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Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | majority | Riggins v. Nevada | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112732/riggins-v-nevada/ | in reference to medicating prisoners against their will, stated that `courts have recognized a protectable liberty interest in the freedom to avoid unwanted medication with such drugs.' The court in so stating cited [,] which addressed the issue of medicating pre-trial detainees and stated that `less restrictive alternatives, such as segregation or the use of less controversial drugs like tranquilizers or sedatives, should be ruled out before resorting to antipsychotic drugs.' In the case at bar, no less restrictive alternatives were utilized, considered or even proposed." Record 1070 1071 (emphasis in original). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins' convictions and death sentence. With respect to administration of Mellaril, the court held that expert testimony presented at trial "was sufficient to inform the jury of the effect of the Mellaril on Riggins' demeanor and testimony." Thus, although Riggins' demeanor was relevant to his insanity defense, the court held that denial of the defense's motion to terminate medication was neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of Riggins' trial rights. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rose suggested that the District Court should have determined whether administration of Mellaril during trial was "absolutely necessary" by ordering a pretrial suspension of medication. Justice Springer dissented, arguing that antipsychotic drugs may never be forced on a criminal defendant solely to allow prosecution. We granted certiorari, to decide whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication *133 during trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. II The record in this case narrowly defines the issues before us. The parties have indicated that once the District Court denied Riggins' motion to terminate use of Mellaril, subsequent administration of the drug was involuntary. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 6 (medication was "forced"); Brief for Respondent 14, 22, 28 (describing medication as "unwanted," "over objection," and "compelled"). This understanding accords with the determination of the Nevada Supreme Court. See 107 Nev., ; 808 P. 2d, at 537 (describing medication as "involuntary" and "forced"). Given the parties' positions on this point and the absence of any record evidence to the contrary, we adhere to the understanding of the State Supreme Court. We also presume that administration of Mellaril was medically appropriate. Although defense counsel stressed that Riggins received a very high dose of the drug, at no point did he suggest to the Nevada courts that administration of Mellaril was medically improper treatment for his client. Finally, the record is dispositive with respect to Riggins' Eighth Amendment claim that administration of Mellaril denied him an opportunity to show jurors his true mental condition at the sentencing hearing. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | majority | Riggins v. Nevada | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112732/riggins-v-nevada/ | show jurors his true mental condition at the sentencing hearing. Because this argument was presented neither to the Nevada Supreme Court nor in Riggins' petition for certiorari, we do not address it here. With these considerations in mind, we turn to Riggins' core contention that involuntary administration of Mellaril denied him "a full and fair trial." Pet. for Cert. i. Our discussion in provides useful background for evaluating this claim. In a prison inmate alleged that the State of Washington and various individuals violated his right to due process by giving him Mellaril and other antipsychotic drugs against his will. Although the inmate did not prevail, we agreed that *134 his interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. "The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body," we said, "represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty." 9. In the case of antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril, that interference is particularly severe: "The purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient's brain, leading to changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes. While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects. One such side effect identified by the trial court is acute dystonia, a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes. The trial court found that it may be treated and reversed within a few minutes through use of the medication Cogentin. Other side effects include akathesia (motor restlessness, often characterized by an inability to sit still); neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a relatively rare condition which can lead to death from cardiac dysfunction); and tardive dyskinesia, perhaps the most discussed side effect of antipsychotic drugs. Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological disorder, irreversible in some cases, that is characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of various muscles, especially around the face. [T]he proportion of patients treated with antipsychotic drugs who exhibit the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia ranges from 10% to 25%. According to the American Psychiatric Association, studies of the condition indicate that 60% of tardive dyskinesia is mild or minimal in effect, and about 10% may be characterized as severe." 9-230 Taking account of the unique circumstances of penal confinement, however, we determined that due process allows a *135 mentally ill inmate to be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs where there is a determination that "the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." 7. Under forcing |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | majority | Riggins v. Nevada | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112732/riggins-v-nevada/ | treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." 7. Under forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness. The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons the State detains for trial. See ; Thus, once Riggins moved to terminate administration of antipsychotic medication, the State became obligated to establish the need for Mellaril and the medical appropriateness of the drug. Although we have not had occasion to develop substantive standards for judging forced administration of such drugs in the trial or pretrial settings, Nevada certainly would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had found, that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others. See 5-226; cf. Similarly, the State might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means. See ("Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of `ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace"). We note that during the July 14 hearing Riggins did not contend that he had the right to be tried without Mellaril if its discontinuation rendered him incompetent. See Record 424-425, 496, 500. The question whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at trial is not before us. Contrary to the dissent's understanding, we do not "adopt a standard of strict scrutiny." Post, at 156. We have no occasion to finally prescribe such substantive standards as mentioned above, since the District Court allowed administration of Mellaril to continue without making any determination of the need for this course or any findings about reasonable alternatives. The court's laconic order denying Riggins' motion did not adopt the State's view, which was that continued administration of Mellaril was required to ensure that the defendant could be tried; in fact, the hearing testimony casts considerable doubt on that argument. See 0-131. Nor did the order indicate a finding that safety considerations or other compelling concerns outweighed Riggins' interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. Were we to divine the District Court's logic from the hearing transcript, we would have to conclude that the court simply weighed the risk that the defense would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins' outward appearance against the chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | majority | Riggins v. Nevada | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112732/riggins-v-nevada/ | against the chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken off Mellaril, and struck the balance in favor of involuntary medication. See Record 502 ("[T]hat he was nervous and so forth can all be brought out [through expert testimony]. And when you start weighing the consequences of taking him off his medication and possibly have him revert into an incompetent situation, I don't think that that is a good experiment"). *137 The court did not acknowledge the defendant's liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. This error may well have impaired the constitutionally protected trial rights Riggins invokes. At the hearing to consider terminating medication, Dr. O'Gorman suggested that the dosage administered to Riggins was within the toxic range, and could make him "uptight," Dr. Master testified that a patient taking 800 milligrams of Mellaril each day might suffer from drowsiness or confusion. Cf. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae 10-11 ("[I]n extreme cases, the sedationlike effect [of antipsychotic medication] may be severe enough (akinesia) to affect thought processes"). It is clearly possible that such side effects had an impact upon not just Riggins' outward appearance, but also the content of his testimony on direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel. Efforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice from the record before us would be futile, and guesses whether the outcome of the trial might have been different if Riggins' motion had been granted would be purely speculative. We accordingly reject the dissent's suggestion that Riggins should be required to demonstrate how the trial would have proceeded differently if he had not been given Mellaril. See post, at 149-150. Like the consequences of compelling a defendant to wear prison clothing, see or of binding and gagging an accused during trial, see the precise consequences of forcing antipsychotic medication upon Riggins cannot be shown from a trial transcript. What the testimony of doctors who examined Riggins establishes, and what we will not ignore, is a strong possibility that Riggins' defense was impaired due to the administration of Mellaril. We also are persuaded that allowing Riggins to present expert testimony about the effect of Mellaril on his demeanor *138 did nothing to cure the possibility that the substance of his own testimony, his interaction with counsel, or his comprehension at trial were compromised by forced administration of Mellaril. Even if (as the dissent argues, post, at 147-149) the Nevada Supreme Court was right that expert testimony allowed jurors to assess Riggins' demeanor fairly, an unacceptable risk of prejudice |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,991 | 19 | dissenting | McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112536/mcnary-v-haitian-refugee-center-inc/ | Congress has carefully limited the judicial review available under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Reform Act) in language which "he who runs may read." The Court, with considerable and obvious effort, finds a way to avoid this limitation, because to apply the statute as written could bar judicial review of respondents' constitutional claims. The statute as written is, in my view, constitutional, and there is therefore no need to rewrite it. I The relevant provisions of the Reform Act dealing with administrative and judicial review are found in 8 U.S. C. 1160(e): "(1) Administrative and judicial review "There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection. "(2) Administrative review "(A) Single level of administrative appellate review "The Attorney General shall establish an appellate authority to provide for a single level of administrative appellate review of such a determination "(3) Judicial review "(A) Limitation to review of exclusion or deportation "There shall be judicial review of such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation under section 1105a of this title." *500 The first of the quoted sentences states, as clearly as any language can, that judicial review of a "determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section" may not be had except in accordance with the provisions of the subsection. The plain language of subsection (3)(A) provides that judicial review of a denial may be had only in connection with review of an order of exclusion or deportation. The Court chooses to read this language as dealing only with "direct review of individual denials of SAW status, rather than as referring to general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing applications." Ante, at 492. But the accepted view of judicial review of administrative action generally even when there is no express preclusion provision as there is in the present statuteis that only "final actions" are reviewable in court. The Administrative Procedure Act provides: "[F]inal agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action." 5 U.S. C. 704. The Court's reasoning is thus a classic non sequitur. It reasons that because Congress limited judicial review only of what were in effect final administrative decisions, it must not have intended to preclude separate |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,991 | 19 | dissenting | McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112536/mcnary-v-haitian-refugee-center-inc/ | administrative decisions, it must not have intended to preclude separate challenges to procedures used by the agency before it issued any final decision. But the type of judicial review of agency action which the Court finds that Congress failed to preclude is a type not generally available even without preclusion. In the light of this settled rule, the natural reading of "determination respecting an application" in 1160(e) encompasses both final decisions and procedures used to reach those decisions. Each of respondents' claims attacks the process used by Immigration and *501 Naturalization Service (INS) to make a determination respecting an application. We have on several occasions rejected the argument advanced by respondents that individual plaintiffs can bypass restrictions on judicial review by purporting to attack general policies rather than individual results. For instance, in United we found that in the context of the "precisely drawn provisions" of the Medicare statute, the provision of judicial review for awards made under Part A of the statute, coupled with the omission of judicial review for awards under Part B, "provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims." Similarly, in we addressed a challenge to a ruling issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that precluded payment under Medicare for a particular medical procedure. The Medicare Act permits judicial review of "any claim arising under" the Act, 42 U.S. C. 405(g), (h), only after a claimant seeks payment and exhausts administrative remedies. The plaintiffs contended that their lawsuits challenging the Secretary's refusal to reimburse the procedure at issue were permissible without exhausting administrative remedies because they challenged only the Secretary's "`procedure' for reaching her decision," not the underlying decision on their particular claims. We rejected this distinction, finding that "it makes no sense to construe the claims as anything more than, at bottom, a claim that they should be paid for their surgery." This holding was based on the recognition that a contrary result would allow claimants "to bypass the exhaustion requirements of the Medicare Act by simply bringing declaratory judgment actions in federal court before they undergo the medical procedure in question." We expressly rejected the contentionalso urged by the respondents herethat "simply because a claim somehow can be construed *502 as `procedural,' it is cognizable in federal district court by way of federal-question jurisdiction." It is well settled that when Congress has established a particular review mechanism, courts are not free to fashion alternatives to the specified scheme. See United ; Whitney National In creating the Reform Act and the SAW program, Congress balanced the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,991 | 19 | dissenting | McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112536/mcnary-v-haitian-refugee-center-inc/ | the Reform Act and the SAW program, Congress balanced the goals of the unprecedented amnesty programs with the need "to insure reasonably prompt determinations" in light of the incentives and opportunity for ineligible applicants to delay the disposition of their cases and derail the program. The Court's ponderously reasoned gloss on the statute's plain language sanctions an unwarranted intrusion into a carefully drafted congressional program, a program which placed great emphasis on a minimal amount of paperwork and procedure in an effort to speed the process of adjusting the status of those aliens who demonstrated their entitlement to adjustment. "If the balance is to be struck anew, the decision must come from Congress and not from this Court." Ringer, II The Court bases its conclusion that district courts have jurisdiction to entertain respondents' pattern and practice allegations in part out of respect for the "strong presumption" that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action. Ante, at 498. This presumption, however, comes into play only where there is a genuine ambiguity as to whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review of administrative action. In this case two things are evident: First, in drafting the Reform Act, Congress did not preclude all judicial review of administrative action; as detailed earlier, Congress provided for judicial review of INS action in the courts of appeals in deportation proceedings, and in the district courts in orders of exclusion. Second, by enacting *503 such a scheme, Congress intended to foreclose all other avenues of relief. Therefore, since the statute is not ambiguous, the presumption has no force here. The Court indicates that this presumption of judicial review is particularly applicable in cases raising constitutional challenges to agency action. Ante, at 496-499. I believe that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of such claims in this instance, and that in this context it is permissible for it to do so. In the Reform Act, Congress enacted a one-time amnesty program to process claims of illegal aliens allowing them to obtain status as lawful residents. Congress intended aliens to come forward during the limited, 12-month eligibility period because "[t]his is the first call and the last call, a one-shot deal." 132 Cong. Rec. 33217 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Simpson). If an alien failed to file a legalization application within the 12-month period, the opportunity was lost forever. To further expedite this unique and unprecedented amnesty program and to minimize the burden on the federal courts, Congress provided for limited judicial review. Given the structure of the Act, and the status of these alien respondents, it is extremely doubtful |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,991 | 19 | dissenting | McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112536/mcnary-v-haitian-refugee-center-inc/ | the status of these alien respondents, it is extremely doubtful that the operation of the administrative process in their cases would give rise to any colorable constitutional claims. "`An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare.'" Respondents are undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of those procedures which Congress has accorded them in the Reform Act. But there is no reason to believe that administrative appeals as provided in the Actwhich simply have not been resorted to by these respondents before suing in the *504 District Courtwould not have assured them compliance with statutory procedures. The Court never mentions what colorable constitutional claims these aliens, illegally present in the United States, could have had that demand judicial review. The most that can be said for respondents' case in this regard is that it is conceivable, though not likely, that the administrative processing of their claims could be handled in such a way as to deny them some constitutional right, and that the remedy of requesting deportation in order to obtain judicial review is a burdensome one. We have never held, however, that Congress may not, by explicit language, preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, and here, where that body was obviously interested in expeditiously processing an avalanche of claims from noncitizens upon whom it was conferring a substantial benefit, I think it may do so. |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109756/united-air-lines-inc-v-mcmann/ | Today the Court, in its first encounter with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C. 621 et seq., sharply limits the reach of that important law. In apparent disregard of settled principles of statutory construction, it gives an unduly narrow interpretation to a congressional enactment designed to remedy arbitrary discrimination in the workplace. Because I believe that the Court misinterprets the Act, I respectfully dissent. But for 4 (f) (2) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 623 (f) (2), petitioner's decision to discharge respondent because he reached the age of 60 would violate 4 (a) (1), 29 U.S. C. 623 (a) (1). This latter section makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual [between 40 and 6] with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." The language used in 4 (a) (1) tracks the language of 703 (a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2 (a) (1).[1] This section has been interpreted as forbidding involuntary retirement when improper criteria, such as race or sex, are used in selecting those to be retired. With reference to the statutory language, courts have reasoned that forced retirement is "tantamount to a discharge," (CA7), cert. denied, or that the employer requiring *209 retirement is "discriminat[ing] against" the retired employee "with respect to [a] condition of employment," see 492 n. 3 (CA), cert. denied, ; ; at 1188-.[2] Given these constructions of 703 (a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act and the absence of any indication that Congress intended 4 (a) (1) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be interpreted differently, I would construe the identical language of the two statutes in an identical manner. The question that remains is whether 4 (f) (2) sanctions this otherwise unlawful act. That section provides: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]" The opinion of the Court assumes that this language is clear on its face. Ante, at 199. I cannot agree with this premise. In my view, the statutory language is susceptible of at least two interpretations, and the only reading consonant with congressional intent would preclude involuntary retirement of employees covered by the Act. On this latter reading, 4 (f) (2) allows different treatment |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109756/united-air-lines-inc-v-mcmann/ | On this latter reading, 4 (f) (2) allows different treatment of older employees only with respect to the benefits paid or available under certain employee benefit plans, including pension *2 and retirement plans.[3] Alternatively, the section may be read, as the Court has read it, also to permit involuntary retirement of older employees prior to age 6 pursuant to a pension or retirement benefit plan. Ante, at 198. The critical question, then, is whether the phrase "employee benefit plan," as used by Congress here to include a "retirement, pension or insurance plan," encompasses only the rules defining what benefits retirees receive, or whether it also encompasses rules mandating retirement at a particular age. We need not decide on a strictly grammatical basis which reading is preferable. We are judges, not linguists, and our task is to divine congressional intent, using all available evidence. "[W]ords are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how `clear the words may appear on "superficial examination." ' " quoting United See The Court's analysis of the legislative history establishes that the primary purpose of the Act was to facilitate the *211 hiring of older workers. I have no quarrel with that proposition. Understanding this primary purpose, however, aids not at all in determining whether Congress also intended to prohibit forced retirement of those already employed. The Court's analysis of the legislative history on this issue, ante, at 199-202, on which MR. JUSTICE WHITE relies, ante, at 206, is unpersuasive, since it relies primarily on references to an exception that was not enacted. There can be no question, that had Congress enacted 4 (f) (2) in the form in which it was proposed by the administration, forced retirement would be permissible. That section of the initial bill quite specifically allowed such retirement. It provided: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer to separate involuntarily an employee under a retirement policy or system where such policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act" S. 830 and H. R. 4221, 4 (f) (2), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Thus the remarks of Secretary Wirtz, Senator Javits, and the representative of the AFL-CIO on which the Court relies, see ante, at 199-201, quite properly reflect that the bill as it then existed would have authorized involuntary retirement. But the present benefit-plan exception to the 4 (a) prohibition on age discrimination differs significantly from that contained in the original bill. The specific authorization for involuntary retirement |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109756/united-air-lines-inc-v-mcmann/ | in the original bill. The specific authorization for involuntary retirement was deleted. That this deletion was made may of itself suggest that Congress concluded such an exception was unwise; a review of the legislative history strongly supports this view. Two sets of objections were made to the bill during the Senate and House hearings.[4] Many persons, including members *212 of the Committees, expressed concern that the bill did "not provide any flexibility in the amount of pension benefits payable to older workers depending on their age when hired, and thus may actually encourage employers, faced with the necessity of paying greatly increased premiums, to look for excuses not to hire older workers when they might have hired them under a law granting them a degree of flexibility with respect to such matters." Statement of Sen. Javits, Senate Hearings 27; see also, e. g., House Hearings 62-63 (statement of Labor Counsel, Chamber of Commerce of the United States). Representatives of organized labor voiced totally different objections to the initial version of 4 (f) (2); they argued against permitting any involuntary retirement based on age for those within the coverage of the bill, whether or not pursuant to a bona fide plan. Senate Hearings 98; House Hearings 413. In addition, they suggested that bona fide seniority systems should receive express protection under 4 (f). After the hearings, the House and Senate Committees changed the exemption section to its present form. By adding to 4 (f) (2) a provision permitting observance of bona fide seniority systems, Congress acceded to organized labor's concern that seniority systems not be abrogated. The addition of language permitting observance of the terms of a benefit plan was plainly responsive to the numerous criticisms that the bill would deter employment of older workers.[] But the third change that was madethe deletion of the specific language permitting involuntary retirementwas not responsive to either of those criticisms, since deletion of that language could have no effect on the hiring of older workers or on seniority systems. A reasonable inference to be drawn from the deletion, *213 therefore, is that Congress was responding to labor's other objection by removing the authorization for involuntary retirement from the exceptions to the statute's prohibitions. While, as the Court notes, ante, at 201, the specific language proposed by labor was not adopted, the Court offers no alternative explanation for the deletion of the explicit authorization for involuntary retirement.[6] In contrast to the hearings on the original version of the 4 (f) (2) exception, where there are repeated references to the fact that the bill permitted involuntary |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109756/united-air-lines-inc-v-mcmann/ | repeated references to the fact that the bill permitted involuntary retirement, there are no similar statements in the Committee Reports or in the House and Senate debates with respect to the amended version of 4 (f) (2). For example, the House and Senate Committee Reports explain the purpose and effect of 4 (f) (2) as follows: "This exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the billhiring of older workersby permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in employee benefit plans. The specific exception was an amendment to the original bill, is considered vita[l] to the legislation, and was favorably received by witnesses at the hearings." H. R. Rep. No. 80, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967). See S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967).[7] Nowhere did the Committees suggest that the exemption permitted *214 involuntary retirements. Indeed, their emphasis on encouraging the employment of older workers by allowing employers to make distinctions based on age in the provision of certain ancillary employment benefits, fully accords with the view that 4 (f) (2) was intended only to permit those variations. Moreover, when the sponsors of the legislation explained the bill to the House and Senate during the debates preceding its passage, they made no mention of the possibility that 4 (f) (2) permitted involuntary retirement and discussed it in terms incompatible with any such interpretation.[8] The following exchange between Senator Javits, the minority floor manager of the bill and Senator Yarborough, the majority floor manager, is illustrative: "Mr. JAVITS. The meaning of this provision is as follows: An employer will not be compelled under this section to afford to older workers exactly the same pension, retirement, or insurance benefits as he affords to younger workers. If the older worker chooses to waive all of those provisions, then the older worker can obtain the benefits of this act, but the older worker cannot compel an employer through the use of this act to undertake some special relationship, course, or other condition with respect to a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the act *21 and we understand thatin order to give that older employee employment on the same terms as others. "I would like to ask the manager of the bill whether he agrees with that interpretation, because I think it is very necessary to make its meaning clear to both employers and employees. "Mr. YARBOROUGH. I wish to say to the Senator that that is basically my understanding of the provision in line 22, Page 20 of |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109756/united-air-lines-inc-v-mcmann/ | understanding of the provision in line 22, Page 20 of the bill, clause 2, subsection (f) of section 4, when it refers to retirement, pension, or insurance plan, it means that a man who would not have been employed except for this law does not have to receive the benefits of the plan. Say an applicant for employment is comes in and seeks employment, and the company has bargained for a plan with its labor union that provides that certain moneys will be put up for a pension plan for anyone who worked for the employer for 20 years so that a -year-old employee would not be employed past years. This means he cannot be denied employment because he is but he will not be able to participate in that pension plan because unlike a man hired at 44, he has no chance to earn 20 years retirement. In other words, this will not disrupt the bargained-for pension plan. This will not deny an individual employment or prospective employment but will limit his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension, retirement, or insurance plan. "Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague. That is important to business people." 113 Cong. Rec. 312 (1967) (emphasis added).[9] *216 The statements of those who criticized the bill for not going far enough lend still further support to the interpretation of the Act that would preclude forced retirement of persons covered by the Act. Senator Young spoke eloquently against subjecting those aged 6 or older to "[c]ompulsory retirement programs" which, he proclaimed, "have forged an iron collar" for those Americans "ready, willing and able" to work past 6. Senator Young never alluded to the possibility that compulsory retirement of those under 6 and thus covered by the Act would be permitted, since the unmistakable premise of his argument was that, under the law being considered, compulsory retirement of covered employees was prohibited. Others criticized 4 (f) (2) because it authorized employers to deny older employees various benefits in accordance with benefit plans, but again made no reference to the possibility of forced retirement of covered employees. 113 Cong. Rec., at 3474 (remarks of Rep. Smith); In view of the tenor and substance of those objections to the Act, it is inconceivable that these Congressmen would have remained silent had they understood 4 (f) (2) to allow involuntary retirement before the age of 6.[] *217 Any doubt as to the correctness of reading the Act to prohibit forced retirement is dispelled by considering the anomaly that results from the Court's contrary interpretation. Under 4 (a) and |
Justice Marshall | 1,977 | 15 | dissenting | United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109756/united-air-lines-inc-v-mcmann/ | results from the Court's contrary interpretation. Under 4 (a) and 4 (f) (2), see n. it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire a job applicant under the age of 6 because of his age. If, as the Court holds, involuntary retirement before age 6 is permissible under 4 (f) (2), the individual so retired has a simple route to regain his job: He need only reapply for the vacancy created by his retirement. As a new applicant, the individual plainly cannot be denied the job because of his age. And as someone with experience in performing the tasks of the "vacant" job he once held, the individual likely will be better qualified than any other applicant. Thus the individual retired one day would have to be hired the next. We should be loathe to attribute to Congress an intention to produce such a bizarre result. One final reason exists for rejecting the Court's broad interpretation of the Act's exemption. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is a remedial statute designed, in the Act's own words, "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary *218 age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 2 (b), 29 U.S. C. 621 (b). It is well settled that such legislation should "be given a liberal interpretation [and] exemptions from its sweep should be narrowed and limited to effect the remedy intended." Piedmont & Northern R. See also, e. g., Phillips (194). To construe the 4 (f) (2) exemption broadly to authorize involuntary retirement when no statement in the Committee Reports or by the Act's floor managers or sponsors in the debates supports that interpretation flouts this fundamental principle of construction. The mischief the Court fashions today may be short lived. Both the House and Senate have passed amendments to the Act. 123 Cong. Rec. H9984-998 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977); at S17303 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977). The amendments to 4 (f) (2) expressly provide that the involuntary retirement of employees shall not be permitted or required pursuant to any employee benefit plan. Thus, today's decision may have virtually no prospective effect.[11] But the Committee Reports of both Houses make plain that, properly understood, the existing Act already prohibits involuntary retirement, and that the amendment is only a clarification necessitated by court decisions misconstruing congressional intent. H. R. Rep. No. 9-27, pp. -6 (1977); ; S. Rep. No. 9-, pp. 9- (1977).[12] Because the Court today has also |
Justice Souter | 1,992 | 20 | majority | Sochor v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112746/sochor-v-florida/ | Under Florida law, after a defendant is found guilty of capital murder, a separate jury proceeding is held as the first of two steps in deciding whether his sentence should be life imprisonment or death. (1) At the close of such aggravating and mitigating evidence as the prosecution and the defense may introduce, the trial judge charges the jurors to weigh whatever aggravating and mitigating circumstances or factors they may find, and to reach an advisory verdict by majority vote. 921.141(2). The jury does not report specific findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but if, at the second sentencing step, the judge decides upon death, he must issue a written statement of the circumstances he finds. 921.141(3). A death sentence is then subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida. 921.141(4). A Florida trial court sentenced petitioner to death after a jury so recommended, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. We must determine whether, as petitioner claims, the sentencer in his case weighed either of two aggravating factors that he claims were invalid, and if so, whether the State Supreme Court cured the error by holding it harmless. *530 We answer yes to the first question and no to the second, and therefore vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida and remand. I On New Year's Eve petitioner Dennis Sochor met a woman in a bar in Broward County, Florida. Sochor tried to rape her after they had left together, and her resistance angered him to the point of choking her to death. He was indicted for first-degree murder and kidnaping and, after a jury trial, was found guilty of each offense. At the penalty hearing, aggravating and mitigating evidence was offered, and the jury was instructed on the possibility of finding four aggravating circumstances, two of which were that "the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel, and [that] the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner, without any pretense of moral or legal justification." App. 326-327. The judge then explained to the jury that it could find certain statutory and any nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, which were to be weighed against any aggravating ones. By a vote of 10 to 2, the jury recommended the death penalty for the murder. The trial court adopted the jury's recommendation, finding all four aggravating circumstances as defined in the jury instructions and no circumstances in mitigation. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. It declined to reverse for |
Justice Souter | 1,992 | 20 | majority | Sochor v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112746/sochor-v-florida/ | Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. It declined to reverse for unconstitutional vagueness in the trial judge's instruction that the jury could find as an aggravating factor that "the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel" (hereinafter, for brevity, the heinousness factor, after the statute's words "heinous, atrocious, or *531 cruel," (5)(h) ). The court held the issue waived for failure to object and the claim lacking merit in any -603, and n. 10. The court also rejected Sochor's claim of insufficient evidence to support the trial judge's finding of the heinousness factor, citing evidence of the victim's extreme anxiety and fear before she died. The State Supreme Court did agree with Sochor, however, that the evidence failed to support the trial judge's finding that "the crime was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification" (hereinafter the coldness factor), holding this factor to require a "heightened" degree of premeditation not shown in this case. The State Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence notwithstanding the error, saying that: "[1] We disagree with Sochor's claim that his death sentence is disproportionate. [2] The trial court carefully weighed the aggravating factors against the lack of any mitigating factors and concluded that death was warranted. [3] Even after removing the aggravating factor of cold, calculated, and premeditated there still remain three aggravating factors to be weighed against no mitigating circumstances. [4] Striking one aggravating factor when there are no mitigating circumstances does not necessarily require resentencing. ; ; (Fla.), cert. denied, ; cert. denied, [5] Under the circumstances of this case, and in comparison with other death cases, we find Sochor's sentence of death proportionate to his crime. E. g., ; Tompkins cert. denied, ]; Doyle ]." *532 Sochor petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising four questions. We granted review limited to the following two: (1) "Did the application of Florida's [heinousness factor] violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?" and (2) "Did the Florida Supreme Court's review of petitioner's death sentence violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where that court upheld the sentence even though the trial court had instructed the jury on, and had applied, an improper aggravating circumstance, [in that] the Florida Supreme Court did not reweigh the evidence or conduct a harmless error analysis as to the effect of improper use of the circumstance on the jury's penalty verdict?" Pet. for Cert. ii; see II In a weighing State like Florida, there is Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an "invalid" aggravating |
Justice Souter | 1,992 | 20 | majority | Sochor v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112746/sochor-v-florida/ | Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an "invalid" aggravating circumstance in reaching the ultimate decision to impose a death sentence. See Employing an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process "creates the possibility of randomness," by placing a "thumb [on] death's side of the scale," thus "creat[ing] the risk [of] treat[ing] the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty," Even when other valid aggravating factors exist, merely affirming a sentence reached by weighing an invalid aggravating factor deprives a defendant of "the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances." Clemons, at and ); see While federal law does not require the state appellate court to remand for resentencing, it must, short of remand, either itself reweigh without the invalid aggravating factor or determine that weighing the invalid factor was harmless error. *533 A Florida's capital sentencing statute allows application of the heinousness factor if "[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." (5)(h) Sochor first argues that the jury instruction on the heinousness factor was invalid in that the statutory definition is unconstitutionally vague, see ; and the instruction failed to narrow the meaning enough to cure the defect. This error goes to the ultimate sentence, Sochor claims, because a Florida jury is "the sentencer" for Clemons purposes, or at the least one of "the sentencer's" constituent elements. This is so because the trial judge does not render wholly independent judgment, but must accord deference to the jury's recommendation. See ; cert. denied, Hence, the argument runs, error at the jury stage taints a death sentence, even if the trial judge's decision is otherwise error free. Cf. While Sochor concedes that the general advisory jury verdict does not reveal whether the jury did find and weigh the heinousness factor, he seems to argue that the possibility that the jury weighed an invalid factor is enough to require cure. This argument faces a hurdle, however, in the rule that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a state court's resolution of an issue of federal law if the state court's decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground, see as it will if the state court's opinion "indicates clearly and expressly" that the state ground is an alternative holding, see ; see also ; Fox Film *534 The Supreme Court of Florida said this about petitioner's claim that the trial judge's instruction on the heinousness factor was unconstitutional: "Sochor's next claim, regarding alleged errors in the penalty jury instructions, likewise must fail. None of the complained-of jury instructions |
Justice Souter | 1,992 | 20 | majority | Sochor v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112746/sochor-v-florida/ | instructions, likewise must fail. None of the complained-of jury instructions were objected to at trial, and, thus, they are not preserved for appeal. In any event, Sochor's claims here have no merit.10 "10 We reject without discussion Sochor's claims that the instructions as to the aggravating factors of heinous, atrocious, or cruel and cold, calculated, and premeditated were improper" -603, and n. 10. The quoted passage indicates with requisite clarity that the rejection of Sochor's claim was based on the alternative state ground that the claim was "not preserved for appeal," and Sochor has said nothing in this Court to persuade us that this state ground is either not adequate or not independent. Hence, we hold ourselves to be without authority to address Sochor's claim based on the jury instruction about the heinousness factor.[*] *535 B Sochor maintains that the same Eighth Amendment violation occurred again when the trial judge, who both parties *536 agree is at least a constituent part of "the sentencer," weighed the heinousness factor himself. To be sure, Sochor acknowledges the rule in where we held it was no error for a trial judge to weigh an aggravating factor defined by statute with impermissible vagueness, when the State Supreme Court had construed the statutory language narrowly in a prior case. We presumed that the trial judge had been familiar with the authoritative construction, which gave significant guidance. Sochor nonetheless argues that is no help to the State, because Florida's heinousness factor has not been subjected to the limitation of a narrow construction from the State Supreme Court. In cert. denied, the Supreme Court of Florida construed the statutory definition of the heinousness factor: "It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital feloniesthe conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." Understanding the factor, as defined in Dixon, to apply only to a "conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim," we held in that the sentencer had adequate guidance. See Sochor contends, however, that the State Supreme Court's post-Proffitt cases have not adhered to Dixon `s limitation as *537 stated in Proffitt, but instead evince inconsistent and overbroad constructions that |
Justice Souter | 1,992 | 20 | majority | Sochor v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112746/sochor-v-florida/ | in Proffitt, but instead evince inconsistent and overbroad constructions that leave a trial court without sufficient guidance. And we may well agree with him that the Supreme Court of Florida has not confined its discussions on the matter to the Dixon language we approved in Proffitt, but has on occasion continued to invoke the entire Dixon statement quoted above, perhaps thinking that Proffitt approved it all. See, e. g., cert. denied, ; cert. denied, ; But however much that may be troubling in the abstract, it need not trouble us here, for our review of Florida law indicates that the State Supreme Court has consistently held that heinousness is properly found if the defendant strangled a conscious victim. See cert. denied, ; ; ; ; Cf. ; We must presume the trial judge to have been familiar with this body of case law, see 497 U. S., which, at a minimum, gave the trial judge "[some] guidance," Since the Eighth Amendment requires no more, we infer no error merely from the fact that the trial judge weighed the heinousness factor. While Sochor responds that the State Supreme Court's interpretation of the heinousness factor has left Florida trial judges without sufficient guidance in other factual situations, we fail to see how that supports the conclusion that the trial judge was without sufficient guidance in the case at hand. See generally -364. *538 III Sochor also claims that when "the sentencer" weighed the coldness factor there was Eighth Amendment error that went uncorrected in the State Supreme Court. A First, Sochor complains of consideration of the coldness factor by the jury, the first step in his argument being that the coldness factor was "invalid" in that it was unsupported by the evidence; the second step, that the jury in the instant case "weighed" the coldness factor; and the third and last step, that in Florida the jury is at least a constituent part of "the sentencer" for Clemons purposes. The argument fails, however, for the second step is fatally flawed. Because the jury in Florida does not reveal the aggravating factors on which it relies, we cannot know whether this jury actually relied on the coldness factor. If it did not, there was no Eighth Amendment violation. Thus, Sochor implicitly suggests that, if the jury was allowed to rely on any of two or more independent grounds, one of which is infirm, we should presume that the resulting general verdict rested on the infirm ground and must be set aside. See ; cf. Just this Term, however, we held it was no |
Justice Souter | 1,992 | 20 | majority | Sochor v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112746/sochor-v-florida/ | cf. Just this Term, however, we held it was no violation of due process that a trial court instructed a jury on two different legal theories, one supported by the evidence, the other not. See We reasoned that although a jury is unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law, it is indeed likely to disregard an option simply unsupported by evidence. We see no occasion for different reasoning here, and accordingly decline to presume jury error. B Sochor next complains that Eighth Amendment error in the trial judge's weighing of the coldness factor was left uncured by the State Supreme Court. *539 1 We can start from some points of agreement. The parties agree that, in Florida, the trial judge is at least a constituent part of "the sentencer" for Clemons purposes, and there is, of course, no doubt that the trial judge "weighed" the coldness factor, as he said in his sentencing order. Nor is there any question that the coldness factor was "invalid" for Clemons purposes, since Parker applied the Clemons rule where a trial judge had weighed two aggravating circumstances that were invalid in the sense that the Supreme Court of Florida had found them to be unsupported by the evidence. See It follows that Eighth Amendment error did occur when the trial judge weighed the coldness factor in the instant case. What is in issue is the adequacy of the State Supreme Court's effort to cure the error under the rule announced in Clemons, that a sentence so tainted requires appellate reweighing or review for harmlessness. 2 We noted in Parker that the Supreme Court of Florida will generally not reweigh evidence (citing cert. denied, ; ), and the parties agree that, to this extent at least, our perception of Florida law was correct. The State argues, nonetheless, that, in this case, the State Supreme Court did support the death verdict adequately by performing harmless-error analysis. It relies on the excerpt from the state court's opinion quoted above, and particularly on the second through fourth sentences, as "declar[ing] a belief that" the trial judge's weighing of the coldness factor "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" in that it "did not contribute to the [sentence] obtained." This, however, is far from apparent. Not only does the State Supreme Court's opinion fail so much as to mention *540 "harmless error," see but the quoted sentences numbered one and five expressly refer to the quite different enquiry whether Sochor's sentence was proportional. The State tries to counter this deficiency by arguing that the four cases cited following the |
Justice Souter | 1,992 | 20 | majority | Sochor v. Florida | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112746/sochor-v-florida/ | deficiency by arguing that the four cases cited following the fourth sentence of the quoted passage were harmless-error cases, citation to which was a shorthand signal that the court had reviewed this record for harmless error as well. But the citations come up short. Only one of the four cases contains language giving an explicit indication that the State Supreme Court had performed harmless-error analysis. See The other three simply do not, and the result is ambiguity. Although we do not mean here to require a particular formulaic indication by state courts before their review for harmless federal error will pass federal scrutiny, a plain statement that the judgment survives on such an enquiry is clearly preferable to allusions by citation. In any event, when the citations stop as far short of clarity as these do, they cannot even arguably substitute for explicit language signifying that the State Supreme Court reviewed for harmless error. IV In sum, Eighth Amendment error occurred when the trial judge weighed the coldness factor. Since the Supreme Court of Florida did not explain or even "declare a belief that" this error "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" in that "it did not contribute to the [sentence] obtained," at the error cannot be taken as cured by the State Supreme Court's consideration of the case. It follows that Sochor's sentence cannot stand on the existing record of appellate review. We vacate the judgment of the *541 Supreme Court of Florida and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | second_dissenting | DeFunis v. Odegaard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109012/defunis-v-odegaard/ | I respectfully dissent. Many weeks of the school term remain, and petitioner may not receive his degree despite respondents' assurances that petitioner will be allowed to complete this term's schooling regardless of our decision. Any number of unexpected eventsillness, economic necessity, even academic failuremight prevent his graduation at the end of the term. Were that misfortune to befall, and were petitioner required to register for yet another term, the prospect that he would again face the hurdle of the admissions policy is real, not fanciful; for respondents warn that "Mr. DeFunis would have to take some appropriate action to request continued admission for the remainder of his law school education, and some discretionary action by the University on such request would have to be taken." Respondents' Memorandum on the Question of Mootness 3-4 (emphasis supplied). Thus, respondents' assurances have not dissipated the possibility that petitioner might once again have to run the gantlet of the University's allegedly unlawful admissions policy. The Court therefore proceeds on an erroneous premise in resting its mootness holding on a supposed inability to render any judgment that may affect one way or the other petitioner's completion of his law studies. For surely if we were to reverse the Washington Supreme Court, we could insure that, if for some reason petitioner did not graduate this spring, he would be entitled to re-enrollment at a later time on the same basis as others who have not faced the hurdle of the University's allegedly unlawful admissions policy. *349 In these circumstances, and because the University's position implies no concession that its admissions policy is unlawful, this controversy falls squarely within the Court's long line of decisions holding that the "[m]ere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case." United ; see ; United ; ; ; United Since respondents' voluntary representation to this Court is only that they will permit petitioner to complete this term's studies, respondents have not borne the "heavy burden," United at of demonstrating that there was not even a "mere possibility" that petitioner would once again be subject to the challenged admissions policy. United On the contrary, respondents have positioned themselves so as to be "free to return to [their] old ways." I can thus find no justification for the Court's straining to rid itself of this dispute. While we must be vigilant to require that litigants maintain a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy to assure that "the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that |
Justice Brennan | 1,974 | 13 | second_dissenting | DeFunis v. Odegaard | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109012/defunis-v-odegaard/ | issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution," there is no want of an adversary contest in this case. Indeed, the Court concedes that, if petitioner has lost his stake in this controversy, he did so only when he *350 registered for the spring term. But petitioner took that action only after the case had been fully litigated in the state courts, briefs had been filed in this Court, and oral argument had been heard. The case is thus ripe for decision on a fully developed factual record with sharply defined and fully canvassed legal issues. Cf. Moreover, in endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot, the Court clearly disserves the public interest. The constitutional issues which are avoided today concern vast numbers of people, organizations, and colleges and universities, as evidenced by the filing of twenty-six amicus curiae briefs. Few constitutional questions in recent history have stirred as much debate, and they will not disappear. They must inevitably return to the federal courts and ultimately again to this Court. Cf. Because avoidance of repetitious litigation serves the public interest, that inevitability counsels against mootness determinations, as here, not compelled by the record. Cf. United ; 362 U.S. 4, Although the Court should, of course, avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions, we should not transform principles of avoidance of constitutional decisions into devices for sidestepping resolution of difficult cases. Cf. On what appears in this case, I would find that there is an extant controversy and decide the merits of the very important constitutional questions presented. |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | In cases involving state legislation affecting private contracts, this Court's decisions over the past half century, consistently with both the constitutional text and its original understanding, have interpreted the Contract Clause as prohibiting state legislative Acts which, "[w]ith studied indifference to the interests of the [contracting party] or to his appropriate protection," effectively diminished or nullified the obligation due him under the terms of a contract. W. B. Worthen But the Contract Clause has not, during this period, been applied to state legislation that, while creating new duties, in nowise diminished the efficacy of any contractual obligation owed the constitutional claimant. Cf. The constitutionality of such legislation has, rather, been determined solely by reference to other provisions of the Constitution, e. g., the Due Process Clause, insofar as they operate to protect existing economic values. Today's decision greatly expands the reach of the Clause. The Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act (Act) does not abrogate or dilute any obligation due a party to a private contract; rather, like all positive social legislation, the Act imposes new, additional obligations on a particular class of persons. In my view, any constitutional infirmity in the law must therefore derive, not from the Contract Clause, but from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *252 I perceive nothing in the Act that works a denial of due process and therefore I dissent. I I begin with an assessment of the operation and effect of the Minnesota statute. Although the Court disclaims knowledge of the purposes of the law, both the terms of the Act and the opinion of the State Supreme Court disclose that it was designed to remedy a serious social problem arising from the operation of private pension plans. As the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated, see the impetus for the law must have been a legislative beliefshared by Congress, see generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S. C. 1001 et seq. (1976 ed.)that private pension plans often were grossly unfair to covered employees. Not only would employers often neglect to furnish their employees with adequate information concerning their rights under the plans, leading to erroneous expectations, but also because employers often failed to make contributions to the pension funds large enough adequately to fund their plans, employees often ultimately received only a small amount of those benefits they reasonably anticipated. See at 251 N.W.2d, at Acting against this background, Minnesota, prior to the enactment of ERISA, adopted the Act to remedy, inter alia, what was viewed as a related serious social problem: the frustration of expectation interests |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | a related serious social problem: the frustration of expectation interests that can occur when an employer closes a single plant and terminates the employees who work there.[1] Pension plans normally do not make provision to protect *253 the interests of employeeseven those within only a few months of the "vesting" of their rights under the planwho are terminated because an employer closes one of his plants. See generally Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals, Even assumingcontrary to common experiencethat an employer adequately informs his employees that a termination for any reason prior to vesting will result in forfeiture of accrued pension credits, denial of all pension benefits not because of job-related failings, but only because the employees are unfortunate enough to be employed at a plant that closes for purely economic reasons, is harsh indeed. For unlike discharges for inadequate job performance, which may reasonably be foreseen, the closing of a plant is a contingency outside the range of normal expectations of both the employer and the employeeas is made clear by the fact that Allied did not rely upon the possibility of a plant's closing in calculating the amount of its contributions to its pension plan fund.[2] The Minnesota Act addresses this problem by selecting a period10 years of employmentafter which this generally unforeseen contingency may not be the basis for depriving employees of their accumulated pension fund credits, and by establishing a mechanism to provide the employees with the equivalent of the earned pension plan credits. Although the Court glides over this fact, it should be apparent that the Act will impose only minor economic burdens on employers whose pension plans have been adequately funded. For, where, as was true here and as will generally be true, the possibility of a plant's closing was not relied upon by actuaries in calculating the amount of the employer's contributions to the plan, an *254 adequate pension plan fund would include contributions on behalf of terminated employees of 10 or more years' service whose rights had not vested. Indeed, without the Act, the closing of the plant would create a windfall for the employer, because, due to the resulting surplus in the fund, his future contributions would be reduced. In denying the windfall, the Act requires that the employer use the money he will save in the future to purchase annuities for the terminated employees.[3] Of course, the consequence for the employer may be a slightly higher pension expense; the greater outlay might arise, in part, because the past contributions to the plan would have |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | part, because the past contributions to the plan would have reflected the actuarial possibility that some of the employees who had served 10 years might not ultimately satisfy the plan's vesting requirement. I emphasize, contrary to the repeated protestations of the Court, that the Act does not impose "sudden and unanticipated" burdens. The features of the Act involved in this case come into play only when an employer, after the effective date of the Act, closes a plant. The existence of the Act's duties which are similar to a legislatively imposed requirement of *255 severance pay measured by the length of the discharged employees' serviceis simply one of a number of factors that the employer considers in making the business decision whether to close a plant and terminate the employees who work there. In no sense, therefore, are the Act's requirements unanticipated. While the extent of the employer's obligation depends on pre-enactment conduct, the requirements are triggered solely by the closing of a plant subsequent to enactment.[4] II The primary question in this case is whether the Contract Clause is violated by state legislation enacted to protect employees covered by a pension plan by requiring an employer to make outlayswhich, although not in this case, will largely be offset against future savingsto provide terminated employees with the equivalent of benefits reasonably to be expected under the plan. The Act does not relieve either the employer or his employees of any existing contract obligation. Rather, the Act simply creates an additional, supplemental duty of the employer, no different in kind from myriad duties created by a wide variety of legislative measures which defeat settled expectations but which have nonetheless been sustained by this Court. See, e. g., ; For this reason, the Minnesota Act, in my view, does not implicate the Contract Clause in any way. The basic fallacy of today's decision is its mistaken view that the Contract Clause protects all contract-based expectations, including that of an employer that his obligations to his employees will not be legislatively enlarged beyond those explicitly provided in his pension plan. *256 A Historically, it is crystal clear that the Contract Clause was not intended to embody a broad constitutional policy of protecting all reliance interests grounded in private contracts. It was made part of the Constitution to remedy a particular social evilthe state legislative practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their obligations under certain contracts and thus was intended to prohibit States from adopting "as [their] policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them," Home Building & Loan But the Framers never contemplated that the Clause would limit the legislative power of States to enact laws creating duties that might burden some individuals in order to benefit others. The widespread dissatisfaction with the Articles of Confederation and, thus, the adoption of our Constitution, was largely a result of the mass of legislation enacted by various States during our earlier national period to relieve debtors from the obligation to perform contracts with their creditors. The economic depression that followed the Revolutionary War witnessed "an ignoble array of [such state] legislative schemes." Perhaps the most common of these were laws providing for the emission of paper currency, making it legal tender for the payment of debts. In addition, there were "installment laws," authorizing the payment of overdue obligations in several installments over a period of months or even years, rather than in a single lump sum as provided for in a contract; "stay laws," statutes staying or postponing the payment of private debts or temporarily closing the courts; and "commodity payment laws," permitting payments in certain enumerated commodities at a proportion, often three-fourths or four-fifths, of actual value. See ; ; see also B. The Contract Clause of the *257 Constitution 4 (1938); The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, -513 Thus, the several provisions of Art. I, 10, of the Constitution "No State shall coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; [or] pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts"were targeted directly at this wide variety of debtor relief measures. Although the debates in the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent public discussion of the Constitution are not particularly enlightening in determining the scope of the Clause, they support the view that the sole evil at which the Contract Clause was directed was the theretofore rampant state legislative interference with the ability of creditors to obtain the payment or security provided for by contract. The Framers regarded the Contract Clause as simply an adjunct to the currency provisions of Art. I, 10, which operated primarily to bar legislation depriving creditors of the payment of the full value of their loans. See The Clause was thus intended by the Framers to be applicable only to laws which altered the obligations of contracts by effectively relieving one party of the obligation to perform a contract duty.[5] B The terms of the Contract Clause negate any basis for its interpretation as protecting all |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | Clause negate any basis for its interpretation as protecting all contract-based expectations from unjustifiable interference. It applies, as confirmed by consistent judicial interpretations, only to state legislative Acts. See generally Tidal Oil Its inapplicability to impairments by state judicial acts or by national legislation belies interpretation of the Clause as *258 intended broadly to make all contract expectations inviolable. Rather, the only possible interpretation of its terms, especially in view of its history, is as a limited prohibition directed at a particular, narrow social evil, likely to occur only through state legislative action. This evil is identified with admirable precision: "Law[s] impairing the Obligation of Contracts." (Emphasis supplied.) It is nothing less than an abuse of the English language to interpret, as does the Court, the term "impairing" as including laws which create new duties. While such laws may be conceptualized as "enlarging" the obligation of a contract when they add to the burdens that had previously been imposed by a private agreement, such laws cannot be prohibited by the Clause because they do not dilute or nullify a duty a person had previously obligated himself to perform. Early judicial interpretations of the Clause explicitly rejected the argument that the Clause applies to state legislative enactments that enlarge the obligations of contracts. is the leading case. There, this Court rejected a claim that a state legislative Act which gave validity to a contract which the state court had held, before the enactment of the statute, to be invalid at common law could be said to have "impaired the obligation of a contract." It reasoned that "all would admit the retrospective character of [the particular state] enactment, and that the effect of it was to create a contract between parties where none had previously existed. But it surely cannot be contended, that to create a contract, and to destroy or impair one, mean the same thing."[6] Since creating an obligation where none had existed previously is not an impairment of contract, it of course should follow necessarily that *259 legislation increasing the obligation of an existing contract is not an impairment.[7] See C The Court seems to attempt to justify its distortion of the meaning of the Contract Clause on the ground that imposing new duties on one party to a contract can upset his contract-based expectations as much as can laws that effectively relieve the other party of any duty to perform. But it is no more anomalous to give effect to the term "impairment" and deny a claimant protection under the Contract Clause when new duties are created than |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | under the Contract Clause when new duties are created than it is to give effect to the Clause's inapplicability to acts of the National Government and deny a Contract Clause remedy when an Act of Congress denies a creditor the ability to enforce a contract right to payment. Both results are simply consequences of the fact that the Clause does not protect all contract-based expectations. More fundamentally, the Court's distortion of the meaning of the Contract Clause creates anomalies of its own and threatens to undermine the jurisprudence of property rights developed over the last 40 years. The Contract Clause, of course, is but one of several clauses in the Constitution that protect existing economic values from governmental interference. The Fifth Amendment's command that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just *2 compensation" is such a clause. A second is the Due Process Clause, which during the heyday of substantive due process, see largely supplanted the Contract Clause in importance and operated as a potent limitation on government's ability to interfere with economic expectations. See G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 3-4 (9th ed. 1975); The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, Decisions over the past 50 years have developed a coherent, unified interpretation of all the constitutional provisions that may protect economic expectations and these decisions have recognized a broad latitude in States to effect even severe interference with existing economic values when reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, ante, p. 104; ; ; ; At the same time the prohibition of the Contract Clause, consistently with its wording and historic purposes, has been limited in application to state laws that diluted, with utter indifference to the legitimate interests of the beneficiary of a contract duty, the existing contract obligation, W. B. Worthen ; see United States Trust ; cf. El ; Home Building & Loan Today's conversion of the Contract Clause into a limitation on the power of States to enact laws that impose duties additional to obligations assumed under private contracts must inevitably produce results difficult to square with any rational conception of a constitutional order. Under the Court's opinion, any law that may be characterized as "superimposing" new obligations on those provided for by contract is to be *261 regarded as creating "sudden, substantial, and unanticipated burdens" and then to be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. The validity of such a law will turn upon whether judges see it as a law that deals with a generalized social |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | it as a law that deals with a generalized social problem, whether it is temporary (as few will be) or permanent, whether it operates in an area previously subject to regulation, and, finally, whether its duties apply to a broad class of persons. See ante, at 249-250. The necessary consequence of the extreme malleability of these rather vague criteria is to vest judges with broad subjective discretion to protect property interests that happen to appeal to them.[8] To permit this level of scrutiny of laws that interfere with contract-based expectations is an anomaly. There is nothing sacrosanct about expectations rooted in contract that justify according them a constitutional immunity denied other property rights. Laws that interfere with settled expectations created by state property law (and which impose severe economic burdens) are uniformly held constitutional where reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare. is illustrative. There a property owner had established on a particular parcel *262 of land a perfectly lawful business of a brickyard, and, in reliance on the existing law, continued to operate that business for a number of years. However, a local ordinance was passed prohibiting the operation of brickyards in the particular locale and diminishing the value of the claimant's parcel and thus of his investment by nearly 90%. Notwithstanding the effect of the ordinance on the value of the investment, the ordinance was sustained against a taking claim. See also There is no logical or rational basis for sustaining the duties created by the laws in Miller and Hadacheck, but invalidating the duty created by the Minnesota Act. Surely, the Act effects no greater interference with reasonable reliance interests than did these other laws. Moreover, the laws operate identically: They all create duties that burden one class of persons and benefit another. The only difference between the present case and Hadacheck or Miller is that here there was a prior contractual relationship between the members of the benefited and burdened classes. I simply cannot accept that this difference should possess constitutional significance. The only means of avoiding this anomaly is to construe the Contract Clause consistently with its terms and the original understanding and hold it is inapplicable to laws which create new duties. III But my view that the Contract Clause has no applicability whatsoever to the Minnesota Act does not end the inquiry in this case. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a State's power to enact such laws and I therefore address that related challenge to the Act's validity.[9] I think that any claim based on due process |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | dissenting | Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109929/allied-structural-steel-co-v-spannaus/ | validity.[9] I think that any claim based on due process has no merit. *263 My conclusion rests to a considerable extent upon That case involved a federal statute that required the operators of coal mines to compensate employees who had contracted pneumoconiosis even though the employees had terminated their work in the coal-mining industry before the Act was passed. This federal statute imposed a new duty on operators based on past acts and applied even though the coal mine operators might not have known of the danger that their employees would contract pneumoconiosis at the time of the particular employees' service. ; see also at 40 n. 4 (POWELL, J., concurring in part). While indicating that the Due Process Clause may place greater limitations on the Government's power to legislate retrospectively than it does on the Government's ability to act prospectively, the statute was upheld on the ground that Congress had broad discretion to deal with the serious social problem of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners and that it was "a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their laborthe operators and the coal consumers." A similar analysis is appropriate here. The Act is an attempt to remedy a serious social problem: the utter frustration of an employee's expectations that can occur when he is terminated because his employer closes down his place of work. The burden on his employer is surely far less harsh than that saddled upon coal operators by the federal statute. Too, a large part of the employer's outlay that the Act requires will be offset against future savings. To this extent, the Act merely *264 prevents the employer from obtaining a windfall, an effect which would immunize this aspect of the statutory requirement from attack even under the more stringent standards the Court reads into the Contract Clause. See El and cases cited. To the extent the Act does more than prevent a windfall, it is simply implementing a reasonable legislative judgment that the expectation interests of employees of more than 10 years' service in the receipt of a pension but who, as an actuarial matter, would not satisfy the vesting requirements of the pension plan, should not be frustrated by the generally unforeseen contingency of a plant's closing. Significantly, also, the Minnesota Act, unlike the federal statute upheld in Turner Elkhorn Mining, is not wholly retrospective in its operation. The Act requires an outlay from an employer like appellant only if after the enactment date of the Act (thus when it may give |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110967/philko-aviation-inc-v-shacket/ | This case presents the question whether the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Act), as amended, 49 U.S. C. 1301 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), prohibits all transfers of title to aircraft from having validity against innocent third parties unless the transfer has been evidenced by a written instrument, and the instrument has been recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). We conclude that the Act does have such effect. On April 19, 1978, at an airport in Illinois, a corporation operated by Roger Smith sold a new airplane to respondents. Respondents, the Shackets, paid the sale price in full and took possession of the aircraft, and they have been in possession ever since. Smith, however, did not give respondents the original bills of sale reflecting the chain of title to the plane. He instead gave them only photocopies and his assurance that he would "take care of the paperwork," which the Shackets understood to include the recordation of the original bills of sale with the FAA. Insofar as the present record *408 reveals, the Shackets never attempted to record their title with the FAA. Unfortunately for all, Smith did not keep his word but instead commenced a fraudulent scheme. Shortly after the sale to the Shackets, Smith purported to sell the same airplane to petitioner, Philko Aviation. According to Philko, Smith said that the plane was in Michigan having electronic equipment installed. Nevertheless, Philko and its financing bank were satisfied that all was in order, for they had examined the original bills of sale and had checked the aircraft's title against FAA records.[1] At closing, Smith gave Philko the title documents, but, of course, he did not and could not have given Philko possession of the aircraft. Philko's bank subsequently recorded the title documents with the FAA. After the fraud became apparent, the Shackets filed the present declaratory judgment action to determine title to the plane. Philko argued that it had title because the Shackets had never recorded their interest in the airplane with the FAA. Philko relied on 503(c) of the Act, as amended, 49 U.S. C. 1403(c), which provides that no conveyance or instrument affecting the title to any civil aircraft shall be valid against third parties not having actual notice of the sale, until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation with the FAA. However, the District Court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Shackets, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that 503(c) did not pre-empt substantive state law regarding title transfers, and that, under the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code, Ill. |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110967/philko-aviation-inc-v-shacket/ | transfers, and that, under the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, ¶ 1-101 et seq. (1981), the Shackets had title but Philko did not. We granted certiorari, and we now reverse and remand for further proceedings. *409 Section 503(a)(1) of the Act, 49 U.S. C. 1403(a)(1), directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish and maintain a system for the recording of any "conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft of the United States." Section 503(c), 49 U.S. C. 1403(c), states: "No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by [ 503(a)(1)] shall be valid in respect of such aircraft against any person other than the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Transportation." The statutory definition of "conveyance" defines the term as "a bill of sale, contract of conditional sale, mortgage, assignment of mortgage, or other instrument affecting title to, or interest in, property." 49 U.S. C. 1301(20) (1976 ed., Supp. V). If 503(c) were to be interpreted literally in accordance with the statutory definition, that section would not require every transfer to be documented and recorded; it would only invalidate unrecorded title instruments, rather than unrecorded title transfers. Under this interpretation, a claimant might be able to prevail against an innocent third party by establishing his title without relying on an instrument. In the present case, for example, the Shackets could not prove their title on the basis of an unrecorded bill of sale or other writing purporting to evidence a transfer of title to them, even if state law did not require recordation of such instruments, but they might still prevail, since Illinois law does not require written evidence of a sale "with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted." Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, ¶ 2-(3)(c) (1981). We are convinced, however, that Congress did not intend 503(c) to be interpreted in this manner. Rather, 503(c) means that every aircraft transfer must be evidenced by an *410 instrument, and every such instrument must be recorded, before the rights of innocent third parties can be affected. Furthermore, because of these federal requirements, state laws permitting undocumented or unrecorded transfers are pre-empted, for there is a direct conflict between 503(c) and such state laws, and the federal law must prevail.[2] These conclusions are dictated |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110967/philko-aviation-inc-v-shacket/ | and the federal law must prevail.[2] These conclusions are dictated by the legislative history. The House and House Conference Committee Reports, and the section-by-section analysis of one of the bill's drafters, all expressly declare that the federal statute "requires" the recordation of "every transfer of any interest in a civil aircraft."[3] The House Conference Report explains: "This section requires the recordation with the Authority of every transfer made after the effective date of the section, of any interest in a civil aircraft of the United States. The conveyance evidencing each such transfer is to be recorded with an index in a recording system to be established by the Authority."[4] Thus, since Congress intended to require the recordation of a conveyance evidencing each transfer of an interest in aircraft, Congress must have intended to pre-empt any state law under which a transfer without a recordable conveyance would be valid against innocent transferees or lienholders who have recorded. *411 Any other construction would defeat the primary congressional purpose for the enactment of 503(c), which was to create "a central clearing house for recordation of titles so that a person, wherever he may be, will know where he can find ready access to the claims against, or liens, or other legal interests in an aircraft." Hearings on H. R. 9738 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 407 (1938) (testimony of F. Fagg, Director of Air Commerce, Dept. of Commerce). Here, state law does not require any documentation whatsoever for a valid transfer of an aircraft to be effected. An oral sale is fully valid against third parties once the buyer takes possession of the plane. If the state law allowing this result were not pre-empted by 503(c), then any buyer in possession would have absolutely no need or incentive to record his title with the FAA, and he could refuse to do so with impunity, and thereby prevent the "central clearing house" from providing "ready access" to information about his claim. This is not what Congress intended.[5] In the absence of the statutory definition of conveyance, our reading of 503(c) would be by far the most natural one, because the term "conveyance" is first defined in the dictionary as "the action of conveying," i. e., "the act by which title to property is transferred." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 499 (P. Gove ed. 1976). Had Congress defined "conveyance" in accordance with this definition, *412 then 503(c) plainly would have required the recordation of every transfer. Congress' failure to adopt this definition is not dispositive, however, since |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | majority | Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110967/philko-aviation-inc-v-shacket/ | failure to adopt this definition is not dispositive, however, since the statutory definition is expressly not applicable if "the context otherwise requires." 49 U.S. C. 1301 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Even in the absence of such a caveat, we need not read the statutory definition mechanically into 503(c), since to do so would render the recording system ineffective and thus would defeat the purpose of the legislation. A statutory definition should not be applied in such a manner. Accordingly, we hold that state laws allowing undocumented or unrecorded transfers of interests in aircraft to affect innocent third parties are pre-empted by the federal Act. In support of the judgment below, respondents rely on In re Gary Aircraft Corp., which rejected the contention that 503 pre-empted all state laws dealing with priority of interests in aircraft. The Court of Appeals held that the first person to record his interest with the FAA is not assured of priority, which is determined by reference to state law.[6] We are inclined to agree with this *413 rationale, but it does not help the Shackets. Although state law determines priorities, all interests must be federally recorded before they can obtain whatever priority to which they are entitled under state law. As one commentator has explained: "The only situation in which priority appears to be determined by operation of the [federal] statute is where the security holder has failed to record his interest. Such failure invalidates the conveyance as to innocent third persons. But recordation itself merely validates; it does not grant priority." Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. Air L. & Commerce 193, 203 (1958) (footnote omitted). Accord, Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder: Interests in Aircraft under Our Federal System, 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. 316, 324-325 (1973) (although recordation does not establish priority, "failure to record serves to subordinate"); Note,[7] *414 In view of the foregoing, we find that the courts below erred by granting the Shackets summary judgment on the basis that if an unrecorded transfer of an aircraft is valid under state law, it has validity as against innocent third parties. Of course, it is undisputed that the sale to the Shackets was valid and binding as between the parties. Hence, if Philko had actual notice of the transfer to the Shackets or if, under state law, Philko failed to acquire or perfect the interest that it purports to assert for reasons wholly unrelated to the sale to the Shackets,[8] Philko would not have an enforceable interest, and the Shackets would retain possession of the aircraft. Furthermore, we do not |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | This action raises two questions. First, do the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ever pre-empt a state-law tort action? Second, if so, does the MDA pre-empt the particular state-law tort claims at issue here? I My answer to the first question is that the MDA will sometimes pre-empt a state-law tort suit. I basically agree with Justice O'Connor's discussion of this point and with her conclusion. See post, at 510-512. The statute's language, read literally, supports that conclusion. It says: "[N]o State may establish with respect to a device any [state] requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any [federal] requirement" 21 U.S. C. 360k(a) *504 One can reasonably read the word "requirement" as including the legal requirements that grow out of the application, in particular circumstances, of a State's tort law. Moreover, in the Court made clear that similar language "easily" encompassed tort actions because "[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief." (internal quotation marks omitted); see Accord, CSX Transp., This rationale would seem applicable to the quite similar circumstances at issue here. Finally, a contrary holding would have anomalous consequences. Imagine that, in respect to a particular hearing aid component, a federal MDA regulation requires a 2-inch wire, but a state agency regulation requires a 1-inch wire. If the federal law, embodied in the "2-inch" MDA regulation, pre-empts the state "1-inch" agency regulation, why would it not similarly pre-empt a state-law tort action that premises liability upon the defendant manufacturer's failure to use a 1-inch wire (say, an award by a jury persuaded by expert testimony that use of a more than 1-inch wire is negligent)? The effects of the state agency regulation and the state tort suit are identical. To distinguish between them for preemption purposes would grant greater power (to set state standards "different from, or in addition to," federal standards) to a single state jury than to state officials acting through state administrative or legislative lawmaking processes. Where Congress likely did not focus specifically upon the matter, see ante, at 486-491, I would not take it to have intended this anomalous result. Consequently, I believe that ordinarily, insofar as the MDA pre-empts a state requirement embodied in a state statute, rule, regulation, or other administrative action, it would also pre-empt a similar requirement that takes the form of a *505 standard of care or behavior imposed by a state-law tort action. It is possible that the plurality also agrees on this point, |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | is possible that the plurality also agrees on this point, although it does not say so explicitly. II The answer to the second question turns on Congress' intent. See, e. g., Barnett of Marion Cty., N. ; Allis-Chalmers ; ante, at 485-486. Although Congress has not stated whether the MDA does, or does not, pre-empt the tort claims here at issue, several considerations lead me to conclude that it does not. First, the MDA's pre-emption provision is highly ambiguous. That provision makes clear that federal requirements may pre-empt state requirements, but it says next to nothing about just when, where, or how they may do so. The words "any [state] requirement" and "any [federal] requirement," for example, do not tell us which requirements are at issue, for every state requirement that is not identical to even one federal requirement is "different from, or in addition to," that single federal requirement; yet, Congress could not have intended that the existence of one single federal rule, say, about a 2-inch hearing aid wire, would pre-empt every state law hearing aid rule, even a set of rules related only to the packaging or shipping of hearing aids. Thus, Congress must have intended that courts look elsewhere for help as to just which federal requirements pre-empt just which state requirements, as well as just how they might do so. Second, this Court has previously suggested that, in the absence of a clear congressional command as to pre-emption, courts may infer that the relevant administrative agency possesses a degree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect. See ; ; Lawrence ; Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., To draw a similar inference here makes sense, and not simply because of the statutory ambiguity. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is fully responsible for administering the MDA. See 21 U.S. C. 393. That responsibility means informed agency involvement and, therefore, special understanding of the likely impact of both state and federal requirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to which) state requirements may interfere with federal objectives. See 471 U. S., at The FDA can translate these understandings into particularized pre-emptive intentions accompanying its various rules and regulations. See It can communicate those intentions, for example, through statements in "regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments," ib as well as through the exercise of its explicitly designated power to exempt state requirements from pre-emption, see 21 U.S. C. 360k(b); see also ante, at 496 (noting that FDA's authority to |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | see also ante, at 496 (noting that FDA's authority to exempt state requirements from pre-emption necessarily requires FDA to assess federal laws' pre-emptive effect). Third, the FDA has promulgated a specific regulation designed to help. That regulation says: "State requirements are preempted only when there are specific [federal] requirements applicable to a particular device thereby making any existing divergent State requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific [federal] requirements." 21 CFR 808.1(d) (1995) The regulation does not fill all the statutory gaps, for its word "divergent" does not explain, any more than did the statute, just when different device-related federal and state *507 requirements are closely enough related to trigger preemption analysis. But the regulation's word "specific" does narrow the universe of federal requirements that the agency intends to displace at least some state law. Insofar as there are any applicable FDA requirements here, those requirements, even if numerous, are not "specific" in any relevant sense. See ante, at 497-4, 501. Hence, as the FDA's above-quoted pre-emption rule tells us, the FDA does not intend these requirements to pre-empt the state requirements at issue here. At least in present circumstances, no law forces the FDA to make its requirements pre-emptive if it does not think it appropriate. I cannot infer a contrary intent from Justice O'Connor's characterization of the federal standards applicable here as "comprehensive" and "extensive," post, at 513, 514, both because that characterization is questionable, see ante, at 497 4, 501, and because this Court has previously said that it would "seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety." It therefore seems to me that the better indicator of the FDA's intent is its pre-emption-related regulation. And that regulation's word "specific" would seem a reasonable exercise of the leeway that statutory language and practical administrative circumstance suggest Congress intended to grant to the agency. Fourth, ordinary principles of "conflict" and "field" preemption point in the same direction. Those principles make clear that a federal requirement pre-empts a state requirement if (1) the state requirement actually conflicts with the federal requirementeither because compliance with both is impossible, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, or because the state requirement "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," or (2) the *508 scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," 2 See, e. g., Barnett ; |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | States to supplement it," 2 See, e. g., Barnett ; ; Wisconsin Public ; It makes sense, in the absence of any indication of a contrary congressional (or agency) intent, to read the preemption statute (and the pre-emption regulation) in light of these basic pre-emption principles. The statutory terms "different from" and "in addition to" readily lend themselves to such a reading, for their language parallels pre-emption law's basic concerns. Without any contrary indication from the agency, one might also interpret the regulation's word "divergent" in light of these same basic pre-emption principles. Insofar as these basic principles inform a court's interpretation of the statute and regulation, they support the conclusion that there is no pre-emption here. I can find no actual conflict between any federal requirement and any of the liability-creating premises of the plaintiffs' state-law tort suit; nor, for the reasons discussed above, can I find any indication that either Congress or the FDA intended the relevant FDA regulations to occupy entirely any relevant field. For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment. I also join the Court's opinion, but for Parts IV and VI. I do not join Part IV, which emphasizes the differences between the MDA and the pre-emption statute at issue in Cipollone, because those differences are not, in my view, relevant in this action. I do not join Part VI, because I am not convinced that future incidents of MDA pre-emption of common-law claims will be "few" or "rare," ante, at 502. *509 Justice O'Connor, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Section 360k(a), the pre-emption provision of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), provides that no State may establish or continue in effect "any requirement" "which is different from, or in addition to," any requirement applicable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) to the device. As the Court points out, because Congress has expressly provided a pre-emption provision, "we need not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt" state law. Ante, at 484. We agree, then, on the task before us: to interpret Congress' intent by reading the statute in accordance with its terms. This, however, the Court has failed to do. The cases require us to determine whether the Lohrs' state common-law claims survive pre-emption under 360k. I conclude that state common-law damages actions do impose "requirements" and are therefore pre-empted where such requirements would differ from those imposed by the FDCA. The plurality acknowledges that a common-law |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | imposed by the FDCA. The plurality acknowledges that a common-law action might impose a "requirement," but suggests that such a pre-emption would be "rare indeed." Ante, at 502. To reach that determination, the opinionwithout explicitly relying on Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations and without offering any sound basis for why deference would be warrantedimports the FDA regulations interpreting 360k to "inform" the Court's reading. Accordingly, the principal opinion states that pre-emption occurs only "where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest," ante, at 500, and for that reason, concludes that common-law claims are almost never pre-empted, ante, at 502-503, and that the Lohrs' claims here are not pre-empted. This decision is bewildering and seemingly without guiding principle. *510 The language of 360k demonstrates congressional intent that the MDA pre-empt "any requirement" by a State that is "different from, or in addition to," that applicable to the device under the FDCA. The Lohrs have raised various state common-law claims in connection with Medtronic's pacemaker lead. Analysis, therefore, must begin with the question whether state common-law actions can constitute "requirements" within the meaning of 360k(a). We recently addressed a similar question in Cipollone, where we examined the meaning of the phrase "no requirement or prohibition" under the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. A majority of the Court agreed that state common-law damages actions do impose "requirements." -522 ; As the plurality explained: "The phrase, `[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules. As we noted in another context, `[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.' San Diego Building Trades" That rationale is equally applicable in the present context. Whether relating to the labeling of cigarettes or the manufacture of medical devices, state common-law damages actions operate to require manufacturers to comply with common-law duties. As Cipollone declared, in answer to the same argument raised here that common-law actions *511 do not impose requirements, "such an analysis is at odds both with the plain words" of the statute and "with the general understanding of common-law damages actions." If 360k's language is given its ordinary meaning, it clearly pre-empts any state common-law action that would impose a requirement different from, or in addition to, that applicable under the FDCAjust as |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | or in addition to, that applicable under the FDCAjust as it would pre-empt a state statute or regulation that had that effect. Justice Breyer reaches the same conclusion. Ante, at 503-505 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The plurality's reasons for departing from this reading are neither clear nor persuasive. It fails to refute the applicability of the reasoning of Cipollone. Instead, in Part IV, the plurality essentially makes the case that the statute's language, purpose, and legislative history, as well as the consequences of a different interpretation, indicate that Congress did not intend "requirement" to include state commonlaw claims at all. The principal opinion proceeds to disclaim this position, however, in Parts V and VI and concludes, rather, that a state common-law action might constitute a requirement, but that such a case would be "rare indeed." Ante, at 502. The Court holds that an FDCA "requirement" triggers pre-emption only when a conflict exists between a specific state requirement and a specific FDCA requirement applicable to the particular device. See ante, at 4-502. But see ante, at 500 ("[W]e do not believe that this statutory and regulatory language necessarily precludes `general' federal requirements from ever pre-empting state requirements, or `general' state requirements from ever being pre-empted"). The plurality emphasizes the "critical importance of device specificity" in its understanding of the pre-emption scheme. Ante, at 502. To reach its particularized reading of the statute, the Court imports the interpretation put forth by the FDA's regulations. Justice Breyer similarly relies on the FDA regulations to arrive at an understanding of 360(k). Ante, *512 at 505-507. Apparently recognizing that Chevron deference is unwarranted here, the Court does not admit to deferring to these regulations, but merely permits them to "infor[m]" the Court's interpretation. Ante, at 495. It is not certain that an agency regulation determining the pre-emptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to deference, cf. but one pertaining to the clear statute at issue here is surely not. "If the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent." CSX Transp., Where the language of the statute is clear, resort to the agency's interpretation is improper. See Chevron U. S. A. Title 21 U.S. C. 360k(a)(1) directs the pre-emption of "any [state] requirement" "which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the FDCA] to the device." As explained above, and as Justice Breyer agrees, ante, at 503-505, the term "requirement" |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | as Justice Breyer agrees, ante, at 503-505, the term "requirement" encompasses state common-law causes of action. The Court errs when it employs an agency's narrowing construction of a statute where no such deference is warranted. The statute makes no mention of a requirement of specificity, and there is no sound basis for determining that such a restriction on "any requirement" exists. I conclude that a fair reading of 360k indicates that state common-law claims are pre-empted, as the statute itself states, to the extent that their recognition would impose "any requirement" different from, or in addition to, FDCA requirements applicable to the device. From that premise, I proceed to the question whether FDCA requirements applicable to the device exist here to pre-empt the Lohrs' state-law claims. *513 I agree with the Court that the Lohrs' defective design claim is not pre-empted by the FDCA's 510(k) "substantial equivalency" process. The 510(k) process merely evaluates whether the Class III device at issue is substantially equivalent to a device that was on the market before 1976, the effective date of the MDA; if so, the later device may be also be marketed. Because the 510(k) process seeks merely to establish whether a pre-1976 device and a post1976 device are equivalent, and places no "requirements" on a device, the Lohrs' defective design claim is not pre-empted. I also agree that the Lohrs' claims are not pre-empted by 360k to the extent that they seek damages for Medtronic's alleged violation of federal requirements. Where a state cause of action seeks to enforce an FDCA requirement, that claim does not impose a requirement that is "different from, or in addition to," requirements under federal law. To be sure, the threat of a damages remedy will give manufacturers an additional cause to comply, but the requirements imposed on them under state and federal law do not differ. Section 360k does not preclude States from imposing different or additional remedies, but only different or additional requirements. I disagree, however, with the Court's conclusion that the Lohrs' claims survive pre-emption insofar as they would compel Medtronic to comply with requirements different from those imposed by the FDCA. Because I do not subscribe to the Court's reading into 360k the additional requisite of "specificity," my determination of what claims are pre-empted is broader. Some, if not all, of the Lohrs' common-law claims regarding the manufacturing and labeling of Medtronic's device would compel Medtronic to comply with requirements different from, or in addition to, those required by the FDA. The FDA's Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) regulations impose comprehensive requirements relating to |
Justice Breyer | 1,996 | 2 | concurring | Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118055/medtronic-inc-v-lohr/ | Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) regulations impose comprehensive requirements relating to every aspect of the device-manufacturing process, *514 including a manufacturer's organization and personnel, buildings, equipment, component controls, production and process controls, packaging and labeling controls, holding, distribution, installation, device evaluation, and record keeping. See 21 CFR 820.20-820.1 (1995). The Lohrs' common-law claims regarding manufacture would, if successful, impose state requirements "different from, or in addition to," the GMP requirements, and are therefore pre-empted. In similar fashion, the Lohrs' failure to warn claim is pre-empted by the extensive labeling requirements imposed by the FDA. See, e. g., 21 CFR 801.109 (1995) These extensive federal manufacturing and labeling requirements are certainly applicable to the device manufactured by Medtronic. Section 360k(a) requires no more specificity than that for pre-emption of state common-law claims. To summarize, I conclude that 360k(a)'s term "requirement" encompasses state common-law claims. Because the statutory language does not indicate that a "requirement" must be "specific," either to pre-empt or be pre-empted, I conclude that a state common-law claim is pre-empted if it would impose "any requirement" "which is different from, or in addition to," any requirement applicable to the device under the FDCA. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the Lohrs' design claim is not pre-empted by the MDA, and that the manufacture and failure to warn claims are pre-empted; I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the MDA pre-empts a common-law claim alleging violation of federal requirements. |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | dissenting | Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112599/summit-health-ltd-v-pinhas/ | The Court treats this case as involving no more than a conspiracy among eye surgeons at Midway to eliminate one of their competitors. That alone, it concludes, restrains trade or commerce among the several States within the meaning of the Sherman Act. In my judgment, the conspiracy alleged by the complaint, fairly viewed, involved somewhat more than that; but even so falls far short of what is required for Sherman Act jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent. I The Court has "no doubt concerning the power of Congress to regulate a peer review process controlling access to the market for ophthalmological surgery in Los Angeles," and concludes that "respondent's claim has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support federal jurisdiction." Ante, at 332 and this page. I agree with all that. Unfortunately, however, the question before us is not whether Congress could reach the activity before us here if it wanted to, but whether it has done so via the Sherman Act. That enactment does not prohibit all conspiracies using instrumentalities of commerce that Congress could regulate. Nor does it prohibit all conspiracies that have sufficient constitutional "nexus" to interstate commerce to be regulated. It prohibits only those conspiracies that are "in restraint of trade or commerce *334 among the several States." 15 U.S. C. 1. This language commands a judicial inquiry into the nature and potential effect of each particular restraint. "The jurisdictional inquiry under general prohibitions like 1 of the Sherman Act, turning as it does on the circumstances presented in each case and requiring a particularized judicial determination, differs significantly from that required when Congress itself has defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce and therefore require federal regulation." Gulf Oil Until the nature of this jurisdictional inquiry (with respect to alleged restraints not targeted at the very flow of interstate commerce) was clear: The question was whether the restraint at issue, if successful, would have a substantial effect on interstate commercial activity. See Building ; ; Mandeville Island Farms, See Note, The Interstate Commerce Test for Jurisdiction in Sherman Act Cases and Its Substantive Applications, As I shall discuss in due course, that criterion would have called for reversal in the present case. See United Unfortunately, in the Court seemed to abandon this approach. appeared to shift the focus of the inquiry away from the effects of the restraint itself, asking instead whether the "[defendants'] activities which allegedly have been infected by a price-fixing conspiracy have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved." The result in would have been the same under the |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | dissenting | Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112599/summit-health-ltd-v-pinhas/ | The result in would have been the same under the prior test, since the subject of the suit was an alleged massive conspiracy by all realtors in the Greater New Orleans area, involving price *335 fixing, suppression of market information, and other anticompetitive practices. The Court's resort to the more expansive "infected activity" test was prompted by the belief that focusing upon the effects of the restraint itself would require plaintiffs to prove their case at the jurisdictional stage. See That belief was in error, since the prior approach had simply assumed, rather than required proof of, the success of the conspiracy. Thus, as a dictum based upon a misconception, the "infected activities" approach was introduced into antitrust law. It was not received with enthusiasm. Most courts simply finessed the language of and said that nothing had changed, i. e., that the ultimate question was still whether the unlawful conduct itself, if successful, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, ; ; ; ; ; ; see also aff'd, Others, however, took at face valueand of course immediately fell into disagreement over the proper application of the new test. With respect to a restraint like the one at issue here, for example, how does one decide which "activities of the defendants" are "infected"? Are they all the activities of the hospital, 7 F.2d 786, ? Only the activities of the eye surgery department, see ? The entire practice of eye surgeons who use the hospital, El ? Or, as the Ninth Circuit apparently found in this case, the peer review process itself? Today the Court could have cleared up the confusion created by refocused the inquiry along the lines marked out by our previous cases (and still adhered to by most Circuits), and reversed the judgment below. Instead, it compounds the confusion by rejecting the two competing interpretations of and adding yet a third candidate to the field, one that no court or commentator has ever suggested, let alone endorsed. To determine Sherman Act jurisdiction it looks neither to the effect on commerce of the restraint, nor to the effect on commerce of the defendants' infected activity, but rather, it seems, to the effect on commerce of the activity from which the plaintiff has been excluded. As I understand the Court's opinion, the test of Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the entire line of commerce from which Dr. Pinhas has been excluded affects interstate commerce. Since excluding him from eye surgery at Midway effectively excluded him from the entire Los Angeles |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | dissenting | Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112599/summit-health-ltd-v-pinhas/ | at Midway effectively excluded him from the entire Los Angeles market for eye surgery (because no other Los Angeles hospital would accord him practice privileges after Midway rejected him), the jurisdictional question is simply whether that market affects interstate commerce, which of course it does.[*] This analysis tells us nothing about the substantiality of the impact on interstate commerce generated by the particular conduct at issue here. Determining the "market" for a product or service, meaning the scope of other products or services against which it must compete, is of course necessary for many purposes of antitrust analysis. But today's opinion does not identify a relevant "market" in that sense. It declares Los Angeles to be the pertinent "market" only because that is the entire scope of Dr. Pinhas' exclusion from practice. If the scope of *337 his exclusion had been national, it would have declared the entire United States to be the "market," though it is quite unlikely that all eye surgeons in the United States are in competition. I cannot understand why "market" in the Court's peculiar sense has any bearing upon this restraint's impact on interstate commerce, and hence upon Sherman Act jurisdiction. The Court does not even attempt to provide an explanation. The Court's focus on the Los Angeles market would make some sense if Midway was attempting to monopolize that market, or conspiring with all (or even most) of the hospitals in Los Angeles to fix prices there, cf. But the complaint does not mention 2 of the Sherman Act, and Dr. Pinhas does not allege a conspiracy to affect eye surgery in the Los Angeles market. He merely alleges a conspiracy to exclude him from that market by a sort of group boycott. Since group boycotts are per se violations (not because they necessarily affect competition in the relevant market, but because they deprive at least some consumers of a preferred supplier, see R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 3-332 (1978)), Dr. Pinhas need not prove an effect on competition in the Los Angeles area to prevail, if the Sherman Act applies. But the question before us today is whether the Act does apply, and that must be answered by determining whether, in its practical economic consequences, the boycott substantially affects interstate commerce by restricting competition or, as in Klor's, interrupts the flow of interstate commerce. The Court never comes to grips with that issue. Instead, because a group boycott, like a price-fixing scheme, would be (if the Sherman Act applies) a per se violation, the Court concludes that "the same analysis applies" to this |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | dissenting | Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112599/summit-health-ltd-v-pinhas/ | the Court concludes that "the same analysis applies" to this exclusion of a single competitor from the Los Angeles market as was applied in to the fixing of prices by all realtors in the Greater New Orleans market. See ante, at 3-332. It *338 seems to me obvious that the two situations are not remotely comparable. The economic effects of a price-fixing scheme are felt throughout the market in which the prices are fixed; the economic effects of "black-balling" a single supplier are felt not throughout the market from which he is theoretically excluded, but, at most, within the subportion of that market in which he was, or could be, doing business. If, for example, the alleged conspirators in the present case had decided to effectuate the ultimate exclusion of Dr. Pinhas, i. e., to have him killed, it would be absurd to think that the world market in eye surgery would thereby be affected. It is undoubtedly true, in the present case, that Dr. Pinhas has been affected throughout the Los Angeles area; but it is rudimentary that the effect of a restraint of trade must be gauged according to its effect on "competition, not competitors," Brown Shoe See also, e. g., Associated General Contractors of Cal., 9 U.S. 519, ; The Court's suggestion that competition in the entire Los Angeles market was affected by this one surgeon's exclusion from that market simply ignores the "practical economics" of the matter. II In any case, it does not seem to me that a correct analysis of this case would treat it as involving a conspiracy to boycott a single physician. Such boycotts rarely exist in a vacuum; they are usually the means of enforcing compliance with larger anticompetitive schemes. H. Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law 275-276 ; R. Posner, Antitrust Law 207 Cf. 352 U.S. 4, Charitably read, respondent's complaint alleges just such a scheme, namely, a scheme to fix prices for some of the eye *339 surgery performed at Midway Instead of simply agreeing to a supercompetitive price, Midway's eye surgeons have, contrary to prevailing Los Angeles practice, allegedly "padded" the cost of certain varieties of eye surgery by requiring a useless second surgeon to be present. The so-called "sham contract" was an attempt to compensate the hyperproductive Dr. Pinhas for his participation in the scheme and the concomitant reduction in his output. When that failed, the conspirators eliminated him as a competitor by terminating his medical staff privileges through the peer review process. That termination was not the totality of the conspiracy, but merely the means used |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | dissenting | Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112599/summit-health-ltd-v-pinhas/ | the totality of the conspiracy, but merely the means used to enforce itjust as, in Monsanto the elimination of the price-cutting Spray-Rite as a distributor of Monsanto's products (via termination and a boycott) was merely the means of enforcing the alleged price-fixing conspiracy between Monsanto and its other distributors. This case, like Monsanto, involves a "termination pursuant to a conspiracy to set prices," and for purposes of determining Sherman Act jurisdiction, what counts is the impact of that entire price-fixing conspiracy. Even when the conspiracy is viewed in this broader fashion, however, the scope of the market affected by it has nothing to do with the scope of Dr. Pinhas' exclusion from practice. If this had been a naked price-fixing conspiracy, instead of the more subtle one that it is, no one would contend that it affected prices throughout Los Angeles. Pursuant to standard antitrust analysis, the agreement itself would define the extent of the market. The market would be eye surgery at Midway (not "eye surgery in the city where Midway is located"), since the very existence of the agreement implies power over price in that defined market. It is irrational to use a different analysis, and to assume *340 the affected market to be all of Los Angeles, simply because this more subtle price-fixing conspiracy led (incidentally) to the exclusion of Dr. Pinhas not only from Midway but from all hospitals throughout the city. There is simply no basis for assuming that this alleged conspiracy's market powerand its consequent effect upon competition, as opposed to its effect upon Dr. Pinhasextended throughout Los Angeles. It has not been alleged that the conspirators have perverted the peer review process in hospitals throughout the city; nor that the peer review process at Midway is the "gateway" to the Los Angeles market in the sense of being the only way (or even one of the few ways) to gain entry. To the contrary, it is acknowledged that every hospital in Los Angeles has its own peer review process, and the complaint itself asserts that, well before the offer of the "sham contract," "nearly all" those hospitals had abolished the featherbedding practice that is the object of this conspiracy. These uncontested facts reveal the truly local nature of the restraint and preclude any inference that the conspiracy at issue here had (or could have) an effect on competition in the Los Angeles market. Cf. Jefferson Parish Dist. No. ; Northern Pacific R. Any allegations to the contrary (and there are none) would have to be dismissed as inconsistent with simple economics. See Matsushita |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | dissenting | Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112599/summit-health-ltd-v-pinhas/ | to be dismissed as inconsistent with simple economics. See Matsushita Elec. Industrial III In my view, the present case should be decided by applying to the price-fixing conspiracy at Midway the workable jurisdictional test that our cases had established before confused things. On that basis, I would reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment that respondent had stated a Sherman Act claim. *341 The complaint does not begin to suggest that the conspiracy at Midway could have even the most trivial effect on interstate commerce. Cf. 637 F. 2d, at 725. It literally alleges nothing more than that Dr. Pinhas, the defendant physicians, Midway and Summit Health, Ltd., are "engaged in interstate commerce." Contrary to the Court's (undocumented) suggestion, ante, at 327 and 329-330, there is no allegation that any out-of-state patients call upon the hospital for eye surgery (or anything else)let alone a sufficient number that overcharging them would create a "substantial" effect on commerce among the several States. Respondent does not allege that out-of-state insurance companies or the Federal Government pays for the overcharges, cf. ; indeed, it appears on the face of the complaint that the Federal Government has stopped reimbursing featherbedded operations. He does not allege that eye surgery involves the use of implements or equipment purchased out of state, or that the restraint at issue here could have any appreciable effect on such purchases, cf. Building 425 U. S., at Quite simply, the complaint is entirely devoid of any attempt to show a connection between the challenged restraint and "commerce among the several States." Because "it is not sufficient merely to rely on identification of a relevant local activity and to presume an interrelationship with some unspecified aspect of interstate commerce," I would dismiss the complaint out of hand. In point of fact, such a dismissal seems compelled by our decision in United There, the state medical society, eight county medical services, and eight individual physicians conspired to restrain the business of providing prepaid medical care by, inter alia, allocating territories to be served by doctor-sponsored plans. The District Court found that the *342 conspiracy did not restrain interstate commerce. On direct appeal, the United States argued that the interstate activities of the private associations sufficed to show the requisite interstate effect. The Court rejected this argument, holding that, in order to prevail, the Government had to show that the restraint itself (the allocation of territories), had a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce. Such an effect had not been proven, the Court observed, because the activities of the doctor-sponsored plans were "wholly intrastate," It did |
Justice Scalia | 1,991 | 9 | dissenting | Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112599/summit-health-ltd-v-pinhas/ | activities of the doctor-sponsored plans were "wholly intrastate," It did not matter that the plans had made a few payments to out-of-state patients. Those payments were "few, sporadic, and incidental." A straightforward application of this same rationale compels reversal in the present case. * * * If it is true, as the complaint alleges, that one hospital will ordinarily not accord privileges to a doctor who has failed the peer review process elsewhere, it may well be that Dr. Pinhas has been the victim of a business tort affecting him throughout Los Angelesor perhaps even nationwide. Cf. 744 F. 2d, at 1343-13 (various torts, in addition to Sherman Act violation, alleged to have arisen out of negative peer review). But the Sherman Act "does not purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate commerce," (19), unless those torts restrain commerce "among the several States." The short of the matter is that Dr. Pinhas may well have a legitimate grievance, but it is not one redressed by the Sherman Act. Disputes over the denial of hospital practice privileges are common, and most of the Circuits to which they have been presented as federal antitrust claims have rejected them on jurisdictional grounds. 710 F. 2d, at ; 707 F. Supp., at ; 769 F. *343 2d, at 1283-1284; 744 F. 2d, at 1342-1343. At least two other Circuits would reach that result on the particular complaint before us here. Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, 649 F. 2d, at ; 637 F. 2d, at 725. I think it is a mistake to overturn this view. Federal courts are an attractive forum, and the treble damages of the Clayton Act an attractive remedy. We have today made them available for routine business torts, needlessly destroying a sensible statutory allocation of federalstate responsibility and contributing to the trivialization of the federal courts. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Marshall | 1,970 | 15 | dissenting | Monks v. New Jersey | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108150/monks-v-new-jersey/ | Petitioner, a 15-year-old boy, was arrested at 1 o'clock in the morning of February 16, 1957, removed to the *72 police station, and questioned by detectives for several hours about two purse-snatching incidents. He was then held in confinement in the Children's Shelter for 10 days during which time he was questioned at least three times by two detectives in the presence of a juvenile probation officer. Further questioning began on other crimes including two murders in the same area as the purse snatchings. During the entire 10-day period this 15-year-old boy was without advice of his parents, lawyer, or friends. Indeed, his mother first learned he was in custody after he confessed to the two murders. During the entire 10-day period petitioner was never told he had a right to remain silent, or to refuse to answer the questions by the two detectives. The end came on February 26, 1957. Petitioner arose at 7 o'clock in the morning, questioning began at 10 o'clock and continued off and on for 15 hours before the confession was typed. During this period he was moved from the Children's Shelter to the courthouse, the grand jury room, and an adjacent room. He was given several lie-detector tests and confronted with alleged witnesses. He had no sleep. He was given sandwiches for his lunch and dinner. Certainly, such treatment so clearly violates the holdings of ; ; ; and as to require a reversal in this case |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | concurring | Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109771/raymond-motor-transp-inc-v-rice/ | I join the opinion of the Court, but I add these comments to emphasize the narrow scope of today's decision. First, the Court's reliance on does not signal, for me, a new approach to review of state highway safety regulations under the Commerce Clause. Wisconsin argues that the Court previously has refused to balance safety considerations against burdens on interstate commerce. Brief for Appellees 8. This contention misreads which recognized the Court's responsibility to weigh the national interest in free-flowing commerce against " `slight or problematical' " safety interests. quoting Southern Pacific Second, the reliance on Pike should not be read to equate the factual balance struck here with the balance established in Pike regarding the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act. Arizona prohibited interstate shipment of cantaloupes *449 not "packed in regular compact arrangement in closed standard containers." quoting -503C (Supp. 1969). Application of the prohibition to the appellee grower would have prevented it from processing its cantaloupes just across the state line in California, and would have required it to construct a packing facility in Arizona. The State attempted to justify this burden on interstate commerce solely by its interest "to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting deceptive packaging." More specifically, Arizona wanted the appellee to package the cantaloupes in the State so that the high-quality fruit could be advertised as grown in Arizona rather than California. Although recognizing the legitimacy of the State's interest, the Court refused to accord the concern much weight in the Commerce Clause balancing: "[T]he State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the requirement that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000 packing plant in the State." In short, despite the unchallenged existence and legitimacy of the State's interest, the Court determined that the interest was not important enough to justify the burden on commerce. Neither the Pike opinion nor today's decision suggests that a similar balance would be struck when a State legitimately asserts the existence of a safety justification for a regulation. In Pike itself the Court noted that it did not confront " `state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized.' " quoting Southern Pacific In other words, if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce. I therefore join *450 the opinion of the Court because its ultimate balancing does not depart from this principle, as stated in : "These safety |
Justice Blackmun | 1,978 | 11 | concurring | Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109771/raymond-motor-transp-inc-v-rice/ | depart from this principle, as stated in : "These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field." 359 U.S., Here, the Court does not engage in a balance of policies; it does not make a legislative choice. Instead, after searching the factual record developed by the parties, it concludes that the safety interests have not been shown to exist as a matter of law. Third, the illusory nature of the safety interests in this case is illustrated not only by the overwhelming empirical data submitted by the appellants, but also by the State's willingness to permit the use of oversized vehicles under the numerous administrative exceptions for in-state manufacturers and important Wisconsin industries. See ante, at 433-434, nn. 4-5, and 446-447. From 1973 through June 1975, the State issued 43,900 annual or general permits for the use of vehicles longer than 65 feet. Brief of Plaintiffs before the District Court in Case No. 75-C-172, App. C, 10-11. An additional 16,760 single-trip permits were granted during the same period. Despite the alleged safety problems, the State regularly permitted the use of oversized vehicles merely to lower the cost of transportation for in-state industries. The bulkiness of the cargoes frequently did not justify the permits. See Deposition of Robert T. Huber, Chairman of the Wisconsin State Highway Commission, 7-9, 21; Deposition of Wayne Volk, Chief Traffic Engineer, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 31, 36, 49-50, 53. American Motors, one of the State's largest employers, received permission to use oversized trucks on the 45-mile stretch of highway between Milwaukee *451 and Kenosha, even though the State's Chief Traffic Engineer conceded that the road was heavily traveled. Deposition of Wayne Volk, Furthermore, Stoughton Body Co., a Wisconsin manufacturer of trailers, received permits to pull oversized, double-trailer vehicles on a two-lane highway to facilitate out-of-state deliveries. The record therefore suggests that the State in practice does not believe that oversized, double-trailer vehicles present a threat to highway safety. Nineteen years after Bibb, then, the Court has been presented with another of those cases"few in number"in which highway safety regulations unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. See The contour-mudflaps law burdened the flow of commerce through Illinois in 1959 just as the length and configuration regulations burden the flow through Wisconsin today. It was shown that neither the mudflaps law nor the regulations contributed to |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | In this case we determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires us to vacate the sentence of death imposed *224 on petitioner Thomas Schiro. For the reasons explained below, we hold that it does not. I Schiro was convicted and sentenced to death for murder. The body of Laura Luebbehusen was discovered in her home on the morning of February 5, 1981, by her roommate, Darlene Hooper, and Darlene Hooper's former husband. Darlene Hooper, who had been away, returned to find the home in disarray. Blood covered the walls and floor; Laura Luebbehusen's semiclad body was lying near the entrance. The police recovered from the scene a broken vodka bottle, a handle and metal portions of an iron, and bottles of various types of liquor. The pathologist testified that there were a number of contusions on the body, including injuries to the head. The victim also had lacerations on one nipple and a thigh, and a tear in the vagina, all caused after death. A forensic dentist determined that the thigh injury was caused by a human bite. The cause of death was strangulation. Laura Luebbehusen's car was later found near a halfway house where Schiro was living. Schiro told one counselor at the halfway house he wanted to discuss something "heavy." App. 53. Schiro later confessed to another counselor that he had committed the murder. After his arrest, he confessed to an inmate in the county jail that he had been drinking and taking Quaaludes the night of the killing, and that he had had intercourse with the victim both before and after killing her. Schiro also admitted the killing to his girlfriend, Mary Lee. Schiro told Mary Lee that he gained access to Laura Luebbehusen's house by telling her his car had broken down. Once in the house, he exposed himself to her. She told him that she was a lesbian, that she had been raped as a child, that she had never otherwise had intercourse before and did not want to have sex. Nonetheless, Schiro raped her numerous times. There was evidence that Schiro forced her *225 to consume drugs and alcohol. When Laura Luebbehusen tried to escape, Schiro restrained and raped her at least once more. Then, as Laura Luebbehusen lay or slept on the bed, Schiro realized that she would have to die so that she would not turn him in. He found the vodka bottle and beat her on the head with it until it broke. He then beat her with the iron and, when she resisted, finally strangled her to death. Schiro dragged |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | when she resisted, finally strangled her to death. Schiro dragged her body into another room and sexually assaulted the corpse. After the murder, he attempted to destroy evidence linking him to the crime. II At the time of the crime, the of Indiana defined murder as follows: "A person who: "(1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being; or "(2) kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery; "commits murder, a felony." (Supp. 1978). Schiro was charged with three counts of murder. In Count I he was charged with "knowingly" killing Laura Luebbehusen; in Count II with killing her while committing the crime of rape; and in Count III with killing her while committing criminal deviate conduct. App. 3-5. The sought the death penalty for Counts II and III. At trial, Schiro did not contest that he had killed Laura Luebbehusen. Indeed, in closing argument, Schiro's defense attorney stated: "Was there a killing? Sure, no doubt about it. Did Tom Schiro do it? Sure There's no question about it, I'm not going to try. and `bamboozle' this jury. There was a killing and he did it." App. to Brief for Respondent 24. Instead, the defense argued that Schiro *2 either was not guilty by reason of insanity or was guilty but mentally ill, an alternative verdict permitted under Indiana law. The jury was given 10 possible verdicts, among them the 3 murder counts described above, the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, guilty but mentally ill, not guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty. App. 37-38. After five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count II; it left the remaining verdict sheets blank. Under Indiana law, to obtain the death penalty the is required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of nine aggravating factors. (b) (Supp. 1978). The aggravating factor relevant here is: "[T]he defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit. rape" or another enumerated felony. 35-50-2-9(b)(1). Upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an aggravating factor, the sentencer weighs the factor against any mitigating circumstances. When the initial conviction is by a jury, the "jury. reconvene[s] for the sentencing hearing" to "recommend to the court whether the death penalty should be imposed." 35-50-2-9(d), (e). The trial judge makes "the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation." 35-50-2-9(e)(2). "The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation," however. The primary issue at |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | bound by the jury's recommendation," however. The primary issue at the sentencing hearing was the weight to be given Schiro's mitigating evidence. Defense counsel stated to the jury that "I assume by your verdict [at the guilt phase that] you've probably decided" that the aggravating circumstance was proved. App. to Brief for Respondent 31-32. He therefore confined his argument to a plea for leniency, citing Schiro's mental and emotional problems. After considering the statements of counsel, the jury recommended against the death penalty. The trial judge *227 rejected the jury's recommendation and sentenced Schiro to death. While the case was pending on direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court granted the 's petition to remand the case to the trial court to make written findings of fact regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court found that the had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that "[t]he defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit rape." App. 46. The trial court also found that no mitigating circumstances had been established, and reaffirmed the sentence of death. The sentence was affirmed on direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. This Court denied certiorari. Schiro sought postconviction relief in state court. Again, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. This Court again denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Schiro then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United s District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The District Judge remanded the case to the Indiana courts for exhaustion of state remedies. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence for a third time. In so doing, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected Schiro's argument that the jury's failure to convict him on the first murder count operated as an acquittal of intentional murder, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the use of the intentional murder aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. The Indiana Supreme Court held that "[felony murder] is not an included offense of [murder] and where the jury, as in the instant case, finds the defendant guilty of one of the types of murder and remains silent on the other, it does not operate as an acquittal of the elements of the type of murder the jury *228 chose not to consider." This Court denied certiorari. The Federal District Court then denied Schiro's federal habeas petition. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals accepted the Indiana Supreme Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was not an acquittal on |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | conclusion that the jury's verdict was not an acquittal on the Count I murder charge, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated by the use of the intentional murder aggravating circumstance. The Court of Appeals also concluded that collateral estoppel was not implicated since "the defendant must show that the jury's verdict actually and necessarily determined the issue he seeks to foreclose" and "Schiro's conviction for murder/rape did not act as an acquittal with respect to the pure murder charge as a matter of state law." We granted certiorari, to consider whether the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by relying on the intentional murder aggravating circumstance. III The argues that granting relief to Schiro would require the retroactive application of a new rule, in violation of the principle announced in Teague analysis is ordinarily our first step when we review a federal habeas case. See, e. g., The Teague bar to the retroactive application of new rules is not, however, jurisdictional. In this case, the did not raise the Teague argument in the lower courts. Cf. While we ordinarily do not review claims made for the first time in this Court, see, e. g., we recognize that the as respondent, is entitled to rely on any *229 legal argument in support of the judgment below. See, e. g., Nevertheless, the failed to argue Teague in its brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari. In deciding whether to grant certiorari in a particular case, we rely heavily on the submissions of the parties at the petition stage. See this Court's Rule 15.1. If, as in this case, a legal issue appears to warrant review, we grant certiorari in the expectation of being able to decide that issue. Since a can waive the Teague bar by not raising it, see and since the propriety of reaching the merits of a dispute is an important consideration in deciding whether or not to grant certiorari, the 's omission of any Teague defense at the petition stage is significant. Although we undoubtedly have the discretion to reach the 's Teague argument, we will not do so in these circumstances. IV Schiro first argues that he could not be sentenced to death based on the intentional murder aggravating circumstance, because the sentencing proceeding amounted to a successive prosecution for intentional murder in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We have recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause consists of several protections: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North These protections stem from the underlying premise that a defendant should not be twice tried or punished for the same offense. United The Clause operates as a "bar against repeated attempts to convict, with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrassment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found *230 guilty even though innocent." United When a defendant has been acquitted, the "Clause guarantees that the shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him." Where, however, there is "no threat of either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended." Thus, our cases establish that the primary evil to be guarded against is successive prosecutions: "[T]he prohibition against multiple trials is the controlling constitutional principle." See also United Schiro urges us to treat the sentencing phase of a single prosecution as a successive prosecution for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We decline to do so. Our prior decisions are inconsistent with the argument that a first sentencing proceeding can amount to a successive prosecution. In we held that where a defendant's murder conviction was overturned on appeal, the defendant could be resentenced after retrial. Similarly, we found no constitutional infirmity in holding a second sentencing hearing where the first sentence was improperly based on a prior conviction for which the defendant had been pardoned. See also North ; If a second sentencing proceeding ordinarily does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, we fail to see how an initial sentencing proceeding could do so. We have also upheld the use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions, even though this means a defendant must, in a certain sense, relitigate in a *231 sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was previously tried. Cf. In short, as applied to successive prosecutions, the Clause "is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punishment." Our decision in is not to the contrary. Bullington was convicted of capital murder. At the first death penalty sentencing proceeding, the jury rejected the death penalty and sentenced him to a term of years. The conviction was overturned; on resentencing the again sought the death penalty. In Bullington we recognized the general rule that "the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial." Nonetheless, we recognized a narrow exception to this general principle because the capital |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | a narrow exception to this general principle because the capital sentencing scheme at issue "differ[ed] significantly from those employed in any of the Court's cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable to sentencing." Because the capital sentencing proceeding "was itself a trial on the issue of punishment," ib requiring a defendant to submit to a second, identical proceeding was tantamount to permitting a second prosecution of an acquitted defendant, This case is manifestly different. Neither the prohibition against a successive trial on the issue of guilt nor the Bullington prohibition against a second capital sentencing proceeding is implicated herethe did not reprosecute Schiro for intentional murder, nor did it force him to submit to a second death penalty hearing. It simply conducted a single sentencing hearing in the course of a single prosecution. The state is entitled to "one fair opportunity" to prosecute a defendant, Bullington, and that opportunity extends not only to prosecution at the guilt phase, but also to present evidence at an ensuing sentencing proceeding. V Schiro also contends that principles of constitutional collateral estoppel require vacation of his death sentence. In we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings. See also Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage, issue preclusion, "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Schiro reasons that the jury acquitted him of "intentionally" murdering Laura Luebbehusen, and that as a result, the trial court was precluded from finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance that he "committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit. rape." We do not address whether collateral estoppel could bar the use of the "intentional" murder aggravating circumstance, because Schiro has not met his burden of establishing the factual predicate for the application of the doctrine, if it were applicable, namely, that an "issue of ultimate fact has once been determined" in his favor. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the jury verdict did not amount to an acquittal on the intentional murder count. Ordinarily on habeas review, we presume the correctness of state court findings of fact. See 28 U.S. C. 2254(d). Cf. also The preclusive effect of the jury's verdict, however, is a question of federal law which we must review de novo. Cf. *233 We must first determine "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than" Schiro's intent |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | grounded its verdict upon an issue other than" Schiro's intent to kill. Cf. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 4421, p. 192 ("Issue preclusion attaches only to determinations that were necessary to support the judgment entered in the first action"). To do so, we "examine the record of a prior proceeding taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter" The burden is "on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding." In for example, the defendant contended that because he had been acquitted of a robbery, the jury must have concluded that he had not been present at the crime. In rejecting that argument, we considered the fact that during the trial there was a discussion between the lawyers and the judge where it was asserted that the intruder's identity was not a factual issue in the case. Because there were "any number of possible explanations for the jury's acquittal verdict," the defendant had "failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating" that he was not one of the intruders. Applying these principles, we find that the jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other than Schiro's intent to kill. The jury was not instructed to return verdicts on all the counts listed on the verdict sheets. In fact, there are indications in the record that the jury might have believed it could only return one verdict. In closing argument at the guilt phase, defense counsel told the jury that it would "have to go back there and try to figure out which one of eight or ten verdicts. that you will return back into this Court." App. to Brief for Respondents 17. The prosecution also told the jury that "you are only going to be allowed to return one verdict." Although the jury instructions indicated *234 to the jury that more than one verdict was possible, -28, on this record it is impossible to tell which of these statements the jury relied on. The dissent concludes that the jury acquitted on Count I for lack of intent, based on the fact that the only way the jury could have expressed that conclusion was by leaving the Count I verdict form blank, as it did. What stands in the way of such an inference, however, is that the jury would also have acted as it did after reaching a guilty verdict on Count II but without ever deliberating on Count I. In short, since it was not clear |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | on Count I. In short, since it was not clear to the jury that it needed to consider each count independently, we will not draw any particular conclusion from its failure to return a verdict on Count I. The jury instructions on the issue of intent to kill were also ambiguous. Under Indiana law, a person who either "knowingly or intentionally kills another human being" or "kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit rape" is guilty of "murder." (Supp. 1978). Thus, intent to kill is not required for a felony murder conviction. Schiro reasons that since the jury found him guilty of felony murder in the course of a rape, but failed to convict him of intentional murder, the jury must have found that he did not have an intent to kill. We do not so interpret the jury's failure to convict on Count I, however. Although the jury was provided with the state law definition of murder, App. 21, the judge also instructed the jury that the had to prove intent for both felony and intentional murder: "To sustain the charge of murder, the must prove. [t]hat the defendant engaged in the conduct which caused the death of Laura Luebbehusen [and] [t]hat when the defendant did so, he knew the conduct would or intended the conduct to cause the death of Laura Luebbehusen." This instruction did not differentiate between the two ways of proving "murder" under Indiana law. The jury was further *235 told that "[t]he instructions of the court are the best source as to the law applicable to this case." The jury may well have believed, therefore, that it was required to find a knowing or intentional killing in order to convict Schiro on any of the three murder counts. In sum, in light of the jury instructions, we find that as a matter of law the jury verdict did not necessarily depend on a finding that Schiro lacked an intent to kill. Although not necessary to our conclusion, we note that there is additional evidence in the record indicating that Schiro's intent to kill was not a significant issue in the case. The defense primarily confined its proof at trial to showing that Schiro was insane, and did not dispute that Schiro had committed the murder. At no point during the guilt phase did defense counsel or any of the defense witnesses assert that Schiro should be acquitted on Count I because he lacked an intent to kill. Indeed, we have located no point in the transcript of the proceedings where defense counsel |
Justice O'Connor | 1,994 | 14 | majority | Schiro v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112922/schiro-v-farley/ | point in the transcript of the proceedings where defense counsel or defense witnesses even discussed the issue of Schiro's intent to kill. Schiro argues that his intent to kill was put in issue by the insanity defense. But, even if that were so, the jury did not accept this defense. Even defense counsel apparently believed that Schiro's intent was not an issue in the case. After the jury returned its verdict of guilty on Count II, and reconvened to consider the appropriate sentence, defense counsel indicated his belief that by convicting Schiro on Count II, the jury had found that he had an intent to kill: "The statute provides for aggravating circumstances. There is one listed in this case, and one which you may consider. And that one is that the murder was committed, was intentionally committed in the commission of rape and some other things. I assume by your verdict Friday, or Saturday, that you've probably decided that issue. In finding him guilty of murder in the commission of rape, I'm assuming you've decided beyond *236 a reasonable doubt that it was done in the commission of a rape, and so that aggravating circumstance most likely exists in your mind." App. to Brief for Respondent 31-32. Finally, we observe that a jury finding of intent to kill is entirely consistent with the evidence presented at trial. By Schiro's own admission, he decided to kill Laura Luebbehusen after she tried to escape and he realized she would go to the police. In addition, the physical evidence suggested a deliberate, rather than unintentional, accidental, or even reckless, killing. The victim was repeatedly beaten with a bottle and an iron; when she resisted, she was strangled to death. We have in some circumstances considered jury silence as tantamount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. Green v. United s, ; 398 U. S., at The failure to return a verdict does not have collateral estoppel effect, however, unless the record establishes that the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendant's favor. As explained above, our cases require an examination of the entire record to determine whether the jury could have "grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." See also In view of Schiro's confession to the killing, the instruction requiring the jury to find intent to kill, and the uncertainty as to whether the jury believed it could return more than one verdict, we find that Schiro has not met his "burden to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | What the Court has done in this case makes a mockery of our Rules. Petitioner’s counsel convinced the Court to stay his client’s execution and to grant his petition for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of deciding a clear-cut constitu- tional question: Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit the execution of a murderer who cannot recall committing the murder for which the death sentence was imposed? The petition strenuously argued that executing such a person is unconstitutional. After persuading the Court to grant review of this ques- tion, counsel abruptly changed course. Perhaps because he concluded (correctly) that petitioner was unlikely to prevail on the question raised in the petition, he conceded that the argument advanced in his petition was wrong, and he switched to an entirely different argument, namely, that the state court had rejected petitioner’s claim that he is incompetent to be executed because the court erroneously thought that dementia, as opposed to other mental condi- tions, cannot provide a basis for such a claim. See Brief for Petitioner 16. This was not a question that the Court agreed to hear; indeed, there is no mention whatsoever of this argument in the petition—not even a hint. Nor is this question 2 MADISON v. ALABAMA ALITO, J., dissenting fairly included within those on which the Court granted review. On the contrary, it is an entirely discrete and independent question. Counsel’s tactics flagrantly flouted our Rules. Our Rules make it clear that we grant certiorari to decide the specific question or questions of law set out in a petition for certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court”). Our whole certiorari system would be thrown into turmoil if we allowed counsel to obtain review of one question and then switch to an entirely different question after review is granted. In the past when counsel have done this, we have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. See, e.g., Visa, Inc. v. Osborn, 580 U. S. (2016); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. (2015). We should do that here. Instead, the majority rewards counsel’s trick. It vacates the judgment below because it is unsure whether the state court committed the error claimed in petitioner’s merits brief. But not only was there no trace of this argument in the petition, there is nothing in the record showing that the state court ever adopted the erroneous view that peti- tioner claims it took. I The question on which we granted review was |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | took. I The question on which we granted review was an out- growth of our per curiam decision in Dunn v. Madison, 583 U. S. (2017), which concerned an Eleventh Circuit decision granting petitioner federal habeas relief. Prior to that decision, this Court had held in that the Eighth Amendment prohib- its the execution of a person who is “insane,” and in Panetti v. Quarterman, the Court elaborated on this rule, explaining that a person cannot be executed if he lacks a rational understanding of the reason for the Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 3 ALITO, J., dissenting execution. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted those cases to mean that petitioner could not be executed because he did not remember killing his victim, Mobile, Alabama, police officer Julius Schulte. We summarily reversed. Under the relevant provision of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S. C. which was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), petitioner could not obtain federal habeas relief unless the state court’s rejec- tion of his memory-loss claim represented an unreasonable application of federal law as clearly established at the time by decisions of this Court. We held that neither Ford nor Panetti clearly established that a person cannot be executed if he does not remember committing the crime for which the death sentence was imposed. Our opinion stated, however, that it “express[ed] no view on the merits of the underlying question outside of the AEDPA context.” Dunn, 583 U. S., at (slip op., at 4). And a concurring opinion authored by JUSTICE GINSBURG and joined by JUSTICES BREYER and SOTOMAYOR teed up this question for review in a later case. at (slip op., at 1) (“The issue whether a State may administer the death penalty to a person whose disability leaves him without memory of his commission of a capital offense is a substantial question not yet ad- dressed by the Court. Appropriately presented, the issue would warrant full airing”). Taking this cue, petitioner then sought relief in state court based on his inability to remember his crime, and when that effort failed, he filed the petition at issue now. II The centerpiece of the petition and petitioner’s 11th- hour application for a stay of execution1 was the argument —————— 1 Petitioner sought and obtained a stay of execution based on this 4 MADISON v. ALABAMA ALITO, J., dissenting that he could not constitutionally be executed because he did not remember killing Officer Schulte. The petition repeatedly noted petitioner’s inability to remember his crime. See Pet. for Cert. i, iii, 1, |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | remember his crime. See Pet. for Cert. i, iii, 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28. And the petition was very clear about the question on which review was sought: “[T]his case presents this Court with the appropriate vehicle to consider the substantial question of whether the execution of a prisoner with no memory of the un- derlying offense is consistent with the evolving stand- ards of decency inherent in this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” This same point was made time and again: ● “[B]ecause [petitioner’s] disability renders him unable to remember the underlying offense for which he is to be punished, his execution does not comport with the evolving standards of decency required by this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” ● “[I]mposing death on a prisoner, who, like Mr. Madi- son, suffers from substantial memory deficits by vir- tue of multiple stroke and resulting vascular dementia serves no retributive or deterrent purpose.” 2. ● “[E]xecuting an individual with no memory of the un- derlying offense serves no retributive purpose.” ● “[W]here the person being punished has no memory of the commission of the offense for which he is to be ex- ecuted, the ‘moral quality’ of that punishment is less- ened and unable to match outrage over the offense.” 2–23. —————— same argument. See Application for Stay of Execution 2, 6 (moving the Court to stay petitioner’s execution so that it could address the “sub- stantial” and “critical” question whether executing petitioner, “whose severe cognitive dysfunction leaves him without memory of his commis- sion of the capital offense,” would violate the Eighth Amendment). Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 5 ALITO, J., dissenting ● “Mr. Madison’s severe memory impairments as a re- sult of vascular dementia render him incompetent to be executed under the Eight Amendment.” 5 (quotation altered). In sum, the body of the petition makes it clear that review was sought on the question invited by the Dunn concurrence, and the thrust of the wording of the two questions was the same. They read as follows: “1. Consistent with the Eighth Amendment, and this Court’s decisions in Ford and Panetti, may the State execute a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him without memory of his commission of the capital of- fense? See Dunn v. Madison, [583 U. S. (2017) (GINSBURG, J., joined by BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., concurring).] “2. Do evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual pun- ishment bar the execution of a prisoner whose compe- tency has been compromised by vascular dementia and multiple |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | compe- tency has been compromised by vascular dementia and multiple strokes causing severe cognitive dys- function and a degenerative medical condition which prevents him from remembering the crime for which he was convicted or understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution? ” Pet. for Cert. iii. With the exception of the final phrase in question two (“or understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution”), both questions solely concern the effect of memory loss on an Eighth Amendment analysis. The final phrase in question two and certain passages in the peti- tion, if read with an exceedingly generous eye, might be seen as a basis for considering whether the evidence in the state-court record shows that petitioner’s dementia ren- dered him incapable of having a rational understanding of the reason for his execution. But that is the sort of fact- bound question on which we rarely grant review, see this 6 MADISON v. ALABAMA ALITO, J., dissenting Court’s Rule 10, and it is questionable whether we did so here. But whether or not the petition may be fairly read to present that factbound question, it is a travesty to read it as challenging the state-court order on the ground that the state court erroneously believed that dementia cannot provide a basis for a Ford/Panetti claim. There is no ink- ling of that argument in the petition. Although the peti- tion described the state-court order at numerous places, the petition never claimed that the order was based on an impermissible distinction between dementia and other mental conditions. See, e.g., Pet. for Cert. ii, 2–3, 16. And in fact, there is a point in the petition where such an interpretation of the state-court order would surely have been mentioned if the petition had intended to raise it as a ground for review. The petition noted that “courts have recognized dementia and attendant cognitive decline and memory impairment as a basis for a finding of incompe- tency to be executed,” 5, but the petition did not follow that statement by claiming that the state court in this case took a contradictory position. Because the petition did not raise—indeed, did not even hint at—the argument on which the Court now grants relief, the Court’s decision is insupportable.2 It violates our Rule that “[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.” See Rule 14.1(a). III Even if it were proper for us to consider whether the order below was based on an erroneous distinction be- tween dementia and other mental conditions, there is little reason to |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | dementia and other mental conditions, there is little reason to think that it was. After a full evidentiary hear- —————— 2 The Court is unable to cite a single place in the petition that makes any reference to the argument that the state court failed to understand that dementia could satisfy the Ford/Panetti test. Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 7 ALITO, J., dissenting ing in 2016, the state court rejected petitioner’s Ford/Panetti claim based on a correct statement of the holding of those decisions. It found that petitioner “ha[d] not carried his burden [of showing] by a preponderance of the evidence that he does not rationally understand the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is about to suffer it.” Order (Apr. 29, 2016), p. 10. The court’s order went on to say that it “specifically [found] that Mad- ison has a rationa[l] understanding, as required by Panetti, that he is going to be executed because of the murder he committed and a rationa[l] understanding that the State is seeking retribution and that he will die when he is executed.” In concluding that the state court might have drawn a distinction between dementia and other mental conditions, the majority seizes upon the wording of the order issued after a subsequent hearing in 2018. Ante, In that order, the same judge wrote: “Defendant did not provide a substantial threshold showing of insanity, a requirement set out by the United States Supreme Court, sufficient to convince this Court to stay the execution.” Order (Jan. 16, 2018), p. 1 (emphasis added). The majority worries that the state-court judge might not have applied the same standard in 2018 as he had two years earlier and might have viewed “insanity” as something narrower than the standard mandated by Ford and Panetti. This concern is unfounded. Taken out of context, the term “insanity” might not be read to encompass dementia, but in context, it is apparent that the state court’s use of that term was based on the way in which it was used in Ford and Panetti. The state court did not simply refer to “insanity.” It referred to “insanity, a requirement set out by the United States Supreme Court.” Thus, it followed the term “insanity” with an appositive, which is a word or phrase that re- names the word or phrase that precedes it. In other 8 MADISON v. ALABAMA ALITO, J., dissenting words, what the state court clearly meant by “insanity” was what this Court termed insanity in Ford and Panetti. What was that? In Ford, the Court held that |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | Panetti. What was that? In Ford, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a person who is “insane,” and in the portion of Justice Marshall’s lead opinion that was joined by a plurality, Justice Marshall equated insanity with a mental condition that “prevents [a person] from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implica- tions.” Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote for the decision, took a similar position. See at 422–423 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In Panetti, which built on the holding in Ford, the Court used the term in a similar way. See 551 U.S., at 958–960. Accordingly, a defendant suffers from “insanity,” as the term is used in Ford and Panetti, if the prisoner does not understand the reason for his execution. Today’s decision does not reject this interpretation of the state-court order; it says only that it is vacating and re- manding because it is “at the least unsure” whether the state court used the term “insanity” in this way. Ante, at 14. The majority cites two reasons for its uncertainty, but both are weak. First, the majority attributes to the state court an inter- pretation of the term “insanity” that was advanced by the State in this Court in its brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. Ante, at 15. In that submission, the State argued that certiorari should be denied because petitioner had sought relief in state court under the wrong provision of state law, namely, –16–23 (2011), which authorizes the suspension of the execution of an inmate who is “insane.” The State argued that petitioner’s memory loss did not render him “insane” within the mean- ing of this statute and that if he wished to argue that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of an inmate who cannot remember his crime, he “should have filed a peti- Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 9 ALITO, J., dissenting tion for post-conviction relief ” under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4. Brief in Opposition 11–12. The majority’s argument based on the State’s brief in opposition suffers from multiple defects. For one thing, nothing suggests that the state court rejected petitioner’s application on the ground that he invoked the wrong provision of state law; the State’s filing in the state court made no mention of the argument set out in its brief in opposition filed here. Moreover, if the state court had rejected petitioner’s application on the ground that he moved under the wrong provision of state law, it is doubt- ful that we could review |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | state law, it is doubt- ful that we could review that decision, for then it would appear to rest on an adequate and independent state-law ground. And to top things off, the majority’s argument distorts what the State’s brief in opposition attempted to say about the term “insane.” The State did not argue that a defendant who lacks a rational understanding of the reason for his execution due to dementia is not “insane” under –16–23. Instead, the State’s point was that a defendant is not “insane” in that sense merely because he cannot remember committing the crime for which he was convicted. The majority’s other proffered basis for doubt is that the State “repeatedly argued to the [state] court (over Madi- son’s objection) that only prisoners suffering from delu- sional disorders could qualify as incompetent under Panetti.” Ante, at 16. The majority, however, cites no place where the State actually made such an argument. To be sure, the State, in contending that petitioner was not entitled to relief under Ford and Panetti, argued strenuously that he was not delusional. (The State made this argument be- cause petitioner’s counsel claimed that petitioner was in fact delusional and fell within Ford and Panetti for that reason.3) But arguing, as the State did, that petitioner —————— 3 Petitioner’s papers emphasized again and again that he suffers from 10 MADISON v. ALABAMA ALITO, J., dissenting was not entitled to relief because the claim that he was delusional was untrue is not the same as arguing that petitioner could be executed even if his dementia rendered him incapable of understanding the reason for his execu- tion. The majority cites no place where the State made the latter argument in the state court.4 And even if the —————— delusions. See Pet. for Suspension in No. CC–85–1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Feb. 12, 2016), p. 1 (“Mr. Madison has long suffered from serious mental illness, marked by paranoid delusions and other disabil- ities”); (“At Mr. Madison’s trial, Dr. Barry Amyx established that Mr. Madison suffers from a delusional disorder that has existed since he was an adolescent”); (“This well-documented history of paranoia was one of the reasons Dr. Amyx concluded that Mr. Madison had a delusional disorder in a paranoid, really a persecutory type” (internal quotation marks omitted)); (“Dr. Amyx noted that Mr. Madison exhibited delusional thinking about medication and believed that he was being used as a guinea pig in medical experi- ments”); (emphasizing a “more recent observation” that “ ‘Mr. Madison consistently presented with paranoid delusions’ ”); (“Mr. Madison exhibited delusional and disoriented behavior |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | paranoid delusions’ ”); (“Mr. Madison exhibited delusional and disoriented behavior in June 2015”); (“decades of delusional thinking and psychotropic medications”); see also Pet. for Suspension in No. CC–85–1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Dec. 18, 2017), pp. 6–7 (detailing similar statements). This line of argument fell apart when petitioner’s own expert testified that he found no indication that petitioner was “[e]ither delusional or psychotic.” Tr. 56 (Apr. 14, 2016). 4 Unable to cite any place where the State made this argument to the state court, the Court claims that the State did so in the Eleventh Circuit. Ante, –7, n. 1. But even if that were so, it is hard to see what that would have to do with the question whether the state court thought that dementia could not satisfy the Ford/Panetti test. And in any event, the Court does not fairly describe the State’s argument in the Eleventh Circuit. The State’s Eleventh Circuit brief argued that merely suffering from a mental condition like dementia is not enough to render a prisoner incompetent to be executed; instead, the prisoner must also establish that he lacks a rational understanding of the reason for his execution. See Brief for Appellee in No. 16–12279 (CA11), pp. 37–38 (Brief for Appellee) (“The fairest reading of the state court’s opinion is that it assumed that dementia and memory loss caused by strokes is a mental illness and went straight to the rational understanding question. Thus, it is not that the trial court refused to Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 11 ALITO, J., dissenting —————— consider Madison’s claims pertaining to dementia—Madison cannot point to any portion of the state court order that says this—it is that the trial court correctly noted that Madison failed to prove that any dementia interfered with Madison’s ability to have a rational under- standing of his execution, including the reasons therefor”); 7 (“The Supreme Court has not held that a petitioner can show incompe- tence without demonstrating a mental illness or that dementia and memory loss definitively preclude rational understanding”); 9 (“To the extent the state court followed the lead of the Supreme Court, this Court, and the ABA and required Madison to show that a mental illness prevented him from having a rational understanding of his punishment, doing so was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law”). It is true that the State’s brief, in addressing the standard for granting federal habeas relief under 28 U.S. C. stated that this Court “ha[d] never held that dementia or memory loss is sufficient to show a lack of |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | or memory loss is sufficient to show a lack of rational understanding,” Brief for Appellee 29, but that was because a claim under must be based on a clearly established Supreme Court holding. See Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 16–12279 (CA11, June 23, 2016), at 32:37–33:30 (State rejecting a suggestion that Panetti holds “if you don’t remember committing the crime at all, and it is clear based on the medical testimony that you don’t remember committing this crime, then you don’t have a rational understanding of the factual basis for the imposition of the death penalty”: “First of all, under AEDPA deference, I think that that is not the holding of Panetti. I think under AEDPA deference, it’s pretty clear that the holding of Panetti is very narrow. I would say the holding in Panetti is that documented mental illness that results in a delusion has to be considered when talking about rational understand- ing”); at 36:00–36:30 (“I think the Supreme Court has never held that not remembering something is equivalent to not having a rational understanding. I think that is just undeniably true. And if AEDPA deference applies, then I don’t think the state court could have been unreasonable in rejecting the view that memory is required”). The State did not argue either that dementia cannot satisfy Ford and Panetti or that the state court based its decision on that ground. On the contrary, Alabama wrote that “even if the trial court had deter- mined that dementia and severe memory loss—or even total amnesia— are insufficient to meet the rational understanding test, that finding would not contradict clearly established federal law.” Brief for Appellee 29; see also (“Even assuming the state court held, as a matter of law, that amnesia is not sufficient to show a lack of rational under- standing, that determination was not unreasonable in light of clearly 12 MADISON v. ALABAMA ALITO, J., dissenting State had made such an argument, what matters is the basis for the state court’s decision, not what counsel for the State wrote or said. I add one more comment regarding the majority’s uncer- tainty about the basis for the state-court decision: Our decision two years ago in Dunn evinced no similar doubts. There, we said that the state court “held that, under this Court’s decisions in Ford and Panetti, Madison was en- titled to relief if he could show” that he lacks a rational understanding of the circumstances of his punishment. 583 U. S., at (slip op., ) (quotation altered). And we said that the state court “determined that Madison |
Justice Alito | 2,019 | 8 | dissenting | Madison v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4594558/madison-v-alabama/ | And we said that the state court “determined that Madison is competent to be executed because—notwithstanding his memory loss—he recognizes that he will be put to death as punishment for the murder he was found to have commit- ted.” at (slip op., at 4); see also (referring to the state court’s “finding that Madison understands both that he was tried and imprisoned for murder and that Alabama will put him to death as punishment for that crime”). Why the majority cannot now see what it under- stood without any apparent difficulty two years ago is hard to grasp. For all these reasons, what the Court has done in this case cannot be defended, and therefore it is hard to escape thinking that the real reason for today’s decision is doubt on the part of the majority regarding the correctness of the —————— established federal law”). The majority acknowledges that the State made this concededly correct habeas argument, but then oddly writes it off as an “additional” or alternative argument. Ante, at 7, n. 1. Yet, as the State’s brief and oral argument illustrate, the State’s core contention was that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established law under Panet- ti’s “very narrow” holding. (And as we later held in Dunn, the State was correct.) The majority simply cannot escape the inconvenient fact that the State never argued, as a non-AEDPA matter, that peti- tioner could be executed even if his dementia precluded a rational understanding. Cite as: 586 U. S. (2019) 13 ALITO, J., dissenting state court’s factual finding on the question whether Mad- ison has a rational understanding of the reason for his execution. There is no question that petitioner suffers from severe physical and mental problems, and the ques- tion whether he is capable of understanding the reason for his execution was vigorously litigated below. But if the Court thinks it is proper for us to reach that question and to reverse the state court’s finding based on a cold record, it should own up to what it is doing. * * * Petitioner has abandoned the question on which he succeeded in persuading the Court to grant review, and it is highly improper for the Court to grant him relief on a ground not even hinted at in his petition. The writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted, and I therefore respectfully dissent |
Justice Souter | 2,004 | 20 | majority | United States v. Dominguez Benitez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136986/united-states-v-dominguez-benitez/ | Respondent claims the right to withdraw his plea of guilty as a consequence of the District Court's failure to give one of the warnings required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 Because the claim of Rule 11 error was not preserved by timely objection, the plain-error standard of Rule 52(b) applies, with its requirement to prove effect on substantial rights The question is what showing must thus be made to obtain relief for an unpreserved Rule 11 failing, and we hold that a defendant is obliged to show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea I In early May 1999, a confidential informant working with law enforcement arranged through respondent Carlos Dominguez Benitez (hereinafter Dominguez) to buy several pounds of methamphetamine First, the informant got a sample from Dominguez, and a week later Dominguez went to a restaurant in Anaheim, California, to consummate the sale in the company of two confederates, one of whom brought a shopping bag with over a kilogram of the drugs The meeting ended when the informant gave a signal and officers arrested the dealers Dominguez confessed to selling the methamphetamine and gave information about his supplier and confederates *77 A federal grand jury indicted Dominguez on two counts: conspiracy to possess more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, and possession of 1,391 grams of a methamphetamine mixture, both with intent to distribute On the conspiracy count, Dominguez faced a statutory, mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, with a maximum of life 21 US C 846 The District Court appointed counsel, who began talking with the Government about a plea agreement In September 1999, the District Court received the first of several letters from Dominguez,[1] in which he asked for a new lawyer and expressed discomfort with the plea agreement his counsel was encouraging him to sign On counsel's motion, the court held a status conference, at which Dominguez spoke to the judge Again he said he was dissatisfied with his representation, and wanted a "better deal" The court asked whether he was "talking about a disposition other than trial," and Dominguez answered, "At no time have I decided to go to any trial" App 46-47 Counsel spoke to the same effect later in the proceeding, when he said that he had "told [the prosecutor] all along that there won't be a trial on the [date set] based on my client's representations that he doesn't want a trial" The court explained to Dominguez that it could not help him in plea negotiations, and found no reason to change |
Justice Souter | 2,004 | 20 | majority | United States v. Dominguez Benitez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136986/united-states-v-dominguez-benitez/ | him in plea negotiations, and found no reason to change counsel Shortly after that, the parties agreed that Dominguez would plead guilty to the conspiracy, and the Government would dismiss the possession charge The Government stipulated that Dominguez would receive what is known as a safety-valve reduction of two levels See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual *78 5C12 (Nov 1999) (hereinafter USSG)[2] The safety valve was important because it would allow the court to invoke 18 US C 3553(f), authorizing a sentence below the otherwise mandatory minimum in certain cases of diminished culpability, the only chance Dominguez had for a sentence under 10 years That chance turned on satisfying five conditions, one going to Dominguez's criminal history, which the agreement did not address The agreement did, however, warn Dominguez that it did not bind the sentencing court, and that Dominguez could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the Government's stipulations or recommendations At a hearing the next day, Dominguez changed his plea to guilty In the plea colloquy, the court gave almost all the required Rule 11 warnings, including the warning that the plea agreement did not bind the court, but the judge failed to mention that Dominguez could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the Government's recommendations See Fed Rule Crim Proc 11(c)(3)(B)[3] When the Probation Office subsequently issued its report, it found that Dominguez had three prior convictions, two of them under other names, which neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor had known at the time of the plea negotiations The upshot was that Dominguez was ineligible for the safety valve, and so had no chance to escape the sentence of 10 years After receiving two more letters from Dominguez complaining about the quality of counsel's representation, *79 the District Court sentenced Dominguez to the mandatory minimum At the sentencing hearing, all counsel told the court that they had thought Dominguez might at least have been eligible for the safety-valve mitigation, but agreed that with three convictions, he was not Dominguez told the court that he had "never had any knowledge about the points of responsibility, the safety valve, or anything like that" App 109 The court replied that in light of the "lengthy change of plea proceedings" it was "difficult to accept what" Dominguez said On appeal, Dominguez argued that the District Court's failure to warn him, as Rule 11(c)(3)(B) instructs, that he could not withdraw his guilty plea if the court did not accept the Government's recommendations required reversal After waiting for United a divided panel of |
Justice Souter | 2,004 | 20 | majority | United States v. Dominguez Benitez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136986/united-states-v-dominguez-benitez/ | required reversal After waiting for United a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, and cited United in applying the plain-error standard The court held that the District Court had indeed erred; and that the error was plain, affected Dominguez's substantial rights, and required correction in the interests of justice To show that substantial rights were affected, the Court of Appeals required Dominguez to "prove that the court's error was not minor or technical and that he did not understand the rights at issue when he entered his guilty plea" [4] The court rejected the Government's arguments that the written plea agreement or the District Court's other statements in the plea colloquy sufficiently advised Dominguez of his rights, given Dominguez's inability to speak English and the assurances of both counsel that he would likely qualify under the safety-valve provision Judge Tallman dissented, with the warning that the majority's *80 analysis followed neither nor Circuit precedent -1228 We granted certiorari, on the question "[w]hether, in order to show that a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 constitutes reversible plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred" Pet for Cert (I) We now reverse II A Because the Government agreed to make a nonbinding sentencing recommendation, Rule 11(c)(3)(B) required the court to "advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request" Rule 11, however, instructs that not every violation of its terms calls for reversal of conviction by entitling the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea "A variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights" Fed Rule Crim Proc 11(h)[5] In we considered the standard that applies when a defendant is dilatory in raising Rule 11 error, and held that reversal is not in order unless the error is ; see Although we explained that in assessing the effect of Rule 11 error, a reviewing court must look to the entire record, not to the plea proceedings alone, we did not formulate the standard for determining whether a defendant has shown, as the plain-error standard requires, an effect on his substantial rights *81 B It is only for certain structural errors undermining the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole that even preserved error requires reversal without regard to the mistake's effect on the proceeding See Dominguez does not argue that either Rule 11 error generally or the Rule 11 |
Justice Souter | 2,004 | 20 | majority | United States v. Dominguez Benitez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136986/united-states-v-dominguez-benitez/ | that either Rule 11 error generally or the Rule 11 error here is structural in this sense[6] Otherwise, relief for error is tied in some way to prejudicial effect, and the standard phrased as "error that affects substantial rights," used in Rule 52, has previously been taken to mean error with a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding See To affect "substantial rights," see 28 US C 2111, an error must have "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the verdict" [7] In cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on the defendant seeking relief, we have invoked a standard with similarities to the formulation in requiring the showing of *82 "a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different" United for claims under ); (same)[8] No reason has appeared for treating the phrase "affecting substantial rights" as untethered to a prejudice requirement when applying to this nonstructural error, or for doubting that is a sensible model to follow As makes clear, the burden of establishing entitlement to relief for plain error is on the defendant claiming it, and for several reasons, we think that burden should not be too easy for defendants in Dominguez's position First, the standard should enforce the policies that underpin Rule 52(b) generally, to encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved error See Second, it should respect the particular importance of the finality of guilty pleas, which usually rest, after all, on a defendant's *83 profession of guilt in open court, and are indispensable in the operation of the modern criminal justice system See United And, in this case, these reasons are complemented by the fact, worth repeating, that the violation claimed was of Rule 11, not of due process We hold, therefore, that a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the proceeding at ; at [9] *84 C What we have already said points to why the test applied by the Court of Appeals in this case fell short Its first element was whether the error was "minor or technical," a phrase |
Justice Souter | 2,004 | 20 | majority | United States v. Dominguez Benitez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136986/united-states-v-dominguez-benitez/ | was whether the error was "minor or technical," a phrase it took from United which in turn found it in the 1983 commentary that accompanied the amendment to Rule 11(h) But this element requires no examination of the effect of the omitted warning on a defendant's decision, a failing repeated to a significant extent by the second element of the Ninth Circuit's test, taken from United States v Minore, 292 F3d 1109 which asks whether the defendant understood "the rights at issue when he entered his guilty plea" True, this enquiry gets closer than the first to a consideration of the likely effect of Rule 11 error on the defendant's decision to plead; assessing a claim that an error affected a defendant's decision to plead guilty must take into account any indication that the omission of a Rule 11 warning misled him But the standard of the Court of Appeals does not allow consideration of any record evidence tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential to a defendant's decision, or evidence indicating the relative significance of other facts that may have borne on his choice regardless of any Rule 11 error[10] Relevant evidence that the Court of Appeals thus passed over in this case included Dominguez's statement to the District Court that he did not intend to go to trial, and his counsel's *85 confirmation of that representation, made at the same hearing The neglected but relevant considerations also included the implications raised by Dominguez's protests at the sentencing hearing He claimed that when he pleaded guilty he had "never had any knowledge about the points of responsibility, the safety valve, or anything like that" App 109 These statements, if credited, would show that Dominguez was confused about the law that applied to his sentence, about which the court clearly informed him, but they do not suggest any causal link between his confusion and the particular Rule 11 violation on which he now seeks relief Other matters that may be relevant but escape notice under the Ninth Circuit's test are the overall strength of the Government's case and any possible defenses that appear from the record, subjects that courts are accustomed to considering in a or Brady analysis When the record made for a guilty plea and sentencing reveals evidence, as this one does, showing both a controlled sale of drugs to an informant and a confession, one can fairly ask a defendant seeking to withdraw his plea what he might ever have thought he could gain by going to trial The point of the question is not to |
Justice Souter | 2,004 | 20 | majority | United States v. Dominguez Benitez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/136986/united-states-v-dominguez-benitez/ | to trial The point of the question is not to second-guess a defendant's actual decision; if it is reasonably probable he would have gone to trial absent the error, it is no matter that the choice may have been foolish The point, rather, is to enquire whether the omitted warning would have made the difference required by the standard of reasonable probability; it is hard to see here how the warning could have had an effect on Dominguez's assessment of his strategic position And even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered, there was the plea agreement, read to Dominguez in his native Spanish, which specifically warned that he could not withdraw his plea if the court refused to accept the Government's recommendations This fact, uncontested by Dominguez, tends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here *86 * * * We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion It is so ordered JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | [*] As part of a comprehesive program to recoup the costs of federal aviatio programs from those who use the atioal airsystem, Cogress i 70 imposed a aual registratio tax o all civil aircraft that fly i the avigable airspace of the Uited 26 U.S. C.[] The costitutioal questio preseted i this case is whether this tax, as applied to a aircraft owed by a State ad used by it exclusively for police fuctios, violates the implied immuity of a state govermet from federal taxatio. We hold that it does ot. I Sice the passage of the Air Commerce Act of 26, the Federal Govermet has expeded sigificat amouts of federal fuds to develop ad stregthe a itegrated atioal airsystem ad to make civil air trasportatio safe ad practical. It has established, developed, ad improved a wide array of air avigatioal facilities ad services that beefit all aircraft flyig i the Natio's avigable *7 airspace,[2] ad it has also made substatial grats to state ad local govermets to assist i plaig ad developig airports. I 70, after a exteded study of the atioal airsystem, Cogress cocluded that the level of aual federal outlays o aviatio, while sigificat, had ot bee sufficiet to permit the atioal airsystem to develop the capacity to cope satisfactorily the curret ad projected growth i air trasportatio. To remedy this situatio, Cogress eacted two laws, the Airport ad Airway Developmet Act of 70 (Developmet Act), ad the Airport ad Airway Reveue Act of 70 (Reveue Act), which together costitute a comprehesive program substatially to expad ad improve the atioal airport ad airway system over the decade begiig July 70. I the Developmet Act, Cogress provided for vastly icreased federal expeditures both for airport plaig ad developmet ad for the further expasio of federal avigatioal services. More importatly for preset purposes, the Reveue Act adopted several measures to esure that federal outlays that beefited the civil users of the airways would, to a substatial extet, be fiaced by taxig measures imposed o those civil users.[3]* The Reveue Act, therefore, eacted for the first time, or icreased, several taxes o civil aviatio. Cogress coceived of each of these reveue measures as user fees ad calculated that they would produce reveues that would defray a sigificat ad icreasig percetage of the civil share of the aual total federal airport ad airway expeditures for the fiscal years 70 to 7.[] To assure that the reveues from these user taxes would be expeded oly for the expasio, improvemet, ad maiteace of the air trasportatio system, a Airport ad Airway Trust Fud |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | the air trasportatio system, a Airport ad Airway Trust Fud was created, ad Cogress provided that the amout of reveue geerated by the aviatio user charges would, durig the 70's, be paid ito this trust fud, as would ay moey appropriated from geeral reveues for aviatio purposes.[5] Reveue Act, 20, U.S. C. 72; see H. R. Rep. No. -60, p. (6) (hereiafter H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. -706, pp. 23-25 (70) (hereiafter S. Rep.). The fiacig measures i the Reveue Act are iteded to promote two purposes. First, they are desiged to serve the cogressioal policy of havig those who especially beefit from Govermet activity help bear the cost. See H. R. Rep. * 3; S. Rep. 5. Secod, the fiacig provisios are iteded to esure that the capacity of the atioal air system would ot agai be foud to be isufficiet to meet the demads of icreasig use. Cogress believed that the iadequacy i past levels of ivestmet i aviatio had bee due to the substatial competitio from oaviatio budgetary requests. See H. R. Rep. 3. The trust fud ad the user fees were, therefore, established to provide fudig for aviatio that would "geerally match ad grow the demad" for use of the airways. The tax challeged i this case is oe of several adopted i the Reveue Act, the aual aircraft registratio tax. Reveue Act, 206, 26 U.S. C. It imposes a aual "flat fee" tax o all civil aircrafticludig those owed by State ad Natioal Govermets[6]that fly i the avigable *50 airspace of the Uited[7] The amout of the aual charge depeds upo the type ad weight of the aircraft: those pisto-drive egies pay $25 plus 2 cets per poud of the maximum certificated takeoff weight i excess of 2,500 pouds whereas turbie-powered aircraft pay $25 plus 3 /2 cets per poud of the maximum certificated takeoff weight. See As is apparet from both the rate of tax i ad the legislative history of the Reveue Act, Cogress did ot cotemplate that the aual registratio tax would geerate sigificat amouts of reveue, but rather that the bulk of the fuds geerated by the system would come from other user taxes,[] each of which is related more directly to the level *5 of use of the avigable airspace. Thus, commercial aviatio's share of the cost of the federal activities would be raised primarily through a % tax o the price of domestic air passeger tickets, see Reveue Act, 203, 26 U.S. C. 26; a $3 "head tax" o iteratioal flights origiatig i the Uited ibid.; ad a |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | o iteratioal flights origiatig i the Uited ibid.; ad a 5% tax o the cost of trasportig property by air, Reveue Act, 20, 26 U.S. C. 27. Nocommercial geeral aviatiothe geeric category that icludes state police aircraftwould pay most of its share through a 7-cet-per-gallo tax o aircraft fuel. See Reveue Act, 202, 26 U.S. C. 0. But while the registratio tax was expected to produce oly modest reveues ad was uderstood to be oly idirectly related to system use, Cogress regarded it as a itegral ad essetial part of the etwork of user charges.[] Moreover, it is *52 the oly tax imposed o those geeral ocommercial aircraft owed ad operated by Although Cogress was geerally of the view that the should be required to pay aviatio user charges sice "there would appear to be o reaso why [they] should ot pay for their fair share of the use of the airway facilities," H. R. Rep. 6; see S. Rep. 7-, ad i fact made the subject to all the other user charges, it retaied a statutory exemptio for the from the aircraft fuel, tire, ad tube taxes. See 6A Stat. 0, as ameded, 26 U.S. C. 0 (g) (76 ed.); 26 U.S. C. 22. The Commowealth of Massachusetts ows several aircraft that are subject to the tax imposed by icludig a helicopter which the Commowealth uses exclusively for patrollig highways ad other police [0] I 73 the Uited otified the Commowealth that it had bee assessed for a tax of $3.3 o this state police helicopter for the period from July 70, to Jue 30, 7. The Commowealth refused to pay ad the Uited thereafter levied o oe of the Commowealth's bak accouts ad collected this tax, plus iterest ad pealties. Pursuat to 2 U.S. C. 36 (70 ed. ad Supp. V), the Commowealth the istituted this actio for a refud of the moey collected, cotedig that the Uited may ot costitutioally impose a tax that directly affects the essetial ad traditioal state fuctio of operatig a police force. The District Court dismissed the complait i a ureported decisio. It first idicated its view that the most recet decisios of this Court had so limited a State's costitutioal immuity from federal taxatio that a costitutioal challege could ot succeed uless the tax was discrimiatory or the State showed that the tax actually impaired a State fuctio. Because the Commowealth had ot alleged that this odiscrimiatory *53 aual fee had i fact impaired the operatios of its police force, the District Court cocluded dismissal was madatory. I the alterative, the |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | District Court cocluded dismissal was madatory. I the alterative, the District Court held that the tax i questio is a user fee ad that, whatever the preset scope of the costitutioal priciple of implied immuity of a state govermet from federal taxes, a user fee does ot implicate the doctrie. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, solely o the latter groud. (77). We grated certiorari, (77), to resolve a coflict betwee this decisio ad Georgia Dept. of (ND Ga. 76), appeal docketed, No. 77-6. See also City of New 3 F. Supp. 6 (SDNY 75), affirmace order, (CA2 76); Texas v. Uited 72-2 USTC ¶ 6.0 (WD Tex. 72), aff'd, 73- USTC ¶ 6,0 (CA5 73) (holdig th% air passeger tax may costitutioally be applied to state employees travelig o official state busiess). We affirm. II A review of the developmet of the costitutioal doctrie of state immuity from federal taxatio is a ecessary preface to decisio of this case. For while the Commowealth cocedes that certai types of user fees may costitutioally be applied to its essetial activities,[] it urges that the decisios of this Court teach that the validity of ay impost levied agaist a State must be judged by a "bright-lie" test: If the measure is labeled a tax ad/or imposed or collected pursuat to the Iteral Reveue Code, it is ucostitutioal as applied to a essetial state fuctio eve if the reveue measure *5 operates as a user fee. See Brief for Petitioer -2. Ad the Commowealth maitais that is ivalid for the additioal reaso that the values furthered by this costitutioal doctrie ecessarily require the ivalidatio of a levy such as that uder which, as a aual fee, is ot directly related to use. See Brief for Petitioer 2-. Neither cotetio has merit. The priciples that have aimated the developmet of the doctrie of state tax immuity ad the decisios of this Court i aalogous cotexts persuade us that a State ejoys o costitutioal immuity from a odiscrimiatory reveue measure, like which operates oly to esure that each member of a class of special beeficiaries of a federal program pay a reasoable approximatio of its fair share of the cost of the program to the Natioal Govermet.[2] Like the Court of Appeals, we have o occasio to decide either the preset vitality of the doctrie of state tax immuity or the coditios uder which it might be ivoked. A That the existece of the implies some restrictio o the atioal taxig power was first decided i Wall. 3 (7). There this Court |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | was first decided i Wall. 3 (7). There this Court held that the immuity that federal istrumetalities ad employees the ejoyed from state taxatio, see 6 Pet. 35 (2); Wheat. 36 (), was to some extet reciprocal ad that the salaries paid state judges were immue from a odiscrimiatory federal tax. This immuity of State ad Federal Govermets *55 from taxatio by each other was expaded i decisios over the last third of the th cetury ad the first third of this cetury, see, e. g., Pahadle Oil 277 U.S. 2 (2); Idia Motorcycle (3) but more recet decisios of this Court have cofied the scope of the doctrie. The immuity of the Federal Govermet from state taxatio is bottomed o the Supremacy Clause, but the ' immuity from federal taxes was judicially implied from the ' role i the costitutioal scheme. emphasized that the had bee i existece as idepedet sovereigs whe the Costitutio was adopted, ad that the Costitutio presupposes ad guaratees the cotiued existece of the as govermetal bodies performig traditioal sovereig Wall., at 25-26. To implemet this aspect of the costitutioal pla, cocluded that it was imperative absolutely to prohibit ay federal taxatio that directly affected a traditioal state fuctio, quotig Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's aphorisms that "`the power of taxig may be exercised so far as to destroy,'" at 23, quotig ad "`a right [to tax], i its ature, ackowledges o limits.'" Wall., at 23, quotig (2). The Court has more recetly remarked that these maxims refer primarily to two attributes of the taxig power. First, i imposig a tax to support the services a govermet provides to the public at large, a legislature eed ot cosider the value of particular beefits to a taxpayer, but may assess the tax solely o the basis of taxpayers' ability to pay. Secod (of perhaps greater cocer i the preset cotext), a tax is a powerful regulatory device; a legislature ca discourage or elimiate a particular activity that is i its regulatory jurisdictio simply by imposig *56 a heavy tax o its exercise. See Natioal Cable Televisio 5 U.S. 336, 30-3 (7). like the earlier reflected the view that the awesomeess of the taxig power required a flat ad absolute prohibitio agaist a tax implicatig a essetial state fuctio because the ability of the federal courts to determie whether particular reveue measures would or would ot destroy such a essetial fuctio was to be doubted. As the cotours of the priciple evolved i later decisios, "coget reasos" were recogized for arrowly limitig the immuity of the from federal |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | recogized for arrowly limitig the immuity of the from federal imposts. See 6 (3). The first is that ay immuity for the protectio of state sovereigty is at the expese of the sovereig power of the Natioal Govermet to tax. Therefore, whe the scope of the ' costitutioal immuity is elarged beyod that ecessary to protect the cotiued ability of the to deliver traditioal govermetal services, the burde of the immuity is throw upo the Natioal Govermet out ay correspodig promotio of the costitutioally protected values. See, at 6-7; (3); 22 U.S. 26, (3). The secod, also recogized by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall i is that the political process is uiquely adapted to accommodatig the competig demads "for atioal reveue, o the oe had, ad for reasoable scope for the idepedece of state actio, o the other," at 6: The Cogress, composed as it is of members chose by state costituecies, costitutes a iheret check agaist the possibility of abusive taxig of the by the Natioal Govermet.[3] *57 I tacit, ad at times explicit, recogitio of these cosideratios, decisios of the Court either have declied to elarge the scope of state immuity or have i fact restricted its reach. Typical of this tred are decisios holdig that the Natioal Govermet may tax reveue-geeratig activities of the that are of the same ature as those traditioally egaged i by private persos. See, e. g., New (6) ; (3) ; 23 U.S. 2 (3) ; (3) ; South U.S. 37 (05) It is true that some of the opiios speak of the state activity taxed as "proprietary" ad thus ot a immue essetial govermetal activity, but the opiios of the Members of the Court i New the most recet decisio, rejected the govermetal-proprietary distictio as uteable.[] Rather the majority[5] reasoed that a odiscrimiatory tax *5 may be applied to a state busiess activity where, as was the case there, the recogitio of immuity would "accomplish a drawal from the taxig power of the atio a subject of taxatio of a ature which has bee traditioally i that power from the begiig. Its exercise by a odiscrimiatory tax, does ot curtail the busiess of the state govermet more tha it does the like busiess of the citize." -5 Illustrative of decisios actually restrictig the scope of the immuity is the lie of cases that culmiated i the overrulig of i 306 U.S. (3). See, e. g., Metcalf & 26 U.S. 5 (26). of course, ivolved a odiscrimiatory tax that was imposed ot directly o the State but rather o the salary eared by |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | o the State but rather o the salary eared by a judicial officer. Neither itself or its progey or precursors made clear how such a taxig measure could be employed to preclude the from performig essetial I ay case, i the lie of decisios that culmiated i the Court demostrated that a immuity for the salaries paid key state officials is ot justifiable. Although key state officials are agets of the State, they are also citizes of the Uited so their icome is a atural subject for icome taxatio. See at 20 ad 22. More sigificatly, because the taxes imposed were odiscrimiatory ad thus also applicable to icome eared by persos i private employmet, the risk was virtually oexistet that such reveue provisios could sigificatly impede a State's ability to hire able persos to perform its essetial *5 See ; at 20-2. The oly advatage coceivably to be lost by deyig the such a immuity is that essetial state fuctios might be obtaied at a lesser cost because employees exempt from taxatio might be willig to work for smaller salaries. See -2. But that was regarded as a iadequate groud for sustaiig the immuity ad prevetig the Natioal Govermet from requirig these citizes to support its activities. See at 3 ad cases cited i 3. The purpose of the implied costitutioal restrictio o the atioal taxig power is ot to give a advatage to the by eablig them to egage employees at a lower charge tha those paid by private etities, see at 2-22, but rather is solely to protect the from udue iterferece their traditioal govermetal While a tax o the salary paid key state officers may icrease the cost of govermet, it will o more preclude the from performig traditioal fuctios tha it will prevet private etities from performig their missios. See ; at 20-2. These two lies of decisios illustrate the "practical costructio" that the Court ow gives the limitatio the existece of the costitutioally imposes o the atioal taxig power; "that limitatio caot be so varied or exteded as seriously to impair either the taxig power of the govermet imposig the tax or the appropriate exercise of the fuctios of the govermet affected by it." New -50 quotig Metcalf & Where the subject of tax is a atural ad traditioal source of federal reveue ad where it is icoceivable that such a reveue measure could ever operate to preclude traditioal *60 state activities, the tax is valid. While the Court has by o meas abadoed its doubts cocerig its ability to make particularized assessmets of the |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | doubts cocerig its ability to make particularized assessmets of the impact of reveue measures o essetial state operatios, compare New at 5 [6][7] it has recogized that some geeric types of reveue measures could ever seriously threate the cotiued fuctioig of the ad hece are outside the scope of the implied tax immuity. B A odiscrimiatory taxig measure that operates to defray the cost of a federal program by recoverig a fair approximatio of each beeficiary's share of the cost is surely o more offesive to the costitutioal scheme tha is either a tax o the icome eared by state employees or a tax o a State's sale of bottled water.[] The Natioal Govermet's iterest i beig compesated for its expeditures is oly too apparet. More sigificatly perhaps, such reveue measures by their very ature caot possess the attributes that led Mr. Chief Justice Marshall to proclaim that the power to tax is the power *6 to destroy. There is o dager that such measures will ot be based o beefits coferred or that they will fuctio as regulatory devices uduly burdeig essetial state activities. It is, of course, the case that a reveue provisio that forces a State to pay its ow way whe performig a essetial fuctio will icrease the cost of the state activity. But ad its precursors, see ad the cases cited i 3, teach that a ecoomic burde o traditioal state fuctios out more is ot a sufficiet basis for sustaiig a claim of immuity. Ideed, sice the Costitutio explicitly requires to bear similar ecoomic burdes whe egaged i essetial operatios, see U. S. Cost., Amdts. 5, ; Pesylvaia Coal (22) ; U. S. Cost., Art. I, 0, cl. ; Uited Trust 3 U.S. (77) (eve whe burdesome, a State ofte must comply the obligatios of its cotracts), it caot be seriously coteded that federal exactios from the of their fair share of the cost of specific beefits they receive from federal programs offed the costitutioal scheme. Our decisios i aalogous cotext support this coclusio. We have repeatedly held that the Federal Govermet may impose appropriate coditios o the use of federal property or privileges ad may require that state istrumetalities comply coditios that are reasoably related to the federal iterest i particular atioal projects or programs. See, e. g., Ivahoe Irrigatio (5); 330 U.S. 27, 2- (7); Uited v. Sa Fracisco, 30 U.S. 6 (0); cf. Natioal League of (76); Fry v. Uited 2 U.S. 52 (75). A requiremet that like all other users, pay a portio of the costs of the beefits they |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | pay a portio of the costs of the beefits they ejoy from federal programs is surely permissible sice it is closely related to the *62 federal iterest i recoverig costs from those who beefit ad sice it effects o greater iterferece state sovereigty tha do the restrictios which this Court has approved. A clearly aalogous lie of decisios is that iterpretig provisios i the Costitutio that also place limitatios o the taxig power of govermet. See, e. g., U. S. Cost., Art. I, cl. 3 (restrictig power of to tax iterstate commerce); 0, cl. 3 (prohibitig ay state tax that operates "to impose a charge for the privilege of eterig, tradig i, or lyig i a port." Clyde Mallory 26 U.S. 26, (35)). These restrictios, like the implied state tax immuity, exist to protect costitutioally valued activity from the udue ad perhaps destructive iterferece that could result from certai taxig measures. The restrictio implicit i the Commerce Clause is desiged to prohibit from burdeig the free flow of commerce, see geerally Complete Auto Trasit, (77), whereas the prohibitio agaist duties o the privilege of eterig ports is iteded specifically to guard agaist local hidraces to trade ad commerce by vessels. See Packet (77). Our decisios implemetig these costitutioal provisios have cosistetly recogized that the iterests protected by these Clauses are ot offeded by reveue measures that operate oly to compesate a govermet for beefits supplied. See, e. g., Clyde Mallory Lies v. ; Evasville-Vaderburgh Airport (72) ($ head tax o explaiig commercial air passegers upheld uder the Commerce Clause because desiged to recoup cost of airport facilities). A govermetal body has a obvious iterest i makig those who specifically beefit from its services pay the cost ad, provided that the charge is structured to compesate the govermet for the beefit coferred, there ca be o dager of the kid of iterferece *63 costitutioally valued activity that the Clauses were desiged to prohibit. C Havig established that taxes that operate as user fees may costitutioally be applied to the we tur to cosider the Commowealth's argumet that should ot be treated as a user fee because the amout of the tax is a flat aual fee ad hece is ot directly related to the degree of use of the airways.[] This argumet has bee cofroted ad rejected i aalogous cotexts. Capitol Greyhoud (50), is illustrative. There the Court rejected a attack uder the Commerce Clause o a aual highway tax of "2% upo the fair market value of motor vehicles used i iterstate commerce." The carrier argued that the correlatio betwee |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | i iterstate commerce." The carrier argued that the correlatio betwee the tax ad use was ot sufficietly precise to sustai the tax as a valid user charge. Notig that the tax "should be judged by its result, ot its formula, ad must stad uless prove to be ureasoable i amout for the privilege grated," the Court rejected the carrier's argumet: "Complete fairess would require that a state tax formula vary every factor affectig appropriate compesatio for road use. These factors, like those relevat i cosiderig the costitutioality of other state taxes, are so coutless that we must be cotet `rough approximatio rather tha precisio.' Each additioal factor adds to admiistrative burdes of *6 eforcemet, which fall alike o taxpayers ad govermet. We have recogized that such burdes may be sufficiet to justify states i igorig eve such a key factor as mileage, although the result may be a tax which o its face appears to bear uequal weight upo differet carriers. Upo this type of reasoig rests our geeral rule that taxes like that of here are valid uless the amout is show to be i excess of fair compesatio for the privilege of usig state roads." (Citatios ad foototes omitted.) See also Aero Mayflower Trasit (7) (taxes of $0 ad $5 per vehicle sustaied agaist Commerce Clause challeges); Clyde Mallory This Court recetly relied upo this reasoig to uphold a tax o commercial aviatio activity. I Evasville-Vaderburgh Airport we sustaied agaist claims based o the Commerce Clause ad o the right to travel a $ head tax o commercial airlie passegers. We held that such taxes are valid so log as they () do ot discrimiate agaist iterstate commerce, (2) are based upo some fair approximatio of use, ad (3) are ot show to be excessive i relatio to the cost to the govermet of the beefits coferred. 05 U.S., at 76-720. The Commowealth, of course, recogizes that flat fees, ad eve flat aual fees, have bee held costitutioally permissible i these cotexts. It urges, however, that such "rough approximatios of cost," while appropriate compesatory measures i other settigs, should ot be permissible here. It maitais that the values protected by the doctrie of state tax immuity require that ay user tax be closely calibrated *65 to the amout of ay taxpayer's actual use, ad it suggests that wefor purposes of the state tax immuity doctrie olydefie user fees as charges for measurable amouts of use of govermet facilities. We ote first that it is doubtful that the Natioal Govermet could recover the costs of its aviatio activities from |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | Govermet could recover the costs of its aviatio activities from those direct beeficiaries out makig at least some use of aual flat fees. I arguig that the Reveue Act provisios are ot sufficietly user related, the Commowealth places extesive reliace upo the DOT Study, prepared at the directio of Cogress,[20] of the best way to recoup the costs of the federal aviatio activities from its beeficiaries. While the report recogized that it would be geerally possible, albeit costly i the case of geeral aviatio, to tie the charges to specific measurable beefits received, see DOT Study 6, it idicated that certai costs imposed by geeral aviatio could oly be recovered through flat fees. at 6 2. But eve if it were feasible to recover all costs through charges for measurable amouts of use of Govermet facilities, we fail to see how such a requiremet would appreciably advace the policies embodied i the doctrie of state tax immuity. Sice a State has o costitutioal complait whe it is required to pay the cost of beefits received, the Commowealth's oly legitimate fear is that the flat-fee requiremet may result i the collectio from it of more tha its actual "fair share." We observe first that where the * charges imposed by the Federal Govermet apply to large umbers of private parties as well as to state activities, it is as likely as ot that the user fee will result i exactig less moey from the State tha it would have to pay uder a perfect user-fee system. More fudametally, eve whe a aual flat fee results i some overcharges, the Commo-wealth's solutio would ofte icrease the fiscal burde o the If the Natioal Govermet were required more precisely to calibrate the amout of the fee to the extet of the actual use of the airways, admiistrative costs would icrease ad so would the amout of reveue eeded to operate the system. The resultig icremet i a State's actual fair share might well be greater tha ay overcharge resultig from the preset fee system. But the complete aswer to the Commowealth's cocer is that eve if the flat fee does cost it somewhat more tha it would have to pay uder a perfect user-fee system, there is still o iterferece the values protected by the implied costitutioal tax immuity of the The possibility of a slight overcharge is o more offesive to the costitutioal structure tha is the icrease i the cost of essetial operatios that results either from the fact that those who deal the State may be required to pay odiscrimiatory |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | who deal the State may be required to pay odiscrimiatory taxes o the moey they receive or from the fact a jury may award a emiet domai claimat a amout i excess of what would be "just compesatio" i a ideal system of justice. Whatever the preset scope of the priciple of state tax immuity, a State ca have o costitutioal objectio to a reveue measure that satisfies the three-prog test of Evasville-Vaderburgh Airport substitutig "state fuctio" for "iterstate commerce" i that test. So log as the charges do ot discrimiate agaist state fuctios, are based o a fair approximatio of use of the system, ad are structured to produce reveues that will ot exceed the total cost to the Federal Govermet of the beefits *67 to be supplied, there ca be o substatial basis for a claim that the Natioal Govermet will be usig its taxig powers to cotrol, uduly iterfere or destroy a State's ability to perform essetial services. The requiremet that total reveues ot exceed expeditures places a atural ceilig o the total amout that such charges may geerate ad the further requiremet that the measure be reasoable ad odiscrimiatory precludes the adoptio of a charge that will uduly burde state activities.[2] III Applyig these priciples to this case demostrates that the Commowealth's claim of costitutioal immuity is particularly isubstatial. First, there is o questio but that the tax imposed by is odiscrimiatory. It applies ot oly to private users of the airways but also to civil aircraft operated by the Uited facts which miimize, if ot elimiate etirely, the basis for a coclusio that might be a abusive exercise of the taxig power. Ideed, the Reveue Act discrimiates i favor of the sice it retais the ' exemptio from the 7-cet-per-gallo fuel tax that applies to private ocommercial geeral aviatioa fact that illustrates the maer i which the political process is peculiarly adapted to the protectio of state iterests. Secod, the tax satisfies the requiremet that it be a fair approximatio of the cost of the beefits civil aircraft receive from the federal activities. As we have idicated, the legislative backgroud ad terms of the Reveue Act idicate that *6 Cogress believed that four measures, take together, would fairly reflect some of the cost of the beefits that redoud to the ocommercial geeral aircraft that fly i the avigable airspace of the Uited : a 7-cet-per-gallo fuel tax, a 5-cet-per-poud tax o aircraft tires, a 0-cet-per-poud tax o tubes, see 26 U.S. C. 07, ad the aual aircraft registratio tax. See ad The formula cotaied i |
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | majority | Massachusetts v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109824/massachusetts-v-united-states/ | aual aircraft registratio tax. See ad The formula cotaied i these four measures take together does ot, of course, give weight to every factor affectig appropriate compesatio for airport ad airway use. A probable deficiecy i the formula arises because ot all aircraft make equal use of the federal avigatioal facilities or of the airports that have bee plaed or costructed federal assistace. But the preset scheme evertheless is a fair approximatio of the cost of the beefits each aircraft receives. Every aircraft that flies i the avigable airspace of the Uited has available to it the avigatioal assistace ad other special services supplied by the Uited[22] Ad eve those aircraft, if there are ay, that have ever received specific services from the Natioal Govermet beefit from them i the sese that the services are available for their use if eeded ad i that the provisio of the services makes the airways safer for all users.[23] The four taxes, take together, fairly *6 reflect the beefits received, sice three are geared directly to use, whereas the fourth, the aircraft registratio tax, is desiged to give weight to factors affectig the level of use of the avigatioal facilities. See A more precisely calibrated formulawhich would iclude ladig fees, charges for specific services received, ad less reliace o aual flat fees, see DOT Study 62would, of course, be admiistratively more costly. It follows that a State may ot complai of the applicatio of o the groud it is ot a fair approximatio of use. Sice the fuel tax, tire ad tube tax, ad aual registratio fee together costitute a appropriate meas of recoverig the amout of the federal ivestmet, a State, beig exempt from the fuel, tire ad tube taxes, ca have o costitutioal objectio to the applicatio of the registratio fee aloe. Fially, the tax is ot excessive i relatio to the cost of the Govermet beefits supplied. Whe Cogress eacted the Reveue Act, it cotemplated that the user fees imposed o civil aircraft would ot be sufficiet to cover the federal expeditures o civil aviatio i ay oe year, see ad the actual experiece durig the first years of operatio was that the reveues fell far short of coverig the aual civil aviatio outlays.[2] Sice the Commowealth pays far *70 less tha private ocommercial users of the airways, there therefore is o basis for a coclusio that the applicatio of the registratio tax to the produces reveues i excess of the costs[25] icurred by the Federal Govermet.[26] Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took o part i the cosideratio or decisio of |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | Once again this Court must consider the constitutional implications of the 1911 will of United States Senator A. O. Bacon of Georgia which conveyed property in trust to Senator Bacon's home city of Macon for the creation of a public park for the exclusive use of the white people of that city. As a result of our earlier decision in this case which held that the park, Baconsfield, could not continue to be operated on a racially discriminatory basis, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that Senator Bacon's intention to provide a park for whites only had become impossible to fulfill and that accordingly the trust had failed and the parkland and other trust property had reverted by operation of Georgia law to the heirs of the Senator. *437 Petitioners, the same Negro citizens of Macon who have sought in the courts to integrate the park, contend that this termination of the trust violates their rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions involved. For the reasons to be stated, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia should be, and it is affirmed. The early background of this litigation was summarized by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in his opinion for the Court in -298: "In 1911 United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon, Georgia, a tract of land which, after the death of the Senator's wife and daughters, was to be used as `a park and pleasure ground' for white people only, the Senator stating in the will that while he had only the kindest feeling for the Negroes he was of the opinion that `in their social relations the two races (white and negro) should be forever separate.' The will provided that the park should be under the control of a Board of Managers of seven persons, all of whom were to be white. The city kept the park segregated for some years but in time let Negroes use it, taking the position that the park was a public facility which it could not constitutionally manage and maintain on a segregated basis. "Thereupon, individual members of the Board of Managers of the park brought this suit in a state court against the City of Macon and the trustees of certain residuary beneficiaries of Senator Bacon's estate, asking that the city be removed as trustee and that the court appoint new trustees, to whom title to the |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | the court appoint new trustees, to whom title to the park would be transferred. The city *438 answered, alleging it could not legally enforce racial segregation in the park. The other defendants admitted the allegation and requested that the city be removed as trustee. "Several Negro citizens of Macon intervened, alleging that the racial limitation was contrary to the laws and public policy of the United States, and asking that the court refuse to appoint private trustees. Thereafter the city resigned as trustee and amended its answer accordingly. Moreover, other heirs of Senator Bacon intervened and they and the defendants other than the city asked for reversion of the trust property to the Bacon estate in the event that the prayer of the petition were denied. "The Georgia court accepted the resignation of the city as trustee and appointed three individuals as new trustees, finding it unnecessary to pass on the other claims of the heirs. On appeal by the Negro intervenors, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that Senator Bacon had the right to give and bequeath his property to a limited class, that charitable trusts are subject to supervision of a court of equity, and that the power to appoint new trustees so that the purpose of the trust would not fail was clear." The Court in went on to reverse the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court and to hold that the public character of Baconsfield "requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state law." Thereafter, the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted this Court's reversal of its decision as requiring that Baconsfield be henceforth operated on a nondiscriminatory basis. "Under these circumstances," the state high court *439 held, "we are of the opinion that the sole purpose for which the trust was created has become impossible of accomplishment and has been terminated." Without further elaboration of this holding, the case was remanded to the Georgia trial court to consider the motion of Guyton G. Abney and others, successor trustees of Senator Bacon's estate, for a ruling that the trust had become unenforceable and that accordingly the trust property had reverted to the Bacon estate and to certain named heirs of the Senator. The motion was opposed by petitioners and by the Attorney General of Georgia, both of whom argued that the trust should be saved by applying the cy pres doctrine to amend the terms of the will by striking the racial restrictions and opening Baconsfield to all the citizens |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | the racial restrictions and opening Baconsfield to all the citizens of Macon without regard to race or color. The trial court, however, refused to apply cy pres. It held that the doctrine was inapplicable because the park's segregated, whites-only character was an essential and inseparable part of the testator's plan. Since the "sole purpose" of the trust was thus in irreconcilable conflict with the constitutional mandate expressed in our opinion in the trial court ruled that the Baconsfield trust had failed and that the trust property had by operation of law reverted to the heirs of Senator Bacon. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. We are of the opinion that in ruling as they did the Georgia courts did no more than apply well-settled general principles of Georgia law to determine the meaning and effect of a Georgia will. At the time Senator Bacon made his will Georgia cities and towns were, and they still are, authorized to accept devises of property for the establishment and preservation of "parks and pleasure grounds" and to hold the property thus received in *440 charitable trust for the exclusive benefit of the class of persons named by the testator. Ga. Code Ann., c. 69-5 (1967); 108-207 (1959). These provisions of the Georgia Code explicitly authorized the testator to include, if he should choose, racial restrictions such as those found in Senator Bacon's will. The city accepted the trust with these restrictions in it. When this Court in held that the continued operation of Baconsfield as a segregated park was unconstitutional, the particular purpose of the Baconsfield trust as stated in the will failed under Georgia law. The question then properly before the Georgia Supreme Court was whether as a matter of state law the doctrine of cy pres should be applied to prevent the trust itself from failing. Petitioners urged that the cy pres doctrine allowed the Georgia courts to strike the racially restrictive clauses in Bacon's will so that the terms of the trust could be fulfilled without violating the Constitution. The Georgia cy pres statutes upon which petitioners relied provide: "When a valid charitable bequest is incapable for some reason of execution in the exact manner provided by the testator, donor, or founder, a court of equity will carry it into effect in such a way as will as nearly as possible effectuate his intention." (1959). "A devise or bequest to a charitable use will be sustained and carried out in this State; and in all cases where there is a general intention manifested by the testator to effect |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | is a general intention manifested by the testator to effect a certain purpose, and the particular mode in which he directs it to be done shall fail from any cause, a court of chancery may, by approximation, effectuate the purpose in a manner most similar to that indicated by the testator." (1959). *441 The Georgia courts have held that the fundamental purpose of these cy pres provisions is to allow the court to carry out the general charitable intent of the testator where this intent might otherwise be thwarted by the impossibility of the particular plan or scheme provided by the testator. But this underlying logic of the cy pres doctrine implies that there is a certain class of cases in which the doctrine cannot be applied. Professor Scott in his treatise on trusts states this limitation on the doctrine of cy pres which is common to many States[1] as follows: "It is not true that a charitable trust never fails where it is impossible to carry out the particular purpose of the testator. In some cases it appears that the accomplishment of the particular purpose and only that purpose was desired by the testator and that he had no more general charitable intent and that he would presumably have preferred to have the whole trust fail if the particular purpose is impossible of accomplishment. In such a case the cy pres doctrine is not applicable." 4 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts 399, p. 3085 (3d ed. 1967). In this case, Senator Bacon provided an unusual amount of information in his will from which the Georgia courts could determine the limits of his charitable purpose. Immediately after specifying that the park should be for "the sole, perpetual and unending, use, benefit and enjoyment of the white women, white girls, white boys and white children of the City of Macon," the Senator stated that "the said property under no circumstances. (is) to be at any time for any reason *442 devoted to any other purpose or use excepting so far as herein specifically authorized." And the Senator continued: "I take occasion to say that in limiting the use and enjoyment of this property perpetually to white people, I am not influenced by any unkindness of feeling or want of consideration for the Negroes, or colored people. On the contrary I have for them the kindest feeling, and for many of them esteem and regard, while for some of them I have sincere personal affection. "I am, however, without hesitation in the opinion that in their social relations the two races. |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | the opinion that in their social relations the two races. should be forever separate and that they should not have pleasure or recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in common." The Georgia courts, construing Senator Bacon's will as a whole, concluded from this and other language in the will that the Senator's charitable intent was not "general" but extended only to the establishment of a segregated park for the benefit of white people. The Georgia trial court found that "Senator Bacon could not have used language more clearly indicating his intent that the benefits of Baconsfield should be extended to white persons only, or more clearly indicating that this limitation was an essential and indispensable part of his plan for Baconsfield." App. 519. Since racial separation was found to be an inseparable part of the testator's intent, the Georgia courts held that the State's cy pres doctrine could not be used to alter the will to permit racial integration. See ; The Baconsfield trust was therefore held to have failed, and, under Georgia law, "[w]here a trust is expressly created, but [its] uses fail from any cause, a resulting trust *443 is implied for the benefit of the grantor, or testator, or his heirs." Ga. Code Ann. 108-106 (4) (1959).[2] The Georgia courts concluded, in effect, that Senator Bacon would have rather had the whole trust fail than have Baconsfield integrated. When a city park is destroyed because the Constitution requires it to be integrated, there is reason for everyone to be disheartened. We agree with petitioners that in such a case it is not enough to find that the state court's result was reached through the application of established principles of state law. No state law or act can prevail in the face of contrary federal law, and the federal courts must search out the fact and truth of *444 any proceeding or transaction to determine if the Constitution has been violated. Presbyterian ; New York Times Here, however, the action of the Georgia Supreme Court declaring the Baconsfield trust terminated presents no violation of constitutionally protected rights, and any harshness that may have resulted from the state court's decision can be attributed solely to its intention to effectuate as nearly as possible the explicit terms of Senator Bacon's will. Petitioners first argue that the action of the Georgia court violates the United States Constitution in that it imposes a drastic "penalty," the "forfeiture" of the park, merely because of the city's compliance with the constitutional mandate expressed by this Court in Of course, did not |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | mandate expressed by this Court in Of course, did not speak to the problem of whether Baconsfield should or could continue to operate as a park; it held only that its continued operation as a park had to be without racial discrimination. But petitioners now want to extend that holding to forbid the Georgia courts from closing Baconsfield on the ground that such a closing would penalize the city and its citizens for complying with the Constitution. We think, however, that the will of Senator Bacon and Georgia law provide all the justification necessary for imposing such a "penalty." The construction of wills is essentially a state-law question, and in this case the Georgia Supreme Court, as we read its opinion, interpreted Senator Bacon's will as embodying a preference for termination of the park rather than its integration. Given this, the Georgia court had no alternative under its relevant trust laws, which are long standing and neutral with regard to race, but to end the Baconsfield trust and return the property to the Senator's heirs. *445 A second argument for petitioners stresses the similarities between this case and the case in which a city holds an absolute fee simple title to a public park and then closes that park of its own accord solely to avoid the effect of a prior court order directing that the park be integrated as the Fourteenth Amendment commands. Yet, assuming arguendo that the closing of the park would in those circumstances violate the Equal Protection Clause, that case would be clearly distinguishable from the case at bar because there it is the State and not a private party which is injecting the racially discriminatory motivation. In the case at bar there is not the slightest indication that any of the Georgia judges involved were motivated by racial animus or discriminatory intent of any sort in construing and enforcing Senator Bacon's will. Nor is there any indication that Senator Bacon in drawing up his will was persuaded or induced to include racial restrictions by the fact that such restrictions were permitted by the Georgia trust statutes. On the contrary, the language of the Senator's will shows that the racial restrictions were solely the product of the testator's own full-blown social philosophy. Similarly, the situation presented in this case is also easily distinguishable from that presented in where we held unconstitutional state judicial action which had affirmatively enforced a private scheme of discrimination against Negroes. Here the effect of the Georgia decision eliminated all discrimination against Negroes in the park by eliminating the park itself, and |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | Negroes in the park by eliminating the park itself, and the termination of the park was a loss shared equally by the white and Negro citizens of Macon since both races would have enjoyed a constitutional right of equal access to the park's facilities had it continued. Petitioners also contend that since Senator Bacon did not expressly provide for a reverter in the event *446 that the racial restrictions of the trust failed, no one can know with absolute certainty that the Senator would have preferred termination of the park rather than its integration, and the decision of the Georgia court therefore involved a matter of choice. It might be difficult to argue with these assertions if they stood alone, but then petitioners conclude: "Its [the court's] choice, the anti-Negro choice, violates the Fourteenth Amendment, whether it be called a `guess,' an item in `social philosophy,' or anything else at all." We do not understand petitioners to be contending here that the Georgia judges were motivated either consciously or unconsciously by a desire to discriminate against Negroes. In any case, there is, as noted above, absolutely nothing before this Court to support a finding of such motivation. What remains of petitioners' argument is the idea that the Georgia courts had a constitutional obligation in this case to resolve any doubt about the testator's intent in favor of preserving the trust. Thus stated, we see no merit in the argument. The only choice the Georgia courts either had or exercised in this regard was their judicial judgment in construing Bacon's will to determine his intent, and the Constitution imposes no requirement upon the Georgia courts to approach Bacon's will any differently than they would approach any will creating any charitable trust of any kind. Surely the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated where, as here, a state court operating in its judicial capacity fairly applies its normal principles of construction to determine the testator's true intent in establishing a charitable trust and then reaches a conclusion with regard to that intent which, because of the operation of neutral and nondiscriminatory state trust laws, effectively denies everyone, whites as well as Negroes, the benefits of the trust. *447 Another argument made by petitioners is that the decision of the Georgia courts holding that the Baconsfield trust had "failed" must rest logically on the unspoken premise that the presence or proximity of Negroes in Baconsfield would destroy the desirability of the park for whites. This argument reflects a rather fundamental misunderstanding of Georgia law. The Baconsfield trust "failed" under that law not because of |
Justice Black | 1,970 | 21 | majority | Evans v. Abney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108034/evans-v-abney/ | The Baconsfield trust "failed" under that law not because of any belief on the part of any living person that whites and Negroes might not enjoy being together but, rather, because Senator Bacon who died many years ago intended that the park remain forever for the exclusive use of white people. Petitioners also advance a number of considerations of public policy in opposition to the conclusion which we have reached. In particular, they regret, as we do, the loss of the Baconsfield trust to the City of Macon, and they are concerned lest we set a precedent under which other charitable trusts will be terminated. It bears repeating that our holding today reaffirms the traditional role of the States in determining whether or not to apply their cy pres doctrines to particular trusts. Nothing we have said here prevents a state court from applying its cy pres rule in a case where the Georgia court, for example, might not apply its rule. More fundamentally, however, the loss of charitable trusts such as Baconsfield is part of the price we pay for permitting deceased persons to exercise a continuing control over assets owned by them at death. This aspect of freedom of testation, like most things, has its advantages and disadvantages. The responsibility of this Court, however, is to construe and enforce the Constitution and laws of the land as they are and not to legislate social policy on the basis of our own personal inclinations. In their lengthy and learned briefs, the petitioners and the Solicitor General as amicus curiae have advanced *448 several arguments which we have not here discussed. We have carefully examined each of these arguments, however, and find all to be without merit. The judgment is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | Burke v. Barnes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111787/burke-v-barnes/ | Both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a bill, H. R. 4042, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), conditioning the continuance of United States military aid to El Salvador upon the President's semiannual certification of El Salvador's progress in protecting human rights. The President neither signed the bill nor returned it to the House of Representatives where it had originated, and took the position that because Congress had in the meantime adjourned at the end of its first session the bill had been subjected to a "pocket veto" under Article I, 7, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution. Respondents-plaintiffs in this action are 33 individual Members of the House of Representatives who filed suit in the District Court challenging the action of the President in seeking to "pocket-veto" the bill in question. The Senate and the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House of Representatives intervened in support of the plaintiffs and are also respondents here. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners-defendants, but a divided Court of Appeals reversed. The majority concluded that respondents had standing to maintain this action, and that the bill had become a law notwithstanding the President's effort to "pocket-veto" it. The dissenting judge took the view that respondents did not have standing *363 to maintain the action. Petitioners Frank G. Burke, Acting Archivist of the United States, and Ronald Geisler, Executive Clerk of the White House, contend in this Court that (a) respondents lacked standing to maintain the action, (b) the Court of Appeals was incorrect in construing the "Pocket Veto" Clause of the Constitution as it did, and (c) the case is moot. We agree with this final contention of petitioners, and hold that the case is moot. We therefore do not reach either of the other contentions of petitioners. The bill in question expired by its own terms on September 30, a few weeks after the Court of Appeals entered its judgment. Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case; it is not enough that there may have been a live case or controversy when the case was decided by the court whose judgment we are reviewing. ; We therefore analyze this case as if respondents had originally sought to litigate the validity of a statute which by its terms had already expired. In we stated: "The only relief sought in the complaint was a declaratory judgment that the now repealed Fla. Stat. 192.06 (4) is unconstitutional as applied to |
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