretary to apply similar recordkeeping requirements to institutions insured thereunder. Sections 122-123 of the Act, 12 U.S. C. 1952-1953, authorize the Secretary to issue regulations applying similar recordkeeping requirements to additional domestic financial institutions.[3] *32 Although an initial draft of Title I, see H. R. 15073, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., would have compelled the Secretary to promulgate regulations requiring banks to maintain copies of all items received for collection or presented for payment, the Act as finally passed required the maintenance only of such records and microfilm copies as the Secretary determined to have a "high degree of usefulness."[4] Upon passage of the Act, the Treasury Department established a task force which consulted with representatives from financial institutions, trade associations, and |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | which consulted with representatives from financial institutions, trade associations, and governmental agencies to determine the type of records which should be maintained. Whereas the original regulations promulgated by the Secretary had required the copying of all checks, the task force decided, and the regulations were accordingly amended, to require check copying only as to checks in excess of $100.[5] The regulations also require the copying of *33 only "on us" checks: checks drawn on the bank or issued and payable by it. 31 CFR 103.34 (3). The regulations exempt from the copying requirements certain "on us" checks such as dividend, payroll, and employee benefit checks, provided they are drawn on an account expected to average at least one hundred checks per month.[6] The regulations also require banks to maintain records of the identity and taxpayer identification number of each person maintaining a financial interest in each deposit or share account opened after June 30, and to microfilm various other financial documents. 31 CFR 103.34.[7] In addition, the *34 Secretary's regulations require all financial institutions to maintain a microfilm or other copy of each extension of credit in an amount exceeding $5,000 except those secured by interest in real property, and to microfilm each advice, request, or instruction given or received regarding the transfer of funds, currency, or other money or credit in amounts exceeding $10,000 to a person, account, or place outside the United 31 CFR 103.33. Reiterating the stated intent of the Congress, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. ; S. Rep. No. the regulations provide that inspection, review, or access to the records required by the Act to be maintained is governed by existing legal process. 31 CFR 103.51.[8] Finally, 125-127 of the Act provide *35 for civil and criminal penalties for willful violations of the recordkeeping requirements. 12 U.S. C. 1955-1957. B. TITLE IIFOREIGN FINANCIAL TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Chapter 3 of Title II of the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder generally require persons to report the transportation of monetary instruments into or out of the United or receipts of such instruments in the United from places outside the United if the transportation or receipt involves instruments of a value greater than $5,000. Chapter 4 of Title II of the Act and the implementing regulations generally require United citizens, residents, and businessmen to file reports of their relationships with foreign financial institutions. The legislative history of the foreign-transaction reporting provisions indicates that the Congress was concerned with the circumvention of United regulatory, tax, and criminal laws which United citizens and residents were accomplishing through the medium |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | which United citizens and residents were accomplishing through the medium of secret foreign bank transactions. S. Rep. No. ; H. R. Rep. No. Section 231 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1101, requires anyone connected with the transaction to report, in the manner prescribed by the Secretary, the transportation into or out of the country of monetary instruments[9] exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion. As *36 provided by the Secretary's regulations, the report must include information as to the amount of the instrument, the date of receipt, the form of instrument, and the person from whom it was received. See 31 CFR 103.23, 103.25.[10] The regulations exempt various classes of persons from this reporting requirement, including banks, brokers or other dealers in securities, common carriers, and others engaged in the business of transporting currency for banks. 31 CFR 103.23 Monetary instruments which are transported without the filing of a required report, or with a materially erroneous report, are subject to forfeiture under 232 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1102; a person who has failed to file the required report or who has filed a false report is subject to civil penalties under 207 and 233, 31 U.S. C. 1056 and 1103, as well as criminal penalties under 209 and 210, 31 U.S. C. 1058 and 1059. Section 241 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1121, authorizes the Secretary to prescribe regulations requiring residents and citizens of the United as well as nonresidents in the United and doing business therein, to maintain records and file reports with respect to their transactions *37 and relationships with foreign financial agencies. Pursuant to this authority, the regulations require each person subject to the jurisdiction of the United to make a report on yearly tax returns of any "financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country." 31 CFR 103.24. Violations of the reporting requirement of 241 as implemented by the regulations are also subject to civil and criminal penalties under 207, 209, and 210 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1056, 1058, and 1059. C. TITLE IIDOMESTIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS In addition to the foreign transaction reporting requirements discussed above, Title II of the Act provides for certain reports of domestic transactions where such reports have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. Prior to the enactment of the Act, financial institutions had been providing reports of their customers' large currency transactions pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Treasury[11] which had required reports |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | promulgated by the Secretary of Treasury[11] which had required reports of all currency transactions that, in the judgment of the institution, exceeded those "commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or profession of the person or organization concerned."[12] In passing the *38 Act, Congress recognized that the use of financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, in furtherance of activities designed to evade the regulatory mechanisms of the United had markedly increased. H. R. Rep. No. ; S. Rep. No. Congress recognized the importance of reports of large and unusual currency transactions in ferreting out criminal activity and desired to strengthen the statutory basis for requiring such reports. H. R. Rep. No. In particular, Congress intended to authorize more definite standards for determining what constitutes the type of unusual transaction that should be reported. S. Rep. No. Section 221 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1081, therefore delegates to the Secretary the authority for specifying the currency transactions which should be reported, "if they involve the payment, receipt, or transfer of United currency, or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may specify." Section 222 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1082, provides that the Secretary may require such reports from the domestic financial institution involved or the parties to the transactions or both.[13] Section 223 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1083, authorizes the Secretary to designate financial institutions to receive such reports. *39 In the implementing regulations promulgated under this authority, the Secretary has required only that financial institutions file certain reports with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The regulations require that a report be made for each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency,[14] or other payment or transfer "which involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000." 31 CFR 103.22.[15] The regulations exempt from the reporting requirement certain intrabank transactions and "transactions with an established customer maintaining a deposit relationship [in amounts] commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry, or profession of the customer concerned." *40 [16] Provision is also made in the regulations whereby information obtained by the Secretary may in some instances and in confidence be available to other departments or agencies of the United 31 CFR 103.43; see 31 U.S. C. 1061.[17] There is also provision made in the regulations whereby the Secretary may in his sole discretion make exceptions to or grant exemptions from the requirements of the regulation. 31 CFR 103.45[18] Failure to file the required *41 report or the filing of a false report subjects the banks to criminal and civil penalties. 31 U.S. C. 1056, 1058, 1059. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | criminal and civil penalties. 31 U.S. C. 1056, 1058, 1059. II This litigation began in June in the United District Court for the Northern District of California. Various plaintiffs applied for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendants, including the Secretary of the Treasury and heads of other federal agencies, from enforcing the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, enacted by Congress on October 26, 19, and thereafter implemented by the Treasury regulations. The plaintiffs below included several named individual bank customers, the Security National Bank, the California Bankers Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), suing on behalf of itself and its various bank customer members. The plaintiffs' principal contention in the District Court was that the Act and the regulations were violative of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. The complaints also alleged that the Act violated the First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the foreign and domestic reporting provisions of Title II of the Act, and requested the convening of a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2284 to entertain the myriad of constitutional challenges to the Act. *42 The three-judge District Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the recordkeeping requirements of Title I of the Act and the accompanying regulations, and the requirements of Title II of the Act and the regulations for reports concerning the import and export of currency and monetary instruments and relationships with foreign financial institutions. The District Court concluded, however, with one judge dissenting, that the domestic reporting provisions of 221-223 of Title II of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1081-1083, were repugnant to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. The court held that since the domestic reporting provisions of the Act permitted the Secretary of the Treasury to require detailed reports of virtually all domestic financial transactions, including those involving personal checks and drafts, and since the Act could conceivably be administered in such a manner as to compel disclosure of all details of a customer's financial affairs, the domestic reporting provisions must fall as facially violative of the Fourth Amendment. Their enforcement was enjoined. Both the plaintiffs and the Government defendants filed timely notices of appeal from the portions of the District Court judgment adverse to them. We noted probable jurisdiction over three separate appeals from the decision below pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1252 and 1253. : No. The appellant in this appeal is the California Bankers Association, an association of all state and national banks doing business in California. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | of all state and national banks doing business in California. The Association challenges the constitutionality of the recordkeeping provisions of Title I, as implemented by the regulations, on two grounds. First, the Association contends that the Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because there is no rational relationship *43 between the objectives of the Act and the recordkeeping required, and because the Act places an unreasonable burden on the Association's member banks. Second, the Association contends that the recordkeeping requirements of Title I violate the First Amendment right of privacy and anonymity of the member banks' customers. No. 72-1196. This appeal was filed on behalf of a number of plaintiffs in the original suit in the District Court: on behalf of the Security National Bank, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union as a depositor in a bank subject to the recordkeeping requirements and as a representative of its bank customer members, and on behalf of certain bank customers. The appeal first challenges the constitutionality of the recordkeeping requirements of Title I of the Act and the implementing regulations, as does the appeal in No. Second, the appeal challenges the constitutionality of the foreign financial transaction reporting requirements of Title II of the Act and the implementing regulations. These recordkeeping and foreign reporting requirements are challenged on three grounds: first, that the requirements constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; second, that the requirements constitute a coerced creation and retention of documents in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; and third, that the requirements violate the First Amendment rights of free speech and free association. No. 72-1073. In this appeal, the Secretary of the Treasury, as appellant, challenges that portion of the District Court's order holding the domestic financial transaction reporting requirements of Title II to violate the Fourth Amendment. The Government contends that the District Court erred in holding these provisions of Title II to *44 be unconstitutional on their face, without considering the actual implementation of the statute by the Treasury regulations. The Government urges that since only those who violate these regulations may incur civil or criminal penalties, it is the actual regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, and not the broad authorizing language of the statute, which are to be tested against the standards of the Fourth Amendment; and that when so tested they are valid. For convenience, we will refer throughout the remainder of this opinion to the District Court plaintiffs as plaintiffs, since they are both appellants and appellees |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | plaintiffs as plaintiffs, since they are both appellants and appellees in the appeals filed in this Court. III We entertain serious doubt as to the standing of the plaintiff California Bankers Association to litigate the claims which it asserts here. Its complaint alleged that it is an unincorporated association consisting of 158 state and national banks doing business in California. So far as appears from the complaint, the Association is not in any way engaged in the banking business, and is not even subject to the Secretary's regulations which it challenges. While the District Court found that the Association sued on behalf of its member banks, the Association's complaint contains no such allegation. The Association seeks to litigate, not only claims on behalf of its member banks, but also claims of injury to the depositors of its member banks. Since the Government has not questioned the standing of the Association to litigate the claims peculiar to banks, and more importantly since plaintiff Security National Bank has standing as an affected bank, and therefore determination of the Association's standing would in no way avoid resolution of any constitutional issues, we assume without deciding that *45 the Association does have standing. See ; Sierra ; We proceed then to consider the initial contention of the bank plaintiffs that the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the Secretary's regulations under the authority of Title I deprive the banks of due process by imposing unreasonable burdens upon them, and by seeking to make the banks the agents of the Government in surveillance of its citizens. Such recordkeeping requirements are scarcely a novelty. The Internal Revenue Code, for example, contains a general authorization to the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe by regulation records to be kept by both business and individual taxpayers, 26 U.S. C. 6001, which has been implemented by the Secretary in various regulations.[19] And this Court has been *46 faced with numerous cases involving similar recordkeeping requirements. Similar requirements imposed on the countless businesses subject to the Emergency Price Control Act during the Second World War were upheld in the Court observing that there was "a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so that the Government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records, subject to inspection." In United the Court held that employers subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act could be required to keep records of wages paid and hours worked: "Since, as we have held, Congress may require production for interstate commerce to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | have held, Congress may require production for interstate commerce to conform to [wage and hour] conditions, it may require the employer, as a means of enforcing the valid law, to keep a record showing whether he has in fact complied with it." We see no reason to reach a different result here. The plenary authority of Congress over both interstate and foreign commerce is not open to dispute, and that body was not limited to any one particular approach to effectuate its concern that negotiable instruments moving in the channels of that commerce were significantly aiding criminal enterprise. The Secretary of the Treasury, authorized by Congress, concluded that copying and retention of certain negotiable instruments by the bank upon which they were drawn would facilitate the detection and apprehension of participants in such criminal *47 enterprises. Congress could have closed the channels of commerce entirely to negotiable instruments, had it thought that so drastic a solution were warranted; it could have made the transmission of the proceeds of any criminal activity by negotiable instruments in interstate or foreign commerce a separate criminal offense. Had it chosen to do the latter, under the precise authority of Darby or Shapiro, it could have required that each individual engaging in the sending of negotiable instruments through the channels of commerce maintain a record of such action; the bank plaintiffs concede as much.[20] The bank plaintiffs contend, however, that the Act does not have as its primary purpose regulation of the banks themselves, and therefore the requirement that the banks keep the records is an unreasonable burden on the banks. Shapiro and Darby, which involved legislation imposing recordkeeping requirements in aid of substantive regulation, are therefore said not to control. But provisions requiring reporting or recordkeeping by the paying institution, rather than the individual who receives the payment, are by no means unique. The Internal Revenue Code and its regulations, for example, contain provisions which require businesses to report income payments to third parties (26 U.S. C. 6041 ), employers to keep records of certain payments made to employees (Treas. Reg. 31.6001 et seq.), corporations to report dividend payments made to third parties (26 U.S. C. 6042), cooperatives to report patronage dividend payments (26 U.S. C. 6044), brokers to report customers' gains and losses (26 U.S. C. 6045), and banks to report payments of interest made to depositors (26 U.S. C. 6049). * In Darby an identifiable class of employer was made subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and in Shapiro an identifiable class of business had been placed under the Price Control |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | class of business had been placed under the Price Control Act; in each of those instances, Congress found that the purpose of its regulation was adequately secured by requiring records to be kept by the persons subject to the substantive commands of the legislation. In this case, however, Congress determined that recordkeeping alone would suffice for its purposes, and that no correlative substantive legislation was required. Neither this fact, nor the fact that the principal congressional concern is with the activities of the banks' customers, rather than with the activities of the banks themselves, serves to invalidate the legislation on due process grounds. The bank plaintiffs proceed from the premise that they are complete bystanders with respect to transactions involving drawers and drawees of their negotiable instruments. But such is hardly the case. A voluminous body of law has grown up defining the rights of the drawer, the payee, and the drawee bank with respect to various kinds of negotiable instruments. The recognition of such rights, both in the various of this country and in other countries, is itself a part of the reason why the banking business has flourished and played so prominent a part in commercial transactions. The bank is a party to any negotiable instrument drawn upon it by a depositor, and upon acceptance or payment of an instrument incurs obligations to the payee. While it obviously is not privy to the background of a transaction in which a negotiable instrument is used, the existing wide acceptance and availability of negotiable instruments is of inestimable benefit to the banking industry as well as to commerce in general. Banks are therefore not conscripted neutrals in transactions *49 involving negotiable instruments, but parties to the instruments with a substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance. Congress not illogically decided that if records of transactions of negotiable instruments were to be kept and maintained, in order to be available as evidence under customary legal process if the occasion warranted, the bank was the most easily identifiable party to the instrument and therefore should do the recordkeeping. We believe this conclusion is consistent with Darby and Shapiro, and that there is a sufficient connection between the evil Congress sought to address and the recordkeeping procedure it required to pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[21] *50 The bank plaintiffs somewhat halfheartedly argue, on the basis of the costs which they estimate will be incurred by the banking industry in complying with the Secretary's recordkeeping requirements, that this cost burden alone deprives them of due process of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | this cost burden alone deprives them of due process of law. They cite no cases for this proposition, and it does not warrant extended treatment. In its complaint filed in the District Court, plaintiff Security National Bank asserted that it was an "insured" national bank; to the extent that Congress has acted to require records on the part of banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or of financial institutions insured under the National Housing Act, Congress is simply imposing a condition on the spending of public funds. See, e. g., Steward Machine ; Since there was no allegation in the complaints filed in the District Court, and since it is not contended here that any bank plaintiff is not covered by FDIC or Housing Act insurance, it is unnecessary to consider what questions would arise had Congress relied solely upon its power over interstate commerce to impose the recordkeeping requirements. The cost burdens imposed on the banks by the recordkeeping requirements are far from unreasonable, and we hold that such burdens do not deny the banks due process of law.[22] *51 The bank plaintiffs also contend that the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the Secretary pursuant to the Act undercut a depositor's right to effectively challenge a third-party summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service. See ; ; Whatever wrong such a result might work on a depositor, it works no injury on his bank. It is true that in a limited class of cases this Court has permitted a party who suffered injury as a result of the operation of a law to assert his rights even though the sanction of the law was borne by another, and conversely, the Court has allowed a party upon whom the sanction falls to rely on the wrong done to a third party in obtaining relief, ; Whether the bank might in other circumstances rely on an injury to its depositors, or whether, instead, this case is governed by the general rule that one has standing only to vindicate his own rights, e. g., Moose need not now be decided, since, in any event, the claim is premature. Claims of depositors against the compulsion *52 by lawful process of bank records involving the depositors' own transactions must wait until such process issues. Certain of the plaintiffs below, appellants in No. 72-1196, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Security National Bank, and various individual plaintiff depositors, argue that if "the dominant purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act is the creation, preservation, and collection of evidence of crime [i]t is against the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | and collection of evidence of crime [i]t is against the standards applicable to the criminal law, then, that its constitutionality must be measured." They contend that the recordkeeping requirements violate the provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and First Amendments to the Constitution. At this point, we deal only with such constitutional challenges as they relate to the recordkeeping provisions of Title I of the Act. We see nothing in the Act which violates the Fourth Amendment rights of any of these plaintiffs. Neither the provisions of Title I nor the implementing regulations require that any information contained in the records be disclosed to the Government; both the legislative history and the regulations make specific reference to the fact that access to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process. Plaintiffs urge that when the bank makes and keeps records under the compulsion of the Secretary's regulations it acts as an agent of the Government, and thereby engages in a "seizure" of the records of its customers. But all of the records which the Secretary requires to be kept pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself a party. See United The fact that a large number of banks voluntarily kept records of this sort before they were required to do so by regulation is an indication that the records were thought useful to the bank in the conduct of its *53 own business, as well as in reflecting transactions of its customers. We decided long ago that an Internal Revenue summons directed to a third-party bank was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of either the bank or the person under investigation by the taxing authorities. See First National aff'g ; 22. "[I]t is difficult to see how the summoning of a third party, and the records of a third party, can violate the rights of the taxpayer, even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated or in progress." 37 Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the broad authorization given by the Act to the Secretary to require the maintenance of records, coupled with the broad authority to require certain reports of financial transactions, amounts to the power to commit an unlawful search of the banks and the customers. This argument is based on the fact that 31 CFR 103.45, as it existed when the District Court ruled in the case, permitted the Secretary to impose additional recordkeeping or reporting requirements by written order or authorization; this authority has now been deleted from the regulation;[23] plaintiffs thus argue that the Secretary could order the immediate reporting of any |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | that the Secretary could order the immediate reporting of any records made or kept under the compulsion of the Act. We, of course, must examine the statute and the regulations as they now exist. ; Even if plaintiffs were correct in urging that we decide the case on the basis of the regulation as it existed at the time the District Court ruled, their contention would be without merit. Whatever the Secretary might have authorized *54 under the regulation, he did not in fact require the reporting of any records made or kept under the compulsion of the Act. Indeed, since the legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that records which it authorized the Secretary to require were to be available only by normal legal process, it is doubtful that the Secretary would have the authority ascribed to him by plaintiffs even under the earlier form of the regulation. But in any event, whether or not he had the authority, he did not exercise it, and in fact none of the records were required to be reported. Since we hold that the mere maintenance of the records by the banks under the compulsion of the regulations invaded no Fourth Amendment right of any depositor, plaintiffs' attack on the recordkeeping requirements under that Amendment fails.[24] That the bank in making the records required by the Secretary acts under the compulsion of the regulation is clear, but it is equally clear that in doing so it neither searches nor seizes records in which the depositor has a Fourth Amendment right. *55 Plaintiffs have briefed their contentions in such a way that we cannot be entirely certain whether their Fifth Amendment attack is directed only to the reporting provisions of the regulations, or to the recordkeeping provisions as well. To the extent that it is directed to the regulations requiring the banks to keep records, it is without merit. Incorporated banks, like other organizations, have no privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, e. g., ; Wilson v. United ; United v. Since a party incriminated by evidence produced by a third party sustains no violation of his own Fifth Amendment rights, Johnson v. United ; 409 U. S., 8, the depositor plaintiffs here present no meritorious Fifth Amendment challenge to the recordkeeping requirements. Plaintiff ACLU makes an additional challenge to the recordkeeping requirements of Title I. It argues that those provisions, and the implementing regulations, violate its members' First Amendment rights, since the provisions could possibly be used to obtain the identities of its members and contributors through the examination of the organization's bank |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | members and contributors through the examination of the organization's bank records. This Court has recognized that an organization may have standing to assert that constitutional rights of its members be protected from governmentally compelled disclosure of their membership in the organization, and that absent a countervailing governmental interest, such information may not be compelled. See 283 F. Supp. 2 (ED Ark.), aff'd per curiam, Those cases, however, do not elicit a per se rule that would forbid such disclosure in a situation where the governmental interest would override the associational *56 interest in maintaining such confidentiality. Each of them was litigated after a subpoena or summons had already been served for the records of the organization, and an action brought by the organization to prevent the actual disclosure of the records.[25] No such disclosure has been sought by the Government here, and the ACLU's challenge is therefore premature. This Court, in the absence of a concrete fact situation in which competing associational and governmental interests can be weighed, is simply not in a position to determine whether an effort to compel disclosure of such records would or would not be barred by cases such as [26] The threat to any First Amendment rights of the ACLU or its members from the mere existence of the records in the hands of the bank is a good deal more *57 remote than the threat assertedly posed by the Army's system of compilation and distribution of information which we declined to adjudicate in IV We proceed now to address the constitutional challenges directed at the reporting requirements of the regulations authorized in Title II of the Act. Title II authorizes the Secretary to require reporting of two general categories of banking transactions: foreign and domestic. The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the foreign transaction reporting requirements of regulations issued under Title II; certain of the plaintiffs below, appellants in No. 72-1196, have appealed from that portion of the District Court's judgment, and here renew their contentions of constitutional infirmity in the foreign reporting regulations based upon the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The District Court invalidated the Act insofar as it authorized the Secretary to promulgate regulations requiring banks to report domestic transactions involving their customers, and the Government in No. 72-1073 appeals from that portion of the District Court's judgment. As noted above, the regulations issued by the Secretary under the authority of Title II contain two essential reporting requirements with respect to foreign financial transactions. Chapter 3 of Title II of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1101-1105, and the corresponding |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1101-1105, and the corresponding regulation, 31 CFR 103.23, require individuals to report transportation of monetary instruments into or out of the United or receipts of such instruments in the United from places outside the United if the instrument transported or received has a value in excess of $5,000. Chapter 4 of Title II of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1121-1122, and the corresponding regulation, 31 CFR 103.24, generally *58 require United citizens, residents, and businessmen to file reports of their relationships with foreign financial institutions. The domestic reporting provisions of the Act as implemented by the regulations, in contrast to the foreign reporting requirements, apply only to banks and financial institutions. In enacting the statute, Congress provided in 221, 31 U.S. C. 1081, that the Secretary might specify the types of currency transactions which should be reported: "Transactions involving any domestic financial institution shall be reported to the Secretary at such time, in such manner, and in such detail as the Secretary may require if they involve the payment, receipt, or transfer of United currency, or such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may specify, in such amounts, denominations, or both, or under such circumstances, as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe." Section 222 of the Act, 31 U.S. C. 1082, authorizes the Secretary to require such reports from the domestic financial institution involved, from the parties to the transactions, or from both. In exercising his authority under these sections, the Secretary has promulgated regulations which require only that the financial institutions make the report to the Internal Revenue Service; he has not required any report from the individual parties to domestic financial transactions.[27] The applicable regulation, 31 CFR 103.22, requires the financial institution to "file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution, which involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000." The regulation exempts several types of currency transactions *59 from this reporting requirement, including transactions "with an established customer maintaining a deposit relationship with the bank, in amounts which the bank may reasonably conclude do not exceed amounts commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or profession of the customer concerned." A. FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE FOREIGN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS The District Court, in differentiating for constitutional purposes between the foreign reporting requirements and the domestic reporting requirements imposed by the Secretary, relied upon our opinion in United v. U. S. District Court, for the proposition that Government surveillance in the area of foreign relations |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | proposition that Government surveillance in the area of foreign relations is in some instances subject to less constitutional restraint than would be similar activity in domestic affairs. Our analysis does not take us over this ground. The plenary authority of Congress to regulate foreign commerce, and to delegate significant portions of this power to the Executive, is well established. C. & S. Air ; Norwegian Nitrogen Products v. United Plaintiffs contend that in exercising that authority to require reporting of previously described foreign financial transactions, Congress and the Secretary have abridged their Fourth Amendment rights. The familiar language of the Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Since a statute requiring the filing and subsequent publication of a corporate tax return has been upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge, reporting requirements are by no means *60 per se violations of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, a contrary holding might well fly in the face of the settled sixty-year history of self-assessment of individual and corporate income taxes in the United This Court has on numerous occasions recognized the importance of the self-regulatory aspects of that system, and interests of the Congress in enforcing it: "In assessing income taxes the Government relies primarily upon the disclosure by the taxpayer of the relevant facts. This disclosure it requires him to make in his annual return. To ensure full and honest disclosure, to discourage fraudulent attempts to evade the tax, Congress imposes sanctions. Such sanctions may confessedly be either criminal or civil." To the extent that the reporting requirements of the Act and the settled practices of the tax collection process are similar, this history must be overcome by those who argue that the reporting requirements are a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs contend, however, that Boyd v. United establishes the invalidity of the foreign reporting requirement under the Fourth Amendment, and that the particular requirements imposed are so indiscriminate in their nature that the regulations must be deemed to be the equivalent of a general warrant of the kind condemned as obnoxious to the Fourth Amendment in cases such as We do not think these cases would support plaintiffs even if their contentions were directed at the domestic reporting requirements; in light of the fact that the foreign reporting requirements deal with matters in foreign commerce, we think plaintiffs' reliance on the cases to challenge those requirements must fail. *61 Boyd v. United is a case which has been the subject of repeated citation, discussion, and |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | which has been the subject of repeated citation, discussion, and explanation since the time of its decision 88 years ago. In Communist the Court described the Boyd holding as follows: "The Boyd case involved a statute providing that in proceedings other than criminal arising under the revenue laws, the Government could secure an order of the court requiring the production by an opposing claimant or defendant of any documents under his control which, the Government asserted, might tend to prove any of the Government's allegations. If production were not made, the allegations were to be taken as confessed. On the Government's motion, the District Court had entered such an order, requiring the claimants in a forfeiture proceeding to produce a specified invoice. Although the claimants objected that the order was improper and the statute unconstitutional in coercing self-incriminatory disclosures and permitting unreasonable searches and seizures, they did, under protest, produce the invoice, which was, again over their constitutional objection, admitted into evidence. This Court held that on such a record a judgment for the United could not stand, and that the statute was invalid as repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." But the Boyd Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all requirements that information be made available to the Government: "[T]he supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles, and the entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category of *62 unreasonable searches and seizures." 116 U.S., 23-624. involved a warrant issued by a state judge which described petitioner's home and authorized the search and seizure of "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of" This Court found the warrant to be an unconstitutional general warrant, and invalidated the search and seizure conducted pursuant to it. Unlike the situation in Stanford, the Secretary's regulations do not authorize indiscriminate rummaging among the records of the plaintiffs, nor do the reports they require deal with literary material as in Stanford; the information sought is about commerce, not literature. The reports of foreign financial transactions required by the regulations must contain information as to a relatively limited group of financial transactions in foreign commerce, and are reasonably related to the statutory purpose of assisting in the enforcement of the laws of the United Of primary importance, in addition, is the fact that the information required by the foreign reporting requirements pertains only to commercial transactions which take |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | foreign reporting requirements pertains only to commercial transactions which take place across national boundaries. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in his opinion for the Court in Carroll v. United observed: "Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in." This settled proposition has been reaffirmed as recently *63 as last Term in Almeida-Sanchez v. United If reporting of income may be required as an aid to enforcement of the federal revenue statutes, and if those entering and leaving the country may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment, we see no reason to invalidate the Secretary's regulations here. The statutory authorization for the regulations was based upon a conclusion by Congress that international currency transactions and foreign financial institutions were being used by residents of the United to circumvent the enforcement of the laws of the United The regulations are sufficiently tailored so as to single out transactions found to have the greatest potential for such circumvention and which involve substantial amounts of money. They are therefore reasonable in the light of that statutory purpose, and consistent with the Fourth Amendment. B. FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE DOMESTIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS The District Court examined the domestic reporting requirements imposed on plaintiffs by looking to the broad authorization of the Act itself, without specific reference to the regulations promulgated under its authority. The District Court observed: "[A]lthough to date the Secretary has required reporting only by the financial institutions and then only of currency transactions over $10,000, he is empowered by the Act, as indicated above, to require, if he so decides, reporting not only by the financial institution, but also by other parties to or participants in transactions with the institutions and, further, that the Secretary may require reports, not only of currency transactions but of any transaction *64 involving any monetary instrumentand in any amountlarge or small." The District Court went on to pose, as the question to be resolved, whether "these provisions, broadly authorizing an executive agency of government to require financial institutions and parties [thereto] to routinely report the detail of almost every conceivable financial transaction [are] such an invasion of a citizen's right of privacy as amounts to an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Since, as we have observed earlier in this opinion, the statute is not self-executing, and were the Secretary to take no |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | is not self-executing, and were the Secretary to take no action whatever under his authority there would be no possibility of criminal or civil sanctions being imposed on anyone, the District Court was wrong in framing the question in this manner. The question is not what sort of reporting requirements might have been imposed by the Secretary under the broad authority given him in the Act, but rather what sort of reporting requirements he did in fact impose under that authority. "Even where some of the provisions of a comprehensive legislative enactment are ripe for adjudication, portions of the enactment not immediately involved are not thereby thrown open for a judicial determination of constitutionality. `Passing upon the possible significance of the manifold provisions of a broad statute in advance of efforts to apply the separate provisions is analogous to rendering an advisory opinion upon a statute or a declaratory judgment upon a hypothetical case.'" Communist 367 U. S., 1. The question for decision, therefore, is whether the regulations relating to the reporting of domestic transactions, *65 violations of which could subject those required to report to civil or criminal penalties, invade any Fourth Amendment right of those required to report. To that question we now turn. The regulations issued by the Secretary require the reporting of domestic financial transactions only by financial institutions. United v. Morton Salt held that organizations engaged in commerce could be required by the Government to file reports dealing with particular phases of their activities. The language used by the Court in that case is instructive: "It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Although the `right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United at 478, is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, Boyd v. United neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. United v. "While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, cf. Federal Trade corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. Cf. United v. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from *66 which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. [Citations omitted.] Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 338 U.S., 51-652. We have no difficulty then in determining that the Secretary's requirements for the reporting of domestic financial transactions abridge no Fourth Amendment right of the banks themselves. The bank is not a mere stranger or bystander with respect to the transactions which it is required to record or report. The bank is itself a party to each of these transactions, earns portions of its income from conducting such transactions, and in the past may have kept records of similar transactions on a voluntary basis for its own purposes. See United 406 U. S., at The regulations presently in effect governing the reporting of domestic currency transactions require information as to the personal and business identity of the person conducting the transaction and of the person or organization for whom it was conducted, as well as a summary description of the nature of the transaction. It is conceivable, and perhaps likely, that the bank might not of its own volition compile this amount of detail for its own purposes, and therefore to that extent the regulations put the bank in the position of seeking information from the customer in order to eventually report it to the Government. But as we have noted above, "neither *67 incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret." United v. Morton Salt 52. The regulations do not impose unreasonable reporting requirements on the banks. The regulations require the reporting of information with respect to abnormally large transactions in currency, much of which information the bank as a party to the transaction already possesses or would acquire in its own interest. To the extent that the regulations in connection with such transactions require the bank to obtain information from a customer simply because the Government wants it, the information is sufficiently described and limited in nature, and sufficiently related to a tenable congressional determination as to improper use of transactions of that type in interstate commerce, so as to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge made by the bank plaintiffs. "[T]he inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. `The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.' " United v. Morton Salt 52-653; see Oklahoma Press Publishing In addition to the Fourth Amendment challenge to the domestic reporting requirements made by the bank plaintiffs, we are faced with a similar challenge by the depositor plaintiffs, who contend that since the reports of domestic transactions which the bank is required to make will include transactions to which the depositors were parties, the requirement that the bank make a report of the transaction violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the depositor. The complaint filed in the District Court by the ACLU and the depositors contains *68 no allegation by any of the individual depositors that they were engaged in the type of $10,000 domestic currency transaction which would necessitate that their bank report it to the Government. This is not a situation where there might have been a mere oversight in the specificity of the pleadings and where this Court could properly infer that participation in such a transaction was necessarily inferred from the fact that the individual plaintiffs allege that they are in fact "depositors." Such an inference can be made, for example, as to the recordkeeping provisions of Title I, which require the banks to keep various records of certain transactions by check; as our discussion of the challenges by the individual depositors to the recordkeeping provisions, implicitly recognizes, the allegation that one is a depositor is sufficient to permit consideration of the challenges to the recordkeeping provisions, since any depositor would to some degree be affected by them. Here, however, we simply cannot assume that the mere fact that one is a depositor in a bank means that he has engaged or will engage in a transaction involving more than $10,000 in currency, which is the only type of domestic transaction which the Secretary's regulations require that the banks report. That being so, the depositor plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the domestic reporting regulations, since they do not show that their transactions are required to be reported.[28] "Plaintiffs in the federal courts `must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively *69 illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.' Linda R. There must be a `personal stake in the outcome' such as to `assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' Abstract injury is not |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' Abstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged that the plaintiff `has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct. 8 The injury or threat of injury must be both `real and immediate,' not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.' -110 ; Maryland Casualty v. Pacific Coal & Oil 312 U.S. 2, ; United Public" 414 U.S. 8, We therefore hold that the Fourth Amendment claims of the depositor plaintiffs may not be considered on the record before us. Nor do we think that the California Bankers Association or the Security National Bank can vicariously assert such Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of bank customers in general. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary require that a report concerning a domestic currency transaction involving more than $10,000 be filed only by the financial institution which is a party to the transaction; the regulations do not require a report from the customer. 31 CFR 103.22; see 31 U.S. C. 1082. Both the bank and depositor plaintiffs here argue that the regulations are constitutionally defective because they do not require * the financial institution to notify the customer that a report will be filed concerning the domestic currency transaction. Since we have held that the depositor plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing of injury to make a constitutional challenge to the domestic reporting requirements, we do not address ourselves to the necessity of notice to those bank customers whose transactions must be reported. The fact that the regulations do not require the banks to notify the customer of the report violates no constitutional right of the banks, and the banks in any event are left free to adopt whatever customer notification procedures they desire.[29] *71 C. FIFTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS The District Court rejected the depositor plaintiffs' claim that the foreign reporting requirements violated the depositors' Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and found it unnecessary to consider the similarly based challenge to the domestic reporting requirements since the latter were found to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The appeal of the depositor plaintiffs in No. 72-1196 challenges the foreign reporting requirements under the Fifth Amendment, and their brief likewise challenges the domestic reporting requirements as violative of that Amendment. Since they are free to urge in this Court reasons for affirming the judgment of the District Court which may not have been relied upon by the District Court, we consider here the Fifth Amendment objections to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | District Court, we consider here the Fifth Amendment objections to both the foreign and the domestic reporting requirements. As we noted above, the bank plaintiffs, being corporations, have no constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by virtue of the Fifth Amendment. Their brief urges that they may vicariously assert Fifth Amendment claims on behalf of their depositors. But since we hold infra that those depositor plaintiffs who are actually parties in this litigation are premature in asserting any Fifth Amendment claims, we do not believe that the banks *72 under these circumstances have standing to assert Fifth Amendment claims on behalf of customers in general. The individual depositor plaintiffs below made various allegations in the complaint and affidavits filed in the District Court. Plaintiff Stark alleged that he was, in addition to being president of plaintiff Security National Bank, a customer of and depositor in the bank. Plaintiff Marson alleged that he was a customer of and depositor in the Bank of America. Plaintiff Lieberman alleged that he had repeatedly in the recent past transported or shipped one or more monetary instruments exceeding $5,000 in value from the United to places outside the United and expected to do likewise in the near future. Plaintiffs Lieberman, Harwood, Bruer, and Durell each alleged that they maintained a financial interest in and signature authority over one or more bank accounts in foreign countries. This, so far as we can ascertain from the record, is the sum and substance of the depositors' allegations of fact upon which they seek to mount an attack on the reporting requirements of regulations as violative of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination granted to each of them by the Fifth Amendment. Considering first the challenge of the depositor plaintiffs to the foreign reporting requirements, we hold that such claims are premature. In United v. Sullivan, this Court reviewed a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which had held that the Fifth Amendment protected the respondent from being punished for failure to file an income tax return. This Court reversed the decision below, stating: "As the defendant's income was taxed, the statute of course required a return. See United v. Sischo, In the decision that this was contrary to the Constitution we are of opinion that *73 the protection of the Fifth Amendment was pressed too far. If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | account refuse to make any return at all. We are not called on to decide what, if anything, he might have withheld. Most of the items warranted no complaint. It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime. But if the defendant desired to test that or any other point he should have tested it in the return so that it could be passed upon. He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word upon the government blank would bring him into danger of the law." -264. Here the depositor plaintiffs allege that they intend to engage in foreign currency transactions or dealings with foreign banks which the Secretary's regulations will require them to report, but they make no additional allegation that any of the information required by the Secretary will tend to incriminate them. It will be time enough for us to determine what, if any, relief from the reporting requirement they may obtain in a judicial proceeding when they have properly and specifically raised a claim of privilege with respect to particular items of information required by the Secretary, and the Secretary has overruled their claim of privilege. The posture of plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights here is strikingly similar to those asserted in Communist 367 U. S., 5-110. The Communist Party there sought to assert the Fifth Amendment claims of its officers as a *74 defense to the registration requirement of the Subversive Activities Control Act, although the officers were not at that stage of the proceeding required by the Act to register, and had neither registered nor refused to register on the ground that registration might incriminate them. The Court said: "If a claim of privilege is made, it may or may not be honored by the Attorney General. We cannot, on the basis of supposition that privilege will be claimed and not honored, proceed now to adjudicate the constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment of the registration provisions. Whatever proceeding may be taken after and if the privilege is claimed will provide an adequate forum for litigation of that issue." 7. Plaintiffs argue that cases such as Albertson v. 382 U.S. have relaxed the requirements of earlier cases, but we do not find that contention supported by the language or holding of that case. There the Attorney General had petitioned for and obtained an order from the Subversive |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | had petitioned for and obtained an order from the Subversive Activities Control Board compelling certain named members of the Communist Party to register their affiliation. In response to the Attorney General's petitions, both before the Board and in subsequent judicial proceedings, the Communist Party members had asserted the privilege against self-incrimination, and their claims had been rejected by the Attorney General. A previous decision of this Court had held that an affirmative answer to the inquiry as to membership in the Communist Party was an incriminating admission protected under the Fifth Amendment. Blau v. United The differences then between the posture of the depositor plaintiffs in this case and that of petitioner in Albertson v. are evident. *75 We similarly think that the depositor plaintiffs' challenges to the domestic reporting requirements are premature. As we noted above, it is not apparent from the allegations of the complaints in these actions that any of the depositor plaintiffs would be engaged in $10,000 domestic transactions with the bank which the latter would be required to report under the Secretary's regulations pertaining to such domestic transactions. Not only is there no allegation that any depositor engaged in such transactions, but there is no allegation in the complaint that any report which such a bank was required to make would contain information incriminating any depositor. To what extent, if any, depositors may claim a privilege arising from the Fifth Amendment by reason of the obligation of the bank to report such a transaction may be left for resolution when the claim of privilege is properly asserted. Depositor plaintiffs rely on Marchetti v. United Grosso v. United and Haynes v. United as supporting the merits of their Fifth Amendment claim. In each of those cases, however, a claim of privilege was asserted as a defense to the requirement of reporting particular information required by the law under challenge, and those decisions therefore in no way militate against our conclusion that depositor plaintiffs' efforts to litigate the Fifth Amendment issue at this time are premature. D. PLAINTIFF ACLU'S FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS The ACLU claims that the reporting requirements with respect to foreign and domestic transactions invade its associational interests protected by the First Amendment. *76 We have earlier held a similar claim by this organization to be speculative and hypothetical when addressed to the recordkeeping requirements imposed by the Secretary. 5-57. The requirement that particular transactions be reported to the Government, rather than that records of them be available through normal legal process, removes part of the speculative quality |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | majority | California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109005/california-bankers-assn-v-shultz/ | through normal legal process, removes part of the speculative quality of the claim. But the only allegation found in the complaints with respect to the financial activities of the ACLU states that it maintains accounts at one of the San Francisco offices of the Wells Fargo Bank & Trust Company. There is no allegation that the ACLU engages with any regularity in abnormally large domestic currency transactions, transports or receives monetary instruments from channels of foreign commerce, or maintains accounts in financial institutions in foreign countries. Until there is some showing that the reporting requirements contained in the Secretary's regulations would require the reporting of information with respect to the organization's financial activities, no concrete controversy is presented to this Court for adjudication. 414 U. S., at V All of the bank and depositor plaintiffs have stressed in their presentations to the District Court and to this Court that the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act are focused in large part on the acquisition of information to assist in the enforcement of the criminal laws. While, as we have noted, Congress seems to have been equally concerned with civil liability which might go undetected by reason of transactions of the type required to be recorded or reported, concern for the enforcement of the criminal law was undoubtedly prominent in the minds of the legislators who considered *77 the Act. We do not think it is strange or irrational that Congress, having its attention called to what appeared to be serious and organized efforts to avoid detection of criminal activity, should have legislated to rectify the situation. We have no doubt that Congress, in the sphere of its legislative authority, may just as properly address itself to the effective enforcement of criminal laws which it has previously enacted as to the enactment of those laws in the first instance. In so doing, it is of course subject to the strictures of the Bill of Rights, and may not transgress those strictures.[30] But the fact that a legislative enactment manifests a concern for the enforcement of the criminal law does not cast any generalized pall of constitutional suspicion over it. Having concluded that on the record in these appeals, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and having concluded that the enactment in question was within the legislative authority of Congress, our inquiry is at an end. On the appeal of the California Bankers Association in No. from that portion of the judgment of the District Court upholding the recordkeeping |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | I The facts of this case, taken principally from the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, are as follows. On April 1, *784 1975, at approximately 7:45 a. m., Thomas and Eunice Kersey, aged 86 and 74, were robbed and fatally shot at their farmhouse in central Florida. The evidence showed that Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong had gone to the back door of the Kersey house and asked for water for an overheated car. When Mr. Kersey came out of the house, Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, and told Jeanette Armstrong to take his money. Mr. Kersey cried for help, and his wife came out of the house with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her. Sampson Armstrong, and perhaps Jeanette Armstrong, then shot and killed both of the Kerseys, dragged them into the kitchen, and took their money and fled. Two witnesses testified that they drove past the Kersey house between 7:30 and 7:40 a. m. and saw a large cream- or yellow-colored car parked beside the road about 200 yards from the house and that a man was sitting in the car. Another witness testified that at approximately 6:45 a. m. he saw Ida Jean Shaw, petitioner's common-law wife and Jeanette Armstrong's mother, driving a yellow Buick with a vinyl top which belonged to her and petitioner Earl Enmund. Enmund was a passenger in the car along with an unidentified woman. At about 8 a. m. the same witness saw the car return at a high rate of speed. Enmund was driving, Ida Jean Shaw was in the front seat, and one of the other two people in the car was lying down across the back seat. Enmund, Sampson Armstrong, and Jeanette Armstrong were indicted for the first-degree murder and robbery of the Kerseys. Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried together.[1] The prosecutor maintained in his closing argument that "Sampson Armstrong killed the old people." Record 1577. The judge instructed the jury that "[t]he killing of a *785 human being while engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate the offense of robbery is murder in the first degree even though there is no premeditated design or intent to kill." App. 6. He went on to instruct them that "[i]n order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder while engaging in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the crime of robbery, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the robbery." The jury found both Enmund and Sampson Armstrong guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery. A separate sentencing hearing was held and the jury recommended the death penalty for both defendants under the Florida procedure whereby the jury advises the trial judge whether to impose the death penalty. See Fla. Stat. ง 921.141(2) The trial judge then sentenced Enmund to death on the two counts of first-degree murder. Enmund appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court remanded for written findings as required by Fla. Stat. ง 921.141(3) The trial judge found four statutory aggravating circumstances: the capital felony was committed while Enmund was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of an armed robbery, Fla. Stat. ง 921.141(5)(d) ; the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, ง 921.141(5)(f); it was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, ง 921.141(5)(h); and Enmund was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, ง 921.141(5)(b). The court found that "none of the statutory mitigating circumstances applied" to Enmund and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Enmund was therefore sentenced to death on each of the murder counts. *786 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's conviction and sentences. It found that "[t]here was no direct evidence at trial that Earl Enmund was present at the back door of the Kersey home when the plan to rob the elderly couple led to their being murdered." However, it rejected petitioner's argument that at most he could be found guilty of second-degree murder under Florida's felony-murder rule. The court explained that the interaction of the "`felony murder rule and the law of principals combine to make a felon generally responsible for the lethal acts of his co-felon.'" quoting cert. denied, Although petitioner could be convicted of second-degree murder only if he were an accessory before the fact rather than a principal, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned: "[T]he only evidence of the degree of his participation is the jury's likely inference that he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes. The jury could have concluded that he was there, a few hundred feet away, waiting to help the robbers escape with the Kerseys' money. The evidence, therefore, was sufficient to find that the appellant was a principal of the second degree, constructively present aiding and abetting the commission |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | the second degree, constructively present aiding and abetting the commission of the crime of robbery. This conclusion supports the verdicts of murder in the first degree on the basis of the felony murder portion of section 782.04(1)(a)." 399 So. 2d,[2] *787 The State Supreme Court rejected two of the four statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court. It held that the findings that the murders were committed in the course of a robbery and that they were committed for pecuniary gain referred to the same aspect of petitioner's crime and must be treated as only one aggravating circumstance. In addition, the court held that "[t]he recited circumstance, that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, cannot be approved." citing[3] However, because there were two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, the death sentence was affirmed. In so doing, the court expressly rejected Enmund's submission that because the evidence did not establish that he intended to take life, the death penalty was barred by the Eighth Amendment of the United States We granted Enmund's petition for certiorari, presenting the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.[4] *788 II As recounted above, the Florida Supreme Court held that the record supported no more than the inference that Enmund was the person in the car by the side of the road at the time of the killings, waiting to help the robbers escape. This was enough under Florida law to make Enmund a constructive aider and abettor and hence a principal in first-degree murder upon whom the death penalty could be imposed. It was thus irrelevant to Enmund's challenge to the death sentence that he did not himself kill and was not present at the killings; also beside the point was whether he intended that the Kerseys be killed or anticipated that lethal force would or might be used if necessary to effectuate the robbery or a safe escape. We have concluded that imposition of the death penalty in these circumstances is inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. A The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment is directed, in part, "`against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.'" quoting This Court most recently held a punishment excessive in relation to the crime charged in There the plurality opinion concluded that the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman "is grossly disproportionate and |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | the rape of an adult woman "is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." In reaching this conclusion, it was stressed that our judgment "should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent." Accordingly, the Court looked to the historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made before bringing its *789 own judgment to bear on the matter. We proceed to analyze the punishment at issue in this case in a similar manner. B The Coker plurality observed that "[a]t no time in the last 50 years have a majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for rape." More importantly, in reenacting death penalty laws in order to satisfy the criteria established in only three States provided the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman in their revised The plurality therefore concluded that "[t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman." Thirty-six state and federal jurisdictions presently authorize the death penalty. Of these, only eight jurisdictions authorize imposition of the death penalty solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber takes life.[5] Of the remaining 28 jurisdictions, in 4 felony murder is not a capital crime.[6] Eleven States require some culpable mental state *790 with respect to the homicide as a prerequisite to conviction of a crime for which the death penalty is authorized. Of these 11 States, 8 make knowing, intentional, purposeful, or premeditated killing an element of capital murder.[7] Three other States require proof of a culpable mental state short of intent, such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life, before the death penalty may be imposed.[8] In these 11 States, therefore, the actors in a felony murder are not subject to the death penalty without proof of their mental state, proof which was not required with respect to Enmund *791 either under the trial court's instructions or under the law announced by the Florida Supreme Court. Four additional jurisdictions do not permit a defendant such as Enmund to be put to death. Of these, one State flatly prohibits capital punishment in cases where the defendant did not actually commit murder.[9] Two jurisdictions preclude the death penalty in cases such as this one where the defendant "was a principal in the |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | this one where the defendant "was a principal in the offense, which was committed by another, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution."[10] One other State limits the death penalty in felony murders to narrow circumstances not involved here.[11] Nine of the remaining States deal with the imposition of the death penalty for a vicarious felony murder in their capital sentencing In each of these States, a defendant may not be executed solely for participating in a felony in which a person was killed if the defendant did not actually cause the victim's death. For a defendant to be executed in these States, typically the statutory aggravating circumstances which are present must outweigh mitigating factors. To be sure, a vicarious felony murderer may be sentenced to death in these jurisdictions absent an intent to kill if sufficient aggravating circumstances are present. However, six *792 of these nine States make it a statutory mitigating circumstance that the defendant was an accomplice in a capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.[12] By making minimal participation in a capital felony committed by another person a mitigating circumstance, these sentencing statutes reduce the likelihood that a person will be executed for vicarious felony murder. The remaining three jurisdictions exclude felony murder from their lists of aggravating circumstances that will support a death sentence.[13] In each of these nine States, a nontriggerman guilty of felony murder cannot be sentenced to death for the felony murder absent aggravating circumstances above and beyond the felony murder itself. Thus only a small minority of jurisdictionsโeightโallow the death penalty to be imposed solely because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was committed. Even if the nine States are included where such a defendant could be executed for an unintended felony murder if sufficient aggravating circumstances are present to outweigh mitigating circumstancesโwhich often include the defendant's minimal participation in the murderโonly about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant who somehow participated in a robbery where a murder occurred to be sentenced to die. Moreover, of the eight States which have enacted new death penalty statutes since 1978, none authorize capital punishment in such circumstances.[14] While the current legislative judgment *793 with respect to imposition of the death penalty where a defendant did not take life, attempt to take it, or intend to take life is neither "wholly unanimous among state legislatures," U. S., nor as compelling as the legislative judgments considered in Coker, |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | nor as compelling as the legislative judgments considered in Coker, it nevertheless weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue.[15] *794 C Society's rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murders is also indicated by the sentencing decisions that juries have made. As we have previously observed, "`[t]he jury is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.'" quoting Gregg v. The evidence is overwhelming that American juries have repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as petitioner's. First, according to the petitioner, a search of all reported appellate court decisions since 1954 in cases where a defendant was executed for homicide shows that of the 362 executions, in 339 the person executed personally committed a homicidal assault.[16] In 2 cases the person executed had another person commit the homicide for him, and in 16 cases the facts were not reported in sufficient detail to determine whether the person executed committed the homicide.[17] The survey revealed only 6 cases out of 362 where a nontriggerman felony murderer was executed. All six executions took place in *795 1955. By contrast, there were 72 executions for rape in this country between 1955 and this Court's decision in in 1977.[18] That juries have rejected the death penalty in cases such as this one where the defendant did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did not participate in a plot or scheme to murder is also shown by petitioner's survey of the Nation's death-row population.[19] As of October 1, 1981, there were 796 inmates under sentences of death for homicide. Of the 739 for whom sufficient data are available, only 41 did not participate in the fatal assault on the victim. Of the 40 among the 41 for whom sufficient information was available, only 16 were not physically present when the fatal assault was committed. These 16 prisoners included only 3, including petitioner, who were sentenced to die absent a finding that they hired or solicited someone else to kill the victim or participated in a scheme designed to kill the victim. The figures for Florida are similar.[20] Forty-five felony murderers are currently on death row. The Florida Supreme Court either found or affirmed a trial court or jury finding that the defendant intended life to be taken in 36 cases. In eight cases the courts made no finding with respect to intent, but the defendant was the triggerman in each case. In only one caseโEnmund'sโthere was no finding of |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | each case. In only one caseโEnmund'sโthere was no finding of an intent to kill and the defendant was not the triggerman.[21]*796 The State does not challenge this analysis of the Florida cases. The dissent criticizes these statistics on the ground that they do not reveal the percentage of homicides that were charged as felony murders or the percentage of cases where the State sought the death penalty for an accomplice guilty of felony murder. Post, at 818-819. We doubt whether it is possible to gather such information, and at any rate, it would be relevant if prosecutors rarely sought the death penalty for accomplice felony murder, for it would tend to indicate that prosecutors, who represent society's interest in punishing crime, consider the death penalty excessive for accomplice felony murder. The fact remains that we are not aware of a single person convicted of felony murder over the past quarter century who did not kill or attempt to kill, and did not intend the death of the victim, who has been executed, and that only three persons in that category are presently sentenced to die. Nor can these figures be discounted by attributing to petitioner the argument that "death is an unconstitutional penalty absent an intent to kill," post, at 819, and observing that the statistics are incomplete with respect to intent. Petitioner's argument is that because he did not kill, attempt to kill, and he did not intend to kill, the death penalty is disproportionate as applied to him, and the statistics he cites are adequately tailored to demonstrate that juriesโ and perhaps prosecutors as wellโconsider death a disproportionate penalty for those who fall within his category.[22] *797 III Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. We have concluded, along with most legislatures and juries, that it does not. We have no doubt that robbery is a serious crime deserving serious punishment. It is not, however, a crime "so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death." Gregg v. "[I]t does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, [robbery] |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, [robbery] by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the [robber], if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the [robbery] victim, life is not over and normally is not beyond repair." As was said of the crime of rape in Coker, we have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is "unique in its severity and irrevocability," Gregg v. is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such, does not take human life. *798 Here the robbers did commit murder; but they were subjected to the death penalty only because they killed as well as robbed. The question before us is not the disproportionality of death as a penalty for murder, but rather the validity of capital punishment for Enmund's own conduct. The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on "individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence," which means that we must focus on "relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender." Enmund himself did not kill or attempt to kill; and, as construed by the Florida Supreme Court, the record before us does not warrant a finding that Enmund had any intention of participating in or facilitating a murder. Yet under Florida law death was an authorized penalty because Enmund aided and abetted a robbery in the course of which murder was committed. It is fundamental that "causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally." H. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 162 (1968). Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the Kerseys. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. In Gregg v. the opinion announcing the judgment observed that "[t]he death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders." Unless the death penalty when applied to those in Enmund's position measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it "is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an unconstitutional punishment. We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat *799 that the death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | the death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be taken. Instead, it seems likely that "capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation," for if a person does not intend that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force will be employed by others, the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony murder will not "enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act." Gregg v. It would be very different if the likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony. But competent observers have concluded that there is no basis in experience for the notion that death so frequently occurs in the course of a felony for which killing is not an essential ingredient that the death penalty should be considered as a justifiable deterrent to the felony itself. Model Penal Code ง 210.2, Comment, p. 38, and n. 96. This conclusion was based on three comparisons of robbery statistics, each of which showed that only about one-half of one percent of robberies resulted in homicide.[23] The most recent national *800 crime statistics strongly support this conclusion.[24] In addition to the evidence that killings only rarely occur during robberies is the fact, already noted, that however often death occurs in the course of a felony such as robbery, the death penalty is rarely imposed on one only vicariously guilty of the murder, a fact which further attenuates its possible utility as an effective deterrence. As for retribution as a justification for executing Enmund, we think this very much depends on the degree of Enmund's culpabilityโwhat Enmund's intentions, expectations, and actions were. American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intentionโand therefore his moral guiltโto be critical to "the degree of [his] criminal culpability," and the Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing. In a statute making narcotics addiction a crime, even though such addiction "is apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily," was struck down under the Eighth Amendment. Similarly, in the Court invalidated a statute making it a crime for a public official to make a false entry in a public record but not requiring the offender to "injur[e] any one by his act or inten[d] to injure any one." The Court employed a |
Justice White | 1,982 | 6 | majority | Enmund v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110795/enmund-v-florida/ | or inten[d] to injure any one." The Court employed a similar approach in Godfrey v. reversing a death sentence based on the existence of an aggravating circumstance because the defendant's crime did not reflect "a consciousness *801 materially more `depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder." For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt. Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts. This is the judgment of most of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter, and we have no reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of construing and applying the Eighth Amendment. IV Because the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty in this case in the absence of proof that Enmund killed or attempted to kill, and regardless of whether Enmund intended or contemplated that life would be taken, we reverse the judgment upholding the death penalty and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | Ca a private citize sue oe State i the courts of aother? Normally the aswer to this questio is o, because the State where the suit is brought will choose to grat its sister States immuity. But the questio here is whether the Federal Costitutio requires each State to grat its sister States immuity, or whether the Costitu- tio istead permits a State to grat or dey its sister States immuity as it chooses. We aswered that questio 40 years ago i Nevada v. The Court i held that the Costitutio took the permissive approach, leavig it up to each State to decide whether to grat or dey its sister States sovereig immuity. Today, the majority takes the cotrary approach—the absolute approach—ad overrules I ca fid o good reaso to overrule however, ad I cosequetly disset. I ivolved a suit brought by a Califoria residet agaist the State of Nevada i the Califoria courts. We rejected the claim that the Costitutio etitled Nevada to absolute immuity. We first cosidered the immuity that States possessed as idepedet sovereigs before 2 FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT BREYER, J., dissetig the Costitutio was ratified. Ad we the asked whether ratificatio of the Costitutio altered the priciples of state sovereig immuity i ay relevat respect. At both steps, we cocluded, the relevat history ad precedet refuted the claim that States are etitled to absolute immuity i each other’s courts. A first cosidered the immuity that States pos- sessed before ratificatio. “States cosidered themselves fully sovereig atios” durig this period, ate, at 6, ad the Court i therefore asked whether sovereig atios would have ejoyed absolute immuity i each other’s courts at the time of our foudig. The aswer was o. At the time of the foudig, atios grated other atios sovereig immuity i their courts ot as a matter of legal obligatio but as a matter of choice, i.e., of comity or grace or coset. Foreig sover- eig immuity was a doctrie “of implied coset by the territorial sovereig derivig from stadards of public morality, fair dealig, reciprocal self-iterest, ad re- spect.” Natioal City Bak of N. Sice customary iteratioal law made the matter oe of choice, a atio could with- draw that sovereig immuity if it so chose. This Court took that view of foreig sovereig immuity i two foudig-era decisios that forecast the result i I Schooer (1812), whe cosiderig whether a America citize could impose a lie upo a Frech warship, Chief Justice Joh Marshall wrote for the Court that iteratioal law did ot require the Uited States to |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | that iteratioal law did ot require the Uited States to grat Frace sover- eig immuity. Ay such requiremet, he reasoed, “would imply a dimiutio” of America “sovereigty.” Istead, Chief Justice Marshall observed that ay “exceptios” to “the full ad complete power of a a- Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 3 BREYER, J., dissetig tio withi its ow territories, must be traced up to the coset of the atio itself ” ad “ca flow from o other legitimate source.” The Court ultimately held i Schooer Exchage that the Uited States had coseted implicitly to give immu- ity to the Frech warship. See But that was because “atioal ships of war, eterig the port of a friedly power ope for their receptio, [we]re to be co- sidered as exempted by the coset of that power from its jurisdictio.” at 145–146. Ad the Chief Justice was careful to ote that this implicatio of coset could be “destroy[ed]” i various ways, icludig by subjectig the foreig atio “to the ordiary tribuals.” Te years later, i The Satissima Triidad, 7 Wheat. 283 (1822), this Court uaimously reaffirmed Schooer Exchage’s coclusio that foreig sovereig immuity was ot a absolute right. The Court i Satissima Tri- idad was called upo to determie whether the cargo of a Argetie ship, foud i Baltimore Harbor, was immue from seizure. The ship’s commader asserted that Arge- tia had a absolute right to immuity from suit, claimig that “o sovereig is aswerable for his acts to the tribu- als of ay foreig sovereig.” But Justice Joseph Story, writig for the Court, squarely rejected the “otio that a foreig sovereig had a absolute right, i virtue of his sovereigty, to a exemptio of his property from the local jurisdictio of aother sovereig, whe it came withi his territory.” Rather, ay exceptio to jurisdictio, icludig sovereig immuity, “stads upo priciples of public comity ad coveiece, ad arises from the presumed coset or licese of atios.” at 353. Accordigly, Justice Story explaied, the right to assert sovereig immuity “may be withdraw upo otice at ay time, without just offece.” Justice Story the held that the Argetie ship’s cargo was ot immue from seizure. 4 FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT BREYER, J., dissetig The Court i relied o this reasoig. See U.S., –417. Drawig o the compariso to foreig atios, the Court i emphasized that Califoria had made a sovereig decisio ot to “exte[d] immuity to Nevada as a matter of comity.” Uless some costitutioal rule required Califoria to grat immuity that it had chose to withhold, the Court “ha[d] o power |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | it had chose to withhold, the Court “ha[d] o power to disturb the judgmet of the Califoria courts.” B The Court i ext held that ratificatio of the Costitutio did ot alter priciples of state sovereig immuity i ay relevat respect. The Court cocluded that express provisios of the Costitutio—such as the Eleveth Amedmet ad the Full Faith ad Credit Clause of Article IV—did ot require States to accord each other sovereig immuity. See –424. Ad the Court held that othig “implicit i the Costitutio” treats States differetly i respect to immuity tha iteratioal law treats sovereig atios. ; see also at 424–427. To the cotrary, the Court i observed that a express provisio of the Costitutio udermied the assertio that States were absolutely immue i each other’s courts. Ulike suits brought agaist a State i the State’s ow courts, oted, a suit agaist a State i the courts of a differet State “ecessarily implicates the power ad authority of ” both States. The defedat State has a sovereig iterest i immuity from suit, while the forum State has a sovereig iterest i defiig the jurisdictio of its ow courts. The Court i therefore justified its decisio i part by referece to “the Teth Amedmet’s remider that powers ot dele- gated to the Federal Govermet or prohibited to the States are reserved to the States or to the people.” at 425. Compellig States to grat immuity to their sister Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 5 BREYER, J., dissetig States would risk iterferig with sovereig rights that the Teth Amedmet leaves to the States. To illustrate that priciple, cited which cocered codema- tio proceedigs brought by a muicipality agaist prop- erty owed by a eighborig State. See U.S., at 426, 29. The Court i Chattaooga held that oe State (Georgia) that had purchased property for a railroad i a eighborig State (Teessee) could ot exempt itself from the emiet domai power of the Teessee city i which the property was The reaso was obvious: “The power of emiet domai is a attribute of sovereigty,” ad Teessee did ot surreder that sovereig power simply by sellig lad to Georgia. I light of the competig sovereigty iterests o both sides of the matter, the Court i Chattaooga foud o basis to iterpose a federally madated resolutio. Similar reasoig applied i Madatig absolute iterstate immuity “by iferece from the structure of our Costitutio ad othig else” would “itru[de] o the sovereigty of the States—ad the power of the people—i our Uio.” –427. II The majority disputes both ’s historical coclusio regardig state immuity |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | The majority disputes both ’s historical coclusio regardig state immuity before ratificatio ad its co- clusio that the Costitutio did ot alter that immuity. But I do ot fid the majority’s argumets covicig. A The majority asserts that before ratificatio “it was well settled that States were immue uder both the commo law ad the law of atios.” Ate, at 9. The majority thus maitais that States were exempt from suit i each other’s courts. But the questio i cocered the basis for that 6 FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT BREYER, J., dissetig exemptio. Did oe sovereig have a absolute right to a exemptio from the jurisdictio of the courts of aother, or was that exemptio a customary matter, a matter of co- set that a sovereig might withdraw? As to that ques- tio, othig i the majority’s opiio casts doubt o ’s coclusio that States—like foreig atios—were accorded immuity as a matter of coset rather tha absolute right. The majority refers to “the foudig era’s foremost expert o the law of atios,” Emer de Vattel, who stated that a “sovereig is ‘exempt from all foreig jurisdictio.’ ” Ate, at 7 (quotig 4 E. de Vattel, The Law of Natios (J. Chitty ed. 1883) (Vattel); alteratios omitted). But Vattel made clear that the source of a sovereig’s immu- ity i a foreig sovereig’s courts is the “ ‘cose[t]’ ” of the foreig sovereig, which, he added, reflects a “ ‘tacit co- vetio’ ” amog atios. Schooer Exchage, 7 Crach, at 143 (quotig 4 Vattel 2). Ad Schooer Exchage ad Satissima Triidad uderscore that such a tacit covetio ca be rejected, ad that coset ca be “with- draw upo otice at ay time.” Satissima Triidad, 7 Wheat., at 353. The majority also draws o statemets of the Fouders cocerig the importace of sovereig immuity geer- ally. But, as oted, those statemets cocered mat- ters etirely distict from the questio of state immuity at issue here. Those statemets istead “cocered ques- tios of federal-court jurisdictio ad the extet to which the States, by ratifyig the Costitutio ad creatig federal courts, had authorized suits agaist themselves i those courts.” –421 That issue was “a matter of importace i the early days of idepedece,” for it cocered the ability of holders of Revolutioary War debt owed by States to collect that debt i a federal forum. There is o evidece that the Fouders who made those statemets iteded to Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 7 BREYER, J., dissetig express views o the questio before us. Ad it seems particularly ulikely that |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | the questio before us. Ad it seems particularly ulikely that Joh Marshall, oe of those to whom the Court refers, see ate, at 10–11, would have held views of the law i respect to States that he later repudiated i respect to sovereig atios. The majority cites (C. P. Phila. Cty. 1781). As the majority poits out, that case ivolved a Pesylvaia citize who filed a suit i Pe- sylvaia’s courts seekig to attach property belogig to Virgiia. The Pesylvaia Court of Commo Pleas ac- cepted Virgiia’s claim of sovereig immuity ad dis- missed the suit. But it did so oly after “delegates i Cogress from Virgiia applied to the supreme execu- tive coucil of Pesylvaia” for immuity, ad Pesyl- vaia’s Attorey Geeral, represetig its Executive, asked the court to dismiss the case. The Pesylvaia court thus grated immuity oly after Virgiia “followed the usual diplomatic course.” Pfader, Rethikig the Supreme Court’s Origial Jurisdictio i State-Party Cases, Give the participatio of Pesylvaia’s Executive i this dip- lomatic matter, the case likely ivolved Pesylvaia’s coset to a claim of sovereig immuity, rather tha a view that Virgiia had a absolute right to immuity. B The majority ext argues that “the Costitutio affirm- atively altered the relatioships betwee the States” by givig them immuity that they did ot possess whe they were fully idepedet. Ate, at 13. The majority thus maitais that, whatever the ature of state immuity before ratificatio, the Costitutio accorded States a absolute immuity that they did ot previously possess. The most obvious problem with this argumet is that o provisio of the Costitutio gives States absolute immu- ity i each other’s courts. The majority does ot attempt 8 FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT BREYER, J., dissetig to situate its ewfoud costitutioal immuity i ay provisio of the Costitutio itself. Istead, the majority maitais that a State’s immuity i other States’ courts is “implicit” i the Costitutio, ate, at 16, “embed[ded] withi the costitutioal desig,” ate, at 13, ad reflected i “ ‘the pla of the Covetio,’ ” ate, at 9. See also (arguig that immuity i this cotext is foud “ot i a express provisio of the Costitutio but i a guaratee that is implied as a essetial compoet of federalism”). I agree with today’s majority ad the disseters i that the Costitutio cotais implicit guaratees as well as explicit oes. But, as I have previously oted, cocepts like the “costitutioal desig” ad “pla of the Cove- tio” are “highly abstract, makig them difficult to ap- ply”—at least abset support i “cosideratios of history, of costitutioal |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | ply”—at least abset support i “cosideratios of history, of costitutioal purpose, or of related cosequece.” Federal Maritime Such cocepts “ivite differig iterpretatios at least as much as do the Costitutio’s ow broad liberty-protectig phrases” such as “ ‘due process’ ” ad “ ‘liberty,’ ” ad “they suffer the additioal disadvatage that they do ot actually appear aywhere i the Costitutio.” At ay rate, I ca fid othig i the “pla of the Co- vetio” or elsewhere to suggest that the Costitutio coverted what had bee the customary practice of ex- tedig immuity by coset ito a absolute federal requiremet that o State could withdraw. Noe of the majority’s argumets idicates that the Costitutio accomplished ay such trasformatio. The majority argues that the Costitutio sought to preserve States’ “equal digity ad sovereigty.” Ate, at 13. That is true, but tells us othig useful here. Whe a citize brigs suit agaist oe State i the courts of a- other, both States have strog sovereigty-based iterests. Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 9 BREYER, J., dissetig I cotrast to a State’s power to assert sovereig immu- ity i its ow courts, sovereigty iterests here lie o both sides of the costitutioal equatio. The majority also says—also correctly—that the Costi- tutio demaded that States give up certai sovereig rights that they would have retaied had they remaied idepedet atios. From there the majority ifers that the Costitutio must have implicitly give States im- muity i each other’s courts to provide protectio that they gave up whe they etered the Federal Uio. But where the Costitutio alters the authority of States vis-à-vis other States, it teds to do so explicitly. The Import-Export Clause cited by the majority, for exam- ple, creates “harmoy amog the States” by prevetig them from “burde[ig] commerce amog themselves.” Micheli Tire (1976). The Full Faith ad Credit Clause, also ivoked by the majority, prohibits States from adoptig a “policy of hostility to the public Acts” of aother State. Frachise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 578 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 2). By cotrast, the Costitutio says othig explicit about iterstate sovereig immuity. Nor does there seem to be ay eed to create implicit costitutioal protectios for States. As the history of this case shows, the Costitutio’s express provisios seem adequate to prohibit oe State from treatig its sister States ufairly—eve if the State permits suits agaist its sister States i its courts. See at (slip op., at 4) (holdig that the Full Faith ad Credit Clause prohibits Nevada from subjectig the Board to greater liability tha Nevada would impose |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | subjectig the Board to greater liability tha Nevada would impose upo its ow agecy i similar circumstaces). The majority may believe that the distictio betwee permissive ad absolute immuity was too uaced for the Framers. The Framers might have uderstood that most atios did i fact allow other atios to assert 10 FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT BREYER, J., dissetig sovereig immuity i their courts. Ad they might have stopped there, igorig the fact that, uder iteratioal law, a atio had the sovereig power to chage its mid. But there is simply othig i the Costitutio or its history to suggest that ayoe reasoed i that way. No costitutioal laguage supports that view. Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Story, ad the Court itself took a some- what cotrary view without metioig the matter. Ad there is o strog reaso for treatig States differetly tha foreig atios i this cotext. Why would the Framers, siletly ad without ay evidet reaso, have trasformed sovereig immuity from a permissive im- muity predicated o comity ad coset ito a absolute immuity that States must accord oe aother? The Court i could idetify o such reaso. Nor ca I. III I ay evet, stare decisis requires us to follow ot overrule it. See Plaed Parethood of Southeaster Pa. v. ; see also Kimble v. Marvel Etertaimet, LLC, 576 U. S. – (2015) (slip op., at 7–8). Overrulig a case always requires “ ‘spe- cial justificatio.’ ” Kimble, 576 U. S., at (slip op., at 8). What could that justificatio be i this case? The majority does ot fid oe. The majority believes that was wrogly decided. But “a argumet that we got somethig wrog—eve a good argumet to that effect—caot by itself justify scrappig settled precedet.” Kimble, 576 U. S., at (slip op., at 8). Three disseters i also believed that was wrog, but they recogized that the Court’s opiio was “plausible.” (opiio of Blackmu, J.). While reasoable jurists might disagree about whether was correct, that very fact—that is ot obviously wrog—shows that today’s majority is obviously wrog to overrule it. Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 11 BREYER, J., dissetig The law has ot chaged sigificatly sice this Court decided ad has ot left a relic of a abadoed doctrie. To the cotrary, relied o this Court’s precedet i reachig its coclusio, ad this Court’s subsequet cases are cosistet with As oted earlier, drew its historical aalysis from earlier decisios such as Schooer Exchage, writte by Chief Justice Marshall. Ad our post- decisios regardig the immuity of foreig atios are cosistet with those |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | regardig the immuity of foreig atios are cosistet with those earlier decisios. The Court has recetly reaffirmed “Chief Justice Marshall’s observatio that foreig sover- eig immuity is a matter of grace ad comity rather tha a costitutioal requiremet.” Republic of Austria v. Altma, Ad the Court has reiterated that a atio may declie to grat other atios sovereig immuity i its courts. Verlide B. V. v. Ce- tral Bak of Nigeria, Nor has our uderstadig of state sovereig immuity evolved to udermie The Court has decided several state sovereig immuity cases sice but these cases have all ivolved a State’s immuity i a federal forum or i the State’s ow courts. Compare Federal Maritime Comm’, (state immuity i a federal forum); Semiole Tribe of (1996) (same); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (same), with Alde v. Maie, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (state immuity i a State’s “ow courts”); Will v. Michiga Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (same). Noe ivolved immuity asserted by oe State i the courts of aother. Ad our most recet case to address i ay detail edorses it. See Alde, –740 (otig that ’s distictio “be- twee a sovereig’s immuity i its ow courts ad its immuity i the courts of aother sovereig” is “cosistet with, ad eve support[s],” moder cases). The disseters i feared its “practical implica- 12 FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT BREYER, J., dissetig tios.” (opiio of Rehquist, J.). But I ca fid othig i the iterveig 40 years to suggest that this fear was well fouded. The Board ad its amici have, by my cout, idetified oly 14 cases i 40 years i which oe State has etertaied a private citize’s suit agaist aother State i its courts. See Brief for Petitioer 46–; Brief for State of Idiaa et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14. I at least oe of those 14 cases, moreover, the state court evetually agreed to dismiss the suit agaist its sister State as a matter of comity. See Motaño v. Frezza, 2017–NMSC–015, How ca it be that these cases, decided over a period of four decades, show to be uworkable? The issue so rarely arises because most States, like most sovereig atios, are reluctat to dey a sister State the immuity that they would prefer to ejoy recip- rocally. Thus, eve i the absece of costitutioally madated immuity, States ormally grat sovereig immuity volutarily. States that fear that this practice will be isufficietly protective are free to eter ito a iterstate compact to guaratee that the ormal |
Justice Breyer | 2,019 | 2 | dissenting | Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4618956/franchise-tax-bd-of-cal-v-hyatt/ | eter ito a iterstate compact to guaratee that the ormal practice of gratig immuity will cotiue. See Although may States have filed a amicus brief i this case askig us to overtur I ca fid othig i the brief that idicates that reaffirmig would affrot “the digity ad respect due sovereig etities.” Federal Maritime Comm’, As already ex- plaied, sovereig iterests fall o both sides of this ques- tio. While reaffirmig might harm States seekig sovereig immuity, overrulig would harm States seekig to cotrol their ow courts. Perhaps the majority believes that there has bee isuf- ficiet reliace o to justify preservig it. But ay such belief would igore a importat feature of reliace. The people of this Natio rely upo stability i the law. Cite as: 587 U. S. (2019) 13 BREYER, J., dissetig Legal stability allows lawyers to give cliets soud advice ad allows ordiary citizes to pla their lives. Each time the Court overrules a case, the Court produces icreased ucertaity. To overrule a soud decisio like is to ecourage litigats to seek to overrule other cases; it is to make it more difficult for lawyers to refrai from challeg- ig settled law; ad it is to cause the public to become icreasigly ucertai about which cases the Court will overrule ad which cases are here to stay. I uderstad that judges, icludig Justices of this Court, may decide cases wrogly. I also uderstad that later-appoited judges may come to believe that earlier- appoited judges made just such a error. Ad I uder- stad that, because opportuities to correct old errors are rare, judges may be tempted to seize every opportuity to overrule cases they believe to have bee wrogly decided. But the law ca retai the ecessary stability oly if this Court resists that temptatio, overrulig prior precedet oly whe the circumstaces demad it. * * * It is oe thig to overrule a case whe it “def [ies] practi- cal workability,” whe “related priciples of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule o more tha a remat of abadoed doctrie,” or whe “facts have so chaged, or come to be see so differetly, as to have robbed the old rule of sigificat applicatio or justifica- tio.” 505 U.S., at It is far more dager- ous to overrule a decisio oly because five Members of a later Court come to agree with earlier disseters o a difficult legal questio. The majority has surredered to the temptatio to overrule eve though it is a well- reasoed decisio that has caused o serious |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | majority | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/219106/wal-mart-stores-inc-v-dukes/ | We are presented with one of the most expansive class actions ever. The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the certification of a class comprising about one and a half million plaintiffs, current and former female employees of petitioner Wal-Mart who allege that the discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion matters violates Title VII by discriminat ing against women. In addition to injunctive and declara tory relief, the plaintiffs seek an award of backpay. We consider whether the certification of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). I A Petitioner Wal-Mart is the Nation’s largest private employer. It operates four types of retail stores through out the country: Discount Stores, Supercenters, Neighbor hood Markets, and Sam’s Clubs. Those stores are divided into seven nationwide divisions, which in turn comprise 41 regions of 80 to 85 stores apiece. Each store has between 2 WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES Opinion of the Court 40 and 53 separate departments and 80 to 500 staff posi tions. In all, Wal-Mart operates approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than one million people. Pay and promotion decisions at Wal-Mart are generally committed to local managers’ broad discretion, which is exercised “in a largely subjective manner.” 222 F. R. D. 137, 145 (ND Cal. 2004). Local store managers may in crease the wages of hourly employees (within limits) with only limited corporate oversight. As for salaried employ ees, such as store managers and their deputies, higher corporate authorities have discretion to set their pay with in preestablished ranges. Promotions work in a similar fashion. Wal-Mart per mits store managers to apply their own subjective criteria when selecting candidates as “support managers,” which is the first step on the path to management. Admission to Wal-Mart’s management training program, however, does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria, including an above-average performance rating, at least one year’s tenure in the applicant’s current position, and a willingness to relocate. But except for those requirements, regional and district managers have discretion to use their own judgment when selecting candidates for management training. Promotion to higher office—e.g., assistant man ager, co-manager, or store manager—is similarly at the discretion of the employee’s superiors after prescribed objective factors are satisfied. B The named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, representing the 1.5 million members of the certified class, are three cur rent or former Wal-Mart employees who allege that the company discriminated against them on the basis of their sex by denying them equal pay or promotions, in violation of Title VII |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | majority | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/219106/wal-mart-stores-inc-v-dukes/ | them equal pay or promotions, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 3 Opinion of the Court amended, 42 U.S. C. et seq.1 Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburgh, California, Wal-Mart in 1994. She started as a cashier, but later sought and received a promotion to customer service man ager. After a series of disciplinary violations, however, Dukes was demoted back to cashier and then to greeter. Dukes concedes she violated company policy, but contends that the disciplinary actions were in fact retaliation for invoking internal complaint procedures and that male employees have not been disciplined for similar infrac tions. Dukes also claims two male greeters in the Pitts burgh store are paid more than she is. Christine Kwapnoski has worked at Sam’s Club stores in Missouri and California for most of her adult life. She has held a number of positions, including a supervisory position. She claims that a male manager yelled at her frequently and screamed at female employees, but not at men. The manager in question “told her to ‘doll up,’ to wear some makeup, and to dress a little better.” App. 1003a. The final named plaintiff, Edith Arana, worked at a Wal-Mart store in Duarte, California, from 1995 to In 2000, she approached the store manager on more than one occasion about management training, but was brushed off. Arana concluded she was being denied opportunity for advancement because of her sex. She initiated internal complaint procedures, whereupon she was told to apply directly to the district manager if she thought her store manager was being unfair. Arana, however, decided against that and never applied for management training again. In she was fired for failure to comply with Wal-Mart’s timekeeping policy. These plaintiffs, respondents here, do not allege that —————— 1 The complaint included seven named plaintiffs, but only three re main part of the certified class as narrowed by the Court of Appeals. 4 WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES Opinion of the Court Wal-Mart has any express corporate policy against the advancement of women. Rather, they claim that their local managers’ discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female employees, see 42 U.S. C. And, respondents say, because Wal- Mart is aware of this effect, its refusal to cabin its manag ers’ authority amounts to disparate treatment, see Their complaint seeks injunctive and de claratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay. It does not ask for compensatory damages. Importantly for our purposes, |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | majority | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/219106/wal-mart-stores-inc-v-dukes/ | does not ask for compensatory damages. Importantly for our purposes, respondents claim that the discrimination to which they have been subjected is common to all Wal-Mart’s female employees. The basic theory of their case is that a strong and uniform “corporate culture” permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—thereby mak ing every woman at the company the victim of one com mon discriminatory practice. Respondents therefore wish to litigate the Title VII claims of all female employees at Wal-Mart’s stores in a nationwide class action. C Class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking certifi cation must demonstrate, first, that: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem- bers is impracticable, “(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, “(3) the claims or defenses of the representative par ties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and “(4) the representative parties will fairly and ade quately protect the interests of the class” (paragraph Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 5 Opinion of the Court breaks added). Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Respondents rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”2 Invoking these provisions, respondents moved the Dis trict Court to certify a plaintiff class consisting of “ ‘[a]ll women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and man agement track promotions policies and practices.’ ” 222 F. R. D., at 141–142 (quoting Plaintiff ’s Motion for Class Certification in case No. 3:01–cv–02252–CRB (ND Cal.), Doc. 99, p. 37). As evidence that there were indeed “ques tions of law or fact common to” all the women of Wal-Mart, as Rule 23(a)(2) requires, respondents relied chiefly on three forms of proof: statistical evidence about pay and promotion disparities between men and women at the company, anecdotal reports of discrimination from about 120 of Wal-Mart’s female employees, and the testimony of a sociologist, Dr. William Bielby, who conducted a “social —————— 2 Rule 23(b)(1) allows a class to be maintained where “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of ” either |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | majority | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/219106/wal-mart-stores-inc-v-dukes/ | individual class members would create a risk of ” either “(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications,” or “(B) adjudications that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudica tions or would substantially impair or impeded their ability to protect their interests.” Rule 23(b)(3) states that a class may be maintained where “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and a class action would be “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The applicability of these provisions to the plaintiff class is not before us. 6 WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES Opinion of the Court framework analysis” of Wal-Mart’s “culture” and person- nel practices, and concluded that the company was “vul- nerable” to gender discrimination. (CA9 2010) (en banc). Wal-Mart unsuccessfully moved to strike much of this evidence. It also offered its own countervailing statistical and other proof in an effort to defeat Rule 23(a)’s require- ments of commonality, typicality, and adequate represen- tation. Wal-Mart further contended that respondents’ monetary claims for backpay could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), first because that Rule refers only to injunc- tive and declaratory relief, and second because the back- pay claims could not be manageably tried as a class with- out depriving Wal-Mart of its right to present certain statutory defenses. With one limitation not relevant here, the District Court granted respondents’ motion and certi- fied their proposed 3 D A divided en banc Court of Appeals substantially af- firmed the District Court’s certification order. 603 F.3d 571. The majority concluded that respondents’ evidence of commonality was sufficient to “raise the common question whether Wal-Mart’s female employees nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate policies (not merely a number of independent discriminatory acts) that may have worked to unlawfully discriminate against them in violation of Title VII.” It also agreed with the District Court that the named plain- tiffs’ claims were sufficiently typical of the class as a whole —————— 3 The District Court excluded backpay claims based on promotion opportunities that had not been publicly posted, for the reason that no applicant data could exist for such positions. 222 F. R. D. 137, 182 (ND Cal. 2004). It also decided to afford class members notice of the ac- tion and the right to opt-out of the class with respect to respondents’ punitive-damages claim. Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 7 Opinion of the Court to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), and that they could serve as |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | majority | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/219106/wal-mart-stores-inc-v-dukes/ | to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), and that they could serve as ade quate class representatives, see Rule 23(a)(4). at – 615. With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) question, the Ninth Circuit held that respondents’ backpay claims could be certified as part of a (b)(2) class because they did not “predominat[e]” over the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, meaning they were not “superior in strength, influence, or authority” to the nonmonetary claims.4 Finally, the Court of Appeals determined that the action could be manageably tried as a class action because the District Court could adopt the approach the Ninth Circuit approved in 782– 787 (1996). There compensatory damages for some 9,541 class members were calculated by selecting 137 claims at random, referring those claims to a special master for valuation, and then extrapolating the validity and value of the untested claims from the sample set. See 603 F.3d, at 625–626. The Court of Appeals “s[aw] no reason why a similar procedure to that used in Hilao could not be em ployed in this case.” It would allow Wal-Mart “to present individual defenses in the randomly selected ‘sample cases,’ thus revealing the approximate percentage of class members whose unequal pay or nonpromotion was due to something other than gender discrimination.” Ib n. 56 —————— 4 To enable that result, the Court of Appeals trimmed the (b)(2) class in two ways: First, it remanded that part of the certification order which included respondents’ punitive-damages claim in the (b)(2) class, so that the District Court might consider whether that might cause the monetary relief to Second, it accepted in part Wal-Mart’s argument that since class members whom it no longer employed had no standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief, as to them monetary claims must It excluded from the certified class “those putative class members who were no longer Wal-Mart employees at the time Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed,” at (emphasis added). 8 WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES Opinion of the Court We granted certiorari. 562 U. S. (2010). II The class action is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” 700–701 In order to justify a departure from that rule, “a class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class ” East Tex. Motor Freight System, ). Rule 23(a) ensures that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate. The Rule’s four requirements—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation—“effectively ‘limit the class |
Justice Scalia | 2,011 | 9 | majority | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/219106/wal-mart-stores-inc-v-dukes/ | four requirements—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation—“effectively ‘limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plain tiff ’s claims.’ ” General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. (quoting General Tele phone Co. of (1980)). A The crux of this case is commonality—the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the ” Rule 23(a)(2).5 That language is —————— 5 We have previously stated in this context that “[t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the inter ests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the latter requirement also raises concerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest.” General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Fal Cite as: 564 U. S. (2011) 9 Opinion of the Court easy to misread, since “[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises common ‘questions.’ ” Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 97, 131–132 (2009). For example: Do all of us plaintiffs indeed work for Wal-Mart? Do our manag ers have discretion over pay? Is that an unlawful em ployment practice? What remedies should we get? Recit ing these questions is not sufficient to obtain class certification. Commonality requires the plaintiff to dem onstrate that the class members “have suffered the same injury,” This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same pro vision of law. Title VII, for example, can be violated in many ways—by intentional discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in disparate impact, and by the use of these practices on the part of many different superiors in a single company. Quite obviously, the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for ex ample, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the valid |
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