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Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | The following Term, in the Court applied Linkletter's analysis to hold the Fifth Amendment rule of nonretroactive to judgments of conviction made final before Griffin was decided. The Court again found no "question of the applicability of the Griffin rule to cases still pending on direct review at the time it was announced." n. 3, citing Thus, after Linkletter and Shott, it appeared that all newly declared constitutional rules of criminal procedure would apply retrospectively at least to judgments of conviction not yet final when the rule was established. In and however, the Court departed from that basic principle. Those cases held that, in the interest of justice, the Court may balance three factors to determine whether a "new" constitutional rule should be retrospectively *544 or prospectively applied: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." See also Because the outcome of that balancing process might call for different degrees of retroactivity in different cases, the Court concluded that "no distinction is justified between convictions now final. and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review." See Because the balance of the three Stovall factors inevitably has shifted from case to case, it is hardly surprising that, for some, "the subsequent course of Linkletter became almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its intended victim." At one extreme, the Court has regularly given complete retroactive effect to new constitutional rules whose major purpose "is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials." See also at n. ; ; ; ; Ivan V. v. City of New York, At the other extreme, the Court has applied some standards only to future cases, denying the benefit of the new rule even to the parties before the Court. See, e. g., citing England and As an intermediate position, the Court has applied a change in the law to all future litigants, but retroactively only to the parties at bar. See, e. g., ; ; ; In a consistent stream of separate opinions since Linkletter, Members of this Court have argued against selective awards of retroactivity. Those opinions uniformly have asserted that, at a minimum, all defendants whose cases were still pending on direct appeal at the time of the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | still pending on direct appeal at the time of the law-changing decision should be entitled to invoke the new [9]*54 In and Justice Harlan presented a comprehensive analysis in support of that principle. In his view, failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule at least to cases pending on direct review at the time of the decision violated three norms of constitutional adjudication. First, Justice Harlan argued, the Court's "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine," conflicts with the norm of principled decisionmaking. "Some members of the Court, and I have come to regret that I was among them, initially grasped this doctrine as a way of limiting the reach of decisions that seemed to them fundamentally unsound. Others rationalized this resort to prospectivity as a `technique' that provided an `impetus for the implementation of long overdue reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably effected.' " at citing "The upshot of this confluence of viewpoints," 401 U.S., at was that the coalitions favoring nonretroactivity had realigned from case to case, inevitably generating a welter of "incompatible rules and inconsistent principles," See also ("principled adjudication requires the Court to abandon the charade of carefully balancing countervailing considerations when deciding the question of retroactivity"). Second, Justice Harlan found it difficult to accept the notion that the Court, as a judicial body, could apply a " `new' constitutional rule entirely prospectively, while making an exception only for the particular litigant whose case was chosen as the vehicle for establishing that " Desist v. *547 United A legislature makes its new rules "wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective as it deems wise." This Court, however, "announce[s] new constitutional rules only as a correlative of our dual duty to decide those cases over which we have jurisdiction and to apply the Federal Constitution as one source of the matrix of governing legal rules. Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this model of judicial review." at 78-. Third, Justice Harlan asserted that the Court's selective application of new constitutional rules departed from the principle of treating similarly situated defendants similarly:[10] "[W]hen another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting differently. We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those who *548 alone will receive the benefit of a `new' rule |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | *548 alone will receive the benefit of a `new' rule of constitutional law." -259 Justice Harlan suggested one simple rule to satisfy all three of his concerns. "I have concluded that Linkletter was right in insisting that all `new' rules of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this Court at the time the `new' decision is handed down." "[A] proper perception of our duties as a court of law, charged with applying the Constitution to resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct review, mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was." 401 U. S., We now agree with Justice Harlan that "[r]etroactivity' must be rethought," We therefore examine the circumstances of this case to determine whether it presents a retroactivity question clearly controlled by past precedents, and if not, whether application of the Harlan approach would resolve the retroactivity issue presented in a principled and equitable manner. III A At the outset, we must first ask whether respondent's case presents a retrospectivity problem clearly controlled by existing precedent. Re-examination of the post-Linkletter decisions convinces us that in three narrow categories of cases, the answer to the retroactivity question has been effectively determined, not by application of the Stovall factors, but rather, through application of a threshold test.[11] *549 First, when a decision of this Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered that rule in any material way. See, e. g., U.S. 200, ); Spinelli v. United ); Conversely, where the Court has expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to be "a clear break with the past," it almost invariably has gone on to find such a newly minted principle nonretroactive. See United v. Peltier, (collecting cases). In this second type of case, the traits of the particular constitutional rule have been less critical than the Court's express threshold determination that the " `new' constitutional interpretatio[n]. so change[s] the law that prospectivity is arguably the proper course," Once the Court has found that the new rule was unanticipated, the second and third Stovall factors reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule have virtually *550 compelled a finding of nonretroactivity. See, e. g., -73, 82-85 ; U. S., at 55-57.[] Third, the Court has recognized full retroactivity as a necessary adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place. The Court has invalidated inconsistent prior judgments where its reading of a particular constitutional guarantee immunizes a defendant's conduct from punishment, see, e. g., United v. United Coin & Currency, or serves "to prevent [his] trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of [that] trial," In such cases, the Court has relied less on the technique of retroactive application than on the notion that the prior inconsistent judgments or sentences were void ab initio. See, e. g., ); ). See also ; (rulings are fully retroactive when the "Court *551 has held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the traditional sense"). Respondent's case neatly fits none of these three categories. First, did not simply apply settled precedent to a new set of facts. In Payton, the Court acknowledged that the "important constitutional question presented" there had been "expressly left open in a number of our prior opinions." and 575, n. 1, citing United v. Watson, ; ; ; and Jones v. United By the same token, however, Payton also did not announce an entirely new and unanticipated principle of law. In general, the Court has not subsequently read a decision to work a "sharp break in the web of the law," unless that ruling caused "such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one," Hanover Shoe, Such a break has been recognized only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court, see, e. g., ; or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases, see, e. g., ; ; or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved. See, e. g., (applying nonretroactively a decision that "effected a decisional change in attitude that had prevailed for many decades"); -300. See also Chevron Oil ; Cipriano ; -382, n. 2 ("sharp break" occurs when "decision overrules clear past precedent or disrupts a practice long accepted and widely relied upon"). Payton did none of these. Payton expressly overruled no clear past precedent of this |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | these. Payton expressly overruled no clear past precedent of this Court on which litigants may have relied. Nor did Payton disapprove an established practice that the Court had previously sanctioned. To the extent that the Court earlier had spoken to the conduct engaged in by the police officers in Payton, it had deemed it of doubtful constitutionality.[] The Court's own analysis in Payton makes it clear that its ruling rested on both long-recognized principles of Fourth Amendment law and the weight of historical authority as it had appeared to the Framers of the Fourth Amendment.[] Finally, Payton overturned no longstanding *553 practice approved by a near-unanimous body of lower court authority.[15]Payton therefore does not fall into that narrow class of decisions whose nonretroactivity is effectively *554 preordained because they unmistakably signal "a clear break with the past," It is equally plain that Payton does not fall into the third category of cases that do not pose difficult retroactivity questions. Payton did not hold that the trial court lacked authority to convict or sentence Theodore Payton, nor did Payton's reading of the Fourth Amendment immunize Payton's conduct from punishment. The holding in Payton did not prevent the defendant's trial from taking place; rather, it reversed the New York Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for a new trial to be conducted without unconstitutionally obtained evidence. B Having determined that the retroactivity question here is not clearly controlled by our prior precedents, we next must ask whether that question would be fairly resolved by applying the rule in Payton to all cases still pending on direct appeal at the time when Payton was decided. Answering that question affirmatively would satisfy each of the three concerns stated in Justice Harlan's opinions in Desist and Mackey. First, retroactive application of Payton to all previously nonfinal convictions would provide a principle of decisionmaking consonant with our original understanding of retroactivity in Linkletter and Shott. Moreover, such a principle would be one capable of general applicability, satisfying Justice Harlan's central concern: "Refusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising on direct review tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing us *555 to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis a force which ought properly to bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem." -81 Second, application of Payton to cases pending on direct review would comport with our judicial responsibilities "to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case," and to "resolve all |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | the merits of his own case," and to "resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles." 401 U. S., at The Court of Appeals held that the circumstances of respondent's arrest violated Payton, and the Government does not dispute that contention. See n. It would be ironic indeed were we now to reverse a judgment applying Payton's rule, when in Payton itself, we reversed a directly contrary judgment of the New York Court of Appeals. As Justice Harlan noted in Desist: "If a `new' constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced." Third, application of the Harlan approach to respondent's case would further the goal of treating similarly situated defendants similarly. The Government contends that respondent may not invoke Payton because he was arrested before Payton was decided. Yet it goes without saying that Theodore Payton also was arrested before Payton was decided, and he received the benefit of the rule in his case. Furthermore, at least one other defendant whose conviction was not final when Payton issued benefited from Payton's rule, although he, too, was arrested before Payton was decided.[1]*55 An approach that resolved all nonfinal convictions under the same rule of law would lessen the possibility that this Court might mete out different constitutional protection to defendants simultaneously subjected to identical police conduct.[17] *557 IV Against adoption of this approach, the Government raises four arguments based on United v. Peltier, None is persuasive. The Government first cites Peltier's holding: that the Fourth Amendment rule announced in Almeida-Sanchez v. United 4 U.S. 2 should not apply retroactively to a case pending on appeal when Almeida-Sanchez was announced. By so holding, the Government suggests, *558 Peltier declared a principle that controls the issue of retroactivity for all Fourth Amendment rulings.[18] Upon examination, however, the retroactivity question posed here differs from that presented in Peltier. As the Government concedes, Payton overturned neither a statute nor any consistent judicial history approving nonconsensual, warrantless home entries. See Brief for United 30, n. 18. Thus, its nonretroactivity is not preordained under the "clear break" principles stated above. In Peltier, in contrast, the Court noted that Almeida-Sanchez had invalidated a form of search previously sanctioned by "a validly enacted statute, supported by longstanding administrative regulations and continuous judicial approval." See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United ("While the question is one of first impression in this Court," the practice disapproved had "been consistently approved by the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | Court," the practice disapproved had "been consistently approved by the judiciary"); (35 of 3 judges in 20 Court of Appeals cases had approved the invalidated practice). Because Almeida-Sanchez had overturned a longstanding practice to which this Court had not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority had approved, it represented a "clear break" with the past. For that reason alone, under controlling retroactivity precedents, the nonretroactive application of Almeida-Sanchez would have been appropriate even if the case had involved no Fourth Amendment question. In that respect, Peltier resembles several earlier decisions that held "new" Fourth Amendment *559 doctrine nonretroactive, not on the ground that all Fourth Amendment rulings apply only prospectively, but because the particular decisions being applied "so change[d] the law that prospectivity [was] arguably the proper course." which overruled United v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 5 and Harris v. United ). See also which overruled Goldman v. United 31 U.S. 9 and Olmstead v. United ). The Government bases its second argument on Peltier's broad language: "If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment" (emphasis added). The Government reads this language to require that new Fourth Amendment rules must be denied retroactive effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in good-faith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional norms. The Government does not seriously suggest that the retroactivity of a given Fourth Amendment ruling should turn solely on the subjective state of a particular arresting officer's mind. Instead, it offers an "objective" test: that law enforcement officers "may properly be charged with knowledge" of all "settled" Fourth Amendment law. Under the Government's theory, because the state of Fourth Amendment law regarding warrantless home arrests was "unsettled" before Payton, that ruling should not apply retroactively even to cases pending on direct appeal when Payton was decided. See Brief for United -19, 34-38. *50 Yet the Government's reading of Peltier would reduce its own "retroactivity test" to an absurdity. Under this view, the only Fourth Amendment rulings worthy of retroactive application are those in which the arresting officers violated pre-existing guidelines clearly established by prior cases. But as we have seen above, cases involving simple application of clear, pre-existing Fourth Amendment guidelines raise no real questions of retroactivity at all. Literally read, the Government's theory would automatically eliminate all Fourth Amendment |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | read, the Government's theory would automatically eliminate all Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application. The Government's third claim is that Peltier's logic suggests that retroactive application of Fourth Amendment decisions like Payton even to cases pending on direct review would not serve the policies underlying the exclusionary 422 U.S., at 53-542. Yet viewed in the light of Peltier's holding, this assertion also fails. Peltier suggested only that retroactive application of a Fourth Amendment ruling that worked a "sharp break" in the law, like Almeida-Sanchez, would have little deterrent effect, because law enforcement officers would rarely be deterred from engaging in a practice they never expected to be invalidated. See -542. This logic does not apply to a ruling like Payton, that resolved a previously unsettled point of Fourth Amendment law. Because this Court cannot rule on every unsettled Fourth Amendment question, years may pass before the Court finally invalidates a police practice of dubious constitutionality. See, e. g., had been moribund for 17 years before it was formally overruled). Long before Payton, for example, this Court had questioned the constitutionality of warrantless home arrests. See n. Furthermore, the Court's *51 opinions consistently had emphasized that, in light of the constitutional protection traditionally accorded to the privacy of the home, police officers should resolve any doubts regarding the validity of a home arrest in favor of obtaining a warrant. See, e. g., Johnson v. United ("Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers"). If, as the Government argues, all rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior.[19] Official awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be excluded only in the one case definitively resolving the unsettled question. Failure to accord any retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would "encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach." The Government finally argues that retroactive application of Payton, even to a case pending on direct appeal, would accomplish nothing but the discharge of a wrongdoer. Justice Harlan gave the answer to this assertion. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | majority | United States v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110754/united-states-v-johnson/ | a wrongdoer. Justice Harlan gave the answer to this assertion. "We do not release a criminal from jail because we like to do so, or because we think it wise to do so, but only because the government has offended constitutional principle in the conduct of his case. And when another similarly situated defendant comes *52 before us, we must grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting differently." Applying Payton to convictions that were not yet final when Payton issued would accomplish the first step toward "turning our backs on the ad hoc approach that has so far characterized our decisions in the retroactivity field and proceeding to administer the doctrine on principle." V To the extent necessary to decide today's case, we embrace Justice Harlan's views in Desist and Mackey. We therefore hold that, subject to the exceptions stated below, a decision of this Court construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered. By so holding, however, we leave undisturbed our precedents in other areas. First, our decision today does not affect those cases that would be clearly controlled by our existing retroactivity precedents. Second, because respondent's case arises on direct review, we need not address the retroactive reach of our Fourth Amendment decisions to those cases that still may raise Fourth Amendment issues on collateral attack.[20] n. 10, Third, we express no view on the retroactive application of decisions construing any constitutional provision other than the Fourth Amendment.[21]*53 Finally, all questions of civil retroactivity continue to be governed by the standard enunciated in Chevron Oil 404 U. S., at 10-. See n. Respondent's case was pending on direct appeal when was decided. Because the Court of Appeals correctly held that the rule in Payton should apply to respondent's case, its judgment is affirmed.[22] It is so ordered. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | Although the Jicarilla Apache Tribe is ot a party to the appeal, this case cetrally cocers "the boudaries betwee state regulatory authority ad [the Tribe's] self-govermet." White Moutai Apache The basic priciples that defie those boudaries are well established. The Court today, while faithfully recitig these priciples, is less faithful i their applicatio. Pre-emptio is essetially a matter of cogressioal itet. I this case, our goal should be to determie whether the State's taxatio of Cotto Petroleum's reservatio oil productio is cosistet with federal Idia policy as expressed i relevat statutes ad regulatios. First ad foremost, we must look to the statutory scheme Cogress has established to gover the activity the State seeks to tax i order to see whether the statute itself expresses Cogress' views o the questio of state taxatio. As the discussio i Part I below reveals, the statute most relevat to this case makes clear that Cogress iteded to foreclose the kid of tax New Mexico has imposed. Secod, we must cosider other idicatios of whether federal policy permits the tax i questio. Part II below demostrates that, uder established priciples, state taxatio is pre-empted by federal ad tribal iterests i this case. Because the record is more tha adequate to demostrate the pre-emptive force of federal ad tribal iterests, I disset.[1] *194 I The most relevat statute is the Idia Mieral Leasig Act of 1938, 5 U.S. C. 396a et seq. (1938 Act), pursuat to which the Jicarilla Apache etered ito mieral leases with appellat Cotto Petroleum. The 1938 Act is silet o the questio of state taxatio. But, as iterpreted by this Court i the silece of the 1938 Act is eloquet ad argues forcefully agaist the result reached by the majority. I Motaa, the State sought to tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty iterests uder oil ad gas leases held, pursuat to the 1938 Act, by o-Idia lessees operatig o the reservatio. The State sought to do so despite the fact that the 1938 Act cotais o express authorizatio for ay state tax o such leases. The State based its claim of taxatio authority o a 194 statute eacted to permit oil ad gas leasig o Idia reservatios created by treaty.[] Act of May 9, 194, ch. 10, 5 U.S. C. 398 (194 Act). The 194 Act cotaied a proviso that "the productio of oil ad gas ad other mierals o such lads may be taxed by the State i which said lads are located i all respects the same as productio o urestricted lads, ad the Secretary of the Iterior is authorized ad |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | lads, ad the Secretary of the Iterior is authorized ad directed to cause to be paid the tax so *195 assessed agaist the royalty iterests o said lads." The State took the positio that the 1938 Cogress could ot be presumed by mere silece to have abrogated the law permittig state taxatio. -766. I Motaa, we squarely rejected the State's argumet. After otig that the 1938 Act was "comprehesive legislatio," cotaiig a geeral repealer of all statutory provisios " `icosistet herewith,' " quotig 7 of the 1938 Act, see ote followig 5 U.S. C. 396a, we held that, uder the caos of costructio applicable to laws goverig Idias, the geeral repealer clause could ot be take as implicitly icorporatig cosistet provisios of earlier laws. Rather, i the Idia cotext, clear cogressioal coset to state taxatio was required ad, o that poit, we foud o "idicatio that Cogress iteded to icorporate implicitly i the 1938 Act the taxig authority of the 194 Act." Iterpretig the 1938 Act as preservig the taxig authority of the 194 Act, we held, would ot "satisfy the rule requirig that statutes be costrued liberally i favor of the Idias." I additio, we observed that such a iterpretatio would udermie the purposes of the 1938 Act as reflected i its legislative history: to achieve uiformity i tribal leasig, to harmoize tribal leasig with the goals of the Idia Reorgaizatio Act, Act of Jue 18, 1934, ch. 576, 16, codified at 5 U.S. C. 476 et seq. (IRA), ad "to esure that Idias receive `the greatest retur from their property.' " 5. The majority appropriately ackowledges that Cogress kew whe it eacted the 1938 Act that a statute goverig tribal leases that failed expressly to authorize state taxatio of Idia royalty iterests would have the effect of leavig the States without the power to tax those iterests. Ate, at 183, 14. Thus, the clear import of our decisio i Motaa is that Cogress' silece i 1938 expressed a itet substatially to arrow state taxig authority. *196 But the majority takes the positio that the 1938 Act's silece meas somethig completely differet whe it comes to the kid of taxatio at issue here, ad expeds cosiderable eergy attemptig to support that view. The majority argues that the same silece that reflected a itet to prohibit state taxatio of Idia tribes' royalty iterests was "fully cosistet with a itet to permit state taxatio of omember lessees," ate, at 183 (emphasis added). The majority otes that whe the pre-1938 mieral-leasig statutes were eacted (icludig the 197 Act, 5 U.S. C. 398a |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | were eacted (icludig the 197 Act, 5 U.S. C. 398a et seq., which is of the greatest relevace here, see express cogressioal authorizatio was required ot oly for direct taxes o Idias (or other "sovereigs"), but also for taxes o those who cotracted with Idias. See, e. g., 57 U.S. 501 (19) I cotrast, "[b]y the time the 1938 Act was eacted, Gillespie had bee overruled ad replaced by the moder rule permittig such taxes abset cogressioal disapproval." Ate, at 18. From this, the majority ifers that because Cogress kew i 1938 that it could maitai the pre-1938 status quo regardig lessee taxatio simply by sayig othig, Cogress' silece is cosistet with a itet to maitai that status quo. The argumet that the 1938 cogressioal silece regardig lessee taxatio is cosistet with a itet to permit such taxatio caot, for two reasos, withstad close scrutiy. First, eve if the majority is correct i seekig the meaig of Cogress' silece i chages i this Court's itergovermetal tax immuity jurisprudece, the facts defeat the majority's theory. Secod, ad fudametally, the majority's court-cetered approach fails to give due weight to a far more sigificat iterveig evet: the major chage i federal Idia policy embodied i the IRA. *197 The case which overruled Justice Holmes' opiio for the Court i Gillespie was Moutai Producers was decided o March 7, 1938. The majority, ideed, is correct that the 1938 Act was eacted o May 11, 1938, after that case was decided. But a review of the history of the 1938 Act reveals that it had assumed fial form well before this Court's decisio i Moutai Producers. The majority's chroology thus is somewhat misleadig, at least if the realities of the legislative process are to have ay relevace to the aalysis of legislative itet. The 1938 Act was drafted by the Departmet of the Iterior ad was submitted to the respective Committees o Idia Affairs of the House ad Seate o Jue 17, 1937. See S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cog., 1st Sess., 1 (1937) (Seate Report); H. R. Rep. No. 187, 75th Cog., 3d Sess., 1 (House Report).[3] The proposed bill was reported out of the Seate Committee i July 1937, with a recommedatio that it be passed without amedmet. Seate Report, at 1. The bill was passed by the Seate without debate o August 6, 1937. See 81 Cog. Rec. 8399. The bill was reported out of the House Committee o Idia Affairs o March 3, 1938, agai with a recommedatio that it pass without amedmet. House Report, at 1. All this took place |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | without amedmet. House Report, at 1. All this took place before the March 7, 1938, decisio i Moutai Producers, durig a period i which, the majority ackowledges, the proposed statute's silece o the questio of taxatio would have meat that the States had o power to tax o-Idia lessees' *198 oil ad gas productio. The House passed the bill, also without debate, o May 1938. See 83 Cog. Rec. 6057-6058. Thus, although the majority is techically correct that the 1938 Act did ot become law util after the aoucemet of this Court's decisio i Moutai Producers, the legislatio was formulated, cosidered by the House ad Seate Committees, referred out of the Committees without amedmet, ad passed by the Seate, all before Moutai Producers o March 7, 1938, chaged the law of itergovermetal tax immuity. Up util that poit, the clear meaig of the statute, as our decisio i Motaa makes clear, is that the State lacked power to impose the tax at issue i this case. There is o evidece that the chage i the law wrought by Moutai Producers was brought to the attetio of the House. It defies historical sese to make Moutai Producers the ceterpiece of the iterpretatio of a statute which reached fial form before Moutai Producers was decided.[4] The Court i Motaa put forward a more sesible explaatio of the absece of state taxatio authority i the 1938 Act. As the relevat House ad Seate Reports explai, the 1938 Act was crafted, proposed, ad eacted i light of the recetly eacted IRA. The IRA worked a fudametal *199 chage i federal Idia law marked by two pricipal goals: " `to rehabilitate the Idia's ecoomic life ad to give him a chace to develop the iitiative destroyed by a cetury of oppressio ad pateralism.' " Mescalero Apache 15 quotig H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cog., d Sess., 6 (1934). I reviewig pre-1934 Idia mieral-leasig statutes, the Iterior Departmet foud them watig i both respects. The statutes ot oly gave the Idias o "voice" i the gratig of leases, but also were ot "adequate to give Idias the greatest retur from their property." House Report, at ; Seate Report, at The 1938 Act was proposed to "brig all mieral-leasig matters i harmoy with the Idia Reorgaizatio Act" i these respects. House Report, at 3; Seate Report, at 3. The Court observed i Motaa that "these purposes would be udermied" by treatig the 1938 Act as explicitly or implicitly leavig the taxatio provisios of prior statutes i 5.[5] The majority's observatio, ate, at 18, that "[t]here is. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | 5.[5] The majority's observatio, ate, at 18, that "[t]here is. o history of tribal idepedece from state taxatio of these lessees to form a `backdrop' agaist which the 1938 Act must be read" caot be dispositive. The IRA, eacted oly a few years before the 1938 Act, is itself sufficiet "backdrop" to iform our iterpretatio, for the IRA marked the rejectio of all the assumptios upo which prior statutes providig for state taxatio of reservatio mieral productio had bee based. The expectatio that aimated Idia policy uder the Geeral Allotmet Act of 1887, ch. 119, 4 Stat. 388, was *00 that at the expiratio of a 5-year trust period, there would be o differece betwee Idias ad other citizes: tribal life would come to a ed, the Idias would be assimilated ad fully subject to state govermetal authority, Idia lads would be freely alieable to o-Idias ad subject to state taxatio, ad surplus lads would be opeed to private developmet. See geerally F. Cohe, Hadbook of Federal Idia Law 131-13 (198); Readjustmet of Idia Affairs: Hearigs o H. R. 790 before the House Committee o Idia Affairs (History of the Allotmet Policy), 73d Cog., d Sess., pt. 9, pp. 48-489 (1934); Blackfeet 79 F.d 119, aff'd, With the passage of time, evetual state cotrol remaied the goal of the allotmet policy, but delays i the full implemetatio of that policy became a matter of cocer to the States. This was particularly evidet i the area of mieral leasig. Such leasig for periods of up to 10 years had bee authorized by statute i 1891, Act of Feb. 8, 1891, ch. 383, 3, 6 Stat. 795, but it became icreasigly clear that loger-term leases were a ecoomic ecessity. A patter soo developed: i retur for Cogress' extedig the period durig which mieral rights would be reserved to the Idia tribes, States were give the power to tax mieral productio. See 3 Idias of the Uited States, Hearigs before a Subcommittee of the House Committee o Idia Affairs 191-19, 81, 444-445 (190). The taxatio proviso i the 194 Act, which was icluded at the isistece of members of the Subcommittee, was true to that patter. See H. R. No. 386, 68th Cog., 1st Sess. (194); see geerally Brief for Uited States as Amicus Curiae i O. T. 1983, No. 83-161, pp. 16-6. By 197, whe Cogress addressed the problem of oil ad gas leasig o Executive Order reservatios, the States were axious to ope those lads for mieral developmet ad the debate i Cogress squarely addressed the coflictig iterests *01 of States |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | i Cogress squarely addressed the coflictig iterests *01 of States ad Idia tribes. The Attorey Geeral had issued a cotroversial opiio that the Mieral Lads Leasig Act of 190, did ot apply to Executive Order reservatios, 34 Op. Atty. Ge. 181 (194) (opiio of the-Attorey Geeral Harla F. Stoe), ad the matter was i litigatio. See Developmet of Oil ad Gas Miig Leases o Idia Reservatios, Hearigs o S. 17 ad S. 3159 before the Subcommittee of the Seate Committee o Idia Affairs, 69th Cog., 1st Sess., 9-30 (196). If the Attorey Geeral's positio did ot prevail i the courts, the Idias would receive o icome from mieral productio o Executive Order reservatios, ad ay claim of Idia etitlemet to those reservatios would be substatially udermied. I that ucertai legal climate, the 197 Act is best viewed as a compromise: Idia iterests acquiesced i the States' claim that they had a right to icrease their geeral reveues by sharig i the profits of reservatio miig activities; i retur, the Idias avoided legislatio that would have obliterated ay hope of obtaiig recogitio of their legal etitlemet to Executive Order lads. See See also Hearigs o S. 3159 ad S. 415 before the Seate Committee o Idia Affairs, 69th Cog., 1st Sess., 14, 4-5, 33-34 (196).[6] The political climate chaged dramatically with the passage i 1934 of the IRA, i which " `[t]he policy of allotmet ad sale of surplus reservatio lad was repudiated' " as atithetical to tribal iterests. 45 U.S. 463, quotig 41 U.S. 481, It would be a mistake to impute the political compromises of the allotmet period ito legislatio eacted soo after the passage *0 of the IRA, legislatio expressly tailored to brig Idia mieral policy ito lie with a radically altered set of assumptios about the political ad ecoomic future of the Idias. Furthermore, the IRA embodied a approach to tribal idepedece which would be udoe by limitig Idia tribes to those powers they had bee permitted to exercise i the past. The Departmet of the Iterior, i iterpretig the IRA at Cogress' request, realized that the assertios of Idia automoy that the IRA sought to foster would seem ovel, ad would likely come at the expese of settled state expectatios. "It is a fact that State govermets ad admiistrative officials have frequetly trespassed upo the realm of tribal autoomy, presumig to gover the Idia tribes through State law or departmetal regulatio or arbitrary admiistrative fiat, but these trespasses have ot impaired the vested legal powers of local self-govermet which have bee recogized agai ad agai whe |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | local self-govermet which have bee recogized agai ad agai whe these trespasses have bee challeged by a Idia tribe. `Power ad authority rightfully coferred do ot ecessarily cease to exist i cosequece of log ouser'. The [IRA], by affordig statutory recogitio of these powers of local self-govermet ad admiistrative assistace i developig adequate mechaisms for such govermet, may reasoably be expected to ed the coditios that have i the past led the Iterior Departmet ad various State agecies to deal with matters that are properly withi the legal competece of the Idia tribes themselves." Powers of Idia Tribes, 55 I. D. 14, 8-9 (1934). The Departmet oted: "Chief amog the powers of sovereigty recogized as pertaiig to a Idia tribe is the power of taxatio." It would be etirely cosistet with the spirit of the IRA for the Departmet, ad for Cogress, to have doe away with the express authorizatio of state taxatio i order to leave room for Idias to operate *03 i the sphere of taxatio uimpeded by the States. That Idias had ever before asserted the right to freedom from state taxatio was simply a product of the ufortuate state of affairs that the IRA sought to remedy. I sum, we are give to choose betwee two possible iterpretatios of the silece of the 1938 Act. Oe, adopted by the majority, focuses o the chage i this Court's itergovermetal immuity doctrie which took place at the very ed of the process leadig to the 1938 Act. The other focuses o a fudametal chage i cogressioal Idia policy which took place shortly before the process bega, ad was expressly oted as its motivatig The latter iterpretatio is clearly the more compellig. I must coclude that, cotrary to the majority's view, the silece of the 1938 Act is ot cosistet with a cogressioal itet that o-Idia lessees of Idia mieral lads shall be subject to state taxatio for their o-reservatio activities.[7] This coclusio does ot costitute, as the majority says, a "retur to [the] log-discarded ad thoroughly repudiated doctrie" of costitutioal itergovermetal tax immuity. Ate, at 187. Rather, it reflects a fuller uderstadig of the policies uderlyig federal Idia law i the mid- to late-1930's ad cotiuig, i relevat part, ito the preset time. II Eve if we did ot have such direct evidece of Cogress' itet to preclude state taxatio of o-Idia oil productio o Idia lads, that coclusio would be amply supported by a routie applicatio of the traditioal tools of Idia pre-emptio aalysis. The majority cocludes otherwise *04 because it distorts the legal stadard it purports |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | otherwise *04 because it distorts the legal stadard it purports to apply. Istead of egagig i a careful examiatio of state, tribal, ad federal iterests required by our precedets, see e. g., Ramah Navajo School Board, 458 U.S. 83, (198), the majority has adopted the priciple of "the iexorable zero." 431 U.S. 34, 34, 3 Uder the majority's approach, there is o pre-emptio uless the States are etirely excluded from a sphere of activity ad provide o services to the Idias or to the lessees they seek to tax. That extreme approach is hardly cosistet with the "flexible" stadard the majority purports to apply. Ate, at 184. The Court has idetified "two idepedet but related barriers to the assertio of state regulatory authority over tribal reservatios." White Moutai Apache 448 U. S., at 14. The exercise of state authority may be impermissible solely o the groud that the state itervetio would iterfere with "the right of reservatio Idias to make their ow laws ad be ruled by them." 358 U.S. 17, 0 Alteratively, state law may be pre-empted by the existece of a comprehesive federal regulatory scheme goverig the subject matter. See, e. g., Warre Tradig Post These methods of aalysis overlap. Idia sovereigty is ot a "platoic" cocept. 17 It is a growig traditio, actively supported by federal legislatio. Our pre-emptio cases recogize that "federal law reflects related federal ad tribal iterests," ad that "the ecouragemet of [Idia] sovereigty i cogressioal Acts promotig tribal idepedece ad ecoomic developmet" must iform our pre-emptio aalysis. Ramah Navajo, 458 U. S., at I this case, all the elemets that traditioally have resulted i a fidig of federal pre-emptio are preset. *05 Federal regulatio of leasig of Idia oil lads "is both comprehesive ad pervasive." Provisios of the 1938 Act regulate all stages of the process of oil ad gas leasig ad productio o Idia reservatios. The auctio or biddig process through which leases are acquired is supervised by the Departmet of the Iterior. 5 U.S. C. 396b. Successful lessees must furish a bod to secure compliace with lease terms, 396c, ad each lessee's operatios are i all respects subject to federal rules ad regulatios, 396d. Logstadig regulatios promulgated pursuat to the 1938 Act gover the miute details of the biddig process, 5 CFR 11.3 ad give the Secretary of the Iterior the power to reject bids that are ot i the best iterest of the Idia lessor, 11.3(b). Federal law sets acreage limitatios, 11.9, the term of each lease, 11.10, ad royalty rates, methods, ad times of paymet, 11.13 ad 11.16. Turig |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | rates, methods, ad times of paymet, 11.13 ad 11.16. Turig to the regulatio of the lessee's operatios, federal law cotrols whe operatios may start, 11.0, ad federal supervisory persoel are empowered to esure the coservatio of resources ad prevetio of waste, 11.19-11.1. Additioal restrictios are placed o lessees by the Federal Oil ad Gas Royalty Maagemet Act of 198, 96 Stat. 447, 30 U.S. C. 1701 et seq., which further safeguards tribal iterests by imposig additioal ispectio, collectio, auditig, security, ad coservatio requiremets o lessees. I additio, the Jicarilla Apache, as expressly authorized by their Costitutio, have eacted regulatios of their ow to supplemet federal guidelies, ad have created a tribal Oil ad Gas Admiistratio to exercise tribal authority i this area.[8] See Jicarilla Apache Tribal Code, Tit. 18, ch. 1, 1-7 ad their Revised Costitutio, Art. XI, 1(a)(3). Ideed, *06 just as we earlier foud of the Mescalero Apache: "The Tribe has egaged i a cocerted ad sustaied udertakig to develop ad maage the reservatio's resources specifically for the beefit of its members." New 46 U.S. 34, The majority ackowledges that federal ad tribal regulatios i this case are extesive. But because the District Court foud that the State regulates spacig ad the mechaical itegrity of wells, ad that federal ad tribal regulatios are therefore ot "exclusive," the majority cocludes without further ado that there is sufficiet state activity to support the State's claimed authority to tax.[9] The majority's reliace o the propositio that "[t]his is ot a case i which the State has had othig to do with the o-reservatio activity, save tax it," ate, at 186, reflects a mechaical ad absolutist approach to the delicate issue of pre-emptio that this Court expressly has repudiated. White Moutai Apache, "[C]omplete abdicatio or oivolvemet," ate, at 185, has ever bee the applicable stadard. The taxes the State seeks to impose "would threate the overridig federal objective of guarateeig Idias that they will `receive the beefit of whatever profit [their oil ad gas reserves are] capable of yieldig,' " ad would "reduc[e] tribal reveues ad dimiis[h] the profitability of the eterprise for potetial cotractors." White Moutai Apache, State taxes would also reduce the fuds available to oil ad gas producers to meet the fiacial obligatios placed upo them by the extesive federal ad tribal regulatory schemes. Tribal ad federal regulatios clearly leave o room for these taxes. See *07 Just as the majority errs by adoptig a stadard of "exclusivity," it places udue sigificace o the fact that the State made some expeditures that beefited Cotto Petroleum's o-reservatio activities.[10] Cocededly, the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | some expeditures that beefited Cotto Petroleum's o-reservatio activities.[10] Cocededly, the State did sped some moey o the reservatio for purposes directly ad idirectly related to oil ad gas productio. It is clear o this record, however, that the ifrastructure which supports oil ad gas productio o the Jicarilla Apache Reservatio is provided almost completely by the federal ad tribal govermets rather tha by the State. Ideed, the majority appears to accept the fact that the state taxes are vastly disproportioate, ate, at 185, as well it must: $89,384 i services, as compared with $,93,953 i taxes, speaks for itself.[11] But the majority deems this fact legally irrelevat i order to *08 avoid imposig a "proportioality requiremet" that would be icosistet with the otio that taxatio is ot based o a quid pro quo. Ate, at 185, 15. That otio, draw from Due Process ad Commerce Clause aalysis, see ate, at 189-190, is iapposite i the pre-emptio cotext. Pre-emptio aalysis calls for a close cosideratio of coflictig iterests ad of their potetial impact o oe aother. Uder the majority's aalysis, isigificat state expeditures, reflectig miimal state iterests, are sufficiet to support state iterferece with sigificat federal ad tribal iterests. The exclusio of all sese of proportio has led to a result that is atithetical to the cocers that aimate our Idia pre-emptio jurisprudece. Fially, the majority sorely uderestimates the degree to which state taxatio of oil ad gas productio adversely affects the iterests of the Jicarilla Apache. Assumig that the Tribe cotiues to tax oil ad gas productio at preset levels, o-reservatio taxes will remai 75% higher (14% as opposed to 8% of gross value) tha off-reservatio taxes withi the State. The state trial court was ot disturbed by this fact: it foud that Cotto Petroleum had plas to dig ew wells, ad took that to be proof positive that the taxes imposed by the State did ot deter drillig. But the court failed to recogize that Cotto Petroleum's ew wells were ifield (or "ifill") wells, drilled betwee existig producig wells to icrease the efficiecy of draiage o lads already leased. Tr. 41-4, 68; see H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil ad Gas Terms 468 A ifill well is essetially a o-risk propositio, i that there is little doubt that the well will be productive. Therefore, Cotto Petroleum's willigess to drill ifill wells does ot reflect its willigess to develop ew lads. Federal ad tribal iterests legitimately iclude log-term plaig for developmet of lease reveues o ew lads, where there is greater ecoomic risk, see Tr. 450, ad a greater probability |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | greater ecoomic risk, see Tr. 450, ad a greater probability that differece i tax rates will have a adverse effect o a producer's willigess to drill ew wells ad o the competitiveess of Jicarilla *09 leases. "[B]oth the rate at which miig compaies acquire Idia lad leases ad the rate at which they develop them are depedet o the future balace betwee the deterrets to ad the advatages of Idia lad leasig. Where the balace will be struck caot be predicted, for there are simply too may variables ivolved." Federal Trade Commissio, Staff Report o Mieral Leasig o Idia Lads 48 (1975) (FTC Report). Dual state ad tribal taxatio ievitably affects that balace. I weighig the effect of state taxatio o tribal iterests, logic dictates that it is ecessary to cosider ot oly the size of the tax, but also the importace of the taxed activity to the tribal ecoomy. See 480 U.S. 0, 18 I this case, too, it is udisputed that oil ad gas productio is the Jicarilla Apache ecoomy a commo patter i reservatios with substatial oil ad gas reserves. See Tr. 159 (oil ad gas royalties accout for 90% of tribal icome); FTC Report, at 10; Aders, Idias, Eergy, ad Ecoomic Developmet, 9 J. Cotemp. Busiess 57 Furthermore, where, as here, the Tribe has made the decisio to tax oil ad gas producers, the log-term impact of state taxatio o the Tribe's freedom of actio i the sphere of taxatio must also be cosidered.[1] Tribal taxatio has bee widely perceived as ecessary to protect Idia iterests.[13] The fact that the Jicarilla Apache have see fit to impose their ow taxes reders the threat to tribal iterests *10 which is always iheret i state taxatio all the more apparet.[14] The market ca bear oly so much taxatio, ad it is ievitable that a poit will be reached at which the State's taxes will impose a ceilig o tribal tax reveues. That the Jicarilla Apache have ot yet raised their taxes to a level at which the combied effect of tribal ad state taxatio has bee proved to dimiish tribal reveues caot be dispositive. Our decisios have ever required a case-specific showig that state taxatio i fact has deterred tribal activity; the potetial for coflict is sufficiet. The majority observes that this is ot "a case i which a uusually large state tax has imposed a substatial burde o the Tribe," ate, at 186, ad deems the tribal iterest "idirect ad isubstatial," ate, at 187. But the majority does ot explai why iterfereces with federal policy of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,989 | 11 | dissenting | Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112249/cotton-petroleum-corp-v-new-mexico/ | majority does ot explai why iterfereces with federal policy of oly the dramatic magitude of the tax at issue i meet the pre-emptio threshold. I Warre Tradig Post the Court rejected a % tax o the gross proceeds of a o-Idia trader o a Idia reservatio because it put "fiacial burdes o [the trader] or the Idias i additio to those Cogress or the tribes have prescribed, ad could thereby disturb ad disarrage the statutory pla Cogress set up i order to protect Idias." Ideed, the disseters i White Moutai Apache characterized the less-tha-1% tax struck dow i that case *11 as "relatively trivial" ad "ulikely to have a serious adverse impact o the tribal busiess," (STEVENS, J., dissetig). That the tax burde was held sufficiet to support a fidig of pre-emptio i White Moutai Apache ad Warre Tradig Post udermies the majority's positio here. III I sum, uder established Idia pre-emptio priciples, the case before us should have bee straightforward. We deal here with state taxes o oil producers egaged i the developmet of the atural resource upo which the ecoomic future of the Jicarilla Apache depeds. The federal statute goverig the producers' activities, ulike its historical predecessors, cotais o express authorizatio of state taxatio. That statute was eacted i a period i which cocer with tribal sovereigty ad tribal self-sufficiecy was at the very core of federal Idia policy. Pursuat to that statute, the Federal Govermet regulates every aspect of the producers' activities to advace the Idias' best iterests. The statute also ecourages tribes to assert their ow sovereig authority i this area; the Jicarilla Apache have doe so through regulatio ad taxatio. O the other side of the balace, New Mexico asserts little more tha a desire to icrease its geeral reveues at the expese of tribal ecoomic developmet. That purpose "is isufficiet to justify the additioal burdes imposed by the tax o the comprehesive federal scheme ad o the express federal policy of ecouragig Idia self-sufficiecy i [this] area." Ramah Navajo, I respectfully disset. |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | , held that a gender-based classification in the spousal-benefit provisions of the Social Security Act violated the right to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Due Process Clause *731 of the Fifth Amendment. In this case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that amendments to the Act, adopted in 7 partly in response to our decision, unjustifiably revive the gender-based classification that was invalidated in and therefore also violate the Fifth Amendment. App. to Juris. Statement 1a-9a. The Secretary of Health and Human Services appealed directly to this Court. We probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1252, and now reverse. I A The Social Security Act (Act) provides spousal benefits for the wives, husbands, widows, and widowers of retired and disabled wage earners. 42 U.S. C. 402 (6 ed. and Supp. V). Prior to December 7, benefits were payable only to those husbands or widowers who could demonstrate dependency on their wage-earning wives for one-half of their support. Wives and widows, on the other hand, were entitled to spousal benefits without any such showing of dependency on their husbands. See former 42 U.S. C. 402(b), (c)(1)(C), and (f)(1)(D). In March 7, affirmed the judgment of a three-judge District Court which held that the gender-based dependency requirement for widowers violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[1] Subsequently, the Court summarily affirmed two District Court decisions invalidating the dependency requirement for husbands' benefits. ; Following these decisions, as part of a general reform of the Social Security system, Congress repealed the dependency requirement for widowers and husbands. Social Security *732 Amendments of 7 (7 Amendments), 334(b)(1), (d)(1), Stat. 1544, 1545, 42 U.S. C. 402(c)(1), (f)(1) (6 ed., Supp. V). See S. Rep. No. pp. 88, 93[2] It concluded, however, that elimination of the dependency test, by increasing the number of individuals entitled to spousal benefits, could create a serious fiscal problem for the Social Security trust fund. See This problem was particularly acute with respect to the large number of retired federal and state employees who would now become eligible for spousal benefits. Unlike most applicants, who must offset any dual Social Security benefits against each other, 42 U.S. C. 402(k)(3)(A), retired civil servants could, at the time of the 7 Amendments, receive the full amount of both the spousal benefits and the government pensions to which they were entitled. Congress estimated that payment of unreduced spousal benefits to such individuals could cost the system an estimated $190 million in 9. S. Rep. No. To avoid |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | estimated $190 million in 9. S. Rep. No. To avoid this fiscal drain, Congress included as part of the 7 Amendments a "pension offset" provision that generally requires the reduction of spousal benefits by the amount of certain Federal or State Government pensions received by the Social Security applicant. 7 Amendments, 334 (a)(2) and (b)(2), 42 U.S. C. 402(b)(4)(A) and (c)(2)(A) (6 ed., Supp. V). Congress estimated that 90 percent of the savings that would be achieved by the pension offset provision as proposed by the Senate would be attributable to a reduction in payments to nondependent husbands and widowers who had not been entitled to any spousal benefits prior to *733 the decision in See S. Rep. No. The remaining portion of the savings, however, would come from a reduction in benefits to individuals, mostly women but also dependent men, who had retired or were about to retire and who had planned their retirements in reliance on their entitlement, under pre-7 law, to spousal benefits unreduced by government pension benefits. See ibid.; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. p. 72 ; S. Conf. Rep. No. p. 72 In order to protect the reliance interests of this group, see infra, at 742, Congress exempted from the pension offset requirement as ultimately enacted those spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits under the Act "as it was in effect and being administered in January 7." 7 Amendments, 334(g)(1), note following 42 U.S. C. 402 (6 ed., Supp. V).[3] *734 In the same subsection in which it established this 5-year grace period for individuals who qualified for spousal benefits in January 7, Congress also included a severability clause, which provides: "If any provision of this subsection, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall not be affected thereby, but the application of this subsection to any other persons or circumstances shall also be considered invalid." 7 Amendments, 334(g)(3), note following 42 U.S. C. 402 (6 ed., Supp. V). The Conference Committee explained that the severability clause was enacted "so that if [the exception to the pension offset provision] is found invalid the pension-offset would not be affected, and the application of the exception clause would not be broadened to include persons or circumstances that are not included within it." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. pp. 71-72 ; S. Conf. Rep. No. pp. 71-72 B Appellee Robert H. Mathews (hereafter Mathews or appellee) retired from his job with the United |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | Mathews or appellee) retired from his job with the United States Postal Service on November 18, 7. His wife, who had retired from her job a few months earlier, was fully insured under the *735 Social Security Act. In December 7, Mathews applied for husband's benefits on his wife's account. On review of the application, the Social Security Administration (SSA) informed Mathews that he was entitled to spousal benefits of $153.30 per month but that, because, as appellee acknowledged, he was not dependent upon his wife for one-half of his support, this amount would be entirely offset by his $573 per month Postal Service pension in accordance with 334(b)(2) of the 7 Amendments, 42 U.S. C. 402(c)(2) (6 ed., Supp. V). App. to Juris. Statement 2a. After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the SSA's initial decision. at 16a-22a. The ALJ's decision was in turn affirmed by the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services and thereby became the final decision of the Secretary. at 13a-14a. Mathews and his wife then brought this class action against the Secretary in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S. C. 405(g). The complaint alleged that application of the pension offset provision of the 7 Amendments to Mathews and other nondependent men but not to similarly situated nondependent women violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. Appellee also contended that the severability clause of the 7 Amendments was unconstitutional. The District Court certified a nationwide class composed of "all applicants for husband's insurance benefits whose applications have been denied [beginning 60 days before the filing of the complaint] solely because of the statutory requirement that husbands must have received more than one-half of their support from their wives in order to be entitled to benefits." App. to Juris. Statement 10a. Shortly thereafter, the District Court filed an opinion, at 1a-9a, and order, at 27a-28a, holding both the pension offset exception of 334(g)(1)(B) and the severability clause of 334(g)(3) unconstitutional. The court that, in essence, *736 the exception to the pension offset "provides a five-year grace period for all women who retire within five years of the enactment, and for men who retire within five years of the enactment and who are economically dependent upon their wives." at 3a. In light of this gender-based classification, the court that the offset exception could be upheld only if it " `serve[s] important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' " at 4a, quoting The court decided that the exception could not be justified as protecting the reliance interests of individuals who had planned their retirements prior to the 7 Amendments in expectation of undiminished benefits because, by requiring men to prove dependency notwithstanding the decision in the offset exception presumes that "women would have relied upon the practices of the Social Security Administration, yet men would not have relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court." App. to Juris. Statement 5a. Accordingly, the court held that the "portion of the exception to the pension offset provision that requires a male applicant to prove that he received one-half of his economic support from his wife violates the equal protection guarantees of the due process clause of the fifth amendment." at 6a-7a Having invalidated the exception to the offset provision, the District Court considered the severability clause of 334(g)(3). The court that, in the event appellee obtained a judgment that the offset exception unconstitutionally discriminates against him, the clause, if valid, would require nullification of the exception as to all persons, rather than extension of the exception to persons like appellee. Consequently, all government retirees not covered by Social Security, without regard to gender or dependency, would have their spousal benefits offset by the amount of their government pensions. The court characterized this effect of the severability clause as an effort by Congress "to mandate the *737 outcome of any challenge to the validity of the [pension offset] exception by making such a challenge fruitless. Even if a plaintiff achieved success in having the gender-based classification stricken, he would derive no personal benefit from the decision, because the pension offset would be applied to all applicants without exception." at 8a. Because of its view that Congress could not have meant to defeat the reliance interests of government retirees in that way, the court concluded "that the severability clause is not an expression of the true Congressional intent, but instead is an adroit attempt to discourage the bringing of an action by destroying standing." Accordingly, the court held the severability provision unconstitutional and ordered the Secretary to pay Mathews and the rest of the plaintiff class full spousal benefits without regard to dependency and without offsetting the amount of their government pensions. at 9a. II Because it may affect our jurisdiction, see Linda R. (3), we consider first the District Court's conclusion that the severability provision of the 7 Amendments would, if valid, deprive appellee of standing to bring this |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | would, if valid, deprive appellee of standing to bring this action by preventing him from receiving any more spousal benefits if he prevails than he is now allowed. Appellee agrees with the District Court's analysis and, for that reason, contends that the severability clause amounts to an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to thwart the jurisdiction and remedial power of the federal courts. We agree with the Secretary, however, that because the right asserted by appellee is the right to receive "benefits distributed according to classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered [applicants] solely on the basis of sex," (5), and not a substantive right to any particular amount of benefits, appellee's standing does not depend on his ability to obtain increased Social Security payments. *7 In order to establish standing for purposes of the constitutional "case or controvery" requirement, a plaintiff "must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, (9), and that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," In this case, appellee claims a type of personal injury we have long recognized as judicially cognizable.[4] He alleges that the pension offset exception subjects him to unequal treatment in the provision of his Social Security benefits solely because of his gender; specifically, as a nondependent man, he receives fewer benefits than he would if he were a similarly situated woman. App. 6. Although the severability clause would prevent a court from redressing this inequality by increasing the benefits payable to appellee, we have never suggested that the injuries caused by a constitutionally underinclusive scheme can be remedied only by extending the program's benefits to the excluded class. To the contrary, we have that a court sustaining such a claim faces "two remedial alternatives: [it] may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion." (0) See (9).[5] For that reason, we have frequently entertained attacks on discriminatory statutes or practices even when the government could deprive a successful plaintiff of any monetary relief by withdrawing the statute's benefits from both the favored and the excluded class.[6] These decisions demonstrate that, like the right to procedural due process, see (8), the right to equal treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not coextensive with any substantive rights to the benefits denied the party discriminated against. Rather, as we |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | the benefits denied the party discriminated against. Rather, as we have repeatedly emphasized, discrimination itself, by perpetuating "archaic and stereotypic notions" or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as "innately inferior" and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, Mississippi University for can cause serious noneconomic injuries *740 to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group.[7] Accordingly, as Justice Brandeis explained, when the "right invoked is that to equal treatment," the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class. Iowa-Des Moines National[8] Because the severability clause would forbid only the latter and not the former kind of relief in this case, the injury caused by the unequal treatment allegedly suffered by appellee may "be redressed by a favorable decision," at and he therefore has standing to prosecute this action.[9] *741 III Although appellee prevailed in the District Court on his constitutional claim, he urges as an alternative ground for affirmance that we construe the pension offset exception so that it does not incorporate a gender-based classification of the kind invalidated in but instead exempts from the offset requirement both men and women, without regard to dependency. Relying on "the maxim that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions," United (9), he contends that Congress, in reviving the qualifying criteria in effect before the decision in must be presumed to have done so without reenacting the gender-based dependency test which this Court had held unconstitutional. The cannon favoring constructions of statutes to avoid constitutional questions does not, however, license a court to usurp the policymaking and legislative functions of duly elected representatives. Yu Cong See 4-501 (9); ; United " `[A]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of *742 perverting the purpose of a statute' or judicially rewriting it." quoting In this case, the language and history of the offset exception plainly demonstrate that Congress meant to resurrect, for a 5-year grace period, the gender-based dependency test of pre- law. As we have Congress adopted the pension offset requirement to prevent the serious fiscal drain that it concluded would result from payment of unreduced benefits to the new class of recipients made eligible by the decision in Nevertheless, in an effort to protect the reliance interests of individuals who had planned |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | to protect the reliance interests of individuals who had planned their retirement before the March 7 decision and the resulting amendments to the Act, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. p. 72 ; S. Conf. Rep. No. p. 72 Congress exempted from the offset requirement those individuals eligible for spousal benefits under the Act "as it was in effect and being administered in January 7." There can be no dispute that in January 7 men were eligible for benefits only upon a showing of dependency whereas women were subject to no such requirement. See former 42 U.S. C. 402(c) and (f); and nn. 1, 2.[10] And Congress further indicated its intent to revive those eligibility criteria by including an unusual *743 severability clause that would, in the event the classification were held invalid, sacrifice the exception's protection of reliance interests to the goal served by the offset provision itself preventing an undue financial burden on the system. See and n. 5; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. ; S. Conf. Rep. No. Consistent with the plain import of these provisions, Senator Long, then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and principal manager of the bill in the Senate, explained that the exception clause was meant "to afford protection to those who anticipated receiving their spouses benefits prior to March 7 without providing it also to those [who] would qualify only as a result of [the ] decision." 123 Cong. Rec. 39134 (emphasis added). See also Appellee's proposed interpretation of the exception provision would defeat this clearly expressed intention and, by rendering the offset requirement applicable to very few applicants,[11] frustrate the congressional *744 aim of preventing a major fiscal drain on the Social Security trust fund. Accordingly, we reject appellee's construction of the Act and conclude that the exception to the offset provision applies to otherwise eligible men only when they can show dependency on their wives for one-half of their support. We turn therefore to consider the constitutionality of that gender-based classification. IV We recently reviewed the "firmly established principles" by which to evaluate a claim of gender discrimination like that made by appellee: "Our decisions establish that the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an `exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification. The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves `important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are `substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' "Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or `protect' members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate. "If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and means is present." Mississippi University for 458 U. S., 4-. (Citations and footnotes omitted.) *745 We therefore consider in turn whether the Secretary has carried her burden of (A) showing a legitimate and "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based classification of the pension offset provision and (B) demonstrating "the requisite direct, substantial relationship" between the classification and the important governmental objectives it purports to serve. A Although the offset exception temporarily revives the gender-based eligibility requirements invalidated in Congress' purpose in adopting the exception bears no relationship to the concerns that animated the original enactment of those criteria. The Court concluded in that the original gender-based standards, which were premised on an assumption that females would normally be dependent on the earnings of their spouses but males would not, constituted an "accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females," that reflected " `old notions' and `archaic and overbroad' generalizations" about the roles and relative abilities of men and women, at 217 Accordingly, the statute's "objective itself [was] illegitimate." Mississippi University for at[12] The provision at issue here, in contrast, reflects no such illegitimate government purposes. As detailed above, Congress adopted the offset exception in order to protect the expectations of persons, both men and women, who had planned their retirements based on pre-January 7 law, under which they could receive spousal benefits unreduced by the amount of any government pensions to which they were also entitled. Congress accomplished its aim by incorporating *746 the eligibility criteria as they existed in January 7; its choice of this approach rather than an explicit adoption of new gender-based standards confirms that its purpose was to protect reliance on prior law, not to reassert the sexist assumptions rejected in Nor is that purpose rendered illegitimate by the fact that it is achieved through a temporary revival of an invalidated classification. We have recognized, in a number of contexts, the legitimacy of protecting reasonable reliance on prior law even when that requires allowing an |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | reliance on prior law even when that requires allowing an unconstitutional statute to remain in effect for a limited period of time. See, e. g., Northern Pipeline Construction ; ; Chevron Oil (1). See also Los Angeles Dept. of Water & (8). Although an unconstitutional scheme could not be retained for an unduly prolonged period in the name of protecting reliance interests, or even for a brief period if the expectations sought to be protected were themselves unreasonable or illegitimate, there is no indication that the offset exception suffers from either of these flaws. The duration of the exception is closely related to its goal of protecting only individuals who had planned their retirements in reliance on prior law, see infra, at 748-749, and appellee does not suggest that the expectations of those individuals, who hardly could have anticipated the adoption of the offset requirement, were unreasonable or illegitimate. The protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a legitimate governmental objective: it provides "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the statute at issue here. See ; Personnel Administrator of (9). Appellee does not, and cannot, contest the Secretary's statement that "it is a significant and salutary goal to secure the retirement plans of our Nation's workers who in *747 good faith had long and reasonably relied on the provisions of the Social Security Act." Brief for Appellant 33. Instead, appellee contends that the only people who could justifiably have relied on an expectation of unreduced benefits are those who actually retired before the effective date of the offset provision and those individuals will not be required to offset their benefits. Brief for Appellees 28-29, and n. 21, 31-32. Congress determined, however, that many individuals adjusted their spending and savings habits prior to their retirements in expectation of receiving full spousal benefits as well as a government pension,[13] and we have no reason to doubt that conclusion. One commentator has explained: "Many couples have undoubtedly made retirement plans and adjusted the level of their private saving and investment in anticipation of retirement benefits from social security which include a special benefit for a spouse. An abrupt denial of benefits in these cases, even if the spouse who would have received them is shown to be not truly dependent on the other is clearly inequitable since the couple's savings and retirement plans would have *748 been different had the spouse benefit not been anticipated. Thus, were it to be decided that wives should prove dependency in order to receive spouse benefits, a strong argument could be made for making such a change |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Heckler v. Mathews | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111114/heckler-v-mathews/ | strong argument could be made for making such a change gradually so as to avoid inequities to couples approaching retirement who had anticipated that such benefits would be available to them and had made their retirement plans accordingly." M. Flowers, Women and Social Security: An Institutional Dilemma 41 In short, particularly in the years immediately preceding retirement, individuals make spending, savings, and investment decisions based on assumptions regarding the amount of income they expect to receive after they stop working. For such individuals reliance on the law in effect during those years may be critically important.[14] In recognition of this fact, the offset exception, in the words of the Conference Report, protects "people who are already retired, or close to retirement, from public employment and who cannot be expected to readjust their retirement plans to take account of the `offset' provision that will apply in the future." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. p. 72 ; S. Conf. Rep. No. p. 72 That purpose, consistent with the principle that " `[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word,' " (1), quoting 362 U.S. provides an exceedingly persuasive justification for the gender-based classification incorporated in the offset exception. B Having identified the legitimate and important governmental purpose of the offset exception, we have little trouble *749 concluding that the means employed by the statute is "substantially related to the achievement of [that] objectiv[e]." 446 U.S. By reviving for a 5-year period the eligibility criteria in effect in January 7, the exception is narrowly tailored to protect only those individuals who made retirement plans prior to the changes in the law that occurred after that date. Individuals who were eligible for spousal benefits before the law changed and who retire within five years of the statute's enactment may reasonably be assumed to have begun planning for their retirement prior to the adoption of the offset provision. See Such persons, men as well as women, may receive spousal benefits unreduced by their government pensions, while those persons, men as well as women, who first became eligible for benefits after January 7 may not.[15] *750 Moreover, the offset exception was plainly adopted "through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women." Mississippi University for 458 U. S., 6 As the legislative history set out above demonstrates, Congress considered carefully and at length both the financial problems that led to the offset provision and the reliance interests that might be frustrated by that requirement. The solution finally adopted, after rejection of more |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Thompson v. Keohane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117982/thompson-v-keohane/ | During a two-hour, tape-recorded session at Alaska state trooper headquarters, petitioner Carl Thompson confessed that he killed his former wife. Thompson's confession was placed in evidence at the ensuing Alaska state-court trial, *102 and he was convicted of first-degree murder. Challenging his conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, Thompson maintained that the Alaska troopers gained his confession without according him the warnings requires: that he could remain silent; that anything he said could be used against him in court; and that he was entitled to an attorney, either retained or appointed. Miranda warnings are due only when a suspect interrogated by the police is "in custody." The state trial and appellate courts determined that Thompson was not "in custody" when he confessed. The statute governing federal habeas corpus proceedings, 28 U.S. C. 2254, directs that, ordinarily, state-court fact findings "shall be presumed to be correct." 2254(d). The question before this Court is whether the state-court determination that Thompson was not "in custody" when he confessed is a finding of fact warranting a presumption of correctness, or a matter of law calling for independent review in federal court. We hold that the issue whether a suspect is "in custody," and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings, presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review. I On September 10, 1986, two moose hunters discovered the body of a dead woman floating in a gravel pit lake on the outskirts of Fairbanks, Alaska. The woman had been stabbed 29 times. Notified by the hunters, the Alaska state troopers issued a press release seeking assistance in identifying the body. Thompson called the troopers on September 11 to inform them that his former wife, Dixie Thompson, fit the description in the press release and that she had been missing for about a month. Through a dental examination, the troopers conclusively established that the corpse was Dixie Thompson. On September 15, a trooper called *103 Thompson and asked him to come to headquarters, purportedly to identify personal items the troopers thought belonged to Dixie Thompson. It is now undisputed, however, that the trooper's primary reason for contacting Thompson was to question him about the murder. Thompson drove to the troopers' headquarters in his pickup truck and, upon arriving, immediately identified the items as Dixie's. He remained at headquarters, however, for two more hours while two unarmed troopers continuously questioned him in a small interview room and tape-recorded the exchange. The troopers did not inform Thompson of his Miranda rights. Although they constantly assured Thompson he was free to leave, they also told |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Thompson v. Keohane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117982/thompson-v-keohane/ | assured Thompson he was free to leave, they also told him repeatedly that they knew he had killed his former wife. Informing Thompson that execution of a search warrant was underway at his home, and that his truck was about to be searched pursuant to another warrant, the troopers asked questions that invited a confession. App. 43-79.[1] Eventually, Thompson told the troopers he killed Dixie. *104 As promised, the troopers permitted Thompson to leave, but impounded his truck. Left without transportation, Thompson accepted the troopers' offer of a ride to his friend's *105 house. Some two hours later, the troopers arrested Thompson and charged him with first-degree murder. The Alaska trial court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, denied Thompson's motion to suppress his September 15 statements. Tr. 118 (Dec. 12, 1986); Tr. 142 (Mar. 18, 1987). Deciding the motion on the papers submitted, the trial court ruled that Thompson was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, therefore the troopers had no obligation to inform him of his Miranda rights. App. 8-9.[2] Applying an objective test to resolve the "in custody" question, the court asked whether "`a reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off police questioning.' " at 7 ). These features, the court indicated, were key: Thompson arrived at the station in response to a trooper's request; two unarmed troopers in plain clothes questioned him; Thompson was told he was free to go at any time; and he was not arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation. App. 7-8. Although the trial court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, it also observed that the troopers' subsequent actionsreleasing and shortly thereafter arresting Thompsonrendered the question "very close." at 8-9. After a trial, at which the prosecution played the taperecorded confession, the jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence. The Court of Appeals of Alaska affirmed Thompson's conviction, concluding, among other things, that the troopers had not placed Thompson "in custody," and therefore had no obligation to give him Miranda warnings.[3] The Alaska Supreme Court denied discretionary review. App. 24. Thompson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The District Court denied the writ, according a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S. C. 2254(d) to the state court's conclusion that, when Thompson confessed, he was not yet "in custody" for Miranda purposes. App. 37. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed without publishing an opinion. Based |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Thompson v. Keohane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117982/thompson-v-keohane/ | for the Ninth Circuit affirmed without publishing an opinion. Based on Circuit precedent,[4] the court held that "a state court's determination that a defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda is a question of fact entitled to the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S. C. 2254(d)." App. 41. Federal Courts of Appeals disagree on the issue Thompson asks us to resolve: whether state-court "in custody" determinations are matters of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S. C. 2254(d), or mixed questions of law and fact warranting independent review by the federal habeas court. Compare with Because uniformity among federal courts is important on questions of this order, we granted certiorari to end the division of authority. 513 U. S. *107 1126 We now hold that the 28 U.S. C. 2254(d) presumption does not apply to "in custody" rulings; accordingly, we vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment. II "[I]n-custody interrogation[s]," this Court recognized in place "inherently compelling pressures" on the persons To safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court held, suspects interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation. at 444. The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Ib; see also (duty to give Miranda warnings is triggered "only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody' ") ). Our task in petitioner Thompson's case is to identify the standard governing federal habeas courts' review of state-court "in custody" determinations.[5] A Section 2254 governs federal habeas corpus proceedings instituted by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. In such proceedings, 2254(d) declares, *108 state-court determinations of "a factual issue" "shall be presumed to be correct" absent one of the enumerated exceptions.[6] This provision, added in a 1966 amendment, Act of *109 Nov. 2, 1966, Stat. 1105-1106, received the Court's close attention in As the Court observed, 2254(d) "was an almost verbatim codification of the standards delineated in for determining when a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing before acting on a habeas petition."[7]Townsend counseled that, if the habeas petitioner has had in state court "a full and fair hearing resulting in reliable findings," the federal court |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Thompson v. Keohane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117982/thompson-v-keohane/ | and fair hearing resulting in reliable findings," the federal court "ordinarily should accept the facts as found" by the state Section 2254(d) essentially "elevated [the Townsend Court's] exhortation into a mandatory presumption of correctness." -112; see also at 112 ). Just as Townsend `s instruction on the respect appropriately accorded state-court fact findings is now captured in the 2254(d) presumption, so we have adhered to Townsend `s definition of the 2254(d) term "factual issue."[8] The Townsend Court explained that by "`issues of fact,' " it meant *110 "basic, primary, or historical facts: facts `in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators' " n. 6 ). "Socalled mixed questions of fact and law, which require the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations," the Townsend Court added, "are not facts in this sense." n. 6.[9] In applying 2254(d), we have reaffirmed that "basic, primary, or historical facts" are the "factual issue[s]" to which the statutory presumption of correctness dominantly relates. See, e. g., ("[S]ubsidiary factual questions" in alleged involuntariness of confession cases are subject to the 2254(d) presumption, but "the ultimate question"requiring a "totality of the circumstances" assessment"is a matter for independent federal determination."); ("mixed determination[s] of law and fact" generally are not subject to the 2254(d) presumption of correctness). It must be acknowledged, however, "that the Court has not charted an entirely clear course in this area." In regard to 2254(d), as in other contexts,[10] the proper characterization of a question as one of *111 fact or law is sometimes slippery. See ib; ("It will not always be easy to separate questions of `fact' from `mixed questions of law and fact' for 2254(d) purposes"). Two lines of decisions compose the Court's 2254(d) law/fact jurisprudence. In several cases, the Court has classified as "factual issues" within 2254(d)'s compass questions extending beyond the determination of "what happened." This category notably includes: competency to stand trial ); and juror impartiality ; ). While these issues encompass more than "basic, primary, or historical facts," their resolution depends heavily on the trial court's appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor. See, e. g., 469 U. S., at This Court has reasoned that a trial court is better positioned to make decisions of this genre, and has therefore accorded the judgment of the jurist-observer "presumptive weight." On the other hand, the Court has ranked as issues of law for 2254(d) purposes: the voluntariness of a confession (, ); the effectiveness of counsel's assistance ); and the potential conflict of interest arising out of an attorney's representation of multiple |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Thompson v. Keohane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117982/thompson-v-keohane/ | of interest arising out of an attorney's representation of multiple defendants (, -). "What happened" issues in these cases warranted a presumption of correctness, but the Court declared "the ultimate question" outside 2254(d)'s domain *112 because of its "uniquely legal dimension." ; see also ("[T]he constitutionality of the pretrial identification procedures used in this case is a mixed question of law and fact that is not governed by 2254(d)."); B The ultimate "in custody" determination for Miranda purposes, we are persuaded, fits within the latter class of cases. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances,[11] would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve "the ultimate inquiry": "[was] there a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (quoting U. S., at ). The first inquiry, all agree, is distinctly factual. State-court findings on these scene- and action-setting questions attract a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S. C. 2254(d). The second inquiry, however, calls for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts. This ultimate *113 determination, we hold, presents a "mixed question of law and fact" qualifying for independent review. The practical considerations that have prompted the Court to type questions like juror bias and competency as "factual issue[s]," and therefore governed by 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness, are not dominant here. As this case illustrates, the trial court's superior capacity to resolve credibility issues is not dispositive of the "in custody" inquiry.[12] Credibility determinations, as in the case of the alleged involuntariness of a confession, see may sometimes contribute to the establishment of the historical facts and thus to identification of the "totality of the circumstances." But the crucial question entails an evaluation made after determination of those circumstances: if encountered by a "reasonable person," would the identified circumstances add up to custody as defined in Miranda?[13]*114 See ; cf. - Unlike the voir dire of a juror, or the determination of a defendant's competency, 462 U. S., at which "take[s] place in open court on a full record," 474 U. S., at the trial court does not have a first-person vantage on whether a defendant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. See 474 U.S., at Furthermore, in fathoming the state of mind of a potential juror or a defendant in order to |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Thompson v. Keohane | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117982/thompson-v-keohane/ | of a potential juror or a defendant in order to answer the questions, "Is she free of bias?," "Is he competent to stand trial?," the trial court makes an individual-specific decision, one unlikely to have precedential value.[14] In contrast, "in custody" determinations do guide future decisions.[15] We thus conclude *115 that once the historical facts are resolved, the state court is not "in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court to make [the ultimate] determination" of the consistency of the law enforcement officer's conduct with the federal Miranda warning requirement. See 474 U.S., at Notably, we have treated the "in custody" question as one of law when States complained that their courts had erroneously expanded the meaning of "custodial interrogation." See - ; U. S., at 494-496 ; cf. It would be anomalous to type the question differently when an individual complains that the state courts had erroneously constricted the circumstances that add up to an "in custody" conclusion. Classifying "in custody" as a determination qualifying for independent review should serve legitimate law enforcement interests as effectively as it serves to ensure protection of the right against self-incrimination. As our decisions bear out, the law declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law. See, e. g., -439 ; see also Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, * * * Applying 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness to the Alaska court's "in custody" determination, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Thompson was not "in custody" and thus not entitled to Miranda warnings. Because we conclude that state-court "in custody" determinations warrant independent review by a federal habeas court, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Willy v. Coastal Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112700/willy-v-coastal-corp/ | We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal district court may impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case in which the district court is later determined to be without subject-matter jurisdiction. We conclude that in the circumstances presented here it may do so. Petitioner Willy sued respondent Coastal Corporation (Coastal or respondent) in Texas state court, raising a variety of claims relating to Coastal's decision to terminate his employment as "in-house" counsel. Petitioner alleged that he had been fired due to his refusal to participate in respondent's violation of various federal and state environmental laws. Respondent removed the case to Federal District Court, claiming original federal-question jurisdiction under 8 U.S. C. 1331, 1441. Petitioner objected to the removal, claiming that his case did not "arise under" federal law, see 1331, but the District Court disagreed and concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court subsequently granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to *133 state a claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1(b)(6), and dismissed petitioner's pendent state claims. At the same time, the District Court granted respondent's motion for Rule 11 sanctions, awarding attorney's fees of $,65 against Willy and his attorney, Young, jointly and severally. The District Court found that the filings made by plaintiff's counsel "create[d] a blur of absolute confusion." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-7. These included a 1,00-page, unindexed, unnumbered pile of materials that the District Court determined "to be a conscious and wanton affront to the judicial process, this Court, and opposing counsel" that was "irresponsible at a minimum and at worst intentionally harassing." Petitioner's sanctionable behavior also included careless pleading, such as reliance on a nonexistent Federal Rule of Evidence. None of the sanctionable conduct was related to petitioner's initial effort to convince the District Court that it was without subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the District Court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint raised no claims arising under federal law. It therefore reversed the District Court order dismissing the claims and instructed that the case be remanded to state court. The court also upheld the District Court's decision to award Rule 11 sanctions, although it remanded the case to the District Court to determine the amount. On remand the District Court recomputed the Rule 11 sanctions and imposed sanctions in the amount of $19,307, the amount of attorney's fees that respondent had incurred in responding to petitioner's sanctionable conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On this second appeal, the Court of Appeals |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Willy v. Coastal Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112700/willy-v-coastal-corp/ | Appeals affirmed. On this second appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that, in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the District Court was constitutionally without *134 authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions. It concluded that the authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions rested in the "inherent powers" of the federal courtsthose powers "`necessary to the exercise of all others.' " ). The court concluded that the exercise of Rule 11 powers was an example of such inherent powers. It principally relied on our recent decision in Cooter & in which we upheld a Rule 11 sanction imposed for filing a frivolous complaint even though the sanction order was entered after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its suit. Before this Court, petitioner advances two claims. The first is that Congress, in acquiescing in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, did not "authoriz[e] recovery of fees or costs against parties who prevail on jurisdictional grounds." Brief for Petitioner 18. Petitioner finds in both the Rules Enabling Act and the Rules the "implicit premise that rules of practice and procedure are not necessary for disputes beyond the judicial power conferred by Article III." Phrased this way, the petitioner's contention is correct, but it does not dispose of this case. The Rules Enabling Act, 8 U.S. C. 07, authorizes the Court to "prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts" Those rules may not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." In response, we have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 governs their scope. It provides that "[t]hese rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature" Rule 81(c) specifically provides that the Rules "apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and govern procedure after removal." This expansive language contains no express exceptions *135 and indicates a clear intent to have the Rules, including Rule 11, apply to all district court civil proceedings.[1] But in we observed that federal courts, in adopting rules, were not free to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute. Such a caveat applies a fortiori to any effort to extend by rule the judicial power of the United States described in Article III of the Constitution. The Rules, then, must be deemed to apply only if their application will not impermissibly expand the judicial authority conferred by Article III. We must therefore examine petitioner's second, and related contention, that the District Court action in |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Willy v. Coastal Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112700/willy-v-coastal-corp/ | second, and related contention, that the District Court action in this case lies outside the range of action constitutionally permitted to an Article III court. Petitioner begins by pointing out that Article III limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to certain "cases or controversies." Brief for Petitioner 11. He then contends that the District Court's exercise of judicial power to grant Rule 11 sanctions must have been an unconstitutional act because, in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, *136 the district court lacks "a substantive source of judicial power, beyond that conferred by Article III." Thus, according to petitioner, even had Congress attempted to grant the courts authority to impose sanctions in a case such as this, the grant would run afoul of Article III. In making this claim, petitioner acknowledges that there are some circumstances in which federal courts may impose attorney's fees or costs, even where the court eventually proves to be without subject-matter jurisdiction.[] He contends, however, that such instances are limited to a narrowly prescribed category of cases and do not include the situation in which sanctions are imposed against a party who has successfully contested jurisdiction. We think petitioner's contentions flawed in several respects. Article I, 8, cl. 9, authorizes Congress to establish the lower federal courts. From almost the founding days of this country, it has been firmly established that Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to make all laws "necessary and proper"[3] to their establishment, also may enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts and the means by which their judgments are enforced. See ; Indeed, in acknowledging the many circumstances in which sanctions can be imposed, several of which have a statutory basis, petitioner effectively concedes both Congress' general power to regulate the courts and its specific *137 power to authorize the imposition of sanctions. See n. This leaves only petitioner's contention that Rule 11 sanctions must be aborted because at a time after the sanctionable conduct occurred, it was determined by the Court of Appeals that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. A final determination of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of course, precludes further adjudication of it. But such a determination does not automatically wipe out all proceedings had in the district court at a time when the district court operated under the misapprehension that it had jurisdiction. In Chicot County Drainage we held that a judgment rendered in a case in which it was ultimately concluded that the District Court was without jurisdiction was nonetheless res judicata on collateral attack made |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Willy v. Coastal Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112700/willy-v-coastal-corp/ | without jurisdiction was nonetheless res judicata on collateral attack made by one of the parties. See also In Stoll, we observed that the practical concern with providing an end to litigation justifies a rule preventing collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction. at 17. In United 330 U.S. 58 we upheld a criminal contempt citation even on the assumption that the District Court issuing the citation was without jurisdiction over the underlying action. In that case, the question was raised on direct review and not collateral attack. We think the same concern expressed in these cases the maintenance of orderly procedure, even in the wake of a jurisdiction ruling later found to be mistakenjustifies the conclusion that the sanction ordered here need not be upset. The District Court order which the petitioner seeks to upset is one that is collateral to the merits. We recently had occasion to examine Rule 11's scope and purpose in great detail in Cooter & The challenge in that case was to an order imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint, entered *138 after the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed his action. In the course of our discussion we noted that "[i]t is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending. [An] imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate." Such an order implicates no constitutional concern because it "does not signify a district court's assessment of the legal merits of the complaint." It therefore does not raise the issue of a district court adjudicating the merits of a "case or controversy" over which it lacks jurisdiction. Petitioner places great weight on our decision in United States Catholic 487 U.S. 7 a case involving a civil contempt order entered by the District Court. The contemnors, two nonparty witnesses, refused to comply with a District Court document subpoena. The District Court found them in civil contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of $50,000 per day. The contemnors, as was their right, immediately appealed the contempt order, challenging the District Court's subjectmatter jurisdiction. We held that the Court of Appeals was obligated to consider the jurisdictional challenge in full, rather than simply contenting itself with an inquiry into whether the District Court colorably had jurisdiction. We further concluded that if the District Court was found to be lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, that the contempt order |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,992 | 19 | majority | Willy v. Coastal Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112700/willy-v-coastal-corp/ | found to be lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, that the contempt order would also fall. Focusing on this second part of our decision, petitioner cites Catholic Conference as establishing the proposition that a sanction must fall if imposed when jurisdiction is in fact absent.[4] Catholic Conference does not stand for such a broad assertion. A civil contempt order has much different purposes *139 than a Rule 11 sanction. Civil contempt is designed to force the contemnor to comply with an order of the court, ; Rule 11 is designed to punish a party who has already violated the court's rules. Cooter & Given that civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with the court's decree, it is logical that the order itself should fall with a showing that the court was without authority to enter the decree. Accord, United The interest in having rules of procedure obeyed, by contrast, does not disappear upon a subsequent determination that the court was without subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts do make mistakes; in cases such as Catholic Conference it may be possible immediately to seek relief in an appellate tribunal. But where such an immediate appeal is not authorized, there is no constitutional infirmity under Article III in requiring those practicing before the courts to conduct themselves in compliance with the applicable procedural rules in the interim, and to allow the courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their failure to do so.[5] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | Motaa, like may other States, imposes a severace tax o mieral productio i the State. I this appeal, we cosider whether the tax Motaa levies o each to of coal mied i the State, et seq. violates the Commerce ad Supremacy Clauses of the Uited States Costitutio. I Buried beeath Motaa are large deposits of low-sulfur coal, most of it o federal lad. Sice 1921, Motaa has imposed a severace tax o the output of Motaa coal mies, icludig coal mied o federal lad. After commissioig a study of coal productio taxes i 1974, see House Resolutios Nos. 45 ad 93, Seate Resolutio No. 83, -1620, 1653-1654, 1683-1684 ; Motaa Legislative Coucil, Fossil Fuel Taxatio i 1975, the Motaa Legislature eacted the tax schedule at issue i this case. The tax is levied at varyig rates depedig o the value, eergy cotet, ad method of extractio of the coal, ad may equal, at a maximum, 30% of the "cotract sales price."[1] Uder the terms of a 1976 amedmet to the Motaa Costitutio, after December 31, 1979, at least 50% of the reveues geerated by the tax must be paid ito a permaet trust fud, the pricipal of which may be appropriated oly by a vote of three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature. Mot. Cost., Art. IX, 5. Appellats, 4 Motaa coal producers ad 11 of their out-of-state utility compay customers, filed these suits i Motaa state court i 1978. They sought refuds of over $5.4 millio i severace taxes paid uder protest, a declaratio that the tax is ivalid uder the Supremacy ad Commerce Clauses, ad a ijuctio agaist further collectio of the tax. Without receivig ay evidece, the court upheld the tax ad dismissed the complaits. O appeal, the Motaa Supreme Court affirmed the judgmet of the trial court. Mot., The Supreme Court held that the tax is ot subject to scrutiy uder the Commerce Clause[2] because it is imposed o the severace of coal, which the court characterized as a itrastate activity precedig etry of the coal ito *614 commerce. I this regard, the Motaa court relied o this Court's decisios i Oliver Iro Miig ad Hope Natural Gas which employed similar reasoig i upholdig state severace taxes agaist Commerce Clause challeges. As a alterative basis for its resolutio of the Commerce Clause issue, the Motaa court held, as a matter of law, that the tax survives scrutiy uder the four-part test articulated by this Court i Complete Auto Trasit, The Motaa court also rejected appellats' Supremacy Clause[3] challege, cocludig that appellats had |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | also rejected appellats' Supremacy Clause[3] challege, cocludig that appellats had failed to show that the Motaa tax coflicts with ay federal statute. We oted probable jurisdictio, to cosider the importat issues raised. We ow affirm. II A As a iitial matter, appellats assert that the Motaa Supreme Court erred i cocludig that the Motaa tax is ot subject to the strictures of the Commerce Clause. I appellats' view, Heisler's "mechaical" approach, which looks to whether a state tax is levied o goods prior to their etry ito commerce, o loger accurately reflects the law. Appellats coted that the correct aalysis focuses o whether the challeged tax substatially affects commerce, i which case it must be scrutiized uder the Complete Auto Trasit test. We agree that Heisler's reasoig has bee udermied by more recet cases. The Heisler aalysis evolved at a time whe the Commerce Clause was thought to prohibit the States from imposig ay direct taxes o commerce. *615 See, e. g., Helso & ; Ozark Pipe Lie Cosequetly, the distictio betwee itrastate activities ad commerce was crucial to protectig the States' taxig power.[4] The Court has, however, log sice rejected ay suggestio that a state tax or regulatio affectig commerce is immue from Commerce Clause scrutiy because it attaches oly to a "local" or itrastate activity. See ; ; Correspodigly, the Court has rejected the otio that state taxes levied o commerce are per se ivalid. See, e. g., Washigto Reveue ; Complete Auto Trasit, I reviewig Commerce Clause challeges to state taxes, our goal has istead bee to "establish a cosistet ad ratioal method of iquiry" focusig o "the practical effect of a challeged tax." Mobil Oil See Moorma Mfg. ; Washigto Reveue Dept. v. Associatio of Wash. Stevedorig *616 ; Complete Auto Trasit, We coclude that the same "practical" aalysis should apply i reviewig Commerce Clause challeges to state severace taxes. I the first place, there is o real distictioi terms of ecoomic effectsbetwee severace taxes ad other types of state taxes that have bee subjected to Commerce Clause scrutiy.[5] See, e. g., Michiga-Wiscosi Pipe Lie ; Puget Soud Stevedorig both overruled i Washigto Reveue [6] State taxes levied o a "local" activity precedig etry of the goods ito commerce may substatially affect commerce, ad this effect is the proper focus of Commerce Clause iquiry. See Mobil Oil at Secod, this Court has ackowledged that "a State has a sigificat iterest i exactig from commerce its fair share of the cost of state govermet," Washigto Reveue As the Court has stated, "`[e]ve busiess must pay its way.'" |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | the Court has stated, "`[e]ve busiess must pay its way.'" Wester Live quotig Postal Telegraph-Cable *617 Cosequetly, the Heisler Court's cocer that a loss of state taxig authority would be a ievitable result of subjectig taxes o "local" activities to Commerce Clause scrutiy is o loger teable. We therefore hold that a state severace tax is ot immuized from Commerce Clause scrutiy by a claim that the tax is imposed o goods prior to their etry ito the stream of commerce. Ay cotrary statemets i Heisler ad its progey are disapproved.[7] We agree with appellats that the Motaa tax must be evaluated uder Complete Auto Trasit's four-part test. Uder that test, a state tax does ot offed the Commerce Clause if it "is applied to a activity with a substatial exus with the taxig State, is fairly apportioed, does ot discrimiate agaist commerce, ad is fairly related to services provided by the State." B Appellats do ot dispute that the Motaa tax satisfies the first two progs of the Complete Auto Trasit test. As the Motaa Supreme Court oted, "there ca be o argumet here that a substatial, i fact, the oly exus of the severace of coal is established i Motaa." Mot., at , Nor is there ay questio here regardig apportiomet or potetial multiple taxatio, for as the state court observed, "the severace ca occur i o other state" ad "o other state ca tax the severace." Appellats do coted, however, that the Motaa tax is ivalid uder the third ad fourth progs of the Complete Auto Trasit test. Appellats assert that the Motaa tax "discrimiate[s] agaist commerce" because 90% of Motaa coal is shipped to other States uder cotracts that shift the tax burde primarily to o-Motaa utility compaies ad thus *618 to citizes of other States. But the Motaa tax is computed at the same rate regardless of the fial destiatio of the coal, ad there is o suggestio here that the tax is admiistered i a maer that departs from this evehaded formula. We are ot, therefore, cofroted here with the type of differetial tax treatmet of ad itrastate commerce that the Court has foud i other "discrimiatio" cases. See, e. g., ; Bosto Stock ; cf. ; Istead, the gravame of appellats' claim is that a state tax must be cosidered discrimiatory for purposes of the Commerce Clause if the tax burde is bore primarily by out-of-state cosumers. Appellats do ot suggest that this assertio is based o ay of this Court's prior discrimiatory tax cases. I fact, a similar claim was cosidered |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | discrimiatory tax cases. I fact, a similar claim was cosidered ad rejected i Heisler. There, it was argued that Pesylvaia had a virtual moopoly of athracite coal ad that, because 80% of the coal was shipped out of State, the tax discrimiated agaist ad impermissibly burdeed commerce. -253. The Court, however, dismissed these factors as "advetitious cosideratios." at We share the Heisler Court's misgivigs about judgig the validity of a state tax by assessig the State's "moopoly" positio or its "exportatio" of the tax burde out of State. The premise of our discrimiatio cases is that "[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create a area of free trade amog the several States." See 432 U. S., at ; Bosto Stock Uder such a regime, the borders betwee the States are essetially irrelevat. As the Court stated i West v. Kasas Natural Gas "`i matters of foreig *619 ad commerce there are o state lies.'" See Bosto Stock Cosequetly, to accept appellats' theory ad ivalidate the Motaa tax solely because most of Motaa's coal is shipped across the very state borders that ordiarily are to be cosidered irrelevat would require a sigificat ad, i our view, uwarrated departure from the ratioale of our prior discrimiatio cases. Furthermore, appellats' assertio that Motaa may ot "exploit" its "moopoly" positio by exportig tax burdes to other States, caot rest o a claim that there is eed to protect the out-of-state cosumers of Motaa coal from discrimiatory tax treatmet. As previously oted, there is o real discrimiatio i this case; the tax burde is bore accordig to the amout of coal cosumed ad ot accordig to ay distictio betwee i-state ad out-of-state cosumers. Rather, appellats assume that the Commerce Clause gives residets of oe State a right of access at "reasoable" prices to resources located i aother State that is richly edowed with such resources, without regard to whether ad o what terms residets of the resource-rich State have access to the resources. We are ot coviced that the Commerce Clause, of its ow force, gives the residets of oe State the right to cotrol i this fashio the terms of resource developmet ad depletio i a sister State. Cf.[8] *620 I ay evet, appellats' discrimiatio theory ultimately collapses ito their claim that the Motaa tax is ivalid uder the forth prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test: that the tax is ot "fairly related to the services provided by the State." Because appellats cocede that Motaa may impose some severace tax o coal mied i the State,[9] the oly remaiig foudatio |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | o coal mied i the State,[9] the oly remaiig foudatio for their discrimiatio theory is a claim that the tax burde bore by the out-of-state cosumers of Motaa coal is excessive. This is, of course, merely a variat of appellats' assertio that the Motaa tax does ot satisfy the "fairly related" prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test, ad it is to this cotetio that we ow tur. Appellats argue that they are etitled to a opportuity to prove that the amout collected uder the Motaa tax is ot fairly related to the additioal costs the State icurs because of coal miig.[10] Thus, appellats' objectio is to *621 the rate of the Motaa tax, ad eve the, their oly complait is that the amout the State receives i taxes far exceeds the value of the services provided to the coal miig idustry. I objectig to the tax o this groud, appellats may be assumig that the Motaa tax is, i fact, iteded to reimburse the State for the cost of specific services furished to the coal miig idustry. Alteratively, appellats could be arguig that a State's power to tax a activity coected to commerce caot exceed the value of the services specifically provided to the activity. Either way, the premise of appellats' argumet is ivalid. Furthermore, appellats have completely misuderstood the ature of the iquiry uder the fourth prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test. The Motaa Supreme Court held that the coal severace tax is "imposed for the geeral support of the govermet." Mot., at , ad we have o reaso to questio this characterizatio of the Motaa tax as a geeral reveue tax.[11] Cosequetly, i reviewig appellats' cotetios, we put to oe side those cases i which the Court reviewed challeges to "user" fees or "taxes" that were desiged ad defeded as a specific charge imposed by the State for the use of state-owed or state-provided trasportatio or other facilities ad services. See, e. g., Evasville-Vaderburgh *622 Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlies, Ic., ; Clark v. Paul Gray, Ic., ; Igels v. Morf,[12] This Court has idicated that States have cosiderable latitude i imposig geeral reveue taxes. The Court has, for example, cosistetly rejected claims that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteeth Amedmet stads as a barrier agaist taxes that are "ureasoable" or "uduly burde-some." See, e. g., Pittsburgh v. Alco Parkig Corp., ; Magao v. Hamilto, ; Alaska Fish Saltig & By-Products U.S. 44 Moreover, there is o requiremet uder the Due Process Clause that the amout of geeral reveue taxes collected from a |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | that the amout of geeral reveue taxes collected from a particular activity must be reasoably related to the value of the services provided to the activity. Istead, our cosistet rule has bee: "Nothig is more familiar i taxatio tha the impositio of a tax upo a class or upo idividuals who ejoy o direct beefit from its expediture, ad who are ot resposible for the coditio to be remedied. "A tax is ot a assessmet of beefits. It is, as we *623 have said, a meas of distributig the burde of the cost of govermet. The oly beefit to which the taxpayer is costitutioally etitled is that derived from his ejoymet of the privileges of livig i a orgaized society, established ad safeguarded by the devotio of taxes to public purposes. Ay other view would preclude the levyig of taxes except as they are used to compesate for the burde o those who pay them, ad would ivolve abadomet of the most fudametal priciple of govermetthat it exists primarily to provide for the commo good." Carmichael v. Souther Coal & Coke (citatios ad footote omitted). See St. Louis & S. W. R. v. Natti, ; There is o reaso to suppose that this latitude afforded the States uder the Due Process Clause is somehow divested by the Commerce Clause merely because the taxed activity has some coectio to commerce; particularly whe the tax is levied o a activity coducted withi the State. "The exploitatio by foreig corporatios [or cosumers] of itrastate opportuities uder the protectio ad ecouragemet of local govermet offers a basis for taxatio as urestricted as that for domestic corporatios." Ford Motor ; see also Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Lie To accept appellats' apparet suggestio that the Commerce Clause prohibits the States from requirig a activity coected to commerce to cotribute to the geeral cost of providig govermetal services, as distict from those costs attributable to the taxed activity, would place such commerce i a privileged positio. But as we recetly reiterated. "[i]t was ot the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those egaged i commerce from their just share of state tax burde eve though it icreases *624 the cost of doig busiess.'" Coloial Pipelie quotig Wester Live 303 U. S., at The "just share of state tax burde" icludes sharig i the cost of providig "police ad fire protectio, the beefit of a traied work force, ad `the advatages of a civilized society.'" Exxo Corp. v. Wiscosi Dept. of Reveue, quotig Japa Lie, Ltd. v. Couty of Los Ageles, See Washigto Reveue -751; (POWELL, |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | v. Couty of Los Ageles, See Washigto Reveue -751; (POWELL, J., cocurrig i part ad cocurrig i result); Geeral Motors Corp. v. Washigto, Furthermore, there ca be o questio that Motaa may costitutioally raise geeral reveue by imposig a severace tax o coal mied i the State. The etire value of the coal, before trasportatio, origiates i the State, ad miig of the coal depletes the resource base ad wealth of the State, thereby dimiishig a future source of taxes ad ecoomic activity.[13] Cf. -759. I may respects, a severace tax is like a real property tax, which has ever bee doubted as a legitimate meas of raisig reveue by the situs State (quite apart from the right of that or ay other State to tax icome derived from use of the property). See, e. g., Old Domiio S.S. v. Virgiia, ; Wester Uio Telegraph ; Postal Telegraph Cable Whe, as here, a geeral reveue tax does ot discrimiate agaist commerce ad is apportioed to activities occurrig withi *625 the State, the State "is free to pursue its ow fiscal policies, uembarrassed by the Costitutio, if by the practical operatio of a tax the state has exerted its power i relatio to opportuities which it has give, to protectio which it has afforded, to beefits which it has coferred by the fact of beig a orderly, civilized society." Wiscosi v. J. C. Peey As we explaied i Geeral Motors Corp. v. Washigto, at : "[T]he validity of the tax rests upo whether the State is exactig a costitutioally fair demad for that aspect of commerce to which it bears a special relatio. For our purposes, the decisive issue turs o the operatig icidece of the tax. I other words, the questio is whether the State has exerted its power i proper proportio to appellat's activities withi the State ad to appellat's cosequet ejoymet of the opportuities ad protectios which the State has afforded. As was said i Wiscosi v. J. C. Peey `[t]he simple but cotrollig questio is whether the state has give aythig for which it ca ask retur.'" The relevat iquiry uder the fourth prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test[14] is ot, as appellats suggest, the amout of the tax or the value of the beefits allegedly bestowed as measured by the costs the State icurs o accout of the taxpayer's activities.[15] Rather, the test is *626 closely coected to the first prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test. Uder this threshold test, the busiess must have a substatial exus with the State before ay tax may |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | a substatial exus with the State before ay tax may be levied o it. See Natioal Bellas Hess, Ic. v. Illiois Reveue Dept., Beyod that threshold requiremet, the fourth prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test imposes the additioal limitatio that the measure of the tax must be reasoably related to the extet of the cotact, sice it is the activities or presece of the taxpayer i the State that may properly be made to bear a "just share of state tax burde," Wester Live 303 U. S., at See Natioal Geographic Society v. Califoria Board of Equalizatio, ; Stadard Pressed Steel v. Washigto Reveue Dept., As the Court explaied i Wiscosi v. J. C. Peey "the icidece of the tax as well as its measure [must be] tied to the earigs which the State has made possible, isofar as govermet is the prerequisite for the fruits of civilizatio for which, as Mr. Justice Holmes was fod of sayig, we pay taxes." Agaist this backgroud, we have little difficulty cocludig that the Motaa tax satisfies the fourth prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test. The "operatig icidece" of the tax, see Geeral Motors Corp. v. Washigto, 377 U. S., at is o the miig of coal withi Motaa. Because it is measured as a percetage of the value of the coal take, the Motaa tax is i "proper proportio" to appellats' activities withi the State ad, therefore, to their "cosequet ejoymet of the opportuities ad protectios which the State has afforded" i coectio with those activities. Cf. *627 Whe a tax is assessed i proportio to a taxpayer's activities or presece i a State, the taxpayer is shoulderig its fair share of supportig the State's provisio of "police ad fire protectio, the beefit of a traied work force, ad `the advatages of a civilized society.'" Exxo Corp. v. Wiscosi Dept. of Reveue, 447 U. S., at quotig Japa Lie, Ltd. v. Couty of Los Ageles, 441 U. S., at Appellats argue, however, that the fourth prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test must be costrued as requirig a factual iquiry ito the relatioship betwee the reveues geerated by a tax ad costs icurred o accout of the taxed activity, i order to provide a mechaism for judicial disapproval uder the Commerce Clause of state taxes that are excessive. This assertio reveals that appellats labor uder a miscoceptio about a court's role i cases such as this.[16] The simple fact is that the appropriate level or rate of taxatio is essetially a matter for legislative, ad ot judicial, resolutio.[17] See Helso |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | a matter for legislative, ad ot judicial, resolutio.[17] See Helso & ; cf. Pittsburgh v. Alco Parkig Corp., 417 * ; Magao v. Hamilto, I essece, appellats ask this Court to prescribe a test for the validity of state taxes that would require state ad federal courts, as a matter of federal costitutioal law, to calculate acceptable rates or levels of taxatio of activities that are coceded to be legitimate subjects of taxatio. This we declie to do. I the first place, it is doubtful whether ay legal test could adequately reflect the umerous ad competig ecoomic, geographic, demographic, social, ad political cosideratios that must iform a decisio about a acceptable rate or level of state taxatio, ad yet be reasoably capable of applicatio i a wide variety of idividual cases. But eve apart from the difficulty of the judicial udertakig, the ature of the factfidig ad judgmet that would be required of the courts merely reiforces the coclusio that questios about the appropriate level of state taxes must be resolved through the political process. Uder our federal system, the determiatio is to be made by state legislatures i the first istace ad, if ecessary, by Cogress, whe particular state taxes are thought to be cotrary to federal iterests.[18] Cf. Mobil Oil U. S., at 448-449; Moorma Mfg. 437 U. S., at Furthermore, the referece i the cases to police ad fire protectio ad other advatages of civilized society is ot, as appellats suggest, a disigeuous icatatio desiged to avoid a more searchig iquiry ito the relatioship betwee the value of the beefits coferred o the taxpayer ad the amout of taxes it pays. Rather, whe the measure of a tax is reasoably related to the taxpayer's activities or presece i the Statefrom which it derives some beefit such as the *629 substatial privilege of miig coalthe taxpayer will realize, i proper proportio to the taxes it pays, "[t]he oly beefit to which the taxpayer is costitutioally etitled [:] that derived from his ejoymet of the privileges of livig i a orgaized society, established ad safeguarded by the devotio of taxes to public purposes." Carmichael v. Souther Coal & Coke Correspodigly, whe the measure of a tax bears o relatioship to the taxpayers' presece or activities i a State, a court may properly coclude uder the fourth prog of the Complete Auto Trasit test that the State is imposig a udue burde o commerce. See ; cf. Michiga-Wiscosi Pipe Lie We are satisfied that the Motaa tax, assessed uder a formula that relates the tax liability to the value of |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | formula that relates the tax liability to the value of appellat coal producers' activities withi the State, comports with the requiremets of the Complete Auto Trasit test. We therefore tur to appellats' cotetio that the tax is ivalid uder the Supremacy Clause. III A Appellats coted that the Motaa tax, as applied to miig of federally owed coal, is ivalid uder the Supremacy Clause because it "substatially frustrates" the purposes of the Mieral Lads Leasig Act of 1920, ch. 85, 30 U.S. C. 181 et seq. (1976 ed. ad Supp. III) (1920 Act), as ameded by the Federal Coal Leasig Amedmets Act of 1975, Stat. 3 (1975 Amedmets). Appellats argue that uder the 1920 Act, the "ecoomic rets" attributable to the miig of coal o federal ladi. e., the differece betwee the cost of productio (icludig a reasoable profit) ad the market price of the coal are to be captured by the Federal Govermet i the form of royalty paymets from federal lessees. The paymets thus *630 received are the to be divided betwee the States ad the Federal Govermet accordig to a formula prescribed by the Act.[19] I appellats' view, the Motaa tax seriously udercuts ad disrupts the 1920 Act's divisio of reveues betwee the Federal ad State Govermets by appropriatig directly to Motaa a major portio of the "ecoomic rets." Appellats coted the Motaa tax will alter the statutory scheme by causig potetial coal producers to reduce the amout they are willig to bid i royalties o federal leases. As a iitial matter, we ote that this argumet rests o a factual premisethat the pricipal effect of the tax is to shift a major portio of the relatively fixed "ecoomic rets" attributable to the extractio of federally owed coal from the Federal Treasury to the State of Motaathat appears to be icosistet with the premise of appellats' Commerce Clause claims. I pressig their Commerce Clause argumets, appellats assert that the Motaa tax icreases the cost of Motaa coal, thereby icreasig the total amout of "ecoomic rets," ad that the burde of the tax is bore by out-of-state cosumers, ot the Federal Treasury.[20] But *631 eve assumig that the Motaa tax may reduce royalty paymets to the Federal Govermet uder leases executed i Motaa, this fact aloe hardly demostrates that the tax is icosistet with the 1920 Act. Ideed, appellats' argumet is substatially udermied by the fact that i 32 of the 1920 Act, 30 U.S. C. 189, Cogress expressly authorized the States to impose severace taxes o federal lessees without imposig ay limits o the amout of such |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | lessees without imposig ay limits o the amout of such taxes. Sectio 32, as set forth i 30 U.S. C. 189, provides i pertiet part: "Nothig i this chapter shall be costrued or held to affect the rights of the States or other local authority to exercise ay rights which they may have, icludig the right to levy ad collect taxes upo improvemets, output of mies, or other rights, property, or assets of ay lessee of the Uited States." This Court had occasio to costrue 32 soo after it was eacted. The Court explaied: "Cogress meat by the proviso to say i effect that, although the act deals with the lettig of public lads ad the relatios of the [federal] govermet to the lessees thereof, othig i it shall be so costrued as to affect the right of the states, i respect of such private persos ad corporatios, to levy ad collect taxes as though the govermet were ot cocered. "We thik the proviso plaily discloses the itetio of Cogress that persos ad corporatios cotractig with the Uited States uder the act, should ot, for that reaso, be exempt from ay form of state taxatio otherwise *632 lawful." Mid-Norther Oil v. It ecessarily follows that if the Motaa tax is "otherwise lawful." the 1920 Act does ot forbid it. Appellats coted that the Motaa tax is ot "otherwise lawful" because it coflicts with the very purpose of the 1920 Act. We do ot agree. There is othig i the laguage or legislative history of either the 1920 Act or the 1975 Amedmets to support appellats' assertio that Cogress iteded to maximize ad capture all "ecoomic rets" from the miig of federal coal, ad the to distribute the proceeds i accordace with the statutory formula. The House Report o the 1975 Amedmets, for example, speaks oly i terms of a cogressioal itet to secure a "fair retur to the public." H. R. Rep. No. 94-681, pp. 17-18 Moreover, appellats' argumet proves too much. By defiitio, ay state taxatio of federal lessees reduces the "ecoomic rets" accruig to the Federal Govermet, ad appellats' argumet would preclude ay such taxes despite the explicit grat of taxig authority to the States by 32. Fially, appellats' cotetio ecessarily depeds o ifereces to be draw from 7 ad 35 of the 1920 Act, 30 U.S. C. 207 ad 191, which, as ameded, prescribe the statutory formula for the divisio of the paymets received by the Federal Govermet. See Complait ¶¶ 38-41, J. S. App. 57a-58a. Yet 32 of the 1920 Act, as set forth i 30 |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | 32 of the 1920 Act, as set forth i 30 U.S. C. 189, states that "[]othig i this chapter"which icludes 7 ad 35"shall be costrued or held to affect the rights of the States to levy ad collect taxes upo output of mies of ay lessee of the Uited States." Ad if, as the Court has held, the States may "levy ad collect taxes as though the [federal] govermet were ot cocered," Mid-Norther Oil v. the maer i which the Federal Govermet collects receipts from its lessees ad the shares them with the States has o bearig o the validity of a state tax. We *633 therefore reject appellats' cotetio that the Motaa tax must be ivalidated as icosistet with the Mieral Lads Leasig Act. B The fial issue we must cosider is appellats' assertio that the Motaa tax is ucostitutioal because it substatially frustrates atioal eergy policies, reflected i several federal statutes, ecouragig the productio ad use of coal, particularly low-sulfur coal such as is foud i Motaa. Appellats isist that they are etitled to a hearig to explore the cotours of these atioal policies ad to adduce evidece supportig their claim that the Motaa tax substatially frustrates ad impairs the policies. We caot quarrel with appellats' recitatio of federal statutes ecouragig the use of coal. Appellats correctly ote that 2 (6) of the Eergy Policy ad Coservatio Act of 1975, 42 U.S. C. 6201 (6), declares that oe of the Act's purposes is "to reduce the demad for petroleum products ad atural gas through programs desiged to provide greater availability ad use of this Natio's abudat coal resources." Ad 102 (b) (3) of the Powerplat ad Idustrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA), 42 U.S. C. 8301 (b) (3) (1976 ed., Supp. III), recites a similar objective "to ecourage ad foster the greater use of coal ad other alterate fuels, i lieu of atural gas ad petroleum, as a primary eergy source." We do ot, however, accept appellats' implicit suggestio that these geeral statemets demostrate a cogressioal itet to pre-empt all state legislatio that may have a adverse impact o the use of coal. I Exxo Corp. v. Goveror of Marylad, we rejected a pre-emptio argumet similar to the oe appellats urge here. There, it was argued that the "basic atioal policy favorig free competitio" reflected i the Sherma Act pre-empted a state law regulatig retail distributio of gasolie. The Court ackowledged *634 the coflict betwee the state law ad this atioal policy, but rejected the suggestio that the "broad implicatios" of the Sherma Act should be costrued |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | the "broad implicatios" of the Sherma Act should be costrued as a cogressioal decisio to pre-empt the state law. -134. Cf. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Califoria v. Orri W. Fox As we have frequetly idicated, "[p]re-emptio of state law by federal statute or regulatio is ot favored `i the absece of persuasive reasoseither that the ature of the regulated subject matter permits o other coclusio, or that the Cogress has umistakably so ordaied.'" Chicago & North Wester Trasp. v. Kalo Brick & Tile quotig Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Ic. v. Paul, See Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahatta, Ic., ; Joes v. Rath Packig ; I cases such as this, it is ecessary to look beyod geeral expressios of "atioal policy" to specific federal statutes with which the state law is claimed to coflict.[21] The oly specific statutory provisios favorig the use of coal cited by appellats are those i PIFUA. PIFUA prohibits ew electric power plats or ew major fuel-burig istallatios from usig atural gas or petroleum as a primary eergy source, ad prohibits existig facilities from usig atural gas as a primary eergy source after 1989. 42 U.S. C. 8311 (1), 8312 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Appellats coted that "the maifest purpose of this Act to favor the use of coal is clear." Brief for Appellats 37. As the statute itself makes clear, however, Cogress did ot ited PIFUA to pre-empt state severace taxes o coal. Sectio 601 (a) (1) of PIFUA, 42 U.S. C. 8401 (a) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III), provides for federal fiacial *635 assistace to areas of a State adversely affected by icreased coal or uraium miig, based upo fidigs by the Goveror of the State that the state or local govermet lacks the fiacial resources to meet icreased demad for housig or public services ad facilities i such areas. Sectio 601 (a) (2), 42 U.S. C. 8401 (a) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. III), the provides that "icreased reveues, icludig severace tax reveues, royalties, ad similar fees to the State ad local govermets which are associated with the icrease i coal or uraium developmet activities shall be take ito accout i determiig if a State or local govermet lacks fiacial resources." This sectio clearly cotemplates the cotiued existece, ot the pre-emptio, of state severace taxes o coal ad other mierals. Furthermore, the legislative history of 601 (a) (2) reveals that Cogress eacted this provisio with Motaa's tax specifically i mid. The Seate versio of the PIFUA bill provided for impact aid, but the House bill did ot. See H. R. Cof. Rep. No. 95-1749, |
Justice Marshall | 1,981 | 15 | majority | Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110563/commonwealth-edison-co-v-montana/ | bill did ot. See H. R. Cof. Rep. No. 95-1749, p. 93 The Seate's proposal for impact aid was opposed by the House coferees, who took the positio that the States would be able to satisfy the demad for additioal facilities ad services caused by icreased coal productio through impositio of severace taxes ad, i Wester States, through royalties received uder the Mieral Lads Leasig Act. See Trascript of the Joit Coferece o Eergy 1822, 1824, 1832, 1834-1837, 1839 (Tr.), reprited i 2 U. S. Dept. of Eergy, Legislative History: Powerplat ad Idustrial Fuel Use Act, 777, 779, 787, 789-792, 794 (Legislative History). I explaiig the objectios of the House coferees, Represetative Eckhardt poited out: "[T]he wester states may collect severace taxes o that coal. *636 "As I poited out [see Tr. 1822, Legislative History, at 777], Motaa already collects $3 a to o severace taxes o coal ad still ejoys a 50 percet royalty retur. As the price of coal goes up these severace taxes i additio go up. "This is a percetage tax, ot a flat tax i most istaces. "If we are goig to merely determie o the basis of impact o a particular commuity i a state how much moey is goig to go to that commuity, without takig ito accout how much that commuity is eriched, I thik we are goig to have people who are so agry at us i Cogress" Tr. 1835, Legislative History, at 790. Sectio 601 (a) (2) was obviously icluded i PIFUA as a respose to these cocers, for it provides that severace taxes ad royalties are to be "take ito accout" i determiig eligibility for impact aid. The legislative history of 601 (a) (2) thus cofirms what seems evidet from the face of the statutethat Motaa's severace tax is ot pre-empted by PIFUA. Sice PIFUA is the oly federal statute that eve comes close to providig a specific basis for appellats' claims that the Motaa statute "substatially frustrates" federal eergy policies, this aspect of appellats' Supremacy Clause argumet must also fail.[22] IV I sum, we coclude that appellats have failed to demostrate either that the Motaa tax suffers from ay of the costitutioal defects alleged i their complaits, or that a *637 trial is ecessary to resolve the issue of the costitutioality of the tax. Cosequetly, the judgmet of the Supreme Court of Motaa is affirmed. So ordered. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | This case presents the question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by the refusal of a state trial court to instruct the jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial that under state law the defendant was ineligible for parole. We hold that where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible. I A In July 1990, petitioner beat to death an elderly woman, Josie Lamb, in her home in Columbia, South Carolina. The week before petitioner's capital murder trial was scheduled to begin, he pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two prior assaults on elderly women. Petitioner's guilty pleas resulted inconvictions for violent offenses, and those convictions rendered petitioner ineligible for parole if convicted of any subsequent violent-crime offense. S. C. Code Ann. 2-21-60 Prior to jury selection, the prosecution advised the trial judge that the State "[o]bviously [was] going to ask you to exclude any mention of parole throughout this trial." App. 2. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion for an order barring the *157 defense from asking any question during voir dire regarding parole. Under the court's order, defense counsel was forbidden even to mention the subject of parole, and expressly was prohibited from questioning prospective jurors as to whether they understood the meaning of a "life" sentence under South Carolina law.[1] After a 3-day trial, petitioner was convicted of the murder of Ms. Lamb. During the penalty phase, the defense brought forward mitigating evidence tending to show that petitioner's violent behavior reflected serious mental disorders that stemmed from years of neglect and extreme sexual and physical abuse petitioner endured as an adolescent. While there was some disagreement among witnesses regarding the extent to which petitioner's mental condition properly could be deemed a "disorder," witnesses for both the defense and the prosecution agreed that petitioner posed a continuing danger to elderly women. In its closing argument the prosecution argued that petitioner's future dangerousness was a factor for the jury to consider when fixing the appropriate punishment. The question for the jury, said the prosecution, was "what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our midst." at The prosecution further urged that a verdict for death would be "a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense." Petitioner sought to rebut the prosecution's generalized |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | act of self-defense." Petitioner sought to rebut the prosecution's generalized argument of future dangerousness by presenting evidence that, due to his unique psychological problems, his dangerousness was limited to elderly women, and that there was no reason to expect further acts of violence once he was isolated in a prison setting. In support of his argument, petitioner introduced testimony from a female medical assistant and *158 from two supervising officers at the Richland County jail where petitioner had been held prior to trial. All three testified that petitioner had adapted well to prison life during his pretrial confinement and had not behaved in a violent manner toward any of the other inmates or staff. Petitioner also offered expert opinion testimony from Richard L. Boyle, a clinical social worker and former correctional employee, who had reviewed and observed petitioner's institutional adjustment. Mr. Boyle expressed the view that, based on petitioner's background and his current functioning, petitioner would successfully adapt to prison if he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Concerned that the jury might not understand that "life imprisonment" did not carry with it the possibility of parole in petitioner's case, defense counsel asked the trial judge to clarify this point by defining the term "life imprisonment" for the jury in accordance with S. C. Code Ann. 2-21-60[2] To buttress his request, petitioner proffered, outside the presence of the jury, evidence conclusively establishing his parole ineligibility. On petitioner's behalf, attorneys for the South Carolina Department of Corrections and the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardons testified that any offender in petitioner's position was in fact ineligible for parole under South Carolina law. The prosecution did not challenge or question petitioner's parole ineligibility. Instead, it sought to elicit admissions from the witnesses that, notwithstanding petitioner's parole ineligibility, petitioner might receive holiday furloughs or other forms of early release. Even this effort was unsuccessful, however, *159 as the cross-examination revealed that Department of Corrections regulations prohibit petitioner's release under early release programs such as work-release or supervised furloughs, and that no convicted murderer serving life without parole ever had been furloughed or otherwise released for any reason. Petitioner then offered into evidence, without objection, the results of a statewide public-opinion survey conducted by the University of South Carolina's Institute for Public Affairs. The survey had been conducted a few days before petitioner's trial, and showed that only 7.1 percent of all jury-eligible adults who were questioned firmly believed that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment in South Carolina actually would be required to spend the rest of his life in prison. See App. 152-15. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | the rest of his life in prison. See App. 152-15. Almost half of those surveyed believed that a convicted murderer might be paroled within 20 years; nearly three-quarters thought that release certainly would occur in less than 30 years. More than 75 percent of those surveyed indicated that if they were called upon to make a capital sentencing decision as jurors, the amount of time the convicted murderer actually would have to spend in prison would be an "extremely important" or a "very important" factor in choosing between life and death. Petitioner argued that, in view of the public's apparent misunderstanding about the meaning of "life imprisonment" in South Carolina, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jurors would vote for death simply because they believed, mistakenly, that petitioner eventually would be released on parole. The prosecution opposed the proposed instruction, urging the court "not to allow any argument by state or defense about parole and not charge the jury on anything concerning parole." Citing the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Torrence, 305 S. C. 5, 06 S. E. *160 2d 315 (1991), the trial court refused petitioner's requested instruction. Petitioner then asked alternatively for the following instruction: "I charge you that these sentences mean what they say. That is, if you recommend that the defendant Jonathan Simmons be sentenced to death, he actually will be sentenced to death and executed. If,on the other hand, you recommend that he be sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the balance of his natural life. "In your deliberations, you are not to speculate that these sentences mean anything other than what I have just told you, for what I have told you is exactly what will happen to the defendant, depending on what your sentencing decision is." App. 162. The trial judge also refused to give this instruction, but indicated that he might give a similar instruction if the jury inquired about parole eligibility. After deliberating on petitioner's sentence for 90 minutes, the jury sent a note to the judge asking a single question: "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?" Over petitioner's objection, the trial judge gave the following instruction: "You are instructed not to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning." Twenty-five minutes after receiving |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning." Twenty-five minutes after receiving this response from the court, the jury returned to the courtroom with a sentence of death. On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the trial judge's refusal to provide the jury accurate information regarding his parole ineligibility *161 violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[3] The South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of petitioner's challenges. With one justice dissenting, it concluded that, regardless of whether a trial court's refusal to inform a sentencing jury about a defendant's parole ineligibility might be error under some circumstances, the instruction given to petitioner's jury "satisfie[d] in substance [petitioner's] request for a charge on parole ineligibility," and thus there was no reason to consider whether denial of such an instruction would be constitutional error in this case. 310 S. C. 39, We granted certiorari, II The Due Process Clause does not allow the execution of a person "on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain." In this case, the jury reasonably may have believed that petitioner could be released on parole if he were not executed. To the extent this misunderstanding pervaded the jury's deliberations, it had the effect of creating a false choice between sentencing petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration. This *162 grievous misperception was encouraged by the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with accurate information regarding petitioner's parole ineligibility, and by the State's repeated suggestion that petitioner would pose a future danger to society if he were not executed. Three times petitioner asked to inform the jury that in fact he was ineligible for parole under state law; three times his request was denied. The State thus succeeded in securing a death sentence on the ground, at least in part, of petitioner's future dangerousness, while at the same time concealing from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its noncapital sentencing alternative, namely, that life imprisonment meant life without parole. We think it is clear that the State denied petitioner due process.[] A This Court has approved the jury's consideration of future dangerousness during the penalty phase of a capital trial, recognizing that a defendant's future dangerousness bears on all sentencing determinations made in our criminal justice system. See (noting that "any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose"); Although South Carolina statutes do not mandate consideration of the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | Although South Carolina statutes do not mandate consideration of the defendant's future dangerousness in capital sentencing, the State's evidence in aggravation is not limited to evidence relating to statutory aggravating circumstances. *163 See ; Thus, prosecutors in South Carolina, like those in other States that impose the death penalty, frequently emphasize a defendant's future dangerousness in their evidence and argument at the sentencing phase; they urge the jury to sentence the defendant to death so that he will not be a danger to the public if released from prison. Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, Arguments relating to a defendant's future dangerousness ordinarily would be inappropriate at the guilt phase of a trial, as the jury is not free to convict a defendant simply because he poses a future danger; nor is a defendant's future dangerousness likely relevant to the question whether each element of an alleged offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But where the jury has sentencing responsibilities in a capital trial, many issues that are irrelevant to the guilt-innocence determination step into the foreground and require consideration at the sentencing phase. The defendant's character, prior criminal history, mental capacity, background, and age are just a few of the many factors, in addition to future dangerousness, that a jury may consider in fixing appropriate punishment. See 38 U.S. 586 ; 55 U.S. 10, ; 63 U. S., at In assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant. Holding all other factors constant, it is entirely reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a defendant who is eligible for parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is not. Indeed, there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's *16 future nondangerousness to the public than the fact that he never will be released on parole. The trial court's refusal to apprise the jury of information so crucial to its sentencing determination, particularly when the prosecution alluded to the defendant's future dangerousness in its argument to the jury, cannot be reconciled with our wellestablished precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause. B In 76 U.S. 1 this Court held that a defendant was denied due process by the refusal of the state trial court to admit evidence of the defendant's good behavior in prison in the penalty phase of his capital trial. Although the majority opinion stressed that the defendant's good behavior in prison was "relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment," and thus admissible under the Eighth Amendment, at citing 38 U. S., at 60 |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | the Eighth Amendment, at citing 38 U. S., at 60 the Skipper opinion expressly noted that the Court's conclusion also was compelled by the Due Process Clause. The Court explained that where the prosecution relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in requesting the death penalty, elemental due process principles operate to require admission of the defendant's relevant evidence in rebuttal. 76 U.S., at 5, n. 1. See also at 9 (Powell, J., opinion concurring in judgment) ("[B]ecause petitioner was not allowed to rebut evidence and argument used against him," the defendant clearly was denied due process). The Court reached a similar conclusion in In that case, a defendant was sentenced to death on the basis of a presentence report which was not made available to him and which he therefore could not rebut. A plurality of the Court explained that sending a man to his death "on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain" violated fundamental notions of due process. at The principle announced *165 in was reaffirmed in Skipper, and it compels our decision today. See also 76 U.S. 683, (citation omitted); 70 U.S. 68, Like the defendants in Skipper and petitioner was prevented from rebutting information that the sentencing authority considered, and upon which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of death. The State raised the specter of petitioner's future dangerousness generally, but then thwarted all efforts by petitioner to demonstrate that, contrary to the prosecutor's intimations, he never would be released on parole and thus, in his view, would not pose a future danger to society.[5] The logic and effectiveness of petitioner's argument naturally depended on the fact that he was legally ineligible for parole and thus would remain in prison if afforded a life sentence. Petitioner's efforts to focus the jury's attention on the question whether, in prison, he would be a future danger were futile, as he repeatedly was denied any opportunity to inform the jury that he never would be released on parole. The jury was left to speculate about petitioner's parole eligibility when evaluating petitioner's future dangerousness, and was denied a straight answer *166 about petitioner's parole eligibility even when it was requested. C The State and its amici contend that petitioner was not entitled to an instruction informing the jury that petitioner is ineligible for parole because such information is inherently misleading.[6] Essentially, they argue that because future exigencies such as legislative reform, commutation, clemency, and escape might allow petitioner to be released into society, petitioner was not entitled to inform the jury |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | into society, petitioner was not entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible. Insofar as this argument is targeted at the specific wording of the instruction petitioner requested, the argument is misplaced. Petitioner's requested instruction ("If you recommend that [the defendant] be sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the balance of his natural life," App. 162) was proposed only after the trial court ruled that South Carolina law prohibited a plain-language instruction that petitioner was ineligible for parole under state law. To the extent that the State opposes even a simple paroleineligibility instruction because of hypothetical future developments, the argument has little force. Respondent admits that an instruction informing the jury that petitioner is ineligible for parole is legally accurate. Certainly, such an instruction is more accurate than no instruction at all, which leaves the jury to speculate whether "life imprisonment" means life without parole or something else. The State's asserted accuracy concerns are further undermined by the fact that a large majority of States which provide *167 for life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to capital punishment inform the sentencing authority of the defendant's parole ineligibility.[7] The few States that do not provide capital sentencing juries with any information regarding parole ineligibility seem to rely, as South Carolina *168 does here, on the proposition that held that such determinations are purely matters of state law.[8] It is true that stands for the broad proposition that we generally will defer to a State's determination as to what a jury should and should not be told about sentencing. In a State in which parole is available, how the jury's knowledge of parole availability will affect the decision whether or not to impose the death penalty is speculative, and we shall not lightly second-guess a decision whether or not to inform a jury of information regarding parole. States reasonably may conclude that truthful information regarding the availability of commutation, pardon, and the like should be kept from the jury in order to provide "greater protection in [the States'] criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires." at 101. Concomitantly, nothing in the Constitution prohibits the prosecution from arguing any truthful information relating to parole or other forms of early release. But if the State rests its case for imposing the death penalty at least in part on the premise that the defendant will *169 be dangerous in the future, the fact that the alternative sentence to death is life without parole will necessarily undercut the State's argument regarding the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | without parole will necessarily undercut the State's argument regarding the threat the defendant poses to society. Because truthful information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant to "deny or explain" the showing of future dangerousness, due process plainly requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention by way of argument by defense counsel or an instruction from the court. See 30 U. S., at III There remains to be considered whether the South Carolina Supreme Court was correct in concluding that the trial court "satisfie[d] in substance [petitioner's] request for a charge on parole ineligibility," 310 S. C., at 27 S.E.2d, at when it responded to the jury's query by stating that life imprisonment was to be understood in its "plain and ordinary meaning," ib In the court's view, petitioner basically received the parole-ineligibility instruction he requested. We disagree. It can hardly be questioned that most juries lack accurate information about the precise meaning of "life imprisonment" as defined by the States. For much of our country's history, parole was a mainstay of state and federal sentencing regimes, and every term (whether a term of life or a term of years) in practice was understood to be shorter than the stated term. See generally Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, Increasingly, legislatures have enacted mandatory sentencing laws with severe penalty provisions, yet the precise contours of these penal laws vary from State to State. See Cheatwood, The Life-Without-Parole Sanction: Its Current Status and a Research Agenda, 3 Crime & Delinq. 3, 5, 8 (1988). Justice Chandler of the South Carolina Supreme *170 Court observed that it is impossible to ignore "the reality, known to the `reasonable juror,' that, historically, life-term defendants have been eligible for parole." State v. Smith, 298 S. C. 82, 89-90, 381 S.E.2d 72, cert. denied, 9 U.S. 1060[9] An instruction directing juries that life imprisonment should be understood in its "plain and ordinary" meaning does nothing to dispel the misunderstanding reasonable jurors may have about the way in which any particular State defines "life imprisonment."[10] See 9 U.S. 370, It is true, as the State points out, that the trial court admonished the jury that "you are instructed not to consider parole" and that parole "is not a proper issue for your consideration." App. 16. Far from ensuring that the jury was not misled, however, this instruction actually suggested that parole was available but that the jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact. Undoubtedly, the instruction was confusing and frustrating to the jury, given |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | majority | Simmons v. South Carolina | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117854/simmons-v-south-carolina/ | the instruction was confusing and frustrating to the jury, given *171 the arguments by both the prosecution and the defense relating to petitioner's future dangerousness, and the obvious relevance of petitioner's parole ineligibility to the jury's formidable sentencing task. While juries ordinarily are presumed to follow the court's instructions, see 83 U.S. 756, we have recognized that in some circumstances "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." See also 7 U.S. 625, 62 ; 63 U. S., at 950 But even if the trial court's instruction successfully prevented the jury from considering parole, petitioner's due process rights still were not honored. Because petitioner's future dangerousness was at issue, he was entitled to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. An instruction directing the jury not to consider the defendant's likely conduct in prison would not have satisfied due process in 76 U.S. 1 and, for the same reasons, the instruction issued by the trial court in this case does not satisfy due process. IV The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never will be released on parole. The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | Crawford Fitting Co. v. JT Gibbons, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111918/crawford-fitting-co-v-jt-gibbons-inc/ | In these two consolidated cases we address the power of federal courts to require a losing party to pay the compensation of the winner's expert witnesses. In No. 86-322, respondent J. T. Gibbons, Inc., sued petitioner Crawford Fitting Co. and other petitioners for alleged violations of the *439 antitrust laws. The District Court directed a verdict in favor of petitioners. aff'd, Petitioners then filed a bill of costs with the Clerk of that court, seeking reimbursement from respondent for over $220,000 in litigation expenses, including substantial expert witness fees. The District Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) granted it discretion to exceed the $30-per-day witness fee limit found in 28 U.S. C. 1821(b). It accordingly awarded petitioners $86,480.70 for their expert witnesses. 102 F. R. D. 73 (ED La. 1984). En banc, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the limit of 1821(b) controlled. In No. 86-328, respondent International Woodworkers of America (IWA) sued petitioner Champion International, alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S. C. After a trial on the merits, the District Court dismissed all of respondent's claims. Petitioner thereafter filed a bill of costs, including $11,807 in expert witness fees. The District Court declined to order respondent to reimburse petitioner for these fees to the extent they exceeded the $30-per-day limit. The en banc Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding the limit set forth in 1821(b) dispositive. We agree and hold that when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the limit of 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary. In 1793 Congress enacted a general provision linking some taxable costs in most cases in federal courts to the practice of the courts of the State in which the federal court sat. Act of Mar. 1, 1793, 4, This provision expired in 1799. Apparently from 1799 until 1853 federal courts continued to refer to state rules governing taxable costs. See Alyeska Service By 1853 there was a "great diversity *440 in practice among the courts" and "losing litigants were being unfairly saddled with exorbitant fees." Accordingly, Congress returned to the issue and comprehensively regulated fees and the taxation of fees as costs in the federal courts. The resulting 1853 Fee Act "was a far-reaching Act specifying in detail the nature and amount of the taxable items of cost in the federal courts." 421 U.S., -252. It provided, in part, "That in lieu |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | Crawford Fitting Co. v. JT Gibbons, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111918/crawford-fitting-co-v-jt-gibbons-inc/ | 421 U.S., -252. It provided, in part, "That in lieu of the compensation now allowed by law to attorneys, solicitors, and witnesses. in the several States, the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed." Act of Feb. 26, 1853, The rate for witnesses was set at $1.50 per day. The sweeping reforms of the 1853 Act have been carried forward to today, "without any apparent intent to change the controlling rules." Alyeska Title 28 U.S. C. 1920 now embodies Congress' considered choice as to the kinds of expenses that a federal court may tax as costs against the losing party: "A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: "(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; "(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; "(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; "(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; "(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; "(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title." The witness fee specified in 1920(3) is defined in 28 U.S. C. 1821: *441 "(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a witness in attendance at any court of the United States shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this section. "(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $30 per day for each day's attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance at the beginning and end of such attendance or at any time during such attendance." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) in turn provides in part: "Except when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." The logical conclusion from the language and interrelation of these provisions is that 1821 specifies the amount of the fee that must be tendered to a witness, 1920 provides that the fee may be taxed as a cost, and Rule 54(d) provides that the cost shall be taxed against the losing party unless the court otherwise directs. Petitioners argue that since 1920 lists which expenses a court "may" tax as costs, that section only authorizes taxation of certain items. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | Crawford Fitting Co. v. JT Gibbons, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111918/crawford-fitting-co-v-jt-gibbons-inc/ | as costs, that section only authorizes taxation of certain items. In their view, 1920 does not preclude taxation of costs above and beyond the items listed, and more particularly, amounts in excess of the 1821(b) fee. Thus, the discretion granted by Rule 54(d) is a separate source of power to tax as costs expenses not enumerated in 1920. We think, however, that no reasonable reading of these provisions together can lead to this conclusion, for petitioners' view renders 1920 superfluous. If Rule 54(d) grants courts discretion to tax whatever costs may seem appropriate, then 1920, which enumerates the costs that may be taxed, serves no role whatsoever. We think the better view is that 1920 defines the term "costs" as used in Rule 54(d). Section 1920 enumerates expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority *442 found in Rule 54(d). It is phrased permissively because Rule 54(d) generally grants a federal court discretion to refuse to tax costs in favor of the prevailing party. One of the items enumerated in 1920 is the witness fee, set by 1821(b) at $30 per day. We cannot accept an interpretation of Rule 54(d) that would render any of these specific statutory provisions entirely without meaning. Repeals by implication are not favored, and petitioners proffer the ultimate in implication, for Rule 54(d) and 1920 and 1821 are not even inconsistent. We think that it is clear that in 1920 and 1821, Congress comprehensively addressed the taxation of fees for litigants' witnesses. This conclusion is all the more compelling when we consider that 1920(6) allows the taxation, as a cost, of the compensation of court-appointed expert witnesses. There is no provision that sets a limit on the compensation for court-appointed expert witnesses in the way that 1821(b) sets a limit for litigants' witnesses. It is therefore clear that when Congress meant to set a limit on fees, it knew how to do so. We think that the inescapable effect of these sections in combination is that a federal court may tax expert witness fees in excess of the $30-per-day limit set out in 1821(b) only when the witness is court-appointed. The discretion granted by Rule 54(d) is not a power to evade this specific congressional command. Rather, it is solely a power to decline to tax, as costs, the items enumerated in 1920. The logic of this conclusion notwithstanding, petitioners place heavy weight on a single sentence found in our opinion in In that case this Court held that the District Court had not abused its discretion in refusing |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | Crawford Fitting Co. v. JT Gibbons, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111918/crawford-fitting-co-v-jt-gibbons-inc/ | the District Court had not abused its discretion in refusing to tax against the losing plaintiff the travel expenses of witnesses for the defendant. In the course of so ruling, the Court stated: "[T]he discretion given district judges [by Rule 54(d)] to tax costs should be sparingly exercised with reference to *443 expenses not specifically allowed by statute." Applying this language to the present case, petitioners argue that courts therefore have discretion to tax as costs expenses incurred beyond those specified by Congress as fees in 1821, and made taxable by 1920. The sentence relied upon is classic obiter: something mentioned in passing, which is not in any way necessary to the decision of the issue before the Court. We think the dictum is inconsistent with the foregoing analysis, and we disapprove it. The argument petitioners present today was squarely rejected in In that case, the Court held that federal courts have no authority to award expert witness fees in excess of the statutory limit set by Congress in the Fee Act of 1853. The Court's reasoning was straightforward: "Specific provision as to the amounts payable and taxable as witness fees was made by Congress as early as the Act of February 28, 1799 Under these provisions, additional amounts paid as compensation, or fees, to expert witnesses cannot be allowed or taxed as costs in cases in the federal courts. ". Congress has dealt with the subject comprehensively and has made no exception of the fees of expert witnesses. Its legislation must be deemed controlling." Petitioners contend that because Henkel was decided before the merger of law and equity in the federal courts, it is no longer good law. Petitioners' argument proceeds along the following lines: Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts could sit in law or in equity. In petitioners' view, courts sitting in equity had broad discretion to award fees not specified by statute. Henkel, decided *444 under this regime, held that courts at law had no power to exceed the limits set by statute. Now that the federal courts' legal and equitable powers are combined, petitioners conclude that Henkel cannot control the scope of a federal court's powers to exceed the limits set by statute. We cannot agree. Henkel rested on statutory interpretation. Whatever the effect of the merger of law and equity in federal courts, it did not repeal any part of the Fee Act. Title 28 U.S. C. 1920 and 1821, today's counterparts to the provisions of the Fee Act at issue in Henkel, are still law, and |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | Crawford Fitting Co. v. JT Gibbons, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111918/crawford-fitting-co-v-jt-gibbons-inc/ | Fee Act at issue in Henkel, are still law, and when not overridden by contract or explicit statutory authority, they control a federal court's power to hold a losing party responsible for the opponent's witness fees. Our conclusion conforms to our prior interpretations of the 1853 Fee Act. In Alyeska Service we considered the general role of the Act in federal courts. The Act "specif[ied] in detail the nature and amount of the taxable items of cost in the federal courts." The comprehensive scope of the Act and the particularity with which it was drafted demonstrated to us that Congress meant to impose rigid controls on cost-shifting in federal courts. Thus, we rejected an argument similar to the one posited by petitioners today: "Nor has [Congress] extended any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them warranted." Although Congress responded to our decision in Alyeska by broadening the availability of attorney's fees in the federal courts, see the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S. C. 1988, it has not otherwise "retracted, repealed, or modified the limitations on taxable fees contained in the 1853 statute and its successors." 421 U.S., Thus, we are once again asked to hold that a specific congressional enactment on the shifting of litigation costs is of no moment. We think that, as in Alyeska, Congress has made its intent plain in its detailed treatment of *445 witness fees. We will not lightly infer that Congress has repealed 1920 and 1821, either through Rule 54(d) or any other provision not referring explicitly to witness fees. As always, " `[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.' " quoting Any argument that a federal court is empowered to exceed the limitations explicitly set out in 1920 and 1821 without plain evidence of congressional intent to supersede those sections ignores our longstanding practice of construing statutes in pari materia. See United ; We hold that absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant's witness as costs, federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S. C. 1821 and 1920. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed, and No. 86-322 is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | majority | Philip Morris USA v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145758/philip-morris-usa-v-williams/ | The question we address today concerns a large state-court punitive damages award. We are asked whether the Constitution's Due Process Clause permits a jury to base that award in part upon its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court (, victims whom the parties do not represent). We hold that such an award would amount to a taking of "property" from the defendant without due process. I This lawsuit arises out of the death of Jesse Williams, a heavy cigarette smoker. Respondent, Williams' widow, represents his estate in this state lawsuit for negligence and deceit against Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro, the brand that Williams favored. A jury found that *1061 Williams' death was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that this was so. The jury ultimately found that Philip Morris was negligent (as was Williams) and that Philip Morris had engaged in deceit. In respect to deceit, the claim at issue here, it awarded compensatory damages of about $821,000 (about $21,000 economic and $800,000 noneconomic) along with $79.5 million in punitive damages. The trial judge subsequently found the $79.5 million punitive damages award "excessive," see, of North America, and reduced it to $2 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Philip Morris' arguments and restored the $79.5 million jury award. Subsequently, Philip Morris sought review in the Oregon Supreme Court (which denied review) and then here. We remanded the case in light of State Mut. Automobile Ins. The Oregon Court of Appeals adhered to its original views. And Philip Morris sought, and this time obtained, review in the Oregon Supreme Court. Philip Morris then made two arguments relevant here. First, it said that the trial court should have accepted, but did not accept, a proposed "punitive damages" instruction that specified the jury could not seek to punish Philip Morris for injury to other persons not before the court. In particular, Philip Morris pointed out that the plaintiff's attorney had told the jury to "think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the State of Oregon there have been. In Oregon, how many people do we see outside, driving home smoking cigarettes? [C]igarettes are going to kill ten [of every hundred]. [And] the market share of Marlboros [i.e., Philip Morris] is one-third [i.e., one of every three killed]." App. 197a, 199a. In light of this argument, Philip Morris asked the trial |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | majority | Philip Morris USA v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145758/philip-morris-usa-v-williams/ | In light of this argument, Philip Morris asked the trial court to tell the jury that "you may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what [the] reasonable relationship is" between any punitive award and "the harm caused to Jesse Williams" by Philip Morris' misconduct, "[but] you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their claims" at 280a. The judge rejected this proposal and instead told the jury that "[p]unitive damages are awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct and to deter misconduct," and "are not intended to compensate the plaintiff or anyone else for damages caused by the defendant's conduct." at 28a. In Philip Morris' view, the result was a significant likelihood that a portion of the $79.5 million award represented punishment for its having harmed others, a punishment that the Due Process Clause would here forbid. Second, Philip Morris pointed to the roughly 100-to-1 ratio the $79.5 million punitive damages award bears to $821,000 in compensatory damages. Philip Morris noted that this Court in emphasized the constitutional need for punitive damages awards to reflect (1) the "reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, (2) a "reasonable relationship" to the harm the plaintiff (or related victim) suffered, and () the presence (or absence) of "sanctions," criminal penalties, that state law provided for comparable conduct, -585, And in State this Court said that the longstanding historical practice of setting punitive damages at two, three, or four times *1062 the size of compensatory damages, while "not binding," is "instructive," and that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process." ; ; State The Oregon Supreme Court rejected these and other Philip Morris arguments. In particular, it rejected Philip Morris' claim that the Constitution prohibits a state jury "from using punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to nonparties." And in light of Philip Morris' reprehensible conduct, it found that the $79.5 million award was not "grossly excessive." -1182. Philip Morris then sought certiorari. It asked us to consider, among other things, (1) its claim that Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted it to be punished for harming nonparty victims; and (2) whether Oregon had in effect disregarded "the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plaintiff's harm." Pet. for Cert. (I). We granted certiorari limited to these two questions. For reasons we shall set forth, we consider only the first of these questions. We vacate the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment, and we remand the |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | majority | Philip Morris USA v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145758/philip-morris-usa-v-williams/ | vacate the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment, and we remand the case for further proceedings. II This Court has long made clear that "[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition." ; ; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. At the same time, we have emphasized the need to avoid an arbitrary determination of an award's amount. Unless a State insists upon proper standards that will cabin the jury's discretionary authority, its punitive damages system may deprive a defendant of "fair notice of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose," ; it may threaten "arbitrary punishments," i.e., punishments that reflect not an "application of law" but "a decisionmaker's caprice," State ; and, where the amounts are sufficiently large, it may impose one State's (or one jury's) "policy choice," say as to the conditions under which (or even whether) certain products can be sold, upon "neighboring States" with different public policies, For these and similar reasons, this Court has found that the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as "grossly excessive." See Honda Motor ; Cooper Industries, ; -585, (excessiveness decision depends upon the reprehensibility of the defendant's *106 conduct, whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to the actual and potential harm caused by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the difference between the award and sanctions "authorized or imposed in comparable cases"); State (excessiveness more likely where ratio exceeds single digits). Because we shall not decide whether the award here at issue is "grossly excessive," we need now only consider the Constitution's procedural limitations. III In our view, the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation. For one thing, the Due Process Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual with "an opportunity to present every available defense." Yet a defendant threatened with punishment for injuring a nonparty victim has no opportunity to defend against the charge, by showing, for example in a case such as this, that the other victim was not entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was dangerous or did not rely upon the defendant's statements to the contrary. For another, to permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | majority | Philip Morris USA v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145758/philip-morris-usa-v-williams/ | nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages How many such victims are there? How seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate. And the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive damages cases referrisks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of noticewill be magnified. State 58 U.S., ; 517 U.S., Finally, we can find no authority supporting the use of punitive damages awards for the purpose of punishing a defendant for harming others. We have said that it may be appropriate to consider the reasonableness of a punitive damages award in light of the potential harm the defendant's conduct could have caused. But we have made clear that the potential harm at issue was harm potentially caused the plaintiff. See State ("[W]e have been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award" (emphasis added)). See also -462, (using same kind of comparison as basis for finding a punitive award not unconstitutionally excessive). We did use the term "error-free" (in ) to describe a lower court punitive damages calculation that likely included harm to others in the 517 U.S., n. 11, But context makes clear that the term "error-free" in the footnote referred to errors relevant to the case at hand. Although elsewhere in we noted that there was no suggestion that the plaintiff "or any other purchaser was threatened with any additional potential harm" by the defendant's conduct, we did not purport to decide the question of harm to others. Rather, the opinion appears to have left the question open. Respondent argues that she is free to show harm to other victims because it is relevant to a different part of the punitive *1064 damages constitutional equation, namely, reprehensibility. That is to say, harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct. Philip Morris, in turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order to demonstrate reprehensibility. Nor do we. Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensiblealthough counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others nonetheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse. Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | majority | Philip Morris USA v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145758/philip-morris-usa-v-williams/ | may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties. Given the risks of unfairness that we have mentioned, it is constitutionally important for a court to provide assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong one. And given the risks of arbitrariness, the concern for adequate notice, and the risk that punitive damages awards can, in practice, impose one State's (or one jury's) policies (, banning cigarettes) upon other Statesall of which accompany awards that, today, may be many times the size of such awards in the 18th and 19th centuries, see (BREYER, J., concurring)it is particularly important that States avoid procedure that unnecessarily deprives juries of proper legal guidance. We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused strangers. IV Respondent suggests as well that the Oregon Supreme Court, in essence, agreed with us, that it did not authorize punitive damages awards based upon punishment for harm caused to nonparties. We concede that one might read some portions of the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion as focusing only upon reprehensibility. See, 127 P.d, at But the Oregon court's opinion elsewhere makes clear that that court held more than these few phrases might suggest. The instruction that Philip Morris said the trial court should have given distinguishes between using harm to others as part of the "reasonable relationship" equation (which it would allow) and using it directly as a basis for punishment. The instruction asked the trial court to tell the jury that "you may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what [the] reasonable relationship is" between Philip Morris' punishable misconduct and harm caused to Jesse Williams, "[but] you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve their claims" App. 280a (emphasis added). And as the Oregon Supreme Court explicitly recognized, Philip Morris argued that the Constitution "prohibits the state, acting through a civil jury, from using punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to nonparties." 40 Ore., at 127 P.d, at The court rejected that claim. In doing so, it pointed out (1) that this Court in State had held only that a jury could not base its award upon "dissimilar" acts of a |
Justice Breyer | 2,007 | 2 | majority | Philip Morris USA v. Williams | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145758/philip-morris-usa-v-williams/ | could not base its award upon "dissimilar" acts of a 127 P.d, at -1176. It added (2) that "[i]f *1065 a jury cannot punish for the conduct, then it is difficult to see why it may consider it at all." 127 P.d, at n. And it stated () that "[i]t is unclear to us how a jury could `consider' harm to others, yet withhold that consideration from the punishment calculus." The Oregon court's first statement is correct. We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury may not punish for the harm caused others. But we do so hold now. We do not agree with the Oregon court's second statement. We have explained why we believe the Due Process Clause prohibits a State's inflicting punishment for harm caused strangers to the litigation. At the same time we recognize that conduct that risks harm to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to only a few. And a jury consequently may take this fact into account in determining reprehensibility. Cf., 515 U.S. 89, 12 L. Ed. 2d 51 )). The Oregon court's third statement raises a practical problem. How can we know whether a jury, in taking account of harm caused others under the rubric of reprehensibility, also seeks to punish the defendant for having caused injury to others? Our answer is that state courts cannot authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of any such confusion occurring. In particular, we believe that where the risk of that misunderstanding is a significant onebecause, for instance, of the sort of evidence that was introduced at trial or the kinds of argument the plaintiff made to the jurya court, upon request, must protect against that risk. Although the States have some flexibility to determine what kind of procedures they will implement, federal constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protection in appropriate cases. V As the preceding discussion makes clear, we believe that the Oregon Supreme Court applied the wrong constitutional standard when considering Philip Morris' appeal. We remand this case so that the Oregon Supreme Court can apply the standard we have set forth. Because the application of this standard may lead to the need for a new trial, or a change in the level of the punitive damages award, we shall not consider whether the award is constitutionally "grossly excessive." We vacate the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | California v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111797/california-v-brown/ | The question presented for review in this case is whether an instruction informing jurors that they "must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not. Respondent Albert Brown was found guilty by a jury of forcible rape and first-degree murder in the death of 15-year-old Susan J. At the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that respondent had raped another young girl some years prior to his attack on Susan J. Respondent presented the testimony of several family members, who recounted respondent's peaceful nature and expressed disbelief that respondent was capable of such a brutal crime. Respondent also presented the testimony of a psychiatrist, who stated that Brown killed his victim because of his shame and fear over sexual dysfunction. Brown himself testified, stating that he was ashamed of his prior criminal conduct and asking for mercy from the jury. *540 California Penal Code Ann. 190.3 (West Supp. 1987) provides that capital defendants may introduce at the penalty phase any evidence "as to any matter relevant to mitigation including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense, and the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition."[*] The trial court instructed the jury to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to weigh them in determining the appropriate penalty. App. 23-24. But the court cautioned the jury that it "must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." Respondent was sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed the sentence of death. Over two dissents on this point, the majority opinion found that the instruction at issue here violates the Federal Constitution: " `federal constitutional law forbids an instruction which denies a capital defendant the right to have the jury consider any "sympathy factor" raised by the evidence when determining the appropriate penalty' " quoting Relying on and the court ruled that the instruction "is calculated to divert the jury from its constitutional duty to consider `any [sympathetic] aspect of the defendant's character or record,' whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial, in deciding the appropriate penalty." 40 Cal. 3d, We granted certiorari to resolve whether such an instruction violates the United States Constitution. *541 The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of this Court establishes two separate prerequisites to a valid death sentence. First, sentencers may not |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | California v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111797/california-v-brown/ | prerequisites to a valid death sentence. First, sentencers may not be given unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital offenses. The Constitution instead requires that death penalty statutes be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion. ; Second, even though the sentencer's discretion must be restricted, the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his " `character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.' " quoting Consideration of such evidence is a "constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." The instruction given by the trial court in this case violates neither of these constitutional principles. We think that the California Supreme Court improperly focused solely on the word "sympathy" to determine that the instruction interferes with the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence. "The question, however, is not what the State Supreme Court declares the meaning of the charge to be, but rather what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning." ; see To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an instruction, we "must focus initially on the specific language challenged." If the specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law. In this case, we need not reach the second step of analysis because we hold that a reasonable juror would not interpret *542 the challenged instruction in a manner that would render it unconstitutional. The jury was told not to be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." Respondent does not contend, and the Supreme Court of California did not hold, that conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling should properly play any role in the jury's sentencing determination, even if such factors might weigh in the defendant's favor. Rather, respondent reads the instruction as if it solely cautioned the jury not to be swayed by "sympathy." Even if we were to agree that a rational juror could parse the instruction in such a hypertechnical manner, we would disagree with both respondent's interpretation of the instruction and his conclusion that the instruction is unconstitutional. By concentrating on the noun "sympathy," respondent ignores the crucial fact that the jury was instructed to avoid basing its decision on mere sympathy. Even a juror who insisted on focusing on this one phrase in the instruction would likely interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional responses |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,987 | 19 | majority | California v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111797/california-v-brown/ | interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase. While strained in the abstract, respondent's interpretation is simply untenable when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. This instruction was given at the end of the penalty phase, only after respondent had produced 13 witnesses in his favor. Yet respondent's interpretation would have these two words transform three days of favorable testimony into a virtual charade. We think a reasonable juror would reject that interpretation, and instead understand the instruction not to rely on "mere sympathy" as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase. We also think it highly unlikely that any reasonable juror would almost perversely single out the word "sympathy" from the other nouns which accompany it in the instruction: *543 conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion, and public feeling. Reading the instruction as a whole, as we must, it is no more than a catalog of the kind of factors that could improperly influence a juror's decision to vote for or against the death penalty. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is based on common sense, and a rational juror could hardly hear this instruction without concluding that it was meant to confine the jury's deliberations to considerations arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating. An instruction prohibiting juries from basing their sentencing decisions on factors not presented at the trial, and irrelevant to the issues at the trial, does not violate the United States Constitution. It serves the useful purpose of confining the jury's imposition of the death sentence by cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors, which, we think, would be far more likely to turn the jury against a capital defendant than for him. And to the extent that the instruction helps to limit the jury's consideration to matters introduced in evidence before it, it fosters the Eighth Amendment's "need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson, Indeed, by limiting the jury's sentencing considerations to record evidence, the State also ensures the availability of meaningful judicial review, another safeguard that improves the reliability of the sentencing process. See We hold that the instruction challenged in this case does not violate the provisions of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109763/pfizer-inc-v-government-of-india/ | In this case we are asked to decide whether a foreign nation is entitled to sue in our courts for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The respondents are the Government of India, the Imperial Government of Iran, and the Republic of the Philippines. They brought separate actions in Federal District Courts against the petitioners, six pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. The actions were later consolidated for pretrial purposes in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.[1] The complaints alleged that the petitioners *310 had conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign trade in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of broad spectrum antibiotics, in violation of 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, as amended, 15 U.S. C. 1, 2. Among the practices the petitioners allegedly engaged in were price fixing, market division, and fraud upon the United States Patent Office.[2] India and Iran each alleged that it was a "sovereign foreign state with whom the United States of America maintains diplomatic relations"; the Philippines alleged that it was a "sovereign and independent government." Each respondent claimed that as a purchaser of antibiotics it had been damaged in its business or property by the alleged antitrust violations and sought treble damages under 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 15, on its own behalf and on behalf of several classes of foreign purchasers of antibiotics.[3] *311 The petitioners asserted as an affirmative defense to the complaints that the respondents as foreign nations were not "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages under 4. In response to pretrial motions[4] the District Court held that the respondents were "persons" and refused to dismiss the actions.[5] The trial court certified the question for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 122 (b).[6] The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, and adhered to its decision upon rehearing en banc.[7] at 400. We granted certiorari to resolve an important and novel question in the administration of the antitrust laws. I As the Court of Appeals observed, this case "turns on the interpretation of the statute." A treble-damages remedy for persons injured by antitrust violations was first provided in 7 of the Sherman Act, and was re-enacted in 114 without substantial change as 4 of the Clayton Act.[8] Section 4 provides: "[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust *312 laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109763/pfizer-inc-v-government-of-india/ | resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Thus, whether a foreign nation is entitled to sue for treble damages depends upon whether it is a "person" as that word is used in 4. There is no statutory provision or legislative history that provides a clear answer; it seems apparent that the question was never considered at the time the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted.[] The Court has previously noted the broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust laws. "The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms, ; cf. Perma Life Mufflers, And the legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrates that Congress used the phrase "any person" intending it to have its naturally broad and inclusive meaning. There was no mention in the floor debates of any more restrictive definition. Indeed, during the course of those debates the word "person" was used interchangeably with other terms even *313 broader in connotation. For example, Senator Sherman said that the treble-damages remedy was being given to "any party," and Senator Edmunds, one of the principal draftsmen of the final bill,[10] said that it established "the right of anybody to sue who chooses to sue." 21 Cong. Rec. 256, 3148 (180). In light of the law's expansive remedial purpose, the Court has not taken a technical or semantic approach in determining who is a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages. Instead, it has said that "[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate" the proper scope of the law. United II The respondents in this case possess two attributes that could arguably exclude them from the scope of the sweeping phrase "any person." They are foreign, and they are sovereign nations. A As to the first of these attributes, the petitioners argue that, in light of statements made during the debates on the Sherman Act and the general protectionist and chauvinistic attitude evidenced by the same Congress in debating contemporaneous tariff bills, it should be inferred that the Act was intended to protect only American consumers. Yet it is clear that a foreign corporation is entitled to sue for treble damages, since the definition of "person" contained in the Sherman and Clayton Acts explicitly includes "corporations |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109763/pfizer-inc-v-government-of-india/ | contained in the Sherman and Clayton Acts explicitly includes "corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of any foreign country." See n. Moreover, the antitrust laws extend to trade "with foreign nations" as well as among the several States of the Union. 15 U.S. C. 1, 2.[11] Clearly, therefore, Congress *314 did not intend to make the treble-damages remedy available only to consumers in our own country.[12] In addition, the petitioners' argument confuses the ultimate purposes of the antitrust laws with the question of who can invoke their remedies. The fact that Congress' foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws was the protection of Americans does not mean that it intended to deny foreigners a remedy when they are injured by antitrust violations. Treble-damages suits by foreigners who have been victimized by anti-trust violations clearly may contribute to the protection of American consumers. The Court has noted that 4 has two purposes: to deter violators and deprive them of " `the fruits of their illegality,' " and "to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries." Illinois Brick ; Brunswick 42 U.S. 477, ; Perma Life Mufflers, at 13. To deny a foreign plaintiff injured by an antitrust violation the right to sue would defeat these purposes. It would permit a price fixer or a monopolist to escape full liability for his illegal actions and would deny *315 compensation to certain of his victims, merely because he happens to deal with foreign customers. Moreover, an exclusion of all foreign plaintiffs would lessen the deterrent effect of treble damages. The conspiracy alleged by the respondents in this case operated domestically as well as internationally.[13] If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their antitrust injuries, persons doing business both in this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plaintiffs at home. If, on the other hand, potential antitrust violators must take into account the full costs of their conduct, American consumers are benefited by the maximum deterrent effect of treble damages upon all potential violators.[14] B The second distinguishing characteristic of these respondents is that they are sovereign nations. The petitioners contend that the word "person" was clearly understood by Congress when it passed the Sherman Act to exclude sovereign governments. The word "person," however, is not a term of art with a fixed meaning wherever it is used, nor was it in 180 when the Sherman Act was passed.[15] Cf. |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109763/pfizer-inc-v-government-of-india/ | it in 180 when the Sherman Act was passed.[15] Cf. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. *316 418, 425. Indeed, this Court has expressly noted that use of the word "person" in the Sherman and Clayton Acts did not create a "hard and fast rule of exclusion" of governmental bodies. United -. On the two previous occasions that the Court has considered whether a sovereign government is a "person" under the antitrust laws, the mechanical rule urged by the petitioners has been rejected.[16] In United the United States sought to maintain a treble-damages action under 7 of the Sherman Act for injury to its business or property. The Court considered the question whether the United States was a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages as one to be decided not "by a strict construction of the words of the Act, nor by the application of artificial canons of construction," but by analyzing the language of the statute "in the light, not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well, by all other available aids to construction." at The Court noted that the Sherman Act provides several *317 separate and distinct remedies: criminal prosecutions, injunctions, and seizure of property by the United States on the one hand, and suits for treble damages "granted to redress private injury" on the other. Statements made during the congressional debates on the Sherman and Clayton Acts provided further evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to exclude the United States from the treble-damages remedy. Thus, the Court found that the United States was not a "person" entitled to bring suit for treble damages.[17] In 316 U.S. 15, decided the very next Term, the question was whether Georgia was entitled to sue for treble damages under 7 of the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals, believing that the Cooper case controlled, had held that a State, like the Federal Government, was not a "person." This Court reversed, noting that Cooper did not hold "that the word `person,' abstractly considered, could not include a governmental body." As in Cooper, the Court did not rest its decision upon a bare analysis of the word "person," but relied instead upon the entire statutory context to hold that Georgia was entitled to sue. Unlike the United States, which "had chosen for itself three potent weapons for enforcing the Act." a State had been given no other remedies to enforce the prohibitions of the law. To deprive it also of a suit for damages "would deny all redress to a State, when mulcted by a violator |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109763/pfizer-inc-v-government-of-india/ | all redress to a State, when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it is a State." Although the legislative history of the Sherman Act did not indicate that Congress ever considered whether a State would be entitled to sue, the Court found no reason to believe that Congress had intended to deprive a State of the remedy made available to all other victims of antitrust violations. *318 It is clear that in the Court rejected the proposition that the word "person" as used in the antitrust laws excludes all sovereign states. And the reasoning of that case leads to the conclusion that a foreign nation, like a domestic State, is entitled to pursue the remedy of treble damages when it has been injured in its business or property by antitrust violations. When a foreign nation enters our commercial markets as a purchaser of goods or services, it can be victimized by anticompetitive practices just as surely as a private person or a domestic State. The antitrust laws provide no alternative remedies for foreign nations as they do for the United States.[18] The words of are thus equally applicable here: "We can perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to deprive a [foreign nation], as purchaser of commodities shipped in [international] commerce, of the civil remedy of treble damages which is available to other purchasers who suffer through violation of the Act. Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could justify so restrictive a construction of the word `person' in 7 Such a construction would deny all redress to a [foreign nation], when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it is a [foreign nation]." 316 U.S., III The result we reach does not involve any novel concept of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This Court has long recognized the rule that a foreign nation is generally entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United States *31 upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or individual might do. "To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling." The Sapphire, ; 22 U.S. 313, 323 n. 2; Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 38, 408-40; see U. S. Const., Art. III, 2, cl. 1.[1] To allow a foreign sovereign to sue in our courts for treble damages to the same extent as any other person injured by an antitrust violation is thus no more than a specific application of a long-settled general rule. To exclude foreign nations from the protections of our |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109763/pfizer-inc-v-government-of-india/ | rule. To exclude foreign nations from the protections of our anti-trust laws would, on the other hand, create a conspicuous exception to this rule, an exception that could not be justified in the absence of clear legislative intent. Finally, the result we reach does not require the Judiciary in any way to interfere in sensitive matters of foreign policy.[20] It has long been established that only governments recognized by the United States and at peace with us are entitled to access *320 to our courts, and that it is within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to determine which nations are entitled to sue. ; Guaranty Trust ; Banco Nacional de Nothing we decide today qualifies this established rule of complete judicial deference to the Executive Branch.[21] We hold today only that a foreign nation otherwise entitled to sue in our courts is entitled to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws to the same extent as any other plaintiff. Neither the fact that the respondents are foreign nor the fact that they are sovereign is reason to deny them the remedy of treble damages Congress afforded to "any person" victimized by violations of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | n this litigation we must decide the constitutionality of several provisions of an ordinance enacted by the city of Akron, Ohio, to regulate the performance of abortions. Today we also review abortion regulations enacted by the State of Missouri, see Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., nc. v. Ashcroft, post, p. 476, and by the State of Virginia, see Simopoulos v. Virginia, post, p. 506. These cases come to us a decade after we held in that the right of privacy, grounded in the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, encompasses a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. Legislative responses to the Court's decision have required us on several occasions, and again today, to define the limits of a State's authority to regulate the performance of abortions. And arguments continue to be made, in these cases as well, that we erred in interpreting the Constitution. Nonetheless, the doctrine of *420 stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law.[1] We respect it today, and reaffirm *421 n February 1978 the City Council of Akron enacted Ordinance No. 160-1978, entitled "Regulation of Abortions."[2]*422 The ordinance sets forth 17 provisions that regulate the performance of abortions, see Akron Codified Ordinances, ch. 1870, 5 of which are at issue in this case: (i) Section 1870.03 requires that all abortions performed after the first trimester of pregnancy be performed in a hospital.[3] (ii) Section 1870.05 sets forth requirements for notification of and consent by parents before abortions may be performed on unmarried minors.[4] *423 (iii) Section 1870.06 requires that the attending physician make certain specified statements to the patient "to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent."[5] *424 (iv) Section 1870.07 requires a 24-hour waiting period between the time the woman signs a consent form and the time the abortion is performed.[6] (v) Section 1870.16 requires that fetal remains be "disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner."[7] *425 A violation of any section of the ordinance is punishable as a criminal misdemeanor. 1870.18. f any provision is invalidated, it is to be severed from the remainder of the ordinance.[8] The ordinance became effective on May 1, 1978. On April 19, 1978, a lawsuit challenging virtually all of the ordinance's provisions was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs, respondents and cross-petitioners in this Court, were three corporations that operate abortion clinics in Akron and a physician who has performed abortions |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | clinics in Akron and a physician who has performed abortions at one of the clinics. The defendants, petitioners and cross-respondents here, were the city of Akron and three city officials (Akron). Two individuals (intervenors) were permitted to intervene as codefendants "in their individual capacity as parents of unmarried minor daughters of childbearing age." On April 27, 1978, the District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the ordinance. n August after hearing evidence, the District Court ruled on the merits. t found that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge seven provisions of the ordinance, none of which is before this Court. The District Court invalidated four provisions, including 1870.05 (parental notice and consent), 1870.06(B) (requiring disclosure of facts concerning the woman's pregnancy, fetal development, the complications of abortion, and agencies available to assist the woman), and 1870.16 (disposal of fetal remains). The court upheld the constitutionality of the remainder of the ordinance, including 1870.03 (hospitalization for abortions after the first trimester), 1870.06(C) (requiring disclosure of the particular risks of the woman's pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed), and 1870.07 (24-hour waiting period). *426 All parties appealed some portion of the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. t affirmed the District Court's decision that 1870.03's hospitalization requirement is constitutional. t also affirmed the ruling that 1870.05, 1870.06(B), and 1870.16 are unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision on 1870.06(C) and 1870.07, finding these provisions to be unconstitutional. Three separate petitions for certiorari were filed. n light of the importance of the issues presented, and in particular the conflicting decisions as to whether a State may require that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital,[9] we granted both Akron's and the plaintiffs' petitions. We denied the intervenors' petition, but they have participated in this Court as respondents under our Rule 19.6. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding Akron's hospitalization requirement, but affirm the remainder of the decision invalidating the provisions on parental consent, informed consent, waiting period, and disposal of fetal remains. n the Court held that the "right of privacy,. founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Although the Constitution does not specifically identify this right, the *427 history of this Court's constitutional adjudication leaves no doubt that "the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution." Central among these protected liberties is an individual's "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life." See, e. g., ; ; ; ; The decision in was based firmly on this long-recognized and essential element of personal liberty. The Court also has recognized, because abortion is a medical procedure, that the full vindication of the woman's fundamental right necessarily requires that her physician be given "the room he needs to make his best medical judgment." See Whalen v. The physician's exercise of this medical judgment encompasses both assisting the woman in the decisionmaking process and implementing her decision should she choose abortion. See At the same time, the Court in acknowledged that the woman's fundamental right "is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in abortion." But restrictive state regulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other fundamental rights subject to searching judicial examination, must be supported by a compelling state interest. We have recognized two such interests that may justify state regulation of abortions.[10] *428 First, a State has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." Although this interest exists "throughout the course of the woman's pregnancy," it becomes compelling only at viability, the point at which the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," See Planned Parenthood of Central At viability this interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn child is so important that the State may proscribe abortions altogether, "except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Second, because a State has a legitimate concern with the health of women who undergo abortions, "a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health [and] *429 in maintaining medical standards." We held in however, that this health interest does not become compelling until "approximately the end of the first trimester" of pregnancy.[] Until that time, a pregnant woman must be permitted, in consultation with her physician, *430 to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate that decision "free of interference by the State."[12] This does not mean that a State never may enact a regulation touching on the woman's abortion right during the first weeks of pregnancy. Certain regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives. n we unanimously upheld two Missouri statutory provisions, applicable to the |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | we unanimously upheld two Missouri statutory provisions, applicable to the first trimester, requiring the woman to provide her informed written consent to the abortion and the physician to keep certain records, even though comparable requirements were not imposed on most other medical procedures. See -67, 79-81. The decisive factor was that the State met its burden of demonstrating that these regulations furthered important health-related state concerns.[13] But even these minor regulations on the abortion procedure during the first trimester may not interfere with physician-patient consultation or with the woman's choice between abortion and childbirth. See From approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the State "may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation *431 and protection of maternal health."[14], 410 U. S., The State's discretion to regulate on this basis does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart from accepted medical practice. We have rejected a State's attempt to ban a particular second-trimester abortion procedure, where the ban would have increased the costs and limited the availability of abortions without promoting important health benefits. See -78. f a State requires licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions during this period, the health standards adopted must be "legitimately related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish." Section 1870.03 of the Akron ordinance requires that any abortion performed "upon a pregnant woman subsequent to the end of the first trimester of her pregnancy"[15] must be *432 "performed in a hospital." A "hospital" is "a general hospital or special hospital devoted to gynecology or obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic Association." 1870.01(B). Accreditation by these organizations requires compliance with comprehensive standards governing a wide variety of health and surgical services.[16] The ordinance thus prevents the performance of abortions in outpatient facilities that are not part of an acute-care, full-service hospital.[17] n the District Court plaintiffs sought to demonstrate that this hospitalization requirement has a serious detrimental impact on a woman's ability to obtain a second-trimester abortion in Akron and that it is not reasonably related to the State's interest in the health of the pregnant woman. The District Court did not reject this argument, but rather found the evidence "not so convincing that it is willing to discard the Supreme Court's formulation in " of a line between impermissible first-trimester regulation and permissible second-trimester regulation. The Court of Appeals affirmed on a similar basis. t accepted plaintiffs' argument that Akron's hospitalization requirement did not have a |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | plaintiffs' argument that Akron's hospitalization requirement did not have a reasonable health justification during at least part of the second trimester, but declined to "retreat from the `bright line' in" 651 F. 2d, at *433 1210.[18] We believe that the courts below misinterpreted this Court's prior decisions, and we now hold that 1870.03 is unconstitutional. A n the Court held that after the end of the first trimester of pregnancy the State's interest becomes compelling, and it may "regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." 410 U.S., We noted, for example, that States could establish requirements relating "to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be in a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status." n the companion case of the Court invalidated a Georgia requirement that all abortions be performed in a hospital licensed by the State Board of Health and accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. See We recognized the State's legitimate health interests in establishing, for second-trimester abortions, "standards for licensing all facilities where abortions may be performed." We found, however, that "the State must show more than [was shown in ] in order to prove that only the full resources of *434 a licensed hospital, rather than those of some other appropriately licensed institution, satisfy these health " [19] We reaffirm today, see that a State's interest in health regulation becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester. The existence of a compelling state interest in health, however, is only the beginning of the inquiry. The State's regulation may be upheld only if it is reasonably designed to further that state interest. See And the Court in did not hold that it always is reasonable for a State to adopt an abortion regulation that applies to the entire second trimester. A State necessarily must have latitude in adopting regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area. But if it appears that during a substantial portion of the second trimester the State's regulation "depart[s] from accepted medical practice," the regulation may not be upheld simply because it may be reasonable for the remaining portion of the trimester. Rather, the State is obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to the period in the trimester during which its health interest will be furthered. B There can be no doubt that 1870.03's second-trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant obstacle in the |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | 1870.03's second-trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. A primary burden created by the requirement is additional cost to the woman. The Court of Appeals noted that there was testimony that a second-trimester abortion costs more than twice as much in a *435 hospital as in a clinic. See[20] Moreover, the court indicated that second-trimester abortions were rarely performed in Akron hospitals.[21] Thus, a second-trimester hospitalization requirement may force women to travel to find available facilities, resulting in both financial expense and additional health risk. t therefore is apparent that a second-trimester hospitalization requirement may significantly limit a woman's ability to obtain an abortion. Akron does not contend that 1870.03 imposes only an insignificant burden on women's access to abortion, but rather defends it as a reasonable health regulation. This position had strong support at the time of as hospitalization for second-trimester abortions was recommended by the American Public Health Association (APHA), see -146, and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist (ACOG), see Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 65 (4th ed. 1974). Since then, however, the safety of second-trimester abortions has increased *436 dramatically.[22] The principal reason is that the D&E procedure is now widely and successfully used for second-trimester abortions.[23] The Court of Appeals found that there was "an abundance of evidence that D&E is the safest method of performing post-first trimester abortions today." The availability of the D&E procedure during the interval between approximately 12 and 16 weeks of pregnancy, a period during which other second-trimester abortion techniques generally cannot be used,[24] has meant that women desiring an early second-trimester abortion no longer are forced to incur the health risks of waiting until at least the 16th week of pregnancy. For our purposes, an even more significant factor is that experience indicates that D&E may be performed safely on an outpatient basis in appropriate nonhospital facilities. The evidence is strong enough to have convinced the APHA to abandon its prior recommendation of hospitalization for all second-trimester abortions: "Current data show that abortions occurring in the second trimester can be safely performed by the Dilatation and Evacuation (D and E) procedure. Requirements that all abortions after 12 weeks of gestation be performed in hospitals increase the expense and inconvenience to the woman without contributing to the safety of the procedure." APHA Recommended Program *437 Guide for Abortion Services 70 Am. J. Public Health 652, 654 (1980) (hereinafter APHA Recommended Guide). Similarly, the ACOG no longer suggests that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital. t recommends that abortions performed in |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | performed in a hospital. t recommends that abortions performed in a physician's office or outpatient clinic be limited to 14 weeks of pregnancy, but it indicates that abortions may be performed safely in "a hospital-based or in a free-standing ambulatory surgical facility, or in an outpatient clinic meeting the criteria required for a free-standing surgical facility," until 18 weeks of pregnancy. ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 These developments, and the professional commentary supporting them, constitute impressive evidence that at least during the early weeks of the second trimester D&E abortions may be performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital.[25] We conclude, therefore, that "present medical knowledge," convincingly undercuts Akron's justification for requiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital.[26] *438 Akron nonetheless urges that "[t]he fact that some midtrimester abortions may be done in a minimally equipped clinic does not invalidate the regulation."[27] Brief for Respondents in No. 81-72, p. 19. t is true that a state abortion regulation is not unconstitutional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the asserted state interest. But the lines drawn in a state regulation must be reasonable, and this cannot be said of 1870.03. By preventing the performance of D&E abortions in an appropriate nonhospital setting, Akron has imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure.[28] Section 1870.03 has "the effect of inhibiting the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks," and *439 therefore unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion. V We turn next to 1870.05(B), the provision prohibiting a physician from performing an abortion on a minor pregnant woman under the age of 15 unless he obtains "the informed written consent of one of her parents or her legal guardian" or unless the minor obtains "an order from a court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or induced." The District Court invalidated this provision because "[i]t does not establish a procedure by which a minor can avoid a parental veto of her abortion decision by demonstrating that her decision is, in fact, informed. Rather, it requires, in all cases, both the minor's informed consent and either parental consent or a court order." The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same basis.[29] The relevant legal standards are not in dispute. The Court has held that "the State may not impose a blanket provision. requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor." n a majority of the Court indicated that a State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial. See ; (expressing approval of absolute parental or judicial consent requirement). See also The Bellotti plurality cautioned, however, that the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself *440 or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best -644. Under these decisions, it is clear that Akron may not make a blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too immature to make this decision or that an abortion never may be in the minor's best interest without parental approval. Akron's ordinance does not create expressly the alternative procedure required by Bellotti But Akron contends that the Ohio Juvenile Court will qualify as a "court having jurisdiction" within the meaning of 1870.05(B), and that "it is not to be assumed that during the course of the juvenile proceedings the Court will not construe the ordinance in a manner consistent with the constitutional requirement of a determination of the minor's ability to make an informed consent." Brief for Petitioner in No. 81-746, p. 28. Akron concludes that the courts below should not have invalidated 1870.05(B) on its face. The city relies on in which the Court did not decide whether a State's parental consent provisions were unconstitutional as applied to mature minors, holding instead that "abstention is appropriate where an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary `which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem.' " ). See also H.[30] *441 We do not think that the abstention principle should have been applied here. t is reasonable to assume, as we did in Bellotti and that a state court presented with a state statute specifically governing abortion consent procedures for pregnant minors will attempt to construe the statute consistently with constitutional requirements. This suit, however, concerns a municipal ordinance that creates no procedures for making the necessary determinations. Akron seeks to invoke the Ohio statute governing juvenile proceedings, but that statute neither mentions minors' abortions nor suggests that the Ohio Juvenile Court has authority to inquire into a minor's maturity or emancipation.[31] n these circumstances, we do not think that the Akron ordinance, as applied in Ohio |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | not think that the Akron ordinance, as applied in Ohio juvenile proceedings, is reasonably susceptible of being construed to create an "opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors." Bellotti We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that 1870.05(B) is unconstitutional. V The Akron ordinance provides that no abortion shall be performed except "with the informed written consent of the pregnant woman, given freely and without coercion." 1870.06(A). Furthermore, "in order to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent," the woman must be "orally informed by her attending physician" of the status of her pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional complications that may result from an abortion, and the availability of agencies to provide her with assistance and information with respect to birth control, adoption, and childbirth. 1870.06(B). n addition, the attending physician must inform her "of the particular risks associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed [and] other information which in his own medical judgment is relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion or carry her pregnancy to term." 1870.06(C). The District Court found that 1870.06(B) was unconstitutional, but that 1870.06(C) was related to a valid state interest in maternal health. See -1204. The Court of Appeals concluded that both provisions were unconstitutional. See We affirm. A n we upheld a Missouri law requiring a pregnant woman to "certif[y] in writing her consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion." We explained: "The decision to abort is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. *443 The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring her prior written consent." We rejected the view that "informed consent" was too vague a term, construing it to mean "the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession." n. 8. The validity of an informed consent requirement thus rests on the State's interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman. The decision to have an abortion has "implications far broader than those associated with most |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | abortion has "implications far broader than those associated with most other kinds of medical treatment," Bellotti and thus the State legitimately may seek to ensure that it has been made "in the light of all attendant circumstances psychological and emotional as well as physical that might be relevant to the well-being of the patient."[32] This does not mean, however, that a State has unreviewable authority to decide what information a woman must be given before she chooses to have an abortion. t remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that appropriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular circumstances. 's recognition of the State's interest in ensuring that this information be given *444 will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth.[33] B Viewing the city's regulations in this light, we believe that 1870.06(B) attempts to extend the State's interest in ensuring "informed consent" beyond permissible limits. First, it is fair to say that much of the information required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether. Subsection (3) requires the physician to inform his patient that "the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception," a requirement inconsistent with the Court's holding in that a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions. See -162. Moreover, much of the detailed description of "the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child" required by subsection (3) would involve at best speculation by the physician.[34] And subsection (5), that begins with the dubious statement that "abortion is a major surgical procedure"[35] and proceeds to describe numerous possible *445 physical and psychological complications of abortion,[36] is a "parade of horribles" intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure. An additional, and equally decisive, objection to 1870.06(B) is its intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician. This provision specifies a litany of information that the physician must recite to each woman regardless of whether in his judgment the information is relevant to her personal decision. For example, even if the physician believes that some of the risks outlined in subsection (5) are nonexistent for a particular patient, he remains obligated to describe them to her. n the Court warned against placing the physician in just such an "undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket." 428 U.S., n. 8. Consistent with its interest in ensuring informed consent, a State may require that a physician make certain that his |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | State may require that a physician make certain that his patient understands the physical and emotional implications of having an abortion. But Akron has gone far beyond merely describing the general subject matter relevant to informed consent. By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible list of information, Akron unreasonably has placed "obstacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her decision." Whalen v. n. 33.[37] * C Section 1870.06(C) presents a different question. Under this provision, the "attending physician" must inform the woman "of the particular risks associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed including providing her with at least a general description of the medical instructions to be followed subsequent to the abortion in order to insure her safe recovery, and shall in addition provide her with such other information which in his own medical judgment is relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion or carry her pregnancy to term." The information required clearly is related to maternal health and to the State's legitimate purpose in requiring informed consent. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals determined that it interfered with the physician's medical judgment "in exactly the same way as section 1870.06(B). t requires the doctor to make certain disclosures in all cases, regardless of his own professional judgment as to the desirability of so." This was a misapplication of There we construed "informed consent" to mean "the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences." 428 U.S., n. 8. We see no significant difference in Akron's requirement that the woman be told of the particular risks of her pregnancy and the abortion technique to be *447 used, and be given general instructions on proper postabortion care. Moreover, in contrast to subsection (B), 1870.06(C) merely describes in general terms the information to be disclosed. t properly leaves the precise nature and amount of this disclosure to the physician's discretion and "medical judgment." The Court of Appeals also held, however, that 1870.06(C) was invalid because it required that the disclosure be made by the "attending physician." The court found that "the practice of all three plaintiff clinics has been for the counseling to be conducted by persons other than the doctor who performs the abortion," and determined that Akron had not justified requiring the physician personally to describe the health risks. Akron challenges this holding as contrary to our cases that emphasize the importance of the physician-patient relationship. |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | our cases that emphasize the importance of the physician-patient relationship. n Akron's view, as in the view of the dissenting judge below, the "attending physician" requirement "does no more than seek to ensure that there is in fact a true physician-patient relationship even for the woman who goes to an abortion clinic." Requiring physicians personally to discuss the abortion decision, its health risks, and consequences with each patient may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions, though the record here does not suggest that ethical physicians will charge more for adhering to this typical element of the physician-patient relationship. Yet in and subsequent cases we have "stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried out." 439 U. S., at Moreover, we have left no doubt that, to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that only physicians perform abortions. See ; *448 We are not convinced, however, that there is as vital a state need for insisting that the physician performing the abortion, or for that matter any physician, personally counsel the patient in the absence of a request. The State's interest is in ensuring that the woman's consent is informed and unpressured; the critical factor is whether she obtains the necessary information and counseling from a qualified person, not the identity of the person from whom she obtains it.[38] Akron and intervenors strongly urge that the nonphysician counselors at the plaintiff abortion clinics are not trained or qualified to perform this important function. The courts below made no such findings, however, and on the record before us we cannot say that the woman's consent to the abortion will not be informed if a physician delegates the counseling task to another qualified individual. n so holding, we do not suggest that the State is powerless to vindicate its interest in making certain the "important" and "stressful" decision to abort "[i]s made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences." 428 U. S., Nor do we imply that a physician may abdicate his essential role as the person ultimately responsible for the medical aspects of the decision to perform the abortion.[39] A *449 State may define the physician's responsibility to include verification that adequate counseling has been provided and that the woman's consent is informed.[40] n addition, the State may establish reasonable minimum qualifications for those people who perform the primary counseling function.[41] See, e. g., n light of these |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | primary counseling function.[41] See, e. g., n light of these alternatives, we believe that it is unreasonable for a State to insist that only a physician is competent to provide the information and counseling relevant to informed consent. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that 1870.06(C) is invalid. V The Akron ordinance prohibits a physician from performing an abortion until 24 hours after the pregnant woman signs a consent form. 1870.07.[42] The District Court upheld this provision on the ground that it furthered Akron's interest in ensuring "that a woman's abortion decision is made after careful consideration of all the facts applicable to her particular *450 situation." The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the inflexible waiting period had "no medical basis," and that careful consideration of the abortion decision by the woman "is beyond the state's power to require." We affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment. The District Court found that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period increases the cost of obtaining an abortion by requiring the woman to make two separate trips to the abortion facility. See Plaintiffs also contend that because of scheduling difficulties the effective delay may be longer than 24 hours, and that such a delay in some cases could increase the risk of an abortion. Akron denies that any significant health risk is created by a 24-hour waiting period, and argues that a brief period of delay with the opportunity for reflection on the counseling received often will be beneficial to the pregnant woman. We find that Akron has failed to demonstrate that any legitimate state interest is furthered by an arbitrary and inflexible waiting period. There is no evidence suggesting that the abortion procedure will be performed more safely. Nor are we convinced that the State's legitimate concern that the woman's decision be informed is reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay as a matter of course. The decision whether to proceed with an abortion is one as to which it is important to "affor[d] the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment." 439 U. S., at n accordance with the ethical standards of the profession, a physician will advise the patient to defer the abortion when he thinks this will be beneficial to her.[43] But if a woman, after appropriate counseling, is prepared *451 to give her written informed consent and proceed with the abortion, a State may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that decision. V Section 1870.16 of the Akron ordinance requires physicians performing abortions to "insure that the remains of |
Justice Powell | 1,983 | 17 | majority | Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110968/akron-v-akron-center-for-reproductive-health-inc/ | requires physicians performing abortions to "insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." The Court of Appeals found that the word "humane" was impermissibly vague as a definition of conduct subject to criminal prosecution. The court invalidated the entire provision, declining to sever the word "humane" in order to uphold the requirement that disposal be "sanitary." See 651 F.2d, at 12. We affirm this judgment. Akron contends that the purpose of 1870.16 is simply " `to preclude the mindless dumping of aborted fetuses onto garbage piles.' " Planned Parenthood (quoting State's characterization of legislative purpose), summarily aff'd sub nom. v. Fitzpatrick,[44] t is far from clear, however, that this provision has such a limited intent. The phrase "humane and sanitary" does, as the Court of Appeals noted, suggest a possible intent to "mandate some sort of `decent burial' of an embryo at the earliest stages of formation." 651 F.2d, at 12. This level of uncertainty is fatal where criminal liability is imposed. See Because 1870.16 fails to give a physician "fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden," United States v. Harriss, 347 *452A U. S. 612, 617 (1954), we agree that it violates the Due Process Clause.[45] V We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals invalidating those sections of Akron's "Regulations of Abortions" ordinance that deal with parental consent, informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period, and the disposal of fetal remains. The remaining portion of the judgment, sustaining Akron's requirement that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, is reversed. t is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | Respondents, who have for over 15 years smoked “light” cigarettes manufactured by petitioners, Philip Morris USA, Inc., and its parent company, Altria Group, Inc., claim that petitioners violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA). Specifically, they allege that petitioners’ advertising fraudulently conveyed the mes sage that their “light” cigarettes deliver less tar and nico tine to consumers than regular brands despite petitioners’ knowledge that the message was untrue. Petitioners deny the charge, asserting that their advertisements were factually accurate. The merits of the dispute are not before us because the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of petitioners on the ground that re spondents’ state-law claim is pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended (Labeling Act). The Court of Appeals reversed that judg ment, and we granted certiorari to review its holding that the Labeling Act neither expressly nor impliedly pre empts respondents’ fraud claim. We affirm. 2 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court I Respondents are Maine residents and longtime smokers of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes, which are manufactured by petitioners. Invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal District Court, re spondents filed a complaint alleging that petitioners delib erately deceived them about the true and harmful nature of “light” cigarettes in violation of the MUTPA, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, (Supp. 2008).1 Respondents claim that petitioners fraudulently marketed their cigarettes as being “light” and containing “ ‘[l]owered [t]ar and [n]icotine’ ” to convey to consumers that they deliver less tar and nicotine and are therefore less harmful than regu lar cigarettes. App. 28a–29a. Respondents acknowledge that testing pursuant to the Cambridge Filter Method2 indicates that tar and nicotine yields of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights are lower than those of regular cigarettes. at 30a. Respondents allege, however, that petitioners have known at all rele vant times that human smokers unconsciously engage in compensatory behaviors not registered by Cambridge Filter Method testing that negate the effect of the tar- and —————— 1 The MUTPA provides, as relevant, that “[u]nfair methods of compe tition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful.” In construing that section, courts are to “be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 United States Code 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.” (1). 2 The Cambridge Filter Method weighs and measures the tar and nicotine collected by a smoking machine that takes 35 milliliter puffs of |
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