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Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | dissenting | Hunter v. Bryant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112671/hunter-v-bryant/ | The question in this case is not whether a reasonable officer could have believed that respondent posed a threat to the life of the President. Those "who guard the life of the President," ante this page (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), properly rely on the slightest bits of evidence nothing *230 more than hunches or suspicion in taking precautions to avoid the ever-present danger of assassination. Mere suspicion is obviously a sufficient justification for a host of protective measures such as, for example, careful surveillance of a person like respondent. The question that is presented, however, is whether a reasonable trained law enforcement officer could have concluded that the evidence available to petitioners at the time they arrested respondent constituted probable cause to believe that he had committed the crime of threatening the life of President Reagan. The evidence on which the officers relied to support their conclusion that probable cause existed is summarized in two affidavits which they filed in support of their motion for summary judgment. That evidence includes three relevant components: (1) a rambling, confusing letter written by respondent contained statements indicating that a "Mr Image" intended to assassinate the President while he was in Germany; (2) the officers "believed that the use of the term Mr. Image may have been a pseudonym for [respondent] Bryant and that Bryant was writing in the third person," App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a, 54a; and (3) when respondent delivered a copy of the letter to Veronica Tincher in the budget office of the University of Southern California, he "said something about `across the throat,' while simultaneously moving his hand horizontally across his throat to simulate a cutting action," at 43a. The affidavits explained that in addition to the above facts, the affiants were "concerned that Bryant might pose a threat to the President's well-being." at 48a, 54a. It is also noteworthy that when the officers visited Bryant in his apartment, he allowed them to enter and voluntarily consented to a search for weapons in plain view, and then to a second search of the entire residence. That search resulted in nothing more than the discovery of the original of the letter. *231 The letter is the key piece of evidence supposedly justifying a finding that the officers reasonably believed that Bryant had threatened the life of the President. Bryant freely admitted to writing the letter, and the letter does refer to, among other things, a scheme to assassinate President Reagan. The letter does not, however, state that it is Bryant who intends to assassinate the President. Rather, |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | dissenting | Hunter v. Bryant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112671/hunter-v-bryant/ | it is Bryant who intends to assassinate the President. Rather, the letter warns that "Mr Image" intends to harm the President. Nor does the letter leave the identity of "Mr Image" in doubt. In its first sentence, the letter identifies the term parenthetically: "Mr `Image' (Communist white men within the `National Council of Churches).' " The letter then proceeds to explain the derivation of the term: "The name `Image to the Beast' is a biblical name given to and identify [sic] the National Council of Churches as a body though the NCC is composed largely of women, it is men who really control it. So it is appropriate to respectfully address the NCC as Mr IMAGE!" A postscript to the letter further specifies the Biblical origin of the term and its identification with the National Council of Churches: "Mr Image ¬(NCC) is scard [sic] to death over the possibility [sic] of being exposed by the prophecy of Rev. 13:11-17 & Rev. 14:9 11."[1] at 727. At other places in the letter, as well, "Mr Image" is identified with the National Council of Churches through parenthetical references. Bryant's letter advances a conspiracy theory accusing the National Council of Churches of spreading communism and *232 scheming to assassinate the President.[2] Such a theory is of course absurd, but this absurdity does not mean that Bryant was threatening to harm the President. A vast gap separates the conclusion that a letter warning of an assassination threat is preposterous or delusional and the conclusion that the letter, itself, constitutes a threat by the author. Even if a delusional warning may serve to identify the author as mentally unstable and justify appropriate surveillance of his activities, such legitimate concern does not transform a delusional warning into a threat. As I suggested at the outset, the confusing set of facts may well have justified a trained officer in coming to the conclusion that a mentally unstable person might pose a threat to the President's well-being. No matter how reasonable such an officer's belief may have been, that kind of suspicion is not a substitute for a reasonable determination that the evidence established probable cause to arrest. *233 The District Court denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity because it decided that further fact finding was necessary. On such a motion, the court was of course required to resolve any disputed question of fact against the moving parties. In my opinion the Court of Appeals correctly stated the governing standards when it wrote: "Qualified immunity is an affirmative |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | dissenting | Hunter v. Bryant | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112671/hunter-v-bryant/ | governing standards when it wrote: "Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which the government official bears the burden of proof. ], Be- As with all summary judgment motions, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to Bryant as the nonmoving party; to prevail on their motion for summary judgment, the defendants must show that they were reasonable in their belief that they had probable cause. Bryant, however, bears the burden of proving that the right which the defendants allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of their conduct. ". In order for a secret service agent reasonably to have believed he had cause to arrest Bryant, the agent must have been reasonable in his belief that Bryant's words and the context in which he delivered them were a serious threat against the president. ]. "Whether a reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause is a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment or a directed verdict in a 1983 action based on lack of probable cause is proper only if there is only one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach. Because qualified immunity protects government officials from suit as well as from *234 liability, it is essential that qualified immunity claims be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Mitchell [v. Forsyth, ]. This necessarily expands the fact finding role that must be played by the district court judge. In some cases, district courts will be able to establish entitlement to qualified immunity before trial and, sometimes, even before discovery. In some cases, however, further development of the record will be necessary. In this case it was proper for the court to require further development of the facts to determine whether the secret service reasonably could have interpreted the letter as violating 871." -721. Like Justice Scalia, I am satisfied that the Court of Appeals applied the correct legal standard when it affirmed the District Court's refusal to grant summary judgment in favor of petitioners. When the Court of Appeals opinion is read in its entirety, that conclusion is inescapable. Unlike Justice Scalia, however, I am also satisfied that when the proper legal standards are applied to this record, with the evidence examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, petitioners have not yet established that a reasonable officer could have concluded that he had sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause at the time of respondent's arrest. I also think it unwise for this Court, on the basis of its de novo review of a |
Justice Stevens | 1,986 | 16 | second_dissenting | Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111596/pacific-gas-elec-co-v-public-util-commn-of-cal/ | Because the plurality opinion is largely concerned with questions that need not be answered in order to decide this case,[1] I believe it is important to identify the actual issue with some care. The narrow question we must address is whether a state public utility commission may require the fundraising solicitation of a consumer advocacy group to be carried in a utility billing envelope. Since the utility concedes that it has no right to use the extra space in the billing envelope for its own newsletter, the question is limited to whether the Commission's requirement that it be the courier *36 for the message of a third party violates the First Amendment. In my view, this requirement differs little from regulations applied daily to a variety of commercial communications that have rarely been challenged and to my knowledge never invalidated on First Amendment grounds. I As the California Public Utilities Commission summarized its own ruling: "[T]his decision grants, in modified form, the complaint of Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) proposing access to the extra space in Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) billing envelope by consumer representative organizations for the purpose of soliciting funds to be used for residential ratepayer representation in proceedings of this Commission involving PG&E." App. to Juris. Statement A-1. Accord, at A-4.[2] The Commission did not select among competing advocacy groups yearning to reach residential ratepayers through the billing envelope; "no other ratepayer organizations sought access to the extra space." at A-24. In my view the propagandizing and sloganeering feared by the plurality is not authorized by paragraph 5(b) of the Commission's order, which provides that "PG&E and TURN shall each determine the content of [its] own material." at A-32. In context, it is clear that the limited editorial license afforded by that provision is confined to "a billing envelope extra space insert which (1) explains the program, (2) *37 sets forth a list of pending and anticipated PG&E applications and other cases likely to have a significant effect on customers' rates and services, and (3) invites voluntary donations to support advocacy by [TURN] on behalf of PG&E's residential customers before the Commission. The insert would also include a return envelope for mailing donations to a central collection point for transmittal to [TURN]." at A-4, A-5. It is unrealistic to suppose that the Commission, after adopting a program so detailed as to prescribe the subject matter of the communication and even to require return envelopes, can be thought to have sanctioned the freewheeling political debate the plurality opinion presupposes. Far from creating the postal |
Justice Stevens | 1,986 | 16 | second_dissenting | Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111596/pacific-gas-elec-co-v-public-util-commn-of-cal/ | debate the plurality opinion presupposes. Far from creating the postal equivalent of the soapbox in the park, the Commission "order[ed] that proposal 3" of the "Consumer Advocacy Checkoff" alternatives listed in TURN's complaint "be implemented." at A-17. Accord, at A-31. That proposal, in marked contrast to the typically broad prayers for relief found in most complaints, limited the requested insert to the three matters described above, see at A-78, and even provided a full illustrative insert as an exhibit, see at A-85, A-86. Simply as a matter of construing a decision by a regulatory agency I find it difficult to understand the plurality's preference for discussing issues in their most abstract form. And as a matter of constitutional law there is surely no warrant for presuming that the Commission acted indiscriminately, insensitively, and without regard to the First Amendment questions raised by its access requirement. If any presumption is invoked, it should be that in favor of the regularity and constitutionality of governmental action, and the Commission's order should be construed narrowly as a consequence. II I assume that the plurality would not object to a utility commission rule dictating the format of the bill, even as to required warnings and the type size of various provisos and *38 disclaimers.[3] Such regulation is not too different from that applicable to credit card bills, loan forms, and media advertising. See, e. g., 15 U.S. C. 1632(a), 1663; 12 CFR 226.6-226.8, 226.10 (1985).[4] I assume also the plurality would permit the Commission to require the utility to disseminate legal notices of public hearings and ratemaking proceedings written by it. See ante, at 15-16, n. 12 (attempting to distinguish legal notices).[5] These compelled statements *39 differ little from mandating disclosure of information in the bill itself, as the plurality recognizes.[6] Given that the Commission can require the utility to make certain statements and to carry the Commission's own messages to its customers, it seems but a small step to acknowledge that the Commission can also require the utility to act as the conduit for a public interest group's message that bears a close relationship to the purpose of the billing envelope.[7] An analog to this requirement appears in securities law: the Securities and Exchange Commission requires the incumbent board of directors to transmit proposals of dissident shareholders which it opposes.[8] Presumably the plurality does not doubt the constitutionality of the SEC's requirement *40 under the First Amendment, and yet although the analogy is far from perfect it performs the same function as the Commission's rule by making accessible the relevant audience, |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | Seven enlisted members of the United States Navy brought this class action in the District Court for the District of Columbia under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. 1346 (a) (2), alleging that their agreements to extend their enlistments, made at various times from 1968 to 1970, entitled each of them to payment of a re-enlistment bonus. The District Court ordered that the bonuses be paid, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 17 U. S. App. D. C. 32, We granted certiorari, We affirm. I From early in our history, Congress has provided by statute for payment of a re-enlistment bonus to members of the Armed Services who re-enlisted upon expiration of their term of service, or who agreed to extend their period of service before its expiration.[1] Prior to the enactment of Stat. 47 (196), this bonus was determined for an enlistee's first re-enlistment or extension of enlistment by multiplying his monthly pay at the time of expiration of the initial period *866 of service by the number of years specified in the re-enlistment agreement. See former 37 U.S. C. 308 (a), (b). The perceived defect of this system was that "it failed to vary the monetary incentive for reenlistment according to the needs of the armed services for personnel with particular skills." 17 U. S. App. D. C., at Consequently, Congress enacted former 37 U.S. C. 308 (g), which authorized the services to provide, in addition to the Regular Re-enlistment Bonus (RRB) just described, a Variable Re-enlistment Bonus (VRB) to members of the Armed Services whose particular skills were in short supply. The VRB was to be a multiple, no greater than four, of the RRB.[2] This program was in effect when respondent Nicholas J. Larionoff enlisted in the Navy for four years on June 23, *867 1969.[3] Shortly after his enlistment, Larionoff chose to participate in a Navy training program, completion of which would qualify him for the service rating "Communications TechnicianMaintenance" (CTM). At that time, as Larionoff was aware,[4] the CTM rating was classified by Navy regulations as a "critical military skill," whose holders were eligible upon re-enlistment or extension of enlistment for payment of a VRB in the amount of four times the RRB, the highest allowable rate. Before entering the training program, which entailed a six-year service obligation, Larionoff entered a written agreement to extend his enlistment "in consideration of the pay, allowances, and benefits which will accrue to me during the continuance of my service." Larionoff successfully completed the program and was advanced to the CTM rating, |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | completed the program and was advanced to the CTM rating, expecting to receive a VRB upon entering the period of his extended enlistment on June 23,[] *868 On March 24, 1972, however, the Navy announced that effective July 1, 1972, the CTM rating would no longer be considered a "critical military skill" eligible for a VRB. When Larionoff, through his congressional representatives, inquired into his continued eligibility for a VRB, he was informed that since the CTM rating was no longer listed, he would not receive the expected bonus. Accordingly, in March respondents filed this lawsuit, and in September of that year the District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for respondents, ordering payment of the disputed VRB's. While the Government's appeal of this order was pending in the Court of Appeals, Congress repealed the statutes authorizing both the RRB and the VRB, and substituted a new Selective Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB), effective June 1, 1974. Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974, 37 U.S. C. 308 (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Government concedes that this action had no effect on six of the named respondents; like Larionoff, they were scheduled to begin serving their extended enlistments prior to the effective date of the Act, and therefore should have received their VRB's, if at all, while the program was still in effect.[6] Respondent Johnnie S. Johnson, however, first enlisted in the Navy in August 1970, and did not begin serving his extended enlistment until August 1974. The Court of Appeals was thus confronted with two questions: (1) whether Larionoff and those in his position were entitled to receive VRB's despite the Navy's elimination of their rating from the eligible list in the period after their agreement to extend their enlistments but before they began serving those extensions; and (2) whether Johnson and others in his situation were entitled to receive VRB's despite the repeal of the VRB program in the same *869 period. The Court of Appeals held that both were entitled to receive VRB's. II A Both the Government and respondents recognize that "[a] soldier's entitlement to pay is dependent upon statutory right," and that accordingly the rights of the affected service members must be determined by reference to the statutes and regulations governing the VRB, rather than to ordinary contract principles.[7] In this case, the relevant statute, former 37 U.S. C. 308 (g), provided: "Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, a member who is designated as having a critical military skill and who is entitled to [an RRB] upon his first |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | and who is entitled to [an RRB] upon his first reenlistment may be paid an additional amount not more than four times the amount of [the RRB]." The regulations governing individual eligibility were set forth in Department of Defense Instruction 1304.1, ¶ V.B.1 (Sept. 3, 1970).[8] *870 The Government contends that these eligibility criteria are to be applied as of the time the enlisted member completes service of his original enlistment and enters into the extended *871 enlistment. This is a reasonable construction, since the statute requires that the VRB not be paid until that time. See n. At that time, it is argued, respondents did not satisfy two related criteria prescribed by ¶ V.B.1, although it is conceded they met the others. First, they were not then "serving in a military specialty designated" as a critical military skill, ¶ V.B.1.a, since the CTM rating was by that time no longer so designated; second, they had not "[a]ttain[ed] eligibility prior to the effective date of termination of awards" for the CTM rating. ¶ V.B.1.f. The Government also relies upon the regulations governing the amount of the award to be received. Under Department of Defense Directive ¶ IV.F (Sept. 3, 1970): "When a military skill is designated for reduction or termination of award an effective date for reduction or termination of awards shall be established and announced to the field at least 90 days in advance. All awards on or after that effective date in military skills designated for reduction of award level will be at the level effective that date and no new awards will be made on or after the effective date in military skills designated for termination of awards."[9] (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Department of Defense Instruction 1304.1, ¶ VI.A, stated: "Members serving in a military specialty designated for reduction or termination of award under the provisions of subsection IV.F. of [Directive will receive the award level effective on the date of their reenlistment or extension of enlistment, except as provided in paragraph V.B.1.f. above."[10] *872 The Government argues that these regulations, read together, establish that respondents were entitled to receive only the VRB in effect for their service rating at the time the period of their original enlistment ended, and the extended enlistment began. These regulations, as the Court of Appeals pointed out and the Government freely concedes, contain a number of ambiguities. See 17 U. S. App. D. C., at 33 F.2d, at 117-1177. We need not tarry, however, over the various ambiguous terms and complex interrelations of the regulations. In construing administrative regulations, "the ultimate criterion |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | of the regulations. In construing administrative regulations, "the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 32 U.S. 410, (194). See also 39 U.S. 62 The Government represents, and respondents do not seriously dispute, that throughout the period in which the VRB program was in effect, the Navy interpreted the Department of Defense regulations as entitling an enlisted member who extends his enlistment to the VRB level, if any, in effect at the time he began to serve the extended enlistment.[11] Since this interpretation *873 is not plainly inconsistent with the wording of the regulations, we accept the Government's reading of those regulations as correct. B This, however, does not end our inquiry. For regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated.[12] We are persuaded that insofar as they required that the amount of the VRB to be awarded to a service member who extended his enlistment was to be determined by reference to the award level in effect at the time he began to serve the extension, rather than at the time he agreed to it, the relevant regulations were contrary to the manifest purposes of Congress in enacting the VRB program, and hence invalid.[13] The legislative history of the VRB statute makes those congressional purposes crystal clear. As noted above, the re-enlistment bonus scheme in effect before 196, which relied entirely on the RRB, was criticized for providing the same re-enlistment incentive to all members of the Armed Services, regardless of the need for their skills. The Defense Department desired greater flexibility in calibrating re-enlistment incentives to its manpower needs. The additional expenditures *874 for the VRB were expected to save money in the long run, since payment of the higher re-enlistment bonus would enable the Armed Forces to retain highly skilled individuals whose training had required a considerable investment.[14] Members of Congress in the floor debates clearly recognized the wisdom of offering such incentives.[1] The VRB was thus intended to induce selected service members to extend their period of service beyond their original enlistment. Of course, the general pay raise for the military included in the same Act was also intended to have a similar effect, by making a military career generally more attractive.[16] But the VRB was expected to be a very specific sort of incentive, not only because it was aimed at a selected group of particularly desirable service members, but also because it offered an incentive "at just the time that it |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | it offered an incentive "at just the time that it will be most effective, when an individual decides whether or not to reenlist." Remarks of Rep. 111 Cong. Rec. 17201 (196). The then Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, made the same point to the House Armed Services Committee, in contrasting the VRB to "proficiency pay," which provides increased pay to service members with critical skills: "We believe a more efficient way to provide additional reenlistment incentives to selected first termers in especially high demand is by using a variable reenlistment bonus. Monetary rewards are thereby concentrated at the first reenlistment decision point, obtaining the greatest return per dollar spent on the retention of personnel." Hearings on Military Pay Bills before the House Committee *87 on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (June 7, 196) (House Hearings). (Emphasis added.) The then Assistant Secretary of Defense, Norman S. Paul, also distinguished the VRB from ordinary pay, stating that with the VRB the military hoped "to cure a separate specific problem by specific means, rather than overall pay." Hearings on Military Pay Increase before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (July 29, 196) (Senate Hearings). The timing of the VRB was crucial to this intention: "At the end of his first term of reenlistment [sic] he is trying to make up his mind whether to stay in the military. And we think that the added bonus may push him over the line into staying with us, which is what we want to see happening."[17] It is true that in discussing the VRB, Congress focused on the service member who reaches the end of his enlistment, and is faced with the decision "whether or not to reenlist." (Emphasis added.) Remarks of Rep. But, as Congress has recognized in providing that "[a] member of the [Armed Forces] who extends his enlistment is entitled to the same pay and allowances as though he had reenlisted," 37 U.S. C. 906, precisely the same reasoning applies to the decision to extend enlistment as to the decision to re-enlist. In either case, the VRB could only be effective as a selective incentive to extension of service if at the time he made his *876 decision the service member could count on receiving it if he elected to remain in the service. This is very apparent when the VRB program is examined from the perspective of an individual who is at the point of deciding whether or not to extend an enlistment due to expire at some future date. At the time he |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | to expire at some future date. At the time he makes this decision, he is aware that his rating or expected rating is classified as a critical military skill eligible for a VRB at a particular level. Under the plan as envisioned by Congress, and as applied by the Navy in the case of re-enlistments, the incentive operates "at just the time it will be most effective," because the service member knows that if he remains in the service, he will receive a VRB at the prescribed level. But under the contested regulations, the service member has no such reassurance. Whether or not his rating is eligible for a VRB now, it may not be at the future date on which his first enlistment expires.[18] His "incentive" to extend his enlistment is the purely hypothetical possibility that he might receive a VRB if there is a personnel shortage in his skill on that date. On the other hand, if he nevertheless extends his enlistment, and if the VRB level for his rating is increased in the interval before his original term expires, he will receive a higher award than that which sufficed to induce his decision to remain in the servicefrom the standpoint of Congress' purposes, a totally gratuitous award.[19] *877 The clear intention of Congress to enact a program that "concentrates monetary incentives at the first reenlistment decision point where the greatest returns per retention dollar can be expected," Senate Hearings 26 (statement of Asst. Secy. Paul), could only be effectuated if the enlisted member at the decision point had some certainty about the incentive being offered. Instead, the challenged regulations provided for a virtual lottery.[20] We therefore hold that insofar as the Defense Department regulations required that the amount of the VRB to be paid to a service member who was otherwise eligible to receive one be determined by the award level as of the time he began to serve his extended enlistment, they are in clear conflict with the congressional intention in enacting the VRB program, and hence invalid. Because Congress intended to provide at the re-enlistment decision point a promise of a reasonably certain and specific bonus for extending service in the Armed Forces, Larionoff and the members of his class are entitled, as the Court of Appeals held, to payment of VRB's determined according to the award levels in effect at the time they agreed to extend their enlistments. *878 III This brings us to the further question of respondent Johnson's entitlement to a VRB. At the time he agreed to extend his enlistment, the |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | At the time he agreed to extend his enlistment, the VRB program was in effect, and his CTM rating was classified as a critical military skill. Before he began serving the extended enlistment period, however, Congress repealed the RRB and VRB system, and substituted the new SRB. 37 U.S. C. 308 (1970 ed., Supp. V). The Government contends that since the VRB had been abolished before Johnson became eligible to receive one, he is not entitled to receive a bonus. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument.[21] What we have said above as to Larionoff goes far toward answering this question. The intention of Congress in enacting the VRB was specifically to promise to those who *879 extended their enlistments that a VRB award would be paid to them at the expiration of their original enlistment in return for their commitment to lengthen their period of service.[22] When Johnson made that commitment, by entering an agreement to extend his enlistment, he, like Larionoff, became entitled to receive at some future date a VRB at the award level then in effect (provided that he met the other eligibility criteria). Thus, unless Congress intended, in repealing the VRB program in 1974, to divest Johnson of the rights he had already earned, and constitutionally could do so, the prospective repeal of the program could not affect his right to receive a VRB, even though the date on which the bonus was to be paid had not yet arrived. Of course, if Congress had such an intent, serious constitutional questions would be presented. No one disputes that Congress may prospectively reduce the pay of members of the Armed Forces, even if that reduction deprived members of benefits they had expected to be able to earn. Cf. ; United 310 U.S. 4 It is quite a different matter, however, for Congress to deprive a service member of pay due for services already performed, but still owing. In that case, the congressional action would appear in a different constitutional light. Cf. 292 U.S. 71 ; (193). In view of these problems, we would not lightly conclude, in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, that in amending 37 U.S. C. 308 and establishing a new bonus system, Congress intended to affect the rights of those service members who had extended their enlistments and become entitled to receive VRB's. Nothing in the language of the 1974 Act or its legislative history expresses such an intention. The Act makes no reference *880 whatever to service members who have become entitled to payment of a VRB by |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | majority | United States v. Larionoff | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109685/united-states-v-larionoff/ | who have become entitled to payment of a VRB by extending their enlistments. There is no prohibition of further payments of VRB's to those already entitled to them;[23] the Act simply replaces the old 308 with a new one that authorizes SRB's rather than RRB's and VRB's. Nor does the legislative history express any intention to effect such a prohibition. No paramount power of the Congress or important national interest justifying interference with contractual entitlements is invoked. The Courts of Appeals that have upheld the Government's position have relied on two indications of a congressional intent to affect the rights of Johnson and his class. First, the 1974 Act expressly preserves the right of all service members on active duty as of the effective date of the Act to receive upon re-enlistment the RRB's they would have been entitled to before passage of the Act. Pub. L. No. 93-277, 3,[24] 88 *. The failure to include a similar saving clause as to VRB's, it is argued, indicates that Congress intended to abolish them entirely. But the saving clause for RRB's does not merely preserve them for those who had already extended their enlistments, but assures RRB's upon re-enlistment to any service member then on active duty. The failure to enact a similar provision as to VRB's indicates only that Congress did not intend that VRB's be paid to those service members who re-enlisted after the effective date of the Act, and has no bearing on those who had already extended their enlistments and become entitled to VRB's. Second, reference is made to a portion of the Conference Report on the Act, indicating a congressional "understanding" that service members, like Johnson, who had already entered two-year extensions of enlistment could become eligible for an SRB by canceling the extension and replacing it with a four-year extension. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-98, pp. 4- (1974).[2] This, it is argued, indicates that Congress had *882 considered the possible unfairness that eliminating the VRB could work on members such as Johnson, and felt that it had made sufficient provision for them by making them eligible, upon a further extension of their commitment, for an SRB. But the Report does not refer to the possible unfairness of eliminating the VRB payable to those service members with whom it deals; rather, it refers to the Navy's concern that language in the legislative history might cast doubt on a commitment the Navy had made "to a man with a four-year enlistment and a two-year extension that he can cancel the two-year extension and reenlist for four |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | This case concerns California’s time limitation on appli cations for postconviction (habeas corpus) relief. The question presented: Does California’s timeliness require ment qualify as an independent state ground adequate to bar habeas corpus relief in federal court? California does not employ fixed statutory deadlines to determine the timeliness of a state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus. Instead, California directs petitioners to file known claims “as promptly as the circumstances al low.” In re 38, n. (1993). Petitioners are further instructed to state when they first learned of the asserted claims and to explain why they did not seek postconviction relief sooner. In re 31– Claims substantially delayed without justifi cation may be denied as untimely. ; Cal. 4th, at n. California courts signal that a habeas petition is denied as untimely by citing the controlling decisions, i.e., and A spare order denying a petition without 2 WALKER v. MARTIN Opinion of the Court explanation or citation ordinarily ranks as a disposition on the merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. ; see Harrington v. Richter, ante, at 9–10. California courts may elect to pretermit the question whether a petition is timely and simply deny the petition, thereby signaling that the petition lacks merit. Petitioner below, respondent here, Charles W. Martin, presented the claims at issue—all alleging ineffective assistance of counsel—in a habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court nearly five years after his con viction became final. He stated no reason for the long delay. Citing and the court denied Mar tin’s petition. In turn, the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Martin’s federal habeas petition raising the same ineffective assistance claims. Denial of Martin’s state-court petition as un timely, the District Court held, rested on an adequate and independent state ground, i.e., Martin’s failure to seek relief in state court “without substantial delay.” See 99 P.2d, 22. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re versed the District Court’s decision. Contrasting the precision of “fixed statutory deadlines” with California’s proscription of “substantial delay,” the appeals court held that California’s standard lacked the clarity and certainty necessary to constitute an adequate state bar. 3 Fed. Appx. 93, 94 ). In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 8 U. S. this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had dis cretion to reach the merits despite the default. Guided by that decision, we hold that California is not put to the choice of imposing a |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | California is not put to the choice of imposing a specific deadline for habeas petitions (which would almost certainly rule out Martin’s nearly five-year delay) or preserving the flexibility of current Cite as: 62 U. S. (2011) 3 Opinion of the Court practice, “but only at the cost of undermining the finality of state court judgments.” at (slip op., at ). In so ruling, we stress that Martin has not alleged that Califor nia’s time bar, either by design or in operation, discrimi nates against federal claims or claits. I A While most States set determinate time limits for collat eral relief applications, in California, neither statute nor rule of court does so. Instead, California courts “appl[y] a general ‘reasonableness’ standard” to judge whether a habeas petition is timely filed. Carey v. 36 U.S. 214, 222 The basic instruction provided by the California Supreme Court is simply that “a [habeas] peti tion should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow” Cal. 4th, at 8 P.2d, at 38, n. Three leading decisions describe California’s timeliness requirement: and In re 18 Cal. 4th 82, 99 P.2d 290 A prisoner must seek ha beas relief without “substantial delay,” 18 Cal. 4th, at 99 P.2d, 1; 99 P.2d, at 296; Cal. 4th, at 83, 8 P. 2d, at 0, as “measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the informa tion offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” 99 P.2d, 22. Petitioners in noncapital cases have “the burden of estab lishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness.” at 99 P.2d, 1.1 —————— 1A petition for habeas relief in a capital case is “presumed to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed within 180 days after the final due date for the filing of [an] appellant’s reply brief on the direct appeal” California Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From 4 WALKER v. MARTIN Opinion of the Court California’s collateral review regime differs from that of other States in a second notable respect: All California courts “have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus pro ceedings,” Cal. Const., Art. VI, thus “no appeal lies from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus,” Cal. 4th, at 6, n. 8 P.2d, at 40, n. “[A] prisoner whose petition has been denied by the superior court can obtain review of his claims only by the filing of a new petition in the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | only by the filing of a new petition in the Court of Appeal.” The new petition, however, must be confined to claims raised in the initial petition. See In re Martinez, 46 Cal. 4th 94, 96, 91 Because a habeas petitioner may skip over the lower courts and file directly in the California Supreme Court, In re Kler, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 889, 891–892 that court rules on a staggering number of habeas petitions each year.2 The court issues generally unelaborated “summary denials” of petitions that “d[o] not state a prima facie case for relief” or that contain “claims [that] are all procedurally barred.” People v. Romero, 8 Cal. 4th 28, 3, (internal quotation marks omitted). A summary denial citing and means that the petition is re jected as untimely. See, e.g., Brief for Habeas Corpus Resource Center as Amicus Curiae 20, and n. 23. Califor nia courts have discretion, however, to bypass a timeliness issue and, instead, summarily reject the petition for want —————— Judgments of Death, Policy 3, Standard 1–1.1 2 In fiscal year 2008–, the California Supreme Court issued dis positions in 3,28 original habeas actions. Judicial Council of Califor nia, 2010 Court Statistics Report, Statewide Caseload Trends, 1999– 2000 Through 2008–, p. 6, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/ documents/csr2010.pdf (as visited Feb. 1, 2011, and in Clerk of Court’s case file). During a similar time period, a total of 2,210 habeas cases were on this Court’s docket. See October Term 2008 Filings by Case Type (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Cite as: 62 U. S. (2011) Opinion of the Court of merit. See 18 Cal. 4th, at 8, n. 1, 99 P.2d, 16, n. 1. See also 36 U.S., at 22–226. B In December 1986, Charles Martin participated in a robbery and murder in California. Martin fled the State, but eight years later he was extradited to California to stand trial. Convicted in state court of murder and rob bery, Martin was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 199, the California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Martin initiated his first round of state habeas proceed ings in and the next year, the California Supreme Court denied his petition. He then filed a habeas petition in the appropriate U. S. District Court. Finding that Martin’s federal petition included ineffective-assistance-of counsel claims he had not aired in state court, the District Court stayed the federal proceedings pending Martin’s return to state court to exhaust his remedies there.3 In March 2002, Martin filed his second habeas |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | remedies there.3 In March 2002, Martin filed his second habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, raising the federal in effective assistance claims his earlier filing omitted. He gave no reason for his failure to assert the additional claims until nearly five years after his sentence and con viction became final. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, 39. In Septem ber 2002, the California Supreme Court denied Martin’s petition in an order typical of that court’s summary dispo sitions for failure to file “as promptly as the circumstances —————— 3 Rather than dismiss a petition containing both exhausted and un exhausted claims, “a district court might stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his previously unexhausted claims. Once the petitioner exhausts his state remedies, the district court will lift the stay and allow the petitioner to proceed in federal court.” 44 U.S. 269, 2–26 (200). 6 WALKER v. MARTIN Opinion of the Court allow.” Cal. 4th, at n. The order read in its entirety: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. (See In re (1993) Cal. 4th 0, In re).” See App. to Pet. for Cert. 60. Having exhausted state postconviction remedies, Martin returned to federal court and filed an amended petition. Based upon the California Supreme Court’s time-bar disposition, the District Court dismissed Martin’s belat edly asserted claims as procedurally precluded. at 2, The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal order and reded the case, directing the District Court to deter mine the “adequacy” of the State’s time bar. Martin v. Hubbard, The District Court again rejected Martin’s petition, stating that “[t]he California timeliness bar as set forth in / is clearly defined, well established and consistently ap plied.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4. The Ninth Circuit again disagreed. Controlled by its prior decision in 62 F.3d, at 120–1208, the Court of Appeals held that California’s time bar “has yet to be firmly defined” and was not shown by the State to be “consistently applied.” 3 Fed. Appx., at 94. The re d order directed the District Court to determine the merits of the claims Martin asserted in his second petition to the California Supreme Court. We granted certiorari, 61 U. S. to determine the “adequacy” of California’s practice under which a prisoner may be barred from collaterally attacking his conviction when he has “substantially delayed” filing his habeas petition. Martin does not here dispute that the time limitation is an “independent” state ground. See Brief in Opposition –6. See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 3, 82–83 (CA9 |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 3, 82–83 (CA9 2003). Nor does he contend that he established “cause” and “prejudice,” i.e., cause for the delay in asserting his claims and actual prejudice result Cite as: 62 U. S. (2011) Opinion of the Court ing from the State’s alleged violation of his constitutional rights. See 433 U.S. 2, 8–91 (19). II A “A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’ ” Kind ler, 8 U. S., at (slip op., at 1) ). The state-law ground may be a substantive rule dispositive of the case, or a procedural barrier to adjudication of the claim on the merits. See –82, 90. Ordinarily, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must first “exhaus[t] the remedies available in the courts of the State,” 28 U.S. C. §224(b)(1)(A), thereby affording those courts “the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of [the] prisoner’s federal rights,” Cole 01 U.S., 1. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine furthers that objective, for without it, “habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaus tion requirement by defaulting their federal claims in state court.” 2. Accordingly, absent showings of “cause” and “prejudice,” see –8, federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) “a state court [has] declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,” and (2) “the state judgment rests on inde pendent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Cole 01 U.S., at 29–30. B To qualify as an “adequate” procedural ground, a state rule must be “firmly established and regularly followed. ” 8 WALKER v. MARTIN Opinion of the Court Kindler, 8 U. S., at (slip op., at ) (internal quotation marks omitted).4 “[A] discretionary state procedural rule,” we held in Kindler, “can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review.” A “rule can be ‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed,’ ” Kindler observed, “even if the appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not others.” California’s time rule, although discretionary, meets the “firmly established” criterion, as Kindler comprehended that requirement. The California Supreme Court, as earlier noted, framed the timeliness requirement for ha beas petitioners in a trilogy of cases. See Those decisions instruct habeas petitioners to “alleg[e] with specificity” the absence of substantial delay, good cause for delay, or eligibility for one of four |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | good cause for delay, or eligibility for one of four exceptions to the time bar. 99 P. 2d, at 299; see 18 Cal. 4th, at 99 P. 2d, 1. —————— 4 Wehave also recognized a “limited category” of “exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.” Lee v. Kemna, 34 U.S. 362, 36 In Lee, for example, the defendant unsuccessfully moved for a continuance when, for reasons unknown to him, his alibi witnesses left the courthouse the day they were scheduled to testify. This Court held inadequate to bar federal review a state court’s persnickety application of a rule detailing formal requirements for continuance motions. The defendant had substantially complied with the rule’s key requirement and flawless compliance would have been unavailing given the trial court’s reason for denying the motion. See 81–382. Martin does not suggest that the application of California’s timeliness rule in his case falls within the exceptional category Lee described and illustrated. See Brief for Respondent 28, 29, 4. An untimely petition “will be entertained on the merits if the peti tioner demonstrates (i) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reason able judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (ii) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which he or she was convicted; (iii) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing Cite as: 62 U. S. (2011) 9 Opinion of the Court And California’s case law made it altogether plain that Martin’s delay of nearly five years ranked as “substantial.” See –831, 838, and n. 13, 99 P.2d, at 293–294, 299, and n. 13 (delay of four years barred claim); In re Tsaturyan, No. B16012, 2002 WL 161410, *3 (delay of 16 months barred claim). See also In re Miller, No. B18644, WL 198038, *2–3 (delay of two years and six months barred claim). Martin nevertheless urges that California’s rule is too vague to be regarded as “firmly established.” “[R]eason able time” period and “substantial delay,” he maintains, are “meaningless terms.” Brief for Respondent 48 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. Indetermi nate language is typical of discretionary rules. Applica tion of those rules in particular circumstances, however, can supply the requisite clarity. Congressional statutes and this Court’s decisions, we note, have employed time limitations that are not stated in precise, numerical terms. Former Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a), for example, set no fixed time limit on submission of |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | for example, set no fixed time limit on submission of habeas petitions. The Rule permitted dis missal of a state prisoner’s petition when it appeared that delay in commencing litigation “prejudiced [the State] in its ability to respond.” 28 U.S. C. §224 Rule 9(a) ( ed.). To stave off dismissal, the petitioner had to show that he could not earlier have known, “by the exercise of reasonable diligence,” the grounds on which he based the petition. In 44 U.S. 269 (200), we instructed district courts, when employing stay and abeyance procedure, see at n. 3, to “place reason —————— authority that had such a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner before it that, absent the trial error or omission, no reasonable judge or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; or (iv) that the petitioner was convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute.” In re 18 Cal. 4th 0, –81, 10 WALKER v. MARTIN Opinion of the Court able time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” 44 U.S., at 28. Current federal habeas prescriptions limit the time for filing a petition to one year. The clock runs from “the date on which the [supporting] facts could have been dis covered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S. C. §22(f)(4) ( ed., Supp. III) (applicable to federal prisoners); see ( ed.) (similar provision applicable to state prisoners). “[D]ue diligence,” we have observed, “ is an inexact measure of how much delay is too much.” 44 U.S. 29, 309, n. (200) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “use of an imprecise standard,” we immediately added, “is no justifi cation for depriving [a rule’s] language of any meaning.” “[I]t would seem particularly strange to disregard state procedural rules that are substantially similar to those to which we give full force in our own courts.” Kind- ler, 8 U. S., at (slip op., at 8). Nor is California’s time rule vulnerable on the ground that it is not regularly followed. Each year, the California Supreme Court summarily denies hundreds of habeas petitions by citing and Brief for Appellant in No. 08–12 (CA9), pp. 31–32. On the same day the court denied Martin’s petition, it issued 21 other / summary denials. See Brief for Habeas Corpus Resource Center as Amicus Curiae 20. In rea soned opinions, too, California courts regularly invoke and to determine whether a ha beas petition is time barred.6 Martin argued below that California’s time bar is not regularly followed in this sense: Use of summary denials —————— 6 See, e.g., In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | —————— 6 See, e.g., In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 69, 03, (1999); In re Hamilton, 20 Cal. 4th 23, 283, n. 9 P.2d 600, 60, n. (1999); In re Watson, 40 (offi cially depublished); In re Nunez, 13 Cal. App. 4th 09, 23, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 22 Cite as: 62 U. S. (2011) 11 Opinion of the Court makes it “impossible to tell” why the California Supreme Court “decides some delayed petitions on the merits and rejects others as untimely.” Brief for Appellant in No. 08– 12 (CA9), pp. 3–38. We see no reason to reject Cali fornia’s time bar simply because a court may opt to bypass the / assessment and summarily dismiss a petition on the merits, if that is the easier path. See, e.g., 69 (“[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s perforce was deficient [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffec tiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice”); cf. Ruhrgas 26 U.S. 4, 8 (1999) (“It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”). The Ninth Circuit concluded that California’s time bar is not consistently applied because outcomes under the rule vary from case to case. See 3 Fed. Appx., at 94. For example, in People v. Fairbanks, No. C04810, WL 9026, *2–*3 a one-year delay was found substantial, while in In re Little, No. D04468, (Cal. App., Jan. 16, 2008), a delay of 14 months was determined to be insubstantial. A discretionary rule ought not be disregarded automati cally upon a showing of seeming inconsistencies. Discre —————— Closerinspection may reveal that “seeming ‘inconsistencie[s]’ are not necessarily arbitrar[y] or irrationa[l].” 41, n. 1 Fairbanks and Little are illustrative. In Fairbanks, the court found that petitioner did not act diligently when she waited to withdraw her guilty plea until one year after learning that revocation of her driver’s license was irreversible. WL 9026, *2–*3. In Little, a pro se prisoner claimed that his trial counsel should have raised a posttraumatic stress disorder defense. Although the filing delay was 14 months, the court entertained it on the merits. Given the discrete context in which each case arose, the two decisions present no square conflict. 12 WALKER v. MARTIN Opinion of the Court tion enables a court to home in on case-specific considera tions and to avoid the harsh results that sometimes attend consistent application of an unyielding rule. See 910 F.2d 139, 138 (“Uncertainty is not enough to disqualify a state’s procedural ground as one ‘adequate’ under |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,011 | 5 | majority | Walker v. Martin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205316/walker-v-martin/ | to disqualify a state’s procedural ground as one ‘adequate’ under federal law. If it were, states would be induced to make their rules draconian”). A state ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate when “discretion has been exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial support in prior state law” 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure p. 386 (2d ed. 1996) (hereinafter Wright & Miller); see Prihoda, (state ground “applied infrequently, unexpectedly, or freakishly” may “discriminat[e] against the federal rights asserted” and therefore rank as “inade quate”). Martin does not contend, however, that in his case, the California Supreme Court exercised its discretion in a surprising or unfair ner. “[S]ound procedure often requires discretion to exact or excuse compliance with strict rules,” 16B Wright & Miller p. 403, and we have no cause to discourage stan dards allowing courts to exercise such discretion. As this Court observed in Kindler, if forced to choose between datory rules certain to be found “adequate,” or more supple prescriptions that federal courts may disregard as “inadequate,” “y States [might] opt for datory rules to avoid the high costs that come with plenary fed eral review.” 8 U. S., at (slip op., at ). “Th[at] result would be particularly unfortunate for [habeas peti tioners], who would lose the opportunity to argue that a procedural default should be excused through the exercise of judicial discretion.” at (slip op., at 8).8 —————— 8 See also 16B Wright & Miller pp. 38–386 (“Precisely defined Cite as: 62 U. S. (2011) 13 Opinion of the Court C Today’s decision, trained on California’s timeliness rule for habeas petitions, leaves unaltered this Court’s re peated recognition that federal courts must carefully examine state procedural requirements to ensure that they do not operate to discriminate against claims of federal rights. See Brown v. Western R. Co. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298–299 (1949); 24–2 (1923); 16B Wright & Miller p. 386 (noting “risk that discretionary procedural sanctions may be invoked more harshly against disfavored federal rights, deny[ing] [litigants] a fair opportunity to present federal claims”). See also Kindler, 8 U. S., at (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., ) (a state proce dural ground would be inadequate if the challenger shows a “purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guarantees”). On the record before us, however, there is no basis for concluding that California’s timeliness rule operates to the particular disadvantage of petitioners asserting federal rights. * * * For the reasons stated, we find no inadequacy in Cali fornia’s timeliness rule generally or as |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | The question presented is whether an otherwise generally applicable state property tax violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, 8, cl. 3, because its exemption for property owned by charitable institutions excludes organizations operated principally for the benefit of nonresidents. I Petitioner is a Maine nonprofit corporation that operates a summer camp for the benefit of children of the Christian Science faith. The regimen at the camp includes supervised prayer, meditation, and church services designed to help the children grow spiritually and physically in accordance with the tenets of their religion. App. 40-41. About 95 percent of the campers are not residents of Maine. The camp is located in the town of Harrison (Town); it occupies 180 acres on the shores of a lake about 40 miles northwest of Portland. Brief for Respondents 4, and n. 6. Petitioner's revenues include camper tuition averaging about $400 per week for each student, contributions from private donors, and income from a "modest endowment." App. 42, 51. In recent years, the camp has had an annual operating deficit of approximately $175,000. From 1989 to 11, it paid over $20,000 in real estate and personal property taxes each year.1] at 42-43. *568 The Maine statute at issue, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, 652(1)(A) provides a general exemption from real estate and personal property taxes for "benevolent and charitable institutions incorporated" in the State. With respect to institutions that are "in fact conducted or operated principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine," however, a charity may only qualify for a more limited tax benefit, and then only if the weekly charge for services provided does not exceed $30 per person. 652(1)(A)(1).2] Because most of the campers come from out *569 of State, petitioner could not qualify for a complete exemption.3] And, since the weekly tuition was roughly $400, petitioner was ineligible for any charitable tax exemption at all. In 12 petitioner made a formal request to the Town for a refund of taxes paid from 1989 through 11, and a continuing exemption from future property taxes, based principally on a claim that the tax exemption statute violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.4] The request was denied, and petitioner filed suit in the Superior Court against the Town and its tax assessors and collectors.5] After the *570 parties agreed on the relevant facts, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court ruled for petitioner, explaining that under Maine's statute: "Denial of a tax exemption is explicitly and primarily triggered by engaging in a certain |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | is explicitly and primarily triggered by engaging in a certain level of interstate commerce. This denial makes operation of the institutions serving non-residents more expensive. This increased cost results from an impermissible distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers. See Commonwealth Edison -19. Maine's charitable tax exemption is denied, not because there is a difference between the activities of charitable institutions serving residents and non-residents, but because of the residency of the people whom the institutions serve." App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a15a (footnote omitted). The Town, but not the State, appealed and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed. Noting that a Maine statute6] characterized tax exemptions as "tax expenditures," it viewed the exemption for charitable institutions as the equivalent of a purchase of their services. Because the exemption statute "treats all Maine charities alike"given the fact that "all have the opportunity to qualify for an exemption by choosing to dispense the majority of their charity locally"it "regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce." In the absence of evidence that petitioner's camp "competes with other summer camps outside of or within Maine," or that the statute "impedes interstate travel" or that it "provides services that are necessary for interstate travel," the Court concluded that petitioner had *571 "not met its heavy burden of persuasion that the statute is unconstitutional." We granted certiorari. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse. II During the first years of our history as an independent confederation, the National Government lacked the power to regulate commerce among the States. Because each State was free to adopt measures fostering its own local interests without regard to possible prejudice to nonresidents, what Justice Johnson characterized as a "conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States," ensued. See In his view, this "was the immediate cause that led to the forming of a constitutional] convention." "If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints."7] We have subsequently endorsed Justice Johnson's appraisal of the central importance of federal control over interstate and foreign commerce and, more narrowly, his conclusion that the Commerce Clause had not only granted Congress express authority to override restrictive and conflicting commercial regulations adopted by the States, but that it had immediately effected a curtailment of state power. "In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States. Southern Pacific v. Arizona ex rel. *572 Sullivan, ]; |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | States. Southern Pacific v. Arizona ex rel. *572 Sullivan, ]; ]." Our decisions on this point reflect, "upon fullest consideration, the course of adjudication unbroken through the Nation's history." See H. P. Hood & Sons, Although Congress unquestionably has the power to repudiate or substantially modify that course of adjudication,8] it has not done so. This case involves an issue that we have not previously addressedthe disparate real estate tax treatment of a nonprofit service provider based on the residence of the consumers that it serves. The Town argues that our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is wholly inapplicable to this case, because interstate commerce is not implicated here and Congress has no power to enact a tax on real estate. We first reject these arguments, and then explain why we think our prior cases make it clear that if profit-making enterprises were at issue, Maine could not tax petitioner more heavily than other camp operators simply because its campers come principally from other States. We next address the novel question whether a different rule should apply to a discriminatory tax exemption for charitable and benevolent institutions. Finally, we reject the Town's argument that the exemption should either be viewed as a permissible subsidy or as a purchase of services by the State acting as a "market participant." III We are unpersuaded by the Town's argument that the dormant Commerce Clause is inapplicable here, either because campers are not "articles of commerce" or, more generally, because the camp's "product is delivered and `consumed' entirely within Maine." Brief for Respondents *573 17-18. Even though petitioner's camp does not make a profit, it is unquestionably engaged in commerce, not only as a purchaser, see ; United but as a provider of goods and services. It markets those services, together with an opportunity to enjoy the natural beauty of an inland lake in Maine, to campers who are attracted to its facility from all parts of the Nation. The record reflects that petitioner "advertises for campers in out-of-state] periodicals and sends its Executive Director annually on camper recruiting trips across the country." App. 49-50. Petitioner's efforts are quite successful; 95 percent of its campers come from out of State. The attendance of these campers necessarily generates the transportation of persons across state lines that has long been recognized as a form of "commerce." ; see ; Summer camps are comparable to hotels that offer their guests goods and services that are consumed locally. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, we recognized that interstate commerce is substantially affected by the activities of a hotel that "solicits |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | substantially affected by the activities of a hotel that "solicits patronage from outside the State of Georgia through various national advertising media, including magazines of national circulation." In that case, we held that commerce was substantially affected by private race discrimination that limited access to the hotel and thereby impeded interstate commerce in the form of travel. ; see 514 U. S., at -559. Official discrimination that limits the access of nonresidents to summer camps creates a similar impediment. Even when business activities are purely local, if "`it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.' " Heart of Atlanta, *574 ). Although Heart of Atlanta involved Congress' affirmative Commerce Clause powers, its reasoning is applicable here. As we stated in : "The definition of `commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation." That case in turn rested upon our reasoning in in which we rejected a "two-tiered definition of commerce." "Just as Congress had] power to regulate the interstate movement of the] wastes" at issue in that case, so too we held were States "not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement." -623. See The Town's arguments that the dormant Commerce Clause is inapplicable to petitioner because the campers are not "articles of commerce," or more generally that interstate commerce is not at issue here, are therefore unpersuasive. The services that petitioner provides to its principally out-ofstate campers clearly have a substantial effect on commerce, as do state restrictions on making those services available to nonresidents. Cf. C & A Carbone, The Town argues that the dormant Commerce Clause is inapplicable because a real estate tax is at issue. We disagree. A tax on real estate, like any other tax, may impermissibly burden interstate commerce. We may assume as the Town argues (though the question is not before us) that Congress could not impose a national real estate tax. It does not follow that the States may impose real estate taxes in a manner that discriminates against interstate commerce. A State's "power to lay and collect taxes, comprehensive and necessary as that power is, cannot be exerted in a way which *575 involves a discrimination against interstate] commerce." To allow a State to avoid the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause by the simple device of labeling its discriminatory tax a levy on real estate would destroy the barrier against protectionism that the Constitution provides. We noted |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | the barrier against protectionism that the Constitution provides. We noted in West Creamery, that "t]he paradigmatic law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective import] tariff or customs duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in State." Such tariffs are "so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by a State to enact one." Yet, were the Town's theory adopted, a State could create just such a tariff with ease. The State would need only to pass a statute imposing a special real estate tax on property used to store, process, or sell imported goods. By gearing the increased tax to the value of the imported goods at issue, the State could create the functional equivalent of an import tariff. As this example demonstrates, to accept the Town's theory would have radical and unacceptable results. We therefore turn to the question whether our prior cases preclude a State from imposing a higher tax on a camp that serves principally nonresidents than on one that limits its services primarily to residents. IV There is no question that were this statute targeted at profit-making entities, it would violate the dormant Commerce Clause. "State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are `virtually per se invalid.' " Fulton ). It is not necessary to look beyond the text of this statute to determine that it * discriminates against interstate commerce. The Maine law expressly distinguishes between entities that serve a principally interstate clientele and those that primarily serve an intrastate market, singling out camps that serve mostly instaters for beneficial tax treatment, and penalizing those camps that do a principally interstate business. As a practical matter, the statute encourages affected entities to limit their out-of-state clientele, and penalizes the principally nonresident customers of businesses catering to a primarily interstate market. If such a policy were implemented by a statutory prohibition against providing camp services to nonresidents, the statute would almost certainly be invalid. We have "consistently held that the Commerce Clause precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom." New England Power v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. Our authorities on this point date to the early part of the century.9] Petitioner's "product" is *577 in part the natural beauty of Maine itself and, in addition, the special services that the camp provides. In this way, the Maine statute is like a law that burdens out-of-state access to domestically |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | is like a law that burdens out-of-state access to domestically generated hydroelectric power, New England Power, or to local landfills, In those cases, as in this case, the burden fell on out-of-state access both to a natural resource and to related services provided by state residents.10] Avoiding this sort of "economic Balkanization," and the retaliatory acts of other States that may follow, is one of the central purposes of our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See ibid.; West v. Kansas Natural Gas And, as we noted in Brown-Forman Distillers : "Economic protectionism is not limited to attempts to convey advantages *578 on local merchants; it may include attempts to give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other States."11] By encouraging economic isolationism, prohibitions on out-of-state access to in-state resources serve the very evil that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to prevent. Of course, this case does not involve a total prohibition. Rather, the statute provides a strong incentive for affected entities not to do business with nonresidents if they are able to so avoid the discriminatory tax. In this way, the statute is similar to the North Carolina "intangibles tax" that we struck down in Fulton That case involved the constitutionality under the Commerce Clause of a state "regime that taxed] stock held by in-state shareholders] only to the degree that its issuing corporation participates in interstate commerce." We held the statute facially discriminatory, in part because it tended "to discourage domestic corporations from plying their trades in interstate commerce." Maine's statute has a like effect. To the extent that affected Maine organizations are not deterred by the statute from doing a principally interstate business, it is clear that discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce imposed by regulation or taxation may violate the Commerce Clause. We have held that special fees assessed on nonresidents directly by the State when they attempt to use local services impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Chemical Management, (12) That the tax discrimination comes in the form of a deprivation of a generally available tax benefit, rather than *579 a specific penalty on the activity itself, is of no moment. Thus, in New Energy of the Court invalidated an Ohio statute that provided a tax credit for sales of ethanol produced in State, but not ethanol produced in certain other States; the law "deprived] certain products of generally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in certain other States, and thus on its face appeared] to violate the cardinal requirement of nondiscrimination."12] Given the fact that the burden of Maine's |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | of nondiscrimination."12] Given the fact that the burden of Maine's facially discriminatory tax scheme falls by design in a predictably disproportionate way on outof-staters,13] the pernicious effect on interstate commerce is * the same as in our cases involving taxes targeting out-ofstaters alone. Unlike in Chemical we recognize that here the discriminatory burden is imposed on the out-of-state customer indirectly by means of a tax on the entity transacting business with the non-Maine customer. This distinction makes no analytic difference. As we noted in West Creamery discussing the general phenomenon of import tariffs: "For over 150 years, our cases have rightly concluded that the imposition of a differential burden on any part of the stream of commercefrom wholesaler to retailer to consumeris invalid, because a burden placed at any point will result in a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer." (citing cases). So too here, it matters little that it is the camp that is taxed rather than the campers. The record demonstrates that the economic incidence of the tax falls at least in part on the campers, the Town has not contested the point, and the courts below based their decision on this presumption. App. 49; 655 A.2d, ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a, n. 2.14] With respect to those businesseslike petitioner'sthat continue to engage in a primarily interstate trade, the Maine statute therefore functionally serves as an export tariff that targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the businesses that *581 principally serve them. As our cases make clear, this sort of discrimination is at the very core of activities forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause. "`A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.' " Chemical 504 U. S., at ); see West Creamery, 512 U. S., Ninety-five percent of petitioner's campers come from out of State. Insofar as Maine's discriminatory tax has increased tuition, that burden is felt almost entirely by outof-staters, deterring them from enjoying the benefits of camping in Maine.15] In sum, the Maine statute facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and is all but per se invalid. See, e. g., Oregon -101. We recognize that the Town might have attempted to defend the Maine law under the per se rule by demonstrating that it "`advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.' " (quoting New Energy ). In assessing respondents' arguments, we would have applied our "strictest scrutiny." 441 *. This is an extremely difficult burden, "so heavy that `facial discrimination by itself may be |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | burden, "so heavy that `facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect.' " Oregon 511 U. S., (quoting ); see Chemical Management, 504 U. S., at Perhaps realizing the weight of its burden, the Town has made no effort to defend the statute under the per se rule, and so we do not address this question. See Fulton 516 U. S., -334.16] We have no doubt that if petitioner's camp were *583 a profit-making entity, the discriminatory tax exemption would be impermissible. V The unresolved question presented by this case is whether a different rule should apply to tax exemptions for charitable and benevolent institutions. Though we have never had cause to address the issue directly, the applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause to the nonprofit sector of the economy follows from our prior decisions. Our cases have frequently applied laws regulating commerce to not-for-profit institutions. In Associated for example, we held the National Labor Relations Act as applied to the Associated Press' (A. P.'s) news gathering activities to be an enactment entirely within Congress' Commerce Clause power, despite the fact that the A. P. "does not sell news and does not operate for a profit." Noting that the A. P.'s activities "involved] the constant use of channels of interstate and foreign communication," we concluded that its operations "amounted] to commercial intercourse, and such intercourse is commerce within the meaning of the Constitution." *584 at 128. See Polish National Alliance of United We have similarly held that federal antitrust laws are applicable to the anti competitive activities of nonprofit organizations. See National Collegiate Athletic (Sherman Act 1 applies to nonprofits); American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers, ("I]t is beyond debate that nonprofit organizations can be held liable under the antitrust laws"); The nonprofit character of an enterprise does not place it beyond the purview of federal laws regulating commerce. See We have already held that the dormant Commerce Clause is applicable to activities undertaken without the intention of earning a profit. In we addressed the constitutionality of a California statute prohibiting the transport into that State of indigent persons. We struck the statute down as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, reasoning that "the transportation of persons is `commerce,' " and that the California statute was an "unconstitutional barrier to that] interstate commerce." at -173. In determining whether the transportation of persons is "commerce," we noted that "i]t is immaterial whether or not the transportation is commercial in character." at n. 1. We see no reason why the nonprofit character of an enterprise should exclude it from the coverage |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | character of an enterprise should exclude it from the coverage of either the affirmative or the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause. See 441 U. S., ; -623 ; 458 U. S., at ; see at *585 572-574. There are a number of lines of commerce in which both for-profit and nonprofit entities participate. Some educational institutions, some hospitals, some child care facilities, some research organizations, and some museums generate significant earnings; and some are operated by not-for-profit corporations. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L. J. 835, 835, and n. 1, 865 A nonprofit entity is ordinarily understood to differ from a for-profit corporation principally because it "is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees."17] Nothing intrinsic to the nature of nonprofit entities prevents them from engaging in interstate commerce. Summer camps may be operated as for-profit or nonprofit entities; nonprofits may dependas herein substantial part on fees charged for their services. Clotfelter, The Distributional Consequences of Nonprofit Activities, in Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? 1, 6 (C. Clotfelter ed. 12) (nonprofits in some sectors are "heavily dependent on fees by paying customers, with private payments accounting for at least half of total revenues"). Whether operated on a for-profit or nonprofit basis, they purchase goods and *586 services in competitive markets, offer their facilities to a variety of patrons, and derive revenues from a variety of sources, some of which are local and some out of State. For purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, any categorical distinction between the activities of profit-making enterprises and not-for-profit entities is therefore wholly illusory. Entities in both categories are major participants in interstate markets. And, although the summer camp involved in this case may have a relatively insignificant impact on the commerce of the entire Nation, the interstate commercial activities of nonprofit entities as a class are unquestionably significant.18] See ; 559-560. *587 From the State's standpoint it may well be reasonable to use tax exemptions as a means of encouraging nonprofit institutions to favor local citizens, notwithstanding any possible adverse impact on the larger markets in which those institutions *588 participate. Indeed, if we view the issue solely from the State's perspective, it is equally reasonable to use discriminatory tax exemptions as a means of encouraging the growth of local trade. But as our cases clearly hold, such exemptions are impermissible. See, e. g., Bacchus Imports, Protectionism, whether targeted at for-profit entities or serving, as here, to encourage nonprofits to keep their efforts close |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | as here, to encourage nonprofits to keep their efforts close to home, is forbidden under the dormant Commerce Clause.19] If there is need for a special exception for nonprofits, Congress not only has the power to create it,20] but is in a far better position than we to determine its dimensions.21] VI Rather than urging us to create a categorical exception for nonprofit entities, the Town argues that Maine's exemption statute should be viewed as an expenditure of government money designed to lessen its social service burden and to foster the societal benefits provided by charitable organizations. So characterized, the Town submits that its tax exemption scheme is either a legitimate discriminatory subsidy *589 of only those charities that choose to focus their activities on local concerns, or alternatively a governmental "purchase" of charitable services falling within the narrow exception to the dormant Commerce Clause for States in their role as "market participants," see, e. g., v. Alexandria ; We find these arguments unpersuasive. Although tax exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important and relevant respects, and our cases have recognized these distinctions. As for the "market participant" argument, we have already rejected the Town's position in a prior case, and in any event respondents' openended exemption for charitable and benevolent institutions is not analogous to the industry-specific state actions that we reviewed in Alexandria and The Town argues that its discriminatory tax exemption is, in economic reality, no different from a discriminatory subsidy of those charities that cater principally to local needs. Noting our statement in West Creamery that "a] pure subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business," 512 U.S., at 1, the Town submits that since a discriminatory subsidy may be permissible, a discriminatory exemption must be, too. We have "never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies," at 1, n. 15, and we need not address these questions today. Assuming, arguendo, that the Town is correct that a direct subsidy benefiting only those nonprofits serving principally Maine residents would be permissible, our cases do not sanction a tax exemption serving similar ends.22] *590 In notwithstanding our assumption that a direct subsidy of religious activity would be invalid,23] we held that New York's tax exemption for church property did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.24] That holding rested, in part, on the premise that there is a constitutionally significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions.25] We have expressly recognized that this distinction is applicable to claims that certain state action designed to |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | is applicable to claims that certain state action designed to give residents an advantage in the marketplace is prohibited by the Commerce Clause. In New Energy of we found unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause an Ohio tax scheme that provided a sales tax credit for ethanol produced in State, or manufactured in another State to the extent that State gave similar tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio. We recognized that the party challenging the Ohio scheme was "eligible to receive a cash subsidy" *591 from its home State, and was therefore "the potential beneficiary of a scheme no less discriminatory than the one that it attacks, and no less effective in conferring a commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors." That was of no importance. We noted: "The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State's regulation of interstate commerce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation does." See West (drawing similar distinction between forbidden generally applicable tax with discriminatory "exemption" and permissible "subsidy funded from the State's general revenues"). This distinction is supported by scholarly commentary as well as precedent, and we see no reason to depart from it. See Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, ; Hellerstein & Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives,26] The Town's claim its discriminatory tax scheme should be viewed as a permissible subsidy is therefore unpersuasive.27] *592 Finally, the Town argues that its discriminatory tax exemption scheme falls within the "market-participant" exception. As we explained in New Energy : "That doctrine differentiates between a State's acting in its distinctive governmental capacity, and a State's acting in the more general capacity of a market participant; only the former is subject to the limitations of the negative Commerce Clause." See ; -437; v. Alexandria In Alexandria we concluded that the State of Maryland had, in effect, entered the market for abandoned automobile hulks as a purchaser because it was using state funds to provide bounties for their removal from Maryland streets and junkyards. In the State of South Dakota similarly participated in the market for cement as a seller of the output of the cement plant that it had owned and operated for many -432. And in the city of Boston had participated in the construction industry by funding certain -206. These three cases stand for the proposition that, for purposes of analysis under the |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | for the proposition that, for purposes of analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause, a State acting in its proprietary capacity as a purchaser *593 or seller may "favor its own citizens over others." Alexandria Maine's tax exemption statute cannot be characterized as a proprietary activity falling within the market-participant exception. In New Energy Ohio argued similarly that a discriminatory tax credit program fell within the exception. We noted that the tax program had "the purpose and effect of subsidizing a particular industry, as do many dispositions of the tax laws." "That," we explained, "does not transform it into a form of state participation in the free market." "The Ohio action ultimately at issue is neither its purchase nor its sale of ethanol, but its assessment and computation of taxesa primeval governmental activity." As we indicated in : "I]n this kind of case there is `a single inquiry: whether the challenged "program constituted direct state participation in the market."` " 460 U.S., at (quoting n. 7). A tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market that falls within the marketparticipation doctrine. Even if we were prepared to expand the exception in the manner suggested by the Town, the Maine tax statute at issue here would be a poor candidate. Like the tax exemption upheld in Walz which applied to libraries, art galleries, and hospitals as well as churches28]the exemption that has been denied to petitioner is available to a broad category of charitable and benevolent institutions.29] For that reason, nothing short of a dramatic expansion of the "marketparticipant" *594 exception would support its application to this case. Alexandria involved Maryland's entry into the market for automobile hulks, a discrete activity focused on a single industry. Similarly, South Dakota's participation in the market for cement wasin part because of its narrow scopereadily conceived as a proprietary action of the State. In contrast, Maine's tax exemptionwhich sweeps to cover broad swathes of the nonprofit sectormust be viewed as action taken in the State's sovereign capacity rather than a proprietary decision to make an entry into all of the markets in which the exempted charities function. See n. 7 The Town's version of the "market-participant" exception would swallow the rule against discriminatory tax schemes. Contrary to the Town's submission, the notion that whenever a State provides a discriminatory tax abatement it is "purchasing" some service in its proprietary capacity is not readily confined to the charitable context. A special tax concession for liquors indigenous to Hawaii, for example, might be conceived as a "purchase" of the jobs produced by |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118111/camps-newfoundowatonna-inc-v-town-of-harrison/ | be conceived as a "purchase" of the jobs produced by local industry, or an investment in the unique local cultural value provided by these beverages. Cf. Bacchus, -271. Discriminatory schemes favoring local farmers might be seen as the "purchase" of agricultural services in order to ensure that the State's citizens will have a steady local supply of the product. Cf. West (striking down statute protecting in-state milk producers designed to "preserve local industry," "thereby ensuring] a continuous and adequate supply of fresh milk for our market" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our cases provide no support for the Town's radical effort to expand the marketparticipant doctrine. *595 VII As was true in Bacchus Imports, the facts of this particular case, viewed in isolation, do not appear to pose any threat to the health of the national economy. Nevertheless, history, including the history of commercial conflict that preceded the Constitutional Convention as well as the uniform course of Commerce Clause jurisprudence animated and enlightened by that early history, provides the context in which each individual controversy must be judged. The history of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence has shown that even the smallest scale discrimination can interfere with the project of our Federal Union. As Justice Cardozo recognized, to countenance discrimination of the sort that Maine's statute represents would invite significant inroads on our "national solidarity": "The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | In we ruled that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on "one who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed." This case requires us to determine in whose hands the decision that a defendant possesses the requisite degree of culpability properly lies. *379 I Early in the morning of September 22, 1978, respondent Crawford Bullock and his friend Ricky Tucker accepted Mark Dickson's offer of a ride home from a bar in Jackson, Mississippi. During the course of the ride, Tucker and Dickson began to argue about some money Dickson supposedly owed Tucker. The argument became a fight: Dickson stopped the car, and Dickson and Tucker exchanged blows. Bullock attempted to grab Dickson, but Dickson eluded his grasp and fled from the car. Tucker gave chase and succeeded in tackling Dickson, while Bullock, who had a cast on his leg, followed more slowly. When Bullock caught up with the struggling men, he held Dickson's head as Tucker struck Dickson in the face with a whiskey bottle. Tucker then pummeled Dickson with his fists until Dickson fell to the ground. As Dickson lay helpless, Tucker killed him by smashing his skull with repeated blows from a concrete block. Bullock and Tucker together disposed of Dickson's body, and Bullock kept Dickson's car for himself. Bullock was arrested the next day when police spotted him driving the car. Under questioning at the police station, he confessed to his participation in the course of events just described. Bullock was charged with capital murder under a Mississippi statute that provided that "[t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder [w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery or in any attempt to commit such." (2)(e) Under Mississippi law, a participant in a robbery could be convicted of capital murder under the statute for a murder committed in the course of the robbery by an accomplice notwithstanding the defendant's own lack of intent that any killing take place, for "[i]t is familiar law that when two or more persons act in concert, with a common design, in committing a crime of violence upon others, and a *380 homicide committed by one of them is incident to the execution of the common design, |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | them is incident to the execution of the common design, both are criminally liable for the homicide." In accordance with this doctrine of accomplice liability, the court instructed the jury at the conclusion of the guilt phase of Bullock's trial as follows: "The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt that on September 21, 1978, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, Crawford Bullock, Jr., was present, consented to, and encouraged the commission of a crime and thereby aided another individual, and that he, the said Crawford Bullock, Jr., or the other, then and there did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the personal property of another from the presence of Mark Dickson, and from his person, against his will, by violence to his person, to-wit [sic]; his billfold or one 1978 Thunderbird automobile then in his possession, then and in that event, the Defendant, Crawford Bullock, Jr. is guilty of robbery as if he had with his own hands committed the whole offense; and, if the Jury further finds from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on said date aforesaid, while engaged in the commission of the aforesaid robbery, if any, that the said Crawford Bullock, Jr., did alone, or while acting in consert [sic] with another, while present at said time and place by consenting to the killing of the said, Mark Dickson, and that the said Crawford Bullock, Jr., did any overt act which was immediately connected with or leading to its commission, without authority of law, and not in necessary self defense, by any means, in any manner, whether done with or without any design to effect the death of the said Mark Dickson, that the[n], and in that event, the said Crawford Bullock, Jr., is guilty of capital murder." App. 87-89. *381 The jury found Bullock guilty of capital murder. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the jury found that two statutory aggravating circumstances were present and that they were not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the jury sentenced Bullock to death. On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, Bullock argued, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to allow submission of the capital murder charge to the jury and that the imposition of the death penalty on him would be so disproportionate to his level of involvement in the crime as to violate the Eighth Amendment. The court rejected both contentions. cert. denied, The court ruled that the verdict of |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | contentions. cert. denied, The court ruled that the verdict of capital murder was sustainable in view of the "overwhelming" evidence "that [Bullock] was present, aiding and assisting in the assault upon, and slaying of, Dickson and in the taking of the T-bird automobile, which was in the lawful possession and use of Dickson." With respect to Bullock's claim that the punishment of death was disproportionate to his degree of culpability, the court noted that "[t]he law is well settled in this state that any person who is present, aiding and abetting another in the commission of a crime, is equally guilty with the principal offender." Because Bullock was "an active participant in the assault and homicide committed upon Mark Dickson," the court concluded that the punishment was not disproportionate to his guilt. After exhausting state postconviction remedies, Bullock filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The District Court denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that Bullock's death sentence was invalid under our decision in which was handed down during the pendency of the District Court proceedings. The *382 court based this conclusion solely upon its reading of the jury instructions given at Bullock's trial. The court reasoned that under the instructions offered at the guilt phase and quoted in pertinent part above, the jury could have found Bullock guilty of capital murder solely on the basis of his participation in a robbery in which he had aided and abetted someone else who had killed: the instructions did not require a finding of any intent to kill on Bullock's part, nor did they require the jury to find that Bullock had actually killed. In addition, the court noted that the instructions offered the jury at the sentencing phase nowhere required the jury to make any further findings regarding Bullock's personal involvement in the killing. Thus, it was quite possible that the jury had sentenced Bullock to death without ever finding that he had killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. In the court's view, prohibited execution of a defendant absent such findings by the trier of fact; accordingly, the court granted a writ of habeas corpus vacating Bullock's death sentence, but permitting the State, "at its option, to either impose a sentence of life imprisonment or, within a reasonable period of time, conduct a new sentencing hearing" at which with the proper findings a death sentence could be Because the Fifth Circuit's holding that can be satisfied |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | be Because the Fifth Circuit's holding that can be satisfied only by findings made at the guilt-innocence or sentencing phase of a trial ) conflicts with the interpretation of adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, see[1] we granted certiorari, *383 II The Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that neither the jury's verdict of guilt nor its imposition of the death sentence necessarily reflects a finding that Bullock killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. The jury instructions at the guilt phase were, to say the least, confusing, and they do not lend themselves easily to any particular interpretation. A fair-minded juror, however, could have understood them to mean that the jury could find Bullock guilty of capital murder without regard to his intent and solely by virtue of his having aided his accomplice at some point in the assault that led to the killing.[2] This interpretation of the instructions is buttressed, *384 as Judge Garwood pointed out in his concurring opinion below, by the fact that "the entire case was essentially tried on the theory, in full accordance with the then law of Mississippi, that it was not necessary, either for the felony murder conviction or for the sentence to death, to find that Bullock had either the intent to kill or any personal participation in the killing." Thus, the jury may well have sentenced Bullock to death despite concluding that he had neither killed nor intended to kill; or it may have reached its decision without ever coming to any conclusion whatever on those questions. III But the conclusion that the jury may not have found that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be employed does not end the inquiry into whether bars the death sentence; rather, it is only the first step. In focusing only on the jury instructions and in requiring a new sentencing hearing before a jury before the death penalty might be reimposed the Fifth Circuit apparently proceeded upon the premise that can be satisfied only at a sentencing hearing and by a jury's decision (presumably based upon proof beyond reasonable doubt) that the defendant possessed the requisite culpability. Examination of the nature of our ruling in reveals that this premise is erroneous. A defendant charged with a serious crime has the right to have a jury determine his guilt or innocence, and a jury's verdict cannot stand if the instructions provided the jury do not require it to find each element of the crime under the proper standard of |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | each element of the crime under the proper standard of proof, Findings *385 made by a judge cannot cure deficiencies in the jury's finding as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant resulting from the court's failure to instruct it to find an element of the crime. See ; cf. ; ; But our ruling in does not concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant it establishes no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury. Rather, as the Fifth Circuit itself has recognized, "does not affect the state's definition of any substantive offense, even a capital offense." 728 F. 2d, at 709; see also n. 19 holds only that the principles of proportionality embodied in the Eighth Amendment bar imposition of the death penalty upon a class of persons who may nonetheless be guilty of the crime of capital murder as defined by state law: that is, the class of murderers who did not themselves kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.[3] The decision whether a particular punishment even the death penalty is appropriate in any given case is not one that we have ever required to be made by a jury. Indeed, in we specifically rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment or any other constitutional provision provides a defendant with the right *386 to have a jury consider the appropriateness of a capital sentence. Moreover, the decision whether a sentence is so disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment in any particular case, like other questions bearing on whether a criminal defendant's constitutional rights have been violated, has long been viewed as one that a trial judge or an appellate court is fully competent to make. See, e. g., ; The determination whether the death sentence is permissible under is different in a significant respect both from the general exercise of sentencing discretion and from the type of Eighth Amendment proportionality inquiry undertaken in The latter two determinations typically involve case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances decisionmaking. by contrast, imposes a categorical rule: a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used may not be sentenced to death. Nonetheless, the rule remains a substantive limitation on sentencing, and like other such limits it need not be enforced by the jury. Indeed, does not impose any particular form of procedure upon the States. The Eighth Amendment is satisfied so long as the death penalty is not imposed upon a person ineligible under for such punishment. |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | not imposed upon a person ineligible under for such punishment. If a person sentenced to death in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, the Eighth Amendment itself is not violated by his or her execution regardless of who makes the determination of the requisite culpability; by the same token, if a person sentenced to death lacks the requisite culpability, the Eighth Amendment violation can be adequately remedied by any court that has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence. At what precise point in its criminal process a State chooses to make the determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the Constitution. The State has considerable freedom to structure its capital sentencing *387 system as it sees fit, for "[a]s the Court has several times made clear, we are unwilling to say that there is any one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme." Spaziano, ; see also ; ; 1 Accordingly, when a federal habeas court reviews a claim that the death penalty has been imposed on one who has neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended that a killing take place or lethal force be used, the court's inquiry cannot be limited to an examination of jury instructions. Rather, the court must examine the entire course of the state-court proceedings against the defendant in order to determine whether, at some point in the process, the requisite factual finding as to the defendant's culpability has been made.[4] If *388 it has, the finding must be presumed correct by virtue of 28 U.S. C. 2254(d), see and unless the habeas petitioner can bear the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption, the court is obliged to hold that the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in is not offended by the death sentence.[5] *389 IV The Court of Appeals thus erred in focusing exclusively on the jury and in ordering a new sentencing hearing without inquiring whether the necessary finding of intent had been made by the trial court or by the state appellate court. The State argues that the Mississippi Supreme Court itself made a finding sufficient to satisfy in the course of its direct review of Bullock's conviction and sentence. It relies on two separate statements in the court's opinion. First, in responding to the claim of insufficient evidence, the court said that "[t]he evidence is overwhelming that appellant was present, aiding and assisting in the assault upon, and slaying of, Dickson." Second, in determining that the death penalty was not disproportionate to the sentences imposed in other |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | penalty was not disproportionate to the sentences imposed in other cases, the court stated that "[t]he evidence is overwhelming that appellant was an active participant in the assault and homicide committed upon Mark Dickson." We are very doubtful, however, that these assessments of the record were sufficient in themselves to constitute a finding that Bullock killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill Dickson. The Mississippi Supreme Court obviously was not addressing the specific requirements set forth in for that case had not yet been decided. Rather, the court's remarks are better read as stating the court's conclusion that Bullock's participation in the assault and robbery were sufficient to make him liable for the murder and deserving of the death penalty in light of Mississippi law under which one who takes some overt act in aid of an assault that leads to a killing by his accomplice is equally responsible with the accomplice for the killing. Indeed, immediately before its statement with respect to proportionality, the court said that "[t]he law is well settled in this state that any person who is present, *390 aiding and abetting another in the commission of a crime, is equally guilty with the principal offender." 391 So. 2d, In other words, the Mississippi court's statements represent at most a finding that, as the District Court put it, Bullock "by legal definition actually killed." App. to Pet. for Cert. A30-A31 (emphasis added). Such a finding does not satisfy for holds that the Eighth Amendment does more than require that a death-sentenced defendant be legally responsible for a killing as a matter of state law; it requires that he himself have actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended that lethal force be used. V There remains the question of the appropriate course of action for a federal court faced with a petition for habeas corpus raising an claim when the state courts have failed to make any finding regarding the criteria. Two possibilities come immediately to mind. The federal court could itself make the factual determination whether the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, and either grant or deny the writ depending on the outcome of that inquiry. Alternatively, the federal court could take steps to require the State's own judicial system to make the factual findings in the first instance. Such findings would, of course, be presumptively correct as a result of 28 U.S. C. 2254(d) in any subsequent federal habeas proceedings. Either alternative would, in theory, be adequate to remedy any hypothesized Eighth Amendment violation, for either approach would prevent the |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | hypothesized Eighth Amendment violation, for either approach would prevent the execution of any defendant who did not in fact kill, attempt to kill, or intend the use of lethal force. We believe, however, that the second course of action is the sounder one. Two considerations underlie this conclusion. First, to the extent that recognizes that a defendant has a right not to face the death penalty absent a particular factual predicate, it also implies that the State's judicial process leading to the imposition of the death penalty *391 must at some point provide for a finding of that factual predicate. Accordingly, Bullock "is entitled to a determination [of the issue] in the state courts in accordance with valid state procedures." Second, the State itself has "a weighty interest in having valid federal constitutional criteria applied in the administration of its criminal law by its own courts." Considerations of federalism and comity counsel respect for the ability of state courts to carry out their role as the primary protectors of the rights of criminal defendants, see ; these same considerations indicate the appropriateness of allowing the Mississippi courts an opportunity to carry out in the first instance the factual inquiry called for by To paraphrase our opinion in at -394, it is Mississippi, therefore, not the federal habeas corpus court, which should first provide Bullock with that which he has not yet had and to which he is constitutionally entitled a reliable determination as to whether he is subject to the death penalty as one who has killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used.[6] *392 VI The proceeding that the state courts must provide Bullock need not take the form of a new sentencing hearing before a jury. As indicated above, the Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury make the findings required by Moreover, the sentence currently in force may stand provided only that the requisite findings are made in an adequate proceeding before some appropriate tribunal be it an appellate court, a trial judge, or a jury.[7] A new hearing devoted to the identification and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors is thus, as far as we are concerned, unnecessary. Accordingly, the District Court should be directed to issue the writ of habeas corpus vacating Bullock's death sentence but leaving to the State of Mississippi the choice of either imposing a sentence of life imprisonment or, within a reasonable time, obtaining a determination from its own courts of the factual question whether Bullock killed, attempted to |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | In 1971 the Indiana Legislature enacted a statue providing that served mineral interest that in not used for a period of 20 years automatically lapses and reverts to the current surface owner of the property, unless the mineral owner, files a statement of claim in the local county recorder's office.[1] The Indiana Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. Ind. We note probable jurisdiction, and now affirm. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained, the Mineral Lapse Act "puts an end to interests in coal, oil, gas or other minerals which have not been used for twenty years."[2] The statute provides that the unused interest shall be "extinguished" and that its "ownership shall revert to the then owner of the interest out of which it was carved."[3] The statute, which became effective on September 2, 1971, contained a 2-year grace period in which owners of mineral interests *519 that were then unused and subject to lapse could preserve those interests by filing a claim in the recorder's office.[4] The "use" of a mineral interest[5] that is sufficient to preclude its extinction includes the actual or attempted production of minerals, the payment of rents or royalties, and any payment of taxes;[6] a mineral owner may also protect his interest by filing a statement of claim with the local recorder of deeds.[7] The statute contains one exception to this general *520 rule: if an owner of 10 or more interests in the same county files a statement of claim that inadvertently omits some of those interests, the omitted interests may be preserved by a supplemental filing made within 60 days of receiving actual notice of the lapse.[8] The statute does not require that any specific notice be given to a mineral owner prior to a statutory lapse of a mineral estate. The Act does set forth a procedure, however, by which a surface owner who has succeeded to the ownership of a mineral estate pursuant to the statute may give notice that the mineral interest has lapsed.[9] *521 Two cases are consolidated in this appeal. The facts in each are stipulated. In No. 80-965, appellants include 11 parties who claim ownership of fractional mineral interests served in 1942 and in 1944 from a 132-acre tract of land in Gibson County, Ind.; a 12th appellant is the lessee of oil and gas leases executed in 1976 and 1977 by the other appellants. The appellee is the surface owner of the 132-acre tract from which the appellants' mineral interests were carved. The parties stipulated that the appellants had not used the |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | The parties stipulated that the appellants had not used the mineral interest for 20 years and had not filed a statement of claim within 2 years of the effective date of the statute. Thus, under the terms of the Dormant Mineral Interests Act, the mineral interest automatically lapsed on September 2, 1973, when the 2-year grace period expired. On April 28, 1977, appellee gave notice that the mineral interests had lapsed.[10] Appellants responded by filing statements of claim in the Office of the Recorder of Gibson County. Thereafter, appellee filed this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the rights of the mineral interest owners had lapsed and were extinguished by reason of the Dormant Mineral Interests Act. In No. 80-1018, the severed mineral estate was created on March 1, 1954. On the date, appellants Pond and Bobe conveyed land to appellees by a warranty deed that contained a reservation of the mineral estate. On June 17, 1976, Pond and Bobe executed a coal mining lease with appellant Consolidated Coal Co. The parties stipulated that, for a 20-year *522 period following the creation of the mineral estate, appellants did not use the interest or file a statement of claim in the Recorder's Office. Thus, on March 1, 1974, a date more than two years after the effective date of the Dormant Mineral Interests Act, a statutory lapse occurred. On March 4, 1977, appellees gave notice of the lapse, both by letter to the appellants and by publication in the Princeton Daily Clarion. The parties jointly filed the instant lawsuit on January 12, 1978, to resolve their conflicting claims to the mineral rights. In each case it is agreed that if the statue is valid, appellants' mineral interests have lapsed because of their failure to produce minerals, pay taxes, or file a statement of claim within the statutory period. In neither case does the agreed statement of facts indicate whether any of the appellants was aware of the enactment of the Mineral Lapse Act, or of its possible effect on his mineral interests, at any time after the enactment of the statute and before the appellees published notice of the lapse of the mineral estates. At all stages of the proceedings, appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Dormant Mineral Interests Act. Appellants claimed that the lack of prior notice of the lapse of their mineral rights deprived them of property without due process of law, that the statute effected a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and that the exception contained in the Act for owners of 10 |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | the exception contained in the Act for owners of 10 or more mineral interests denied them the equal protection of the law; appellants based these arguments on the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.[11] Appellants also *523 contended that the statute constituted an impairment of contracts in violation of Art. I, 10, of the constitution.[12] The state trial court held that the statute deprived appellants of property without due process of law, and effected a taking of property without just compensation.[13] On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The court first explained the purpose of the Mineral Lapse Act: "The Act reflects the legislative belief that the existence of a mineral interest about which there has been no display of activity or interest by the owners thereof for a period of twenty years or more is mischievous and contrary to the economic interests and welfare of the public. The existence of such stale and abandoned interests creates uncertainties in titles and constitutes an impediment to the development of the mineral interests that may be present and to the development of the surface rights as well. The Act removes this impediment by returning the severed mineral estate to the surface rights owner. There is a decided public interest to be served when this occurs. The extinguishment of such an interest makes the entire productive potential of the property again available for human use." Ind., at The court rejected the argument that a lapse of a vested mineral interest could not occur without affording the mineral owner prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court noted that "[p]rior to any extinguishment the owner of an interest will have had notice by reason of the enactment itself of the conditions which would give rise to an extinguishment and at a minimum a two-year opportunity to prevent those conditions from occurring by filing a statement of *524 claim."[14] The Indiana Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the statute effected a taking without just compensation. The court reasoned that, like statutes of limitations, the Mineral Lapse Act was a permissible exercise of the police power of the State.[15] Finally, the court rejected the argument that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing a special exception for owners of 10 or more interests who, through inadvertence, failed to preserve all such interests. The court again noted that the purpose of the statute was to encourage *525 the development of mineral interests, and held that it was rational for the Indiana Legislature to provide special protection for |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | rational for the Indiana Legislature to provide special protection for owners of 10 or more mineral interests since those owners are more likely to be able to engage in the actual production of mineral resources.[16] I Appellants raise several specific challenges to the constitutionality of the Mineral Lapse Act. Before addressing these arguments, however, it is appropriate to consider whether the State has the power to provide that property rights of this character shall be extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative action required by the State.[17] In Board of the Court stated: "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." The State of Indiana has defined a severed mineral estate as a "vested property interest," entitled to "the same protection *526 as are fee simple titles."[18] Through its Dormant Mineral Interests Act, however, the State has declared that this property interest is of less than absolute duration; retention is conditioned on the performance of at least one of the actions required by the Act. We have no doubt that, just as a State may create a property interest that is entitled to constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition the permanent retention of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to retain the interest. From an early time, this Court has recognized that States have the power to permit unused or abandoned interests in property to revert to another after the passage of time. In the Court upheld a Kentucky statute that prevented a landowner from recovering property on which the defendant had resided for more than seven years under a claim of right. The Court stated: "Such laws have frequently passed in review before this Court; and occasions have occurred, in which they have been particularly noticed as laws not to be impeached on the ground of violating private right. What right has any one to complain, when a reasonable time has been given him, if he has not been vigilant in asserting his rights?"[19] *527 Similarly, in the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statue that provided for the extinguishment of a reserved interest in ground rent if the owner collected no rent and made no demand for payment for a period of 21 years.[20] Though the effect of the Pennsylvania statute was to extinguish |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | Though the effect of the Pennsylvania statute was to extinguish a fee simple estate of permanent duration, the Court held that the legislation was valid.[21] *528 In these early cases, the Court often emphasized that the statutory "extinguishment" properly could be viewed as the withdrawal of a remedy rather than the destruction of a right.[22] We have subsequently made clear, however, that, when the practical consequences for extinguishing a right are identical to the consequences of eliminating a remedy, the constitutional analysis is the same. El The extinguishment of the property owners' "remedy" in Hawkins and placed them in precisely the same position as that held by the mineral owners in the instant cases after their interests had lapsed. The Indiana statute is similar in operation to a typical recording statute. Such statutes provide that a valid transfer of property may be defeated by a subsequent purported transfer if the earlier transfer is not properly recorded. In the Court upheld such a statute, even as retroactively applied to a deed that need not have been recorded at the time delivered. The Court stated: "It is within the undoubted power of state legislatures to pass recording acts, by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded within the limited time; and the power is the same whether the deed is debated before or after the passage of the recording act. Though the effect of such a law is to render the prior deed fraudulent a void against a subsequent purchaser, it is not a law impairing the obligation of contracts; such too is the power to pass acts of limitations, and their effect. Reasons of sound policy have led to the general adoption of laws of both descriptions, and their validity cannot be questioned. The time *529 and manner of their operation, the exceptions to them, and the acts from which the time limited shall begin to run, will generally depend on the sound discretion of the legislature, according to the nature of the titles, the situation of the country, and the emergency which leads to their enactment." These decisions clearly establish that the State of Indiana has the power to enact the kind of legislation at issue. In each case, the Court upheld the power of the State to condition the retention of a property right upon the performance of an act within a limited period of time. In each instance, as a result of the failure of the property owner to perform the statutory condition, an interest in fee was |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | to perform the statutory condition, an interest in fee was deemed as a matter of law to be abandoned and to lapse. It is also clear that the State has not exercised this power in an arbitrary manner. The Indiana statute provides that a severed mineral interest shall not terminate if its owner takes any one of three steps of establish his continuing interest in the property. If the owner engages in actual production, or collects rents or royalties from another person who does or proposes to do so, his interest is protected. If the owner pays taxes, no matter how small, the interest is secure. If the owner files a written statement of claim in the county recorder's office, the interest remains viable. Only if none of these actions is taken for a period of 20 years does a mineral interest lapse and revert to the surface owner. Each of the actions required by the State to avoid an abandonment of a mineral estate furthers a legitimate state goal. Certainly the State may encourage owners of mineral interests to develop the potential of those interests; similarly, the fiscal interest in collecting property taxes is manifest. The requirement that a mineral owner file a public statement of claim furthers both of these goals by facilitating the identification and location of mineral owners, from whom developers may acquire operating rights and from whom the county may collect taxes. The State surely has the power to condition *530 the ownership of property on compliance with conditions that impose such a slight burden on the owner while providing such clear benefits to the State.[23] II Two of appellants' arguments may be answered quickly. Appellants contend that the Mineral Lapse Act takes private property without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; they also argue that the statute constitutes an impermissible impairment of contracts in violation of the Contract Clause. The authorities already discussed mandate rejection of each of these arguments. In ruling that private property may be deemed to be abandoned and to lapse upon the failure to its owner to take reasonable actions imposed by law, this Court has never required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect. We have concluded that the State may treat a mineral interest that has not been used for 20 years and for which no statement of claim has been filed as abandoned; it follows that, after abandonment, the former owner retains no interest for which he may claim compensation. It is the owner's failure to make any use |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | compensation. It is the owner's failure to make any use of the property and not the action of the State the causes the lapse of the property right; there is no "taking" that requires compensation. The requirement that an owner of a property interest that has not been used for 20 years must come forward and file a current statement of claim is not itself a "taking." *531 Nor does the Mineral Lapse act unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts. In the specific cases under review, the mineral owners did not execute the coal and oil leases in question until after the statutory lapse of their mineral rights. The statute cannot be said to impair a contract that did not exist at the time of its enactment. Appellants' right to enter such an agreement of course has been impaired by the statute; this right, however, is a property right and not a contract right. In any event, a mineral owner may safeguard any contractual obligations or rights by filing a statement of claim in the county recorder's office. Such a minimal "burden" on contractual obligations is not beyond the scope of permissible state action.[24] III Appellants' primary attack on the Dormant Mineral Interests Act is that it extinguished their property rights without adequate notice. In advancing this argument, appellants actually assert two quite different claims. First, appellants argue that the State of Indiana did not adequately notify them of the legal requirements of the new statute. Second, appellants argue that mineral interest may not be extinguished unless the surface owner gives the mineral owner advance notice that the 20-year period of nonuse is about to expire. When these two arguments are considered separately, it is clear that neither has merit. A The first question raised is simply how a legislature must go about advising its citizens of actions that must be taken to avoid a valid rule of law that a mineral interest that has not been used for 20 years will be deemed to be abandoned. The answer to this question is no different from that posed for any *532 legislative enactment affecting substantial rights. Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply. In this case, the 2-year grace period included in the Indiana statute forecloses any argument that the statute is invalid because mineral owners may not have had an opportunity to become familiar with its terms. It is well established that persons owning property |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | its terms. It is well established that persons owning property within a State are charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property.[25] It is also settled that the question whether a statutory grace period provides an adequate opportunity for citizens to become familiar with a new law is a matter on which the Court shows the greatest deference to the judgment of state legislatures. See 3 Pet., ; -63. A legislative body is in a far better position than a court to form a correct judgment concerning the number of persons affected by a change in the law, the means by which information concerning the law in disseminated in the community, and the likelihood that innocent persons may be harmed by the failure to receive adequate notice.[26] In short, both the Indiana Legislature and the Indiana Supreme Court have concluded that a 2-year period was sufficient *533 to allow property owners in the State to familiarize themselves with the terms of the statute and to take any action deemed appropriate to protect existing interests. On the basis of the records in these two proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute was so unprecedented and so unlikely to come to the attention of citizens reasonably attentive to the enactment of laws affecting their rights that this 2-year period was constitutionally inadequate. We refuse to displace hastily the judgment of the legislature and to conclude that a legitimate exercise of state legislative power is invalid because citizens might not have been aware of the requirements of the law.[27] B We have concluded that appellants may be presumed to have had knowledge of the terms of the Dormant Mineral Interests Act. Specifically, they are presumed to have known that an unused mineral interest would lapse unless they filed a statement of claim. The question then presented is whether, given that knowledge, appellants had a constitutional right to be advised presumably by the surface owner that their 20-year period of nonuse was about to expire. In answering this question, it is essential to recognize the difference between the self-executing feature of the statute and a subsequent judicial determination that a particular lapse did in fact occur. As noted by appellants, no specific notice need be given of an impending lapse. If there has *534 been a statutory use of the interest during the preceding 20-year period, however, by definition there is no lapse whether or not the surface owner, or any other party, is aware of that use. Thus, no mineral estate that has |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | aware of that use. Thus, no mineral estate that has been protected by any of the means set forth in the statute may be lost through lack of notice. It is undisputed that, before judgment could be entered in a quiet title action that would determine conclusively that a mineral interest has reverted to the surface owner, the full procedural protections of the Due Process Clause including notice reasonably calculated to reach all interested parties and a prior opportunity to be heard must be provided. Appellants place primary reliance on our decision in In that case the Court considered the constitutional sufficiency of notice given to the beneficiaries of a common trust fund of a judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of the fund. The Court held that the notice by publication authorized by the relevant New York statute was not sufficient, since it was not reasonably calculated to apprise the beneficiaries of the pendency of the judicial proceeding. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, stated: "Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Specifically, the Court held that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections," ; the notice in Mullane was deficient "not because in fact it fail[ed] to reach everyone, *535 but because under the circumstances it [was] not reasonably calculated to each those who could easily be informed by other means at hand." The reasoning in Mullane is applicable to a judicial proceeding brought to determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur, but not to the self-executing feature of the Mineral Lapse Act. The due process standards of Mullane apply to an "adjudication" that is "to be accorded finality." The Court in Mullane itself distinguished the situation in which a State enacted a general rule of law governing the abandonment of property.[28] It has long been established that "laws [must] give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly," Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. *536 104, 108, but it has never been suggested that |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | *536 104, 108, but it has never been suggested that each citizen must in some way be given specific notice of the impact of a new statute on his property before that law may affect his property rights. As emphasized above, appellants do not challenge the sufficiency of the notice that must be given prior to an adjudication purporting to determine that a mineral interest has not been used for 20-years. Appellants simply claim that the absence of specific notice prior to the lapse of a mineral right renders ineffective the self-executing feature of the Indiana statute. That claim has no greater force than a claim that a self-executing statute of limitations is unconstitutional. The Due Process Clause does not require a defendant to notify a potential plaintiff that a statue of limitations is about to run, although it certainly would preclude him from obtaining a declaratory judgment that his adversary's claim is barred without giving notice of that proceeding. Appellants also rely on a series of cases that have required specific notice and an opportunity to be heard before a driver's license is suspended for failure to post security after an accident,[29] before property is seized pursuant to a prejudgment replevin order,[30] or before service is terminated by a *537 public utility for failure to tender payment of amounts due.[31] In each of those cases, however, the property interest was taken only after a specific determination that the deprivation was proper.[32] In the instant case, the State of Indiana has enacted a rule of law uniformly affecting all citizens that establishes the circumstances in which a property interest will lapse through the inaction of its owner. None of the cases cited by appellants suggests that an individual must be given advance notice before such a rule of law may operate.[33] *538 We have held that the State may impose on an owner of a mineral interest the burden of using that interest or filing a current statement of claim. We think it follows inexorably that the State may impose on him the lesser burden of keeping informed of the use or nonuse of his own property. We discern no procedural defect in this statute.[34] IV The Indiana statute allows a mineral owner to retain an interest, notwithstanding a failure to file a statement of claim within the statutory period, if he satisfies four specific conditions: (1) he must own at least 10 mineral interests in the county; (2) he must have made a diligent effort to preserve all his interests and have succeeded is preserving some; (3) his failure |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | Texaco, Inc. v. Short | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110600/texaco-inc-v-short/ | interests and have succeeded is preserving some; (3) his failure to preserve the interest in question must have been *539 through "inadvertence"; and (4) he must file a statement of claim within 60 days after receiving notice that the mineral interest has lapsed.[35] Appellants contend that this special exception violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is nothing in the records to tell us how often, if ever, this statutory exception has been invoked. Nor do the records indicate the number of persons who own 10 or more interests in any one county in Indiana. Since mineral interests may be bought and sold like other property, and often have little value, the composition of the class benefited by this exception is subject to constant change. Unlike those classes that are defined by personal characteristics, anyone who purchases 10 fractional mineral interests in the same county, of whatever value, can join this favored class. Although appellants do not suggest that they are financially unable to join the special class, or that its existence has any adverse impact on their own rights or indeed that excision of the exception from the Act would provide them with any benefit whatsoever they nevertheless argue that it is basically unfair to treat owners of multiple interests more favorably than they are treated. The Indiana Supreme Court has explained, however, that the State has an interest in encouraging the assembly of multiple interests in a single ownership because such owners are more likely to be able to engage in the actual production of mineral resources.[36] This *540 state interest in unquestionably legitimate. Thus, a statutory provision that encourages multiple ownership by giving that kind of ownership additional protection against forfeiture after it has been assembled is related to the central purpose of the statute. Since the exception furthers a legitimate statutory purpose, and has no adverse impact on persons like the appellants who owner fewer mineral interests, the exception does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Powell | 1,976 | 17 | concurring | Runyon v. McCrary | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109509/runyon-v-mccrary/ | If the slate were clean I might well be inclined to agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that 1981 was not intended to restrict private contractual choices. Much of the review of the history and purpose of this statute set forth in his dissenting opinion is quite persuasive. It seems to me, however, that it comes too late. The applicability of 1981 to private contracts has been considered maturely and recently, and I do not feel free to disregard these precedents.[*] As they are reviewed in the Court's opinion, I merely cite them: an opinion in which I joined; another opinion in which I joined; ; and particularly and primarily, Although the latter two cases involved 1982, rather than 1981, I agree that their considered holdings with respect to the purpose and meaning of 1982 necessarily apply to both statutes in view of their common derivation. Although the range of consequences suggested by the dissenting opinion, post, at 212, goes far beyond what we hold today, I am concerned that our decision not be construed more broadly than would be justified. By its terms 1981 necessarily imposes some restrictions on those who would refuse to extend to Negroes "the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens." But our holding that this restriction extends to certain actions by private individuals does not imply the intrusive investigation into the motives of every refusal to contract by a private citizen that is suggested by the dissent. As the Court of Appeals suggested, some contracts are so personal "as to have a discernible rule of exclusivity which is inoffensive to 1981." In Sullivan v. Little Hunting we were faced with an association in which "[t]here was no plan or purpose of exclusiveness." Participation was "open to every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race." See also In certain personal contractual relationships, however, such as those where the offeror selects those with whom he desires to bargain on an individualized basis, or where the contract is the foundation of a close association (such as, for example, that between an employer and a private tutor, babysitter, or housekeeper), there is reason to assume that, although the choice made by the offeror is selective, it reflects "a purpose of exclusiveness" other than the desire to bar *188 members of the Negro race. Such a purpose, certainly in most cases, would invoke associational rights long respected. The case presented on the record before us does not involve this type of personal contractual relationship. As the Court |
Justice Powell | 1,976 | 17 | concurring | Runyon v. McCrary | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109509/runyon-v-mccrary/ | involve this type of personal contractual relationship. As the Court of Appeals said, the petitioning "schools are private only in the sense that they are managed by private persons and they are not direct recipients of public funds. Their actual and potential constituency, however, is more public than private." The schools extended a public offer open, on its face, to any child meeting certain minimum qualifications who chose to accept. They advertised in the "Yellow Pages" of the telephone directories and engaged extensively in general mail solicitations to attract students. The schools are operated strictly on a commercial basis, and one fairly could construe their open-end invitations as offers that matured into binding contracts when accepted by those who met the academic, financial, and other racially neutral specified conditions as to qualifications for entrance. There is no reason to assume that the schools had any special reason for exercising an option of personal choice among those who responded to their public offers. A small kindergarten or music class, operated on the basis of personal invitations extended to a limited number of preidentified students, for example, would present a far different case. I do not suggest that a "bright line" can be drawn that easily separates the type of contract offer within the reach of 1981 from the type without. The case before us is clearly on one side of the line, however defined, and the kindergarten and music school examples are clearly on the other side. Close questions undoubtedly will arise in the gray area that necessarily exists in between. But some of the applicable principles and considerations, for the most part identified by the Court's opinion, are *189 clear: 1981, as interpreted by our prior decisions, does reach certain acts of racial discrimination that are "private" in the sense that they involve no state action. But choices, including those involved in entering into a contract, that are "private" in the sense that they are not part of a commercial relationship offered generally or widely, and that reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual entering into a personal relationship, certainly were never intended to be restricted by the 19th century Civil Rights Acts. The open offer to the public generally involved in the cases before us is simply not a "private" contract in this sense. Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court. MR. |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | This case concerns the scope of the cause of action made available by 42 U.S. C. 1985(3) ( ed., Supp. V)[*] to those injured by conspiracies formed "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." A. A. Cross Construction Co., nc. (Cross), contracted with the Department of the Army to construct the Alligator Bayou Pumping Station and Gravity Drainage Structure on the Taylor Bayou Hurricane Levee near Port Arthur, Tex. n accordance with its usual practice, Cross hired workers for the project without regard to union membership. Some of them were from outside the Port Arthur area. Employees *828 of Cross were several times warned by local residents that Cross' practice of hiring nonunion workers was a matter of serious concern to many in the area and that it could lead to trouble. According to the District Court, the evidence showed that at a January 15, 1975, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Sabine Area Building and Construction Trades Council a citizen protest against Cross' hiring practices was discussed and a time and place for the protest were chosen. On the morning of January 17, a large group assembled at the entrance to the Alligator Bayou construction site. n the group were union members present at the January 15 meeting. From this gathering several truckloads of men emerged, drove on to the construction site, assaulted and beat Cross employees, and burned and destroyed construction equipment. The District Court found that continued violence was threatened "if the nonunion workers did not leave the area or concede to union policies and principles." The violence and vandalism delayed construction and led Cross to default on its contract with the Army. The plaintiffs in this case, after amendment of the complaint, were respondents Scott and Matthews two Cross employees who had been beaten and the company itself. The Sabine Area Building and Trades Council, 25 local unions, and various individuals were named as defendants. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants had conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their legally protected rights, contrary to 42 U.S. C. 1985(3) ( ed., Supp. V). The case was tried to the court. A permanent injunction was entered, and damages were awarded against 11 of the local unions, $5,000 each to the individual plaintiffs and $112,385.44 to Cross, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $25,000. n arriving at its judgment, the District Court recognized that to make out a violation of 1985(3), as construed in |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | to make out a violation of 1985(3), as construed in the plaintiff must allege and prove four elements: (1) a conspiracy; *829 (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. The District Court found that the first, third, and fourth of these elements were plainly established. The issue, the District Court thought, concerned the second element, for in construing that requirement in we held that the conspiracy not only must have as its purpose the deprivation of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," but also must be motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." having involved racial animus and interference with rights that Congress could unquestionably protect against private conspiracies, the issue the District Court identified was whether private conspiratorial discrimination against employees of a nonunionized entity is the kind of conduct that triggers the proscription of 1985(3). The District Court concluded that the conspiracy encompassed violations of both the civil and criminal laws of the State of Texas, thus depriving plaintiff of the protections afforded by those laws, that 1985(3) proscribes class-based animus other than racial bias, and that the class of nonunion laborers and employers is a protected class under the section. The District Court believed that "men and women have the right to associate or not to associate with any group or class of individuals, and concomitantly, to be free of violent acts against their bodies and property because of such association or non-association." The conduct evidenced a discriminatory animus against nonunion workers; hence, there had been a violation of the federal law. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, except for setting aside for failure of proof the judgment against 8 of the 11 local *830 unions, affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals understood respondents' submission to be that petitioners' conspiracy was aimed at depriving respondents of their First Amendment right to associate with their fellow nonunion employees and that this curtailment was a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of 1985(3). The Court of Appeals agreed, for the most part, holding that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | holding that the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive plaintiffs of their First Amendment right not to associate with a union. The court rejected the argument that it was necessary to show some state involvement to demonstrate an infringement of First Amendment rights. This argument, it thought, had been expressly rejected in and it therefore felt compelled to disagree with two decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit espousing that position. ; The Court of Appeals went on to hold that 1985(3) reached conspiracies motivated either by political or economic bias. Thus petitioners' conspiracy to harm the nonunion employees of a nonunionized contractor embodied the kind of class-based animus contemplated by 1985(3) as construed in Because of the importance of the issue involved, we granted certiorari, We now reverse. We do not disagree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that there was a conspiracy, an act done in furtherance thereof, and a resultant injury to persons and property. Contrary to the Court of Appeals, however, we conclude that an alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights is not a violation of 1985(3) unless it is proved that the State is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State. We *831 also disagree with the Court of Appeals' view that there was present here the kind of animus that 1985(3) requires. A The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any State from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. The First Amendment, which by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now applies to state governments and their officials, prohibits either Congress or a State from making any "law abridging the freedom of speech, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." Had 1985(3) in so many words prohibited conspiracies to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, it would be untenable to contend that either of those provisions could be violated by a conspiracy that did not somehow involve or affect a State. "t is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one acting under the color of its authority. The Equal Protection Clause `does not. add any thing to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.' United As Mr. JUSTCE DOUGLAS more recently put it, `The |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | United As Mr. JUSTCE DOUGLAS more recently put it, `The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.' United (dissenting opinion). This has been the view of the Court from the beginning. United United The opinion for the Court by Justice Fortas in the companion case characterized the Fourteenth Amendment rights in the same way: "As we have consistently held `The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.' Williams 341 U. S., at " United n this respect, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was thus correct in holding that a conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights is not made out without proof of state involvement. is not to the contrary. There we held that 1985(3) reaches purely private conspiracies and, as so interpreted, was not invalid on its face or as there applied. We recognized that the language of the section referring to deprivations of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and immunities" resembled the language and prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that if 1985(3) was so understood, it would be difficult to conceive of a violation of the statute that did not involve the State in some respect. But we observed that the section does not expressly refer to the Fourteenth Amendment and that there is nothing "inherent" in the language used in 1985(3) "that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the State." This was a correct reading of the language of the Act; the section is not limited by the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment. The broader scope of 1985(3) became even more apparent when we explained that the conspiracy at issue was actionable because it was aimed at depriving the plaintiffs of rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. *833 Section 1985(3) constitutionally can and does protect those rights from interference by purely private conspiracies. did not hold that even when the alleged conspiracy is aimed at a right that is by definition a right only against state interference the plaintiff in a 1985(3) suit nevertheless need not prove that the conspiracy contemplated state involvement of some sort. The complaint in alleged, among other things, a deprivation of First Amendment rights, but we did not sustain the action on the basis of that allegation and paid it scant attention. nstead, we upheld the application of 1985(3) to private conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights constitutionally protected against private, as well as official, encroachment. Neither is respondents' position helped |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | as well as official, encroachment. Neither is respondents' position helped by the assertion that even if the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide authority to proscribe exclusively private conspiracies, precisely the same conduct could be proscribed by the Commerce Clause. That is no doubt the case; but 1985(3) is not such a provision, since it "provides no substantive rights itself" to the class conspired against. Great American Federal Savings & Loan The rights, privileges, and immunities that 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere, and here the right claimed to have been infringed has its source in the First Amendment. Because that Amendment restrains only official conduct, to make out their 1985(3) case, it was necessary for respondents to prove that the State was somehow involved in or affected by the conspiracy. The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in holding that 1985(3) prohibits wholly private conspiracies to abridge the right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Because of that holding the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether respondents' action could be sustained under 1985(3) as involving a conspiracy to deprive respondents of rights, privileges, or immunites under state law or those protected against private action by the Federal *834 Constitution or federal statutory law. Conceivably, we could remand for consideration of these possibilities, or we ourselves could consider them. We take neither course, for in our view the Court of Appeals should also be reversed on the dispositive ground that 1985(3)'s requirement that there must be "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action," 403 U. S., was not satisfied in this case. B As indicated above, after examining the language, structure, and legislative history of 1985(3), the opinion emphatically declared that the section was intended to reach private conspiracies that in no way involved the State. The Court was nevertheless aware that the sweep of 1985 as originally introduced in the House provoked strong opposition in that chamber and precipitated the proposal and adoption of a narrowing amendment, which limited the breadth of the bill so that the bill did not provide a federal remedy for "all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others." n large part, opposition to the original bill had been motivated by a belief that Congress lacked the authority to punish every assault and battery committed by two or more persons. ; Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 115, 153, 188, 315 (1871); As we interpreted the legislative history 12 years ago in the narrowing amendment "centered entirely on the animus or motivation that would |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | amendment "centered entirely on the animus or motivation that would be required." Thus: "The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. *835 See the remarks of Representatives Willard and Shellabarger, The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." This conclusion was warranted by the legislative history, was reaffirmed in and we accept it as the authoritative construction of the statute. Because the facts in revealed an animus against Negroes and those who supported them, a class-based, invidious discrimination which was the central concern of Congress in enacting 1985(3), the Court expressly declined to decide "whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of 1985(3) before us." 403 U.S., n. 9. Both courts below answered that question; both held that the section not only reaches conspiracies other than those motivated by racial bias but also forbids conspiracies against workers who refuse to join a union. We disagree with the latter conclusion and do not affirm the former. C The Court of Appeals arrived at its result by first describing the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan as a political organization that sought to deprive a large segment of the Southern population of political power and participation in the governance of those States and of the Nation. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that because Republicans were among the objects of the Klan's conspiratorial activities, Republicans in particular and political groups in general were to be protected by 1985(3). Finally, because it believed that an animus against an economic group such as those who preferred *836 nonunion association is "closely akin" to the animus against political association, the Court of Appeals concluded that the animus against nonunion employees in the Port Arthur area was sufficiently similar to the animus against a political party to satisfy the requirements of 1985(3). We are unpersuaded. n the first place, it is a close question whether 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most notably Republicans. The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them equal access to political power. The predominant purpose of 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters. The latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views towards the Negro. Although we have examined with some care the legislative history that has been marshaled in support of the position that Congress meant to forbid wholly nonracial, but politically motivated conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. To accede to that view would go far toward making the federal courts, by virtue of 1985(3), the monitors of campaign tactics in both state and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to assume. f respondents' submission were accepted, the proscription of 1985(3) would arguably reach the claim that a political party has interfered with the freedom of speech of another political party by encouraging the heckling of its rival's speakers and the disruption of the rival's meetings. We realize that there is some legislative history to support the view that 1985(3) has a broader reach. Senator Edmunds' statement on the floor of the Senate is the clearest expression of this view. He said that if a conspiracy *837 were formed against a man "because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter, then this section could reach it." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 567 (1871). The provision that is now 1985(3), however, originated in the House. The narrowing amendment, which changed 1985(3) to its present form, was proposed, debated, and adopted there, and the Senate made only technical changes to the bill. Senator Edmunds' views, since he managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, are not without weight. But we were aware of his views in 403 U. S., n. 9, and still withheld judgment on the question whether 1985(3), as enacted, went any farther than its central concern combating the violent and other efforts of the Klan and its allies to resist and to frustrate the intended effects of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Lacking other evidence |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Lacking other evidence of congressional intention, we follow the same course here. D Even if the section must be construed to reach conspiracies aimed at any class or organization on account of its political views or activities, or at any of the classes posited by Senator Edmunds, we find no convincing support in the legislative history for the proposition that the provision was intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities. Such a construction would extend 1985(3) into the economic life of the country in a way that we doubt that the 1871 Congress would have intended when it passed the provision in 1871. Respondents submit that Congress intended to protect two general classes of Republicans, Negroes and Northern immigrants, the latter because the Klan resented carpetbagger efforts to dominate the economic life of the South. Respondents rely on a series of statements made during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, of which 1985 was a part, *838 indicating that Northern laborers and businessmen who had come from the North had been the targets of Klan conspiracies. Brief for Respondents 42-44. As we understand these remarks, however, the speakers believed that these Northerners were viewed as suspect because they were Republicans and were thought to be sympathetic to Negroes. We do not interpret these parts of the debates as asserting that the Klan had a general animus against either labor or capital, or against persons from other States as such. Nor is it plausible that the Southern Democrats were prejudiced generally against enterprising persons trying to better themselves, even if those enterprising persons were from Northern States. The animus was against Negroes and their sympathizers, and perhaps against Republicans as a class, but not against economic groups as such. Senator Pool, on whose remarks respondents rely, identified what he thought was the heart of the matter: "The truth is that whenever a northern man, who goes into a southern State, will prove a traitor to the principles which he entertained at home, when he will lend himself to the purposes of the Democracy or be purchased by them, they forget that he is a carpet-bagger and are ready to use him and elevate him to any office within their gift." Cong Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st. Sess., 607 (1871). We thus cannot construe 1985(3) to reach conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial animus. Were it otherwise, for example, 1985(3) could be brought to bear on any act of violence resulting from |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Carpenters v. Scott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111015/carpenters-v-scott/ | brought to bear on any act of violence resulting from union efforts to organize an employer or from the employer's efforts to resist it, so long as the victim merely asserted and proved that the conduct involved a conspiracy motivated by an animus in favor of unionization, or against it, as the case may be. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S. C. 151 et seq. ( ed. and Supp. V), addresses in great detail the relationship between employer, employee, and union in a great variety of situations, *839 and it would be an unsettling event to rule that strike and picket-line violence must now be considered in the light of the strictures of 1985(3). Moreover, if antiunion, antinonunion, or antiemployer biases represent the kinds of animus that trigger 1985(3), there would be little basis for concluding that the statute did not provide a cause of action in a variety of other situations where one economic group is pitted against another, each having the intent of injuring or destroying the economic health of the other. We think that such a construction of the statute, which is at best only arguable and surely not compelled by either its language or legislative history, should be eschewed and that group actions generally resting on economic motivations should be deemed beyond the reach of 1985(3). Economic and commercial conflicts, we think, are best dealt with by statutes, federal or state, specifically addressed to such problems, as well as by the general law proscribing injuries to persons and property. f we have misconstrued the intent of the 1871 Congress, or, in any event, if Congress now prefers to take a different tack, the Court will, of course, enforce any statute within the power of Congress to enact. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Standefer v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110289/standefer-v-united-states/ | We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a defendant accused of aiding and abetting in the commission of a federal offense may be convicted after the named principal has been acquitted of that offense. I In June 1977, petitioner Standefer was indicted on four counts of making gifts to a public official, in violation of 18 U.S. C. 201 (f), and on five counts of aiding and abetting a revenue official in accepting compensation in addition to that authorized by law, in violation of 26 U.S. C. 72 (a) (2) and 18 U.S. C. 2.[1] The indictment charged that *12 petitioner, as head of Gulf Oil Corp.'s tax department, had authorized payments for five vacation trips to Cyril Niederberger, who then was the Internal Revenue Service agent in charge of the audits of Gulf's federal income tax returns.[2] Specifically, the indictment alleged that Gulf, on petitioner's authorization, had paid for vacations for Niederberger in Pompano Beach Miami (January 1973), Absecon (August-September 1973), Pebble Beach and Las Vegas The four counts under 18 U.S. C. 201 (f) related to the Miami, Absecon, Pebble Beach, and Las Vegas vacations; the five counts under 26 U.S. C. 72 (a) (2) and 18 U.S. C. 2 were one for each vacation.[3] Prior to the filing of this indictment, Niederberger was separately charged in a 10-count indictmenttwo counts for each of the five vacationswith violating 18 U.S. C. 201 (g)[4] and 26 U.S. C. 72 (a) (2). In February 1977, Niederberger was tried on these charges. He was convicted on four counts of violating 201 (g) in connection with the vacations in Miami, Absecon, Pebble Beach, and Las Vegas and of *13 two counts of violating 72 (a) (2) for the Pebble Beach and Las Vegas trips. He was acquitted on the 201 (g) count involving the Pompano Beach trip and on the three counts under 72 (a) (2) charging him with accepting payments from Gulf for trips to Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon.[5] In July 1977, following Niederberger's trial and before the trial in his own case commenced, petitioner moved to dismiss the counts under 72 (a) (2) and 18 U.S. C. 2 which charged him with aiding and abetting Niederberger in connection with the Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon vacations. Petitioner argued that because Niederberger, the only named principal, had been acquitted of accepting unlawful compensation as to those vacations, he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting in the commission of those offenses. The District Court denied the motion. Petitioner's case then proceeded to trial on all nine counts. |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Standefer v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110289/standefer-v-united-states/ | Petitioner's case then proceeded to trial on all nine counts. At trial, petitioner admitted authorizing payment for all five vacation trips, but testified that the trips were purely social and not designed to influence Niederberger in the performance of his official duties. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all nine counts.[6] Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation; he was fined a total of $18,000$2,000 on each count. Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit claiming, inter alia, that he could not * be convicted of aiding and abetting a principal, Niederberger, when that principal had been acquitted of the charged offense. By a divided vote, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, rejected that contention. It concluded that "the outcome of Niederberger's prosecution has no effect on [petitioner's] conviction." Because the question presented is one of importance to the administration of criminal justice on which the Courts of Appeals are in conflict, we granted certiorari.[7] We affirm. II Petitioner makes two main arguments: first, that Congress in enacting 18 U.S. C. 2 did not intend to authorize prosecution of an aider and abettor after the principal has been acquitted of the offense charged; second, that, even if 2 permits such a prosecution, the Government should be barred from relitigating the issue of whether Niederberger accepted unlawful compensation in connection with the Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon vacations.[8] The first contention relies largely on the common law as it prevailed before the enactment of 18 U.S. C. 2. The second rests on the contemporary doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel. *15 A At common law, the subject of principals and accessories was riddled with "intricate" distinctions. 2 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 231 (1883). In felony cases, parties to a crime were divided into four distinct categories: (1) principals in the first degree who actually perpetrated the offense; (2) principals in the second degree who were actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime and aided or abetted its commission; (3) accessories before the fact who aided or abetted the crime, but were not present at its commission; and (4) accessories after the fact who rendered assistance after the crime was complete. See W. LaFave & A. Criminal Law 63 (1972); 4 W. Commentaries *33; Perkins, Parties to Crime, By contrast, misdemeanor cases "d[id] not admit of accessories either before or after the fact," United (No. 15,318) (CC Mass. 1869); instead, all parties to a misdemeanor, whatever their roles, were |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Standefer v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110289/standefer-v-united-states/ | instead, all parties to a misdemeanor, whatever their roles, were principals. United ; 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law 33 Because at early common law all parties to a felony received the death penalty, certain procedural rules developed tending to shield accessories from punishment. See LaFave & Among them was one of special relevance to this case: the rule that an accessory could not be convicted without the prior conviction of the principal offender. See 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *623-*624. Under this rule, the principal's flight, death, or acquittal barred prosecution of the accessory. And if the principal were pardoned or his conviction reversed on appeal, the accessory's conviction could not stand. In every way, "an accessory follow[ed], like a shadow, his principal." 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law 666 (8th ed. 1892). This procedural bar applied only to the prosecution of accessories *16 in felony cases. In misdemeanor cases, where all participants were deemed principals, a prior acquittal of the actual perpetrator did not prevent the subsequent conviction of a person who rendered assistance. Queen v. Humphreys and Turner, [1965] 3 All E. R. 689; Queen v. Burton, 13 Cox C. C. 71, 75 (Crim. App. 1875). And in felony cases a principal in the second degree could be convicted notwithstanding the prior acquittal of the first-degree principal. King v. Taylor and Shaw, 168 Eng. Rep. 283 (1785); Queen v. Wallis, 1 Salk. 334, 91 Eng. Rep. 294 (K. B. 1703); 28 Ga. ; Not surprisingly, considerable effort was expended in defining the categoriesin determining, for instance, when a person was "constructively present" so as to be a second-degree principal. 4 at [*]34. In the process, justice all too frequently was defeated. To overcome these judge-made rules, statutes were enacted in England and in the United States. In 1848 the Parliament enacted a statute providing that an accessory before the fact could be "indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all respects like the Principal." 11 & 12 Vic. ch. 46, 1 As interpreted, the statute permitted an accessory to be convicted "although the principal be acquitted." Queen v. Hughes, Bell 242, 248, 169 Eng. Rep. 1245, 1248 (18). Several state legislatures followed suit.[9] In 1899, *17 Congress joined this growing reform movement with the enactment of a general penal code for Alaska which abrogated the common-law distinctions and provided that "all persons *18 concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the crime or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, are |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Standefer v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110289/standefer-v-united-states/ | aid and abet in its commission, though not present, are principals, and to be tried and punished as such." Act of Mar. 3, 1899, 186, In 1901, Congress enacted a similar provision for the District of Columbia.[10] The enactment of 18 U.S. C. 2 in 1909 was part and parcel of this same reform movement. The language of the statute, as enacted, unmistakably demonstrates the point: "Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 332,[11] *19 The statute "abolishe[d] the distinction between principals and accessories and [made] them all principals." Read against its common-law background, the provision evinces a clear intent to permit the conviction of accessories to federal criminal offenses despite the prior acquittal of the actual perpetrator of the offense. It gives general effect to what had always been the rule for second-degree principals and for all misdemeanants. The legislative history of 2 confirms this understanding. The provision was recommended by the Commission to Revise and Codify the Criminal and Penal Laws of the United States as "[i]n accordance with the policy of recent legislation" by which "those whose relations to a crime would be that of accessories before the fact according to the common law are made principals." 1 Final Report of the Commission to Revise and Codify the Laws of the United States 118-119 (1906). The Commission's recommendation was adopted without change. The House and Senate Committee Reports, in identical language, stated its intended effect: "The committee has deemed it wise to make those who are accessories before the fact at common law principal offenders, thereby permitting their indictment and conviction for a substantive offense. "At common law an accessory can not be tried without his consent before the conviction or outlawry of the principal except where the principal and accessory are tried together; if the principal could not be found or if he had been indicted and refused to plead, had been pardoned or died before conviction, the accessory could not be tried at all. This change of the existing law renders these obstacles to justice impossible." S. Rep. No. 10, th *20 Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 13 (1908); H. R. Rep. No. 2, th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 13 (1908).[12] And on the floor of the House of Representatives, Representative Moon, the Chairman of the Joint Select Committee, put the point simply: "We have abolished the existing arbitrary distinction between felonies and misdemeanors." 42 |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Standefer v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110289/standefer-v-united-states/ | abolished the existing arbitrary distinction between felonies and misdemeanors." 42 Cong. Rec. 585 (1908). This history plainly rebuts petitioner's contention that 2 was not intended to authorize conviction of an aider and abettor after the principal had been acquitted of the offense charged.[13] With the enactment of that section, all participants in conduct violating a federal criminal statute are "principals." As such, they are punishable for their criminal conduct; the fate of other participants is irrelevant.[] *21 B The doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel was unknown to the common law and to the Congress when it enacted 2 in 1909.[15] It emerged in a civil case in 1942, There, we held that a determination of patent invalidity in a prior infringement action was entitled to preclusive effect against the patentee in subsequent litigation against a different defendant. Just this past Term we again applied the doctrinethis time "offensively" to hold that a defendant who had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate issues of fact in a civil proceeding initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission could be estopped from relitigating those issues in a subsequent action brought by a private plaintiff. Parklane Hosiery In both cases, application of nonmutual estoppel promoted judicial economy and conserved private resources without unfairness to the litigant against whom estoppel was invoked. Here, petitioner urges us to apply nonmutual estoppel against the Government; specifically he argues that the Government *22 should be barred from relitigating Niederberger's guilt under 72 (a) (2) in connection with the vacation trips to Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon. That issue, he notes, was an element of his offense which was determined adversely to the Government at Niederberger's trial.[16] This, however, is a criminal case, presenting considerations different from those in Blonder-Tongue or Parklane Hosiery. First, in a criminal case, the Government is often without the kind of "full and fair opportunity to litigate" that is a prerequisite of estoppel. Several aspects of our criminal law make this so: the prosecution's discovery rights in criminal cases are limited, both by rules of court and constitutional privileges; it is prohibited from being granted a directed verdict or from obtaining a judgment notwithstanding the verdict no matter how clear the evidence in support of guilt, cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50; it cannot secure a new trial on the ground that an acquittal was plainly contrary to the weight of the evidence, cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 59; and it cannot secure appellate review where a defendant has been acquitted. See United The absence of these remedial procedures in criminal cases permits |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Standefer v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110289/standefer-v-united-states/ | The absence of these remedial procedures in criminal cases permits juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of "'their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.'" quoting See generally H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury *23 193-347 (ed. 1976).[17] It is of course true that verdicts induced by passion and prejudice are not unknown in civil suits. But in civil cases, post-trial motions and appellate review provide an aggrieved litigant a remedy; in a criminal case the Government has no similar avenue to correct errors. Under contemporary principles of collateral estoppel, this factor strongly militates against giving an acquittal preclusive effect. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) (denying preclusive effect to an unreviewable judgment).[18] The application of nonmutual estoppel in criminal cases is also complicated by the existence of rules of evidence and exclusion unique to our criminal law. It is frequently true in criminal cases that evidence inadmissible against one defendant is admissible against another. The exclusionary rule, for example, may bar the Government from introducing evidence against one defendant because that evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. And the suppression of that evidence may result in an acquittal. *24 The same evidence, however, may be admissible against other parties to the crime "whose rights were [not] violated." Accord, In such circumstances, where evidentiary rules prevent the Government from presenting all its proof in the first case, application of nonmutual estoppel would be plainly unwarranted.[19] It is argued that this concern could be met on a case-by-case basis by conducting a pretrial hearing to determine whether any such evidentiary ruling had deprived the Government of an opportunity to present its case fully the first time around. That process, however, could prove protracted and burdensome. Under such a scheme, the Government presumably would be entitled to seek review of any adverse evidentiary ruling rendered in the first proceeding and of any aspect of the jury charge in that case that worked to its detriment. Nothing short of that would insure that its opportunity to litigate had been "full and fair." If so, the "pretrial hearing" would fast become a substitute for appellate review, and the very purpose of litigation economy that estoppel is designed to promote would be frustrated. Finally, this case involves an ingredient not present in either Blonder-Tongue or Parklane Hosiery: the important federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law. Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery were disputes over private rights between private |
Justice Burger | 1,980 | 12 | majority | Standefer v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110289/standefer-v-united-states/ | and Parklane Hosiery were disputes over private rights between private litigants. In such cases, no significant harm flows from enforcing a rule that affords a litigant only one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, and there is no sound reason for burdening the courts with repetitive litigation. *25 That is not so here. The Court of Appeals opinion put the point well: "[T]he purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a forum for the ascertainment of private rights. Rather it is to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant. The public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal results is greater than the concern for judicial economy professed in civil cases and we are thus inclined to reject, at least as a general matter, a rule that would spread the effect of an erroneous acquittal to all those who participated in a particular criminal transaction. To plead crowded dockets as an excuse for not trying criminal defendants is in our view neither in the best interests of the courts, nor the public." In short, this criminal case involves "competing policy considerations" that outweigh the economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 68.1 (e) and comments thereto (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); cf. III In denying preclusive effect to Niederberger's acquittal, we do not deviate from the sound teaching that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." This case does no more than manifest the simple, if discomforting, reality that "different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept under our jury system." While symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required. See *26 Here, petitioner received a fair trial at which the Government bore the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that Niederberger violated 26 U.S. C. 72 (a) (2) and that petitioner aided and abetted him in that venture. He was entitled to no lessand to no more. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive in civil cases brought by private parties. See ante, at 276-277. Several of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible civil that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due Process Clause forbids awards that are "grossly excessive," Waters-Pierce Oil or "so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable," St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. See also Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone ; Missouri Pacific R. I should think that, if anything, our scrutiny of awards made without the benefit of a legislature's deliberation and guidance would be less indulgent than our consideration of those that fall within statutory limits. Without statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the determination of how large an award of punitive is appropriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves in making this important, and potentially devastating, decision. Indeed, the jury in this case was sent to the jury room with nothing more than the following terse instruction: "In determining the amount of punitive you may take into account the character of the defendants, their financial standing, and the nature of their acts." App. 81. Guidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not suggest that the instruction itself was in error; indeed, it appears to have been a correct statement of Vermont law. The point is, rather, that the instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive are imposed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to do what they think is best. Because " `[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government,' " quoting I for one would look longer and harder at an award of punitive based on such skeletal guidance than I would at one situated within a range of penalties as to which responsible officials had deliberated and then agreed. Since the Court correctly concludes that Browning-Ferris' challenge based on the Due Process Clause is not properly *2 before us, however, I leave fuller discussion of these matters for another day. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Awards of punitive are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | case was $250,000. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sustained on appeal. See Ford Motor ; Ford Motor 171 Ga. App. ; The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products. Some manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market. See, e. g., Brief for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association et. al. as Amici Curiae 5-23. Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive See generally P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 152-171 The trend toward multimillion dollar awards of punitive is exemplified by this case. A Vermont jury found that Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI), tried to monopolize the Burlington roll-off waste disposal market and interfered with the contractual relations of Kelco Disposal, Inc. (Kelco). The jury awarded Kelco $51,000 in compensatory (later trebled) on the antitrust claim, and over $6 million in punitive The award of punitive was 117 times the actual suffered by Kelco and far exceeds the highest reported award of punitive affirmed by a Vermont court. Cf. (punitive of $380,000 based on compensatory of $187,500), cert. denied, The Court holds today that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment places no limits on the amount of punitive that can be awarded in a suit between private parties. That result is neither compelled by history nor supported by precedent, and I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II of the Court's opinion. I do, however, agree with the Court that no due process claims either procedural or substantive are properly presented in this case, and that the award of punitive here should not be overturned as a matter of federal common law. I therefore join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion. Moreover, I share JUSTICE BRENNAN'S view, ante, at 280-2, that nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses a due process challenge to awards of punitive or the method by which they are imposed, and I adhere to my comments in Bankers Life & Casualty regarding the vagueness and procedural due process problems presented by juries given unbridled discretion to impose punitive I Before considering the merits of BFI's Eighth Amendment claim, two preliminary questions must be addressed. First, does the Excessive Fines Clause apply to the States through the Due Process Clause |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | Clause apply to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Second, is a corporation such as BFI protected by the Excessive Fines Clause? A The award of punitive against BFI was based on Vermont law. See Almost 100 years ago, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the States. See See also But 13 years before O'Neil, the Court had applied the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments to a Territory. See In Louisiana ex rel. the Court assumed, without deciding, that the Eighth Amendment applied to the States. Any confusion created by O'Neil, Wilkerson, and Francis was eliminated in in which the Court, albeit without discussion, reversed a state conviction for the offense of narcotics addiction as constituting cruel and unusual punishment and being repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Since Robinson, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has been regularly applied to the States, most notably in the capital sentencing context. In addition, the Court has assumed that the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the States. See I see no reason to distinguish one Clause of the Eighth Amendment from another for purposes of incorporation, and would hold that the Excessive Fines Clause also applies to the States. B In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, a corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." Dartmouth As such, it is not entitled to " `purely personal' guarantees" whose " `historic function' has been limited to the protection of individuals." First National Bank of Thus, a corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or right to privacy, United On the other hand, a corporation has a First Amendment right to freedom *285 of speech, Virginia Pharmacy and cannot have its property taken without just compensation, Penn Central Transportation A corporation is also protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, and can plead former jeopardy as a bar to a prosecution, United Furthermore, a corporation is entitled to due process, Helicopteros Nacionales de and equal protection, Metropolitan Life Ins. of law. Whether a particular constitutional guarantee applies to corporations "depends on the nature, history, and purpose" of the guarantee. First National Bank of at The payment of monetary penalties, unlike the ability to remain silent, is something that a corporation can do as an entity, and the Court has reviewed fines and monetary penalties imposed on corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment at a time when the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the States. See Waters-Pierce Oil 212 -112 See also |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | to the States. See Waters-Pierce Oil 212 -112 See also St. Louis I. M. & S. R. If a corporation is protected by the Due Process Clause from overbearing and oppressive monetary sanctions, it is also protected from such penalties by the Excessive Fines Clause. See Whitney Stores, (SC) (three-judge court) (entertaining Eighth Amendment challenge by corporation to fine for violation of Sunday closing laws), summarily aff'd, II Language in and Ex parte Watkins, suggests that the entire Eighth Amendment is confined to criminal prosecutions and punishments. But as the Court correctly acknowledges, *286 ante, at 262-263, and n. 3, that language is not dispositive here. In Ingraham, the Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment at a public school. Because the Excessive Fines Clause was not at issue in Ingraham, the Court's statement that the "text of the [Eighth] Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of government," is not controlling. The similar statement in Ex parte Watkins, that the Eighth Amendment "is addressed to courts of the United States exercising criminal jurisdiction," -574, is dictum, for the Court there held only that it did not have appellate jurisdiction to entertain a challenge, by way of a writ for habeas corpus, to criminal fines imposed upon a defendant: "[T]his Court has no appellate jurisdiction to revise the sentences of inferior courts in criminal cases; and cannot, even if the excess of the fine were apparent on the record, reverse the sentence." There is another reason not to rely on or be guided by the sweeping statements in Ingraham and Ex parte Watkins. Those statements are inconsistent with the Court's application of the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment to civil proceedings in See United In sum, none of the Court's precedents foreclose application of the Excessive Fines Clause to punitive III The history of the Excessive Fines Clause has been thoroughly canvassed in several recent articles, all of which conclude that the Clause is applicable to punitive See Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 Cooley L. Rev. *287 667 (); Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, ; Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, ; Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, In my view, a chronological account of the Clause and its antecedents demonstrates that the Clause derives from limitations in English law |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | demonstrates that the Clause derives from limitations in English law on monetary penalties exacted in civil and criminal cases to punish and deter misconduct. History aside, this Court's cases leave no doubt that punitive serve the same purposes punishment and deterrence as the criminal law, and that excessive punitive present precisely the evil of exorbitant monetary penalties that the Clause was designed to prevent. A The story of the Excessive Fines Clause begins in the "early days of English justice, before crime and tort were clearly distinct." Jeffries 154. Under the Saxon legal system in pre-Norman England, the victim of a wrong would, rather than seek vengeance through retaliation or "bloodfeud," accept financial compensation for the injury from the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer could also be made to pay an additional sum "on the ground that every evil deed inflicts a wrong on society in general." W. McKechnie, Magna Carta 284-285 (1958) (McKechnie). At some point after the Norman Conquest in 1066, this method of settling disputes gave way to a system in which individuals who had engaged in conduct offensive to the Crown placed themselves "in the King's mercy" so as not to have to satisfy all the monetary claims against them. See generally 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 512-516 (2d ed. 1899) (Pollock & Maitland). In order to receive clemency, these individuals were required to pay an "amercement" to the Crown, its representative, or *288 a feudal lord. ; Massey 1252-1253, and n. 111. But cf. R. Stringham, Magna Carta: Fountainhead of Freedom 40 (1966) (a share of the amercement went to the victim or the victim's family). Because the amercement originated at a time when there was little distinction between criminal law and tort law, it was "neither strictly a civil nor a criminal sanction." Note, at 1716. Blackstone, however, clearly thought that amercements were civil punishments. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *372 ("amercements for misbehaviour in matters of civil right"). As one commentator has noted, the "amercement was assessed most commonly as a civil sanction for wrongfully bringing or defending a civil lawsuit." Massey 1251. The list of conduct meriting amercement was voluminous: trespass, improper or false pleading, default, failure to appear, economic wrongs, torts, and crimes. See generally Beecher's Case, 8 Rep. 58a, b-61b, 77 Eng. Rep. 5, 564-567 (Ex. 1609). The amount of an amercement was set arbitrarily, according to the extent to which the King or his officers "chose to relax the forfeiture of all the offender's goods." Jeffries 154-155. See also 725. Because of the |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | offender's goods." Jeffries 154-155. See also 725. Because of the frequency and sometimes abusive nature of amercements, Chapter 20 of Magna Carta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), prohibited amercements that were disproportionate to the offense or that would deprive the wrongdoer of his means of livelihood: "A Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contenement; and a Merchant likewise, saving to him his Merchandise; and any other's villain than ours shall be likewise amerced, saving his wainage, if he fall into our mercy. And none of the said amerciaments shall be assessed, but by the oath of honest and lawful men of the vicinage. Earls and Barons shall not be amerced but by their Peers, and after the manner of their offence. No man of *289 the Church shall be amerced after the quantity of his spiritual Benefice, but after his Lay-tenement, and after the quantity of his offence" (numbers omitted). After Magna Carta, the amount of an amercement was initially set by the court. A group of the amerced party's peers would then be assembled to reduce the amercement in accordance with the party's ability to pay. McKechnie 288-289. For example, in Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. Ch. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52 Publications of the Selden Society 3, 5 (1934), an amercement for improper civil pleading was vacated, and the bailiff who had imposed the amercement was ordered to "take a moderate amercement proper to the magnitude and manner of that offence." See also Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, (listing other examples of amercements that were reduced or set aside). Fines and amercements had very similar functions. Fines originated in the 13th century as voluntary sums paid to the Crown to avoid an indefinite prison sentence for a common-law crime or to avoid royal displeasure. 2 Pollock & Maitland 517; Massey 1261. The fine operated as a substitute for imprisonment. Having no actual power to impose a fine, the court would sentence the wrongdoer to prison. "To avoid imprisonment, the wrongdoer would then `make fine' by `voluntarily' contracting with the Crown to pay money, thereby ending the matter. The Crown gradually eliminated the voluntary nature of the fine by imposing indefinite sentences upon wrongdoers who effectively would be forced to pay the fine. Once the fine was no longer voluntary, it became the equivalent of an amercement." Note, |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | longer voluntary, it became the equivalent of an amercement." Note, at 1715. See also 719-720. Although in theory fines were voluntary while amercements were not, the purpose of the two penalties was equivalent, and it is not surprising that in practice it became difficult to distinguish the two. *290 B By the 17th century, fines had lost their original character of bargain and had replaced amercements as the preferred penal sanction. The word "fine" took on its modern meaning, while the word "amercement" dropped out of ordinary usage. McKechnie 293. But the nomenclature still caused some confusion. See Griesley's Case, 8 Rep. 38a, 77 Eng. Rep. 530 (C. P. 1609) ("fine" for refusing to serve as a constable analyzed as an "amercement"). William Shakespeare, an astute observer of English law and politics, did not distinguish between fines and amercements in the plays he wrote in the late 16th century. In Romeo and Juliet, published in 17, Prince Escalus uses the words "amerce" and "fine" interchangeably in warning the Montagues and the Capulets not to shed any more blood on the streets of Verona: "I have an interest in your hate's proceeding, My blood for your rude brawls doth lie a-bleeding; But I'll amerce you with so strong a fine, That you shall all repent the loss of mine." Act III, scene 1, lines 186-189. The preeminence of fines gave courts much more power, for only they could impose fines. Massey 1253. Once it was clear that Magna Carta did not apply to fines for offenses against the Crown, see John Hampden's Case, 9 State Tr. 1054, 1126 (K. B. 1684), English courts during the reigns of Charles II and James II took advantage of their newly acquired power and imposed ruinous fines on wrongdoers and critics of the Crown. After James II fled England during the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689, the House of Commons, in an attempt to end the crisis precipitated by the vacation of the throne, appointed a committee to draft articles concerning essential laws and liberties that would be presented to William of Orange. As the Court correctly notes, some of the men who made up the committee had been subjected to heavy fines by the courts of James II. See generally *291 L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689, pp. 30-33, 91- (Schwoerer). The committee ultimately reported 13 Articles to the House of Commons. The final draft of Article 10 provided that "excessive Baile ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted." 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | unusual Punishments inflicted." 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 Stat. at Large 440, 441 (1689). According to Blackstone, the English Bill of Rights was "only declaratory of the old constitutional law." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *372. See also Schwoerer (excessive fines provision of Article 10 "reaffirmed ancient law"). Of course, the only prohibition on excessive monetary penalties predating Article 10 was contained in Magna Carta. "Since it incorporated the earlier prohibition against excessive amercements which could arise in civil settings as well as other forms of punishment, [Article 10's limitation on excessive fines] cannot be limited to strictly criminal cases but extends to monetary sanctions imposed in both criminal and civil contexts." Note, at 1717. Because the word "amercement" had dropped out of ordinary usage by the late 17th century, it appears that the word "fine" in Article 10 was simply shorthand for all monetary penalties, "whether imposed by judge or jury, in both civil and criminal proceedings." Massey 1256. Indeed, three months after the adoption of the English Bill of Rights, the House of Lords reversed a fine by referring to Magna Carta, and not to Article 10. See Earl of Devonshire's Case, 11 State Tr. 1367, 1372 (H. L. 1689) (ruling that "fine" of £30,000 for striking another was "excessive and exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject, and the law of the land"). The Court argues that Chapter 20 of Magna Carta and Article 10 of the English Bill of Rights were concerned only with limiting governmental abuses of power. Because amercements and fines were paid to the Crown, the Court assumes that governmental abuses can only take place when the sovereign itself exacts a penalty. That assumption, however, *2 simply recalls the historical accident that, prior to the mid-18th century, monetary sanctions filled the coffers of the King and his barons. As early as 12, with the First Statute of Westminster, double and treble were allowed by statute. See ante, at 274. However, "[i]t was only after the prevalence of the amercement had diminished that the cases began to report the award of punitive as a common law entitlement." Massey 1266. One of the first reported cases allowing punitive is Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft. 1, 18-19, 98 Eng. Rep. 9, 498-499 (K. B. 1763): "[A] jury have it in their power to give for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself." The link between the gradual disappearance of the amercement and the emergence of punitive provides strong historical support for applying the Excessive Fines Clause to awards of punitive See 728-732. The case of Lord Townsend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 151, 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 994-995 (C. P. 1677), cited by the Court, ante, at 268, 272, is not inconsistent with this understanding of history. At the time Hughes was decided, were understood only as compensation for injury. See T. Blount, Law-Dictionary (1670) (Blount) (unpaginated) (defining "" as "a recompense for what the Plaintiff or Demandant hath suffered, by means of the wrong done him by the Defendant or Tenant") Hughes involved an action for slander, and the jury was told to award for the harm the plaintiff had sustained. The awarded were entirely compensatory and did not contain any punitive element whatsoever. Thus, Hughes does not stand for the proposition that Magna Carta is inapplicable to punitive awarded in civil cases. For the same reasons, neither do the commentaries cited by the Court differentiating between *293 and amercements. See ante, at 265, n. 7, 270, n. 13. The referred to in those commentaries are compensatory, and not punitive, in nature. See, e. g., Introduction to the Curia Regis Rolls, 1199-1230 A. D., in 62 Publications of the Selden Society 463 (C. Flower ed. 1944) ( "represented the loss incurred by a litigant through an unlawful act") Amercements and fines were not meant to compensate the injured plaintiff, but rather to punish the wrongdoer and express society's displeasure at the improper act. Compensatory even in Saxon England, had not been limited by Magna Carta, which was meant to ensure that monetary penalties, assessed in addition to compensatory sums, have some measure of proportionality. The Court also points out that in Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A. C. 1129, 1221-1231, Lord Devlin, in his extensive discussion of exemplary and decision to limit them to certain cases, did not mention either Magna Carta or the Excessive Fines Clause of the English Bill of Rights. Ante, at 273, n. 18. Although this is a small point, I think the Court is mistaken to place any reliance on the lack of citation to Magna Carta or the English Bill of Rights in Rookes. English courts today need not cite those two documents, for the principles set forth in them are now ingrained as part of the common law. See J. Holt, Magna |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | as part of the common law. See J. Holt, Magna Carta 2 (1965) ("[I]t is now possible and indeed justifiable for a lawyer to compose a general survey of the freedom of the individual in England without once referring to Magna Carta"). Indeed, English courts have not cited Magna Carta or the English Bill of Rights in cases involving the excessiveness of criminal fines. See Queen v. Asif, Cr. App. R. 123 (upholding fine of £25,000 for fraudulent evasion of taxes); Queen v. Farenden, 6 Cr. App. R. (S) 42 (finding that fine of £250 for first offense of careless driving was "too heavy" and reducing it to £100). Moreover, Lord Devlin noted in Rookes that punitive could be "used against liberty. Some of the awards that juries have made in the past seem to me to *294 amount to a greater punishment than would be likely to be incurred if the conduct were criminal I should not allow the respect which is traditionally paid to an assessment of by a jury to prevent me from seeing that the weapon is used without restraint." [1964] A. C., at 1227. Thus, he suggested that some limits might have to be placed on punitive : "It may even be that the House [of Lords] may find it necessary to place some arbitrary limit on awards of that are made by way of punishment. Exhortations to be moderate may not be enough." C There was little debate over the Eighth Amendment in the First Congress, and no discussion of the Excessive Fines Clause. Consideration of the Eighth Amendment immediately followed consideration of the Fifth Amendment. After deciding to confine the benefits of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to criminal proceedings, the Framers turned their attention to the Eighth Amendment. There were no proposals to limit that Amendment to criminal proceedings, and the only discussion was by Mr. Smith of South Carolina and Mr. Livermore of New Hampshire, both of whom thought that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was too indefinite. See Granucci 842; Exactly what significance the silence of the Framers has in constitutional interpretation is open to debate, compare, e. g., L. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 42-44 with, e. g., Powell, Rules for Originalists, but it is not necessary to address that issue here. The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Article I, 9, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which had in turn adopted verbatim the language of 10 of the English Bill of Rights. "There can be no doubt that the Declaration of Rights guaranteed at |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | be no doubt that the Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least the liberties and privileges of Englishmen." *295 See also A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 (Howard). If anything is apparent from the history set forth above, it is that a monetary penalty in England could be excessive, and that there is a strong link between amercements, which were assessed in civil cases, and fines. Cf. There is, in short, considerable historical support for application of the Excessive Fines Clause to punitive The Court, however, thinks otherwise, and emphasizes that at the time the Eighth Amendment was enacted, "the word `fine' was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense." Ante, at 265, and n. 6. In my view, the meaning of that word was much more ambiguous than the Court is willing to concede. In defining the word "fine," some 18th-century dictionaries did not mention to whom the money was paid. See, e. g., T. Sheridan, A Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796) (unpaginated) ("a mulct [or] a pecuniary punishment"); S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785) (unpaginated) ("a mulct [or] pecuniary punishment," a "penalty," or "money paid for any exemption or liberty"). To the same effect are some 19th-century dictionaries. See, e. g., 1 C. Richardson, A New Dictionary of the English Language 796 (1839) ("any thing (as a sum of money) paid at the end, to make an end, termination or conclusion of a suit, of a prosecution"). That the word "fine" had a broader meaning in the 18th century is also illustrated by the language of 37 of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641. That provision granted courts the authority to impose on a civil plaintiff who had instituted an improper suit "a proportionable fine to the use of the defendant, or accused person." 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 76 It is noteworthy that the "fine" was payable to a *296 private party, and not a governmental entity. 714. In 1646, the Massachusetts General Court ruled that 37 of the Body of Liberties was based directly on Chapter 20 of Magna Carta. Howard 401, 404. The Court also finds it significant that, in the 18th and 19th centuries, "fines were assessed in criminal, rather than in private civil, actions." Ante, at 265, Again, in my view the Court's recitation of history is not complete. As noted above, 37 of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties required that "fines" payable to private litigants in |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | of Liberties required that "fines" payable to private litigants in civil cases be proportional. Furthermore, not all 17th-century sources unequivocally linked fines with criminal proceedings. See Blount ("fine" is "sometimes an amends, pecuniary punishment, or recompence upon an offence committed against the King, and his laws, or a Lord of a Mannor") Nor did all American courts in the 19th century view "fines" as exclusively criminal. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the word "fine" in a statute meant "forfeitures and penalties recoverable in civil actions, as well as pecuniary punishments inflicted by sentence." It explained that "the word `fine' has other meanings" besides pecuniary penalties "inflicted by sentence of a court in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction as appears by most of the dictionaries of our language, where it is defined not only as a pecuniary punishment, but also as a forfeiture, a penalty, [etc.]" at 374-. The Iowa Supreme Court had the following to say about fines: "The terms, fine, forfeiture, and penalty, are often used loosely, and even confusedly A fine is a pecuniary penalty, and is commonly (perhaps always) to be collected by suit in some form. A `forfeiture' is a penalty by which one loses his rights and interest in his property." Hence, around the time of the framing and enactment of the Eighth Amendment some courts and *297 commentators believed that the word "fine" encompassed civil penalties. D In my view, the $6 million award of punitive imposed on BFI constitutes a fine subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment. In current usage, the word "fine" comprehends a forfeiture or penalty recoverable in a civil action. See Black's Law Dictionary 569 ; Webster's Third New International Dictionary 852 Not only is that understanding supported by the history set forth above, it is buttressed by this Court's precedents. Punitive are "private fines levied by civil juries." Electrical They are not awarded to compensate for injury, but rather to further the aims of the criminal law: " `to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.' " Bankers Life & Casualty 6 U. S., at 87 See also Restatement (Second) of Torts 908(1) Their role therefore "runs counter to the normal reparative function of tort and contract remedies." K. Redden, Punitive Damages 2.1, p. 24 (1980). The Court's cases abound with the recognition of the penal nature of punitive See 1 U.S. 412, ; Memphis Community School ; ; ; ; ; ; Lake Shore & M. S. R. v. Prentice, This plethora of case law on the nature of punitive it seems |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | of case law on the nature of punitive it seems to me, is sufficient to find the Excessive Fines Clause applicable to the award in this case. There is, however, *298 ever, even more support for the applicability of the Clause. In determining whether a sanction is penal, the Court has generally looked to several factors: (1) whether it involves an affirmative disability; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether there is an alternative purpose for it; and (7) whether it is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. I agree with those commentators who have found it easy to conclude that punitive are penal under the Mendoza-Martinez factors. See, e. g., Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 Hastings L. Q. 241 The character of a sanction imposed as punishment "is not changed by the mode in which it is inflicted, whether by a civil action or a criminal prosecution." United As the Court wrote only recently, "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment." United 4 In order to evade the teachings of cases like Choteau and Halper, the Court determines that the Excessive Fines Clause becomes relevant only when some governmental entity is seeking to reap the benefits of a monetary sanction. Ante, at 2-276. I disagree with the Court's formalistic analysis. A governmental entity can abuse its power by allowing civil juries to impose ruinous punitive as a way of furthering the purposes of its criminal law. Cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil (19). I also note that by relying so heavily on the distinction between governmental involvement and purely private suits, the Court suggests (despite its claim, ante, at 2-276, n. 21, that it leaves the question open) that *299 the Excessive Fines Clause will place some limits on awards of punitive that are recovered by a governmental entity. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. 768.73(2)(b) As far as I know, the applicability of a provision of the Constitution has never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law, and in Missouri Pacific R. the Court stressed the constitutional insignificance of how a monetary sanction is administered or by whom it is recovered. Humes involved a state statute providing for double to any individual who suffered |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | state statute providing for double to any individual who suffered harm due to a railroad's failure to maintain fences and cattle guards. In holding that the double provision did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, at the Court said: "The additional being by way of punishment,. it is not a valid objection that the sufferer instead of the State receives them. The power of the State to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion." Humes teaches that the identity of the recipient of a monetary penalty is irrelevant for purposes of determining the constitutional validity of the penalty. From the standpoint of the defendant who has been forced to pay an excessive monetary sanction, it hardly matters what disposition is made of the award. IV The only remaining question is whether the award of over $6 million in this case is "excessive" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. * A Using economic analysis, some of the amici in support of BFI argue that the wealth of a defendant should not, as a constitutional matter, be taken into account in setting the amount of an award of punitive See, e. g., Brief for Navistar International Transportation Corp. as Amicus Curiae 9-25. It seems to me that this argument fails because the Excessive Fines Clause is only a substantive ceiling on the amount of a monetary sanction, and not an economic primer on what factors best further the goals of punishment and deterrence. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, see the Eighth Amendment does not incorporate the views of the Law and Economics School. The "Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory." CTS 1 U.S. 69, Moreover, as a historical matter, the argument is weak indeed. First, Magna Carta only required that an amercement be proportionate and not destroy a person's livelihood. Second, Blackstone remarked that the "quantum, in particular, of pecuniary fines neither can, nor ought to be, ascertained by any invariable law. The value of money itself changes from a thousand causes; and at all events, what is ruin to one man's fortune, may be a matter of indifference to another's." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *371. B Determining whether a particular award of punitive is excessive is not an easy |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | concurring | Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112324/browning-ferris-industries-of-vt-inc-v-kelco-disposal-inc/ | particular award of punitive is excessive is not an easy task. The proportionality framework that the Court has adopted under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, however, offers some broad guidelines. See -2. Cf. United 817 F.2d 1, (applying factors to civil forfeiture under RICO). I would adapt the framework to punitive in the following *301 manner. First, the reviewing court must accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue. Second, the court should examine the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the harshness of the award of punitive Third, because punitive are penal in nature, the court should compare the civil and criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for different types of conduct, and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct. In identifying the relevant civil penalties, the court should consider not only the amount of awards of punitive but also statutory civil sanctions. In identifying the relevant criminal penalties, the court should consider not only the possible monetary sanctions, but also any possible prison term. The Court of Appeals did not think that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to awards of punitive and therefore did not conduct any sort of proportionality analysis. I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals so that it could, in the first instance, apply the framework set forth above and determine whether the award of over $6 million imposed on BFI violates the Excessive Fines Clause. |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | majority | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | Respondents brought this class action in the District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on their claim that their rights were being invaded by the Department of the Army's alleged "surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity." The petitioners in response described the activity as "gathering by lawful means [and] maintaining and using in their intelligence activities information relating to potential or actual civil disturbances [or] street demonstrations." In connection with respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, both parties filed a number of affidavits with the District Court and presented their oral arguments at a hearing on the two motions. On the basis of the pleadings,[1] the affidavits before the court, and the oral arguments advanced at the hearing, the *3 District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding that there was no justiciable claim for relief. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the case remanded for further proceedings. We granted certiorari to consider whether, as the Court of Appeals held, respondents presented a justiciable controversy in complaining of a "chilling" effect on the exercise of their First Amendment rights where such effect is allegedly caused, not by any "specific action of the Army against them, [but] only [by] the existence and operation of the intelligence gathering and distributing system, which is confined to the Army and related civilian investigative agencies." 144 U. S. App. D. C. 72, 78, We reverse. (1) There is in the record a considerable amount of background information regarding the activities of which respondents complained; this information is set out primarily in the affidavits that were filed by the parties in connection with the District Court's consideration of respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and petitioners' motion to dismiss. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b). A brief review of that information is helpful to an understanding of the issues. The President is authorized by 10 U.S. C. 331[2] to make use of the armed forces to quell insurrection *4 and other domestic violence if and when the conditions described in that section obtain within one of the States. Pursuant to those provisions, President Johnson ordered *5 federal troops to assist local authorities at the time of the civil disorders in Detroit, Michigan, in the summer of 1967 and during the disturbances that followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Prior to the Detroit disorders, the Army had a general contingency plan for providing such assistance to local authorities, but the 1967 experience led Army authorities to believe that more attention should |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | majority | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | experience led Army authorities to believe that more attention should be given to such preparatory planning. The data-gathering system here involved is said to have been established in connection with the development of more detailed and specific contingency planning designed to permit the Army, when called upon to assist local authorities, to be able to respond effectively with a minimum of force. As the Court of Appeals observed, "In performing this type function the Army is essentially a police force or the back-up of a local police force. To quell disturbances or to prevent further disturbances the Army needs the same tools and, most importantly, the same information to which local police forces have access. Since the Army is sent into territory almost invariably unfamiliar to most soldiers and their commanders, their need for information is likely to be greater than that of the hometown policeman. "No logical argument can be made for compelling the military to use blind force. When force is employed *6 it should be intelligently directed, and this depends upon having reliable informationin time. As Chief Justice John Marshall said of Washington, `A general must be governed by his intelligence and must regulate his measures by his information. It is his duty to obtain correct information' So we take it as undeniable that the military, i. e., the Army, need a certain amount of information in order to perform their constitutional and statutory missions." 144 U. S. App. D. C., at - The system put into operation as a result of the Army's 1967 experience consisted essentially of the collection of information about public activities that were thought to have at least some potential for civil disorder, the reporting of that information to Army Intelligence headquarters at Fort Holabird, Maryland, the dissemination of these reports from headquarters to major Army posts around the country, and the storage of the reported information in a computer data bank located at Fort Holabird. The information itself was collected by a variety of means, but it is significant that the principal sources of information were the news media and publications in general circulation. Some of the information came from Army Intelligence agents who attended meetings that were open to the public and who wrote field reports describing the meetings, giving such data as the name of the sponsoring organization, the identity of speakers, the approximate number of persons in attendance, and an indication of whether any disorder occurred. And still other information was provided to the Army by civilian law enforcement agencies. The material filed by the Government in the |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | majority | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | enforcement agencies. The material filed by the Government in the District Court reveals that Army Intelligence has field offices in various parts of the country; these offices are staffed in the aggregate with approximately 1,000 agents, 94% *7 of whose time[3] is devoted to the organization's principal mission,[4] which is unrelated to the domestic surveillance system here involved. By early 1970 Congress became concerned with the scope of the Army's domestic surveillance system; hearings on the matter were held before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Meanwhile, the Army, in the course of a review of the system, ordered a significant reduction in its scope. For example, information referred to in the complaint as the "blacklist" and the records in the computer data bank at Fort Holabird were found unnecessary and were destroyed, along with other related records. One copy of all the material relevant to the instant suit was retained, however, because of the pendency of this litigation. The review leading to the destruction of these records was said at the time the District Court ruled on petitioners' motion to dismiss to be a "continuing" one (App. 82), and the Army's policies at that time were represented as follows in a letter from the Under Secretary of the Army to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights: "[R]eports concerning civil disturbances will be limited to matters of immediate concern to the Armythat is, reports concerning outbreaks of violence or incidents with a high potential for violence beyond the capability of state and local police and *8 the National Guard to control. These reports will be collected by liaison with other Government agencies and reported by teletype to the Intelligence Command. They will not be placed in a computer. These reports are destroyed 60 days after publication or 60 days after the end of the disturbance. This limited reporting system will ensure that the Army is prepared to respond to whatever directions the President may issue in civil disturbance situations and without `watching' the lawful activities of civilians." (App. 80.) In briefs for petitioners filed with this Court, the Solicitor General has called our attention to certain directives issued by the Army and the Department of Defense subsequent to the District Court's dismissal of the action; these directives indicate that the Army's review of the needs of its domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a continuing one and that those activities have since been significantly reduced. (2) The District Court held a combined hearing on respondents' motion for a |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | majority | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | Court held a combined hearing on respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and petitioners' motion for dismissal and thereafter announced its holding that respondents had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It was the view of the District Court that respondents failed to allege any action on the part of the Army that was unlawful in itself and further failed to allege any injury or any realistic threats to their rights growing out of the Army's actions.[5] *9 In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that respondents "have some difficulty in establishing visible injury": "[They] freely admit that they complain of no specific action of the Army against them There is no evidence of illegal or unlawful surveillance activities. We are not cited to any clandestine intrusion by a military agent. So far as is yet shown, the information gathered is nothing more than a good newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publications available on any newsstand." 144 U. S. App. D. C., at 78, 444 F.2d, at The court took note of petitioners' argument "that nothing [detrimental to respondents] has been done, that nothing is contemplated to be done, and even if some action by the Army against [respondents] were possibly foreseeable, such would not present a presently justiciable controversy." With respect to this argument, the Court of Appeals had this to say: "This position of the [petitioners] does not accord full measure to the rather unique argument advanced by appellants [respondents]. While [respondents] do indeed argue that in the future it is possible that *10 information relating to matters far beyond the responsibilities of the military may be misused by the military to the detriment of these civilian [respondents], yet [respondents] do not attempt to establish this as a definitely foreseeable event, or to base their complaint on this ground. Rather, [respondents] contend that the present existence of this system of gathering and distributing information, allegedly far beyond the mission requirements of the Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on [respondents] and other persons similarly situated which exercises a present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights" (Emphasis in original.) Our examination of the record satisfies us that the Court of Appeals properly identified the issue presented, namely, whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | majority | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose. We conclude, however, that, having properly identified the issue, the Court of Appeals decided that issue incorrectly.[6] *11 In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or "chilling," effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights. E. g., ; ; ; In none of these cases, however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to that individual. Rather, in each of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging. For example, the petitioner in had been denied admission to the bar solely because of her refusal to answer a question regarding the organizations with which she had been associated in the past. In announcing the judgment of the Court, *12 Mr. Justice Black said that "a State may not inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes." Some of the teachers who were the complainants in had been discharged from employment by the State, and the others were threatened with such discharge, because of their political acts or associations. The Court concluded that the State's "complicated and intricate scheme" of laws and regulations relating to teacher loyalty could not withstand constitutional scrutiny; it was not permissible to inhibit First Amendment expression by forcing a teacher to "guess what conduct or utterance" might be in violation of that complex regulatory scheme and might thereby "lose him his position." dealt with a governmental regulation requiring private individuals to make a special written request to the Post Office for delivery of each individual mailing of certain kinds of political literature addressed to them. In declaring the regulation invalid, the Court said: "The addressee carries an affirmative obligation which we do not think the Government may impose on him." dealt with a requirement that an oath of vague and uncertain meaning be taken as a condition of employment by a governmental agency. |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | majority | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | taken as a condition of employment by a governmental agency. The Court said: "Those with a conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear or affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, avoid the risk of loss of employment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited." The decisions in these cases fully recognize that governmental action may be subject to constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the *13 exercise of First Amendment rights. At the same time, however, these decisions have in no way eroded the "established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action" Ex parte Levitt, The respondents do not meet this test; their claim, simply stated, is that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army needs and that the very existence of the Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights. That alleged "chilling" effect may perhaps be seen as arising from respondents' very perception of the system as inappropriate to the Army's role under our form of government, or as arising from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be concerned with activities in the civilian sector, or as arising from respondents' less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way that would cause direct harm to respondents.[7] Allegations of a subjective "chill" *14 are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm; "the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions." United Public Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking is a broad-scale investigation, conducted by themselves as private parties armed with the subpoena power of a federal district court and the power of cross-examination, to probe into the Army's intelligence-gathering activities, with the district court determining at the conclusion of that investigation the extent to which those activities may or may not be appropriate to the Army's mission. The following excerpt from the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests the broad sweep implicit in its holding: "Apparently |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | majority | Laird v. Tatum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108595/laird-v-tatum/ | Appeals suggests the broad sweep implicit in its holding: "Apparently in the judgment of the civilian head of the Army not everything being done in the operation of this intelligence system was necessary to the performance of the military mission. If the Secretary of the Army can formulate and implement such judgment based on facts within his Departmental *15 knowledge, the United States District Court can hear evidence, ascertain the facts, and decide what, if any, further restrictions on the complained-of activities are called for to confine the military to their legitimate sphere of activity and to protect [respondents'] allegedly infringed constitutional rights." 144 U. S. App. D. C., at (Emphasis added.) Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the "power of the purse"; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action. We, of course, intimate no view with respect to the propriety or desirability, from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities of the Department of the Army; our conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that on this record the respondents have not presented a case for resolution by the courts. The concerns of the Executive and Legislative Branches in response to disclosure of the Army surveillance activities and indeed the claims alleged in the complaint reflect a traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our history and found early expression, for example, in the Third Amendment's explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes without consent and in the constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military. Those prohibitions are not directly presented by this case, but their philosophical underpinnings explain our traditional insistence on limitations on military operations in peacetime. Indeed, when presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury *16 resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history or in this Court's decided cases, including our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110085/greenholtz-v-inmates-of-neb-penal-and-correctional-complex/ | We granted certiorari to decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to discretionary parole-release determinations made by the Nebraska Board of Parole, and, if so, whether the procedures the Board currently provides meet constitutional requirements. I Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex brought a class action under 42 U.S. C. 1983 claiming that they had been unconstitutionally denied parole by the Board *4 of Parole. The suit was filed against the individual members of the Board. One of the claims of the inmates was that the statutes and the Board's procedures denied them procedural due process. The statutes provide for both mandatory and discretionary parole. Parole is automatic when an inmate has served his maximum term, less good-time credits. Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-1,107 (1) (b) An inmate becomes eligible for discretionary parole when the minimum term, less good-time credits, has been served. 83-1,110 (1). Only discretionary parole is involved in this case. The procedures used by the Board to determine whether to grant or deny discretionary parole arise partly from statutory provisions and partly from the Board's practices. Two types of hearings are conducted: initial parole review hearings and final parole hearings. At least once each year initial review hearings must be held for every inmate, regardless of parole eligibility. 83-192 (9).[1] At the initial review hearing, the Board examines the inmate's entire preconfinement and postconfinement record. Following that examination it provides an informal hearing; no evidence as such is introduced, but the Board interviews the inmate and considers any letters or statements that he wishes to present in support of a claim for release. If the Board determines from its examination of the entire record and the personal interview that he is not yet a good risk for release, it denies parole, informs the inmate why release was deferred and makes recommendations designed to *5 help correct any deficiencies observed. It also schedules another initial review hearing to take place within one year. If the Board determines from the file and the initial review hearing that the inmate is a likely candidate for release, a final hearing is scheduled. The Board then notifies the inmate of the month in which the final hearing will be held; the exact day and time is posted on a bulletin board that is accessible to all inmates on the day of the hearing. At the final parole hearing, the inmate may present evidence, call witnesses and be represented by private counsel of his choice. It is not a traditional adversary hearing since the inmate is not permitted |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110085/greenholtz-v-inmates-of-neb-penal-and-correctional-complex/ | a traditional adversary hearing since the inmate is not permitted to hear adverse testimony or to cross-examine witnesses who present such evidence. However, a complete tape recording of the hearing is preserved. If parole is denied, the Board furnishes a written statement of the reasons for the denial within 30 days. 83-1, 111 (2).[2] II The District Court held that the procedures used by the Parole Board did not satisfy due process. It concluded that the inmate had the same kind of constitutionally protected "conditional liberty" interest, recognized by this Court in held that some of the procedures used by the Parole Board fell short of constitutional guarantees, and prescribed several specific requirements. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the inmate had a Morrissey-type, conditional liberty interest at stake and also found a *6 statutorily defined, protectible interest in Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-1,114 The Court of Appeals, however, modified the procedures required by the District Court as follows: (a) When eligible for parole each inmate must receive a full formal hearing; (b) the inmate is to receive written notice of the precise time of the hearing reasonably in advance of the hearing, setting forth the factors which may be considered by the Board in reaching its decision; (c) subject only to security considerations, the inmate may appear in person before the Board and present documentary evidence in his own behalf. Except in unusual circumstances, however, the inmate has no right to call witnesses in his own behalf; (d) a record of the proceedings, capable of being reduced to writing, must be maintained; and (e) within a reasonable time after the hearing, the Board must submit a full explanation, in writing, of the facts relied upon and reasons for the Board's action denying parole. The Court's holding mandating the foregoing procedures for parole determinations conflicts with decisions of other Courts of Appeals, see, e. g., (CA5), cert. denied, ; (CA5) (en banc), vacated as moot, ; Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, No. 74-1899 vacated and remanded to consider mootness, See also cert. denied, ; United States ex rel. cert. denied, We granted certiorari to resolve the Circuit conflicts. *7 III The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty or property; accordingly, when there is a claimed denial of due process we have inquired into the nature of the individual's claimed interest. "[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the `weight' but to the nature of the interest |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110085/greenholtz-v-inmates-of-neb-penal-and-correctional-complex/ | to the `weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Board of This has meant that to obtain a protectible right "a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: "[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." Decisions of the Executive Branch, however serious their impact, do not automatically invoke due process protection; there simply is no constitutional guarantee that all executive decisionmaking must comply with standards that assure error-free determinations. See ; ; This is especially true with respect to the sensitive choices presented by the administrative decision to grant parole release. A state may, as Nebraska has, establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so. Moreover, to insure that the *8 state-created parole system serves the public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence,[3] the state may be specific or general in defining the conditions for release and the factors that should be considered by the parole authority. It is thus not surprising that there is no prescribed or defined combination of facts which, if shown, would mandate release on parole. Indeed, the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage. In parole releases, like its siblings probation release and institutional rehabilitation, few certainties exist. In each case, the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate and for the community.[4] This latter conclusion requires the Board to assess whether, in light of the nature of the crime, the inmate's release will minimize the gravity of the offense, weaken the deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for the administration of justice. The entire inquiry is, in a sense, an "equity" type judgment that cannot always be articulated in traditional findings. IV Respondents suggest two theories to support their view that they have a constitutionally protected interest in a parole determination which calls for the process mandated by the |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110085/greenholtz-v-inmates-of-neb-penal-and-correctional-complex/ | parole determination which calls for the process mandated by the Court of Appeals. First, they claim that a reasonable entitlement is created whenever a state provides for the possibility *9 of parole. Alternatively, they claim that the language in Nebraska's statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-1, 114 (1) creates a legitimate expectation of parole, invoking due process protections. A In support of their first theory, respondents rely heavily on where we held that a parole-revocation determination must meet certain due process See also They argue that the ultimate interest at stake both in a parole-revocation decision and in a parole determination is conditional liberty and that since the underlying interest is the same the two situations should be accorded the same constitutional protection. The fallacy in respondents' position is that parole release and parole revocation are quite different. There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires. The parolees in Morrissey (and probationers in Gagnon) were at liberty and as such could "be gainfully employed and [were] free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life." The inmates here, on the other hand, are confined and thus subject to all of the necessary restraints that inhere in a prison. A second important difference between discretionary parole release from confinement and termination of parole lies in the nature of the decision that must be made in each case. As we recognized in Morrissey, the parole-revocation determination actually requires two decisions: whether the parole in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of parole and whether the parolee should be recommitted either for his or society's benefit. "The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual question." The parole-release decision, however, is more subtle and *10 depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release. Unlike the revocation decision, there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable to the individual. The parole determination, like a prisoner-transfer decision, may be made "for a variety of reasons and often involve[s] no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate." 427 U. S., The decision turns on a "discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110085/greenholtz-v-inmates-of-neb-penal-and-correctional-complex/ | "discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done." Kadish, The Advocate and the ExpertCounsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, The differences between an initial grant of parole and the revocation of the conditional liberty of the parolee are well recognized. In United States ex rel. the Second Circuit took note of this critical distinction: "It is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom so long as he abides by the conditions of his release, than to his mere anticipation or hope of freedom." Judge Henry Friendly cogently noted that "there is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what one wants." Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," See also 528 F. 2d, at 1053; 477 F. 2d, at 282; 569 F. 2d, at 799 (Field, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. That the state holds out the possibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. Board of U. S., To that extent the general interest asserted here is no more substantial than the inmate's hope that he will not be transferred to another prison, a hope which is not protected by due process. 427 U. S., ; B Respondents' second argument is that the Nebraska statutory language itself creates a protectible expectation of parole. They rely on the section which provides in part: "Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because: "(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole; "(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law; "(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or "(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date." Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-1,114 (1)[5] Respondents emphasize that the structure of the provision together with the use of the word "shall" binds the Board of *12 Parole to release an inmate unless any one of the four specifically designated reasons are found. In their view, the statute creates a presumption that parole release will be granted, and that this in turn creates a legitimate expectation of release absent the |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | majority | Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110085/greenholtz-v-inmates-of-neb-penal-and-correctional-complex/ | in turn creates a legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite finding that one of the justifications for deferral exists. It is argued that the Nebraska parole-determination provision is similar to the Nebraska statute involved in that granted good-time credits to inmates. There we held that due process protected the inmates from the arbitrary loss of the statutory right to credits because they were provided subject only to good behavior. We held that the statute created a liberty interest protected by due process guarantees. The Board argues in response that a presumption would be created only if the statutory conditions for deferral were essentially factual, as in Wolff and Morrissey, rather than predictive. Since respondents elected to litigate their due process claim in federal court, we are denied the benefit of the Nebraska court's interpretation of the scope of the interest, if any, the statute was intended to afford to inmates. See We can accept respondents' view that the expectancy of release provided in this statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. However, we emphasize that this statute has unique structure and language and thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case basis. We therefore turn to an examination of the statutory procedures to determine whether they provide the process that is due in these circumstances. It is axiomatic that due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." ; Cafeteria & Restaurant ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error. Here, as we noted previously, the Parole Board's decision as defined by Nebraska's statute is necessarily subjective in part and predictive in part. Like most parole statutes, it vests very broad discretion in the Board. No ideal, error-free way to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been and will continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of the actual parole decisionmakers in predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism encourages this state experimentation. If parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states |
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