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Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | work" criterion of the Equal Pay Act, one would expect all plaintiffs to file suit under the "broader" Title VII standard. Such a result would, for all practical purposes, constitute an implied repeal of the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act and render that Act a nullity. This was precisely the result Congress sought to avert when it adopted the Bennett Amendment, and the result the Court today embraces. *194 Senator Bennett confirmed this interpretation just one year later. The Senator expressed concern as to the proper interpretation of his Amendment and offered his written understanding of the Amendment. "The Amendment therefore means that it is not an unlawful employment practice:(b) to have different standards of compensation for nonexempt employees, where such differentiation is not prohibited by the equal pay amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. "Simply stated, the [Bennett] amendment means that discrimination in compensation on account of sex does not violate title VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act." 111 Cong. Rec. 13359 Senator Dirksen agreed that this interpretation was "precisely" the one that he, Senator Humphrey, and their staffs had in mind when the Senate adopted the Bennett Amendment. He added: "I trust that that will suffice to clear up in the minds of anyone, whether in the Department of Justice or elsewhere, what the Senate intended when that amendment was accepted." [6] *195 We can glean further insight into the proper interpretation of the Bennett Amendment from the comments of Representative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and sponsor of Title VII. After the Senate added the Bennett Amendment to Title VII and sent the bill to the House, Representative Celler set out in the record the understanding of the House that sex-based compensation claims would not satisfy Title VII unless they met the equal work standards of the Equal Pay Act. He explained that the Bennett Amendment "[p]rovides that compliance with the [EPA] satisfies the requirement of the title barring discrimination because of sex[ 703 (h)]." 110 Cong. Rec. 15896 (1964). The majority discounts this statement because it is somewhat "imprecise." Ante, at 176. I find it difficult to believe that a comment to the full House made by the sponsor of Title VII, who obviously understood its provisions, including its amendments, is of no aid whatsoever to the inquiry before us.[7] Finally, the contemporaneous interpretations of the Bennett Amendment by the EEOC, which are entitled to great *196 weight since they were issued while the intent of Congress was still fresh in the administrator's mind, further buttresses |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | Congress was still fresh in the administrator's mind, further buttresses petitioners' interpretation of the Amendment. ; General Electric The EEOC interpretations clearly state that the Equal Pay Act's equal work standard is incorporated into Title VII as the standard which must be met by plaintiffs alleging sex-based compensation claims under Title VII. The Commission's 1965 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex explain: "Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the Equal Pay Act (section 6 (d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S. C. (d)) in order to avoid conflicting interpretations or requirements with respect to situations to which both statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets section 703 (h) to mean that the standards of `equal pay for equal work' set forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title VII. However, it is the judgment of the Commission that the employee coverage of the prohibition against discrimination in compensation because of sex is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions in section 703, and is not limited by 703 (h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act." 29 CFR 04.7 (1966). Three weeks after the EEOC issued its Guidelines, the General Counsel explained the Guidelines in an official opinion letter.[8] He explained: "The Commission, as indicated in 04.7 of the *197 Guidelines issued November 24, 1965, 30 F. R. 14928, has decided that section 703 (h), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 incorporates the definition of discrimination in compensation found in the Equal Pay Act, including the four enumerated exceptions" General Counsel's opinion of December 29, 1965, App. to Brief for Petitioners 7a. Thus EEOC's contemporaneous interpretation of the Bennett Amendment leaves no room for doubt: The Bennett Amendment incorporates the equal work standard of discrimination into Title VII.[9] *198 The Court blithely ignores all of this legislative history and chooses to interpret the Bennett Amendment as incorporating only the Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses, and not the equal work requirement.[10] That argument does not survive scrutiny. In the first place, the language of the Amendment draws no distinction between the Equal Pay Act's standard for liabilityequal pay for equal workand the Act's defenses. Nor does any Senator or Congressman *199 even come close to suggesting that the Amendment incorporates the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into Title VII, but not the equal work standard itself. Quite the contrary, the concern was that Title VII would render the Equal Pay Act a nullity. It is only too |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | the Equal Pay Act a nullity. It is only too obvious that reading just the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII does not protect the careful draftsmanship of the Equal Pay Act. We must examine statutory words in a manner that "`reconstitute[s] the gamut of values current at the time when the words were uttered.'" National Woodwork Manufacturers U.S. 612, In this case, it stands Congress' concern on its head to suppose that Congress sought to incorporate the affirmative defenses, but not the equal work standard. It would be surprising if Congress in 1964 sought to reverse its decision in 1963 to require a showing of "equal work" as a predicate to an equal pay claim and at the same time carefully preserve the four affirmative defenses. Moreover, even on its own terms the Court's argument is unpersuasive. The Equal Pay Act contains four statutory defenses: different compensation is permissible if the differential is made by way of (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (4) is based on any other factor other than sex. 29 U.S. C. (d) (1). The flaw in interpreting the Bennett Amendment as incorporating only the four defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII is that Title VII, even without the Bennett Amendment, contains those very same defenses.[11] The opening sentence of *200 703 (h) protects differentials and compensation based on seniority, merit, or quantity or quality of production. These are three of the four EPA defenses. The fourth EPA defense, "a factor other than sex," is already implicit in Title VII because the statute's prohibition of sex discrimination applies only if there is discrimination on the basis of sex. Under the Court's interpretation, the Bennett Amendment, the second sentence of 703 (h), is mere surplusage. United[12] The Court's answer to this argument is curious. It suggests that repetition ensures that the provisions would be consistently interpreted by the courts. Ante, at 170. But that answer only speaks to the purpose for incorporating the defenses in each statute, not for stating the defenses twice in the same statute. Courts are not quite as dense as the majority assumes. In sum, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, read together, provide a balanced approach to resolving sex-based wage discrimination claims. Title VII guarantees that qualified female employees will have access to all jobs, and the Equal Pay Act assures that men and women performing the same work will be paid equally. Congress intended to remedy |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | same work will be paid equally. Congress intended to remedy wage discrimination through the Equal Pay Act standards, whether suit is brought under that statute or under Title *201 VII. What emerges is that Title VII would have been construed in pari materia even without the Bennett Amendment, and that the Amendment serves simply to insure that the equal work standard would be the standard by which all wage compensation claims would be judged. III Perhaps recognizing that there is virtually no support for its position in the legislative history, the Court rests its holding on its belief that any other holding would be unacceptable public policy. Ante, at 178-180. It argues that there must be a remedy for wage discrimination beyond that provided for in the Equal Pay Act. Quite apart from the fact that that is an issue properly left to Congress and not the Court, the Court is wrong even as a policy matter. The Court's parade of horribles that would occur absent a distinct Title VII remedy simply does not support the result it reaches. First, the Court contends that a separate Title VII remedy is necessary to remedy the situation where an employer admits to a female worker, hired for a unique position, that her compensation would have been higher had she been male. Ante, at 178-179. Stated differently, the Court insists that an employer could isolate a predominantly female job category and arbitrarily cut its wages because no men currently perform equal or substantially equal work. But a Title VII remedy is unnecessary in these cases because an Equal Pay Act remedy is available. Under the Equal Pay Act, it is not necessary that every Equal Pay Act violation be established through proof that members of the opposite sex are currently performing equal work for greater pay. However unlikely such an admission might be in the bullpen of litigation, an employer's statement that "if my female employees performing a particular job were males, I would pay them more simply because they are males" would be admissible in a suit under that Act. Overt discrimination does not go unremedied by the Equal Pay Act. See ; ; International Union of Electrical In addition, insofar as hiring or placement discrimination caused the isolated job category, Title VII already provides numerous remedies (such as backpay, transfer, and constructive seniority) without resort to job comparisons. In short, if women are limited to low paying jobs against their will, they have adequate remedies under Title VII for denial of job opportunities even under what I believe is the correct |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | job opportunities even under what I believe is the correct construction of the Bennett Amendment. The Court next contends that absent a Title VII remedy, women who work for employers exempted from coverage of the Equal Pay Act would be wholly without a remedy for wage discrimination. Ante, at 179-180. The Court misapprehends petitioners' argument. As Senator Clark explained in his memorandum, see Congress sought to incorporate into Title VII the substantive standard of the Equal Pay Actthe "equal work" standardnot the employee coverage provisions. See Thus, to say that the "equal pay for equal work" standard is incorporated into Title VII does not mean that employees are precluded from bringing compensation discrimination claims under Title VII. It means only that if employees choose to proceed under Title VII, they must show that they have been deprived of "equal pay for equal work." There is of course a situation in which petitioners' position would deny women a remedy for claims of sex-based wage discrimination. A remedy would not be available where a lower paying job held primarily by women is "comparable," but not substantially equal to, a higher paying job performed by men. That is, plaintiffs would be foreclosed from showing that they received unequal pay for work of "comparable worth" or that dissimilar jobs are of "equal worth." The short, and best, answer to that contention is that Congress *203 in 1963 explicitly chose not to provide a remedy in such cases. And contrary to the suggestion of the Court, it is by no means clear that Title VII was enacted to remedy all forms of alleged discrimination. We recently emphasized for example, that "Title VII could not have been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for their support that `management prerogatives, and union freedoms. be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.'" See Mohasco Congress balanced the need for a remedy for wage discrimination against its desire to avoid the burdens associated with governmental intervention into wage structures. The Equal Pay Act's "equal pay for equal work" formula reflects the outcome of this legislative balancing. In construing Title VII, therefore, the courts cannot be indifferent to this sort of political compromise. IV Even though today's opinion reaches what I believe to be the wrong result, its narrow holding is perhaps its saving feature. The opinion does not endorse the so-called "comparable worth" theory: though the Court does not indicate how a plaintiff might establish a prima facie case under |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | how a plaintiff might establish a prima facie case under Title VII, the Court does suggest that allegations of unequal pay for unequal, but comparable, work will not state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Court, for example, repeatedly emphasizes that this is not a case where plaintiffs ask the court to compare the value of dissimilar jobs or to quantify the effect of sex discrimination on wage rates. Ante, at 6, 180-181. Indeed, the Court relates, without criticism, respondents' contention that F.2d 228 (CA10), cert. denied, is distinguishable. Ante, at 6, n. 7. There the court found that Title VII did not provide a remedy to nurses who sought increased compensation based on a comparison of their jobs to dissimilar jobs of "comparable" value in the community. See also Given that implied repeals of legislation are disfavored, 437 U.S. we should not be surprised that the Court disassociates itself from the entire notion of "comparable worth." In enacting the Equal Pay Act in 1963, Congress specifically prohibited the courts from comparing the wage rates of dissimilar jobs: there can only be a comparison of wage rates where jobs are "equal or substantially equal." Because the legislative history of Title VII does not reveal an intent to overrule that determination, the courts should strive to harmonize the intent of Congress in enacting the Equal Pay Act with its intent in enacting Title VII. Where, as here, the policy of prior legislation is clearly expressed, the Court should not "transfuse the successor statute with a gloss of its own choosing." De Because there are no logical underpinnings to the Court's opinion, all we may conclude is that even absent a showing of equal work, there is a cause of action under Title VII where there is direct evidence that an employer has intentionally depressed a woman's salary because she is a woman. The decision today does not approve a cause of action based on a comparison of the wage rates of dissimilar jobs. For the foregoing reasons, however, I believe that even that narrow holding cannot be supported by the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. This is simply a case where the Court has superimposed upon Title VII a "gloss of its own choosing." |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | The Court today applies a presumption that when Con- gress enacts statutes authorizing administrative agencies to resolve disputes in an adjudicatory setting, it intends those agency decisions to have preclusive effect in Article III courts. That presumption was first announced in poorly supported dictum in a 1991 decision of this Court, and we have not applied it since. Whatever the validity of that presumption with respect to statutes enacted after its creation, there is no justification for applying it to the Lanham Act, passed in 1946. Seeing no other reason to conclude that Congress implicitly authorized the decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to have preclusive effect in a subsequent trademark infringement suit, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. I A The presumption in favor of administrative preclusion the Court applies today was first announced in Fed. Sav. & Loan (1991). In that case, the Court confronted the question 2 B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting “whether claimants under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 [(ADEA)] are collaterally estopped to relitigate in federal court the judicially unre- viewed findings of a state administrative agency made with respect to an age-discrimination claim.” It answered that question in the negative, concluding that the availability of administrative preclusion was an issue of statutory construction and that the particular statute at issue “carrie[d] an implication that the federal courts should recognize no [such] preclusion.” at 110. Despite rejecting the availability of preclusion, the Court nevertheless, in dictum, announced a presumption in favor of giving preclusive effect to administrative de- terminations “where Congress has failed expressly or impliedly to evince any intention on the issue.” at 110. That dictum rested on two premises. First, that “Con- gress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.” at And, second, that the Court had “long favored application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those determina- tions of administrative bodies that have attained finality.” I do not quarrel with the first premise, but I have seri- ous doubts about the second. The Court in offered only one decision predating the enactment of the ADEA to shore up its assertion that Congress had legislated against a background principle in favor of administrative preclu- sion—United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). See1 And that decision cannot be read for the broad proposition —————— 1 The Court also cited University of (1986), but because that decision postdated the enactment |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | University of (1986), but because that decision postdated the enactment of the ADEA by almost two decades and itself primarily relied on Utah Construction it cannot be evidence of any background principle existing at the relevant time. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting asserted by the Court. Like itself, Utah Construction discussed admin- istrative preclusion only in dictum. The case arose out of a contract dispute between the United States and a private The contract at issue con- tained a disputes clause providing for an administrative process by which “ ‘disputes concerning questions of fact arising under th[e] contract’ ” would be decided by the contracting officer, subject to written appeal to the head of the department. at 397–398. The Wunderlich Act of 1954 likewise provided that such administrative factfind- ing would be “final and conclusive” in a later breach-of- contract action “ ‘unless the same is fra[u]dulent or capri- cious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evi- dence.’ ” Because both “the disputes clause [of the contract] and the Wunderlich Act categorically state[d] that administrative findings on factual issues relevant to questions arising under the contract [would] be final and conclusive on the parties,” the Court required the lower courts to accept those findings. Only after acknowledging that its decision “rest[ed] upon the agree- ment of the parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act” did the Court go on to comment that the decision was “harmo- nious with general principles of collateral estoppel.” at 421. To create a presumption based solely on dictum would be bad enough, but the principles Utah Construction re- ferred to were far too equivocal to constitute “long- established and familiar” background principles of the common law of the sort on which we base our statutory inferences. Isbrandtsen (1952). Although Utah Construction asserted that “[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to 4 B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose,” it admitted that “courts have used language to the effect that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings.” – 422. These contradictory signals are not typically the stuff of which background rules of common law are made. Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U. S. (2013) (slip op., at 17) (presuming that Congress intended to retain the “first |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | at 17) (presuming that Congress intended to retain the “first sale” doctrine in copyright statutes based on that common-law doctrine’s “impeccable historic pedigree”). B If the occasion had arisen in for the Court to examine the history of administrative preclusion, it would have discovered that the issue was far from settled. At common law, principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel applied only to a decision by a “court of competent jurisdiction.” Aurora ; accord, ; Re- statement of Judgments 7, and Comment f, pp. 20, 41, 45 (1942). That rule came with the corollary requirement that the court be “legally constituted”—that is, a court “known to and recognized by the law.” 2 H. Law of Judgments p. 614 (1891). A court not “legally con- stituted” lacked jurisdiction to enter a legally binding judgment, and thus any such judgment could have no preclusive effect. Nineteenth century courts generally understood the term “court of competent jurisdiction” to include all courts with authority and jurisdiction conclusively to resolve a dispute. See J. Wells, A Treatise on the Doctrines of Res Judicata and Stare Decisis pp. 336–338 (18); 2 13–614. Thus, courts of law, courts of equity, admiralty courts, and foreign courts could all satisfy the requirement of a “[c]ourt of competent juris- Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 5 THOMAS, J., dissenting diction.” 6 Wheat., at This broad definition served the interest in finality that supports preclusion doctrines, without which “an end could never be put to litigation.” But however broadly “[c]ourt of competent jurisdiction” was defined, it would require quite a leap to say that the concept encompasses administrative agencies, which were recognized as categorically different from courts. E.g., ; F. Administrative Agencies and the Courts 241–242 (1951) (taking the position that agencies “are not courts, and their determinations are not judgments”). This distinction stems from the Constitution itself, which vests the “judi- cial Power” not in administrative agencies, but in federal courts, whose independence is safeguarded by certain constitutional requirements. Art. III, One of the consequences of this allocation of judicial power is that agencies possess limited ability to act in a judicial capacity in cases resolving traditional disputes between private parties. See infra, at 11–12. It is therefore unsurprising that federal courts— including this Court—have been far more hesitant than today’s majority to extend common-law preclusion princi- ples to decisions of administrative tribunals. In Pearson, for example, this Court declined to recognize any preclu- sive effect of a decision of an immigration board. 202 U.S., at 284–285. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes explained that “[t]he board is an |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | the Court, Justice Holmes explained that “[t]he board is an instrument of the execu- tive power, not a court”; that it consisted of officials “whose duties are declared to be administrative by” stat- ute; and that “[d]ecisions of a similar type long have been recognized as decisions of the executive department, and cannot constitute res judicata in a technical sense.” Other courts likewise declined to apply general preclu- sion principles to decisions of administrative agencies. For example, as late as 1947, the D. C. Circuit would rely 6 B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting on the “well settled doctrine that res judicata and equita- ble estoppel do not ordinarily apply to decisions of admin- istrative tribunals.” Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 246 (1947). The Restatement of Judgments also reflected this prac- tice: It contained no provision for administrative preclu- sion and explained that it would not address “the effect of the decisions of administrative tribunals.” Restatement of Judgments, Scope Note, at 2. It rejected the idea of any consistent practice in favor of administrative preclusion, noting that “the question whether the decisions of a par- ticular tribunal are binding in subsequent controversies depends upon the character of the tribunal and the nature of its procedure and the construction of the statute creat- ing the tribunal and conferring powers upon it.” Consistent with that comment, federal courts approved of administrative preclusion in narrow circumstances arguably involving only claims against the Government, over which Congress exercises a broader measure of con- trol.2 In the 19th century, for instance, this Court effec- tively gave preclusive effect to the decisions of the U. S. Land Department with respect to land patents when it held such patents unreviewable in federal court “for mere errors of judgment.” Smelting 646 (1882) (“A patent, in a court of law, is conclusive as to all matters properly determined by the Land Depart- ment”). Commentators explained that these cases could —————— 2 This distinction reaches at least as far back as 17th-century Eng- land. See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 413 (1958) (explaining that, since the 17th century in England, courts have been “identified with the enforcement of private right, and admin- istrative agencies with the execution of public policy”); see also Hetley v. Boyer, Croc. Jac. 336, 79 Eng. Rep. 2 (K. B. 1614) (reviewing the actions of the “commissioners of the sewers,” who had exceeded the bounds of their traditional jurisdiction and had imposed on citizens’ core private rights). Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting not |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 THOMAS, J., dissenting not truly be understood to involve an application of res judicata or collateral estoppel—for, after all, administra- tive agencies are not courts—but rather a “species of equitable estoppel.” ; see also 2 A. Freeman, Law of Judgments p. 1335 (5th ed. rev. 15) (explaining that “the immunity from judicial review” for certain administrative decisions was “not based upon the doctrine of res judicata nor governed by exactly the same rules”). As one commentator put it, res judicata could “not apply, in any strict or technical sense, to the decisions of administrative agencies.” at 241. This history undercuts any suggestion in Utah Con- struction that administrative preclusion was widely ac- cepted at common law. Accordingly, at least for statutes passed before I would reject the presumption of administrative preclusion.3 II In light of this history, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to apply administrative preclusion in the context of the Lanham Act.4 To start, the Lanham Act was en- —————— 3 I have no occasion to consider whether the discussion in Elliott, or Utah Construction could be understood to create a back- ground principle in favor of administrative preclusion that would apply, as a matter of statutory interpretation, to statutes passed after those decisions. 4 The majority insists that we must apply the presumption of admin- istrative preclusion because the Court has “repeatedly endorsed Utah Construction” and the parties do not challenge “its historical accuracy.” Ante, at 12, n. 2. But regardless of whether the Court has endorsed Utah Construction’s dictum, the Court has never applied the presump- tion of administrative preclusion to the Lanham Act. Even if the Court’s description of the presumption were not dictum, no principle of stare decisis requires us to extend a tool of statutory interpretation from one statute to another without first considering whether it is appropriate for that statute. Cf. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 469–470 (2008) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (“[S]tare decisis, 8 B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting acted in 1946, 20 years before this Court said—even in dic- tum—that administrative preclusion was an established common-law principle. Thus, even if one thought that the dictum in Utah Construction were sufficient to establish a common-law principle in favor of preclusion, that conclu- sion would not warrant applying ’s presumption to this enactment from the 1940’s. And, construing the Act on its own terms, I see no reason to conclude that Con- gress intended administrative preclusion to apply to TTAB findings of fact in a subsequent trademark infringement |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | to TTAB findings of fact in a subsequent trademark infringement suit. The Act says nothing to indicate such an intent, and several features of the Act support the contrary inference. The first feature indicating that Congress did not intend preclusion to apply is the limited authority the Act gives the TTAB. The Act authorizes the TTAB only to “deter- mine and decide the respective rights of [trademark] registration,” 15 U.S. C. thereby withholding any authority from the TTAB to “determine the right to use” a trademark or to “decide broader questions of in- fringement or unfair competition,” TTAB Manual of Pro- cedure §.01 (2014). This limited job description indi- cates that TTAB’s conclusions regarding registration were never meant to become decisive—through application of administrative preclusion—in subsequent infringement suits. See 15 U.S. C. (providing that registration of a mark “shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of —————— designed to be a principle of stability or repose, [should not] become a vehicle of change whereby an error in one area metastasizes into others, thereby distorting the law”). As for the parties’ lack of argu- ment, I would not treat tools of statutory interpretation as claims that can be forfeited. If, for example, one party peppered its brief with legislative history, and the opposing party did not challenge the propri- ety of using legislative history, I still would not consider myself bound to rely upon it. The same is true here: Although the Court has com- mented in the past that the presumption of administrative preclusion would apply to other statutes, we are not bound to apply it now to the Lanham Act, even if the parties have assumed we would. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 9 THOMAS, J., dissenting the registered mark” but “shall not preclude another person from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect”). Giving preclusive effect to the TTAB’s decision on likelihood of confusion would be an end-run around the statutory limitation on its authority, as all parties agree that likelihood of confusion is the central issue in a subse- quent infringement suit. A second indication that Congress did not intend admin- istrative preclusion to apply is the Lanham Act’s provision for judicial review. After the TTAB issues a registration decision, a party “who is dissatisfied with the decision” may either appeal to the Federal Circuit or file a civil action in district court seeking review. (b)(1).5 And it is undisputed that a civil action in district court would entail de novo review of the TTAB’s decision. Ante, at 5. Although under ordinary preclusion principles |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | TTAB’s decision. Ante, at 5. Although under ordinary preclusion principles “the failure to pursue an appeal does not undermine issue preclusion,” ante, at 13, the availability of de novo judicial review of an administrative decision does. That is true both because the judicial review afforded by the Act marks the first opportunity for consideration of the issue by an Article III court and because Congress has deviated from the usual practice of affording deference to the factfind- ings of an initial tribunal in affording de novo review of the TTAB’s decisions. The decision to provide this de novo review is even more striking in light of the historical background of the choice: Congress passed the Lanham Act the same year it passed the Administrative Procedure Act, following a lengthy period of disagreement in the courts about what deference administrative findings of fact were entitled to receive on direct review. The issue had been the subject of debate for over 50 years, with varying results. See generally 2 J. —————— 5 The original 1946 Lanham Act provided for appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See 10 B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 39–75 (17). Sometimes this Court refused to re- view factual determinations of administrative agencies at all, Smelting 646, and sometimes it allowed lower courts to engage in essentially de novo review of factual determinations, see ICC v. Alabama Midland R. ; Reckendorfer v. Faber, In the early 20th century, the Court began to move toward substantial-evidence review of administrative determinations involving mixed questions of law and fact, ICC v. Union Pacific R. but reserved the authority to review de novo any so-called “jurisdictional facts.” 62– 63 (1932). Courts then struggled to determine the bound- ary between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional facts, and thus to determine the appropriate standard of review for administrative decisions. See, e.g., (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (noting the “casuistic difficulties spawned” in and the “attritions of that case through later decisions”). Although Congress provided for substantial- evidence review in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. it required de novo review in the Lan- ham Act. I need not take a side in this historical debate about the proper level of review for administrative findings of fact to conclude that its existence provides yet another reason to doubt that Congress intended administrative preclusion to apply to the Lanham Act. III In addition to being unsupported by our precedents or historical evidence, the majority’s application of adminis- trative preclusion raises serious constitutional concerns. |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | majority’s application of adminis- trative preclusion raises serious constitutional concerns. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 11 THOMAS, J., dissenting A Executive agencies derive their authority from Article II of the Constitution, which vests “[t]he executive power” in “a President of the United States,” Art. II, cl. 1. Execu- tive agencies are thus part of the political branches of Government and make decisions “not by fixed rules of law, but by the application of governmental discretion or pol- icy.” at 35–36; see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (An agency “is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration”). They are not constituted to exercise “independent judg- ment,” but to be responsive to the pressures of the political branches. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., ante, at 8 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). Because federal administrative agencies are part of the Executive Branch, it is not clear that they have power to adjudicate claims involving core private rights. Under our Constitution, the “judicial power” belongs to Article III courts and cannot be shared with the Legislature or the Executive. v. Marshall, 564 U. S. – (2011) (slip op., at 16–17); see also Perez, ante, at 8–11 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). And some historical evidence suggests that the adjudication of core private rights is a function that can be performed only by Article III courts, at least absent the consent of the parties to adjudication in another forum. See Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 5, 561–574 (2007) (here- inafter Nelson); see also Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, ante, at 4 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that “there are cer- tain core functions” that require the exercise of a particu- lar constitutional power and that only one branch can constitutionally perform). 12 B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting To the extent that administrative agencies could, con- sistent with the Constitution, function as courts, they might only be able to do so with respect to claims involving public or quasi-private rights. See Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line 68–70 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also Nelson 561–574; Dick- Public rights are those belonging to the public as a whole, see Nelson 566, whereas quasi-private rights, or statutory entitlements, are those “ ‘privileges’ ” or “ ‘franchises’ ” that are bestowed by the government on individuals, ; see, e.g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., (discussing claims “arising |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | ; see, e.g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., (discussing claims “arising be- tween the government and others, which from their na- ture do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it”). The historical treatment of administrative preclusion is consistent with this understanding. As discussed above, most administrative adjudications that were given preclu- sive effect in Article III courts involved quasi-private rights like land grants. See Smelting 104 U.S., at 646. And in the context of land grants, this Court recog- nized that once “title had passed from the government,” a more complete form of judicial review was available be- cause “the question became one of private right.” Johnson v. Towsley, It is true that, in the New Deal era, the Court some- times gave preclusive effect to administrative findings of fact in tax cases, which could be construed to implicate private rights. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, ; Tait v. Western Maryland R. But administrative tax determinations may simply have en- joyed a special historical status, in which case this practice might be best understood as a limited deviation from a general distinction between public and private rights. See Nelson 588–0. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 13 THOMAS, J., dissenting B Trademark registration under the Lanham Act has the characteristics of a quasi-private right. Registration is a creature of the Lanham Act, which “confers important legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who regis- ter their marks.” Ante, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because registration is merely a statutory gov- ernment entitlement, no one disputes that the TTAB may constitutionally adjudicate a registration claim. See at (slip op., at 19); Nelson 568–569. By contrast, the right to adopt and exclusively use a trademark appears to be a private property right that “has been long recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England and of this country.” Trade-Mark Cases, (19). As this Court explained when addressing Congress’ first trademark statute, enacted in 10, the exclusive right to use a trademark “was not created by the act of Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement.” “The whole system of trade-mark property and the civil remedies for its protec- tion existed long anterior to that act, and have remained in full force since its passage.” Thus, it appears that the trademark infringement suit at issue in this case might be of a type that must be decided by “Article III judges in Article III courts.” 564 U. S., at (slip op., at 18). The majority, however, would have Article III courts |
Justice Thomas | 2,015 | 1 | dissenting | B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2959751/bb-hardware-inc-v-hargis-industries-inc/ | at 18). The majority, however, would have Article III courts decide infringement claims where the central issue— whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion be- tween two trademarks—has already been decided by an executive agency. This raises two potential constitutional concerns. First, it may deprive a trademark holder of the opportunity to have a core private right adjudicated in an Article III court. See at (slip op., at 21). Second, it may effect a transfer of a core attribute of the judicial power to an executive agency. Cf. Perez, ante, at 10–12 14 B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (explaining that interpretation of regulations having the force and effect of law is likely a core attribute of the judicial power that cannot be trans- ferred to an executive agency). Administrative preclusion thus threatens to “sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our own system, wher- ever fundamental rights depend upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law.” At a minimum, this practice raises serious questions that the majority does not adequately confront. The ma- jority does not address the distinction between private rights and public rights or the nature of the power exer- cised by an administrative agency when adjudicating facts in private-rights disputes. And it fails to consider whether applying administrative preclusion to a core factual de- termination in a private-rights dispute comports with the separation of powers. * * * I would hold that the TTAB’s trademark-registration decisions are not entitled to preclusive effect in a subse- quent infringement suit. The common law does not sup- port a general presumption in favor of administrative preclusion for statutes passed before this Court’s decision in and the text, structure, and history of the Lanham Act provide no support for such preclusion. I disagree with the majority’s willingness to endorse Asto- ria’s unfounded presumption and to apply it to an adjudi- cation in a private-rights dispute, as that analysis raises serious constitutional questions. Because I can resolve this case on statutory grounds, however, I leave these questions for another day. I respectfully dissent |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | When the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) evalu- ates an application to market a generic drug, it considers whether the proposed drug would infringe a patent held by the manufacturer of the brand-name version. To assess that matter, the FDA requires brand manufacturers to submit descriptions of the scope of their patents, known as use codes. The FDA does not attempt to determine if that information is accurate. Rather, the FDA assumes that it is so and decides whether to approve a generic drug on that basis. As a result, the breadth of the use code may make the difference between approval and denial of a generic company’s application. In this case, we consider whether Congress has author- ized a generic company to challenge a use code’s accuracy by bringing a counterclaim against the brand manufac- turer in a patent infringement suit. The relevant statute provides that a generic company “may assert a counter- claim seeking an order requiring the [brand manufac- turer] to correct or delete the patent information [it] submitted under [two statutory subsections] on the 2 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court ground that the patent does not claim an approved method of using the drug.” 21 U.S. C. We hold that a generic manufacturer may employ this provision to force correction of a use code that inaccurately describes the brand’s patent as covering a particular method of using the drug in question. I A The FDA regulates the manufacture, sale, and labeling of prescription drugs under a complex statutory scheme. To begin at the beginning: When a brand manufacturer wishes to market a novel drug, it must submit a new drug application (NDA) to the FDA for approval. The NDA must include, among other things, a statement of the drug’s components, scientific data showing that the drug is safe and effective, and proposed labeling describing the uses for which the drug may be marketed. See (d). The FDA may approve a brand-name drug for multiple methods of use—either to treat different conditions or to treat the same condition in different ways. Once the FDA has approved a brand manufacturer’s drug, another company may seek permission to market a generic version pursuant to legislation known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. See Drug Price Competi- tion and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585. Those amendments allow a generic competitor to file an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) piggy- backing on the brand’s NDA. Rather than providing independent evidence of safety and efficacy, the typical ANDA shows that the generic drug |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | and efficacy, the typical ANDA shows that the generic drug has the same active ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent to, the brand- name drug. See (iv). As we have previ- ously recognized, this process is designed to speed the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market. See Eli & Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) Opinion of the Court Because the FDA cannot authorize a generic drug that would infringe a patent, the timing of an ANDA’s approval depends on the scope and duration of the patents cover- ing the brand-name drug. Those patents come in different varieties. One type protects the drug compound itself. Another kind—the one at issue here—gives the brand manufacturer exclusive rights over a particular method of using the drug. In some circumstances, a brand manufac- turer may hold such a method-of-use patent even after its patent on the drug compound has expired. To facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and FDA regulations direct brand manufacturers to file information about their patents. The statute mandates that a brand submit in its NDA “the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the [brand] submitted the [NDA] or which claims a method of using such drug.” And the regulations issued under that statute require that, once an NDA is approved, the brand provide a description of any method-of-use patent it holds. See (c)(2)(ii)(P)(), (e) That description is known as a use code, and the brand submits it on FDA Form 542. As later discussed, the FDA does not attempt to verify the accuracy of the use codes that brand manufacturers supply. It simply pub- lishes the codes, along with the corresponding patent numbers and expiration dates, in a fat, brightly hued volume called the Orange Book (less colorfully but more officially denominated Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations). After consulting the Orange Book, a company filing an ANDA must assure the FDA that its proposed generic drug will not infringe the brand’s patents. When no pa- tents are listed in the Orange Book or all listed patents have expired (or will expire prior to the ANDA’s approval), the generic manufacturer simply certifies to that effect. 4 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court See 21 U.S. C. Otherwise, the applicant has two possible ways to obtain approval. One option is to submit a so-called section viii state- ment, which asserts that the generic manufacturer will market the drug for one or more methods of use |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | market the drug for one or more methods of use not cov- ered by the brand’s patents. See A section viii statement is typically used when the brand’s patent on the drug compound has expired and the brand holds patents on only some approved methods of using the drug. If the ANDA applicant follows this route, it will propose labeling for the generic drug that “carves out” from the brand’s approved label the still-patented methods of use. See (a)(8)(iv). The FDA may ap- prove such a modified label, see as an ex- ception to the usual rule that a generic drug must bear the same label as the brand-name product, see 21 U.S. C. (j)(4)(G). FDA acceptance of the carve- out label allows the generic company to place its drug on the market (assuming the ANDA meets other require- ments), but only for a subset of approved uses—i.e., those not covered by the brand’s patents. Of particular relevance here, the FDA will not approve such an ANDA if the generic’s proposed carve-out label overlaps at all with the brand’s use code. See 68 Fed. Reg. 6682–668 (200). The FDA takes that code as a given: It does not independently assess the patent’s scope or otherwise look behind the description authored by the brand. According to the agency, it lacks “both [the] exper- tise and [the] authority” to review patent claims; although it will forward questions about the accuracy of a use code to the brand,1 its own “role with respect to patent listing is —————— 1 Under the FDA’s regulations, any person may dispute the accuracy of patent information listed in the Orange Book by notifying the agency in writing. See (f). The FDA will then request that the brand verify the information, but will make no changes “[u]nless the [brand] withdraws or amends” the listing. Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court ministerial.” ; see (“A fundamental assumption of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is that the courts are the appropriate mechanism for the resolu- tion of disputes about the scope and validity of patents”).2 Thus, whether section viii is available to a generic manu- facturer depends on how the brand describes its patent. Only if the use code provides sufficient space for the gener- ic’s proposed label will the FDA approve an ANDA with a section viii statement. The generic manufacturer’s second option is to file a so- called paragraph IV certification, which states that a listed patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic] drug.” 21 |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic] drug.” 21 U.S. C. A generic manufacturer will typically take this path in either of two situations: if it wants to market the drug for all uses, rather than carving out those still allegedly under patent; or if it discovers, as described above, that any carve-out label it is willing to adopt cannot avoid the brand’s use code. Filing a para- graph IV certification means provoking litigation. The patent statute treats such a filing as itself an act of in- fringement, which gives the brand an immediate right to sue. See 5 U.S. C. Assuming the brand does so, the FDA generally may not approve the ANDA until 0 months pass or the court finds the patent invalid or not infringed. See 21 U.S. C. Accord- ingly, the paragraph IV process is likely to keep the gen- eric drug off the market for a lengthy period, but may eventually enable the generic company to market its drug for all approved uses. In the late 1990’s, evidence mounted that some brands —————— 2 Several courts have affirmed the FDA’s view of its ministerial role. See, e.g., Apotex, F.d 15, 149 (CA Fed. 200); That question is not before us, and we express no view on it. 6 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court were exploiting this statutory scheme to prevent or delay the marketing of generic drugs, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) soon issued a study detailing these anticompetitive practices. See FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, pp. iii–vi (hereinafter FTC Study). That report focused at- tention on brands’ submission of inaccurate patent infor- mation to the FDA. In one case cited by the FTC, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, F.d 12 a brand whose original patent on a drug was set to expire listed a new patent ostensibly extending its rights over the drug, but in fact covering neither the com- pound nor any method of using it. The FDA, as was (and is) its wont, accepted the listing at its word and accord- ingly declined to approve a generic product. The generic manufacturer sued to delete the improper listing from the Orange Book, but the Federal Circuit held that the Hatch- Waxman Amendments did not allow such a right of action. See at 10–1. As the FTC noted, that ruling meant that the only option for generic manufacturers in Mylan’s situation was to file a paragraph IV certification (triggering an infringement suit) and then wait out the usual 0-month period before the |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | and then wait out the usual 0-month period before the FDA could approve an ANDA. See FTC Study 40–45. Congress responded to these abuses by creating a mech- anism, in the form of a legal counterclaim, for generic manufacturers to challenge patent information a brand has submitted to the FDA. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 200, 117 Stat. 2452. The provision authorizes an ANDA applicant sued for patent infringement to “assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the [brand] to correct or delete the patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c) [of on the ground that the patent does not claim Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court either— “(aa) the drug for which the [brand’s NDA] was approved; or “(bb) an approved method of using the drug.” 21 U.S. C. The counterclaim thus enables a generic competitor to obtain a judgment directing a brand to “correct or delete” certain patent information that is blocking the FDA’s approval of a generic product. This case raises the ques- tion whether the counterclaim is available to fix a brand’s use code. B The parties to this case sell or seek to sell the diabetes drug repaglinide. Respondents (collectively Novo) manu- facture Prandin, the brand-name version of the drug. The FDA has approved three uses of Prandin to treat diabe- tes: repaglinide by itself; repaglinide in combination with metformin; and repaglinide in combination with thiazoli- dinediones (TZDs). Petitioners (collectively Caraco) wish to market a generic version of the drug for two of those uses. Novo originally owned a patent for the repaglinide compound, known as the ’05 patent, but it expired in 2009. In 2004, Novo also acquired a method-of-use patent for the drug, called the ’58 patent, which does not expire until 2018. That patent—the one at issue here—claims a “method for treating [diabetes by] administering rep- aglinide in combination with metformin.” 162 (CA Fed. 2010). Thus, Novo currently holds a patent for one of the three FDA-approved uses of repaglinide—its use with metformin. But Novo holds no patent for the use of repaglinide with TZDs or its use alone. In 2005, Caraco filed an ANDA seeking to market a generic version of repaglinide. At that time, the Orange Book entry for Prandin listed both the ’05 patent (the 8 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court drug compound) and the ’58 patent (the use of the drug with metformin). Caraco assured the FDA that it would not market its generic drug until the ’05 |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | it would not market its generic drug until the ’05 patent expired, thus making that patent irrelevant to the FDA’s review of the ANDA. Caraco filed a paragraph IV certification for the remaining, ’58 patent, stating that it was “invalid or [would] not be infringed.” see In accord with the patent statute, Novo treated this filing as an act of infringement and brought suit. When Caraco filed its ANDA, Novo’s use code for the ’58 patent represented that the patent covered “ ‘[u]se of repaglinide in combination with metformin to lower blood glucose.’ ” –16. The FDA therefore advised Caraco that if it did not seek to market repag- linide for use with metformin, it could submit a section viii statement. That would allow Caraco, assuming its ANDA was otherwise in order, to market its generic drug for the other two uses. Caraco took the FDA’s cue and in 2008 submitted a section viii statement, with proposed labeling carving out Novo’s patented metformin therapy. See App. 166–176. Before the FDA took further action, however, Novo changed its use code for the ’58 patent. The new use code describes “ ‘[a] method for improving glycemic control in adults with type 2 diabetes.’ ” Be- cause that code indicates that the ’58 patent protects all three approved methods of using repaglinide to treat diabetes, Caraco’s proposed carve-out of metformin ther- apy was no longer sufficient; even with that exclusion, —————— Novo asserts that it made the change so that its use code would mirror its label, which the FDA had just asked it to alter. See Brief for Respondents 14. But the FDA, in calling for new labeling, neither requested nor required Novo to amend its use code. And indeed, Novo’s counsel conceded before the Federal Circuit that Novo modified its use code in part as “ ‘a response to the [FDA’s] section viii’ ” suggestion. 601 F.d, at 180–181. Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court Caraco’s label now overlapped with Novo’s use code on the other two uses. And Caraco could not carve out those uses as well, because at that point nothing would be left for it to market. The FDA has approved repaglinide for only three uses, and Novo’s use code encompassed them all. The FDA accordingly informed Caraco that it could no longer employ section viii to bring its drug to market. Caraco responded to Novo’s new, preclusive use code by filing a statutory counterclaim in the ongoing infringe- ment suit. The counterclaim sought an order requiring Novo to “correct” its use code |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | sought an order requiring Novo to “correct” its use code “on the ground that [the ’58] patent does not claim” two approved methods of using repaglinide—alone and in combination with TZDs. §55(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I); see –7. That order would permit the FDA to accept Caraco’s proposed carve-out label and approve the company’s ANDA. The District Court granted summary judgment to Caraco, enjoining Novo to “correct its inaccurate description of the ’58 patent” by submitting a new Form 542 to the FDA that would “reinstat[e] its former” use code. App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a–66a. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Caraco lacked “a statutory basis to assert a counterclaim.” 601 F.d, at 160. The court first read the statutory phrase “the patent does not claim an approved method of using the drug” to require Caraco to demonstrate that the ’58 patent does not claim any approved method of use. See at 165 (“ ‘[A]n approved method’ means ‘any approved method’ ”). Because the patent covers one ap- proved method of use—repaglinide in combination with metformin—the counterclaim was unavailable. The court further ruled that the counterclaim provision does not reach use codes because they are not “patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c).” On the Federal Circuit’s view, that information consists only of the patent number and expiration date. See at 10 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court 166–167. Judge Dyk dissented. He would have read the phrase “the patent does not claim an approved method of using the drug” to include situations where, as here, the use code wrongly indicates that the patent covers one or more particular approved methods of use. See at 176–178. And he would have construed “patent in- formation submitted under subsection (b) or (c)” to include use codes. See at –176.4 We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. and now reverse. II We begin “where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.” United 489 U.S. 25, This case requires us to construe two statutory phrases. First, we must decide when a “patent does not claim an ap- proved method of using” a drug. Second, we must deter- mine the content of “patent information submitted under subsection (b) or (c)” of §55. We consider both of those questions against the backdrop of yet a third statu- tory phrase, providing that the remedy for a prevailing counterclaimant is an order requiring the brand “to correct or delete” that patent information. And we consider each question in the context of the entire statute. See Robinson |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | question in the context of the entire statute. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 7, 41 (Statutory in- terpretation focuses on “the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole”). We cannot say that the counterclaim clause is altogether free of ambiguity. But when we consider statutory text and context together, we conclude that a generic manufacturer in Caraco’s position —————— 4 On remand from the Federal Circuit’s decision, the District Court determined that the ’58 patent was invalid and unenforceable. See The Federal Circuit stayed Novo’s appeal from that judgment pending the decision here. Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court can use the counterclaim.5 A An ANDA applicant sued for patent infringement may bring a counterclaim “on the ground that the patent does not claim an approved method of using the drug.” 21 U.S. C. The parties debate the mean- ing of this language. Novo (like the Federal Circuit) reads “not an” to mean “not any,” contending that “the counter- claim is available only if the listed patent does not claim any (or, equivalently, claims no) approved method of using the drug.” Brief for Respondents 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). By that measure, Caraco may not bring a counterclaim because Novo’s ’58 patent claims the use of repaglinide with metformin. In contrast, Caraco reads “not an” to mean “not a particular one,” so that the statute permits a counterclaim whenever the patent does not claim a method of use for which the ANDA applicant seeks to market the drug. On that view, the counterclaim is available here—indeed, is available twice over—because —————— 5 Before proceeding to the merits, we dispose of a recently raised ju- risdictional argument. Novo now contends that the federal courts lost subject-matter jurisdiction over this infringement action (including the counterclaim) at the moment Caraco filed its section viii statement. On Novo’s theory, such a statement (unlike a paragraph IV certification) does not count as an act of infringement under the patent statute, see 5 U.S. C. and so cannot provide a jurisdictional basis for the suit. But that argument is wrong even assuming (as Novo con- tends) that Caraco’s section viii filing terminated its paragraph IV certification and that a section viii filing is not an act of infringement. The want of an infringing act is a merits problem, not a jurisdictional one. Nothing in the section of the statute defining certain filings as acts of infringement suggests anything to the contrary. And “we are |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | of infringement suggests anything to the contrary. And “we are not inclined to interpret statutes as creating a jurisdictional bar when they are not framed as such.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. (slip op., at 1). In the absence of such a bar, the federal courts have jurisdiction over this suit for a single, simple reason: It “ar[ose] under a[n] Act of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S. C. §18(a). 12 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court the ’58 patent does not claim the use of repaglinide with TZDs or its use alone. Truth be told, the answer to the general question “What does ‘not an’ mean?” is “It depends”: The meaning of the phrase turns on its context. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. (2010) (slip op., ) (“Ultimately, con- text determines meaning”). “Not an” sometimes means “not any,” in the way Novo claims. If your spouse tells you he is late because he “did not take a cab,” you will infer that he took no cab at all (but took the bus instead). If your child admits that she “did not read a book all sum- mer,” you will surmise that she did not read any book (but went to the movies a lot). And if a sports-fan friend be- moans that “the New York Mets do not have a chance of winning the World Series,” you will gather that the team has no chance whatsoever (because they have no hitting). But now stop a moment. Suppose your spouse tells you that he got lost because he “did not make a turn.” You would understand that he failed to make a particular turn, not that he drove from the outset in a straight line. Sup- pose your child explains her mediocre grade on a college exam by saying that she “did not read an assigned text.” You would infer that she failed to read a specific book, not that she read nothing at all on the syllabus. And suppose a lawyer friend laments that in her last trial, she “did not prove an element of the offense.” You would grasp that she is speaking not of all the elements, but of a particular one. The examples could go on and on, but the point is simple enough: When it comes to the meaning of “not an,” context matters.6 —————— 6 For this reason, we find Novo’s reliance on the occasional dictionary definition of “a[n]” unconvincing. Although “an” sometimes means “any” when used in negative structures, see, e.g., Microsoft Encarta |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | “any” when used in negative structures, see, e.g., Microsoft Encarta College Dictionary 1 (fifth definition), it sometimes does not. Cf. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. (slip. op., at –5) (rejecting a proposed definition of “personal” because it did not always hold in Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 1 Opinion of the Court And the statutory context here supports Caraco’s posi- tion. As described earlier (and as Congress understood), a single drug may have multiple methods of use, only one or some of which a patent covers. See, e.g., 21 U.S. C. §55(b)(1) (requiring that an NDA applicant file infor- mation about “any patent which claims the drug or which claims a method of using such drug” (emphasis added)). The Hatch-Waxman Amendments authorize the FDA to approve the marketing of a generic drug for par- ticular unpatented uses; and section viii provides the mechanism for a generic company to identify those uses, so that a product with a label matching them can quickly come to market. The statutory scheme, in other words, contemplates that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones. Within that framework, the counterclaim naturally func- tions to challenge the brand’s assertion of rights over whichever discrete use (or uses) the generic company wishes to pursue. That assertion, after all, is the thing blocking the generic drug’s entry on the market. The availability of the counterclaim thus matches the availa- bility of FDA approval under the statute: A company may bring a counterclaim to show that a method of use is un- patented because establishing that fact allows the FDA to authorize a generic drug via section viii. Consider the point as applied to this case. Caraco wishes to market a generic version of repaglinide for two (and only two) uses. Under the statute, the FDA could approve Caraco’s application so long as no patent covers those uses, regardless whether a patent protects yet a third method of using the drug. Novo agrees that Caraco could bring a counterclaim if Novo’s assertion of patent protec- tion for repaglinide lacked any basis—for example, if Novo held no patent, yet claimed rights to the pair of uses for —————— ordinary usage and the statutory context suggested it did not apply). 14 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court which Caraco seeks to market its drug. But because Novo has a valid patent on a different use, Novo argues that Caraco’s counterclaim evaporates. And that is so even though, once again, Caraco has no wish to market |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | even though, once again, Caraco has no wish to market its product for that patented use and the FDA stands ready, pursuant to the statute, to approve Caraco’s product for the other two. To put the matter simply, Novo thinks the counterclaim disappears because it has a patent for a method of use in which neither Caraco nor the FDA is interested at all. “It would take strong evidence to per- suade us that this is what Congress wrought.” Eli 496 U.S., 7. That “not an” sometimes (but some- times not) means “not any” is not enough. Novo argues that our reading must be wrong because Congress could have expressly “impose[d] additional qualifications” on the term “an approved method of us[e]”—and indeed did so in another place in the statute. Brief for Respondents 1; 21 U.S. C. Novo points here to section viii itself, which applies when the brand’s patent “does not claim a use for which the [ANDA] applicant is seeking approval.” §55(j)(2)(A)(viii) (emphasis added). But the mere possibility of clearer phrasing cannot defeat the most natural reading of a statute; if it could (with all due respect to Congress), we would interpret a great many statutes differently than we do. Nor does Congress’s use of more detailed language in another provision, enacted years earlier, persuade us to put the counterclaim clause at odds with its statutory context. That is especially so because we can turn this form of argument back around on Novo. Congress, after all, could have more clearly expressed Novo’s proposed meaning in the easiest of ways—by adding a single letter to make clear that “not an” really means “not any.” And indeed, Congress used a “not any” construction in the very next subclause, enacted at the very same time. See §55(j)(5)(C)(ii)(II) (“Subclause (I) does not authorize the Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 15 Opinion of the Court assertion of a claim in any [other] civil action”). So if we needed any proof that Congress knew how to say “not any” when it meant “not any,” here we find it. We think that sees, raises, and bests Novo’s argument. Our more essential point, though, has less gamesman- ship about it: We think that the “not any” construction does not appear in the relevant counterclaim provision because Congress did not mean what Novo wishes it had. And we think that is so because Congress meant (as it usually does) for the provision it enacted to fit within the statutory scheme—here, by facilitating the approval of non-infringing generic drugs under section viii. B Novo contends that Caraco’s |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | generic drugs under section viii. B Novo contends that Caraco’s counterclaim must fail for another, independent reason: On its view (as on the Fed- eral Circuit’s), the counterclaim does not provide a way to correct use codes because they are not “patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c)” of §55. Once again, we disagree. The statute does not define “patent information,” but a use code must qualify. It describes the method of use claimed in a patent. See (c)(2)(ii)(P)(), (e). That fits under any ordinary understanding of the language.7 —————— 7 Novo’s only counter is to redefine a use code. Novo argues that a use code need not be tied to the patent at all—that “[t]he relevant regula- tion requires [NDA] applicants to provide [only] ‘a description of each approved method of use or indication.’ ” Brief for Respondents 48 (quoting (c)(2)(ii)(P)(1)). Because an “indication” refers generally to what a drug does (here, treat diabetes), see Novo claims that a use code may sweep more broadly than the patent. But that is incorrect. First, Novo does not cite the regulations that specify the information required for publication—i.e., use codes. See §14.5(c)(2)(ii)(P)() (requiring a “description of the patented method of use as required for publication”); §14.5(e) (“[F]or each use patent,” FDA will publish “the approved indications or other conditions of use 16 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court The more difficult question arises from the “submitted under” phrase. The subsections mentioned there—(b) and (c) of §55—require an NDA applicant to submit specified information: “the patent number and the expiration date of any patent” claiming the drug or a method of its use. 21 U.S. C. (c)(2). According to Novo, only that information comes within the counterclaim provision. But subsections (b) and (c) as well govern the regulatory pro- cess by which brands provide additional patent infor- mation to the FDA, both before and after an NDA is ap- proved. In particular, those subsections provide the basis for the regulation requiring brands to submit use codes, see ; in issuing that regulation, the FDA noted that “[o]ur principal legal authority is section 505 of the act [codified at in conjunction with our general rulemaking authority.” 68 Fed. Reg. 6697–6698 (specifically referring to subsections (b) and (c)). And the form (Form 542) on which brands submit their use codes states that the information appearing there is “provided in accordance with Section [55](b) and (c).” App. 97. So use codes fall within the counterclaim’s ambit if the phrase “submitted under” reaches filings that not |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | ambit if the phrase “submitted under” reaches filings that not only subsec- tions (b) and (c) themselves, but also their implementing regulations require. Several of our cases support giving “under” this broad meaning. For example, in Eli –668, we examined a similar statutory reference to the “submis- sion of information under a Federal law which regulates —————— covered by a patent”). Those provisions (whether referring to methods of use, conditions of use, or indications) all demand a description of the patent. And second, even the provision Novo cites—which mandates the submission of additional material, not listed in the Orange Book— ties information about indications to patent coverage; that regulation requires (when quoted in full) that the brand provide “a description of each approved method of use or indication and related patent claim of the patent being submitted.” §14.5(c)(2)(ii)(P)(1). Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 17 Opinion of the Court the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs,” 5 U.S. C. We noted there that submitting information “under a Federal law” suggests doing so “in furtherance of or compliance with a comprehensive scheme of regula- tion.” Likewise, in 15 we held that a regulatory pro- ceeding “under section 554,” 5 U.S. C. meant any proceeding “subject to,” “governed by,” or conducted “by reason of the authority of ” that statutory provision. So too here. “Patent information submitted under subsection (b) or (c)” most naturally refers to patent in- formation provided as part of the “comprehensive scheme of regulation” premised on those subsections. Eli It includes everything (about patents) that the FDA requires brands to furnish in the proceed- ings “subject to,” “governed by,” or conducted “by reason of the authority of ” §§55(b) and (c). Ardestani, 502 U.S., at 15. The breadth of the term “under” becomes particu- larly clear when compared with other phrases—“described in” and “prescribed by”—appearing in neighboring provi- sions. See, e.g., 21 U.S. C. §55(c)(2) (“patent information described in subsection (b)”); §55(d)(6) (“patent infor- mation prescribed by subsection (b)”). Those phrases denote a patent number and expiration date and nothing more. In contrast, the word “under” naturally reaches beyond that most barebones information to other patent materials the FDA demands in the regulatory process. Once again, that congressional choice fits the broader statutory context. Use codes are pivotal to the FDA’s implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments—and no less so because a regulation, rather than the statute itself, requires their submission. Recall that those Amendments instruct the FDA (assuming other require- ments are met) to approve an ANDA filed with a section viii statement when it proposes to market |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | with a section viii statement when it proposes to market a drug for only 18 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court unpatented methods of use. To fulfill that charge, the FDA must determine whether any patent covers a particu- lar method of use; and to do that, the agency (which views itself as lacking expertise in patent matters, see at 4–5, and n. 2) relies on the use codes submitted in the regulatory process. See 68 Fed. Reg. 6682–668. An overbroad use code therefore throws a wrench into the FDA’s ability to approve generic drugs as the statute con- templates. So it is not surprising that the language Con- gress used in the counterclaim provision sweeps widely enough to embrace that filing. C Another aspect of the counterclaim provision—its de- scription of available remedies—dispatches whatever remains of Novo’s arguments. According to the statute, a successful claimant may obtain an order requiring the brand to “correct or delete” its patent information. Our interpretation of the statute gives content to both those remedies: It deletes a listing from the Orange Book when the brand holds no relevant patent and corrects the listing when the brand has misdescribed the patent’s scope. By contrast, Novo’s two arguments would all but read the term “correct” out of the statute. Consider first how Novo’s an-means-any contention would accomplish that result. Recall that on Novo’s view, a counterclaim can succeed only if the patent challenged does not claim either the drug or any approved method of using it. See But when a generic manufac- turer makes that showing, the remedy must be to “delete” the listing; no correction would be enough. Novo agrees with that proposition; “[a]t bottom,” Novo avers, “the counterclaim is a delisting provision.” Brief for Respond- ents 20. But that raises the obvious question: Why did Congress also include the term “correct” in the statute? Novo can come up with just one answer: The counter- Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 19 Opinion of the Court claim, it proposes, can correct erroneous patent numbers. Imagine, for example, that Novo mistakenly entered the number ’59, instead of ’58, when submitting information about its repaglinide patent for publication in the Orange Book. Then, Novo suggests, Caraco could bring a counter- claim to challenge the inaccurate listing (on the ground that ’59 does not claim any method of use), and the rem- edy would be “correct[ion]” (substituting an 8 for a 9). But we think Novo’s admission that this scenario would be “unusual,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, considerably understates the |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | be “unusual,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, considerably understates the matter. As Novo concedes, brands have every incen- tive to provide the right patent number in the first place, and to immediately rectify any error brought to their attention. See at 40–41. By doing so, they place both generic companies and the FDA on notice of their patents and thereby prevent infringement. And conversely, gener- ics have little or no incentive to bring a counterclaim that will merely replace one digit in the Orange Book with another. So we doubt Congress created a legal action to “correct” patent information just to fix such scrivener’s errors. See, e.g., TRW Andrews, 54 U.S. 19, 1 (refusing to adopt an interpretation of a statute that would render a piece of it “insignificant, if not wholly superfluous” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That would have been, in the most literal sense, to make a federal case out of nothing. The same problem afflicts Novo’s alternative conten- tion—that “patent information submitted under sub- section (b) or (c)” includes only numbers and expiration dates (and not use codes). Once again, we cannot think Congress included the remedy of “correct[ion]” so that courts could expunge typos in patent numbers. And not even Novo has proffered a way for the counterclaim to “correct” an erroneous expiration date. Suppose, for ex- ample, that a brand incorrectly lists the expiration date of a valid patent as 2018 rather than 2015. The counter- 20 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court claim would be useless: It authorizes a remedy only “on the ground that” the listed patent does not claim the drug or an approved method of using it—and notwithstanding the wrong expiration date, this patent does so. Alterna- tively, suppose the brand lists a patent as having a 2018 expiration date when in fact the patent has already lapsed. Then, a generic manufacturer could bring a coun- terclaim alleging that the patent no longer claims the drug or a method of using it—but the appropriate remedy would be deletion, not correction, of the brand’s listing. Novo’s reading of “patent information,” like its reading of “not an,” effectively deletes the term “correct” from the statute. III Novo finally advances two arguments relating to the counterclaim’s drafting history. Neither contention, how- ever, overcomes the statutory text and context. Indeed, consideration of the provision’s background only strength- ens our view of its meaning. A Novo first contends that our interpretation of the stat- ute “effectively resurrect[s] the scheme rejected by Con- gress.” Brief for Respondents 44 (quoting 20, n. |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | by Con- gress.” Brief for Respondents 44 (quoting 20, n. 4 (199)). In Novo notes, Congress failed to pass a bill that would have re- quired brands to file specified “patent information,” in- cluding, for method-of-use patents, a description of “the approved use covered by the [patent] claim.” S. 812, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., §10(a)(1), p. 7 (engrossed bill). That bill would have allowed a generic company to bring its own civil action—not merely a counterclaim in ongoing litiga- tion—to “delete” or “correct” the information filed. at 8. The Senate approved the bill, but the House of Repre- sentatives took no action on it. Novo argues that because Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 21 Opinion of the Court this failed legislation would have allowed a generic com- pany to challenge overbroad descriptions of a patent, we cannot read the statute Congress eventually enacted as doing so. We disagree. We see no reason to assume, as Novo does, that Congress rejected S. 812 because it required brands to submit patent information beyond a number and expi- ration date. Indeed, Novo’s argument highlights the perils of relying on the fate of prior bills to divine the meaning of enacted legislation. “A bill can be proposed for any num- ber of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as many others.” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 51 U.S. 159, ). S. 812 contained numerous items, including a title on import- ing prescription drugs (no controversy there!), that may have caused its failure. See S. 812, Tit. II. Moreover, what criticism there was of the bill’s mechanism for chal- lenging brands’ patent claims focused not on the specifica- tion of “patent information,” but instead on the creation of an independent cause of action—stronger medicine than the counterclaim Congress ultimately adopted.8 And finally, Novo ignores a likely cause for the redrafting of the provision on submitting information. Between S. 812’s demise and the counterclaim’s enactment, the FDA issued a rule requiring brands to supply material concerning method-of-use patents, including use codes. The drafters of the counterclaim provision knew about that rule,9 and —————— 8 See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. 15424 (remarks of Sen. Gregg) (“Probably the most significant issue is the fact that it creates a new cause of action”); at 1541–1542 (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (similar); at 1444 (similar). 9 See, e.g., Hearings on Barriers to Entry in the Pharmaceutical Mar- ketplace before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., 5–8 (200) (statement of Daniel Troy, Chief Counsel to the FDA); (“The |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | (statement of Daniel Troy, Chief Counsel to the FDA); (“The bill provides a critical complement to the work FDA has done in clarifying its regula- tions on patent listing, but it goes much further”). 22 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court had no need to duplicate its list of mandated filings. So the drafting history does not support Novo’s conclusion. If anything, the statute’s evolution indicates that Congress determined to enforce the FDA’s new listing provisions, including its use-code requirement, through the new counterclaim. B Novo next argues that Congress established the coun- terclaim only to solve the problem raised by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Mylan, 268 F.d 12—the impossi- bility of deleting an improperly listed patent from the Orange Book. In Mylan, as earlier described, a generic company alleged that a brand had listed a patent that covered neither the approved drug nor any method of using it, and brought an action seeking delisting. See The Federal Circuit held that no such action was available, even assuming the allegation was true. Because several legislators saw Mylan as “exemplif[ying]” brands’ “perceived abuse” of the FDA’s patent listing prac- tices, Brief for Respondents 5, Novo contends that we should construe the counterclaim provision to aid only a generic company that “finds itself in the same position as Mylan was in Mylan,” Supp. Brief in Opposition 5–6. Once again, we think not. Maybe Mylan triggered the legislative effort to enact a counterclaim, or maybe it didn’t: By the time Congress acted, it also had at hand an FTC study broadly criticizing brands’ patent listings and an FDA rule designed to address the very same issue. See 21. But even assuming Mylan “prompted the proposal” of the counterclaim, “whether that alone ac- counted for its enactment is quite a different question.” Eli 496 U.S., 70, n. Here, we think Mylan alerted Congress to a broader problem— that generic companies generally had no avenue to chal- lenge the accuracy of brands’ patent listings, and that the Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 2 Opinion of the Court FDA therefore could not approve proper applications to bring inexpensive drugs to market. The proof of that lies in the statute itself (where the best proof of what Congress means to address almost always resides). As we have de- scribed, the statute’s text and context demonstrate that the counterclaim is available not only (as in Mylan) when the patent listing is baseless, but also (as here) when it is overbroad. See at 10–20. In particular, Congress’s decision to allow a |
Justice Kagan | 2,012 | 3 | majority | Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/s | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/728300/caraco-pharmaceutical-laboratories-ltd-v-novo-nordisk-as/ | See at 10–20. In particular, Congress’s decision to allow a counterclaimant to seek “correct[ion]” of patent information explodes Novo’s theory, because the remedy for a Mylan-type impropriety is complete delisting. And to make matters still easier, Congress’s equation of the two situations—the one in Mylan and the one here— makes perfect sense. Whether a brand lists a patent that covers no use or describes a patent on one use as extend- ing to others, the brand submits misleading patent in- formation to the FDA. In doing so, the brand equally ex- ploits the FDA’s determination that it cannot police patent claims. And the brand’s action may in either case delay or block approval of a generic drug that infringes no patent— and that under the statute should go to market. See su- pra, at 4. That is the danger Caraco faces here, as much as it was the threat in Mylan: Novo seeks to preclude Caraco from selling repaglinide for unpatented uses until 2018, when Novo’s patent on a different use expires. Indeed, the need for the counterclaim is greater here than in Mylan. When a brand lists a patent that covers no use, a generic company has a pathway aside from the counterclaim to challenge the listing. As described ear- lier, the company may make a paragraph IV certification stating that the listed patent “is invalid or will not be infringed” by the generic drug. 21 U.S. C. see If the brand sues, the generic company can argue that its product would not infringe the patent. Using the counterclaim may enable a generic manufacturer to obtain delisting more quickly, see 24 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Opinion of the Court Tr. of Oral Arg. 54; but even without it, the company can eventually get a judgment of non-infringement enabling the FDA to approve its ANDA. In contrast, where (as here) a brand files an overbroad use code, a generic com- pany cannot use paragraph IV litigation to that end. A paragraph IV certification (unlike a section viii statement) requires the generic company to propose labeling identical to the brand’s; it cannot carve out any uses. See at 4. And that proposed label will necessarily infringe be- cause it will include the use(s) on which the brand does have a patent. So here, a paragraph IV suit cannot lead to a judgment enabling FDA approval; the counterclaim offers the only route to bring the generic drug to market for non-infringing uses. Novo’s view eliminates the coun- terclaim where it has the greatest value. IV The statutory counterclaim |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | Duren v. Missouri | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109965/duren-v-missouri/ | In this Court held that systematic exclusion of women during the jury-selection process, resulting in jury pools not "reasonably *359 representative" of the community, denies a criminal defendant his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a petit jury selected from a fair cross section of the community.[1] Under the system invalidated in a women could not serve on a jury unless she filed a written declaration of her willingness to do so.[2] As a result, although 53% of the persons eligible for jury service were women, less than 1% of the 1,800 persons whose names were drawn from the jury wheel during the year in which appellant 's jury was chosen were female. At the time of our decision in no other State provided that women could not serve on a jury unless they volunteered to serve.[3] However, five States, including Missouri, provided an automatic exemption from jury service for any women requesting not to serve.[4] Subsequent to *360 three of these States eliminated this exemption.[5] Only Missouri, respondent in this case, and Tennessee[6] continue to exempt women from jury service upon request.[7] Today we hold that such systematic exclusion of women that results in jury venires averaging less than 15% female violates the Constitution's fair-cross-section requirement. I Petitioner Duren was indicted in 1975 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Mo., for first-degree murder and first-degree robbery. In a pretrial motion to quash his petit jury panel, and again in a post-conviction motion for a new trial, he contended that his right to trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of his community was denied by provisions of Missouri law granting women who so request an automatic exemption from jury service.[8] Both motions were denied. *361 At hearings on these motions, petitioner established that the jury-selection process in Jackson County begins with the annual mailing of a questionnaire to persons randomly selected from the Jackson County voter registration list. Approximately 70,000 questionnaires were mailed in 1975. The questionnaire contains a list of occupations and other categories which are the basis under Missouri law for either disqualification[9] or exemption[10] from jury service.[11] Included on the questionnaire is a paragraph prominently addressed "TO WOMEN" that states in part: "Any woman who elects not to serve will fill out this paragraph and mail this questionnaire to the jury commissioner at once."[12] *362 A similar paragraph is addressed "TO MEN OVER 65 YEARS OF AGE," who are also statutorily exempt upon request.[13] The names of those sent questionnaires are placed in the master jury wheel for Jackson County, |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | Duren v. Missouri | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109965/duren-v-missouri/ | are placed in the master jury wheel for Jackson County, except for those returning the questionnaire who indicate disqualification or claim an applicable exemption. Summonses are mailed on a weekly basis to prospective jurors randomly drawn from the jury wheel. The summons, like the questionnaire, contains special directions to men over 65 and to women, this time advising them to return the summons by mail if they desire not to serve. The practice also is that even those women who do not return the summons are treated as having claimed exemption if they fail to appear for jury service on the appointed day.[14] Other persons seeking to claim an exemption at this stage must make written or personal application to the court. Petitioner established that according to the 1970 census, 54% of the adult inhabitants of Jackson County were women. He also showed that for the periods June-October 1975 and January-March 1976,[15] 11, 197 persons were summoned and that 2,992 of these, or 26.7%, were women. Of those summoned, 741 women and 4,378 men appeared for service. Thus, 14.5% (741 of 5,119) of the persons on the postsummons weekly venires during the period in which petitioner's jury was chosen were female.[16] In March 1976, when petitioner's *363 trial began, 15.5% of those on the weekly venires were women (110 of 707).[17] Petitioner's jury was selected from a 53-person panel on which there were 5 women; all 12 jurors chosen were men.[18] None of the foregoing statistical evidence was disputed. In affirming petitioner's conviction, the Missouri Supreme Court questioned two aspects of his statistical presentation. First, it considered the census figures inadequate because they were six years old and might not precisely mirror the percentage of women registered to vote. Second, petitioner had not unequivocally demonstrated the extent to which the low percentage of women appearing for jury service was due to the automatic exemption for women, rather than to sex-neutral exemptions such as that for persons over age 65. The court went on to hold, however, that even accepting petitioner's statistical proof, "the number of female names in the wheel, those summoned and those appearing were well above acceptable constitutional standards."[19] We granted certiorari, because of concern that the decision below is not consistent with our decision in II We think that in certain crucial respects the Missouri Supreme Court misconceived the nature of the fair-cross-section inquiry set forth in In holding that "petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community," we explained that "jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | Duren v. Missouri | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109965/duren-v-missouri/ | wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude *364 distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof." Ibid.[20] In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. A With respect to the first part of the prima facie test, without doubt established that women "are sufficiently numerous and distinct from men" so that "if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied." B The second prong of the prima facie case was established by petitioner's statistical presentation. Initially, the defendant must demonstrate the percentage of the community made up of the group alleged to be underrepresented, for this is the conceptual benchmark for the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement. In the State had stipulated that 53% of the population eligible for jury service[21] was female, while petitioner Duren has relied upon a census *365 measurement of the actual percentage of women in the community (54%). In the trial court, the State of Missouri never challenged these data. Although the Missouri Supreme Court speculated that changing population patterns between 1970 and 1976 and unequal voter registration by men and women[22] rendered the census figures a questionable frame of reference,[23] there is no evidence whatsoever in the record to suggest that the 1970 census data significantly distorted the percentage of women in Jackson County at the time of trial. Petitioner's presentation was clearly adequate prima facie evidence of population characteristics for the purpose of making a fair-cross-section violation.[24] Given petitioner's proof that in the relevant community slightly over half of the adults are women, we must disagree with the conclusion of the court below that jury venires containing approximately 15% women are "reasonably representative" *366 of this community. If the percentage of women appearing on jury pools in Jackson County had precisely mirrored the percentage of women in the population, more than one of every two prospective jurors would have been female. In fact, less than one of every six prospective jurors was female; 85% of the average jury was male. Such a gross discrepancy between the percentage of women in jury venires and |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | Duren v. Missouri | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109965/duren-v-missouri/ | discrepancy between the percentage of women in jury venires and the percentage of women in the community requires the conclusion that women were not fairly represented in the source from which petit juries were drawn in Jackson County. C Finally, in order to establish a prima facie case, it was necessary for petitioner to show that the underrepresentation of women, generally and on his venire, was due to their systematic exclusion in the jury-selection process. Petitioner's proof met this requirement. His undisputed demonstration that a large discrepancy occurred not just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation was systematic that is, inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized. Petitioner Duren's statistics and other evidence also established when in the selection process the systematic exclusion took place. There was no indication that underrepresentation of women occurred at the first stage of the selection process the questionnaire canvass of persons randomly selected from the relevant voter registration list. The first sign of a systematic discrepancy is at the next stagethe construction of the jury wheel from which persons are randomly summoned for service. Less than 30% of those summoned were female, demonstrating that a substantially larger number of women answering the questionnaire claimed either ineligibility or exemption from jury service. Moreover, at the summons stage women were not only given another opportunity to *367 claim exemption, but also were presumed to have claimed exemption when they did not respond to the summons. Thus, the percentage of women at the final, venire, stage (14.5%) was much lower than the percentage of women who were summoned for service (26.7%). The resulting disproportionate and consistent exclusion of women from the jury wheel and at the venire stage was quite obviously due to the system by which juries were selected. Petitioner demonstrated that the underrepresentation of women in the final pool of prospective jurors was due to the operation of Missouri's exemption criteriawhether the automatic exemption for women or other statutory exemptionsas implemented in Jackson County. Women were therefore systematically underrepresented within the meaning of[25] III The demonstration of a prima facie fair-cross-section violation by the defendant is not the end of the inquiry into whether a constitutional violation has occurred. We have explained that "States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of the community." However, we cautioned that "[t]he right to a proper jury cannot be overcome |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | Duren v. Missouri | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109965/duren-v-missouri/ | that "[t]he right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds," Rather, it requires that a significant state interest be manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the *368 jury-selection process, such as exemption criteria, that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group.[26] The Supreme Court of Missouri suggested that the low percentage of women on jury venires in Jackson County may have been due to a greater number of women than of men qualifying for or claiming permissible exemptions, such as those for persons over 65, teachers, and government Respondent further argues that petitioner has not proved that the exemption for women had "any effect" on or was responsible for the underrepresentation of women on venires. Brief for Respondent 15. However, once the defendant has made a prima facie showing of an infringement of his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, it is the State that bears the burden of justifying this infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest. See -535. Assuming, arguendo, that the exemptions mentioned *369 by the court below would justify failure to achieve a fair community cross section on jury venires, the State must demonstrate that these exemptions caused the underrepresentation complained of. The record contains no such proof, and mere suggestions or assertions to that effect are insufficient. The other possible cause of the disproportionate exclusion of women on Jackson County jury venires is, of course, the automatic exemption for women. Neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor respondent in its brief has offered any substantial justification for this exemption. In response to questioning at oral argument, counsel for respondent ventured that the only state interest advanced by the exemption is safeguarding the important role played by women in home and family life.[27] But exempting all women because of the preclusive domestic responsibilities of some women is insufficient justification for their disproportionate exclusion on jury venires. What we stated in with respect to the system there challenged under which women could "opt in" for jury service is equally applicable to Missouri's "opt out" exemption: "It is untenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any women from their present duties. This may be the case with many, and it may be burdensome to sort out those who should be exempted from those who should serve. But that task is performed in the case |
Justice White | 1,979 | 6 | majority | Duren v. Missouri | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109965/duren-v-missouri/ | should serve. But that task is performed in the case of men, and the administrative convenience in dealing with women as a class is insufficient justification for diluting the quality of community judgment represented by the jury in criminal trials. "If it was ever the case that women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required to perform jury service, that time has long *370 since passed." 419 U.S., -535, 537 We recognize that a State may have an important interest in assuring that those members of the family responsible for the care of children are available to do so. An exemption appropriately tailored to this interest would, we think, survive a fair-cross-section challenge. We stress, however, that the constitutional guarantee to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community requires that States exercise proper caution in exempting broad categories of persons from jury service. Although most occupational and other reasonable exemptions may inevitably involve some degree of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness, any category expressly limited to a group in the community of sufficient magnitude and distinctiveness so as to be within the fair-cross-section requirement such as womenruns the danger of resulting in underrepresentation sufficient to constitute a prima facie violation of that constitutional requirement. We also repeat the observation made in that it is unlikely that reasonable exemptions, such as those based on special hardship, incapacity, or community needs, "would pose substantial threats that the remaining pool of jurors would not be representative of the community." The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. MR. |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Morris v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111606/morris-v-mathews/ | The question presented in this case is whether a state appellate court provided an adequate remedy for a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment by modifying a jeopardy-barred conviction to that of a lesser included offense that is not jeopardy barred. I On February 17, 1978, respondent James Michael Mathews and Steven Daugherty robbed the Alexandria Bank in Alexandria, Ohio. After an automobile chase, the police finally surrounded the two men when they stopped at a farmhouse. Soon thereafter, the police heard shots fired inside the house, *239 and respondent then emerged from the home and surrendered to police. When the officers entered the house, they found Daugherty dead, shot once in the head and once in the chest. The police also found the money stolen from the bank hidden in the pantry. Once in custody, respondent gave a series of statements to law enforcement officials. In his first statement, given one hour after his surrender, respondent claimed that Daugherty and another man had forced him to aid in the bank robbery by threatening to kill both respondent and his girlfriend. Respondent denied shooting Daugherty. In the second statement, given the same day, respondent again denied shooting Daugherty, but admitted that no other man was involved with the robbery, and that he and Daugherty alone had planned and performed the crime. Two days later, respondent gave a third statement to police in which he again confessed to robbing the bank. Respondent also related that after he and Daugherty arrived at the farmhouse, he had run back out to their van to retrieve the stolen money, and on his way back inside, he "heard a muffled shot from inside the house." App. Upon investigation, respondent discovered that Daugherty had shot himself in the head. Respondent claimed that Daugherty was still conscious, and called to him by name. The County Coroner initially ruled Daugherty's death to be a suicide. The Coroner made this determination, however, before receiving the results of an autopsy performed by a forensic pathologist. This report indicated that Daugherty had received two wounds from the same shotgun. The initial shot had been fired while Daugherty was standing, and entered the left side of his face. This shot fractured Daugherty's skull, and the mere force of the blast would have rendered him immediately unconscious. This wound was not fatal. The second shot was fired while Daugherty was lying on his back, and was fired directly into his heart from extremely close range. This shot was instantaneously fatal. *20 As a result of this evidence, the Coroner |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Morris v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111606/morris-v-mathews/ | fatal. *20 As a result of this evidence, the Coroner issued a supplemental death certificate, listing "multiple gun shot wounds" as the cause of death. Record 295. Based on the Coroner's first opinion that Daugherty took his own life, the State did not charge respondent with Daugherty's death. Instead, he was indicted under (Supp. 198) on aggravated robbery charges.[1] Respondent pleaded guilty on May 17 and was sentenced to a term of incarceration of from 7 to 25 years. Two days after entering his guilty plea, respondent made the first of two statements in which he admitted having shot Daugherty. Respondent maintained that Daugherty initially had shot himself in the head, and that he was still alive when respondent discovered him after returning to the farmhouse with the stolen money. Acting on the theory that, if Daugherty were dead, respondent could claim that he was kidnaped and had not voluntarily robbed the bank, respondent "put [the gun] an inch or two from [Daugherty's] chest and pulled the trigger." App. 6.[2] Respondent's second *21 statement, given one week later, reiterated these same points. On June 1, 1978, the State charged respondent with the aggravated murder of Steven Daugherty. Ohio Rev. Code 2903.01 (1982) defines aggravated murder, in part, as "purposely caus[ing] the death of another while fleeing immediately after committing aggravated robbery."[3] The aggravated robbery referred to in the indictment was the armed robbery of the Alexandria Bank to which respondent had previously pleaded guilty. The state trial court denied respondent's pretrial motion to dismiss the aggravated murder indictment as violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury as to the elements of the offense of aggravated murder. *22 The judge also instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of murder as follows: "If you find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of aggravated murder, your verdict must be guilty of that crime and in that event you will not consider any lesser offense. "But if you find that the State failed to prove the killing was done while the defendant was committing or fleeing immediately after committing aggravated robbery, but that the killing was nonetheless purposely done, you will proceed with your deliberations and decide whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the lesser crime or murder. "The crime of murder is distinguished from aggravated murder by the State's failure to prove that the killing was done while the defendant was committing or |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Morris v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111606/morris-v-mathews/ | the killing was done while the defendant was committing or fleeing immediately after committing the crime of aggravated robbery." App. 21. The jury found respondent guilty of aggravated murder, and the court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. Respondent appealed his conviction, claiming that his trial for aggravated murder following his conviction for aggravated robbery violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Ohio Court of Appeals, Fifth Judicial District, affirmed his conviction, State v. Mathews, CA No. 2578 and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to grant discretionary review. State v. Mathews, No. 79-132 This Court granted respondent's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the Double Jeopardy Clause, as construed by this Court in Vitale, barred respondent's conviction for aggravated murder. State v. Mathews, No. 2578 The *23 court noted, however, that 2903.01 defines aggravated murder as purposely causing the death of another while committing certain felonies, and that 2903.02 defines murder simply as purposely causing the death of another. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-26.[] In respondent's trial, therefore, "if all the facts relating to the aggravated robbery of which he was convicted are excluded from consideration of the court and jury, the defendant was still charged with and convicted of murder in that he did purposely cause the death of Steven Daugherty on the date charged." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction of aggravated murder to murder and reduced respondent's sentence to an indefinite term of from 15 years to life. at A-27.[5] Once again, the Ohio Supreme Court denied respondent's motion to appeal, and this Court denied his subsequent petition for certiorari review. Respondent then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Applying the reasoning of the Ohio Court of Appeals, *2 the District Court denied respondent's petition. No. C-1-81-83 (WD Ohio, Apr. 19, 1983). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Although refusing to hold that in a case like this a new trial on the nonbarred charge is always necessary, the court held that "a conviction obtained in violation of the double jeopardy clause cannot be modified if the defendant can show that there was a `reasonable possibility that he was prejudiced' by the double jeopardy violation," and that " `an exceedingly small showing would suffice.' " quoting Apparently agreeing with respondent's assertion that "evidence was admitted in his trial for aggravated murder that would not have been admissible in a trial |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Morris v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111606/morris-v-mathews/ | murder that would not have been admissible in a trial for murder," and stating that the jury "may have [been] prejudiced" by that evidence, the court concluded that respondent had established a sufficient possibility of prejudice to warrant a new trial on the murder charge.[6] We granted certiorari, and now reverse. II As an initial matter, we note several issues that are not in dispute. First, the State concedes that under our cases the prosecution of respondent for aggravated murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Similarly, respondent concedes that the Clause would not prevent the State from trying him for murder. Next, all of the courts that have reviewed this case have agreed that, in finding respondent guilty of aggravated murder, the jury necessarily found that he "purposely cause[d] the death of another," which is the definition of murder under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2903.02 (1982). See n. Finally, this is not a "harmless *25 error" case: allowing respondent to be tried for aggravated murder was error, and it was not in any sense harmless. With these considerations aside, the only issue before us is whether reducing respondent's conviction for aggravated murder to a conviction for murder is an adequate remedy for the double jeopardy violation. Respondent argues that, because the trial for aggravated murder should never have occurred, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State from taking advantage of the jeopardy-barred conviction by converting it into a conviction for the lesser crime of murder. He submits that a new trial must be granted whether or not there is a showing of prejudice. Respondent relies heavily on but his reliance is misplaced. Price was tried for murder and convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. After that conviction was reversed on appeal, there was another trial for murder and another conviction of the lesser crime of manslaughter. We held that the second conviction could not stand because Price had been impliedly acquitted of murder at the first trial and could not be tried again on that charge. Nor could we "determine whether or not the murder charge against petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence." This holding in Price did not impose an automatic retrial rule whenever a defendant is tried for a jeopardy-barred crime and is convicted of a lesser included offense. Rather, the Court relied on the likelihood that the conviction for manslaughter had been influenced by the trial on the murder charge that the charge of the greater |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Morris v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111606/morris-v-mathews/ | the murder charge that the charge of the greater offense for which the jury was unwilling to convict also made the jury less willing to consider the defendant's innocence on the lesser charge. That basis for finding or presuming prejudice is not present here. The jury did not acquit Mathews of the greater offense of aggravated murder, but found him guilty of that charge and, a fortiori, of the lesser offense of murder as well. *26 395 U.S. 78 also strongly indicates that to prevail here, Mathews must show that trying him on the jeopardy-barred charge tainted his conviction for the lesser included offense. Benton was tried for both larceny and burglary. The jury acquitted him on the larceny count, but found him guilty of burglary. His conviction was later set aside because the jury had been improperly sworn. Benton again was tried for both burglary and larceny, and the second jury found him guilty of both offenses. The Maryland Court of Appeals held there had been no double jeopardy violation, but we disagreed, ruling that the Double Jeopardy Clause required setting aside the larceny conviction and sentence. Benton urged that his burglary conviction must also fall because certain evidence admitted at his second trial would not have been admitted had he been tried for burglary alone. This evidence, he claimed, prejudiced the jury and influenced their decision to convict him of burglary. We rejected that argument, saying both that "[i]t [was] not obvious on the face of the record that the burglary conviction was affected by the double jeopardy violation," and that we should not make this kind of evidentiary determination "unaided by prior consideration by the state courts." We thus vacated the judgment of the Maryland court, and remanded for further proceedings. Neither Benton nor Price suggests that a conviction for an unbarred offense is inherently tainted if tried with a jeopardy-barred charge. Instead, both cases suggest that a new trial is required only when the defendant shows a reliable inference of prejudice. We perceive no basis for departing from this approach here; for except that murder was a lesser offense included in the aggravated murder charge rather than a separate charge, there is no difference between this case and Benton for double jeopardy purposes. Accordingly, we hold that when a jeopardy-barred conviction is reduced to a conviction for a lesser included offense *27 which is not jeopardy barred, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | majority | Morris v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111606/morris-v-mathews/ | of the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred offense. In this situation, we believe that a "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Cf. 66 U.S. 668, (198). After all, one of the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent multiple prosecutions and to protect an individual from suffering the embarrassment, anxiety, and expense of another trial for the same offense, 355 U.S. 18, In cases like this, therefore, where it is clear that the jury necessarily found that the defendant's conduct satisfies the elements of the lesser included offense, it would be incongruous always to order yet another trial as a means of curing a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court of Appeals thus was correct in rejecting respondent's per se submission, but it was nevertheless too ready to find that he had made the necessary showing of prejudice. First, the court's "reasonable possibility" standard, which could be satisfied by "an exceedingly small showing," was not sufficiently demanding. To prevail in a case like this, the defendant must show that, but for the improper inclusion of the jeopardy-barred charge, the result of the proceeding probably would have been different. Second, the Court of Appeals appeared to agree with respondent that certain evidence admitted at his trial would not have been admitted in a separate trial for murder, but it did not expressly say so, nor did it refer to any Ohio authorities. 75 F. 2d, The State submits that under Ohio law, conduct of a defendant tending to show either "his motive or intent," or his "scheme, plan or system," is admissible, "notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant." *28 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 295.59 (1982).[7] See generally 2 Ohio St. 2d 166, We normally accept a court of appeals' view of state law, but if this case turns on the admissibility of the challenged evidence in a separate trial for murder, the issue deserves a more thorough consideration by the lower court. Finally, the court's observation that the admission of questionable evidence "may have prejudiced the jury" falls far short of a considered conclusion that if the evidence at issue was not before the jury in a separate trial for murder, there is a reasonable probability that respondent would not have been convicted. Because the Court of Appeals' legal and factual basis for ordering the writ of habeas corpus to issue was seriously flawed, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court |
Justice Brennan | 1,970 | 13 | dissenting | North Carolina v. Alford | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108215/north-carolina-v-alford/ | Last Term, this Court held, over my dissent, that a plea of guilty may validly be induced by an unconstitutional threat to subject the defendant to the risk of death, so long as the plea is entered in open court and the defendant is represented by competent counsel who is aware of the threat, albeit not of its unconstitutionality. ; Today the Court makes clear that its previous holding was intended to apply even when the record demonstrates that the actual effect of the unconstitutional threat was to induce a guilty plea from a defendant who was unwilling to admit his guilt. I adhere to the view that, in any given case, the influence of such an unconstitutional threat "must necessarily be given weight in determining the voluntariness of a plea." And, without reaching the question whether due process permits the entry of judgment upon a plea of guilty accompanied by a contemporaneous denial of acts constituting the crime,[1] I believe that at the very least such a denial of guilt is also a relevant factor in determining whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. With these factors in mind, it is sufficient in my view to state that the facts set out in the majority opinion demonstrate that Alford was "so gripped by fear of the death penalty"[2] that his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary but was "the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint." Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | concurring | Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112217/coit-independence-joint-venture-v-fslic/ | I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion. I refrain from joining Part IV and thus concur only in the judgment. My concern with Part IV is that it seems to me to amount to only an advisory opinion on what the Bank Board may do, based on a surmise of what the Bank Board might someday conclude it must do in order to liquidate "in an orderly manner." JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the judgment of the Court, and join Parts I through III of its opinion. I do not join Part IV, however, because there is no precedent and in my view no sound policy justification for (1) using the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a basis for pre-empting state law, and (2) imposing upon the Bank Board the obligation to set forth by rule a specific time period within which FSLIC must act upon claims. I This case is not about exhaustion; it is about pre-emption. To my knowledge, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has never been used, as it is in today's opinion, as a means of pre-empting state law. We normally apply the doctrine by refusing to entertain a federal claim unless and until the plaintiff has resorted to the federally created administrative remedies for the grievance underlying that claim. See, e. g., Renegotiation ; That is a fair assessment of the congressional intent in creating the administrative remedies. In the present case, by contrast, the Court applies what purports to be the exhaustion doctrine, not to determine when Congress wished federal claims to be first assertible, but to determine when Congress wished to prohibit the assertion *589 of state claims. The claims at issue in this case and, I expect, in most litigation involving insolvent thrifts arise under state law; and the suit was originally brought, before removal, in a Texas court. Part IV of the Court's opinion says that the Bank Board can exclude these Texas-law claims from federal court until they have first been acted upon by FSLIC, or until a specific time limit for such action has passed. Moreover, unless that statement is devoid of practical effect (requiring no more than the remand of removed cases to the state courts), presumably the Court means that the Board can exclude these "unexhausted" claims from state courts as well. What is enough to suggest a congressional intent to defer the maturing of a federal cause of action is not enough to suggest a congressional intent to |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | concurring | Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112217/coit-independence-joint-venture-v-fslic/ | action is not enough to suggest a congressional intent to override state law. We have repeatedly said that federal law pre-empts state law in traditional fields of state regulation only when "that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress," ; see also Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer ; Hillsborough ; These assurances are meaningless if the directions to FSLIC to "pay all valid credit obligations," 12 U.S. C. 1729(b)(1)(B), to "liquidate assets in an orderly manner," 12 U.S. C. 1729(b)(1)(A)(v), and to "settle, compromise, or release claims and to do all other things that may be necessary in connection therewith," 12 U.S. C. 1729(d), can be interpreted as a congressional authorization for the suspension of rights arising under state usury and contract law, and for the exclusion of state-court jurisdiction. II It is, however, an understatement to say that what is involved is merely a "suspension" of state-created rights. The *590 suspension becomes an extinguishment if, during the period while the plaintiff is pursuing his required "exhaustion" of federal remedies for his state claim, the state statute of limitations expires. To meet this difficulty, and thereby to make its pre-emption of state law seem less drastic, the Court imposes upon the Bank Board the requirement that its regulations "place a clear and reasonable time limit on FSLIC's consideration of whether to pay, settle, or disallow claims." Ante, at 586. Of course even this does not completely solve the problem. Even if the Bank Board establishes a flat 90-day limit, those state-created claims whose statute of limitations happens to expire during that 90-day period will be extinguished. The only complete solution would be to require tolling of the state statutes of limitations during this 90-day period but that is so much more obviously a pre-emption of state law, and so difficult to conceal under the guise of "exhaustion," that the Court avoids it, leaving state claimants without remedy if their causes of action expire before federal "exhaustion" has occurred. But to achieve this limited benefit, the Court creates yet another novel doctrine that we may have cause to regret. I know of no precedent for the proposition that an agency's regulations are "arbitrary, capricious" or "otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S. C. 706(2)(A), simply because they do not set forth a precise time by which the agency will have acted. To be sure, particular agency action becomes arbitrary and capricious when it is too long delayed, where-fore the Administrative Procedure Act instructs reviewing courts to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," 5 U.S. C. 706(1) |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | concurring | Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112217/coit-independence-joint-venture-v-fslic/ | action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," 5 U.S. C. 706(1) (emphasis added). But that determination is made on a case-by-case basis. See, e. g., Sierra ; Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, 238 U. S. App. D. C. 271, 285, The equivalent, in the present context, would be *591 to say that exhaustion has been completed when, in the particular case, FSLIC has taken too long to make up its mind. See, e. g., ; Environmental Defense Fund, But to say that the Bank Board must establish, for all cases, a specified cut-off date is to impose, contrary to our case law, a requirement that appears neither in the Administrative Procedure Act nor in FSLIC's organic law. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 4 U.S. 519, The only thing to be said for the invention is that it somewhat reduces the harm caused by invention of the "exhaustion" requirement. One distortion has led to another. * * * It seems to me that, in Part IV of its opinion, the Court labors courageously but in the last analysis unsuccessfully to supply what is lacking in FSLIC's organic law to cover the extraordinary situation with which the agency is now confronted. Ordinarily, the filing of a lawsuit against an insolvent thrift would pose no major problem. Service of summons in the suit would itself constitute notice of the claim, and if FSLIC was interested in granting or settling the claim it could request the state or federal court to defer further proceedings for a reasonable time pending settlement negotiations. It is hard to imagine that any court would deny such a request. It is only the current enormous volume of claims against insolvent thrifts, in a diversity of courts, that makes it impracticable for FSLIC to proceed in this fashion. I do not think it our role to supply the emergency provisions Congress has not enacted and we are not much good at it anyway, since I doubt that (even at the expense of making some bad law) we have succeeded in giving FSLIC meaningful relief. The agency's main problem, I suspect, is that the number of claims it must review is so high that it cannot give courts assurances that it will be able to address *592 settlement within a "reasonable time." Today's opinion does nothing to solve that. Congress is currently considering legislation directed towards the so-called "Savings and Loan crisis," Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, S. 413, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), and instead of the dicta |
Justice Blackmun | 1,981 | 11 | majority | American Express Co. v. Koerner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110514/american-express-co-v-koerner/ | The question presented is whether a creditor must follow the requirements specified in 1974 by the Fair Credit Billing Act, Tit. III, for the correction of billing errors, when both a corporation and an individual officer are liable for a debt. I The Fair Credit Billing Act added a number of provisions to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Tit. I, A primary provision, and the one at issue in this case, is 161 (a), as so added. 15 U.S. C. 1666 (a).[1] This section applies whenever a creditor transmits *235 to an obligor "a statement of the obligor's account in connection with an extension of consumer credit." If the *236 obligor believes that the statement contains a billing error,[2] he then may send the creditor a written notice setting forth that belief, indicating the amount of the error and the reasons supporting his belief that it is an error. If the creditor receives this notice within 60 days of transmitting the statement of account, 161 (a) imposes two separate obligations upon the creditor. Within 30 days, it must send a written acknowledgment that it has received the notice. And, within 90 days *237 or two complete billing cycles, whichever is shorter, the creditor must investigate the matter and either make appropriate corrections in the obligor's account or send a written explanation of its belief that the original statement sent to the obligor was correct. The creditor must send its explanation before making any attempt to collect the disputed amount. A creditor that fails to comply with 161 (a) forfeits its right to collect the first $50 of the disputed amount including finance charges. 161 (e), 15 U.S. C. 1666 (e). In addition, 161 (d) provides that, pursuant to regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, a creditor operating an "open end consumer credit plan" may not restrict or close an account due to an obligor's failure to pay a disputed amount until the creditor has sent the written explanation required by 161 (a). Every creditor under an "open end consumer credit plan" must disclose the protections available under 161 to the obligor. This disclosure must occur at the time the account is opened and at semiannual intervals thereafter. See 127 (a) (8), 15 U.S. C. 1637 (a) (8). II This case presents a dispute over the applicability of 161. The relevant facts, as the District noted, are largely undisputed. On November 16, 1965, prior to the enactment of the TILA, John E. Koerner & Co., Inc., applied for a credit card account with petitioner American Express Company. The application was |
Justice Blackmun | 1,981 | 11 | majority | American Express Co. v. Koerner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110514/american-express-co-v-koerner/ | card account with petitioner American Express Company. The application was for a "company account" designed for business customers. App. 27a. The Koerner Company asked American Express to issue cards bearing the company's name to respondent Louis R. Koerner, Sr., and four other officers of the corporation. Respondent was required to sign a "company account" form, agreeing that he would be jointly and severally liable with the company for all charges incurred through the use of the company card that was issued to him. at 28a. American Express, before issuing the cards, investigated *238 the company's credit rating, but not that of respondent or the other officers. American Express billed the Koerner Company for all charges arising from the use of the five cards issued for the company account. It sent a monthly statement showing the total due and listing individual subtotals for each of the five users. Although respondent employed his card mostly for business-related expenses, he used it occasionally for personal expenses. When he did so, he paid for these items by sending his personal check to American Express. Charges for his business-related expenses were paid by the company. In 1975, a dispute arose between the Koerner Company and American Express concerning charges that appeared on the company account. American Express had billed the company for flight insurance for three business trips made by company employees, and for renewal fees for two of the cards that the company claimed were no longer desired. The total amount in dispute, which the company refused to pay, was $55. Company officials wrote to American Express several times about this. The record does not indicate that American Express responded in any way prior to November 1976.[3] On September 28, 1976, respondent attempted to use his card to purchase a plane ticket for a business trip. After getting in touch with American Express, the ticket agent requested that respondent speak by telephone with an American Express employee. This employee informed respondent that the account was canceled because of delinquency in payment. She instructed the ticket agent to cut respondent's card in two and return it to him. Shortly thereafter, respondent filed this action in the United States District for the Eastern District of Louisiana. He alleged that American Express had canceled the *239 account because of the Koerner Company's refusal to pay the disputed charges and in retaliation for the many complaints that had been made by the company in its attempt to resolve the dispute. Jurisdiction was based upon 130 of the TILA, 15 U.S. C. 1640, which provides for the recovery of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,981 | 11 | majority | American Express Co. v. Koerner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110514/american-express-co-v-koerner/ | 15 U.S. C. 1640, which provides for the recovery of actual damages sustained by any person as the result of a creditor's failure to comply with various provisions of the TILA, including 161, and grants jurisdiction of such actions to the federal district courts. The complaint sought damages of $25,000 for "inconvenience, mental anguish, grief, aggravation, and humiliation." App. 20a.[4] Respondent, invoking diversity jurisdiction, also sought damages under Louisiana law. The District granted American Express' motion for summary judgment. It held that both 161, which applies only to "an extension of consumer credit," and 4 (1), 15 U.S. C. 1603 (1), which exempts "[c]redit transactions involving extensions of credit for business or commercial purposes" from most of the provisions of the TILA,[5] required the conclusion that the procedures established by 161 do not apply to an account opened in the *240 name of a corporation in reliance upon the corporation's credit.[6] The United States of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Noting that respondent was jointly and severally liable with the company for all debts incurred by his use of the card, the court concluded: "If [American Express] can recover from a consumer, then it must abide by the requirements of [ 161] for correction of billing errors in a consumer's credit card statement. The credit card company cannot have it both ways" Because of the significance of the issue in the enforcement of the TILA, we granted certiorari. III The threshold inquiry under 161 (a) is whether the creditor has transmitted to an obligor " a statement of the obligor's account in connection with an extension of consumer credit." If there has been no extension of "consumer credit," the section imposes no obligation upon a creditor, and the creditor is free to adopt its own procedures for responding to a customer's complaint about a billing error. We conclude that, on the undisputed facts of this case, respondent has failed to show that American Express has extended him "consumer credit" in any relevant transaction. Section 161 (a), therefore, is not applicable to the dispute between these parties.[7] In order for there to be an extension of consumer credit, *241 there first must be an extension of "credit." The TILA's definition of "credit" is contained in 3 (e), 15 U.S. C. 1602 (e): "The term 'credit' means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment."[8] Thus, a credit card company such as American Express extends credit to an individual or an organization when it opens or renews |
Justice Blackmun | 1,981 | 11 | majority | American Express Co. v. Koerner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110514/american-express-co-v-koerner/ | an individual or an organization when it opens or renews an account, as well as when the cardholder actually uses the credit card to make purchases. When the account is opened or renewed, the creditor has granted a right "to incur debt and defer its payment"; when the card is used, the creditor has allowed the cardholder "to defer payment of debt." An extension of credit is an extension of "consumer credit" if the conditions specified in the statute's definition of "consumer" are also satisfied. Section 3 (h) of the TILA, 15 U.S. C. 1602 (h), defines "consumer" as follows: "The adjective `consumer,' used with reference to a credit transaction, characterizes the transaction as one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes." Two elements thus must be present in every "consumer credit" transaction: the party to whom the credit is extended must be a natural person, and the money, property, or services received by that person must be "primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes."[9] We therefore conclude that the of Appeals erred in holding respondent to be a "consumer" without deciding whether American *242 Express had extended him credit primarily for any of the purposes specified in 3 (h). If it had considered this issue, the only permissible conclusion for it to reach would have been that the undisputed facts of this case establish that the threshold requirement of 161 (a)an "extension of consumer credit"has not been satisfied because none of the credit transactions relevant to the billing dispute was entered into "primarily" for consumer purposes. The language of 161 (a) does not distinguish between the two types of transactions included in the definition of "credit" or indicate which of them must satisfy the definition of "consumer" in order for the section to be applicable. There are several possibilities. The relevant extension of credit may be only the creation or renewal of the account. Under this view, adopted by the District if an account is opened by a natural person, its overall purpose must be considered. If the account is opened primarily for consumer purposes, 161 (a) applies, even if the cardholder uses the card for an occasional nonconsumer purchase. On the other hand, the language might be interpreted to call for a transaction-by-transaction approach. With such an approach, 161 would apply if the transaction that is the subject of the dispute is a consumer credit transaction, regardless |
Justice Blackmun | 1,981 | 11 | majority | American Express Co. v. Koerner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110514/american-express-co-v-koerner/ | subject of the dispute is a consumer credit transaction, regardless of the overall purpose of the account. A third alternative would be to combine the two approaches by holding 161 applicable to all disputes that arise under an account that is characterized as a consumer credit account as well as to any dispute concerning an individual transaction that is an extension of consumer credit, even if the overall purpose of the account is primarily a business one. We need not choose among these alternatives in order to decide this case,[] for we find that respondent is unable to *243 succeed under any of them. The undisputed facts of this case reveal that the Koerner Company obtained the right "to incur debt and defer its payment" from American Express *244 primarily for business, not consumer, purposes. In addition, the specific transactions that were the subject of the dispute between the company and American Express also were business transactions. The facts of this case, therefore, are not encompassed within any possible interpretation of the phrase "extension of consumer credit" in 161 (a). The overall purpose of the Koerner Company's account is clear, and respondent has not claimed that the company sought its account with American Express primarily for consumer purposes. Rather, the company applied for a "company account" using a form supplied by American Express for such an account. App. 27a. Respondent's separate application for a supplementary credit card for the same account also was submitted on a company account form. at 28a. The only credit references submitted to American Express on these forms were those of the Koerner Company, and respondent has admitted that the account was billed to the Koerner Company as a business account. at 25a and 30a. We agree with the District that this evidence is sufficient to indicate that the account was opened primarily for business or commercial purposes. See The evidence submitted by respondent does not weaken this conclusion. In fact, it confirms it. Respondent admitted that he used the card mostly for business purposes.[11] His answers to petitioner's interrogatories identified no more than seven nonbusiness uses of the card between 1972 and 1976. App. 42a-43a.[12] *245 We do not suggest that it always will be easy to determine whether the opening of a credit account involves an extension of consumer credit. The of Appeals noted that often it is difficult to characterize the overall purpose of a credit card account that allows for a large number of individual transactions. 615 F.2d,[13] It is clear, however, that the Fair Credit Billing Act requires creditors and the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,981 | 11 | majority | American Express Co. v. Koerner | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110514/american-express-co-v-koerner/ | that the Fair Credit Billing Act requires creditors and the courts to undertake this task. See n. On this record, there can be no dispute that the Koerner Company's account was not covered by 3 (h)'s definition of "consumer," because it was not opened "primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes." Similarly, the transactions that were the subject of the underlying dispute cannot be characterized as extensions of consumer credit. These transactions involved either charges for flight insurance added to the cost of airline tickets purchased with the Koerner Company's American Express card or charges for the renewal of cards that the company asserted were no longer wanted. None of these charges was an extension of consumer credit. Respondent's answers to interrogatories admitted that the airline tickets were purchased for business trips. App. 41a-42a. The renewal charges could be considered charges for an extension of consumer credit only if the overall purposes of the account were consumer purposes. As we already have seen, respondent has provided no evidence indicating that this was so. Inasmuch as the record establishes that there was no dispute between petitioner and respondent concerning "a statement of [respondent's] account in connection with an extension *246 of consumer credit," petitioner was not required to follow the procedures mandated by 161 (a). IV Because Congress has restricted the operation of 161 (a) to disputes concerning extensions of consumer credit, and because the dispute between American Express and respondent did not concern an extension of consumer credit, the judgment of the of Appeals must be, and is, reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | concurring | Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110715/insurance-corp-of-ireland-v-compagnie-des-bauxites-de-guinee/ | The Court rests today's decision on a constitutional distinction between "subject matter" and "in personam" jurisdiction. Under this distinction, subject-matter jurisdiction defines an Art. III limitation on the power of federal courts. By contrast, the Court characterizes the limits on in personam jurisdiction solely in terms of waivable personal rights and notions of "fair play." Having done so, it determines *710 that fundamental questions of judicial power do not arise in this case concerning the personal jurisdiction of a federal district court. In my view the Court's broadly theoretical decision misapprehends the issues actually presented for decision. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their personal jurisdiction, no less than their subject-matter jurisdiction, is subject both to constitutional and to statutory definition. When the applicable limitations on federal jurisdiction are identified, it becomes apparent that the Court's theory could require a sweeping but largely unexplicated revision of jurisdictional doctrine. This revision could encompass not only the personal jurisdiction of federal courts but "sovereign" limitations on state jurisdiction as identified in World-Wide Volkswagen Fair resolution of this case does not require the Court's broad holding. Accordingly, although I concur in the Court's judgment, I cannot join its opinion. I This lawsuit began when the respondent Compagnie des Bauxites brought a contract action against the petitioner insurance companies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Alleging diversity jurisdiction, respondent averred that the District Court had personal jurisdiction of the petitioners, all foreign corporations, under the long-arm statute of the State of Pennsylvania. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Petitioners, however, denied that they were subject to the court's personal jurisdiction under that or any other statute. Viewing the question largely as one of fact, the court ordered discovery to resolve the dispute. Meantime, while respondent unsuccessfully sought compliance with its discovery requests, petitioners brought a parallel action in England's High Court of Justice, Queens Bench *711 Division. It was at this juncture that the current issues arose. Seeking to enjoin the English proceedings, respondent sought an injunction in the District Court. Petitioners protested that they were not subject to that court's personal jurisdiction and thus that they lay beyond its injunctive powers. But the District Court disagreed. As a jurisdictional prerequisite to its entry of the injunction, the court upheld its personal jurisdiction over petitioners.[1] It characterized its finding of jurisdiction partly as a sanction for petitioners' noncompliance with its discovery orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b).[2] Rule 37(b) is not, however, a jurisdictional provision. As recognized by the Court of Appeals, the governing jurisdictional statute |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | concurring | Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110715/insurance-corp-of-ireland-v-compagnie-des-bauxites-de-guinee/ | recognized by the Court of Appeals, the governing jurisdictional statute remains the long-arm statute of the State of Pennsylvania. See In my view the Court fails to make clear the implications of this central fact: that the District Court in this case relied on state law to obtain personal jurisdiction. As courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal district courts possess no warrant to create jurisdictional law of their own. Under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S. C. 1652, they must apply state law "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide" See generally Erie R. Thus, in the absence of a federal rule or statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is determined in diversity cases by the law of the forum State. See, e. g., Intermeat, ; (CA5), cert. denied, ; ; Lakeside Bridge & Steel cert. denied, ; Lakota Girl Scout Council, ; ; (CA9), cert. denied, ;[3] As a result of the District Court's dependence on the law of Pennsylvania to establish personal jurisdiction a dependence mandated by Congress under 28 U.S. C. 1652 its jurisdiction in this case normally would be subject to the same due process limitations as a state court. See, e. g., at ; ; Fisons[4] Thus, the question arises how today's decision is related to cases restricting the personal jurisdiction of the States. Before today our decisions had established that "minimum contacts" represented a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant. See, e. g., World-Wide Volkswagen * 444 U. S., at ; ; International Shoe In the absence of a showing of minimum contacts, a finding of personal jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant, even as a sanction, therefore would appear to transgress previously established constitutional limitations. The cases cannot be reconciled by a simple distinction between the constitutional limits on state and federal courts. Because of the District Court's reliance on the Pennsylvania long-arm statute the applicable jurisdictional provision under the Rules of Decisions Act the relevant constitutional limits would not be those imposed directly on federal courts by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but those applicable to state jurisdictional law under the Fourteenth. The Court's decision apparently must be understood as related to our state jurisdictional cases in one of two ways. Both involve legal theories that fail to justify the doctrine adopted by the Court in this case. A Under traditional principles, the due process |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | concurring | Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110715/insurance-corp-of-ireland-v-compagnie-des-bauxites-de-guinee/ | in this case. A Under traditional principles, the due process question in this case is whether "minimum contacts" exist between petitioners and the forum State that would justify the State in exercising personal jurisdiction. See, e. g., World-Wide Volkswagen at ; ; at By finding that the establishment of minimum contacts is not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, the Court may be understood as finding that "minimum contacts" no longer are a constitutional requirement for the exercise by a state court of personal jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant.[5] Whenever the Court's notions *714 of fairness are not offended, jurisdiction apparently may be upheld. Before today, of course, our cases had linked minimum contacts and fair play as jointly defining the "sovereign" limits on state assertions of personal jurisdiction over unconsenting defendants. See World-Wide Volkswagen ; see at The Court appears to abandon the rationale of these cases in a footnote. See ante, at 702-703, n. 10. But it does not address the implications of its action. By eschewing reliance on the concept of minimum contacts as a "sovereign" limitation on the power of States for, again, it is the State's long-arm statute that is invoked to obtain personal jurisdiction in the District Court the Court today effects a potentially substantial change of law. For the first time it defines personal jurisdiction solely by reference to abstract notions of fair play. And, astonishingly to me, it does so in a case in which this rationale for decision was neither argued nor briefed by the parties. B Alternatively, it is possible to read the Court opinion, not as affecting state jurisdiction, but simply as asserting that Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents a congressionally approved basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal district court. On this view Rule 37 vests the federal district courts with authority to take jurisdiction over persons not in compliance with discovery orders. This of course would be a more limited holding. Yet the Court does not cast its decision in these terms. And it provides no support for such an interpretation, either in the language or in the history of the Federal Rules. *715 In the absence of such support, I could not join the Court in embracing such a construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[6] There is nothing in Rule 37 to suggest that it is intended to confer a grant of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, the clear language of Rule 82 seems to establish |
Justice Powell | 1,982 | 17 | concurring | Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110715/insurance-corp-of-ireland-v-compagnie-des-bauxites-de-guinee/ | Indeed, the clear language of Rule 82 seems to establish that Rule 37 should not be construed as a jurisdictional grant: "These rules shall not be construed to extend the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." Moreover, assuming that minimum contacts remain a constitutional predicate for the exercise of a State's in personam jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant, constitutional questions would arise if Rule 37 were read to permit a plaintiff in a diversity action to subject a defendant to a "fishing expedition" in a foreign jurisdiction. A plaintiff is not entitled to discovery to establish essentially speculative allegations necessary to personal jurisdiction. Nor would the use of Rule 37 sanctions to enforce discovery orders constitute a mere abuse of discretion in such a case.[7] For me at least, such a use of discovery would raise serious questions as to the constitutional as well as the statutory authority of a federal court in a diversity case to exercise personal jurisdiction *716 absent some showing of minimum contacts between the unconsenting defendant and the forum State. II In this case the facts alone unaided by broad jurisdictional theories more than amply demonstrate that the District Court possessed personal jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Rule 37 and otherwise to adjudicate this case. I would decide the case on this narrow basis. As recognized both by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the respondent adduced substantial support for its jurisdictional assertions. By affidavit and other evidence, it made a prima facie showing of "minimum contacts." See -882, 886, and n. 9. In the view of the District Court, the evidence adduced actually was sufficient to sustain a finding of personal jurisdiction independently of the Rule 37 sanction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a, 53a.[8] Where the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts, I have little difficulty in holding that its showing was sufficient to warrant the District Court's entry of discovery orders. And where a defendant then fails to comply with those orders, I agree that the prima facie showing may be held adequate to sustain the court's finding that minimum contacts exist, either under Rule 37 or under a theory of "presumption" or "waiver." Finding that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on this ground, I concur in the judgment of the Court. |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | second_dissenting | Pennsylvania v. Mimms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109751/pennsylvania-v-mimms/ | Almost 10 years ago in the Court held that "probable cause" was not required to justify every seizure of the person by a police officer. That case was decided after six months of deliberation following full argument and unusually elaborate briefing.[1] The approval in Terry of a lesser standard for certain limited situations represented a major development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Today, without argument, the Court adopts still another *116 and even lesserstandard of justification for a major category of police seizures.[2] More importantly, it appears to abandon "the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence"[3]which has ordinarily required individualized inquiry into the particular facts justifying every police intrusion in favor of a general rule covering countless situations. But what is most disturbing is the fact that this important innovation is announced almost casually, in the course of explaining the summary reversal of a decision the Court should not even bother to review. Since Mimms has already served his sentence, the importance of reinstating his conviction is minimal at best.[4] Even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has afforded him greater protection than is required by the Federal Constitution, the conviction may be invalid under state law.[5] Moreover, the *117 Pennsylvania Supreme Court may still construe its own constitution to prohibit what it described as the "indiscriminate procedure" of ordering all traffic offenders out of their vehicles.[6] In all events, whatever error the state court has committed affects only the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Its decision creates no conflict requiring resolution by this Court on a national level. In most cases, these considerations would cause us to deny certiorari. No doubt it is a legitimate concern about the safety of police officers throughout the Nation that prompts the Court to give this case such expeditious treatment. I share that concern and am acutely aware that almost every decision of this Court holding that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been invaded makes law enforcement somewhat more difficult and hazardous. That, however, is not a sufficient reason for this Court to reach out to decide every new Fourth Amendment issue as promptly as possible. In this area of constitutional adjudication, as in all others, it is of paramount importance that the Court have the benefit of differing judicial evaluations of an issue before it is finally resolved on a nationwide basis. This case illustrates two ways in which haste can introduce a new element of confusion into an already complex set of rules. First, the Court has based its legal ruling on a factual assumption about police safety that is dubious at |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | second_dissenting | Pennsylvania v. Mimms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109751/pennsylvania-v-mimms/ | a factual assumption about police safety that is dubious at best; second, the Court has created an entirely new legal standard of justification for intrusions on the liberty of the citizen. Without any attempt to differentiate among the multitude of varying situations in which an officer may approach a person *118 seated in an automobile, the Court characterizes the officer's risk as "inordinate" on the basis of this statement: "`According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer ShootingsA Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 93 (1963).'" Ante, at 110. That statement does not fairly characterize the study to which it refers. Moreover, the study does not indicate that police officers can minimize the risk of being shot by ordering drivers stopped for routine traffic violations out of their cars. The study reviewed 110 selected police shootings that occurred in 1959, 1960, and 1961.[7] In 35 of those cases, "officers were attempting to investigate, control, or pursue suspects who were in automobiles."[8] Within the group of 35 cases, there were examples of officers who "were shot through the windshield or car body while their vehicle was moving"; examples in which "the officer was shot while dismounting from his vehicle or while approaching the suspect[']s vehicle"; and, apparently, instances in which the officer was shot by a passenger in the vehicle. Bristow, at 93. In only 28 of the 35 cases was the location of the suspect who shot the officer verified. In 12 of those cases the suspect was seated behind the wheel of the car, but that figure seems to include cases in which the shooting occurred before the officer had an opportunity to order the suspect to get out. In *119 nine cases the suspect was outside the car talking to the officer when the shooting occurred. These figures tell us very little about the risk associated with the routine traffic stop;[9] and they lend no support to the Court's assumption that ordering the routine traffic offender out of his car significantly enhances the officer's safety. Arguably, such an order could actually aggravate the officer's danger because the fear of a search might cause a serious offender to take desperate action that would be unnecessary if he remained in the vehicle while being ticketed. Whatever the reason, it is significant that some experts in this area of human behavior strongly recommend that the police officer "never allow the violator to get out of the car"[10] Obviously, it is not |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | second_dissenting | Pennsylvania v. Mimms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109751/pennsylvania-v-mimms/ | to get out of the car"[10] Obviously, it is not my purpose to express an opinion on the *120 safest procedure to be followed in making traffic arrests or to imply that the arresting officer faces no significant hazard, even in the apparently routine situation. I do submit, however, that no matter how hard we try we cannot totally eliminate the danger associated with law enforcement, and that, before adopting a nationwide rule, we should give further consideration to the infinite variety of situations in which today's holding may be applied. The Court cannot seriously believe that the risk to the arresting officer is so universal that his safety is always a reasonable justification for ordering a driver out of his car. The commuter on his way home to dinner, the parent driving children to school, the tourist circling the Capitol, or the family on a Sunday afternoon outing hardly pose the same threat as a driver curbed after a high-speed chase through a high-crime area late at night. Nor is it universally true that the driver's interest in remaining in the car is negligible. A woman stopped at night may fear for her own safety; a person *121 in poor health may object to standing in the cold or rain; another who left home in haste to drive children or spouse to school or to the train may not be fully dressed; an elderly driver who presents no possible threat of violence may regard the police command as nothing more than an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority. Whether viewed from the standpoint of the officer's interest in his own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not being required to obey an arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that the millions of traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible. Until today the law applicable to seizures of a person has required individualized inquiry into the reason for each intrusion, or some comparable guarantee against arbitrary harassment.[11] A factual demonstration of probable cause is required *122 to justify an arrest; an articulable reason to suspect criminal activity and possible violence is needed to justify a stop and frisk. But to eliminate any requirement that an officer be able to explain the reasons for his actions signals an abandonment of effective judicial supervision of this kind of seizure and leaves police discretion utterly without limits. Some citizens will be subjected to this minor indignity while others perhaps those with more expensive cars, or different bumper stickers, or different-colored skinmay escape it entirely. The Court holds today that "third-class" |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | second_dissenting | Pennsylvania v. Mimms | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109751/pennsylvania-v-mimms/ | skinmay escape it entirely. The Court holds today that "third-class" seizures may be imposed without reason; how large this class of seizures may be or become we cannot yet know. Most narrowly, the Court has simply held that whenever an officer has an occasion to speak with the driver of a vehicle, he may also order the driver out of the car. Because the balance of convenience and danger is no different for passengers in stopped cars, the Court's logic necessarily encompasses the passenger. This is true even though the passenger has committed no traffic offense. If the rule were limited to situations in which individualized inquiry identified a basis for concern in particular cases, then the character of the violation might justify different treatment of the driver and the passenger. But when the justification rests on nothing more than an assumption about the danger associated with every stopno matter how trivial *123 the offensethe new rule must apply to the passenger as well as to the driver. If this new rule is truly predicated on a safety rationale rather than a desire to permit pretextual searchesit should also justify a frisk for weapons, or at least an order directing the driver to lean on the hood of the car with legs and arms spread out. For unless such precautionary measures are also taken, the added safetyif anyin having the driver out of the car is of no value when a truly dangerous offender happens to be caught.[12] I am not yet persuaded that the interest in police safety requires the adoption of a standard any more lenient than that permitted by[13] In this case the offense might well have gone undetected if respondent had not been ordered out of his car, but there is no reason to assume that he otherwise would have shot the officer. Indeed, there has been no showing of which I am aware that the Terry standard will not provide the police with a sufficient basis to take appropriate protective measures whenever there is any real basis for concern. When that concern does exist, they should be able to frisk a violator, but I question the need to eliminate the requirement of an articulable justification in each case and to authorize the indiscriminate invasion of the liberty of every citizen stopped for a traffic violation, no matter how petty. Even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court committed error, that is not a sufficient justification for the exercise of this *124 Court's discretionary power to grant review, or for the summary disposition of a novel constitutional question. |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | The California Elections Code forbids ballot position to an independent candidate for elective public office if he voted in the immediately preceding primary, 6830 (c) (Supp. 1974),[1] or if he had a registered affiliation with a qualified political party at any time within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). The independent candidate must also file nomination papers signed by voters not less *727 in number than 5% nor more than 6% of the entire vote cast in the preceding general election in the area for which the candidate seeks to run. 6831 (1961). All of these signatures must be obtained during a 24-day period following the primary and ending 60 days prior to the general election, 6833 (Supp. 1974), and none of the signatures may be gathered from persons who vote at the primary election. 6830 (c) (Supp. 1974). The constitutionality of these provisions is challenged here as infringing on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and as adding qualifications for the office of United States Congressman, contrary to Art. I, 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Prior to the 1972 elections, appellants Storer, Frommhagen, Hall, and Tyner, along with certain of their supporters, filed their actions[2] to have the above sections of the Elections Code declared unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined. Storer and Frommhagen each sought ballot status as an independent candidate for Congressman from his district.[3] Both complained about the party disaffiliation requirement of 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) and asserted that the combined effects of the provisions were unconstitutional burdens on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Hall and Tyner claimed the right to ballot position as independent candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. They *728 were members of the Communist Party but that party had not qualified for ballot position in California. They, too, complained of the combined effect of the indicated sections of the Elections Code on their ability to achieve ballot position. A three-judge District Court concluded that the statutes served a sufficiently important state interest to sustain their constitutionality and dismissed the complaints. Two separate appeals were taken from the judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for oral argument. I We affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it refused relief to Storer and Frommhagen with respect to the 1972 general election. Both men were registered Democrats until early in 1972, Storer until January and Frommhagen until March of that year. This affiliation with a qualified political party within a year prior to the 1972 primary |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | political party within a year prior to the 1972 primary disqualified both men under 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974); and in our view the State of California was not prohibited by the United States Constitution from enforcing that provision against these men. In the Court held that although the citizens of a State are free to associate with one of the two major political parties, to participate in the nomination of their chosen party's candidates for public office and then to cast their ballots in the general election, the State must also provide feasible means for other political parties and other candidates to appear on the general election ballot. The Ohio law under examination in that case made no provision for independent candidates and the requirements for any but the two major parties qualifying for the ballot were so burdensome that it was "virtually impossible" for other parties, new or old, to achieve ballot position for their candidates. *729 Because these restrictions, which were challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, severely burdened the right to associate for political purposes and the right to vote effectively, the Court, borrowing from other cases, ruled that the discriminations against new parties and their candidates had to be justified by compelling state interests. The Court recognized the substantial state interest in encouraging compromise and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner will represent a majority of the community and in providing the electorate with an understandable ballot and inferred that "reasonable requirements for ballot position," would be acceptable. But these important interests were deemed insufficient to warrant burdens so severe as to confer an effective political monopoly on the two major parties. The First and Fourteenth Amendments, including the Equal Protection Clause of the latter, required as much. In challenging 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974), appellants rely on and assert that under that case and subsequent cases dealing with exclusionary voting and candidate qualifications, e. g., ; ; substantial burdens on the right to vote or to associate for political purposes are constitutionally suspect and invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal Protection Clause unless essential to serve a compelling state interest. These cases, however, do not necessarily condemn 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). It has never been suggested that the Williams-Kramer-Dunn rule automatically invalidates every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate. Nor could this be the case under our Constitution where the States are given the initial task of determining the *730 qualifications of voters who will elect members of Congress. Art. I, 2, cl. |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | who will elect members of Congress. Art. I, 2, cl. 1. Also Art. I, 4, cl. 1, authorizes the States to prescribe "[t]he Times. Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives." Moreover, as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. In any event, the States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates. It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases; and the rule fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional challenges to specific provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause. The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a "matter of degree," very much a matter of "consider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification." ; What the result of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult to predict with great assurance. The judgment in invalidated the Tennessee one-year residence requirement for voting but agreed that the State's interest was obviously sufficient *731 to limit voting to residents, to require registration for voting, and to close the registration books at some point prior to the election, a deadline which every resident must meet if he is to cast his vote at the polls. Subsequently, three-judge district courts differed over the validity of a requirement that voters be registered for 50 days prior to election. This Court, although divided, sustained the provision. ; is more relevant to the problem before us. That case dealt with a provision that to vote in a party primary the voter must have registered as a party member 30 days prior to the previous general election, a date eight months prior to the presidential primary and 11 months prior to the nonpresidential primary. Those failing to meet this deadline, with some exceptions, were barred from voting at |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | this deadline, with some exceptions, were barred from voting at either primary. We sustained the provision as "in no sense invidious or arbitrary," because it was "tied to [the] particularized legitimate purpose," of preventing interparty raiding, a matter which bore on "the integrity of the electoral process." Later the Court struck down similar Illinois provisions aimed at the same evil, where the deadline for changing party registration was 23 months prior to the primary date. One consequence was that a voter wishing to change parties could not vote in any primary that occurred during the waiting period. The Court did not retreat from Rosario or question the recognition in that case of the States' strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process by preventing interparty raiding. Although the 11-month requirement imposed in New York had been accepted as necessary for an effective remedy, the Court was unconvinced that the 23-month period established *732 in Illinois was an essential instrument to counter the evil at which it was aimed. Other variables must be considered where qualifications for candidates rather than for voters are at issue. In we upheld a requirement that independent candidates must demonstrate substantial support in the community by securing supporting signatures amounting to 5% of the total registered voters in the last election for filling the office sought by the candidate. The Court said: "There is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election." Subsequently, in a unanimous Court said: "The Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. 403 U. S., ; 393 U. S., In so doing, the State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections. Although we have no way of gauging the number of candidates who might enter primaries in Texas if access to the ballot were unimpeded by the large filing fees in question here, we are bound to respect the legitimate objectives of the State in avoiding overcrowded ballots. *733 Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. 403 U. S.," Against this pattern of decisions we have no hesitation in sustaining 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). In California, the independent candidacy route to obtaining ballot position is but a part of the candidate-nominating process, an alternative to being nominated in one of the direct party primaries. The independent candidate need not stand for primary election but must qualify for the ballot by demonstrating substantial public support in another way. Otherwise, the qualifications required of the independent candidate are very similar to, or identical with, those imposed on party candidates. Section 6401 (Supp. 1974) imposes a flat disqualification upon any candidate seeking to run in a party primary if he has been "registered as affiliated with a political party other than that political party the nomination of which he seeks within 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the declaration." Moreover, 6402 and 6611 provide that a candidate who has been defeated in a party primary may not be nominated as an independent or be a candidate of any other party; and no person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office, or for more than one office at the same election. The requirement that the independent candidate not have been affiliated with a political party for a year before the primary is expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot. It involves no discrimination against independents. Indeed, the independent candidate must be clear of political party affiliations for a year before the primary; the party candidate must not have been registered with another party for a year before he files *734 his declaration, which must be done not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the primary. 6490 (Supp. 1974). In there was an 11-month waiting period for voters who wanted to change parties. Here, a person terminating his affiliation with a political party must wait at least 12 months before he can become a candidate in another party's primary or an independent candidate for public office. The State's interests recognized in Rosario are very similar to those that undergird the California waiting period; and the extent of the restriction is not significantly different. It is true that a California candidate who desires to run for office as an independent must anticipate his candidacy substantially in advance of his election campaign, but the required foresight is little more than the possible 11 months examined in |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | is little more than the possible 11 months examined in Rosario, and its direct impact is on the candidate, and not voters. In any event, neither Storer nor Frommhagen is in position to complain that the waiting period is one year, for each of them was affiliated with a qualified party no more than six months prior to the primary. As applied to them, 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) is valid. After long experience, California came to the direct party primary as a desirable way of nominating candidates for public office. It has also carefully determined which public offices will be subject to partisan primaries and those that call for nonpartisan elections.[4] Moreover, after long experience with permitting candidates to run in the primaries of more than one party, California forbade the cross-filing practice in 1959.[5] A candidate in *735 one party primary may not now run in that of another; if he loses in the primary, he may not run as an independent; and he must not have been associated with another political party for a year prior to the primary. See 6401, 6611. The direct party primary in California is not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of the entire election process,[6] the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates. The State's general policy is to have contending forces within the party employ the primary campaign and primary election to finally settle their differences. The general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum for continuing intraparty feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly qualified. The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively. Section 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) carries very similar credentials. It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an "independent" candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | votes in the general election that might well go to another party. *736 A State need not take the course California has, but California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison). It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State's interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot status. Nor do we have reason for concluding that the device California chose, 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974), was not an essential part of its overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals. As we indicated in Rosario, the Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citizenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having instantaneous access to the ballot. We conclude that 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) is not unconstitutional, and Storer and Frommhagen were properly barred from the ballot as a result of its application.[7] Cf. Having reached this result, there is no need to examine the constitutionality of the other provisions of the Elections Code as they operate singly or in combination as applied to these candidates. Even if these statutes were wholly or partly unconstitutional. Storer and Frommhagen were still properly barred from having their names placed on *737 the 1972 ballot. Although spoke in terms of assessing the "totality" of the election laws as they affected constitutional rights, if a candidate is absolutely and validly barred from the ballot by one provision of the laws, he cannot challenge other provisions as applied to other candidates. The concept of "totality" is applicable only in the sense that a number of facially valid provisions of election laws may operate in tandem to produce impermissible barriers to constitutional rights. The disaffiliation requirement does not change its character when combined with other provisions of the electoral code. It is an absolute bar to candidacy, and a valid one. The District Court need not have heard a challenge to these other provisions of the California Elections Code by one who did not satisfy the age requirement for becoming a member of Congress, and there was no more reason to consider them at the request of |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | no more reason to consider them at the request of Storer and Frommhagen or at the request of voters who desire to support unqualified candidates.[8] *738 II We come to different conclusions with respect to Hall and Tyner.[9] As to these two men we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings to determine whether the California election laws place an unconstitutional burden on their access to the ballot. We start with the proposition that the requirements for an independent's attaining a place on the general election ballot can be unconstitutionally severe. We must, therefore, inquire as to the nature, extent, and likely impact of the California requirements. Beyond the one-year party disaffiliation condition and the rule against voting in the primary, both of which Hall apparently satisfied, it was necessary for an independent candidate to file a petition signed by voters not less in number than 5% of the total votes cast in California at the last general election. This percentage, as such, does not appear to be excessive, see but to assess realistically whether the law imposes excessively burdensome requirements upon independent candidates it is necessary to know other critical facts which do not appear from the evidentiary record in this case. *739 It is necessary in the first instance to know the "entire vote" in the last general election. Appellees suggest that 5% of that figure, whatever that is, is 325,000. Assuming this to be the correct total signature requirement, we also know that it must be satisfied within a period of 24 days between the primary and the general election. But we do not know the number of qualified voters from which the requirement must be satisfied within this period of time. California law disqualifies from signing the independent's petition all registered voters who voted in the primary. In theory, it could be that voting in the primary was so close to 100% of those registered, and new registrations since closing the books before primary day were so low, that eligible signers of an unaffiliated candidate's petition would number less than the total signatures required. This is unlikely, for it is usual that a substantial percentage of those eligible do not vote in the primary, and there were undoubtedly millions of voters qualified to vote in the 1972 primary. But it is not at all unlikely that the available pool of possible signers, after eliminating the total primary vote, will be substantially smaller than the total vote in the last general election and that it will require substantially more than |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | general election and that it will require substantially more than 5% of the eligible pool to produce the necessary 325,000 signatures. This would be in excess, percentagewise, of anything the Court has approved to date as a precondition to an independent's securing a place on the ballot and in excess of the 5% which we said in Jenness was higher than the requirement imposed by most state election codes.[10] *740 We are quite sure, therefore, that further proceedings should be had in the District Court to permit further findings with respect to the extent of the burden imposed on independent candidates for President and Vice President under California law. Standing alone, gathering 325,000 signatures in 24 days would not appear to be an impossible burden. Signatures at the rate of 13,542 per day would be required, but 1,000 canvassers could perform the task if each gathered 14 signers a day. On its face, the statute would not appear to require an impractical undertaking for one who desires to be a candidate for President. But it is a substantial requirement; and if the additional likelihood is, as it seems to us to be, that the total signatures required will amount to a substantially higher percentage of the available pool than the 5% stipulated in the statute, the constitutional claim asserted by Hall is not frivolous. Before the claim is finally dismissed, it should be determined whether the available pool is so diminished in size by the disqualification of those who voted in the primary that the 325,000-signature requirement, to be satisfied in 24 days, is too great a burden on the independent candidates for the offices of President and Vice President. Because further proceedings are required, we must resolve certain issues that are in dispute in order that the ground rules for the additional factfinding in the District Court will more clearly appear. First, we have no doubt about the validity of disqualifying from signing an independent candidate's petition all those registered voters who voted a partisan ballot in the primary, although they did not vote for the office sought by the *741 independent. We have considered this matter at greater length in American Party of Texas v. White, see post, at 785-786, and we merely repeat here that a State may confine each voter to one vote in one primary election, and that to maintain the integrity of the nominating process the State is warranted in limiting the voter to participating in but one of the two alternative procedures, the partisan or the nonpartisan, for nominating candidates for the general |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | partisan or the nonpartisan, for nominating candidates for the general election ballot. Second, the District Court apparently had little doubt that the California law disqualified anyone voting in the primary election, whether or not he confined his vote to nonpartisan offices and propositions.[11] The State of California asserts this to be an erroneous interpretation of California law and claims that the District Court should have abstained to permit the California courts to address the question. In any event, the State does not attempt to justify disqualifying as signers of an independent's petition those who voted only a non-partisan ballot at the primary, such as independent voters who themselves were disqualified from voting a partisan ballot. See 311 (Supp. 1974). With what we have before us, it would be difficult to ascertain any rational ground, let alone a compelling interest, for disqualifying nonpartisan voters at the primary from signing an independent candidate's petition, and we think the District Court should reconsider the matter in the light of tentative views expressed here. Under the controlling cases, the District Court may, if it is so advised, abstain and permit the California courts to construe the California statute. On the other hand, it may be that adding to *742 the qualified pool of signers all those nonpartisan voters at the primary may make so little difference in the ultimate assessment of the overall burden of the signature requirement that the status of the nonpartisan voter is in fact an insignificant consideration not meriting abstention.[12] Third, once the number of signatures required in the 24-day period is ascertained, along with the total pool from which they may be drawn, there will arise the inevitable question for judgment: in the context of California politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not. We note here that the State mentions only one instance of an independent candidate's qualifying for any office under 6430, but disclaims having made any comprehensive survey of the official records that would perhaps reveal the truth of the matter. One of the difficulties will be that the number of signatures required will vary with the total vote in the last election; *743 the total disqualifying vote at the primary election and hence the size of the eligible |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | the primary election and hence the size of the eligible pool of possible signers will also vary from election to election. Also to be considered is the relationship between the showing of support through a petition requirement and the percentage of the vote the State can reasonably expect of a candidate who achieves ballot status in the general election. As a preliminary matter, it would appear that the State, having disqualified defeated candidates and recent defectors, has in large part achieved its major purpose of providing and protecting an effective direct primary system and must justify its independent signature requirements chiefly by its interest in having candidates demonstrate substantial support in the community so that the ballot, in turn, may be protected from frivolous candidacies and kept within limits understandable to the voter. If the required signatures approach 10% of the eligible pool of voters, is it necessary to serve the State's compelling interest in a manageable ballot to require that the task of signature gathering be crowded into 24 days?[13] Of course, the petition period must end at a reasonable time before election day to permit nomination papers to be verified. Neither must California abandon its policy of confining each voter to a single nominating acteither voting in the partisan primary or a signature on an independent petition. But the question remains whether signature gathering must *744 await conclusion of the primary. It would not appear untenable to permit solicitation of signatures to begin before primary day and finish afterwards. Those signing before the primary could either be definitely disqualified from a partisan vote in the primary election or have the privilege of canceling their petition signatures by the act of casting a ballot in the primary election. And if these alternatives are unacceptable, there would remain the question whether it is essential to demonstrate community support to gather signatures of substantially more than 5% of the group from which the independent is permitted to solicit support.[14] Appellees insist, however, that the signature requirements for independent candidates are of no consequence because California has provided a valid way for new political parties to qualify for ballot position, an alternative that Hall could have pursued, but did not. Under 6430, new political parties can be recognized and qualify their candidate for ballot position if 135 days before a primary election it appears that voters equal in number to at least 1% of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared to the *745 county clerks their intention to affiliate with the new party, or |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | clerks their intention to affiliate with the new party, or if, by the same time, the new party files a petition with signatures equal in number to 10% of the last gubernatorial vote.[15] It is argued that the 1% registration requirement is feasible, has recently been resorted to successfully by two new political parties now qualified for the California ballot, and goes as far as California constitutionally must go in providing an alternative to the direct party primary of the major parties. It may be that the 1% registration requirement is a valid condition to extending ballot position to a new political party. Cf. American Party of Texas v. White, post, p. 767. But the political party and the independent candidate approaches to political activity are entirely different and neither is a satisfactory substitute for the other. A new party organization contemplates a state-wide, ongoing organization with distinctive political character. Its goal is typically to gain control of the machinery of state government by electing its candidates to public office. From the standpoint of a potential supporter, affiliation with the new party would mean giving up his ties with another party or sacrificing his own independent status, even though his possible interest in the new party centers around a particular candidate for a particular office. For the candidate himself, it would mean undertaking the serious responsibilities of qualified party status under California law, such as the conduct of a primary, holding party conventions, and the promulgation of party platforms. But more fundamentally, the candidate, who is by definition an independent and desires to remain one, must now consider himself a party man, *746 surrendering his independent status. Must he necessarily choose the political party route if he wants to appear on the ballot in the general election? We think not. In the opportunity for political activity within either of two major political parties was seemingly available to all. But this Court held that to comply with the First and Fourteenth Amendments the State must provide a feasible opportunity for new political organizations and their candidates to appear on the ballot. No discernible state interest justified the burdensome and complicated regulations that in effect made impractical any alternative to the major parties. Similarly, here, we perceive no sufficient state interest in conditioning ballot position for an independent candidate on his forming a new political party as long as the State is free to assure itself that the candidate is a serious contender, truly independent, and with a satisfactory level of community support.[16] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment in No. 72-812 insofar |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | support.[16] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment in No. 72-812 insofar as it refused relief to Hall and Tyner and remand the case in this respect to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment in No. 72-812 and No. 72-6050 is affirmed. So ordered. *747 APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT California Elections Code 41. "Nonpartisan office" "Nonpartisan office" means an office for which no party may nominate a candidate. Judicial, school, county, and municipal offices are nonpartisan offices. 311 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration of political affiliation; voting at primary elections At the time of registering and of transferring registration, each elector may declare the name of the political party with which he intends to affiliate at the ensuing primary election. The name of that political party shall be stated in the affidavit of registration and the index. If the elector declines to state his political affiliation. he shall be registered as "Nonpartisan" or "Declines to state," as he chooses. If the elector declines to state his political affiliation, he shall be informed that no person shall be entitled to vote the ballot of any political party at any primary election unless he has stated the name of the party with which he intends to affiliate at the time of registration. He shall not be permitted to vote the ballot of any party or for delegates to the convention of any party other than the party designated in his registration. 2500. General election There shall be held throughout the State, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in every even-numbered year, an election, to be known as the general election. 2501. Direct primary For the nomination of all candidates to be voted for at the general election, a direct primary shall be held at *748 the legally designated polling places in each precinct on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in the immediately preceding June. 2502. Primary elections Any primary election other than the direct primary or presidential primary shall be held on Tuesday, three weeks next preceding the election for which the primary election is held. 6401 [Supp. 1974]. Party affiliation No declaration of candidacy for a partisan office or for membership on a county central committee shall be filed, either by the candidate himself or by sponsors on his behalf, (1) unless at the time of presentation of the declaration and continuously for not less than three months immediately prior to that time, or for as long as he has been eligible to register to vote in |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | as he has been eligible to register to vote in the state, the candidate is shown by his affidavit of registration to be affiliated with the political party the nomination of which he seeks, and (2) the candidate has not been registered as affiliated with a political party other than that political party the nomination of which he seeks within 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the declaration. The county clerk shall attach a certificate to the declaration of candidacy showing the date on which the candidate registered as intending to affiliate with the political party the nomination of which he seeks, and indicating that the candidate has not been affiliated with any other political party for the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing of the declaration. 6402. Independent nominees This chapter does not prohibit the independent nomination of candidates under the provisions of Chapter 3 *749 (commencing at Section 6800) of this division, subject to the following limitations: (a) A candidate whose name has been on the ballot as a candidate of a party at the direct primary and who has been defeated for that party nomination is ineligible for nomination as an independent candidate. He is also ineligible as a candidate named by a party central committee to fill a vacancy on the ballot for a general election. (b) No person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office, or for more than one office at the same election. 6430. Qualified parties A party is qualified to participate in any primary election: (a) If at the last preceding gubernatorial election there was polled for any one of its candidates who was the candidate of that party only for any office voted on throughout the State, at least 2 percent of the entire vote of the State; or (b) If at the last preceding gubernatorial election there was polled for any one of its candidates who, upon the date of that election, as shown by the affidavits of registration of voters in the county of his residence, was affiliated with that party and was the joint candidate of that party and any other party for any office voted on throughout the State, at least 6 percent of the entire vote of the State; or (c) If on or before the 135th day before any primary election, it appears to the Secretary of State, as a result of examining and totaling the statement of voters and their political affiliations transmitted to him by the county clerks, that voters equal in |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | to him by the county clerks, that voters equal in number to at least 1 percent of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared their intention to affiliate with that party; or *750 (d) If on or before the 135th day before any primary election, there is filed with the Secretary of State a petition signed by voters, equal in number to at least 10 percent of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election, declaring that they represent a proposed party, the name of which shall be stated in the petition, which proposed party those voters desire to have participate in that primary election. This petition shall be circulated, signed, verified and the signatures of the voters on it shall be certified to and transmitted to the Secretary of State by the county clerks substantially as provided for initiative petitions. Each page of the petition shall bear a caption in 18-point blackface type, which caption shall be the name of the proposed party followed by the words "Petition to participate in the primary election." No voters or organization of voters shall assume a party name or designation which is so similar to the name of an existing party as to mislead voters. Whenever the registration of any party which qualified in the previous direct primary election falls below one-fifteenth of 1 percent of the total state registration, that party shall not be qualified to participate in the primary election but shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the voters, since the expense of printing ballots and holding a primary election would be an unjustifiable expense and burden to the State for so small a group. The Secretary of State shall immediately remove the name of the party from any list, notice, ballot, or other publication containing the names of the parties qualified to participate in the primary election. 6490 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration of candidacy No candidate's name shall be printed on the ballot to be used at a direct primary unless a declaration of his *751 candidacy is filed not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the direct primary. The declaration may be made by the candidate or by sponsors on his behalf. When the declaration is made by sponsors the candidate's affidavit of acceptance shall be filed with the declaration. 6611. Unsuccessful candidate; ineligibility as candidate of another party A candidate who fails to receive the highest number of votes for the nomination of the political party with which he was |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | the nomination of the political party with which he was registered as affiliated on the date his declaration of candidacy or declaration of acceptance of nomination was filed with the county clerk cannot be the candidate of any other political party. 6803. Group of candidates for presidential electors; designation of presidential and vice presidential candidates Whenever a group of candidates for presidential electors, equal in number to the number to the number of presidential electors to which this State is entitled, files a nomination paper with the Secretary of State pursuant to this chapter, the nomination paper may contain the name of the candidate for President of the United States and the name of the candidate for Vice President of the United States for whom all of those candidates for presidential electors pledge themselves to vote. 6804. Printing of names on ballot When a group of candidates for presidential electors designates the presidential and vice presidential candidates for whom all of the group pledge themselves to vote, the names of the presidential candidate and vice presidential candidate designated by that group shall be printed on the ballot. *752 6830 [Supp. 1974]. Contents Each candidate or group of candidates shall file a nomination paper which shall contain: (a) The name and residence address of each candidate, including the name of the county in which he resides. (b) A designation of the office for which the candidate or group seeks nomination. (c) A statement that the candidate and each signer of his nomination paper did not vote at the immediately preceding primary election at which a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper. The statement required in this subdivision shall be omitted when no candidate was nominated for the office at the preceding primary election. (d) A statement that the candidate is not, and was not at any time during the one year preceding the immediately preceding primary election at which a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper, registered as affiliated with a political party qualified under the provisions of Section 6430. The statement required by this subdivision shall be omitted when no primary election was held to nominate candidates for the office to which the independent nomination paper is directed. 6831. Signatures required Nomination papers shall be signed by voters of the area for which the candidate is to be nominated, not less in number than 5 percent nor more than 6 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding general election. Nomination papers for Representative in Congress, |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | the preceding general election. Nomination papers for Representative in Congress, State Senator or Assemblyman, to be voted for at a special election to fill a vacancy, shall be signed by voters in the district not less in number than 500 or 1 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding *753 general election, whichever is less, nor more than 1,000. 6833 [Supp. 1974]. Time for filing, circulation and signing; verification Nomination papers required to be filed with the Secretary of State or with the county clerk shall be filed not more than 79 nor less than 54 days before the day of the election, but shall be prepared, circulated, signed, verified and left with the county clerk for examination, or for examination and filing, no earlier than 84 days before the election and no later than 5 p. m. 60 days before the election. If the total number of signatures submitted to a county clerk for an office entirely within that county does not equal the number of signatures needed to qualify the candidate, the county clerk shall declare the petition void and is not required to verify the signatures. If the district falls within two or more counties, the county clerk shall within two working days report in writing to the Secretary of State the total number of signatures filed. If the Secretary of State finds that the total number of signatures filed in the district or state is less than the minimum number required to qualify the candidate he shall within one working day notify in writing the counties involved that they need not verify the signatures. 10014. Ballots for voters at primary elections At a primary election only a nonpartisan ballot shall be furnished to each voter who is not registered as intending to affiliate with any one of the political parties participating in the primary election; and to any voter registered as intending to affiliate with a political party participating in a primary election, there shall be furnished only a ballot of the political party with which he is registered as intending to affiliate. *754 10232. Inconveniently large ballots If the election board of a county determines that due to the number of candidates and measures that must be printed on the general election ballot, the ballot will be larger than may be conveniently handled, the board may order nonpartisan offices and local measures omitted from the general election ballot and printed on a separate ballot in a form substantially the same as provided for the general election ballot. If the board |
Justice White | 1,974 | 6 | majority | Storer v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108993/storer-v-brown/ | as provided for the general election ballot. If the board so orders, each voter shall receive both ballots, and the procedure prescribed for the handling and canvassing of ballots shall be modified to the extent necessary to permit the use of two ballots by a voter. The board may, in such case, order the second ballot to be printed on paper of a different tint and assign to those ballots numbers higher than those assigned to the ballots containing partisan offices and statewide ballot measures. 10318. Inconveniently large ballots If the election board of a county determines that due to the number of candidates and measures that must be printed on the direct primary ballot the ballot will be larger than may be conveniently handled, the board may provide that a nonpartisan ballot shall be given to each partisan voter, together with his partisan ballot, and that the material appearing under the heading "Nonpartisan Offices" on partisan ballots, as well as the heading itself, shall be omitted from the partisan ballots. If the board so provides, the procedure prescribed for the handling and canvassing of ballots shall be modified to the extent necessary to permit the use of two ballots by partisan voters. 18600 [Supp. 1974]. Write-in votes Any name written upon a ballot shall be counted, unless prohibited by Section 18603, for that name for the *755 office under which it is written, if it is written in the blank space therefor, whether or not a cross (+) is stamped or made with pen or pencil in the voting square after the name so written. 18601 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration required Every person who desires to have his name as written on the ballots of an election counted for a particular office shall file a declaration stating that he is a write-in candidate for the nomination for or election to the particular office and giving the title of that office. 18602 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration; filing The declaration required by Section 18601 shall be filed no later than the eighth day prior to the election to which it applies. It shall be filed with the clerks, registrar of voters, or district secretary responsible for the conduct of the election in which the candidate desires to have write-in votes of his name counted. 18603 [Supp. 1974]. Requirements for tabulation of write-in vote No name written upon a ballot in any state, county, city, city and county, or district election shall be counted for an office or nomination unless (a) A declaration has been filed pursuant to Sections 18601 and 18602 declaring a |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | I have frequently dissented from this Court's progressive emasculation of collateral review of criminal convictions. E. g., Engle v. Isaac, ante, p. 107; ; ; ; see also Today the Court takes a further step down this unfortunate path by declaring the plain-error standard of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure inapplicable to petitions for relief under 28 U.S. C. 2255. In so doing, the Court does not pause to consider the nature of the plain-error Rule. Nor does the Court consider the criminal character of a proceeding under 2255 as distinguished from *179 the civil character of a proceeding under 28 U.S. C. 2254. Because the Court's decision is obviously inconsistent with both, I dissent. I A The Court declares that the plain-error Rule, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b), was intended for use only on direct appeal and is "out of place" when the prisoner is collaterally attacking his conviction. Ante, at 164. But the power to notice plain error at any stage of a criminal proceeding is fundamental to the courts' obligation to correct substantial miscarriages of justice. That obligation qualifies what the Court characterizes as our entitlement to presume that the defendant has been fairly and finally convicted. The Court correctly points out, ante, at 163, n. 13, that Rule 52(b)[1] was merely a restatement of existing law. The role of the plain-error doctrine has always been to empower courts, especially in criminal cases, to correct errors that seriously affect the "fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United Significantly, although some of the Rules of Criminal Procedure appear under headings such as "Preliminary Proceedings," "Trial," or "Appeal," Rule 52(b) is one of the "General Provisions" of the Rules, applicable to all stages of all criminal proceedings in federal courts. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 1. *180 The Rule has been relied upon to correct errors that may have seriously prejudiced a possibly innocent defendant, see, e. g., United and errors that severely undermine the integrity of the judicial proceeding, see e. g., United The plain-error Rule mitigates the harsh impact of the adversarial system, under which the defendant is generally bound by the conduct of his lawyer, by providing relief in exceptional cases despite the lawyer's failure to object at trial. The Rule thus "has a salutary effect on the prosecution's conduct of the trial. If the intelligent prosecutor wishes to guard against the possibility of reversible error, he cannot rely on the incompetence or inexperience of his adversary but, on the contrary, must often intervene to protect the defendant from the mistakes of counsel." |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | intervene to protect the defendant from the mistakes of counsel." 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 52.02 [2] The Rule does not undermine our interest in the finality of criminal convictions. Rule 52(b) permits, rather than directs, the courts to notice plain error; the power to recognize plain error is one that the courts are admonished to exercise cautiously, see United and resort to only in "exceptional circumstances," at Yet, it is this power that the Court holds Congress intended to deny federal courts reviewing actions brought under 2255. But the text and history of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2255, and the special Rules governing 2255 actions make clear that the Court errs.[2] *181 B The Court's assumption that Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to proceedings under 2255 is built upon dictum in which suggests that the plain-error Rule is inapplicable in a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S. C. 2254. Even if I were to agree, and I do not, that the plain-error doctrine has no role in 2254 actions, I could not accept the Court's analysis because it fails to consider the explicit congressional distinction between 2254,[3] a civil collateral review procedure for state prisoners, and 2255,[4] a criminal collateral review procedure for federal prisoners. *182 In enacting 28 U.S. C. 2254 and 2255, Congress could not have been more explicit; Section 2254 provided for a separate civil action, but a 2255 motion was "a further step in the criminal case in which petitioner is sentenced." S. Rep. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1948).[5] This was reaffirmed in the 28 U.S. C. 2254 Rules and the 28 U.S. C. 2255 Rules, approved by Congress in The Advisory Committee's Notes for the 2255 Rules emphasize repeatedly that a proceeding under 2255 is a continuation of the criminal trial and not a civil proceeding. Advisory Committee's Notes to 2255 Rules 1, 3, 11, 12, 28 U.S. C., pp. 280, 282, 287.[6] Section 2255 Rule 12 directs that "[i]f no procedure is specifically prescribed by these rules, the district court [considering *183 a motion under 2255] may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules, or any applicable statute, and may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whichever it deems most appropriate, to motions filed under these rules." (Emphasis added.) This is in contrast to the parallel Rule governing motions under 2254, which provides: "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with [the Rules governing 2254 cases], may be applied, |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | inconsistent with [the Rules governing 2254 cases], may be applied, when appropriate" 28 U.S. C. 2254 Rule 11 (emphasis added). The Court today blurs the distinction between 2255 and 2254, ignores Congress' insistence that a 2255 motion is a continuation of the criminal trial, and makes no mention of Congress' express authorization to apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court suggests that to apply the plain-error Rule in 2255 proceedings and not in 2254 habeas actions would grant federal prisoners a "preferred" status. Ante, at 166. To the contrary, to bar federal judges from recognizing plain errors on collateral review is to bind the federal prisoners more tightly than their state counterparts to this Court's procedural barriers. State-court judges may have power to recognize plain error in collateral review of state-court convictions, see e. g., ; ; ; ; indeed, by waiving a procedural bar, state courts can permit the petitioner collateral review in federal court as well. See But the federal prisoner's only source of respite from this Court's "airtight system of [procedural] forfeitures," lies with the discretionary exercise of the federal court's power. The Court's ruling does not establish parity between federal and state prisoners; rather it unduly restricts the power of the federal courts to remedy substantial injustice. As the Court notes, ante, at 166, the concerns of comity which underlie many of the opinions establishing obstacles to 2254 review of state confinement, e. g., ; n. 31; are absent here. If it is true, as the Court has repeatedly asserted, that the tensions inherent in federal-court review of state-court convictions require that substantive rights yield at times to procedural rules, no similar tension exists in a 2255 proceeding. Under 2255, the prisoner is directed back to the same court that first convicted him. The plain-error doctrine merely allows federal courts the discretion common to most courts to waive procedural defaults where justice requires. I might add that this is not the first instance in which the Court has obscured the distinction between 2254 and 2255. In and then in the Court ignored the distinction between 2255 and 2254 in order to apply a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure to the purely civil 2254 proceeding. Now, ironically, the Court again obscures the distinction, this time to avoid application of a Criminal Procedure Rule to a criminal 2255 proceeding. With each obfuscation of the distinction between 2254 and 2255, the Court has erected a new "procedural hurdl[e]," see Engle v. Issac, ante, at 136 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), for prisoners seeking |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | concurring in part and dissenting in part), for prisoners seeking collateral review of their convictions. Indeed, *185 the "cause and prejudice" standard, which the Court today decides pre-empts the plain-error Rule, and which I continue to view as antithetical to this Court's duty to ensure that " `federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review,'"[7] has its origin in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that the Court now finds inapplicable. As the cause-and-prejudice standard has taken on its talismanic role in the law of habeas corpus only through the Court's past application of the principles of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in both 2254 and 2255 actions, perhaps a brief review of this history is in order. The "cause and prejudice" standard originated in In Davis, the Court applied Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure[8] to hold that a federal prisoner seeking collateral review under 2255 had waived his objection to the composition of the grand Relying on the exception for "cause shown" in Rule 12(b)(2), and Shotwell Manufacturing the Court divined a rule for 2255 challenges to the composition of the grand jury: such claims were cognizable only if the prisoner showed both "cause" and "prejudice." at 243-. *186 On the foundation of Davis, the Court has built an incredible "house of cards whose foundation has escaped any systematic inspection." Notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of congressional purpose to apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure except in 2255 proceedings,[9], applied the Davis "cause and prejudice" standard to a state prisoner who, in a 2254 proceeding, raised a constitutional challenge to the composition of the grand 425 U.S., at -542; see Building upon this strained foundation, relied on Davis and Francis to declare the "cause and prejudice" standard applicable to all procedural defaults occurring during the trial of a state criminal defendant. Finally, coming full circle, the Court today relies on this "cause and prejudice" standard to pre-empt the plain-error standard of Rule 52(b). Francis and Wainwright held applicable to a civil proceeding an inapplicable Rule of Criminal Procedure in order to defeat substantial claims of state prisoners. Today the Court excludes the applicability in a criminal proceeding of a Rule of Criminal Procedure plainly intended by Congress to be available to federal prisoners. Any consistency in these decisions lies in their announcement that even in the teeth of clear congressional direction to the contrary, this Court will strain to subordinate a prisoner's interest in substantial justice to a supposed government interest |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | United States v. Frady | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110693/united-states-v-frady/ | prisoner's interest in substantial justice to a supposed government interest in finality. *187 II The Court's determination to ride roughshod over congressional intention in order to curtail the collateral remedies of prisoners, state and federal, is evident in its passing up the opportunity to decide this case on the ground offered by the Government, Brief for United 41, n. 34, and adopted by JUSTICE BLACKMUN in his opinion concurring in the judgment, that, in any event, petitioner did not show that the instructions constituted plain error affecting his substantial rights. That admittedly is a close question on this record.[10] The Government argues that because the jury could not have found premeditation without also inferring malice, the unobjected to instructions did not affect "substantial rights." A plausible counter to this argument occurs to me in that the trial court instructed the jury that malice and premeditation were two separate elements of the crime, App. 26-29. The premeditation instruction did not, in terms, require the jury to find that the defendant acted without such provocation as would preclude a finding of malice. Yet, if the Court had concluded that there was not "plain" error, it might be difficult to support a dissent from that conclusion, given the particular facts of this case. As the Court did not base it's holding upon this ground, I dissent. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | This case involves two federal prescriptions: the one-year limitation period imposed on federal habeas corpus petitioners by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S. C. 2244(d)(1); and the rule that pleading amendments relate back to the filing date of the original pleading when both the original plea and the amendment arise out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2). Jacoby Lee Felix, California prisoner and federal habeas petitioner, was convicted in California state court of first-degree murder and second-degree robbery, and received a life sentence. Within the one-year limitation period AEDPA allows for habeas petitions, Felix filed a pro se petition in federal court. He initially alleged, inter alia, that the admission into evidence of videotaped testimony of a witness for the prosecution violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Five months after the expiration of AEDPA's time limit, and eight months after the federal court appointed counsel to represent him, Felix filed *649 an amended petition in which he added a new claim for relief: He asserted that, in the course of pretrial interrogation, the police used coercive tactics to obtain damaging statements from him, and that admission of those statements at trial violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The question presented concerns the timeliness of Felix's Fifth Amendment claim. In ordinary civil proceedings, the governing Rule, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases requires a more detailed statement. The habeas rule instructs the petitioner to "specify all the grounds for relief available to [him]" and to "state the facts supporting each ground."[1] By statute, Congress provided that a habeas petition "may be amended as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions." 28 U.S. C. 2242. The Civil Rule on amended pleadings, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, instructs: "An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2). The issue before us is one on which federal appellate courts have divided: Whether, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2), Felix's amended petition, filed after AEDPA's one-year limitation and targeting his pretrial statements, relates back to the date of |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | targeting his pretrial statements, relates back to the date of his original timely filed petition, which targeted the videotaped witness testimony. Felix urges, and the Court of Appeals held, that the *650 amended petition qualifies for relation back because both the original petition and the amended pleading arose from the same trial and conviction. We reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment in this regard. An amended habeas petition, we hold, does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA's one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth. I In 1995, after a jury trial in Sacramento, California, respondent Jacoby Lee Felix was found guilty of murder and robbery stemming from his participation in a carjacking in which the driver of the car was shot and killed. App. E to Pet. for Cert. 2-7. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. App. C to Pet. for Cert. 1-2. The current controversy centers on two alleged errors at Felix's trial. Both involve the admission of out-of-court statements during the prosecutor's case in chief, but the two are otherwise unrelated. One prompted a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objection originally raised in the trial court, the other, a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause challenge, also raised in the trial proceedings. Felix's Fifth Amendment claim rested on the prosecution's introduction of statements Felix made during pretrial police interrogation. These statements were adduced at trial on direct examination of the investigating officer. Felix urged that the police used coercive tactics to elicit the statements. His Sixth Amendment claim related to the admission of the videotaped statements prosecution witness Kenneth Williams made at a jailhouse interview. The videotape records Williams, a friend of Felix, telling the police that he had overheard a conversation in which Felix described the planned robbery just before it occurred. When Williams testified at trial that he did not recall the police interview, the trial court determined that Williams' loss of *651 memory was feigned, and that the videotape was admissible because it contained prior inconsistent statements. App. E to Pet. for Cert. 10-13. On direct appeal, Felix urged, inter alia, that the admission of Williams' videotaped statements violated Felix's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. He did not, however, argue that admission of his own pretrial statements violated his right to protection against self-incrimination. The intermediate appellate court affirmed Felix's conviction and sentence, and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review, App. F to Pet. for Cert. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | his petition for review, App. F to Pet. for Cert. 2. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. App. C to Pet. for Cert. 10. Under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, Felix had until August 12, to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. See 2244(d)(1)(A). Within the one-year period, on May 8, he filed a pro se petition for federal habeas relief. Felix's federal petition repeated his Sixth Amendment objection to the admission of the Williams videotape, but he again failed to reassert the objection he made in the trial court to the admission of his own pretrial statements. App. G to Pet. for Cert. 1-7. On May 29, a Magistrate Judge appointed counsel to represent Felix. App. C to Pet. for Cert. 6; App. H to Pet. for Cert. 2. Thereafter, on September 15, the Magistrate Judge ordered Felix to file an amended petition within 30 days. On Felix's unopposed requests, that period was successively extended. Pending the filing of an amended petition, the State was not required to interpose an answer. On January 28, over five months after the August 12, expiration of AEDPA's time limit, and eight months after the appointment of counsel to represent him, Felix filed an amended petition. In this pleading, he reasserted his Confrontation Clause claim, and also asserted, for the first time post-trial, that his own pretrial statements to *652 the police were coerced and therefore inadmissible at trial. App. I to Pet. for Cert. 4. Further, he alleged that his counsel on appeal to the California intermediate appellate court was ineffective in failing to raise the coerced confession claim on direct appeal.[2] In its answer to the amended petition, the State asserted that the Fifth Amendment claim was time barred because it was initially raised after the expiration of AEDPA's one-year limitation period. Felix argued in response that the new claim related back to the date of his original petition. Because both Fifth Amendment and Confrontation Clause claims challenged the constitutionality of the same criminal conviction, Felix urged, the Fifth Amendment claim arose out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2). App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Felix's Fifth Amendment coerced statements claim. Relation back was not in order, the Magistrate said, because Felix's "allegedly involuntary statements to police d[id] not arise out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence as the videotaped interrogation of [prosecution witness] Kenneth Williams." It did not suffice, the Magistrate observed, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | witness] Kenneth Williams." It did not suffice, the Magistrate observed, that Felix's Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims attack the same criminal conviction. Adopting the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation in full, the District *653 Court dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim as time barred, and rejected the Confrontation Clause claim on its merits. App. B to Pet. for Cert. 1-3. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Felix's Confrontation Clause claim, but reversed the dismissal of his coerced statements claim and remanded that claim for further proceedings. In the majority's view, the relevant "transaction" for purposes of Rule 15(c)(2) was Felix's "trial and conviction in state court." Defining the transaction at any greater level of specificity, the majority reasoned, would "unduly strai[n] the usual meaning of `conduct, transaction, or occurrence'" by dividing the "trial and conviction [into] a series of perhaps hundreds of individual occurrences." Judge Tallman concurred in part and dissented in part. In his view, defining "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" under Rule 15(c)(2) "so broadly that any claim stemming from pre-trial motions, the trial, or sentencing relates back to a timely-filed habeas petition" would "obliterat[e] AEDPA's one year statute of limitation." "While an amendment offered to clarify or amplify the facts already alleged in support of a timely claim may relate back," he reasoned, "an amendment that introduces a new legal theory based on facts different from those underlying the timely claim may not." We granted certiorari, to resolve the conflict among Courts of Appeals on relation back of habeas petition amendments. ; with United ; United ; ; United ; United ; United We now reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment to the extent that it allowed relation back of Felix's Fifth Amendment claim. II A In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress imposed for the first time a fixed time limit for collateral attacks in federal court on a judgment of conviction. Section 2244(d)(1) provides: "A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." See also 2255, ¶ 6 (providing one-year limitation period in which to file a motion to vacate a federal conviction).[3] A discrete set of Rules governs federal habeas proceedings launched by state prisoners. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United District Courts.[4] The last of those Rules, Habeas Corpus Rule 11, permits application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas cases "to the extent that [the civil rules] are not |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | cases "to the extent that [the civil rules] are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the habeas] rules." See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2) (The civil rules "are applicable to proceedings for habeas corpus."). Rule 11, the Advisory Committee's Notes caution, "permits application of the civil rules only when it would be appropriate to do so," and would not be "inconsistent or inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus." Advisory Committee's Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 11, 28 U.S. C., p. 480. In addition to the general prescriptions on application of the civil rules in federal *655 habeas cases, 2242 specifically provides that habeas applications "may be amended as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions." The Civil Rule governing pleading amendments, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, made applicable to habeas proceedings by 2242, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(2), and Habeas Corpus Rule 11, allows pleading amendments with "leave of court" any time during a proceeding. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a). Before a responsive pleading is served, pleadings may be amended once as a "matter of course," i. e., without seeking court leave. Amendments made after the statute of limitations has run relate back to the date of the original pleading if the original and amended pleadings "ar[i]se out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence." Rule 15(c)(2). The "original pleading" to which Rule 15 refers is the complaint in an ordinary civil case, and the petition in a habeas proceeding. Under Rule 8(a), applicable to ordinary civil proceedings, a complaint need only provide "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) is more demanding. It provides that the petition must "specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner" and "state the facts supporting each ground." See also Advisory Committee's Note on subd. (c) of Habeas Corpus Rule 2, 28 U.S. C., p. 469 ("In the past, petitions have frequently contained mere conclusions of law, unsupported by any facts. [But] it is the relationship of the facts to the claim asserted that is important"); Advisory Committee's Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 4, 28 U.S. C., p. 1 ("`[N]otice' pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the model form available to aid prisoners in filing their habeas petitions instructs in boldface: *656 "CAUTION: You must include in this petition all the grounds for relief from the conviction or sentence that you |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | grounds for relief from the conviction or sentence that you challenge. And you must state the facts that support each ground. If you fail to set forth all the grounds in this petition, you may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date." Petition for Relief From a Conviction or Sentence By a Person in State Custody, Habeas Corpus Rules, Forms App., 28 U.S. C., p. 685 ( ed., Supp. V) (emphasis in original). A prime purpose of Rule 2(c)'s demand that habeas petitioners plead with particularity is to assist the district court in determining whether the State should be ordered to "show cause why the writ should not be granted." 2243. Under Habeas Corpus Rule 4, if "it plainly appears from the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court," the court must summarily dismiss the petition without ordering a responsive pleading. If the court orders the State to file an answer, that pleading must "address the allegations in the petition." Rule 5(b). B This case turns on the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2)'s relation-back provision in the context of federal habeas proceedings and AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. Rule 15(c)(2), as earlier stated, provides that pleading amendments relate back to the date of the original pleading when the claim asserted in the amended plea "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." The key words are "conduct, transaction, or occurrence." The Ninth Circuit, whose judgment we here review, in accord with the Seventh Circuit, defines those words to allow relation back of a claim first asserted in an amended petition, so long as the new claim stems from the habeas petitioner's trial, conviction, or sentence. Under that comprehensive definition, *657 virtually any new claim introduced in an amended petition will relate back, for federal habeas claims, by their very nature, challenge the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence, and commonly attack proceedings anterior thereto. See 235 F. 3d, 05 ; 283 F. 3d, 88. The majority of Circuits, mindful of "Congress' decision to expedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time restrictions on [them]," ib define "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" in federal habeas cases less broadly. See 88-389; 235 F. 3d, 03-505; 217 F. 3d, at ; 209 F. 3d, 17-318; 174 F. 3d, 37; 167 F. 3d, at They allow relation back only when the claims added by amendment arise from the same core facts as the timely filed claims, and not when the new claims |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | the timely filed claims, and not when the new claims depend upon events separate in "both time and type" from the originally raised episodes. Because Felix's own pretrial statements, newly raised in his amended petition, were separated in time and type from witness Williams' videotaped statements, raised in Felix's original petition, the former would not relate back under the definition of "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" to which most Circuits adhere. We are not aware, in the run-of-the-mine civil proceedings Rule 15 governs, of any reading of "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" as capacious as the construction the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have adopted for habeas cases. (allowing relation back where original complaint alleged that defendant union had breached its duty of fair representation by inadequately representing plaintiff because of his gender, and amended complaint asserted a Title VII gender discrimination claim based on the same differential treatment); Clipper *658 (claim asserting that defendant included fraudulent information in rate protests filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission related back to original complaint, which asserted that defendant filed the same rate protests "for the purpose of restricting. competition" (internal quotation marks omitted)); ; Rural Fire Protection with ; In re Coastal Plains, Inc., (Coastal Plains's claim that creditor interfered with business relations by attempting *659 to sell Coastal Plains to a third party did not relate back to claim based on creditor's failure to return inventory to Coastal Plains, even though both claims were linked to creditor's alleged "broader plan to destroy Coastal [Plains]"); Sierra See also (although all of plaintiff's 42 U.S. C. 1983 claims arose out of a single state-court criminal proceeding, plaintiff's First Amendment claims did not arise out of the same conduct as the originally asserted excessive force claims, and therefore did not relate back). As these decisions illustrate, Rule 15(c)(2) relaxes, but does not obliterate, the statute of limitations; hence relation back depends on the existence of a common "core of operative facts" uniting the original and newly asserted claims. See Clipper Exxpress, 690 F. 2d, at 1259, n. 29; 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 1497, p. 85 (2d ed. 1990). Felix asserts that he seeks, and the Ninth Circuit accorded, no wider range for Rule 15(c)'s relation-back provision than this Court gave to the Rule's key words "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" in We disagree. In Tiller, a railroad worker was struck and killed by a railroad car. His widow sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S. C. 51 et seq., to recover for his wrongful death. She initially alleged |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | seq., to recover for his wrongful death. She initially alleged various negligent acts. In an amended complaint, she added a claim under the Federal Boiler Inspection Act for failure to provide the train's locomotive with a rear light. We held that the amendment related back, and therefore avoided a statute of limitations bar, even though the amendment invoked a legal theory not suggested by the original complaint and relied on facts not originally asserted. *660 There was but one episode-in-suit in Tiller, a worker's death attributed from the start to the railroad's failure to provide its employee with a reasonably safe place to work. The federal rulemakers recognized that personal injury plaintiffs often cannot pinpoint the precise cause of an injury prior to discovery. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1215, pp. 138-143 (2d ed. 1990). They therefore included in the Appendix to the Federal Rules an illustrative form indicating that a personal injury plaintiff could adequately state a claim for relief simply by alleging that the defendant negligently operated a certain instrumentality at a particular time and place. See Form 9, Complaint for Negligence, Forms App., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc., 28 U.S. C. App., p. 829. The widow in Tiller met that measure. She based her complaint on a single "occurrence," an accident resulting in her husband's death. In contrast, Felix targeted separate episodes, the pretrial police interrogation of witness Williams in his original petition and his own interrogation at a different time and place in his amended petition. Felix contends, however, that his amended petition qualifies for relation back because the trial itself is the "transaction" or "occurrence" that counts. See Brief for Respondent 21-23. Citing Felix urges that neither the videotaped interview with witness Williams nor the pretrial police interrogation to which Felix himself was exposed transgressed any constitutional limitation. Until the statements elicited by the police were introduced at trial, Felix argues, he had no actionable claim at all. Both the confrontation right he timely presented and the privilege against self-incrimination he asserted in his amended petition are "trial right[s]," Felix underscores. Brief for Respondent 21 (emphasis deleted). His claims based on those rights, he maintains, are not "separate," ; rather, they are related in time and type, for "they arose on successive days during the trial and both *661 challenged [on constitutional grounds] admission of pretrial statements," -23. Felix artificially truncates his claims by homing in only on what makes them actionable in a habeas proceeding. We do not here question his assertion that his Fifth Amendment right did not |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | question his assertion that his Fifth Amendment right did not ripen until his statements were admitted against him at trial. See -767. Even so, the essential predicate for his self-incrimination claim was an extrajudicial event, i. e., an out-of-court police interrogation. The dispositive question in an adjudication of that claim would be the character of Felix's conduct, not in court, but at the police interrogation, specifically, did he answer voluntarily or were his statements coerced. See Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c), we earlier noted, see instructs petitioners to "specify all [available] grounds for relief" and to "state the facts supporting each ground." Under that Rule, Felix's Confrontation Clause claim would be pleaded discretely, as would his self-incrimination claim. Each separate congeries of facts supporting the grounds for relief, the Rule suggests, would delineate an "occurrence." Felix's approach, the approach that prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, is boundless by comparison. A miscellany of claims for relief could be raised later rather than sooner and relate back, for "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" would be defined to encompass any pretrial, trial, or post-trial error that could provide a basis for challenging the conviction. An approach of that breadth, as the Fourth Circuit observed, "views `occurrence' at too high a level of generality." 209 F. 3d, 18.[6] *662 Congress enacted AEDPA to advance the finality of criminal convictions. See To that end, it adopted a tight time line, a one-year limitation period ordinarily running from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review," 28 U.S. C. 2244(d)(1)(A). If claims asserted after the one-year period could be revived simply because they relate to the same trial, conviction, or sentence as a timely filed claim, AEDPA's limitation period would have slim significance. See (Ninth Circuit's rule would permit "the `relation back' doctrine to swallow AEDPA's statute of limitation"); 209 F. 3d, 18 ; 174 F. 3d, 38 The very purpose of Rule 15(c)(2), as the dissent notes, is to "qualify a statute of limitations." Post, at 666. *663 But "qualify" does not mean repeal. See Given AEDPA's "finality" and "federalism" concerns, see ; 283 F. 3d, 89, it would be anomalous to allow relation back under Rule 15(c)(2) based on a broader reading of the words "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" in federal habeas proceedings than in ordinary civil litigation, see Felix urges that an unconstrained reading of Rule 15(c)(2) is not problematic because Rule 15(a) arms district courts with "ample power" to deny leave to amend when justice so requires. See |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | Mayle v. Felix | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799989/mayle-v-felix/ | to deny leave to amend when justice so requires. See Brief for Respondent 31-33. Under that Rule, once a responsive pleading has been filed, a prisoner may amend the petition "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party." Rule 15(a); see 324 F. 3d, 26 This argument overlooks a pleader's right to amend without leave of court "any time before a responsive pleading is served." Rule 15(a). In federal habeas cases that time can be rather long, as indeed it was in the instant case. See Under Habeas Corpus Rule 4, a petition is not immediately served on the respondent. The judge first examines the pleading to determine whether "it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Only if the petition survives that preliminary inspection will the judge "order the respondent to file an answer." In the interim, the petitioner may amend his pleading "as a matter of course," as Felix did in this very case. Rule 15(a). Accordingly, we do not regard Rule 15(a) as a firm check against petition amendments that present new claims dependent upon discrete facts after AEDPA's limitation period has run. *664 Our rejection of Felix's translation of same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" to mean same "trial, conviction, or sentence" scarcely leaves Rule 15(c)(2) "meaningless in the habeas context," 379 F. 3d, So long as the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be in order.[7] Our reading is consistent with the general application of Rule 15(c)(2) in civil cases, see with Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c), see and with AEDPA's installation of a tight time line for 2254 petitions, see[8] *665 * * * As to the question presented, for the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,003 | 4 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/127904/brown-v-legal-foundation-of-wash/ | The principal dissenting opinion, authored by JUSTICE SCALIA, sets forth a precise, complete, and convincing case for rejecting the holding and analysis of the Court. I join the dissent in full. It does seem appropriate to add this further observation. By mandating that the interest from these accounts serve causes the justices of the Washington Supreme Court prefer, the State not only takes property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States but also grants to itself a monopoly which might then be used for the forced support of certain viewpoints. Had the State, with the help of Congress, not acted in violation of its constitutional responsibilities by taking for itself property which all concede to be that of the client, ante, at 235; the free market might have created various and diverse funds for pooling small interest amounts. These funds would have allowed the true owners of the property the option to express views and policies of their own choosing. Instead, as these programs stand today, the true owner cannot even opt out of the State's monopoly. The First Amendment consequences of the State's action have not been addressed in this case, but the potential for a serious violation is there. See ; Today's holding, then, is doubly unfortunate. One constitutional violation (the taking of property) likely will lead to another (compelled speech). These matters may have to come before the Court in due course. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | majority | Riggins v. Nevada | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112732/riggins-v-nevada/ | Petitioner David Riggins challenges his murder and robbery convictions on the ground that the State of Nevada unconstitutionally forced an antipsychotic drug upon him during trial. Because the Nevada courts failed to make findings sufficient to support forced administration of the drug, we reverse. I During the early hours of November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his Las Vegas apartment. An autopsy revealed that Wade died from multiple stab wounds, including wounds to the head, chest, and back. David Riggins was arrested for the killing 45 hours later. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins told Dr. R. Edward Quass, a private psychiatrist who treated patients at the Clark County Jail, about hearing voices in his head and having trouble sleeping. Riggins informed Dr. Quass that he had been successfully treated with Mellaril in the past. Mellaril is the trade name for thioridazine, an antipsychotic drug. After this consultation, Dr. Quass prescribed Mellaril at a level of 100 milligrams per day. Because Riggins continued to complain of voices and sleep problems in the following months, Dr. Quass gradually increased the Mellaril prescription to 800 milligrams per day. Riggins also received a prescription for Dilantin, an antiepileptic drug. In January 1988, Riggins successfully moved for a determination of his competence to stand trial. App. 6. Three *130 court-appointed psychiatrists performed examinations during February and March, while Riggins was taking 450 milligrams of Mellaril daily. Dr. William O'Gorman, a psychiatrist who had treated Riggins for anxiety in 1982, and Dr. Franklin Master concluded that Riggins was competent to stand trial. The third psychiatrist, Dr. Jack Jurasky, found that Riggins was incompetent. The Clark County District Court determined that Riggins was legally sane and competent to stand trial, so preparations for trial went forward. In early June, the defense moved the District Court for an order suspending administration of Mellaril and Dilantin until the end of Riggins' trial. Relying on both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nevada Constitution, Riggins argued that continued administration of these drugs infringed upon his freedom and that the drugs' effect on his demeanor and mental state during trial would deny him due process. Riggins also asserted that, because he would offer an insanity defense at trial, he had a right to show jurors his "true mental state." In response, the State noted that Nevada law prohibits the trial of incompetent persons, see (1989), and argued that the court therefore had authority to compel Riggins to take medication necessary to ensure his competence. App. 31-32. On July 14, 1988, the District Court held an |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | majority | Riggins v. Nevada | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112732/riggins-v-nevada/ | 31-32. On July 14, 1988, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on Riggins' motion. At the hearing, Dr. Master "guess[ed]" that taking Riggins off medication would not noticeably alter his behavior or render him incompetent to stand trial. Record 412. Dr. Quass testified that, in his opinion, Riggins would be competent to stand trial even without the administration of Mellaril, but that the effects of Mellaril would not be noticeable to jurors if medication continued. Finally, Dr. O'Gorman told the court that Mellaril made the defendant calmer and more relaxed *131 but that an excessive dose would cause drowsiness. Dr. O'Gorman was unable to predict how Riggins might behave if taken off antipsychotic medication, yet he questioned the need to give Riggins the high dose he was receiving. The court also had before it a written report in which Dr. Jurasky held to his earlier view that Riggins was incompetent to stand trial and predicted that if taken off Mellaril the defendant "would most likely regress to a manifest psychosis and become extremely difficult to manage." App. 19. The District Court denied Riggins' motion to terminate medication with a one-page order that gave no indication of the court's rationale. Riggins continued to receive 800 milligrams of Mellaril each day through the completion of his trial the following November. At trial, Riggins presented an insanity defense and testified on his own behalf. He indicated that on the night of Wade's death he used cocaine before going to Wade's apartment. Riggins admitted fighting with Wade, but claimed that Wade was trying to kill him and that voices in his head said that killing Wade would be justifiable homicide. A jury found Riggins guilty of murder with use of a deadly weapon and robbery with use of a deadly weapon. After a penalty hearing, the same jury set the murder sentence at death. Riggins presented several claims to the Nevada Supreme Court, among them that forced administration of Mellaril denied him the ability to assist in his own defense and prejudicially affected his attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial. This prejudice was not justified, Riggins said in his opening brief, because the State neither demonstrated a need to administer Mellaril nor explored alternatives to giving him 800 milligrams of the drug each day. Record 1020. Riggins amplified this claim in his reply brief, objecting that the State intruded upon his constitutionally protected liberty *132 interest in freedom from antipsychotic drugs without considering less intrusive options. Riggins argued: "In United [,] the court, in reference to medicating prisoners against their will, stated that |
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