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Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | by a smoking machine that takes 35 milliliter puffs of two seconds’ duration every 60 seconds until the cigarette is smoked to a specified butt length. App. 294a, 668a. As discussed below, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) signaled in 1966 that the Cambridge Filter Method was an acceptable means of measuring the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes, but it never required manu facturers to publish test results in their advertisements. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 3 Opinion of the Court nicotine-reducing features of “light” cigarettes. at 30a–31a. By covering filter ventilation holes with their lips or fingers, taking larger or more frequent puffs, and holding the smoke in their lungs for a longer period of time, smokers of “light” cigarettes unknowingly inhale as much tar and nicotine as do smokers of regular cigarettes. “Light” cigarettes are in fact more harmful because the increased ventilation that results from their unique design features produces smoke that is more mutagenic per milligram of tar than the smoke of regular cigarettes. at 31a–32a. Respondents claim that petitioners vio lated the MUTPA by fraudulently concealing that infor mation and by affirmatively representing, through the use of “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” descriptors, that their cigarettes would pose fewer health risks. at 32a, 33a. Petitioners moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Labeling Act, 15 U.S. C. expressly pre empts respondents’ state-law cause of action. Relying on our decisions in v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 533 U.S. 525 (2001), the District Court concluded that respondents’ MUTPA claim is pre-empted. The court recast respon dents’ claim as a failure-to-warn or warning neutralization claim of the kind pre-empted in : The claim charges petitioners with “produc[ing] a product it knew contained hidden risks not apparent or known to the consumer”—a claim that “runs to what [petitioners] actu ally said about Lights and what [respondents] claim they should have said.” And the difference between what petitioners said and what respondents would have them say is “ ‘intertwined with the concern about cigarette smoking and ’ ” (quoting ). The District Court thus concluded that respondents’ claim rests on a state-law requirement based on smoking and health of 4 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court precisely the kind that pre-empts, and it granted summary judgment for petitioners. Respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals re versed. The Court of Appeals first rejected the District Court’s characterization of respondents’ claim as a warn ing neutralization claim akin to the pre-empted claim in Instead, the |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | neutralization claim akin to the pre-empted claim in Instead, the court concluded that respondents’ claim is in substance a fraud claim that alleges that petitioners falsely repre sented their cigarettes as “light” or having “lowered tar and nicotine” even though they deliver to smokers the same quantities of those components as do regular ciga rettes. “The fact that these alleged misrepre sentations were unaccompanied by additional statements in the nature of a warning does not transform the claimed fraud into failure to warn” or warning neutralization. at 42–43. Finding respondents’ claim indistinguishable from the non-pre-empted fraud claim at issue in the Court of Appeals held that it is not expressly pre empted. The court also rejected petitioners’ argument that respondents’ claim is impliedly pre-empted because their success on that claim would stand as an obstacle to the purported policy of the FTC allowing the use of de scriptive terms that convey Cambridge Filter Method test results. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the District Court. In concluding that respondents’ claim is not expressly pre-empted, the Court of Appeals considered and rejected the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in a similar case. 501 F.3d, at 45. Unlike the court below, the Fifth Circuit likened the plaintiffs’ challenge to the use of “light” descriptors to ’s warning neutralization claim and thus found it expressly pre-empted. We granted the petition for certiorari to resolve this apparent conflict. 552 U. S. (2008). Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 5 Opinion of the Court II Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Consistent with that command, we have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Mary Our inquiry into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that “ ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, ). Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose. See 525 (1977). If a federal law contains an express pre emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Con gress’ displacement of state law still remains. Pre emptive intent may also be inferred if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, When |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | between state and federal law. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, When addressing questions of express or implied pre emption, we begin our analysis “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” That assump tion applies with particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States. 518 U.S., at ; see also – 542 (“Because ‘federal law is said to bar state action in [a] 6 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court fiel[d] of traditional state regulation,’ namely, advertising, we ‘wor[k] on the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ ” (citation omitted)). Thus, when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausi ble reading, courts ordinarily “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” Congress enacted the Labeling Act in 19653 in response to the Surgeon General’s determination that cigarette smoking is harmful to The Act required that every package of cigarettes sold in the United States contain a conspicuous warning, and it pre-empted state-law positive enactments that added to the federally prescribed warn ing. Congress amended the Labeling Act a few years later by enacting the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 4 The amendments strengthened the language of the prescribed warning, and pro hibited cigarette advertising in “any medium of electronic communication subject to [FCC] jurisdiction,” They also broadened the Labeling Act’s pre-emption provi sion. See (discussing the difference in scope of the pre-emption clauses of the 1965 and 1969 Acts). The Labeling Act has since been amended further to require cigarette manufac turers to include four more explicit warnings in their packaging and advertisements on a rotating basis.5 The stated purpose of the Labeling Act is “to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal —————— 3 79 Stat. 282. 4 Pub. L. 91–222, Though actually enacted in 1970, Con gress directed that it be cited as a “1969 Act.” 5 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. 98–474, 98 Stat. 2201, 15 U.S. C. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 7 Opinion of the Court with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby— “(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by in clusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and “(2) commerce and the national |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | each package of cigarettes; and “(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, non uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and adver tising regulations with respect to any relationship be tween smoking and ” 15 U.S. C. The requirement that cigarette manufacturers include in their packaging and advertising the precise warnings mandated by Congress furthers the Act’s first purpose. And the Act’s pre-emption provisions promote its second purpose. As amended, the Labeling Act contains two express pre emption provisions. Section 5(a) protects cigarette manu facturers from inconsistent state labeling laws by prohibit ing the requirement of additional statements relating to smoking and health on cigarette packages. 15 U.S. C. Section 5(b), which is at issue in this case, provides that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” Together, the labeling requirement and pre-emption provisions express Congress’ determination that the pre scribed federal warnings are both necessary and sufficient to achieve its purpose of informing the public of the health consequences of smoking. Because Congress has decided 8 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court that no additional warning statement is needed to attain that goal, States may not impede commerce in cigarettes by enforcing rules that are based on an assumption that the federal warnings are inadequate. Although both of the Act’s purposes are furthered by prohibiting States from supplementing the federally prescribed warning, neither would be served by limiting the States’ authority to pro hibit deceptive statements in cigarette advertising. Peti tioners acknowledge that “Congress had no intention of insulating tobacco companies from liability for inaccurate statements about the relationship between smoking and ” Brief for Petitioners 28. But they maintain that Congress could not have intended to permit the enforce ment of state fraud rules because doing so would defeat the Labeling Act’s purpose of preventing nonuniform state warning requirements. 15 U.S. C. 6 As we ob —————— 6 Petitioners also urge us to find support for their claim that Congress gave the FTC exclusive authority to police deceptive health-related claims in cigarette advertising in what they refer to as the Labeling Act’s “saving clause.” The clause provides that, apart from the warning requirement, nothing in the Act “shall be construed to limit, restrict, expand, or otherwise affect the authority of the Federal Trade Commis sion with respect |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | the authority of the Federal Trade Commis sion with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertis ing of cigarettes.” A plurality of this Court has previously read this clause to “indicat[e] that Congress intended the phrase ‘relating to smoking and health’ to be construed narrowly, so as not to pro scribe the regulation of deceptive advertising.” v. Liggett Group, Inc., Nothing in the clause suggests that Congress meant to proscribe the States’ historic regula tion of deceptive advertising practices. The FTC has long depended on cooperative state regulation to achieve its mission because, although one of the smallest administrative agencies, it is charged with policing an enormous amount of activity. See 1 S. Kanwit, Federal Trade Commission 1:2 (2004 ed. and Supp. 2008). Moreover, when the Labeling Act was amended in 1969 it was not even clear that the FTC possessed rulemaking authority, see making it highly unlikely that Congress would have intended to assign exclusively to the FTC the substantial task of overseeing deceptive practices in cigarette advertisements. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 9 Opinion of the Court served in however, fraud claims “rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity.” (plu rality opinion). Although it is clear that fidelity to the Act’s purposes does not demand the pre-emption of state fraud rules, the principal question that we must decide is whether the text of nevertheless requires that result. III We have construed the operative phrases of in two prior cases: and 533 U.S. 525. On both occasions we recognized that the phrase “based on smoking and health” modifies the state law rule at issue rather than a particular application of that rule. In the plurality, which consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, and STEVENS, read the pre-emption provision in the 1969 amendments to the Labeling Act to pre-empt common-law rules as well as positive enactments. Unlike Justices Blackmun, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, the plurality con cluded that the provision does not preclude all common law claims that have some relationship to smoking and –523. To determine whether a particular common-law claim is pre-empted, the plurality inquired “whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a ‘require ment or prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to advertising or promotion,’ giving that clause a fair but narrow reading.” Applying this standard, the plurality held that the plaintiff’s claim that cigarette manufacturers had fraudu lently misrepresented and concealed a material fact was not pre-empted. That claim alleged a violation of the manufacturers’ duty not to deceive—a |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | alleged a violation of the manufacturers’ duty not to deceive—a duty that is not “based on” smoking and at Respon 10 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court dents in this case also allege a violation of the duty not to deceive as that duty is codified in the MUTPA. The duty codified in that state statute, like the duty imposed by the state common-law rule at issue in has nothing to do with smoking and 7 Petitioners endeavor to distance themselves from that holding by arguing that respondents’ claim is more analo gous to the “warning neutralization” claim found to be pre empted in Although the plurality understood the plaintiff to have presented that claim as a “theory of fraudulent misrepresentation,” the gravamen of the claim was the defendants’ failure to warn, as it was “predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional materials that tend to minimize the health hazards associated with smoking,” Thus understood, the plurality’s analysis of the warning neutralization claim has no appli cation in this case.8 —————— 7 In his dissent, JUSTICE THOMAS criticizes our reliance on the plural ity opinion in post, at 6–8, 14–19, 22, and advocates adopting the analysis set forth by JUSTICE SCALIA in his opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part in that case, post, at 3–6, 19– 21. But JUSTICE SCALIA’s approach was rejected by seven Members of the Court, and in the almost 17 years since was decided Congress has done nothing to indicate its approval of that approach. Moreover, JUSTICE THOMAS fails to explain why Congress would have intended the result that JUSTICE SCALIA’s approach would produce— namely, permitting cigarette manufacturers to engage in fraudulent advertising. As a majority of the Court concluded in nothing in the Labeling Act’s language or purpose supports that result. 8 The plurality further stated that the warning neutraliza tion claim was “merely the converse of a state-law requirement that warnings be included in advertising and promotional materials,” 505 U.S., evincing the plurality’s recognition that warning neutrali zation and failure-to-warn claims are two sides of the same coin. JUSTICE THOMAS’ criticism of the plurality’s treatment of the failure-to warn claim, post, at 16, is beside the point, as no such claim is at issue in this litigation. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 11 Opinion of the Court Petitioners nonetheless contend that respondents’ claim is like the pre-empted warning neutralization claim be cause it is based on statements that “might create a false impression” rather than statements that are “inherently false.” Brief |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | false impression” rather than statements that are “inherently false.” Brief for Petitioners 39. But the extent of the falsehood alleged does not alter the nature of the claim. Nothing in the Labeling Act’s text or purpose or in the plurality opinion in suggests that whether a claim is pre-empted turns in any way on the distinction between misleading and inherently false statements. Petitioners’ misunderstanding is the same one that led the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, when confronted with a “light” descriptors claim, to reach a result at odds with the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case. See –393. Certainly, the extent of the falsehood alleged may bear on whether a plaintiff can prove her fraud claim, but the merits of respondents’ claim are not before us. Once that erroneous distinction is set aside, it is clear that our holding in that the common-law fraud claim was not pre-empted is directly applicable to the statutory claim at issue in this case. As was true of the claim in respondents’ claim that the deceptive statements “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” induced them to purchase petitioners’ product alleges a breach of the duty not to deceive.9 To be sure, the presence of the federally mandated warnings may bear on the materiality of petitioners’ allegedly fraudulent statements, “but that possibility does not change [respondents’] case from one —————— 9 As the Court of Appeals observed, respondents’ allegations regard ing petitioners’ use of the statements “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” could also support a warning neutralization claim. But respondents did not bring such a claim, and the fact that they could have does not, as petitioners suggest, elevate form over substance. There is nothing new in the recognition that the same conduct might violate multiple proscriptions. 12 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court about the statements into one about the warnings.” 501 F.3d, at 44.10 Our decision in is consistent with ’s analysis. involved regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts attorney general “ ‘in order to address the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by children under legal age [and] in order to prevent access to such products by underage customers.’ ” 533 U.S., at 533 (quoting 940 Code Mass. Regs. (2000)). The regulations did not pertain to the content of any advertising; rather, they placed a variety of restrictions on certain cigarette sales and the location of outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising. The attorney general promulgated those restrictions pursuant to his statutory authority to prevent unfair or deceptive trade practices. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | prevent unfair or deceptive trade practices. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 93A, But although the attorney general’s authority derived from a general deceptive practices statute like the one at issue in this case, the challenged regulations targeted advertising that tended to promote tobacco use by children instead of pro hibiting false or misleading statements. Thus, whereas the “prohibition” in was the common-law fraud rule, the “prohibitions” in were the targeted regula —————— 10 JUSTICE THOMAS contends that respondents’ fraud claim must be pre-empted because “[a] judgment in [their] favor will result in a ‘requirement’ that petitioners represent the effects of smoking on health in a particular way in their advertising and promotion of light cigarettes.” Post, at 3. He further asserts that “respondents seek to require the cigarette manufacturers to provide additional warnings about compensatory behavior, or to prohibit them from selling these products with the ‘light’ or ‘low-tar’ descriptors.” Post, at 20. But this mischaracterizes the relief respondents seek. If respondents prevail at trial, petitioners will be prohibited from selling as “light” or “low tar” only those cigarettes that are not actually light and do not actually deliver less tar and nicotine. Barring intervening federal regulation, petitioners would remain free to make nonfraudulent use of the “light” and “low-tar” descriptors. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 13 Opinion of the Court tions. Accordingly, our holding in that the regula tions were pre-empted provides no support for an argu ment that a general prohibition of deceptive practices is “based on” the harm caused by the specific kind of decep tion to which the prohibition is applied in a given case. It is true, as petitioners argue, that the appeal of their advertising is based on the relationship between smoking and And although respondents have expressly repudiated any claim for damages for personal injuries, see App. 26a, their actual injuries likely encompass harms to health as well as the monetary injuries they allege. These arguments are unavailing, however, because the text of does not refer to harms related to smoking and Rather, it pre-empts only requirements and prohibitions—i.e., rules—that are based on smoking and The MUTPA says nothing about either “smoking” or “” It is a general rule that creates a duty not to deceive and is therefore unlike the regulations at issue in11 Petitioners argue in the alternative that we should reject the express pre-emption framework established by the plurality and relied on by the Court in In so doing, they invoke the reasons set forth in the separate opinions of Justice Blackmun (who especially criticized the plurality’s holding that the |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | Justice Blackmun (who especially criticized the plurality’s holding that the failure-to-warn claim was pre-empted) and JUSTICE SCALIA (who argued that the fraud claim also should be pre-empted). While we again acknowledge that our analysis of these claims may lack “theoretical elegance,” we remain persuaded that it —————— 11 In implementing the MUTPA, neither the state legislature nor the state attorney general has enacted a set of special rules or guidelines targeted at cigarette advertising. As we noted in it was the threatened enactment of new state warning requirements rather than the enforcement of pre-existing general prohibitions against deceptive practices that prompted congressional action in and n. 11. 14 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court represents “a fair understanding of congressional pur pose.” –530, n. 27 (plurality opinion). Petitioners also contend that the plurality opinion is inconsistent with our decisions in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U. S. (2008). Both cases, however, are inap posite—the first because it involved a pre-emption provi sion much broader than the Labeling Act’s, and the second because it involved precisely the type of state rule that Congress had intended to pre-empt. At issue in Wolens was the pre-emptive effect of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U.S. C. App. (1988 ed.), which prohibits States from enacting or enforcing any law “relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.” The plaintiffs in that case sought to bring a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 815, Our conclusion that the state-law claim was pre-empted turned on the unusual breadth of the ADA’s pre-emption provision. We had previously held that the meaning of the key phrase in the ADA’s pre emption provision, “ ‘relating to rates, routes, or services,’ ” is a broad one. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383–384 (emphasis added). Relying on precedents construing the pre-emptive effect of the same phrase in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S. C. we concluded that the phrase “relating to” indicates Congress’ intent to pre-empt a large area of state law to further its purpose of deregulating the airline –384.12 Unquestionably, —————— 12 Petitioners also point to Morales as evidence that our decision in was wrong. But Morales predated and it is in any event even more easily distinguishable from this case than American Airlines, 513 U. S 219 At issue in Morales were guidelines regarding the form and substance of airline fare advertising Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | of airline fare advertising Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 15 Opinion of the Court the phrase “relating to” has a broader scope than the Labeling Act’s reference to rules “based on” smoking and health; whereas “relating to” is synonymous with “having a connection with,” “based on” describes a more direct relationship, see Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. (slip op., at 13) (“In common talk, the phrase ‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal relation ship and thus a necessary logical condition”). Petitioners’ reliance on Riegel is similarly misplaced. The plaintiffs in Riegel sought to bring common-law de sign, manufacturing, and labeling defect claims against the manufacturer of a faulty catheter. The case presented the question whether those claims were expressly pre empted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S. C. et seq. The MDA’s pre-emption clause provides that no State “ ‘may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device any requirement’ relating to safety or effectiveness that is different from, or in addition to, federal requirements.” Riegel, 552 U. S., at (slip op., at 14) (quoting 21 U.S. C. emphasis deleted). The catheter at issue in Riegel had received premarket approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). We concluded that premarket approval imposes “require ment[s] relating to safety [and] effectiveness” because the FDA requires a device that has received premarket ap proval to be made with almost no design, manufacturing, or labeling deviations from the specifications in its ap proved application. The plaintiffs’ products liability —————— implemented by the National Association of Attorneys General to give content to state deceptive practices Like the regulations at issue in the guidelines were industry-specific directives that targeted the subject matter made off-limits by the ADA’s express pre-emption provisions. See also Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Assn., 552 U. S. (2008) (holding that targeted ground carrier regulations were pre-empted by a statute modeled on the ADA). 16 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court claims fell within the core of the MDA’s pre-emption pro vision because they sought to impose different require ments on precisely those aspects of the device that the FDA had approved. Unlike the plaintiff’s fraud claim, which fell outside of the Labeling Act’s pre-emptive reach because it did not seek to impose a prohibition “based on smoking and health,” the Riegel plaintiffs’ com mon-law products liability claims unquestionably sought to enforce “requirement[s] relating to safety or effective ness” under the MDA. That the “relating to” language of the MDA’s pre-emption provision is, like the ADA’s, |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | language of the MDA’s pre-emption provision is, like the ADA’s, much broader than the operative language of the Labeling Act provides an additional basis for distinguishing Riegel. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, Riegel is entirely consistent with our holding in In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipol lone, that “the phrase ‘based on smoking and health’ fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.” 505 U.S., at 529. IV As an alternative to their express pre-emption argu ment, petitioners contend that respondents’ claim is impli edly pre-empted because, if allowed to proceed, it would present an obstacle to a longstanding policy of the FTC. According to petitioners, the FTC has for decades pro moted the development and consumption of low tar ciga rettes and has encouraged consumers to rely on represen tations of tar and nicotine content based on Cambridge Filter Method testing in choosing among cigarette brands. Even if such a regulatory policy could provide a basis for obstacle pre-emption, petitioners’ description of the FTC’s actions in this regard are inaccurate. The Government itself disavows any policy authorizing the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors. Brief for United States as Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 17 Opinion of the Court Amicus Curiae 16–33. In 1966, following the publication of the Surgeon Gen eral’s report on smoking and health, the FTC issued an industry guidance stating its view that “a factual state ment of the tar and nicotine content (expressed in milli grams) of the mainstream smoke from a cigarette,” as measured by Cambridge Filter Method testing, would not violate the FTC Act. App. 478a. The Commission made clear, however, that the guidance applied only to factual assertions of tar and nicotine yields and did not invite “collateral representations made, expressly or by im plication, as to reduction or elimination of health haz ards.” at 479a. A year later, the FTC reiterated its position in a letter to the National Association of Broad casters. The letter explained that, as a “general rule,” the Commission would not challenge statements of tar and nicotine content when “they are shown to be accurate and fully substantiated by tests conducted in accordance with the [Cambridge Filter Method].” 8a. In 1970, the FTC considered providing further guidance, proposing a rule that would have required manufacturers to disclose tar and nicotine yields as measured by Cambridge Filter Method testing. The leading ciga rette manufacturers responded by submitting a voluntary agreement under which they would disclose tar and nico tine content in their |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | they would disclose tar and nico tine content in their advertising, App. 899a–900a, and the FTC suspended its rulemaking, (1971). Based on these events, petitioners assert that “the FTC has required tobacco companies to disclose tar and nico tine yields in cigarette advertising using a government mandated testing methodology and has authorized them to use descriptors as shorthand references to those nu merical test results.” Brief for Petitioners 2 (emphasis in original). As the foregoing history shows, however, the FTC has in fact never required that cigarette manufactur ers disclose tar and nicotine yields, nor has it condoned 18 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court representations of those yields through the use of “light” or “low tar” descriptors. Subsequent Commission actions further undermine petitioners’ claim. After the tobacco companies agreed to report tar and nicotine yields as measured by the Cam bridge Filter Method, the FTC continued to police ciga rette companies’ misleading use of test results. In 1983, the FTC responded to findings that tar and nicotine yields for Barclay cigarettes obtained through Cambridge Filter Method testing were deceptive because the cigarettes in fact delivered disproportionately more tar to smokers than other cigarettes with similar Cambridge Filter Method ratings. And in 1995, the FTC found that a manufacturer’s representation “that consumers will get less tar by smoking ten packs of Carlton brand ciga rettes than by smoking a single pack of the other brands” was deceptive even though it was based on the results of Cambridge Filter Method testing. In re American Tobacco Co., 119 F. T. C. 3, 4. The FTC’s conclusion was based on its recognition that, “[i]n truth and in fact, consumers will not necessarily get less tar” due to “such behavior as compensatory smoking.” 13 —————— 13 In a different action, the FTC charged a cigarette manufacturer with violating the FTC Act by misleadingly advertising certain brands as “low in tar” even though they had a higher-than-average tar rating. See In re American Brands, Inc., 79 F. T. C. 255 (1971). The Commis sion and the manufacturer entered a consent order that prevented the manufacturer from making any such representations unless they were accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the cigarettes’ tar and nicotine content as measured by the Cambridge Filter Method. at 258. Petitioners offer this consent order as evidence that the FTC authorized the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors as long as they accurately describe Cambridge Filter Method test results. As the Government observes, however, the decree only enjoined conduct. Brief for United States as Amicus |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | decree only enjoined conduct. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26. And a consent order is in any event only binding on the parties to the agreement. For all of these reasons, the consent order does not support the conclusion that respon dents’ claim is impliedly pre-empted. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 19 Opinion of the Court This history shows that, contrary to petitioners’ sugges tion, the FTC has no longstanding policy authorizing collateral representations based on Cambridge Filter Method test results. Rather, the FTC has endeavored to inform consumers of the comparative tar and nicotine content of different cigarette brands and has in some instances prevented misleading representations of Cam bridge Filter Method test results. The FTC’s failure to require petitioners to correct their allegedly misleading use of “light” descriptors is not evidence to the contrary; agency nonenforcement of a federal statute is not the same as a policy of approval. Cf. (holding that the Coast Guard’s deci sion not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly pre empt petitioner’s tort claims).14 More telling are the FTC’s recent statements regarding the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors. In 1997, the Commission observed that “[t]here are no official defini tions for” the terms “light” and “low tar,” and it sought comments on whether “there [is] a need for official guid ance with respect to the terms” and whether “the descrip tors convey implied health claims.” In November 2008, following public notice and comment, the Commission rescinded its 1966 guidance concerning the Cambridge Filter Method. The rescission is a response to “a consensus among the public health and scientific communities that the Cambridge Filter method is sufficiently flawed that statements of tar and nicotine yields as measured by that method are not likely to help consumers make informed decisions.” at 74503. The Commission’s notice of its proposal to rescind —————— 14 It seems particularly inappropriate to read a policy of authorization into the FTC’s inaction when that inaction is in part the result of petitioners’ failure to disclose study results showing that Cambridge Filter Method test results do not reflect the amount of tar and nicotine that consumers of “light” cigarettes actually inhale. See at 8–11. 20 ALTRIA GROUP, INC. v. GOOD Opinion of the Court the guidance also reiterated the original limits of that guidance, noting that it “only addresse[d] simple factual statements of tar and nicotine yields. It d[id] not apply to other conduct or express or implied representations, even if they concern[ed] tar and nicotine yields.” In short, neither the handful of industry guidances and |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | majority | Altria Group, Inc. v. Good | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145925/altria-group-inc-v-good/ | yields.” In short, neither the handful of industry guidances and consent orders on which petitioners rely nor the FTC’s inaction with regard to “light” descriptors even arguably justifies the pre-emption of state deceptive practices rules like the MUTPA. V We conclude, as we did in that the Labeling Act does not pre-empt state-law claims like respondents’ that are predicated on the duty not to deceive. We also hold that the FTC’s various decisions with respect to statements of tar and nicotine content do not impliedly pre-empt respondents’ claim. Respondents still must prove that petitioners’ use of “light” and “lowered tar” descriptors in fact violated the state deceptive practices statute, but neither the Labeling Act’s pre-emption provi sion nor the FTC’s actions in this field prevent a jury from considering that claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 555 U. S. (2008) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 07–562 ALTRIA GROUP, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. STEPHANIE GOOD ET AL. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | Respondent Richard Russell was charged in three counts of a five-count indictment returned against him and codefendants John and Patrick Connolly.[1] After a jury trial in the District Court, in which his sole defense was entrapment, respondent was convicted on all three counts of having unlawfully manufactured and processed methamphetamine ("speed") and of having unlawfully sold and delivered that drug in violation of 21 U.S. C. 331 (q) (1), (2), 360a (a), (b) (1964 ed., Supp. V). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of two years in prison for each offense, the terms to be suspended on the condition that he spend six months in prison and be placed on probation for the following three years. On appeal, the United Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the conviction solely for the reason that an undercover agent supplied an essential chemical for manufacturing the methamphetamine which formed the basis of respondent's conviction. The court concluded that as a matter of law "a defense to a criminal charge may be founded upon an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." We granted *425 certiorari, and now reverse that judgment. There is little dispute concerning the essential facts in this case. On December 7, 1969, Joe Shapiro, an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, went to respondent's home on Whidbey Island in the State of Washington where he met with respondent and his two codefendants, John and Patrick Connolly. Shapiro's assignment was to locate a laboratory where it was believed that methamphetamine was being manufactured illicitly. He told the respondent and the Connollys that he represented an organization in the Pacific Northwest that was interested in controlling the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine. He then made an offer to supply the defendants with the chemical phenyl-2-propanone, an essential ingredient in the manufacture of methamphetamine, in return for one-half of the drug produced. This offer was made on the condition that Agent Shapiro be shown a sample of the drug which they were making and the laboratory where it was being produced. During the conversation, Patrick Connolly revealed that he had been making the drug since May 1969 and since then had produced three pounds of it.[2] John Connolly gave the agent a bag containing a quantity of methamphetamine that he represented as being from "the last batch that we made." Shortly thereafter, Shapiro and Patrick Connolly left respondent's house to view the laboratory which was located in the Connolly house on Whidbey Island. At the house, Shapiro observed an empty bottle |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | Whidbey Island. At the house, Shapiro observed an empty bottle bearing the chemical label phenyl-2-propanone. *426 By prearrangement, Shapiro returned to the Connolly house on December 9, 1969, to supply 100 grams of propanone and observe the manufacturing process. When he arrived he observed Patrick Connolly and the respondent cutting up pieces of aluminum foil and placing them in a large flask. There was testimony that some of the foil pieces accidentally fell on the floor and were picked up by the respondent and Shapiro and put into the flask.[3] Thereafter, Patrick Connolly added all of the necessary chemicals, including the propanone brought by Shapiro, to make two batches of methamphetamine. The manufacturing process having been completed the following morning, Shapiro was given one-half of the drug and respondent kept the remainder. Shapiro offered to buy, and the respondent agreed to sell, part of the remainder for $60. About a month later, Shapiro returned to the Connolly house and met with Patrick Connolly to ask if he was still interested in their "business arrangement." Connolly replied that he was interested but that he had recently obtained two additional bottles of phenyl-2-propanone and would not be finished with them for a couple of days. He provided some additional metham-phetamine to Shapiro at that time. Three days later Shapiro returned to the Connolly house with a search warrant and, among other items, seized an empty 500-gram bottle of propanone and a 100-gram bottle, not the one he had provided, that was partially filled with the chemical. There was testimony at the trial of respondent and Patrick Connolly that phenyl-2-propanone was generally difficult to obtain. At the request of the Bureau of *427 Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, some chemical supply firms had voluntarily ceased selling the chemical. At the close of the evidence, and after receiving the District Judge's standard entrapment instruction,[4] the jury found the respondent guilty on all counts charged. On appeal, the respondent conceded that the jury could have found him predisposed to commit the but argued that on the facts presented there was entrapment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals agreed, although it did not find the District Court had misconstrued or misapplied the traditional standards governing the entrapment defense. Rather, the court in effect expanded the traditional notion of entrapment, which focuses on the predisposition of the defendant, to mandate dismissal of a criminal prosecution whenever the court determines that there has been "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." In this case the court decided that the conduct of the agent |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | case the court decided that the conduct of the agent in supplying a scarce ingredient essential for the manufacture of a controlled substance established that defense. This new defense was held to rest on either of two alternative theories. One theory is based on two lower court decisions which have found entrapment, regardless of predisposition, whenever the government supplies contraband to the defendants. United ; United The second theory, a nonentrapment rationale, is based on a recent Ninth Circuit decision that reversed a conviction because a government investigator was so enmeshed in the criminal activity that the prosecution of the defendants was held to be repugnant to the American criminal justice system. The court below held that these two rationales constitute the same defense, and that only the label distinguishes them. In any event, it held that "[b]oth theories are premised on fundamental concepts of due process and evince the reluctance of the judiciary to countenance `overzealous law enforcement.'" quoting This Court first recognized and applied the entrapment defense in[5] In Sorrells, a federal prohibition agent visited the defendant while posing as a tourist and engaged him in conversation about their common war experiences. After gaining the defendant's confidence, the agent asked for some liquor, was twice refused, but upon asking a third time the defendant finally capitulated, and was subsequently prosecuted for violating the National Prohibition Act. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, held that as a matter of statutory construction the defense of entrapment should have been available to the defendant. Under the theory propounded by the Chief Justice, the entrapment defense prohibits law enforcement officers from instigating a criminal act by persons "otherwise innocent *429 in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them." Thus, the thrust of the entrapment defense was held to focus on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime. "[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue." Mr. Justice Roberts concurred but was of the view "that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents."[6] The difference in the view of the majority and the concurring opinions is that in the former the inquiry focuses on the predisposition of the defendant, whereas in the latter the inquiry focuses on whether the government "instigated the crime." In 1958 the Court again considered the theory underlying the entrapment defense and expressly reaffirmed the view expressed by the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | entrapment defense and expressly reaffirmed the view expressed by the Sorrells majority. In Sherman the defendant was convicted of selling narcotics to a Government informer. As in Sorrells, it appears that the Government agent gained the confidence of the defendant and, despite initial reluctance, the defendant finally acceded to the repeated importunings of the agent to commit the criminal act. On the basis of Sorrells, this Court reversed the affirmance of the defendant's conviction. In affirming the theory underlying Sorrells, Mr. Chief Justice Warren for the Court, held that "[t]o determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in an opinion concurring *430 in the result that he believed Mr. Justice Roberts had the better view in Sorrells and would have framed the question to be asked in an entrapment defense in terms of "whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards for the proper use of governmental power."[7] In the instant case, respondent asks us to reconsider the theory of the entrapment defense as it is set forth in the majority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman. His principal contention is that the defense should rest on constitutional grounds. He argues that the level of Shapiro's involvement in the manufacture of the methamphetamine was so high that a criminal prosecution for the drug's manufacture violates the fundamental principles of due process. The respondent contends that the same factors that led this Court to apply the exclusionary rule to illegal searches and seizures, Weeks v. United ; and confessions, should be considered here. But he would have the Court go further in deterring undesirable official conduct by requiring that any prosecution be barred absolutely because of the police involvement in criminal activity. The analogy is imperfect in any event, for the principal reason behind the adoption of the exclusionary rule was the Government's "failure to observe its own laws." Unlike the situations giving rise to the holdings in Mapp and Miranda, the Government's conduct here violated no independent constitutional right of the respondent. Nor did Shapiro violate any federal statute or rule or commit any crime in infiltrating the respondent's drug enterprise. *431 Respondent would overcome this basic weakness in his analogy to the exclusionary rule cases by having the Court adopt a rigid constitutional rule that would preclude any prosecution when it is shown that the criminal conduct would not have been possible had not an undercover agent "supplied an indispensable means to the commission |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | an undercover agent "supplied an indispensable means to the commission of the crime that could not have been obtained otherwise, through legal or illegal channels." Even if we were to surmount the difficulties attending the notion that due process of law can be embodied in fixed rules, and those attending respondent's particular formulation, the rule he proposes would not appear to be of significant benefit to him. For, on the record presented, it appears that he cannot fit within the terms of the very rule he proposes.[8] The record discloses that although the propanone was difficult to obtain, it was by no means impossible. The defendants admitted making the drug both before and after those batches made with the propanone supplied by Shapiro. Shapiro testified that he saw an empty bottle labeled phenyl-2-propanone on his first visit to the laboratory on December 7, 1969. And when the laboratory was searched pursuant to a search warrant on January 10, two additional bottles labeled phenyl-2-propanone were seized. Thus, the facts in the record amply demonstrate that the propanone used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine not only could have been obtained without the intervention of Shapiro but was in fact obtained by these defendants. While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to *432 obtain a conviction, cf. the instant case is distinctly not of that breed. Shapiro's contribution of propanone to the criminal enterprise already in process was scarcely objectionable. The chemical is by itself a harmless substance and its possession is legal. While the Government may have been seeking to make it more difficult for drug rings, such as that of which respondent was a member, to obtain the chemical, the evidence described above shows that it nonetheless was obtainable. The law enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice," mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Kinsella v. United ex rel. Singleton, The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a continuing, though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for illegally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all but impossible task. Thus in drug-related law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices. Such infiltration |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | a limited participation in their unlawful present practices. Such infiltration is a recognized and permissible means of investigation; if that be so, then the supply of some item of value that the drug ring requires must, as a general rule, also be permissible. For an agent will not be taken into the confidence of the illegal entrepreneurs unless he has something of value to offer them. Law enforcement tactics such as this can hardly be said to violate "fundamental fairness" or "shocking to the universal sense of justice," Kinsella, Respondent also urges, as an alternative to his constitutional argument, that we broaden the nonconstitutional *433 defense of entrapment in order to sustain the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This Court's opinions in and held that the principal element in the defense of entrapment was the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Respondent conceded in the Court of Appeals, as well he might, "that he may have harbored a predisposition to commit the charged" Yet he argues that the jury's refusal to find entrapment under the charge submitted to it by the trial court should be overturned and the views of Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, in Sorrells and Sherman, respectively, which make the essential element of the defense turn on the type and degree of governmental conduct, be adopted as the law. We decline to overrule these cases. Sorrells is a precedent of long standing that has already been once reexamined in Sherman and implicitly there reaffirmed. Since the defense is not of a constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question and adopt any substantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable.[9] Critics of the rule laid down in Sorrells and Sherman have suggested that its basis in the implied intent of Congress is largely fictitious, and have pointed to what they conceive to be the anomalous difference between the treatment of a defendant who is solicited by a private individual and one who is entrapped by a government agent. Questions have been likewise raised as to whether "predisposition" can be factually established with the requisite degree of certainty. Arguments such as these, while not devoid of appeal, have been twice *434 previously made to this Court, and twice rejected by it, first in Sorrells and then in Sherman. We believe that at least equally cogent criticism has been made of the concurring views in these cases. Commenting in Sherman on Mr. Justice Roberts' position in Sorrells that "although the defendant could claim that the Government had induced him to commit the crime, the Government could |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | had induced him to commit the crime, the Government could not reply by showing that the defendant's criminal conduct was due to his own readiness and not to the persuasion of government agents," -377, Mr. Chief Justice Warren quoted the observation of Judge Learned Hand in an earlier stage of that proceeding: " `Indeed, it would seem probable that, if there were no reply [to the claim of inducement], it would be impossible ever to secure convictions of any offences which consist of transactions that are carried on in secret.' United v. Sherman," n. 7. Nor does it seem particularly desirable for the law to grant complete immunity from prosecution to one who himself planned to commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because government undercover agents subjected him to inducements which might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not so predisposed. We are content to leave the matter where it was left by the Court in Sherman: "The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer. However, `A different question is presented when the criminal design originates *435 with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.'" quoting Several decisions of the United district courts and courts of appeals have undoubtedly gone beyond this Court's opinions in Sorrells and Sherman in order to bar prosecutions because of what they thought to be, for want of a better term, "overzealous law enforcement." But the defense of entrapment enunciated in those opinions was not intended to give the federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve. The execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive Branch of the Government, subject to applicable constitutional and statutory limitations and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce those limitations. We think that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case quite unnecessarily introduces an unmanageably subjective standard which is contrary to the holdings of this Court in Sorrells and Sherman. Those cases establish that entrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law enforcement," but instead in the notion |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,973 | 19 | majority | United States v. Russell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108768/united-states-v-russell/ | have been "overzealous law enforcement," but instead in the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the Government. Sorrells and Sherman both recognize "that the fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution," ; 356 U. S., Nor will the mere fact of *436 deceit defeat a prosecution, see, e. g., Lewis v. United for there are circumstances when the use of deceit is the only practicable law enforcement technique available. It is only when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play. Respondent's concession in the Court of Appeals that the jury finding as to predisposition was supported by the evidence is, therefore, fatal to his claim of entrapment. He was an active participant in an illegal drug manufacturing enterprise which began before the Government agent appeared on the scene, and continued after the Government agent had left the scene. He was, in the words of Sherman, not an "unwary innocent" but an "unwary criminal." The Court of Appeals was wrong, we believe, when it sought to broaden the principle laid down in Sorrells and Sherman. Its judgment is therefore. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | concurring | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | While I join Justice SCALIA's cogent resolution of the constitutional issues raised by this case, I think it appropriate to emphasize the distinction between constitutionality and wise policy. Our holding with respect to the former should not be misread as endorsement of the electoral system under review, or disagreement with the findings of the District Court that describe glaring deficiencies in that system and even lend support to the broader proposition that the very practice of electing judges is unwise. But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: "The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws." Justice KENNEDY, with whom Justice BREYER joins as to Part II, concurring in the judgment. The Court's analysis, in my view, is correct in important respects; but my own understanding of the controlling principles counsels concurrence in the judgment and the expression of these additional observations. I When a state-mandated primary is used to select delegates to conventions or nominees for office, the State is bound not to design its ballot or election processes in ways that impose severe burdens on First Amendment rights of expression and political participation. See ; see also California Democratic ; cf. ; ; Respondents' objection to New York's scheme of nomination by convention is that it is difficult for those who lack party connections or party backing to be chosen as a delegate or to become a nominee for office. Were the state-mandated-and-designed nominating convention the sole means to attain access to the general election ballot there would be considerable force, in my view, to respondents' contention that the First Amendment prohibits the State from requiring a delegate selection mechanism with the rigidities and difficulties attendant upon this one. The system then would be subject to scrutiny from the standpoint of a "reasonably diligent independent candidate," The Second Circuit took this approach. As the Court is careful to note, however, New York has a second mechanism for placement on the final election ballot. Ante, at 797. One who seeks to be a Justice of the New York Supreme Court may qualify by a petition process. The petition must be signed by the lesser of (1) 5 percent of the number of votes last cast for Governor in the judicial district or (2) either 3,500 or 4,000 voters (depending on the district). This requirement has not been shown to be an unreasonable one, a point respondents appear to concede. True, the candidate who gains ballot access by petition does not have a party designation; but the candidate is still considered by |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | concurring | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | a party designation; but the candidate is still considered by the voters. The petition alternative changes the analysis. Cf. This is not to say an alternative route to the general election exempts the delegate primary/nominating convention from all scrutiny. For instance, the Court in Bullock, after determining that Texas' primary election filing fees were so "patently exclusionary" on the basis of wealth as to invoke strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, rejected the argument that candidate access to the general election without a fee saved the statute. -, 146-147, ("[W]e can hardly accept as reasonable an alternative that requires candidates and voters to abandon their party affiliations in order to avoid the burdens of the filing fees"). But there is a dynamic relationship between, in this case, the convention system and the petition process; higher burdens at one stage are mitigated by lower burdens at the other. See (2) ("The liberality of a State's ballot access laws is one determinant of the extent of the burden imposed by the write-in ban; it is not, though, an automatic excuse for forbidding all write-in voting"); Persily, Candidates v. Parties: Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, And, though the point does not apply here, there are certain injuries (as in Bullock) that are so severe they are unconstitutional no matter how minor the burdens at the other stage. As the Court recognized in Kusper, moreover, there is an individual *803 right to associate with the political party of one's choice and to have a voice in the selection of that party's candidate for public office. See On the particular facts and circumstances of this case, then, I reach the same conclusion the Court does. II It is understandable that the Court refrains from commenting upon the use of elections to select the judges of the State's courts of general jurisdiction, for New York has the authority to make that decision. This closing observation, however, seems to be in order. When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for competition among interest groups and political parties, the persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial excellence. The rule of law, which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional attainments, and the absolute probity of its judges. And it may seem difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections. Still, though the Framers did not provide for elections of federal judges, most States |
Justice Stevens | 2,008 | 16 | concurring | New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145835/new-york-state-bd-of-elections-v-lopez-torres/ | did not provide for elections of federal judges, most States have made the opposite choice, at least to some extent. In light of this longstanding practice and tradition in the States, the appropriate practical response is not to reject judicial elections outright but to find ways to use elections to select judges with the highest qualifications. A judicial election system presents the opportunity, indeed the civic obligation, for voters and the community as a whole to become engaged in the legal process. Judicial elections, if fair and open, could be an essential forum for society to discuss and define the attributes of judicial excellence and to find ways to discern those qualities in the candidates. The organized bar, the legal academy, public advocacy groups, a principled press, and all the other components of functioning democracy must engage in this process. Even in flawed election systems there emerge brave and honorable judges who exemplify the law's ideals. But it is unfair to them and to the concept of judicial independence if the State is indifferent to a selection process open to manipulation, criticism, and serious abuse. Rule of law is secured only by the principled exercise of political will. If New York statutes for nominating and electing judges do not produce both the perception and the reality of a system committed to the highest ideals of the law, they ought to be changed and to be changed now. But, as the Court today holds, and for further reasons given in this separate opinion, the present suit does not permit us to invoke the Constitution in order to intervene. III With these observations, I concur in the judgment of the Court |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | This case poses the question whether a State's use of highway sobriety checkpoints violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not and therefore reverse the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals of Michigan. Petitioners, the Michigan Department of State Police and its director, established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program in early 1986. The director appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee comprising representatives of the State Police force, local police forces, state prosecutors, and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. Pursuant to its charge, the advisory committee created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. Under the guidelines, checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. In cases where a checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a location out of the traffic flow where an officer would check the motorist's driver's license and car registration and, if warranted, conduct further sobriety tests. Should the field tests and the officer's observations suggest that the driver was intoxicated, an arrest would be made. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately. *448 The first and to date the only sobriety checkpoint operated under the program was conducted in Saginaw County with the assistance of the Saginaw County Sheriff's Department. During the 75-minute duration of the checkpoint's operation, 126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint. The average delay for each vehicle was approximately 25 seconds. Two drivers were detained for field sobriety testing, and one of the two was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver who drove through without stopping was pulled over by an officer in an observation vehicle and arrested for driving under the influence. On the day before the operation of the Saginaw County checkpoint, respondents filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wayne County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints. Each of the respondents "is a licensed driver in the State of Michigan. who regularly travels throughout the State in his automobile." See Complaint, App. 3a-4a. During pretrial proceedings, petitioners agreed to delay further implementation of the checkpoint program pending the outcome of this litigation. After the trial, at which the court heard extensive testimony concerning, inter alia, the "effectiveness" of highway sobriety checkpoint programs, the court ruled that the Michigan program violated the Fourth Amendment and Art. 1, 11, of the Michigan |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | the Fourth Amendment and Art. 1, 11, of the Michigan Constitution. App. to Pet. for Cert. 132a. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that the program violated the Fourth Amendment and, for that reason, did not consider whether the program violated the Michigan Constitution. After the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioners' application for leave to appeal, we granted certiorari. To decide this case the trial court performed a balancing test derived from our opinion in As described by the Court of Appeals, the test involved *449 "balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints." 429 N. W. 2d, at 182 (citing ). The Court of Appeals agreed that "the three-prong balancing test was the correct test to be used to determine the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint plan." As characterized by the Court of Appeals, the trial court's findings with respect to the balancing factors were that the State has "a grave and legitimate" interest in curbing drunken driving; that sobriety checkpoint programs are generally "ineffective" and, therefore, do not significantly further that interest; and that the checkpoints' "subjective intrusion" on individual liberties is substantial. 184. According to the court, the record disclosed no basis for disturbing the trial court's findings, which were made within the context of an analytical framework prescribed by this Court for determining the constitutionality of seizures less intrusive than traditional arrests. at 429 N.W.2d, at In this Court respondents seek to defend the judgment in their favor by insisting that the balancing test derived from was not the proper method of analysis. Respondents maintain that the analysis must proceed from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and rely for support on language from our decision last Term in Treasury We said in Von Raab: "[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant *450 or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." Respondents argue that there must be a showing of some special governmental need "beyond the normal need" for criminal law enforcement before a balancing analysis is appropriate, and that petitioners have demonstrated no such special need. But it is perfectly plain from a reading of Von Raab, which cited and discussed with approval our earlier decision in United that it |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | discussed with approval our earlier decision in United that it was in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways. which utilized a balancing analysis in approving highway checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens, and are the relevant authorities here. Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11; see ; The question thus becomes whether such seizures are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. It is important to recognize what our inquiry is not about. No allegations are before us of unreasonable treatment of any person after an actual detention at a particular checkpoint. See As pursued in the lower courts, the instant action challenges only the use of sobriety checkpoints generally. We address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation *451 by checkpoint officers. Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard. No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion. The anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical. "Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000[[*]] and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage." 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 10.8(d), p. 71 (2d ed. 1987). For decades, this Court has "repeatedly lamented the tragedy." South ; see Conversely, the weight bearing on the other scale the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints is slight. We reached a similar conclusion as to the intrusion on motorists subjected to a brief stop at a highway checkpoint for detecting illegal aliens. See at We see virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists *452 from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types of checkpoints, which to the average motorist would seem identical save for the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus, accurately gauged the "objective" intrusion, measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation, as minimal. See 429 N. W. 2d, at 184. With respect to what it perceived to be the "subjective" intrusion on motorists, however, the Court of Appeals |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | the "subjective" intrusion on motorists, however, the Court of Appeals found such intrusion substantial. See The court first affirmed the trial court's finding that the guidelines governing checkpoint operation minimize the discretion of the officers on the scene. But the court also agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the checkpoints have the potential to generate fear and surprise in motorists. This was so because the record failed to demonstrate that approaching motorists would be aware of their option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the checkpoints. On that basis, the court deemed the subjective intrusion from the checkpoints unreasonable. -. We believe the Michigan courts misread our cases concerning the degree of "subjective intrusion" and the potential for generating fear and surprise. The "fear and surprise" to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop. This was made clear in Comparing checkpoint stops to roving patrol stops considered in prior cases, we said: "[W]e view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In [United States v.] Ortiz, [] we noted: *453 " `[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the -895.' " 428 U. S., at See also id, at 559. Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle. The intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in The Court of Appeals went on to consider as part of the balancing analysis the "effectiveness" of the proposed checkpoint program. Based on extensive testimony in the trial record, the court concluded that the checkpoint program failed the "effectiveness" part of the test, and that this failure materially discounted petitioners' strong interest in implementing the program. We think the Court of Appeals was wrong on this point as well. The actual language from upon which the Michigan courts based |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | The actual language from upon which the Michigan courts based their evaluation of "effectiveness," describes the balancing factor as "the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest." This passage from was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger. Experts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers is preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives *454 remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. 's rather general reference to "the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest" was derived, as the opinion makes clear, from the line of cases culminating in Neither nor U.S. 648 however, the two cases cited by the Court of Appeals as providing the basis for its "effectiveness" review, see 429 N. W. 2d, at 183, supports the searching examination of "effectiveness" undertaken by the Michigan court. In we disapproved random stops made by Delaware Highway Patrol officers in an effort to apprehend unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles. We observed that no empirical evidence indicated that such stops would be an effective means of promoting roadway safety and said that "[i]t seems common sense that the percentage of all drivers on the road who are driving without a license is very small and that the number of licensed drivers who will be stopped in order to find one unlicensed operator will be large indeed." We observed that the random stops involved the "kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion [which] is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." We went on to state that our holding did not "cast doubt on the permissibility of roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." Unlike this case involves neither a complete absence of empirical data nor a challenge to random highway stops. During the operation of the Saginaw County checkpoint, the detention of the 126 vehicles that entered the checkpoint resulted in the arrest of two drunken drivers. *455 Stated as a percentage, approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. In |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | passing through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. In addition, an expert witness testified at the trial that experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists 429 N. W. 2d, at 183. By way of comparison, the record from one of the consolidated cases in showed that in the associated checkpoint, illegal aliens were found in only 0.12 percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint. See The ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped (considering that on occasion two or more illegal aliens were found in a single vehicle) was approximately 0.5 percent. See We concluded that this "record. provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint," and we sustained its constitutionality. We see no justification for a different conclusion here. In sum, the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program. We therefore hold that it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | While the products of the Sentencing Commission's labors have been given the modest name "Guidelines," see 28 U.S. C. 994(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV); United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual they have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive. A judge who disregards them will be reversed, 18 U.S. C. 3742 (1982 ed., Supp. IV). I dissent from today's decision because I can find no place within our constitutional system for an agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws. I There is no doubt that the Sentencing Commission has established significant, legally binding prescriptions governing application of governmental power against private individuals indeed, application of the ultimate governmental power, short of capital punishment.[1] Statutorily permissible sentences for particular crimes cover as broad a range as zero years to life, see, e. g., 18 U.S. C. 1201 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV) (kidnaping), and within those ranges the Commission was given broad discretion to prescribe the "correct" sentence, 28 U.S. C. 994(b)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Average prior sentences were to be a starting point for the Commission's inquiry, 994(m), but it could and regularly did deviate from those averages as it thought appropriate. It chose, for example, to prescribe substantial increases over average prior sentences for white-collar crimes such as public corruption, antitrust violations, and tax evasion. Guidelines, *41431, 2.133, 2.140. For antitrust violations, before the Guidelines, only 39% of those convicted served any imprisonment, and the average imprisonment was only days,133, whereas the Guidelines prescribe base sentences (for defendants with no prior criminal conviction) ranging from 2-to-8 months to 10-to-16 months, depending upon the volume of commerce involved. See131, 5.2. The Commission also determined when probation was permissible, imposing a strict system of controls because of its judgment that probation had been used for an "inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes."8. Moreover, the Commission had free rein in determining whether statutorily authorized fines should be imposed in addition to imprisonment, and if so, in what amounts. It ultimately decided that every nonindigent offender should pay a fine according to a schedule devised by the Commission.18. Congress also gave the Commission discretion to determine whether 7 specified characteristics of offenses, and 11 specified characteristics of offenders, "have any relevance," and should be included among the factors varying the sentence. 28 U.S. C. 994(c), (d) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Of the latter, it included only three among the factors required to be considered, and declared the remainder not ordinarily relevant. Guidelines,29-5.31. |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | be considered, and declared the remainder not ordinarily relevant. Guidelines,29-5.31. It should be apparent from the above that the decisions made by the Commission are far from technical, but are heavily laden (or ought to be) with value judgments and policy assessments. This fact is sharply reflected in the Commission's product, as described by the dissenting Commissioner: "Under the guidelines, the judge could give the same sentence for abusive sexual contact that puts the child in fear as for unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States. Similarly, the guidelines permit equivalent sentences for the following pairs of offenses: drug *415 trafficking and a violation of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act; arson with a destructive device and failure to surrender a cancelled naturalization certificate; operation of a common carrier under the influence of drugs that causes injury and alteration of one motor vehicle identification number; illegal trafficking in explosives and trespass; interference with a flight attendant and unlawful conduct relating to contraband cigarettes; aggravated assault and smuggling $11,000 worth of fish." Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission 6-7 (citations omitted). Petitioner's most fundamental and far-reaching challenge to the Commission is that Congress' commitment of such broad policy responsibility to any institution is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It is difficult to imagine a principle more essential to democratic government than that upon which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded: Except in a few areas constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing society are to be made by the Legislature. Our Members of Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all power to the President and adjourn sine die. But while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts. Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree. As Chief Justice Taft expressed the point for the Court in the landmark case of J. W. Hampton, Jr., & the limits of delegation "must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." Since Congress is no less endowed with common sense than we are, and better |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | less endowed with common sense than we are, and better equipped to inform itself of the "necessities" of government; and since the factors bearing upon those necessities are both multifarious and (in the nonpartisan sense) highly political including, for example, whether the Nation is at war, see or whether for other reasons "emergency is instinct in the situation," Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North it is small wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law. As the Court points out, we have invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation to invalidate a law only twice in our history, over half a century ago. See Panama Refining ; A. L. A. Schechter Poultry What legislated standard, one must wonder, can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a "public interest" standard? See, e. g., National Broadcasting ; New York Central Securities In short, I fully agree with the Court's rejection of petitioner's contention that the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority has been violated because of the lack of intelligible, congressionally prescribed standards to guide the Commission. II Precisely because the scope of delegation is largely uncontrollable by the courts, we must be particularly rigorous in *417 preserving the Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive delegation. The major one, it seems to me, is that the power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than Congress, except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power. The whole theory of lawful congressional "delegation" is not that Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to determine up to a point how small or how large that degree shall be. Thus, the courts could be given the power to say precisely what constitutes a "restraint of trade," see Standard Oil of New or to adopt rules of procedure, see or to prescribe by rule the manner in which their officers shall execute their judgments, because that "lawmaking" was ancillary to their exercise of judicial powers. And the Executive could be given the power to adopt policies and rules specifying in detail what radio and television |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | policies and rules specifying in detail what radio and television licenses will be in the "public interest, convenience or necessity," because that was ancillary to the exercise of its executive powers in granting and policing licenses and making a "fair and equitable allocation" of the electromagnetic spectrum. See Federal Radio[2] Or to take examples closer to the case before us: Trial judges could be given the power to determine *418 what factors justify a greater or lesser sentence within the statutorily prescribed limits because that was ancillary to their exercise of the judicial power of pronouncing sentence upon individual defendants. And the President, through the Parole Commission subject to his appointment and removal, could be given the power to issue Guidelines specifying when parole would be available, because that was ancillary to the President's exercise of the executive power to hold and release federal prisoners. See 18 U.S. C. 4203(a)(1) and (b); 28 CFR 2.20 As Justice Harlan wrote for the Court in : " `The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.' " quoting Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. " `Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.' " quoting In United 0 U.S. 506, which upheld a statutory grant of authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules and regulations governing use of the public forests he was charged with managing, the Court said: *419 "From the beginning of the Government various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power." (Emphasis added.) Or, finally, as Chief Justice Taft described it in Hampton & 276 U. S., at : "The field of Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action, and Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such officers |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing for penalizing a breach of such regulations." (Emphasis added.) The focus of controversy, in the long line of our so-called excessive delegation cases, has been whether the degree of generality contained in the authorization for exercise of executive or judicial powers in a particular field is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers. I say "so-called excessive delegation" because although that convenient terminology is often used, what is really at issue is whether there has been any delegation of legislative power, which occurs (rarely) when Congress authorizes the exercise of executive or judicial power without adequate standards. Strictly speaking, there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power. As John Locke put it almost 300 years ago, "[t]he power of the legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other, than what the positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative *420 can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands." J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government 87 (R. Cox ed. 1982) Or as we have less epigrammatically said: "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." In the present case, however, a pure delegation of legislative power is precisely what we have before us. It is irrelevant whether the standards are adequate, because they are not standards related to the exercise of executive or judicial powers; they are, plainly and simply, standards for further legislation. The lawmaking function of the Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the law. It is divorced from responsibility for execution of the law not only because the Commission is not said to be "located in the Executive Branch" (as I shall discuss presently, I doubt whether Congress can "locate" an entity within one Branch or another for constitutional purposes by merely saying so); but, more importantly, because the Commission neither exercises any executive power on its own, nor is subject to the control of the President who does. The only functions it performs, apart from prescribing the law, 28 U.S. C. 994(a) (1), (3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), conducting the investigations |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | 994(a) (1), (3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), conducting the investigations useful and necessary for prescribing the law, e. g., 995(a) (13), (15), (16), (21), and clarifying the intended application of the law that it prescribes, e. g., 994(a)(2), 995(a)(10), are data collection and intragovernmental advice giving and education, e. g., 995(a)(8), (9), (12), (17), (18), (20). These latter activities similar to functions performed by congressional agencies and even congressional staff neither determine nor affect private rights, and do not constitute an exercise of governmental power. See Humphrey's And the Commission's *421 lawmaking is completely divorced from the exercise of judicial powers since, not being a court, it has no judicial powers itself, nor is it subject to the control of any other body with judicial powers. The power to make law at issue here, in other words, is not ancillary but quite naked. The situation is no different in principle from what would exist if Congress gave the same power of writing sentencing laws to a congressional agency such as the General Accounting Office, or to members of its staff. The delegation of lawmaking authority to the Commission is, in short, unsupported by any legitimating theory to explain why it is not a delegation of legislative power. To disregard structural legitimacy is wrong in itself but since structure has purpose, the disregard also has adverse practical consequences. In this case, as suggested earlier, the consequence is to facilitate and encourage judicially uncontrollable delegation. Until our decision last Term in it could have been said that Congress could delegate lawmaking authority only at the expense of increasing the power of either the President or the courts. Most often, as a practical matter, it would be the President, since the judicial process is unable to conduct the investigations and make the political assessments essential for most policymaking. Thus, the need for delegation would have to be important enough to induce Congress to aggrandize its primary competitor for political power, and the recipient of the policymaking authority, while not Congress itself, would at least be politically accountable. But even after it has been accepted, pursuant to that those exercising executive power need not be subject to the control of the President, Congress would still be more reluctant to augment the power of even an independent executive agency than to create an otherwise powerless repository for its delegation. Moreover, assembling the full-time senior personnel for an agency exercising executive powers is more difficult than borrowing other officials (or employing new officers on a *4 short-term basis) to head an organization such |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | on a *4 short-term basis) to head an organization such as the Sentencing Commission. By reason of today's decision, I anticipate that Congress will find delegation of its lawmaking powers much more attractive in the future. If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or executive powers, I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.'s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, "no-win" political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that we set not because of the scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the three Branches of Government. The only governmental power the Commission possesses is the power to make law; and it is not the Congress. III The strange character of the body that the Court today approves, and its incompatibility with our constitutional institutions, is apparent from that portion of the Court's opinion entitled "Location of the Commission." This accepts at the outset that the Commission is a "body within the Judicial Branch," ante, at 385, and rests some of its analysis upon that asserted reality. Separation-of-powers problems are dismissed, however, on the ground that "[the Commission's] powers are not united with the powers of the Judiciary in a way that has meaning for separation-of-powers analysis," since the Commission "is not a court, does not exercise judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch," ante, at 393. In light of the latter concession, I am at a loss to understand why the Commission is "within the Judicial Branch" in any sense that has relevance to today's discussion. I am sure that Congress can *423 divide up the Government any way it wishes, and employ whatever terminology it desires, for nonconstitutional purposes for example, perhaps the statutory designation that the Commission is "within the Judicial Branch" places it outside the coverage of certain laws which say they are inapplicable to that Branch, such as the Freedom of Information Act, see 5 U.S. C. 552(f) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). For such statutory purposes, Congress can define the term as it pleases. But since our subject here is the Constitution, to admit that that congressional designation "has [no] meaning for separation-of-powers analysis" is to admit that the Court must therefore decide for itself |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | to admit that the Court must therefore decide for itself where the Commission is located for purposes of separation-of-powers analysis. It would seem logical to decide the question of which Branch an agency belongs to on the basis of who controls its actions: If Congress, the Legislative Branch; if the President, the Executive Branch; if the courts (or perhaps the judges), the Judicial Branch. See, e. g., In Humphrey's we approved the concept of an agency that was controlled by (and thus within) none of the Branches. We seem to have assumed, however, that that agency (the old Federal Trade Commission, before it acquired many of its current functions) exercised no governmental power whatever, but merely assisted Congress and the courts in the performance of their functions. See at Where no governmental power is at issue, there is no strict constitutional impediment to a "branchless" agency, since it is only "[a]ll legislative Powers," Art. I, 1, "[t]he executive Power," Art. II, 1, and "[t]he judicial Power," Art. III, 1, which the Constitution divides into three departments. (As an example of a "branchless" agency exercising no governmental powers, one can conceive of an Advisory Commission charged with reporting to all three Branches, whose members are removable only for cause and are thus subject to the control of none of the Branches.) Over the years, however, *424 Humphrey's Executor has come in general contemplation to stand for something quite different not an "independent agency" in the sense of an agency independent of all three Branches, but an "independent agency" in the sense of an agency within the Executive Branch (and thus authorized to exercise executive powers) independent of the control of the President. We approved that concept last Term in See -691. I dissented in that case, essentially because I thought that concept illogical and destructive of the structure of the Constitution. I must admit, however, that today's next step recognition of an independent agency in the Judicial Branch makes seem, by comparison, rigorously logical. "The Commission," we are told, "is an independent agency in every relevant sense." Ante, at 393. There are several problems with this. First, once it is acknowledged that an "independent agency" may be within any of the three Branches, and not merely within the Executive, then there really is no basis for determining what Branch such an agency belongs to, and thus what governmental powers it may constitutionally be given, except (what the Court today uses) Congress' say-so. More importantly, however, the concept of an "independent agency" simply does not translate into the legislative |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | an "independent agency" simply does not translate into the legislative or judicial spheres. Although the Constitution says that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America," Art. II, 1, it was never thought that the President would have to exercise that power personally. He may generally authorize others to exercise executive powers, with full effect of law, in his place. See, e. g., ; It is already a leap from the proposition that a person who is not the President may exercise executive powers to the proposition we accepted in that a person who is neither the President nor subject to the President's control may exercise executive powers. But with *425 respect to the exercise of judicial powers (the business of the Judicial Branch) the platform for such a leap does not even exist. For unlike executive power, judicial and legislative powers have never been thought delegable. A judge may not leave the decision to his law clerk, or to a master. See United ; cf. 1 U.S. 543 Senators and Members of the House may not send delegates to consider and vote upon bills in their place. See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule VIII(3); Standing Rules of the United States Senate, Rule XII. Thus, however well established may be the "independent agencies" of the Executive Branch, here we have an anomaly beyond equal: an independent agency exercising governmental power on behalf of a Branch where all governmental power is supposed to be exercised personally by the judges of courts.[3] Today's decision may aptly be described as the Humphrey's Executor of the Judicial Branch, and I think we will live to regret it. Henceforth there may be agencies "within the Judicial Branch" (whatever that means), exercising governmental powers, that are neither courts nor controlled by courts, nor even controlled by judges. If an "independent agency" such as this can be given the power to fix sentences previously exercised by district courts, I must assume that a similar agency can be given the powers to adopt rules of procedure *426 and rules of evidence previously exercised by this Court. The bases for distinction would be thin indeed. * * * Today's decision follows the regrettable tendency of our recent separation-of-powers jurisprudence, see to treat the Constitution as though it were no more than a generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches should not be commingled too much how much is too much to be determined, case-by-case, by this Court. The Constitution is not that. Rather, as its name suggests, it |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | dissenting | Mistretta v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112173/mistretta-v-united-states/ | Constitution is not that. Rather, as its name suggests, it is a prescribed structure, a framework, for the conduct of government. In designing that structure, the Framers themselves considered how much commingling was, in the generality of things, acceptable, and set forth their conclusions in the document. That is the meaning of the statements concerning acceptable commingling made by Madison in defense of the proposed Constitution, and now routinely used as an excuse for disregarding it. When he said, as the Court correctly quotes, that separation of powers " `d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,' " ante, at 380-381, quoting The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), his point was that the commingling specifically provided for in the structure that he and his colleagues had designed the Presidential veto over legislation, the Senate's confirmation of executive and judicial officers, the Senate's ratification of treaties, the Congress' power to impeach and remove executive and judicial officers did not violate a proper understanding of separation of powers. He would be aghast, I think, to hear those words used as justification for ignoring that carefully designed structure so long as, in the changing view of the Supreme Court from time to time, "too much commingling" does not occur. Consideration of the degree of commingling that a particular disposition produces may be appropriate at *427 the margins, where the outline of the framework itself is not clear; but it seems to me far from a marginal question whether our constitutional structure allows for a body which is not the Congress, and yet exercises no governmental powers except the making of rules that have the effect of laws. I think the Court errs, in other words, not so much because it mistakes the degree of commingling, but because it fails to recognize that this case is not about commingling, but about the creation of a new Branch altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress. It may well be that in some circumstances such a Branch would be desirable; perhaps the agency before us here will prove to be so. But there are many desirable dispositions that do not accord with the constitutional structure we live under. And in the long run the improvisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of currently perceived utility will be disastrous. I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision, and would reverse the judgment of the District Court. |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, provides that “[a]ny alien who is con- victed of an aggravated felony after admission” to the United States may be removed from the country by the Attorney General. U.S. C. One of the many crimes that constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA is “sexual abuse of a minor.” A conviction for sexual abuse of a minor is an aggravated felony regardless of whether it is for a “violation of Federal or State law.” The INA does not expressly define sexual abuse of a minor. We must decide whether a conviction under a state statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse be- tween a 21-year-old and a 17-year-old qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA. We hold that it does not. I Petitioner Juan Esquivel-Quintana is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he 2 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion of the Court pleaded no contest in the Superior Court of California to a statutory rape offense: “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator,” Cal. Penal Code Ann. (West 2014); see also (“Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a mi- nor”). For purposes of that offense, California defines “minor” as “a person under the age of 1 years.” The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against petitioner based on that conviction. An Immigration Judge concluded that the conviction qualified as “sexual abuse of a minor,” U.S. C. and ordered petitioner removed to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissed his appeal. “[F]or a statutory rape offense involving a 16- or 17-year-old victim” to qualify as “ ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ ” it reasoned, “the statute must require a meaningful age difference between the victim and the perpetrator.” In its view, the 3-year age difference required by Cal. Penal Code was meaningful. Accordingly, the Board concluded that petitioner’s crime of conviction was an aggravated felony, making him removable under the INA. A divided Court of Appeals denied Esquivel-Quintana’s petition for review, deferring to the Board’s interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (194). ; see also (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted certiorari, 50 U. S. and now reverse. II Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) makes aliens removable based on |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | now reverse. II Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) makes aliens removable based on the nature of their convictions, not based on their actual conduct. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U. S. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 3 Opinion of the Court (slip op., at 7). Accordingly, to determine whether an alien’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under that section, we “employ a categorical approach by looking to the statute of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime.” ; see, e.g., (applying the categori- cal approach set forth in v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), to the INA). Under that approach, we ask whether “ ‘the state statute defining the crime of convic- tion’ categorically fits within the ‘generic’ federal defini- tion of a corresponding aggravated felony.” v. Holder, (quoting Duenas- at ). In other words, we presume that the state conviction “rested upon the least of th[e] acts” criminalized by the statute, and then we determine whether that conduct would fall within the federal defini- tion of the crime. 137 ; see also (focusing “on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute”).1 Petitioner’s state conviction is thus an “aggravated felony” under the INA only if the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor. A Because Cal. Penal Code criminalizes “unlaw- ful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than —————— 1 Where a state statute contains several different crimes that are described separately, we employ what is known as the “modified categorical approach.” See Gonzales v. Duenas-, 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that approach, which is not at issue here, the court may review the charging docu- ments, jury instructions, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and similar sources to determine the actual crime of which the alien was convicted. See 4 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion of the Court three years younger than the perpetrator” and defines a minor as someone under age 1, the conduct criminalized under this provision would be, at a minimum, consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 1 and a perpetrator who just turned 21. Regardless of the actual facts of petitioner’s crime, we must presume that his conviction was based on acts that were no more criminal than that. If those acts do not constitute sexual abuse of a minor under the INA, then petitioner was not convicted of an aggravated felony and is not, on that basis, removable. Petitioner concedes that sexual abuse of a minor under the INA includes some statutory rape |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | of a minor under the INA includes some statutory rape offenses. But he argues that a statutory rape offense based solely on the partners’ ages (like the one here) is “ ‘abuse’ ” “only when the younger partner is under 16.” Reply Brief 2. Because the California statute criminalizes sexual intercourse when the victim is up to 17 years old, petitioner contends that it does not categorically qualify as sexual abuse of a minor. B We agree with petitioner that, in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16. Because the California statute at issue in this case does not categorically fall within that definition, a conviction pursuant to it is not an aggravated felony under We begin, as always, with the text. 1 Section 1101(a)(43)(A) does not expressly define sexual abuse of a minor, so we interpret that phrase using the normal tools of statutory interpretation. “Our analysis begins with the language of the statute.” v. Ash- Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 5 Opinion of the Court croft, ; see also Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006) (“The everyday understanding of ” the term used in “should count for a lot here, for the statutes in play do not define the term, and so remit us to regular usage to see what Congress probably meant”). Congress added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA in 1996, as part of a comprehensive immigration reform act. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi- bility Act of 1996, –627. At that time, the ordinary meaning of “sexual abuse” included “the engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a specified age or who is incapable of giving consent because of age or mental or physical incapacity.” Merriam- Webster’s Dictionary of Law 4 (1996). By providing that the abuse must be “of a minor,” the INA focuses on age, rather than mental or physical incapacity. Accordingly, to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor, the statute of convic- tion must prohibit certain sexual acts based at least in part on the age of the victim. Statutory rape laws are one example of this category of crimes. Those laws generally provide that an older person may not engage in sexual intercourse with a younger person under a specified age, known as the “age of con- sent.” See (defining “age of consent” as “the age at which a person is deemed |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | consent” as “the age at which a person is deemed competent by law to give consent esp. to sexual intercourse” and cross-referencing “statutory rape”). Many laws also require an age differen- tial between the two partners. Although the age of consent for statutory rape purposes varies by jurisdiction, see infra, at 9, reliable dictionaries provide evidence that the “generic” age—in 1996 and today—is 16. See B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 3 (2d ed. 1995) (“Age of consent, usu[ally] 16, denotes the age when one is legally capable of agreeing to sexual intercourse” and cross-referencing “statutory rape”); Black’s Law Dictionary 73 (10th ed. 2014) (noting 6 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion of the Court that the age of consent is “usu[ally] defined by statute as 16 years”). 2 Relying on a different dictionary (and “sparse” legisla- tive history), the Government suggests an alternative “ ‘everyday understanding’ ” of “sexual abuse of a minor.” Brief for Respondent 16–17 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990)). Around the time sexual abuse of a minor was added to the INA’s list of aggravated felonies, that dictionary defined “[s]exual abuse” as “[i]llegal sex acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance,” and defined “[m]inor” as “[a]n infant or person who is under the age of legal competence,” which in “most states” was “1.” “ ‘Sex- ual abuse of a minor,’ ” the Government accordingly con- tends, “most naturally connotes conduct that (1) is illegal, (2) involves sexual activity, and (3) is directed at a person younger than 1 years old.” Brief for Respondent 17. We are not persuaded that the generic federal offense corresponds to the Government’s definition. First, the Government’s proposed definition is flatly inconsistent with the definition of sexual abuse contained in the very dictionary on which it relies; the Government’s proposed definition does not require that the act be performed “by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). In any event, as we explain below, offenses predicated on a spe- cial relationship of trust between the victim and offender are not at issue here and frequently have a different age requirement than the general age of consent. Second, in the context of statutory rape, the prepositional phrase “of a minor” naturally refers not to the age of legal compe- tence (when a person is legally capable of agreeing to a contract, for example), but to the age of consent (when a person is legally capable of agreeing to sexual intercourse). Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 7 |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | to sexual intercourse). Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 7 Opinion of the Court Third, the Government’s definition turns the categorical approach on its head by defining the generic federal of- fense of sexual abuse of a minor as whatever is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted. Under the Government’s preferred ap- proach, there is no “generic” definition at all. See (requiring “a clear indication that Congress intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical definitions to identify predicate offenses”); (“We think that ‘burglary’ in must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes”). C The structure of the INA, a related federal statute, and evidence from state criminal codes confirm that, for a statutory rape offense to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA based solely on the age of the partic- ipants, the victim must be younger than 16. 1 Surrounding provisions of the INA guide our interpreta- tion of sexual abuse of a minor. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 This offense is listed in the INA as an “aggravated felony.” U.S. C. (emphasis added). “An ‘aggravated’ offense is one ‘made worse or more seri- ous by circumstances such as violence, the presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime.’ ” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 75 (9th ed. 2009)). More- over, the INA lists sexual abuse of a minor in the same subparagraph as “murder” and “rape,” (a)(43)(A)— among the most heinous crimes it defines as aggravated felonies. The structure of the INA therefore suggests that sexual abuse of a minor encom- ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion of the Court passes only especially egregious felonies. A closely related federal statute, 1 U.S. C. provides further evidence that the generic federal defini- tion of sexual abuse of a minor incorporates an age of consent of 16, at least in the context of statutory rape offenses predicated solely on the age of the participants. Cf. –13, n. 9 (concluding that Con- gress’ treatment of 1 U.S. C. in an Act passed “just nine months earlier” provided “stron[g] suppor[t]” for our interpretation of as incorporated into the INA); Pow- erex 232 Section 2243, which criminalizes “[s]exual abuse of a minor or ward,” contains the only definition of that phrase in the United States Code. As originally enacted in 196, proscribed engaging in a “sexual act” with a person between the ages of 12 and 16 if the perpetrator was at |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | ages of 12 and 16 if the perpetrator was at least four years older than the victim. In 1996, Congress expanded to include victims who were younger than 12, thereby protecting anyone under the age of 16. (a); see also Congress did this in the same omnibus law that added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA, which suggests that Congress under- stood that phrase to cover victims under age 16.2 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 321,–31, 3009–627. Petitioner does not contend that the definition in (a) must be imported wholesale into the INA, Brief for Petitioner 17, and we do not do so. One reason is that the INA does not cross-reference (a), whereas many other aggravated felonies in the INA are defined by cross- reference to other provisions of the United States Code, —————— 2 To eliminate a redundancy, Congress later amended (a) to revert to the pre-1996 language. See Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 199, That amend- ment does not change Congress’ understanding in 1996, when it added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 9 Opinion of the Court see, e.g., (a)(43)(H) (“an offense described in section 75, 76, 77, or 1202 of Title 1 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom)”). Another is that (a) re- quires a 4-year age difference between the perpetrator and the victim. Combining that element with a 16-year age of consent would categorically exclude the statutory rape laws of most States. See Brief for Respondent 34–35; cf. (declining to “constru[e] ‘burglary’ to mean common-law burglary,” because that “would come close to nullifying that term’s effect in the statute,” since “few of the crimes now generally recognized as burglaries would fall within the common-law definition”). Accordingly, we rely on (a) for evidence of the meaning of sexual abuse of a minor, but not as providing the complete or exclusive definition. 2 As in other cases where we have applied the categorical approach, we look to state criminal codes for additional evidence about the generic meaning of sexual abuse of a minor. See 495 U.S., at 59 (interpreting “‘bur- glary’” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 194 accord- ing to “the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States”); Duenas-, 549 U.S., at (interpreting “theft” in the INA in the same manner). When “sexual abuse of a minor” was added to the INA in 1996, thirty-one States and the District of Columbia set the age of consent at 16 |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | District of Columbia set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses that hinged solely on the age of the participants. As for the other States, one set the age of consent at 14; two set the age of consent at 15; six set the age of consent at 17; and the remaining ten, including California, set the age of consent at 1. See Appendix, infra; cf. ALI, Model Penal Code (190) (in the absence of a special relationship, setting the default age of consent at 16 for 10 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion of the Court the crime of “[c]orruption of [m]inors”).3 A significant majority of jurisdictions thus set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses predicated exclusively on the age of the participants. Many jurisdictions set a different age of consent for offenses that include an element apart from the age of the participants, such as offenses that focus on whether the perpetrator is in some special relationship of trust with the victim. That was true in the two States that had offenses labeled “sexual abuse of a minor” in 1996. See Alaska Stat. §11.41.43 (1996) (age of consent for third- degree “sexual abuse of a minor” was 16 generally but 1 where “the offender occupie[d] a position of authority in relation to the victim”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, (193), as amended by 1995 Me. Laws p. 123 (age of consent for “[s]exual abuse of minors” was 16 generally but 1 where the victim was “a student” and the offender was “a teacher, employee or other official in the school in which the student [was] enrolled”). And that is true in four of the five jurisdictions that have offenses titled “sexual abuse of a minor” today. Compare, e.g., D. C. Code 22–300 ( Cum. Supp.) (age of consent is 16 in the absence of a significant relationship) with (age of consent is 1 where the offender “is in a significant relationship” with the victim); see also Brief for Respondent 31 (listing statutes with that title). Accordingly, the generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor may include a different age of consent where the perpetra- tor and victim are in a significant relationship of trust. As —————— 3 The Government notes that this sort of multijurisdictional analysis can “be useful insofar as it helps shed light on the ‘common understand- ing and meaning’ of the federal provision being interpreted,” but that it is not required by the categorical approach. Brief for Respondent 23–25 ). We agree. In this case, state criminal codes |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | 23–25 ). We agree. In this case, state criminal codes aid our interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor” by offering useful context. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 11 Opinion of the Court relevant to this case, however, the general consensus from state criminal codes points to the same generic definition as dictionaries and federal law: Where sexual intercourse is abusive solely because of the ages of the participants, the victim must be younger than 16. D The laws of many States and of the Federal Government include a minimum age differential (in addition to an age of consent) in defining statutory rape. We need not and do not decide whether the generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor under U.S. C. (a)(43)(A) includes an addi- tional element of that kind. Petitioner has “show[n] some- thing special about California’s version of the doctrine”— that the age of consent is 1, rather than 16—and needs no more to prevail. Duenas-, Ab- sent some special relationship of trust, consensual sexual conduct involving a younger partner who is at least 16 years of age does not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA, regardless of the age differential between the two participants. We leave for another day whether the generic offense requires a particular age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, and whether the generic offense encompasses sexual intercourse involving victims over the age of 16 that is abusive because of the nature of the relationship between the participants. III Finally, petitioner and the Government debate whether the Board’s interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor is entitled to deference under Chevron, Peti- tioner argues that any ambiguity in the meaning of this phrase must be resolved in favor of the alien under the rule of lenity. See Brief for Petitioner 41–. The Gov- ernment responds that ambiguities should be resolved by deferring to the Board’s interpretation. See Brief for 12 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion of the Court Respondent –53. We have no need to resolve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority in this case because the statute, read in context, unambiguously fore- closes the Board’s interpretation. Therefore, neither the rule of lenity nor Chevron applies. * * * We hold that in the context of statutory rape offenses focused solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” under (a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | majority | Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4395245/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions/ | Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 13 Opinion Appendix of the of to opinion Court the Court APPENDIX These tables list offenses criminalizing sexual intercourse solely because of the age of the participants. The tables are organized according to the statutory age of consent as of September 30, 1996—the date “sexual abuse of a minor” was added to the INA. 14 Years Haw. Rev. Stat. Hawaii (1993) 15 Years Colo. Rev. Stat. Colorado §1–3–403(1)(e) (1997) S. C. Code Ann. South Carolina –3–655(2) (195) 16 Years Ala. Code Alabama 13A–6–70(c)(1) (1994) Alaska Stat. Alaska (1996) –14– Arkansas 106(a), 5–14–107(a) (1997) Conn. Gen. Stat. Connecticut 71(a)(1) (1995) Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, Delaware (1995) 14 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion Appendix of the of to opinion Court the Court D. C. Code District of Columbia 22–410 (1996) Ga. Code Ann. –6–3(a) Georgia (1996) Indiana 199 Ind. Acts §, p. 774 (2) (197), Iowa as amended by 1994 Iowa Acts p. 290 – Kansas 3504(a)(1) (1995) Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Kentucky 510.060(1)(b) (Lexis 1990) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, (193), as Maine amended by 1995 Me. Laws p. 123 Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, Maryland (5), 464C(a)(2), (3) (1996) Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 265, Massachusetts (1992) Mich. Comp. Laws (1991), as Michigan amended by 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts p. 393 (b) Minnesota (1996) Mont. Code Ann. §§–5– Montana 501(1)(b)(iii), –5– 503(3)(a) (1995) Neb. Rev. Stat. §2–319(1) Nebraska (1994 Cum. Supp.) Cite as: 51 U. S. (2017) 15 Opinion Appendix of the of to opinion Court the Court Nev. Rev. Stat. Nevada 200.36 (1997) N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. New Hampshire A:3(II) (196) N. J. Stat. Ann. New Jersey 2(c)(5) (West 1995) N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. North Carolina 27.7A (199 Cum. Supp.) Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Ohio (Lexis 1996) Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, (193), as Oklahoma amended by 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 22, p. 119 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3122.1, Pennsylvania added by 1995 Pa. Laws 95, p. 97 Rawle I. Gen. Laws Rhode Island (1994) S. D. Codified Laws South Dakota 22–1(5) (199) Utah 193 Utah Laws ch. Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, Vermont (199) Wash. Rev. Code Washington (1994) –B– West Virginia 2(c)(1), 61–B–5(a)(2) (Lexis 1997) –2– Wyoming 304(a)(i) (1997) 16 ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA v. SESSIONS Opinion Appendix of the of to opinion Court the Court 17 Years Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, Illinois 5/12–16(d) (West 1996) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:0(A)(1) (West 196), as Louisiana amended by 1995 |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | majority | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | This case presents the question whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial. We hold that it is not. I On August 2, 1984, in the early hours of the morning, respondent entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Las Vegas, Nevada, and shot the bartender and a patron four times each with an automatic pistol. He then walked behind the bar and removed the cash register. Nine days later, respondent arrived at the apartment of his former wife and opened fire on her; five of his seven shots hit their target. Respondent then shot himself in the abdomen and attempted, without success, to slit his wrists. Of the four victims of respondent's gunshots, only respondent himself survived. On August 13, respondent summoned police to his hospital bed and confessed to the killings. After respondent pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder, the trial court ordered that he be examined by a pair of psychiatrists, both of whom concluded that he was competent to stand trial.[1] The State thereafter announced *392 its intention to seek the death penalty. On November 28, 1984, 2 12 months after the psychiatric evaluations, respondent again appeared before the trial court. At this time respondent informed the court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty. The reason for the request, according to respondent, was to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing. On the basis of the psychiatric reports, the trial court found that respondent "is competent in that he knew the nature and quality of his acts, had the capacity to determine right from wrong; that he understands the nature of the criminal charges against him and is able to assist in his defense of such charges, or against the pronouncement of the judgment thereafter; that he knows the consequences of entering a plea of guilty to the charges; and that he can intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional right to assistance of an attorney." App. 21. The court advised respondent that he had a right both to the assistance of counsel and to self-representation, warned him of the "dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation, inquired into his understanding of the proceedings and his awareness of his rights, and asked why he had chosen to represent himself. It then accepted respondent's waiver of counsel. The court also accepted respondent's guilty pleas, but not before it had determined that respondent was not pleading guilty in response to threats or promises, that he understood |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | majority | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | guilty in response to threats or promises, that he understood the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, that he was aware of the *393 rights he was giving up, and that there was a factual basis for the pleas. The trial court explicitly found that respondent was "knowingly and intelligently" waiving his right to the assistance of counsel, ib and that his guilty pleas were "freely and voluntarily" given,[2] On January 21, 1985, a three-judge court sentenced respondent to death for each of the murders. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed respondent's sentences for the Red Pearl Saloon murders, but reversed his sentence for the murder of his ex-wife and remanded for imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. On July 30, respondent filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected respondent's claim that he was "mentally incompetent to represent himself," concluding that "the record clearly shows that he was examined by two psychiatrists both of whom declared [him] competent." App. to Pet. for Cert. D-8. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed respondent's appeal, Respondent then filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The District Court denied the petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the "record in this case" should have led the trial court to "entertai[n] a good faith doubt about [respondent's] competency to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent *394 waiver of constitutional rights,"[3] and that the Due Process Clause therefore "required the court to hold a hearing to evaluate and determine [respondent's] competency before it accepted his decision to discharge counsel and change his pleas," Rejecting petitioner's argument that the trial court's error was "cured by the postconviction hearing," ib and that the competency determination that followed the hearing was entitled to deference under 28 U.S. C. 2254(d), the Court of Appeals held that "the state court's postconviction ruling was premised on the wrong legal standard of competency," "Competency to waive constitutional rights," according to the Court of Appeals, "requires a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial"; while a defendant is competent to stand trial if he has "a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his counsel," a defendant is competent to waive counsel or plead guilty only if he has "the capacity for `reasoned choice' among the alternatives available to him." The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had "erroneously applied |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | majority | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | of Appeals determined that the trial court had "erroneously applied the standard for evaluating competency to stand trial, instead of the correct `reasoned choice' standard," and further concluded that when examined "in light of the correct legal standard," the record did not support a finding that respondent was "mentally capable of the reasoned choice required for a valid waiver of constitutional rights,"[4] The Court of Appeals accordingly instructed *395 the District Court to issue the writ of habeas corpus within 60 days, "unless the state court allows [respondent] to withdraw his guilty pleas, enter new pleas, and proceed to trial with the assistance of counsel." Whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial is a question that has divided the Federal Courts of Appeals[5] and state courts of last resort.[6]*396 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. II A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so "competently and intelligently," ; accord, In we held that the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Accord, While we have described the standard for competence to stand trial, however, we have never expressly articulated a standard for competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to the assistance of counsel. Relying in large part upon our decision in the Ninth Circuit adheres to the view that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial. See In Westbrook, a two-paragraph per curiam opinion, we vacated the lower court's judgment affirming the petitioner's conviction, because there had been "a hearing on the issue of [the petitioner's] competence to stand trial," but "no hearing or inquiry into the issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel." The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that the "clear implication" of Westbrook is that the Dusky formulation is not "a high enough standard" for determining whether a defendant is competent to waive a constitutional right.[7] We think the Ninth Circuit has read too much into Westbrook, and we think it errs in applying two different competency standards.[8] A The standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit is whether a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | majority | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | is whether a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel has the capacity for "reasoned choice" among the alternatives available to him. How this standard is different from (much less higher than) the Dusky standardwhether the defendant has a "rational understanding" of the proceedingsis not readily apparent to us. In fact, respondent himself opposed certiorari on the ground that the difference between the two standards is merely one of "terminology," Brief in Opposition 4, and he devotes little space in his brief on the merits to a defense of the Ninth Circuit's standard, see, e. g., Brief for *398 Respondent 17-18, 27, 32; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 ("Due process does not require [a] higher standard, [it] requires a separate inquiry").[9] But even assuming that there is some meaningful distinction between the capacity for "reasoned choice" and a "rational understanding" of the proceedings, we reject the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard. We begin with the guilty plea. A defendant who stands trial is likely to be presented with choices that entail relinquishment of the same rights that are relinquished by a defendant who pleads guilty: He will ordinarily have to decide whether to waive his "privilege against compulsory selfincrimination," by taking the witness stand; if the option is available, he may have to decide whether to waive his "right to trial by jury," ; and, in consultation with counsel, he may have to decide whether to waive his "right to confront [his] accusers," ib by declining to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution. A defendant who pleads not guilty, moreover, faces still other strategic choices: In consultation with his attorney, he may be called upon to decide, among other things, whether (and how) to put on a defense and whether to raise one or more affirmative defenses. In sum, all criminal defendantsnot merely those who plead guiltymay be required to make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been initiated. And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial. (The decision to plead guilty is also made over a shorter period of *399 time, without the distraction and burden of a trial.) This being so, we can conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of competence for those defendants who choose to |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | majority | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | higher level of competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty. If the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty. Nor do we think that a defendant who waives his right to the assistance of counsel must be more competent than a defendant who does not, since there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. Respondent suggests that a higher competency standard is necessary because a defendant who represents himself "`must have greater powers of comprehension, judgment, and reason than would be necessary to stand trial with the aid of an attorney.' " Brief for Respondent 26 (quoting Silten & Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 Hastings L. J. 1053, 1068 (1977)). Accord, Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 10-12. But this argument has a flawed premise; the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.[10] In we *400 held that a defendant choosing self-representation must do so "competently and intelligently," but we made it clear that the defendant's "technical legal knowledge" is "not relevant" to the determination whether he is competent to waive his right to counsel, and we emphasized that although the defendant "may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored," Thus, while "[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts," ib a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose selfrepresentation.[11] B A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial, however, is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty or waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. ; In this *401 sense there is a "heightened" standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence.[12] This two-part inquiry[13] is what we had in mind in Westbrook. When we distinguished between "competence to stand trial" and "competence to waive [the] constitutional right to the assistance of counsel," we were using "competence to waive" |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | majority | Godinez v. Moran | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112898/godinez-v-moran/ | the assistance of counsel," we were using "competence to waive" as a shorthand for the "intelligent and competent waiver" requirement of This much is clear from the fact that we quoted that very language from immediately after noting that the trial court had not determined whether the petitioner was competent to waive his right to counsel. See (quoting ). Thus, Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable proposition *402 that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted.[14] III Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements. Cf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,986 | 16 | dissenting | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | This case presents the question whether the antitrust laws provide a remedy for a private party that challenges a horizontal merger between two of its largest competitors. The issue may be approached along two fundamentally different paths. First, the Court might focus its attention entirely on the postmerger conduct of the merging firms and deny relief *123 unless the plaintiff can prove a violation of the Sherman Act. Second, the Court might concentrate on the merger itself and grant relief if there is a significant probability that the merger will adversely affect competition in the market in which the plaintiff must compete. Today the Court takes a step down the former path;[1] I believe that Congress has directed us to follow the latter path. In this case, one of the major firms in the beef-packing market has proved to the satisfaction of the District Court, and the Court of Appeals, that the merger between Excel and Spencer Beef is illegal. This Court holds, however, that the merger should not be set aside because the adverse impact of the merger on respondent's profit margins does not constitute the kind of "antitrust injury" that the Court described in As I shall demonstrate, merely rejected a "novel damages theory," ; the Court's implicit determination that forecloses the appropriate line of inquiry in this quite different case is therefore misguided. In my view, a *124 competitor in Monfort's position has standing to seek an injunction against the merger. Because Monfort must compete in the relevant market, proof establishing that the merger will have a sufficient probability of an adverse effect on competition to violate 7 is also sufficient to authorize equitable relief. I Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and expanded in 1950, because Congress concluded that the Sherman Act's prohibition against mergers was not adequate.[2] The Clayton Act, unlike the Sherman Act, proscribes certain combinations of competitors that do not produce any actual injury, either to competitors or to competition. An acquisition is prohibited by 7 if "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S. C. 18. The legislative history teaches us that this delphic language was designed "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding." S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1950).[3] In *125 this Court recognized that 7 is "a prophylactic measure, intended `primarily to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their |
Justice Stevens | 1,986 | 16 | dissenting | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil' " ). The 1950 amendment to 7 was particularly concerned with the problem created by a merger which, when viewed by itself, would appear completely harmless, but when considered in its historical setting might be dangerous to competition. As Justice Stewart explained: "The principal danger against which the 1950 amendment was addressed was the erosion of competition through the cumulative centripetal effect of acquisitions by large corporations, none of which by itself might be sufficient to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. Congress' immediate fear was that of large corporations buying out small companies. A major aspect of that fear was the perceived trend toward absentee ownership of local business. Another, more generalized, congressional purpose revealed by the legislative history was to protect small businessmen and to stem the rising tide of concentration in the economy. These goals, Congress thought, could be achieved by `arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.' Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, [370 U. S.,] at 317." United Thus, a merger may violate 7 of the Clayton Act merely because it poses a serious threat to competition and even though the evidence falls short of proving the kind of actual restraint that violates the Sherman Act, 15 U.S. C. 1. The language of 16 of the Clayton Act also reflects Congress' emphasis on probable harm rather than actual harm. Section 16 authorizes private parties to obtain injunctive relief *126 "against threatened loss or damage" by a violation of 7.[4] The broad scope of the language in both 7 and 16 identifies the appropriate standing requirements for injunctive relief. As the Court has squarely held, it is the threat of harm, not actual injury, that justifies equitable relief: "The evident premise for striking [the injunction at issue] was that Zenith's failure to prove the fact of injury barred injunctive relief as well as treble damages. This was unsound, for 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 26, which was enacted by the Congress to make available equitable remedies previously denied private parties, invokes traditional principles of equity and authorizes injunctive relief upon the demonstration of `threatened' injury. That remedy is characteristically available even though the plaintiff has not yet suffered actual injury; he need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely to continue or recur." Zenith Radio Judged by these standards, respondent's showing |
Justice Stevens | 1,986 | 16 | dissenting | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | or recur." Zenith Radio Judged by these standards, respondent's showing that it faced the threat of loss from an impending antitrust violation clearly conferred standing to obtain injunctive relief. Respondent *127 alleged, and in the opinion of the courts below proved, the injuries it would suffer from a violation of 7: "Competition in the markets for the procurement of fed cattle and the sale of boxed beef will be substantially lessened and a monopoly may tend to be created in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act; "Concentration in those lines of commerce will be increased and the tendency towards concentration will be accelerated." More generally, given the statutory purposes to protect small businesses and to stem the rising tide of concentration in particular markets, a competitor trying to stay in business in a changing market must have standing to ask a court to set aside a merger that has changed the character of the market in an illegal way. Certainly the businesses small or large that must face competition in a market altered by an illegal merger are directly affected by that transaction. Their inability to prove exactly how or why they may be harmed does not place them outside the circle of interested parties whom the statute was enacted to protect. II Virtually ignoring the language and history of 7 of the Clayton Act and the broad scope of the Act's provision for injunctive relief, the Court bases its decision entirely on a case construing the "private damages action provisions" of the Act. In we began our analysis by acknowledging the difficulty of meshing 7, "a statutory prohibition against acts that have a potential to cause certain harms," with 4, a "damages action intended to remedy those harms." We concluded that a plaintiff must prove more than a violation of 7 to recover damages, "since such proof establishes only that injury may result." Beyond the special nature of an action for treble damages, 16 differs from 4 because by its terms it requires only that the antitrust violation threaten *128 the plaintiff with loss or damage, not that the violation cause the plaintiff actual "injur[y] in his business or property." 15 U.S. C. 15. In the case, the Court set aside a damages award that was based on the estimated additional profits that the plaintiff would have earned if competing bowling alleys had gone out of business instead of being acquired by the defendant. We concluded "that the loss of windfall profits that would have accrued had the acquired centers failed" was not the kind |
Justice Stevens | 1,986 | 16 | dissenting | Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111777/cargill-inc-v-monfort-of-colo-inc/ | accrued had the acquired centers failed" was not the kind of actual injury for which damages could be recovered under That injury "did not occur `by reason of' that which made the acquisitions unlawful." In contrast, in this case it is the threatened harm to both competition and to the competitors in the relevant market that makes the acquisition unlawful under 7. The Court's construction of the language of 4 in is plainly not controlling in this case.[5] The concept of "antitrust injury," which is at the heart of the treble-damages action, is simply not an element of a cause of action for injunctive relief that depends on finding a reasonable threat that an incipient disease will poison an entire market. A competitor plaintiff who has proved a violation of 7, as the Court recognized, has established that injury may result. This showing satisfies the language of 16 provided that the plaintiff can show that injury may result to him. When the proof discloses a reasonable probability that competition will be harmed as a result of a merger, I would also conclude that there is a reasonable probability that *129 a competitor of the merging firms will suffer some corresponding harm in due course. In my opinion, that reasonable probability gives the competitor an interest in the proceeding adequate to confer standing to challenge the merger. To hold otherwise is to frustrate 7 and to read 16 far too restrictively. It would be a strange antitrust statute indeed which defined a violation enforceable by no private party. Effective enforcement of the antitrust laws has always depended largely on the work of private attorney generals, for whom Congress made special provision in the Clayton Act itself.[6] As recently as 1976, Congress specifically indicated its intent to encourage private enforcement of 16 by authorizing recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee by a plaintiff in an action for injunctive relief. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, (amending 15 U.S. C. 26). The Court misunderstands the message that Congress conveyed in 1914 and emphasized in 1950. If, as the District Court and the Court of Appeals held, the merger is illegal, it should be set aside. I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | dissenting | Reed v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117860/reed-v-farley/ | The federal habeas corpus statute allows a state prisoner to challenge his conviction on the ground that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S. C. 2254(a). The Court acknowledges, as it must, that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a "la[w] of the United States" under this statute. See ; In addition, respondents concede that a defendant tried in clear violation of the IAD's 120-day limit would be held in custody in violation of a law of the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Nevertheless, the Court appears to conclude that a violation of the IAD is simply not serious enough to warrant collateral relief, at least where the defendant fails to invoke *360 his IAD rights according to the precise rules the Court announces for the first time today. The Court purports to resolve this case by relying on "precedent already in place," ante, at 348, referring to "principles and precedent generally controlling availability of the great writ," ante, at 352. Our precedent, on its face, does not reach nearly so far, and its extension to this case is unwarranted under general habeas corpus principles. Most seriously, the Court disregards Congress' unambiguous judgment about the severity of,and the necessary remedy for, a violation of the IAD time limits. I respectfully dissent. I The Court purports to resolve this issue by relying on the -Timmreck line of cases. See ; ; United ; see also ; United Despite the professed narrowness of the Court's ultimate holding, however, its decision reflects certain assumptions about the nature of habeas review of state court judgments that do not withstand close analysis. Each of the cases relied on by the majority, Timmreck, and Davis concerned a federal prisoner's request under 28 U.S. C. 2255 for collateral relief from alleged defects in his federal trial. Before today, this Court never had applied those precedents to bar review of a 2254 petition.[1] It does so now without a full discussion of, or appreciation for, the different policy concerns that should shape the exercise of federal courts' discretion in 2254 cases. *361 A While there are stray remarks in our opinions suggesting that this Court has treated 2254 and 2255 as equivalents,[2] there are other indications to the contrary, see, e. g., In any event, there are sound reasons to refrain from treating the two as identical. Primary among them is the importance under 2254 of providing a federal forum for review of state prisoners' federal claims, not only in order to ensure |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | dissenting | Reed v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117860/reed-v-farley/ | state prisoners' federal claims, not only in order to ensure the enforcement of federal rights, but also to promote uniformity in the state courts' interpretation and application of federal law.[3] We recognized in United that the "federal prisoner unlike his state counterparts, has already had an opportunity to present his federal claims in federal trial and appellate forums." For the federal prisoner *362 claiming statutory violations, habeas courts serve less to guarantee uniformity of federal law or to satisfy a threshold need for a federal forum than to provide a backstop to catch and correct certain nonconstitutional errors that evaded the trial and appellate courts.[4] Thus, this Court has determined that "where the trial or appellate court has had a `say' on a federal prisoner's claim, it may be open to the 2255 court to determine that `the prisoner is entitled to no relief.' " Under and Timmreck, relief may be limited to the correction of "fundamental defect[s]" or "omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." The principle, in short, is that where the error is not egregious, the habeas court need not cover the ground already covered by other federal courts. For the state prisoner, by contrast, a primary purpose of 2254 is to provide a federal forum to review a state prisoner's claimed violations of federal law, claims that were, of necessity, addressed to the state courts. See ( 2254 collateral review is necessary to permit a federal court to have the "last say" with respect to questions of federal law); Vasquez v. ery, Thus, 2254 motions anticipate that the federal court will undertake an independent review of the work of the state courts, even where the federal claim was fully and fairly litigated. (affirming that a state court's determination *363 of federal law and of mixed questions of federal law and fact are entitled to de novo review by federal habeas court).[5] Even if we recognize valid reasons for limiting this review to claims of serious or substantial error, where no federal court previously has addressed the 2254 petitioner's federal claims, there is less reason to sift these claims through so fine a screen as and Timmreck provide. Similarly, prudential justifications for `s "fundamental error" standard may differ from state to federal proceedings. In a federal trial and appeal, virtually any procedural error, however minor, will violate a "law" of the United States. In this context, it is both impracticable and unnecessary to allow collateral review of all claims of error, particularly since the defendant has had the opportunity both to raise them in and |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | dissenting | Reed v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117860/reed-v-farley/ | has had the opportunity both to raise them in and to appeal them to a federal forum. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the -Timmreck screening device, which sorts the substantial errors from the mere technical violations, was developed in 2255. A state trial, by contrast, implicates few federal laws outside the Constitution. On the extraordinary occasions when Congress does consider a federal law to be so important as to warrant its application in state proceedings, this alone counsels an approach other *364 than -Timmreck to determine whether a violation of that law warrants federal court review and enforcement.[6] The difference in the roles that federal statutes play in state and federal criminal proceedings points to another danger attendant to the uncritical application of the standard in 2254. has been read to disfavor habeas review of federal statutory violations as a class. See, e. g., ante, at 356 (concurring opinion) (reading for the proposition that "[m]ost statutory violations are simply not important enough to invoke the extraordinary habeas jurisdiction"). This distinction between statutory and constitutional violations, exaggerated even in the context of 2255,[7] has even less justification under 2254. *365 The language of 2254 itself permits a state prisoner to seek relief for a violation "of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." By its own terms, then, 2254 applies equally to claims of statutory or constitutional violations. When construing the similar language of Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S. C. 1983, which permits civil actions against state actors for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States, we concluded that "the phrase `and laws,' as used in 1983, means what it says." Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. *366 1, 4 (1980) (refusing to construe "and laws" as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws); ( 1983 "include[s] rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws of the United States as well as by the Constitution"). Section 1983 was enacted contemporaneously with 2254, and it shares the common purpose of making the federal courts available for the uniform interpretation and enforcement of federal rights in state settings. There is no reason to read 1983 as placing statutes on a par with the Constitution, but to read 2254 as largely indifferent to violations of statutes. Moreover, at least until today, this Court never had held that a properly preserved claim of a violation of a federal statute should be treated differently in a 2254 proceeding from a claim of a violation of the Constitution. Nor is there any |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | dissenting | Reed v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117860/reed-v-farley/ | of a violation of the Constitution. Nor is there any reason to do so. Congress' decision to apply a federal statute to state criminal proceedings, which ordinarily are the exclusive province of state legislatures, generally should be read to reflect the congressional determination that important national interests are at stake. Where Congress has made this determination, the federal courts should be open to ensure the uniform enforcement and interpretation of these interests. It should be clear, then, that the distinction drawn in 2255 between fundamental errors and "omission[s] of the kind contemplated in Timmreck, or Davis, " ante, at 349, simply does not support a distinction in 2254 between constitutional and statutory violations. II Even putting aside any misgivings about the general extension of to 2254 proceedings, there is a specific, and I believe insurmountable, obstacle to applying this standard to violations of the IAD. In concluding that an "unwitting judicial slip of the kind involved here ranks with the nonconstitutional lapses we have held not cognizable," ante, at 349, *367 in and Timmreck, the majority overlooks Congress' own determination about the seriousness of such a "slip" and its consequences. Congress spoke with unmistakable clarity when it prescribed both the time limits for trying a prisoner whose custody was obtained under the IAD and the remedy for a violation of those limits. Article IV(c) of the IAD provides that the trial of a transferred prisoner "shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days" of his arrival in the receiving jurisdiction.[8] The IAD is equally clear about the consequences of a failure to bring a defendant to trial within the prescribed time limits. Article V(c) states: "[I]n the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect." Quite simply, Congress has determined that a receiving State must try the defendant within 120 days or not at all. This determination undermines the majority's approach for two reasons. *368 First, the congressional imposition of the drastic sanction of dismissal forecloses any argument that a violation of the IAD time limits is somehow a mere "technical" violation too trivial to warrant habeas review. The dismissal with prejudice of criminal charges is a remedy rarely seen in criminal law, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | dissenting | Reed v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117860/reed-v-farley/ | criminal charges is a remedy rarely seen in criminal law, even for constitutional violations. See, e. g., ; In fact, there are countless constitutional violations for which habeas review is allowed, but dismissal is not required. However this Court might have assessed the "fundamentality" of a violation of the IAD time limits in the absence of this sanction, this congressional directive does not leave us free to determine that violating the IAD time limits is no more serious than failure to comply with the technical requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, United or the formal requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a), Surely, a violation that Congress found troubling enough to warrant the severe remedy of dismissal cannot become trivial simply because the defendant did not utter what this Court later determines to be the magic words at the magic moment, particularly in the absence of any congressional requirement that the defendant either invoke his right to a timely trial or object to the setting of an untimely trial date. In the absence of any suggestion that Reed procedurally defaulted on his IAD claim so as to deprive him of relief on direct review, it is curious, to say the least, to deny habeas relief based largely on a sort of "quasi-default" standard. Such a two-tiered "default" standard is unwarranted, and to my knowledge, unprecedented.[9] Cf. *369 Second, Congress' clear mandate of the remedy of dismissal can be read to constrain this Court's equitable or supervisory powers to determine an appropriate remedy, either on direct review or on habeas.[10] Nothing in our case law even suggests that, where Congress has mandated a remedy for the violation of a federal law, a habeas court is free to cast about for a different remedy. The remedy prescribed by the statute must be the remedy that "law and justice require." 28 U.S. C. 2243. In other words, the prerogative writ of habeas corpus should be exercised in accord with an express legislative command. See IAD, Art. IX, 5 (directing "[a]ll courts of the United States to enforce the agreement on detainers and to cooperate with all party States in enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose"). At the very least, the drastic remedy of dismissal saves the IAD from falling below the fundamentality line. *370 In sum, under a faithful reading of the IAD, the state trial court was required to dismiss with prejudice all charges against Reed because his trial did not commence within 120 days of his transfer to Indiana state custody. Faced with the state courts' failure |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | dissenting | Reed v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117860/reed-v-farley/ | to Indiana state custody. Faced with the state courts' failure to impose this remedy, the federal habeas court should have done so. III A final word is in order about the Court's emphasis on Reed's conduct and its suggestion that relief might be in order if only Reed had objected at the "relevant" moments. Under one reading of the majority opinion, the Court concludes that Reed's failure to make oral objections at the pretrial hearings somehow mitigates the seriousness of the failure to bring him to trial within the IAD time limits. In other words, the majority suggests that it is the "unobjected-to" nature of the violation, ante, at 356 (concurring opinion), that reduces it to the level of a -Timmreck error, one with which the habeas court should not concern itself. But as already explained, the statute itself does not permit this Court to denigrate the significance of the violation. It is also possible, however, to read the majority opinion as relying on a theory of waiver or procedural default. This theory is equally untenable, particularly when due consideration is given not only to the language of the IAD, but also to Reed's repeated attempts to invoke its protections. The IAD itself does not require dismissal for a violation of its 120-day limit only "upon motion of the defendant," much less "upon defendant's timely oral objection to the setting of the trial date." Instead, the statute unambiguously directs courts to dismiss charges when the time limits are breached. This arguably puts the responsibility on courts and States to police the applicable time limits. This is a reasonable choice for Congress to make. Judges and prosecutors are players who can be expected to know the IAD's straightforward requirements *371 and to make a simple time calculation at the outset of the proceedings against a transferred defendant. Indeed, in this case, the trial court and prosecutor both had constructive notice of the IAD time limits. The Fulton County Circuit Court signed and certified that the request for temporary custody was transmitted "for action in accordance with its terms and the provisions of the Agreement on Detainers. " App. 5-6 The State's request stated: "I propose to bring this person to trial on this [information] within the time period specified in Article IV(c) of the [IAD]." at 5. Even assuming, however, that a defendant must invoke the IAD's time limits in order to obtain its protections, Reed clearly did so here. In United this Court agreed that the defendant's "failure to invoke the [IAD] in specific terms in his speedy trial motions |
Justice Blackmun | 1,994 | 11 | dissenting | Reed v. Farley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117860/reed-v-farley/ | the [IAD] in specific terms in his speedy trial motions before the District Court did not result in a waiver" of his claim that the Government violated the IAD. We concluded, instead, that the prosecution and the court were "on notice of the substance" of an inmate's IAD claims when he "persistently requested that he be given a speedy trial" and "sought the dismissal of his indictment on the ground that the delay in bringing him to trial while the detainer remained lodged against him was causing him to be denied certain privileges at the state prison." 365. Reed did no less. On May 9, 1983, at his first appearance before the court, Reed, appearing without counsel, informed the court that he would be in a halfway house but for the detainer. App. 12. The court acknowledged that there is a "world of difference" between a halfway house and the Fulton County jail. The court later observed that Reed's incarceration rendered him incapable of preparing his defense. At the June 27 pretrial conference, Reed asked the court if it would prefer future motions orally or in writing. The court responded, "I want it in writing," and "I read better *372 than I listen." ; see also Conforming to this request, Reed filed a motion on July 25, requesting that "trial be held within the legal guidelines of the Agreement on Detainer Act." Clarifying his concerns, Reed complained that the State of Indiana was "forcing [him] to be tried beyond the limits as set forth in the Agreement on Detainer Act," and specifically "request[ed that] no extension of time be granted beyond those guidelines." This pro se motion was filed 31 days before the 120-day period expired. Three days later, Reed filed a motion stating that there was "limited time left for trial within the laws." This pro se motion was filed 28 days before the IAD clock ran out. Finally, on August 11, he filed a motion for subpoenas that sought prompt relief because the "Detainer Act time limits" were "approaching." This pro se motion was filed 15 days before the 120-day IAD time limit expired. Thus, after being instructed that the court wanted all motions in writing, Reed filed three timely written motions indicating his desire to be tried within the IAD time limits. The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that Reed's July 26 motion constituted "a general demand that trial be held within the time limits of the IAD." Under Mauro, this was enough to put the court on notice of his demands. Even as an original matter, |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | In 1998, petitioner CIGN Corporation changed the nature of its basic pension plan for employees. Previously, the plan provided a retiring employee with a defined benefit in the form of an annuity calculated on the basis of his preretirement salary and length of service. The new plan provided most retiring employees with a (lump sum) cash balance calculated on the basis of a defined annual contribution from CIGN as increased by compound inter est. Because many employees had already earned at least some old-plan benefits, the new plan translated already earned benefits into an opening amount in the employee’s cash balance account. Respondents, acting on behalf of approximately 25,000 beneficiaries of the CIGN Pension Plan (which is also a petitioner here), challenged CIGN’s adoption of the new plan. They claimed in part that CIGN had failed to give them proper notice of changes to their benefits, particu larly because the new plan in certain respects provided 2 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court them with less generous benefits. See Employee Retire ment Income Security ct of 1974 (ERIS) 104(b), 204(h), 848, 862, as amended, 29 U.S. C. 1024(b), 1054(h). The District Court agreed that the disclosures made by CIGN violated its obligations under ERIS. In deter mining relief, the court found that CIGN’s notice failures had caused the employees “likely harm.” The Court then reformed the new plan and ordered CIGN to pay benefits accordingly. It found legal authority for doing so in ERIS 29 U.S. C. (authoriz ing a plan “participant or beneficiary” to bring a “civil action” to “recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan”). We agreed to decide whether the District Court applied the correct legal standard, namely, a “likely harm” stan dard, in determining that CIGN’s notice violations caused its employees sufficient injury to warrant legal relief. To reach that question, we must first consider a more general matter—whether the ERIS section just mentioned (ERIS’s recovery-of-benefits-due provision, authorizes entry of the relief the District Court provided. We conclude that it does not authorize this relief. Nonetheless, we find that a different equity related ERIS provision, to which the District Court also referred, authorizes forms of relief similar to those that the court entered. 29 U.S. C. Section 502(a)(3) authorizes “appropriate equitable relief ” for violations of ERIS. ccordingly, the relevant standard of harm will depend upon the equitable theory by which the District Court provides relief. We leave it to the District Court to conduct that analysis in the first in stance, but we identify equitable principles that the court |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | in stance, but we identify equitable principles that the court might apply on remand. Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 3 Opinion of the Court I Because our decision rests in important part upon the circumstances present here, we shall describe those cir cumstances in some detail. We still simplify in doing so. But the interested reader can find a more thorough de scription in two District Court opinions, which set forth that court’s findings reached after a lengthy trial. See 559 F. Supp. 2d 192 ; Under CIGN’s pre-1998 defined-benefit retirement plan, an employee with at least five years service would receive an annuity annually paying an amount that de pended upon the employee’s salary and length of service. Depending on when the employee had joined CIGN, the annuity would equal either (1) 2 percent of the employee’s average salary over his final three years with CIGN, multiplied by the number of years worked (up to 30); or (2) 12⁄3 percent of the employee’s average salary over his final five years with CIGN, multiplied by the number of years worked (up to 35). Calculated either way, the annuity would approach 60 percent of a longtime employee’s final salary. well-paid longtime employee, earning, say, $160,000 per year, could receive a retirement annuity paying the employee about $96,000 per year until his death. The plan offered many employees at least one other benefit: They could retire early, at age 55, and re ceive an only-somewhat-reduced annuity. In November 1997, CIGN sent its employees a news letter announcing that it intended to put in place a new pension plan. The new plan would substitute an “account balance plan” for CIGN’s pre-existing defined-benefit system. pp. 991a The newsletter added that the old plan would end on December 31, 1997, that CIGN would introduce (and describe) the new plan 4 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court sometime during 1998, and that the new plan would apply retroactively to January 1, 1998. Eleven months later CIGN filled in the details. Its new plan created an individual retirement account for each employee. (The account consisted of a bookkeeping entry backed by a CIGN-funded trust.) Each year CIGN would contribute to the employee’s individual account an amount equal to between 3 percent and 8.5 percent of the employee’s salary, depending upon age, length of service, and certain other factors. The account balance would earn compound interest at a rate equal to the return on 5-year treasury bills plus one-quarter per cent (but no less than 4.5 percent and no greater than 9 percent). Upon retirement |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | 4.5 percent and no greater than 9 percent). Upon retirement the employee would receive the amount then in his or her individual account—in the form of either a lump sum or whatever annuity the lump sum then would buy. s promised, CIGN would open the accounts and begin to make contributions as of January 1, 1998. But what about the retirement benefits that employees had already earned prior to January 1, 1998? CIGN promised to make an initial contribution to the individ ual’s account equal to the value of that employee’s already earned benefits. nd the new plan set forth a method for calculating that initial contribution. The method con sisted of calculating the amount as of the employee’s (future) retirement date of the annuity to which the em ployee’s salary and length of service already (i.e., as of December 31, 1997) entitled him and then discounting that sum to its present (i.e., January 1, 1998) value. n example will help: Imagine an employee born on January 1, 1966, who joined CIGN in January 1991 on his 25th birthday, and who (during the five years preced ing the plan changeover) earned an average salary of $100,000 per year. s of January 1, 1998, the old plan would have entitled that employee to an annuity equal to Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 5 Opinion of the Court $100,000 times 7 (years then worked) times 12⁄3 percent, or $11,667 per year—when he retired in 2031 at age 65. The 2031 price of an annuity paying $11,667 per year until death depends upon interest rates and mortality assump tions at that time. If we assume the annuity would pay 7 percent until the holder’s death (and we use the mortality assumptions used by the plan, see pp. 407a (incorporat ing the mortality table prescribed by Rev. Rul. 95–6, 1995–1 Cum. Bull. 80)), then the 2031 price of such an annuity would be about $120,500. nd CIGN should initially deposit in this individual’s account on January 1, 1998, an amount that will grow to become $120,500, 33 years later, in 2031, when the individual retires. If we assume a 5 percent average interest rate, then that amount presently (i.e., as of January 1, 1998) equals about $24,000. nd (with one further mortality-related adjust ment that we shall describe infra, at 6–7) that is the amount, more or less, that the new plan’s transition rules would have required CIGN initially to deposit. Then CIGN would make further annual deposits, and all the deposited amounts would earn compound interest. When the employee retired, he would |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | would earn compound interest. When the employee retired, he would receive the resulting lump sum. The new plan also provided employees a guarantee: n employee would receive upon retirement either (1) the amount to which he or she had become entitled as of January 1, 1998, or (2) the amount then in his or her individual account, whichever was greater. Thus, the employee in our example would receive (in 2031) no less than an annuity paying $11,667 per year for life. B 1 The District Court found that CIGN’s initial descrip tions of its new plan were significantly incomplete and misled its employees. In November 1997, for example, 6 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court CIGN sent the employees a newsletter that said the new plan would “significantly enhance” its “retirement pro gram,” would produce “an overall improvement in retirement benefits,” and would provide “the same benefit security” with “steadier benefit growth.” pp. 990a, 991a, 993a. CIGN also told its employees that they would “see the growth in [their] total retirement benefits from CIGN every year,” at 952a, that its initial deposit “represent[ed] the full value of the benefit [they] earned for service before 1998,” Record E–503 (Exh. 98), and that “[o]ne advantage the company will not get from the re tirement program changes is cost savings.” pp. 993a. In fact, the new plan saved the company $10 million annually (though CIGN later said it devoted the savings to other employee benefits). Its initial deposit did not “represen[t] the full value of the benefit” that employees had “earned for service before 1998.” nd the plan made a significant number of employees worse off in at least the following specific ways: First, the initial deposit calculation ignored the fact that the old plan offered many CIGN employees the right to retire early (beginning at age 55) with only somewhat reduced benefits. This right was valuable. For example, as of January 1, 1998, respondent Janice mara had earned vested age-55 retirement benefits of $1,833 per month, but CIGN’s initial deposit in her new-plan indi vidual retirement account (ignoring this benefit) would have allowed her at age 55 to buy an annuity benefit of only $900 per month. Second, as we previously indicated but did not explain, the new plan adjusted CIGN’s initial deposit downward to account for the fact that, unlike the old plan’s lifetime annuity, an employee’s survivors would receive the new plan’s benefits (namely, the amount in the employee’s individual account) even if the employee died before retiring. The downward adjustment consisted of Cite as: 3 U. S. |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | The downward adjustment consisted of Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 7 Opinion of the Court multiplying the otherwise-required deposit by the prob ability that the employee would live until retirement—a 90 percent probability in the example of our 32-year-old, at 4–5. nd that meant that CIGN’s initial de posit in our example—the amount that was supposed to grow to $120,500 by 2031—would be less than $22,000, not $24,000 (the number we computed). The employee, of course, would receive a benefit in return—namely, a form of life insurance. But at least some employees might have preferred the retirement benefit and consequently could reasonably have thought it important to know that the new plan traded away one-tenth of their already-earned benefits for a life insurance policy that they might not have wanted. Third, the new plan shifted the risk of a fall in interest rates from CIGN to its employees. Under the old plan, CIGN had to buy a retiring employee an annuity that paid a specified sum irrespective of whether falling inter est rates made it more expensive for CIGN to pay for that annuity. nd falling interest rates also meant that any sum CIGN set aside to buy that annuity would grow more slowly over time, thereby requiring CIGN to set aside more money to make any specific sum available at retirement. Under the new plan CIGN did not have to buy a retiring employee an annuity that paid a specific sum. The employee would simply receive whatever sum his account contained. nd falling interest rates meant that the account’s lump sum would earn less money each year after the employee retired. nnuities, for example, would become more expensive (any fixed purchase price paying for less annual income). t the same time falling interest meant that the individual account would grow more slowly over time, leaving the employee with less money at retirement. Of course, interest rates might rise instead of fall, leav ing CIGN’s employees better off under the new plan. 8 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court But the latter advantage does not cancel out the former disadvantage, for most individuals are risk averse. nd that means that most of CIGN’s employees would have preferred that CIGN, rather than they, bear these risks. The amounts likely involved are significant. If, in our example, interest rates between 1998 and 2031 averaged 4 percent rather than the 5 percent we assumed, and if in 2031 annuities paid 6 percent rather than the 7 percent we assumed, then CIGN would have had to make an initial deposit of |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | CIGN would have had to make an initial deposit of $35,500 (not $24,000) to assure that employee the $11,667 annual annuity payment to which he had already become entitled. Indeed, that $24,000 that CIGN would have contributed (leaving aside the life insurance problem) would have provided enough money to buy (in 2031) an annuity that assured the employee an annual payment of only about $8,000 (rather than $11,667). We recognize that the employee in our example (like others) might have continued to work for CIGN after January 1, 1998; and he would thereby eventually have earned a pension that, by the time of his retirement, was worth far more than $11,667. But that is so because CIGN made an additional contribution for each year worked after January 1, 1998. If interest rates fell (as they did), it would take the employee several additional years of work simply to catch up (under the new plan) to where he had already been (under the old plan) as of January 1, 1998—a phenomenon known in pension jargon as “wear away,” see –304 (referring to respondents’ requiring 6 to 10 years to catch up). The District Court found that CIGN told its employees nothing about any of these features of the new plan— which individually and together made clear that CIGN’s descriptions of the plan were incomplete and inaccurate. The District Court also found that CIGN intentionally misled its employees. focus group and many employees Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 9 Opinion of the Court asked CIGN, for example, to “ ‘[d]isclose details’ ” about the plan, to provide “ ‘individual comparisons,’ ” or to show “ ‘[a]n actual projection for retirement.’ ” But CIGN did not do so. Instead (in the words of one inter nal document), it “ ‘focus[ed] on NOT providing employees before and after samples of the Pension Plan changes.’ ” The District Court concluded, as a matter of law, that CIGN’s representations (and omissions) about the plan, made between November 1997 (when it announced the plan) and December 1998 (when it put the plan into effect) violated: (a) ERIS implemented by Treas. Reg. (d)–6 (2000), which (as it ex isted at the relevant time) forbade an amendment of a pension plan that would “provide for a significant reduc tion in the rate of future benefit accrual” unless the plan administrator also sent a “written notice” that provided either the text of the amendment or summarized its likely effects, 29 U.S. C. (2000 ed.) (amended 2001); Treas. Reg. Q&–10, (1998); and (b) ERIS and 104(b), which require a plan |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | (1998); and (b) ERIS and 104(b), which require a plan administrator to provide beneficiaries with summary plan descriptions and with summaries of material modifica tions, “written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant,” that are “sufficiently accu rate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such par ticipants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan,” 29 U.S. C. 1024(b) (2006 ed. and Supp. III). 2 The District Court then turned to the remedy. First, the court agreed with CIGN that only employees whom CIGN’s disclosure failures had harmed could obtain 10 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court relief. But it did not require each individual member of the relevant CIGN employee class to show individual injury. Rather, it found (1) that the evidence presented had raised a presumption of “likely harm” suffered by the members of the relevant employee class, and (2) that CIGN, though free to offer contrary evidence in respect to some or all of those employees, had failed to rebut that presumption. It concluded that this unrebutted showing was sufficient to warrant class-applicable relief. Second, the court noted that had been inter preted by the Second Circuit to permit the invalidation of plan amendments not preceded by a proper notice, prior to the 2001 amendment that made this power explicit. 559 F. Supp. 2d, at 207 ); see 29 U.S. C. (6) (2006 ed.) (entitling participants to benefits “without regard to [the] amendment” in case of an “egregious failure”). But the court also thought that granting this relief here would harm, not help, the injured employees. That is because the notice failures all concerned the new plan that took effect in December 1998. The court thought that the notices in respect to the freezing of old-plan benefits, effective December 31, 1997, were valid. To strike the new plan while leaving in effect the frozen old plan would not help CIGN’s employees. The court considered treating the November 1997 notice as a sham or treating that notice and the later 1998 no tices as part and parcel of a single set of related events. But it pointed out that respondents “ha[d] argued none of these things.” nd it said that the court would “not make these arguments now on [re spondents’] behalf.” Third, the court reformed the terms of the new plan’s guarantee. It erased the portion that assured participants who retired the greater of “” (that which they had al ready earned as of December 31, 1997, under the old plan, Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 11 Opinion |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | old plan, Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 11 Opinion of the Court $11,667 in our example) or “B” (that which they would earn via CIGN’s annual deposits under the new plan, including CIGN’s initial deposit). nd it substituted a provision that would guarantee each employee “” (that which they had already earned, as of December 31, 1997, under the old plan) plus “B” (that which they would earn via CIGN’s annual deposits under the new plan, exclud ing CIGN’s initial deposit). In our example, the District Court’s remedy would no longer force our employee to choose upon retirement either an $11,667 annuity or his new plan benefits (including both CIGN’s annual depos its and CIGN’s initial deposit). It would give him an $11,667 annuity plus his new plan benefits (with CIGN’s annual deposits but without CIGN’s initial deposit). Fourth, the court “order[ed] and enjoin[ed] the CIGN Plan to reform its records to reflect that all class members now receive [the just described] ‘ + B’ benefits,” and that it pay appropriate benefits to those class members who had already retired. Fifth, the court held that ERIS provided the legal authority to enter this relief. That provision states that a “civil action may be brought” by a plan “par ticipant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” 29 U.S. C. The court wrote that its orders in effect awarded “benefits under the terms of the plan” as reformed. 559 F. Supp. 2d, at 212. t the same time the court considered whether ERIS also provided legal authority to enter this relief. That provision states that a civil action may be brought “by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary () to en join any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to ob tain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this 12 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S. C. (emphasis added). The District Court decided not to answer this question because (1) it had just decided that the same relief was available under regardless, cf. Varity v. Howe, ; and (2) the Supreme Court has “issued several opinions that have severely curtailed the kinds of relief that are available under ” ; Great-West Life & nnuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); and v. Hewitt ssociates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993)). 3 The parties cross-appealed the District Court’s judg ment. The Court |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | The parties cross-appealed the District Court’s judg ment. The Court of ppeals for the Second Circuit issued a brief summary order, rejecting all their claims, and affirming “the judgment of the district court for substan tially the reasons stated” in the District Court’s “well reasoned and scholarly opinions.” (2009). The parties filed cross-petitions for writs of certio rari in this Court. We granted the request in CIGN’s petition to consider whether a showing of “likely harm” is sufficient to entitle plan participants to recover benefits based on faulty disclosures. II CIGN in the merits briefing raises a preliminary question. Brief for Petitioners 13–20. It argues first and foremost that the statutory provision upon which the District Court rested its orders, namely, the provision for recovery of plan benefits, does not in fact authorize the District Court to enter the kind of relief it entered here. nd for that reason, CIGN argues, whether the District Court did or did not use a proper Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 13 Opinion of the Court standard for determining harm is beside the point. We believe that this preliminary question is closely enough related to the question presented that we shall consider it at the outset. The District Court ordered relief in two steps. Step 1: It ordered the terms of the plan reformed (so that they pro vided an “ plus B,” rather than a “greater of or B” guarantee). Step 2: It ordered the plan administrator (which it found to be CIGN) to enforce the plan as re formed. One can fairly describe step 2 as consistent with for that provision grants a participant the right to bring a civil action to “recover benefits due under the terms of his plan.” 29 U.S. C. nd step 2 orders recovery of the benefits provided by the “terms of [the] plan” as reformed. But what about step 1? Where does grant a court the power to change the terms of the plan as they previously existed? The statutory language speaks of “enforc[ing]” the “terms of the plan,” not of changing them. 29 U.S. C. (emphasis added). The provision allows a court to look outside the plan’s written language in deciding what those terms are, i.e., what the language means. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of merica v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 377–379 (1999) (permitting the insurance terms of an ERIS-governed plan to be interpreted in light of state insurance rules). But we have found nothing sug gesting that the provision authorizes a court to alter those terms, at least not in present circumstances, |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | to alter those terms, at least not in present circumstances, where that change, akin to the reform of a contract, seems less like the simple enforcement of a contract as written and more like an equitable remedy. See infra, at 18. Nor can we accept the Solicitor General’s alternative rationale seeking to justify the use of this provision. The Solicitor General says that the District Court did enforce 14 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court the plan’s terms as written, adding that the “plan” in cludes the disclosures that constituted the summary plan descriptions. In other words, in the view of the Solicitor General, the terms of the summaries are terms of the plan. Even if the District Court had viewed the summaries as plan “terms” (which it did not, see at 10–11), however, we cannot agree that the terms of statutorily required plan summaries (or summaries of plan modifica tions) necessarily may be enforced (under as the terms of the plan itself. For one thing, it is difficult to square the Solicitor General’s reading of the statute with ERIS the provision that obliges plan adminis trators to furnish summary plan descriptions. The syntax of that provision, requiring that participants and benefici aries be advised of their rights and obligations “under the plan,” suggests that the information about the plan pro vided by those disclosures is not itself part of the plan. See 29 U.S. C. Nothing in (or, as far as we can tell, anywhere else) suggests the contrary. Nor do we find it easy to square the Solicitor General’s reading with the statute’s division of authority between a plan’s sponsor and the plan’s administrator. The plan’s sponsor (e.g., the employer), like a trust’s settlor, creates the basic terms and conditions of the plan, executes a written instrument containing those terms and conditions, and provides in that instrument “a procedure” for making amendments. 29 U.S. C. The plan’s admin istrator, a trustee-like fiduciary, manages the plan, follows its terms in doing so, and provides participants with the summary documents that describe the plan (and modifica tions) in readily understandable form. 101(a), 102, 104, 29 U.S. C. 1021(a), 1022, 1024 (2006 ed. and Supp. III). Here, the District Court found that the same entity, CIGN, filled both roles. See 534 F. Supp. 2d, at 331. But that is not always the case. Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 15 Opinion of the Court Regardless, we have found that ERIS carefully distin guishes these roles. See, e.g., Varity 516 U.S., at 498. nd we have no reason to believe |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | U.S., at 498. nd we have no reason to believe that the statute intends to mix the responsibilities by giving the adminis trator the power to set plan terms indirectly by including them in the summary plan descriptions. See Curtiss- Wright Finally, we find it difficult to reconcile the Solicitor General’s interpretation with the basic summary plan description objective: clear, simple communication. See 102(a), 29 U.S. C. 1022(a) (2006 ed.). To make the language of a plan summary legally binding could well lead plan administrators to sacrifice simplicity and comprehensibility in order to describe plan terms in the language of lawyers. Consider the difference between a will and the summary of a will or between a property deed and its summary. Consider, too, the length of Part I of this opinion, and then consider how much longer Part I would have to be if we had to include all the qualifications and nuances that a plan drafter might have found impor tant and feared to omit lest they lose all legal significance. The District Court’s opinions take up 109 pages of the Federal Supplement. None of this is to say that plan administrators can avoid providing complete and accurate summaries of plan terms in the manner required by ERIS and its implementing regulations. But we fear that the Solicitor General’s rule might bring about com plexity that would defeat the fundamental purpose of the summaries. For these reasons taken together we conclude that the summary documents, important as they are, provide communication with beneficiaries about the plan, but that their statements do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan for purposes of We also conclude that the District Court could not find authority in that section to reform CIGN’s plan as written. 16 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court B If does not authorize entry of the relief here at issue, what about nearby ? That provi sion allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief ” to redress viola tions of (here relevant) parts of ERIS “or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S. C. (emphasis added). The District Court strongly implied, but did not directly hold, that it would base its relief upon this subsection were it not for (1) the fact that the preceding “plan benefits due” provision, provided sufficient authority; and (2) certain cases from this Court that narrowed the appli cation of the term “appropriate equitable relief,” see, e.g., ; Great-West, Our holding in Part II–, removes the District Court’s first obstacle. nd given the likelihood that, on |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | District Court’s first obstacle. nd given the likelihood that, on remand, the District Court will turn to and rely upon this alterna tive subsection, we consider the court’s second concern. We find that concern misplaced. We have interpreted the term “appropriate equitable relief ” in as referring to “ ‘those categories of relief ’ ” that, traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger of law and equity) “ ‘were typically available in equity.’ ” (quoting 508 U.S., at 2). In we applied this principle to a claim seeking money damages brought by a beneficiary against a private firm that provided a trustee with actuar ial services. We found that the plaintiff sought “nothing other than compensatory damages” against a nonfiduci ary. nd we held that such a claim, traditionally speaking, was legal, not equi table, in nature. In Great-West, we considered a claim brought by a fidu ciary against a tort-award-winning beneficiary seeking monetary reimbursement for medical outlays that the plan had previously made on the beneficiary’s behalf. We noted Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 17 Opinion of the Court that the fiduciary sought to obtain a lien attaching to (or a constructive trust imposed upon) money that the benefici ary had received from the tort-case defendant. But we noted that the money in question was not the “particular” money that the tort defendant had paid. nd, tradition ally speaking, relief that sought a lien or a constructive trust was legal relief, not equitable relief, unless the funds in question were “particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.” (emphasis added). The case before us concerns a suit by a beneficiary against a plan fiduciary (whom ERIS typically treats as a trustee) about the terms of a plan (which ERIS typi cally treats as a trust). See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & ssociates, Inc., ; Varity –497. It is the kind of lawsuit that, before the merger of law and equity, respondents could have brought only in a court of equity, not a court of law. 4 Scott, W. Fratcher, & M. scher, Trusts p. 1654 (5th ed. 2007) (hereinafter Scott & scher) (“Trusts are, and always have been, the bailiwick of the courts of eq uity”); (a trustee was “only suable in equity”). With the exception of the relief now provided by Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1957) (hereinafter Second Restatement); 4 Scott & scher the remedies available to those courts of equity were traditionally considered equitable remedies, see Second Restatement J. dams, Doctrine of Equity: Commentary on the Law as dministered by the Court of Chancery 61 (7th |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | Law as dministered by the Court of Chancery 61 (7th m. ed. 1881) (hereinafter dams); 4 Scott & scher The District Court’s affirmative and negative injunc tions obviously fall within this category. at 2 (identifying injunctions, mandamus, and restitution as equitable relief ). nd other relief ordered by the Dis 18 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court trict Court resembles forms of traditional equitable relief. That is because equity chancellors developed a host of other “distinctively equitable” remedies—remedies that were “fitted to the nature of the primary right” they were intended to protect. 1 S. Symons, Pomeroy’s Equity Juris prudence pp. 139–140 (5th ed. 1941) (hereinafter Pomeroy). See generally 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (12th ed. 1877) (hereinafter Story). Indeed, a maxim of equity states that “[e]quity suffers not a right to be without a remedy.” R. Francis, Maxims of Equity 29 (1st m. ed. 1823). nd the relief entered here, insofar as it does not consist of injunctive relief, closely resembles three other traditional equitable remedies. First, what the District Court did here may be regarded as the reformation of the terms of the plan, in order to remedy the false or misleading information CIGN pro vided. The power to reform contracts (as contrasted with the power to enforce contracts as written) is a traditional power of an equity court, not a court of law, and was used to prevent fraud. See Balt v. Raleigh & ugusta R. Co., (“[I]t is well settled that equity would reform the contract, and enforce it, as reformed, if the mistake or fraud were shown”); (“The reformation of written contracts for fraud or mistake is an ordinary head of eq uity jurisdiction”); Bradford v. Union Bank of Tenn., 13 How. 57, 66 (1852); J. Eaton, Handbook of Equity Juris prudence p. 618 (1901) (hereinafter Eaton) (courts of common law could only void or enforce, but not reform, a contract); 4 Pomeroy at 1000 (reformation “chiefly occasioned by fraud or mistake,” which were themselves concerns of equity courts); 1 Story see also 4 Pomeroy at 999 (equity often considered refor mation a “preparatory step” that “establishes the real contract”). Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 19 Opinion of the Court Second, the District Court’s remedy essentially held CIGN to what it had promised, namely, that the new plan would not take from its employees benefits they had already accrued. This aspect of the remedy resembles estoppel, a traditional equitable remedy. See, e.g., E. Merwin, Principles of Equity and Equity Pleading (H. Merwin ed. 1895); 3 Pomeroy Equitable estoppel “operates to |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | (H. Merwin ed. 1895); 3 Pomeroy Equitable estoppel “operates to place the person entitled to its benefit in the same position he would have been in had the representa tions been true.” Eaton at 176. nd, as Justice Story long ago pointed out, equitable estoppel “forms a very essential element in fair dealing, and rebuke of all fraudulent misrepresentation, which it is the boast of courts of equity constantly to promote.” 2 Story at 776. Third, the District Court injunctions require the plan administrator to pay to already retired beneficiaries money owed them under the plan as reformed. But the fact that this relief takes the form of a money payment does not remove it from the category of traditionally equi table relief. Equity courts possessed the power to provide relief in the form of monetary “compensation” for a loss resulting from a trustee’s breach of duty, or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment. Restatement (Third) of Trusts and Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 2, 2009) (hereinafter Third Restatement); Eaton at 440. Indeed, prior to the merger of law and equity this kind of monetary remedy against a trustee, sometimes called a “surcharge,” was “exclusively equitable.” Princess Lida of Thurn and U.S. 4, 464 (1939); Third Restatement and Comment a; G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (hereinafter Bogert); 4 Scott & scher 24.9, at 1659–1660, 1686; Second Restatement see also Manhattan Bank of (1889) (“The suit is plainly one of equitable cognizance, the 20 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court bill being filed to charge the defendant, as a trustee, for a breach of trust”); 1 J. Perry, Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees p. 13 (common-law attempts “to punish trustees for a breach of trust in dam ages, w[ere] soon abandoned”). The surcharge remedy extended to a breach of trust committed by a fiduciary encompassing any violation of a duty imposed upon that fiduciary. See Second Restate ment dams 59; 4 Pomeroy 2 Story 1268. Thus, insofar as an award of make-whole relief is concerned, the fact that the defendant in this case, unlike the defendant in is analogous to a trustee makes a critical difference. See –263. In sum, contrary to the District Court’s fears, the types of reme dies the court entered here fall within the scope of the term “appropriate equitable relief ” in III Section 502(a)(3) invokes the equitable powers of the District Court. We cannot know with certainty which remedy the District Court understood itself to be impos ing, nor whether the District Court will find |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | be impos ing, nor whether the District Court will find it appropriate to exercise its discretion under to impose that remedy on remand. We need not decide which remedies are appropriate on the facts of this case in order to resolve the parties’ dispute as to the appropriate legal standard in determining whether members of the relevant employee class were injured. The relevant substantive provisions of ERIS do not set forth any particular standard for determining harm. They simply require the plan administrator to write and to distribute written notices that are “sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise” plan partici pants and beneficiaries of “their rights and obligations under the plan.” see also 204(h). Nor can we find a definite standard in the ERIS provision, Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 21 Opinion of the Court (which authorizes the court to enter “appropri ate equitable relief ” to redress ERIS “violations”). Hence any requirement of harm must come from the law of equity. Looking to the law of equity, there is no general princi ple that “detrimental reliance” must be proved before a remedy is decreed. To the extent any such requirement arises, it is because the specific remedy being contem plated imposes such a requirement. Thus, as CIGN points out, when equity courts used the remedy of estop pel, they insisted upon a showing akin to detrimental reliance, i.e., that the defendant’s statement “in truth, influenced the conduct of ” the plaintiff, causing “preju dic[e].” Eaton at 175; see 3 Pomeroy ccord ingly, when a court exercises its authority under to impose a remedy equivalent to estoppel, a showing of detrimental reliance must be made. But this showing is not always necessary for other equitable remedies. Equity courts, for example, would reform contracts to reflect the mutual understanding of the contracting parties where “fraudulent suppression[s], omission[s], or insertion[s],” 1 Story at 149, “mate rial[ly] affect[ed]” the “substance” of the contract, even if the “complaining part[y]” was negligent in not realizing its mistake, as long as its negligence did not fall below a standard of “reasonable prudence” and violate a legal duty. 3 Pomeroy §§8, 8b, at 334, 340–341; see Balt 115 U.S., at ; Eaton Nor did equity courts insist upon a showing of detrimen tal reliance in cases where they ordered “surcharge.” Rather, they simply ordered a trust or beneficiary made whole following a trustee’s breach of trust. In such in stances equity courts would “mold the relief to protect the rights of the beneficiary according to the situation in volved.” Bogert at 4. This flexible approach |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | CIGNA Corp. v. Amara | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/216734/cigna-corp-v-amara/ | the situation in volved.” Bogert at 4. This flexible approach belies a strict requirement of “detrimental reliance.” 22 CIGN CORP. v. MR Opinion of the Court To be sure, just as a court of equity would not surcharge a trustee for a nonexistent harm, 4 Scott & scher a fiduciary can be surcharged under only upon a showing of actual harm—proved (under the default rule for civil cases) by a preponderance of the evidence. That actual harm may sometimes consist of detrimental reli ance, but it might also come from the loss of a right pro tected by ERIS or its trust-law antecedents. In the present case, it is not difficult to imagine how the failure to provide proper summary information, in violation of the statute, injured employees even if they did not themselves act in reliance on summary documents—which they might not themselves have seen—for they may have thought fellow employees, or informal workplace discussion, would have let them know if, say, plan changes would likely prove harmful. We doubt that Congress would have wanted to bar those employees from relief. The upshot is that we can agree with CIGN only to a limited extent. We believe that, to obtain relief by sur charge for violations of and 104(b), a plan partici pant or beneficiary must show that the violation injured him or her. But to do so, he or she need only show harm and causation. lthough it is not always necessary to meet the more rigorous standard implicit in the words “detrimental reliance,” actual harm must be shown. We are not asked to reassess the evidence. nd we are not asked about the other prerequisites for relief. We are asked about the standard of prejudice. nd we conclude that the standard of prejudice must be borrowed from equitable principles, as modified by the obligations and injuries identified by ERIS itself. Information-related circumstances, violations, and injuries are potentially too various in nature to insist that harm must always meet that more vigorous “detrimental harm” standard when equity imposed no such strict requirement. Cite as: 3 U. S. (2011) 23 Opinion of the Court IV We have premised our discussion in Part III on the need for the District Court to revisit its determination of an appropriate remedy for the violations of ERIS it identi fied. Whether or not the general principles we have dis cussed above are properly applicable in this case is for it or the Court of ppeals to determine in the first instance. Because the District Court has not determined if an ap propriate remedy |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | I agree with much in the Court’s opinion. But I do not agree that the designs that Varsity Brands, Inc., submit- ted to the Copyright Office are eligible for copyright pro- tection. Even applying the majority’s test, the designs cannot “be perceived as two- or three-dimensional work[s] of art separate from the useful article.” Ante, at 1. Look at the designs that Varsity submitted to the Copy- right Office. See Appendix to opinion of the Court, ante. You will see only pictures of cheerleader uniforms. And cheerleader uniforms are useful articles. A picture of the relevant design features, whether separately “perceived” on paper or in the imagination, is a picture of, and thereby “replicate[s],” the underlying useful article of which they are a part. Ante, at 1, 10. Hence the design features that Varsity seeks to protect are not “capable of existing inde- pendently o[f] the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U.S. C. I The relevant statutory provision says that the “design of a useful article” is copyrightable “only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, 2 STAR ATHLETICA, L. L. C. v. VARSITY BRANDS, INC. BREYER, J., dissenting and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitar- ian aspects of the article.” But what, we must ask, do the words “identified separately” mean? Just when is a design separate from the “utilitarian aspect of the [useful] article?” The most direct, helpful aspect of the Court’s opinion answers this question by stating: “Nor could someone claim a copyright in a useful arti- cle merely by creating a replica of that article in some other medium—for example, a cardboard model of a car. Although the replica could itself be copyright- able, it would not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.” Ante, at 7–8. Exactly so. These words help explain the Court’s state- ment that a copyrightable work of art must be “perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article.” Ante, at 1, 17. They help clarify the concept of separateness. Cf. 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (2016) (Nimmer) (de- scribing courts’ difficulty in applying that concept). They are consistent with Congress’ own expressed intent. 17 U.S. C. H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, pp. 55, 105 (1976) (H. R. Rep.). And they reflect long held views of the Copyright Office. See Compendium of U. S. Copyright Office Practices (3d ed. 2014), online at http://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf (as last visited Mar. 7, 2017) (Compendium). |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | online at http://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf (as last visited Mar. 7, 2017) (Compendium). Consider, for example, the explanation that the House Report for the Copyright Act of 1976 provides. It says: “Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set, or any other in- dustrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted” H. R. Rep., at 55 (emphasis added). Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 3 BREYER, J., dissenting These words suggest two exercises, one physical, one mental. Can the design features (the picture, the graphic, the sculpture) be physically removed from the article (and considered separately), all the while leaving the fully functioning utilitarian object in place? If not, can one nonetheless conceive of the design features separately without replicating a picture of the utilitarian object? If the answer to either of these questions is “yes,” then the design is eligible for copyright protection. Otherwise, it is not. The abstract nature of these questions makes them sound difficult to apply. But with the Court’s words in mind, the difficulty tends to disappear. An example will help. Imagine a lamp with a circular marble base, a vertical 10-inch tall brass rod (containing wires) inserted off center on the base, a light bulb fixture emerging from the top of the brass rod, and a lampshade sitting on top. In front of the brass rod a porcelain Sia- mese cat sits on the base facing outward. Obviously, the Siamese cat is physically separate from the lamp, as it could be easily removed while leaving both cat and lamp intact. And, assuming it otherwise qualifies, the designed cat is eligible for copyright protection. Now suppose there is no long brass rod; instead the cat sits in the middle of the base and the wires run up through the cat to the bulbs. The cat is not physically separate from the lamp, as the reality of the lamp’s con- struction is such that an effort to physically separate the cat and lamp will destroy both cat and lamp. The two are integrated into a single functional object, like the similar configuration of the ballet dancer statuettes that formed the lamp bases at issue in (1954). But we can easily imagine the cat on its own, as did Congress when conceptualizing the ballet dancer. See H. R. Rep., at 55 (the statuette in was “incorporated into a product without losing its ability to exist inde- pendently as a work of art”). In doing so, we |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | pendently as a work of art”). In doing so, we do not create 4 STAR ATHLETICA, L. L. C. v. VARSITY BRANDS, INC. BREYER, J., dissenting a mental picture of a lamp (or, in the Court’s words, a “replica” of the lamp), which is a useful article. We simply perceive the cat separately, as a small cat figurine that could be a copyrightable design work standing alone that does not replicate the lamp. Hence the cat is conceptually separate from the utilitarian article that is the lamp. The pair of lamps pictured at Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix to this opinion illustrate this principle. Case law, particularly case law that Congress and the Copyright Office have considered, reflects the same ap- proach. Congress cited examples of copyrightable design works, including “a carving on the back of a chair” and “a floral relief design on silver flatware.” H. R. Rep., at 55. Copyright Office guidance on copyrightable designs in useful articles include “an engraving on a vase,” “[a]rtwork printed on a t-shirt,” “[a] colorful pattern decorating the surface of a shopping bag,” “[a] drawing on the surface of wallpaper,” and “[a] floral relief decorating the handle of a spoon.” Compendium Courts have found copy- rightable matter in a plaster ballet dancer statuette encas- ing the lamp’s electric cords and forming its base, see as well as carvings engraved onto furniture, see Universal Furniture Int’l, and designs on laminated floor tiles, see Home Leg- end, 1412– 1413 (CA11 2015). See generally Brief for Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae. By way of contrast, Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of old shoes, though beautifully executed and copyrightable as a painting, would not qualify for a shoe design copyright. See Appendix, fig. 3, infra; 17 U.S. C. Courts have similarly denied copyright protection to ob- jects that begin as three-dimensional designs, such as measuring spoons shaped like heart-tipped arrows, Bona- zoli v. R. S. V. P. Int’l, Inc., 226–227 Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 5 BREYER, J., dissenting (RI 2005); candleholders shaped like sailboats, Design Ideas, 1128 (CD Ill. 2012); and wire spokes on a wheel cover, Norris Industries, None of these de- signs could qualify for copyright protection that would prevent others from selling spoons, candleholders, or wheel covers with the same design. Why not? Because in each case the design is not separable from the utilitarian aspects of the object to which it relates. The designs cannot be physically separated because they themselves make up the shape of the spoon, candleholders, or wheel covers of which they are |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | the spoon, candleholders, or wheel covers of which they are a part. And spoons, candlehold- ers, and wheel covers are useful objects, as are the old shoes depicted in Van Gogh’s painting. More importantly, one cannot easily imagine or otherwise conceptualize the design of the spoons or the candleholders or the shoes without that picture, or image, or replica being a picture of spoons, or candleholders, or wheel covers, or shoes. The designs necessarily bring along the underlying utilitarian object. Hence each design is not conceptually separable from the physical useful object. The upshot is that one could copyright the floral design on a soupspoon but one could not copyright the shape of the spoon itself, no matter how beautiful, artistic, or es- thetically pleasing that shape might be: A picture of the shape of the spoon is also a picture of a spoon; the picture of a floral design is not. See Compendium To repeat: A separable design feature must be “capable of existing independently” of the useful article as a sepa- rate artistic work that is not itself the useful article. If the claimed feature could be extracted without replicating the useful article of which it is a part, and the result would be a copyrightable artistic work standing alone, then there is a separable design. But if extracting the claimed features would necessarily bring along the underlying useful arti- 6 STAR ATHLETICA, L. L. C. v. VARSITY BRANDS, INC. BREYER, J., dissenting cle, the design is not separable from the useful article. In many or most cases, to decide whether a design or artistic feature of a useful article is conceptually separate from the article itself, it is enough to imagine the feature on its own and ask, “Have I created a picture of a (useful part of a) useful article?” If so, the design is not separable from the useful article. If not, it is. In referring to imagined pictures and the like, I am not speaking technically. I am simply trying to explain an intuitive idea of what separation is about, as well as how I understand the majority’s opinion. So understood, the opinion puts design copyrights in their rightful place. The law has long recognized that drawings or photographs of real world objects are copyrightable as drawings or photo- graphs, but the copyright does not give protection against others making the underlying useful objects. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic (1884). That is why a copyright on Van Gogh’s painting would prevent others from reproducing that painting, but it would not prevent others from reproducing and |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | painting, but it would not prevent others from reproducing and selling the comfortable old shoes that the painting depicts. In- deed, the purpose of was to ensure that “ ‘copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, portraying a useful article as such, does not extend to the manufacture of the useful article itself.’ ” H. R. Rep., at 105. II To ask this kind of simple question—does the design picture the useful article?—will not provide an answer in every case, for there will be cases where it is difficult to say whether a picture of the design is, or is not, also a picture of the useful article. But the question will avoid courts focusing primarily upon what I believe is an un- helpful feature of the inquiry, namely, whether the design can be imagined as a “two- or three-dimensional work of art.” Ante, at 1, 17. That is because virtually any indus- Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 7 BREYER, J., dissenting trial design can be thought of separately as a “work of art”: Just imagine a frame surrounding the design, or its being placed in a gallery. Consider Marcel Duchamp’s “ready- mades” series, the functional mass-produced objects he designated as art. See Appendix, fig. 4, infra. What is there in the world that, viewed through an esthetic lens, cannot be seen as a good, bad, or indifferent work of art? What design features could not be imaginatively repro- duced on a painter’s canvas? Indeed, great industrial design may well include design that is inseparable from the useful article—where, as Frank Lloyd Wright put it, “form and function are one.” F. Wright, An Autobiography 146 (1943) (reprint 2005). Where they are one, the de- signer may be able to obtain 15 years of protection through a design patent. 35 U.S. C. 173; see also McKenna & Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 48–51 (2013). But, if they are one, Congress did not intend a century or more of copyright protection. III The conceptual approach that I have described reflects Congress’ answer to a problem that is primarily practical and economic. Years ago Lord Macaulay drew attention to the problem when he described copyright in books as a “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writ- ers.” 56 Parl. Deb. (3d Ser.) (1841) 341, 350. He called attention to the main benefit of copyright protection, which is to provide an incentive to produce copyrightable works and thereby “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 8. But Macaulay also |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 8. But Macaulay also made clear that copyright protection imposes costs. Those costs include the higher prices that can accompany the grant of a copyright monopoly. They also can include (for those wishing to display, sell, or perform a design, film, work of art, or piece of music, for example) the costs 8 STAR ATHLETICA, L. L. C. v. VARSITY BRANDS, INC. BREYER, J., dissenting of discovering whether there are previous copyrights, of contacting copyright holders, and of securing permission to copy. (BREYER, J., dissenting). Sometimes, as Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison, costs can outweigh “the benefit even of limited monopolies.” Letter from Thomas Jeffer- son to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 443 (J. Boyd ed. 1956) (Jefferson Let- ter). And that is particularly true in light of the fact that Congress has extended the “limited Times” of protection, U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 8, from the “14 years” of Jeffer- son’s day to potentially more than a century today. Jeffer- son Letter 443; see also at 246–252 (opinion of BREYER, J.). The Constitution grants Congress primary responsibil- ity for assessing comparative costs and benefits and draw- ing copyright’s statutory lines. Courts must respect those lines and not grant copyright protection where Congress has decided not to do so. And it is clear that Congress has not extended broad copyright protection to the fashion design industry. See, e.g., 1 Nimmer (describing how Congress rejected proposals for fashion design protection within the 1976 Act and has rejected every proposed bill to this effect since then); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, (observ- ing that at the time of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress had rejected every one of the approximately 70 design protection bills that had been introduced since 1914); e.g., H. R. 5055, 109th Cong., 2d Sess.: “To Amend title 17, United States Code, to provide protection for fashion design” (introduced Mar. 30, 2006; unenacted). Congress has left “statutory protection largely unavailable for dress designs.” 1 Nimmer Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellec- tual Property in Fashion Design, 1698– 1705 (2006). Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 9 BREYER, J., dissenting Congress’ decision not to grant full copyright protection to the fashion industry has not left the industry without protection. Patent design protection is available. 35 U.S. C. 173. A maker of clothing can obtain trademark protection under the Lanham Act for signature features of the clothing. 15 U.S. C. et seq. And a designer who creates an original textile design can receive copyright protection |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | who creates an original textile design can receive copyright protection for that pattern as placed, for exam- ple, on a bolt of cloth, or anything made with that cloth. E.g., Compendium “[T]his [type of] claim is generally made by the fabric producer rather than the garment or costume designer,” and is “ordinarily made when the two-dimensional design is applied to the textile fabric and before the garment is cut from the fabric.” 56 Fed. Reg. 56531 (1991). The fashion industry has thrived against this backdrop, and designers have contributed immeasurably to artistic and personal self-expression through clothing. But a decision by this Court to grant protection to the design of a garment would grant the designer protection that Con- gress refused to provide. It would risk increased prices and unforeseeable disruption in the clothing industry, which in the United States alone encompasses nearly $370 billion in annual spending and 1.8 million jobs. Brief for Council of Fashion Designers of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 3–4 (citing U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Com- mittee, The New Economy of Fashion 1 (2016)). That is why I believe it important to emphasize those parts of the Court’s opinion that limit the scope of its interpretation. That language, as I have said, makes clear that one may not “claim a copyright in a useful article merely by creat- ing a replica of that article in some other medium,” which “would not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.” Ante, at 7–8. 10 STAR ATHLETICA, L. L. C. v. VARSITY BRANDS, INC. BREYER, J., dissenting IV If we ask the “separateness” question correctly, the answer here is not difficult to find. The majority’s opinion, in its appendix, depicts the cheerleader dress designs that Varsity submitted to the Copyright Office. Can the design features in Varsity’s pictures exist separately from the utilitarian aspects of a dress? Can we extract those fea- tures as copyrightable design works standing alone, with- out bringing along, via picture or design, the dresses of which they constitute a part? Consider designs 074, 078, and 0815. They certainly look like cheerleader uniforms. That is to say, they look like pictures of cheerleader uniforms, just like Van Gogh’s old shoes look like shoes. I do not see how one could see them otherwise. Designs 299A and 2999B present slightly closer questions. They omit some of the dresslike context that the other designs possess. But the necklines, the sleeves, and the cut of the skirt suggest that they too are pictures of dresses. Looking at all five of Varsity’s |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377349/star-athletica-l-l-c-v-varsity-brands-inc/ | are pictures of dresses. Looking at all five of Varsity’s pic- tures, I do not see how one could conceptualize the design features in a way that does not picture, not just artistic designs, but dresses as well. Were I to accept the majority’s invitation to “imagina- tively remov[e]” the chevrons and stripes as they are ar- ranged on the neckline, waistline, sleeves, and skirt of each uniform, and apply them on a “painter’s canvas,” ante, at 10, that painting would be of a cheerleader’s dress. The esthetic elements on which Varsity seeks protection exist only as part of the uniform design—there is nothing to separate out but for dress-shaped lines that replicate the cut and style of the uniforms. Hence, each design is not physically separate, nor is it conceptually separate, from the useful article it depicts, namely, a cheerleader’s dress. They cannot be copyrighted. Varsity, of course, could have sought a design patent for its designs. Or, it could have sought a copyright on a Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 11 BREYER, J., dissenting textile design, even one with a similar theme of chevrons and lines. But that is not the nature of Varsity’s copyright claim. It has instead claimed ownership of the particular “ ‘treatment and arrangement’ ” of the chevrons and lines of the design as they appear at the neckline, waist, skirt, sleeves, and overall cut of each uniform. Brief for Re- spondents 50. The majority imagines that Varsity submit- ted something different—that is, only the surface decora- tions of chevrons and stripes, as in a textile design. As the majority sees it, Varsity’s copyright claim would be the same had it submitted a plain rectangular space depicting chevrons and stripes, like swaths from a bolt of fabric. But considered on their own, the simple stripes are plainly unoriginal. Varsity, then, seeks to do indirectly what it cannot do directly: bring along the design and cut of the dresses by seeking to protect surface decorations whose “treatment and arrangement” are coextensive with that design and cut. As Varsity would have it, it would prevent its competitors from making useful three-dimensional cheerleader uniforms by submitting plainly unoriginal chevrons and stripes as cut and arranged on a useful article. But with that cut and arrangement, the resulting pictures on which Varsity seeks protection do not simply depict designs. They depict clothing. They depict the useful articles of which the designs are inextricable parts. And Varsity cannot obtain copyright protection that would give them the power to prevent others from making those useful uniforms, any more than |
Justice Burger | 1,981 | 12 | concurring | Polk County v. Dodson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110589/polk-county-v-dodson/ | I join the Court's opinion, but it is important to emphasize that in providing counsel for an accused the governmental participation is very limited. Under and the government undertakes only to provide a professionally qualified advocate wholly independent of the government. It is the independence from the governmental control as to how the assigned task it to be performed that is crucial. The advocate, as an officer of the court which issued the commission to practice, owes an obligation to the court to repudiate any external effort to direct how the obligations to the client are to be carried out. The obligations owed by the attorney to the client are defined by the professional codes, not by the governmental entity from which the defense advocate's compensation is derived. Disciplinary Rule 5-107(B) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility[*] succinctly states the rule: *328 "(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services." Moreover, it is elementary that every advocate has an obligation to eschew proceedings considered to be professionally improper or irresponsible. Once counsel in this case reached a considered judgment on the merits of the claim sought to be put forward, her actions were consistent with the highest traditions of the Bar. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | The Court today holds a plaintiff may state a claim of sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII without even establishing that she has performed "equal or substantially equal work" to that of males as defined in the Equal Pay Act. Because I believe that the legislative history of both the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII clearly establish that there can be no Title VII claim of sex-based wage discrimination without proof of "equal work," I dissent. I Because the Court never comes to grips with petitioners' argument, it is necessary to restate it here. Petitioners argue *182 that Congress in adopting the Equal Pay Act specifically addressed the problem of sex-based wage discrimination and determined that there should be a remedy for claims of unequal pay for equal work, but not for "comparable" work. Petitioners further observe that nothing in the legislative history of Title VII, enacted just one year later in 1964, reveals an intent to overrule that determination. Quite the contrary, petitioners note that the legislative history of Title VII, including the adoption of the so-called Bennett Amendment, demonstrates Congress' intent to require all sex-based wage discrimination claims, whether brought under the Equal Pay Act or under Title VII, to satisfy the "equal work" standard. Because respondents have not satisfied the "equal work" standard, petitioners conclude that they have not stated a claim under Title VII. In rejecting that argument, the Court ignores traditional canons of statutory construction and relevant legislative history. Although I had thought it well settled that the legislative history of a statute is a useful guide to the intent of Congress, the Court today claims that the legislative history "has no bearing on the meaning of the [Act]," ante, at 173, n. 12, "does not provide a solution to the present problem," ante, at 176, and is simply of "no weight." Ante, at 176, n. Instead, the Court rests its decision on its unshakable belief that any other result would be unsound public policy. It insists that there simply must be a remedy for wage discrimination beyond that provided in the Equal Pay Act. The Court does not explain why that must be so, nor does it explain what that remedy might be. And, of course, the Court cannot explain why it and not Congress is charged with determining what is and what is not sound public policy. The closest the Court can come in giving a reason for its decision is its belief that interpretations of Title VII which "deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate" |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate" must be avoided. Ante, at 178. But that analysis turns traditional canons of statutory construction *183 on their head. It has long been the rule that when a legislature enacts a statute to protect a class of persons, the burden is on the plaintiff to show statutory coverage, not on the defendant to show that there is a "clear congressional mandate" for excluding the plaintiff from coverage. Such a departure from traditional rules is particularly unwarranted in this case, where the doctrine of in pari materia suggests that all claims of sex-based wage discrimination are governed by the substantive standards of the previously enacted and more specific legislation, the Equal Pay Act. Because the decision does not rest on any reasoned statement of logic or principle, it provides little guidance to employers or lower courts as to what types of compensation practices might now violate Title VII. The Court correctly emphasizes that its decision is narrow, and indeed one searches the Court's opinion in vain for a hint as to what pleadings or proof other than that adduced in this particular case, see ante, at 180-181, would be sufficient to state a claim of sexbased wage discrimination under Title VII. To paraphrase Justice Jackson, the Court today does not and apparently cannot enunciate any legal criteria by which suits under Title VII will be adjudicated and it lays "down no rule other than our passing impression to guide ourselves or our successors." Bob-Lo Excursion All we know is that Title VII provides a remedy when, as here, plaintiffs seek to show by direct evidence that their employer intentionally depressed their wages. And, for reasons that go largely unexplained, we also know that a Title VII remedy may not be available to plaintiffs who allege theories different than that alleged here, such as the so-called "comparable worth" theory. One has the sense that the decision today will be treated like a restricted railroad ticket, "good for this day and train only." In the end, however, the flaw with today's decision is not so much that it is so narrowly written as to be virtually *184 meaningless, but rather that its legal analysis is wrong. The Court is obviously more interested in the consequences of its decision than in discerning the intention of Congress. In reaching its desired result, the Court conveniently and persistently ignores relevant legislative history and instead relies wholly on what it believes Congress should have enacted. II The Equal Pay Act The starting point for any discussion of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | Equal Pay Act The starting point for any discussion of sex-based wage discrimination claims must be the Equal Pay Act of 1963, enacted as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S. C. 201-219 ( ed., Supp. III). It was there that Congress, after 18 months of careful and exhaustive study, specifically addressed the problem of sex-based wage discrimination. The Equal Pay Act states that employers shall not discriminate on the basis of sex by paying different wages for jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility. In adopting the "equal pay for equal work" formula, Congress carefully considered and ultimately rejected the "equal pay for comparable worth" standard advanced by respondents and several amici. As the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act amply demonstrates, Congress realized that the adoption of the comparable-worth doctrine would ignore the economic realities of supply and demand and would involve both governmental agencies and courts in the impossible task of ascertaining the worth of comparable work, an area in which they have little expertise. The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act begins in 1962 when Representatives Green and Zelenko introduced two identical bills, H. R. 8898 and H. R. 10226 respectively, representing the Kennedy administration's proposal for equal pay legislation. Both bills stated in pertinent part: "SEC. 4. No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to *185 any employee at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to any employee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character on jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit increase system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex." H. R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H. R. 10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962)[1] During the extensive hearings on the proposal, the administration strenuously urged that Congress adopt the "comparable" language, noting that the comparability of different jobs could be determined through job evaluation procedures. Hearings on H. R. 8898, H. R. 10226 before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 27 (1962) (testimony of Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg and Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson). A bill containing the comparable-work formula, then denominated H. R. 177, was reported out of the House Committee on Education and Labor and reached the full House. Once there, Representative St. George objected to the "comparable work" language of the bill and offered an amendment which limited |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | language of the bill and offered an amendment which limited equal pay claims to those "for equal work on jobs, the performance of which requires equal skills." 108 Cong. Rec. 14767 (1962). As she explained, her purpose was to limit wage discrimination claims *186 to the situation where men and women were paid differently for performing the same job. "What we want to do in this bill is to make it exactly what it says. It is called equal pay for equal work in some of the committee hearings. There is a great difference between the word `comparable' and the word `equal'. ". The word `comparable' opens up great vistas. It gives tremendous latitude to whoever is to be arbitrator in these disputes." Representative Landrum echoed those remarks. He stressed that the St. George amendment would prevent "the trooping around all over the country of employees of the Labor Department harassing business with their various interpretations of the term `comparable' when `equal' is capable of the same definition throughout the United States." The administration, represented by Representatives Zelenko and Green, vigorously urged the House to reject the St. George amendment. They observed that the "equal work" standard was narrower than the existing "equal pay for comparable work" language and cited correspondence from Secretary of Labor Goldberg that "comparable is a key word in our proposal." -14769. The House, however, rejected that advice and adopted the St. George amendment. When the Senate considered the bill, it too rejected the "comparable work" theory in favor of the "equal work" standard. Because the Conference Committee failed to report a bill out of Committee, enactment of equal pay legislation was delayed until 1963. Equal pay legislation, containing the St. George amendment, was reintroduced at the beginning of the session. The congressional debate on that legislation leaves no doubt that Congress clearly rejected the entire notion of "comparable worth." For example, Representative *187 Goodell, a cosponsor of the Act, stressed the significance of the change from "comparable work" to "equal work."[2] "I think it is important that we have clear legislative history at this point. Last year when the House changed the word `comparable' to `equal' the clear intention was to narrow the whole concept. We went from `comparable' to `equal' meaning that the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, that they would be very much alike or closely related to each other. "We do not expect the Labor Department to go into an establishment and attempt to rate jobs that are not equal. We do not want to hear the Department say, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | equal. We do not want to hear the Department say, `Well, they amount to the same thing,' and evaluate them so that they come up to the same skill or point. We expect this to apply only to jobs that are substantially identical or equal." 109 Cong. Rec. 9197 (1963) Representative Frelinghuysen agreed with those remarks. "[W]e can expect that the administration of the equal pay concept, while fair and effective, will not be excessive nor excessively wide ranging. What we seek to insure, where men and women are doing the same job under the same working conditions[,] that they will receive the same pay. It is not intended that either the Labor Department or individual employees will be equipped with hunting licenses. ". [The EPA] is not intended to compare unrelated jobs, or jobs that have been historically and normally considered by the industry to be different."[3] *188 Thus, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act clearly reveals that Congress was unwilling to give either the Federal Government or the courts broad authority to determine comparable wage rates. Congress recognized that the adoption of such a theory would ignore economic realities and would result in major restructuring of the American economy. Instead, Congress concluded that governmental intervention to equalize wage differentials was to be undertaken only within one circumstance: when men's and women's jobs were identical or nearly so, hence unarguably of equal worth. It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress which, after 18 months of hearings and debates, had decided in 1963 upon the extent of federal involvement it desired in the area of wage rate claimsintended sub silentio to reject all of this work and to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VII. Title VII Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000a et seq., one year after passing the Equal Pay Act. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2 (a)(1). The question is whether Congress intended to completely turn its back on the "equal work" standard enacted in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 when it adopted Title VII only one year later. * The Court answers that question in the affirmative, concluding that Title VII must be read more broadly than the Equal Pay Act. In so holding, the majority wholly ignores this Court's repeated adherence to the doctrine of in pari materia, namely, that "[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | namely, that "[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." citing ; United In Continental Tuna, for example, the lower court held that an amendment to the Suits in Admiralty Act allowed plaintiffs to sue the United States under that Act and ignore the applicable and more stringent provisions of the previously enacted Public Vessels Act. We rejected that construction because it amounted to a repeal of the Public Vessels Act by implication. We recognized that such an evasion of the congressional purpose reflected in the restrictive provisions would not be permitted absent some clear statement by Congress that such was intended by the later statute. Similarly, in this Court rejected a construction of the Federal Water Control Act which would have substantially altered the regulation scheme established under the Atomic Energy Act, without a "clear indication of legislative intent." When those principles are applied to this case, there can be no doubt that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII should be construed in pari materia. The Equal Pay Act is the more specific piece of legislation, dealing solely with sex-based wage discrimination, and was the product of exhaustive congressional study. Title VII, by contrast, is a general antidiscrimination provision, passed with virtually no consideration of the specific problem of sex-based wage discrimination. See General Electric[4] Most significantly, there is absolutely nothing in the legislative history of Title VII which reveals an intent by Congress to repeal by implication the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. Quite the contrary, what little legislative history there is on the subject such as the comments of Senators Clark and Bennett and Representative Celler, and the contemporaneous interpretation of the EEOCindicates that Congress intended to incorporate the substantive standards of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII so that sex-based wage discrimination claims would be governed by the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act and by that standard alone. See discussion infra, at 190-197. In order to the reach the result it so desperately desires, the Court neatly solves the problem of this contrary legislative history by simply giving it "no weight." Ante, at 172, n. 12, 176, and n. But it cannot be doubted that Chief Justice Marshall stated the correct rule that "[w]here the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived" United In this case, when all of the pieces of legislative history are considered in toto, the Court's |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | pieces of legislative history are considered in toto, the Court's version of the legislative history of Title VII is barely plausible, say nothing of convincing. Title VII was first considered by the House, where the prohibition against sex discrimination was added on the House floor. When the bill reached the Senate it bypassed the *191 Senate Committee system and was presented directly to the full Senate. It was there that concern was expressed about the relation of the Title VII sex discrimination ban to the Equal Pay Act. In response to questions by Senator Dirksen, Senator Clark, the floor manager for the bill, prepared a memorandum in which he attempted to put to rest certain objections which he believed to be unfounded. Senator Clark's answer to Senator Dirksen reveals that Senator Clark believed that all cases of wage discrimination under Title VII would be treated under the standards of the Equal Pay Act: "Objection. The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the bill duplicate the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. But more than this, they extend far beyond the scope and coverage of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the limitations in that act with respect to equal work on jobs requiring equal skills in the same establishments, and thus, cut across different jobs. "Answer. The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour law, with different coverage and with numerous exemptions unlike title VII. Furthermore, under title VII, jobs can no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is a rational basis for discrimination on the ground of bona fide occupational qualification. The standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situation under title VII." 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964) (emphasis added). In this passage, Senator Clark asserted that the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII were necessary, notwithstanding the Equal Pay Act, because (a) the Equal Pay Act had numerous exemptions for various types of businesses, and (b) Title VII covered discrimination in access (e. g., assignment and promotion) to jobs, not just compensation. In addition, Senator Clark made clear that in the compensation area the equal work standard would continue to be the applicable *192 standard. He explained, in answer to Senator Dirksen's concern, that when different jobs were at issue, the Equal Pay Act's legal standardthe "equal work" standard would apply to limit the reach of Title VII. Thus Senator Clark rejected as unfounded the objections that the sex provisions of Title VII were unnecessary on the one |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | County of Washington v. Gunther | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110512/county-of-washington-v-gunther/ | sex provisions of Title VII were unnecessary on the one hand or extended beyond the equal work standard on the other. Notwithstanding Senator Clark's explanation, Senator Bennett remained concerned that, absent an explicit cross-reference to the Equal Pay Act, the "wholesale insertion" of the word "sex" in Title VII could nullify the carefully conceived Equal Pay Act standard. 110 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964). Accordingly, he offered, and the Senate accepted, the following amendment to Title VII: "It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [ 6 (d) of the Equal Pay Act]." Although the language of the Bennett Amendment is ambiguous, the most plausible interpretation of the Amendment is that it incorporates the substantive standard of the Equal Pay Actthe equal pay for equal work standardinto Title VII. A number of considerations support that view. In the first place, that interpretation is wholly consistent with, and in fact confirms, Senator Clark's earlier explanation of Title VII. Second, in the limited time available to Senator Bennett when he offered his amendmentthe time for debate having been limited by cloturehe explained the Amendment's purpose.[5] "Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members *193 of the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became effective only yesterday. "By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of this act. Now when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the word `sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word `sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act. "The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified." 110 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964) It is obvious that the principal way in which the Equal Pay Act could be "nullified" would be to allow plaintiffs unable to meet the "equal pay for equal work" standard to proceed under Title VII asserting some other theory of wage discrimination, such as "comparable worth." If plaintiffs can proceed under Title VII without showing that they satisfy the "equal work" criterion of the Equal Pay Act, one would expect |
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