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Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | Court said, no such purpose, the Arizona Act has both that effect and that purpose. Believing as we do that and Reitz are not in harmony with sound constitutional principle, they certainly should not be extended to cover this new and distinguishable IV One final argument merits discussion. The dissent points out that the District of Columbia Code contains an anti-discharge provision similar to that included in the Arizona Act. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia, D. C. Code Ann. 40-464 In light of our decision today, the sum of the argument is to draw into question the constitutional validity of the District's anti-discharge section, for as noted in the dissent the Constitution confers upon Congress the power "[t]o establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 4 (emphasis *655 added). It is asserted that "Congress must have regarded the two statutes as consistent and compatible," post, at 665, but such an argument assumes a modicum of legislative attention to the question of consistency. The D. C. Code section does, of course, refer specifically to discharges, but its passage may at most be viewed as evidencing an opinion of Congress on the meaning of the general discharge provision enacted by an earlier Congress and interpreted by this Court as early as 5. See In fact, in passing the initial and amended version of the District of Columbia financial responsibility law, Congress gave no attention to the interaction of the anti-discharge section with the Bankruptcy Act.[15] Moreover, the legislative history is *656 quite clear that when Congress dealt with the subject of financial responsibility laws for the District, it based its work upon the efforts of the uniform commissioners which had won enactment in other States.[16] Had Congress focused on the interaction between this minor subsection of the rather lengthy financial responsibility act and the discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Act, it would have been immediately apparent to the legislators that the only constitutional method for so defining the scope and effect of a discharge in bankruptcy was by amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, which by its terms is a uniform statute applicable in the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. 11 U.S. C. 1 (29). To follow any other course would obviously be to legislate in such a way that a discharge in bankruptcy means one thing in the District of Columbia and something else in the Statesdepending on state lawa result explicitly prohibited by the uniformity requirement in the constitutional authorization to Congress |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | by the uniformity requirement in the constitutional authorization to Congress to enact bankruptcy legislation. V From the foregoing, we think it clear that 28-1163 of the Arizona Safety Responsibility Act is constitutionally invalid. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. *657 MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART. I concur in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and dissent as to petitioner Adolfo Perez. I The slaughter on the of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars.[1] The country is fragmented about the current conflict in Southeast Asia, but I detect little genuine public concern about what takes place in our very midst and on our daily travel routes. See This being so, it is a matter of deep concern to me that today the Court lightly brushes aside and overrules two s where it had upheld a representative attempt by the States to regulate traffic and where the Court had considered and rejected the very Supremacy Clause argument that it now discovers to be so persuasive.[2] II I think it is desirable to stress certain factual details. The facts, of course, are only alleged, but for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are to accept them as true. Arizona is a community property state. Adolfo and Emma Perez are husband and wife. They were resident citizens of Arizona at the time of the accident in Tucson in July 1965. Mr. Perez was driving an automobile registered in his name. He was alone. Mrs. Perez was not with him and had nothing to do with her husband's *658 operation of the car on that day. The automobile, however, was the property of the marital community. Accompanying, and supposedly supportive of, the Perez complaint in the present suit, were affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Perez. These affidavits asserted that the Perezes had four minor children ages 6 to 17; that Emma is a housewife and not otherwise gainfully employed; that Emma's inability to drive has required their two older children, aged 17 and 14, to walk one and a half miles to high school and the third child, aged 9, one mile to elementary school, with consequent nosebleeding; that Emma's inability to drive has caused inconvenience and financial injury; and that Adolfo's inability to drive has caused inconvenience because he must rely on others for transportation or use public facilities or walk. III The Statutory Plan Arizona has a comprehensive statutory |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | walk. III The Statutory Plan Arizona has a comprehensive statutory plan for the regulation of vehicles upon its Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 28. Among the State's efforts to assure responsibility in this area of increasing national concern are its Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act (c. 4), its Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (c. 6), and its Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (c. 7).[3] The challenged 28-1163 is a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. The Act's provisions are not unfamiliar. There is imposed upon the Motor *659 Vehicle Division Superintendent the duty to suspend the license of each operator, and the registration of each owner, of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury or death or property damage to any one person in excess of $, except, among other situations, where proof of financial responsibility, as by the deposit of appropriate security or by the presence of a liability policy of stated minimum coverage, is afforded. 28-1142 28-1143, and 28-11. The suspension, once imposed, remains until the required security is deposited or until one year has elapsed and no action for damages has been instituted. 28-1144. If the registrant or operator fails, within 60 days, to satisfy an adverse motor vehicle final judgment, as defined in 28-1102 (2) the court clerk has the duty to notify the Superintendent and the latter to suspend the license and registration of the judgment debtor. 28-1161 and 28-1162 But if the judgment creditor consents in writing that the debtor be allowed to retain his license and registration, the Superintendent in his discretion may grant that privilege. 28-1162 Otherwise the suspension remains in effect until the judgment is satisfied. 28-1163 Payments of stated amounts are deemed to satisfy the judgment, 28-1164 and court-approved installment payment of the judgment will preserve the license and registration, 28-1165. IV Adolfo Perez Inasmuch as the is before us on the motion of defendants below to dismiss the Perez complaint that alleged Adolfo's driving alone, the collision, and the judgment in favor of the Pinkertons, it is established, for present purposes, that the Pinkerton judgment was *660 based on Adolfo's negligence in driving the Perez vehicle. Adolfo emphasizes, and I recognize, that under Art. I, 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress has possessed the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"; that, of course, this power, when exercised, as it has been since 1800, is "exclusive," New Lamp Chimney and "unrestricted and paramount," International Shoe ; that one of the |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | "unrestricted and paramount," International Shoe ; that one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to "relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh" ; and that a bankrupt by his discharge receives "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre&emul;xisting debt," Local Loan From these general and accepted principles it is argued that 28-1163 with its insistence upon post-discharge payment as a condition for license and registration restoration, is violative of the Bankruptcy Act and, thus, of the Supremacy As Mr. Perez acknowledges in his brief here, the argument is not new. It was raised with respect to a New York statute in and was rejected there by a five-to-four vote: "The use of the public by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees * and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process. "The penalty which 94-b imposes for injury due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety." -37. Left specifically unanswered in that but acknowledged as a "serious question," was the claim that interim amendments of the statutes gave the creditor control over the initiation and duration of the suspension and thus violated the Bankruptcy Act. The dissenters, speaking through MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concluded that that constitutional issue "cannot be escaped. unless we are to overlook the realities of collection methods." Nine years ago, the same argument again was advanced, this time with respect to Utah's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and again was rejected. There, Utah's provisions relating to duration of suspension and restoration, more stringent than those of New York, were challenged. It was claimed that the statutes made the State a "collecting agent for the creditor rather than furthering an interest |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | "collecting agent for the creditor rather than furthering an interest in highway safety," *662 and that suspension that could be perpetual "only renders the collection pressure more effective." 369 U.S., There was a troublesome jurisdictional issue in the the decision as to which was later overruled, Swift & but on the merits the Court, by a five-to-three vote, sustained all the Utah statutes then under attack:[4] "But the lesson Zavelo [v. Reeves, ] and Spalding [v. New York ex rel. Backus, ] teach is that the Bankruptcy Act does not forbid a State to attach any consequence whatsoever to a debt which has been discharged. "The Utah Safety Responsibility Act leaves the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the discharged debt. Certainly some inroad is made on the consequences of bankruptcy if the creditor can exert pressure to recoup a discharged debt, or part of it, through the leverage of the State's licensing and registration power. But the exercise of this power is deemed vital to the State's well-being, and, from the point of view of its interests, is wholly unrelated to the considerations which propelled Congress to enact a national bankruptcy law. There are here overlapping interests which cannot be uncritically resolved by exclusive regard to the money consequences of enforcing a widely adopted measure for safeguarding life and safety. ". At the heart of the matter are the complicated demands of our federalism. "Are the differences between the Utah statute and *663 that of New York so significant as to make a constitutionally decisive difference? A State may properly decide, as forty-five have done, that the prospect of a judgment that must be paid in order to regain driving privileges serves as a substantial deterrent to unsafe driving. We held in Reitz that it might impose this requirement despite a discharge, in order not to exempt some drivers from appropriate protection of public safety by easy refuge in bankruptcy. To whatever extent these provisions make it more probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge, each no less reflects the State's important deterrent interest. Congress had no thought of amending the Bankruptcy Act when it adopted this law for the District of Columbia; we do not believe Utah's identical statute conflicts with it either. "Utah is not using its police power as a devious collecting agency under the pressure of organized creditors. Victims of careless car drivers are a wholly diffused group of shifting and uncertain composition, not even remotely united by a common financial interest. The Safety Responsibility Act is not an Act for the |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | The Safety Responsibility Act is not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors. It is not directed to bankrupts as such. Though in a particular a discharged bankrupt who wants to have his rightfully suspended license and registration restored may have to pay the amount of a discharged debt, or part of it, the bearing of the statute on the purposes served by bankruptcy legislation is essentially tangential." -174 MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissented on the ground that Utah Code Ann. 41-12-15 (1953), essentially identical to Arizona's 28-1163 *664 operated to deny the judgment debtor the federal immunity given him by 17 of the Bankruptcy Act and, hence, violated the Supremacy -185. The Perezes in their brief, p. 7, acknowledge that the Arizona statutes challenged here "are not unlike the Utah ones discussed in" Accordingly, Adolfo Perez is forced to urge that Reitz and the remaining portion of that bears upon the subject be overruled. The Court bows to that argument. I am not prepared to overrule those two s and to undermine their control over Adolfo Perez' posture here. I would adhere to the rulings and I would hold that the States have an appropriate and legitimate concern with highway safety; that the means Arizona has adopted with respect to one in Adolfo's position (that is, the driver whose negligence has caused harm to others and whose judgment debt based on that negligence remains unsatisfied) in its attempt to assure driving competence and care on the part of its licensees, as well as to protect others, is appropriate state legislation; and that the Arizona statute, like its Utah counterpart, despite the tangential effect upon bankruptcy, does not operate in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act or conflict with it to the extent it may rightly be said to violate the Supremacy Other factors of significance are also to be noted: 1. The Court struggles to explain away the parallel District of Columbia situation installed by Congress itself. Section 40-464 of the D. C. Code Ann. in all pertinent parts is identical with Arizona's 28-1163 The only difference is in the final word, namely, "article" in the Arizona statute and "chapter" in the District's. The District of Columbia statute was enacted as 48 of Pub. Law 365 of May 25, 1954, effective one year later, This is long after the Bankruptcy Act *665 was placed on the books and, indeed, long after this Court's decision in that a personal injury judgment is a provable claim in bankruptcy. Surely, as the Court noted in 369 U. S., |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | bankruptcy. Surely, as the Court noted in 369 U. S., -174, "Congress had no thought of amending the Bankruptcy Act when it adopted this law for the District of Columbia." See Congress must have regarded the two statutes as consistent and compatible, and cannot have thought otherwise for the last 35 years.[5] If the statutes truly are in tension, then I would suppose that the later one, that is, 40-464, would be the one to prevail. But, if so, we then have something less than the "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States" that Art. I, 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution commands, for the law would be one way in Arizona (and, by the present overruling of Reitz and in New York and in Utah) and the other way in the District of Columbia. Unfortunately, such is the dilemma in which the Court's decision today leaves us. 2. Arizona's 28-1163 also has its counterparts in the statutes of no less than 44 other States.[6] It is, after * all, or purports to be, a uniform Act. I suspect the Court's decision today will astonish those members of the Congress who were responsible for the District of Columbia Code provision, and will equally astonish the legislatures of those 44 States that absorbed assurance from Reitz and that the provision withstands constitutional attack. 3. The Court rationalizes today's decision by saying that went beyond Reitz and that the present goes beyond and that that is too much. It would justify this by noting the Arizona Supreme Court's characterization of the Arizona statute as one for the protection of the public from financial hardship and by concluding, *6 from this description, that the statute is not a public highway safety measure, but rather a financial one protective, I assume the implication is, of insurance companies. The Arizona court's characterization of its statute, I must concede, is not a fortunate one. However, I doubt that that court, in evolving that description, had any idea of the consequences to be wrought by this Court's decision today. I am not willing to say that the description in embraced the only purpose of the State's legislation. Section 28-1163 is a part of the State's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act and does not constitute an isolated subchapter of that Act concerned only with financial well-being of the victims of drivers' negligence. In any event, as the Court's opinion makes clear, the decision today would be the same however the Arizona court had described its statute. 4. While stare decisis "is no immutable principle,"[7] |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | its statute. 4. While stare decisis "is no immutable principle,"[7] as a glance at the Court's decisions over the last 35 years, or over almost any period for that matter, will disclose, it seems to me that the principle does have particular validity and application in a situation such as the one confronting the Court in this Here is a statute concerning motor vehicle responsibility, a substantive matter peculiarly within the competence of the State rather than the National Government. Here is a serious and conscientious attempt by a State to legislate and do something about the problem that, in terms of death and bodily injury and adverse civilian effect, is so alarming. Here is a statute widely adopted by the several States and legitimately assumed by the lawmakers of those States to be consistent with the Bankruptcy Act, an assumption rooted in positive, albeit divided, decision *668 by this Court, not once, but twice. And here is a statute the Congress itself, the very author of the Bankruptcy Act, obviously considered consistent therewith. I fear that the Court today makes stare decisis meaningless and downgrades it to the level of a tool to be used or cast aside as convenience dictates. I doubt if Justices Stone, Reed, Frankfurter, Murphy, Warren, Clark, HARLAN, BRENNAN, and STEWART, who constituted the respective majorities on the merits in Reitz and were all that wrong. 5. Adolfo's affidavit protestation of hardship goes no further than to assert a resulting reliance upon friends and neighbors or upon public transportation or upon walking to cover the seven miles from his home to his place of work; this is inconvenience, perhaps, even in this modern day when we are inclined to equate convenience with necessity and to eschew what prior generations routinely accepted as part of the day's labor, but it falls far short of the "great harm" and "irreparable injury" that he otherwise asserts only in general and conclusory terms. Perez' professed inconvenience stands vividly and starkly in contrast with his victims' injuries. But as is so often the the victim, once damaged, is seemingly beyond concern. What seems to become important is the perpetrator's inconvenience. 6. It is conceded that Arizona constitutionally could prescribe liability insurance as a condition precedent to the issuance of a license and registration. V Emma Perez Emma Perez' posture is entirely different. Except for possible emotional strain resulting from her husband's predicament, she was in no way involved in the Pinkerton accident. She was not present when it occurred and no negligence or nonfeasance on her part contributed to it. |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | no negligence or nonfeasance on her part contributed to it. *669 Emma thus finds herself in a position where, having done no wrong, she nevertheless is deprived of her operator's license. This comes about because the Perez vehicle concededly was community property under 25-211 and because, for some reason, the judgment was confessed as to her as well as against her husband. As one amicus brief describes it, Emma, a fault-free driver, "is without her license solely because she is the impecunious wife of an impecunious, negligent driver in a community property state." At this point a glance at the Arizona community property system perhaps is indicated. Emma Perez was a proper nominal defendant in the Pinkerton lawsuit, see 3 P.2d 245 but she was not a necessary party there. First National ; However, a judgment against a marital community based upon the husband's tort committed without the wife's knowledge or consent does not bind her separate property. (19). The judgment would, of course, bind the community property vehicle to the extent permitted by Arizona law. See 33-1124. In Arizona during coverture personal property may be disposed of only by the husband. 25-211 The community personalty is subject to the husband's dominance in management and control. The wife has no power to make contracts binding the common property. 25-214 Her power to contract is limited to necessaries for herself and the children. 25-215. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, she could neither enter into a contract for the purchase of an automobile nor acquire insurance upon it except by use of her separate property. *0 The Court of Appeals ruled that Mrs. Perez' posture, as the innocent wife who had no connection with the negligent conduct that led to the confession and entry of judgment, was, under the logic of and Reitz, "a distinction without a significant difference" even though "she had no alternative." The court opined that the spouse can acquire an automobile with her separate funds and that negligent operation of it on separate business would then not call into question the liability of the other spouse. It described Emma's legal status as "closely analogous" to that of the automobile owner who permits another person to drive, and it regarded as authority s upholding a State's right to revoke the owner's license and registration after judgment had been entered against him and remains unsatisfied. The husband was described, under Arizona law, as the managing agent of the wife in the control of the community automobile, and "the driver's licenses of both husband and wife are an integral |
Justice White | 1,971 | 6 | majority | Perez v. Campbell | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108350/perez-v-campbell/ | driver's licenses of both husband and wife are an integral part of the ball of wax, which is the basis of the Arizona community property laws." The loss of her license "is the price an Arizona wife must pay for negligent driving by her husband of the community vehicle" when the resulting judgment is not paid. For what it is worth, Emma's affidavit is far more persuasive of hardship than Adolfo's. She relates the family automobile to the children and their medical needs and to family purchasing at distant discount stores. But I need not, and would not, decide her on the representations in her affidavit. I conclude that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, in its application to Emma Perez and her operator's license, does not comport with the purpose and policy of the Bankruptcy Act and that it effects a result at odds with the Supremacy Emma's subordinate *1 position with respect to the community's personal property, and her complete lack of connection with the Pinkerton accident and with the negligence that occasioned it, are strange accompaniments for the deprival of her operator's license. The nexus to the state police power, claimed to exist because of her marriage to the negligent Adolfo and the community property character of the accident vehicle, is, for me, elusive and unconvincing. The argument based on Arizona's appropriate concern with highway safety, that prompts me to adhere to the Reitz- rationale for Adolfo, is drained of all force and persuasion when applied to the innocent Emma. Despite the underlying community property legal theory, Emma had an incident of ownership in the family automobile only because it was acquired during coverture. She had no "control" over Adolfo's use of the vehicle and she could not forbid his use as she might have been able to do were it her separate property. Thus, the state purpose in deterring the reckless driver and his unsafe driving has only undeserved punitive application to Emma. She is personally penalized not only with respect to the operation of the Perez car but also with respect to any automobile. I therefore would hold that under these circumstances the State's action, under 28-1163 in withholding from Emma her operator's license is not, within the language of Reitz, an appropriate means for Arizona "to insure competence and care on the part of [Emma] and to protect others" using the and that it interferes with the paramount federal interest in her bankruptcy discharge and violates the Supremacy [For Appendix to opinion of BLACKMUN, J., see post, p. 2.] *2 |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | Indian tribes are generally entitled to immunity from suit. This Court has considered the scope of that immu- nity in a number of circumstances. This case presents an ordinary negligence action brought against a tribal em- ployee in state court under state law. We granted certio- rari to resolve whether an Indian tribe’s sovereign immu- nity bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment and for which the employees are indemnified by the tribe. We hold that, in a suit brought against a tribal employee in his individual capacity, the employee, not the tribe, is the real party in interest and the tribe’s sovereign immu- nity is not implicated. That an employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time the tort was committed is not, on its own, sufficient to bar a suit against that employee on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity. We hold further that an indemnification provi- sion does not extend a tribe’s sovereign immunity where it otherwise would not reach. Accordingly, we reverse and 2 LEWIS v. CLARKE Opinion of the Court remand. I A The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut traces its lineage back centuries. Originally part of the Lenni Le- nape, the Tribe formed the independent Mohegan Tribe under the leadership of Sachem Uncas in the early 1600’s. M. Fawcett, The Lasting of the Mohegans 7, 11–13 In 1994, in accordance with the petition procedures estab- lished by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Tribe attained federal recognition.1 See ; Mohegan Const., Preamble and Art. II. As one means of maintaining its economic self- sufficiency, the Tribe entered into a Gaming Compact with the State of Connecticut pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, U.S. C. et seq. The compact authorizes the Tribe to conduct gaming on its land, subject to certain conditions including establishment of the Gaming Disputes Court. See ); Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, Mohegan Tribe Code 3–248(a) The Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, an arm of the Tribe, exercises the powers of the Mohegan Tribe over tribal gaming activities. Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, Mohegan Tribe Code Of particular relevance here, Mohegan law sets out —————— 1 There are currently 567 federally recognized Indian and Alaska Native entities. –26832 ; see also Native Hawaiian Law: A Treatise 303–324 (M. MacKenzie ed. 2015) (discuss- ing the existing relationships between the U. S. Government and federally recognized tribes and other indigenous groups in the United States); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2012 and Supp. 2015); V. Deloria & R. DeMallie, |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | Law (2012 and Supp. 2015); V. Deloria & R. DeMallie, Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions, 1775–1979 (1999). Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 3 Opinion of the Court sovereign immunity and indemnification policies applica- ble to disputes arising from gaming activities. The Gam- ing Authority has waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in the Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court. Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, Mohegan Tribe Code Neither the Tribe nor the Gaming Au- thority has consented to suit for claims arising under Connecticut state law. See Mohegan Const., Art. IX, Mohegan Tribe Code see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, (ob- serving that Indian tribes have not surrendered their immunity against suits by States). Further, Mohegan Tribe Code provides that the Gaming Authority “shall save harmless and indemnify its Officer or Em- ployee from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, or suit by reason of his or her alleged negligence if the Officer or Employee is found to have been acting in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment.” The Gaming Author- ity does not indemnify employees who engage in “wanton, reckless or malicious” activity. Mohegan Tribe Code B Petitioners Brian and Michelle Lewis were driving down Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut, when a limousine driven by respondent William Clarke hit their vehicle from behind. Clarke, a Gaming Authority employee, was transporting patrons of the Mohegan Sun Casino to their homes. For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that Clarke caused the accident. The Lewises filed suit against Clarke in his individual capacity in Connecticut state court, and Clarke moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity. See (Super. Ct. Conn., Sept. 10, 2014) (Cole-Chu, J.). Clarke 4 LEWIS v. CLARKE Opinion of the Court argued that because the Gaming Authority, an arm of the Tribe, was entitled to sovereign immunity, he, an employee of the Gaming Authority acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, was similarly entitled to sovereign immunity against suit. According to Clarke, denying the motion would abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. The trial court denied Clarke’s motion to dismiss. at *8. The court agreed with the Lewises that the sovereign immunity analysis should focus on the remedy sought in their complaint. To that end, the court identified Clarke, not the Gaming Authority or the Tribe, as the real party in interest because the damages remedy sought was solely against Clarke and would |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | the damages remedy sought was solely against Clarke and would in no way affect the Tribe’s ability to govern itself independently. The court therefore concluded that tribal sovereign immunity was not impli- cated. at –*8. It also rejected Clarke’s alternative argument that because the Gaming Authority was obligated to indemnify him pursuant to Mohegan Tribe Code and would end up paying the damages, he should prevail under the remedy analysis. The trial court reasoned that a “voluntary undertaking cannot be used to extend sovereign immunity where it did not otherwise exist.” The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding that tribal sovereign immunity did bar the suit. 320 Conn. 706, The court agreed with Clarke that “because he was acting within the scope of his em- ployment for the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority and the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority is an arm of the Mohegan Tribe, tribal sovereign immunity bars the plain- tiffs’ claims against him.” Of particular significance to the court was ensuring that “plaintiffs cannot circumvent tribal immunity by merely naming the defendant, an employee of the tribe, when the complaint concerns actions taken within the scope of his Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 5 Opinion of the Court duties and the complaint does not allege, nor have the plaintiffs offered any other evidence, that he acted outside the scope of his authority.” To do otherwise, the court reasoned, would “ ‘eviscerate’ ” the protections of tribal immunity. 135 A. 3d, at 684 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the court determined that Clarke was entitled to sovereign immunity on the sole basis that he was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, –686, it did not consider whether Clarke should be entitled to sovereign immunity on the basis of the indemnification statute. We granted certiorari to consider whether tribal sover- eign immunity bars the Lewises’ suit against Clarke, 579 U. S. and we now reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut. II Two issues require our resolution: (1) whether the sov- ereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual- capacity damages against tribal employees for torts com- mitted within the scope of their employment; and (2) what role, if any, a tribe’s decision to indemnify its employees plays in this analysis. We decide this case under the framework of our precedents regarding tribal immunity. A Our cases establish that, in the context of lawsuits against state and federal employees or entities, courts should look to whether the sovereign is the real party in interest to determine whether sovereign immunity bars |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | real party in interest to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the suit. See In making this assessment, courts may not simply rely on the characterization of the parties in the complaint, but rather must determine in the first instance whether the remedy sought is truly against the sovereign. See, e.g., Ex parte 6 6 U.S. 490, If, for example, an action is in essence against a State even if the State is not a named party, then the State is the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amend- ment’s protection. For this reason, an arm or instrumen- tality of the State generally enjoys the same immunity as the sovereign itself. E.g., Regents of Univ. of 519 U.S. 4, Similarly, lawsuits brought against employees in their official capacity “repre- sent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,” and they may also be barred by sovereign immunity. (internal quotation marks omitted). The distinction between individual- and official-capacity suits is paramount here. In an official-capacity claim, the relief sought is only nominally against the official and in fact is against the official’s office and thus the sovereign itself. 71 (1989); 620–622 (1963). This is why, when officials sued in their official capacities leave office, their successors automatically assume their role in the litigation. 502 U.S., at The real party in interest is the government entity, not the named official. See 663–665 (1974). “Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a govern- ment officer for actions taken under color of state law.” 502 U.S., at ; see also at 27–31 (discharged employees entitled to bring personal damages action against state auditor general); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, (1971). “[O]fficers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals,” and the real party in interest is the individual, not the sovereign. The identity of the real party in interest dictates what Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 7 Opinion of the Court immunities may be available. Defendants in an official- capacity action may assert sovereign immunity. An officer in an individual-capacity action, on the other hand, may be able to assert personal immunity defenses, such as, for example, absolute prose- cutorial immunity in certain circumstances. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, But sovereign immunity “does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and personal liability.” – 31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see B There is no reason to depart from these general rules in the context of tribal sovereign immunity. |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | these general rules in the context of tribal sovereign immunity. It is apparent that these general principles foreclose Clarke’s sovereign immunity defense in this case. This is a negligence action arising from a tort committed by Clarke on an interstate highway within the State of Connecticut. The suit is brought against a tribal employee operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment but on state lands, and the judgment will not operate against the Tribe. This is not a suit against Clarke in his official capacity. It is simply a suit against Clarke to recover for his personal actions, which “will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign’s property.” We are cognizant of the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s con- cern that plaintiffs not circumvent tribal sovereign im- munity. But here, that immunity is simply not in play. Clarke, not the Gaming Authority, is the real party in interest. In ruling that Clarke was immune from this suit solely because he was acting within the scope of his employment, the court extended sovereign immunity for tribal employ- ees beyond what common-law sovereign immunity princi- 8 LEWIS v. CLARKE Opinion of the Court ples would recognize for either state or federal employees. See, e.g., –168. The protection offered by tribal sovereign immunity here is no broader than the protection offered by state or federal sovereign immunity. Accordingly, under established sovereign immunity principles, the Gaming Authority’s immunity does not, in these circumstances, bar suit against Clarke.2 III The conclusion above notwithstanding, Clarke argues that the Gaming Authority is the real party in interest here because it is required by Mohegan Tribe Code to indemnify Clarke for any adverse judgment.3 A We have never before had occasion to decide whether an indemnification clause is sufficient to extend a sovereign immunity defense to a suit against an employee in his individual capacity. We hold that an indemnification —————— 2 There are, of course, personal immunity defenses distinct from sov- ereign immunity. E.g., 811–815 (1982). Clarke argues for the first time before this Court that one particular form of personal immunity is available to him here—official immunity. See That defense is not properly before us now, however, given that Clarke’s motion to dismiss was based solely on tribal sovereign immunity. See Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 455 (2007). 3 As noted above, the Supreme Court of Connecticut did not reach whether Clarke should be entitled to sovereign immunity on the basis of the indemnification statute. We nevertheless consider the issue fairly |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | of the indemnification statute. We nevertheless consider the issue fairly included within the question presented, as it is a purely legal question that is an integral part of Clarke’s sovereign immunity argu- ment and that was both raised to and passed on by the trial court. See (“[T]he purely legal question on which [petitioner’s] claim of immunity turns is appropriate for our immediate resolution notwithstanding that it was not addressed by the Court of Appeals” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 9 Opinion of the Court provision cannot, as a matter of law, extend sovereign immunity to individual employees who would otherwise not fall under its protective cloak. Our holding follows naturally from the principles dis- cussed above. Indeed, we have applied these same princi- ples to a different question before—whether a state in- strumentality may invoke the State’s immunity from suit even when the Federal Government has agreed to indem- nify that instrumentality against adverse judgments. In Regents of Univ. of an individual brought suit against the University of California, a public university of the State of California, for breach of contract related to his employ- ment at a laboratory operated by the university pursuant to a contract with the Federal Government. We held that the indemnification provision did not divest the state instrumentality of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 519 U.S., at 426. Our analysis turned on where the potential legal liability lay, not from whence the money to pay the damages award ultimately came. Because the lawsuit bound the university, we held, the Eleventh Amendment applied to the litigation even though the damages award would ultimately be paid by the federal Department of Energy. at 429–431. Our reasoning remains the same. The critical inquiry is who may be legally bound by the court’s adverse judgment, not who will ultimately pick up the tab.4 Here, the Connecticut courts exercise no jurisdiction over the Tribe or the Gaming Authority, and their judg- ments will not bind the Tribe or its instrumentalities in —————— 4 Our holding in is not to the contrary. There the immunity ques- tion turned on whether the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation was a state agency cloaked with Eleventh Amendment immunity such that any judgment “must be paid out of a State’s treasury.” 51–52 Here, unlike in Hess, the damages judgment would not come from the sovereign. 10 LEWIS v. CLARKE Opinion of the Court any way. The Tribe’s indemnification provision does not somehow convert the suit against Clarke into a suit against the sovereign; when Clarke is sued in his individ- ual capacity, |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | sovereign; when Clarke is sued in his individ- ual capacity, he is held responsible only for his individual wrongdoing. Moreover, indemnification is not a certainty here. Clarke will not be indemnified by the Gaming Au- thority should it determine that he engaged in “wanton, reckless, or malicious” activity. Mohegan Tribe Code 52. That determination is not necessary to the disposition of the Lewises’ suit against Clarke in the Connecticut state courts, which is a separate legal matter. B Clarke notes that courts have extended sovereign im- munity to private healthcare insurance companies under certain circumstances. See, e.g., ; Pine View Gardens, Inc. v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1073, 1074–1075 (CADC 1973); Brief for Respondent 19, n. 4. But, these cases rest on the proposition that the fiscal intermediaries are essentially state instrumentali- ties, as the governing regulations make clear. See 42 CFR (providing that the Medicare Administra- tor “is the real party of interest in any litigation involving the administration of the program”). It is well established in our precedent that a suit against an arm or instrumen- tality of the State is treated as one against the State itself. See Regents of Univ. of We have not before treated a lawsuit against an individual em- ployee as one against a state instrumentality, and Clarke offers no persuasive reason to do so now. Nor have we ever held that a civil rights suit under 42 U.S. C. against a state officer in his individual capacity implicates the Eleventh Amendment and a Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 11 Opinion of the Court State’s sovereign immunity from suit.5 Federal appellate courts that have considered the indemnity question have rejected the argument that an indemnity statute brings the Eleventh Amendment into play in actions. See, e.g., ; ; These cases rely on the concern that originally drove the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment—the protection of the States against involuntary liability. See But States institute indemnification policies vol- untarily. And so, indemnification provisions do not impli- cate one of the underlying rationales for state sovereign immunity—a government’s ability to make its own deci- sions about “the allocation of scarce resources.” Alden, 527 U.S., at 751. Finally, our conclusion that indemnification provisions do not alter the real-party-in-interest analysis for purposes of sovereign immunity is consistent with the practice that applies in the contexts of diversity of citizenship and joinder. In assessing diversity jurisdiction, courts look to the real parties to the controversy. Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee, Applying this principle, courts below have agreed that the fact that a third party |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | majority | Lewis v. Clarke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4385683/lewis-v-clarke/ | below have agreed that the fact that a third party indemnifies one of the named parties to the case does not, as a general rule, influence the diversity analysis. See, e.g., (CA5 2003); E. R. Squibb & Sons, 160 F.3d 9, They have similarly held that a party does not become a required party for joinder purposes under Federal Rule of Civil —————— 5 A suit against a state officer in his official, rather than individual, capacity might implicate the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. 12 LEWIS v. CLARKE Opinion of the Court Procedure 19 simply by virtue of indemnifying one of the named parties. See, e.g., ; Rochester Methodist 1016–1017 (CA8 1984). In sum, although tribal sovereign immunity is implicated when the suit is brought against individual officers in their official capacities, it is simply not present when the claim is made against those employees in their individual capacities. An indemnification statute such as the one at issue here does not alter the analysis. Clarke may not avail himself of a sovereign immunity defense. IV The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–1500 BRIAN LEWIS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM CLARKE ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT [April 2017] JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. |
per_curiam | 1,983 | 200 | per_curiam | Rushen v. Spain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111051/rushen-v-spain/ | Respondent was one of six inmates involved in a 1971 San Quentin Prison escape that resulted in the death of three prisoners and three corrections officers. The State of California jointly tried respondent and five other prisoners on numerous charges, including murder, conspiracy, and assault. The prosecution attempted to show that the Black Panther Party had organized the escape attempt and to link respondent to the conspiracy through his membership in that Party. Respondent's defense was that state police had organized the breakout and ambushed the escapees to eliminate an important faction of the Black Panther Party. During voir dire, the court admonished prospective jurors to reveal their associations, if any, with crimes of violence and their attitudes toward radical groups, including the Black Panthers. Patricia Fagan, who became a juror, testified at voir dire that she had no personal knowledge of violent crimes as a witness, victim, or otherwise and that she did not associate the Black Panther Party with any form of violence. However, in the course of the 17-month-long trial, evidence was introduced of a crime, unrelated to those at issue in respondent's trial, of which juror Fagan had some knowledge. A defense witness identified a Black Panther named Pratt as a police informant involved in the alleged *116 police plot. The prosecution sought to impeach this witness by introducing evidence that Pratt was in custody for the 1968 murder of a Santa Monica woman during the entire period at issue. This evidence triggered juror Fagan's recollection of the murder of a childhood friend, who was the woman Pratt had been convicted of killing. Upon hearing the evidence about Pratt, juror Fagan twice went to the trial judge's chambers to tell him of her personal acquaintance with Pratt's 1968 murder victim. She told him that she feared that she might cry if the 1968 murder were explored further at trial. The judge asked her on each occasion whether her disposition of the case would be affected. She assured him that it would not. The judge told her not to be concerned and that the matter probably would not be mentioned again. He made no record of either conversation, and he did not inform the defendants or their counsel about them. At the close of trial, the jury found respondent guilty of two counts of murder and of conspiracy to escape, and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The jury also convicted two other defendants of assault, and found insufficient evidence to support the numerous remaining charges. Respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment. Counsel for respondent |
per_curiam | 1,983 | 200 | per_curiam | Rushen v. Spain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111051/rushen-v-spain/ | charges. Respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment. Counsel for respondent subsequently learned of the ex parte communications between judge and juror and moved for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, juror Fagan testified that she had not remembered her friend's death during voir dire and that her subsequent recollection did not affect her ability impartially to judge respondent's innocence or guilt. She admitted telling other jurors that she personally knew Pratt's 1968 murder victim, but denied making any disparaging remarks about the Black Panther Party. The trial judge concluded that the ex parte communications "lacked any significance" and that respondent suffered no prejudice therefrom. See App. C to Pet. for Cert. 22. Accordingly, he denied the motion for new trial. *117 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. It found the ex parte communication to be federal constitutional error that was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt" because the jury's deliberations, as a whole, were unbiased. The California Supreme Court denied review. Respondent then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court issued the writ, ruling that the ex parte communications between judge and juror violated both respondent's right to be present during all critical stages of the proceedings and his right to be represented by counsel. Furthermore, the District Court held that automatic reversal was necessary because the absence of a contemporaneous record made intelligent application of the harmless-error standard impossible. Alternatively, it concluded that a post-trial hearing could not establish that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it found that respondent's conviction had to be vacated because of the state court's failure to hold a contemporaneous hearing about, or to make a contemporaneous record of, the ex parte communication. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the basis that an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error.[1] Judgment order reported at We emphatically disagree. Our cases recognize that the right to personal presence at all critical stages of the trial and the right to counsel are fundamental rights of each criminal defendant.[2] "At the same time and without detracting from *118 the fundamental importance of [these rights], we have implicitly recognized the necessity for preserving society's interest in the administration of criminal justice. Cases involving [such constitutional] deprivations are [therefore] subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." United ; see also In this spirit, we have previously noted that the |
per_curiam | 1,983 | 200 | per_curiam | Rushen v. Spain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111051/rushen-v-spain/ | also In this spirit, we have previously noted that the Constitution "does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation [because] it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote." There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial. The lower federal *119 courts' conclusion that an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error ignores these day-to-day realities of courtroom life and undermines society's interest in the administration of criminal justice.[3] This is not to say that ex parte communications between judge and juror are never of serious concern or that a federal court on habeas may never overturn a conviction for prejudice resulting from such communications. When an ex parte communication relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the communication to counsel for all parties.[4] The prejudicial effect of a failure to do so, however, can normally be determined by a post-trial hearing. The adequacy of any remedy is determined solely by its ability *120 to mitigate constitutional error, if any, that has occurred. See, e. g., United ; Post-trial hearings are adequately tailored to this task. See, e. g., and n. 8; Remmer v. United The final decision whether the alleged constitutional error was harmless is one of federal law. Nevertheless, the factual findings arising out of the state courts' post-trial hearings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S. C. 2254(d); The substance of the ex parte communications and their effect on juror impartiality are questions of historical fact entitled to this presumption. Thus, they must be determined, in the first instance, by state courts and deferred to, in the absence of "convincing evidence" to the contrary, by the federal courts. See Here, both the State's trial and appellate courts concluded that the jury's deliberations, as a whole, were not biased. This finding of "fact" on a question the state courts were in a far better position than the federal courts to answer deserves a "high measure of deference," and may be set aside only if it "lack[s] even `fair support' in the record." The absence of a contemporaneous recording will rarely deprive the finding of "even `fai[r] suppor[t]' in the record." See The post-trial hearing in this case created more |
per_curiam | 1,983 | 200 | per_curiam | Rushen v. Spain | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111051/rushen-v-spain/ | record." See The post-trial hearing in this case created more than adequate support for the conclusion that juror Fagan's presence on the jury did not prejudice respondent. The 1968 murder was not related to the crimes at issue in the trial. Pratt was not connected to any of the offenses for which respondent was convicted, and he did not testify at the trial. Juror Fagan never willfully concealed her association with the Santa Monica crime, and she repeatedly testified that, upon *121 recollection, the incident did not affect her impartiality.[5] She turned to the most natural source of information the trial judge to disclose the information she should have recalled but failed to recall during voir dire. Their ex parte communication was innocuous. They did not discuss any fact in controversy or any law applicable to the case. The judge simply assured her that there was no cause for concern. Thus, the state courts had convincing evidence that the jury's deliberations, as a whole, were not biased by the undisclosed communication of juror Fagan's recollection. The lower federal courts should have deferred to this presumptively correct state-court finding and therefore should have found the alleged constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.[6] *122 Accordingly, we grant the motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BRENNAN dissents from this summary disposition. He would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for oral argument. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Butterworth v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112396/butterworth-v-smith/ | A Florida statute, with certain limited exceptions, prohibits a grand jury witness from ever disclosing testimony which he gave before that body. We hold that insofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Respondent was a reporter for the Charlotte Herald-News in Charlotte County, Florida. While writing a series of newspaper articles, he obtained information relevant to alleged improprieties committed by the Charlotte County State Attorney's Office and Sheriff's Department. A special prosecutor appointed to investigate the allegations called respondent to testify before a special grand jury which had been convened as part of the investigation. At the time he testified, respondent was warned by the special prosecutor's staff not to reveal his testimony in any manner, and that such revelation could result in a criminal prosecution for violating Section 905.27 provides in pertinent part: *627 "(1) A grand juror or any other person appearing before the grand jury shall not disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury except when required by a court to disclose the testimony for the purpose of: "(a) Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the testimony given by the witness before the court; "(b) Determining whether the witness is guilty of perjury; or "(c) Furthering Justice. "(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose, divulge, or communicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to be published, broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other person, in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the content, gist, or import thereof, except when such testimony is or has been disclosed in a court proceeding.'[1] *628 After the grand jury terminated its investigation, respondent set out to publish a news story and perhaps a book about the subject matter of the investigation, a publication which would include respondent's testimony and experiences in dealing with the grand jury. He sued in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, seeking a declaration that 905.27 was an unconstitutional abridgment of speech, and an injunction preventing the State from prosecuting him. The District Court granted summary judgment to the State, holding that Florida was entitled to make the judgment that a permanent and total ban on the disclosure of witness testimony was necessary to the proper functioning of the grand jury, and that "this is the exceptional case where a severe |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Butterworth v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112396/butterworth-v-smith/ | and that "this is the exceptional case where a severe infringement on rights under the First Amendment is permissible." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Recognizing that the "question presented by this appeal is a narrow one," the court held that "the provisions *629 of section 905.27 prohibiting `any other person' from disclosing the nature of grand jury testimony are unconstitutional to the extent that they apply to witnesses who speak about their own testimony after the grand jury investigation is terminated." While acknowledging that "the freedom of speech afforded by the first amendment is not absolute," the court concluded that the competing state interests were not sufficiently compelling to warrant the imposition of criminal sanctions on witnesses who revealed the content of their own grand jury testimony. In reaching its determination, the court relied principally on our decision in and the fact that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure governing grand jury secrecy imposes no such obligation on grand jury We granted certiorari, and now affirm.[2] Historically, the grand jury has served an important role in the administration of criminal justice. Although the English forerunner of the modern grand jury served primarily as a prosecutorial and investigative arm of the Crown and was designed to enhance the government's authority, by the 17th century the grand jury had developed an equally important function to safeguard citizens against an overreaching Crown and unfounded accusations. See 1 S. Beale & W. Grand Jury Law and Practice 1:02, pp. 5-8 (1986). The tradition of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings evolved, at least partially, as a means of implementing this latter function by ensuring the impartiality of that body. Douglas Oil of ; Brown, The Witness and Grand Jury Secrecy, Am. J. Crim. Law 169, 170 (1983). Today, grand jury secrecy remains important to safeguard a number of different interests. "We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. See, e. g., United ]. In particular, we have noted several distinct interests served by safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Butterworth v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112396/butterworth-v-smith/ | risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule." Douglas Oil At the same time, we have recognized that the invocation of grand jury interests is not "some talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections." United Indeed, we have noted that grand juries are expected to "operate within the limits of the First Amendment," as well as the other provisions of the Constitution. See also We must thus balance respondent's asserted First Amendment rights against Florida's interests in preserving the confidentiality of its grand jury proceedings. See *631 ; The Court examined the tension between First Amendment rights and government investigatory proceedings in There, a Virginia statute made it a crime to divulge information regarding proceedings before the state judicial review commission. A newspaper publisher was convicted of violating the statute after publishing an article accurately reporting on a pending inquiry by the commission and identifying the state judge under investigation. This Court held that the conviction violated the United States Constitution, concluding "that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press which follow therefrom." While assuming that the confidentiality of the judicial review proceedings served legitimate state interests, the Court observed that the State had "offered little more than assertion and conjecture to support its claim that without criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory scheme would be seriously undermined." The Court also noted that over 40 States with similar judicial review procedures had found it unnecessary to criminalize the type of conduct at issue in order to preserve the integrity of their proceedings. Florida argues that our decision in Seattle Times rather than governs the validity of its prohibition. In Rhinehart we held that a protective order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing information which it had obtained through discovery procedures *632 did not offend the First Amendment. Here, by contrast, we deal only with respondent's right to divulge information of which he was in possession before he testified before the grand jury, and not information which he may have obtained as a result of his participation in the proceedings of the grand jury. In such cases, where a person "lawfully obtains |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Butterworth v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112396/butterworth-v-smith/ | grand jury. In such cases, where a person "lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance," we have held that "state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." ; Florida Here Florida seeks to punish the publication of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct speech which has traditionally been recognized as lying at the core of the First Amendment. See 435 U. S., ; To justify such punishment, Florida relies on the interests in preserving grand jury secrecy acknowledged by the Court in Douglas Oil of 441 U.S. 2 But we do not believe those interests warrant a permanent ban on the disclosure by a witness of his own testimony once a grand jury has been discharged. Some of these interests are not served at all by the Florida ban on disclosure, and those that are served are not sufficient to sustain the statute. When an investigation ends, there is no longer a need to keep information from the targeted individual in order to prevent his escape that individual presumably will have been exonerated, on the one hand, or arrested or otherwise informed of the charges against him, on the other.[3] There is *633 also no longer a need to prevent the importuning of grand jurors since their deliberations will be over. Similarly, the concern that some witnesses will be deterred from presenting testimony due to fears of retribution is, we think, not advanced by this prohibition; any witness is free not to divulge his own testimony, and that part of the Florida statute which prohibits the witness from disclosing the testimony of another witness remains enforceable under the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Florida's interest in preventing the subornation of grand jury witnesses who will later testify at trial is served by the prohibition in question to this extent: if the accused is of a mind to suborn potential witnesses against him, he will have an additional opportunity to learn of the existence of such a witness if that witness chooses to make his grand jury testimony public. But with present day criminal procedure generally requiring the disclosure of witnesses on the part of the State, see, e. g., Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.220(a), the names of these witnesses will be available to the accused sometime before trial in any event. Florida provides substantial criminal *634 penalties for both perjury and tampering with witnesses, see Fla. Stat. 837.02, 914.22 and its courts have subpoena and contempt powers available to bring |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Butterworth v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112396/butterworth-v-smith/ | its courts have subpoena and contempt powers available to bring recalcitrant witnesses to the stand. We think the additional effect of the ban here in question is marginal at best and insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in speech involved. Florida undoubtedly retains a substantial interest in seeing that "persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule." Douglas Oil And the ban in question does serve that interest to some extent, although it would have the opposite effect if applied to a witness who was himself a target of the grand jury probe and desired to publicize this testimony by way of exonerating himself. But even in those situations where the disclosure by the witness of his own testimony could have the effect of revealing the names of persons who had been targeted by the grand jury but exonerated, our decisions establish that absent exceptional circumstances, reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech. See -842 (quotation omitted); cf. Florida ; ; Oklahoma Publishing v. Oklahoma County District Court, We also take note of the fact that neither the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor the drafters of similar rules in the majority of the States, found it necessary to impose an obligation of secrecy on grand jury witnesses with respect to their own testimony to protect reputational *635 interests or any of the other interests asserted by Florida. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2), governing grand jury secrecy, expressly prohibits certain individuals other than witnesses from disclosing "matters occurring before the grand jury," and provides that "[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule." The pertinent Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 6(e)(2), 18 U.S. C. App., p. 726, expressly exempt witnesses from the obligation of secrecy, stating that "[t]he seal of secrecy on witnesses seems an unnecessary hardship and may lead to injustice if a witness is not permitted to make a disclosure to counsel or to an associate." Similarly, only 14 States have joined Florida in imposing an obligation of secrecy on grand jury Of the remaining 35 States, 21 either explicitly or implicitly exempt witnesses from a general secrecy obligation, and 14 simply remain silent on the issue. See 2 Beale & 7.05, pp. 20-21, and nn. 18-21.[4] While these practices are not conclusive as to the constitutionality of Florida's rule, they are probative of the weight to be assigned Florida's asserted interests and the extent to which the prohibition in question is |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,990 | 19 | majority | Butterworth v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112396/butterworth-v-smith/ | and the extent to which the prohibition in question is necessary to further them. Against the state interests which we have just evaluated must be placed the impact of Florida's prohibition on respondent's ability to make a truthful public statement. The effect is dramatic: before he is called to testify in front of the grand jury, respondent is possessed of information on matters of admitted public concern about which he was free to speak at will. After giving his testimony, respondent believes he is no longer free to communicate this information since it relates to the "content, gist, or import" of his testimony. The ban extends not merely to the life of the grand jury but into the indefinite future. The potential for abuse of the Florida prohibition, through its employment as a device *636 to silence those who know of unlawful conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials, is apparent. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the interests advanced by the portion of the Florida statute struck down are not sufficient to overcome respondent's First Amendment right to make a truthful statement of information he acquired on his own. Its judgment is therefore Affirmed. |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | concurring | Kowalski v. Tesmer | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/137732/kowalski-v-tesmer/ | That this case is even remotely close demonstrates that our third-party standing cases have gone far astray. We have granted third-party standing in a number of cases to litigants whose relationships with the directly affected individuals were at best remote. We have held, for instance, that beer vendors have standing to raise the rights of their prospective young male customers, see ; that criminal defendants have standing to raise the rights of jurors excluded from service, *135 see ; that sellers of mail-order contraceptives have standing to assert the rights of potential customers, see ; that distributors of contraceptives to unmarried persons have standing to litigate the rights of the potential recipients, ; and that white sellers of land have standing to litigate the constitutional rights of potential black purchasers, see I agree with the Court that "[t]he attorneys before us do not have a `close relationship' with their alleged `clients'; indeed, they have no relationship at all." Ante, at 131. The Court of Appeals understandably could have thought otherwise, given how generously our precedents have awarded third-party standing. It is doubtful whether a party who has no personal constitutional right at stake in a case should ever be allowed to litigate the constitutional rights of others. Before and this Court adhered to the rule that "[a] court will not listen to an objection made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect and who has therefore no interest in defeating it."[*] This made sense. Litigants who have no personal right at stake may have very different interests from the individuals whose rights they are raising. Moreover, absent a personal right, a litigant has no cause of action (or defense), and thus no right to relief. It may be too late in the day to return to this traditional view. But even assuming it makes sense to grant litigants *136 third-party standing in at least some cases, it is more doubtful still whether third-party standing should sweep as broadly as our cases have held that it does. Because the Court's opinion is a reasonable application of our precedents, I join it in full. |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | The question before us is whether California's approach to imposing the death penalty makes California a "weighing" or a "nonweighing" State for purposes of determining whether to apply "harmless-error" review in a certain kind of death casenamely, a case in which the death sentence rests in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. In my view, it does not matter whether California is a "weighing" or a "nonweighing" State, as ordinary rules of appellate review should apply. A reviewing court must find that the jury's consideration of an invalid aggravator was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the form a State's death penalty law takes. I To understand my answer, one must fully understand the question, including the somewhat misleading terminology in which the question is phrased. A Death penalty proceedings take place in two stages. At the first stage, the jury must determine whether there is something especially wrongful, i. e., "aggravating," about the defendant's conduct. State statutes typically list these specific * "aggravating" factors, and the jury typically must find at least one such factor present for the defendant to become eligible for the death penalty. "By doing so, the jury narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty according to an objective legislative definition," as required by the Eighth Amendment. If the jury finds that an aggravating factor is present and the defendant is consequently eligible for the death penalty, it proceeds to Stage Two. At Stage Two, the jury (or sometimes the judge) must determine whether to sentence the defendant to death or to provide a different sentence (usually, life imprisonment). At this stage, this Court has said, States divide as to their approach. Weighing States. Some States tell the jury: "Consider all the mitigating factors and weigh them against the specific aggravating factors that you found, at Stage One, made the defendant eligible for the death penalty. If the aggravating factors predominate, you must sentence the defendant to death; otherwise, you may not." Because the law in these States tells the jury to weigh only statutory aggravating factors (typically the same factors considered at Stage One) against the mitigating factors, this Court has called these States "weighing States." This is something of a misnomer because the jury cannot weigh everything but is instead limited to weighing certain statutorily defined aggravating factors. The Court has identified Mississippi as a classic example of a weighing State. See Nonweighing States. Other States tell the jury: "Consider all the mitigating factors and weigh them, not simply against the statutory aggravating factors you previously found at Stage One, |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | the statutory aggravating factors you previously found at Stage One, but against any and all factors you consider aggravating." Because the balance includes all aggravating factors and not only those on the Stage One eligibility list, this Court has called such States "nonweighing States." Although it might be clearer to call these States "complete *230 weighing" States (for the jury can weigh everything that is properly admissible), I shall continue to use the traditional terminology. The Court has identified Georgia as the prototypical example of a State that has adopted this complete weighing approach. B The question in this case arises under the following circumstances. (1) At Stage One, a jury found several aggravating factors, the presence of any one of which would make the defendant eligible for the death penalty. (2) At least one of those aggravating factors was an "improper" factor, i. e., a factor that the law forbids the jury from considering as aggravating and that the jury's use of which (for this purpose) was later invalidated on appeal. The sentencing court made a mistake, indeed a mistake of constitutional dimensions, when it listed the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel," Cal. Penal Code Ann. 190.2(a)(1) aggravating factor as one of the several factors for the jury to consider at Stage One. See But that mistake did not, in and of itself, forbid application of the death penalty. After all, the jury also found other listed aggravating factors, the presence of any one of which made the defendant eligible for the death penalty. (3) All the evidence before the sentencing jury at Stage Two was properly admitted. The evidence that supported the improper heinousness factor, for example, also showed how the crime was committed, and the jury is clearly entitled to consider it. Given this outline of the problem, two questions follow. Question One: Is it possible that the judge's legal mistake at Stage Onetelling the jury that it could determine that the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was presentprejudiced the jury's decisionmaking at Stage Two? In other words, could that mistake create harmful error, causing the *231 jury to impose a death sentence due to the fact that it was told to give special weight to its heinousness finding? The lower courts have read this Court's opinions to say that in a nonweighing State the answer must be "no"; but in a weighing State the answer might be "yes." Question Two: Given the lower courts' answer to Question One, is California a nonweighing State? If so, the reviewing court can assume, without going further, that the error arising |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | court can assume, without going further, that the error arising out of the sentencing judge's having listed an invalid aggravator was harmless. Or is California a weighing State? If so, the reviewing court should have gone further and determined whether the error was in fact harmless. I would answer Question Two by holding that the lower courts have misunderstood this Court's answer to Question One. Despite the Court's occasional suggestion to the contrary, the weighing/nonweighing distinction has little to do with the need to determine whether the error was harmless. Moreover, given "the `acute need' for reliable decisionmaking when the death penalty is at issue," reviewing courts should decide if that error was harmful, regardless of the form a State's death penalty law takes. II To distinguish between weighing and nonweighing States for purposes of determining whether to apply harmless-error analysis is unrealistic, impractical, and legally unnecessary. A Use of the distinction is unrealistic because it is unrelated to any plausible conception of how a capital sentencing jury actually reaches its decision. First, consider the kind of error here at issue. It is not an error about the improper admission of evidence. See infra, at 239-21. It is an error about the importance a jury might attach to certain admissible evidence. Using the metaphor of a "thumb on death's side of the scale," we have identified the error as the "possibility *232 not only of randomness but also of bias in favor of the death penalty." ; see ("Employing an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process creates the possibility of randomness by placing a thumb on death's side of the scale, thus creating the risk of treating the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty" (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)). Second, consider why that error could affect a decision to impose death. If the error causes harm, it is because a jury has given special weight to its finding of (or the evidence that shows) the invalid "aggravating factor." The jury might do so because the judge or prosecutor led it to believe that state law attaches particular importance to that factor: Indeed, why else would the State call that factor an "aggravator" and/or permit it to render a defendant death eligible? See ; see also ante, at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that jury may consider the aggravating label "a legislative imprimatur on a decision to impose death and therefore give greater weight to its improper heinousness finding"); The risk that the jury will give greater weight at Stage Two to its Stage One finding |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | greater weight at Stage Two to its Stage One finding of an aggravating factora factor that, it turns out, never should have been found in the first instanceis significant in a weighing State, for the judge will explicitly tell the jury to consider that particular aggravating factor in its decisionmaking process. That risk may prove significant in a nonweighing State as well, for *233 there too the judge may tell the jury to consider that aggravating factor in its decisionmaking process. The only difference between the two kinds of States is that, in the nonweighing State, the jury can also consider other aggravating factors (which are usually not enumerated by statute). Cf. Ga. Code Ann. 17-10-30(b) (200) But the potential for the same kind of constitutional harm exists in both kinds of States, namely, that the jury will attach special weight to that aggravator on the scale, the aggravator that the law says should not have been there. To illustrate this point, consider the following two statements. Statement OneThe judge tells the jury in a weighing State: "You can sentence the defendant to death only if you find one, or more, of the following three aggravating circumstances, X, Y, or Z. If you do, the law requires you to consider those aggravators and weigh them against the mitigators." Statement TwoThe judge tells the jury in a nonweighing State: "You can sentence the defendant to death only if you find one, or more, of the following three aggravating circumstances, X, Y, or Z. If you do, the law permits you to consider all mitigating and aggravating evidence, including X, Y, and Z, in reaching your decision." What meaningful difference is there between these two statements? The decisionmaking process of the first jury and that of the second jury will not differ significantly: Both juries will weigh the evidence offered in aggravation and the evidence offered in mitigation. Cf. Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae ("In reality, all sentencers `weigh'"). If Statement One amounts to harmful error because the prosecutor emphasized the importance of wrongfully listed factor Y, why would Statement Two not amount to similarly harmful error? In both instances, a *23 jury might put special weight upon its previous finding of factor Y. It is not surprising that commentators have found unsatisfactory the Court's efforts to distinguish between the two statements for harmless-error purposes. See, e. g., Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, ; Widder, Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 Tulane L. Rev. 131, 1363-1365 (199) (arguing that the distinction is largely an "illusion" that "appears to be derived from a fixation on the literal meaning of the metaphor of weighing, [which] remains a common means of describing the capital sentencing process even in decisions of state courts that rely on the non-weighing status of their statutory schemes to uphold [death] sentences resting on invalid factors"). B The distinction is impractical to administer for it creates only two paradigmsStates that weigh only statutory aggravators and States that weigh any and all circumstances (i. e., statutory and nonstatutory aggravators). Many States, however, fall somewhere in between the two paradigms. A State, for example, might have a set of aggravating factors making a defendant eligible for the death penalty and an additional set of sentencing factors (unrelated to the eligibility determination) designed to channel the jury's discretion. California is such a State, as it requires the jury to take into account the eligibility-related aggravating factors and other sentencing factorsincluding an omnibus factor that permits consideration of all of the circumstances of the crime. Cal. Penal Code Ann. 190.3 (West 1999). And because *235 many States collapse Stage One (eligibility) and Stage Two (sentence selection) into a single proceeding in which the jury hears all of the evidence at the same time, those States permit the prosecution to introduce and argue any relevant evidence, including evidence related to the statutory aggravators. Indeed, one State the Court has characterized as a weighing State (Mississippi) and one State the Court has characterized as a nonweighing State (Virginia) both fall into this intermediate category. Miss. Code Ann. 99-19-101 (1973-2000); Va. Code Ann. 19.2-26.(B) (Lexis 200). Efforts to classify these varied schemes, for purposes of applying harmless-error analysis, produce much legal heat while casting little light. C Our precedents, read in detail, do not require us to maintain this unrealistic and impractical distinction. The Court has discussed the matter in three key cases. In the first case, the Court considered an error that arose in Georgia, a nonweighing State. The Georgia Supreme Court had held that one of several statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jurythat the defendant had a "`substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions'" was unconstitutionally vague. and n. 5. The jury, however, had also found other aggravators present, so the defendant remained eligible for death. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing court's instruction on the unconstitutional factor, though erroneous, "had `an |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | court's instruction on the unconstitutional factor, though erroneous, "had `an inconsequential impact on the jury's decision regarding the death penalty.'" ). This Court agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion. The Court conceded that the label"aggravating circumstance"created the risk that the jury might place too much weight on the evidence that showed that aggravator. Indeed, it said that the statutory label "`aggravating circumstance[s]'" might "arguably have caused the jury *236 to give somewhat greater weight to respondent's prior criminal record than it otherwise would have given." 62 U.S., at But the Court concluded that, under the circumstances, the error was harmless. For one thing, Georgia's statute permitted the jury to consider more than just the specific aggravators related to Stage One. See For another thing, the trial court's "instructions did not place particular emphasis on the role of statutory aggravating circumstances in the jury's ultimate decision." In fact, it specifically told the jury to "`consider all facts and circumstances presented in ext[e]nuation., mitigation and aggravation.'" Finally, there was no indication at all that either the judge or the prosecutor tried to single out the erroneous aggravator for special weight. Because under the circumstances there was no real harm, the Court concluded that "any possible impact cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process." The Court in Zant did not say that the jury's consideration of an improper aggravator is never harmless in a State like Georgia. It did say that the jury's consideration of the improper aggravator was harmless under the circumstances of that case. And the Court's detailed discussion of the jury instructions is inconsistent with a rule of law that would require an automatic conclusion of "harmless error" in States with death penalty laws like Georgia's. See at -889, and n. 25; see also The dissent in Zant also clearly understood the principal opinion to have conducted a harmless-error analysis. at 90-905 And the Court repeated this same understanding in a case decided only two weeks later. 63 U.S. 939, (upholding death sentence *237 and concluding that "we need not apply the type of federal harmless-error analysis that was necessary in Zant".) The second case, involved a weighing State, Mississippi. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the petitioner's death sentence "even though the jury instruction regarding one of the aggravating factors pressed by the State, that the murder was `especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,' was constitutionally invalid." 9 U.S., at 71. Finding it unclear whether the state court reweighed the aggravating and mitigating evidence or conducted harmless-error review, the Court vacated and remanded to the |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | conducted harmless-error review, the Court vacated and remanded to the Mississippi Supreme Court to conduct either procedure (or to remand to a sentencing jury) in the first instance. at 75. As far as the Court's "harmless-error" analysis reveals, the reason the Court remandedthe reason it thought the error might not be harmlesshad nothing to do with the fact that Mississippi was a so-called weighing State. Cf. ante, at 218-219, n. 3. Rather, the Court thought the error might be harmful because "the State repeatedly emphasized and argued the `especially heinous' factor during the sentencing hearing," in stark contrast to the "little emphasis" it gave to the other valid aggravator found by the jury. 9 U.S., at 753. The Court concluded that, "[u]nder these circumstances, it would require a detailed explanation based on the record for us possibly to agree that the error in giving the invalid `especially heinous' instruction was harmless." at 753-75. The third case, presented a different kind of question: For the purposes of 89 U.S. 288 does the rule that a vague aggravating circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment apply to a weighing State like Mississippi in the same way it applies to a nonweighing State like Georgia? The Court answered this question "yes." In so doing, it described the difference between Mississippi's system and Georgia's system as follows: *238 "In a nonweighing State, so long as the sentencing body finds at least one valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also finds an invalid aggravating factor does not infect the formal process of deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty. Assuming a determination by the state appellate court that the invalid factor would not have made a difference to the jury's determination, there is no constitutional violation resulting from the introduction of the invalid factor in an earlier stage of the proceedings. But when the sentencing body is told to weigh an invalid factor in its decision, a reviewing court may not assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been removed from death's side of the scale. When the weighing process itself has been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an individualized sentence." The first sentence in this statement is the first and only suggestion in our cases that the submission of a vague aggravating circumstance to a jury can never result in constitutional error in a nonweighing State. Indeed, the term "nonweighing State," and the significance attached to it, does not appear in the Court's jurisprudence prior to |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | it, does not appear in the Court's jurisprudence prior to Stringer. The second sentence in the statement is less categorical than the first. It suggests that a state appellate court would have to make some form of a harmless-error inquiry to satisfy itself that the invalidated factor "would not have made a difference to the jury's determination" before it could conclude that there was "no constitutional violation." Given this errant language in Stringer, I agree that it is "[n]ot surprisin[g]" that the lower courts have since operated under the assumption "that different rules apply to weighing and nonweighing States," and that harmless-error review is necessary only in the former. Ante, at 218, n. 3. My point is simply that such an assumption is unfounded based on our *239 prior cases. And regardless of the lower courts' interpretation of our precedents, I think it more important that our own decisions have not repeated Stringer's characterization of those precedents. See, e. g., (characterizing Zant as holding "that a death sentence supported by multiple aggravating circumstances need not always be set aside if one aggravator is found to be invalid" ). For the reasons stated in Parts II-A and I would not take a single ambiguous sentence of dicta and derive from it a rule of law that is unjustified and that, in cases where the error is in fact harmful, would deprive a defendant of a fair and reliable sentencing proceeding. III The upshot is that I would require a reviewing court to examine whether the jury's consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating factor was harmful, regardless of whether the State is a weighing State or a nonweighing State. I would hold that the fact that a State is a nonweighing State may make the possibility of harmful error less likely, but it does not excuse a reviewing court from ensuring that the error was in fact harmless. Our cases in this area do not require a different result. IV The Court reaches a somewhat similar conclusion. It, too, would abolish (or at least diminish the importance of) the weighing/nonweighing distinction for purposes of harmless-error analysis. But then, surprisingly, it also diminishes the need to conduct any harmless-error review at all. If all the evidence was properly admitted and if the jury can use that evidence when it considers other aggravating factors, any error, the Court announces, must be harmless. See ante, at 220 (holding that when "one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances" that underlie the invalidated *20 aggravating factor, |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | facts and circumstances" that underlie the invalidated *20 aggravating factor, a reviewing court need not apply harmless-error review). Common sense suggests, however, and this Court has explicitly held, that the problem before us is not a problem of the admissibility of certain evidence. It is a problem of the emphasis given to that evidence by the State or the trial court. If that improper emphasis is strong enough, it can wrongly place a "thumb on death's side of the scale" at Stage Two (sentencing). That is what the Court said in Stringer, that is what the Court necessarily implied in Zant, and that is what the Court held in I believe the Court is right to depart from the implication of an errant sentence in Stringer. But it is wrong to depart without explanation from ' unanimous holdinga holding that at least two Members of this Court have explicitly recognized as such. See (noting that the "`especially heinous' instruction did not change the mix of evidence presented to the jury in []" and "that fact alone did not support a finding of harmlessness"). The Court cannot reconcile its holding with That opinion makes clear that the issue is one of emphasis, not of evidence. Indeed, the Court explicitly disavowed the suggestion that Mississippi's "reliance on the `especially heinous' factor led to the introduction of any evidence that was not otherwise admissible in either the guilt or sentencing phases of the proceeding. All of the circumstances surrounding the murder already had been aired during the guilt phase of the trial and a jury clearly is entitled to consider such evidence in imposing [the] sentence." 9 U.S., at 75-755, n. 5. And the entire Court agreed that the potentially improper emphasis consisted of the fact that "the State repeatedly emphasized and argued the `especially heinous' factor during the sentencing hearing," while placing "little emphasis" *21 on the sole valid aggravator of robbery for pecuniary gain. at 753-75; see also (mun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court's only answer is to assert that " maintains the distinction envisioned in Zant." Ante, at 218, n. 3 (citing at 75). But did no such thing. Although the Court did observe the differences between the statutory schemes of Georgia and Mississippi, it certainly did not, as the Court claims, suggest that harmless-error analysis should never be conducted in the former and always be conducted in the latter. Rather, the Court made the unremarkable statement that "[i]n a State like Georgia, where aggravating circumstances serve only |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | second_dissenting | Brown v. Sanders | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145694/brown-v-sanders/ | "[i]n a State like Georgia, where aggravating circumstances serve only to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty and not to determine the punishment, the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance does not necessarily require an appellate court to vacate a death sentence and remand to a jury." at 7-75 Of course, the implication of the qualifier "necessarily" is that, in some cases, a jury's consideration of an invalidated aggravating circumstance might require that a death sentence be vacated, even "[i]n a State like Georgia." In sum, an inquiry based solely on the admissibility of the underlying evidence is inconsistent with our previous cases. And as explained above, see at 231-23, the potential for a tilting of the scales toward death is present even in those States (like Georgia and Virginia) that permit a jury to consider all of the circumstances of the crime. V It may well be that the errors at issue in this case were harmless. The State of California did not ask us to consider the Ninth Circuit's contrary view, and I have not done so. Given the fact that I (like the Court in this respect) would *22 abolish the weighing/nonweighing distinction, and in light of the explanation of the kind of error at issue, I would remand this case and require the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its entire decision in light of the considerations I have described. |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA or Act), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 401 et seq., was Congress' first major attempt to regulate the internal affairs of labor unions. Title I of the Act provides a statutory "Bill of Rights" for union members, including various protections for members involved in union elections, with enforcement and appropriate remedies available in district court. Title IV, in contrast, provides an elaborate postelection procedure aimed solely at protecting union democracy through free and democratic elections, with primary responsibility for enforcement lodged with the Secretary of Labor. Resolution of the question presented by this case requires that we address the conflict that exists between the separate enforcement mechanisms included in these two Titles. In particular, we must determine whether suits alleging violations of Title I may properly be maintained in district court during the course of a union election. The Court of Appeals approved a preliminary injunction issued by the District Court that enjoined an ongoing union *529 election and ordered the staging of a new election pursuant to procedures promulgated by the court. After reviewing the complex statutory scheme created by Congress, we conclude that such judicial interference in an ongoing union election is not appropriate relief under 102 of Title I, 29 U.S. C. 412. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals. I Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen, and Packers (Local 82) represents approximately 700 employees engaged in the furniture moving business in the Boston, Mass., area.[1] The union is governed by a seven-member executive board whose officers, pursuant to 401(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S. C. 481(b), must be chosen by election no less than once every three years. These elections, consistent with the executive board's discretion under the union's bylaws and constitution, have traditionally been conducted by mail referendum balloting. The dispute giving rise to the present case stems from the union election that was regularly scheduled for the last two months of 1980. On November 9, 1980, Local 82 held a meeting to nominate candidates for positions on its executive board. The meeting generated considerable interest, in part because dissident members of the union were attempting to turn the incumbent union officials out of office. Two aspects of the controversial meeting are especially important for present purposes. First, admission to the meeting was restricted to those members who could produce a computerized receipt showing that their dues had been paid up to date. Several union members, including respondent Jerome Crowley, were prohibited from entering the meeting because they did not |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | were prohibited from entering the meeting because they did not have such dues receipts in their possession. Second, during the actual *530 nominations process, there was disagreement relating to the office for which respondent John Lynch had been nominated. At the close of nominations, petitioner Bart Griffiths, the union's incumbent secretary-treasurer, declared himself the only candidate nominated for that office; at the same time, he included Lynch among the candidates selected to run for union president. Several dissatisfied members of the union, now respondents before this Court,[2] filed a protest with the union. On November 20, their protest was denied by Local 82.[3] Election ballots were thereafter distributed to all members of the union, who were instructed to mark and return the ballots by mail so that they would arrive in a designated post office box by 9 a. m. on December 13, 1980, at which time they were scheduled to be counted. Respondent Lynch's name appeared on the ballot as a candidate for president, and not for secretary-treasurer. On December 1, 1980, after the distribution of ballots had been completed, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They alleged, inter alia, that Local 82 and its officers had violated several provisions of Title I of the LMRDA, and sought a preliminary injunction. In particular, the respondents claimed that restricting admission to the nominations meeting to those members who could produce computerized dues receipts violated their "equal rights to nominate * candidates [and] to attend membership meetings" under 101(a)(1) of the Act,[4] as well as their right freely to express views at meetings of the union under 101(a)(2) of the Act.[5] They also alleged that the union and its officers had violated 101(a)(1) by failing to recognize respondent Lynch as a candidate for secretary-treasurer.[6] *532 After preliminary papers were filed, on December 12 the District Court issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo and to protect its own jurisdiction. See App. 40-47. Given that the next morning (December 13) was the pre-established deadline for voting, many, if not most, of the ballots had already been returned by the union's voting members. Nonetheless, the court noted that federal-court jurisdiction was available under 102 of Title I, 29 U.S. C. 412, for claims alleging discriminatory application of union rules. Moreover, the court's order specifically required that the ballots be sealed and delivered to the court, thereby preventing the petitioners from counting the ballots until a final determination could be made on the motion for a preliminary injunction. Several days of |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | on the motion for a preliminary injunction. Several days of hearings on the preliminary injunction, and several months of negotiations concerning an appropriate court order to accompany that injunction, followed. Finally, on July 13, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction accompanied by a memorandum opinion. The court first addressed more fully the petitioners' argument that, because the challenged conduct concerned the procedures for conducting union elections, the respondents' exclusive remedy was to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor under Title IV. The court rejected this argument, noting that, "at least with respect to actions challenging pre-election conduct, Title I of the LMRDA establishes an alternative enforcement mechanism for remedying conduct interfering with a member's right to engage in the activities associated with union democracy." Therefore, the court concluded, it could properly invoke its jurisdiction under Title I, if only for those claims concerning dues receipts and the nomination of respondent Lynch that are now before this Court. Because the suit concerned disputes arising out of a nominations meeting conducted in preparation for a union election, and given that the court had issued a temporary *533 restraining order barring actual completion of the election, Title I jurisdiction could properly be asserted over this "pre-election conduct." n. 12. After concluding that the respondents had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claims,[7] the court issued its comprehensive injunction.[8] The court explicitly intended to issue an order that "interfere[d] as little as possible with the nomination and election procedures" required by the union's constitution and bylaws, ; moreover, the terms of the preliminary injunction were derived in large part from an ongoing process of negotiations and hearings that the court had conducted with the parties during the preceding six months. Nonetheless, the order declared the ballots cast in December 1980 to be "legally without effect," n., and provided detailed procedures to be followed by the union during a new nominations meeting and a subsequent election. Among other things, the order selected an outside group of arbitrators to conduct and supervise the election, and set forth eligibility requirements for attending the nominations meeting, being a candidate for office, and *534 voting. The order also provided that it would remain in effect until further order of the District Court. The petitioners appealed, and the Secretary of Labor, who until then had not participated in the proceedings, intervened on their behalf. They argued that the District Court lacked authority under Title I to enjoin the tabulation of ballots and order new nominations and elections under court supervision. The Court of Appeals rejected |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | and elections under court supervision. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments, however, and affirmed in all respects. It agreed with the District Court that Title I remedies are not foreclosed when violations of Title I occur during the course of an election. The court also held that 403 of the Act, which explicitly provides that Title IV's remedies are exclusive for elections that are "already conducted," 29 U.S. C. does not apply until all the ballots have actually been tabulated.[9] Writing in dissent, Judge Campbell was "unable to read Title I as extending so far as to allow a district court, once balloting has commenced, to invalidate an election and order a new one under its supervision and under terms and conditions extemporized by the courts and parties." He believed that "the proper accommodation between Title I and Title IV requires consideration not only of the stage which the election process has reached but [also] the nature of the relief" requested and granted. Because of the confusion evident among the lower federal courts that have tried to reconcile the remedial provisions *535 under Title I and Title IV of the Act,[10] we granted certiorari. We now reverse.[11] II To examine fully the relationship between the respective enforcement provisions of Title I and Title IV of the *536 LMRDA, it is necessary first to summarize the relevant statutory provisions and Congress' principal purposes in their enactment. The LMRDA was "the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership." Although the Act "had a history tracing back more than two decades," ib and was directly generated by several years of congressional hearings, see S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959) (hereafter S. Rep. No. 187), many specific provisions did not find their way into the Act until the proposed legislation was fully considered on the floor of the 456 U.S., at n. 4. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the interaction between various provisions that were finally included in the Act has generated considerable uncertainty. A Chief among the causes for this confusion is Title I of the Act, which provides union members with an exhaustive "Bill of Rights" enforceable in federal court. 101-105, 29 U.S. C. 411-415. In particular, Title I is designed to guarantee every union member equal rights to vote and otherwise participate in union decisions, freedom from unreasonable *537 restrictions on speech and assembly, and protection from improper discipline. See at -436; Given these purposes, there can be no doubt that the protections afforded by Title I extend to |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | doubt that the protections afforded by Title I extend to union members while they participate in union elections. As we have previously noted: "Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision [ 101(a)(2), 29 U.S. C. 411(a)(2)] in order to promote union democracy. It recognized that democracy would be assured only if union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal. Congress also recognized that this freedom is particularly critical, and deserves vigorous protection, in the context of election campaigns. For it is in elections that members can wield their power, and directly express their approval or disapproval of the union leadership." As first introduced by Senator McClellan on the floor of the see 105 Cong. Rec. 6469-6476, 6492-6493 (1959), Title I empowered the Secretary of Labor to seek injunctions and other relief in federal district court to enforce the rights guaranteed to union members. A few days later, however, the McClellan amendment was replaced by a substitute amendment offered by Senator Kuchel. See Among the principal changes made by this substitute was to provide for enforcement of Title I through suits by individual union members in federal district court.[12] As so amended, the legislation *538 was endorsed in the by a vote of 77-14, and was quickly accepted without substantive change by the House, see H. R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 102 (1959); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1959) (hereafter H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147). In relevant part, therefore, 102 of the Act now provides: "Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate." 29 U.S. C. 412. Standing by itself, this jurisdictional provision suggests that individual union members may properly maintain a Title I suit whenever rights guaranteed by that Title have been violated.[13] At the same time, however, 102 explicitly limits the relief that may be ordered by a district court to that which is "appropriate" to any given situation. See B Nor would it be appropriate to interpret the enforcement and remedial provisions of Title I in isolation. In particular, *539 Title IV of the LMRDA specifically regulates the conduct of elections for union officers, and therefore protects many of the same rights as does Title I. See 401-403, 29 U.S. C. 481-. Title IV "sets up a statutory scheme governing the election of union officers, fixing |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | a statutory scheme governing the election of union officers, fixing the terms during which they hold office, requiring that elections be by secret ballot, regulating the handling of campaign literature, requiring a reasonable opportunity for the nomination of candidates, authorizing unions to fix `reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed' for candidates, and attempting to guarantee fair union elections in which all the members are allowed to participate."[14] In general terms, "Title IV's special function in furthering the overall goals of the LMRDA is to insure `free and democratic' elections," an interest "vital" not only to union members but also to the general public, See Although Congress meant to further this basic policy with a minimum of interference in the internal affairs of unions, see at 402 of Title IV contains its own comprehensive administrative and judicial procedure for enforcing the standards established in that Title of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 482. See ; ; at 138-. "Any union member who alleges a violation [of Title IV] may initiate the enforcement procedure. He must first exhaust any internal remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of his union. Then he may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who `shall investigate' the complaint. Finally, if the Secretary finds probable cause to believe a violation has occurred, he `shall bring a civil action against the labor organization' *540 in federal district court, to set aside the election if it has already been held, and to direct and supervise a new election." Trbovich, at (quoting 402, 29 U.S. C. 482). See at Significantly, the court may invalidate an election already held, and order the Secretary to supervise a new election, only if the violation of Title IV "may have affected the outcome" of the previous election. 402(c), 29 U.S. C. 482(c). Congress also included in Title IV an exclusivity provision that explains the relationship between the enforcement procedures established for violations of Title IV and the remedies available for violations of potentially overlapping state and federal laws. In relevant part, 403 of the LMRDA provides: "Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this title. The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive." 29 U.S. C. Relying on this provision, and on the comprehensive nature of the enforcement scheme established by 402, we have held that Title IV "sets up an exclusive method for protecting Title IV rights," and that Congress "decided not |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | for protecting Title IV rights," and that Congress "decided not to permit individuals to block or delay union elections by filing federal-court suits for violations of Title IV." at[15] III We have not previously determined exactly how the exclusivity of Title IV's remedial scheme for enforcing rights guaranteed by that Title might affect remedies available to enforce other rights, such as those protected by Title I. Nor *541 has Congress provided any definitive answers in this area. This case requires, however, that we decide whether Title I remedies are available to aggrieved union members while a union election is being conducted. A It is useful to begin by noting what the plain language of the Act clearly establishes about the relationship between the remedies provided under Title I and Title IV. First, the exclusivity provision included in 403 of Title IV plainly bars Title I relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an election that has already been completed.[16] Second, the full panoply of Title I rights is available to individual union members "prior to the conduct" of a union election. As with the plain language of most federal labor laws, however, this simplicity is more apparent than real. Indeed, by its own terms, the provision offers no obvious solution to what remedies are available during the course of a union election, the issue presented by this case. Even if the plain meaning of the "already conducted" language of 403 could be read not to preclude other remedies until the actual tabulation and certification of ballots have been completed, we would hesitate to find such an interpretation determinative. First, such an approach would ignore the limitation on judicial remedies that Congress included in Title I, which allows a district court to award only "appropriate" relief. Moreover, we have previously "cautioned against a literal reading" of the LMRDA. Like much federal *542 labor legislation, the statute was "the product of conflict and compromise between strongly held and opposed views, and its proper construction frequently requires consideration of its wording against the background of its legislative history and in the light of the general objectives Congress sought to achieve." ). See Indeed, in many ways this admonition applies with its greatest force to the interaction between Title I and Title IV of the LMRDA, if only because of the unusual way in which the legislation was enacted.[17] Nor does the legislative history of the LMRDA provide any definitive indication of how Congress intended 403 to apply to Title I suits while an election is being conducted. Throughout the legislative |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | suits while an election is being conducted. Throughout the legislative debate on this provision, the exclusivity of Title IV was predominantly, if not only, considered in the context of a union election, such as one held at a union meeting, that would take place for a discrete and limited period of time.[18] Thus, Congress did not explicitly consider how the exclusivity provision might apply to an election that takes several weeks or months to complete. Moreover, *543 the legislative history that is available on the meaning of 403 is largely derived from congressional action that occurred prior to the time that Title I was added to the LMRDA. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 187, at 21; ; H. R. Rep. No. 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1959). The interplay between the rights and remedies provided to union members by Title I, and the exclusivity provision already included in Title IV, therefore received little, if any, attention from the Congress. Cf. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, at 35 (Conference Report, written after both Titles were included in the Act, but failing to explain what remedies are available during an election). B Despite this absence of conclusive evidence in the legislative history, the primary objectives that controlled congressional enactment of the LMRDA provide important guidance for our consideration of the availability of Title I remedies during a union election. In particular, throughout the congressional discussions preceding enactment of both Title I and Title IV, Congress clearly indicated its intent to consolidate challenges to union elections with the Secretary of Labor, and to have the Secretary supervise any new elections necessitated by violations of the Act. This strongly suggests that, even when Title I violations are properly alleged and proved, Congress would not have considered a court order requiring and judicially supervising a new election to be "appropriate" relief under Title I. At the same time, there is nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to foreclose all access to federal courts under Title I during an election, especially when a statutory violation could be corrected without any major delay or disruption to an ongoing election. We therefore conclude that whether a Title I suit may properly be maintained by individual union members during the course of a union election depends upon the nature of the relief sought by the Title I claimants. *544 Throughout its consideration of the LMRDA, Congress clearly intended to lodge exclusive responsibility for post-election suits challenging the validity of a union election with the Secretary of Labor. The legislative history of Title IV consistently |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | Secretary of Labor. The legislative history of Title IV consistently echoes this theme. For example, the election provisions contained in the Committee bill as originally reported to the full gave the Secretary exclusive authority to enforce Title IV and to supervise whatever new elections might be needed because of violations of its provisions. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 302-303 (1959). As the Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare explained: "[S]ince the bill provides an effective and expeditious remedy for overthrowing an improperly held election and holding a new election, the Federal remedy is made the sole remedy and private litigation would be precluded." S. Rep. No. 187, at 21.[19] The bill that was finally passed by the retained these procedures for violations of Title IV. *545 In the House, three separate bills were introduced, with all three containing substantially similar enforcement procedures for violations of Title IV. Unlike the bill, the House bills permitted an aggrieved union member to file suit in federal district court to enforce his Title IV rights. See, e. g., H. R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 402 (1959) (Landrum-Griffin bill). Significantly, however, even these bills provided that the Secretary of Labor would supervise any new elections ordered by the court. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. Thus, even before the Conference Committee adopted the Title IV enforcement procedures included in the bill, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, at 35, both Houses of Congress had consistently indicated their intent to have the Secretary of Labor supervise any new union elections necessitated by the Act.[20] Moreover, nothing in the flurry of activity that surrounded enactment of Title I, see and n. 12, indicates that Congress intended that Title to reverse this consistent opposition to court supervision of union elections. Although the enactment of Title I offered additional protection to union members, including the establishment of various statutory safeguards effective during the course of a union election, there is no direct evidence to suggest that Congress believed that enforcement of Title I would either require or allow courts to pre-empt the expertise of the Secretary and *546 supervise their own elections. In the absence of such legislative history, and given the clear congressional preference expressed in Title IV for supervision of new elections by the Secretary of Labor, we are compelled to conclude that Congress did not consider court supervision of union elections to be an "appropriate" remedy for a Title I suit filed during the course of a union election. 102, 29 U.S. C. 412. That is not to say |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | 102, 29 U.S. C. 412. That is not to say that a court has no jurisdiction over otherwise proper Title I claims that are filed during the course of a lengthy union election. The important congressional policies underlying enactment of Title I, see likewise compel us to conclude that appropriate relief under Title I may be awarded by a court while an election is being conducted. Individual union members may properly allege violations of Title I that are easily remediable under that Title without substantially delaying or invalidating an ongoing election. For example, union members might claim that they did not receive election ballots distributed by the union because of their opposition to the incumbent officers running for reelection. Assuming that such union members prove a statutory violation under Title I, a court might appropriately order the union to forward ballots to the claimants before completion of the election. To foreclose a court from ordering such Title I remedies during an election would not only be inefficient, but would also frustrate the purposes that Congress sought to serve by including Title I in the LMRDA. Indeed, eliminating all Title I relief in this context might preclude aggrieved union members from ever obtaining relief for statutory violations, since the more drastic remedies under Title IV are ultimately dependent upon a showing that a violation "may have affected the outcome" of the election, 402(c), 29 U.S. C. 482(c).[21] *547 C Our conclusion that appropriate Title I relief during the course of a union election does not include the invalidation of *548 an ongoing election or court supervision of a new election finds further support in our prior cases interpreting the LMRDA, and in the underlying policies of the Act that have controlled those decisions. In for example, we were faced with a pre-election challenge to several union rules that controlled eligibility to run and nominate others for union office. The claimants in that case asked the court to enjoin the union from preparing for or conducting any election until the rules were revised. We first concluded that in substance the claims alleged violations of Title IV rather than Title I, because the latter only protects union members against the discriminatory application of union rules. Then, given that "Congress decided not to permit individuals to block or delay union elections by filing federal-court suits for violations of Title IV," at ; see we held that the District Court could not invoke its jurisdiction under Title I to hear Title IV claims. We relied for our conclusion in part on Congress' intent "to allow |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | for our conclusion in part on Congress' intent "to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies, and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most familiar with union problems to aid in bringing about a settlement through discussion before resort to the courts." 379 U.S., at See also In several subsequent decisions, we also relied on the important role played by the Secretary in enforcing Title IV *549 violations and in supervising new union elections. See, e. g., -475; -484; At the same time, we noted that another primary goal of Congress was to maximize the " `amount of independence and self-government' " granted to unions. See Glass Bottle Blowers ; As we more fully explained in Congress made suit by the Secretary under Title IV the exclusive post-election remedy for challenges to an election "(1) to protect unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary judicial interference with their elections, and (2) to centralize in a single proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a single election." Thus, exclusive postelection enforcement by the Secretary serves "as a device for eliminating frivolous complaints and consolidating meritorious ones." Consistent with these policies, Trbovich cited at for the proposition that " 403 prohibits union members from initiating a private suit to set aside an election." 404 U.S., at Although this somewhat overstated our holding in which was limited to the exclusivity of postelection suits by the Secretary for violations of Title IV, we believe that the policies supporting Congress' decision to consolidate Title IV suits with the Secretary are equally applicable to Title I suits that seek to "set aside an election."[22] Although the important protections *550 provided to union members by Title I should not easily be precluded, the equally strong policies vesting the Secretary with exclusive supervisory authority over new union elections require that Title I remedies during the course of an election be limited to this extent. In sum, whether suits alleging violations of Title I of the LMRDA may properly be maintained during the course of a union election depends upon the appropriateness of the remedy required to eliminate the claimed statutory violation. If the remedy sought is invalidation of the election already being conducted with court supervision of a new election, then union members must utilize the remedies provided by Title IV. For less intrusive remedies sought during an election, however, a district court retains authority to order appropriate relief under Title I. IV The procedural history of this case clearly demonstrates the undesirable consequences that follow from judicial supervision of |
Justice Brennan | 1,984 | 13 | majority | Furniture Moving Drivers v. Crowley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111210/furniture-moving-drivers-v-crowley/ | demonstrates the undesirable consequences that follow from judicial supervision of a union election. The respondents filed suit after Local 82 had distributed election ballots to its members, but before some of the ballots had been returned or any of the ballots had been counted. Then, less than 24 hours before the election would have been completed and the ballots tabulated, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order that brought the election to a halt. This was followed by several months of negotiations between the parties and hearings before the District Court. Finally, the court issued *551 an order declaring the interrupted election invalid, and setting forth elaborate procedures to be followed during a new election. Several aspects of these proceedings demonstrate why they are inconsistent with the policies underlying the LMRDA. For example, the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued by the court delayed the union election that was originally scheduled for December 1980 for one full year. Among other consequences, this left the incumbent union officers in power beyond the scheduled expiration of their terms. Cf. 401(b), 29 U.S. C. 481(b) (officers shall be elected not less than once every three years). If the procedures under Title IV had been properly followed, the December 1980 election would have been presumed valid, see 402(a), 29 U.S. C. 482(a), and new officers would have replaced the incumbents. Moreover, the expertise of the Secretary in supervising elections was completely ignored. Not only did the court acting alone decide that a new election was required, but its order established procedures for that election and appointed outside arbitrators to supervise their implementation. This action by the District Court directly interfered with the Secretary's exclusive responsibilities for supervising new elections, and was inconsistent with the basic objectives of the LMRDA enforcement scheme. V We conclude that the District Court overstepped the bounds of "appropriate" relief under Title I of the LMRDA when it enjoined an ongoing union election and ordered that a new election be held pursuant to court-ordered procedures. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[23] It is so ordered. |
Justice Scalia | 1,989 | 9 | concurring | Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112197/firestone-tire-rubber-co-v-bruch/ | I join the judgment of the Court and Parts I and II of its opinion. I agree with its disposition but not all of its reasoning regarding Part III. The Court holds that a person with a colorable claim is one who " `may become eligible' for benefits" within the meaning of the statutory definition of "participant," because, it reasons, such a claim raises the possibility that "he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits." Ante, at 117. The relevant portion of the definition, however, refers to an employee "who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit." There is an obvious parallelism here: one "may become" eligible by acquiring, in the future, the same characteristic of eligibility that someone who "is" eligible now possesses. And I find it contrary to normal usage to think that the characteristic of "being" eligible consists of "having prevailed in a suit for benefits." Eligibility exists not merely during the brief period between formal judgment of entitlement and payment of benefits. Rather, one is eligible whether or not he has yet been adjudicated to be and, similarly, one can become eligible before he is adjudicated to be. It follows that the phrase "may become eligible" has nothing to do with the probabilities of winning a suit. I think that, properly read, the definition of "participant" embraces those whose benefits have vested, and those who (by reason of current or former employment) have some potential to receive the vesting of benefits in the future, but not those who have a good argument that benefits have vested even though they have not. Applying the definition in this fashion would mean, of course, that if the employer guesses right that a person with a colorable claim is in fact not entitled to benefits, he can deny that person the information required to be provided under 29 U.S. C. 1024(b)(4) without paying the $100-a-day damages assessable for breach of that obligation, 29 U.S. C. 1132(c)(1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Since, however, no employer *120 sensible enough to consult the law would be senseless enough to take that risk, giving the term its defined meaning would produce precisely the same incentive for disclosure as the Court's opinion. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | This case requires us once aga to consider the so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and its application to the search of a closed contaer the trunk of a car. I On October 28, 1987, Officer Coleman of the Santa Ana, Cal., Police Department received a telephone call from a federal *567 drug enforcement agent Hawaii. The agent formed Coleman that he had seized a package contag marijuana which was to have been delivered to the Federal Express Office Santa Ana and which was addressed to J. R. Daza at 805 West Stevens Avenue that city. The agent arranged to send the package to Coleman stead. Coleman then was to take the package to the Federal Express office and arrest the person who arrived to claim it. Coleman received the package on October 29, verified its contents, and took it to the Senior Operations Manager at the Federal Express office. At about 10:30 a.m. on October 30, a man, who identified himself as Jamie Daza, arrived to claim the package. He accepted it and drove to his apartment on West Stevens. He carried the package to the apartment. At 11:45 a.m., officers observed Daza leave the apartment and drop the box and paper that had contaed the marijuana to a trash b. Coleman at that pot left the scene to get a search warrant. About 12:05 p.m., the officers saw Richard St. George leave the apartment carryg a blue knapsack which appeared to be half full. The officers stopped him as he was drivg off, searched the knapsack, and found 1½ pounds of marijuana. At 12:30 p.m., respondent Charles Steven Acevedo arrived. He entered Daza's apartment, stayed for about 10 mutes, and reappeared carryg a brown paper bag that looked full. The officers noticed that the bag was the size of one of the wrapped marijuana packages sent from Hawaii. Acevedo walked to a silver Honda the parkg lot. He placed the bag the trunk of the car and started to drive away. Fearg the loss of evidence, officers a marked police car stopped him. They opened the trunk and the bag, and found marijuana.[1] *568 Respondent was charged state court with possession of marijuana for sale, violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. 11359 (West Supp. 1991). App. 2. He moved to suppress the marijuana found the car. The motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty but appealed the denial of the suppression motion. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, concluded that the marijuana found the paper bag the car's trunk should |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | the marijuana found the paper bag the car's trunk should have been suppressed. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to believe that the paper bag contaed drugs but lacked probable cause to suspect that Acevedo's car, itself, otherwise contaed contraband. Because the officers' probable cause was directed specifically at the bag, the court held that the case was controlled by United rather than by United Although the court agreed that the officers could seize the paper bag, it held that, under they could not open the bag without first obtag a warrant for that purpose. The court then recoguized "the anomalous nature" of the dichotomy between the rule and the rule That dichotomy dictates that if there is probable cause to search a car, then the entire carcludg any closed contaer found there may be searched without a warrant, but if there is probable cause only as to a contaer the car, the contaer may be held but not searched until a warrant is obtaed. The Supreme Court of California denied the State's petition for review. App. E to Pet. for Cert. 33. On May 14, JUSTICE O'CONNOR stayed enforcement of the Court of Appeal's judgment pendg the disposition of the State's petition for certiorari, and, if that petition were granted, the issuance of the mandate of this Court. We granted certiorari, to reexame the law applicable to a closed contaer an automobile, a *569 subject that has troubled courts and law enforcement officers sce it was first considered II The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure their persons, houses, papers, and effects, agast unreasonable searches and seizures." Contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the First Congress, and, later, the Second and Fourth Congresses, distguished between the need for a warrant to search for contraband concealed "a dwellg house or similar place" and the need for a warrant to search for contraband concealed a movable vessel. See See also In Carroll, this Court established an exception to the warrant requirement for movg vehicles, for it recognized "a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwellg house or other structure respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtaed, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction which the warrant must be sought." It therefore held that a warrantless search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contaed evidence of crime the light of an exigency arisg out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle, did not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See The Court refed the exigency requirement when it held that the existence of exigent circumstances was to be determed at the time the automobile is seized. The car search at issue *570 took place at the police station, where the vehicle was immobilized, some time after the driver had been arrested. Given probable cause and exigent circumstances at the time the vehicle was first stopped, the Court held that the later warrantless search at the station passed constitutional muster. The validity of the later search derived from the rulg Carroll that an immediate search without a warrant at the moment of seizure would have been permissible. See The Court reasoned that the police could search later whenever they could have searched earlier, had they so chosen. Followg if the police have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct either an immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle. In United decided 1982, we held that a warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll doctre could clude a search of a contaer or package found side the car when such a search was supported by probable cause. The warrantless search of ' car occurred after an formant told the police that he had seen complete a drug transaction usg drugs stored the trunk of his car. The police stopped the car, searched it, and discovered the trunk a brown paper bag contag drugs. We decided that the search of ' car was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: "The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrowerand no broaderthan the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause." Thus, "[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search." In therefore, we clarified the scope of the Carroll doctre as properly cludg a "probg search" of compartments and contaers with the automobile so long as the search is supported by probable cause. *571 In addition to this clarification, distguished the Carroll doctre from the separate rule that governed the search of closed contaers. See The Court had announced this separate rule, unique to luggage and other closed packages, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | this separate rule, unique to luggage and other closed packages, bags, and contaers, United In federal narcotics agents had probable cause to believe that a 200-pound double-locked footlocker contaed marijuana. The agents tracked the locker as the defendants removed it from a tra and carried it through the station to a waitg car. As soon as the defendants lifted the locker to the trunk of the car, the agents arrested them, seized the locker, and searched it. In this Court, the United States did not contend that the locker's brief contact with the automobile's trunk sufficed to make the Carroll doctre applicable. Rather, the United States urged that the search of movable luggage could be considered analogous to the search of an automobile. -12. The Court rejected this argument because, it reasoned, a person expects more privacy his luggage and personal effects than he does his automobile. Moreover, it concluded that as "may often not be the case when automobiles are seized," secure storage facilities are usually available when the police seize luggage. n. 7. In the Court extended 's rule to apply to a suitcase actually beg transported the trunk of a car. In the police had probable cause to believe a suitcase contaed marijuana. They watched as the defendant placed the suitcase the trunk of a taxi and was driven away. The police pursued the taxi for several blocks, stopped it, found the suitcase the trunk, and searched it. Although the Court had applied the Carroll doctre to searches of tegral parts of the automobile itself, (deed, Carroll, contraband whiskey was the upholstery of the seats, see 267 U.S., 6), it did not extend the doctre to the warrantless search of personal luggage *572 "merely because it was located an automobile lawfully stopped by the police." Aga, the majority stressed the heightened privacy expectation personal luggage and concluded that the presence of luggage an automobile did not dimish the owner's expectation of privacy his personal items. Cf. In the Court endeavored to distguish between Carroll, which governed the automobile search, and which governed the automobile search. It held that the Carroll doctre covered searches of automobiles when the police had probable cause to search an entire vehicle, but that the doctre governed searches of luggage when the officers had probable cause to search only a contaer with the vehicle. Thus, a situation, the police could conduct a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment without obtag a warrant, whereas a situation, the police had to obta a warrant before they searched. JUSTICE STEVENS is correct, of course, that volved |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | they searched. JUSTICE STEVENS is correct, of course, that volved the scope of an automobile search. See post, at 592. held that closed contaers encountered by the police durg a warrantless search of a car pursuant to the automobile exception could also be searched. Thus, this Court took the critical step of sayg that closed contaers cars could be searched without a warrant because of their presence with the automobile. Despite the protection that purported to extend to closed contaers, the privacy terest those closed contaers yielded to the broad scope of an automobile search. III The facts this case closely resemble the facts In the police had probable cause to believe that drugs were stored the trunk of a particular car. See 456 U.S., Here, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the police had probable cause to believe that respondent was *573 carryg marijuana a bag his car's trunk.[2] Furthermore, for what it is worth, as here, the drugs the trunk were contaed a brown paper bag. This Court rejected 's distction between contaers and cars. It concluded that the expectation of privacy one's vehicle is equal to one's expectation of privacy the contaer, and noted that "the privacy terests a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those a movable contaer." 456 U.S., It also recognized that it was arguable that the same exigent circumstances that permit a warrantless search of an automobile would justify the warrantless search of a movable contaer. In deference to the rule of and however, the Court put that question to one side. -810. It concluded that the time and expense of the warrant process would be misdirected if the police could search every cubic ch of an automobile until they discovered a paper sack, at which pot the Fourth Amendment required them to take the sack to a magistrate for permission to look side. We now must decide the question deferred : whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obta a warrant to open the sack a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car. We conclude that it does not. IV Dissenters asked why the suitcase was "more private, less difficult for police to seize and store, or *574 any other relevant respect more properly subject to the warrant requirement, than a contaer that police discover a probable-cause search of an entire automobile?" We now agree that a contaer found after a general search of the automobile and a contaer found a car after a limited search for the contaer are |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | a car after a limited search for the contaer are equally easy for the police to store and for the suspect to hide or destroy. In fact, we see no prcipled distction terms of either the privacy expectation or the exigent circumstances between the paper bag found by the police and the paper bag found by the police here. Furthermore, by attemptg to distguish between a contaer for which the police are specifically searchg and a contaer which they come across a car, we have provided only mimal protection for privacy and have impeded effective law enforcement. The le between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to search a package that vehicle is not always clear, and separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve privacy terests. We noted this the context of a search of an entire vehicle. Recognizg that under Carroll, the "entire vehicle itself could be searched without a warrant," we concluded that "prohibitg police from openg immediately a contaer which the object of the search is most likely to be found and stead forcg them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the trusion on privacy terests." n. 28. At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be less than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of certaty that the vehicle contas drugs a bag or simply contas drugs. If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are actually searchg the entire car, they may search more extensively *575 than they otherwise would order to establish the general probable cause required by Such a situation is not farfetched. In United Customs agents saw two trucks drive to a private airstrip and approach two small planes. The agents drew near the trucks, smelled marijuana, and then saw the backs of the trucks packages wrapped a manner that marijuana smugglers customarily employed. The agents took the trucks to headquarters and searched the packages without a warrant. Relyg on the defendants argued that the search was unlawful. The defendants contended that was applicable because the agents lacked probable cause to search anythg but the packages themselves and supported this contention by notg that a search of the entire vehicle never occurred. We rejected that argument and found and apposite because the agents had probable cause to search the entire body of each truck, although they had chosen not to do so. -483. We cannot see the benefit of a |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | do so. -483. We cannot see the benefit of a rule that requires law enforcement officers to conduct a more trusive search order to justify a less trusive one. To the extent that the - rule protects privacy, its protection is mimal. Law enforcement officers may seize a contaer and hold it until they obta a search warrant. 433 U. S., "Sce the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that a warrant will be routely forthcomg the overwhelmg majority of cases." (dissentg opion). And the police often will be able to search contaers without a warrant, despite the - rule, as a search cident to a lawful arrest. In New the Court said: *576 "[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous cident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. "It follows from this conclusion that the police may also exame the contents of any contaers found with the passenger compartment." Under Belton, the same probable cause to believe that a contaer holds drugs will allow the police to arrest the person transportg the contaer and search it. Fally, the search of a paper bag trudes far less on dividual privacy than does the cursion sanctioned long ago Carroll. In that case, prohibition agents slashed the upholstery of the automobile. This Court nonetheless found their search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If destroyg the terior of an automobile is not unreasonable, we cannot conclude that lookg side a closed contaer is. In light of the mimal protection to privacy afforded by the - rule, and our serious doubt whether that rule substantially serves privacy terests, we now hold that the Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a contaer with the vehicle. V The - rule not only has failed to protect privacy but also has confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law enforcement. The conflict between the Carroll doctre cases and the - le has been criticized academic commentary. See, e. g., Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations a Post- World, ; Latzer, Searchg Cars and Their Contents: United ; Kamisar, The "Automobile Search" Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify the "Labyrth" of Judicial Uncertaty, *577 3 The Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1980-1981, p. 69 One leadg authority on the Fourth Amendment, after comparg and with Carroll and its progeny, observed: "These two les |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | and with Carroll and its progeny, observed: "These two les of authority cannot be completely reconciled, and thus how one comes out the contaer--the-car situation depends upon which le of authority is used as a pot of departure." 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 53 (2d ed. 1987). The discrepancy between the two rules has led to confusion for law enforcement officers. For example, when an officer, who has developed probable cause to believe that a vehicle contas drugs, begs to search the vehicle and immediately discovers a closed contaer, which rule applies? The defendant will argue that the fact that the officer first chose to search the contaer dicates that his probable cause extended only to the contaer and that and therefore require a warrant. On the other hand, the fact that the officer first chose to search the most obvious location should not restrict the propriety of the search. The rule, as applied has devolved to an anomaly such that the more likely the police are to discover drugs a contaer, the less authority they have to search it. We have noted the virtue of providg "`"clear and unequivocal" guideles to the law enforcement profession.'" Mnick v. Mississippi, quotg The - rule is the antithesis of a "`clear and unequivocal' guidele." JUSTICE STEVENS argues that the decisions of this Court evce a lack of confusion about the automobile exception. See post, at 594. The first case cited by the dissent, United however, did not volve an automobile at all. We considered Place the temporary detention of luggage an airport. Not only was no automobile volved, but the defendant, Place, was waitg *578 at the airport to board his plane rather than preparg to leave the airport a car. Any similarity to which the defendant was leavg the airport a car, is remote at best. Place had nothg to do with the automobile exception and is apposite. Nor does JUSTICE STEVENS' citation of support his contention. Castleberry presented the same question about the application of the automobile exception to the search of a closed contaer that we face here. In Castleberry, we affirmed by an equally divided court. That result illustrates this Court's contued struggle with the scope of the automobile exception rather than the absence of confusion applyg it. JUSTICE STEVENS also argues that law enforcement has not been impeded because the Court has decided 29 Fourth Amendment cases sce favor of the government. See post, at 600. In each of these cases, the government appeared as the petitioner. The dissent fails to expla how the loss of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | petitioner. The dissent fails to expla how the loss of 29 cases below, not to mention the many others which this Court did not hear, did not terfere with law enforcement. The fact that the state courts and the Federal Courts of Appeals have been reversed their Fourth Amendment holdgs 29 times sce 1982 further demonstrates the extent to which our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has confused the courts. Most important, with the exception of United and the Fourth Amendment cases cited by the dissent do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception. From Carroll through this Court has explaed that automobile searches differ from other searches. The dissent fails to acknowledge this basic prciple and so misconstrues and misapplies our Fourth Amendment case law. The dissenters predicted that the contaer rule would have "the perverse result of allowg fortuitous circumstances to control the outcome" of various searches. 433 *. The rule also was so confusg that with two years after this Court found it necessary to expound on the meang of that decision and expla its application to luggage general. -764. Aga, dissenters bemoaned the "herent opaqueness" of the difference between the Carroll and prciples and noted "the confusion to be created for all concerned." See also Robbs v. California, (listg cases decided by Federal Courts of Appeals sce had been announced). Three years after we returned to "this troubled area," order to assert that had not cut back on Carroll. Although we have recognized firmly that the doctre of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes our legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the comparatively rare occasion when it has bred confusion or been a derelict or led to anomalous results. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, was explicitly undermed and the existence of the dual regimes for automobile searches that uncover contaers has proved as confusg as the and dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and elimate the warrant requirement for closed contaers set forth VI The terpretation of the Carroll doctre set forth now applies to all searches of contaers found an automobile. In other words, the police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause. The Court put it this way: "The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is not defed by the nature of the contaer which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defed by the object *580 of the search and the places which there is probable cause to believe that it |
Justice Blackmun | 1,991 | 11 | majority | California v. Acevedo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112608/california-v-acevedo/ | places which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." It went on to note: "Probable cause to believe that a contaer placed the trunk of a taxi contas contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab." We reaffirm that prciple. In the case before us, the police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag the automobile's trunk contaed marijuana. That probable cause now allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Our holdg today neither extends the Carroll doctre nor broadens the scope of the permissible automobile search deleated Carroll, and It remas a "cardal prciple that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few specifically established and well-deleated exceptions.'" Mcey v. Arizona, quotg We held : "The exception recognized Carroll is unquestionably one that is `specifically established and well deleated.'" 456 U.S., Until today, this Court has drawn a curious le between the search of an automobile that cocidentally turns up a contaer and the search of a contaer that cocidentally turns up an automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn on such cocidences. We therefore terpret Carroll as providg one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police may search an automobile and the contaers with it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contaed. *581 The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedgs not consistent with this opion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE SCALIA, concurrg the judgment. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,976 | 19 | dissenting | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | The Court's opinion, while long on the ecclesiastical history of the Serbian Orthodox Church, is somewhat short on the procedural history of this case. A casual reader of some of the passages in the Court's opinion could easily gain the impression that the State of Illinois had commenced a proceeding designed to brand Bishop Dionisije as a heretic, with appropriate pains and penalties. But the state trial judge in the Circuit Court of Lake County was not the Bishop of Beauvais, trying Joan of Arc for heresy; the jurisdiction of his court was invoked by petitioners themselves, who sought an injunction establishing their control over property of the American-Canadian Diocese of the church located in Lake County. The jurisdiction of that court having been invoked *726 for such a purpose by both petitioners and respondents, contesting claimants to Diocesan authority, it was entitled to ask if the real Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese would please stand up. The protracted proceedings in the Illinois courts were devoted to the ascertainment of who that individual was, a question which the Illinois courts sought to answer by application of the canon law of the church, just as they would have attempted to decide a similar dispute among the members of any other voluntary association. The Illinois courts did not in the remotest sense inject their doctrinal preference into the dispute. They were forced to decide between two competing sets of claimants to church office in order that they might resolve a dispute over real property located within the State. Each of the claimants had requested them to decide the issue. Unless the First Amendment requires control of disputed church property to be awarded solely on the basis of ecclesiastical paper title, I can find no constitutional infirmity in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Unless civil courts are to be wholly divested of authority to resolve conflicting claims to real property owned by a hierarchical church, and such claims are to be resolved by brute force, civil courts must of necessity make some factual inquiry even under the rules the Court purports to apply in this case. We are told that "a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them," ante, at 713. But even this rule requires that proof be made as to what these decisions are, and if proofs on that issue conflict the civil court will inevitably have to choose one over the other. In so choosing, if the choice is to be a rational one, reasons must be adduced as to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,976 | 19 | dissenting | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | be a rational one, reasons must be adduced as to why one proffered decision is to prevail over another. Such reasons will *727 obviously be based on the canon law by which the disputants have agreed to bind themselves, but they must also represent a preference for one view of that law over another. If civil courts, consistently with the First Amendment, may do that much, the question arises why they may not do what the Illinois courts did here regarding the defrockment of Bishop Dionisije, and conclude, on the basis of testimony from experts on the canon law at issue, that the decision of the religious tribunal involved was rendered in violation of its own stated rules of procedure. Suppose the Holy Assembly in this case had a membership of 100; its rules provided that a bishop could be defrocked by a majority vote of any session at which a quorum was present, and also provided that a quorum was not to be less than 40. Would a decision of the Holy Assembly attended by 30 members, 16 of whom voted to defrock Bishop Dionisije, be binding on civil courts in a dispute such as this? The hypothetical example is a clearer case than the one involved here, but the principle is the same. If the civil courts are to be bound by any sheet of parchment bearing the ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be a decree of a church court, they can easily be converted into handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness. The cases upon which the Court relies are not a uniform line of authorities leading inexorably to reversal of the Illinois judgment. On the contrary, they embody two distinct doctrines which have quite separate origins. The first is a common-law doctrine regarding the appropriate roles for civil courts called upon to adjudicate church property disputesa doctrine which found general application in federal courts prior to Erie R. but which has never had any application to our review of a state-court *728 decision. The other is derived from the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and is of course applicable to this case; it, however, lends no more support to the Court's decision than does the common-law doctrine. The first decision of this Court regarding the role of civil courts in adjudicating church property disputes was There the Court canvassed the American authorities and concluded that where people had chosen to organize themselves into voluntary religious associations, and had agreed to be bound by the decisions of the hierarchy created to govern such associations, the civil courts could not |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,976 | 19 | dissenting | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | created to govern such associations, the civil courts could not be availed of to hear appeals from otherwise final decisions of such hierarchical authorities. The bases from which this principle was derived clearly had no constitutional dimension; there was not the slightest suggestion that the First Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution was relevant to the decision in that case. Instead the Court was merely recognizing and applying general rules as to the limited role which civil courts must have in settling private intraorganizational disputes. While those rules, and the reasons behind them, may seem especially relevant to intrachurch disputes, adherence or nonadherence to such principles was certainly not thought to present any First Amendment issues. For as the Court in Watson observed: "Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints." The Court's equation of religious bodies with other private voluntary associations makes it clear that the principles *729 discussed in that case were not dependent upon those embodied in the First Amendment. Less than a year later Watson's observations about the roles of civil courts were followed in where the Court held that the appointed trustees of the property of a congregational church "cannot be removed from their trusteeship by a minority of the church society or meeting, without warning, and acting without charges, without citation or trial, and in direct contravention of the church rules." Again, there was nothing to suggest that this was based upon anything but commonsense rules for deciding an intraorganizational dispute: in an organization which has provided for majority rule through certain procedures, a minority's attempt to usurp that rule and those procedures need be given no effect by civil courts. In the Court again recognized the principles underlying Watson in upholding a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands that the petitioner was not entitled to the chaplaincy which he claimed because the decision as to whether he possessed the necessary qualifications for that post was one committed to the appropriate church authorities. In dicta which the Court today conveniently truncates, Mr. Justice Brandeis observed: "In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise. Under like circumstances, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,976 | 19 | dissenting | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | made them so by contract or otherwise. Under like circumstances, effect is given in the courts to the determinations of the judicatory bodies established *730 by clubs and civil associations." Gonzalez clearly has no more relevance to the meaning of the First Amendment than do its two predecessors. The year 1952 was the first occasion on which this Court examined what limits the First and Fourteenth Amendments might place upon the ability of the States to entertain and resolve disputes over church property. In the Court reversed a decision of the New York Court of Appeals which had upheld a statute awarding control of the New York property of the Russian Orthodox Church to an American group seeking to terminate its relationships with the hierarchical Mother Church in Russia. The New York Legislature had concluded that the Communist government of Russia was actually in control of the Mother Church and that " `the Moscow Patriarchate was no longer capable of functioning as a true religious body, but had become a tool of the Soviet Government primarily designed to implement its foreign policy,' " at 107 n. 10, quoting from and the New York Court of Appeals sustained the statute against the constitutional attack. This Court, however, held the statute was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, noting: "By fiat it displaces one church administrator with another. It passes the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to another. It thus intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment." On remand from the decision in Kedroff, the New York Court of Appeals again held that the American *731 group was entitled to the church property at issue. This time relying upon the common law of the State, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Patriarch of Moscow was so dominated by the secular government of Russia that his appointee could not validly occupy the Church's property. On appeal, this Court reversed summarily, noting in its per curiam opinion that "the decision now under review rests on the same premises which were found to have underlain the enactment of the statute struck down in Kedroff." Nine years later, in Presbyterian the Court held that Georgia's common law, which implied a trust upon local church property for the benefit of the general church only on the condition that the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,976 | 19 | dissenting | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches, was inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore could not be utilized to resolve church property disputes. The Georgia law was held impermissible because "[u]nder [the Georgia] approach, property rights do not turn on a church decision as to church doctrine. The standard of departure-from-doctrine, though it calls for resolution of ecclesiastical questions, is a creation of state, not church, law." Finally, in Md. & Va. the Court considered an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland upholding the dismissal of two actions brought by the Eldership seeking to prevent two of its local churches from withdrawing from that general religious association. The Eldership had also claimed the rights to select the *732 clergy and to control the property of the two local churches, but the Maryland courts, relying "upon provisions of state statutory law governing the holding of property by religious corporations, upon language in the deeds conveying the properties in question to the local church corporations, upon the terms of the charters of the corporations, and upon provisions in the constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and control of church property," concluded that the Eldership had no right to invoke the State's authority to compel their local churches to remain within the fold or to succeed to control of their property. This Court dismissed the Eldership's contention that this judgment violated the First Amendment for want of a substantial federal question. Despite the Court's failure to do so, it does not seem very difficult to derive the operative constitutional principle from this line of decisions. As should be clear from even this cursory study, Watson, Bouldin, and Gonzalez have no direct relevance[*] to the question before us today: *733 whether the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, prohibits Illinois from permitting its civil courts to settle religious property disputes in the manner presented to us on this record. I think it equally clear that the only cases which are relevant to that questionKedroff, Kreshik, Hull, and Md. & Va. Churchesrequire that this question be answered in the negative. The rule of those cases, one which seems fairly implicit in the history of our First Amendment, is that the government may not displace the free religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular religious belief, tenet, or sect. That is what New York attempted to do in Kedroff and Kreshik, albeit perhaps for nonreligious reasons, and the Court refused to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,976 | 19 | dissenting | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | albeit perhaps for nonreligious reasons, and the Court refused to permit it. In Hull, the State transgressed the line drawn by the First Amendment when it applied a state-created rule of law based upon "departure from doctrine" to prevent the national hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church in the United States from seeking to reclaim possession and use of two local churches. When the Georgia courts themselves required an examination into whether there had been a departure from the doctrine of the church in order to apply this state-created rule, they went beyond mere application of neutral principles of law to such a dispute. There is nothing in this record to indicate that the Illinois courts have been instruments of any such impermissible intrusion by the State on one side or the other of a religious dispute. There is nothing in the Supreme Court of Illinois' opinion indicating that it placed its thumb on the scale in favor of the respondents. Instead that opinion appears to be precisely what it purports *734 to be: an application of neutral principles of law consistent with the decisions of this Court. Indeed, petitioners make absolutely no claim to the contrary. They agree that the Illinois courts should have decided the issues which they presented; but they contend that in doing so those courts should have deferred entirely to the representations of the announced representatives of the Mother Church. Such blind deference, however, is counseled neither by logic nor by the First Amendment. To make available the coercive powers of civil courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religious associations, when such deference is not accorded similar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free exercise problems petitioners envision, itself create far more serious problems under the Establishment Clause. In any event the Court's decision in Md. & Va. Churches demonstrates that petitioners' position in this regard is untenable. And as I read that decision, it seems to me to compel affirmance of at least that portion of the Illinois court's decision which denied petitioners' request for the aid of the civil courts in enforcing its desire to divide the American-Canadian Diocese. See ante, at 720-724 (Part III). I see no distinction between the Illinois courts' refusal to place their weight behind the representatives of the Serbian Mother Church who sought to prevent portions of their American congregation from splitting off from that body and the Maryland courts' refusal to do the same thing for the Eldership of the Church of God. The Court today expressly eschews any explanation for its failure to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,976 | 19 | dissenting | Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109495/serbian-eastern-orthodox-diocese-for-united-states-and-canada-v/ | Court today expressly eschews any explanation for its failure to follow Md. & Va. Churches, see ante, at 721, contenting itself with this conclusory statement: "The constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian Diocese were not so express that the civil *735 courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity." Ante, at 723. But comparison of the relevant discussions by the state tribunals regarding their consideration of church documents makes this claimed distinction seem quite specious. Compare Md. & Va. with Serbian Orthodox In conclusion, while there may be a number of good arguments that civil courts of a State should, as a matter of the wisest use of their authority, avoid adjudicating religious disputes to the maximum extent possible, they obviously cannot avoid all such adjudications. And while common-law principles like those discussed in Watson, Bouldin, and Gonzalez may offer some sound principles for those occasions when such adjudications are required, they are certainly not rules to which state courts are required to adhere by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The principles which that Amendment, through its incorporation of the First, does enjoin upon the state courtsthat they remain neutral on matters of religious doctrinehave not been transgressed by the Supreme Court of Illinois. |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | concurring | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | I join the opinion and judgment of the Court but write separately to raise some questions likely to arise in this area in the future. *796 A disquieting aspect of Massachusetts' position is that it may carry the risk of impinging on the First Amendment rights of those who employ the corporate formas most do to carry on the business of mass communications, particularly the large media conglomerates. This is so because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from corporations such as the appellants in this case. Making traditional use of the corporate form, some media enterprises have amassed vast wealth and power and conduct many activities, some directly relatedand some notto their publishing and broadcasting activities. See Miami Herald Publishing Today, a corporation might own the dominant newspaper in one or more large metropolitan centers, television and radio stations in those same centers and others, a newspaper chain, news magazines with nationwide circulation, national or worldwide wire news services, and substantial interests in book publishing and distribution enterprises. Corporate ownership may extend, vertically, to pulp mills and pulp timberlands to insure an adequate, continuing supply of newsprint and to trucking and steamship lines for the purpose of transporting the newsprint to the presses. Such activities would be logical economic auxiliaries to a publishing conglomerate. Ownership also may extend beyond to business activities unrelated to the task of publishing newspapers and magazines or broadcasting radio and television programs. Obviously, such far-reaching ownership would not be possible without the state-provided corporate form and its "special rules relating to such matters as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxation of assets" Post, at 809 (WHITE, J., dissenting). In terms of "unfair advantage in the political process" and "corporate domination of the electoral process," post, at 809-810, it could be argued that such media conglomerates as I describe *797 pose a much more realistic threat to valid interests than do appellants and similar entities not regularly concerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues. See Miami Herald Publishing ante, at 791 0. In for example, we noted the serious contentions advanced that a result of the growth of modern media empires "has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion." In terms of Massachusetts' other concern, the interests of minority shareholders, I perceive no basis for saying that the managers and directors of the media conglomerates are more or less sensitive to the views and desires of |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | concurring | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | more or less sensitive to the views and desires of minority shareholders than are corporate officers generally.[1] Nor can it be said, even if relevant to First Amendment analysiswhich it is notthat the former are more virtuous, wise, or restrained in the exercise of corporate power than are the latter. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting ; 14 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 46 (A. Libscomb ed. 1904) (letter to Dr. Walter Jones, Jan. 2, 1814). Thus, no factual distinction has been identified as yet that would justify government restraints on the right of appellants to express their views without, at the same time, opening the door to similar restraints on media conglomerates with their vastly greater influence. Despite these factual similarities between media and nonmedia corporations, those who view the Press Clause as somehow conferring special and extraordinary privileges or status on the "institutional press"which are not extended to those *798 who wish to express ideas other than by publishing a newspaper might perceive no danger to institutional media corporations flowing from the position asserted by Massachusetts. Under this narrow reading of the Press Clause, government could perhaps impose on nonmedia corporations restrictions not permissible with respect to "media" enterprises. Cf. The New Free Press Guarantee,[2] The Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon the "institutional press" any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by all others.[3] I perceive two fundamental difficulties with a narrow reading of the Press Clause. First, although certainty on this point is not possible, the history of the Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a "special" or "institutional" privilege. See The Speech and Press Clauses, The common 18th century understanding of freedom of the press is suggested by Andrew Bradford, a colonial American newspaperman. In defining the nature of the liberty, he did not limit it to a particular group: "But, by the Freedom of the Press, I mean a Liberty, within the Bounds of Law, for any Man to communicate to the Public, his Sentiments on the Important Points of *799 Religion and Government; of proposing any Laws, which he apprehends may be for the Good of his Countrey, and of applying for the Repeal of such, as he Judges pernicious. "This is the Liberty of the Press, the great Palladium of all our other Liberties, which I hope the good People of this Province, will forever enjoy" A. Bradford, Sentiments on the Liberty of the Press, in L. Levy, Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson 41-42 (1966) (emphasis deleted) (first published in Bradford's The American Weekly |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | concurring | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | (1966) (emphasis deleted) (first published in Bradford's The American Weekly Mercury, a Philadelphia newspaper, Apr. 25, 1734). Indeed most pre-First Amendment commentators "who employed the term `freedom of speech' with great frequency, used it synonomously with freedom of the press." L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 174 (1960). Those interpreting the Press Clause as extending protection only to, or creating a special role for, the "institutional press" must either (a) assert such an intention on the part of the Framers for which no supporting evidence is available, cf. ; (b) argue that events after 1791 somehow operated to "constitutionalize" this interpretation, see at 788; or (c) candidly acknowledging the absence of historical support, suggest that the intent of the Framers is not important today. See at 640-641. To conclude that the Framers did not intend to limit the freedom of the press to one select group is not necessarily to suggest that the Press Clause is redundant. The Speech Clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express ideas and beliefs,[4] while the Press Clause *800 focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly and "comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."[5] Yet there is no fundamental distinction between expression and dissemination. The liberty encompassed by the Press Clause, although complementary to and a natural extension of Speech Clause liberty, merited special mention simply because it had been more often the object of official restraints. Soon after the invention of the printing press, English and continental monarchs, fearful of the power implicit in its use and the threat to Establishment thought and orderpolitical and religious devised restraints, such as licensing, censors, indices of prohibited books, and prosecutions for seditious libel, which generally *801 were unknown in the pre-printing press era. Official restrictions were the official response to the new, disquieting idea that this invention would provide a means for mass communication. The second fundamental difficulty with interpreting the Press Clause as conferring special status on a limited group is one of definition. See The very task of including some entities within the "institutional press" while excluding others, whether undertaken by legislature, court, or administrative agency, is reminiscent of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart Englanda system the First Amendment was intended to ban from this country. at 451-. Further, the officials undertaking that task would be required to distinguish the protected from the unprotected on the basis of such variables as content of expression, frequency or fervor of |
Justice Burger | 1,978 | 12 | concurring | First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109836/first-nat-bank-of-boston-v-bellotti/ | such variables as content of expression, frequency or fervor of expression, or ownership of the technological means of dissemination. Yet nothing in this Court's opinions supports such a confining approach to the scope of Press Clause protection.[6] Indeed, the Court has plainly intimated the contrary view: "Freedom of the press is a `fundamental personal right' which `is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow *802 of information to the public" quoting at 450, The meaning of the Press Clause, as a provision separate and apart from the Speech Clause, is implicated only indirectly by this case. Yet Massachusetts' position poses serious questions. The evolution of traditional newspapers into modern corporate conglomerates in which the daily dissemination of news by print is no longer the major part of the whole enterprise suggests the need for caution in limiting the First Amendment rights of corporations as such. Thus, the tentative probings of this brief inquiry are wholly consistent, I think, with the Court's refusal to sustain 8's serious and potentially dangerous restriction on the freedom of political speech. Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give lectures or speeches and seek to enlarge the audience by publication and wide dissemination. "[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it. `. the liberty of the press is no greater and no less' than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic." In short, the First Amendment does not "belong" to any definable category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. |
Justice White | 1,985 | 6 | majority | Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. NRDC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111358/chemical-manufacturers-assn-v-nrdc/ | These cases present the question whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may issue certain variances from toxic pollutant effluent limitations promulgated under the Clean Water Act, as amended, 33 U.S. C. 1251 et seq.[1] I As part of a consolidated lawsuit, respondent Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sought a declaration that 301(l) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S. C. 1311(l), prohibited EPA from issuing "fundamentally different factor" (FDF) variances for pollutants listed as toxic under the Act.[2] Petitioners EPA and Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) argued otherwise. To understand the nature of this controversy, some background with respect to the statute and the case law is necessary. The Clean Water Act, the basic federal legislation dealing with water pollution, assumed its present form as the result of extensive amendments in 1972 and 1977. For direct dischargers those who expel waste directly into navigable waters the Act calls for a two-phase program of technology-based effluent limitations, commanding that dischargers comply with the best practicable control technology currently available (BPT) by July 1, 1977, and subsequently meet the generally more stringent effluent standard consistent with the best available technology economically achievable (BAT).[3] *119 Indirect dischargers those whose waste water passes through publicly owned treatment plants are similarly required to comply with pretreatment standards promulgated by EPA under 307 of the Act, 33 U.S. C. 1317(b), for pollutants not susceptible to treatment by sewage systems or which would interfere with the operation of those systems. Relying upon legislative history suggesting that pretreatment standards are to be comparable to limitations for direct dischargers, see H. R. Rep. No. 95-830, p. 87 and pursuant to a consent decree,[4] EPA has set effluent limitations for indirect dischargers under the same two-phase approach applied to those discharging waste directly into navigable waters. Thus, for both direct and indirect dischargers, EPA considers specific statutory factors[5] and promulgates regulations creating categories and classes of sources and setting uniform discharge limitations for those classes and categories. Since *120 application of the statutory factors varies on the basis of the industrial process used and a variety of other factors, EPA has faced substantial burdens in collecting information adequate to create categories and classes suitable for uniform effluent limits, a burden complicated by the time deadlines it has been under to accomplish the task.[6] Some plants may find themselves classified within a category of sources from which they are, or claim to be, fundamentally different in terms of the statutory factors. As a result, EPA has developed its FDF variance as a mechanism for ensuring that its necessarily |
Justice White | 1,985 | 6 | majority | Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. NRDC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111358/chemical-manufacturers-assn-v-nrdc/ | FDF variance as a mechanism for ensuring that its necessarily rough-hewn categories do not unfairly burden atypical plants.[7] Any interested party may seek an FDF *121 variance to make effluent limitations either more or less stringent if the standards applied to a given source, because of factors fundamentally different from those considered by *122 EPA in setting the limitation, are either too lenient or too strict.[8] The 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act reflected Congress' increased concern with the dangers of toxic pollutants. The Act, as then amended, allows specific statutory modifications of effluent limitations for economic and water-quality *123 reasons in 301(c) and (g).[9] Section 301(l), however, added by the 1977 amendments, provides: "The Administrator may not modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list under section 307(a)(1) of this Act." In the aftermath of the 1977 amendments, EPA continued its practice of occasionally granting FDF variances for BPT *124 requirements. The Agency also promulgated regulations explicitly allowing FDF variances for pretreatment standards[10] and BAT requirements.[11] Under these regulations, EPA granted FDF variances, but infrequently.[12] As part of its consolidated lawsuit, respondent NRDC here challenged pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers and sought a declaration that 301(l) barred any FDF variance with respect to toxic pollutants.[13] In an earlier case, the Fourth Circuit had rejected a similar argument, finding that 301(l) was ambiguous on the issue of whether it applied to FDF variances and therefore deferring to the administrative agency's interpretation that such variances were permitted. Appalachian Power Contrariwise, the Third Circuit here ruled in favor of NRDC, and against petitioners EPA and CMA, holding that 301(l) forbids the issuance of FDF variances for toxic pollutants. National Assn. of Metal Finishers We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict between the Courts of Appeals and to decide this important question of environmental law. We reverse. II Section 301(l) states that EPA may not "modify" any requirement of 301 insofar as toxic materials are concerned. EPA insists that 301(l) prohibits only those modifications expressly permitted by other provisions of 301, namely, those that 301(c) and 301(g) would allow on economic or water-quality grounds. Section 301(l), it is urged, does not address the very different issue of FDF variances. This view of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled to considerable deference; and to sustain it, we need not find that it is the only permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA's understanding of this very "complex statute" is a sufficiently rational one to |
Justice White | 1,985 | 6 | majority | Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. NRDC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111358/chemical-manufacturers-assn-v-nrdc/ | this very "complex statute" is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of EPA. ; see also U. S. A. Of course, if Congress has clearly expressed an intent contrary to that of the Agency, our duty is to enforce the will of Congress. ; A NRDC insists that the language of 301(l) is itself enough to require affirmance of the Court of Appeals, since on its face it forbids any modifications of the effluent limitations that EPA must promulgate for toxic pollutants. If the word "modify" in 301(l) is read in its broadest sense, that is, to encompass any change or alteration in the standards, NRDC is correct. But it makes little sense to construe the section to forbid EPA to amend its own standards, even to correct an error or to impose stricter requirements. Furthermore, *126 reading 301(l) in this manner would forbid what 307(b)(2) expressly directs: EPA is there required to "revise" its pretreatment standards "from time to time, as control technology, processes, operating methods, or other alternatives change." As NRDC does and must concede, Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26, 301(l) cannot be read to forbid every change in the toxic waste standards. The word "modify" thus has no plain meaning as used in 301(l), and is the proper subject of construction by EPA and the courts. NRDC would construe it to forbid the kind of alteration involved in an FDF variance, while the Agency would confine the section to prohibiting the partial modifications that 301(c) would otherwise permit. Since EPA asserts that the FDF variance is more like a revision permitted by 307 than it is like a 301(c) or (g) modification, and since, as will become evident, we think there is a reasonable basis for such a position, we conclude that the statutory language does not foreclose the Agency's view of the statute. We should defer to that view unless the legislative history or the purpose and structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of Congress. NRDC submits that the legislative materials evince such a contrary intent. We disagree. B The legislative history of 301(l) is best understood in light of its evolution. The 1972 amendments to the Act added 301(c), which allowed EPA to waive BAT and pretreatment requirements on a case-by-case basis when economic circumstances justified such a waiver. Stat. 845. In 1977, the Senate proposed amending 301(c) by prohibiting such waivers for toxic pollutants. See S. 1952, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 30 Leg. Hist. 584,[14] and S. Rep. *127 No. |
Justice White | 1,985 | 6 | majority | Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. NRDC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111358/chemical-manufacturers-assn-v-nrdc/ | Sess., 30 Leg. Hist. 584,[14] and S. Rep. *127 No. 95-370, p. 44 Leg. Hist. 677. At the same time, the Senate bill added what became 301(g), which allowed waivers from BAT and pretreatment standards where such waivers would not impair water quality, but which, like 301(c), prohibited waivers for toxic pollutants. S. 1952, at 28-29, Leg. Hist. 582-583.[15] The bill did not contain 301(l). That section was proposed by the Conference Committee, which also deleted the toxic pollutant prohibition in 301(c) and redrafted 301(g) to prohibit water-quality waivers for conventional pollutants and thermal discharges as well as for toxic pollutants.[16] While the Conference Committee Report did not explain the reason for proposing 301(l), Representative Roberts, the House floor manager, stated: "Due to the nature of toxic pollutants, those identified for regulation will not be subject to waivers from or modification of the requirements prescribed under this section, specifically, neither section 301(c) waivers based on the economic capability of the discharger nor 301(g) waivers based on water quality considerations shall be available." Leg. Hist. 328-329 (emphasis added). Another indication that Congress did not intend to forbid FDF waivers as well as 301(c) and (g) modifications is its silence on the issue. Under NRDC's theory, the Conference Committee did not merely tinker with the wording of the Senate bill, but boldly moved to eliminate FDF variances. But if that was the Committee's intention, it is odd that the *128 Committee did not communicate it to either House, for only a few months before we had construed the Act to permit the very FDF variance NRDC insists the Conference Committee was silently proposing to abolish. In E. I. du Pont de Nemours & we upheld EPA's class and category effluent limitations, relying on the availability of FDF waivers. Congress was undoubtedly aware of Du Pont,[17] and absent an expression of legislative will, we are reluctant to infer an intent to amend the Act so as to ignore the thrust of an important decision.[18] *129 NRDC argues that Congress' discussion of the Act's provisions supports its position. Several legislators' comments seemed to equate "modifications" with "waivers" or "variances."[19] Many of these statements, however, came in the specific context of discussing the "waiver" provisions of 301(c) and (g), not the prohibition in 301(l). See, e. g., 123 Cong. Rec. 39183-39184 Leg. Hist. 458, 461 (Sen. Muskie); 123 Cong. Rec. 38961 Leg. Hist. 331 (Rep. Roberts); S. Rep. No. 95-370, pp. 40-44, Leg. Hist. 673-677 (discussing water-quality based modifications). Simply because Members of Congress or Committees referred to modifications authorized by 301(c) and (g) as |
Justice White | 1,985 | 6 | majority | Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. NRDC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111358/chemical-manufacturers-assn-v-nrdc/ | Committees referred to modifications authorized by 301(c) and (g) as "variance" provisions, does not mean that FDF variances are also modifications barred by 301(l). After examining the wording and legislative history of the statute, we agree with EPA and CMA that the legislative history itself does not evince an unambiguous congressional intention to forbid all FDF waivers with respect to toxic materials. -843, and n. 9. C Neither are we convinced that FDF variances threaten to frustrate the goals and operation of the statutory scheme set *130 up by Congress. The nature of FDF variances has been spelled out both by this Court and by the Agency itself. The regulation explains that its purpose is to remedy categories which were not accurately drawn because information was either not available to or not considered by the Administrator in setting the original categories and limitations. 40 CFR 403.13(b) An FDF variance does not excuse compliance with a correct requirement, but instead represents an acknowledgment that not all relevant factors were taken sufficiently into account in framing that requirement originally, and that those relevant factors, properly considered, would have justified indeed, required the creation of a subcategory for the discharger in question. As we have recognized, the FDF variance is a laudable corrective mechanism, "an acknowledgment that the uniform limitation was set without reference to the full range of current practices, to which the Administrator was to refer." It is, essentially, not an exception to the standard-setting process, but rather a more fine-tuned application of it.[20] We are not persuaded by NRDC's argument that granting FDF variances is inconsistent with the goal of uniform effluent limitations under the Act. Congress did intend uniformity among sources in the same category, demanding that "similar point sources with similar characteristics meet similar effluent limitations," S. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 126 (1972). EPA, however, was admonished to take into account the diversity within each industry by establishing appropriate subcategories. Leg. Hist. 455. *131 NRDC concedes that EPA could promulgate rules under 307 of the Act[21] creating a subcategory for each source which is fundamentally different from the rest of the class under the factors the EPA must consider in drawing categories. The same result is produced by the issuance of an FDF variance for the same failure properly to subdivide a broad category.[22] Since the dispute is therefore reduced to an argument over the means used by EPA to define subcategories of indirect dischargers in order to achieve the goals of the Act, these are particularly persuasive cases for deference to the Agency's interpretation. Cf. |
Justice White | 1,985 | 6 | majority | Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. NRDC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111358/chemical-manufacturers-assn-v-nrdc/ | particularly persuasive cases for deference to the Agency's interpretation. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power ; NRDC argues, echoing the concern of the Court of Appeals below, that allowing FDF variances will render meaningless the 301(l) prohibition against modifications on the basis of economic and water-quality factors. That argument ignores the clear difference between the purpose of FDF waivers and that of 301(c) and (g) modifications, a difference we explained in National Crushed Stone. A discharger that satisfies the requirements of 301(c) qualifies for a variance "simply because [it] could not afford a compliance cost that is not fundamentally different from those the Administrator has already considered" in creating a category and setting an effluent A 301(c) modification forces "a displacement of calculations already performed, not because those calculations were incomplete or had unexpected effects, but only because the costs happened to fall on *132 one particular operator, rather than on another who might be economically better off." FDF variances are specifically unavailable for the grounds that would justify the statutory modifications. 40 CFR 403.13(e)(3) and (4) Both a source's inability to pay the foreseen costs, grounds for a 301(c) modification, and the lack of a significant impact on water quality, grounds for a 301(g) modification, are irrelevant under FDF variance procedures. ; see also Crown Simpson Pulp (CA9), cert. denied, EPA and CMA point out that the availability of FDF variances makes bearable the enormous burden faced by EPA in promulgating categories of sources and setting effluent limitations. Acting under stringent timetables,[23] EPA must collect and analyze large amounts of technical information concerning complex industrial categories.[24] Understandably, *133 EPA may not be apprised of and will fail to consider unique factors applicable to atypical plants during the categorical rulemaking process, and it is thus important that EPA's nationally binding categorical pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers be tempered with the flexibility that the FDF variance mechanism offers, a mechanism repugnant to neither the goals nor the operation of the Act.[25] *134A III Viewed in its entirety, neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act demonstrates a clear congressional intent to forbid EPA's sensible variance mechanism for tailoring the categories it promulgates. In the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary, we accept EPA's conclusion that 301(l) does not prohibit FDF variances. That interpretation gives the term "modify" a consistent meaning in 301(c), (g), and (l), and draws support from the legislative evolution of 301(l) and from congressional silence on whether it intended to forbid FDF variances altogether and thus to obviate our decision in Du Pont. Here we |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court. 28 U.S. C. 2254(b)(1), (c) ( ed. and Supp. III). In this case, we are asked to decide whether a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for *840 discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. We conclude that he must. I In 1977, respondent Darren Boerckel was tried in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Illinois, for the rape, burglary, and aggravated battery of an 87-year-old woman. The central evidence against him at trial was his written confession to the crimes, a confession admitted over Boerckel's objection. The jury convicted Boerckel on all three charges, and he was sentenced to serve 20 to 60 years' imprisonment on the rape charge, and shorter terms on the other two charges, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Boerckel appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court of Illinois, raising several issues. He argued, among other things, that his confession should have been suppressed because the confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest, because the confession was coerced, and because he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Boerckel claimed that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial, that he had been denied discovery of exculpatory material held by the police, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The Illinois Appellate Court, with one justice dissenting, rejected Boerckel's claims and affirmed his convictions and sentences. Boerckel next filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. In this petition, he raised only three issues. Boerckel claimed first that his confession was the fruit of an unlawful arrest because, contrary to the Appellate Court's ruling, he was under arrest when he gave his confession. Boerckel contended that he was denied a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct and that he had been erroneously denied discovery of exculpatory material *841 in the possession of the police. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal, and this Court denied Boerckel's subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari. In Boerckel filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S. C. 2254 in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The District Court appointed counsel for Boerckel, and Boerckel's counsel filed an amended petition in March 1995. The amended petition asked for relief on six grounds: (1) that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his confession was not voluntary; (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) that his right to discovery of exculpatory material under was violated. In an order dated November 15, 1995, the District Court found, as relevant here, that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his first, second, and third claims by failing to include them in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. No. 94-3258 (CD Ill.), pp. 4-10. Boerckel attempted to overcome the procedural defaults by presenting evidence that he fell within the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to the procedural default rule. See At a hearing on this issue, Boerckel argued that he was actually innocent of the offenses for which he had been convicted and he presented evidence that he claimed showed that two other men were responsible for the crimes. In a subsequent ruling, the District Court concluded that Boerckel had failed to satisfy the standards established in for establishing the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception, and thus held that Boerckel could not overcome the procedural bars preventing review *842 of his claims. No. 94-3258 (CD Ill., Oct. 28, 1996), pp. 14-15. After rejecting Boerckel's remaining claims for relief, the District Court denied his habeas petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered one question, namely, whether Boerckel had procedurally defaulted the first three claims in his habeas petition (whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, whether his confession was voluntary, and whether the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict) by failing to raise those claims in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court denying Boerckel's habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that Boerckel was not required to present his claims in a petition for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted those claims. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals on this issue. Compare e. g., with cert. denied, II Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. The exhaustion doctrine, first announced in Ex parte Royall, is now codified at 28 U.S. C. 2254(b)(1) ( ed., Supp. III). This doctrine, however, raises a recurring question: What state remedies must a habeas petitioner *843 invoke to satisfy the federal exhaustion requirement? See ; The particular question posed by this case is whether a prisoner must seek review in a state court of last resort when that court has discretionary control over its docket. Illinois law provides for a two-tiered appellate review process. Criminal defendants are tried in the local circuit courts, and although some criminal appeals (e. g., those in which the death penalty is imposed) are heard directly by the Supreme Court of Illinois, most criminal appeals are heard first by an intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Court of Illinois. Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 603 A party may petition for leave to appeal a decision by the Appellate Court to the Illinois Supreme Court (with exceptions that are irrelevant here), but whether "such a petition will be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion." Rule 315(a). See Rule 612(b) (providing that Rule 315 governs criminal, as well as civil, appeals). Rule 315 elaborates on the exercise of this discretion as follows: "The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: the general importance of the question presented; the existence of a conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court, or of another division of the Appellate Court; the need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed." Rule 315(a). Boerckel's amended federal habeas petition raised three claims that he had not included in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. To determine whether Boerckel was required to present those claims to the Illinois Supreme Court in order to exhaust his state *844 remedies, we turn first to the language of the federal habeas statute. Section 2254(c) provides that a habeas petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." Although this language could be read to effectively foreclose habeas review by requiring a state prisoner |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | to effectively foreclose habeas review by requiring a state prisoner to invoke any possible avenue of state court review, we have never interpreted the exhaustion requirement in such a restrictive fashion. See Thus, we have not interpreted the exhaustion doctrine to require prisoners to file repetitive petitions. See We have held that state prisoners do not have to invoke extraordinary remedies when those remedies are alternatives to the standard review process and where the state courts have not provided relief through those remedies in the past. See at (rejecting suggestion that state prisoner should have invoked "any of a number of possible alternatives to state habeas including `a suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a declaratory judgment in the state courts,' or perhaps other relief under the State Administrative Procedure Act"). Section 2254(c) requires only that state prisoners give state courts a fair opportunity to act on their claims. See ; State courts, like federal courts, are obliged to enforce federal law. Comity thus dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief. ; *845 This rule of comity reduces friction between the state and federal court systems by avoiding the "unseem[liness]" of a federal district court's overturning a state court conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in the first instance. See ; at Because the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts, we conclude that state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process. Here, Illinois' established, normal appellate review procedure is a twotiered system. Comity, in these circumstances, dictates that Boerckel use the State's established appellate review procedures before he presents his claims to a federal court. Unlike the extraordinary procedures that we found unnecessary in and a petition for discretionary review in Illinois' Supreme Court is a normal, simple, and established part of the State's appellate review process. In the words of the statute, state prisoners have "the right to raise" their claims through a petition for discretionary review in the State's highest court. 2254(c). Granted, as Boerckel contends, Brief for Respondent 16, he has no right to review in the Illinois Supreme Court, but he does have a "right |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | the Illinois Supreme Court, but he does have a "right to raise" his claims before that court. That is all 2254(c) requires. Boerckel contests this conclusion with two related arguments. His first argument is grounded in a stylized portrait of the Illinois appellate review process. According to Boerckel, Illinois' appellate review procedures make the intermediate appellate courts the primary focus of the system; all routine claims of error are directed to those courts. The Illinois Supreme Court, by contrast, serves only to answer *846 "questions of broad significance." Boerckel's view of Illinois' appellate review process derives from Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 315(a) He reads this Rule to discourage the filing of petitions raising routine allegations of error and to direct litigants to present only those claims that meet the criteria defined by the Rule. Rule 315(a), by its own terms, however, does not "contro[l]" or "measur[e]" the Illinois Supreme Court's discretion. The Illinois Supreme Court is free to take cases that do not fall easily within the descriptions listed in the Rule. Moreover, even if we were to assume that the Rule discourages the filing of certain petitions, it is difficult to discern which cases fall into the "discouraged" category. In this case, for example, the parties disagree about whether, under the terms of Rule 315(a), Boerckel's claims should have been presented to the Illinois Supreme Court. Compare Brief for Respondent 5 with Reply Brief for Petitioner 5. The better reading of Rule 315(a) is that the Illinois Supreme Court has the opportunity to decide which cases it will consider on the merits. The fact that Illinois has adopted a discretionary review system may reflect little more than that there are resource constraints on the Illinois Supreme Court's ability to hear every case that is presented to it. It may be that, given the necessity of a discretionary review system, the Rule allows the Illinois Supreme Court to expend its limited resources on "questions of broad significance." We cannot conclude from this Rule, however, that review in the Illinois Supreme Court is unavailable. By requiring state prisoners to give the Illinois Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve constitutional errors in the first instance, the rule we announce today serves the comity interests that drive the exhaustion doctrine. Boerckel's second argument is related to his first. According to Boerckel, because the Illinois Supreme Court has announced (through Rule 315(a)) that it does not want to hear routine allegations of error, a rule requiring state prisoners *847 to file petitions for review with that court offends comity by inundating the Illinois Supreme |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | with that court offends comity by inundating the Illinois Supreme Court with countless unwanted petitions. Brief for Respondent 8-14. See This point, of course, turns on Boerckel's interpretation of Rule 315(a), an interpretation that, as discussed above, we do not find persuasive. Nor is it clear that the rule we announce today will have the effect that Boerckel predicts. We do not know, for example, what percentage of Illinois state prisoners who eventually seek federal habeas relief decline, in the first instance, to seek review in the Illinois Supreme Court. We acknowledge that the rule we announce today requiring state prisoners to file petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State has the potential to increase the number of filings in state supreme courts. We recognize that this increased burden may be unwelcome in some state courts because the courts do not wish to have the opportunity to review constitutional claims before those claims are presented to a federal habeas court. See, e. g., In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and PostConviction Relief Cases, 321 S. C. 563, ; see Under these circumstances, Boerckel may be correct that the increased, unwelcome burden on state supreme courts disserves the comity interests underlying the exhaustion doctrine. In this regard, we note that nothing in our decision today requires the exhaustion of any specific state remedy when a State has provided that that remedy is unavailable. Section 2254(c), in fact, directs federal courts to consider whether a habeas petitioner has "the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." (Emphasis added.) The exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry into what procedures are "available" under state law. In sum, there is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal courts *848 to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available. We hold today only that the creation of a discretionary review system does not, without more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable. Boerckel's amended federal habeas petition raised three claims that he had pressed before the Appellate Court of Illinois, but that he had not included in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. There is no dispute that this state court remedy a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court is no longer available to Boerckel; the time for filing such a petition has long passed. See Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 315(b). |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | O'Sullivan v. Boerckel | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118296/osullivan-v-boerckel/ | petition has long passed. See Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 315(b). Thus, Boerckel's failure to present three of his federal habeas claims to the Illinois Supreme Court in a timely fashion has resulted in a procedural default of those claims. See We do not disagree with Justice Stevens' general description of the law of exhaustion and procedural default. Specifically, we do not disagree with his description of the interplay of these two doctrines. Post, at 853-854 (dissenting opinion). As Justice Stevens notes, a prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement and thereby undercut the values that it serves by "letting the time run" on state remedies. Post, at 853. To avoid this result, and thus "protect the integrity" of the federal exhaustion rule, ibid., we ask not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies, but whether he has properly exhausted those remedies, i. e., whether he has fairly presented his claims to the state courts, see post, at 854. Our disagreement with Justice Stevens in this case turns on our differing answers to this last question: Whether a prisoner who fails to present his claims in a petition for discretionary review to a state court of last resort has properly presented his claims to the state courts. Because we answer this question "no," we conclude that Boerckel has procedurally defaulted his claims. *849 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Morris v. Gressette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109711/morris-v-gressette/ | The issue in this case concerns the scope of judicial review of the Attorney General's failure to interpose a timely objection under 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to a change in the voting laws of a jurisdiction subject to that Act. I The events leading up to this litigation date back to November 11, 1971, when South Carolina enacted Act 932 reapportioning the State Senate.[1] South Carolina promptly submitted Act 932 to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance review pursuant to 5 of the Voting *494 Rights Act. as amended, 42 U.S. C. c (1970 ed., Supp. V).[2] That section forbids States subject to the Act to implement any change in "any voting qualification *495 or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without first (i) obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," or (ii) submitting the change to the Attorney General and receiving no objection within 60 days.[3] While the Attorney General had Act 932 under review, several suits were filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina challenging that Act as violative of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and seeking to enjoin its enforcement until preclearance had been obtained under 5. The cases were consolidated and a three-judge District Court was convened. On March 6, 1972, the Attorney General interposed an objection to Act 932.[4] Although the South Carolina District Court was aware of this objectionan objection that, standing *496 alone, would have justified an injunction against enforcement of the Actthe court proceeded to address the constitutional validity of the reapportionment plan.[5] That court rejected the Fifteenth Amendment claim for lack of evidence that Act 932 was racially motivated, but held that the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment due to malapportionment. The court retained jurisdiction and allowed South Carolina 30 days to enact an acceptable substitute reapportionment plan. Twiggs v. West, Civ. No. 71-1106 (SC, Apr. 7, 1972). On May 6, 1972, a new senate reapportionment plan was enacted into law as 2 of Act 1205.[6] This new plan was filed with the District Court, and it was submitted to the Attorney General on May 12 for preclearance review. On May 23 the District Court found the plan constitutional.[7] By letter dated *497 June 30, the Attorney General notified South Carolina that he would not interpose an |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Morris v. Gressette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109711/morris-v-gressette/ | General notified South Carolina that he would not interpose an objection to the new plan because he felt "constrained to defer to the determination of the three-judge District Court" in Twiggs v. West, supra.[8] App. 48. Thus, as of June 30, 1972, 2 of Act 1205 had been declared constitutional by a three-judge District Court, and the Attorney General had declined to interpose an objection under 5 of the Voting Rights Act.[9] Not content with the Attorney General's decision to defer to the judicial determination of the three-judge District Court, several of the named plaintiffs in the consolidated Twiggs action commenced another suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on August 10, 1972, in which they challenged the Attorney General's failure to object to the new senate reapportionment plan. On May 16, that court ordered the Attorney General to make "a reasoned decision in accordance with his statutory responsibility." In *498 response to this order, the Attorney General stated that in his view the plan violated the Fifteenth Amendment, but he reaffirmed his refusal to interpose an objection on the ground that he was constrained to defer to the ruling of the District Court in Twiggs v. West. App. to Brief for Appellants 4a. On July 19, the District of Columbia District Court directed the Attorney General to consider Act 1205 without regard to the decision in Twiggs v. West. The next day the Attorney General interposed an objection because he was "unable to conclude that Act No. 1205 does not have the effect of abridging voting rights on account of race." App. 52. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. It held that the Attorney General's decision not to interpose an objection was reviewable under the circumstances of this case,[10] and that 5 requires him to make an independent determination on the merits of 5 issues. Armed with the decision of the Court of Appeals and the belated objection interposed by the Attorney General, two South Carolina voters filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina as a class action under 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See The plaintiffs, appellants here, sought an injunction against implementation of 2 of Act 1205 on the ground that the Attorney General had interposed an objection and the State had not *499 subsequently obtained a favorable declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The three-judge District Court convened under 5 dismissed the complaint. It held |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Morris v. Gressette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109711/morris-v-gressette/ | District Court convened under 5 dismissed the complaint. It held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude it from considering South Carolina's contention that, notwithstanding the decision in Harper v. the requirements of 5 were satisfied when the Attorney General failed to interpose an objection within 60 days after submission to him of Act 1205.[11] The District Court also ruled that the Administrative Procedure Act did not authorize judicial review of the Attorney General's initial determination to defer to the ruling of the three-judge District Court in Twiggs v. West. In light of these considerations, the District Court concluded that the failure of the Attorney General to interpose an objection within the applicable 60-day period left South Carolina free to implement the new senate reapportionment plan. We noted probable jurisdiction to determine the reviewability of the Attorney General's failure to interpose a timely objection under 5 of the Voting Rights Act. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. II The ultimate issue in this case concerns the implementation of South Carolina's reapportionment plan for the State Senate. Since that plan has not been declared by the District Court for the District of Columbia to be without racially discriminatory purpose or effect, it can be implemented only if the Attorney General "has not interposed an objection" to the plan within the meaning of 5 of the Voting Rights Act.[12] It *500 is conceded that no objection was entered within the 60-day But appellants insist that the Attorney General's nunc pro tunc objection of July 20, is effective under the Act and thus bars implementation of the reapportionment plan. Since that objection was interposed pursuant to the District Court's order in its validity depends on whether the Harper court had jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review the Attorney General's failure to object.[13] The Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that the provisions of that Act authorizing judicial review apply "except to the extent that(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." *501 5 U.S. C. 701 (a).[14] It is now well settled that "judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress." Abbott[15] The reviewing court must determine whether "Congress has in express or implied terms precluded judicial review or committed the challenged action entirely to administrative discretion." As no provision of the Voting Rights Act expressly precludes judicial review of the Attorney General's action under 5, it is necessary to |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Morris v. Gressette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109711/morris-v-gressette/ | the Attorney General's action under 5, it is necessary to determine "whether nonreviewability can fairly be inferred." See Association of Data Processing Service ; That inquiry must address the role played by the Attorney General within "the context of the entire legislative scheme." Abbott The nature of the 5 remedy, which this Court has characterized as an "unusual" and "severe" procedure, strongly suggests that Congress did not intend the Attorney General's actions under that provision to be subject to judicial review. Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to delay implementation of validly enacted state legislation until federal authorities have had an opportunity to determine whether that *502 legislation conforms to the Constitution and to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act. See South Section 5 establishes two alternative methods by which covered jurisdictions can comply with this severe requirement of federal preclearance review. First, a covered jurisdiction may file a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia and subsequently may implement the change in voting laws if that court declares that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S. C. c (1970 ed., Supp. V). Second, a covered jurisdiction may submit a change in voting laws to the Attorney General and subsequently may enforce the change if "the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission." According to the terms of 5, a covered jurisdiction is in compliance pursuant to the latter alternative once it has (i) filed a complete submission with the Attorney General, and (ii) received no objection from that office within 60 days. This second method of compliance under 5 is unlike the first in that implementation of changes in voting laws is not conditioned on an affirmative statement by the Attorney General that the change is without discriminatory purpose or effect.[16] To the contrary, compliance with 5 is measured solely by the absence, for whatever reason, of a timely objection on the part of the Attorney General.[17] And this Court *503 has recognized that "[o]nce the State has successfully complied with the 5 approval requirements, private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment only in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality; there is no further remedy provided by 5." Although there is no legislative history bearing directly on the issue of reviewability of the Attorney General's actions under 5, the legislative materials do indicate a desire to provide a speedy alternative method of compliance to |
Justice Powell | 1,977 | 17 | majority | Morris v. Gressette | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109711/morris-v-gressette/ | desire to provide a speedy alternative method of compliance to covered States. Section 8 of the original bill provided for preclearance review only by means of a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (hereafter Senate Hearings). Justified concerns arose that the time required to pursue such litigation would unduly delay the implementation of validly enacted, nondiscriminatory state legislation. Cognizant of the problem, Attorney General Katzenbach suggested that the declaratory judgment procedure "could be improved by applying it only to those laws which the Attorney General takes exception to within a given period of time." Senate Hearings 237. The legislation was changed to incorporate this suggestion.[18] *504 In light of the potential severity of the 5 remedy, the statutory language, and the legislative history, we think it clear that Congress intended to provide covered jurisdictions with an expeditious alternative to declaratory judgment actions. The congressional intent is plain: The extraordinary remedy of postponing the implementation of validly enacted state legislation was to come to an end when the Attorney General failed to interpose a timely objection based on a complete submission.[19] Although there was to be no bar to subsequent constitutional challenges to the implemented legislation, there also was to be "no dragging out" of the extraordinary federal remedy beyond the period specified in the statute. Since judicial review of the Attorney General's *505 actions would unavoidably extend this period, it is necessarily precluded.[20] Our conclusions in this respect are reinforced by the fact that the Attorney General's failure to object is not conclusive with respect to the constitutionality of the submitted state legislation.[21] The statute expressly provides that neither "an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of the newly enacted legislation or voting regulation. Cf. It is true that it was the perceived inadequacy of private suits under the Fifteenth Amendment that prompted Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act. 393 U. S., at n. 21; South * But it does not follow that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of Attorney General actions under 5.[22] The initial alternative requirement of submission to the Attorney General substantially reduces the likelihood that a discriminatory enactment will escape detection by federal authorities.[23] Where the discriminatory character *507 of an enactment is not detected upon review by the Attorney General, it can be challenged in traditional constitutional litigation. |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | Appellee, John Harris, Jr., was indicted in a state court, charged with violation of the Penal Code 11400 and 11401, known as the Criminal Syndicalism Act, set out below.[1] He then filed *39 a complaint in the Federal District Court, asking that court to enjoin the appellant, er, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, from prosecuting him, and alleging that the prosecution and even the presence of the Act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech and press, rights guaranteed him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellees Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch intervened as plaintiffs in the suit, claiming that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them as members of the Progressive Labor Party from peacefully advocating the program of their party, which was to replace capitalism with socialism and to abolish the profit system of production in this country. Appellee Farrell Broslawsky, an instructor in history at Los Angeles Valley College, also intervened claiming that the prosecution of Harris made him uncertain as to whether he could *40 teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his classwork. All claimed that unless the United States court restrained the state prosecution of Harris each would suffer immediate and irreparable injury. A three-judge Federal District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2284, held that it had jurisdiction and power to restrain the District Attorney from prosecuting, held that the State's Criminal Syndicalism Act was void for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and accordingly restrained the District Attorney from "further prosecution of the currently pending action against plaintiff Harris for alleged violation of the Act." The is before us on appeal by the State's District Attorney er, pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1253. In his notice of appeal and his jurisdictional statement appellant presented two questions: (1) whether the decision of this Court in holding 's law constitutional in 1927 was binding on the District Court and (2) whether the State's law is constitutional on its face. In this Court the brief for the State of filed at our request, also argues that only Harris, who was indicted, has standing to challenge the State's law, and that issuance of the injunction was a violation of a longstanding judicial policy and of 28 U.S. C. 2283, which provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." See, e. g., Atlantic Coast Line R. Without regard to the questions *41 raised about since overruled by or the constitutionality of the state law, we have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant er from prosecuting under these statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.[2] We express no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun. I Appellee Harris has been indicted, and was actually being prosecuted by for a violation of its Criminal Syndicalism Act at the time this suit was filed. He thus has an acute, live controversy with the State and its prosecutor. But none of the other parties plaintiff in the District Court, Dan, Hirsch, or Broslawsky, has such a controversy. None has been indicted, arrested, or even threatened by the prosecutor. About these three the three-judge court said: "Plaintiffs Dan and Hirsch allege that they are members of the Progressive Labor Party, which advocates change in industrial ownership and political change, and that they feel inhibited in advocating *42 the program of their political party through peaceful, non-violent means, because of the presence of the Act `on the books,' and because of the pending criminal prosecution against Harris. Plaintiff Broslawsky is a history instructor, and he alleges that he is uncertain as to whether his normal practice of teaching his students about the doctrines of Karl Marx and reading from the Communist Manifesto and other revolutionary works may subject him to prosecution for violation of the Act." Whatever right Harris, who is being prosecuted under the state syndicalism law may have, Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky cannot share it with him. If these three had alleged that they would be prosecuted for the conduct they planned to engage in, and if the District Court had found this allegation to be trueeither on the admission of the State's district attorney or on any other evidence then a genuine controversy might be said to exist. But here appellees Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible. They claim the right to bring this suit solely because, in the language of their complaint, they "feel inhibited." We do not think |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | of their complaint, they "feel inhibited." We do not think this allegation, even if true, is sufficient to bring the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts into play to enjoin a pending state prosecution. A federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution in a state court is a serious matter. And persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in such s. See Since Harris is actually being prosecuted under the challenged laws, however, we proceed with him as a proper party. *43 II Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state s free from interference by federal courts. In 1793 an Act unconditionally provided: "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state" c. 22, 5. A comparison of the 1793 Act with 28 U.S. C. 2283, its present-day successor, graphically illustrates how few and minor have been the exceptions granted from the flat, prohibitory language of the old Act. During all this lapse of years from 1793 to 1970 the statutory exceptions to the 1793 congressional enactment have been only three: (1) "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress"; (2) "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction"; and (3) "to protect or effectuate its judgments." In addition, a judicial exception to the longstanding policy evidenced by the statute has been made where a person about to be prosecuted in a state court can show that he will, if the proceeding in the state court is not enjoined, suffer irreparable damages. See Ex parte[3] The precise reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings have never been specifically identified but the primary sources of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable *44 injury if denied equitable relief. The doctrine may originally have grown out of circumstances peculiar to the English judicial system and not applicable in this country, but its fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction within narrow limits is equally important under our Constitution, in order to prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions where a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted. This |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted. This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in the early struggling days of *45 our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future. This brief discussion should be enough to suggest some of the reasons why it has been perfectly natural for our s to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions. In suit had been brought in the Federal District Court seeking to enjoin state prosecutions under a recently enacted state law that allegedly interfered with the free flow of interstate commerce. The Court, in a unanimous opinion made clear that such a suit, even with respect to state criminal proceedings not yet formally instituted, could be proper only under very special circumstances: "Ex parte and following s have established the doctrine that when absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights courts of the United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions. But this may not be done except under extraordinary circumstances |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | But this may not be done except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate. Ordinarily, there should be no interference with such officers; primarily, they are charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State and must decide when and how this is to be done. The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection." These principles, made clear in the Fenner have been repeatedly followed and reaffirmed in other s involving threatened prosecutions. See, e. g., Spielman Motor *46 Sales ; ; ; ; In all of these s the Court stressed the importance of showing irreparable injury, the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction. In addition, however, the Court also made clear that in view of the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is "both great and immediate." Fenner, Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered "irreparable" in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution. See, e. g., Ex parte Thus, in the we stressed: "Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. `No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and hence unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.'" *47 And similarly, in we made clear, after reaffirming this rule, that: "It does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith" This is where the law stood when the Court decided and held that an injunction against the enforcement of certain state criminal statutes could properly issue under the circumstances presented in that[4] In Dombrowski, *48 unlike many of the earlier s denying injunctions, the |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | *48 unlike many of the earlier s denying injunctions, the complaint made substantial allegations that: "the threats to enforce the statutes against appellants are not made with any expectation of securing valid convictions, but rather are part of a plan to employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass appellants and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana." The appellants in Dombrowski had offered to prove that their offices had been raided and all their files and records seized pursuant to search and arrest warrants that were later summarily vacated by a state judge for lack of probable cause. They also offered to prove that despite the state court order quashing the warrants and suppressing the evidence seized, the prosecutor was continuing to threaten to initiate new prosecutions of appellants under the same statutes, was holding public hearings at which photostatic copies of the illegally seized documents were being used, and was threatening to use other copies of the illegally seized documents to obtain grand jury indictments against the appellants on charges of violating the same statutes. These circumstances, as viewed by the Court sufficiently establish the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith, that had always been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention. See, e. g., Indeed, after quoting the Court's statement in concerning the very restricted circumstances under which an injunction could be justified, the Court in Dombrowski went on to say: "But the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of the State's criminal * prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss of or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court's disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury." -486. And the Court made clear that even under these circumstances the District Court issuing the injunction would have continuing power to lift it at any time and remit the plaintiffs to the state courts if circumstances 380 U.S., at 1, 2. Similarly, in a divided Court denied an injunction after finding that the record did not establish the necessary bad faith and harassment; the dissenting Justices themselves stressed the very limited role to be allowed for federal injunctions against state criminal prosecutions and differed with the Court only on the question whether the particular facts of that |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | only on the question whether the particular facts of that were sufficient to show that the prosecution was brought in bad faith. It is against the background of these principles that we must judge the propriety of an injunction under the circumstances of the present Here a proceeding was already pending in the state court, affording Harris an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. There is no suggestion that this single prosecution against Harris is brought in bad faith or is only one of a series of repeated prosecutions to which he will be subjected. In other words, the injury that Harris faces is solely "that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith," and therefore under the settled doctrine we have already described he is not entitled to equitable relief "even if such statutes are unconstitutional," *50 The District Court, however, thought that the Dombrowski decision substantially broadened the availability of injunctions against state criminal prosecutions and that under that decision the federal courts may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing of bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found "on its face" to be vague or overly broad, in violation of the First Amendment. We recognize that there are some statements in the Dombrowski opinion that would seem to support this argument. But, as we have already seen, such statements were unnecessary to the decision of that because the Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established standards. In addition, we do not regard the reasons adduced to support this position as sufficient to justify such a substantial departure from the established doctrines regarding the availability of injunctive relief. It is undoubtedly true, as the Court stated in Dombrowski, that "[a] criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms." But this sort of "chilling effect," as the Court called it, should not by itself justify federal intervention. In the first place, the chilling effect cannot be satisfactorily eliminated by federal injunctive relief. In Dombrowski itself the Court stated that the injunction to be issued there could be lifted if the State obtained an "acceptable limiting construction" from the state courts. The Court then made clear that once this was done, prosecutions could then be brought for conduct occurring before the narrowing construction was made, and proper convictions could stand so long as the defendants were not deprived of fair warning. 380 U.S., at 1 n. 7. The kind of |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | warning. 380 U.S., at 1 n. 7. The kind of relief granted in Dombrowski thus does not effectively eliminate uncertainty as to the coverage of the state *51 statute and leaves most citizens with virtually the same doubts as before regarding the danger that their conduct might eventually be subjected to criminal sanctions. The chilling effect can, of course, be eliminated by an injunction that would prohibit any prosecution whatever for conduct occurring prior to a satisfactory rewriting of the statute. But the States would then be stripped of all power to prosecute even the socially dangerous and constitutionally unprotected conduct that had been covered by the statute, until a new statute could be passed by the state legislature and approved by the federal courts in potentially lengthy trial and appellate proceedings. Thus, in Dombrowski itself the Court carefully reaffirmed the principle that even in the direct prosecution in the State's own courts, a valid narrowing construction can be applied to conduct occurring prior to the date when the narrowing construction was made, in the absence of fair warning problems. Moreover, the existence of a "chilling effect," even in the area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action. Where a statute does not directly abridge free speech, butwhile regulating a subject within the State's powertends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing so. ; ; Mine Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important *52 and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution. Beyond all this is another, more basic consideration. Procedures for testing the constitutionality of a statute "on its face" in the manner apparently contemplated by Dombrowski, and for then enjoining all action to enforce the statute until the State can obtain court approval for a modified version, are fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal courts in our constitutional plan. The power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is in the final analysis derived |
Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | to declare laws unconstitutional is in the final analysis derived from its responsibility for resolving concrete disputes brought before the courts for decision; a statute apparently governing a dispute cannot be applied by judges, consistently with their obligations under the Supremacy Clause, when such an application of the statute would conflict with the Constitution. But this vital responsibility, broad as it is, does not amount to an unlimited power to survey the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the courts are called upon to enforce them. Ever since the Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal for having members of the Supreme Court render advice concerning pending legislation[5] it has been clear that, even when suits of this kind involve a " or controversy" sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution, the task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. *53 The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, see, e. g., rev'd sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, post, p. 77, ordinarily results in a kind of that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. In light of this fundamental conception of the Framers as to the proper place of the federal courts in the governmental processes of passing and enforcing laws, it can seldom be appropriate for these courts to exercise any such power of prior approval or veto over the legislative process. For these reasons, fundamental not only to our federal system but also to the basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National Government under our Constitution, we hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions. We do not think that opinion stands for the proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a statute solely on the basis of a showing that the statute "on its face" abridges First Amendment rights. There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. For example, as long ago as the we indicated: "It is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly |
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