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Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | ICC v. Transcon Lines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117886/icc-v-transcon-lines/ | did no more than require a balancing of the carrier's argument based on the filed rate doctrine against the ICC's argument based on the credit It thought the balance tilted in favor of disallowing relief. A grant of an injunction would, the Court of Appeals reasoned, "permit an end-run around the filed rate doctrine" by allowing a carrier and shipper to negotiate a private discount from the filed rate, while denying the injunction would still leave the ICC with "a wide array of tools for enforcing its credit " We again granted certiorari, and now reverse. II Just as Reiter was in important respects "a sequel to our decision in " this case is a sequel to our decision in Southern Pacific Transp. In Commercial the carrier released goods to the consignee before payment, but failed to investigate the consignee's credit standing, as ICC regulations required, 49 CFR 1320.1 (1981). See 341, and n. 6. When collection against the consignee proved fruitless and the carrier turned to the shipper for payment, the shipper sought to raise the carrier's violation as a defense. We held the defense improper when raised by the shipper, noting our reluctance to grant the shipper an implied remedy when the statutory scheme did not grant an express one. We went on to say, however, that the case would have been quite different had it involved the ICC's seeking injunctive relief, a remedy for which it has specific authority under the Act. We held that "[t]he remedies for a carrier's violations of the regulations are best left to the ICC for such resolution as it thinks proper," and specified that "the ICC has ample authority to police the *145 credit practices of [by] seek[ing] a federal-court injunction requiring a carrier to comply with the" We conclude that the ICC here is exercising the enforcement powers we acknowledged in Commercial The Act grants the ICC broad authority to bring civil actions to enforce the statute and regulations or orders issued under it. 49 U.S. C. 11702. As respondents themselves concede, the trustee is attempting in this case to collect liquidated damages in violation of the ICC's credit See Brief in Opposition 4-5. To the extent the injunction applies to "a bankruptcy trustee" applying liquidated damages "to aggregate balance-due claims sought for collection on past shipments," the ICC seeks a prospective bar to the trustee's violation of 49 CFR 1320.2(g)(2)(iii) This aspect of the ICC's suit is, in effect, a compliance action the precise relief the Court approved in Commercial To the extent the ICC seeks to enjoin collection |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | ICC v. Transcon Lines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117886/icc-v-transcon-lines/ | Commercial To the extent the ICC seeks to enjoin collection of liquidated damages as a remedy for 's lack of notification in the original bills, see 49 CFR 1320.3(c) (1992), and nonissuance of revised bills within 90 days, see 1320.2(g)(2)(vi), this remedy too is appropriate. The Court's observation in Commercial that the choice of remedies for violation of its regulations is "best left to the ICC," was a particular invocation of the general principle that "the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence," Phelps Dodge ; (citing Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, (18)). Although the ICC's authority to determine proper remedies for violations under the Act is not without limits, its judgment that a particular remedy is an appropriate exercise of its enforcement authority under 49 U.S. C. 11702(a)(4) is entitled to some deference. *146 Two substantial reasons support our conclusion that the remedy chosen by the agency is an appropriate one. First, its remedy appears to the ICC, and to us, necessary to the effective enforcement of its See Commercial ; see also Hewitt-Robins Were we to disallow the injunction, respondents and other trustees of bankrupt would be immune, in effect, from enforcement of the credit Relief limited to prospective injunctions requiring to provide notice of liquidated damages and to send revised bills could have no effect on bankrupt and their trustees. Nor do the Act's remedies for unlawful rates, see 49 U.S. C. 10704(b)(1), 11705(b)(3), allow for adequate enforcement of the credit regulations, for not every credit violation will result in an unlawful rate. Second, unlike the credit regulation violated in Commercial which was intended to protect -346, the requirements for notice of liquidated damages are to protect shippers from the imposition of penalties without warning. When a carrier fails to provide notice, it is an appropriate remedy for the ICC to bar collection of the liquidated damages, for the remedy serves the regulations' intended beneficiaries. Cf. In short, whether or not we would allow shippers to defend against a carrier's collection action by relying on the carrier's violation of credit regulations, it follows from Commercial and our construction of the controlling statute that the ICC has the authority and the discretion to determine appropriate remedies for these violations. Where, as here, the remedy involves "a federal-court injunction requiring *147 a carrier to comply with the regulations," ; constitutes a reasonable and necessary means to effect enforcement of the ICC's credit regulations; and protects the intended beneficiaries of the violated regulations, we believe the injunction is authorized under the Act. In we concluded |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | ICC v. Transcon Lines | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117886/icc-v-transcon-lines/ | the injunction is authorized under the Act. In we concluded the ICC's policy and its interpretation of the Act were "flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a whole." 4 U.S., at 131. We rejected the ICC's enforcement policy, just as we had declined to permit general, nonstatutory equitable defenses in a collection suit. Our concern was that the policy would undercut the whole filed rate system, thus permitting shippers to enforce secret, negotiated, unfiled rates and allowing to discriminate in favor of certain customers. Neither nor our other filed rate cases suggest that the filed rate doctrine prohibits the ICC from requiring departure from a filed rate when necessary to enforce other specific and valid regulations adopted under the Act, regulations that are consistent with the filed rate system and compatible with its effective operation. Carriers must comply with the comprehensive scheme provided by the statute and regulations promulgated under it, and their failure to do so may justify departure from the filed rate. In Reiter, for example, we confirmed that the filed rate doctrine "assuredly does not preclude avoidance of the tariff rate through claims and defenses that are specifically accorded by the [Act] itself." Here, of course, the ICC can and does rely upon Commercial governing the powers of the ICC and not the defenses available to shippers. As we acknowledged in the ICC can require that filed rates be "`suspended or set aside' " in various 4 U.S., at 126 ); see also ICC v. American Trucking ("[T]he Commission may conduct an investigation into a tariff's lawfulness at any time after it has gone into effect," and *148 where a tariff violates the Act, "the Commission has authority to cancel the tariff and require that a reasonable and nondiscriminatory rate apply in the future. 10704(b)(1)"). Any remaining doubts as to the appropriateness of the relief sought are dispelled upon close examination of respondents' particular contention that an injunction here would displace the tariff system by substituting a private agreement for the filed rate. This is not so. The charge that cannot be collected is, as respondents themselves concede, Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, the charge for liquidated damages. The ICC has said in a regulation promulgated under the Act that "[t]he difference between the discount and the full rate constitutes a carrier's liquidated damages for its collection effort." 49 CFR 1320.2(g)(1)(ii) ; see 49 U.S. C. 10743(b)(1) (Act authorizes the extension of creditand therefore any liquidated damages resulting from the extension of creditonly pursuant to ICC regulations). The regulation is entitled to deference as an interpretation |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | majority | Reno v. Condon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118327/reno-v-condon/ | The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA or Act), 18 U.S. C. 2721-2725 (1994 ed. and Supp. IV), regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle departments (DMVs). We hold that in enacting this statute Congress did not run afoul of the federalism principles enunciated in New and The DPPA regulates the disclosure and resale of personal information contained in the records of state DMVs. State DMVs require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, vehicle description, Social Security number, medical information, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress found that many States, in turn, sell this personal information to individuals and businesses. See, e. g., 139 Cong. Rec. 29466, 29468, 29469 (1993); 140 Cong. Rec. 7929 *144 (1994) (remarks of Rep. Goss). These sales generate significant revenues for the States. See The DPPA establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent. The DPPA generally prohibits any state DMV, or officer, employee, or contractor thereof, from "knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record." 18 U.S. C. 2721(a). The DPPA defines "personal information" as any information "that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information," but not including "information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status." 2725(3). A "motor vehicle record" is defined as "any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator's permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles." 2725(1). The DPPA's ban on disclosure of personal information does not apply if drivers have consented to the release of their data. When we granted certiorari in this case, the DPPA provided that a DMV could obtain that consent either on a case-by-case basis or could imply consent if the State provided drivers with an opportunity to block disclosure of their personal information when they received or renewed their licenses and drivers did not avail themselves of that opportunity. 2721(b)(11), (13), and (d). However, Stat. 986, which was signed into law on October 9, 1999, changed this "opt-out" alternative to an "opt-in" requirement. Under the amended DPPA, States may not imply consent from a driver's failure to take advantage of a *145 state-afforded opportunity |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | majority | Reno v. Condon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118327/reno-v-condon/ | driver's failure to take advantage of a *145 state-afforded opportunity to block disclosure, but must rather obtain a driver's affirmative consent to disclose the driver's personal information for use in surveys, marketing, solicitations, and other restricted purposes. See Stat. 986 350(c), (d), and (e), App. to Supp. Brief for Petitioners 1(a), 2(a). The DPPA's prohibition of nonconsensual disclosures is also subject to a number of statutory exceptions. For example, the DPPA requires disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act, the Clean Air Act, and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49." 18 U.S. C. 2721(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (citations omitted). The DPPA permits DMVs to disclose personal information from motor vehicle records for a number of purposes.[1] *146 The DPPA's provisions do not apply solely to States. The Act also regulates the resale and redisclosure of drivers' personal information by private persons who have obtained that information from a state DMV. 18 U.S. C. 2721(c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). In general, the Act allows private persons who have obtained drivers' personal information for one of the aforementioned permissible purposes to further disclose that information for any one of those purposes. If a State has obtained drivers' consent to disclose their personal information to private persons generally and a private person has obtained that information, the private person may redisclose the information for any purpose. Additionally, a private actor who has obtained drivers' information from DMV records specifically for direct-marketing purposes may resell that information for other direct-marketing uses, but not otherwise. Any person who rediscloses or resells personal information from DMV records must, for five years, maintain records identifying to whom the records were disclosed and the permitted purpose for the resale or redisclosure. The DPPA establishes several penalties to be imposed on States and private actors that fail to comply with its requirements. The Act makes it unlawful for any "person" knowingly to obtain or disclose any record for a use that is not permitted under its provisions, or to make a false representation in order to obtain personal information from a motor vehicle record. 2722(a) and (b). Any person who knowingly violates the DPPA may be |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | majority | Reno v. Condon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118327/reno-v-condon/ | (b). Any person who knowingly violates the DPPA may be subject to a criminal fine, 2723(a), 2725(2). Additionally, any person who knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses information from a state motor vehicle record for a use other than those specifically permitted by the DPPA may be subject to liability in a civil action *147 brought by the driver to whom the information pertains. 2724. While the DPPA defines "person" to exclude States and state agencies, 2725(2), a state agency that maintains a "policy or practice of substantial noncompliance" with the Act may be subject to a civil penalty imposed by the United States Attorney General of not more than $5,000 per day of substantial noncompliance. 2723(b). South Carolina law conflicts with the DPPA's provisions. Under that law, the information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. S. C. Code Ann. 56-3510 to 56-3540 South Carolina's DMV retains a copy of all requests for information from the State's motor vehicle records, and it is required to release copies of all requests relating to a person upon that person's written petition. 56-3520. State law authorizes the South Carolina DMV to charge a fee for releasing motor vehicle information, and it requires the DMV to allow drivers to prohibit the use of their motor vehicle information for certain commercial activities. 56 3-530, 56-3540. Following the DPPA's enactment, South Carolina and its Attorney General, respondent Condon, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the DPPA violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court concluded that the Act is incompatible with the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution's division of power between the States and the Federal Government. The court accordingly granted summary judgment for the State and permanently enjoined the Act's enforcement against the State and its officers. See The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Act violates constitutional principles *148 of federalism. See We granted certiorari, and now reverse. We of course begin with the time-honored presumption that the DPPA is a "constitutional exercise of legislative power." ; see also The United States asserts that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3.[2] The United States bases its Commerce Clause argument on the fact that the |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | majority | Reno v. Condon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118327/reno-v-condon/ | bases its Commerce Clause argument on the fact that the personal, identifying information that the DPPA regulates is a "thin[g] in interstate commerce," and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation. United We agree with the United States' contention. The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate motoring. Because drivers' information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation. We therefore need not address the Government's alternative argument that the States' individual, intrastate activities in gathering, maintaining, and distributing drivers' personal *149 information have a sufficiently substantial impact on interstate commerce to create a constitutional base for federal legislation. But the fact that drivers' personal information is, in the context of this case, an article in interstate commerce does not conclusively resolve the constitutionality of the DPPA. In New York and Printz, we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment. In New York, Congress commandeered the state legislative process by requiring a state legislature to enact a particular kind of law. We said: "While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions. See" In Printz, we invalidated a provision of the Brady Act which commanded "state and local enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers." We said: "We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." South Carolina contends that the DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment because it "thrusts upon the States all of the *150 day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex provisions," Brief for Respondents 10, and thereby makes "state officials the unwilling implementors |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | majority | Reno v. Condon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118327/reno-v-condon/ | Respondents 10, and thereby makes "state officials the unwilling implementors of federal policy,"[3] South Carolina emphasizes that the DPPA requires the State's employees to learn and apply the Act's substantive restrictions, which are summarized above, and notes that these activities will consume the employees' time and thus the State's resources. South Carolina further notes that the DPPA's penalty provisions hang over the States as a potential punishment should they fail to comply with the Act. We agree with South Carolina's assertion that the DPPA's provisions will require time and effort on the part of state employees, but reject the State's argument that the DPPA violates the principles laid down in either New York or Printz. We think, instead, that this case is governed by our decision in South In Baker, we upheld a statute that prohibited States from issuing unregistered bonds because the law "regulate[d] state activities," rather than "seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties." We further noted: "The [National Governor's Association] nonetheless contends that 310 has commandeered the state legislative and administrative process because many state legislatures had to amend a substantial number of statutes in order to issue bonds in registered form and because state officials had to devote substantial effort to determine how best to implement a registered bond system. Such `commandeering' is, however, an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage *151 in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect." Like the statute at issue in Baker, the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of data bases. It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz. As a final matter, we turn to South Carolina's argument that the DPPA is unconstitutional because it regulates the States exclusively. The essence of South Carolina's argument is that Congress may only regulate the States by means of "generally applicable" laws, or laws that apply to individuals as well as States. But we need not address the question whether general applicability is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States, because the DPPA is generally |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | The question presented in these cases is whether Congress violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by requiring private railroads to reimburse the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) for rail travel privileges that Amtrak provides to the railroads' employees and former employees, and their dependents. I A From the middle of the 19th century, the railroad passenger coach played a significant and sometimes romantic role in American cultural and economic life. By the middle of this century, however, "this time-honored vehicle" threatened to "take its place in the transportation museum along with the *454 stagecoach, the sidewheeler, and the steam locomotive."[1] Whereas in 1929 about 20,000 intercity trains operated in the country,[2] by 1946, there were only about 11,000 such passenger trains; by 1971, fewer than 500 passenger trains still operated.[3] As cars, buses, and airplanes displaced the passenger railroads, those railroads that continued to provide passenger carriage incurred heavy and continuing losses. At the same time, as common carriers these railroads were bound to continue providing service until the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) or state regulatory authorities relieved them of this responsibility. Given the tremendous operating losses, many of the remaining handful of railroads operating passenger coaches sought ICC permission to discontinue passenger train The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Act or RPSA), 45 U.S. C. 501 et seq. (1970 ed.), which took effect on May 1, 1971, was Congress' effort to "revive the failing intercity passenger train industry and retain a high-quality rail passenger service for the Nation."[4] On concluding that a reorganized and restructured rail passenger system could be successful, Congress established the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, a private, for-profit corporation that has come to be known as Amtrak.[5] The corporation is not "an agency or establishment" of the Government but is authorized by the Government to operate or *455 contract for the operation of intercity rail passenger [6] The Act outlined a procedure under which private railroads could obtain relief from their passenger-service obligations by transferring those responsibilities to Amtrak;[7] the Act authorized the new corporation to enter into standardized contracts with the private railroads, under which a railroad would be relieved "of all [its] responsibilities as a common carrier of passengers by rail in intercity rail passenger service under [Subtitle IV of Title 49] or any State or other law relating to the provision of intercity passenger " 45 U.S. C. 561(1) (1970 ed.).[8] To obtain relief from their common carrier obligations, the railroads had to agree to several conditions. First, "[i]n consideration of being relieved of this responsibility," a railroad was |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | consideration of being relieved of this responsibility," a railroad was to pay Amtrak an amount equal to one-half of that railroad's financial losses from intercity passenger service during 1969. 561(2). Participating railroads also were to provide Amtrak with the use of tracks, other facilities, and services at rates to be agreed upon by the parties or, in the event of disagreement, to be set by the ICC. 561, 562. The Act also included a labor protection provision requiring the railroads to "provide fair and equitable arrangements to *456 protect the interests of employees affected by discontinuances of intercity rail passenger " 565. Participating railroads were required to enter into "protective arrangements" with their unions, in which the railroads promised to protect dislocated employees and to preserve employee benefits, including pension rights and fringe benefits. 565-(e). Finally, in 301 of the Act, 45 U.S. C. 541 (1970 ed.), Congress "expressly reserved" its right to "repeal, alter or amend this Act at any time." All but five private railroads offering intercity passenger service took up the option provided by the Act and entered into contracts, known as "Basic Agreements," with Amtrak.[9] The participating railroads made the required payments to Amtrak and shed their intercity rail passenger obligations. On May 1, 1971, Amtrak began rail passenger The Basic Agreements between the railroads and Amtrak mirrored the provisions of the Act. For example, 2.1 of each Basic Agreement, entitled "Relief from Responsibility," relieved the signatory railroad "of its entire responsibility for the provision of Intercity Rail Passenger Service." App. 13. The Agreements also required the railroads to make services, tracks, and facilities available and to protect employees who would be affected by a discontinuance of passenger Section 7.5 of each Basic Agreement, entitled "Transportation Privileges," spelled out the rights of the railroads and their employees to make use of Amtrak trains. The fifth paragraph, which concerned the rights of railroad employees to travel on Amtrak trains for free or at reduced fares, provided that "[t]ransportation privileges, if any, with respect to business and personal travel of Railroad personnel shall be as *457 determined by [Amtrak]." The paragraph did not specify which party was to bear the cost of the transportation. Shortly after Amtrak began operation, considerable controversy arose over Amtrak's decision to cut back employee pass privileges pursuant to the discretion accorded in this provision. The result of that controversy has given rise to this action, and we turn to consider the evolution of this dispute. B Since the 1880's, railroad employees and retirees, and their dependents, have been able to ride passenger trains |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | and their dependents, have been able to ride passenger trains for free or at reduced rates. Before Amtrak assumed operation, the private railroads often permitted current and retired employees and their dependents to travel on the employees' home lines for free or at reduced rates, and many railroads had reciprocal agreements permitting employees and dependents of other railroads to travel at reduced rates as well.[10] At the time Amtrak was created, between 1.4 million and 2 million rail-travel passes were outstanding.[11] Exercising its discretion under 7.5 of the Basic Agreements, the corporation decided to confine pass privileges to employees of the railroads that operated trains for Amtrak, and to limit those privileges to half-rate fares. As a result, all railroad employees lost their pre-Amtrak access to completely free transportation, and employees of some railroads lost their pass privileges entirely. Amtrak then was faced with vehement protests from the railroads, which continued to operate both freight trains and some passenger service, and which asserted that the withdrawal of free transportation privileges for their employees threatened to produce severe labor problems for them.[12] The corporation thereafter restored some, but not all of the canceled privileges. *458 The railroads continued to protest vigorously the Amtrak decision to cut back pass-rider privileges. They also reaffirmed their concern about employee morale and the possibility of labor strikes if privileges were not restored. Congress responded to this problem in 1972 by amending the RPSA to restore free or reduced-rate transportation to all people who had enjoyed such privileges when Amtrak took over passenger rail Pub. L. 92-316, 8, -231. The new 405(f) of the Act, 45 U.S. C. 565(f) (1976 ed.) (1972 amendment), required Amtrak to assure, "to the maximum extent practicable," that all employees and dependents who had received free or reduced-rate transportation before Amtrak began operation would continue to be eligible for such benefits. In their Committee Reports, both the Senate and the House emphasized that railroad employees should not lose their longstanding pass privileges privileges they had earned through years of service simply on account of the transfer of service to Amtrak.[13] Amtrak implemented this amendment by permitting pass riders to travel free or at half fare depending on the length of an employee's railroad employment, whether the employee was retired, and whether he was traveling on or off the rail lines of his home railroad.[14] In addition, pass riders were eligible for travel on a space-available basis only; they were permitted to make reservations only 24 hours in advance on trains requiring reservations; and they were not permitted to use |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | trains requiring reservations; and they were not permitted to use the passes on Amtrak's special trains called Metroliners. The 1972 amendment also required the railroads to pay for "such costs as may be incurred" by Amtrak in providing the pass privileges mandated by 405(f). As the Senate *459 Committee explained: "Because Congress is merely continuing pass policies which the railroads themselves developed, it would appear that the railroads and not Amtrak should bear the cost, if any." S. Rep. No. 92-756, p. 11 (1972). The amendment did not specify how the costs were to be calculated but did provide that the ICC should resolve the issue if Amtrak and the railroads were unable to agree on the amount to be paid. The matter eventually was referred to the ICC, which set an interim reimbursement rate based on Amtrak's incremental operating costs of providing the service that is, based on the additional cost to Amtrak to transport the riders. The initial rate was $.000 per passenger mile. This amount was to be offset by the revenue derived from the reduced-rate fares paid by pass riders riding pursuant to the 1972 amendment.[] The railroads also were to pay Amtrak for the administrative costs of the program. When the offset formula was applied, the revenue derived from the reduced-rate fares always exceeded the payments otherwise due from the railroads. As a result, the railroads reimbursed Amtrak solely for the pass program's administrative costs.[16] From 1972 to 19, Amtrak collected from the railroads only administrative expenses amounting to about $500,000 per year.[17] In 19, however, Congress decided that the ICC's reimbursement rate resulted in inadequate compensation to Amtrak. Accordingly, in the Amtrak Reorganization Act of 19, Pub. L. 96-73, 120 Congress amended the 405(f) pass-rider provision to require that the railroads prospectively reimburse Amtrak for pass-rider service at the rate of "25 percent of the systemwide average monthly yield per revenue passenger *460 mile" a rate that amounted to approximately one-fourth of the normal fare for ticket-buying passengers. The new rate was to remain in effect for two years.[18] At the same time, Congress also directed the Comptroller General to conduct a study and, "taking into account the value of the services being provided," 120(b), to make recommendations on the appropriate way to reimburse Amtrak for the cost of providing pass-rider transportation. In 1980, the General Accounting Office submitted a report to Congress that analyzed in detail two methods of reimbursement. GAO Report, App. 42-86. The report first considered reimbursing Amtrak for its incremental cost in providing the service, and second, for |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | its incremental cost in providing the service, and second, for the value to the pass rider of the service being provided, which would be less than the fare charged a regular passenger, but which the report otherwise declined to quantify. Neither approach was necessarily the correct one, GAO decided: "Amtrak's costs to provide transportation to pass riders are debatable, and we did not find adequate analytical evidence to support one position over another or to recommend a specific means to reimburse Amtrak." The report therefore concluded that the choice between the two cost reimbursement formulas was "a policy decision that the Congress should make," ; instead of offering an answer, the report simply outlined the available options. *461 After receiving the report, Congress again amended 405(f) of the Act and provided that the 25-percent reimbursement requirement would remain in effect indefinitely. Stat. 697 (1981 amendment). C The cases we consider began in 1980 when five railroads, each of which had taken advantage of the RPSA and discontinued passenger service, filed suit against Amtrak in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging the constitutionality of 405(f) of the Act.[19] They argued that the requirement that they reimburse Amtrak for the pass travel of their employees, former employees, and dependents violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The railroads based this claim on four theories. First, they claimed they had a contractual right against the United States, derived from the RPSA and the Basic Agreements, to be free from the obligation to provide intercity rail passenger They asserted that 405(f), which had been added to the Act in 1972, therefore impaired an obligation of the United States under this statutory contract because pass privileges constituted the "intercity rail passenger service," from which the railroads had been relieved of their "entire responsibility" in the RPSA. Thus, since Congress had contracted in the RPSA to relieve the railroads of intercity rail passenger service, and the railroads had fulfilled their obligations under the contract, they had a right to be free from the responsibility to provide pass privileges. Congress, they claimed, was impairing its contractual obligation through passage of 405. Next, the railroads claimed that even if the Act itself were not a contractual obligation, the Basic *462 Agreements, with identical "relief from responsibility" language, were such a contractual obligation of the United States; that obligation, the railroads asserted, was unconstitutionally impaired by the subsequent legislation. Third, they argued that, even if no contract existed between the United States and the railroads, the statutory requirement that the railroads |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | States and the railroads, the statutory requirement that the railroads pay Amtrak for allowing pass riders constituted a deprivation of property without due process. Finally, the railroads argued that, even if Congress might constitutionally require the railroads to reimburse Amtrak for the cost of the pass-rider program, the particular reimbursement formula set forth in the 19 amendment exceeded the incremental cost to Amtrak of providing the service and therefore constituted a deprivation of property without due process. After the 1981 amendment was passed, the railroads amended their complaint to make their claims applicable to that amendment as well. The railroads filed a motion for summary judgment, and Amtrak filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The United States then intervened as a defendant under 28 U.S. C. 2403 and filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Amtrak and the United States. It concluded that the Act, as amended, did not constitute a contract between the United States and the railroads. It then assumed that the Basic Agreements were contracts between the United States and the railroads and held that 405(f) did not impair that contract. The District Court found that the Agreements relieved the railroads of their responsibility to provide intercity rail service, but that by the railroads' own admission they never had a legal or contractual responsibility to provide free or reduced rate transportation to employees and their families. The court also observed that the Basic Agreements gave to Amtrak the discretion to determine what pass privileges, if any, the railroad employees should have. *463 The District Court rejected the railroads' argument that the requirement that they pay for their employees' pass-rider privileges violated due process and ruled that the railroads had not overcome the firmly established presumption of constitutionality that attaches to legislative Acts " `adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life.' " ). Because the legislation at issue was neither arbitrary nor irrational, the District Court concluded that the reimbursement requirement of 405 did not violate due process under the Turner standard. Finally, the court rejected the railroads' argument that Congress' reimbursement formula violated due process by requiring the railroads to pay more than the incremental cost to Amtrak of transporting the pass riders. "Having determined that the Congress acted constitutionally in requiring the railroads to reimburse Amtrak for the pass rider service, this court will not second-guess the legislative branch on its selection of a particular mathematical formula for reimbursement, absent a showing that the formula was selected in |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | reimbursement, absent a showing that the formula was selected in an arbitrary or irrational manner." The court then traced Congress' decisionmaking process to demonstrate that the choice of reimbursement plans was a rational policy decision, particularly in light of the conclusion in the GAO Report that the reimbursement issue involved a policy choice for Congress. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals rejected most of the railroads' arguments and held that the railroads could be compelled to reimburse Amtrak for the incremental cost of carrying the pass riders. The panel held, however, that the Basic Agreements provided the railroads with a contractual right to be free from having to "finance aspects of [Amtrak] operations that were once part of the railroads' entire responsibility for the provision of intercity rail passenger " According to the Court of Appeals, because the reimbursement *464 scheme in the 19 amendment required the railroads to pay more than the incremental cost to Amtrak, these payments supported Amtrak's general intercity rail passenger service operations, and the statute therefore impaired the railroads' right to be free from the responsibility for providing intercity rail passenger The court ruled that this "windfall" to Amtrak violated the Due Process Clause, because it unreasonably and illegally impaired the rights of the railroads under the Basic Agreements.[20] Amtrak appealed to this Court under 28 U.S. C. 1252, arguing that the reimbursement formula in 405(f) is constitutional, and we noted probable jurisdiction. The railroads cross-appealed, contending that any reimbursement violates due process. We deferred ruling on whether jurisdiction over the cross-appeal was proper until consideration of the cases on the merits. [21] *465 II The railroads argue that the RPSA and the Basic Agreements created a contractual obligation on the part of the United States not to reimpose any rail passenger service responsibilities on those railroads that entered into Basic Agreements, and that the pass-rider amendments to the Act unconstitutionally impair the "contract" into which the United States entered. Thus, the railroads conclude, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the 19 and 1981 amendments substantially impaired their contractual rights and violated due process, but incorrectly ruled that the 1972 amendment, which required only that the railroads pay for the incremental cost to Amtrak of the pass riders, was constitutional. In making these arguments, the railroads argue first that the United States entered into a contractual relationship with the railroads, either through the RPSA or the Basic Agreements, and second that the scope of the contractual agreements encompassed reimbursement for pass-rider |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | the scope of the contractual agreements encompassed reimbursement for pass-rider privileges. But, the railroads assert that, even if their contractual rights were only private ones with Amtrak, those private contractual agreements created a right to be free from paying for pass-rider privileges. They maintain that the 19 and 1981 amendments, as well as the 1972 assessment of incremental costs, therefore unconstitutionally impaired those private contractual rights. We consider, and reject, each of these arguments in turn. A The first question we address is whether the RPSA constituted not merely a regulatory policy but also a contractual arrangement between the United States and the railroads that entered into Basic Agreements. For many decades, this Court has maintained that absent some clear indication *466 that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that "a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise." See also Rector of Christ This well-established presumption is grounded in the elementary proposition that the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state. Indiana ex rel. Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body. Indeed, " `[t]he continued existence of a government would be of no great value, if by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation.' " Thus, the party asserting the creation of a contract must overcome this well-founded presumption, at and we proceed cautiously both in identifying a contract within the language of a regulatory statute and in defining the contours of any contractual obligation. In determining whether a particular statute gives rise to a contractual obligation, "it is of first importance to examine the language of the statute." See also Indiana ex rel "If it provides for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the state the case for an obligation binding upon the state is clear." U.S., But absent "an adequate expression of *467 an actual intent" of the State to bind itself, Wisconsin & Michigan R. 191 U.S. 3, this Court simply will not lightly construe that which is undoubtedly a scheme of public regulation to be, in addition, a private contract to which the State is a party. The language of the RPSA discloses absolutely no congressional intention |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | The language of the RPSA discloses absolutely no congressional intention to have the United States enter into a private contractual arrangement with the railroads. By its terms, the Act does not create or speak of a contract between the United States and the railroads, and it does not in any respect provide for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the United States. Quite to the contrary, the Act expressly established the National Railroad Passenger Corporation as a nongovernmental entity, 45 U.S. C. 541, and it used the term "contract" not to define the relationship of the United States to the railroads, but instead that of the new, nongovernmental corporation to the railroads. The statute states clearly that "the Corporation is authorized to contract and, upon written request therefor from a railroad, shall tender a contract" 45 U.S. C. 561, and that, "[u]pon its entering into a valid contract the railroad shall be relieved of all its responsibilities." We simply cannot agree with the railroads that the frequent usage in a statute of the language of contract, including the term "contract," evidences an intent to bind the Federal Government contractually. Legislation outlining the terms on which private parties may execute contracts does not on its own constitute a statutory contract, but is instead an articulated policy that, like all policies, is subject to revision or repeal. Indeed, lest there be any doubt in these cases about Congress' will, Congress "expressly reserved" its rights to "repeal, alter, or amend" the Act at any time. 45 U.S. C. 541. This is hardly the language of contract.[22] *468 Moreover, the circumstances of the Act's passage belie an intent to contract away governmental powers. Congress long had regulated the railroads and had compelled them through the ICC to continue unprofitable service and undertake new Indeed, the huge sums that the railroads insist they paid to Amtrak in "consideration" for the contractual right to be free from their passenger service obligations represented just one-half of the annual losses they suffered in one year under the prior regulatory scheme. This atmosphere of pervasive prior regulation leads to several conclusions. For one, Congress would have struck a profoundly inequitable bargain if, in exchange for the equivalent of a half year's losses, it had entered into a binding contract never to impose on the railroads which would continue to operate their potentially profitable freight services any rail passenger service obligations at all.[23] Congress simply *469 cannot be presumed to have nonchalantly shed this vitally important governmental power with so little concern for what it |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | important governmental power with so little concern for what it would receive in exchange. Cf. United States Trust Also, the pervasiveness of the prior regulation in this area suggests that absent some affirmative indication to the contrary, the railroads had no legitimate expectation that regulation would cease after 1971. Coupled with the statute's express reservation of the power to repeal, the heavy and longstanding regulation of this area strongly cuts against any argument that the statute created binding contractual rights. Cf. Energy Reserves Group, The railroads argue nevertheless that the RPSA created a contractual obligation "closely analogous to the statutory covenant" at issue in United States Trust, "which this Court held to be a contractual obligation of a State subject to the Contract Clause." Brief for Appellees in No. 83-1492, p. 18. Far from recognizing the similarity, we find that the statute at issue in United States Trust highlights the difference between the RPSA and a true statutory contract. In United States Trust, the Court held that New could not retroactively alter a statutory bond covenant relied upon by bond purchasers. The covenant in that case was a part of the bistate legislation authorizing the Port Authority of New York and New to acquire, construct, and operate the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad and the World Trade Center in New York City. The statute read in part: "The 2 States covenant and agree with each other and with the holders of any affected bonds, as hereinafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds remain *470 outstanding and unpaid neither the States nor the port authority nor any subsidiary corporation incorporated for any of the purposes of this act will apply any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or reserves, which have been or shall be pledged in whole or in part as security for such bonds, for any railroad purposes whatsoever other than permitted purposes hereinafter set forth." 1962 N. J. Laws, ch. 8, 6; 1962 N. Y. Laws, ch. 209, 6. Resort need not be had to a dictionary or case law to recognize the language of contract. The States explicitly bound themselves in a covenant not to take certain actions now or in the future, and the intent to make a contract was, as a result, not even contested in that case. Indeed, the Court found that the States had drafted this language in an effort to invoke the constitutional protections of the Contract Clause as security against repeal. To the contrary, here the statute does not contain a provision in which the United States |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | does not contain a provision in which the United States "covenant[s] and agree[s]" with anyone to do anything, and in fact the United States expressly declined to offer assurances about future activity when it reserved the right to revoke or repeal the Act. We therefore are not persuaded by the railroads' proffered analogy. Because neither the language of the statute nor the circumstances surrounding its passage manifest any intent on the part of Congress to bind itself contractually to the railroads, we hold that the RPSA does not constitute a binding obligation of Congress. B We turn next to consider whether the Basic Agreements into which the railroads entered with Amtrak grant the railroads a contractual right against the United States to be free from all obligation to provide passenger While there can be no doubt that the Basic Agreements are contracts, they are contracts not between the railroads and the United States but simply between the railroads and the nongovernmental corporation, Amtrak. The United States was *471 not a party to the Basic Agreements; by their terms, the agreements do not implicate the United States. The railroads do not point to any language in the RPSA authorizing Amtrak to bargain away any portion of Congress' Commerce Clause power, or to act as the Government's agent and confer upon the railroads the right to be free of any obligation to provide passenger service, assuming even that Congress could make that delegation. The District Court asserted that the Agreements might constitute contracts between the United States and the railroads because they granted the railroads relief from their passenger service obligations, and because only the United States actually could grant such But a careful reading of the RPSA indicates that the Act, and not the Basic Agreements, actually removed that responsibility. Accordingly, we find unpersuasive the railroads' efforts to demonstrate that the United States is contractually bound, either through the RPSA or the Basic Agreements, not to reimpose any rail passenger service obligations. Because, as we have demonstrated, neither the Act nor the Basic Agreements created a contract between railroads and the United States, our focus shifts from a case in which we confront an alleged impairment, by the Government, of its own contractual obligations, to one in which we face an alleged legislative impairment of a private contractual right. We therefore have no need to consider whether an allegation of a governmental breach of its own contract warrants application of the more rigorous standard of review that the railroads urge us to apply.[24] Instead, we turn to consider *472 whether the |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | to apply.[24] Instead, we turn to consider *472 whether the payment obligation in 405(f) of the Act unconstitutionally impairs the private contractual rights of the railroads. C To prevail on a claim that federal economic legislation unconstitutionally impairs a private contractual right, the party complaining of unconstitutionality has the burden of demonstrating, first, that the statute alters contractual rights or obligations. See United States Trust -21. If an impairment is found, the reviewing court next determines whether the impairment is of constitutional dimension. If the alteration of contractual obligations is minimal, the inquiry may end at this stage, Allied Structural Steel ; if the impairment is substantial, a court must look more closely at the legislation, ibid.; see also Energy Reserves Group, When the contract is a private one, and when the impairing statute is a federal one, this next inquiry is especially limited, and the judicial scrutiny quite minimal. The party asserting a Fifth Amendment due process violation must overcome a presumption of constitutionality and " `establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.' " Pension Benefit Guaranty (quoting 428 U. S., at ).[25] *473 The starting point for our inquiry is therefore whether the 19 and 1981 pass-rider amendments impaired the private contractual rights that the railroads obtained under the Basic Agreements.[26] We must first consider what rights vested in the railroads pursuant to the Basic Agreements and then examine the way in which the 19 and 1981 amendments altered those rights.[27] The only right that the railroads obtained under the Basic Agreements was the right to be relieved of the pre-existing responsibilities they had as regulated common carriers. The RPSA expressly permitted the railroads to divest themselves of, and authorized Amtrak to assume, all the railroads' "responsibilities as a common carrier of passengers by rail in intercity rail passenger service under [Subtitle IV of Title 49] or any State or other law relating to the provision of intercity rail passenger " 45 U.S. C. 561(A)(1) (1970 ed.) (emphasis added). In turn, the Basic Agreements relieved the railroads of their "entire responsibility for the provision of Intercity Rail Passenger Service." 2.1, App. 13. Thus the statute and the Basic Agreements together relieved the *474 railroads only of common carriage responsibilities they had by virtue of federal or state law. Moreover, Amtrak had no independent authority to relieve the railroads of obligations imposed by Congress, and it is readily apparent that Congress limited its relief to the previously imposed obligation to operate intercity rail passenger trains. The railroads do not and could not allege that |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | trains. The railroads do not and could not allege that as common carriers they ever had the responsibility, by statute or regulation, to provide free passes or reduced fares for their employees and their dependents. Here, as in the lower courts, they describe the provision of passes as a "gratuitous undertaking, like providing a `Christmas turkey.' " It plainly is not consistent with the nature of relief provided the railroads under the Basic Agreements to include, within the scope of the contract, relief from the "gratuitous undertakings" of providing free and reduced-fare passes. Nor did the provision of free or half-fare passes become a "responsibility" within the meaning of the statute because some railroads, although not the parties here, did not simply offer the passes as noncontractual fringe benefits, but instead were required to provide passes pursuant to their collective-bargaining agreements. The Basic Agreements did not purport to relieve the railroads of their employee obligations under collective-bargaining agreements, and in fact the Act expressly required the railroads to continue to assume their responsibilities under collective-bargaining agreements. 45 U.S. C. 565(b) (1970 ed.) (a railroad shall make provision for "the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) to such employees under existing collective-bargaining agreements"). We therefore find that the Basic Agreements in no respect relieved the railroads of the "responsibility" to provide their employees with pass privileges, for no state or federal law imposed that "responsibility" on them, in connection with intercity rail passenger operations, when the contracts were *475 executed. The Basic Agreements did not address this payment obligation but instead left the reimbursement issue completely open. It was not until after the Basic Agreements were signed, and Amtrak operations were under way, that Congress decided to impose new obligations on both parties to the agreements. We therefore conclude that 405(f) in no respect altered, substantially or otherwise, the railroads' existing contractual rights and duties. D The Court of Appeals concluded that, while the Basic Agreements might not expressly have relieved the railroads of the obligation to reimburse Amtrak for pass riders, they did relieve the railroads of all responsibility both operational and financial for intercity rail passenger 723 F.2d, But because the railroads were required by the 19 and 1981 amendments to pay Amtrak more than its incremental costs, the court reasoned that some portion of the railroads' payments might go to cover Amtrak's operational expenses. In that way, the railroads would indirectly be providing the rail passenger service from which they were to have been contractually freed, and Congress' decision |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | they were to have been contractually freed, and Congress' decision to require such payments might therefore violate the railroads' contractual right to be free of the responsibility to provide intercity rail The court then considered whether the impairment was unconstitutional and concluded that Amtrak had failed to meet its burden of proving that the amendments were "paramount to the rights of the railroads under the basic agreement." The court held that the 19 and 1981 amendments "unreasonably and illegally" impaired the rights of the railroads under the Basic Agreements by indirectly requiring the railroads to help Amtrak finance aspects of its operations that once were part of the railroads' responsibility. Initially, it is far from evident that the railroads have a private contractual right to be free from all obligations *476 to make financial payments to subsidize Amtrak, which is the way in which the railroads view any payments in excess of Amtrak's incremental costs. The railroads were unambiguously relieved only of burdensome intercity rail responsibilities imposed by the federal and state common carrier regulatory schemes. But even if the Basic Agreements relieved the railroads of the obligation to subsidize Amtrak, they surely did not exempt the railroads from financial obligations to Amtrak of other kinds, and the railroads misdirect their attack when they assert a right to be free from subsidizing Amtrak. The issue in these cases is not whether the railroads have a right against subsidizing Amtrak, for here Congress has simply required the railroads to pay for the value of a benefit their employees receive from Amtrak. Nothing in the Basic Agreements lifted from the railroads the responsibility to pay Amtrak for the pass-rider privileges it accords their employees, and nothing gave the railroads a right to special privileges in the pricing of Amtrak services. Whether at some point the amount the railroads are required to pay might be so unreasonably high as to constitute a subsidy we need not decide, for as we demonstrate infra Congress acted rationally in setting the value of the pass to the employees. We therefore disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress impaired a private contractual right simply by passing amendments that required the railroads to pay for a service rendered. Having reached this conclusion, we of course need not consider whether the impairment is substantial. Even were the Court of Appeals correct that the railroads have a private contractual right not to pay more than the incremental cost of the passes, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Due Process Clause limited Congress' power to |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | conclusion that the Due Process Clause limited Congress' power to choose a different reimbursement scheme in these cases. Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Congress remained free to " `adjus[t] the burdens and benefits of economic life,' " as long as it did so in a manner *477 that was neither arbitrary nor irrational. Pension Benefit Guaranty 467 U. S., at (quoting 428 U. S., at ). Moroever, in the determination of whether economic legislation that substantially alters contractual rights and duties violates due process, the burden of proving irrationality rests squarely on the party asserting a due process 467 U.S., at When it performed this due process inquiry, the court below erred both in placing the burden of proof on Amtrak to defend the legislation and in defining the standard of review as rigorously as it did. Had it applied the correct standard, the Court of Appeals would have found that the railroads have not met their burden of proof. In passing 405(f), Congress rationally required Amtrak to honor the expectations of the railroads' past and present employees and their dependents. It rationally took this step to maintain employee morale and labor peace, and it rationally required the railroads to pay at least a portion of the cost of the privileges, both because the railroads, rather than the taxpayers, were responsible for the creation of the moral obligation to the railroad employees and retirees, and because the railroads benefited from labor peace and continued employee morale. Similarly, after reasonably requiring the railroads to reimburse Amtrak for benefits received, Congress acted wholly rationally in selecting the value to the passholders as opposed to the cost to Amtrak as the proper reimbursement amount, and in settling on the 25-percent figure to quantify the value received. It commissioned a study by the GAO, which concluded that several different computations of cost made sense, and that the selection of no one cost-spreading scheme was more inherently rational or fair than any other. App. 80-81. At this point, the decision was uniquely one for Congress, which had absolutely no obligation to select the scheme that a court later would find to be the fairest, but simply one that was rational and not arbitrary. Congress *478 placed a value on the free passes that reasonably relates to the normal fares of the public, and "[w]e are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme It is enough to say that the Act approaches the problem of cost spreading rationally; whether a [different] cost-spreading scheme would have been wiser or more practical |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | National R. Passenger Corp. v. AT & SFR CO. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111369/national-r-passenger-corp-v-at-sfr-co/ | [different] cost-spreading scheme would have been wiser or more practical under the circumstances is not a question of constitutional dimension." Turner We therefore conclude that the 19 and 1981 amendments in no respect offend the Due Process Clause. Having concluded that the Basic Agreements relieved the railroads only of the direct and onerous responsibilities they had borne as common carriers, and having further concluded that the provision of free and partial-fare passes was not among those responsibilities, we conclude that the 19 and 1981 amendments to the Act did not impair private contractual rights acquired by the railroads as parties to the Basic Agreements. The amendments imposed new obligations on the railroads and in no respect infringed the railroads' existing contractual rights. But even if the payment of more than the incremental cost of pass privileges indirectly subsidizes Amtrak operations in violation of a private contractual right, Congress' decision to assess the railroads is rational and reasoned, and the railroads have failed to demonstrate a due process We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals insofar as it ruled to the contrary. III The foregoing analysis a fortiori requires us to reject the railroads' argument on cross-appeal that they have a contractual right to be free from the obligation to make any payments to Amtrak, even for incremental costs. Absolutely nothing in the RPSA or the Basic Agreements suggests that the railroads were relieved of the responsibility to reimburse Amtrak for the costs of providing to the railroads' employees *4 and retirees, and their dependents, the free passes that the railroads had traditionally provided to them. IV Accordingly we hold that 405(f) of the RPSA is constitutional, and we reverse the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that the 19 and 1981 amendments to the Act contravened the Due Process Clause. It is so ordered. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of these cases. |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Massachusetts v. Morash | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112246/massachusetts-v-morash/ | This case requires us to determine whether a company's policy of paying its discharged employees for their unused vacation time constitutes an "employee welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of 3(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 1002(1), and whether a criminal action to enforce that policy is foreclosed by the Act's broad pre-emption provision. I In May 196, petitioner, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, issued two complaints in the Boston Municipal Court against respondent, Richard N. Morash, president of the Yankee Bank for Finance and Savings (Bank). The complaints charged Morash with criminal violations of the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws 149:14[1] Under the Massachusetts law, an employer is required to pay a discharged employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on the date of discharge. Similar wage payment statutes have been enacted by 47 other States,[2] the *110 District of Columbia,[3] and the United States,[4] and over half of these include vacation pay. The complaints filed in the Boston Municipal Court alleged that respondent had failed to compensate two discharged bank vice presidents for vacation time they accrued but did not use. Respondent moved to dismiss the criminal complaints on the ground that the Massachusetts statute, insofar as it applied to these complaints, had been pre-empted by ERISA. He argued that the Bank's vacation policy constituted an "employee welfare benefit plan" under the Act, and that the State's prosecution of him for failure to comply with the policy therefore ran afoul of 4(a) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. *111 1144(a), which pre-empts "any and all State laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan."[5] Without ruling on the motion, the trial judge reported the pre-emption question to the Massachusetts Appeals Court for decision; the Supreme Judicial Court then transferred the case to its docket on its own initiative. For the purpose of answering the reported question, the parties stipulated that the Bank had made oral or written agreements stemming from handbooks, manuals, memoranda, and practices to pay employees in lieu of unused vacation time, and that "such payments are made out of the Bank's general assets" in lump sums upon termination of employment. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the policy constituted an employee welfare benefit plan and that the prosecution was pre-empted by ERISA. The court found that under the plain language of the statute and its earlier decision in the Bank's policy constituted a plan, fund, or program for the purpose of providing its participants vacation benefits. It |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Massachusetts v. Morash | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112246/massachusetts-v-morash/ | for the purpose of providing its participants vacation benefits. It rejected the Commonwealth's argument that a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor (Secretary),[6]*112 had excepted payments out of an employer's general assets for unused vacation time from the definition of a welfare plan because even if regular vacation pay was not included in ERISA, the lump-sum payment for unused vacation time upon discharge was akin to severance pay covered by ERISA. The fact that it would be necessary for an employer to maintain records relating to its employees' unused vacation time, plus the need to accumulate funds to pay the benefits, made it appropriate to treat the employer's promise to its employees as a "plan." The court concluded that the Massachusetts statute related to the plan within the meaning of 4, and was not excluded from its coverage by the provision saving from pre-emption a "generally applicable criminal law." ERISA 4(b)(4), 29 U.S. C. 1144(b)(4). Because the federal question decided by the Supreme Judicial Court is an important one over which the courts have disagreed,[7] we granted certiorari, We now reverse. II ERISA was passed by Congress in 1974 to safeguard employees from the abuse and mismanagement of funds that had been accumulated to finance various types of employee benefits. Fort Halifax Packing The "comprehensive and reticulated statute," Nachman contains elaborate provisions for the regulation of employee benefit plans. It sets forth reporting and disclosure obligations for plans, imposes a fiduciary standard of care for plan administrators, and establishes schedules for the vesting and accrual of pension benefits. Metropolitan Life Ins. Suits to enforce the terms of the statute and to recover welfare benefits wrongfully withheld arise under federal law and can be brought in federal court without regard for the amount in controversy. See Firestone Tire & Rubber The precise coverage of ERISA is not clearly set forth in the Act. ERISA covers "employee benefit plans," which it defines as plans that are either "an employee welfare benefit plan," or "an employee pension benefit plan," or both. ERISA 3(3), 29 U.S. C. 1002(3). An employee welfare benefit plan, in turn, is defined as: "[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Massachusetts v. Morash | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112246/massachusetts-v-morash/ | or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section (c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions)." ERISA 3(1), as codified, 29 U.S. C. 1002(1).[] *114 The Act does not further define "plan, fund, or program" or "vacation benefits" and does not specify whether every policy to provide vacation benefits falls within its ambit. The words "any plan, fund, or program maintained for the purpose of providing vacation benefits" may surely be read to encompass any form of regular vacation payments to an employee. A multiemployer fund created to provide vacation benefits for union members who typically work for several employers during the course of a year, see, e. g., Franchise Tax Bd. of undoubtedly falls within the scope of the Act. In addition, the creation of a separate fund to pay employees vacation benefits would subject a single employer to the regulatory provisions of ERISA. See California Hospital modified, (CA9), cert. denied,[9] We do not believe, however, that the policy here to pay employees for unused vacation time constitutes an employee welfare benefit plan. The interpretation of 3(1) is governed by the familiar principles that " `words grouped in a list should be given related *115 meaning,' " (quoting Securities Industry 46 U.S. 207, 21 (194)), and that "in expounding a statute, we [are] not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Pilot Life Ins. 41 U.S. 41, In enacting ERISA, Congress' primary concern was with the mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to pay employees benefits from accumulated funds. California Hospital at 59.[10] To that end, it established extensive reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duty requirements to insure against the possibility that the employee's expectation of the benefit would be defeated through poor management by the plan administrator. Because ordinary vacation payments are typically fixed, due at known times, and do not depend on contingencies outside the employee's control, they present none of the risks that ERISA is intended to address. If there is a danger of defeated expectations, it is no different from the danger of defeated expectations of wages for services performed a danger Congress chose not to regulate in ERISA. This conclusion is supported by viewing the reference to vacation benefits not in isolation but |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Massachusetts v. Morash | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112246/massachusetts-v-morash/ | viewing the reference to vacation benefits not in isolation but in light of the words that accompany it and give the provision meaning. Section 3(1) subjects to ERISA regulation plans to provide medical, sickness, accident, disability, and death benefits, training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, and legal services. The distinguishing feature of most of these benefits is *1 that they accumulate over a period of time and are payable only upon the occurrence of a contingency outside of the control of the employee. See (1975). Thus, for example, plans to pay employees severance benefits, which are payable only upon termination of employment, are employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning of the Act. See summarily aff'd sub nom. ; summarily aff'd sub nom. The reference to vacation payments in 3(1) should be understood to include within the scope of ERISA those vacation benefit funds, analogous to other welfare benefits, in which either the employee's right to a benefit is contingent upon some future occurrence or the employee bears a risk different from his ordinary employment risk. It is unlikely that Congress intended to subject to ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements those vacation benefits which by their nature are payable on a regular basis from the general assets of the employer and are accumulated over time only at the election of the employee. The Secretary, who is specifically authorized to define ERISA's "accounting, technical, and trade terms," ERISA 505, 29 U.S. C. 1135,[11] and to whose reasonable views we give deference, Chevron U. S. A. 467 U.S. 37, 43 (194); 4 U.S. 259, (191); 30 U.S. 1, has also so understood the statute. In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published shortly after the effective date of the Act, the Secretary identified a basic *117 distinction between the benefit programs covered by the Act and the types of regular compensation, including vacation pay, that are not covered: "The Secretary also anticipates issuance of regulations that will make it clear that other programs, including certain employer practices (whether pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or not) under which employees are paid as a part of their regular compensation directly by the employer and under which no separate fund is established will not subject the employer to any filing or disclosure duties under Title I of the Act. Examples of the employer practices that may receive this treatment are payment of overtime pay, vacation pay, shift premiums, Sunday premiums, holiday premiums, jury duty or military duty, make-up pay, and pay while absent on account of illness or excused absences." (1974) The Secretary subsequently |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Massachusetts v. Morash | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112246/massachusetts-v-morash/ | account of illness or excused absences." (1974) The Secretary subsequently proposed regulations excluding payment of compensation for work performed at night or during holidays and paid sick leave and vacation leave from the definition of an employee benefit. -24643 (1975). He explained: "[P]aid vacations are not treated as employee benefit plans because they are associated with regular wages or salary, rather than benefits triggered by contingencies such as hospitalization. Moreover, the abuses which created the impetus for the reforms in Title I were not in this area, and there is no indication that Congress intended to subject these practices to Title I coverage." The proposed regulations promulgated by the Secretary were adopted without significant modification. They provide that numerous "payroll practices," including the payment of vacation benefits "out of [an] employer's general assets" rather than from a trust fund, are not employee *11 welfare benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA.[12] In addition, under the regulations, the term "employee welfare benefit plan" does not include the payment by an employer of premium rates for work performed during special periods such as holidays and weekends.[13] The Secretary has consistently adhered to this position even when the premium pay is accumulated and carried over to later years.[14] A contrary interpretation, including routine vacation pay policies within ERISA, would have profound consequences. Most employers in the United States provide some type of vacation benefit to their employees.[15] ERISA coverage would put all these employers to the choice of complying with the statute's detailed requirements for reporting and disclosure or discontinuing the practice of compensating employees for unused vacation time. In addition, the extension of ERISA to claims for vacation benefits would vastly expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts, providing a federal *119 forum for any employee with a vacation grievance.[] Finally, such an interpretation would also displace the extensive state regulation of the vesting, funding, and participation rights of vacation benefits; because ERISA's vesting and funding requirements do not apply to welfare benefit plans, ERISA 201(1), 301(a), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 10(1), 1(a), employees would actually receive less protection if ERISA were applied to ordinary vacation wages paid from the employer's general assets. See Note, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 1702, 171[17] The States have traditionally regulated the payment of wages, including vacation pay. Absent any indication that Congress intended such far-reaching consequences, we are reluctant to so significantly interfere with "the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system." Fort Halifax Packing 42 U. S., at 19. III Respondent argues that, even if the Department of Labor regulation exempting |
Justice Stevens | 1,989 | 16 | majority | Massachusetts v. Morash | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112246/massachusetts-v-morash/ | argues that, even if the Department of Labor regulation exempting vacation payments from ERISA constitutes a reasonable construction of the Act, the Bank's policy did not constitute a payroll practice under the regulation because employees were allowed at their option to accumulate vacation time and defer payment for such time until termination. See Brief for Respondent 11. We do not agree. Although neither of the Secretary's regulations explicitly covers the precise practice at issue in this case, the reasons for treating holiday and weekend premiums and payments of compensation while an employee is on vacation as "payroll *120 practices" are equally applicable to the payment of an employee's regular wages for accrued and unused vacation time upon discharge. If the employees in this case had chosen to take a vacation, the vacation days would have been available and the vacation benefit would have been excluded under the regulation; the benefit cannot be transformed into an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA solely because the employees did not use their vacation days prior to their formal termination of employment. See 10 F.2d 372, Moreover, except for the fact that the payment has been deferred, such payments are as much a part of the employees' regular basic compensation as overtime pay or the payment of salary while the employee is absent on vacation. If in the end the employee elects to receive additional compensation instead of a paid vacation, he or she is receiving the same kind of premium pay that is available for holiday or weekend work. The fact that the payments in this case were due at the time of the employee's termination does not affect their character as a part of regular compensation. Unlike normal severance pay, the employees' right to compensation for accrued vacation time is not contingent upon the termination of their employment. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that the case before us and the Secretary's regulations on which we rely concern payments by a single employer out of its general assets. An entirely different situation would be presented if a separate fund had been created by a group of employers to guarantee the payment of vacation benefits to laborers who regularly shift their jobs from one employer to another. Employees who are beneficiaries of such a trust face far different risks and have far greater need for the reporting and disclosure requirements that the federal law imposes than those whose vacation benefits come from the same fund from which they receive their paychecks. It is sufficient for this case that the Secretary's determination |
per_curiam | 1,990 | 200 | per_curiam | Demosthenes v. Baal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112441/demosthenes-v-baal/ | The State of Nevada has moved to vacate an order of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granting a stay of the execution of Thomas E. Baal. We grant the State's motion to vacate the stay. I Thomas E. Baal was convicted and sentenced to death in Nevada District Court for first-degree murder and robbery with use of a deadly weapon. Evidence indicated that after attempting to rob Frances P. Maves, Baal stabbed her numerous times, took her car, and fled. Maves was pronounced dead some hours later. Police officers arrested Baal in Reno on February 28, 1988. After being given his Miranda warnings, Baal confessed to the robbery and murder. In March 1988, two psychiatrists examined Baal and found that Baal was competent to stand trial, able to understand right from wrong at the time of the alleged offense, and disturbed but not psychotic. In June 1988, Baal was arraigned and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A third psychiatrist, Dr. O'Gorman, was appointed to examine Baal, and, following an examination on August 31, 1988, concluded that Baal was competent to stand trial. On September 22, 1988, Baal pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and to robbery, both with use of a deadly weapon. A three-judge panel unanimously sentenced Baal to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Baal's conviction and sentence, rejecting Baal's contention that he was incompetent to enter a guilty plea and that it was error not to conduct a competency hearing prior to accepting his pleas. Baal filed a petition for state postconviction relief, but, prior to the hearing, changed his mind and withdrew the petition. On May 24, the state postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing to determine Baal's competency. At that hearing, Baal testified that he did not want to continue *733 any postconviction proceedings. He further testified that he knew the date he would be put to death, the reason he would be put to death, and that his waiver of postconviction relief would result in his death. A state psychiatrist testified that Baal was competent; a state prison official who had observed Baal also testified as to Baal's competence. The court also reviewed the reports of three psychiatrists who had examined Baal and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. Based on this evidence, the court held that Baal was aware of his impending execution and of the reason for it, and thus was sane under the test set forth in The court further held that Baal was in control of his faculties, was competent to |
per_curiam | 1,990 | 200 | per_curiam | Demosthenes v. Baal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112441/demosthenes-v-baal/ | Baal was in control of his faculties, was competent to choose to decline to pursue an appeal, and had made an intelligent waiver of his right to pursue postconviction relief. Approximately one week later, on May 31, and hours before Baal's scheduled execution, Edwin and Doris Baal (Baal's parents) filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief as "next friend" of Thomas E. Baal. As one of their grounds for relief, petitioners asserted: "Thomas Baal is not competent to waive federal review of his claims." In support of this claim, petitioners relied on an affidavit of a nonexamining psychiatrist, Dr. Jerry Howle, and an affidavit of Doris Baal. The United States District Court conducted a hearing and denied petitioners' application for stay of execution, holding that, under this Court's recent decision in Whitmore v. Arkansas, ante, p. 149, petitioners had failed to establish that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. According to the District Court, petitioners had not provided an adequate explanation of why Baal could not appear on his own behalf to prosecute this action. Upon review of the record, the court found that all the evidence, other than the newly submitted affidavit of Dr. Howle, established that Baal was legally competent to understand the nature and consequences of his act and to represent his own interests in these proceedings. *734 The court determined that Dr. Howle's affidavit was not based on a first-hand examination, was conclusory, and was insufficient to warrant a psychiatric hearing or additional psychiatric examinations of Baal. The court subsequently denied petitioners' motion for a certificate of probable cause. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals granted petitioners' certificate of probable cause and stayed Thomas Baal's execution. That court held that petitioners had made "some minimum showing of [Baal's] incompetence" and evidence in the record provided "at least an arguable basis for finding that a full evidentiary hearing on competence should have been held by the district court." Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-15716 pp. 3, 5. Judge Kozinski, in dissent, asserted that there was no substantial evidence of Baal's incompetence to warrant a further evidentiary hearing or to upset the Nevada District Court's finding that Baal was competent, which is entitled to a presumption of correctness upon federal habeas review. Dissent, at 6, 7. II In Whitmore v. Arkansas, ante, at 165, we held that "one necessary condition for `next friend' standing in federal court is a showing by the proposed `next friend' that the real party in interest |
per_curiam | 1,990 | 200 | per_curiam | Demosthenes v. Baal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112441/demosthenes-v-baal/ | the proposed `next friend' that the real party in interest is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity." See also This prerequisite is not satisfied "where an evidentiary hearing shows that the defendant has given a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed." Whitmore, ante, at 165. In Whitmore, we relied on the competency findings made by the Arkansas Supreme Court and concluded that Whitmore lacked next-friend standing in federal court. Ante, at 165-166. In this case, the state court held such an evidentiary hearing just one week before petitioners brought this petition for habeas corpus. *735 After reviewing the evidence and questioning Baal, the state court concluded that Baal had intelligently waived his right to pursue postconviction relief. A state court's determinations on the merits of a factual issue are entitled to a presumption of correctness on federal habeas review. A federal court may not overturn such determinations unless it concludes that they are not "fairly supported by the record." See 28 U.S. C. 2254(d)(8). We have held that a state court's conclusion regarding a defendant's competency is entitled to such a presumption. In this case, the state court's conclusion that Baal was competent to waive his right to further proceedings was "fairly supported by the record." Three psychiatrists who examined Baal had determined he was competent; a psychiatrist who had the opportunity to observe and talk to Baal testified that Baal was competent at the hearing; and the trial court concluded that Baal was competent after both observing Baal and questioning him extensively on the record. Accordingly, under 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness, the state court's factual finding as to Baal's competence is binding on a federal habeas court. See see also ( 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness required federal habeas court to accept state court's factual findings on the issue of respondent's credibility). The state evidentiary hearing took place on May 24, When petitioners filed their habeas petition in District Court the following week, on May 31, the only new evidence presented to the court was the affidavit of Dr. Jerry Howle, a psychiatrist who had not examined Baal. In the affidavit, Dr. Howle stated that he had examined the reports of the psychiatrists who had found Baal competent to stand trial and a 1987 admission, evaluation, and discharge summary from the Hawaii State Hospital. Dr. Howle did not directly assert that Baal was incompetent. Rather, based only on *736 these reports, and without any opportunity personally to observe Baal, the doctor concluded that "there is reason to believe this person may not |
per_curiam | 1,990 | 200 | per_curiam | Demosthenes v. Baal | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112441/demosthenes-v-baal/ | that "there is reason to believe this person may not be competent to waive his legal remedies." Petition for Habeas Corpus in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-243 (D. Nev.), Exhibit D (emphasis added). Cf. As the District Court determined, this affidavit is "conclusory and lacking sufficient foundation or substance to warrant either a psychiatric hearing or additional psychiatric examination of the defendant." Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. CV-N-90-243-HDM p. 3. The District Court also reviewed the state-court record and the transcript of the state-court proceeding, as well as speaking with Baal at length via telephone. Based on its review, it concluded that petitioners had failed to establish that Baal was not competent to waive further proceedings. In the absence of any "meaningful evidence" of incompetency, Whitmore v. Arkansas, ante, at 166, the District Court correctly denied petitioners' motion for a further evidentiary hearing on the question of Baal's competence to waive his right to proceed. In holding that there was a "basis for finding that a full evidentiary hearing on competence should have been held," Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-15716 p. 5, the Court of Appeals did not rely exclusively on the affidavit of Dr. Howle, the only evidence offered to indicate that Baal might have become incompetent at some time after the State's evidentiary hearing. That affidavit, as noted, was not based on personal examination of Baal and stated only in conclusory and equivocal fashion that, based on his evaluation of the reports of the examining psychiatrists, Baal "may not be competent." Rather, the Court of Appeals based its determination on the same evidence that had been before the *737 State District Court the reports of the three psychiatrists, the hospital report, and testimony regarding Baal's prior suicide attempts. Indeed, because the Court of Appeals did not personally observe Baal, as the state court did, it had even less reason to overturn what is essentially a factual determination. See As there was no evidentiary basis for the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the District Court erred in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the stay granted by the court did not "reflect the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted." We realize that last minute petitions from parents of death row inmates may often be viewed sympathetically. But federal courts are authorized by the federal habeas statutes to interfere with the course of state proceedings only in specified circumstances. Before granting a stay, therefore, federal courts must make certain that an adequate basis exists for the exercise of federal power. In this |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | Under 303 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S. C. 1303 (a) (1976 ed.), whenever a foreign country pays a "bounty or grant" upon the exportation of a product from that country, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to levy a countervailing duty, "equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant," upon importation of the product into the United States.[1] The issue in this case is whether Japan confers a "bounty" or "grant" on certain consumer electronic products by failing to impose a commodity tax on those products when they are exported, while imposing the tax on the products when they are sold in Japan. *446 I Under the Commodity Tax Law of Japan, Law No. 4 of 1962, see App. 44-4, a variety of consumer goods, including the electronic products at issue here, are subject to an "indirect" taxa tax levied on the goods themselves, and computed as a percentage of the manufacturer's sales price rather than the income or wealth of the purchaser or seller. The Japanese tax applies both to products manufactured in Japan and to those imported into Japan.[2] On goods manufactured in Japan, the tax is levied upon shipment from the factory; imported products are taxed when they are withdrawn from the customs warehouse. Only goods destined for consumption in Japan are subject to the tax, however. Products shipped for export are exempt, and any tax paid upon the shipment of a product is refunded if the product is subsequently exported. Thus the tax is "remitted" on exports.[3] In April 1970 petitioner, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, filed a petition with the Commissioner of Customs,[4] requesting assessment of countervailing duties on a number of consumer electronic products exported from Japan to this country.[5] Petitioner alleged that Japan *447 had bestowed a "bounty or grant" upon exportation of these products by, inter alia, remitting the Japanese Commodity Tax that would have been imposed had the products been sold within Japan. In January 1976, after soliciting the views of interested parties and conducting an investigation pursuant to Treasury Department regulations, see 19 CFR 159.47 the Acting Commissioner of Customs published a notice of final determination, rejecting petitioner's request. (1976).[6] Petitioner then filed suit in the Customs Court, claiming that the Treasury Department had erred in concluding that remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax was not a bounty or grant within the purview of the countervailing-duty statute.[7] The Department defended on the ground that, since the remission of indirect taxes was "nonexcessive," the statute did not require assessment of |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | taxes was "nonexcessive," the statute did not require assessment of a countervailing duty. In the Department's terminology, a remission of taxes is "nonexcessive" if it does not exceed the amount of tax paid or otherwise due; thus, for example, if a tax of $5 is levied on goods at the factory, the return of the $5 upon exportation would be "nonexcessive," whereas a payment of $ from the government to the manufacturer upon exportation would be "excessive" by $3. The Department pointed out that the current *44 version of 303 is in all relevant respects unchanged from the countervailing-duty statute enacted by Congress in 197,[] and that the Secretaryin decisions dating back to 19has always taken the position that the nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax is not a bounty or grant within the meaning of the statute.[9] On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Customs Court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the Secretary to assess countervailing duties on all Japanese consumer electronic *449 products specified in petitioner's complaint. The court acknowledged the Secretary's longstanding interpretation of the statute. It concluded, however, that this administrative practice could not be sustained in light of this Court's decision in which held that an export bounty had been conferred by a complicated Russian scheme for the regulation of sugar production and sale, involving, among other elements, remission of excise taxes in the event of exportation. On appeal by the Government, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, dividing 3-2, reversed the judgment of the Customs Court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the United States. 64 Cow. C. P. A. 130, The majority opinion distinguished Downs on the ground that it did not decide the question of whether nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, standing alone, constitutes a bounty or grant upon exportation. The court then examined the language of 303 and the legislative history of the 197 provision and concluded that, "in determining whether a bounty or grant has been conferred, it is the economic result of the foreign government's action which controls." 64 Cow. C. P. A., at Relying primarily on the "long-continued" and "uniform" administrative practice, -1219, 1222-1223, and secondarily on congressional "acquiescence" in this practice through repeated re-enactment of the controlling statutory language, the court held that interpretation of "bounty or grant" so as not to include a nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax is "a lawfully permissible interpretation of 303." We granted certiorari, and we now affirm. *450 II It is undisputed that the Treasury Department adopted the statutory interpretation at issue here |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | the Treasury Department adopted the statutory interpretation at issue here less than a year after passage of the basic countervailing-duty statute in 197, see T. D. 19321, 1 Synopsis of [Treasury] Decisions 696 (19), and that the Department has uniformly maintained this position for over 0 years.[10] This longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation is entitled to considerable weight. "When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. `To sustain [an agency's] application of [a] statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.'" quoting Unemployment Compensation Moreover, an administrative "practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the [persons] charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new." Norwegian Nitrogen Products ; see, e. g., Power Reactor The question is thus whether, in light of the normal aids to statutory construction, the Department's interpretation is "sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court. Our examination of the language, the legislative history, and the overall purpose of the 197 provision persuades us that the Department's initial construction of the statute was far from unreasonable; and we are unable to find anything in the events subsequent to that time that convinces us that the Department was required to abandon this interpretation. A The language of the 197 statute evolved out of two earlier countervailing-duty provisions that had been applicable only to sugar imports. The first provision was enacted in 190, apparently for the purpose of protecting domestic sugar refiners from unfair foreign competition; it provided for a fixed countervailing duty on refined sugar imported from countries that "pay, directly or indirectly, a [greater] bounty on the exportation of" refined sugar than on raw sugar. Tariff Act of 190, ¶ 237, Although the congressional debates did not focus sharply on the meaning of the word "bounty," what evidence there is suggests that the term was not intended to encompass the nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax. Thus, one strong supporter of increased protection for American sugar producers heavily criticized the export "bounties" conferred by several European governments, and attached a concise description of "The Bounty Systems in Europe"; both the remarks and the description indicated that the "bounties" consisted of the amounts by which |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | indicated that the "bounties" consisted of the amounts by which government payments exceeded the excise taxes that had been paid upon the beets from which the sugar was produced. See 21 Cong. Rec. 9529, 9532 (190) (remarks of Sen. Gibson); According to the description, for example, French sugar manufacturers paid an "excise tax [of] $97.06 per gross ton[,] [b]ut upon the export of a ton of sugar received back as a drawback $1.60, making a clear bounty of $20.54 per gross ton of sugar exported." *452 This concept of a "net" bountythat is, a remission in excess of taxes paid or otherwise dueas the trigger for a countervailing-duty requirement emerged more clearly in the second sugar provision, enacted in 194. Tariff Act of 194, ¶ 12 1/2, The 194 statute extended the countervailing-duty requirement to all imported sugar, raw as well as refined, and provided for payment of a fixed duty on all sugar coming from a country which "pays, directly or indirectly, a bounty on the export thereof." A proviso to the statute made clear, however, that no duties were to be assessed in the event that the "bounty" did not exceed the amount of taxes already paid.[11] The author of the 194 provision, Senator Jones, expressly characterized this difference between the amounts received upon exportation and the amounts already paid in taxes as the "net bounty" on exportation. 26 Cong. Rec. 5705 (194) (discussing German export bounty system). The 197 statute greatly expanded upon the coverage of the 194 provision by making the countervailing-duty requirement applicable to all imported products. Tariff Act of 197, 5, quoted in n. There are strong indications, however, that Congress intended to retain the "net bounty" concept of the 194 provision as the criterion for determining when a countervailing duty was to be imposed. Although the proviso in the 194 law was deleted, the 197 statute did provide for levying of duties equal to the "net amount" of any export bounty or grant. And the legislative *453 history suggests that this language, in addition to establishing a responsive mechanism for determining the appropriate amount of countervailing duty, was intended to incorporate the prior rule that nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes would not trigger the countervailing-duty requirement at all. There is no question that the prior rule was carried forward in the version of the 197 statute that originally passed the House. This version did not extend the countervailing-duty requirement to all imports. Instead, it merely modified the 194 sugar provision so that the amount of the countervailing duty, rather than being fixed, would |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | amount of the countervailing duty, rather than being fixed, would be "equal to [the export] bounty, or so much thereof as may be in excess of any tax collected by [the foreign] country upon [the] exported [sugar], or upon the beet or cane from which it was produced." See 30 Cong. Rec. 34 (197). The House Report unequivocally stated that the countervailing duty was intended to be "equivalent to the net export bounty paid by any country." H. R. Rep. No. 1, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (197) (emphasis supplied). The Senate deleted the House provision from the bill and replaced it with the more general provision that was eventually enacted into law. See 30 Cong. Rec. 33 (197) (striking House provision); ; The debates in the Senate indicate, however, thataside from extending the coverage of the House provisionthe Senate did not intend to change its substance. Senator Allison, the sponsor of the Senate amendment, explained that the House provision was being "stricken from the bill," because "the same paragraph in substance [is] being inserted [in] section [5], making this countervailing duty apply to all articles instead of to [sugar] alone." at 35. See also Senator Allison twice remarked that the countervailing duty that he was proposing was an "imitation" of the one provided in the 194 statute, *454 ; see at 74, and later in the debates he statedin response to a question as to whether the countervailing duty would be equal to "the whole amount of the export bounty"that "[the bounty contemplated] is the net bounty, less the taxes and reductions" An additional indication of the Senate's intent can be found in the extended discussion of the effect that the statute would have with respect to German sugar exports. Time after time the amount of the German "bounty"and, correspondingly, the amount of the countervailing duty that would be imposed under the statutewas stated to be 3¢ per 100 pounds of refined sugar, and 27¢ per 100 pounds of raw sugar. See, e. g., at 50 5 (Sens. Allison and Jones), 0 (Sen. Jones), 19 (Sens. Allison and Lindsay), 29 (Sen. Caffery), 223-224 (Sens. Aldrich and Jones). These figures were supplied by the Treasury Department itself, see 22 (letter from Treasury Department to Sen. Caffery), and were utilized by both proponents and opponents of the measure. And yet it was frequently acknowledged during the debates that Germany exempted sugar exports from its domestic consumption tax of $2. per 100 pounds, an amount far in excess of the 3¢ and 27¢ figures. See, e. g., at 46 51 (Sen. Caffery), |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | 27¢ figures. See, e. g., at 46 51 (Sen. Caffery), 97 (same), 2205 (same). Had the Senators considered the mere remission of an indirect tax to be a "bounty," it seems unlikely that they would have stated that the German "bounties" were only 3¢ and 27¢ per 100 pounds.[12] Especially in *455 light of the strong opposition to countervailing duties even of the magnitude of 3¢ and 27¢, see, e. g., 2203-2205 (remarks of Sen. Gray), it seems reasonable to infer that Congress did not intend to impose countervailing duties of many times this magnitude. B Regardless of whether this legislative history absolutely compelled the Secretary to interpret "bounty or grant" so as not to encompass any nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, there can be no doubt that such a construction was reasonable in light of the statutory purpose. Cf. This purpose is relatively clear from the face of the statute and is confirmed by the congressional debates: The countervailing *456 duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by their governments. See, e. g., 30 Cong. Rec. 74 2205 (Sen. Caffery), 2225 (Sen. Lindsay) (197). The Treasury Department was well positioned to establish rules of decision that would accurately carry out this purpose, particularly since it had contributed the very figures relied upon by Congress in enacting the statute. See 396 U.S. In deciding in 19 that a nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes did not result in the type of competitive advantage that Congress intended to counteract, the Department was clearly acting in accordance with the shared assumptions of the day as to the fairness and economic effect of that practice. The theory underlying the Department's position was that a foreign country's remission of indirect taxes did not constitute subsidization of that country's exports. Rather, such remission was viewed as a reasonable measure for avoiding double taxation of exportsonce by the foreign country and once upon sale in this country. As explained in a recent study prepared by the Department for the Senate Committee on Finance: "[The Department's construction was] based on the principle that, since exports are not consumed in the country of production, they should not be subject to consumption taxes in that country. The theory has been that the application of countervailing duties to the rebate of consumption [and other indirect] taxes would have the effect of double taxation of the product, since the United States would not only impose its own indirect taxes, such as Federal and state excise taxes and state and |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | such as Federal and state excise taxes and state and local sales taxes, but would also collect, through the use of the countervailing duty, the indirect tax imposed by the *457 exporting country on domestically consumed goods." Senate Committee on Finance, Executive Branch GATT 93d Cong., 2d Sess., -1 (1974). This intuitively appealing principle regarding double taxation had been widely accepted both in this country and abroad for many years prior to enactment of the 197 statute. See, e. g., Act of July 4, 9, 3, ; 4 Works and Correspondence of D. Ricardo 2-2 (pamphlets and papers first published in 122); A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book Four, ch. IV (76). C The Secretary's interpretation of the countervailing-duty statute is as permissible today as it was in 19. The statute has been re-enacted five times by Congress without any modification of the relevant language, see n. and, whether or not Congress can be said to have "acquiesced" in the administrative practice, it certainly has not acted to change it. At the same time, the Secretary's position has been incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),[13] which is followed by every major trading nation in the world; foreign tax systems as well as private expectations thus have been built on the assumption that countervailing duties would not be imposed on nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes. In light of these substantial reliance interests, the longstanding administrative construction of the statute should "not be *45 disturbed except for cogent reasons." 41 (1); see 30 U. S., at 1. Aside from the contention, discussed in Part III, infra, that the Department's construction is inconsistent with this Court's decisions, petitioner's sole argument is that the Department's position is premised on false economic assumptions that should be rejected by the courts. In particular, petitioner points to "modern" economic theory suggesting that remission of indirect taxes may create an incentive to export in some circumstances, and to recent criticism of the GATT rules as favoring producers in countries that rely more heavily on indirect than on direct taxes.[14] But, even assuming that these arguments are at all relevant in view of the legislative history of the 197 provision and the longstanding administrative construction of the statute, they do not demonstrate the unreasonableness of the Secretary's current position. Even "modern" economists do not agree on the ultimate economic effect of remitting indirect taxes, andgiven the present state of economic knowledgeit may be difficult, if not impossible, to measure the precise effect in any particular case. |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | impossible, to measure the precise effect in any particular case. See, e. g., Executive Branch GATT ; Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 L. & Policy in Int'l Bus. 351 More fundamentally, as the Senate Committee with responsibility in this *459 area recently stated, "the issues involved in applying the countervailing duty law are complex, and internationally, there is [a] lack of any satisfactory agreement on what constitutes a fair, as opposed to an `unfair,' subsidy." S. Rep. No. 93-129, p. 13 (1974). In this situation, it is not the task of the judiciary to substitute its views as to fairness and economic effect for those of the Secretary. III Notwithstanding all of the foregoing considerations, this would be a very different case if, as petitioner contends, the Secretary's practice were contrary to this Court's decision in[15] Upon close examination of the admittedly opaque opinion in that case, however, we do not believe that Downs is controlling on the question presented here. The Russian sugar laws at issue in Downs were, as the Court noted, "very complicated." Much of the Court's opinion was devoted to an exposition of these provisions, see -512, but for present purposes only two features are relevant: (1) excise taxes imposed on sugar sales within Russia were remitted on exports; and (2) the exporter received, in addition, a certificate entitling its bearer to sell an amount of sugar in Russia, equal to the quantity exported, without paying the full excise tax otherwise due. This certificate was transferable and had a substantial market value related to the amount of tax forgiveness that it carried with it. *460 The Secretary, following the same interpretation of the statute that he followed here, imposed a countervailing duty based on the value of the certificates alone, and not on the excise taxes remitted on the exports themselves.[] Downs, the importer, sought review, claiming that the Russian system did not confer any countervailable bounty or grant within the meaning of the 197 statute. He did not otherwise challenge the amount of the duty assessed by the Secretary.[] The issue as it came before this Court, therefore, was whether a nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, together with the granting of an additional benefit represented by the value of the certificate, constituted a "bounty or grant." Since the amount of the bounty was not in question, neither the parties nor this Court focused carefully on the distinction between remission of the excise tax and conferral of the certificate. Petitioner argues, however, that certain broad language in the Court's opinion suggests |
Justice Marshall | 1,978 | 15 | majority | Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109907/zenith-radio-corp-v-united-states/ | however, that certain broad language in the Court's opinion suggests that mere remission of a tax, even if nonexcessive, must be considered a bounty or grant within the meaning of the statute. Petitioner relies in particular on the following language: "The details of this elaborate procedure for the production, sale, taxation and exportation of Russian sugar are of much less importance than the two facts which appear clearly through this maze of regulations, viz.: that no sugar is permitted to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise tax of R. 1.75 per pood, and that sugar exported pays no tax at all When a tax is imposed *461 upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation." This passage is inconsistent with both preceding and subsequent language which suggests that the Court understood the "bounty" to reside in the value of the certificates. At one point the Court stated that "[t]he amount [the exporter] receives for his export certificate [on the market], say, R. 1.25, is the exact amount of the bounty he receives upon exportation." [1] And the Court in conclusion specifically endorsed the Fourth Circuit's holding to the same effect, see n. "[T]he Circuit Court of Appeals found: `That the Russian exporter of sugar obtained from his government a certificate, solely because of such exportation, which is worth in the open market of that country from R. 1.25 to R. 1.64 per pood, or from 1. to 2.35 cents per pound. Therefore we hold that the government of Russia does secure to the exporter of that country, as the inevitable result of its action, a money reward or gratuity whenever he exports sugar from Russia.' We all concur in this expression of opinion." U.S., at 5. Given this other language, we cannot read for its broadest implications the passage on which petitioner relies. In our view the passage does no more than establish the proposition *462 that an excessive remission of taxesthere, the combination of the exemption with the certificatesis an export bounty within the meaning of the statute. As the court below noted, "`[i]t is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.'" 64 Cow. C. P. A., at quoting (121). No one argued in Downs that a nonexcessive remission of taxes, standing alone, would have constituted a bounty on exportation, and |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108731/brennan-v-arnheim-neely-inc/ | It is undisputed that for the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 201 et seq., to apply to all the employees involved in this case, they must be employed in an "enterprise engaged in commerce *522 or in the production of goods for commerce."[1] 29 U.S. C. 203 (s), 206, and 207. An "enterprise" for the purpose of the Act "means the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose" 203 (r). An enterprise, however, does not include the related activities performed for the enterprise by an independent contractor or other specified arrangements, including otherwise independent establishments occupying premises leased to them by the same person. But, for an "enterprise" to be "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," the enterprise must have an "annual gross volume of sales made or business done" in an amount not less than the specified statutory minimum. 203 (s) (1). Congress did not intend to cover all establishments by expanding the coverage of the Act through the enterprise approach. Instead, it drew an economic line. "It is the line which the Congress must draw in determining who shall and who shall not be covered by a minimum wage." S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 5. Nor was the definition of enterprise intended to swallow up the exclusion of small businesses. Related activities conducted by separate businesses would be considered a part of an enterprise only "where they are joined either through unified operation *523 or common control into a unified business system or economic unit to serve a common business purpose." And the express exemptions provided in 203 (r) from the enterprise concept, the Senate Report said, would "insure that a small local independent business, not in itself large enough to come within the new coverage, will not become subject to the act by being considered a part of a large enterprise with which it has business dealings." In the case before us, nine separately and independently owned buildings leasing space to tenants employed the same management company as agent to recommend tenants, collect rents, hire, fire, and supervise employees, and maintain and operate the buildings. The Court holds that even if none of the individual building owners would itself generate gross rentals in sufficient amount to be covered by the Act, the buildings and the management company collectively are an enterprise with collective gross rentals in excess of the statutory minimums and hence covered |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108731/brennan-v-arnheim-neely-inc/ | rentals in excess of the statutory minimums and hence covered by the Act.[2] Because it appears to me that the Court is applying the concept of enterprise in a way which ignores the economic limitations in the Act and the congressional intention they represent, I respectfully dissent. There is no connection between these separately owned buildings other than the fact that they employ the same management company to represent them. They have a common managing agent, but that agent is separately accountable to, and must follow the perhaps diverse directions of, each of its principals. They have no unified operation, do not constitute a unified business system or an economic unit, and surely do not serve a common *524 business purpose. Hence there is no "enterprise" within the meaning of the Act which covers only those "related activities" performed through unified operation or common control "for a common business purpose." As I have indicated, Congress was not unaware of the possibility of stretching the concept "enterprise" beyond its proper bounds and sought to guard against it. The Senate Committee said: "Thus the mere fact that a group of independently owned and operated stores join together to combine their purchasing activities or to run combined advertising will not for these reasons mean that their activities are performed through unified operation or common control and they will not for these reasons be considered a part of the same `enterprise.' " S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 42. Common agents, therefore, are not sufficient to convert otherwise independent entities into an enterprise. The Committee also said: "There may be a number of different types of arrangements established in such cases. The key in each case may be found in the answer to the question, `Who receives the profits, suffers the losses, sets the wages and working conditions of employees, or otherwise manages the business in those respects which are the common attributes of an independent businessman operating a business for profit?' " Under this standard, there can be no question that the buildings are separate economic units and should be treated as such. The manager receives merely a commission for his services. The managing agent manages, but is subject to direction by his principal. The income and expenses for each building are accounted for separately. The owner of each building receives the profits and suffers the losses, if any. Each owner sets the wages and working conditions for each building in the sense that, although the manager negotiates such matters, he negotiates under instructions, and it is each owner who *525 |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108731/brennan-v-arnheim-neely-inc/ | negotiates under instructions, and it is each owner who *525 must approve them. Each building carries a separate employer identification number. Employees are hired with respect to each building, and supplies and other items necessary for the operation of the buildings are purchased separately for each building. Should a particular building terminate its relationship with the manager, the building employees remain with the building. The Arnheim & Neely agency unquestionably was an "employer" insofar as its relationship to each of the buildings was concerned, for 29 U.S. C. 203 (d) defines the term employer as including "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee" But this is a far cry from concluding that the separate buildings and their common agent constitute an enterprise engaged in commerce.[3] Unquestionably, it is the individual owner who bears the burden of the Act and if any one of them, or each of them, individually has gross sales less than the jurisdictional minimums mentioned in the Act, construing the work "enterprise" concept as the majority does distorts clear congressional intent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | dissenting | Diedrich v. Commissioner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110741/diedrich-v-commissioner/ | It is a well-settled principle today that a taxpayer realizes income when another person relieves the taxpayer of a legal obligation in connection with an otherwise taxable transaction. See ; Old Colony Trust In neither Old Colony nor Crane was there any question as to the existence of a taxable transaction; the only question concerned the amount of income realized by the taxpayer as a result of the taxable transaction. The Court in this case, however, begs the question of whether a taxable transaction has taken place at all when it concludes that "[t]he principles of Old Colony and Crane control" this case. Ante, at 196. In Old Colony, the employer agreed to pay the employee's federal tax liability as part of his compensation. The employee provided his services to the employer in exchange for compensation. The exchange of compensation for services was undeniably a taxable transaction. The only question was whether the employee's taxable income included the employer's assumption of the employee's income tax liability. In Crane, the taxpayer sold real property for cash plus the buyer's assumption of a mortgage. Clearly a sale had occurred, and the only question was whether the amount of the *201 mortgage assumed by the buyer should be included in the amount realized by the taxpayer. The Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that what she sold was not the property itself, but her equity in that property. Unlike Old Colony or Crane, the question in this case is not the amount of income the taxpayer has realized as a result of a concededly taxable transation, but whether a taxable transaction has taken place at all. Only after one concludes that a partial sale occurs when the donee agrees to pay the gift tax do Old Colony and Crane become relevant in ascertaining the amount of income realized by the donor as a result of the transaction. Nowhere does the Court explain why a gift becomes a partial sale merely because the donor and donee structure the gift so that the gift tax imposed by Congress on the transaction is paid by the donee rather than the donor. In my view, the resolution of this case turns upon congressional intent: whether Congress intended to characterize a gift as a partial sale whenever the donee agrees to pay the gift tax. Congress has determined that a gift should not be considered income to the donee. 26 U.S. C. 102. Instead, gift transactions are to be subject to a tax system wholly separate and distinct from the income tax. See 26 U.S. C. 2501 et seq. |
Justice Thomas | 1,997 | 1 | concurring | Lynce v. Mathis | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118088/lynce-v-mathis/ | I understand the Court's opinion to hold that retroactively canceling petitioner's so-called "provisional credits" after he has used them to gain his freedom violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. This result naturally follows from our consistent view that the Clause is intended to prohibit laws that "retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment *450 for criminal acts." Whether a particular law retroactively increases a criminal punishment is often a close question. In California Dept. of for example, respondent challenged a retroactive change to the frequency of parole hearings. Given that the retroactive change "create[d] only the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes," we found no ex post facto violation. Unlike in Morales, the increase in petitioner's punishment here was neither "speculative" nor "attenuated." Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and was duly sentenced. During the period of his confinement, petitioner accumulated release credits under a state statute adopted in response to prison overcrowding. Those credits enabled petitioner to be freed from prison before his sentence (as originally imposed) had run. Shortly before petitioner secured his release, however, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute preventing certain categories of offenders from taking advantage of the provisional credits. Although petitioner's offense placed him among the offenders denied the opportunity to acquire those particular credits, the statute was not applied retroactively. Petitioner was thus released. The state attorney general subsequently issued an opinion giving the statute retroactive effect. The State thereafter rearrested petitioner and returned him to custody. Under these narrow circumstances, I agree with the Court that the State's retroactive nullification of petitioner's previously accrued, and then used, release credits violates the Constitution's ban on ex post facto lawmaking. I do not, however, join the majority's discussion of which I find unnecessary to the resolution of this case. In Weaver, we considered whether a statute *451 that merely altered the availability of "good conduct" credits ran afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The present case involves not merely an effect on the availability of future release credits, but the retroactive elimination of credits already earned and used. Accordingly, I concur in part and concur in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | dissenting | Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145687/unitherm-food-systems-inc-v-swift-eckrich-inc/ | Murphy's law applies to trial lawyers as well as pilots. Even an expert will occasionally blunder. For that reason Congress has preserved the federal appeals courts' power to correct plain error, even though trial counsel's omission will ordinarily give rise to a binding waiver. This is not a case, in my view, in which the authority of the appellate court is limited by an explicit statute or controlling rule. The spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favors preservation of a court's power to avoid manifestly unjust results in exceptional cases. See ("`Procedure is the means; full, equal and exact enforcement of substantive law is the end'" (quoting Pound, The Etiquette of Justice, 3 Proceedings Neb. St. Bar Assn. 231 (1909))). Moreover, we have an overriding duty to obey statutory commands that unambiguously express the intent of Congress even in areas such as procedure in which we may have special expertise. Today, relying primarily on a case decided in March 1947, and a case decided in January 1948, Globe Liquor the Court holds that the Court of Appeals was "powerless" to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict in petitioner's favor because respondent failed to file proper postverdict motions pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the trial court. Ante, at 405. The majority's holding is inconsistent with a statute enacted just months after Globe Liquor was decided. That statute, which remains in effect today, provides: "The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." Nothing in Rule 50(b) limits this statutory grant of power to appellate courts; while a party's failure to make a Rule 50(b) motion precludes the district court from directing a verdict in that party's favor, the Rule does not purport to strip the courts of appeals of the authority to review district court judgments or to order such relief as "may be just under the circumstances." Nor do general principles of waiver or forfeiture have that effect. Cf. ante, at 404-405. It is well settled that a litigant's waiver or forfeiture of an argument does not, in the absence of a contrary statutory command, preclude the courts of appeals from considering those arguments. See Arguments raised for the first time on |
Justice Stevens | 2,006 | 16 | dissenting | Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145687/unitherm-food-systems-inc-v-swift-eckrich-inc/ | those arguments. See Arguments raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained, for example, if their consideration would prevent manifest injustice. Ibid.[*] *409 For the reasons articulated by the Court in it may be unfair or even an abuse of discretion for a court of appeals to direct a verdict in favor of the party that lost below if that party failed to make a timely Rule 50(b) motion. Likewise, it may not be "just under the circumstances" for a court of appeals to order a new trial in the absence of a proper Rule 59 motion. Finally, a court of appeals has discretion to rebuff, on grounds of waiver or forfeiture, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence absent a proper Rule 50(b) or Rule 59 motion made in the district court. None of the foregoing propositions rests, however, on a determination that the courts of appeals lack "power" to review the sufficiency of the evidence and order appropriate relief under these circumstances, and I can divine no basis for that determination. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Pulley v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111092/pulley-v-harris/ | Respondent Harris was convicted of a capital crime in a California court and was sentenced to death.[1] Along with *39 many other challenges to the conviction and sentence, Harris claimed on appeal that the California capital punishment statute was invalid under the United States Constitution because it failed to require the California Supreme Court to compare Harris' sentence with the sentences imposed in similar capital *40 cases and thereby to determine whether they were proportionate.[2] Rejecting the constitutional claims by citation to earlier cases, the California Supreme Court affirmed.[3] We denied certiorari. Harris then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts. He again complained of the failure to provide him with comparative proportionality review. The writ was denied without opinion, and we denied certiorari. Harris next sought habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, pressing the claim, among others, that he had been denied the comparative proportionality review assertedly required by the United States Constitution. The District Court denied the writ and refused to stay Harris' execution, but issued a certificate of probable cause. The Court of Appeals, after holding that the proportionality review demanded by Harris was constitutionally required, vacated the judgment of the District Court and ordered that the writ issue relieving Harris of the death sentence unless within 120 days the California Supreme Court undertook to determine whether the penalty imposed *41 on Harris is proportionate to sentences imposed for similar crimes.[4] We granted the State's petition for certiorari presenting the question whether the proportionality review mandated by the Court of Appeals is required by the United States Constitution. I Harris concedes that the Court of Appeals' judgment rested on a federal constitutional ground. He nonetheless contends that we should affirm the judgment, which has the effect of returning the case to the state courts, because state law may entitle him to the comparative proportionality review that he has unsuccessfully demanded. We are unimpressed with the submission. Under 28 U.S. C. 2241, a writ of habeas corpus disturbing a state-court judgment may issue only if it is found that a prisoner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S. C. 2241(c)(3). A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law. Even if an error of state law could be sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, Harris' submission is not persuasive. He relies on |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Pulley v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111092/pulley-v-harris/ | Fourteenth Amendment, Harris' submission is not persuasive. He relies on and for the proposition that proportionality review should have been extended to him as a matter of state law. But since deciding those cases, the California Supreme Court has twice rejected Harris' demand for proportionality review without suggesting that it was in any way departing from precedent. Indeed, on direct review, it indicated that Harris' constitutional claims had been adversely decided in those very cases. Finally, if Harris' claim is that because of an evolution of state law he would now enjoy the kind of proportionality review that has so far been denied him, that claim, even if accurate,[5] would not warrant issuing a writ of habeas corpus. Rather it would appear to be a matter that the state courts should consider, if they are so inclined, free of the constraints of the federal writ. Accordingly, we deem it necessary to reach the constitutional question on which certiorari was granted. II At the outset, we should more clearly identify the issue before us. Traditionally, "proportionality" has been used with reference to an abstract evaluation of the appropriateness of *43 a sentence for a particular crime. Looking to the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty, to sentences imposed for other crimes, and to sentencing practices in other jurisdictions, this Court has occasionally struck down punishments as inherently disproportionate, and therefore cruel and unusual, when imposed for a particular crime or category of crime. See, e. g., ; ; The death penalty is not in all cases a disproportionate penalty in this sense. ; The proportionality review sought by Harris, required by the Court of Appeals,[6] and provided for in numerous state statutes[7] is of a different sort. This sort of proportionality review presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. The issue in this case, therefore, is whether the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth *44 Amendment, requires a state appellate court, before it affirms a death sentence, to compare the sentence in the case before it with the penalties imposed in similar cases if requested to do so by the prisoner. Harris insists that it does and that this is the invariable rule in every case. Apparently, the Court of Appeals was of the same view. We do not agree. III Harris' submission is rooted in In Furman, |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Pulley v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111092/pulley-v-harris/ | not agree. III Harris' submission is rooted in In Furman, the Court concluded that capital punishment, as then administered under statutes vesting unguided sentencing discretion in juries and trial judges, had become unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. The death penalty was being imposed so discriminatorily, so wantonly and freakishly, and so infrequently, that any given death sentence was cruel and unusual. In response to that decision, roughly two-thirds of the States promptly redrafted their capital sentencing statutes in an effort to limit jury discretion and avoid arbitrary and inconsistent results. All of the new statutes provide for automatic appeal of death sentences. Most, such as 's require the reviewing court, to some extent at least, to determine whether, considering both the crime and the defendant, the sentence is disproportionate to that imposed in similar cases. Not every State has adopted such a procedure. In some States, such as the appellate court performs proportionality review despite the absence of a statutory requirement; in others, such as California and Texas, it does not. Four years after Furman, this Court examined several of the new state statutes. We upheld one of each of the three sorts mentioned above. See ; Needless to say, that some schemes providing *45 proportionality review are constitutional does not mean that such review is indispensable. We take statutes as we find them. To endorse the statute as a whole is not to say that anything different is unacceptable. As was said in "[w]e do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis." Examination of our 1976 cases makes clear that they do not establish proportionality review as a constitutional requirement. In six Justices concluded that the system adequately directed and limited the jury's discretion. The bifurcated proceedings, the limited number of capital crimes, the requirement that at least one aggravating circumstance be present, and the consideration of mitigating circumstances minimized the risk of wholly arbitrary, capricious, or freakish sentences. In the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, three Justices concluded that sentencing discretion under the statute was sufficiently controlled by clear and objective standards. In a separate concurrence, three other Justices found sufficient reason to expect that the death penalty would not be imposed so wantonly, freakishly, or infrequently as to be invalid under Both opinions made much of the statutorily required comparative proportionality review. This was considered an additional safeguard against arbitrary |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Pulley v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111092/pulley-v-harris/ | proportionality review. This was considered an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing. While the opinion of Justices Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS suggested that some form of meaningful appellate review is required, those Justices did not declare that comparative review was so critical that without it the statute would not have passed constitutional muster. Indeed, in *46 summarizing the components of an adequate capital sentencing scheme, Justices Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS did not mention comparative review: "[T]he concerns expressed in Furman can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information." In short, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that required proportionality review. There is even less basis for reliance on The statute provides for a bifurcated procedure and forecloses the death penalty unless the sentencing authority finds that at least one of eight statutory aggravating circumstances is present and is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. The joint opinion of Justices Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS observed that the scheme, like its counterpart, requires the sentencer to focus on the individual circumstances of each homicide and each defendant. Also, by vesting ultimate sentencing authority in the judge rather than the jury, the statute was expected to yield more consistent sentencing at the trial court level. Only after concluding that trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to impose the death penalty did the opinion observe that death sentences are reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with the sentences imposed in similar cases.[8] The opinion concurring in *47 the judgment filed by three other Justices approved the statute without even mentioning appellate review. *48 That and Proffitt did not establish a constitutional requirement of proportionality review is made clearer by decided the same day. In Jurek we upheld a death sentence even though neither the statute, as in nor state case law, as in provided for comparative proportionality review. Justices Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, after emphasizing the limits on the jury's discretion,[9] concluded: "Texas' capital-sentencing procedures, like those of and do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. By narrowing its definition of capital murder, Texas has essentially said that there must be at least one statutory aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Pulley v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111092/pulley-v-harris/ | aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death sentence may even be considered. By authorizing the defense to bring before the jury at the separate sentencing hearing whatever mitigating circumstances relating to the individual defendant can be adduced, Texas has ensured that the sentencing jury will have adequate guidance to enable it to perform its sentencing function. By providing *49 prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law. Because this system serves to assure that sentences of death will not be `wantonly' or `freakishly' imposed, it does not violate the Constitution." That the three Justices considered such appellate review as Texas provided "a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences," ib is revealing. First, it makes plain that, at least in light of the other safeguards in the Texas statute, proportionality review would have been constitutionally superfluous. Second, it suggests that the similarly worded references to appellate review in and Proffitt were focused not on proportionality review as such, but only on the provision of some sort of prompt and automatic appellate review. The concurrence expressing the views of three other Justices sustained the Texas statute by focusing solely on the limitations on the jury's discretion, without even mentioning appellate review.[10]*50 In view of Jurek, we are quite sure that at that juncture the Court had not mandated comparative proportionality review whenever a death sentence was imposed.[11] Harris also relies on which was announced after the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. Zant did not depart from and did not question Jurek. Indeed, Jurek was cited in support of the -876, n. 13. While emphasizing the importance of mandatory appellate review under the statute, at 875 and 876, we did not hold that without comparative proportionality review the statute would be unconstitutional. To the contrary, we relied on the jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, not the State Supreme Court's finding of proportionality, as rationalizing the sentence.[12] Thus, the emphasis was on the constitutionally necessary narrowing function of statutory aggravating circumstances. Proportionality review was considered to be an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences, but we certainly did not hold that comparative review was constitutionally required. There is thus no basis in our cases for holding that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and the *51 defendant requests it. Indeed, to so hold would effectively overrule |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Pulley v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111092/pulley-v-harris/ | defendant requests it. Indeed, to so hold would effectively overrule Jurek and would substantially depart from the sense of and Proffitt. We are not persuaded that the Eighth Amendment requires us to take that course. IV Assuming that there could be a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass constitutional muster without comparative proportionality review, the 1977 California statute is not of that sort. Under this scheme, a person convicted of first-degree murder is sentenced to life imprisonment unless one or more "special circumstances" are found, in which case the punishment is either death or life imprisonment without parole. Cal. Penal Code Ann. 190, 190.2[13] Special circumstances are alleged in the charging paper and tried with the issue of guilt at the initial phase of the trial. At the close of evidence, the jury decides guilt or innocence and determines whether the special circumstances alleged are present. Each special circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 190.4(a). If the jury finds the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and finds at least one special circumstance, the trial proceeds to a second phase to determine the appropriate penalty. Additional evidence may be offered and the jury is given a list of relevant factors. *52 190.3.[14] "After having heard and received all of the evidence, the trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall determine whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole." If the jury returns a verdict of death, the defendant is deemed to move to modify the verdict. 190.4(e). The trial judge then reviews the evidence and, in light of the statutory factors, makes an "independent determination as to whether the weight of the evidence supports the jury's findings and verdicts." The judge is required to state on the record the reasons for his findings. *53 If the trial judge denies the motion for modification, there is an automatic appeal. 190.4(e), 1239(b). The statute does not require comparative proportionality review or otherwise describe the nature of the appeal.[15] It does state that the trial judge's refusal to modify the sentence "shall be reviewed." 190.4(e). This would seem to include review of the evidence relied on by the judge. As the California Supreme Court has said, "the statutory requirements that the jury specify the special circumstances which permit imposition of the death penalty, and that the trial judge specify his reasons for denying modification of the death penalty, serve to |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Pulley v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111092/pulley-v-harris/ | reasons for denying modification of the death penalty, serve to assure thoughtful and effective appellate review, focusing upon the circumstances present in each particular case." That court has reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment because the evidence did not support the findings of special circumstances. By requiring the jury to find at least one special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, the statute limits the death sentence to a small subclass of capital-eligible cases. The statutory list of relevant factors, applied to defendants within this subclass, "provide[s] jury guidance and lessen[s] the chance of arbitrary application of the death penalty," "guarantee[ing] that the jury's discretion will be guided and its consideration deliberate," The jury's "discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Its decision is reviewed by the trial judge and the State Supreme Court. On its face, this system, without any requirement or practice of comparative proportionality review, cannot be successfully challenged under Furman and our subsequent cases. *54 Any capital sentencing scheme may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes. Such inconsistencies are a far cry from the major systemic defects identified in As we have acknowledged in the past, "there can be `no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death.' " quoting As we are presently informed, we cannot say that the California procedures provided Harris inadequate protection against the evil identified in The Court of Appeals therefore erred in ordering the writ of habeas corpus to issue. Its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Doe v. Bolton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108714/doe-v-bolton/ | [*] At the heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of reasons convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc. The common claim before us is that for any one of such reasons, or for no reason at all, and without asserting or claiming any threat to life or health, any woman is entitled to an abortion at her request if she is able to find a medical advisor willing to undertake the procedure. The Court for the most part sustains this position: During the period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus; the Constitution, therefore, guarantees the right to an abortion as against any state law or policy seeking to protect the fetus from an abortion not prompted by more compelling reasons of the mother. With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers *222 and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court. The Court apparently values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than the continued existence and development of the life or potential life that she carries. Whether or not I might agree with that marshaling of values, I can in no event join the Court's judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States. In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's exercise of |
Justice White | 1,973 | 6 | dissenting | Doe v. Bolton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108714/doe-v-bolton/ | and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and by investing mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs. It is my view, therefore, that the Texas statute is not constitutionally infirm because it denies abortions to those who seek to serve only their convenience rather than to protect their life or health. Nor is this plaintiff, who claims no threat to her mental or physical health, entitled to assert the possible rights of those women *223 whose pregnancy assertedly implicates their health. This, together with United dictates reversal of the judgment of the District Court. Likewise, because Georgia may constitutionally forbid abortions to putative mothers who, like the plaintiff in this case, do not fall within the reach of 26-1202 (a) of its criminal code, I have no occasion, and the District Court had none, to consider the constitutionality of the procedural requirements of the Georgia statute as applied to those pregnancies posing substantial hazards to either life or health. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court in the Georgia case. MR. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | When the law grants persons the right to compensation for injury from wrongful conduct, there must be some demonstrated connection, some link, between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. The requisite relation between prohibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the principles of causation, a subject most often arising in elaborating the law of torts. This case requires the Court to define those rules in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. et seq., which provides remedies to employees for injuries related to discriminatory conduct and associated wrongs by employers. Title VII is central to the federal policy of prohibiting wrongful discrimination in the Nation’s workplaces and in all sectors of economic endeavor. This opinion discusses the causation rules for two categories of wrongful employer conduct prohibited by Title VII. The first type is called, for purposes of this opinion, status-based discrimination. The term is used here to refer to basic workplace protec- tion such as prohibitions against employer discrimination 2 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in hiring, firing, salary structure, promotion and the like. See –2(a). The second type of conduct is employer retaliation on account of an employee’s having opposed, complained of, or sought remedies for, unlawful workplace discrimination. See –3(a). An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show that the causal link be- tween injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. So-called but-for causa- tion is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s This principle is the result of an earlier case from this Court, Price Water and an ensuing statutory amendment by Congress that codified in part and abrogated in part the holding in Price Waterhouse, see §–2(m), 2000e–5(g)(2)(B). The question the Court must answer here is whether that lessened causation standard is applicable to claims of unlawful employer retaliation under –3(a). Although the Court has not addressed the question of the causation showing required to establish liability for a Title VII retaliation claim, it has addressed the issue of causation in general in a case involving employer discrim- ination under a separate but related statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S. C. See In the Court concluded that the ADEA requires |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | C. See In the Court concluded that the ADEA requires proof that the prohibited criterion was the but-for cause of the prohibited conduct. The holding and analysis of that decision are instructive here. I Petitioner, the University of Texas Southwestern Medi- Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 3 Opinion of the Court cal Center (University), is an academic institution within the University of Texas system. The University specializes in medical education for aspiring physicians, health professionals, and scientists. Over the years, the Univer- sity has affiliated itself with a number of healthcare facili- ties including, as relevant in this case, Parkland Memorial Hospital (Hospital). As provided in its affiliation agree- ment with the University, the Hospital permits the Uni- versity’s students to gain clinical experience working in its facilities. The agreement also requires the Hospital to offer empty staff physician posts to the University’s faculty members, see App. 361–362, 366, and, accordingly, most of the staff physician positions at the Hospital are filled by those faculty members. Respondent is a medical doctor of Middle Eastern de- scent who specializes in internal medicine and infectious diseases. In 1995, he was hired to work both as a member of the University’s faculty and a staff physician at the Hospital. He left both positions in 1998 for additional medical education and then returned in 2001 as an assis- tant professor at the University and, once again, as a physician at the Hospital. In 2004, Dr. Beth Levine was hired as the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine. In that position Levine became respondent’s ultimate (though not direct) superior. Respondent alleged that Levine was biased against him on account of his religion and ethnic heritage, a bias manifested by undeserved scrutiny of his billing practices and productivity, as well as comments that “ ‘Middle Easterners are lazy.’ ” (CA5 2012). On different occasions during his employment, respondent met with Dr. Gregory Fitz, the University’s Chair of Internal Medicine and Levine’s supervisor, to complain about Levine’s alleged harassment. Despite obtaining a promotion with Levine’s assistance in 2006, respondent continued to believe that she was biased 4 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court against him. So he tried to arrange to continue working at the Hospital without also being on the University’s faculty. After preliminary negotiations with the Hospital suggested this might be possible, respondent resigned his teaching post in July 2006 and sent a letter to Dr. Fitz (among others), in which he stated that the reason for his departure was harassment by Levine. That harassment, he asserted, “ |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | departure was harassment by Levine. That harassment, he asserted, “ ‘stems from religious, racial and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.’ ” After reading that letter, Dr. Fitz expressed consternation at respondent’s accusations, saying that Levine had been “publicly humiliated by th[e] letter” and that it was “very important that she be publicly exonerated.” App. 41. Meanwhile, the Hospital had offered respondent a job as a staff physician, as it had indicated it would. On learning of that offer, Dr. Fitz protested to the Hospital, asserting that the offer was inconsistent with the affiliation agree- ment’s requirement that all staff physicians also be members of the University faculty. The Hospital then withdrew its offer. After exhausting his administrative remedies, respond- ent filed this Title VII suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. He alleged two discrete violations of Title VII. The first was a status- based discrimination claim under –2(a). Respondent alleged that Dr. Levine’s racially and religiously moti- vated harassment had resulted in his constructive dis- charge from the University. Respondent’s second claim was that Dr. Fitz’s efforts to prevent the Hospital from hiring him were in retaliation for complaining about Dr. Levine’s harassment, in violation of –3(a). 674 F. 3d, at 452. The jury found for respondent on both claims. It awarded him over $400,000 in backpay and more than $3 million in compensatory damages. The District Court later reduced the compensatory damages award to $300,000. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 5 Opinion of the Court On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court first con- cluded that respondent had submitted insufficient evi- dence in support of his constructive-discharge claim, so it vacated that portion of the jury’s verdict. The court af- firmed as to the retaliation finding, however, on the theory that retaliation claims brought under –3(a)—like claims of status-based discrimination under –2(a)— require only a showing that retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action, rather than its but-for cause. See n. 16 ). It further held that the evidence supported a finding that Dr. Fitz was moti- vated, at least in part, to retaliate against respondent for his complaints against Levine. The Court of Appeals then remanded for a redetermination of damages in light of its decision to vacate the constructive-discharge verdict. Four judges dissented from the court’s decision not to rehear the case en banc, arguing that the Circuit’s appli- cation of the motivating-factor standard to retaliation cases was “an erroneous interpretation of [Title |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | standard to retaliation cases was “an erroneous interpretation of [Title VII] and controlling caselaw” and should be overruled en banc. 688 F.3d 211, 213–214 (CA5 2012) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Certiorari was granted. 568 U. S. (2013). II A This case requires the Court to define the proper stand- ard of causation for Title VII retaliation claims. Causation in fact—i.e., proof that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff ’s injury—is a standard requirement of any tort claim, see Restatement of Torts (1934) (defini- tion of “legal cause”); Comment a (same); and Comment c (intentional infliction of physical harm); (other intentional torts); (negligence). This in- 6 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court cludes federal statutory claims of workplace discrimina- tion. Hazen Paper (1993) (In intentional-discrimination cases, “liability depends on whether the protected trait” “actually motivated the employer’s decision” and “had a determinative in- fluence on the outcome”); Los Angeles Dept. of Water and (explaining that the “simple test” for determining a discriminatory employment practice is “whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the usual course, this standard requires the plaintiff to show “that the harm would not have occurred” in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct. Restatement of Torts Comment a (negligence); and Comment a (same); see and Comment c (intentional infliction of bodily harm); (other inten- tional torts); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm and Comment b (noting the existence of an exception for cases where an injured party can prove the existence of multiple, inde- pendently sufficient factual causes, but observing that “cases invoking the concept are rare”). See also Restate- ment (Second) of Torts (1963 and 1964) (negli- gence claims); Comment l (intentional injury to another); cf. and Comment a (legal cause for inten- tional harm). It is thus textbook tort law that an action “is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without ” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 265 (5th ed. 1984). This, then, is the background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, and these are the default rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an indication to the contrary in the statute itself. See ; Carey v. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 7 Opinion of the Court Piphus, B Since the statute’s passage in |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | of the Court Piphus, B Since the statute’s passage in 1964, it has prohibited employers from discriminating against their employees on any of seven specified criteria. Five of them—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin—are personal character- istics and are set forth in –2. (As noted at the outset, discrimination based on these five characteristics is called status-based discrimination in this opinion.) And then there is a point of great import for this case: The two remaining categories of wrongful employer conduct—the employee’s opposition to employment discrimination, and the employee’s submission of or support for a complaint that alleges employment discrimination—are not wrongs based on personal traits but rather types of protected employee conduct. These latter two categories are covered by a separate, subsequent section of Title VII, – 3(a). Under the status-based discrimination provision, it is an “unlawful employment practice” for an employer “to dis- criminate against any individual because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” –2(a). In its 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse, the Court sought to explain the causation standard imposed by this language. It addressed in particular what it means for an action to be taken “because of ” an individual’s race, religion, or nationality. Although no opinion in that case commanded a majority, six Justices did agree that a plain- tiff could prevail on a claim of status-based discrimination if he or she could show that one of the prohibited traits was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in the employ- er’s ; at 259 (White, J., concurring in judgment); (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). If the plaintiff made that showing, the burden of persuasion would shift 8 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court to the employer, which could escape liability if it could prove that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence of all discriminatory animus. at 258 ; at 259–260 (opinion of White, J.); –277 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). In other words, the employer had to show that a discriminatory motive was not the but-for cause of the adverse employ- ment action. Two years later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), This statute (which had many other provisions) codified the burden-shifting and lessened-causation framework of Price Waterhouse in part but also rejected it to a substantial degree. The legislation first added a new subsection to the end of –2, i.e., Title VII’s principal ban on status-based discrimination. See The new provision, – 2(m), states: “[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” This, of course, is a lessened causation standard. The 1991 Act also abrogated a portion of Price Water house’s framework by removing the employer’s ability to defeat liability once a plaintiff proved the existence of an impermissible motivating factor. See 557 U. S., at 178, n. 5. In its place, Congress enacted –5(g)(2), which provides: “(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a vio- lation under section 2000e–2(m) of this title and [the employer] demonstrates that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court— “(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 9 Opinion of the Court and [limited] attorney’s fees and costs ; and “(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promo- tion, or payment” So, in short, the 1991 Act substituted a new burden- shifting framework for the one endorsed by Price Water house. Under that new regime, a plaintiff could obtain declaratory relief, attorney’s fees and costs, and some forms of injunctive relief based solely on proof that race, color, religion, sex, or nationality was a motivating factor in the employment action; but the employer’s proof that it would still have taken the same employment action would save it from monetary damages and a reinstatement order. See n. 5; see also at 175, n. 2, 177, n. 3. After Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act, considerable time elapsed before the Court returned again to the mean- ing of “because” and the problem of causation. This time it arose in the context of a different, yet similar statute, the ADEA, 29 U.S. C. See Much like the Title VII statute in Price Waterhouse, the relevant portion of the ADEA provided that “ ‘[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi- tions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi- vidual’s age.’ ” (quoting emphasis and ellipsis in original). Concentrating first and foremost on the meaning of the phrase “ ‘because of age,’ ” the Court in explained that the ordinary meaning of “ ‘because of ’ ” is “ ‘by reason of ’ ” or “ ‘on account of.’ ” at 176 (citing 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | ” at 176 (citing 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966); 1 Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933); The Random House Dic- tionary of the English Language 132 (1966); emphasis in 10 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court original). Thus, the “requirement that an employer took adverse action ‘because of ’ age [meant] that age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act,” or, in other words, that “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse ” See also Safeco Ins. of 63–64, and n. 14 (2007) (noting that “because of ” means “based on” and that “ ‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal relationship”); Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258, 265–266 (1992) (equating “by reason of ” with “ ‘but for’ cause”). In the course of approving this construction, declined to adopt the interpretation endorsed by the plu- rality and concurring opinions in Price Waterhouse. Not- ing that “the ADEA must be ‘read the way Congress wrote it,’ ” ), the Court concluded that “the textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA” “prevent[ed] us from applying Price Waterhouse to federal age discrimination claims,” n. 2. In particular, the Court stressed the congressional choice not to add a provision like –2(m) to the ADEA despite making numerous other changes to the latter statute in the 1991 Act. at 174– 175 (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991)); n. 3 ). Finally, the Court in held that it would not be proper to read Price Waterhouse as announcing a rule that applied to both statutes, despite their similar wording and near-contemporaneous n. 5. This different reading was necessary, the Court concluded, because Congress’ 1991 amendments to Title VII, includ- ing its “careful tailoring of the ‘motivating factor’ claim” and the substitution of –5(g)(2)(B) for Price Water house’s full affirmative defense, indicated that the moti- Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 11 Opinion of the Court vating-factor standard was not an organic part of Title VII and thus could not be read into the ADEA. See 557 U. S., at 178, n. 5. In the Court was careful to restrict its analysis to the statute before it and withhold judgment on the proper resolution of a case, such as this, which arose under Title VII rather than the ADEA. But the particular confines of do not deprive it of all persuasive force. Indeed, that opinion holds two insights for the present case. The first is textual and concerns the proper interpretation of the term “because” as |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | and concerns the proper interpretation of the term “because” as it relates to the principles of causa- tion underlying both and –3(a). The second is the significance of Congress’ structural choices in both Title VII itself and the law’s 1991 amendments. These principles do not decide the present case but do inform its analysis, for the issues possess significant parallels. III A As noted, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, which is set forth in –3(a), appears in a different section from Title VII’s ban on status-based discrimination. The antiretaliation provision states, in relevant part: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” This enactment, like the statute at issue in makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse em- ployment action against an employee “because” of certain criteria. Cf. 29 U.S. C. (1). Given the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the text in this 12 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court statute and the one in the proper conclusion here, as in is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action. See at 176. The principal counterargument offered by respondent and the United States relies on their different understand- ing of the motivating-factor section, which—on its face— applies only to status discrimination, discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. In substance, they contend that: (1) retaliation is defined by the statute to be an unlawful employment practice; (2) –2(m) allows unlawful employment practices to be proved based on a showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for—and not nec- essarily the but-for factor in—the challenged employment action; and (3) the Court has, as a matter of course, held that “retaliation for complaining about race discrimination is ‘discrimination based on race.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14; see at 11–14; Brief for Respond- ent 16–19. There are three main flaws in this reading of – 2(m). The first is that it is inconsistent with the provi- sion’s plain language. It must be acknowledged that because Title VII defines “unlawful employment practice” to include retaliation, the question presented by this case would be different if –2(m) extended its coverage to all |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | would be different if –2(m) extended its coverage to all unlawful employment practices. As actually written, however, the text of the motivating-factor provision, while it begins by referring to “unlawful employment practices,” then proceeds to address only five of the seven prohibited discriminatory actions—actions based on the employee’s status, i.e., race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. This indicates Congress’ intent to confine that provision’s coverage to only those types of employment practices. The text of –2(m) says nothing about retaliation claims. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 13 Opinion of the Court Given this clear language, it would be improper to con- clude that what Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope. Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58, 93 (1829) (“What the legislative intention was, can be derived only from the words they have used; and we can- not speculate beyond the reasonable import of these words”); see Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. (2013) (slip op., at 8). The second problem with this reading is its inconsistency with the design and structure of the statute as a whole. See n. 2, 178, n. 5. Just as Con- gress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, so too are its structural choices. See When Congress wrote the motivating-factor provision in 1991, it chose to insert it as a subsection within –2, which contains Title VII’s ban on status-based discrimination, §–2(a) to (d), (l), and says nothing about retaliation. See 1991 Act, (directing that “–2 [be] further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection (m)”). The title of the section of the 1991 Act that created –2(m)— “Clarifying prohibition against impermissible considera- tion of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices”—also indicates that Congress determined to address only claims of status-based discrimination, not retaliation. See What is more, a different portion of the 1991 Act con- tains an express reference to all unlawful employment actions, thereby reinforcing the conclusion that Congress acted deliberately when it omitted retaliation claims from –2(m). See Arabian American Oil 499 U. S., at 256 (congressional amendment of ADEA on a similar subject coupled with congressional failure to amend Title VII weighs against conclusion that the ADEA’s standard applies to Title VII); see also The relevant portion of the 1991 Act, allowed 14 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court certain overseas operations by U. S. employers to engage in “any practice prohibited by section 703 or 704,” i.e., –2 or –3, “if compliance with such section would cause such employer to |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | “if compliance with such section would cause such employer to violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is located.” 105 Stat. 1077. If Congress had desired to make the motivating-factor standard applicable to all Title VII claims, it could have used language similar to that which it invoked in See Arabian American Oil Or, it could have inserted the motivating-factor provision as part of a section that applies to all such claims, such as –5, which establishes the rules and remedies for all Title VII enforcement actions. See But in writing –2(m), Congress did neither of those things, and “[w]e must give effect to Congress’ choice.” The third problem with respondent’s and the Govern- ment’s reading of the motivating-factor standard is in its submission that this Court’s decisions interpreting federal antidiscrimination law have, as a general matter, treated bans on status-based discrimination as also prohibiting retaliation. In support of this proposition, both respond- ent and the United States rely upon decisions in which this Court has “read [a] broadly worded civil rights statute as including an antiretaliation remedy.” CBOCS West, In CBOCS, for example, the Court held that 42 U.S. C. declares that all persons “shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens”—prohibits not only racial dis- crimination but also retaliation against those who oppose And in v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 the Court likewise read a bar on retalia- tion into the broad wording of the federal-employee provi- Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court sions of the ADEA. (20 U.S. C. (Title IX)); (42 U.S. C. These decisions are not controlling here. It is true these cases do state the general proposition that Congress’ enactment of a broadly phrased antidiscrimination statute may signal a concomitant intent to ban retaliation against individuals who oppose that discrimination, even where the statute does not refer to retaliation in so many words. What those cases do not support, however, is the quite different rule that every reference to race, color, creed, sex, or nationality in an antidiscrimination statute is to be treated as a synonym for “retaliation.” For one thing, –2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on discrimina- tion. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the causation standard for proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII. The cases cited by respondent and the Government do not address rules of this sort, and those precedents are of limited relevance here. The approach respondent and the Government suggest is inappropriate in the context of a |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | the Government suggest is inappropriate in the context of a statute as precise, complex, and exhaustive as Title VII. As noted, the laws at issue in CBOCS, Jackson, and were broad, general bars on discrimination. In interpreting them the Court concluded that by using capacious language Con- gress expressed the intent to bar retaliation in addition to status-based discrimination. See at 486–488. In other words, when Congress’ treatment of the subject of prohibited discrimination was both broad and brief, its omission of any specific discussion of retaliation was unremarkable. 16 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court If Title VII had likewise been phrased in broad and general terms, respondent’s argument might have more force. But that is not how Title VII was written, which makes it incorrect to infer that Congress meant anything other than what the text does say on the subject of retalia- tion. Unlike Title IX, and the federal-sector provisions of the ADEA, Title VII is a detailed statutory scheme. This statute enumerates specific unlawful em- ployment practices. See §–2(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (d) (status-based discrimination by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs, respectively); –2(l) (status-based discrimination in employment-related testing); –3(a) (retaliation for opposing, or making or supporting a complaint about, unlawful employment actions); –3(b) (advertising a preference for applicants of a particular race, color, reli- gion, sex, or national origin). It defines key terms, see and exempts certain types of employers, see –1. And it creates an administrative agency with both rulemaking and enforcement authority. See §–5, 2000e–12. This fundamental difference in statutory structure renders inapposite decisions which treated retaliation as an implicit corollary of status-based discrimination. Text may not be divorced from context. In light of Congress’ special care in drawing so precise a statutory scheme, it would be improper to indulge respondent’s suggestion that Congress meant to incorporate the default rules that apply only when Congress writes a broad and undifferentiated statute. See at 486–488 (when con- struing the broadly worded federal-sector provision of the ADEA, Court refused to draw inferences from Congress’ amendments to the detailed private-sector provisions); Arabian American Oil 499 U. S., ; cf. Jackson, (distinguishing Title IX’s “broadly written general prohibition on discrimination” from Title VII’s Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 17 Opinion of the Court “greater detail [with respect to] the conduct that consti- tutes discrimination”). Further confirmation of the inapplicability of – 2(m) to retaliation claims may be found in Congress’ approach to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), In the ADA Congress provided not just a general |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | (ADA), In the ADA Congress provided not just a general prohibition on discrimination “because of [an individual’s] disability,” but also seven paragraphs of detailed description of the practices that would constitute the prohibited discrimination, see §§(a), (b)(1)–(7), at 331–332 (codified at 42 U.S. C. And, most pertinent for present purposes, it included an express antiretaliation provision, see (codi- fied at 42 U.S. C. That law, which Congress passed only a year before enacting –2(m) and which speaks in clear and direct terms to the question of retalia- tion, rebuts the claim that Congress must have intended to use the phrase “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” as the textual equivalent of “retaliation.” To the contrary, the ADA shows that when Congress elected to address retaliation as part of a detailed statutory scheme, it did so in clear textual terms. The Court confronted a similar structural dispute in The question there was whether the federal-employment provisions of the ADEA, 29 U.S. C. provided a jury-trial right for claims against the Federal Government. Nakshian, In concluding that it did not, the Court noted that the portion of the ADEA that prohibited age discrimination by private, state, and local employers, expressly provided for a jury trial, whereas the federal-sector provisions said nothing about such a right. at 162–163, 168. So, too, here. Congress has in explic- it terms altered the standard of causation for one class of claims but not another, despite the obvious opportunity to do so in the 1991 Act. 18 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court B The proper interpretation and implementation of –3(a) and its causation standard have central im- portance to the fair and responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems. This is of particular significance because claims of retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency. The number of these claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has nearly doubled in the past 15 years—from just over 16,000 in 1997 to over 31,000 in 2012. EEOC, Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ charges.cfm (as visited June 20, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Indeed, the number of retalia- tion claims filed with the EEOC has now outstripped those for every type of status-based discrimination except race. See In addition lessening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace harassment. Consider in this regard the case of an employee who knows that he |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | regard the case of an employee who knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor perform- ance, given a lower pay grade, or even just transferred to a different assignment or location. To forestall that lawful action, he or she might be tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or religious discrimination; then, when the unrelated employment action comes, the em- ployee could allege that it is retaliation. If respondent were to prevail in his argument here, that claim could be established by a lessened causation standard, all in order to prevent the undesired change in employment circum- stances. Even if the employer could escape judgment after trial, the lessened causation standard would make it far more difficult to dismiss dubious claims at the summary judgment stage. Cf. Vance v. Ball State Univ., post, at 9– Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 19 Opinion of the Court 11. It would be inconsistent with the structure and opera- tion of Title VII to so raise the costs, both financial and reputational, on an employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any discriminatory or retaliatory intent. See Brief for National School Boards Association as Ami cus Curiae 11–22. Yet there would be a significant risk of that consequence if respondent’s position were adopted here. The facts of this case also demonstrate the legal and factual distinctions between status-based and retaliation claims, as well as the importance of the correct standard of proof. Respondent raised both claims in the District Court. The alleged wrongdoer differed in each: In re- spondent’s status-based discrimination claim, it was his indirect supervisor, Dr. Levine. In his retaliation claim, it was the Chair of Internal Medicine, Dr. Fitz. The proof required for each claim differed, too. For the status-based claim, respondent was required to show instances of racial slurs, disparate treatment, and other indications of nationality-driven animus by Dr. Levine. Respondent’s retaliation claim, by contrast, relied on the theory that Dr. Fitz was committed to exonerating Dr. Levine and wished to punish respondent for besmirching her reputation. Separately instructed on each type of claim, the jury re- turned a separate verdict for each, albeit with a single damages award. And the Court of Appeals treated each claim separately, too, finding insufficient evidence on the claim of status-based discrimination. If it were proper to apply the motivating-factor standard to respondent’s retaliation claim, the University might well be subject to liability on account of Dr. Fitz’s alleged desire to exonerate Dr. Levine, even if it could also be shown that the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | Levine, even if it could also be shown that the terms of the affiliation agreement pre- cluded the Hospital’s hiring of respondent and that the University would have sought to prevent respondent’s hiring in order to honor that agreement in any event. That 20 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court result would be inconsistent with the both the text and purpose of Title VII. In sum, Title VII defines the term “unlawful employ- ment practice” as discrimination on the basis of any of seven prohibited criteria: race, color, religion, sex, national origin, opposition to employment discrimination, and submitting or supporting a complaint about employment discrimination. The text of –2(m) mentions just the first five of these factors, the status-based ones; and it omits the final two, which deal with retaliation. When it added –2(m) to Title VII in 1991, Congress inserted it within the section of the statute that deals only with those same five criteria, not the section that deals with retaliation claims or one of the sections that apply to all claims of unlawful employment practices. And while the Court has inferred a congressional intent to prohibit retal- iation when confronted with broadly worded antidiscrimi- nation statutes, Title VII’s detailed structure makes that inference inappropriate here. Based on these textual and structural indications, the Court now concludes as follows: Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in –2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer. IV Respondent and the Government also argue that apply- ing the motivating-factor provision’s lessened causation standard to retaliation claims would be consistent with longstanding agency views, contained in a guidance man- ual published by the EEOC. It urges that those views are entitled to deference under this Court’s decision in Skid more v. Swift & See National Railroad Passenger Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 21 Opinion of the Court 110, n. 6 (2002). The weight of deference afforded to agency interpretations under Skidmore depends upon “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro- nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.” ; see Vance, post, at 9, n. 4. According to the manual in question, the causation element of a retaliation claim is satisfied if “there is credi- ble direct evidence that retaliation was a motive for the challenged action,” regardless of whether |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | was a motive for the challenged action,” regardless of whether there is also “[e]vidence as to [a] legitimate motive.” 2 EEOC Compli- ance Manual pp. 614:0007–614:0008 After noting a division of authority as to whether motivating-factor or but-for causation should apply to retaliation claims, the manual offers two rationales in support of adopting the former standard. The first is that “[c]ourts have long held that the evidentiary framework for proving [status-based] discrimination also applies to claims of discrimination based on retaliation.” at 614:0008, n. 45. Second, the manual states that “an inter- pretation that permits proven retaliation to go unpun- ished undermines the purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions of maintaining unfettered access to the statutory remedial mechanism.” These explanations lack the persuasive force that is a necessary precondition to deference under Skidmore. See ; Vance, post, at 9, n. 4. As to the first rationale, while the settled judicial construction of a par- ticular statute is of course relevant in ascertaining statu- tory meaning, see 580– 581 the manual’s discussion fails to address the particular interplay among the status-based discrimina- tion provision (–2(a)), the antiretaliation provision (–3(a)), and the motivating-factor provision (–2(m)). Other federal antidiscrimination statutes do not have the structure of statutory subsections that 22 UNIVERSITY OF TEX. SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR Opinion of the Court control the outcome at issue here. The manual’s failure to address the specific provisions of this statutory scheme, coupled with the generic nature of its discussion of the causation standards for status-based discrimination and retaliation claims, call the manual’s conclusions into serious question. See Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC, The manual’s second argument is unpersuasive, too; for its reasoning is circular. It asserts the lessened causation standard is necessary in order to prevent “proven retalia- tion” from “go[ing] unpunished.” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual at 614:0008, n. 45. Yet this assumes the answer to the central question at issue here, which is what causal relationship must be shown in order to prove retaliation. Respondent’s final argument, in which he is not joined by the United States, is that even if –2(m) does not control the outcome in this case, the standard applied by Price Waterhouse should control instead. That assertion is incorrect. First, this position is foreclosed by the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title VII. As noted above, Price Waterhouse adopted a complex burden-shifting frame- work. Congress displaced this framework by enacting –2(m) (which adopts the motivating-factor standard for status-based discrimination claims) and – 5(g)(2)(B) (which replaces employers’ total defense with a remedial limitation). See n. 2, 177, n. 3, 178, n. 5. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,013 | 4 | majority | University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/931121/university-of-tex-southwestern-medical-center-v-nassar/ | limitation). See n. 2, 177, n. 3, 178, n. 5. Given the careful balance of lessened causation and reduced remedies Congress struck in the 1991 Act, there is no reason to think that the different balance articulated by Price Waterhouse somehow sur- vived that legislation’s passage. Second, even if this ar- gument were still available, it would be inconsistent with the Court’s reading (and the plain textual meaning) of the word “because” as it appears in both and –3(a). See at 176–177. For these Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 23 Opinion of the Court reasons, the rule of Price Waterhouse is not controlling here. V The text, structure, and history of Title VII demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under – 3(a) must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the em- ployer. The University claims that a fair application of this standard, which is more demanding than the motivating- factor standard adopted by the Court of Appeals, entitles it to judgment as a matter of law. It asks the Court to so hold. That question, however, is better suited to resolu- tion by courts closer to the facts of this case. The judg- ment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 570 U. S. (2013) 1 GINSBURG, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 12–484 UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER, PETITIONER v. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a criminal conviction to be overturned on direct appeal for "plain error" in the jury instructions, even if the defendant * failed to object to the erroneous instructions before the jury retired, as required by Rule 30. n this case we are asked to decide whether the same standard of review applies on a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction brought under 28 U.S. C. 2255. A Joseph Frady, the respondent, does not dispute that 19 years ago he and Richard Gordon killed Thomas Bennett in the front room of the victim's house in Washington, D. C. Nonetheless, because the resolution of this case depends on what the jury learned about Frady's crime, we must briefly recount what happened, as told by the witnesses at Frady's trial and summarized by the Court of Appeals. See (en banc) (Frady ), cert. denied, The events leading up to the killing began at about 4:30 p. m. on March 13, 1963, when two women saw Frady drive slowly by Bennett's house in an old car. Later, at about 7:00 p. m., Frady, accompanied by Richard Gordon and Gordon's friend, Elizabeth Ryder, returned to the same block. On this second trip, Ryder overheard Frady say "something about that is the house over there," at which point Frady and Gordon looked in the direction of the victim's house. After reconnoitering Bennett's home, Frady, Gordon, and Ryder drove across town to a restaurant, where they were joined by George Bennett, Thomas Bennett's brother. At the restaurant Ryder heard George Bennett tell Frady that "he needed time to get the furniture and things settled." She also heard Frady ask Bennett "if he hit a man in the chest, could you break a rib and fracture or puncture a lung, could it kill a person?" Bennett answered that "[y]ou have to hit a man pretty hard." Just before they left the restaurant, Ryder heard George Bennett say: "f you do a good job you will get a bonus." *155 Ryder, Gordon, and Frady then set out by car for 11th Place, around the corner from Thomas Bennett's home, where they parked, leaving the motor running. Gordon and Frady told Ryder they were going "just around the corner." As Gordon got out, Ryder saw him reach down and pick up something. She could not see exactly what it was, but it "looked like a cuff of a glove or heavy material of some kind." A little after 8:30 p.m., a neighbor heard knocking at the front door of Bennett's |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | a neighbor heard knocking at the front door of Bennett's house, followed by the noise of a fight in progress. At 8:44 p.m., she called the police. Within a couple of minutes, two policemen in a patrol wagon arrived, and one of them got out in time to see Frady and Gordon emerge from Bennett's front door. nside Bennett's house, police officers later found a shambles of broken, disordered furniture and blood-spattered walls. Thomas Bennett lay dead in a pool of blood. His neck and chest had suffered horseshoe-shaped wounds from the metal heel plates on Frady's leather boots and his head was caved in by blows from a broken piece of a tabletop, which, significantly, bore no fingerprints. One of Bennett's eyes had been knocked from its socket. Outside, the policeman on foot heard Frady and Gordon exclaim, "The cops!" as they emerged from the house. They immediately took flight, running around the corner toward their waiting automobile. Both officers pursued, one on foot, the other in the police wagon. As Frady and Gordon ran, one of them threw Thomas Bennett's wallet and a pair of gloves under a parked car. Frady and Gordon managed to reach their waiting automobile and scramble into it without being captured by the officer following on foot, but the patrol wagon arrived in time to block their departure. One of them was then heard to remark, "They've got us." When arrested, Frady and Gordon were covered with their victim's blood. Unlike their victim, however, neither had sustained an injury, apart from a cut on Gordon's forehead. *156 B Although Frady now admits that the evidence that he and Gordon caused Bennett's death was "overwhelming,"[1] at his trial in the United District Court for the District of Columbia Frady defended solely by denying all responsibility for the killing, suggesting through his attorney that another man, the real murderer, had been seen leaving the victim's house while the police were preoccupied apprehending Frady and Gordon. Consistent with this theory, Frady did not raise any justification, excuse, or mitigating circumstance. A jury convicted Frady of first-degree murder and robbery, and sentenced him to death by electrocution. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld Frady's first-degree murder conviction by a vote of 8-1. Frady Apparently all nine judges would have affirmed a conviction for second-degree murder.[2] Nevertheless, by a vote of 5-4, the court set aside Frady's death sentence. The five judges in the majority were unable to agree on a rationale for that result. Four of the five believed |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | a rationale for that result. Four of the five believed the procedures used to instruct and poll the jury on the death penalty were too ambiguous to sustain a sentence of death.[3] The fifth and deciding vote was cast by a judge who *157 believed the District Court should have adopted, for the first time in the District of Columbia, a procedure bifurcating the guilt and sentencing phases of Frady's trial. 121 U. S. App. D. C., at 85, By this narrow margin, Frady escaped electrocution. Frady was then resentenced to a life term. Almost immediately, he began a long series of collateral attacks on his sentence,[4] culminating in the case now before us. C Frady initiated the present action by filing a motion under 28 U.S. C. 2255[5] seeking the vacation of his sentence because the jury instructions used at his trial in 1963 were defective. Specifically, Frady argued that the Court of Appeals, in cases decided after his trial and appeal, had disapproved instructions identical to those used in his case. As determined by these later rulings,[6] the judge at Frady's trial *158 had improperly equated intent with malice by stating that "a wrongful act intentionally done is therefore done with malice aforethought." See 204 U. S. App. D. C. 234, n. 6, Also, the trial judge had incorrectly instructed the jury that "the law infers or presumes from the use of such weapon in the absence of explanatory or mitigating circumstances the existence of the malice essential to culpable homicide." See n his 2255 motion Frady contended that these instructions compelled the jury to presume malice and thereby wrongfully eliminated any possibility of a manslaughter verdict, since manslaughter was defined as culpable homicide without malice.[7] The District Court denied Frady's 2255 motion, stating that Frady should have challenged the jury instructions on direct appeal, or in one of his many earlier motions. The Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that the proper standard to apply to Frady's claim is the "plain error" standard governing relief on direct appeal from errors not objected *159 to at trial, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b), rather than the "cause and actual prejudice" standard enunciated in and governing relief on collateral attack following procedural default at trial. Finding the challenged instructions to be plainly erroneous, the court vacated Frady's sentence and remanded the case for a new trial or, more realistically, the entry of a judgment of manslaughter. Over a vigorous dissent, the full Court of Appeals denied the Government a rehearing en banc. We granted the Government's petition for a |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | rehearing en banc. We granted the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Appeals properly invoked the "plain error" standard in considering Frady's belated collateral attack. Before we reach the merits, however, we first must consider an objection Frady makes to our grant of certiorari. Frady argues that we should refrain from reviewing the decision below because the issues presented pertain solely to the local law of the District of Columbia, with which we normally do not interfere.[8] Frady's contention is that the federal courts in the District of Columbia exercise a purely local jurisdictional function when they rule on a 2255 motion brought by a prisoner convicted of a local law offense. Thus, according to Frady, the general federal law controlling the disposition of 2255 motions does not apply to his case. nstead, a special local brand of 2255 law, developed to implement that section for *160 the benefit of local offenders in the District of Columbia, controls. Frady concludes that we should therefore refrain from disturbing the ruling below, since it is based on an adequate and independent local ground of decision.[9] To examine Frady's contention, it is necessary to review some history. When Frady was tried in 1963, the United District Court for the District of Columbia had exclusive jurisdiction over local felonies, and the United Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acted as the local appellate court, issuing binding decisions of purely local law. n 10, however, the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act (Court Reform Act), split the local District of Columbia and federal criminal jurisdictions, directing local criminal cases to a newly created local court system and retaining (with minor exceptions) only federal criminal cases in the existing Federal District Court and Court of Appeals. As part of this division of jurisdiction, the Court Reform Act substituted for 2255 a new local statute controlling collateral relief for those convicted in the new local trial court. See D. C. Code 23-110 The Act, however, did not alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts in the District to hear postconviction motions and appeals brought under 2255, either by prisoners like Frady who were convicted of local offenses prior to the Act, or by prisoners convicted in federal court after the Act. The crux of Frady's argument is that the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would be violated unless the Court Reform Act is interpreted as implicitly and retroactively splitting, not just the District's court system, but also |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | retroactively splitting, not just the District's court system, but also the District's law governing 2255 motions. According to Frady, equal protection principles require that a 2255 motion brought by a prisoner convicted *161 of a local crime in Federal District Court prior to the passage of the Court Reform Act be treated identically to a motion under local D. C. Code 23-110 brought by a prisoner convicted in the local Superior Court after the passage of the Act. Frady suggests that the Court of Appeals for this reason must have ruled on his motion as though it were subject to the local law developed pursuant to 23-110, and that we should not intervene in this local dispute. Frady's argument, however, was neither made to the court below nor followed by it. Nowhere in the Court of Appeals' opinion or in the submissions to that court or to the District Court[10] is there any hint that there may be peculiarities of 2255 law unique to collateral attack in the District of Columbia. To the contrary, the analysis and authorities cited by the Court of Appeals make it clear that the court relied on the general federal law controlling all 2255 motions, and did not intend to afford Frady's 2255 motion special treatment simply because Frady was convicted under the District of Columbia Code rather than under the United Code. Moreover, the Court of Appeals would have erred had it done so. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended the result Frady suggests, and he does not attempt the impossible task of showing that it did. Furthermore, Frady's suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, equal protection principles do not require that a motion filed pursuant to 2255 by a prisoner convicted in the Federal District Court in 1963 be treated as though it had been filed pursuant to D. C. Code 23-110 after 10. n fact, even those tried in federal court contemporaneously with those tried for the same offense in the local court need not always be treated identically. As we noted in for example, persons *162 convicted in the local courts are not denied equal protection of the laws simply because they, unlike persons convicted in the federal courts, must bring collateral challenges to their convictions before Art. judges.[11] n short, we find no basis whatever for concluding that the ruling below was or should have been grounded on local District of Columbia law, rather than the general federal law applied to all 2255 motions.[12] Therefore, we proceed to the merits. A Nineteen years after his crime, |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | proceed to the merits. A Nineteen years after his crime, Frady now complains he was convicted by a jury erroneously instructed on the meaning of malice. At trial, however, Frady did not object to the instructions, nor did he raise the issue on direct appeal. Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure declares in pertinent part: "No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." *163 Rule 52(b), however, somewhat tempers the severity of Rule 30. t grants the courts of appeals the latitude to correct particularly egregious errors on appeal regardless of a defendant's trial default: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Rule 52(b) was intended to afford a means for the prompt redress of miscarriages of justice.[13] By its terms, recourse may be had to the Rule only on appeal from a trial infected with error so "plain" the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it. The Rule thus reflects a careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed.[14] *164 Because it was intended for use on direct appeal, however, the "plain error" standard is out of place when a prisoner launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction after society's legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment has been perfected by the expiration of the time allowed for direct review or by the affirmance of the conviction on appeal. Nevertheless, in the Court of Appeals applied the "plain error" standard to Frady's long-delayed 2255 motion, as though the clock had been turned back to 1965 when Frady's case was first before the court on direct appeal. n effect, the court allowed Frady to take a second appeal 15 years after the first was decided. As its justification for this action, the Court of Appeals pointed to a single phrase to be found in our opinion in -241. There we asserted that "no more lenient standard of waiver should apply" on collateral attack than on direct review. Seizing on this phrase, the Court of Appeals interpreted "no more lenient" as meaning, in effect, no more stringent, and for this reason applied the "plain error" standard for |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | and for this reason applied the "plain error" standard for direct review to Frady's collateral challenge, despite long-established contrary authority. By adopting the same standard of review for 2255 motions as would be applied on direct appeal, the Court of Appeals accorded no significance whatever to the existence of a final judgment perfected by appeal. Once the defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted, however, we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted, especially when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to present his federal claims to a federal forum. Our trial and appellate procedures are not so unreliable that we may not afford their completed operation any binding effect *165 beyond the next in a series of endless postconviction collateral attacks. To the contrary, a final judgment commands respect. For this reason, we have long and consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal. See, e. g., United v. ; Hill v. United ; ; Adams v. United ex rel. McCann, ; ; n re Gregory, As we recently had occasion to explain: "When Congress enacted 2255 in 1948, it simplified the procedure for making a collateral attack on a final judgment entered in a federal criminal case, but it did not purport to modify the basic distinction between direct review and collateral review. t has, of course, long been settled law that an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment. The reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our adversary system of justice." United v. This citation indicates that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing Frady's 2255 motion under the same standard as would be used on direct appeal, as though collateral attack and direct review were interchangeable. Moreover, only five years ago we expressly stated that the plain-error standard is inappropriate for the review of a state prisoner's collateral attack on erroneous jury instructions: "Orderly procedure requires that the respective adversaries' views as to how the jury should be instructed be presented to the trial judge in time to enable him to deliver *166 an accurate charge and to minimize the risk of committing reversible error. t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court. "The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal." Seemingly, we could not have made the point with greater clarity. Of course, unlike in the case before us, in Kibbe the final judgment of a state, not a federal, court was under attack, so considerations of comity were at issue that do not constrain us here. But the Federal Government, no less than the has an interest in the finality of its criminal judgments. n addition, a federal prisoner like Frady, unlike his state counterparts, has already had an opportunity to present his federal claims in federal trial and appellate forums. On balance, we see no basis for affording federal prisoners a preferred status when they seek postconviction relief. n sum, the lower court's use of the "plain error" standard to review Frady's 2255 motion was contrary to long-established law from which we find no reason to depart. We reaffirm the well-settled principle that to obtain collateral relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.[15] *167 B We believe the proper standard for review of Frady's motion is the "cause and actual prejudice" standard enunciated in and later confirmed and extended in and Under this standard, to obtain collateral relief based on trial *168 errors to which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted defendant must show both (1) "cause" excusing his double procedural default, and (2) "actual prejudice" resulting from the errors of which he complains. n applying this dual standard to the case before us, we find it unnecessary to determine whether Frady has shown cause, because we are confident he suffered no actual prejudice of a degree sufficient to justify collateral relief 19 years after his crime.[16] n considering the prejudice, if any, occasioned by the erroneous jury instructions used at Frady's trial, we note that in we refrained from giving "precise content" to the term "prejudice," expressly leaving to future cases further elaboration of the significance of that term. d., While the import of the term in other situations thus remains an open question, our past decisions nevertheless eliminate any doubt about its meaning for a defendant who has failed to object to jury instructions at trial. *169 Recently, for example, JUSTCE STEVENS, in his opinion without dissent in summarized the degree of prejudice we have required a prisoner to show before obtaining collateral relief for errors in the jury charge as " `whether |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | relief for errors in the jury charge as " `whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,' not merely whether `the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned.'" 431 U.S., at ).[17] We reaffirm this formulation, which requires that the degree of prejudice resulting from instruction error be evaluated in the total context of the events at trial. As we have often emphasized: "[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Moreover, "a judgment of conviction is commonly the culmination of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge. Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction." d., We now apply these established standards to Frady's case. V Frady bases his claim that he was prejudiced on his assertion that the jury was not given an adequate opportunity to *170 consider a manslaughter verdict. According to Frady, the trial court's erroneous instructions relieved the Government of the burden of proving malice, an element of the crime of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, so that, as Frady would have it, his conviction must be overturned.[18] So stated, Frady's claim of actual prejudice has validity only if an error in the instructions concerning an element of the crime charged amounts to prejudice per se, regardless of the particular circumstances of the individual case. Our precedents, however, hold otherwise. Contrary to Frady's suggestion, he must shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. *171 This Frady has failed to do. At the outset, we emphasize that this would be a different case had Frady brought before the District Court affirmative evidence indicating that he had been convicted wrongly of a crime of which he was innocent. But Frady, it must be remembered, did not assert at trial that he and Richard Gordon beat Thomas Bennett to death without malice. nstead, Frady claimed he had nothing whatever to do with the crime. The evidence, however, was overwhelming, and Frady promptly abandoned that theory on appeal. Frady 121 U. S. App. D. C., at 95, Since |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | Frady 121 U. S. App. D. C., at 95, Since that time, Frady has never presented colorable evidence, even from his own testimony, indicating such justification, mitigation, or excuse that would reduce his crime from murder to manslaughter. ndeed, the evidence in the record compels the conclusion that there was, as the dissenters from the denial of a rehearing en banc below put it, "malice aplenty." 204 U. S. App. D. C., at Frady and Gordon twice reconnoitered their victim's house on the afternoon and evening of the murder. Just before the killing, they were overheard in a conversation suggesting that they "were assassins *172 hired by George Bennett to do away with his brother." Frady They brought gloves to the scene of the murder which they discarded during their flight from the police, and the murder weapon bore no fingerprints. Finally, there was the unspeakable brutality of the killing itself. ndeed, the evidence of malice was strong enough that the 10 judges closest to the case the trial judge and the 9 judges who 17 years ago decided Frady's appeal en banc were at that time unanimous in finding the record at least sufficient to sustain a conviction for second-degree murder a killing with malice. Nine of the ten judges went further, finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that Frady not only killed with malice, but with premeditated and deliberate intent. We conclude that the strong uncontradicted evidence of malice in the record, coupled with Frady's utter failure to come forward with a colorable claim that he acted without malice, disposes of his contention that he suffered such actual prejudice that reversal of his conviction 19 years later could be justified. We perceive no risk of a fundamental miscarriage of justice in this case. Should any doubt remain, our examination of the jury instructions shows no substantial likelihood that the same jury that found Frady guilty of first-degree murder would have concluded, if only the malice instructions had been better framed, that his crime was only manslaughter. The jury, after all, did not merely find Frady guilty of second-degree murder, which requires only malice. t found Frady guilty of first-degree deliberate and premeditated murder. To see precisely what the jury had to conclude to make this finding, it is necessary to examine the instructions the trial judge gave the jury on the meaning of premeditation and deliberation: *173 "[P]remeditation is the formation of the intent or plan to kill, the formation of a positive design to kill. t must have been |
Justice O'Connor | 1,982 | 14 | majority | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | of a positive design to kill. t must have been considered by the defendants. "t is your duty to determine from the facts and circumstances in this case as you find them surrounding the killing whether reflection and consideration amounting to deliberation occurred. f so, even though it be of exceedingly brief duration, that is sufficient, because it is the fact of deliberation rather than the length of time it continued that is important. Although some appreciable period of time must have elapsed during which the defendants deliberated in order for this element to be established, no particular length of time is necessary for deliberation; and it does not require the lapse of days or hours or even of minutes." Tr. in No. 402-63 (DC), p. 806, reprinted at App. 28. By contrast, to have found Frady guilty of manslaughter the jury would have had to find the presence of the kind of excuse, justification, or mitigation that reduces a killing from murder to manslaughter. As the trial court put it: "The element [sic] the Government must prove in order for you to find the defendants guilty of manslaughter are: "One, that the defendants inflicted a wound or wounds from which the deceased died, these being inflicted in the District of Columbia. "Two, that the defendants struck the deceased in sudden passion, without malice, that the defendants' sudden passion was aroused by adequate provocation. When say sudden passion, mean to include rage, resentment, anger, terror and fear; so when use the expression `sudden passion.' [sic] include all of these. "Provacation, [sic] in order to bring a homicide under the offense of manslaughter, must be adequate, must be such as might naturally induce a reasonable man in anger *174 of the moment to commit the deed. t must be such provocation would [sic] have like effect upon the mind of a reasonable or average man causing him to lose his self-control. "n addition to the great provocation, there must be passion and hot blood caused by that provocation. Mere words, however, no matter how insulting, offensive or abusive, are not adequate to induce [sic] a homicide although committed in passion, provoked, as have explained, from murder to manslaughter." d., reprinted at App. 30. Plainly, a rational jury that believed Frady had formed a "plan to kill a positive design to kill" with "reflection and consideration amounting to deliberation," could not also have believed that he acted in "sudden passion aroused by adequate provocation causing him to lose his self-control." We conclude that, whatever it may wrongly have believed malice to be, |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n of Va. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109030/dillard-v-industrial-commn-of-va/ | Appellants seek to establish that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Virginia may not permit the suspension of workmen's compensation benefits without a prior adversary hearing. A three-judge United States District Court, over one dissent, rejected appellants' constitutional arguments. We noted probable jurisdiction. Although the parties have focused primarily on the due process issue, the briefs and oral arguments have indicated that under state law a claimant whose workmen's compensation benefits have been suspended may have them reinstated by a state trial court pending a full administrative hearing on the merits of his claim. If this is an accurate reading of state law, it is in all probability unnecessary to address any questions of federal constitutional law in this case. Accordingly, the case must be remanded to the District Court for reconsideration. I This litigation has centered on the role of the Industrial Commission of Virginia (Commission) in overseeing relationships between workmen's compensation claimants and employers or the employers' insurance companies. *785 Although the Virginia system for workmen's compensation is controlled in all significant respects by an extensive statutory scheme referred to as the Act, et seq.[1] it operates in a largely voluntary manner through memoranda of agreement between disabled workmen and employers or insurance companies. Compensation is paid out of private funds, in some cases through self-insurance by employers but for the most part through coverage by private insurance companies. All agreements between employees and employers or insurance companies must be approved by the Commission, which may extend its imprimatur "only when the Commission, or any member thereof, is clearly of the opinion that the best interests of the employee or his dependents will be served thereby" 65.1-93. In most instances the parties agree voluntarily on entitlement to benefits.[2] When this does not occur, the Commission will grant a hearing to resolve the disagreement, 65.1-9, and will make an award if found to be due. 65.1-96. The Commission's awards are subject to review by appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court and, if unchallenged, are conclusive until changed by the *786 Commission. 65.1-98.[3] The Commission has no enforcement power per se. Rather, the Act provides: "Any party in interest may file in the circuit or corporation court of the county or city in which the injury occurred, or if it be in the city of Richmond then in the circuit or law and equity court of such city, a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement approved by the Commission, or of an order or decision of the Commission, or of an award of the Commission unappealed |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n of Va. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109030/dillard-v-industrial-commn-of-va/ | the Commission, or of an award of the Commission unappealed from, or of an award of the Commission affirmed upon appeal, whereupon the court, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same, as though such judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by the court." 65.1-100. The state courts have construed their enforcement duty under 65.1-100 as purely ministerial. They do not inquire into whether a claimant's condition continues to justify compensation. Rather, they simply enforce agreements and awards that have been approved and not formally rescinded by the Commission.[] Thus, *787 a workmen's compensation claimant in Virginia has at his disposal a ready mechanism in the state trial courts to enforce any facially valid award or agreement. Since judicial enforcement is a ministerial act, this relief appears to be available with a minimum of delay or procedural difficulty. Termination of benefits due to a change in a claimant's condition, like the commencement of benefits in the first instance, is a product of voluntary agreement in most cases. But when a dispute arises over a claimant's condition and his continued entitlement to benefits, the only avenue open to an employer for extinguishing a claimant's enforcement rights under 65.1-100 of the Act appears in 65.1-99. See Bristol Door This section provides, in relevant part: "Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in *788 condition, the Industrial Commission may review any award and on such review may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded No such review shall affect such award as regards any moneys paid" Va. Code Ann. 65.1-99[5] Although it may be indisputable that a claimant is no longer entitled to benefits due to a change in his condition, if the claimant refuses to terminate voluntarily an award or agreement, an employer or insurer appears to have no defense against a state court enforcement action until there is a formal determination by the Commission under this section. E. g., Manchester Bd. & Paper[6] If an employer or insurance company meets the requirements established by the Commission for invoking its review under this section, the Commission in due course will *789 conduct a hearing, with notice and the right to participate extended to all parties.[7] At such a hearing, the employer or insurer bears the burden of proving a change in a claimant's condition that |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n of Va. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109030/dillard-v-industrial-commn-of-va/ | burden of proving a change in a claimant's condition that justifies rescission of an award or agreement. E. g., Virginia Oak Flooring ; J. A. Foust Coal The last sentence of the above quotation from 65.1-99 prevents an employer or insurance company from recovering benefits erroneously paid prior to the Commission's formal termination of an award or agreement. See Accordingly, an employer or insurer with cause to believe that a claimant is no longer entitled to benefits has an obvious incentive unilaterally to cease payment at the time it seeks a 65.1-99 hearing before the Commission. If the Commission ultimately holds in its favor, the employer or insurer will not be required to pay any further benefits, and it will have protected itself against unmerited payments in the period prior to the Commission's full hearing. If the Commission rules against it, it will be required to reinstate benefits retroactively to the date of the application for a hearing, but at least it will have avoided paying benefits for which there was no true legal obligation. In order to police this tendency of employers and insurers to terminate first and litigate later, the Commission promulgated its Rule 13. See Manchester Bd. & *790 Paper [8] Rule 13 sets forth certain requirements that an employer or insurer must meet, with precision, see ibid., before it can obtain the 65.1-99 hearing which is a prerequisite to formal termination of an award or agreement on the ground of change in condition.[9] For example, the Rule requires employers and *791 insurers to continue benefits up to a defined date. And since April 1, the Rule has imposed the following requirements on such applications: "All applications by an employer or insurer shall be under oath and shall not be deemed filed and benefits shall not be suspended until the supporting evidence which constitutes a legal basis for changing the existing award shall have been reviewed by the Commission, or such of its employees as may be designated for that purpose, and a determination made that probable cause exists to believe that a change in condition has occurred." Thus, under Rule 13, as amended, an employer or insurer must pay benefits up to a certain date, must make application under oath, and must submit "supporting evidence which constitutes a legal basis for changing the existing award" If these requirements are met and if the Commission finds that "probable cause exists to believe that a change in condition has occurred" the employer or insurer will be accorded a hearing that may lead to rescission of the prior award |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n of Va. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109030/dillard-v-industrial-commn-of-va/ | hearing that may lead to rescission of the prior award or agreement. If the Rule 13 requirements are not met, the request for a hearing will be denied, and the award or agreement at *792 issue will remain subject to enforcement in the state courts. II Appellant Dillard was the original named plaintiff in this class action under 2 U.S. C. 1983. He contended that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented Virginia from permitting the suspension of workmen's compensation benefits without notice to the claimant and an adversary hearing at the time the Commission makes a probable cause determination pursuant to Rule 13. A three-judge United States District Court, over one dissent, rejected this argument on the merits. Dillard appealed, but then settled his claim, and we remanded the case for a determination of mootness. In an unreported order, the District Court subsequently permitted the intervention of appellant Williams and reinstated its published opinion. Williams then appealed, bringing up the due process arguments initially espoused by Dillard. Appellant Williams was injured in the course of employment in April In May the Commission approved an agreement between Williams and his employer's insurance company, one of the appellees herein, for the payment of weekly compensation benefits. In October the insurance company applied under Rule 13 to the Commission for a hearing to determine whether Williams' disability had ended. Simultaneously, the insurer discontinued payments. Within a few days the Commission made an ex parte determination that probable cause existed to believe that a change in Williams' condition had occurred. At this point, Williams made no effort to petition a state court under 65.1-100 of the Act to reinstate benefits pending the Commission's full hearing. In December the Commission *793 conducted an adversary hearing, concluded that the insurance company had not met its burden of proof, and reinstated benefits. On April 17, 1973, the insurance company again petitioned the Commission, claiming a change in Williams' condition. The Commission once more found probable cause on an ex parte basis, and the company for the second time terminated benefits. Williams again did not resort to the state trial courts for an enforcement order. Approximately two months later, the District Court permitted Williams to intervene in this lawsuit and, as noted, reinstated its published opinion. Williams then brought this appeal.[10] Williams' constitutional attack on the Virginia system for suspending workmen's compensation benefits is premised on the assumption that Rule 13, as amended, permits an employer or insurer to shield itself from a state court enforcement suit under 65.1-100 of the Act in the interim |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n of Va. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109030/dillard-v-industrial-commn-of-va/ | enforcement suit under 65.1-100 of the Act in the interim between a probable cause determination *79 by the Commission and the Commission's ultimate full hearing under 65.1-99 of the Act. Williams in essence reads the phrase of Rule 13 providing that "benefits shall not be suspended" prior to meeting the requirements of the Rule as meaning that benefits may successfully be suspended once those requirements have been met. If this reading of Rule 13 is incorrect, the complexion of this case changes dramatically, because it is then within the power of a claimant to reinstate benefits simply by petitioning a state trial court to perform a ministerial duty. It may well be that this perfunctory enforcement power is so readily available that a claimant could render any suspension of benefits de minimis. If so, those in appellants' class may not be able to establish a constitutionally significant injury under any reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Every indication in the record and in the state authorities is that Williams had at his disposal a state court enforcement right that he simply failed to utilize. See n. As the Commission declared in its motion to dismiss before the District Court: "Virginia's statutory framework does not authorize the termination of benefits as alleged by plaintiff, it permits only the initiation of a procedure by which benefits may ultimately be terminated. Should plaintiff be dissatisfied with the temporary cessation of benefits pending an administrative hearing, he is entitled by the provisions of 65.1-100 to reduce his award to judgment in an appropriate court of record and compel the resumption of benefits. It should be noted that in such a case the court has no discretion and must enter judgment against the employer or his insurer." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.) *795 One of the appellees makes the same point in its brief,[11] and Williams' counsel conceded at oral argument that, if read literally, 65.1-100 of the Act permits no other result.[12] Counsel attempted to overcome this concession by arguing that the Virginia courts have not interpreted Rule 13 recently and that they might today hold that the Rule overrides the language of 65.1-100.[13] This argument plainly has no merit, since the Commission is without power to promulgate a rule that would repeal a section of the Act.[1] Moreover, it is obvious that the Commission had no such purpose. Rule 13 was designed to protect employees, see Manchester Bd. & Paper not to deprive them of rights existing under the Act. It establishes barriers that an employer or insurer must |
Justice Powell | 1,974 | 17 | majority | Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n of Va. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109030/dillard-v-industrial-commn-of-va/ | Act. It establishes barriers that an employer or insurer must surmount before it may obtain the 65.1-99 hearing that is a prerequisite to extinguishing a claimant's right to enforce an award or agreement in state court. The Rule is designed to serve as a screening device for eliminating obviously unmeritorious applications for hearings filed by insurers and employers.[15] It is not an authorization for an *796 employer or insurer to suspend payments with assurance that a claimant may not have them reinstated under 65.1-100 of the Act. The District Court itself noted that Rule 13 probably does not permit an employer or insurer to escape 65.1-100 of the Act.[16] It reached appellants' federal constitutional claim only by assuming, arguendo, "that the Rule is authority for the employer or insurer to terminate payments." 37 F. Supp., at 75. Based on what has been brought to our attention and our review of state law, such an assumption in all likelihood would be inaccurate.[17] In any event, that court must resolve any *797 doubts on the issue before reaching appellants' federal claim. If there is significant doubt about the status of state law, the court should consider abstention, as the *798 state law question may well be dispositive. E. g., Lake Carriers' 06 U.S. 98 If, as appears to be the case, state law clearly provided Williams an adequate state court remedy he did not pursue, then the court will be presented with a wholly different issue from the one it decided. Assuming it is also established that the Commission's Rule 13 procedures are necessarily ex parte,[18] then the only question is whether the interruption, if any, of benefits between the time of suspension and the time a claimant obtains reinstatement of benefits by petitioning the state courts is of any controlling significance. If the court determines that a claimant as a general rule may obtain reinstatement of benefits without undue delay following a finding of probable cause by the Commission under Rule 13, then the court should dismiss the complaint. We indicate no view on the question decided by the District Courtwhether the suspension of benefits without notice and an adversary hearing denies due process of law, where the funds at issue are private, not public, where the State requires a finding of probable cause and other procedural safeguards short of a prior adversary hearing, and where a full hearing follows suspension of benefits by a period on the average of one month. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion. It is so |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | The issue in this case is whether a full-time gambler who makes wagers solely for his own account is engaged in a "trade or business," within the meaning of 162(a) and 62(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26 U.S. C. 162(a) and 62(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. V).[1] The tax year with which we here are concerned is the calendar year 1978; technically, then, we look to the Code as it read at that time. I There is no dispute as to the facts. The critical ones are stipulated. See App. 9. Respondent Robert P. Groetzinger had worked for 20 years in sales and market research for an Illinois manufacturer when his position was terminated in February 1978. During the remainder of that year, respondent busied himself with parimutuel wagering, primarily on greyhound races. He gambled at tracks in Florida and Colorado. He went to the track 6 days a week for 48 weeks in 1978. He spent a substantial amount of time studying racing forms, programs, and other materials. He devoted from 60 to 80 hours each week to these gambling-related endeavors. He never placed bets on behalf of any other person, or sold tips, or collected commissions for placing bets, or functioned as a bookmaker. He gambled solely for his own account. He had no other profession or type of employment.[2] *25 Respondent kept a detailed accounting of his wagers and every day noted his winnings and losses in a record book. In 1978, he had gross winnings of $70,000, but he bet $72,032; he thus realized a net gambling loss for the year of $2,032. Respondent received $6,498 in income from other sources in 1978. This came from interest, dividends, capital gains, and salary earned before his job was terminated. On the federal income tax return he filed for the calendar year 1978 respondent report as income only the $6,498 realized from nongambling sources. He did not report any gambling winnings or deduct any gambling losses.[3] He did not itemize deductions. Instead, he computed his tax liability from the tax tables. Upon audit, the of Internal Revenue determined that respondent's $70,000 in gambling winnings were to be included in his gross income and that, pursuant to 165(d) of the Code, 26 U.S. C. 165(d), a deduction was to be allowed for his gambling losses to the extent of these gambling gains. But the further determined that, under the law as it was in 1978, a portion of respondent's $70,000 gambling-loss deduction was an item of tax preference and operated to subject him to |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | item of tax preference and operated to subject him to the minimum tax under 56(a) of the Code, 26 U.S. C. 56(a) (1976 ed.). At that time, under statutory provisions in effect from 1976 until 1982, "items of tax preference" were lessened by certain deductions, but not by deductions not "attributable to a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer." 57(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and 62(1), 26 U.S. C. 57(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and 62(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. I).[4] *26 These determinations by the produced a 56(a) minimum tax of $2,142 and, with certain other adjustments not now in dispute, resulted in a total asserted tax deficiency of $2,522 for respondent for 1978. Respondent sought redetermination of the deficiency in the United States Tax Court. That court, in a reviewed decision, with only two judges dissenting, held that respondent was in the trade or business of gambling, and that, as a consequence, no part of his gambling losses constituted an item of tax preference in determining any minimum tax for 1978. In so ruling, the court adhered to its earlier court-reviewed decision in The court in Ditunno, had overruled a case where it had rejected the 's contention (contrary to his position here) that a full-time gambler was in a trade or business and therefore was subject to self-employment tax. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because of a conflict on the issue among Courts of Appeals,[5] we granted certiorari. *27 II The phrase "trade or business" has been in 162(a) and in that section's predecessors for many years. Indeed, the phrase is common in the Code, for it appears in over 50 sections and 800 subsections and in hundreds of places in proposed and final income tax regulations. The slightly longer phrases, "carrying on a trade or business" and "engaging in a trade or business," themselves are used no less than 60 times in the Code. The concept thus has a well-known and almost constant presence on our tax-law terrain. Despite this, the Code has never contained a definition of the words "trade or business" for general application, and no regulation has been issued expounding its meaning for all purposes.[6] Neither has a broadly applicable authoritative judicial definition emerged.[7] Our task in this case is to ascertain the meaning of the phrase as it appears in the sections of the Code with which we are here concerned.[8] In one of its early tax cases, the Court was concerned with the Corporation Tax imposed by 38 of the Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, -117, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | 38 of the Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, -117, and the status of being engaged in business. It said: " `Business' is a very comprehensive term *28 and embraces everything about which a person can be employed." It embraced the Bouvier Dictionary definition: "That which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit." See also And Justice Frankfurter has observed that "we assume that Congress uses common words in their popular meaning, as used in the common speech of men." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, With these general comments as significant background, we turn to pertinent cases decided here. had to do with margin trading and capital gains, and held, in that context, that an investor, seeking merely to increase his holdings, was not engaged in a trade or business. Justice Brandeis, in his opinion for the Court, noted that the Board of Tax Appeals theretofore had ruled that a taxpayer who devoted the major portion of his time to transactions on the stock exchange for the purpose of making a livelihood could treat losses incurred as having been sustained in the course of a trade or business. He went on to observe that no facts were adduced in Snyder to show that the taxpayer "might properly be characterized as a `trader on an exchange who makes a living in buying and selling securities.' " These observations, thus, are dicta, but, by their use, the Court appears to have drawn a distinction between an active trader and an investor. In the Court was concerned with what were "ordinary and necessary" expenses of a taxpayer's trade or business, within the meaning of 23(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, In ascertaining whether carrying charges on short sales of stock were deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses of the taxpayer's business, the Court assumed that the activities of the taxpayer in conserving and enhancing his estate constituted a trade or business, but nevertheless disallowed the *29 claimed deductions because they were not "ordinary" or "necessary." -497. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Reed, did not join the majority. He took the position that whether the taxpayer's activities constituted a trade or business was "open for determination," and observed: " `. carrying on any trade or business,' within the contemplation of 23(a), involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services. This the taxpayer did not do. Without elaborating the reasons for this construction and not unmindful of opposing considerations, including |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | for this construction and not unmindful of opposing considerations, including appropriate regard for administrative practice, I prefer to make the conclusion explicit instead of making the hypothetical litigation-breeding assumption that this taxpayer's activities, for which expenses were sought to be deducted, did constitute a `trade or business.' " Next came There the Court, in a bare and brief unanimous opinion, ruled that salaries and other expenses incident to looking after one's own investments in bonds and stocks were not deductible under 23(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, as expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business. While surely cutting back on Flint's broad approach, the Court seemed to do little more than announce that since 1918 "the present form [of the statute] was fixed and has so continued"; that "[n]o regulation has ever been promulgated which interprets the meaning of `carrying on a business' "; that the comprehensive definition of "business" in Flint was "not controlling in this dissimilar inquiry"; that the facts in each case must be examined; that not all expenses of every business transaction are deductible; and that "[n]o matter how large the estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be, such facts are not sufficient as a matter of law to permit the courts to reverse the decision of the Board." -218. The opinion, therefore although devoid *30 of analysis and not setting forth what elements, if any, in addition to profit motive and regularity, were required to render an activity a trade or business must stand for the propositions that full-time market activity in managing and preserving one's own estate is not embraced within the phrase "carrying on a business," and that salaries and other expenses incident to the operation are not deductible as having been paid or incurred in a trade or business.[9] See also United ; It is of interest to note that, although Justice Frankfurter was on the Higgins Court and this time did not write separately, and although Justice Reed, who had joined the concurring opinion in Du Pont, was the author of the Higgins opinion, the Court in that case did not even cite Du Pont and thus paid no heed whatsoever to the content of Justice Frankfurter's pronouncement in his concurring opinion.[10] Adoption of the Frankfurter gloss obviously would have disposed of the case in the 's favor handily and automatically, but that easy route was not followed. Less than three months later, the Court considered the issue of the deductibility, as business expenses, of estate and trust fees. In |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | deductibility, as business expenses, of estate and trust fees. In unanimous opinions issued the same day and written by Justice Black, the Court ruled that the efforts *31 of an estate or trust in asset conservation and maintenance did not constitute a trade or business. City Bank Farmers Trust ; United The Higgins case was deemed to be relevant and controlling. Again, no mention was made of the Frankfurter concurrence in Du Pont. Yet Justices Reed and Frankfurter were on the Court. concerned a taxpayer who had advanced capital to a partnership formed to develop an invention. On audit of his 1966 return, a claimed deduction under 174(a)(1) of the 1954 Code for his pro rata share of the partnership's operating loss was disallowed. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit upheld that disallowance. This Court reversed. Justice Douglas, writing for the eight Justices who participated, observed: "Section 174 was enacted in 1954 to dilute some of the conception of `ordinary and necessary' business expenses under 162(a) (then 23(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939) adumbrated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in where he said that the section in question `involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services.' " -503. He went on to state, that 162(a) "is more narrowly written than is 174." From these observations and decisions, we conclude (1) that, to be sure, the statutory words are broad and comprehensive (Flint); (2) that, however, expenses incident to caring for one's own investments, even though that endeavor is full time, are not deductible as paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business (Higgins; City Bank; Pyne); (3) that the opposite conclusion may follow for an active trader (Snyder); (4) that Justice Frankfurter's attempted gloss upon the decision in Du Pont was not adopted by the Court in that case; (5) that the Court, indeed, later characterized it as an "adumbration" (Snow); and (6) that the Frankfurter observation, specifically or by implication, never has been accepted *32 as law by a majority opinion of the Court, and more than once has been totally ignored. We must regard the Frankfurter gloss merely as a two-Justice pronouncement in a passing moment and, while entitled to respect, as never having achieved the status of a Court ruling. One also must acknowledge that Higgins, with its stress on examining the facts in each case, affords no readily helpful standard, in the usual sense, with which to decide the present case and others similar to it. The Court's cases, thus, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | case and others similar to it. The Court's cases, thus, give us results, but little general guidance. III Federal and state legislation and court decisions, perhaps understandably, until recently have not been noticeably favorable to gambling endeavors and even have been reluctant to treat gambling on a parity with more "legitimate" means of making a living. See, e. g., 4401 et seq. of the Code;[11] And the confinement of gambling-loss deductions to the amount of gambling gains, a provision brought into the income tax law as 23(g) of the Revenue Act of 1934, and carried forward into 165(d) of the 1954 Code, closed the door on suspected abuses, see H. R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1934); S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1934), but served partially to differentiate genuine gambling losses from many other types of adverse financial consequences sustained during the tax year. Gambling winnings, however, have not been isolated from gambling losses. The Congress has been realistic enough to recognize that such losses do exist and do have some effect on income, which is the primary focus of the federal income tax. The issue this case presents has "been around" for a long time and, as indicated above, has not met with consistent treatment in the Tax Court itself or in the Federal Courts of *33 Appeals. The Seventh Circuit, in the present case, said the issue "has proven to be most difficult and troublesome over the years." The difficulty has not been ameliorated by the persistent absence of an all-purpose definition, by statute or regulation, of the phrase "trade or business" which so frequently appears in the Code. Of course, this very frequency well may be the explanation for legislative and administrative reluctance to take a position as to one use that might affect, with confusion, so many others. Be that as it may, this taxpayer's case must be decided and, from what we have outlined above, must be decided in the face of a decisional history that is not positive or even fairly indicative, as we read the cases, of what the result should be. There are, however, some helpful indicators. If a taxpayer, as Groetzinger is stipulated to have done in 1978, devotes his full-time activity to gambling, and it is his intended livelihood source, it would seem that basic concepts of fairness (if there be much of that in the income tax law) demand that his activity be regarded as a trade or business just as any other readily accepted activity, such as being a retail store |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | other readily accepted activity, such as being a retail store proprietor or, to come closer categorically, as being a casino operator or as being an active trader on the exchanges. It is argued, however, that a full-time gambler is not offering goods or his services, within the line of demarcation that Justice Frankfurter would have drawn in Du Pont. Respondent replies that he indeed is supplying goods and services, not only to himself but, as well, to the gambling market; thus, he says, he comes within the Frankfurter test even if that were to be imposed as the proper measure. "It takes two to gamble." Brief for Respondent 3. Surely, one who clearly satisfies the Frankfurter adumbration usually is in a trade or business. But does it necessarily follow that one who does not satisfy the Frankfurter adumbration is not in a trade or business? One might well feel that a full-time gambler *34 ought to qualify as much as a full-time trader,[12] as Justice Brandeis in Snyder implied and as courts have held.[13] The indeed, accepts the trader result. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. In any event, while the offering of goods and services usually would qualify the activity as a trade or business, this factor, it seems to us, is not an absolute prerequisite. We are not satisfied that the Frankfurter gloss would add any helpful dimension to the resolution of cases such as this one, or that it provides a "sensible test," as the urges. See Brief for Petitioner 36. It might assist now and then, when the answer is obvious and positive, but it surely is capable of breeding litigation over the meaning of "goods," the meaning of "services," or the meaning of "holding one's self out." And we suspect that apart from gambling almost every activity would satisfy the gloss.[14] A test that everyone passes is not a test at all. We therefore now formally reject the Frankfurter gloss which the Court has never adopted anyway. *35 Of course, not every income-producing and profit-making endeavor constitutes a trade or business. The income tax law, almost from the beginning, has distinguished between a business or trade, on the one hand, and "transactions entered into for profit but not connected with business or trade," on the other. See Revenue Act of 1916, 5(a), Fifth, Congress "distinguished the broad range of income or profit producing activities from those satisfying the narrow category of trade or business." We accept the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | majority | Commissioner v. Groetzinger | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111821/commissioner-v-groetzinger/ | trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit. A sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion does not qualify. It is suggested that we should defer to the position taken by the and by the Solicitor General, but, in the absence of guidance, for over several decades now, through the medium of definitive statutes or regulations, we see little reason to do so. We would defer, instead, to the Code's normal focus on what we regard as a common-sense concept of what is a trade or business. Otherwise, as here, in the context of a minimum tax, it is not too extreme to say that the taxpayer is being taxed on his gambling losses,[15] a result distinctly out of line with the Code's focus on income. We do not overrule or cut back on the Court's holding in Higgins when we conclude that if one's gambling activity is pursued full time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere hobby, it is a trade or business within the meaning of the statutes with which we are here concerned. Respondent *36 Groetzinger satisfied that test in 1978. Constant and largescale effort on his part was made. Skill was required and was applied. He did what he did for a livelihood, though with a less-than-successful result. This was not a hobby or a passing fancy or an occasional bet for amusement. We therefore adhere to the general position of the Higgins Court, taken 46 years ago, that resolution of this issue "requires an examination of the facts in each case." This may be thought by some to be a less-than-satisfactory solution, for facts vary. See Boyle, What is a Trade or Business?, 39 Tax Lawyer 737, 767 ; Note, The Business of Betting: Proposals for Reforming the Taxation of Business Gamblers, 38 Tax Lawyer 759 ; Lopez, Defining "Trade or Business" Under the Internal Revenue Code: A Survey of Relevant Cases, Cf. Comment, Continuing Vitality of the "Goods or Services" Test, But the difficulty rests in the Code's wide utilization in various contexts of the term "trade or business," in the absence of an all-purpose definition by statute or regulation, and in our concern that an attempt judicially to formulate and impose a test for all situations would be counterproductive, unhelpful, and even somewhat precarious for the overall integrity of the Code. We leave repair or |
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