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Justice Black | 1,971 | 21 | majority | Younger v. Harris | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108263/younger-v-harris/ | is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against *54 whomever an effort might be made to apply it." Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but there is no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be. It is sufficient for purposes of the present to hold, as we do, that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not in itself justify an injunction against goodfaith attempts to enforce it, and that appellee Harris has failed to make any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to consider whether 28 U.S. C. 2283, which prohibits an injunction against state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress" would in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Bush v. Gore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118395/bush-v-gore/ | The Constitution assigns to the States the primary responsibility for determining the manner of selecting the Presidential electors. See Art. II, 1, cl. 2. When questions arise about the meaning of state laws, including election laws, it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the highest courts of the States as providing the final answers. On rare occasions, however, either federal statutes or the Federal Constitution may require federal judicial intervention in state elections. This is not such an occasion. The federal questions that ultimately emerged in this case are not substantial. Article II provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors." It does not create state legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they comeas creatures born of, and constrained by, their state constitutions. Lest there be any doubt, we stated over 100 years ago in that "[w]hat is forbidden or required to be done by a State" in the Article II context "is forbidden or required of the legislative power under state constitutions as they exist." In the same vein, we also observed that "[t]he [State's] legislative power is the supreme authority except as limited by the constitution of the State." ; cf.[1] The legislative power in Florida is subject to judicial review pursuant *124 to Article V of the Florida Constitution, and nothing in Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the state legislature from the constraints in the State Constitution that created it. Moreover, the Florida Legislature's own decision to employ a unitary code for all elections indicates that it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play the same role in Presidential elections that it has historically played in resolving electoral disputes. The Florida Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction therefore was wholly consistent with, and indeed contemplated by, the grant of authority in Article II. It hardly needs stating that Congress, pursuant to 3 U.S. C. 5, did not impose any affirmative duties upon the States that their governmental branches could "violate." Rather, 5 provides a safe harbor for States to select electors in contested elections "by judicial or other methods" established by laws prior to the election day. Section 5, like Article II, assumes the involvement of the state judiciary in interpreting state election laws and resolving election disputes under those laws. Neither 5 nor Article II grants federal judges any special authority to substitute their views for those of the state judiciary on matters of state law. Nor are petitioners correct in asserting that the failure of |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Bush v. Gore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118395/bush-v-gore/ | Nor are petitioners correct in asserting that the failure of the Florida Supreme Court to specify in detail the precise manner in which the "intent of the voter," Fla. Stat. Ann. 101.5614(5) (Supp. 2001), is to be determined rises to the level of a constitutional violation.[2] We found such a violation *1 when individual votes within the same State were weighted unequally, see, e. g., but we have never before called into question the substantive standard by which a State determines that a vote has been legally cast. And there is no reason to think that the guidance provided to the fact finders, specifically the various canvassing boards, by the "intent of the voter" standard is any less sufficientor will lead to results any less uniformthan, for example, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard employed every day by ordinary citizens in courtrooms across this country.[3] *126 Admittedly, the use of differing substandards for determining voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may raise serious concerns. Those concerns are alleviatedif not eliminatedby the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process. Of course, as a general matter, "[t]he interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints." Bain Peanut Co. of If it were otherwise, Florida's decision to leave to each county the determination of what balloting system to employdespite enormous differences in accuracy[4]might run afoul of equal protection. So, too, might the similar decisions of the vast majority of state legislatures to delegate to local authorities certain decisions with respect to voting systems and ballot design. Even assuming that aspects of the remedial scheme might ultimately be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause, I could not subscribe to the majority's disposition of the case. As the majority explicitly holds, once a state legislature determines to select electors through a popular vote, the right to have one's vote counted is of constitutional stature. As the majority further acknowledges, Florida law holds that all ballots that reveal the intent of the voter constitute valid votes. Recognizing these principles, the majority nonetheless orders the termination of the contest proceeding before all such votes have been tabulated. Under their own reasoning, *127 the appropriate course of action would be to remand to allow more specific procedures for implementing the legislature's uniform general standard to be established. In the interest of finality, however, the majority effectively orders the disenfranchisement of an unknown |
Justice Stevens | 2,000 | 16 | dissenting | Bush v. Gore | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118395/bush-v-gore/ | however, the majority effectively orders the disenfranchisement of an unknown number of voters whose ballots reveal their intentand are therefore legal votes under state lawbut were for some reason rejected by ballot-counting machines. It does so on the basis of the deadlines set forth in Title 3 of the United States Code. Ante, at 110. But, as I have already noted, those provisions merely provide rules of decision for Congress to follow when selecting among conflicting slates of electors. They do not prohibit a State from counting what the majority concedes to be legal votes until a bona fide winner is determined. Indeed, in 1960, Hawaii appointed two slates of electors and Congress chose to count the one appointed on January 4, 1961, well after the Title 3 deadlines. See Josephson & Ross, Repairing the Electoral College,[5] Thus, nothing prevents the majority, even if it properly found an equal protection violation, from ordering relief appropriate to remedy that violation without depriving Florida voters of their right to have their votes counted. As the majority notes, "[a] desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees." Ante, at 108. Finally, neither in this case, nor in its earlier opinion in Palm Beach County Canvassing did the Florida Supreme Court make any substantive *128 change in Florida electoral law.[6] Its decisions were rooted in long-established precedent and were consistent with the relevant statutory provisions, taken as a whole. It did what courts do[7]it decided the case before it in light of the legislature's intent to leave no legally cast vote uncounted. In so doing, it relied on the sufficiency of the general "intent of the voter" standard articulated by the state legislature, coupled with a procedure for ultimate review by an impartial judge, to resolve the concern about disparate evaluations of contested ballots. If we assumeas I do that the members of that court and the judges who would have carried out its mandate are impartial, its decision does not even raise a colorable federal question. What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | Petitioner Elijah Manuel was held in jail for some seven weeks after a judge relied on allegedly fabricated evidence to find probable cause that he had committed a crime. The primary question in this case is whether Manuel may bring a claim based on the Fourth Amendment to contest the legality of his pretrial confinement. Our answer fol- lows from settled precedent. The Fourth Amendment, this Court has recognized, establishes “the standards and procedures” governing pretrial detention. See, e.g., Ger- And those consti- tutional protections apply even after the start of “legal process” in a criminal case—here, that is, after the judge’s determination of probable cause. See ; (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Accordingly, we hold today that Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on the ground that it violated the Fourth Amendment (while we leave all other issues, including one about that claim’s timeliness, to the court below). MANUEL v. JOLIET Opinion of the Court I Shortly after midnight on March 18, 011, Manuel was riding through Joliet, Illinois, in the passenger seat of a Dodge Charger, with his brother at the wheel. A pair of Joliet police officers pulled the car over when the driver failed to signal a turn. See App. 90. According to the complaint in this case, one of the officers dragged Manuel from the car, called him a racial slur, and kicked and punched him as he lay on the ground. See at 31–3, 63.1 The policeman then searched Manuel and found a vitamin bottle containing pills. See Suspecting that the pills were actually illegal drugs, the officers con- ducted a field test of the bottle’s contents. The test came back negative for any controlled substance, leaving the officers with no evidence that Manuel had committed a crime. See Still, the officers arrested Manuel and took him to the Joliet police station. See There, an evidence technician tested the pills once again, and got the same (negative) result. See But the technician lied in his report, claiming that one of the pills was “found to be positive for the probable pres- ence of ecstasy.” Similarly, one of the arresting officers wrote in his report that “[f ]rom [ his] training and experience, [ he] knew the pills to be ecstasy.” On the basis of those statements, another officer swore out a criminal complaint against Manuel, charging him with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. See at 5–53. Manuel was brought before a county court judge later that day for a determination of whether there was proba- ble cause for the charge, as necessary for |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | was proba- ble cause for the charge, as necessary for further deten- —————— 1 Because we here review an order dismissing Manuel’s suit, we ac- cept as true all the factual allegations in his complaint. See, e.g., Cite as: 580 U. S. (017) 3 Opinion of the Court tion. See (requiring a judicial finding of probable cause following a warrantless arrest to impose any significant pretrial restraint on liberty); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 75, (implementing that constitutional rule). The judge relied exclusively on the criminal complaint—which in turn relied exclusively on the police department’s fabrications—to support a finding of probable cause. Based on that determination, he sent Manuel to the county jail to await trial. In the somewhat obscure legal lingo of this case, Manuel’s subse- quent detention was thus pursuant to “legal process”— because it followed from, and was authorized by, the judge’s probable-cause determination. While Manuel sat in jail, the Illinois police laboratory reexamined the seized pills, and on April 1, it issued a report concluding (just as the prior two tests had) that they contained no controlled substances. See App. 51. But for unknown reasons, the prosecution—and, critically for this case, Manuel’s detention—continued for more than another month. Only on May 4 did an Assistant State’s Attorney seek dismissal of the drug charge. See 101. The County Court immediately granted the request, and Manuel was released the next day. In all, he had spent 48 days in pretrial detention. On April Manuel brought this lawsuit under 4 U.S. C. against the City of Joliet and several of its police officers (collectively, the City). Section 1983 creates a “species of tort liability,” for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu- —————— Although not addressed in Manuel’s complaint, the police depart- ment’s alleged fabrications did not stop at this initial hearing on probable cause. About two weeks later, on March 30, a grand jury indicted Manuel based on similar false evidence: testimony from one of the arresting officers that “[t]he pills field tested positive” for ecstasy. App. 96 (grand jury minutes). 4 MANUEL v. JOLIET Opinion of the Court tion,” Manuel’s complaint alleged that the City violated his Fourth Amendment rights in two ways—first by arresting him at the roadside without any reason, and next by “detaining him in police custody” for almost seven weeks based entirely on made-up evidence. See App. 79–80.3 The District Court dismissed Manuel’s suit. See WL 55166 The court first held that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred Manuel’s claim for unlawful arrest, because more than two years |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | Manuel’s claim for unlawful arrest, because more than two years had elapsed between the date of his arrest (March 18, 011) and the filing of his complaint But the court relied on another basis in rejecting Manuel’s challenge to his subsequent detention (which stretched from March 18 to May 5, 011). Binding Circuit prece- dent, the District Court explained, made clear that pretrial detention following the start of legal process could not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. See at *1 ). According to that line of decisions, a plaintiff chal- lenging such detention must allege a breach of the Due Process Clause—and must show, to recover on that theory, that state law fails to provide an adequate remedy. See at *1–*. Because Manuel’s complaint rested solely on the Fourth Amendment—and because, in any event, Illinois’s remedies were robust enough to pre- clude the due process avenue—the District Court found that Manuel had no way to proceed. See The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed —————— 3 Manuel’s allegation of unlawful detention concerns only the period after the onset of legal process—here meaning, again, after the County Court found probable cause that he had committed a crime. See at 3. The police also held Manuel in custody for several hours between his warrantless arrest and his first appearance in court. But through- out this litigation, Manuel has treated that short period as part and parcel of the initial unlawful arrest. See, e.g., Reply Brief 1. Cite as: 580 U. S. (017) 5 Opinion of the Court the dismissal of Manuel’s claim for unlawful detention (the only part of the District Court’s decision Manuel appealed). See Invoking its prior caselaw, the Court of Appeals reiterated that such claims could not be brought under the Fourth Amend- ment. Once a person is detained pursuant to legal pro- cess, the court stated, “the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture and the detainee’s claim that the detention is improper becomes [one of] due process.” 3–644 ). And again: “When, after the arrest[,] a person is not let go when he should be, the Fourth Amendment gives way to the due process clause as a basis for challenging his deten- tion.” 590 Fed. Appx., 3 (quoting Llovet, 761 F.3d, at 764). So the Seventh Circuit held that Manuel’s com- plaint, in alleging only a Fourth Amendment violation, rested on the wrong part of the Constitution: A person detained following the onset of legal process could at most (although, the court agreed, not in Illinois) challenge his pretrial confinement via the Due |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | not in Illinois) challenge his pretrial confinement via the Due Process Clause. See 590 Fed. Appx., 3–644. The Seventh Circuit recognized that its position makes it an outlier among the Courts of Appeals, with ten others taking the opposite view. See 3; Hernandez- (“[T]here is now broad consensus among the circuits that the Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure but upon proba- ble cause extends through the pretrial period”).4 Still, the —————— 4 See also 114–118 (CA 15); ; ; Castellano v. Fragozo, ; Sykes v. Anderson, ; 307 F.3d 9, ; 797–7 ; Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584–586 (CA11 16); 6 MANUEL v. JOLIET Opinion of the Court court decided, Manuel had failed to offer a sufficient rea- son for overturning settled Circuit precedent; his argu- ment, albeit “strong,” was “better left for the Supreme Court.” 590 Fed. Appx., 3. On cue, we granted certiorari. 577 U. S. (016). II The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreason- able seizures.” Manuel’s complaint seeks just that protection. Government officials, it recounts, detained— which is to say, “seiz[ed]”—Manuel for 48 days following his arrest. See App. 79–80; Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 49, 54 (007) (“A person is seized” whenever offi- cials “restrain[ ] his freedom of movement” such that he is “not free to leave”). And that detention was “unreason- able,” the complaint continues, because it was based solely on false evidence, rather than supported by probable cause. See App. 79–80; Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 19 (“[T]he general rule [is] that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable cause to believe that the individual has commit- ted a crime”). By their respective terms, then, Manuel’s claim fits the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment fits Manuel’s claim, as hand in glove. This Court decided some four decades ago that a claim challenging pretrial detention fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In two persons arrested without a warrant brought a suit complaining that they had been held in custody for “a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.” The Court looked to the Fourth Amendment to analyze— and uphold—their claim that such a pretrial restraint on liberty is unlawful unless a judge (or grand jury) first —————— 510–511 (CADC 007). Cite as: 580 U. S. (017) 7 Opinion of the Court makes a reliable finding of probable cause. See 117, n. 19. The Fourth Amendment, we began, establishes the minimum constitutional “standards and procedures” not just for arrest |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | the minimum constitutional “standards and procedures” not just for arrest but also for ensuing “detention.” at In choosing that Amendment “as the rationale for decision,” the Court responded to a concurring Justice’s view that the Due Process Clause offered the better framework: The Fourth Amendment, the majority coun- tered, was “tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and it[ ] always has been thought to define” the appropriate process “for seizures of person[s] in crimi- nal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial.” That Amendment, standing alone, guaranteed “a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint.” Accordingly, those detained prior to trial without such a finding could appeal to “the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unfounded invasions of liberty.” ; see5 And so too, a later decision indicates, those objecting to a pretrial deprivation of liberty may invoke the Fourth Amendment when (as here) that deprivation occurs after —————— 5 The Court repeated the same idea in a follow-on decision to Ger- stein. In County of (11), we considered how quickly a jurisdiction must provide the probable-cause determination that demanded “as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention.” In holding that the decision should occur within 48 hours of an arrest, the majority understood its “task [as] articulat[ing] more clearly the boundaries of what is permissible under the Fourth Amendment.” In arguing for still greater speed, the principal dissent invoked the original meaning of “the Fourth Amend- ment’s prohibition of ‘unreasonable seizures,’ insofar as it applies to seizure of the person.” The difference between the two opinions was significant, but the commonality still more so: All Justices agreed that the Fourth Amendment provides the appropriate lens through which to view a claim involving pretrial detention. 8 MANUEL v. JOLIET Opinion of the Court legal process commences. The plaintiff in complained of various pretrial restraints imposed after a court found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant, and then bind him over for trial, based on a policeman’s un- founded charges. See –69 (plurality opinion). For uncertain reasons, ignored the Fourth Amendment in drafting his complaint; instead, he alleged that the defendant officer had infringed his sub- stantive due process rights. This Court rejected that claim, with five Justices in two opinions remitting to the Fourth Amendment. See (plurality opin- ion) (“We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment under which [ his] claim must be judged”); (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]njuries like those [he] alleges are cognizable in claims founded upon the Fourth Amendment”). “The Framers,” the plurality wrote, “considered the |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | the Fourth Amendment”). “The Framers,” the plurality wrote, “considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it.” at That the deprivations at issue were pursuant to legal process made no difference, given that they were (allegedly) unsupported by probable cause; indeed, neither of the two opinions so much as mentioned that procedural circum- stance. Relying on the plurality stated that the Fourth Amendment remained the “relevan[t]” constitu- tional provision to assess the “deprivations of liberty”— most notably, pretrial detention—“that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.” 510 U.S., at ; see at 90 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[R]ules of recov- ery for such harms have naturally coalesced under the Fourth Amendment”). As reflected in ’s tracking of ’s analysis, pretrial detention can violate the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case. The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. See That can Cite as: 580 U. S. (017) 9 Opinion of the Court happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements. Then, too, a person is confined without constitutionally adequate justification. Legal process has gone forward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement. And for that reason, it can- not extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim— or somehow, as the Seventh Circuit has held, convert that claim into one founded on the Due Process Clause. See 590 Fed. Appx., 3–644. If the complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention unsup- ported by probable cause, then the right allegedly in- fringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.6 For that reason, and contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s view, Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he —————— 6 The opposite view would suggest an untenable result: that a person arrested pursuant to a warrant could not bring a Fourth Amendment claim challenging the reasonableness of even his arrest, let alone any subsequent detention. An arrest warrant, after all, is a way of initiat- ing legal process, in which a magistrate finds probable cause that a person committed a crime. See (007) (explaining that the seizure of a person was “without legal process” because police officers “did not have a warrant for his arrest”); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | a warrant for his arrest”); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts pp. 871, 886 (5th ed. 1984) (similar). If legal process is the cut-off point for the Fourth Amendment, then someone arrested (as well as later held) under a warrant procured through false testimony would have to look to the Due Process Clause for relief. But that runs counter to our caselaw. See, e.g., (holding that an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because a magistrate’s warrant was not backed by probable cause). And if the Seventh Circuit would reply that arrest warrants are somehow different—that there is legal process and then again there is legal process—the next (and in our view unan- swerable) question would be why. 10 MANUEL v. JOLIET Opinion of the Court sought relief not merely for his (pre-legal-process) arrest, but also for his (post-legal-process) pretrial detention.7 Consider again the facts alleged in this case. Police offic- ers initially arrested Manuel without probable cause, based solely on his possession of pills that had field tested negative for an illegal substance. So (putting timeliness issues aside) Manuel could bring a claim for wrongful arrest under the Fourth Amendment. And the same is true (again, disregarding timeliness) as to a claim for wrongful detention—because Manuel’s subsequent weeks in custody were also unsupported by probable cause, and so also constitutionally unreasonable. No evidence of Manuel’s criminality had come to light in between the roadside arrest and the County Court proceeding initiat- ing legal process; to the contrary, yet another test of Man- uel’s pills had come back negative in that period. All that the judge had before him were police fabrications about the pills’ content. The judge’s order holding Manuel for trial therefore lacked any proper basis. And that means Manuel’s ensuing pretrial detention, no less than his original arrest, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Or put just a bit differently: Legal process did not expunge Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim because the process he received failed to establish what that Amendment makes essential for pretrial detention—probable cause to believe —————— 7 Even the City no longer appears to contest that conclusion. On multiple occasions during oral argument in this Court, the City agreed that “a Fourth Amendment right survive[d] the initiation of pro- cess” at the hearing in which the county judge found probable cause and ordered detention. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31; see (concurring with the statement that “once [an] individual is brought before a magistrate, and the magistrate using the same bad evidence says, stay here in jail |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | using the same bad evidence says, stay here in jail until we get to trial, that that period is a violation of the Fourth Amendment”); (stating that a detainee has “a Fourth Amendment claim” if “misstatements at [such a probable-cause hear- ing] led to ongoing pretrial seizure”). Cite as: 580 U. S. (017) 11 Opinion of the Court he committed a crime.8 III Our holding—that the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process—does not exhaust the disputed legal —————— 8 The dissent goes some way toward claiming that a different kind of pretrial legal process—a grand jury indictment or preliminary exami- nation—does expunge such a Fourth Amendment claim. See post, at 9, n. 4 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (raising but “not decid[ing] that question”); post, at 10 (suggesting an answer nonetheless). The effect of that view would be to cut off Manuel’s claim on the date of his grand jury indict- ment (March 30)—even though that indictment (like the County Court’s probable-cause proceeding) was entirely based on false testi- mony and even though Manuel remained in detention for 36 days longer. See n. Or said otherwise—even though the legal process he received failed to establish the probable cause necessary for his contin- ued confinement. We can see no principled reason to draw that line. Nothing in the nature of the legal proceeding establishing probable cause makes a difference for purposes of the Fourth Amendment: Whatever its precise form, if the proceeding is tainted—as here, by fabricated evidence—and the result is that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the confined person’s Fourth Amendment rights, for all the reasons we have stated. By contrast (and contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at 9, n. 3), once a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out: A person challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 318 (1979) (invalidating a conviction under the Due Process Clause when “the record evidence could [not] reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”); Thompson v. Louisville, 36 U.S. 1, 04 (1960) (striking a conviction under the same provision when “the record [wa]s entirely lacking in evidence” of guilt—such that it could not even establish probable cause). and as already suggested, both reflected and recognized that constitutional division of labor. See –8. In their words, the Framers “drafted the Fourth Amendment” to address “the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty,” 510 U.S., |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | address “the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty,” 510 U.S., at and the Amendment thus provides “standards and procedures” for “the detention of suspects pending trial,” 40 U.S., 1 MANUEL v. JOLIET Opinion of the Court issues in this case. It addresses only the threshold inquiry in a suit, which requires courts to “identify the specific constitutional right” at issue. 510 U.S., After pinpointing that right, courts still must determine the elements of, and rules associated with, an action seeking damages for its violation. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 57–58 Here, the parties particularly disagree over the accrual date of Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim—that is, the date on which the applicable two-year statute of limitations began to run. The timeliness of Manuel’s suit hinges on the choice be- tween their proposed dates. But with the following brief comments, we remand that issue to the court below. In defining the contours and prerequisites of a claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to look first to the common law of torts. See (explaining that tort principles “provide the appropriate starting point” in specifying the conditions for recovery under ); Wal- (007) (same for accrual dates in particular). Sometimes, that review of common law will lead a court to adopt wholesale the rules that would apply in a suit involving the most analogous tort. See at ; v. Humphrey, 51 U.S. 7, 483–487 But not always. Common-law prin- ciples are meant to guide rather than to control the defini- tion of claims, serving “more as a source of inspired examples than of prefabricated components.” Hartman v. Moore, 5 U.S. 50, 58 (006); see (01) (noting that “ is [not] simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common- law claims”). In applying, selecting among, or adjust- ing common-law approaches, courts must closely attend to the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue. With these precepts as backdrop, Manuel and the City offer competing views about what accrual rule should Cite as: 580 U. S. (017) 13 Opinion of the Court govern a suit challenging post-legal-process pretrial detention. According to Manuel, that Fourth Amendment claim accrues only upon the dismissal of criminal charges— here, on May 4, 011, less than two years before he brought his suit. See Reply Brief ; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4–5, n. 16 (taking the same position). Relying on this Court’s caselaw, Manuel analo- gizes his claim to the common-law tort of malicious prose- cution. See Reply Brief 9; 549 U.S., at –390. An element of that tort is the “termination of |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | –390. An element of that tort is the “termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused”; and accordingly, the statute of limitations does not start to run until that ter- mination takes place. 51 U.S., 4, 489. Man- uel argues that following the same rule in suits like his will avoid “conflicting resolutions” in litigation and criminal proceedings by “preclud[ing] the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution.” at 484, 486; see Reply Brief 10–11; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4–5, n. 16. In support of Manuel’s posi- tion, all but two of the ten Courts of Appeals that have recognized a Fourth Amendment claim like his have in- corporated a “favorable termination” element and so pegged the statute of limitations to the dismissal of the criminal case. See n. 4, 9 That means in the great majority of Circuits, Manuel’s claim would be timely. The City, however, contends that any such Fourth Amendment claim accrues (and the limitations period starts to run) on the date of the initiation of legal pro- cess—here, on March 18, 011, more than two years before Manuel filed suit. See Brief for Respondents 33. Accord- ing to the City, the most analogous tort to Manuel’s consti- —————— 9 The two exceptions—the Ninth and D. C. Circuits—have not yet weighed in on whether a Fourth Amendment claim like Manuel’s includes a “favorable termination” element. 14 MANUEL v. JOLIET Opinion of the Court tutional claim is not malicious prosecution but false ar- rest, which accrues when legal process commences. See Tr. of Oral Arg. ; 549 U.S., at (noting accrual rule for false arrest suits). And even if malicious prosecution were the better comparison, the City contin- ues, a court should decline to adopt that tort’s favorable- termination element and associated accrual rule in adjudi- cating a claim involving pretrial detention. That element, the City argues, “make[s] little sense” in this context because “the Fourth Amendment is concerned not with the outcome of a prosecution, but with the legality of searches and seizures.” Brief for Respondents 16. And finally, the City contends that Manuel forfeited an alter- native theory for treating his date of release as the date of accrual: to wit, that his pretrial detention “constitute[d] a continuing Fourth Amendment violation,” each day of which triggered the statute of limitations anew. at 9, and n. 6; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36; see also 510 U.S., at 80 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (propounding a similar view). So Manuel, the City concludes, lost |
Justice Kagan | 2,017 | 3 | majority | Manuel v. Joliet | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376986/manuel-v-joliet/ | (propounding a similar view). So Manuel, the City concludes, lost the opportunity to recover for his pretrial detention by waiting too long to file suit. We leave consideration of this dispute to the Court of Appeals. “[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.” (005). Be- cause the Seventh Circuit wrongly held that Manuel lacked any Fourth Amendment claim once legal process began, the court never addressed the elements of, or rules applicable to, such a claim. And in particular, the court never confronted the accrual issue that the parties contest here.10 On remand, the Court of Appeals should decide —————— 10 The dissent would have us address these questions anyway, on the ground that “the conflict on the malicious prosecution question was the centerpiece of Manuel’s argument in favor of certiorari.” Post, at But the decision below did not implicate a “conflict on the malicious prosecution question”—because the Seventh Circuit, in holding that Cite as: 580 U. S. (017) 15 Opinion of the Court that question, unless it finds that the City has previously waived its timeliness argument. See Reply to Brief in Opposition 1– (addressing the possibility of waiver); Tr. of Oral Arg. 40–44 (same). And so too, the court may consider any other still-live issues relating to the contours of Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention. * * * For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceed- ings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— detainees like Manuel could not bring a Fourth Amendment claim at all, never considered whether (and, if so, how) that claim should resem- ble the malicious prosecution tort. Nor did Manuel’s petition for certiorari suggest otherwise. The principal part of his question pre- sented—mirroring the one and only Circuit split involving the decision below—reads as follows: “[W]hether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process.” Pet. for Cert. i. That is exactly the issue we have resolved. The rest of Manuel’s question did indeed express a view as to what would follow from an affirmative answer (“so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim”). (And as the dissent notes, the Seventh Circuit recounted that he made the same argument in that court. See post, at n. 1.) But as to that secondary issue, we think (for all the reasons just stated) that Manuel jumped the gun. See at 11–14. And contra the dissent, his doing so provides no warrant for our doing so too. Cite as: 580 U. |
Justice Scalia | 2,005 | 9 | concurring | Gonzales v. Raich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799995/gonzales-v-raich/ | I agree with the Court's holding that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) may validly be applied to respondents' cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana for personal, medicinal use. I write separately because my understanding of the doctrinal foundation on which that holding rests is, if not inconsistent with that of the Court, at least more nuanced. Since our cases have mechanically recited that the Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation of three categories: (1) the *34 channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. ; see United ; United ; The first two categories are self-evident, since they are the ingredients of interstate commerce itself. See The third category, however, is different in kind, and its recitation without explanation is misleading and incomplete. It is misleading because, unlike the channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, as this Court has acknowledged since at least United Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause. ; ; United ; Shreveport Rate ; United[1] And the category of "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce," is incomplete because the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws *35 governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce. I Our cases show that the regulation of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce in two general circumstances. Most directly, the commerce power permits Congress not only to devise rules for the governance of commerce between States but also to facilitate interstate commerce by eliminating potential obstructions, and to restrict it by eliminating potential stimulants. See That is why the Court has repeatedly sustained congressional legislation on the ground that the regulated activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e. g., ; ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, ; Mandeville Island Farms, ; Board of Trade of ; U.S. 495, and recognized the expansive scope of Congress's authority in this regard: "[T]he pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will |
Justice Scalia | 2,005 | 9 | concurring | Gonzales v. Raich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799995/gonzales-v-raich/ | activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." ; This principle is not without limitation. In and the Court conscious of the potential of the "substantially affects" test to "`obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local,'" at 566-567 *36 ); see also rejected the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic activity based solely on the effect that it may have on interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences. ; "[I]f we were to accept [such] arguments," the Court reasoned in "we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate." ; see also Thus, although Congress's authority to regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce is broad, it does not permit the Court to "pile inference upon inference," in order to establish that noneconomic activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As we implicitly acknowledged in however, Congress's authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Though the conduct in was not economic, the Court nevertheless recognized that it could be regulated as "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." This statement referred to those cases permitting the regulation of intrastate activities "which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power." Wrightwood Dairy at ; see also United 118- ; Shreveport Rate at As the Court put it in Wrightwood Dairy, where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, "it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective." -. *37 Although this power "to make regulation effective" commonly overlaps with the authority to regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,[2] and may in some cases have been confused with that authority, the two are distinct. The regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though the intrastate activity does not itself "substantially affect" interstate commerce. Moreover, as the passage from quoted above suggests, Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce. See The relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are "reasonably adapted" to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power. See In for instance, the Court explained that "Congress, having adopted |
Justice Scalia | 2,005 | 9 | concurring | Gonzales v. Raich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799995/gonzales-v-raich/ | In for instance, the Court explained that "Congress, having adopted the policy of excluding from interstate commerce all goods produced for the commerce which do not conform to the specified labor standards," 312 U. S., could not only require employers engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce to conform to wage and hour standards, at -121, but could also require those employers to keep employment records in order to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory scheme, While the Court sustained the former regulation on the alternative ground that the activity it regulated could have a "great effect" on interstate commerce, it affirmed the latter on the sole ground that "[t]he requirement *38 for records even of the intrastate transaction is an appropriate means to the legitimate end," As the Court said in the Shreveport Rate the Necessary and Proper Clause does not give "Congress the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State, as such," but it does allow Congress "to take all measures necessary or appropriate to" the effective regulation of the interstate market, "although intrastate transactions may thereby be controlled." 234 U. S., at ; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel (the logic of the Shreveport Rate is not limited to instrumentalities of commerce). II Today's principal dissent objects that, by permitting Congress to regulate activities necessary to effective interstate regulation, the Court reduces and to little "more than a drafting guide." Post, at 46 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). I think that criticism unjustified. Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective. As itself states, and the Court affirms today, Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so "could undercut" its regulation of interstate commerce. See ; ante, at 18, 24-25. This is not a power that threatens to obliterate the line between "what is truly national and what is truly local." -568. and affirm that Congress may not regulate certain "purely local" activity within the States based solely on the attenuated effect that such activity may have in the interstate market. But those decisions do not declare noneconomic intrastate activities to be categorically beyond *39 the reach of the Federal Government. Neither case involved the power of Congress to exert control over intrastate activities in connection with a more comprehensive scheme of regulation; expressly disclaimed that |
Justice Scalia | 2,005 | 9 | concurring | Gonzales v. Raich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799995/gonzales-v-raich/ | with a more comprehensive scheme of regulation; expressly disclaimed that it was such a case, and did not even discuss the possibility that it was.) To dismiss this distinction as "superficial and formalistic," see post, at 47 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting), is to misunderstand the nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation. See And there are other restraints upon the Necessary and Proper Clause authority. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in even when the end is constitutional and legitimate, the means must be "appropriate" and "plainly adapted" to that end. Moreover, they may not be otherwise "prohibited" and must be "consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution." These phrases are not merely hortatory. For example, cases such as and New affirm that a law is not "`proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause'" "[w]hen [it] violates [a constitutional] principle of state sovereignty." ; see also New III The application of these principles to the case before us is straightforward. In the CSA, Congress has undertaken to extinguish the interstate market in Schedule I controlled substances, including marijuana. The Commerce Clause unquestionably permits this. The power to regulate interstate commerce "extends not only to those regulations which aid, * foster and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it." See also Hipolite Egg v. United States, ; Lottery Case, To effectuate its objective, Congress has prohibited almost all intrastate activities related to Schedule I substances both economic activities (manufacture, distribution, possession with the intent to distribute) and noneconomic activities (simple possession). See 21 U.S. C. 841(a), 844(a). That simple possession is a noneconomic activity is immaterial to whether it can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation. Rather, Congress's authority to enact all of these prohibitions of intrastate controlled-substance activities depends only upon whether they are appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating Schedule I substances from interstate commerce. By this measure, I think the regulation must be sustained. Not only is it impossible to distinguish "controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate" from "controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate," but it hardly makes sense to speak in such terms. Drugs like marijuana are fungible commodities. As the Court explains, marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never more than an instant from the interstate market and this is so whether or not the possession is for medicinal use or lawful use under the laws |
Justice Scalia | 2,005 | 9 | concurring | Gonzales v. Raich | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/799995/gonzales-v-raich/ | is for medicinal use or lawful use under the laws of a particular State.[3]*41 See ante, at 25-33. Congress need not accept on faith that state law will be effective in maintaining a strict division between a lawful market for "medical" marijuana and the more general marijuana market. See ante, at 30, and n. 38. "To impose on [Congress] the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another government may furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language of the constitution." Finally, neither respondents nor the dissenters suggest any violation of state sovereignty of the sort that would render this regulation "inappropriate," except to argue that the CSA regulates an area typically left to state regulation. See post, at 48, 51 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); post, at 66 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Brief for Respondents 39-42. That is not enough to render federal regulation an inappropriate means. The Court has repeatedly recognized that, if authorized by the commerce power, Congress may regulate private endeavors "even when [that regulation] may pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result which has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress." National League of 8 ; see ; At bottom, respondents' *42 state-sovereignty argument reduces to the contention that federal regulation of the activities permitted by California's Compassionate Use Act is not sufficiently necessary to be "necessary and proper" to Congress's regulation of the interstate market. For the reasons given above and in the Court's opinion, I cannot agree. * * * I thus agree with the Court that, however the class of regulated activities is subdivided, Congress could reasonably conclude that its objective of prohibiting marijuana from the interstate market "could be undercut" if those activities were excepted from its general scheme of regulation. See That is sufficient to authorize the application of the CSA to respondents. |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | [] Respondents sued petitioners for allegedly targeting them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group. While their suit was pending, Congress *473 passed the llegal mmigration Reform and mmigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (RRA), -546, which contains a provision restricting judicial review of the Attorney General's "decision or action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act." 8 U.S. C. 1252(g) (1994 ed., Supp. ). The issue before us is whether, as petitioners contend, this provision deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents' suit. The mmigration and Naturalization Service (NS), a division of the Department of Justice, instituted deportation proceedings in 1987 against Bashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, all of whom belong to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group that the Government characterizes as an international terrorist and communist organization. The NS charged all eight under the McCarran-Walter Act, which, though now repealed, provided at the time for the deportation of aliens who "advocate world communism." See 8 U.S. C. 1251(a)(6)(D), (G)(v), and (H) (1982 ed.). n addition, the NS charged the first six, who were only temporary residents, with routine status violations such as overstaying a visa and failure to maintain student status.[1] See 8 U.S. C. 1251(a)(2) and (a)(9) (1988 ed.). Almost immediately, the aliens filed suit in District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the anticommunism provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney General, the NS, and various immigration officials in their personal and official capacities. The NS responded by dropping the advocacyof-communism *474 charges, but it retained the technical violation charges against the six temporary residents and charged Hamide and Shehadeh, who were permanent residents, under a different section of the McCarran-Walter Act, which authorized the deportation of aliens who were members of an organization advocating "the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any [government] officer or officers" and "the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property." See 8 U.S. C. 1251(a)(6)(F)(ii) (iii) (1982 ed.).[2] NS regional counsel William Odencrantz said at a press conference that the charges had been changed for tactical reasons but the NS was still seeking respondents' deportation because of their affiliation with the PFLP. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Respondents amended their complaint to include an allegation that the NS was selectively enforcing immigration laws against them in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.[3] Since this suit seeking to prevent the |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | Fifth Amendment rights.[3] Since this suit seeking to prevent the initiation of deportation proceedings was filedin 1987, during the administration of Attorney General Edwin Meeseit has made four trips through the District Court for the Central District of California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The first two concerned jurisdictional issues not now before us. See Hamide v. United States District Court, No. 87-7249 (CA9, Feb. 24, 1988); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Thornburgh, 970 F. 2d *475 501 (CA9 1991). Then, in 1994, the District Court preliminarily enjoined deportation proceedings against the six temporary residents, holding that they were likely to prove that the NS did not enforce routine status requirements against immigrants who were not members of disfavored terrorist groups and that the possibility of deportation, combined with the chill to their First Amendment rights while the proceedings were pending, constituted irreparable injury. With regard to Hamide and Shehadeh's claims, however, the District Court granted summary judgment to the federal parties for reasons not pertinent here. AADC was the Ninth Circuit's first merits determination in this case, upholding the injunction as to the six and reversing the District Court with regard to Hamide and Shehadeh. The opinion rejected the Attorney General's argument that selective-enforcement claims are inappropriate in the immigration context, and her alternative argument that the special statutory-review provision of the mmigration and Nationality Act (NA), 8 U.S. C. 1105a, precluded review of such a claim until a deportation order issued. See -1057. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which entered an injunction in favor of Hamide and Shehadeh and denied the Attorney General's request that the existing injunction be dissolved in light of new evidence that all respondents participated in fundraising activities of the PFLP. While the Attorney General's appeal of this last decision was pending, Congress passed RRA which, inter alia, repealed the old judicial-review scheme set forth in 1105a and instituted a new (and significantly more restrictive) one in 8 U.S. C. 1252. The Attorney General filed motions in both the District Court and Court of Appeals, arguing that 1252(g) deprived them of jurisdiction over respondents' selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion, and the Attorney General's appeal from that denial *476 was consolidated with the appeal already pending in the Ninth Circuit. t is the judgment and opinion in that appeal which is before us here: t affirmed the existence of jurisdiction under 1252, see and reaching the merits of the injunctions, again affirmed the District Court, -1376. The Attorney General's petition for rehearing |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | the District Court, -1376. The Attorney General's petition for rehearing en banc was denied over the dissent of three judges, The Attorney General sought our review, and we granted certiorari, Before enactment of RRA, judicial review of most administrative action under the NA was governed by 8 U.S. C. 1105a, a special statutory-review provision directing that "the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation" shall be that set forth in the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S. C. 2341 et seq., which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals, see 2342. Much of the Court of Appeals' analysis in AADC was devoted to the question whether this pre-RRA provision applied to selective-enforcement claims. Since neither the mmigration Judge nor the Board of mmigration Appeals has authority to hear such claims (a point conceded by the Attorney General in AADC see ), a challenge to a final order of deportation based upon such a claim would arrive in the court of appeals without the factual development necessary for decision. The Attorney General argued unsuccessfully below that the Hobbs Act permits a court of appeals to remand the case to the agency, see 28 U.S. C. 2347(c), or transfer it to a district court, see 2347(b)(3), for further factfinding. The Ninth Circuit, believing these options unavailable, concluded that an original district-court action was respondents' only means of obtaining factual development and thus judicial review of their selectiveenforcement *477 claims. Relying on our decision in Cheng Fan Kwok v. NS, it held that the District Court could entertain the suit under either its general federal-question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S. C. 1331, or the general jurisdictional provision of the NA, see 8 U.S. C. 1329.[4] Whether we must delve further into the details of this issue depends upon whether, after the enactment of RRA, 1105a continues to apply to this case. On the surface of things, at least, it does not. Although the general rule set forth in 309(c)(1) of RRA is that the revised procedures for removing aliens, including the judicial-review procedures of 1252, do not apply to aliens who were already in either exclusion or deportation proceedings on RRA's effective date, see note following 8 U.S. C. 1101 (1994 ed., Supp. ),[5] 306(c)(1) of RRA directs that a single provision, 1252(g), shall apply "without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings." See note following 8 U.S. C. 1252 (1994 ed., Supp. ). Section 1252(g) reads as follows: "(g) Exclusive Jurisdiction "Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | Exclusive Jurisdiction "Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction *478 to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act." This provision seemingly governs here, depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction "[e]xcept as provided in this section." But whether it is as straightforward as that depends upon the scope of the quoted text. Here, and in the courts below, both petitioners and respondents have treated 1252(g) as covering all or nearly all deportation claims. The Attorney General has characterized it as "a channeling provision, requiring aliens to bring all deportation-related claims in the context of a petition for review of a final order of deportation filed in the court of appeals." Supplemental Brief for Appellants in No. 96-55929 (CA9), p. 2. Respondents have described it as applying to "most of what NS does." Corrected Supplemental Brief for Appellees in No. 96-55929 (CA9), p. 7. This broad understanding of 1252(g), combined with RRA's effective-date provisions, creates an interpretive anomaly. f the jurisdictionexcluding provision of 1252(g) eliminates other sources of jurisdiction in all deportation-related cases, and if the phrase in 1252(g) "[e]xcept as provided in this section" incorporates (as one would suppose) all the other jurisdiction-related provisions of 1252, then 309(c)(1) would be rendered a virtual nullity. To say that there is no jurisdiction in pending NS cases "except as" 1252 provides jurisdiction is simply to say that 1252's jurisdictional limitations apply to pending cases as well as future caseswhich seems hardly what 309(c)(1) is about. f, on the other hand, the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" were (somehow) interpreted not to incorporate the other jurisdictional provisions of 1252if 1252(g) stood alone, so to speakjudicial review would be foreclosed for all deportation claims in all pending deportation cases, even after entry of a final order. *479 The Attorney General would have us avoid the horns of this dilemma by interpreting 1252(g)'s phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" to mean "except as provided in 1105a." Because 1105a authorizes review of only final orders, respondents must, she says, wait until their administrative proceedings come to a close and then seek review in a court of appeals. (For reasons mentioned above, the Attorney General of course rejects the Ninth Circuit's position in AADC that application of 1105a would leave respondents without a judicial forum because evidence of selective prosecution cannot be introduced into |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | forum because evidence of selective prosecution cannot be introduced into the administrative record.) The obvious difficulty with the Attorney General's interpretation is that it is impossible to understand how the qualifier in 1252(g), "[e]xcept as provided in this section" can possibly mean "except as provided in 1105a." And indeed the Attorney General makes no attempt to explain how this can be, except to observe that what she calls a "literal application" of the statute "would create an anomalous result." Brief for Petitioners 30, n. 15. Respondents note this deficiency, but offer an equally implausible means of avoiding the dilemma. Section 309(c)(3) allows the Attorney General to terminate pending deportation proceedings and reinitiate them under 1252.[6] They argue that 1252(g) applies only to those pending cases in which the Attorney General has made that election. That way, they claim, the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" can, without producing an anomalous result, be allowed to refer (as it says) to all the rest of 1252. But this approach collides head-on with 306(c)'s prescription that 1252(g) shall apply "without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings." See note following 8 U.S. C. 1252 (1994 ed., Supp. ) (Respondents argue *480 in the alternative, of course, that if the Attorney General is right and 1105a does apply, AADC is correct that their claims will be effectively unreviewable upon entry of a final order. For this reason, and because they say that habeas review, if still available after RRA,[7] will come too late to remedy this First Amendment injury, respondents contend that we must construe 1252(g) not to bar constitutional claims.) The Ninth Circuit, for its part, accepted the parties' broad reading of 1252(g) and concluded, reasonably enough, that on that reading Congress could not have meant 1252(g) to stand alone: "Divorced from all other jurisdictional provisions of RRA, subsection (g) would have a more sweeping impact on cases filed before the statute's enactment than after that date. Without incorporating any exceptions, the provision appears to cut off federal jurisdiction over all deportation decisions. We do not think that Congress intended such an absurd result." t recognized, however, the existence of the other horn of the dilemma ("that retroactive application of the entire amended version of 8 U.S. C. 1252 would threaten to render meaningless section 306(c) of RRA," ), and resolved the difficulty to its satisfaction by concluding that "at least some of the other provisions of section 1252" must be included in *481 subsection (g) "when it applies to pending cases." bid. One |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | subsection (g) "when it applies to pending cases." bid. One of those provisions, it thought, must be subsection (f), entitled "Limit on njunctive Relief," which reads as follows: "Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of chapter 4 of title as amended by [RRA], other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such chapter have been initiated." The Ninth Circuit found in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction that covered the present case. The Attorney General argued that any such grant of jurisdiction would be limited (and rendered inapplicable to this case) by 1252(b)(9), which provides: "Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this chapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section." The Ninth Circuit replied that, even if 1252(b)(9) were one of those provisions incorporated into the transitional application of 1252(g), it could not preclude this suit for the same reason AADC had held that 1105a could not do so namely, the Court of Appeals' lack of access to factual findings regarding selective enforcement. Even respondents scarcely try to defend the Ninth Circuit's reading of 1252(f) as a jurisdictional grant. By its plain terms, and even by its title, that provision is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. t prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of 1221-1231, but specifies that this *482 ban does not extend to individual cases. To find in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction is to go beyond what the language will bear. We think the seeming anomaly that prompted the parties' strained readings of 1252(g)and that at least accompanied the Court of Appeals' strained readingis a mirage. The parties' interpretive acrobatics flow from the belief that 306(c)(1) cannot be read to envision a straightforward application of the "[e]xcept as provided in this section" portion of 1252(g), since that would produce in all pending NS cases jurisdictional restrictions identical to those that were contained in RRA anyway. That belief, however, rests on the unexamined assumption that 1252(g) covers the universe of deportation claimsthat it is a sort of "zipper" clause that says "no judicial review in |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | sort of "zipper" clause that says "no judicial review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review." n fact, what 1252(g) says is much narrower. The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her "decision or action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." (Emphasis added.) There are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation processsuch as the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order. t is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings. Not because Congress is too unpoetic to use synecdoche, but because that literary device is incompatible with the need for precision in legislative drafting. We are aware of no other instance in the United States Code in which language such as this has been used to impose a general jurisdictional limitation; and that those who enacted RRA were familiar with the normal manner of imposing such a limitation is demonstrated *483 by the text of 1252(b)(9), which stands in stark contrast to 1252(g). t could be argued, perhaps, that 1252(g) is redundant if it channels judicial review of only some decisions and actions, since 1252(b)(9) channels judicial review of all of them anyway. But that is not so, since only 1252(g), and not 1252(b)(9) (except to the extent it is incorporated within 1252(g)), applies to what 309(c)(1) calls "transitional cases," that is, cases pending on the effective date of RRA. That alone justifies its existence. t performs the function of categorically excluding from non-final-order judicial revieweven as to transitional cases otherwise governed by 1105a rather than the unmistakable "zipper" clause of 1252(b)(9)certain specified decisions and actions of the NS. n addition, even after all the transitional cases have passed through the system, 1252(g) as we interpret it serves the continuing function of making it clear that those specified decisions and actions, which (as we shall discuss in detail below) some courts had held not to be included within the non-final-order review prohibition of 1105a, are covered by the "zipper" clause of 1252(b)(9). t is rather the Court of Appeals' and the parties' interpretation which renders 1252(g) entirely redundant, adding to one "zipper" clause that does not apply to transitional cases, another one of equal scope that does apply to transitional cases. |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | one of equal scope that does apply to transitional cases. That makes it entirely inexplicable why the transitional provisions of 306(c) refer to 1252(g) instead of 1252(b)(9)and why 1252(g) exists at all. There was good reason for Congress to focus special attention upon, and make special provision for, judicial review of the Attorney General's discrete acts of "commenc[ing] proceedings, adjudicat[ing] cases, [and] execut[ing] removal orders"which represent the initiation or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process. At each stage the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor, and at the time RRA was enacted the NS had been engaging in a *484 regular practice (which had come to be known as "deferred action") of exercising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own convenience.[8] As one treatise describes it: "To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the NS may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation. This commendable exercise in administrative discretion, developed without express statutory authorization, originally was known as nonpriority and is now designated as deferred action. A case may be selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process. Approval of deferred action status means that, for the humanitarian reasons described below, no action will thereafter be taken to proceed against an apparently deportable alien, even on grounds normally regarded as aggravated." 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. YaleLoehr, mmigration Law and Procedure 72.03[2][h] See also Since no generous act goes unpunished, however, the NS's exercise of this discretion opened the door to litigation in instances where the NS chose not to exercise it. "[]n each such instance, the determination to withhold or terminate deportation is confined to administrative *485 discretion. Efforts to challenge the refusal to exercise such discretion on behalf of specific aliens sometimes have been favorably considered by the courts, upon contentions that there was selective prosecution in violation of equal protection or due process, such as improper reliance on political considerations, on racial, religious, or nationality discriminations, on arbitrary or unconstitutional criteria, or on other grounds constituting abuse of discretion." Gordon, Mailman, & YaleLoehr, 72.03[2][a] (footnotes omitted). Such litigation was possible because courts read 1105a's prescription that the Hobbs Act shall be "the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation" to be inapplicable to various decisions and actions leading up to or consequent upon final orders of deportation, and relied on other jurisdictional statutes to permit review. See, e. g., Cheng Fan Kwok v. NS, ; Ramallo v. Reno, Civ. No. |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | Fan Kwok v. NS, ; Ramallo v. Reno, Civ. No. 95-01851 (review of execution of removal order), described in and rev'd on other grounds, ; AADC ; Lennon v. NS, Section 1252(g) seems clearly designed to give some measure of protection to "no deferred action" decisions and similar discretionary determinations, providing that if they are reviewable at all, they at least will not be made the bases for separate rounds of judicial intervention outside the streamlined process that Congress has designed.[9] *486 Of course many provisions of RRA are aimed at protecting the Executive's discretion from the courtsindeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation. See, e. g., 8 U.S. C. 1252(a)(2)(A) (limiting review of any claim arising from the inspection of aliens arriving in the United States); 1252(a)(2)(B) (barring review of denials of discretionary relief authorized by various statutory provisions); 1252(a)(2)(C) (barring review of final removal orders *487 against criminal aliens); 1252(b)(4)(D) (limiting review of asylum determinations for resident aliens). t is entirely understandable, however, why Congress would want only the discretion-protecting provision of 1252(g) applied even to pending cases: because that provision is specifically directed at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings. Our narrow reading of 1252(g) makes sense of the statutory scheme as a whole, for it resolves the supposed tension between 306(c)(1) and 309(c)(1). n cases to which 1252(g) applies, the rest of 1252 is incorporated through the "[e]xcept as provided in this section" clause. This incorporation does not swallow 309(c)(1)'s general rule that 1252(a)(f) do not apply to pending cases, for 1252(g) applies to only a limited subset of deportation claims. Yet it is also faithful to 306(c)(1)'s command that 1252(g) be applied "without limitation" (i. e., including the "[e]xcept as provided" clause) to "claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings." Respondents' challenge to the Attorney General's decision to "commence proceedings" against them falls squarely within 1252(g)indeed, as we have discussed, the language seems to have been crafted with such a challenge precisely in mindand nothing elsewhere in 1252 provides for jurisdiction. Cf. 1252(a)(1) (review of final orders); 1252(e)(2) (limited habeas review for excluded aliens); 1252(e)(3)(A) (limited review of statutes and regulations pertaining to the exclusion of aliens). As we concluded earlier, 1252(f) plainly serves as a limit on injunctive relief rather than a jurisdictional grant. Finally, we must address respondents' contention that, since the lack of prior factual development for their claim will render the 1252(a)(1) exception to 1252(g) unavailing; since habeas relief will also be unavailable; and since even |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | since habeas relief will also be unavailable; and since even if *488 one or both were available they would come too late to prevent the "chilling effect" upon their First Amendment rights; the doctrine of constitutional doubt requires us to interpret 1252(g) in such fashion as to permit immediate review of their selective-enforcement claims. We do not believe that the doctrine of constitutional doubt has any application here. As a general matterand assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present casean alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.[10] *489 Even in the criminal-law field, a selective prosecution claim is a rara avis. Because such claims invade a special province of the Executiveits prosecutorial discretionwe have emphasized that the standard for proving them is particularly demanding, requiring a criminal defendant to introduce "clear evidence" displacing the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully. United We have said: "This broad discretion [afforded the Executive] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute *490 is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All of these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute." These concerns are greatly magnified in the deportation context. Regarding, for example, the potential for delay: Whereas in criminal proceedings the consequence of delay is merely to postpone the criminal's receipt of his just deserts, in deportation proceedings the consequence is to permit and prolong a continuing violation of United States law. Postponing justifiable deportation (in the hope that the alien's status will changeby, for example, marriage to an American citizenor simply with the object of extending the alien's unlawful stay) is often the principal object of resistance to a deportation proceeding, and the additional obstacle of selective-enforcement suits could leave the NS hard pressed to enforce routine status requirements. And as for "chill[ing] law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry": What will be involved in deportation cases is |
Justice Scalia | 1,999 | 9 | majority | Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118264/reno-v-american-arab-anti-discrimination-comm/ | outside inquiry": What will be involved in deportation cases is not merely the disclosure of normal domestic law enforcement priorities and techniques, *491 but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques. The Executive should not have to disclose its "real" reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threator indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country's nationalsand even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy. Moreover, the consideration on the other side of the ledger in deportation casesthe interest of the target in avoiding "selective" treatmentis less compelling than in criminal prosecutions. While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a punishment, see (2). n many cases (for six of the eight aliens here) deportation is sought simply because the time of permitted residence in this country has expired, or the activity for which residence was permitted has been completed. Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act (criminal charges may be available for that separate purpose) but is merely being held to the terms under which he was admitted. And in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an ongoing violation of United States law. The contention that a violation must be allowed to continue because it has been improperly selected is not powerfully appealing. To resolve the present controversy, we need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome. Whether or not there be such exceptions, the general rule certainly applies here. When an alien's continuing presence in this country is in violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not offend the *492 Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that supports terrorist activity. * * * Because 8 U.S. C. 1252(g) deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents' claims, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions for it to vacate the judgment of the District Court. t is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins as to Part concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108971/memorial-hospital-v-maricopa-county/ | I The State of Arizona provides free medical care for indigents. Confronted, in common with its 49 sister States, with the assault of spiraling health and welfare costs upon limited state resources, it has felt bound to require that recipients meet three standards of eligibility.[1] First, they must be indigent, unemployable, or unable to provide their own care. Second, they must be residents of the county in which they seek aid. Third, they must have maintained their residence for a period of one year. These standards, however, apply only to persons seeking nonemergency aid. An exception is specifically provided for "emergency cases when immediate hospitalization or medical care is necessary for the preservation of life or limb" Appellant Evaro moved from New Mexico to Arizona in June 1971, suffering from a "chronic asthmatic and bronchial illness." In July 1971 he experienced a respiratory attack, and obtained treatment at the facilities of appellant Memorial Hospital, a privately operated *278 institution. The hospital sought to recover its expenses from appellee Maricopa County under the provisions of -297A (Supp. 1973-1974), asserting that Evaro was entitled to receive county care. Since he did not satisfy the eligibility requirements discussed above,[2] appellee declined to assume responsibility for his care, and this suit was then instituted in the State Superior Court. Appellants did not, and could not, claim that there is a constitutional right to nonemergency medical care at state or county expense or a constitutional right to reimbursement for care extended by a private hospital.[3] They asserted, however, that the state legislature, having decided to give free care to certain classes of persons, must give that care to Evaro as well. The Court upholds that claim, holding that the Arizona eligibility requirements burdened Evaro's "right to travel." Unlike many traditional government services, such as police or fire protection, the provision of health care has commonly been undertaken by private facilities and personnel. But as strains on private services become greater, and the costs of obtaining care increase, federal, state, and local governments have been pressed to assume a larger role. Reasonably enough, it seems to me, those governments which now find themselves in the hospital business seek to operate that business primarily for those *279 persons dependent on the financing locality both by association and by need. Appellants in this case nevertheless argue that the State's efforts, admirable though they may be, are simply not impressive enough. But others excluded by eligibility requirements certainly could make similar protests. Maricopa County residents of many years, paying taxes to both construct and support public hospital facilities, may |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108971/memorial-hospital-v-maricopa-county/ | taxes to both construct and support public hospital facilities, may be ineligible for care because their incomes are slightly above the marginal level for inclusion. These people have been excluded by the State, not because their claim on limited public resources is without merit, but because it has been deemed less meritorious than the claims of those in even greater need. Given a finite amount of resources, Arizona after today's decision may well conclude that its indigency threshold should be elevated since its counties must provide for out-of-state migrants as well as for residents of longer standing. These more stringent need requirements would then deny care to additional persons who until now would have qualified for aid. Those presently excluded because marginally above the State's indigency standards, those who may be excluded in the future because of more stringent indigency requirements necessitated by today's decision, and appellant Evaro, all have a plausible claim to government-supported medical care. The choice between them necessitated by a finite amount of resources is a classic example of the determination of priorities to be accorded conflicting claims, and would in the recent past have been thought to be a matter particularly within the competence of the state legislature to decide. As this Court stated in "the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult *280 responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." The Court holds, however, that the State was barred from making the choice it made because of the burden its choice placed upon Evaro's "right to travel." Although the Court's definition of this "right" is hardly precise, the Court does state: "[T]he right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital government benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents." This rationale merits further attention. II The right to travel throughout the Nation has been recognized for over a century in the decisions of this Court.[4] See But the concept of that right has not been static. To see how distant a cousin the right to travel enunciated in this case is to the right declared by the Court in Crandall, reference need only be made to the language of Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the Court: "But if the government has these rights on her own account, the citizen also has correlative rights. He has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, or |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108971/memorial-hospital-v-maricopa-county/ | assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are *281 conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it." The Court in Crandall established no right to free benefits from every State through which the traveler might pass, but more modestly held that the State could not use its taxing power to impede travel across its borders.[5] Later cases also defined this right to travel quite conservatively. For example, in the Court upheld a Georgia statute taxing "emigrant agents"persons hiring labor for work outside the Statealthough agents hiring for local work went untaxed. The Court recognized that a right to travel existed, stating: "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." The Court went on, however, to decide that the statute, despite the added cost it assessed against exported labor, affected freedom of egress "only incidentally and remotely." Ibid.[6] *282 The leading earlier case, provides equally little support for the Court's expansive holding here. In Edwards the Court invalidated a California statute which subjected to criminal penalties any person "that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person." Five members of the Court found the statute unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, finding in the Clause a "prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its borders." Four concurring Justices found a better justification for the result in the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the "privileges of national citizenship."[7] Regardless of the right's precise source and definition, it is clear that the statute invalidated in Edwards was specifically designed to, and would, deter indigent persons from entering the State of California. The imposition of criminal penalties on all |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108971/memorial-hospital-v-maricopa-county/ | State of California. The imposition of criminal penalties on all persons assisting the entry of an indigent served to block ingress as surely as if the State has posted guards at the border to turn indigents away. It made no difference to the operation of the statute that the indigent, once inside the State, would be supported by federal payments.[8] Furthermore, *283 the statute did not require that the indigent intend to take up continuous residence within the State. The statute was not therefore an incidental or remote barrier to migration, but was in fact an effective and purposeful attempt to insulate the State from indigents. The statute in the present case raises no comparable barrier. Admittedly, some indigent persons desiring to reside in Arizona may choose to weigh the possible detriment of providing their own nonemergency health care during the first year of their residence against the total benefits to be gained from continuing location within the State, but their mere entry into the State does not invoke criminal penalties. To the contrary, indigents are free to live within the State, to receive welfare benefits necessary for food and shelter,[9] and to receive free emergency medical care if needed. Furthermore, once the indigent has settled within a county for a year, he becomes eligible for full medical care at county expense. To say, therefore, that Arizona's treatment of indigents compares with California's treatment during the 1930's would border on the frivolous. Since those older cases discussing the right to travel are unhelpful to Evaro's cause here, reliance must be placed elsewhere. A careful reading of the Court's opinion discloses that the decision rests almost entirely on two cases of recent vintage: and In the Court struck down statutes requiring one year's residence prior to receiving welfare benefits. In Dunn the Court struck down a statute requiring a year's residence before receiving the right to vote. In placing reliance on these two cases, the Court *284 must necessarily distinguish or discredit recent cases of this Court upholding statutes requiring a year's residence for lower in-state tuition.[10] The important question for this purpose, according to the Court's analysis, is whether a classification " `operates to penalize those persons who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration.' " (Emphasis in Court's opinion.) Since the Court concedes that "some `waiting-period[s]. may not be penalties,' " ante, at 258-259, one would expect to learn from the opinion how to distinguish a waiting period which is a penalty from one which is not. Any expense imposed on citizens crossing state lines but not imposed |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108971/memorial-hospital-v-maricopa-county/ | expense imposed on citizens crossing state lines but not imposed on those staying put could theoretically be deemed a penalty on travel; the toll exacted from persons crossing from Delaware to New Jersey by the Delaware Memorial Bridge is a "penalty" on interstate travel in the most literal sense of all. But such charges,[11] as well as other fees for use of transportation facilities such as taxes on airport users,[12] have been upheld by this Court against attacks based upon the right to travel. It seems to me that the line to be derived from our prior cases is that some financial impositions on interstate travelers have such indirect or inconsequential impact on travel that they simply do not constitute the type of direct purposeful barriers struck down in Edwards and Where the impact is that remote, a State can reasonably require that the citizen bear some proportion of the State's cost in its facilities. I would think that this standard is not only supported by this Court's decisions, but would be *285 eminently sensible and workable. But the Court not only rejects this approach, it leaves us entirely without guidance as to the proper standard to be applied. The Court instead resorts to ipse dixit, declaring rather than demonstrating that the right to nonemergency medical care is within the class of rights protected by and Dunn: "Whatever the ultimate parameters of the penalty analysis, it is at least clear that medical care is as much `a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance. And, governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements. See, e. g., ;" Ante, at 259. (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) However clear this conclusion may be to the majority, it is certainly not clear to me. The solicitude which the Court has shown in cases involving the right to vote,[13] and the virtual denial of entry inherent in denial of welfare benefits"the very means by which to live," ought not be so casually extended to the alleged deprivation here. Rather, the Court should examine, as it has done in the past, whether the challenged requirement erects a real and purposeful barrier to movement, or the threat of such a barrier, or whether the effects on travel, viewed realistically, are merely incidental and remote. As the above discussion has shown, the barrier here is hardly *286 a counterpart to the barriers condemned in earlier cases. That being so, the Court should observe its traditional respect for the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108971/memorial-hospital-v-maricopa-county/ | so, the Court should observe its traditional respect for the State's allocation of its limited financial resources rather than unjustifiably imposing its own preferences. III The Court, in its examination of the proffered state interests, categorically rejects the contention that those who have resided in the county for a fixed period of time may have a greater stake in community facilities than the newly arrived. But this rejection is accomplished more by fiat than by reason. One of the principal factual distinctions between aff'd, and both of which upheld durational residence requirements for in-state university tuition,[14] and which struck them down for welfare recipients, is the nature of the aid which the State or county provides. Welfare benefits, whether in cash or in kind, are commonly funded from current tax revenues, which may well be supported by the very newest arrival as well as by the longtime resident. But universities and hospitals, although demanding operating support from current revenues, require extensive capital facilities which cannot possibly be funded out of current tax revenues. Thus, entirely apart from the majority's conception of whether nonemergency health care is more or less important than continued education, *287 the interest of longer established residents in capital facilities and their greater financial contribution to the construction of such facilities seems indisputable.[15] Other interests advanced by the State to support its statutory eligibility criteria are also rejected virtually out of hand by the Court. The protection of the county economies is dismissed with the statement that "[t]he conservation of the taxpayers' purse is simply not a sufficient state interest"[16] The Court points out that the cost of care, if not borne by the Government, may be borne by private hospitals such as appellant Memorial Hospital. While this observation is doubtless true in large part, and is bound to present a problem to any private hospital, it does not seem to me that it thus becomes a constitutional determinant. The Court also observes that the State may in fact save money by providing nonemergency medical care rather than waiting for deterioration of an illness. However valuable a qualified cost analysis might be to legislators drafting eligibility requirements, and however little this speculation may bear on Evaro's condition (which the record does not indicate to have been a deteriorating illness), this sort of judgment has traditionally been confided to legislatures, rather than to courts charged with determining constitutional questions. The Court likewise rejects all arguments based on *288 administrative objectives. Refusing to accept the assertion that a one-year waiting period is a "convenient rule of thumb to determine |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,974 | 19 | dissenting | Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108971/memorial-hospital-v-maricopa-county/ | waiting period is a "convenient rule of thumb to determine bona fide residence," the majority simply suggests its own alternatives. Similar analysis is applied in rejecting the appellees' argument based on the potential for fraud. The Court's declaration that an indigent applicant "intent on committing fraud, could as easily swear to having been a resident of the county for the preceding year as to being one currently" ignores the obvious fact that fabricating presence in the State for a year is surely more difficult than fabricating only a present intention to remain. The legal question in this case is simply whether the State of Arizona has acted arbitrarily in determining that access to local hospital facilities for nonemergency medical care should be denied to persons until they have established residence for one year. The impediment which this quite rational determination has placed on appellant Evaro's "right to travel" is so remote as to be negligible: so far as the record indicates Evaro moved from New Mexico to Arizona three years ago and has remained ever since. The eligibility requirement has not the slightest resemblance to the actual barriers to the right of free ingress and egress protected by the Constitution, and struck down in cases such as Crandall and Edwards. And, unlike it does not involve an urgent need for the necessities of life or a benefit funded from current revenues to which the claimant may well have contributed. It is a substantial broadening of, and departure from, all of these holdings, all the more remarkable for the lack of explanation which accompanies the result. Since I can subscribe neither to the method nor the result, I dissent. |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | dissenting | TWA, INC. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112211/twa-inc-v-independent-federation-of-flight-attendants/ | The issue in this case is whether under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) an employer, in allocating available jobs among members of a bargaining unit at the conclusion of a strike, may discriminate against full-term strikers by giving preference to employees who crossed the picket line to return to work before the strike was over. Because I conclude that such discrimination on the basis of union activity is "inherently destructive" of the right to strike, as guaranteed by both the RLA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), I dissent. I Notwithstanding the Court's suggestion that the portion of the RLA at issue here addresses "primarily" the precertification context, ante, at 440, it should be clear that under the RLA an employee's right to strike is protected against coercion by her employer. The Court relies in part on Trainmen but it overlooks the clear teaching of that case: "[E]mployees subject to the Railway Labor Act enjoy the right to engage in primary strikes over major disputes. Whether the source of this right be found in a particular provision of the Railway Labor Act or in the scheme as a whole, it is integral to the Act." The "particular provision," we made clear, was 2 Fourth. While the issue in Jacksonville Terminal was the extent of a state court's power to issue an antistrike injunction, we emphasized that the RLA's guarantee of the right to strike was not limited to the context of interference by the State: "However, 2 Fourth of the RLA, added in 1934, was designed primarily, if not exclusively to prohibit coercive employer practices." Whatever may have been the "primary" purpose of 2 Fourth, it is too late in the day to suggest that this provision, at least when read in the context of the entire RLA, does not prohibit employer coercion of the right to strike. The Court compounds its error in regard to the reach of 2 Fourth with a more fundamental mistake when it appears to assume that the employer's action in this case is sanctioned by the mere fact that it occurred during the "self-help" stage of the dispute. Ante, at 440-442. Clearly this cannot be the case. I am confident that the Court would agree, for example, that an employer could not legally discharge striking employees under the RLA. But if this is so, it must be because the RLA contains some injunction against employer interference with the right to strike, even when that interference consists of actions taken during the period of permissible self-help. Thus, the question is not whether the RLA |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | dissenting | TWA, INC. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112211/twa-inc-v-independent-federation-of-flight-attendants/ | permissible self-help. Thus, the question is not whether the RLA protects the right to strike against employer coercion for it surely does but whether that protection goes so far as to prohibit the specific employer practice at issue here. *445 The key to this case is a fundamental command of the RLA and the NLRA alike, which in the case of the RLA is textually anchored in 2 Fourth: the employer may not engage in discrimination among its employees whether at the precertification stage, the bargaining stage, or during or after a strike on the basis of their degree of involvement in protected union activity such as a strike.[1] This case thus falls within the class of cases in which judicial intervention to enforce the right at issue is justified because "the scheme of the Railway Labor Act could not begin to work without judicial involvement." Chicago & N. W. R. The "central theme" of the RLA is, of course, "to bring about voluntary settlement." But "unless the unions fairly represented all of their employees; unless the employer bargained with the certified representative of the employees; unless the status quo was maintained during the entire range of bargaining, the statutory mechanism could not hope to induce a negotiated settlement." The same is true here: the statutory scheme would be just as incapable of bringing about a negotiated settlement if the employer, in the name of "self-help," impermissibly retaliated against employees because of their exercise of their right under the RLA to engage in protected union activity such as a strike.[2] II A That the RLA broadly enjoins discrimination against strikers does not necessarily settle the issue, of course. In the context of the NLRA we have on occasion found reason to *446 make an exception to that statute's nondiscrimination provision in the name of the employer's "necessity." See The RLA itself provides little guidance as to whether the employer is in any way privileged, in allocating jobs at the end of a strike, to give preference to bargaining unit members who crossed the picket line to return to work. As we have previously noted, "the Act is wholly inexplicit as to the scope of allowable self-help." Jacksonville Terminal, While of course "the National Labor Relations Act cannot be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena," we have frequently "referred to the NLRA for assistance in construing the Railway Labor Act." Given the paucity of RLA precedent on the specific issue before us, the Court quite properly looks to the NLRA for guidance. Ante, at 432-439. It |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | dissenting | TWA, INC. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112211/twa-inc-v-independent-federation-of-flight-attendants/ | looks to the NLRA for guidance. Ante, at 432-439. It arrives at an incorrect conclusion, however, because it mischaracterizes the employer's action and because it appears unwilling to take seriously the protection Congress has seen fit to afford to the right to strike. The Court's conception of this case is most clearly expressed in a key paragraph that summarizes its discussion of the NLRA case law: "To distinguish crossovers from new hires in the manner IFFA proposes would have the effect of penalizing those who decided not to strike in order to benefit those who did. We see no reason why those employees who chose not to gamble on the success of the strike should suffer the consequences when the gamble proves unsuccessful. Requiring junior crossovers to be displaced by more senior full-term strikers is precisely to visit the consequences of the lost gamble on those who refused to take the risk." Ante, at 438. This understanding of the Union's position contains a factual and a legal error, both of which infect the Court's analysis of the case. *447 In the first place, refusing to discriminate in favor of crossovers is not to visit the consequences of the lost strike on "those who refused to take the risk," but rather on those who rank lowest in seniority. Whether a given flight attendant chose to take the risk of the strike or not is wholly immaterial. Rather as is virtually universally the case when work-force reductions are necessary for whatever reason in a unionized enterprise it is the most junior employees, whether strikers or crossovers, who are most vulnerable. This is precisely the point of seniority. More fundamental, I fear, is the legal mistake inherent in the Court's objection to "penalizing those who decided not to strike in order to benefit those who did." The Court, of course, does precisely the opposite: it allows TWA to single out for penalty precisely those employees who were faithful to the strike until the end, in order to benefit those who abandoned it. What is unarticulated is the Court's basis for choosing one position over the other. If indeed one group or the other is to be "penalized,"[3] what basis does the Court have for determining that it should be those who remained on strike rather than those who returned to work? I see none, unless it is perhaps an unarticulated hostility toward strikes. In any case the NLRA does provide a basis for resolving this question. It requires simply that in making poststrike reinstatements an employer may not discriminate among its |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | dissenting | TWA, INC. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112211/twa-inc-v-independent-federation-of-flight-attendants/ | making poststrike reinstatements an employer may not discriminate among its employees on account of their union activity. That, in fact, is the holding of NLRB v. Mackay at 346 the more familiar teaching as to the employer's right to hire permanent replacements having been dictum. If an employer may not discriminate in either direction on the basis of the employee's strike activity, then it follows that the employer must make decisions about which employees to reinstate on *448 the basis of some neutral criterion, such as seniority. That is precisely what the Union asks.[4] B We have recognized only a narrow exception to the general principle prohibiting discrimination against employees for exercising their right to strike. Since Mackay it has been accepted that an employer may hire "permanent replacements" in order to maintain operations during a strike, and that these replacements need not be displaced to make room for returning strikers. The question here is whether the Mackay exception should be expanded to cover the present case, involving as it does members of the striking bargaining unit who have crossed the picket lines, rather than new hires from outside the bargaining unit. Despite the superficial similarity between the two situations, strong reasons counsel against applying the Mackay rule to crossover employees. The employer's promise to members of the bargaining unit that they will not be displaced at the end of a strike if they *449 cross the picket lines addresses a far different incentive to the bargaining-unit members than does the employer's promise of permanence to new hires. The employer's threat to hire permanent replacements from outside the existing work force puts pressure on the strikers as a group to abandon the strike before their positions are filled by others. But the employer's promise to members of the striking bargaining unit that if they abandon the strike (or refuse to join it at the outset) they will retain their jobs at strike's end in preference to more senior workers who remain on strike produces an additional dynamic: now there is also an incentive for individual workers to seek to save (or improve) their own positions at the expense of other members of the striking bargaining unit. We have previously observed that offers of "individual benefits to the strikers to induce them to abandon the strike. could be expected to undermine the strikers' mutual interest and place the entire strike effort in jeopardy." Such a "divide and conquer" tactic thus "strike[s] a fundamental blow to union activity and the collective bargaining process itself." Ante, at 442. In Erie |
Justice Brennan | 1,989 | 13 | dissenting | TWA, INC. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112211/twa-inc-v-independent-federation-of-flight-attendants/ | the collective bargaining process itself." Ante, at 442. In Erie Resistor we found the employer's offer of superseniority to new hires and crossovers to be "inherently destructive" of the right to strike and therefore in contravention of 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the -232. In my view the same conclusion should apply here. Beyond its specific holding outlawing superseniority, I read Erie Resistor to stand for the principle that there are certain tools an employer may not use, even in the interest of continued operations during a strike, and that the permissibility of discriminatory measures taken for that purpose must be evaluated by weighing the "necessity" of the employer's action (i. e., its interest in maintaining operations during the strike) against its prejudice to the employees' right to strike.[5] It *450 seems clear to me that in this case the result of such an analysis should be to forbid the employer to give preferential treatment to crossovers, because of the destructive impact of such an action on the strikers' mutual interest. Thus, when an employer recalls workers to fill the available positions at the conclusion of a strike, it may not discriminate against either the strikers or the crossovers. Rather it must proceed according to some principle, such as seniority, that is neutral as between them.[6] That TWA failed to do.[7] *451 III Precedent under the NLRA clearly forbids an employer to burden the right to strike in the manner TWA has done in this case, and I see no reason why that conclusion should not apply equally under the RLA. In a case like this it is not difficult to conjure up a parade of horribles to support either position. Forbidding an employer to discriminate in favor of crossovers, as I would do, makes it impossible for a junior employee who does not want to strike, and who is unable to persuade a majority of her colleagues to adopt that stance, to be sure that she can save her job. But that employee is in the same position she would be in if a layoff were necessary for other reasons beyond her control, such as an economic downturn. The principle of seniority is based on the notion that it is those employees who have worked longest in an enterprise and therefore have most at stake whose jobs should be most protected. Permitting the employer to give preference to crossovers, as the Court today does, will mean that an employee of only six months' experience, who abandoned the strike one day before it ended, could displace a 20-year veteran who chose |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | United States v. Boyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111296/united-states-v-boyle/ | We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether a taxpayer's reliance on an attorney to prepare and file a tax return constitutes "reasonable cause" under 5(a)() of the Internal Revenue Code, so as to defeat a statutory penalty incurred because of a late filing. I A Respondent, Robert W. Boyle, was appointed executor of the will of his mother, Myra Boyle, who died on September 4, 978; respondent retained Ronald Keyser to serve as attorney for the estate. Keyser informed respondent that the estate must file a federal estate tax return, but he did not mention the deadline for filing this return. Under 26 U.S. C. 60(a), the return was due within nine months of the decedent's death, i. e., not later than June 4, Although a businessman, respondent was not experienced in the field of federal estate taxation, other than having been executor of his father's will 20 years earlier. It is undisputed that he relied on Keyser for instruction and guidance. He cooperated fully with his attorney and provided Keyser with all relevant information and records. Respondent and his wife contacted Keyser a number of times during the spring and summer of to inquire about the progress of *243 the proceedings and the preparation of the tax return; they were assured that they would be notified when the return was due and that the return would be filed "in plenty of time." App. 39. When respondent called Keyser on September 6, he learned for the first time that the return was by then overdue. Apparently, Keyser had overlooked the matter because of a clerical oversight in omitting the filing date from Keyser's master calendar. Respondent met with Keyser on September and the return was filed on September 3, three months late. B Acting pursuant to 26 U.S. C. 5(a)(), the Internal Revenue Service assessed against the estate an additional tax of $7,24.45 as a penalty for the late filing, with $,326.56 in interest. Section 5(a)() reads in pertinent part: "In case of failure to file any return on the date prescribed therefor unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate" (Emphasis added.) A Treasury Regulation provides that, |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | United States v. Boyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111296/united-states-v-boyle/ | in the aggregate" (Emphasis added.) A Treasury Regulation provides that, to demonstrate "reasonable cause," a taxpayer filing a late return must show that he "exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed time." 26 CFR 30.5-(c)()[] *244 Respondent paid the penalty and filed a claim for a refund. He conceded that the assessment for interest was proper, but contended that the penalty was unjustified because his failure to file the return on time was "due to reasonable cause," i. e., reliance on his attorney. Respondent brought suit in the United States District Court, which concluded that the claim was controlled by the Court of Appeals' holding in In Rohrabaugh, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that reliance upon counsel constitutes "reasonable cause" under 5(a)() when: () the taxpayer is unfamiliar with the tax law; (2) the taxpayer makes full disclosure of all relevant facts to the attorney that he relies upon, and maintains contact with the attorney from time to time during the administration of the estate; and (3) the taxpayer has otherwise exercised ordinary business care and prudence. 29. The District Court held that, under Rohrabaugh, respondent had established "reasonable cause" for the late filing of his tax return; accordingly, it granted summary judgment for respondent and ordered refund of the penalty. A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit, with three opinions, affirmed. *245 We granted certiorari, and we reverse. II A Congress' purpose in the prescribed civil penalty was to ensure timely filing of tax returns to the end that tax liability will be ascertained and paid promptly. The relevant statutory deadline provision is clear; it mandates that all federal estate tax returns be filed within nine months from the decedent's death, 26 U.S. C. 60(a).[2] Failure to comply incurs a penalty of 5 percent of the ultimately determined tax for each month the return is late, with a maximum of 25 percent of the base tax. To escape the penalty, the taxpayer bears the heavy burden of proving both () that the failure did not result from "willful neglect," and (2) that the failure was "due to reasonable cause." 26 U.S. C. 5(a)(). The meaning of these two standards has become clear over the near-70 years of their presence in the statutes.[3] As used here, the term "willful neglect" may be read as meaning a conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference. See *246 Orient Investment & Finance ; Hatfried, ; Janice Leather Imports ; Gemological Institute of America, Like "willful neglect," the term |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | United States v. Boyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111296/united-states-v-boyle/ | ; Gemological Institute of America, Like "willful neglect," the term "reasonable cause" is not defined in the Code, but the relevant Treasury Regulation calls on the taxpayer to demonstrate that he exercised "ordinary business care and prudence" but nevertheless was "unable to file the return within the prescribed time."[4] 26 CFR 30.5(c)(); accord, e. g., ; ; Haywood & Mining ; Southeastern Finance ; Girard Investment ; see also n. The Commissioner does not contend that respondent's failure to file the estate tax return on time was willful or reckless. The question to be resolved is whether, under the statute, *247 reliance on an attorney in the instant circumstances is a "reasonable cause" for failure to meet the deadline. B In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals recognized the difficulties presented by its formulation but concluded that it was bound by The Court of Appeals placed great importance on the fact that respondent engaged the services of an experienced attorney specializing in probate matters and that he duly inquired from time to time as to the progress of the proceedings. As in Rohrabaugh, see at 29, the Court of Appeals in this case emphasized that its holding was narrowly drawn and closely tailored to the facts before it. The court stressed that the question of "reasonable cause" was an issue to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See 70 F.2d, at 253-254; at 254 Other Courts of Appeals have dealt with the issue of "reasonable cause" for a late filing and reached contrary conclusions.[5] In the court held that taxpayers have a personal and nondelegable duty to file a return on time, and that reliance on an attorney to fulfill this obligation does not constitute "reasonable cause" for a tardy filing. The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that the responsibility for ensuring a timely filing is the taxpayer's alone, and that the taxpayer's reliance on his tax advisers accountants or *248 attorneys is not a "reasonable cause." Millette & 594 F.2d 2, 24-25 cert. denied, ; Logan (9). The Eighth Circuit also has concluded that reliance on counsel does not constitute "reasonable cause." 702 F.2d 74, ; ; Estate of III We need not dwell on the similarities or differences in the facts presented by the conflicting holdings. The time has come for a rule with as "bright" a line as can be drawn consistent with the statute and implementing regulations.[6]*249 Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, however, are often essential to accomplish necessary results. The Government has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | United States v. Boyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111296/united-states-v-boyle/ | Government has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of self-assessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply cannot work on any basis other than one of strict filing standards. Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates.[7] Prompt payment of taxes is imperative to the Government, which should not have to assume the burden of unnecessary ad hoc determinations.[8] Congress has placed the burden of prompt filing on the executor, not on some agent or employee of the executor. The duty is fixed and clear; Congress intended to place upon the taxpayer on obligation to ascertain the statutory deadline and then to meet that deadline, except in a very narrow range of *250 situations. Engaging an attorney to assist in the probate proceedings is plainly an exercise of the "ordinary business care and prudence" prescribed by the regulations, 26 CFR 30.5-(c)() but that does not provide an answer to the question we face here. To say that it was "reasonable" for the executor to assume that the attorney would comply with the statute may resolve the matter as between them, but not with respect to the executor's obligations under the statute. Congress has charged the executor with an unambiguous, precisely defined duty to file the return within nine months; extensions are granted fairly routinely. That the attorney, as the executor's agent, was expected to attend to the matter does not relieve the principal of his duty to comply with the statute. This case is not one in which a taxpayer has relied on the erroneous advice of counsel concerning a question of law. Courts have frequently held that "reasonable cause" is established when a taxpayer shows that he reasonably relied on the advice of an accountant or attorney that it was unnecessary to file a return, even when such advice turned out to have been mistaken. See, e. g., United (CA7 977); 204 F.2d 9, 2 (CA7 953); Burton Swartz Land 98 F.2d 558, (CA5 952); Haywood & Mining 78 F. 2d, at 77; Orient Investment & Finance 83 U. S. App. D. C., at F.2d, at 603; Hatfried, 62 F. 2d, at 633-635; Girard Investment 22 F. 2d, at ; Dayton Bronze Bearing 28 F. 709, 72 (CA6 922). This Court also has implied that, in such a situation, reliance on the opinion of a tax adviser may constitute reasonable cause for failure to file a return. See 32 U.S. 29 (944) (remanding for determination whether failure to file return was due to *25 reasonable cause, when taxpayer was advised that |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | majority | United States v. Boyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111296/united-states-v-boyle/ | due to *25 reasonable cause, when taxpayer was advised that filing was not required).[9] When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice. Most taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or attorney. To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a "second opinion," or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place. See Haywood at 77. "Ordinary business care and prudence" do not demand such actions. By contrast, one does not have to be a tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates and that taxes must be paid when they are due. In short, tax returns imply deadlines. Reliance by a lay person on a lawyer is of course common; but that reliance cannot function as a substitute for compliance with an unambiguous statute. Among the first duties of the representative of a decedent's estate is to identify and assemble the assets of the decedent and to ascertain tax obligations. Although it is common practice for an executor to engage a professional to prepare and file *252 an estate tax return, a person experienced in business matters can perform that task personally. It is not unknown for an executor to prepare tax returns, take inventories, and carry out other significant steps in the probate of an estate. It is even not uncommon for an executor to conduct probate proceedings without counsel. It requires no special training or effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure that it is met. The failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not excused by the taxpayer's reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not "reasonable cause" for a late filing under 5(a)(). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Scalia | 2,012 | 9 | majority | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | We consider whether Michael and Chantell Sackett may bring a civil action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. et seq., to challenge the issuance by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of an admin istrative compliance order under of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S. C. The order asserts that the Sack etts’ property is subject to the Act, and that they have violated its provisions by placing fill material on the prop erty; and on this basis it directs them immediately to restore the property pursuant to an EPA work plan. I The Clean Water Act prohibits, among other things, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person,” without a permit, into the “navigable waters,” the Act defines as “the waters of the United States,” If the EPA determines that any person is in violation of this restriction, the Act directs the agency either to issue a compliance order or to initiate a civil enforcement action. When the EPA prevails in a civil action, the Act provides for “a civil penalty not to exceed [$37,500] per 2 SACKETT v. EPA Opinion of the Court day for each violation.”1 And according to the Government, when the EPA prevails against any person who has been issued a compliance order but has failed to comply, that amount is increased to $75,000—up to $37,500 for the statutory violation and up to an additional $37,500 for violating the compliance order. The particulars of this case flow from a dispute about the scope of “the navigable waters” subject to this en forcement regime. Today we consider only whether the dispute may be brought to court by challenging the com pliance order—we do not resolve the dispute on the merits. The reader will be curious, however, to know what all the fuss is about. In United we upheld a regulation that construed “the navigable waters” to include “freshwa ter wetlands,” themselves not actually naviga ble, that were adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters. Later, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook we held that an abandoned sand and gravel pit, which “seasonally ponded” but which was not adjacent to open water, was not part of the navigable waters. Then most recently, in we consid ered whether a wetland not adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters fell within the scope of the Act. Our answer was no, but no one rationale commanded a majority of the Court. In his separate opinion, THE CHIEF JUSTICE ex pressed the concern that interested parties would lack —————— 1 The original statute set a penalty cap of $25,000 per violation per day. The Federal |
Justice Scalia | 2,012 | 9 | majority | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | penalty cap of $25,000 per violation per day. The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 890, note following 28 U.S. C. as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, –373, note following 28 U.S. C. p. 1315 (Amendment), authorizes the EPA to adjust that maximum penalty for inflation. On the basis of that authority, the agency has raised the cap to $37,500. See 74 Fed. Reg. 626, 627 (2009). Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of the Court guidance “on precisely how to read Congress’ limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act” and would be left “to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.” (concurring opinion). The Sacketts are interested parties feeling their way. They own a 2⁄3-acre residential lot in Bonner County, Idaho. Their property lies just north of Priest Lake, but is separated from the lake by several lots containing perma nent structures. In preparation for constructing a house, the Sacketts filled in part of their lot with dirt and rock. Some months later, they received from the EPA a compli ance order. The order contained a number of “Findings and Conclusions,” including the following: “1.4 [The Sacketts’ property] contains wetlands with in the meaning of (8)(b); the wet lands meet the criteria for jurisdictional wetlands in the 1987 ‘Federal Manual for Identifying and Deline ating Jurisdictional Wetlands.’ “1.5 The Site’s wetlands are adjacent to Priest Lake within the meaning of (8)(c). Priest Lake is a ‘navigable water’ within the meaning of sec tion 502(7) of the Act, 33 U.S. C. and ‘wa ters of the United States’ within the meaning of 40 C. F. R. “1.6 In April and May, 2007, at times more fully known to [the Sacketts, they] and/or persons acting on their behalf discharged fill material into wetlands at the Site. [They] filled approximately one half acre. “1.9 By causing such fill material to enter waters of the United States, [the Sacketts] have engaged, and are continuing to engage, in the ‘discharge of pollu tants’ from a point source within the meaning of sec tions 301 and 502(12) of the Act, 33 U.S. C. and 1362(12). 4 SACKETT v. EPA Opinion of the Court “1.11 [The Sacketts’] discharge of pollutants into wa ters of the United States at the Site without [a] per mit constitutes a violation of section 301 of the Act, 33 U.S. C. App. 19–20. On the basis of these findings and conclusions, the order directs the Sacketts, among other things, “immediately [to] undertake activities to restore the Site in accordance |
Justice Scalia | 2,012 | 9 | majority | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | “immediately [to] undertake activities to restore the Site in accordance with [an EPA-created] Restoration Work Plan” and to “pro- vide and/or obtain access to the Site [and] access to all records and documentation related to the conditions at the Site to EPA employees and/or their designated representatives.” at 21–22, ¶¶2.1, 2.7. The Sacketts, who do not believe that their property is subject to the Act, asked the EPA for a hearing, but that request was denied. They then brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint contended that the EPA’s issuance of the compliance order was “arbitrary [and] capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S. C. and that it deprived them of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and the United States Court of Ap peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, (2010). It concluded that the Act “preclude[s] pre enforcement judicial review of compliance orders,” at 1144, and that such preclusion does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee, We granted certiorari. 564 U. S. (2011). II The Sacketts brought suit under Chapter 7 of the APA, which provides for judicial review of “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S. C. We consider first whether the compliance Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court order is final agency action. There is no doubt it is agency action, which the APA defines as including even a “failure to act.” 701(b)(2). But is it final? It has all of the hallmarks of APA finality that our opinions establish. Through the order, the EPA “ ‘determined’ ” “ ‘rights or ob ligations.’ ” ). By reason of the order, the Sacketts have the legal obliga tion to “restore” their property according to an agency approved Restoration Work Plan, and must give the EPA access to their property and to “records and documentation related to the conditions at the Site.” App. 22, ¶2.7. Also, “ ‘legal consequences flow’ ” from issuance of the order. at (quoting Marine at ). For one, according to the Government’s current litigating position, the order exposes the Sacketts to dou ble penalties in a future enforcement proceeding.2 It also severely limits the Sacketts’ ability to obtain a permit for their fill from the Army Corps of Engineers, see 33 U.S. C. The Corps’ regulations provide that, once the EPA |
Justice Scalia | 2,012 | 9 | majority | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | U.S. C. The Corps’ regulations provide that, once the EPA has issued a compliance order with respect to certain property, the Corps will not process a permit application for that property unless doing so “is clearly appropriate.” (e)(1)(iv) (2011).3 The issuance of the compliance order also marks the “ ‘consummation’ ” of the agency’s decisionmaking process. —————— 2 We do not decide today that the Government’s position is correct, but assume the consequences of the order to be what the Government asserts. 3 The regulation provides this consequence for “enforcement litigation that has been initiated by other Federal regulatory agencies.” 33 CFR (2011). The Government acknowledges, however, that EPA’s issuance of a compliance order is considered by the Corps to fall within the provision. Brief for Respondents 31. Here again, we take the Government at its word without affirming that it represents a proper interpretation of the regulation. 6 SACKETT v. EPA Opinion of the Court at (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, (1948)). As the Sacketts learned when they unsuccessfully sought a hearing, the “Findings and Conclusions” that the compliance order contained were not subject to further agency review. The Government resists this conclusion, pointing to a portion of the order that invited the Sacketts to “engage in informal discussion of the terms and re quirements” of the order with the EPA and to inform the agency of “any allegations [t]herein which [they] believe[d] to be inaccurate.” App. 22–23, ¶2.11. But that confers no entitlement to further agency review. The mere possibil ity that an agency might reconsider in light of “informal discussion” and invited contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make an otherwise final agency action nonfinal. The APA’s judicial review provision also requires that the person seeking APA review of final agency action have “no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S. C. In Clean Water Act enforcement cases, judicial review ordi narily comes by way of a civil action brought by the EPA under 33 U.S. C. But the Sacketts cannot initiate that process, and each day they wait for the agency to drop the hammer, they accrue, by the Government’s telling, an additional $75,000 in potential liability. The other possi ble route to judicial review—applying to the Corps of Engineers for a permit and then filing suit under the APA if a permit is denied—will not serve either. The remedy for denial of action that might be sought from one agency does not ordinarily provide an “adequate remedy” for ac- tion already taken by another agency. The Government, to its credit, does not |
Justice Scalia | 2,012 | 9 | majority | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | by another agency. The Government, to its credit, does not seriously contend that other availa ble remedies alone foreclose review under Instead, the Government relies on of the APA, which excludes APA review “to the extent that [other] statutes preclude judicial review.” The Clean Water Act, it says, is such a statute. Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court III Nothing in the Clean Water Act expressly precludes judicial review under the APA or otherwise. But in de termining “[w]hether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review,” we do not look “only [to] its express language.” The APA, we have said, creates a “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action,” but as with most presumptions, this one “may be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.” The Government offers several reasons why the statutory scheme of the Clean Water Act precludes review. The Government first points to 33 U.S. C. which provides that, when the EPA “finds that any person is in violation” of certain portions of the Act, the agency “shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with [the Act], or shall bring a civil action [to enforce the Act].” The Government argues that, because Congress gave the EPA the choice between a judicial proceeding and an administrative action, it would undermine the Act to allow judicial review of the latter. But that argument rests on the question-begging premise that the relevant difference between a compliance order and an enforcement proceeding is that only the latter is subject to judicial review. There are eminently sound reasons other than insulation from judicial review why compliance orders are useful. The Government itself suggests that they “provid[e] a means of notifying recipients of potential vio lations and quickly resolving the issues through volun- tary compliance.” Brief for Respondents 39. It is entirely consistent with this function to allow judicial review when the recipient does not choose “voluntary compliance.” The Act does not guarantee the EPA that issuing a compliance order will always be the most effective choice. The Government also notes that compliance orders are 8 SACKETT v. EPA Opinion of the Court not self-executing, but must be enforced by the agency in a plenary judicial action. It suggests that Congress there fore viewed a compliance order “as a step in the delibera tive process[,] rather than as a coercive sanction that itself must be subject to judicial review.” But the APA provides for judicial review of all final agency actions, not just those that impose a |
Justice Scalia | 2,012 | 9 | majority | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | all final agency actions, not just those that impose a self-executing sanc tion. And it is hard for the Government to defend its claim that the issuance of the compliance order was just “a step in the deliberative process” when the agency rejected the Sacketts’ attempt to obtain a hearing and when the next step will either be taken by the Sacketts (if they comply with the order) or will involve judicial, not administrative, deliberation (if the EPA brings an enforcement action). As the text (and indeed the very name) of the compliance order makes clear, the EPA’s “deliberation” over whether the Sacketts are in violation of the Act is at an end; the agency may still have to deliberate over whether it is confident enough about this conclusion to initiate litiga tion, but that is a separate subject. The Government further urges us to consider that Con gress expressly provided for prompt judicial review, on the administrative record, when the EPA assesses administra tive penalties after a hearing, see but did not expressly provide for review of compliance orders. But if the express provision of judicial review in one section of a long and complicated statute were alone enough to over- come the APA’s presumption of reviewability for all final agency action, it would not be much of a presumption at all. The cases on which the Government relies simply are not analogous. In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, we held that the Agricultural Marketing Agree ment Act of 1937, which expressly allowed milk handlers to obtain judicial review of milk market orders, precluded review of milk market orders in suits brought by milk Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court 467 U.S., at –348. Where a statute pro vides that particular agency action is reviewable at the instance of one party, who must first exhaust administra tive remedies, the inference that it is not reviewable at the instance of other parties, who are not subject to the admin istrative process, is strong. In United we held that the Medicare statute, which expressly provided for judicial review of awards under Part A, precluded review of awards under Part B. at 206–208. The strong parallel between the award provisions in Part A and Part B of the Medicare statute does not exist between the issuance of a compliance order and the assessment of administrative penalties under the Clean Water Act. And in United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988), we held that the Civil Service Reform Act, which expressly excluded certain “nonpreference” employees from the |
Justice Scalia | 2,012 | 9 | majority | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | Reform Act, which expressly excluded certain “nonpreference” employees from the statute’s review scheme, precluded review at the instance of those employees in a separate Claims Court action. at 448–449. Here, there is no suggestion that Congress has sought to exclude compli ance-order recipients from the Act’s review scheme; quite to the contrary, the Government’s case is premised on the notion that the Act’s primary review mechanisms are open to the Sacketts. Finally, the Government notes that Congress passed the Clean Water Act in large part to respond to the inefficien cy of then-existing remedies for water pollution. Compli ance orders, as noted above, can obtain quick remediation through voluntary compliance. The Government warns that the EPA is less likely to use the orders if they are subject to judicial review. That may be true—but it will be true for all agency actions subjected to judicial review. The APA’s presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all. And there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of 10 SACKETT v. EPA Opinion of the Court regulated parties into “voluntary compliance” without the opportunity for judicial review—even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction. Compliance orders will remain an effective means of securing prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no substantial basis to question their validity. * * * We conclude that the compliance order in this case is final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy other than APA review, and that the Clean Water Act does not preclude that review. We therefore reverse the judg ment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 1 GINSBURG, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–1062 CHANTELL SACKETT, ET VIR, PETITIONERS v. ENVI- RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | In agreement with the Court that we have jurisdiction to decide this case, I join Parts I and II of the opinion. I agree also that the District Court exceeded its authority by attempting to impose a tax. The Court is unanimous in its holding, that the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming "the actions that the [district] court has taken to this point," must be reversed. This is consistent with our precedents and the basic principles defining judicial power. In my view, however, the Court transgresses these same principles when it goes further, much further, to embrace by broad dictum an expansion of power in the Federal Judiciary beyond all precedent. Today's casual embrace of taxation imposed by the unelected, life-tenured Federal Judiciary disregards *59 fundamental precepts for the democratic control of public institutions. I cannot acquiesce in the majority's statements on this point, and should there arise an actual dispute over the collection of taxes as here contemplated in a case that is not, like this one, premature, we should not confirm the outcome of premises adopted with so little constitutional justification. The Court's statements, in my view, cannot be seen as necessary for its judgment, or as precedent for the future, and I cannot join Parts III and IV of the Court's opinion. I Some essential litigation history is necessary for a full understanding of what is at stake here and what will be wrought if the implications of all the Court's statements are followed to the full extent. The District Court's remedial plan was proposed for the most part by the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) itself, which is in name a defendant in the suit. Defendants, and above all defendants that are public entities, act in the highest and best tradition of our legal system when they acknowledge fault and cooperate to suggest remedies. But in the context of this dispute, it is of vital importance to note the KCMSD demonstrated little concern for the fiscal consequences of the remedy that it helped design. As the District Court acknowledged, the plaintiffs and the KCMSD pursued a "friendly adversary" relationship. Throughout the remedial phase of the litigation, the KCMSD proposed ever more expensive capital improvements with the agreement of the plaintiffs, and the State objected. Some of these improvements involved basic repairs to deteriorating facilities within the school system. The KCMSD, however, devised a broader concept for districtwide improvement, and the District Court approved it. The plan involved a variation of the magnet school concept. Magnet schools, as the majority opinion notes, ante, at 40, n. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | schools, as the majority opinion notes, ante, at 40, n. 6, offer special programs, *60 often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation. Although we have approved desegregation plans involving magnet schools of this conventional definition, see the District Court found this insufficient. App. to Pet. for Cert. 122a. Instead, the court and the KCMSD decided to make a magnet of the district as a whole. The hope was to draw new nonminority students from outside the district. The KCMSD plan adopted by the court provided that "every senior high school, every middle school, and approximately one-half of the elementary schools in the KCMSD will become magnet schools by the school year 1991-92." at 121a. The plan was intended to "improve the quality of education of all KCMSD students." at 103a. The District Court was candid to acknowledge that the "long term goal of this Court's remedial order is to make available to all KCMSD students educational opportunities equal to or greater than those presently available in the average Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan suburban school district." at 145a-146a (emphasis in original). It comes as no surprise that the cost of this approach to the remedy far exceeded KCMSD's budget, or for that matter, its authority to tax. A few examples are illustrative. Programs such as a "performing arts middle school," at 118a, a "technical magnet high school" that "will offer programs ranging from heating and air conditioning to cosmetology to robotics," at 75a, were approved. The plan also included a "25 acre farm and 25 acre wildland area" for science study. at 20a. The court rejected various proposals by the State to make "capital improvements necessary to eliminate health and safety hazards and to provide a good learning environment," because these proposals failed to "consider the criteria of suburban comparability." at 70a. The District Court stated: "This `patch and repair' approach proposed by the State would not achieve suburban comparability or the *61 visual attractiveness sought by the Court as it would result in floor coverings with unsightly sections of mismatched carpeting and tile, and individual walls possessing different shades of paint." at 70a. Finding that construction of new schools would result in more "attractive" facilities than renovation of existing ones, the District Court approved new construction at a cost ranging from $61.80 per square foot to $95.70 per square foot as distinct from renovation at $45 per square foot. at 76a. By the time of the order at issue here, the District Court's remedies included some "$260 million in capital |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | the District Court's remedies included some "$260 million in capital improvements and a magnet-school plan costing over $200 million." And the remedial orders grew more expensive as shortfalls in revenue became more severe. As the Eighth Circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc put it: "The remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a school desegregation case. The sheer immensity of the programs encompassed by the district court's order the large number of magnet schools and the quantity of capital renovations and new construction are concededly without parallel in any other school district in the country." -1319. The judicial taxation approved by the Eighth Circuit is also without parallel. Other Circuits that have faced funding problems arising from remedial decrees have concluded that, while courts have undoubted power to order that schools operate in compliance with the Constitution, the manner and methods of school financing are beyond federal judicial authority. See National City ; Plaquemines Parish School The Third Circuit, while leaving open the possibility that in some situation a court-ordered tax might be appropriate, has also declined to approve judicial interference in taxation. cert. denied sub nom. Alexis I. du Pont *62 School The Sixth Circuit, in a somewhat different context, has recognized the severe intrusion caused by federal court interference in state and local financing. cert. denied, Unlike these other courts, the Eighth Circuit has endorsed judicial taxation, first in dicta from cases in which taxation orders were in fact disapproved. United ; The case before us represents the first in which a lower federal court has in fact upheld taxation to fund a remedial decree. For reasons explained below, I agree with the Court that the Eighth Circuit's judgment affirming the District Court's direct levy of a property tax must be reversed. I cannot agree, however, that we "stand on different ground when we review the modifications to the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals," ante, at 52. At the outset, it must be noted that the Court of Appeals made no "modifications" to the District Court's order. Rather, it affirmed "the actions that the court has taken to this point." 855 F.2d, at It is true that the Court of Appeals went on "to consider the procedures which the district court should use in the future." But the Court of Appeals' entire discussion of "a preferable method for future funding," ib can be considered no more than dictum, the court itself having already upheld the District Court's actions to date. No other order of the District Court |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | actions to date. No other order of the District Court was before the Court of Appeals. The Court states that the Court of Appeals' discussion of future taxation was not dictum because although the Court of *63 Appeals "did not require the District Court to reverse the tax increase that it had imposed for prior fiscal years," it "required the District Court to use the less obtrusive procedures beginning with the fiscal year commencing after the remand." Ante, at 52-53, n. 18. But no such distinction is found in the Court of Appeals' opinion. Rather, the court "affirm[ed] the actions that the [district] court has taken to this point," which included the District Court's October 27, order increasing property taxes in the KCMSD through the end of fiscal year 1991-1992. The District Court's January 3, 1989, order does not support, but refutes, the Court's characterization. The District Court rejected a request by the KCMSD to increase the property tax rate using the method endorsed by the Eighth Circuit from $4 to $4.23 per $100 of assessed valuation. The District Court reasoned that an increase in property taxes would be difficult to administer and cause resentment among taxpayers, and that an increase in 1989 property taxes would be premature because it was not yet known whether an increase would be necessary to fund expenditures. App. 511-512. In rejecting the KCMSD's request, the District Court left in effect the $4 rate it had established in its October 27, order. Whatever the Court thinks of the Court of Appeals' opinion, the District Court on remand appears to have thought it was under no compulsion to disturb its existing order establishing the $4 property tax rate through fiscal year 1991-1992 unless and until it became necessary to raise property taxes even higher. The Court's discussion today, and its stated approval of the "method for future funding" found "preferable" by the Court of Appeals, is unnecessary for the decision in this case. As the Court chooses to discuss the question of future taxation, however, I must state my respectful disagreement with its analysis and conclusions on this vital question. The premise of the Court's analysis, I submit, is infirm. Any purported distinction between direct imposition of a tax *64 by the federal court and an order commanding the school district to impose the tax is but a convenient formalism where the court's action is predicated on elimination of state-law limitations on the school district's taxing authority. As the Court describes it, the local KCMSD possesses plenary taxing powers, which allow it to impose any tax |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | plenary taxing powers, which allow it to impose any tax it chooses if not "hinder[ed]" by the Missouri Constitution and state statutes. Ante, at 57. This puts the conclusion before the premise. Local government bodies in Missouri, as elsewhere, must derive their power from a sovereign, and that sovereign is the State of Missouri. See Mo. Const., Art. X, 1 (political subdivisions may exercise only "[tax] power granted to them" by Missouri General Assembly). Under Missouri law, the KCMSD has power to impose a limited property tax levy up to $1.25 per $100 of assessed value. The power to exact a higher rate of property tax remains with the people, a majority of whom must agree to empower the KCMSD to increase the levy up to $3.75 per $100, and two-thirds of whom must agree for the levy to go higher. See Mo. Const., Art. X, 11(b),(c). The Missouri Constitution states that "[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes may not be increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter approval as provided by this constitution." Mo. Const., Art. X, 16. For this reason, I reject the artificial suggestion that the District Court may, by "prevent[ing] officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD," ante, at 56, n. 20, cause the KCMSD to exercise power under state law. State laws, including taxation provisions legitimate and constitutional in themselves, define the power of the KCMSD. Cf. Absent a change in state law, no increase in property taxes could take *65 place in the KCMSD without a federal court order. It makes no difference that the KCMSD stands "ready, willing, and able" to impose a tax not authorized by state law. Ante, at 51. Whatever taxing power the KCMSD may exercise outside the boundaries of state law would derive from the federal court. The Court never confronts the judicial authority to issue an order for this purpose. Absent a change in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal decree. The question is whether a district court possesses a power to tax under federal law, either directly or through delegation to the KCMSD. II Article III of the Constitution states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The description of the judicial power nowhere includes the word "tax" or anything that resembles it. This reflects the Framers' understanding that taxation was not a proper area |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | the Framers' understanding that taxation was not a proper area for judicial involvement. "The judiciary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever." The Federalist No. 78, p. 523 (A. Hamilton). Our cases throughout the years leave no doubt that taxation is not a judicial function. Last Term we rejected the invitation to cure an unconstitutional tax scheme by broadening the class of those taxed. We said that such a remedy "could be construed as the direct imposition of a state tax, a remedy beyond the power of a federal court." Our statement in Davis rested on the explicit holding in Moses Lake Homes, in which we reversed a judgment directing a District Court to decree a valid tax in place of an invalid one that the State had attempted to enforce: *66 "The effect of the Court's remand was to direct the District Court to decree a valid tax for the invalid one which the State had attempted to exact. The District Court has no power so to decree. Federal courts may not assess or levy taxes. Only the appropriate taxing officials of Grant County may assess and levy taxes on these leaseholds, and the federal courts may determine, within their jurisdiction, only whether the tax levied by those officials is or is not a valid one." The nature of the District Court's order here reveals that it is not a proper exercise of the judicial power. The exercise of judicial power involves adjudication of controversies and imposition of burdens on those who are parties before the Court. The order at issue here is not of this character. It binds the broad class of all KCMSD taxpayers. It has the purpose and direct effect of extracting money from persons who have had no presence or representation in the suit. For this reason, the District Court's direct order imposing a tax was more than an abuse of discretion, for any attempt to collect the taxes from the citizens would have been a blatant denial of due process. Taxation by a legislature raises no due process concerns, for the citizens' "rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." Bi-Metallic The citizens who are taxed are given notice and a hearing through their representatives, whose power is a direct manifestation of the citizens' consent. A true exercise of judicial power provides |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | the citizens' consent. A true exercise of judicial power provides due process of another sort. Where money is extracted from parties by a court's judgment, the adjudication itself provides the notice and opportunity to be heard that due process demands before a citizen may be deprived of property. The order here provides neither of these protections. Where a tax is imposed by a governmental body other than *67 the legislature, even an administrative agency to which the legislature has delegated taxing authority, due process requires notice to the citizens to be taxed and some opportunity to be heard. See, e. g., The citizens whose tax bills would have been doubled under the District Court's direct tax order would not have had these protections. The taxes were imposed by a District Court that was not "representative" in any sense, and the individual citizens of the KCMSD whose property (they later learned) was at stake were neither served with process nor heard in court. The method of taxation endorsed by today's dicta suffers the same flaw, for a district court order that overrides the citizens' state-law protection against taxation without referendum approval can in no sense provide representational due process. No one suggests the KCMSD taxpayers are parties. A judicial taxation order is but an attempt to exercise a power that always has been thought legislative in nature. The location of the federal taxing power sheds light on today's attempt to approve judicial taxation at the local level. Article I, 1, states that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." (Emphasis added.) The list of legislative powers in Article I, 8, cl. 1, begins with the statement that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes." As we have said, "[t]axation is a legislative function, and Congress is the sole organ for levying taxes." National Cable Television Assn., (citing Article I, 8, cl. 1). True, today's case is not an instance of one branch of the Federal Government invading the province of another. It is instead one that brings the weight of federal authority upon a local government and a State. This does not detract, however, from the fundamental point that the Judiciary is not free to exercise all federal power; it may exercise only the *68 judicial power. And the important effects of the taxation order here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis. In perhaps the leading case concerning desegregation remedies, we upheld a prospective remedial plan, |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | case concerning desegregation remedies, we upheld a prospective remedial plan, not a "money judgment," ante, at 54, against a State's claim that principles of federalism had been ignored in the plan's implementation. In so doing the Court emphasized that the District Court had "neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor to mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing." No such assurances emerge from today's decision, which endorses federal-court intrusion into these precise matters. Our statement in a case decided more than 100 years ago should apply here. "This power to impose burdens and raise money is the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is exercised, first, to raise money for public purposes only; and, second, by the power of legislative authority only. It is a power that has not been extended to the judiciary. Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State in the exercise of this authority at once so delicate and so important." The confinement of taxation to the legislative branches, both in our Federal and State Governments, was not random. It reflected our ideal that the power of taxation must be under the control of those who are taxed. This truth animated all our colonial and revolutionary history. "Your Memorialists conceive it to be a fundamental Principle. without which Freedom can no Where exist, that the People are not subject to any Taxes but such as are laid on them by their own Consent, or by those who are legally appointed to represent them: Property must become too precarious for the Genius of a free People *69 which can be taken from them at the Will of others, who cannot know what Taxes such people can bear, or the easiest Mode of raising them; and who are not under that Restraint, which is the greatest Security against a burthensome Taxation, when the Representatives themselves must be affected by every tax imposed on the People." Virginia Petitions to King and Parliament, December 18, 1764, reprinted in The Stamp Act Crisis 41 (E. Morgan ed. 1952). The power of taxation is one that the Federal Judiciary does not possess. In our system "the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people," The Federalist No. 48, p. 334 (J. Madison), for it is the Legislature that is accountable to them and represents their will. The authority that would levy the tax at issue here shares none of these qualities. Our Federal Judiciary, by design, is not representative or responsible to the people in a |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | is not representative or responsible to the people in a political sense; it is independent. Federal judges do not depend on the popular will for their office. They may not even share the burden of taxes they attempt to impose, for they may live outside the jurisdiction their orders affect. And federal judges have no fear that the competition for scarce public resources could result in a diminution of their salaries. It is not surprising that imposition of taxes by an authority so insulated from public communication or control can lead to deep feelings of frustration, powerlessness, and anger on the part of taxpaying citizens. The operation of tax systems is among the most difficult aspects of public administration. It is not a function the Judiciary as an institution is designed to exercise. Unlike legislative bodies, which may hold hearings on how best to raise revenues, all subject to the views of constituents to whom the Legislature is accountable, the Judiciary must grope ahead with only the assistance of the parties, or perhaps random amici curiae. Those hearings would be without principled direction, for there exists no body of juridical axioms by *70 which to guide or review them. On this questionable basis, the Court today would give authority for decisions that affect the life plans of local citizens, the revenue available for competing public needs, and the health of the local economy. Day-to-day administration of the tax must be accomplished by judicial trial and error, requisitioning the staff of the existing tax authority, or the hiring of a staff under the direction of the judge. The District Court orders in this case suggest the pitfalls of the first course. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a (correcting order for assessment of penalties for nonpayment that "mistakenly" assessed penalties on an extra tax year); at 57a ("clarify[ing]" the inclusion of savings and loan institutions, estates, trusts, and beneficiaries in the court's income tax surcharge and enforcement procedures). Forcing citizens to make financial decisions in fear of the fledgling judicial tax collector's next misstep must detract from the dignity and independence of the federal courts. The function of hiring and supervising a staff for what is essentially a political function has other complications. As part of its remedial order, for example, the District Court ordered the hiring of a "public information specialist," at a cost of $30,000. The purpose of the position was to "solicit community support and involvement" in the District Court's desegregation plan. See at 191a. This type of order raises a substantial question whether a district court may |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | order raises a substantial question whether a district court may extract taxes from citizens who have no right of representation and then use the funds for expression with which the citizens may disagree. Cf. The Court relies on dicta from to support its statements on judicial taxation. In the Court faced an unrepentent and recalcitrant school board that attempted to provide financial support for white schools while refusing to operate schools for black schoolchildren. We stated that the District Court could "require the Supervisors to exercise the *71 power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system." There is no occasion in this case to discuss the full implications of 's observation, for it has no application here. endorsed the power of a federal court to order the local authority to exercise existing authority to tax. This case does not involve an order to a local government with plenary taxing power to impose a tax, or an order directed at one whose taxing power has been limited by a state law enacted in order to thwart a federal court order. An order of this type would find support in the dicta and present a closer question than the one before us. Yet that order might implicate as well the "perversion of the normal legislative process" that we have found troubling in other contexts. See A legislative vote taken under judicial compulsion blurs lines of accountability by making it appear that a decision was reached by elected representatives when the reality is otherwise. For this reason, it is difficult to see the difference between an order to tax and direct judicial imposition of a tax. The Court asserts that its understanding of follows from cases in which the Court upheld the use of mandamus to compel local officials to collect taxes that were authorized under state law in order to meet bond obligations. See ante, at 55-57. But as there was no state authority in this case for the KCMSD to exercise. In this situation, there could be no authority for a judicial order touching on taxation. See United (where the statute empowering the corporation to issue bonds contains a limit on the taxing power, federal court has no power of mandamus to compel a levy in excess of that power; "We have no power by mandamus to compel a municipal corporation to levy a tax which the law does not authorize. We cannot create new *72 rights or confer new powers. All we can do is |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | rights or confer new powers. All we can do is to bring existing powers into operation"). The Court cites a single case, Von for the proposition that a federal court may set aside state taxation limits that interfere with the remedy sought by the district court. But the Court does not heed Von Hoffman's holding. There a municipality had authorized a tax levy in support of a specific bond obligation, but later limited the taxation authority in a way that impaired the bond obligation. The Court held the subsequent limitation itself unconstitutional, a violation of the Contracts Clause. Once the limitation was held invalid, the original specific grant of authority remained. There is no allegation here, nor could there be, that the neutral tax limitations imposed by the people of Missouri are unconstitutional. Compare Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 ("nothing in the record to suggest" that tax limitation was intended to frustrate desegregation) with The majority appears to concede that the Missouri tax law does not violate a specific provision of the Constitution, stating instead that state laws may be disregarded on the basis of a vague "reason based in the Constitution." Ante, at 57. But this broad suggestion does not follow from the holding in Von Hoffman. Examination of the "long and venerable line of cases," ante, at 55, cited by the Court to endorse judicial taxation reveals the lack of real support for the Court's rationale. One group of these cases holds simply that the common-law writ of mandamus lies to compel a local official to perform a clear duty imposed by state law. See United ; City of ; Board of Commissioners of Knox These common-law mandamus decisions do not purport to involve the Federal Constitution or remedial powers. A second set of cases, including the Von Hoffman case relied upon by the Court, invalidates on Contracts Clause grounds statutory limitations on taxation power passed subsequent to grants of tax authority in support of bond obligations. See Louisiana ex rel. ; ; These cases, like Von Hoffman, are inapposite because there is no colorable argument that the provision of the Missouri Constitution limiting property tax assessments itself violates the Federal Constitution. A third group of cases involving taxation and municipal bonds is more relevant. These cases hold that where there is no state or municipal taxation authority that the federal court may by mandamus command the officials to exercise, the court is itself without authority to order taxation. In some of these cases, the officials charged with administering the tax resigned their positions, and the Court held |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | administering the tax resigned their positions, and the Court held that no judicial remedy was available. See In Heine, the Court held that it had no equitable power to impose a tax in order to prevent the plaintiff's right from going without a remedy. "The power we are here asked to exercise is the very delicate one of taxation. This power belongs in this country to the legislative sovereignty, State or National. It certainly is not vested, as in the exercise of an original jurisdiction, in any Federal court. It is unreasonable to suppose that the legislature would ever select a Federal court for that purpose. It is not only not one of the inherent powers of the court to levy and collect taxes, but it is an invasion by the judiciary of the Federal government of the legislative functions of the State government. It is a most extraordinary request, and a compliance with it would involve consequences no less out of the way of judicial procedure, the end of which no wisdom can foresee." Other cases state more broadly that absent state authority for a tax levy, the exercise of which may be compelled by mandamus, the federal court is without power to impose any tax. See ; ("The levying of taxes is not a judicial act. It has no elements of one"); United ; With all respect, it is this third group of cases that applies. The majority would limit these authorities to a narrow "exceptio[n]" *75 for cases where local officers resigned. Ante, at 56, n. 20. This is not an accurate description. Rather, the cases show that where a limitation on the local authority's taxing power is not a subsequent enactment itself in violation of the Contracts Clause, a federal court is without power to order a tax levy that goes beyond the authority granted by state law. The Court states that the KCMSD was "invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax." Invested by whom? It is plain that the KCMSD had no such power under state law. That being so, the authority to levy a higher tax would have to come from the federal court. The very cases cited by the majority show that a federal court has no such authority. At bottom, today's discussion seems motivated by the fear that failure to endorse judicial taxation power might in some extreme circumstance leave a court unable to remedy a constitutional violation. As I discuss below, I do not think this possibility is in reality a significant one. More important, this possibility is |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | in reality a significant one. More important, this possibility is nothing more or less than the necessary consequence of any limit on judicial power. If, however, judicial discretion is to provide the sole limit on judicial remedies, that discretion must counsel restraint. Ill-considered entry into the volatile field of taxation is a step that may place at risk the legitimacy that justifies judicial independence. III One of the most troubling aspects of the Court's opinion is that discussion of the important constitutional issues of judicial authority to tax need never have been undertaken to decide this case. Even were I willing to accept the Court's proposition that a federal court might in some extreme case authorize taxation, this case is not the one. The suggestion that failure to approve judicial taxation here would leave constitutional rights unvindicated rests on a presumption that the District Court's remedy is the only possible cure for the constitutional violations it found. Neither our precedents *76 nor the record support this view. In fact, the taxation power is sought here on behalf of a remedial order unlike any before seen. It cannot be contended that interdistrict comparability, which was the ultimate goal of the District Court's orders, is itself a constitutional command. We have long since determined that "unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside in different districts" do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. San Antonio Independent School The District Court in this case found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that there was no interdistrict constitutional violation that would support mandatory interdistrict relief. See Instead, the District Court's conclusion that desegregation might be easier if more nonminority students could be attracted into the KCMSD was used as the hook on which to hang numerous policy choices about improving the quality of education in general within the KCMSD. The State's complaint that this suit represents the attempt of a school district that could not obtain public support for increased spending to enlist the District Court to finance its educational policy cannot be dismissed out of hand. The plaintiffs and KCMSD might well be seen as parties that have "joined forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from the state treasury." This Court has never approved a remedy of the type adopted by the District Court. There are strong arguments against the validity of such a plan. A remedy that uses the quality of education as a lure to attract nonminority students will place the District Court at the center of controversies over educational philosophy that by tradition are left to this Nation's |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | educational philosophy that by tradition are left to this Nation's communities. Such a plan as a practical matter raises many of the concerns involved in interdistrict desegregation remedies. Cf. District courts can and must take needed steps to eliminate racial discrimination and ensure the operation of unitary school systems. But it is discrimination, not the ineptitude of educators or the indifference of the public, that is the evil to be remedied. An initial finding of discrimination cannot be used as the basis for a wholesale shift of authority over day-to-day school operations from parents, teachers, and elected officials to an unaccountable district judge whose province is law, not education. Perhaps it is good educational policy to provide a school district with the items included in the KCMSD capital improvement plan, for example: high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium; greenhouses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an editing and animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo project; swimming pools; and numerous other facilities. But these items are a part of legitimate political debate over educational policy and spending priorities, not the Constitution's command of racial equality. Indeed, it may be that a mere 12-acre petting farm, or other corresponding reductions in court-ordered spending, might satisfy constitutional requirements, while preserving scarce public funds for legislative allocation to other public needs, such as paving streets, feeding the poor, building prisons, or housing the homeless. Perhaps the KCMSD's Classical Greek theme schools emphasizing forensics and self-government will provide exemplary training in participatory democracy. But if today's dicta become law, such lessons will be of little use to students who grow up to become taxpayers in the KCMSD. *78 I am required in light of our limited grant of certiorari to assume that the remedy chosen by the District Court was a permissible exercise of its remedial discretion. But it is misleading to suggest that a failure to fund this particular remedy would leave constitutional rights without a remedy. In fact, the District Court acknowledged in its very first remedial order that the development of a remedy in this case would involve "a choice among a wide range of possibilities." App. to Pet. for Cert. 153a. Its observation was consistent with our cases concerning the scope of equitable remedies, |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | consistent with our cases concerning the scope of equitable remedies, which have recognized that "equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies." Any argument that the remedy chosen by the District Court was the only one possible is in fact unsupportable in light of our previous cases. We have approved desegregation orders using assignment changes and some ancillary education programs to ensure the operation of a unitary school system for the district's children. See, e. g., Columbus Bd. of ; Dayton Bd. of To suggest that a constitutional violation will go unremedied if a district does not, though capital improvements or other means, turn every school into a magnet school, and the entire district into a magnet district, is to suggest that the remedies approved in our past cases should have been disapproved as insufficient to deal with the violations. The truth of the matter is that the remedies in those cases were permissible choices among the many that might be adopted by a district court. The prudence we have required in other areas touching on federal court intrusion in local government, see, e. g., is missing here. Even on the assumption that a federal court might order taxation in an extreme case, the unique nature of the taxing power would demand that this remedy be used as a last resort. In my view, a taxation order should not even be *79 considered, and this Court need never have addressed the question, unless there has been a finding that without the particular remedy at issue the constitutional violation will go unremedied. By this I do not mean that the remedy is, as we assume this one was, within the broad discretion of the district court. Rather, as a prerequisite to considering a taxation order, I would require a finding that that any remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of discretion. There is no showing in this record that, faced with the revenue shortfall, the District Court gave due consideration to the possibility that another remedy among the "wide range of possibilities" would have addressed the constitutional violations without giving rise to a funding crisis. The District Court here did consider alternatives to the taxing measures it imposed, but only funding alternatives. See, e. g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. There is no indication in the record that the District Court gave any consideration to the possibility that an alternative remedial plan, while less attractive from an educational policy |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | alternative remedial plan, while less attractive from an educational policy viewpoint, might nonetheless suffice to cure the constitutional violation. Rather, it found only that the taxation orders were necessary to fund the particular remedy it had devised. This Court, with full justification, has given latitude to the district judges that must deal with persisting problems of desegregation. Even when faced with open defiance of the mandate of educational equality, however, no court has ever found necessary a remedy of the scope presented here. For this reason, no order of taxation has ever been approved. The Court fails to provide any explanation why this case presents the need to endorse by dictum so drastic a step. The suggestion that our limited grant of certiorari requires us to decide this case blinkered as to the actual remedy underlying it, ante, at 53, is ill founded. A limited grant of certiorari is not a means by which the Court can pose for itself *80 an abstract question. Our jurisdiction is limited to particular cases and controversies. U. S. Const., Art. III, 2, cl. 1. The only question this Court has authority to address is whether a judicial tax was appropriate in this case. Moreover, the petition for certiorari in this case included the contention that the District Court should not have considered the power to tax before considering whether its choice of remedy was the only possible way to achieve desegregation as a part of its argument on Question 2, which the Court granted. Pet. for Cert. 27. Far from being an improper invitation to go outside the question presented, attention to the extraordinary remedy here is the Court's duty. This would be a far more prudent course than recharacterizing the case in an attempt to reach premature decision on an important question. If the Court is to take upon itself the power to tax, respect for its own integrity demands that the power be exercised in support of true constitutional principle, not "suburban comparability" and "visual attractiveness." IV This case is a stark illustration of the ever-present question whether ends justify means. Few ends are more important than enforcing the guarantee of equal educational opportunity for our Nation's children. But rules of taxation that override state political structures not themselves subject to any constitutional infirmity raise serious questions of federal authority, questions compounded by the odd posture of a case in which the Court assumes the validity of a novel conception of desegregation remedies we never before have approved. The historical record of voluntary compliance with the decree of is not a |
Justice Kennedy | 1,990 | 4 | concurring | Missouri v. Jenkins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112414/missouri-v-jenkins/ | of voluntary compliance with the decree of is not a proud chapter in our constitutional history, and the judges of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals have been courageous and skillful in implementing its mandate. But courage and skill must be exercised with due regard for the proper and historic role of the courts. *81 I do not acknowledge the troubling departures in today's majority opinion as either necessary or appropriate to ensure full compliance with the Equal Protection Clause and its mandate to eliminate the cause and effects of racial discrimination in the schools. Indeed, while this case happens to arise in the compelling context of school desegregation, the principles involved are not limited to that context. There is no obvious limit to today's discussion that would prevent judicial taxation in cases involving prisons, hospitals, or other public institutions, or indeed to pay a large damages award levied against a municipality under 42 U.S. C. 1983. This assertion of judicial power in one of the most sensitive of policy areas, that involving taxation, begins a process that over time could threaten fundamental alteration of the form of government our Constitution embodies. James Madison observed: "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." The Federalist, No. 51, p. 352 In pursuing the demand of justice for racial equality, I fear that the Court today loses sight of other basic political liberties guaranteed by our constitutional system, liberties that can coexist with a proper exercise of judicial remedial powers adequate to correct constitutional violations. |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | The Court today concludes that it has mandatory jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1252 directly to review the District Court's entry of a preliminary injunction restraining the Government from enforcing the provisions of 8 U.S. C. 404 and 405 pending a full trial on the merits of appellees' contention that those statutes violate the First and *9 Fifth Amendments. Ante, at 16-19.[1] The Court then proceeds to sustain the constitutionality of those statutes on the ground that "the process allows a claimant to make a meaningful presentation" on behalf of his claim for service-connected death and disability benefits even without the assistance of his attorney. Ante, at 5. The Court having reached this issue, I feel constrained to note my strong disagreement on the merits for the reasons eloquently set forth in JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, which I join. I write separately, however, because I believe the Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction in this case is not authorized by 1252. Because the District Court's interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction did not constitute a decision striking down the challenged statutes on constitutional grounds, appellate review of the propriety and scope of the preliminary injunction instead rests initially in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1292(a)(1), from which review in this Court could then be sought through a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court's decision to the contrary is wholly inconsistent with the purpose and history of 1252, well-established principles respecting interlocutory review of preliminary injunctions, and common sense. I The District Court did not hold that 404 and 405 are unconstitutional either on their face or as applied. Instead, for purposes of considering the appellees' motion for a pretrial preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it found that appellees had *40 "demonstrated a high likelihood of prevailing" on the merits of their due process and First Amendment challenges. ; see also The court then weighed the potential for irreparable injury and the balance of hardships in light of this likelihood of success. It found that the appellees had "shown the irreparable injury necessary to obtain injunctive relief" and concluded that "the balance of hardship also weighs heavily in [their] favor."[2] Accordingly, the court entered a broad preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of the challenged statutes "pending a trial on the merits of the above-entitled action." As this Court was advised at oral argument, the appellees contemplate further extensive *41 discovery and a full trial on the underlying First and Fifth Amendment issues. Tr. of Oral |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | the underlying First and Fifth Amendment issues. Tr. of Oral Arg. 1-2.[] Contrary to the Court's assertion, there is much more than a "semantic difference" between a finding of likelihood of success sufficient to support preliminary relief and a final holding on the merits. Ante, at 17. Until today, the Court always has recognized that district court findings on "likelihood of success on the merits" are not "tantamount to decisions on the underlying merits"; the two are "significantly different." University of Preliminary injunctions are granted on the basis of a broad "balance of factors" determined through "procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits," and the parties are accorded neither "a full opportunity to present their cases nor a final judicial decision based on the actual merits of a controversy." District court orders granting preliminary injunctions may therefore be reviewed only on an abuse-of-discretion standard: an appellate court may conclude that the district court's preliminary relief sweeps too broadly, or is based on an improper balancing of hardships, or even that the likelihood of success has been overdrawn. See generally ; But under the abuse-of-discretion standard, appellate courts obviously may "intimate no view as to the ultimate merits" of the underlying controversy. ; at[4] For several reasons, this is particularly true *42 where "grave, far-reaching constitutional questions" are presented: the records developed in preliminary-injunction cases are "simply insufficient" to allow a final decision on the merits; as a matter of fairness the litigants are entitled to a full evidentiary presentation before a final decision is reached; and where question of constitutional law turn on disputed fact,[5] such decisions must initially be rendered by a district court factfinder. at Section 1252 does not empower this Court directly to police the preliminary-injunctive process in the district courts. Instead, it was enacted to ensure the "prompt determination by the court of last resort of disputed questions of the constitutionality of acts of the Congress."[6] Whether one relies on *4 the codified language permitting a direct appeal from a lower-court decision "holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional"[7] or on the original language of the statute permitting a direct appeal where "the decision is against the constitutionality of any Act of Congress"[8] it is obvious that *44 1252 contemplates a fully consummated lower-court decision of unconstitutionality so that this Court may carry out the statutory purpose of rendering a prompt and dispositive determination respecting the constitutionality of the challenged legislation. Jurisdiction pursuant to 1252 accordingly is proper only where "the basis |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | pursuant to 1252 accordingly is proper only where "the basis of the decision below in fact was that the Act of Congress was unconstitutional," United [9] and "likelihood" simply does not equate with "in fact." Where a district court merely has concluded that there is a "likelihood" of unconstitutionality sufficient to support temporary relief, 1252's underlying purpose cannot be fulfilled because this Court (if faithful to precedent) cannot resolve the "ultimate merits" of the underlying constitutional issue. 422 U. S., ; 411 U. S., at Instead, all the Court could do would be to consider whether the nature or scope of preliminary relief constituted abuses of discretion, and perhaps to disagree with the district court respecting the "likelihood" that the appellees ultimately would prevail. In my opinion, these questions relating to the supervision of the injunctive process are not subsumed in 1252 and properly are left in the first instance to the courts of appeals. The Court argues, however, that because 1252 explicitly grants jurisdiction to this Court "from an interlocutory or final judgment" of unconstitutionality, Congress surely intended to include preliminary injunctions granted on "likelihood of success" within the scope of 1252. Ante, at 16-17, 18-19. The Court reinforces this argument by noting *45 that all interlocutory decisions, even if cast in dispositive terms, "are subject to revision" before entry of final judgment. Ante, at 17. This argument is wholly unpersuasive. As demonstrated by the large body of precedent applying 28 U.S. C. 1291 and 1292(a), there is a substantial difference between interlocutory decisions that are "tentative, informal or incomplete"[10] and those that for all practical purposes "conclusively determine the disputed question."[11] Interlocutory decisions falling within the latter category may, in a small set of circumstances, be immediately appealed because they represent "fully consummated decisions" on the matter in question that are capable of being reviewed and dispositively affirmed or reversed.[12] The "bare fact"[1] that every order short of a final decree is theoretically "subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge" is insufficient to preclude review in these circumstances.[14] Instead, interlocutory appeals to the courts of appeals pursuant to 1291 and 1292(a) are proper when no further consideration of the disputed issue is contemplated by the district court and when, as a practical matter, there is "no basis to suppose" that the resolution is anything less than definite.[15] Where the disputed decision "remains open, unfinished or inconclusive," on the other hand, it is well established that under 1291 and 1292(a) "there may be no instrusion by appeal" of the unresolved issue.[16] The reasons are manifest. |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | by appeal" of the unresolved issue.[16] The reasons are manifest. If the appellate court addressed the issue in such an inconclusive *46 posture, it either would render an advisory opinion that had no binding effect or, if binding effect were intended, would usurp the authority of the district court to pass on the issue in the first instance. "Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of intervention."[17] This elementary distinction applies with direct force to appeals pursuant to 1252.[18] Where a district court issues an interlocutory order based on a fully consummated determination that a federal statute is unconstitutional, an appeal is proper because the constitutional question can authoritatively be decided with dispatch. Thus in the District Court had denied preliminary relief enjoining the eviction of tenants on the ground that the federal statute prohibiting the evictions was unconstitutional. And in the District Court for the District of Columbia had preliminary enjoined the enforcement of a statute in reliance on a decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the statute was unconstitutional "a decision," we noted, that was "binding on the District Court," In neither case was there any basis to believe that the interlocutory holding of unconstitutionality was anything but final. On the other hand, we have never in the 48-year history of 1252 assumed jurisdiction where the district court had done no more than simply determine that there was a "likelihood" of unconstitutionality sufficient to support temporary relief pending a final decision on the merits. Because such determinations *47 are inherently "open, unfinished [and] inconclusive,"[19] the only proper questions for immediate appellate consideration would be whether the entry and scope of preliminary relief were abuses of discretion. But such review is not the purpose of 1252 because, as the Court today concedes, "it was the constitutional question that Congress wished this Court to decide." Ante, at 18[] If the Court did address the constitutional issue in these circumstances, it either would be rendering an advisory opinion subject to revision once the district court reached the merits or, to the extent it purported to pass on the issue with finality, would be exercising a forbidden "power of intervention" rather than of review.[21] We have long recognized that such intervention is barred under 1291 and 1292(a), and should have so recognized here as well.[22] *48 The Court contends, however, that the District Court in this case enjoined the challenged statute "across the country and under all circumstances," and that immediate mandatory appeal to this Court therefore "is in accord |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | immediate mandatory appeal to this Court therefore "is in accord with the purpose of the statutory grant" provision of "an expeditious means for ensuring certainty and uniformity in the enforcement of such an Act." Ante, at 18-19. See also ante, at 6-7 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Congress unquestionably intended by 1252 to provide an "expeditious" means for resolving constitutional questions,[2] but an appeal is proper only when it is those questions themselves that have been decided a condition not met in preliminary-injunction cases where, as here, we may "intimate no view as to the ultimate merits" of the underlying controversy. 422 U. S., Moreover, the Court's reasoning sweeps both too narrowly and too broadly. It sweeps too narrowly because mandatory jurisdiction pursuant to 1252 is not confined to district court decisions striking down statutes "across the country and under all circumstances." Ante, at 19. See also ante, at 6 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). We have instead long recognized that 1252 requires that we review decisions that simply invalidate challenged statutes even as applied only to particular individuals in particular circumstances.[24] Allowing *49 an immediate appeal in these circumstances is thought to further the "great public interest" in securing "prompt determinations" of the validity of lower court precedent that might have binding effect in cases beyond the one at hand.[25] Where a district court simply has granted a preliminary injunction or for that matter a temporary restraining order[26] barring enforcement of a statute as applied to certain individuals, the precedential effect is far more obscure. Such orders are based on a case-specific balancing of the equities that may well not carry over into other situations. It is simply too burdensome for this Court to bear mandatory direct jurisdiction over every preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, and other pretrial order in cases potentially implicating the constitutionality of federal statutes. The Court might respond that 1252 appeals in this context can be limited to preliminary relief having nationwide impact, but this would be bootstrap reasoning without support in our precedents: the propriety of an appeal under 1252 turns not on the scope of the potential impact, but on the underlying nature of the district court's determination.[27] *50 The Court's reasoning sweeps too broadly because there are means other than an expansive reading of 1252 to ensure that improvident district court injunctions based on "likelihood of success" do not impede the effective functioning of the Federal Government. As Congress has emphasized, "[s]wift judicial review can be had in cases where the public interest requires it" through means short of mandatory appeals jurisdiction.[28] |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | interest requires it" through means short of mandatory appeals jurisdiction.[28] Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1292(a), for example, the courts of appeals may promptly review district court orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions. Courts of appeals routinely supervise the trial-court injunctive process and are therefore in a far superior position to pass initially on questions of irreparable injury, balance of hardships, and abuse of discretion.[29] Moreover, if the question whether a district court abused its discretion in issuing preliminary relief "is of such imperative public importance as to justify the deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate settlement in this Court," this Court's Rule 18, certiorari review can be obtained before the court of appeals renders judgment. See 28 U.S. C. 2101(e). This Court has not hesitated to exercise this power of swift intervention in cases of extraordinary constitutional moment and *51 in cases demanding prompt resolution for other reasons.[0] Under this procedure, the Court has discretion to limit immediate review to exceptional cases and to leave initial review of most matters in the courts of appeals which of course "recognize the vital importance of the time element" in constitutional challenges involving the granting or denial of interlocutory relief.[1] Under today's construction of 1252, however, the Court has no such discretion and accordingly has, I respectfully submit, expanded its mandatory docket to matters that we have no business resolving in the first instance. One final consideration, based on the history of 1252 and related provisions, sheds further light on the fallacy of the Court's jurisdictional reasoning. Section 1252 originally was enacted as 2 of the Judiciary Act of 197, Section of that Act created the since-repealed three-judge district court provisions of 28 U.S. C. 2282 (1970 ed.). Section provided that "[n]o interlocutory or permanent injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any Act of Congress" in cases challenging the constitutionality of the Act could be granted unless presented to and resolved by a three-judge district court. That section also contained its own built-in jurisdictional authorization for direct Supreme Court review of any "order, decree, or judgment" issued by *52 such a court granting or denying "an interlocutory or permanent injunction in such case." Moreover, provided that a single district judge could enter a "temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part," of the enforcement of the challenged statute "until decision upon the application," provided that the applicant made a sufficient showing of, inter alia, "irreparable loss or damage."[2] *5 The history of is relevant to |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | loss or damage."[2] *5 The history of is relevant to the instant question in two respects. First, this Court has held flatly that temporary relief granted by a single district judge pending the convening of a three-judge court is reviewable in the first instance by the courts of appeals and not on direct appeal to this Court. See, e. g., Hicks v. Pleasure House, (preliminary relief "issued pursuant to [28 U.S. C.] 2284() is reviewable in a court of appeals to the extent that any such order is reviewable under 28 U.S. C. 1291 and 1292(a)").[] It would have made no sense to channel appeals of such orders under to the courts of appeals while channeling appeals of identical preliminary orders in cases that might ultimately fall within 2 to this Court in the first instance. Second, when Congress repealed 2282 in 1976[4] it specifically considered the question of the best means for policing the injunctive process in constitutional challenges pending decision on the underlying merits. Whereas review of three-judge interlocutory orders in such cases formerly had been routed directly to this Court, see 2282, 228 (1970 ed.), Congress believed that interlocutory review in the courts of *54 appeals pursuant to 1291 and 1292(a) would be most consistent with sound judicial administration. "One other concern of the committee was the review of the granting, or the denial, of a stay of an injunction by a district court. The committee believes that with appeals of these cases clearly vested in the 11 Circuit Courts of Appeal, they will be more able than the Supreme Court to carefully consider and evaluate requests for a stay in these cases and that ample procedures exist to act effectively in these cases. See, Barron and Holtzoff (Wright ed.) 171-78." S. Rep. No. 94-4, p. 11[5] Congress thereby indicated its firm intention to leave monitoring of the equitable injunctive process to the courts of appeals in the first instance, and to reserve mandatory direct Supreme Court review for those cases in which this Court properly could resolve the underlying merits of the constitutional challenges themselves.[6] II Although deciding that a direct appeal of this preliminary injunction is proper, the six Members of today's majority appear to be sharply divided over the nature of the issues before us and the proper scope of our authority on review. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, eschews any attempt to resolve the underlying merits of the constitutional challenge. She properly recognizes that, because *55 "[t]he merits of these claims are difficult to evaluate on the record of affidavits and depositions |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | difficult to evaluate on the record of affidavits and depositions developed at the preliminary injunction stage," it would be improper to express any views on the merits of the appellees' as-applied challenges. Ante, at 8 (concurring opinion). Nor, properly, does JUSTICE O'CONNOR purport to determine the facial validity of the challenged statutes, given that the District Court has never reached a fully consummated determination on that question. Instead, she simply observes that "the record falls short of establishing any likelihood of such sweeping facial invalidity." Ante, at 7 JUSTICE O'CONNOR accordingly limits her analysis to application of the abuse-of-discretion standard that governs review of preliminary-injunction orders, concluding that "the District Court abused its discretion in issuing a nationwide preliminary injunction." Ante, at 6. Although I find this approach far preferable to that taken by the opinion for the Court, I respectfully submit that it is inconsistent with 1252 for two reasons: First, as set forth above, application of the abuse-of-discretion standard to the equitable process of granting preliminary relief is not subsumed in 1252 and properly is left to the courts of appeals in the first instance. Second, this approach, by properly avoiding the ultimate resolution of the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, has not in the slightest way furthered the underlying purpose of 1252 ensuring the prompt and dispositive resolution of the merits of facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to federal statutes.[7] The opinion for the Court appears to take a very different tack. To be sure, the Court notes two or three times that the District Court simply found a "likelihood" that the appellees *56 after a full trial would be able to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the challenged statutes, and it states once in passing that the District Court "abused its discretion" in so finding. Ante, at 12-1, 15, 4. But that is not the essence of the Court's approach. The Court repeatedly seeks to cast doubt on the bona fides of the District Court's entry of preliminary relief pursuant to Rule 65 by describing that relief in quotation marks: the District Court did not really grant a preliminary injunction, but a "preliminary injunction." Ante, at 08, 12, 16. Having thus suggested that the matter is one of "semantic[s]" making "little difference," ante, at 17, the Court proceeds to assert, repeatedly, that the District Court actually "held that [the $10] limit violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the First Amendment," ante, at 07[8] Having thus mischaracterized the District Court's decision, the Court then purports "to decide this case on the merits," ante, |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | then purports "to decide this case on the merits," ante, at 12, n. 5 bootstrapping its way past the rule that we may "intimate no view as to the ultimate merits" in preliminary-injunction cases[9] by observing that, under 1252, "it was the constitutional question that Congress wished this Court to decide," ante, at 18 Having thus paved the way for its consideration of the constitutional merits, the Court then proceeds to "review" the District Court's "holding" in light of the record evidence and the three-part 424 U.S. 19 balancing test. The Court focuses on the Mathews factors of the risk of an erroneous decision through the current procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards. The Court rummages through the partially developed record and seizes upon scattered evidence introduced by the Government on the eve of the preliminary-injunction hearing evidence that never has been tested in a trial on the merits and pronounces that evidence "reliable" and compelling. See, *57 e. g., ante, at 1.[40] Moreover, the Court excoriates the appellees and the District Court repeatedly for failing to muster sufficient evidence to support the "holding" of unconstitutionality: the appellees made "no such" sufficient presentation of evidence, introduced "nothing" to support the "holding," and "failed to make the very difficult factual showing" necessary to support the "holding" of unconstitutionality. Ante, at 26, 29, 0.[41] The conclusion is preordained: the statutes give the appellees "an opportunity under the present claims process" to "make a meaningful presentation" without an attorney's assistance, and the District Court's "holding" of unconstitutionality must therefore be reversed. Ante, at 5. This brand of constitutional adjudication is extraordinary. Whereas JUSTICE O'CONNOR faithfully adheres to the limited role of appellate judges in reviewing preliminary injunctions and thereby departs from the purposes of 1252, the opinion for the Court seizes upon the underlying purposes of 1252 in order to evade the well-established rule prohibiting appellate courts from even purporting to "intimate view[s]" on the ultimate merits when reviewing preliminary injunctions granted on likelihood of success. 422 U. S., If the opinion for the Court turns out to be more than an unfortunate aberration, it will threaten a fundamental transformation of the equitable process of granting preliminary relief in cases challenging the constitutionality of Government action.[42] Individual litigants seeking such *58A relief on grounds of irreparable injury and a balancing of hardships will essentially be required to confront the Government with both hands tied behind their backs: if they successfully obtain such relief, this Court will immediately intervene pursuant to 1252 to review the "holding" of unconstitutionality, will |
Justice Brennan | 1,985 | 13 | dissenting | Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111504/walters-v-national-assn-of-radiation-survivors/ | pursuant to 1252 to review the "holding" of unconstitutionality, will make de novo findings that selected evidence is "reliable," will castigate the individuals for failing to adduce sufficient evidence to support the "merits" of the "holding," and will issue a ringing proclamation that the challenged statute is constitutional. III I believe that 1252 should have been construed to permit a direct appeal to this Court only from a lower court decision that represents a fully consummated determination that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional so as to permit this Court properly to resolve the constitutional question on the merits. Unlike JUSTICE O'CONNOR, I do not believe that 1252 requires this Court directly to police the injunctive process in constitutional challenges in the first instance. Unlike the opinion for the Court, I do not believe that 1252 may be invoked in such cases to short-circuit the process of orderly and principled constitutional adjudication. Accordingly, I believe the Court should have vacated the judgment and remanded to the District Court for the entry of a fresh decree, so that the Government could take a proper appeal of the preliminary-injunction order to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See, e. g., United The Court having decided to the contrary and having reached the merits, I join JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,979 | 19 | concurring | Sandstrom v. Montana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110109/sandstrom-v-montana/ | The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any State from depriving a person of liberty without due process of law, and in this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees prohibit a State from shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the crime charged. I am loath to see this Court go into the business of parsing jury instructions given by state trial courts, for as we have consistently recognized, "a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." And surely if this charge had, in the words of the Court, "merely described a permissive inference," ante, at 514, it could not conceivably have run afoul of the constitutional decisions cited by the Court in its opinion. But a majority of my Brethren conclude that "it is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory," ante, at 515, and counsel for the State admitted in oral argument "that `it's possible' that the jury believed they were required to apply the presumption." Ante, at 514-515. *528 While I continue to have doubts as to whether this particular jury was so attentively attuned to the instructions of the trial court that it divined the difference recognized by lawyers between "infer" and "presume," I defer to the judgment of the majority of the Court that this difference in meaning may have been critical in its effect on the jury. I therefore concur in the Court's opinion and judgment. |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | majority | Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Galioto | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111729/department-of-treasury-bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-galioto/ | We noted probable jurisdiction to decide whether Congress may, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, forbid all involuntarily committed former mental patients to purchase firearms while permitting some felons to do so. In 1982 appellee attempted to purchase a firearm at Ray's Sport Shop in North Plainfield, New Jersey. The Sport Shop gave appellee a standard questionnaire, which asked, inter alia: "Have you ever been adjudicated mentally defective or have you ever been committed to a mental institution?" Appellee had been involuntarily committed to a mental hospital for a period of several days in 1971, and accordingly answered "yes" to this question. The store then refused to sell him a gun by reason of 18 U.S. C. 922(d)(4), which makes it unlawful for a licensed dealer in firearms "to sell any firearm to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person has been adjudicated as a mental defective or had been committed to any mental institution." Federal firearms laws also forbid "any person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce," 18 U.S. C. 922(g), or to "receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate *558 or foreign commerce," 922(h). Partially overlapping provisions of 18 U.S. C. App. 1202(a)(1) and (3) prohibit any person who has "been adjudged by a court of being mentally incompetent" from receiving, possessing, or transporting firearms. After unsuccessfully seeking a special exemption from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, appellee brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, challenging the constitutionality of the firearms legislation. The District Court concluded that those portions of the federal firearms statutes that deprived appellee of his ability to purchase a firearm were constitutionally infirm. Both felons and persons who have been committed to mental institutions, inter alia, are subject to the firearms disabilities contained in 18 U.S. C. 922(d). Under 18 U.S. C. 925(c), however, felons who have committed crimes not involving firearms may apply to the Bureau for administrative relief from these disabilities. No such relief is permitted for former mental patients. Section 925(c) provides in relevant part: "A person who has been convicted for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (other than a crime involving the use of a firearm or other weapon or a violation of this chapter or of the National Firearms Act) may make application to the Secretary for relief from the |
Justice Burger | 1,986 | 12 | majority | Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Galioto | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111729/department-of-treasury-bureau-of-alcohol-tobacco-and-firearms-v-galioto/ | may make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms and incurred by reason of such conviction, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest." *559 The District Court held that this scheme violated equal protection principles because, in its view, "[t]here is no rational basis for thus singling out mental patients for permanent disabled status, particularly as compared to convicts." The court also concluded that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it "in effect creates an irrebuttable presumption that one who has been committed, no matter the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and dangerous." We noted probable jurisdiction over the Government's appeal, and the case was argued on March 26, 1986. Meanwhile, Congress came to the conclusion, as a matter of legislative policy, that the firearms statutes should be redrafted. On May 19, 1986, while this case was under consideration here, the President signed into law Stat. 449. Section 105 of the statute amends the provision providing for administrative relief from firearms disabilities, 18 U.S. C. 925(c), by striking out the language limiting the provision to certain felons and changing the statute to read that any person who "is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition" may apply to the Secretary of the Treasury for relief. Section 110 of the statute provides that the amendment made by 105 "shall be applicable to any action, petition, or appellate proceeding pending on the date of the enactment of this Act." This enactment significantly alters the posture of this case. The new statutory scheme permits the Secretary to grant relief in some circumstances to former involuntarily committed mental patients such as appellee. The new approach affords an administrative remedy to former mental patients like that Congress provided for others prima facie ineligible to purchase firearms. Thus, it can no longer be contended that such persons have been "singled out." Also, no "irrebuttable presumption" now exists since a hearing is afforded to anyone subject to firearms disabilities. Accordingly, the equal protection and "irrebuttable presumption" issues discussed *560 by the District Court are now moot. See United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County and In such circumstances, "it is the duty |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | dissenting | Steelworkers v. Weber | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/ | The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for were I a Member of Congress considering a proposed amendment of Title VII. I cannot join the Court's judgment, however, because it is contrary to the explicit language of the statute and arrived at by means wholly incompatible with long-established principles of separation of powers. Under the guise of statutory "construction," the Court effectively rewrites Title VII to achieve what it regards as a desirable result. It "amends" the statute to do precisely what both its sponsors and its opponents agreed the statute was not intended to do. When Congress enacted Title VII after long study and searching debate, it produced a statute of extraordinary clarity, which speaks directly to the issue we consider in this case. In 703 (d) Congress provided: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or *217 retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training." 42 U.S. C. 2000e-2 (d). Often we have difficulty interpreting statutes either because of imprecise drafting or because legislative compromises have produced genuine ambiguities. But here there is no lack of clarity, no ambiguity. The quota embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement between Kaiser and the Steelworkers unquestionably discriminates on the basis of race against individual employees seeking admission to on-the-job training programs. And, under the plain language of 703 (d), that is "an unlawful employment practice." Oddly, the Court seizes upon the very clarity of the statute almost as a justification for evading the unavoidable impact of its language. The Court blandly tells us that Congress could not really have meant what it said, for a "literal construction" would defeat the "purpose" of the statuteat least the congressional "purpose" as five Justices divine it today. But how are judges supposed to ascertain the purpose of a statute except through the words Congress used and the legislative history of the statute's evolution? One need not even resort to the legislative history to recognize what is apparent from the face of Title VIIthat it is specious to suggest that 703 (j) contains a negative pregnant that permits employers to do what 703 (a) and (d) unambiguously and unequivocally forbid employers from doing. Moreover, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S opinionwhich I joinconclusively demonstrates, the legislative history makes equally clear that the supporters and opponents of Title VII reached an agreement about the |
Justice Burger | 1,979 | 12 | dissenting | Steelworkers v. Weber | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110135/steelworkers-v-weber/ | and opponents of Title VII reached an agreement about the statute's intended effect. That agreement, expressed so clearly in the language of the statute that no one should doubt its meaning, forecloses the reading which the Court gives the statute today. *218 Arguably, Congress may not have gone far enough in correcting the effects of past discrimination when it enacted Title VII. The gross discrimination against minorities to which the Court advertsparticularly against Negroes in the building trades and craft unionsis one of the dark chapters in the otherwise great history of the American labor movement. And, I do not question the importance of encouraging voluntary compliance with the purposes and policies of Title VII. But that statute was conceived and enacted to make discrimination against any individual illegal, and I fail to see how "voluntary compliance" with the no-discrimination principle that is the heart and soul of Title VII as currently written will be achieved by permitting employers to discriminate against some individuals to give preferential treatment to others. Until today, I had thought the Court was of the unanimous view that "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed" in Title VII. Had Congress intended otherwise, it very easily could have drafted language allowing what the Court permits today. Far from doing so, Congress expressly prohibited in 703 (a) and (d) the very discrimination against Brian Weber which the Court today approves. If "affirmative action" programs such as the one presented in this case are to be permitted, it is for Congress, not this Court, to so direct. It is often observed that hard cases make bad law. I suspect there is some truth to that adage, for the "hard" cases always tempt judges to exceed the limits of their authority, as the Court does today by totally rewriting a crucial part of Title VII to reach a "desirable" result. Cardozo no doubt had this type of case in mind when he wrote: "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of *219 beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to `the primordial necessity of order in the social life.' Wide enough in all conscience is the field of |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. To resolve this question, we must consider once again the tension between the sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand, deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, establishing procedures under which criminal defendants are "acquitted *01 or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." I In August 181, a confidential informant of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy" were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal. The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of methaqualone by "Patsy" at the residence approximately five months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy." He further declared that "Armando" and "Patsy" generally kept only small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank. On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initiated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price Drive residence and later on two other residences as well. Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stewart, who had no criminal record. During the course of the investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack, and drove away. A check of Del Castillo's probation records led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone number Del Castillo had listed as his employer's. Leon had been arrested in 180 on drug charges, and a companion had informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily involved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had *02 learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. During the course |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation, the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716 South Sunset Canyon in Burbank. Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages; observed a variety of other material activity at the two residences as well as at a condominium at 702 Via Magdalena; and witnessed a variety of relevant activity involving respondents' automobiles. The officers also observed respondents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami. The pair later returned to Los Angeles together, consented to a search of their luggage that revealed only a small amount of marihuana, and left the airport. Based on these and other observations summarized in the affidavit, App. 34, Officer Cyril Rombach of the Burbank Police Department, an experienced and well-trained narcotics investigator, prepared an application for a warrant to search 620 Price Drive, 716 South Sunset Canyon, 702 Via Magdalena, and automobiles registered to each of the respondents for an extensive list of items believed to be related to respondents' drug-trafficking activities. Officer Rombach's extensive application was reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys. A facially valid search warrant was issued in September 181 by a State Superior Court Judge. The ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs at the Via Magdalena and Sunset Canyon addresses and a small quantity at the Price Drive residence. Other evidence was discovered at each of the residences and in Stewart's and Del Castillo's automobiles. Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the District Court for the Central District of California and charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a variety of substantive counts. *03 The respondents then filed motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.[1] The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and, while recognizing that the case was a close one, see granted the motions to suppress in part. It concluded that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause,[2] but did not suppress all of the evidence as to all of the respondents because none of the respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches.[3] In *04 response to a request from the Government, the court made clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, but it rejected the Government's suggestion that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant.[4] The District Court denied the Government's motion for reconsideration, and a divided panel |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | denied the Government's motion for reconsideration, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, judgt. order reported at The Court of Appeals first concluded that Officer Rombach's affidavit could not establish probable cause to search the Price Drive residence. To the extent that the affidavit set forth facts demonstrating the basis of the informant's knowledge of criminal activity, the information included was fatally stale. The affidavit, moreover, failed to establish the informant's credibility. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the information provided by the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the two-part test established in and[5] The officers' independent investigation neither cured the staleness nor corroborated the details of the informant's declarations. The Court of Appeals then considered whether the affidavit formed a proper basis for the *05 search of the Sunset Canyon residence. In its view, the affidavit included no facts indicating the basis for the informants' statements concerning respondent Leon's criminal activities and was devoid of information establishing the informants' reliability. Because these deficiencies had not been cured by the police investigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of the search. The Court of Appeals refused the Government's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The Government's petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review of the lower courts' determinations that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and presented only the question "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective." We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of such a modification. Although it undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question whether probable cause existed under the "totality of the circumstances" test announced last Term in that question has not been briefed or argued; and it is also within our authority, which we choose to exercise, to take the case as it comes to us, accepting the Court of Appeals' conclusion that probable cause was lacking under the prevailing legal standards. See this Court's Rule 21.1(a). We have concluded that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the exclusionary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its ability to perform its intended functions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, ; or |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, ; or that the rule is required by the conjunction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Mapp v. ; These implications need not detain us long. The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see and the Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons." A The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure "work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong." United The wrong condemned by the Amendment is "fully accomplished" by the unlawful search or seizure itself, ib and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to "cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered." The rule thus operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is "an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct." Only the former question is currently before us, and it must *07 be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective. The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern. "Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury." United An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains.[6] Particularly *08 when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system. Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well "generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice." Accordingly, "[a]s with any remedial |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | law and administration of justice." Accordingly, "[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." United ; see at -487; United B Close attention to those remedial objectives has characterized our recent decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court has, to be sure, not seriously questioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence *0 from the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate." ; Nevertheless, the balancing approach that has evolved in various contexts including criminal trials "forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment." In the Court emphasized the costs of the exclusionary rule, expressed its view that limiting the circumstances under which Fourth Amendment claims could be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings would not reduce the rule's deterrent effect, and held that a state prisoner who has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial. Cf. Proposed extensions of the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than the criminal trial itself have been evaluated and rejected under the same analytic approach. In United for example, we declined to allow grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or seizure since "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best." 4 U.S., Similarly, in United we permitted the use in federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized by state officials since the likelihood of deterring police misconduct through such an extension of the exclusionary rule was insufficient to outweigh its substantial social costs. In so doing, we declared that, "[i]f the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted." *10 As cases considering the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal trials themselves make clear, it does not follow from the emphasis on the exclusionary rule's deterrent value that "anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment." In determining whether persons aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or codefendants could seek |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | evidence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or codefendants could seek suppression, for example, we found that the additional benefits of such an extension of the exclusionary rule would not outweigh its costs. at 174-. Standing to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct. ; Brown v. United ; Wong Sun v. United Cf. United Even defendants with standing to challenge the introduction in their criminal trials of unlawfully obtained evidence cannot prevent every conceivable use of such evidence. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief may be used to impeach a defendant's direct testimony. Walder v. United See also ; A similar assessment of the "incremental furthering" of the ends of the exclusionary rule led us to conclude in United v. Havens, that evidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief or otherwise as substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach statements made by a defendant in response to "proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination." at -628. When considering the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in the prosecution's case in chief, moreover, we have declined to adopt a per se or "but for" rule *11 that would render inadmissible any evidence that came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest. ; Wong Sun v. United We also have held that a witness' testimony may be admitted even when his identity was discovered in an unconstitutional search. United v. The perception underlying these decisions that the connection between police misconduct and evidence of crime may be sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of that evidence at trial is a product of considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional principles it is designed to protect. ; United v.[7] In short, the "dissipation of the taint" concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus. ; The same attention to the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule also has characterized decisions not involving the scope of the rule itself. We have not |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | involving the scope of the rule itself. We have not required suppression of the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently *12 is declared unconstitutional.[8] Similarly, although the Court has been unwilling to conclude that new Fourth Amendment principles are always to have only prospective effect, United v.[] no Fourth Amendment decision marking a "clear break with the past" has been applied retroactively. See United v. ; Desist v. United ;[10] The propriety *13 of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the deterrence of police misconduct. United v. at -561; United v. As yet, we have not recognized any form of good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.[11] But the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong support for the modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below, our evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution's case in chief. III A Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard * against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer `engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,' " United v. Chadwick, (quoting v. United (8)), we have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that "in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall." United v. See Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according "great deference" to a magistrate's determination. 33 U. S., at 41. See ; United v. at 108-10. Deference to the magistrate, however, is not boundless. It is clear, first, that the deference accorded to a magistrate's finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based.[12] Second, the courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to "perform his `neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." See at 23. A magistrate failing to "manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | "manifest that neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant application" and who acts instead as "an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot provide valid authorization for an otherwise unconstitutional search. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 442 U.S. 31, *15 Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not "provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause." 462 U. S., at 23. "Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." See at 1-115; Giordenello v. United (158); Nathanson v. United 20 U.S. 41 (133).[13] Even if the warrant application was supported by more than a "bare bones" affidavit, a reviewing court may properly conclude that, notwithstanding the deference that magistrates deserve, the warrant was invalid because the magistrate's probable-cause determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances, at 238-23, or because the form of the warrant was improper in some respect. Only in the first of these three situations, however, has the Court set forth a rationale for suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant; in the other areas, it has simply excluded such evidence without considering whether *16 Fourth Amendment interests will be advanced. To the extent that proponents of exclusion rely on its behavioral effects on judges and magistrates in these areas, their reliance is misplaced. First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.[] Third, and most important, we discern no basis, and are offered none, for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.[15] Many of the factors *17 that indicate that the exclusionary rule cannot provide an effective "special" or "general" deterrent for individual offending law enforcement officers[16] apply as well to judges or magistrates. And, to the extent that the rule is thought to operate as a "systemic" deterrent on a wider audience,[17] it clearly can have no such effect on individuals empowered to issue search warrants. Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them. Imposition of the exclusionary sanction is not necessary meaningfully to inform judicial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at the same time declaring that the warrant was somehow defective will in any way reduce judicial officers' professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all colorable warrant requests.[18] *18 B If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, therefore, it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments. One could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the warrant application deters future inadequate presentations or "magistrate shopping" and thus promotes the ends of the Fourth Amendment. Suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a technically defective warrant supported by probable cause also might encourage officers to scrutinize more closely the form of the warrant and to point out suspected judicial errors. We find such arguments speculative and conclude that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.[1] We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. "No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect" United n. 22. But even assuming that the rule effectively *1 deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. As we observed in and reiterated in United v. 422 U. S., at 53: "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." The Court continued, at 542: "If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." See also -261 ; United at 45; -611[20] In short, where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, *20 "excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty." 428 U. S., at 53-540 This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.[21] In most *21 such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. "[O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law." at 48 Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.[22] *22 C We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is always inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. "[S]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness," for "a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish" that a law enforcement officer has "acted in good faith in conducting the search." United v. Ross, 456 U.S. 78, Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable, cf. 815-81[23] and it is clear that in some circumstances *23 the officer[24] will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 442 U.S. 31 ; in such circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." -611 ; see Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient i. e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at 88-1. In so limiting the suppression remedy, we leave untouched the probable-cause standard and the various requirements for a valid warrant. Other objections to the modification of *24 the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule we consider to be insubstantial. The good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants is not intended to signal our unwillingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and we do not believe that it will have this effect. As we have already suggested, the good-faith exception, turning as it does on objective reasonableness, should not be difficult to apply in practice. When officers have acted pursuant to a warrant, the prosecution should ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith without a substantial expenditure of judicial time. Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith exception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will preclude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure, deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth Amendment law in its present state.[25] There is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers' conduct manifested objective good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. Defendants seeking suppression of the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional searches |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | Defendants seeking suppression of the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional searches or seizures undoubtedly raise live controversies which Art. III empowers federal courts to adjudicate. As cases addressing questions of good-faith immunity under 42 U.S. C. compare with 566, n. and cases involving the harmless-error doctrine, compare (172), with 3 U.S. 1 (170), make clear, courts have considerable *25 discretion in conforming their decisionmaking processes to the exigencies of particular cases. If the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing courts from deciding that question before turning to the good-faith issue.[26] Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to determine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under their supervision need to be informed of their errors and so evaluate the officers' good faith only after finding a violation. In other circumstances, those courts could reject suppression motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers' good faith. We have no reason to believe that our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would suffer by allowing reviewing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making this choice. IV When the principles we have enunciated today are applied to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot stand. The Court of Appeals applied the prevailing legal standards to Officer Rombach's warrant application and concluded that the application could not support the magistrate's probable-cause determination. In so doing, the court clearly informed the magistrate that he *26 had erred in issuing the challenged warrant. This aspect of the court's judgment is not under attack in this proceeding. Having determined that the warrant should not have issued, the Court of Appeals understandably declined to adopt a modification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that this Court had not previously sanctioned. Although the modification finds strong support in our previous cases, the Court of Appeals' commendable self-restraint is not to be criticized. We have now reexamined the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances. In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | United States v. Leon | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111262/united-states-v-leon/ | role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Only respondent Leon has contended that no reasonably well trained police officer could have believed that there existed probable cause to search his house; significantly, the other respondents advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach's application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more than a "bare bones" affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. |
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