author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Brennan | 1,978 | 13 | concurring | National Boiler Marketing Assn. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109885/national-boiler-marketing-assn-v-united-states/ | prevent them from preying on contract growers. The Senate Report makes this clear:[2] "As introduced, [ 4 (b)] prohibited discrimination in the terms of `purchase or acquisition' of agricultural products. The committee found that this provision would be ineffective with respect to much that it was manifestly intended to prohibit. Thus a broiler contractor might furnish hatching eggs or chicks to a producer under a bailment contract where title remained in the contractor; or a canning company might furnish seeds or tomato plants to a producer under a similar arrangement. No `purchase or acquisition' would be involved. The committee amendment would extend this provision to `other handling' of agricultural products, thereby covering the examples just given and greatly broadening the scope of this provision." S. Rep. No. 474, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (Emphasis added.) *839 The anomaly of allowing the exemption to those who function more as processors uniquely to disadvantage the contract grower "producers" who today continue to fall within the conception of "farmers" Congress envisioned in 1922, points up the danger of judicially extending the exemption to conditions unforeseen by Congress in 1922.[3] The exemption provides a powerful economic weapon for the benefit of one economic interest group against another. However desirable the integrated broiler production system may be, and however needful of the exemption,[4] judges should not readjust the conflicting interests of growers and integrators; it is for Congress to address the problem of readjusting the power balance between *840 them. Teleprompter 415 U. S., at ; Fortnightly 392 U. S., at MR. JUSTCE WHTE, with whom MR. |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | dissenting | American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109906/american-broadcasting-cos-v-writers-guild-of-america-west-inc/ | The Court holds today that a labor union locked in a direct economic confrontation with an employer is powerless to impose sanctions on its own members who choose to pledge their loyalty to the adversary Nothing in 8 (b) () (B) or any other provision of the National abor Relations Act permits such a radical alteration of the natural balance of *439 power between labor and management I therefore respectfully dissent A union's ability to maintain a unified front in its confrontations with management and to impose disciplinary sanctions on those who "adher[e] to the enemy in time of struggle" are essential to its survival as an effective organization See egal imitations on Union Discipline, An employer also has an interest in securing the loyalty of those who represent him in dealings with the union, and that interest is protected by specific provisions of the Act[] Thus, as the Court observed in Florida Power & ight (FP&), very real concerns are raised on both sides when supervisory employees with collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment responsibilities are also union members But 8 (b) () (B) is not "any part of the solution to the generalized problem of supervisor-member conflict of loyalties" That statutory provision was enacted for the primary purpose of prohibiting a union from exerting direct pressure on an employer to force him into a multiemployer bargaining unit or to dictate his choice of representatives for the settlement of employee grievances S Rep No 05, 80th Cong, st Sess, pt p 2 (947) The Court in FP& reserved decision on whether union pressure expressly aimed at affecting the manner in which supervisor-members performed their collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment functions might *440 fall within the "outer limits" of the proscription of 8 (b) () (B) See San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union NO 8 (Northwest Publications, Inc), 72 N R B 273 But it flatly rejected the argument that union discipline aimed at enforcing uniform rules violated 8 (b) () (B) simply because it might have the ancillary effect of "depriv[ing] the employer of the full allegiance of, and control over, a representative he has selected for grievance adjustment or collective bargaining purposes" 47 US, at 807 In the present cases it is entirely clear that the union had no interest in restraining or coercing the employers in the selection of their bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives, or in affecting the manner in which supervisory employees performed those functions As the Court notes, ante, at 47-48, and n 6, the union expressed no interest at the disciplinary trials in the kind of work that was done behind |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | dissenting | American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109906/american-broadcasting-cos-v-writers-guild-of-america-west-inc/ | trials in the kind of work that was done behind its picket lines Its sole purpose was to enforce the traditional kinds of rules that every union relies on to maintain its organization and solidarity in the face of the potential hardship of a strike Cf NRB v Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co, 388 US 75, In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, this Court today forbids a union from disciplining a supervisor-member who crosses its picket linewho clearly gives "aid and comfort to the enemy" during a strike, see at solely because that action may have the incidental effect of depriving the employer of the hypothetical grievance-adjustment services of that particular supervisor for the duration of the strike This ruling quite simply gives the employer the superior right to call on the loyalty of any supervisor with grievance-adjustment responsibilities,[2] whenever *44 the union to which the supervisor belongs calls him out on strike In short, the Court's decision prevents a union with supervisory members from effectively calling and enforcing a strike[3] Nothing in 8 (b) () (B) permits such a sweeping limitation on the choice of economic weapons by unions that include supervisory employees among their members On the contrary, as the Court clearly held in FP&, an employer's remedy if he does not want to share the loyalty of his supervisors with a union is to insist that his supervisory personnel not belong to a union; or if he does not welcome the consequences of his supervisors' union membership he may legally penalize them for engaging in union activities, see n or "resolv[e] such conflicts as arise through the traditional procedures of collective bargaining" FP&, at 83[4] The sole function of 8 (b) () (B) is to protect an employer from any union coercion of the free choice of his bargaining or grievance-adjustment representative In prohibiting union interference in his choice of representatives for dealings with the union, this statutory provision does not in any *442 way grant him a right to interfere in the union's relationship with its supervisor-members[5] The statute leaves the balance of power in equipoise The Court's decision, by contrast, tips it measurably in favor of the employer at the most delicate point of direct confrontation, by completely preventing the union from enlisting the aid of its supervisor-members in a strike effort It seems to me that the Court's reading of 8 (b) () (B) is "fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act and the function of the sections relied upon" American Ship Building Co v NRB, 380 US 300, 38 Accordingly, I |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | United States v. McDermott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112837/united-states-v-mcdermott/ | I agree with the Court that under 26 U.S. C. 6323(a) we generally look to the filing of notice of the federal tax lien to determine the federal lien's priority as against a competing state-law judgment lien. I cannot agree, however, that a federal tax lien trumps a judgment creditor's claim to afteracquired property whenever notice of the federal lien is filed before the judgment lien has "attached" to the property. Ante, at 451-452. In my view, the Bank's antecedent judgment lien "ha[d] [already] acquired sufficient substance and ha[d] become so perfected," with respect to the McDermotts' *456 after-acquired real property, "as to defeat [the] later-filed federal tax lien." United Applying the governing "first in time" rule, the Court recognizesas it mustthat if the Bank's interest in the property was "perfected in the sense that there [was] nothing more to be done to have a choate lien" before September 9, 1987 (the date the federal notice was filed), United "that is the end of the matter; the Bank's lien prevails," ante, at 4. Because the Bank's identity as lienor and the amount of its judgment lien are undisputed, the choateness question here reduces to whether "the property subject to the lien" was sufficiently "established" as of that date. New at Accord, Pioneer See 26 CFR 301.6323(h)1(g) (1992). The majority is quick to conclude that "establish[ment]" cannot precede attachment, and that a lien in after-acquired property therefore cannot be sufficiently perfected until the debtor has acquired rights in the property. See ante, at 451-453. That holding does not follow from, and I believe it is inconsistent with, our precedents. We have not (before today) prescribed any rigid criteria for "establish[ing]" the property subject to a competing lien; we have required only that the lien "become certain as to the property subject thereto." New Our cases indicate that "certain" means nothing more than "[d]etermined and [d]efinite," Pioneer and that the proper focus is on whether the lien is free from "contingencies" that stand in the way of its execution, United In Security for example, we refused to accord priority to a mere attachment lien that "had not ripened into a judgment," New and was therefore "contingent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it," *457 And in United we recognized the complete superiority of a general tax lien held by the State of upon all property rights belonging to the debtor, even though the lien had not "attach[ed] to [the] specifically identified portions of that property" in which the Federal Government claimed a competing tax lien. With or without specific attachment, 's general |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | United States v. McDermott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112837/united-states-v-mcdermott/ | competing tax lien. With or without specific attachment, 's general lien was "sufficiently choate to obtain priority over the later federal lien," because it was "summarily enforceable" upon assessment and demand. and n. 12. Although the choateness of a state-law lien under 6323(a) is a federal question, that question is answered in part by reference to state law, and we therefore give due weight to the State's "`classification of [its] lien as specific and perfected.' " Pioneer at n. 7 (quoting Security ). Here, state law establishes that upon filing, the Bank's judgment lien was perfected, even as to the real property later acquired by the McDermotts, in the sense that it was definite as to the property in question, noncontingent, and summarily enforceable. Pursuant to Utah statute, from the moment the Bank had docketed and filed its judgment with the Clerk of the state court on July 6, 1987, it held an enforceable lien upon all nonexempt real property owned by the McDermotts or thereafter acquired by them during the existence of the lien. See Utah Code Ann. 78-22-1 (1953). The lien was immediately enforceable through levy and execution against all the debtors' property, whenever acquired. See See also Utah Rule Civ. Proc. 69. And it was "unconditional and not subject to alteration by a court on equitable grounds." Taylor National, 641 P.2d 1, Thus, the Bank's lien had become certain as to the property subject thereto, whether then existing or thereafter acquired, and all competing creditors were on notice that there *458 was "nothing more to be done" by the Bank "to have a choate lien" on any real property the McDermotts might acquire. New at See[1] The Court brushes aside the relevance of our opinion with the simple observation that that case did not involve a lien in after-acquired property. Ante, at 4-451. This is a wooden distinction. In truth, the Government's "specificity" claim rejected in is analytically indistinguishable from the "attachment" argument the Court accepts today. 's general lien applied to all of the debtor's rights in property, with no limitation on when those rights were acquired, and remained valid until the debt was satisfied or became unenforceable. See The United States claimed that its later-filed tax lien took priority over 's as to the debtor's interest in a particular bank account, because the State had not taken "steps to perfect its lien by attaching the bank account in question" until after the federal lien had been recorded. Brief for United States in United O. T. 1963, No. 9, p. 12. "Thus," the Government asserted, "when |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | United States v. McDermott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112837/united-states-v-mcdermott/ | 1963, No. 9, p. 12. "Thus," the Government asserted, "when the federal lien arose, the State lien did not meet one *459 of the three essential elements of a choate lien: that it attach to specific property." In rejecting the federal claim of priority, we found no need even to mention whether the debtor had acquired its property interest in the deposited funds before or after notice of the federal lien. If specific attachment is not required for the state lien to be "sufficiently choate," 377 U.S., then neither is specific acquisition.[2] Like the majority's reasoning today, see ante, at 452, the Government's argument in rested in part on dicta from New suggesting that "attachment to specific property [is] a condition for choateness of a State-created lien." Brief for United States in United See New 347 U. S., New however, involved competing statutory liens that had concededly "attached to the same real estate." The only issue was whether the liens were otherwise sufficiently choate. Thus, like Security (and, in fact, like all of our cases before ), New provided no occasion to consider the necessity of attachment to property that was not specifically identified at the time the state lien arose. *460 Nothing in the law of judgment liens suggests that the possibility, which existed at the time the Bank docketed its judgment, that the McDermotts would not acquire the specific property here at issue was a "contingency" that rendered the Bank's otherwise perfected general judgment lien subordinate to intervening liens. Under the relevant background rules of state law, the Bank's interest in afteracquired real property generally could not be defeated by an intervening statutory lien. In some States, the priority of judgment liens in after-acquired property is determined by the order of their docketing. 3 R. Powell, Law of Real Property ¶ 481[1], p. 38-36 (P. Rohan rev. 1991) (hereinafter Powell). See, e. g., In others, the rule is that "[w]hen two (or more) judgments are successively perfected against a debtor and thereafter the debtor acquires a land interest[,] these liens, attaching simultaneously at the time of the land's acquisition by the debtor, are regarded as on a parity and no priority exists." 3 Powell ¶ 481[1], pp. 38-35 to 38-36. See, e. g., Bank of ; McAllen State Thus, under state common law, the Bank would either retain its full priority in the property by virtue of its earlier filing or, at a minimum, share an equal interest with the competing lienor.[3] The fact that the prior judgment lien remains effective against third parties without further efforts by |
Justice Thomas | 1,993 | 1 | dissenting | United States v. McDermott | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112837/united-states-v-mcdermott/ | lien remains effective against third parties without further efforts by the judgment creditor is enough for purposes of *461 6323(a), since the point of our choateness doctrine is to respect the validity of a competing lien where the lien has become certain as to the property subject thereto and the lienor need take no further action to secure his claim. Under this federal-law principle, the Bank's lien was sufficiently choate to be first in time.[4] I acknowledge that our precedents do not provide the clearest answer to the question of after-acquired property. See ante, at 455. But the Court's parsimonious reading of undercuts the congressional purposeexpressed through repeated amendments to the tax lien provisions in the century since United of "protect[ing] third persons against harsh application of the federal tax lien," Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L. J. 905, 922 The attachment requirement erodes the "preferred status" granted to judgment creditors by 6323(a), and renders a choate judgment lien in after-acquired property subordinate *462 to a "secret lien for assessed taxes." Pioneer 374 U. S., I would adhere to a more flexible choateness principle, which would protect the priority of validly docketed judgment liens. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Scalia | 2,003 | 9 | dissenting | Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/122253/barnhart-v-peabody-coal-co/ | The Court's holding today confers upon the Commissioner of Social Security an unexpiring power to assign retired coal miners to signatory operators under 26 U.S. C. 9706(a). In my view, this disposition is irreconcilable with the text and structure of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act or Act), and finds no support in our precedents. I respectfully dissent. I The respondents contend that the Commissioner improperly assigned them responsibility for 600 coal miners under 9706(a). Section 9706(a) provides, in pertinent part: *173 "[T]he Commissioner of Social Security shall, before October 1, 1993, assign each coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator which (or any related person with respect to which) remains in business in the following order: "(1) First, to the signatory operator which "(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage agreement, and "(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal industry for at least 2 years. "(2) Second, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1), to the signatory operator which "(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage agreement, and "(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal industry. "(3) Third, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1) or (2), to the signatory operator which employed the coal industry retiree in the coal industry for a longer period of time than any other signatory operator prior to the effective date of the 1978 coal wage agreement." The Commissioner failed to complete the task of assigning each eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator before October 1, 1993. As a result, many eligible beneficiaries were "unassigned," and their benefits were financed, for a time, by the United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan (UMWA Pension Plan) and the Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Fund. See 9705(a)(3)(B), 9705(b)(2). The Commissioner blames her failure to meet the statutory deadline on the "magnitude of the task" and the lack of appropriated funds. Brief for Petitioners Trustees of the UMWA Combined Benefit Fund 15. It should not be thought, however, that these cases are about letting the *174 Commissioner complete a little unfinished business that barely missed the deadline. They concern some 600 post-October 1, 1993, assignments to these respondents, the vast majority of which were made between 1995 and 1997, years after the statutory deadline had passed. App. 98-121. Respondents contend that these assignments are unlawful, and unless |
Justice Scalia | 2,003 | 9 | dissenting | Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/122253/barnhart-v-peabody-coal-co/ | 98-121. Respondents contend that these assignments are unlawful, and unless Congress has conferred upon the Commissioner the power that she claims an unexpiring authority to assign eligible beneficiaries to signatory operators the respondents must prevail. Section 9706(a) does not provide such an expansive power, and the other provisions of the Act confirm this. II It is well established that an agency's power to regulate private entities must be grounded in a statutory grant of authority from Congress. See ; ; Louisiana Pub. Serv. This principle has special importance with respect to the extraordinary power the Commissioner asserts here: to compel coal companies to pay miners (and their families) health benefits that they never contracted to pay. We have held that the Commissioner's use of this power under 9706(a), even when exercised before October 1, 1993, violates the Constitution to the extent it imposes severe retroactive liability on certain coal companies. See Eastern When an agency exercises a power that so tests constitutional limits, we have all the more obligation to assure that it is rooted in the text of a statute. The Court holds that the Commissioner retains the power to act after October 1, 1993, because Congress did not "`specify a consequence for noncompliance'" with the statutory deadline. Ante, at 159. This makes no sense. When a power is conferred for a limited time, the automatic consequence of the expiration of that time is the expiration of the *175 power. If a landowner authorizes someone to cut Christmas trees "before December 15," there is no doubt what happens when December 15 passes: The authority to cut terminates. And the situation is not changed when the authorization is combined with a mandate as when the landowner enters a contract which says that the other party "shall cut all Christmas trees on the property before December 15." Even if time were not of the essence of that contract (as it is of the essence of 9706(a), for reasons I shall discuss in Part III, infra) no one would think that the contractor had continuing authority not just for a few more days or weeks but perpetually, to harvest trees.[1] The Court points out, ante, at -162, that three other provisions of the Coal Act combine the word "shall" with a statutory deadline that in its view is extendible: (1) Section 9705(a)(1)(A) states that the UMWA Pension Plan "shall transfer to the Combined Fund $70,000,000 on February 1, 1993"; (2) 9704(h) says the trustees for the Combined Fund "shall, not later than 60 days" after the enactment |
Justice Scalia | 2,003 | 9 | dissenting | Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/122253/barnhart-v-peabody-coal-co/ | Fund "shall, not later than 60 days" after the enactment date, *176 furnish certain information regarding benefits to the Commissioner; and (3) 9702(a)(1) provides that certain individuals described in 9702(b)(1) "shall designate" the trustees for the Combined Fund "not later than 60 days after the enactment date." I agree that the actions mandated by the first two of these deadlines can be taken after the deadlines have expired (though perhaps not forever after, which is what the Court claims for the deadline of 9706(a)). The reason that is so, however, does not at all apply to 9706(a). In those provisions, the power to do what is mandated does not stem from the mere implication of the mandate itself. The private entities involved have the power to do what is prescribed, quite apart from the statutory command that they do it by a certain date: The UMWA Pension Plan has the power to transfer funds,[2] and the trustees of the Combined Fund have the power to provide the specified information, whether the statute commands that they do so or not. The only question *177 is whether the late exercise of an unquestionably authorized act will produce the consequences that the statute says will follow from a timely exercise of that act. It is as though, to pursue the tree-harvesting analogy, a contract provided that the landowner will harvest and deliver trees by December 15; even after December 15 passes, he can surely harvest and deliver trees, and the only issue is whether the December 15 date is so central to the contract that late delivery does not have the contractual consequence of requiring the other side's counterperformance. The Commissioner of Social Security, by contrast, being not a private entity but a creature of Congress, has no authority to assign beneficiaries to operators except insofar as such authority is implicit in the mandate; but the mandate (and hence the implicit authority) expired on October 1, 1993. The last of these three provisions does confer a power that is not otherwise available to the private entities involved: the power to appoint initial trustees to the board of the Combined Fund. I do not, however, think it as clear as the Court does indeed, I think it quite debatable whether that power survives the deadline. If it be thought utterly essential that all the trustees be in place, it seems to me just as reasonable to interpret the provision for appointment of successor trustees ( 9702(b)(2)) to include the power to fill vacancies arising from initial failure to appoint, as to interpret |
Justice Scalia | 2,003 | 9 | dissenting | Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/122253/barnhart-v-peabody-coal-co/ | vacancies arising from initial failure to appoint, as to interpret the initial appointment power to extend beyond its specified termination date. The provision surely does not establish the Court's proposition that time-limited mandates include continuing authority. III None of the cases on which the Court relies is even remotely in point. In the agency action in question was authorized by an explicit statutory grant of authority, separate and apart from the provision that contained the time-limited mandate. *178 Title 29 U.S. C. 816(d)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (now repealed) gave the Secretary of Labor "authority to order such sanctions or corrective actions as are appropriate." Another provision of the statute, former 816(b), required the Secretary, when investigating a complaint that a recipient is misusing funds, to "make the final determination regarding the truth of the allegation not later than 120 days after receiving the complaint." We held that the Secretary's failure to meet the 120-day deadline did not prevent him from ordering repayment of misspent funds. Respondent had not, we said, shown anything that caused the Secretary to "lose its power to act," Here, by contrast, the Commissioner never had power to act apart from the mandate, which expired after October 1, 1993. In United federal statutes authorized the Government to bring a forfeiture action within a 5-year limitation period. 21 U.S. C. 881(a)(7); 19 U.S. C. 1621. We held that that power was not revoked by the Government's failure to comply with some of the separate "internal timing requirements" set forth in 1602-1604. Because those provisions failed to specify a consequence for noncompliance, we refused to "impose [our] own coercive sanction" of terminating the Government's authority to bring a forfeiture action. James Daniel The authorization separate from the defaulted obligation was not affected. There is no authorization separate from the defaulted obligation here. In United the statute at issue, 18 U.S. C. 3142(e), gave courts power to order pretrial detention "after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this section." One of those provisions was that the hearing "shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial officer." 3142(f). The court had failed to hold a hearing immediately upon the respondent's first appearance, yet *179 we held that the authority to order pretrial detention was unaffected. As we explained: "It is conceivable that some combination of procedural irregularities could render a detention hearing so flawed that it would not constitute `a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f)' for purposes of 3142(e)," but the mere failure to comply with the first-appearance requirement |
Justice Scalia | 2,003 | 9 | dissenting | Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/122253/barnhart-v-peabody-coal-co/ | but the mere failure to comply with the first-appearance requirement did not alone have that effect. Once again, the case holds that an authorization separate from the defaulted obligation is not affected; and there is no authorization separate from the defaulted obligation here. The contrast between these cases and the present ones demonstrates why the Court's extended discussion of whether Congress specified consequences for the Commissioner's failure to comply with the October 1 deadline, ante, at 163-164, is quite beside the point. A specification of termination of authority may be needed where there is a separate authorization to be canceled; it is utterly superfluous where the only authorization is contained in the time-limited mandate that has expired. IV That the Commissioner lacks authority to assign eligible beneficiaries after the statutory deadline is confirmed by other provisions of the Coal Act that are otherwise rendered incoherent. A The calculation of "death benefit premiums" and "unassigned beneficiaries premiums" owed by coal operators is based on an assigned operator's "applicable percentage," which is defined in 9704(f) as "the percentage determined by dividing the number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to such operator by the total number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to all such operators" (Emphasis added.) The statute specifies *180 only two circumstances in which adjustments may be made to an assigned operator's "applicable percentage": (1) when changes to the assignments "as of October 1, 1993," result from the appeals process set out in 9706(f), see 9704(f)(2)(A); and (2) when an assigned operator goes out of business, see 9704(f)(2)(B). No provision allows adjustments to account for post-October 1, 1993, initial assignments. This is perfectly consistent with the view that the 9706(a) power to assign does not extend beyond October 1, 1993; it is incompatible with the Court's holding to the contrary. The Court's response to this structural dilemma is nothing short of astonishing. The Court concludes that the applicable percentage based on assignments as of October 1, 1993, may be adjusted to account for the subsequent initial assignments, notwithstanding the statutory command that the applicable percentage be determined "on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993," and notwithstanding the statute's provision of two, and only two, exceptions to this command that do not include post-October 1, 1993, initial assignments. "The enunciation of two exceptions," the Court says, "does not imply an exclusion of a third unless there is reason to think the third was at least considered." Ante, at 170. Here, "[s]ince Congress apparently never thought that initial assignments would be late, the better inference is |
Justice Scalia | 2,003 | 9 | dissenting | Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/122253/barnhart-v-peabody-coal-co/ | that initial assignments would be late, the better inference is that what we face is nothing more than a case unprovided for." Ante, at 169 (referred to ante, at 170-171). This is an unheard-of limitation upon the accepted principle of construction inclusio unius, exclusio alterius. See, e. g., O'Melveny & ; It is also an absurd limitation, since it means that the more unimaginable an unlisted item is, the more likely it is not to be excluded. Does this new maxim mean, for example, that exceptions to the hearsay rule beyond those set forth in the Federal Rules *181 of Evidence must be recognized if it is unlikely that Congress (or perhaps the Rules committee) "considered" those unnamed exceptions? Our cases do not support such a proposition. See, e. g., ; United[3] There is no more reason to make a "case unprovided for" exception to the clear import of an exclusive listing than there is to make such an exception to any other clear textual disposition. In a way, therefore, the Court's treatment of this issue has ample precedentin those many wrongly decided cases that replace what the legislature said with what courts think the legislature would have said (i. e., in the judges' estimation should have said) if it had only "considered" unanticipated consequences of what it did say (of which the courts disapprove). In any event, the relevant question here is not whether 9704(f)(2) excludes other grounds for adjustments to the applicable percentage, but rather whether anything in the statute affirmatively authorizes them. The answer to that question is noan answer that should not surprise the Court, given its acknowledgment that Congress "did not foresee a failure to make timely assignments." Ante, at 170-171. *182 B Post-October 1, 1993, initial assignments can also not be reconciled with the Coal Act's provisions regarding appointments to the board of trustees. Section 9702(b)(1)(B) establishes for the Combined Fund a board of seven members, one of whom is to be "designated by the three employers who have been assigned the greatest number of eligible beneficiaries under section 9706." The Act provides for an "initial trustee" to fill this position pending completion of the assignment process, but 9702(b)(3)(B) permits this initial trustee to serve only "until November 1, 1993." It is evident, therefore, that the "three employers who have been assigned the greatest number of eligible beneficiaries under section 9706" must be known by November 1, 1993. It is simply inconceivable that the three appointing employers were to be unknown (and the post left unfilled) until the Commissioner completes an open-ended assignment processwhenever |
Justice Scalia | 2,003 | 9 | dissenting | Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/122253/barnhart-v-peabody-coal-co/ | left unfilled) until the Commissioner completes an open-ended assignment processwhenever that might be; or that the designated trustee is constantly to change, as the identity of the "three employers who have been assigned the greatest number of eligible beneficiaries under section 9706" constantly changes. V At bottom, the Court's reading of the Coal Actits confident filling in of provisions to cover "cases not provided for"rests upon its perception that the statute's overriding goal is accuracy in assignments. That is a foundation of sand. The Coal Act is demonstrably not a scheme that requires, or even attempts to require, a perfect match between each beneficiary and the coal operator most responsible for that beneficiary's health care. It provides, at best, rough justice; seemingly unfair and inequitable provisions abound. When, for example, an operator goes out of business, 9704(f)(2)(B) provides that beneficiaries previously assigned to that operator must go into the unassigned pool for purposes of calculating the "applicable percentage." It *183 makes no provision for them to be reassigned to another operator, even if another operator might qualify under 9706(a)(1)-(3). That is hardly compatible with a scheme that is keen on "accuracy of assignments," and that envisions perpetual assignment authority in the Commissioner. To account for the existence of 9704(f)(2)(B), the Court retreats to the more nuanced position that the Coal Act prefers accuracy over finality only "in the first assignment," ante, at 169, n. 12. Why it should have this strange preference for perfection in virgin assignments is a mystery. One might understand insisting upon as perfect a matchup as possible up to October 1, 1993, and then prohibiting future changes, both by way of initial assignment or otherwise; that would assure an initial system that is as near perfect as possible, but abstain from future adjustments that upset expectations and render sales of companies more difficult. But what is the conceivable reason for insistence upon perfection in initial assignments, whether made before the deadline or afterward?[4] As it is, however, the Act does not insist upon accuracy in initial assignments, not even in those made before the deadline. For each assigned beneficiary, only one signatory operator is held responsible for health benefits, even if that miner had worked for other signatory operators that should in perfect fairness share the responsibility. The reality is that the Coal Act reflects a compromise between the goals of perfection in assignments and finality. It provides some accuracy in initial assignments along with *184 some repose to signatory operators, who are given full notice of their obligations by October 1, 1993, and can plan |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | Petitioner Samuel Ocasio, a former officer in the Balti more Police Department, participated in a kickback scheme with the owners of a local auto repair shop. When petitioner and other Baltimore officers reported to the scene of an auto accident, they persuaded the owners of damaged cars to have their vehicles towed to the repair shop, and in exchange for this service the officers received payments from the shopowners. Petitioner was convicted of obtaining money from the shopowners under color of official right, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S. C. and of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, in viola tion of 18 U.S. C. He now challenges his conspiracy conviction, contending that, as a matter of law, he cannot be convicted of conspiring with the shopowners to obtain money from them under color of official right. We reject this argument because it is contrary to age-old principles of conspiracy law. I Hernan Alexis Moreno Mejia (known as Moreno) and Edwin Javier Mejia (known as Mejia) are brothers who co- owned and operated the Majestic Auto Repair Shop (Ma 2 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court jestic). In 2008, Majestic was struggling to attract cus tomers, so Moreno and Mejia made a deal with a Balti more police officer, Jhonn Corona. In exchange for kick backs, Officer Corona would refer motorists whose cars were damaged in accidents to Majestic for towing and repairs. Officer Corona then spread the word to other members of the force, and eventually as many as 60 other officers sent damaged cars to Majestic in exchange for payments of $150 to $300 per referral. Petitioner began to participate in this scheme in 2009. On several occasions from 2009 to 2011, he convinced accident victims to have their cars towed to Majestic. Often, before sending a car to Majestic, petitioner called Moreno from the scene of an accident to ensure that the make and model of the car, the extent of the damage, and the car’s insurance coverage would allow the shopowners to turn a profit on the repairs. After directing a vehicle to Majestic, petitioner would call Moreno and request his payment. Because police are often among the first to arrive at the scene of an accident, the Baltimore officers were well positioned to route damaged vehicles to Majestic. As a result, the kickback scheme was highly successful: It substantially increased Majestic’s volume of business and profits, and by early 2011 it provided Majestic with at least 90% of its customers. Moreno, Mejia, petitioner, and nine other Baltimore officers were indicted in |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | Mejia, petitioner, and nine other Baltimore officers were indicted in 2011. The shopowners and most of the other officers eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to plea deals, but petitioner did not. In a superseding indictment, petitioner was charged with three counts of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S. C. by extorting money from Moreno with his consent and under color of official right. As all parties agree, the type of extortion for which petitioner was convicted— obtaining property from another with his consent and Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court under color of official right—is the “rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe.’ ” Evans v. United States, To prove this offense, the Government “need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not enti tled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” Petitioner and another Baltimore officer, Kelvin Quade Manrich, were also charged with violating the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S. C. The indict ment alleged that petitioner and Manrich conspired with Moreno, Mejia, and other Baltimore officers to bring about the same sort of substantive violations with which peti tioner was charged. Before trial, petitioner began to raise a variant of the legal argument that has brought his case to this Court. He sought a jury instruction stating that “[i]n order to convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was to obtain money or property from some person who was not a member of the conspiracy.” App. 53. In support of this instruction, petitioner relied on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United which concerned two bail bondsmen who made payments to a court clerk in exchange for the alteration of court records. The Sixth Circuit held that “[t]o be covered by the [Hobbs Act], the alleged conspirators must have formed an agreement to obtain ‘property from another,’ which is to say, formed an agreement to obtain property from some one outside the conspiracy.” The District Court did not rule on this request prior to trial. Petitioner’s codefendant, Manrich, pleaded guilty during the trial, and at the close of the prosecution’s case and again at the close of all evidence, petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count based on 4 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Brock. The District Court denied these motions, conclud ing that the Fourth Circuit had already rejected Brock’s holding in United |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | the Fourth Circuit had already rejected Brock’s holding in United The District Court also refused to give petitioner’s pro posed instruction. Instead, the court adopted the sort of standard instructions that are typically used in conspiracy cases. See generally L. et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal (2015). In order to convict petitioner of the conspiracy charge, the jury was told, the prosecution was required to prove (1) that two or more persons entered into an unlawful agreement; (2) that petitioner knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy; (3) that at least one member of the con spiracy knowingly committed at least one overt act; and (4) that the overt act was committed to further an objec tive of the conspiracy. The court “caution[ed]” “that mere knowledge or acquiescence, without participation in the unlawful plan, is not sufficient” to demonstrate member ship in the conspiracy. App. 195. Rather, the court ex plained, the conspirators must have had “a mutual under standing to cooperate with each other to accomplish an unlawful act,” and petitioner must have joined the con spiracy “with the intention of aiding in the accomplish ment of those unlawful ends.” The jury found petitioner guilty on both the conspiracy count and the three substantive extortion counts, and the District Court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 18 months in prison on all four counts. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, petitioner’s primary argument was the same one he had pressed before the District Court: that his conspiracy conviction was fatally flawed because the conspirators had not agreed to obtain money from a person who was not a member of the conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument and affirmed his convictions. We then granted certiorari, 574 U. S. (2015), and we Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court now affirm. II Under longstanding principles of conspiracy law, a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he entered into a conspiracy that had as its objective the obtaining of property from another conspirator with his consent and under color of official right. A In analyzing petitioner’s arguments, we begin with the text of the statute under which he was convicted, namely, the general federal conspiracy statute, which makes it a crime to “conspire to commit any offense against the United States.” 18 U.S. C. Sec tion 371’s use of the term “conspire” incorporates long- recognized principles of conspiracy law. And under estab lished case law, the fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy is a joint commitment |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | the fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy is a joint commitment to an “endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of [the under lying substantive] criminal offense.” ; see 2 J. Bishop, Commen taries on the Criminal Law p. 100 (rev. 7th ed. 1882) (“Conspiracy, in the modern law, is generally defined as a confederacy of two or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose”); J. Hawley & M. McGregor, The Crim inal Law 99–100 (3d ed. 1899) (similar); W. Crim inal Law 672 (5th ed. 2010) (similar). Although conspirators must “pursue the same criminal objective,” “a conspirator [need] not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense.” A defendant must merely reach an agreement with the “specific intent that the underlying crime be committed” by some member of the conspiracy. 2 K. O’Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice 6 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court and Instructions: Criminal p. 225 (6th ed. 2008) ; see also at 220 (explaining that a defendant must “intend to agree and must intend that the substantive offense be committed” (emphasis added)). “The government does not have to prove that the defendant intended to commit the underlying offense himself/herself.” at 226. Instead, “[i]f con spirators have a plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.” ; see at 19–54 (“[W]hen people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, each and every member becomes an agent for the other conspirators in carrying out the conspiracy”). A few simple examples illustrate this important point. Entering a dwelling is historically an element of burglary, see, e.g., but a person may con spire to commit burglary without agreeing to set foot inside the targeted home. It is enough if the conspirator agrees to help the person who will actually enter the dwelling, perhaps by serving as a lookout or driving the getaway car. Likewise, “[a] specific intent to distribute drugs oneself is not required to secure a conviction for participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy.” United Agreeing to store drugs at one’s house in support of the conspiracy may be sufficient. Not only is it unnecessary for each member of a conspir acy to agree to commit each element of the substantive offense, but also a conspirator may be convicted “even though he was incapable of committing the substantive offense” himself. ; see United States v. Rabinowich, (“A person may be guilty of conspiring although incapable of committing the objective |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | be guilty of conspiring although incapable of committing the objective offense”); at 19–3 (“[ Y ]ou may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy despite the Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court fact that he himself was incapable of committing the substantive crime”). The Court applied these principles in two cases involv ing the Mann Act. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825. Section 2 of the Mann Act made it a crime to transport a woman or cause her to be transported across state lines for an immoral purpose.1 In United States v. a federal grand jury charged a woman, Clara with conspiring with a man named Chester Laudenschleger to violate this provision. The District Court dismissed the charge against holding that because a woman such as could not be con- victed for the substantive offense of transporting herself or causing herself to be transported across state lines, she also could not be convicted of conspiring to commit that —————— 1 In full, provided as follows: “That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in inter state or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Colum bia, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thou sand dollars, or by |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | a fine not exceeding five thou sand dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 8 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court offense. In a succinct opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court rejected this argument, stating that “plainly a person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a third person,” even if “she could not commit the substantive crime” herself. –145.2 The dissent argued that this holding effectively turned every woman who acquiesced in a covered interstate trip into a conspirator, see (opinion of Lamar, J.), but the Court disagreed. The Court acknowledged that “there may be a degree of coöperation” insufficient to make a woman a conspirator, but it refused to rule out the possibility that a woman could conspire to cause herself to be transported. To illustrate this point, the Court provided the example of a woman who played an active role in planning and carrying out the trip.3 The Court expanded on these points in v. —————— 2 The Court assumed that could not be convicted as a principal for the substantive offense of causing herself to be transported across state lines. But the Court noted that it might be possible for a woman to violate of the Mann Act in a different way: by “aiding in procuring any form of transportation for” a covered interstate trip. 236 U.S., ; see (“aid or assist in obtaining transporta tion”). If a woman could commit that substantive violation, the Court explained, there is no reason why she could not also be convicted of conspiring to commit that offense. See The Court, however, refused to hold that this was the only ground on which a woman like could be convicted for conspiring to violate at 144–145. It thus addressed the broader question of whether it was possible for a woman in ’s position to commit the offense of con spiring “that Laudenschleger should procure transportation and should cause [] to be transported.” 3 The Court wrote: “Suppose, for instance, that a professional prostitute, as well able to look out for herself as was the man, should suggest and carry out a journey within the act of 1910 in the hope of blackmailing the man, and should buy the railroad tickets, or should pay the fare from Jersey City to New York, she would be within the letter of the act of 1910, and we see no reason why the act should not be held |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | see no reason why the act should not be held to apply.” Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 9 Opinion of the Court United States, another Mann Act conspiracy case. A man and a woman were convicted for conspiring to transport the woman from one state to an other for an immoral purpose. at 115–116. In decid ing the case, the Court explicitly reaffirmed the longstanding principle that “[i]ncapacity of one to commit the substantive offense does not necessarily imply that he may with impunity conspire with others who are able to commit it.” Moreover, the Court fully accepted ’s holding that a woman could be convicted of con spiring to cause herself to be transported across state lines. See –117. But the Court held that the evidence before it was insufficient to support the con spiracy convictions because it “show[ed] no more than that [the woman] went willingly upon the journeys for the purposes alleged.” Noting that there was no evidence that the woman was “the active or moving spirit in conceiving or carrying out the transportation,” the Court held that the evidence of her “mere consent” or “acquiescence” was not enough. 123.4 —————— 4 The path of reasoning by which the Court reached these conclusions was essentially as follows: First, the Court perceived in of the Mann Act a congressional judgment that a woman should not be convicted for the offense created by that provision if she did no more than consent to or acquiesce in the interstate trip. The Court concluded that the transported woman could never be convicted under the language prohibiting a person from transporting a woman or causing a woman to be transported across state lines for an immoral purpose. See at 118–119 (“The Act does not punish the woman for transporting her self ”). And with respect to the statutory language making it a crime to “ ‘aid or assist’ someone else in transporting or in procuring transporta tion for herself,” the Court held that aiding and assisting requires more than mere “consent” or “acquiescence.” ; see also Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. – (slip op., at 7–9) (aiding and abetting requires intent to facilitate commission of offense). Second, turning to the issue of conspiracy, the Court reasoned that something more than the woman’s mere consent or acquiescence was 10 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court and make perfectly clear that a person may be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive offense that he or she cannot personally commit. They also show that when that person’s consent or |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | commit. They also show that when that person’s consent or acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive offense, some thing more than bare consent or acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person was a conspirator. B These basic principles of conspiracy law resolve this case. In order to establish the existence of a conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, the Government has no obligation to demonstrate that each conspirator agreed personally to commit—or was even capable of committing—the substan tive offense of Hobbs Act extortion. It is sufficient to prove that the conspirators agreed that the underlying crime be committed by a member of the conspiracy who was capable of committing it. In other words, each conspirator must have specifically intended that some conspirator commit each element of the substantive offense.5 That is exactly what happened here: Petitioner, Moreno, and Mejia “share[d] a common purpose,” namely, that petitioner and other police officers would commit every element of the substantive extortion offense. 522 U.S., –64. Petitioner and other officers would obtain property “under color of official right,” something that Moreno and Mejia were incapable of doing because they were not public officials. And petitioner and other officers —————— needed to avoid undermining the congressional judgment that it saw in The Court framed its holding as follows: “[W]e perceive in the failure of the Mann Act to condemn the woman’s participation in those transportations which are effected with her mere consent, evidence of an affirmative legislative policy to leave her acquiescence unpunished.” 5 Section 371 also requires that one of the conspirators commit an overt act in furtherance of the offense. Petitioner does not dispute that this element was satisfied. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 11 Opinion of the Court would obtain that money from “another,” i.e., from Mo- reno, Mejia, or Majestic. Although Moreno and Mejia were incapable of committing the underlying substantive of fense as principals,6 they could, under the reasoning of and conspire to commit Hobbs Act extor tion by agreeing to help petitioner and other officers com mit the substantive offense. See (“[A] conspiracy with an officer or employé of the govern ment or any other for an offence that only he could commit has been held for many years to fall within the conspiracy section of the penal code”); see also at 63–64; –121; Rabinowich, 238 U.S., at For these reasons, it is clear that petitioner could be convicted of conspiring to obtain property from the shopowners with their consent and under color of official right. C In an effort to escape this conclusion, |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | official right. C In an effort to escape this conclusion, petitioner argues that the usual rules do not apply to the type of Hobbs Act conspiracy charged in this case. His basic argument, as ultimately clarified,7 is as follows. All members of a con —————— 6 The Government argues that the lower courts have long held that a private person may be guilty of this type of Hobbs Act extortion as an aider and abettor. See Brief for United States 36–37. We have no occasion to reach that question here. 7 Petitioner’s position has evolved over the course of this litigation. As noted, petitioner requested a jury instruction stating that “[i]n order to convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was to obtain money or property from some person who was not a member of the conspiracy.” App. 53. Under this instruc tion, as long as the shopowners were named as conspirators, petitioner could not have been convicted even if there was ample evidence to prove that he conspired with other Baltimore officers to obtain money from the shopowners. another officer, Manrich, was still in the case and was charged with the same 12 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court spiracy must share the same criminal objective. The objective of the conspiracy charged in this case was to obtain money “from another, with his consent under —————— conspiracy.) The petition for a writ of certiorari appears to have been based on this same broad argument. The question presented was phrased as follows: “Does a conspiracy to commit extortion require that the con spirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspir- acy?” Pet. for Cert. i. And the argument in petitioner’s opening brief was similar. See Brief for Petitioner 1 (arguing that “a Hobbs Act conspiracy requires that the conspirators agree among themselves to wrongly obtain property from someone outside the ring of conspiracy”). As the Government’s brief pointed out, this argument has strange implications. See Brief for United States 27. Assume that there was sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner conspired with other Balti more officers to obtain money from Moreno and Mejia. Under petition er’s original, broad argument, this charge would be valid so long as Moreno and Mejia were not named as conspirators, but naming them in the indictment would render the charge invalid. Indictments, however, very often do not attempt to name all the conspirators, and the indict ment in this case did not do so. |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | the indict ment in this case did not do so. See App. 36 (charging that petitioner and Manrich conspired with, among others, persons unknown). It would be very strange if the decision to name Moreno and Mejia ren dered an otherwise valid charge defective. (Of course, petitioner might make the even broader argument that the conspiracy charge would fail if Moreno and Mejia, although not named as conspirators in the indict ment, were later listed as conspirators in response to a bill of particu lars or if the Government took that position at trial, perhaps by seeking to introduce their out-of-court statements under the co-conspirator exemption from the hearsay rule.) In response to the Government’s argument, petitioner’s reply brief claimed that his argument is actually the narrower one that we now consider, i.e., that, as a matter of law, Moreno and Mejia cannot be members of a conspiracy that has as its aim the obtaining of money from them with their consent and under color of official right. See Reply Brief 17–20. The reply brief contends that acceptance of this narrower argument requires his acquittal because there is insufficient evidence to show that he conspired with anyone other than Moreno and Mejia. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded otherwise. See Nevertheless, because that court’s decision was based primarily on other grounds, we address petitioner’s argument as ultimately refined. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 13 Opinion of the Court color of official right.” But Moreno and Mejia did not have the objective of obtaining money “from another” because the money in question was their own. Accordingly, they were incapable of being members of the conspiracy charged in this case. And since there is insufficient evi dence in the record to show that petitioner conspired with anyone other than Moreno and Mejia, he must be acquit ted. See Reply Brief 3–11, 17–20. This argument fails for a very simple reason: Contrary to petitioner’s claim, he and the shopowners did have a common criminal objective. The objective was not that each conspirator, including Moreno and Mejia, would obtain money from “another” but rather that petitioner and other Baltimore officers would do so. See App. 36–37, Superseding Indictment ¶11 (“It was a purpose of the conspiracy for Moreno and Mejia to enrich over 50 BPD [Baltimore Police Department] Officers in exchange for the BPD Officers’ exercise of their official positions and influence to cause vehicles to be towed or otherwise deliv ered to Majestic”). Petitioner does not dispute that he was properly convicted for three substantive Hobbs Act viola tions based on proof |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | for three substantive Hobbs Act viola tions based on proof that he obtained money “from another.” The criminal objective on which petitioner, Moreno, and Mejia agreed was that petitioner and other Baltimore officers would commit substantive violations of this na ture. Thus, under well-established rules of conspiracy law, petitioner was properly charged with and convicted of conspiring with the shopowners. Nothing in the text of the Hobbs Act even remotely undermines this conclusion, and petitioner’s invocation of the rule of lenity8 and prin —————— 8 That rule applies only when a criminal statute contains a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty,” and “only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” the Court “can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–139 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ciples of federalism9 is unavailing. 1 Petitioner argues that our interpretation makes the Hobbs Act sweep too broadly, creating a national antibrib ery law and displacing a carefully crafted network of state and federal statutes. He contends that a charge of con spiring to obtain money from a conspirator with his con sent and under color of official right is tantamount to a charge of soliciting or accepting a bribe and that allowing such a charge undermines 18 U.S. C. (a federal bribery statute applicable to state and local officials) and state bribery laws. He also argues that extortion conspir acies of this sort were not known prior to the enactment of the Hobbs Act and that there is no evidence that Congress meant for that Act to plow this new ground. The subtext of these arguments is that it seems unnatu ral to prosecute bribery on the basis of a statute prohibit ing “extortion,” but this Court held in Evans that Hobbs Act extortion “under color of official right” includes the “rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘tak ing a bribe.’ ” 504 U.S., at Petitioner does not ask us to overturn Evans, see, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 1; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–5, 12–13, and we have no occasion to do so. Having already held that prohibits the “rough equivalent” of bribery, we have no principled basis for precluding the prosecution of conspiracies to commit that same offense.10 —————— 9 We are not unmindful of the federalism concerns implicated by this case, but those same concerns were raised—and rejected—in Evans v. United States, see (THOMAS, J., dissent ing) (“The Court’s construction of the Hobbs Act is repugnant to |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | (“The Court’s construction of the Hobbs Act is repugnant to basic tenets of federalism”), which we accept as controlling here, see Part II–C–1, infra. 10 JUSTICE THOMAS argues that Evans was wrongly decided, and his position makes sense to the extent that he simply refuses to accept that case. But it founders insofar as it suggests that even if Evans is ac Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 15 Opinion of the Court Petitioner also exaggerates the reach of our decision. It does not, as he claims, dissolve the distinction between extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion. Because every act of extortion under the Hobbs Act requires prop erty to be obtained with “consent,” petitioner argues, proof of that consent will always or nearly always establish the existence of a conspiratorial agreement and thus allow the Government to turn virtually every such extortion case into a conspiracy case. But there are plenty of instances in which the “consent” required under the Hobbs Act will not be enough to constitute the sort of agreement needed under the law of conspiracy. As used in the Hobbs Act, the phrase “with his consent” is designed to distinguish extortion (“obtaining of property from another, with his consent,” 18 U.S. C. (b)(2) ) from robbery (“obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will,” (b)(1) ). Thus, “consent” simply signifies the taking of property under circumstances falling short of robbery, and such “consent” is quite different from the mens rea necessary for a conspiracy. This conclusion is clear from the language of prohibiting the obtaining of property “from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threat- ened force, violence, or fear.” (b)(2) (emphasis added). This language applies when, for example, a store —————— cepted in relation to substantive Hobbs Act charges, it should not be extended to conspiracy cases. See post, at 1 (dissenting opinion) (“I would not extend Evans’ errors further”); post, at 3 (“[The Court’s] holding needlessly extends Evans’ error to the conspiracy context”); post, at 4 (“The Court today takes another step away from the common- law understanding of extortion that the Hobbs Act adopted”). It would be very strange if a provision of the criminal code meant one thing with respect to charges of a substantive violation but something very differ ent in cases involving a conspiracy to commit the same offense. 16 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court owner makes periodic protection payments to gang mem bers out of fear that they will otherwise trash the store. |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | out of fear that they will otherwise trash the store. While these payments are obtained with the store owner’s grudging consent, the store owner, simply by making the demanded payments, does not enter into a conspiratorial agreement with the gang members conducting the shake down. See 522 U.S., – (conspirators must pursue “the same criminal objective”); United States v. (conspiracy requires “a heightened mental state”); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 223 (1974) (“the prosecution must show that the offender acted with a specific intent”). Just as mere ac quiescence in a Mann Act violation is insufficient to create a conspiracy, see –123; the minimal “consent” required to trig ger is insufficient to form a conspiratorial agree ment. Our interpretation thus does not turn virtually every act of extortion into a conspiracy. Nor does our reading transform every bribe of a public official into a conspiracy to commit extortion. The “con sent” required to pay a bribe does not necessarily create a conspiratorial agreement. In cases where the bribe payor is merely complying with an official demand, the payor lacks the mens rea necessary for a conspiracy. See Sa- –; at ; Anderson, ; at 121–123. For example, imagine that a health inspector demands a bribe from a restaurant owner, threatening to close down the restau rant if the owner does not pay. If the owner reluctantly pays the bribe in order to keep the business open, the owner has “consented” to the inspector’s demand, but this mere acquiescence in the demand does not form a conspiracy.11 —————— 11 Petitioner also claims that naming Moreno and Mejia as conspira tors opened the door for prosecutors to employ the potent party-joinder Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 17 Opinion of the Court 2 While petitioner exaggerates the impact of our decision, his argument would create serious practical problems. The validity of a charge of Hobbs Act conspiracy would often depend on difficult property-law questions having little to do with criminal culpability. In this case, for example, ownership of the money obtained by petitioner is far from clear. It appears that the funds came from Ma jestic’s account, App. 97–98, 149, and there is evidence that during the period of petitioner’s membership in the conspiracy, Majestic was converted from a limited liability company to a regular business corporation, ; App. in No. 12–4462 (CA4), pp. 5–6, 736. After that transformation, the money obtained by petitioner may have come from corporate funds. A corporation is an entity distinct from its shareholders, and therefore, even under petitioner’s interpretation of the applicable law, Moreno |
Justice Alito | 2,016 | 8 | majority | Ocasio v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3199608/ocasio-v-united-states/ | therefore, even under petitioner’s interpretation of the applicable law, Moreno and Mejia would have agreed that petitioner would obtain money “from another,” not from them. Suppose that Moreno or Mejia had made the payments by taking money from a personal bank account. Would that dictate a different outcome? Or suppose that Majestic was a partnership and the payments came from a com- pany account. Would that mean that Moreno agreed that officers would obtain money “from another” insofar as they would obtain Mejia’s share of the partnership funds and that Mejia similarly agreed that officers would obtain money “from another” insofar as they would obtain the —————— and evidentiary rules that conspiracy charges make available. See Brief for Petitioner 10–11, 18, 26–27, 37. But the naming of the shopowners had no effect on joinder. The only other defendant named in the superseding indictment, Manrich, could have been joined even if the shopowners had not been named. Nor did naming Moreno and Mejia have any effect on the admissibility of evidence of overt acts committed by the Baltimore officers named as petitioner’s co-conspirators. 18 OCASIO v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court share belonging to Moreno? Or consider this example. Suppose that the owner and manager of a nightclub reach an agreement with a public official under which the owner will bribe the official to approve the club’s liquor license application. Under peti tioner’s approach, the public official and the club manager may be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion, because they agreed that the official would obtain property “from another”—that is, the owner. But as “the ‘another’ from whom the property is obtained,” Reply Brief 10, the owner could not be prosecuted. There is no apparent reason, however, why the manager but not the owner should be culpable in this situation. III A defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he reached an agree ment with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right. Because peti tioner joined such an agreement, his conspiracy conviction must stand. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Cite as: 578 U. S. (2016) 1 BREYER, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 14–361 SAMUEL OCASIO, PETITIONER v. |
per_curiam | 1,985 | 200 | per_curiam | United States v. Benchimol | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111427/united-states-v-benchimol/ | In April 1976, respondent pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to an information charging him with one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S. C. 1341. Respondent pleaded pursuant *454 to a plea bargain whereby the Government agreed to recommend probation on condition that restitution be made. The District Court disregarded the recommendation and sentenced respondent to six years of treatment and supervision under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S. C. 5010(b). He was released on parole after serving 18 months of his sentence, but a warrant for his arrest because of parole violation was issued in 1978, and he was eventually taken into custody on that warrant in October 1981. A few days before his arrest on this warrant, he filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d) and 28 U.S. C. 2255 to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, to have his sentence vacated and be resentenced to the time already served. He claimed that the Government had failed to comply with its part of the plea bargain upon which his guilty plea was based. The District Court that had received the guilty plea also heard respondent's application for collateral relief, and denied it. The Court of Appeals by a divided vote reversed that judgment, holding that "when the government undertakes to recommend a sentence pursuant to a plea bargain, it has the duty to state its recommendation clearly to the sentencing judge and to express the justification for it." There is some slight disagreement about the facts surrounding the terms of the plea bargain and its presentation to the District Court, a situation entirely understandable by reason of the lapse of more than five years between the entry of the guilty plea and the hearing on the request for collateral relief. The Court of Appeals had this view of the facts: "Benchimol agreed to plead guilty. The government concedes that in exchange for the guilty plea it promised to recommend probation with restitution. However, at the sentencing hearing, the presentence report incorrectly stated that the government would stand silent. Benchimol's counsel informed the court that the government instead recommended probation with restitution. *455 The Assistant United States Attorney then stated: `That is an accurate representation.' " The Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had breached its plea bargain because, although the Assistant United States Attorney concurred with defense counsel's statement that the Government recommended probation with restitution, it "made no effort to explain its reasons for agreeing to recommend a lenient sentence |
per_curiam | 1,985 | 200 | per_curiam | United States v. Benchimol | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111427/united-states-v-benchimol/ | explain its reasons for agreeing to recommend a lenient sentence but rather left an impression with the court of less-than-enthusiastic support for leniency." We think this holding misconceives the effect of the relevant rules and of the applicable case law. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) provides an elaborate formula for the negotiation of plea bargains, which allows the attorney for the Government to agree to move for dismissal of other charges and to agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case. It also authorizes the Government attorney to make a recommendation for a particular sentence, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request for such a sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court. It may well be that the Government in a particular case might commit itself to "enthusiastically" make a particular recommendation to the court, and it may be that the Government in a particular case might agree to explain to the court the reasons for the Government's making a particular recommendation. But respondent does not contend, nor did the Court of Appeals find, that the Government had in fact undertaken to do either of these things here. The Court of Appeals simply held that as a matter of law such an undertaking was to be implied from the Government's agreement to recommend a particular sentence. But our view of Rule 11(e) is that it speaks in terms of what the parties in fact agree to, and does not suggest that such implied-in-law terms as were read into this agreement by the Court of Appeals have any place under the Rule. *456 The Court of Appeals relied on cases such as United and United for the conclusion it reached with respect to the requirement of "enthusiasm," but it appears to us that in each of these cases the Government attorney appearing personally in court at the time of the plea bargain expressed personal reservations about the agreement to which the Government had committed itself. This is quite a different proposition than an appellate determination from a transcript of the record made many years earlier that the Government attorney had "left an impression with the court of less-than-enthusiastic support for leniency." When the Government agrees pursuant to Rule 11(e) to make a recommendation with respect to sentence, it must carry out its part of the bargain by making the promised recommendation; but even if Rule 11(e) allows bargaining about degrees of enthusiasm, there appears to have been none here. Rule 11(e) may well contemplate agreement by |
per_curiam | 1,985 | 200 | per_curiam | United States v. Benchimol | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111427/united-states-v-benchimol/ | been none here. Rule 11(e) may well contemplate agreement by the Government in a particular case to state to the court its reasons for making the recommendation which it agrees to make. The Government suggests that spreading on the record its reasons for agreement to a plea bargain in a particular case for example, that it did not wish to devote scarce resources to a trial of this particular defendant, or that it wished to avoid calling the victim as a witness would frequently harm, rather than help, the defendant's quest for leniency. These may well be reasons why the defendant would not wish to exact such a commitment from the Government, but for purposes of this case it is enough that no such agreement was made in fact. Since Rule 11 (e) speaks generally of the plea bargains that the parties make, it was error for the Court of Appeals to imply as a matter of law a term which the parties themselves did not agree upon. For these reasons, we conclude that there was simply no default on the part of the Government in this case, to say nothing of a default remediable on collateral attack under 28 *457 U. S. C. 2255 or under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), as in effect before August 1, 1983. See The petition for certiorari is accordingly granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.[*] JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | concurring | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | I agree with the Court that the District Court had jurisdiction over petitioner's claims in tort. Moreover, I agree that the federal courts should not entertain claims for divorce, alimony, and child custody. I am unable to agree, however, that the diversity statute contains any "exception" for domestic relations matters. The Court goes to remarkable lengths to craft an exception that is simply not in the statute and is not supported by the case law. In my view, the longstanding, unbroken practice of the federal courts in refusing to hear domestic relations cases is precedent at most for continued discretionary abstention rather than mandatory limits on federal jurisdiction. For these reasons I concur only in the Court's judgment. I The Court holds that the diversity statute contains an "exception" for cases seeking the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree. Ante, at 701-704. Yet no such exception appears in the statute. The diversity statute is not ambiguous at all. It extends the jurisdiction of the district courts to "all civil actions" between diverse parties involving the requisite amount in controversy. 28 U.S. C. 1332 This Court has recognized that in the absence of a "clearly expressed" intention to the contrary, the language of the statute itself is ordinarily "conclusive." See, e. g., Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. *708 102, 108 (1980). The Court apparently discovers in the history of the diversity statute and this Court's own case law a clearly expressed intention contrary to the words of the statute. First, the Court observes that the diversity statute formerly extended only to "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity" rather than to "all civil actions." Ante, at 698. Then the Court interprets this Court's decision in to read into this "common law or equity" limitation an exclusion of matters, such as actions for divorce and alimony, that were not cognizable in the English courts of common law and equity. Ante, at 698-699. The Court points to what it regards as Congress' "apparent acceptance" of this construction of the diversity statute. Ante, at 700. Finally, notwithstanding Congress' replacement in 1948 of the "common law and equity" limitation with the phrase "all civil actions," the Court considers this to be evidence that Congress adopted the prior "well-known construction" of the diversity statute. I have great difficulty with the Court's approach. Starting at the most obvious point, I do not see how a language change that, if anything, expands the jurisdictional scope of the statute can be said to constitute evidence |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | concurring | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | scope of the statute can be said to constitute evidence of approval of a prior narrow construction.[1] Any inaction on the part of Congress in 1948 in failing expressly to mention domestic relations matters in the diversity statute reflects the fact, as is discussed below, that Congress likely had no idea until the *709 Court's decision today that the diversity statute contained an exception for domestic relations matters. This leads to my primary concern: the Court's conclusion that Congress understood Barber as an interpretation of the diversity statute. Barber did not express any intent to construe the diversity statuteclearly, Barber "cited no authority and did not discuss the foundation for its announcement" disclaiming jurisdiction over divorce and alimony matters. Ante, at 694. As the Court puts it, it may only be "inferred" that the basis for declining jurisdiction was the diversity statute. Ante, at 699. It is inferred not from anything in the Barber majority opinion. Rather, it is inferred from the comments of a dissenting Justice and the absence of rebuttal by the Barber majority. Ante, at 699.[2] The Court today has a difficult enough time arriving at this unlikely interpretation of the Barber decision. I cannot imagine that Congress ever assembled this construction on its own. In any event, at least three subsequent decisions of this Court seriously undermine any inference that Barber `s recognition of a domestic relations "exception" traces to a "common law or equity" limitation of the diversity statute. In the Court heard an appeal by a husband from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona affirming the District Court's dismissal of his bill for divorce and its award to his wife of alimony and counsel fees pendente lite. The wife sought dismissal of the appeal to this Court because the suit involved domestic relations. In contrast to Barber, the Court *710 undertook an extensive review and discussion of the statutory bases for its jurisdiction over the appeal. It expressly recognized that its appellate jurisdiction was confined to "those cases, and those cases only, at law or in equity. "[3] Nevertheless, the Court in Simms did not find the "common law or equity" limitation to be a bar to jurisdiction.[4] The Court distinguished Barber, not on grounds that the jurisdictional statute in Barber was limited to cases in law and equity while that in Simms was notindeed, it could not be so distinguished. The Court distinguished Barber on grounds that it involved domestic relations matters in the States rather than in the Territories. It reasoned that the whole subject of domestic relations "belongs to |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | concurring | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | reasoned that the whole subject of domestic relations "belongs to the laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United States," while "[i]n the Territories of the United States, Congress has the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and local." -168. Today the Court infers an interpretation of Barber that the Court in Simms plainly rejected. The second decision undermining the Court's interpretation of Barber is De la in which the Court took jurisdiction over an appeal *711 from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in a wife's action for divorce and alimony. Citing Barber, De la Rama explained the historical reasons that federal courts have not exercised jurisdiction over actions for divorce and alimony. The "common law or equity" limitation the Court now finds so significant was not among those reasons.[5] This was so even though the appellate jurisdictional statute at issue there extended to "all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings," opening the door for the Court easily to have distinguished Barber on the grounds of the "common law or equity" limitation in the diversity statute. Instead, explicitly reaffirming the grounds relied upon in Simms for distinguishing Barber, the Court pointed to the absence of any need to defer to the States' regulation of the area of domestic relations in the context of an appeal from a nonstate, court. The third decision is Ohio ex rel. In Popovici, a Roumanian vice consul was sued by his wife in an Ohio state court for a divorce and alimony. He defended by claiming that the Ohio state court had no jurisdiction to grant the divorce, because federal statutes granted exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts of "`all suits and proceedings against consuls or viceconsuls' " and "`all suits against consuls and vice-consuls.' " *712 (quoting the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 1093). Rejecting this claim, Justice Holmes observed for a unanimous Court that the jurisdictional statutes "do not affect the present case if it be true as has been unquestioned for three-quarters of a century that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce." The Court traced this absence of jurisdiction not to the diversity statute but apparently to the Constitution itself: "If when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in construing the instrument accordingly and not much in dealing with the statutes. `Suits against consuls and vice-consuls' must be taken to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and not |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | concurring | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | be taken to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and not to include what formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts." I think it implausible to believe that, especially after Popovici, Congress could be said to have accepted this Court's decision in Barber as simply a construction of the diversity statute.[6] Accordingly, the Court is without a requisite foundation for ratifying what Congress intended. Cf. Even assuming the Court today correctly interprets Barber, its extension of any domestic relations "exception" to the diversity statute for child custody matters is not warranted by any known principles of statutory construction. The Court relies on In re in which the Court denied the "jurisdiction" of a Federal District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in favor of a father to recover the care and custody of his child from the child's grandfather. That case did not involve the diversity statute, but rather the habeas corpus statute, and the Court expressly declined to address the diversity statute.[7] at 597. To the Court today this is just a "technica[l]" distinction. Ante, at 703. I find it germane, because, to the best of my knowledge, a court is not at liberty to craft exceptions to statutes that are not at issue in a case. II A To reject the Court's construction of the diversity statute is not, however, necessarily to reject the federal courts' longstanding *714 practice of declining to hear certain domestic relations cases. My point today is that no coherent "jurisdictional" explanation for this practice emerges from our line of such cases, and it is unreasonable to presume that Congress divined and accepted one from these cases. To be sure, this Court's old line of domestic relations cases disclaimed "jurisdiction" over domestic relations matters well before the growth and general acceptance in recent decades of modern doctrines of federal abstention that distinguish the refusal to exercise jurisdiction from disclaiming jurisdiction altogether. See generally C. Wright, Federal Courts 302-330 (1983) (discussing growth of traditional abstention doctrines). See also Nevertheless, the common concern reflected in these earlier cases is, in modern terms, abstentionaland not jurisdictionalin nature. These cases are premised not upon a concern for the historical limitation of equity jurisdiction of the English courts, but upon the virtually exclusive primacy at that time of the States in the regulation of domestic relations. As noted above, in Simms and De la Rama this Court justified its exercise of jurisdiction over actions for divorce and alimony not by any reference to the scope of equity jurisdiction but by reference to the absence of any interest |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | concurring | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | jurisdiction but by reference to the absence of any interest of the States in appeals from courts in territories controlled by the National Government. Similarly, in cases wholly outside the "common law or equity" limitation of the diversity statute, the Court has denied federal court review. Ohio ex rel. ; In re As the Court once stated: "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." *715 Whether the interest of States remains a sufficient justification today for abstention is uncertain in view of the expansion in recent years of federal law in the domestic relations area.[8] I am confident, nonetheless, that the unbroken and unchallenged practice of the federal courts since before the War Between the States of declining to hear certain domestic relations cases provides the very rare justification for continuing to do so. It is not without significance, moreover, that, because of this historical practice of the federal courts, the States have developed specialized courts and institutions in family matters, while Congress and the federal courts generally have not done so. Absent a contrary command of Congress, the federal courts properly should abstain, at least from diversity actions traditionally excluded from the federal courts, such as those seeking divorce, alimony, and child custody. The Court is correct that abstention "rarely should be invoked." Ante, at 705. But rarer stilland by far the greater affront to Congressshould be the occasions when this Court invents statutory exceptions that are simply not there. It is one thing for this Court to defer to more than a century of practice unquestioned by Congress. It is quite *716 another to defer on a pretext that Congress legislated what in fact it never did. Although there is no occasion to resolve the issue in definitive fashion in this case, I would suggest that principles of abstention provide a more principled basis for the Court's continued disinclination to entertain domestic relations matters.[9] B Whether or not the domestic relations "exception" is properly grounded in principles of abstention or principles of jurisdiction, I do not believe this case falls within the exception. This case only peripherally involves the subject of "domestic relations." "Domestic relations" actions are loosely classifiable into four categories. The first, or "core," category involves declarations of status, e. g., marriage, annulment, divorce, custody, and paternity. The second, or "semicore," category involves declarations of rights or obligations arising from status (or former status), e. g., alimony, child support, and division of property. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | concurring | Ankenbrandt v. Richards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112752/ankenbrandt-v-richards/ | status), e. g., alimony, child support, and division of property. The third category consists of secondary suits to enforce declarations of status, rights, or obligations. The final, catchall category covers the suits not directly involving status or obligations arising from status but that nonetheless generally relate to domestic relations matters, e. g., tort suits between family or former family members for sexual abuse, battering, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. None of this Court's prior cases that consider the domestic relations "exception" involves the type of periphery domestic relations claim at issue here. *717 Petitioner does not seek a determination of status or obligations arising from status. Moreover, any federal court determination of petitioner's claims will neither upset a prior state court determination of status or obligations appurtenant to status nor pre-empt a pending state court determination of this nature. Cf. While petitioner's claims do not involve a federal question or statutethe presence of which would strongly counsel against abstention, see Colorado River Water Conservation petitioner's state-law tort claims for money damages are easily cognizable in a federal court. All these considerations favor the exercise of federal jurisdiction over petitioner's claims. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment. This should be an exceedingly easy case.[*] As demonstrated by each of the opinions, whatever belief one holds as to the existence, origin, or scope of a "domestic relations exception," the exception does not apply here. However one understands 18th-century English chancery practice and however one construes the Judiciary Act of 1789, the result is the same. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be *718 reversed. For that reason, I would leave for another day consideration of whether any domestic relations cases necessarily fall outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and of what, if any, principle would justify such an exception to federal jurisdiction. As I agree that this case does not come within any domestic relations exception that might exist, I concur in the judgment. |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | This case concerns the taxing authority of the State of Oklahoma over the Chickasaw Nation () and its members.[1] We take up two questions: (1) May Oklahoma impose *453 its motor fuels excise tax upon fuel sold by Chickasaw Nation retail stores on tribal trust land; (2) May Oklahoma impose its income tax upon members of the Chickasaw Nation who are employed by the but who reside in the State outside Indian country.[2] We hold that Oklahoma may not apply its motor fuels tax, as currently designed, to fuel sold by the in Indian country. In so holding, we adhere to settled law: when Congress does not instruct otherwise, a State's excise tax is unenforceable if its legal incidence falls on a or its members for sales made within Indian country. We further hold, however, that Oklahoma may tax the income (including wages from tribal employment) of all persons, Indian and non-Indian alike, residing in the State outside Indian country. The Treaty between the United States and the which guarantees the and its members that "no Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of" the Chickasaw Nation, does not displace the rule, accepted interstate and internationally, that a sovereign may tax the entire income of its residents. I The Chickasaw Nation, a federally recognized Indian commenced this civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, to stop the State of Oklahoma from enforcing several state taxes against the and its members.[3] Pertinent here, the District *454 Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, held for the State on the motor fuels tax imposition and largely for the on the income tax issue. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled for the and its members on both issues: It held that the State may not apply the motor fuels tax to fuel sold by the 's retail stores, and, further, that the State may not tax the wages of members of the Chickasaw Nation who work for the even if they reside outside Indian country. Concerning the motor fuels tax, the Tenth Circuit disapproved the District Court's "balancing of the respective tribal and state interests" approach. The legal incidence of the tax, the Court of Appeals ruled, is the key concept. That incidence, the Tenth Circuit determined, falls directly on fuel retailershere, on the due to its operation of two convenience stores that sell fuel to tribal members and other persons. Oklahoma's imposition of its fuels tax on the as retailer, the Court of Appeals concluded, |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | tax on the as retailer, the Court of Appeals concluded, "conflicts with the traditional scope of Indian sovereign authority." Because the State asserted no congressional authorization for its exaction, the Tenth Circuit declared the fuels tax preempted. Oklahoma's income tax, in the Court of Appeals' view, could not be applied to any tribal member employed by the ;[4] residence, the Tenth Circuit said, was "simply not relevant to [its] determination." The Court of Appeals relied on the provision of the Treaty of Dancing *455 Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, Art. IV, -334, that "no Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descendants." To this treaty language, the Tenth Circuit applied "the general rule that `[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of' the Indians." ). The Court of Appeals also noted that it had endeavored to "rea[d] the treaty as the Indians [who signed it] would have understood it." 31 F.3d, We granted the State's petition for certiorari, and now (1) affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment as to the motor fuels tax, and (2) reverse that judgment as to the income tax applied to earnings of tribal members who work for the but reside in the State outside Indian country. II The contends, and the Tenth Circuit held, that Oklahoma's fuels tax[5] is levied on retailers, not on distributors or consumers. The respect due to the Chickasaw Nation's sovereignty, the maintains, means Oklahomaabsent congressional permissionmay not collect its tax for fuel supplied to, and sold by, the at its convenience stores. In support of the tax immunity it asserts, the recalls our reaffirmations to this effect: "The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes and in recognition of the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even after formation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals generally are exempt from state taxation within their own territory." ; see *4 also, e. g., Mescalero Apache In response, Oklahoma urges that Indian tribes and their members are not inevitably, but only "`generally,' " immune from state taxation. Brief for Petitioner 19 (quoting Blackfeet 471 U. S., at ). At least as to some aspects of state taxation, Oklahoma asserts, an approach "balancing the state and tribal interests" is in order. Brief for Petitioner 17. Even if the legal incidence of the fuels tax falls on the (as retailer), Oklahoma concludes, tax immunity should be disallowed here because "the state interest supporting the levy is compelling, the tribal interest is |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | interest supporting the levy is compelling, the tribal interest is insubstantial, and the state tax would have no effect on `tribal governance and self-determination.' " In the alternative, Oklahoma argues that the Court of Appeals "erred in holding that the legal incidence of the fuel tax falls on the retailer." Moreover, the State newly contends, even if the fuels tax otherwise would be impermissible, Congress, in the 1936 Hayden-Cartwright Act, 4 U.S. C. 104, expressly permitted state taxation of reservation activity of this type. Brief for Petitioner 23-24. We set out first our reason for refusing to entertain at this late date Oklahoma's argument that the Hayden-Cartwright Act expressly permits state levies on motor fuels sold on Indian reservations. We then explain why we agree with the Tenth Circuit on the 's exemption from Oklahoma's fuels tax. A On brief, the State points outfor the first time in this litigationthat the Hayden-Cartwright Act, 4 U.S. C. 104, expressly authorizes States to tax motor fuel sales on "United States military or other reservations." 104(a). The Act's word "reservations," Oklahoma maintains, encompasses Indian reservations. Brief for Petitioner 23-24. We decline to address this question of statutory interpretation. *4 The State made no reference to the Hayden-Cartwright Act in the courts of first and second instance. And even though the Court of Appeals flagged the Act's possible relevance,[6] Oklahoma did not mention this 1936 legislation in its petition for certiorari. Nor is Oklahoma's newly discovered claim of vintage legislative authorization "fairly included"[7] in the question the State tendered for our review: "Whether principles of federal pre-emption or Indian sovereignty preclude a State from imposing a tax on motor fuel sold by an Indian tribe?" Pet. for Cert. (i). As a court of review, not one of first view, we will entertain issues withheld until merits briefing "`only in the most exceptional cases.' " This case does not fit that bill. B Assuming, then, that Congress has not expressly authorized the imposition of Oklahoma's fuels tax on fuel sold by the we must decide if the State's exaction is nonetheless permitted. Oklahoma asks us to make the determination by weighing the relevant state and tribal interests, and urges that the balance tilts in its favor. Oklahoma emphasizes that the fuel sold is used "almost exclusively on state roads," imposing "very substantial costs on the Statebut no burden at all on the" Brief for Petitioner 9. The State *458 also stresses that "the levy does not reach any value generated by the on Indian land," ; i. e., the fuel is not produced or refined |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | ; i. e., the fuel is not produced or refined in Indian country, and is often sold to outsiders. We have balanced federal, state, and tribal interests in diverse contexts, notably, in assessing state regulation that does not involve taxation, see, e. g., and state attempts to compel Indians to collect and remit taxes actually imposed on non-Indians, see, e. g., v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai s of Flathead Reservation, But when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-Indians, we have employed, instead of a balancing inquiry, "a more categorical approach: `[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,' we have held, a State is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians." County of v. Confederated s and Bands of Nation, Taking this categorical approach, we have held unenforceable a number of state taxes whose legal incidence rested on a tribe or on tribal members inside Indian country. See, e. g., ; -166 The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases, therefore, is who bears the legal incidence of a tax. *459 If the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization. See, e. g., -481 But if the legal incidence of the tax rests on non-Indians, no categorical bar prevents enforcement of the tax; if the balance of federal, state, and tribal interests favors the State, and federal law is not to the contrary, the State may impose its levy, see Washington v. Confederated s of Colville Reservation, and may place on a tribe or tribal members "minimal burdens" in collecting the toll,Department of Taxation and Finance of N. Thus, the inquiry proper here is whether the legal incidence of Oklahoma's fuels tax rests on the (as retailer), or on some other transactorshere, the wholesalers who sell to the or the consumers who buy from the[8] Judicial focus on legal incidence in lieu of a more venturesome approach accords due deference to the lead role of Congress in evaluating state taxation as it bears on Indian tribes and tribal members. See The State complains, however, that the legal incidence of a tax "`has no relationship to economic realities.' " Brief for Petitioner 30 ). But our focus on a tax's legal incidence accommodates the reality that tax administration *460 requires predictability. The factors that would enter into an inquiry of the kind the State urges are daunting. |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | an inquiry of the kind the State urges are daunting. If we were to make "economic reality" our guide, we might be obliged to consider, for example, how completely retailers can pass along tax increases without sacrificing sales volumea complicated matter dependent on the characteristics of the market for the relevant product. Cf. -268 By contrast, a "legal incidence" test, as States with large Indian populations have informed us, "provide[s] a reasonably bright-line standard which, from a tax administration perspective, responds to the need for substantial certainty as to the permissible scope of state taxation authority." Brief for South Dakota et al. as Amici Curiae 2.[9] And if a State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax's legal incidence. So, in this case, the State recognizes and the agrees that Oklahoma could accomplish what it here seeks "by declaring the tax to fall on the consumer and directing the to collect and remit the levy." Pet. for Cert. 17; see Brief for Respondent 10-13.[10] *461 C The State also argues that, even if legal incidence is key, the Tenth Circuit erred in holding that the fuels tax's legal incidence rests on the retailer (here, the ). We consider the Court of Appeals' ruling on this point altogether reasonable, and therefore uphold it. See, e. g., The Oklahoma legislation does not expressly identify who bears the tax's legal incidencedistributors, retailers, or consumers; nor does it contain a "pass through" provision, requiring distributors and retailers to pass on the tax's cost to consumers. Cf. In the absence of such dispositive language, the question is one of "fair interpretation of the taxing statute as written and applied." California Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Oklahoma's law requires fuel distributors to "remit" the amount of tax due to the Tax Commission; crucially, the statute describes this remittal by the distributor as "on behalf of a licensed retailer. " Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, 505(C) (1991) The inference that the tax obligation is legally the retailer's, not the distributor's, is supported by the prescriptions that sales between distributors are exempt from taxation, 507, but sales from a distributor to a retailer are subject to taxation, 505(E). Further, if the distributor remits taxes it subsequently is unable to collect from the retailer, the distributor may deduct the uncollected amount from its future payments to the Tax Commission. 505(C). The distributor, then, "is no more than a transmittal agent *462 for the taxes imposed |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | more than a transmittal agent *462 for the taxes imposed on the retailer." And for their services as "agent of the state for [tax] collection," distributors retain a small portion of the taxes they collect. 506(a). The fuels tax law contains no comparable indication that retailers are simply collection agents for taxes ultimately imposed on consumers. No provision sets off the retailer's liability when consumers fail to make payments due; neither are retailers compensated for their tax collection efforts. And the tax imposed when a distributor sells fuel to a retailer applies whether or not the fuel is ever purchased by a consumer. See, e. g., 502 ("There is hereby levied an excise tax upon the sale of each and every gallon of gasoline sold, or stored and distributed, or withdrawn from storage."). Finally, Oklahoma's law imposes no liability of any kind on a consumer for purchasing, possessing, or using untaxed fuel; in contrast, the legislation makes it unlawful for distributors or retailers "to sell or offer for sale in this state, motor fuel or diesel fuel while delinquent in the payment of any excise tax due the state." 505(C). As the Court of Appeals fairly and reasonably concluded: "[T]he import of the language and the structure of the fuel tax statutes is that the distributor collects the tax from the retail purchaser of the fuel"; the "motor fuel taxes are legally imposed on the retailer rather than on the distributor or the consumer." -972. III Regarding Oklahoma's income tax, the Court of Appeals declared that the State may not tax the wages of members of the Chickasaw Nation who work for the including members who reside in Oklahoma outside Indian country. The holding on tribal members who live in the State outside Indian country runs up against a well-established principle of interstate and international taxationnamely, that a jurisdiction, such as Oklahoma, may tax all the income *463 of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction:[] "That the receipt of income by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty is a taxable event is universally recognized. Domicil itself affords a basis for such taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government These are rights and privileges which attach to domicil within the state. Neither the privilege nor the burden is affected by the character of the source from which the income is derived." New York ex rel. This "general principl[e] ha[s] international acceptance." |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | New York ex rel. This "general principl[e] ha[s] international acceptance." American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: International Aspects of United States Income Taxation 4, 6 ; see, e. g., C. Cretton, Expatriate Tax Manual 1 (2d ed. 1991) ("An individual who is resident in the UK is subject to income tax on all his sources of income, worldwide."). It has been applied both to the States, e. g., ; see 2 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation 20.04, p. 20-13 and to the Federal Government, e. g., ; see 1 J. Isenbergh, International Taxation 45- (1990).[12] *464 The seeks to block the State from exercising its ordinary prerogative to tax the income of every resident; in particular, the seeks to shelter from state taxation the income of tribal members who live in Oklahoma outside Indian country but work for the on tribal lands.[13] For the exception the would carve out of the State's taxing authority, the gains no support from the rule that Indians and Indian tribes are generally immune from state taxation, as this principle does not operate outside Indian country. Oklahoma Tax 508 U.S. 4, Notably, the has not asserted here, or before the Court of Appeals, that the State's tax infringes on tribal self-governance. See Brief in Opposition 9-10 ("infringement" question is not presented to this Court); Brief for Respondent 42, n. 37; see also Sac and (reserving question "whether the 's right to selfgovernance could operate independently of its territorial jurisdiction to pre-empt the State's ability to tax income *465 earned from work performed for the itself when the employee does not reside in Indian country").[14] Instead, the relies on the argument that Oklahoma's levy impairs rights granted or reserved by federal law. See Mescalero Apache 4 U. S., at -149 The invokes the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, Art. IV, -334, which provides in pertinent part: "The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to secure to the said [Chickasaw[15]] Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and government of all the persons and property that may be within their limits west, so that no Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descendants but the U. S. shall forever secure said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and against, all [such] laws" According to the the State's income tax, when imposed on tribal members employed by the is a law "for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descendants," and it |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descendants," and it is immaterial that these "descendants" live outside Indian country. In evaluating this argument, we are mindful that "treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians." *466 County of But liberal construction cannot save the 's claim, which founders on a clear geographic limit in the Treaty. By its terms, the Treaty applies only to persons and property "within [the Nation's] limits." We comprehend this Treaty language to provide for the 's sovereignty within Indian country. We do not read the Treaty as conferring super-sovereign authority to interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax income, from all sources, of those who choose to live within that jurisdiction's limits. The and the United States[16] further urge us to read the Treaty in accord with the repudiated view that an income tax imposed on government employees should be treated as a tax on the government. See But see Under this view, a tax on tribal members employed by the would be seen as an impermissible tax on the itself. We doubt the signatories meant to incorporate this nowdefunct view into the Treaty. They likely gave no thought to a State's authority to tax the income of tribal members *467 living in the State's domain, because they did not expect any members to be there. On the contrary, the purpose of the Treaty was to put distance between the and the States. Under the Treaty, the moved across the Mississippi River, from its traditional lands within Mississippi and Alabama, to unsettled lands not then within a State. See D. Hale & A. Gibson, The Chickasaw 46-59 (1991). Moreover, importing the Dobbins rule into the Treaty would prove too much. That dubious doctrine, by typing taxation of wages earned by tribal employees as taxation of the itself, would require an exemption for all employees of the not just tribal members, but nonmembers as well. The Court of Appeals rejected such an extension, see and even the is not urging this view before us, admitting that it is "substantially more tenuous." Brief for Respondent 47. * * * For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to the motor fuels tax, reverse that judgment as to the income tax, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, Article IV, -334 The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to secure to the said [Chickasaw] |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | States are hereby obliged to secure to the said [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and government of all the persons and *468 property that may be within their limits west, so that no Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descendants; and that no part of the land granted them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State; but the U. S. shall forever secure said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and against, all laws except such as from time to time may be enacted in their own National Councils, not inconsistent with the Constitution, Treaties, and Laws of the United States; and except such as may, and which have been enacted by Congress, to the extent that Congress under the Constitution are required to exercise a legislation over Indian Affairs. But the [Chickasaws], should this Treaty be ratified, express a wish that Congress may grant to the [Chickasaws] the right of punishing by their own laws, any white man who shall come into their nation, and infringe any of their national regulations. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Souter join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I dissent from the portion of the Court's decision that permits Oklahoma to tax the wages that (1) the pays (2) to members of the (3) who work for the (4) within Indian country, but (5) who live outside Indian country, and, apparently, commute to work. The issue is whether such a tax falls within the scope of a promise this Nation made to the Chickasaw Nation in 1837a promise that no "State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descendants. but the U. S. shall forever secure said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and against, all laws" except those the made itself (and certain others not relevant here). Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, (1830) (see the Appendix to the opinion of the Court); Treaty of Jan. 17, 1837, Stat. 5. In my view, this language covers the tax. *469 For one thing, history suggests that the signatories to the Treaty intended the language to provide a broad guarantee that state law would not apply to the Chickasaws if they moved west of the Mississippi Riverwhich they d The promise's broad reach was meant initially to induce the Choctaws to make such a move in 1830, and it was extended, in 1837, to the Chickasaws for the same reason, all |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | in 1837, to the Chickasaws for the same reason, all with the hope that other tribes would follow. See A. DeRosier, Removal of the Choctaw Indians 46, 100-128 (1970); 4 (quoting, among other things, President Jackson's statement to Congress, in 1829, that "if the Indians remained east of the Mississippi River, they would be subject to the laws of the several states," but, if they accepted the Treaty and moved west, they would be "free of white men except for a few soldiers"). For another thing, the language of this promise, read broadly and in light of its purpose, fits the tax at issue. The United States promised to secure the "[Chickasaw] Nation from, and against, all laws" for the government of the Nation, except those the Nation made itself or that Congress made. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, The law in question does not fall within one of the explicit exceptions to this promise. Nor need the Court read the Treaty as creating an additional implied exception where, as here, the law in question likely affects significantly and directly the way in which the conducts its affairs in areas subject to tribal jurisdictionhow much, for example, it will likely have to pay workers on its land and what kinds of tribal expenditures it consequently will be able to afford. The impact of the tax upon tribal wages, tribal members, and tribal land makes it possible, indeed reasonable, to consider Oklahoma's tax (insofar as it applies to these tribal wages) as amounting to a law "for the government of" the Indeed, in 1837, when the United States made its promise to the Chickasaws, the law considered a tax like the present one to be a tax on its sourcei. e., the *470 itself. See, e. g., Although tax law subsequently changed, see the empirical connection between tax and has not. The Treaty's basic objective, namely, practical protection for the suggests that this unchanging empirical impact, rather than shifting legal tax theory, is the critical consideration. The majority sets forth several strong arguments against the Treaty's application. But, ultimately, I do not find them convincing. It is true, as the majority points out, that wellestablished principles of tax law permit States to tax those who reside within their boundaries. It is equally true that the Chickasaws whom Oklahoma seeks to tax live in the State at large, although they work in Indian country. But, these truths simply pose the question in this case: Does the Treaty provide an exception to well-established principles of tax law, roughly the same way as do, |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,995 | 5 | majority | Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117956/oklahoma-tax-commn-v-chickasaw-nation/ | principles of tax law, roughly the same way as do, say, treaties governing diplomats and employees of international organizations? See, e. g., The statement of basic tax principles, by themselves, cannot provide the answer. The majority is also concerned about a "line-drawing" problem. If the Treaty invalidates the law before us, what about an Oklahoma tax, for example, on residents who work for, but are not members of, the ? I acknowledge the problem of line drawing, but that problem exists irrespective of where the line is drawn here. And, because this tax (1) has a strong connection to tribal government (i. e., it falls on tribal members, who work for the in Indian country), (2) does not regulate conduct outside Indian country, and (3) does not (as the Solicitor General points out) represent an effort to recover a proportionate share of, say, the cost of providing state services to residents, I am convinced that it *471 falls on the side of the line that the Treaty's language and purpose seek to prohibit. To decide that the Treaty prohibits the law here is not to decide whether or not it would prohibit a law with a weaker link to tribal government or a stronger impact outside Indian country. One final legal consideration strengthens the conclusion I reach. The law requires courts to construe ambiguous treaties in favor of the Indians. County of The majority believes that even a "liberal construction cannot save the 's claim," ante, at 466, because the Treaty says that the United States is "obliged to secure to the said [Chickasaw] Nation the jurisdiction and government of all the persons and property that may be within their limits west." Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, -334 This language, when viewed in its historical context, however, seems primarily designed to point out that the Treaty operates only in respect to Chickasaw lands west of the Mississippii. e., that the Chickasaws would receive no protection unless they moved there. Regardless, the Oklahoma tax in question does affect "persons," namely, tribal members, and "property," namely, their wages, which members work and which wages are paid well "within" the Nation's "limits," i. e., in Indian country. Admittedly, the quoted language, by itself, does not say for certain that such effects are sufficient to bring the state law within the Treaty's prohibition, but neither does it clearly make residency (rather than, say, place of employment) an absolute prerequisite. In these circumstances, the law requires us to give the the benefit of the doubt. Thus, in my view, whether we construe the Treaty's language |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117949/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | Section 22 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), as amended, 33 U.S. C. 922, allows for modification of a disability award *293 "on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact." The question in this case is whether a party may seek modification on the ground of "change in conditions" when there has been no change in the employee's physical condition but rather an increase in the employee's wage-earning capacity due to the acquisition of new skills. I In 190, respondent John Rambo injured his back and leg while working as a longshore frontman for petitioner Metropolitan Stevedore Company. Rambo filed a claim with the Department of Labor that was submitted to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After Rambo and petitioner stipulated that Rambo sustained a 22 12% permanent partial disability and a corresponding $120.24 decrease in his $534.3 weekly wage, the ALJ, pursuant to LHWCA (c)(21), awarded Rambo 66 23% of that figure, or $0.16 per week. App. 5. Because the ALJ also found that Rambo's disability was not due solely to his work-related injury and was "materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone," LHWCA (f)(1), 33 U.S. C. 90(f)(1), he limited the period of petitioner's liability to pay compensation to 104 weeks. Ibid.; App. 6. Later payments were to issue from the special fund administered by respondent Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), LHWCA (f)(2), 33 U.S. C. 90(f)(2). Employers (or their insurance carriers) contribute to the fund based on their outstanding liabilities. See LHWCA 44(c)(2)(B), 33 U.S. C. 944(c)(2)(B). After the award, Rambo began attending crane school. With the new skills so acquired, he obtained longshore work as a crane operator. He also worked in his spare time as a heavy lift truck operator. Between and 1990, Rambo's average weekly wages ranged between $1,307.1 and $1,690.50, more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his physical condition remained unchanged. In light *294 of the increased wage-earning capacity, petitioner, which may seek modification even when the special fund has assumed responsibility for payments, see LHWCA 22, 33 U.S. C. 922; 20 CFR 702.14(b) filed an application to modify the disability award under LHWCA 22. Petitioner asserted there had been a "change in conditions" so that Rambo was no longer "disabled" under the Act. The ALJ agreed that an award may be modified based on changes in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even absent a change in physical condition. After discounting wage increases due to |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117949/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | change in physical condition. After discounting wage increases due to inflation and considering Rambo's risk of job loss and other employment prospects, the ALJ concluded Rambo "no longer has a wage-earning capacity loss" and terminated his disability payments. App. 6. The Benefits Review Board affirmed, relying on v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 16 BRBS 22 (194), aff'd, which held that "change in condition[s]" means change in wage-earning capacity, as well as change in physical condition. App. 73. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Rejecting the Fourth Circuit's approach in the Ninth Circuit held that LHWCA 22 authorizes modification of an award only where there has been a change in the claimant's physical condition. We granted certiorari to resolve this split, and now reverse. II The LHWCA is a comprehensive scheme to provide compensation "in respect of disability or death of an employee. if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States." LHWCA 3, 33 U.S. C. 903(a). Section 22 of the Act provides for modification of awards "on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact." 33 U.S. C. 922. In Rambo's view and that of the Ninth Circuit, "change in conditions" means change in physical condition * and does not include changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity. In our view, this interpretation of "change in conditions" cannot stand in the face of the language, structure, and purpose of the Act. A Neither Rambo nor the Ninth Circuit has attempted to base their position on the language of the statute, where analysis in a statutory construction case ought to begin, for "when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished." Estate of ; Section 22 of the Act provides the only way to modify an award once it has issued. The section states: "Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest (including an employer or carrier which has been granted relief under section 90(f) of this title), on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117949/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case and issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation." 33 U.S. C. 922. On two occasions we have construed the phrase "mistake in a determination of fact" and observed that nothing in the statutory language supports attempts to limit it to particular kinds of factual errors or to cases involving new evidence or changed circumstances. See ; The language of 22 also provides no support for Rambo's narrow construction of the phrase "change in conditions." The use of "conditions," a word in the plural, suggests that Congress did not intend to limit the bases for modifying awards to a single condition, such as an employee's physical health. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 47.34, p. 274 ("`Ordinarily the legislature by use of a plural term intends a reference to more than one matter or thing' ") ); cf. 1 U.S. C. 1 ("[W]ords importing the plural include the singular"). Rather, under the "normal" or "natural reading," Estate of the applicable "conditions" are those that entitled the employee to benefits in the first place, the same conditions on which continuing entitlement is predicated. Our interpretation is confirmed by the language of LHWCA 2(10) and (c)(21). Section 2(10) defines "[d]isability" as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment." 33 U.S. C. 902(10). For certain injuries the statute creates a conclusive presumption of incapacity to earn wages and sets compensation at 66 23% of the claimant's actual wage for a fixed number of weeks, according to a statutory schedule. See LHWCA (c)(1)-(20), (22), 33 U.S. C. 90(c)(1)-0, (22). When these types of scheduled injuries occur, a claimant simply proves the relevant physical injury and compensation follows for a finite period of time. See Bath Iron ; Potomac Elec. Power "In all other cases," however, the statute provides "the compensation shall be 66 23 per centum of the difference between the average weekly wages of the employee *297 and the employee's wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable during the continuance of partial disability." LHWCA (c)(21), 33 U.S. C. 90(c)(21). For these nonscheduled injuries, the type at issue in this case, loss of wage-earning capacity is an element of the claimant's case, for without the statutory presumption that accompanies scheduled injuries, a claimant is not "disabled" unless he proves "incapacity because of injury to earn the |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117949/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | unless he proves "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages." LHWCA 2(10), 33 U.S. C. 902(10). See Bath Iron ; Potomac Elec. Power at -270. These two sections make it clear that compensation, as an initial matter, is predicated on loss of wage-earning capacity, and that such compensation should continue only "during the continuance of partial disability," LHWCA (c)(21), 33 U.S. C. 90(c)(21), i. e., during the continuance of the "incapacity to earn the wages," LHWCA 2(10), 33 U.S. C. 902(10). Section 22 accommodates this statutory requirement by providing for modification of an award on the ground of "a change in conditions." 33 U.S. C. 922. Rambo's insistence on what seems to us a "`narrowly technical and impractical construction' " of this phrase, O', ), does more than disregard the plain language of 22, 2(10), and (c)(21). It also is inconsistent with the structure and purpose of the LHWCA. Like most other workers' compensation schemes, the LHWCA does not compensate physical injury alone but the disability produced by that injury. See LHWCA 3(a), 33 U.S. C. 903(a), 90; see also 1C A. Law of Workmen's Compensation 57.11 Disability under the LHWCA, defined in terms of wage-earning capacity, LHWCA 2(10), is in essence an economic, not a medical, concept. Cf. 3 1.31(e), p. 15-1150 ("[D]isability in the compensation sense has an economic as well as a medical component"). It may be ascertained for *29 nonscheduled injuries according to the employee's actual earnings, if they "fairly and reasonably represent his wageearning capacity," and if they do not, then with "due regard to the nature of [the employee's] injury, the degree of physical impairment, his usual employment and any other factors or circumstances in the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future." LHWCA (h), 33 U.S. C. 90(h). The fundamental purpose of the Act is to compensate employees (or their beneficiaries) for wage-earning capacity lost because of injury; where that wage-earning capacity has been reduced, restored, or improved, the basis for compensation changes and the statutory scheme allows for modification. B Given that the language of 22 and the structure of the Act itself leave little doubt as to Congress' intent, any argument based on legislative history is of minimal, if any, relevance. See Connecticut Nat. ; ; cf. Intercounty Constr. (construing ambiguity in application of 22's 1-year limitations period). In any event, we find Rambo's arguments that the legislative history provides support for his view lacking in force. From congressional Reports accompanying |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117949/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | for his view lacking in force. From congressional Reports accompanying amendments to 22 in 1934, 193, and 194, Reports suggesting Congress was unwilling to extend the 1-year limitations period in which a party may seek modification, Rambo would have us infer that Congress intended a narrow construction of other parts of 22, including the circumstances that would justify reopening an award. We rejected this very argument in at and its logic continues to elude us. Congress' decision to maintain a 1-year limitations period *299 has no apparent relevance to which changed conditions may justify modifying an award. Rambo next contends that following S. S. v. United States Employees' Compensation Comm'n, 64 F.2d 4 the Courts of Appeals unanimously held that "change in conditions" refers only to changes in physical conditions, so Congress' reenactment of the phrase "change in conditions" when it amended other parts of 22 as late as 194 must be understood to endorse that approach. We have often relied on Congress' "reenact[ment of] statutory language that has been given a consistent judicial construction," Central Bank of Denver, N. 15 ; see 47 U.S. 552, (19), in particular where Congress was aware of or made reference to that judicial construction, see ; United The cases in the relevant period, however, were based on a misreading of which did not reject the idea that 22 included a change in wage-earning capacity, but merely expressed doubt that 22 "applies to a change in earnings due to economic conditions," 64 F.2d, at 5; they involved dicta, not holdings, see, e. g., 5 F.2d 75, rev'd on other grounds, ; Burley Welding ; General Dynamics (CA1 192) ; and they were not uniform in their approach, see, e. g., (CA5 191) Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that congressional silence in the reenactment of the phrase "change in conditions" carries any significance. In a related argument, Rambo criticizes petitioner's reading of 22 because it sweeps away an accumulation of more *300 than 50 years of dicta. Far from counseling hesitation, however, we think this step long overdue. "[A]ge is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute," and the dictum of Pillsbury and Burley Welding has not even aged with integrity, see, e. g., v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock 16 BRBS 22 (194); 4 F.2d 54, (CA2 199); Avondale Shipyards, Breath spent repeating dicta does not infuse it with life. The unnecessary observations of these Courts of Appeals "are neither authoritative nor persuasive." 42 ; cf. United 397 U.S. 26, Finally, Rambo argues that including a change in wageearning capacity |
Justice Kennedy | 1,995 | 4 | majority | Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117949/metropolitan-stevedore-co-v-rambo/ | Finally, Rambo argues that including a change in wageearning capacity as a change in conditions under 22 will flood the OWCP and the courts with litigation because parties will request modification every time an employee's wages change or the economy takes a turn in one direction or the other. Experience in the 11 years since the Benefits Review Board decided suggests otherwise, but that argument is, in any case, better directed at Congress or the Director in her rulemaking capacity, see LHWCA 39(a), 33 U.S. C. 939(a); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock than at the courts. It is also based on a misconception of the LHWCA and our holding today. We recognize only that an award in a nonscheduled-injury case may be modified where there has been a change in wage-earning capacity. A change in actual wages is controlling only when actual wages "fairly and reasonably represent wage-earning capacity." LHWCA (h), 33 U.S. C 90(h). Otherwise, wage-earning capacity may be determined according to the many factors identified in (h), including "any factors or circumstances in the case which may affect [the employee's] capacity to earn *301 wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future." This circumspect approach does not permit a change in wageearning capacity with every variation in actual wages or transient change in the economy. There may be cases raising difficult questions as to what constitutes a change in wage-earning capacity, but we need not address them here. Rambo acquired additional, marketable skills and the ALJ, recognizing that higher wages do not necessarily prove an increase in wage-earning capacity, took care to account for inflation and risk of job loss in evaluating Rambo's new "wage-earning capacity in an open labor market under normal employment conditions." App. 66. We hold that a disability award may be modified under 22 where there is a change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee's physical condition. Because Rambo raised other arguments before the Ninth Circuit that the panel did not have the opportunity to address, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | New York's Human Rights Law forbids discrimination in employment, including discrimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy. The State's Disability Benefits Law requires employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work because of pregnancy or other nonoccupational disabilities. The question before us is whether these New York laws are pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. I A The Human Rights Law, N. Y. Exec. Law 290-301 is a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute prohibiting, among other practices, employment discrimination on the basis of sex. 29.1 (a).[1] The New York Court of Appeals has held that a private employer whose employee benefit plan treats pregnancy differently from other nonoccupational disabilities engages in sex discrimination within the meaning of the Human Rights Law. Brooklyn Union Gas In contrast, two weeks before the decision in Brooklyn Union Gas, this Court ruled that discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 194, as amended, *89 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq. General Electric[2] Congress overcame the Gilbert ruling by enacting 1 of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S. C. 2000e(k) ( ed., Supp. V), which added subsection (k) to 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 194.[3] See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Until that Act took effect on April 29, see 2(b), the Human Rights Law in this respect had a reach broader than Title VII. The Disability Benefits Law, N. Y. Work. Comp. Law 200-242 requires employers to pay certain benefits to employees unable to work because of nonoccupational injuries or illness. Disabled employees generally are entitled to receive the lesser of $95 per week or one-half their average weekly wage, for a maximum of 2 weeks in any 1-year period. 204.2, 205.1. Until August 1977, the Disability Benefits Law provided that employees were not entitled to benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities. 205.3 (McKinney 195). From August 1977 to June employers were required to provide eight weeks of benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities. *90 1977 N. Y. Laws, ch. 75, 29 (formerly codified as N. Y. Work. Comp. Law 205.3). This limitation was repealed in see N. Y. Laws, ch. 352, 2, and the Disability Benefits Law now requires employers to provide the same benefits for pregnancy as for any other disability.[4] B The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 1001 et seq. ( ed. and Supp. V), subjects to federal regulation plans providing employees with fringe benefits. ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | fringe benefits. ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. See Nachman ; The term "employee benefit plan" is defined as including both pension plans and welfare *91 plans.[5] The statute imposes participation, funding, and vesting requirements on pension plans. 201-30, 29 U.S. C. 1051- ( ed. and Supp. V). It also sets various uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, for both pension and welfare plans. 101-111, 401-414, 29 U.S. C. 1021-1031, 1-1114 ( ed. and Supp. V). ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits. Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S. C. 1144(a), pre-empts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.[] State laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities are exempt from this pre-emption provision, as are generally applicable state criminal laws. 514(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4), 29 U.S. C. 1144(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4). Section 514(d), 29 U.S. C. 1144(d), moreover, provides that "[n]othing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." And 4(b)(3) *92 of ERISA, 29 U.S. C. 1003(b)(3), exempts from ERISA coverage employee benefit plans that are "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws." II Appellees in this litigation, Delta Air Lines, and other airlines (Airlines), Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs), and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan), provided their employees with various medical and disability benefits through welfare plans subject to ERISA. These plans, prior to the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, did not provide benefits to employees disabled by pregnancy as required by the New York Human Rights Law and the State's Disability Benefits Law. Appellees brought three separate federal declaratory judgment actions against appellant state agencies and officials,[7] alleging that the Human Rights Law was pre-empted by ERISA. The Airlines in their action alleged that the Disability Benefits Law was similarly pre-empted.[8] The United States District Court in each case held that the Human Rights Law was pre-empted, at least insofar as it *93 required the provision of pregnancy benefits prior to the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.[9] With respect to the Airlines' challenge to the Disability Benefits Law, the District Court construed 4(b)(3) of ERISA as exempting from the federal statute "those provisions of an employee plan which |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | the federal statute "those provisions of an employee plan which are maintained to comply with" state disability insurance laws. Delta Air Lines, Because it concluded that the Airlines would have provided pregnancy benefits solely to comply with the Disability Benefits Law, the court dismissed the portion of their complaint seeking relief from that law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to the Human Rights Law. Delta Air Lines, ; Metropolitan Life *94 Insurance ; Burroughs[10] Relying on this Court's decision in and on its own ruling in Pervel Industries, order aff'g cert. denied, the court held that 514(a) of ERISA operated to pre-empt the Human Rights Law, and that 514(d) did not save that law from pre-emption.[11] With respect to the Disability Benefits Law, the Court of Appeals had concluded earlier that 4(b)(3)'s exemption from pre-emption applied only when a benefit plan, "as *95 an integral unit," is maintained solely to comply with a disability law. Delta Air Lines, The court remanded for inquiries into whether the Airlines provided disability benefits through plans constituting separate administrative units, in which event the Disability Benefits Law would be enforceable, or through portions of comprehensive benefit plans, in which case ERISA regulation would be exclusive. Because courts have disagreed about the scope of ERISA's pre-emption provisions,[12] and because of the continuing importance of the issues presented,[13] we noted probable jurisdiction in all three cases. III In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue. "Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and `is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.'" Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 42 U. S. *9 17, 180-182 ; Pacific Gas & Electric In these cases, we address the scope of several provisions of ERISA that speak expressly to the question of pre-emption. The issues are whether the Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law "relate to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of 514(a), see n. and, if so, whether any exception in ERISA saves them from pre-emption.[14] We have no difficulty in concluding that the Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law "relate to" employee benefit plans. The breadth of 514(a)'s pre-emptive reach is apparent from that section's language.[15] A law "relates to" an *97 employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.[1] Employing this definition, |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | with or reference to such a plan.[1] Employing this definition, the Human Rights Law, which prohibits employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, and the Disability Benefits Law, which requires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly "relate to" benefit plans.[17] We must give effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning. Consumer Product Safety ; see North 40 U.S. 300, ; 40 U.S. 103, In fact, however, Congress used the words "relate to" in 514(a) in their broad sense. To interpret 514(a) to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans would be to ignore the remainder of 514. It would have been unnecessary to exempt generally applicable state criminal statutes from pre-emption in 514(b), for example, if 514(a) applied only to state laws dealing specifically with ERISA plans. Nor, given the legislative history, can 514(a) be interpreted to pre-empt only state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like. The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.[18] The Conference Committee rejected these provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that the section's pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1090, p. 383 (1974).[19] Statements by the bill's *99 sponsors during the subsequent debates stressed the breadth of federal pre-emption. Representative Dent, for example, stated: "Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974). Senator Williams echoed these sentiments: "It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law."[20] *100 Given the plain language of 514(a), the structure of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | *100 Given the plain language of 514(a), the structure of the Act, and its legislative history, we hold that the Human Rights Law and the Disability Benefits Law "relate to any employee benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA's 514(a).[21] IV We next consider whether any of the narrow exceptions to 514(a) saves these laws from pre-emption. A Appellants argue that the Human Rights Law is exempt from pre-emption by 514(d), which provides that 514(a) *101 shall not "be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States." According to appellants, pre-emption of state fair employment laws would impair and modify Title VII because it would change the means by which it is enforced. State laws obviously play a significant role in the enforcement of Title VII. See, e. g., 45 U.S. 41, 48-49, 472, 477 ; ; New York Gaslight Club, 3-5 Title VII expressly preserves nonconflicting state laws in its 708: "Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title." 78 Stat. 22, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-7.[22] Moreover, Title VII requires recourse to available state administrative remedies. When an employment practice prohibited by Title VII is alleged to have occurred in a State or locality which prohibits the practice and has established an *102 agency to enforce that prohibition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) refers the charges to the state agency. The EEOC may not actively process the charges "before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." 70(c), 8 Stat. 104, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5(c); see In its subsequent proceedings, the EEOC accords "substantial weight" to the state administrative determination. 70(b), 8 Stat. 104, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5(b). Given the importance of state fair employment laws to the federal enforcement scheme, pre-emption of the Human Rights Law would impair Title VII to the extent that the Human Rights Law provides a means of enforcing Title VII's commands. Before the enactment of ERISA, an employee claiming discrimination in connection with a benefit plan would have had his complaint referred to the New York State Division of Human Rights. If ERISA were interpreted to pre-empt the Human Rights Law entirely with respect to covered |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | pre-empt the Human Rights Law entirely with respect to covered benefit plans, the State no longer could prohibit the challenged employment practice and the state agency no longer would be authorized to grant relief. The EEOC thus would be unable to refer the claim to the state agency. This would frustrate the goal of encouraging joint state/federal enforcement of Title VII; an employee's only remedies for discrimination prohibited by Title VII in ERISA plans would be federal ones. Such a disruption of the enforcement scheme contemplated by Title VII would, in the words of 514(d), "modify" and "impair" federal law.[23] *103 Insofar as state laws prohibit employment practices that are lawful under Title VII, however, pre-emption would not impair Title VII within the meaning of 514(d). Although Title VII does not itself prevent States from extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title VII, see 708, 78 Stat. 22, 42 U.S. C. 2000e-7, it in no way depends on such extensions for its enforcement. Title VII would prohibit precisely the same employment practices, and be enforced in precisely the same manner, even if no State made additional employment practices unlawful. Quite simply, Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employment practices it does not prohibit.[24] We fail to see how federal *104 law would be impaired by pre-emption of a state law prohibiting conduct that federal law permitted. ERISA's structure and legislative history, while not particularly illuminating with respect to 514(d), caution against applying it too expansively. As we have detailed above, Congress applied the principle of pre-emption "in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans," creating only very limited exceptions to pre-emption. 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent); see Sections 4(b)(3) and 514(b), which list specific exceptions, do not refer to state fair employment laws. While 514(d) may operate to exempt provisions of state laws upon which federal laws depend for their enforcement, the combination of Congress' enactment of an all-inclusive pre-emption provision and its enumeration of narrow, specific exceptions to that provision makes us reluctant to expand 514(d) into a more general saving clause. The references to employment discrimination in the legislative history of ERISA provide no basis for an expansive construction of 514(d). During floor debates, Senator Mondale questioned whether the Senate bill should be amended to require nondiscrimination in ERISA plans. Senator Williams replied that no such amendment was necessary or desirable. He noted that Title VII already prohibited discrimination in benefit plans, and stated: "I believe that the thrust toward centralized administration of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | stated: "I believe that the thrust toward centralized administration of nondiscrimination in employment must be maintained. And I believe this can be done by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under terms of existing law." 119 Cong. Rec. 30409 (1973). Senator Mondale, "with the understanding that nondiscrimination in pension and profit-sharing plans is fully required under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act," chose not to offer a nondiscrimination amendment. This colloquy was repeated on the floor of the House by Representatives Abzug and Dent. 120 Cong. Rec. 472 (1974). *105 These exchanges demonstrate only the obvious: that 514(d) does not pre-empt federal law. The speakers referred to federal law, the EEOC, and the need for centralized enforcement. The limited legislative history dealing with 514(d) is entirely consistent with Congress' goal of ensuring that employers would not face "conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans," 120 Cong. Rec. 29933 (1974) Congress might well have believed, had it considered the precise issue before us, that ERISA plans should be subject only to the nondiscrimination provisions of Title VII, and not also to state laws prohibiting other forms of discrimination. By establishing benefit plan regulation "as exclusively a federal concern," Congress minimized the need for interstate employers to administer their plans differently in each State in which they have employees.[25] We recognize that our interpretation of 514(d) as requiring partial pre-emption of state fair employment laws may cause certain practical problems. Courts and state agencies, rather than considering whether employment practices are *10 unlawful under a broad state law, will have to determine whether they are prohibited by Title VII. If they are not, the state law will be superseded and the agency will lack authority to act. It seems more than likely, however, that state agencies and courts are sufficiently familiar with Title VII to apply it in their adjudicative processes. Many States look to Title VII law as a matter of course in defining the scope of their own laws.[2] In any event, these minor practical difficulties do not represent the kind of "impairment" or "modification" of federal law that can save a state law from pre-emption under 514(d). To the extent that our construction of ERISA causes any problems in the administration of state fair employment laws, those problems are the result of congressional choice and should be addressed by congressional action. To give 514(d) the broad construction advocated by appellants would defeat the intent of Congress to provide comprehensive pre-emption of state law. B The Disability Benefits Law presents a different problem. Section 514(a) of ERISA pre-empts |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | Law presents a different problem. Section 514(a) of ERISA pre-empts state laws that relate to benefit plans "described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b)." Consequently, while the Disability Benefits Law plainly is a state law relating to employee benefit plans, it is not pre-empted if the plans to which it relates are exempt from ERISA under 4(b). Section 4(b)(3) exempts "any employee benefit plan maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable disability insurance laws." The Disability Benefits Law is a "disability insurance law," of course; the difficulty is that at least some of the benefit *107 plans offered by the Airlines provide benefits not required by that law. The question is whether, with respect to those among the Airlines using multibenefit plans, the Disability Benefits Law's requirement that employers provide particular benefits remains enforceable. As the Court of Appeals recognized, 4(b)(3) excludes "plans," not portions of plans, from ERISA coverage; those portions of the Airlines' multibenefit plans maintained to comply with the Disability Benefits Law, therefore, are not exempt from ERISA and are not subject to state regulation. There is no reason to believe that Congress used the word "plan" in 4(b) to refer to individual benefits offered by an employee benefit plan. To the contrary, 4(b)(3)'s use of the word "solely" demonstrates that the purpose of the entire plan must be to comply with an applicable disability insurance law. As the Court noted in Alessi, plans that not only provide benefits required by such a law, but also "more broadly serve employee needs as a result of collective bargaining," are not exempt. n. 20. The test is not one of the employer's motive any employer could claim that it provided disability benefits altruistically, to attract good employees, or to increase employee productivity, as well as to obey state law but whether the plan, as an administrative unit, provides only those benefits required by the applicable state law. Any other rule, it seems to us, would make little sense. Under the District Court's approach, for which appellants argue here, one portion of a multibenefit plan would be subject only to state regulation, while other portions would be exclusively within the federal domain. An employer with employees in several States would find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern of regulation in each State, depending on what benefits the State mandated under disability, workmen's compensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The administrative impracticality of permitting mutually exclusive pockets of federal and state * jurisdiction within a plan is apparent. We see no reason to |
Justice Blackmun | 1,983 | 11 | majority | Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110993/shaw-v-delta-air-lines-inc/ | within a plan is apparent. We see no reason to torture the plain language of 4(b)(3) to achieve this result. Only separately administered disability plans maintained solely to comply with the Disability Benefits Law are exempt from ERISA coverage under 4(b)(3). This is not to say, however, that the Airlines are completely free to circumvent the Disability Benefits Law by adopting plans that combine disability benefits inferior to those required by that law with other types of benefits. Congress surely did not intend, at the same time it preserved the role of state disability laws, to make enforcement of those laws impossible. A State may require an employer to maintain a disability plan complying with state law as a separate administrative unit. Such a plan would be exempt under 4(b)(3). The fact that state law permits employers to meet their state-law obligations by including disability insurance benefits in a multibenefit ERISA plan, see N. Y. Work. Comp. Law App. 355. does not make the state law wholly unenforceable as to employers who choose that option. In other words, while the State may not require an employer to alter its ERISA plan, it may force the employer to choose between providing disability benefits in a separately administered plan and including the state-mandated benefits in its ERISA plan. If the State is not satisfied that the ERISA plan comports with the requirements of its disability insurance law, it may compel the employer to maintain a separate plan that does comply. The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, in holding that appellants are not at all free to enforce the Disability Benefits Law against those appellees that provide disability benefits as part of multibenefit plans. V We hold that New York's Human Rights Law is preempted with respect to ERISA benefit plans only insofar as it prohibits practices that are lawful under federal law. To *109 this extent, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. To the extent the Court of Appeals held any more of the Human Rights Law pre-empted, we vacate its judgments and remand the cases. We further hold that the Disability Benefits Law is not pre-empted by ERISA, although New York may not enforce its provisions through regulation of ERISA covered benefit plans. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment in the Airlines' case on this ground and remand that case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs are allowed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | concurring | Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110597/charles-d-bonanno-linen-service-inc-v-nlrb/ | The Court's holding today does not impair an employer's freedom to structure the manner in which it will conduct collective bargaining. Its opinion, which I join, recognizes the voluntary nature of multiemployer bargaining, see ante, at 412, and notes that the Board "neither forces employers into multiemployer units nor erects barriers to withdrawal prior to bargaining." The mere fact that an employer bargains in conjunction with other employers does not necessarily mean that it must sign any contract that is negotiated by the group. The Board requires that, to be bound by the terms of group negotiation, the members of an employer association must "have indicated from the outset an unequivocal intention to be bound in collective bargaining by group rather than individual action," and the union representing their employees must "[have] been notified of the formation of the group and the delegation of bargaining authority to it, and [have] assented and entered upon negotiations with the group's representative." *420 Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 N. L. R. B. 299, 299 (1967), enf'd, 130 U. S. App. D. C. 176, This test is well established in the Courts of Appeals. See, e. g., ; Komatz ; cert. denied, ; Absent such an unequivocal commitment to be bound by group action, an employer is free to withdraw from group negotiation at any time, or simply to reject the terms of the final group contract. See Komatz Ruan Transport Corp., 234 N. L. R. B. 241 (1978). In the instant case, petitioner has never questioned the unequivocal character of its commitment to participate in and to be bound by the results of group negotiation. The Court's holding does not preclude an employer from explicitly conditioning its participation in group bargaining on any special terms of its own design. Presumably, an employer could refuse to participate in multiemployer bargaining unless the union accepted the employer's right to withdraw from the bargaining unit should an impasse develop. The union or the other members of the bargaining unit of course may reject such a condition; in such a case, however, the employer simply would be forced to choose between agreeing to be bound by the terms of group negotiation without a right of withdrawal at impasse, or forgoing the advantages of multiemployer bargaining and bargaining on its own. |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Holder v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117874/holder-v-hall/ | Justice Thomas has written a separate opinion proposing that the terms "standard, practice, or procedure" as used in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 should henceforth be construed to refer only to practices that affect minority citizens' access to the ballot. Specifically, Justice Thomas would no longer interpret the Act to forbid practices that dilute minority voting strength. To the extent that his opinion advances policy arguments in favor of that interpretation of the statute, it should be addressed to Congress, which has ample power to amend the statute. To the extent that the opinion *958 suggests that federal judges have an obligation to subscribe to the proposed narrow reading of statutory language, it is appropriate to supplement Justice Thomas' writing with a few words of history. I Justice Thomas notes that the fit generation of Voting Rights Act cases focused on access to the ballot. Ante, at 894-895. By doing so, he suggests that the early pattern of enforcement is an indication of the original meaning of the statute. In this regard, it is important to note that the Court's fit case addressing a voting practice other than access to the ballot arose under the Fifteenth Amendment. In the Court held that a change in the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama, violated the Fifteenth Amendment. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "The opposite conclusion, urged upon us by respondents, would sanction the achievement by a State of any impairment of voting rights whatever so long as it was cloaked in the garb of the realignment of political subdivisions." "A statute which is alleged to have worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitione' rights is not immune to attack simply because the mechanism employed by the legislature is a redefinition of municipal boundaries. According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legislature has not merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with incidental inconvenience to the petitione; it is more accurate to say that it has deprived the petitione of the municipal franchise and consequent rights and to that end it has incidentally changed the city's boundaries. While in form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens, *959 and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights."[1] Because Gomillion was decided only a few yea before the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, and because coverage under the Voting Rights Act is generally coextensive with or broader than coverage under the Fifteenth Amendment, |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Holder v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117874/holder-v-hall/ | coextensive with or broader than coverage under the Fifteenth Amendment, see ; it is surely not unreasonable to infer that Congress intended the Act to reach the kind of voting practice that was at issue in that case. Nevertheless, the text of the Act would also have supported the opposite inference, because the language of the Fifteenth Amendment would seem to forbid any denial or abridgment of the right to vote, whereas 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act refer only to "voting qualification[s,] prerequisite[s] to voting, standard[s], practice[s], [and] procedure[s]." During the yea between 1965 and 1969 the question whether the Voting Rights Act should be narrowly construed to cover nothing more than impediments to access to the ballot was an unresolved issue. What Justice Thomas describes as "a fundamental shift in the focal point of the Act," ante, at 895, occurred in 1969 when the Court unequivocally rejected the narrow reading, relying heavily on a broad *960 definition of the term "voting" as including "`all action necessary to make a vote effective.' " Despite `s purported deviation from the Act's true meaning, Congress one year later reenacted 5 without in any way changing the operative words. During the next five yea, the Court consistently adhered to see ; and in 1975, Congress again reenacted 5 without change. When, in the late seventies, some parties advocated a narrow reading of the Act, the Court pointed to these congressional reenactments as solid evidence that even if not correctly decided in 1969, would now be clearly correct. In United the Court noted: "In 1970, Congress was clearly fully aware of this Court's interpretation of 5 as reaching voter changes other than those affecting the registration process and plainly contemplated that the Act would continue to be so construed. See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 4249 et al. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 4, 18, 83, 130-131, 133, 147-149, 154-155, 182-184, 402-454 ; Hearings on S. 818 et al. before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397 398, 426-427, 469 (1970) "The congressional history is even clearer with respect to the 1975 extension"[2]*961 As the Court in that case also noted, when Congress reenacts a statute with knowledge of its prior interpretation, that interpretation is binding on the Court. "Whatever one might think of the other arguments advanced, the legislative background of the 1975 reenactment is conclusive of the question before us. When a |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Holder v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117874/holder-v-hall/ | reenactment is conclusive of the question before us. When a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of an administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation, and this Court is bound thereby. See, e. g., Don E. Williams ; Albemarle Paper ; H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1404 (tent. ed. 1958); cf. Zenith Radio ; Girou- Don E. Williams is instructive. As here, there had been a longstanding administrative interpretation of a statute when Congress re-enacted it, and there, as here, the legislative history of the reenactment showed that Congress agreed with that interpretation, *962 leading this Court to conclude that Congress had ratified it. -577." If the 1970 and 1975 reenactments had left any doubt as to congressional intent, that doubt would be set aside by the 1982 amendments to 2. Between 1975 and 1982, the Court continued to interpret the Voting Rights Act in the broad manner set out by See City of ; Dougherty County Bd. of ; United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, ; In a plurality of this Court concluded that violations of both the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment required discriminatory purpose. The case involved a claim that at-large voting diluted minority voting strength. In his opinion for the plurality in Bolden, Justice Stewart expressly relied upon `s holding "that allegations of a racially motivated gerrymander of municipal boundaries stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment." ; see also The only reason Gomillion did not control the outcome in Bolden was that an "invidious purpose" had been alleged in the earlier case but not in[3] The congressional response to Bolden is familiar history. In the 1982 amendment to 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Congress substituted a "results" test for an intent requirement. Pub. L. 97-205, 3, ; see 42 U.S. C. 1973. It is crystal *963 clear that Congress intended the 1982 amendment to cover nonaccess claims like those in Bolden and Gomillion.[4] II Justice Thomas' narrow interpretation of the words "voting qualification standard, practice, or procedure," if adopted, would require us to overrule and the cases that have adhered to its reading of the critical statutory language. The radical character of that suggested interpretation is illustrated by the following passage from an opinion decided only nine yea after : "The Court's decisions over the past 10 yea have given 5 the broad scope suggested by the language of the Act. We fit construed it in ]. There our examination of the Act's |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Holder v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117874/holder-v-hall/ | construed it in ]. There our examination of the Act's objectives and original legislative history led us to interpret 5 to give it `the broadest possible scope,' and to require prior federal scrutiny of `any state enactment which altered the election law in a covered State in even a minor way.' In so construing 5, we unanimously rejected as the plain terms of the Act would themselves have seemingly requiredthe argument of an appellee that 5 should apply only to enactments affecting who may register to Our decisions have required federal preclearance of laws changing the location of polling places, see 400 U. S. *964 379 laws adopting at-large systems of election, ibid.; Fairley v. Patteon (decided with ); laws providing for the appointment of previously elected officials, Bunton v. Patteon (decided with ); laws regulating candidacy, Whitley v. Williams (decided with ); laws changing voting procedures, ; annexations, City of ; City of summarily aff'g ; ; and reapportionment and redistricting, ; ; see United Jewish Organiza- In each case, federal scrutiny of the proposed change was required because the change had the potential to deny or dilute the rights conferred by 4(a)." United -123 The interpretation of the Act has also been followed in a host of cases decided in later yea, among them Houston Lawye' ; Pleasant ; ; Port ; City of ; Dougherty County Bd. of In addition, Justice Thomas' interpretation would call into question the numerous other cases since 1978 that have assumed the broad coverage of the Voting Rights Act that Justice Thomas would now have us reject. ; ; ; ; ; ; ; see also ; ; ; City of The large number of decisions that we would have to overrule or reconsider, as well as the congressional reenactments discussed above, suggests that Justice Thomas' radical reinterpretation of the Voting Rights Act is barred by the well-established principle that stare decisis has special force in the statutory arena. ; Patteon v. McLean Credit Union, ; Illinois Brick Justice Thomas attempts to minimize the radical implications of his interpretation of the phrase "voting qualification. standard, practice, or procedure" by noting that this case involves only the interpretation of 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5, he hints, might be interpreted differently. Even limiting the reinterpretation to 2 cases, however, would require overruling a sizable number of this Court's precedents. Houston Lawye' ; ; ; see also ; In addition, a distinction between 2 and 5 is difficult to square with the language of the statute. Sections 2 and 5 contain exactly |
Justice Stevens | 1,994 | 16 | majority | Holder v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117874/holder-v-hall/ | language of the statute. Sections 2 and 5 contain exactly the same words: "voting qualification standard, practice, or procedure." If anything, the wording of 5 is narrower, because it adds the limiting phrase "with respect to voting" after the word "procedure." Moreover, when Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 in response to Bolden, it amended 2. As noted above, in those amendments Congress clearly endoed the application of the Voting Rights Act to vote dilution claims. While a distinction between 2 and 5 might be supportable on policy grounds, it is an odd distinction for devotees of "plain language" interpretation. *966 Throughout his opinion, Justice Thomas argues that this case is an exception to stare decisis, because and its progeny have "immeed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory." Ante, at 892. There is no question that the Voting Rights Act has required the courts to resolve difficult questions, but that is no reason to deviate from an interpretation that Congress has thrice approved. Statutes frequently require courts to make policy judgments. The Sherman Act, for example, requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic organization. Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has required the courts to formulate a theory of equal opportunity. Our work would certainly be much easier if every case could be resolved by consulting a dictionary, but when Congress has legislated in general terms, judges may not invoke judicial modesty to avoid difficult questions. III When a statute has been authoritatively, repeatedly, and consistently construed for more than a quarter century, and when Congress has reenacted and extended the statute several times with full awareness of that construction, judges have an especially clear obligation to obey settled law. Whether Justice Thomas is correct that the Court's settled construction of the Voting Rights Act has been "a disastrous misadventure," ante, at 893, should not affect the decision in this case. It is therefore inappropriate for me to comment on the portions of his opinion that are best described as an argument that the statute be repealed or amended in important respects. |
Justice Thomas | 2,017 | 1 | dissenting | Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4377351/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corp/ | Today, the Court answers a novel and important ques- tion of bankruptcy law. Unfortunately, it does so without the benefit of any reasoned opinions on the dispositive issue from the courts of appeals (apart from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case) and with briefing on that issue from only one of the parties. That is because, having persuaded us to grant certiorari on one question, petition- ers chose to argue a different question on the merits. In light of that switch, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. We granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement pro- ceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.” Pet. for Cert. i. According to petitioners, the decision below “deepened an existing split” among the Courts of Appeals on this question. ; see at 15–16 (citing In re AWECO, Inc., (CA5 1984), and In re Iridium Operating LLC, 464 (CA2 2007)). After we granted certiorari, however, petitioners recast the question presented to ask “[w]hether a Chapter 11 case may be terminated by a ‘structured dismissal’ that distributes estate property in violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.” Brief for Peti- 2 CZYZEWSKI v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP. THOMAS, J., dissenting tioners i. Although both questions involve priority- skipping distributions of estate assets, the recast question is narrower—and different—than the one on which we granted certiorari. It is also not the subject of a circuit conflict. I think it is unwise for the Court to decide the reformu- lated question today, for two reasons. First, it is a “novel question of bankruptcy law” arising in the rapidly develop- ing field of structured dismissals. In re Jevic Holding Corp., Experience shows that we would greatly benefit from the views of additional courts of appeals on this question. We also would have benefited from full, adversarial briefing. In reliance on this Court’s Rules prohibiting parties from changing the substance of the question presented, see Rule 24.1(a); see also Rule 14.1(a), respondents declined to brief the ques- tion that the majority now decides, see Brief for Respond- ents 52. Second, deciding this question may invite future petitioners to seek review of a circuit conflict only then to change the question to one that seems more favorable. “I would not reward such bait-and-switch tactics.” City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. ) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 3); see also Visa, Inc. v. Osborn, post, p. Accordingly, I would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | In this Court considered whether the Constitution bars defense counsel from conceding a capital defendant’s guilt at trial “when [the] defendant, informed by counsel, neither consents nor objects,” In that case, defense counsel had several times explained to the defendant a proposed guilt- phase concession strategy, but the defendant was unre- sponsive. We held that when counsel confers with the defendant and the defendant remains silent, neither approving nor protesting counsel’s proposed con- cession strategy, “[no] blanket rule demand[s] the defendant’s explicit consent” to implementation of that strategy, In the case now before us, in contrast to the defendant vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the charged acts and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt. App. 286–287, 505–506. Yet the trial court per- mitted counsel, at the guilt phase of a capital trial, to tell the jury the defendant “committed three murders. [H]e’s guilty.” We hold that a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting 2 MCCOY v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Guaranteeing a defendant the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence,” the Sixth Amendment so demands. With individual lib- erty—and, in capital cases, life—at stake, it is the defend- ant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reason- able doubt. I On May 5, 2008, Christine and Willie Young and Grego- ry Colston were shot and killed in the Youngs’ home in Bossier City, Louisiana. The three victims were the mother, stepfather, and son of Robert McCoy’s estranged wife, Yolanda. Several days later, police arrested McCoy in Idaho. Extradited to Louisiana, McCoy was appointed counsel from the public defender’s office. A Bossier Parish grand jury indicted McCoy on three counts of first-degree murder, and the prosecutor gave notice of intent to seek the death penalty. McCoy pleaded not guilty. Throughout the proceedings, he insistently maintained he was out of State at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong. App. 284–286. At defense counsel’s request, a court-appointed sanity commission examined McCoy and found him com- petent to stand trial. In December 2009 and January 2010, McCoy told the court his relationship with assigned counsel had broken down irretrievably. He sought and gained leave |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | counsel had broken down irretrievably. He sought and gained leave to repre- sent himself until his parents engaged new counsel for him. In March 2010, Larry English, engaged by McCoy’s parents, enrolled as McCoy’s counsel. English eventually concluded that the evidence against McCoy was over- Cite as: U. S. (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court whelming and that, absent a concession at the guilt stage that McCoy was the killer, a death sentence would be impossible to avoid at the penalty phase.1 McCoy, English reported, was “furious” when told, two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, that English would concede McCoy’s commission of the triple murders.2 McCoy told English “not to make that concession,” and English knew of McCoy’s “complet[e] oppos[ition] to [Eng- lish] telling the jury that [McCoy] was guilty of killing the three victims”; instead of any concession, McCoy pressed English to pursue acquittal. –287. At a July 26, 2011 hearing, McCoy sought to terminate English’s representation, and English asked to be relieved if McCoy secured other counsel, With trial set to start two days later, the court refused to relieve English and directed that he remain as counsel of record. “[Y]ou are the attorney,” the court told English when he expressed disagreement with McCoy’s wish to put on a defense case, and “you have to make the trial decision of what you’re going to proceed with.” at 469. —————— 1 Part of English’s strategy was to concede that McCoy committed the murders and to argue that he should be convicted only of second-degree murder, because his “mental incapacity prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent to commit first degree murder.” 20–49 (La. 10/19/16), But the second-degree strategy would have encountered a shoal, for Louisiana does not permit intro- duction of evidence of a defendant’s diminished capacity absent the entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Ib and n. 35. 2 The dissent states that English told McCoy his proposed trial strat- egy eight months before trial. Post, at 3. English did encourage McCoy, “[a] couple of months before the trial,” to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial. App. 66–67. But English declared under oath that “the first time [he] told [McCoy] that [he] intended to concede to the jury that [McCoy] was the killer” was July 12, 2011, two weeks before trial commenced. Encouraging a guilty plea pretrial, of course, is not equivalent to imparting to a defendant counsel’s strategic determination to concede guilt should trial occur. 4 MCCOY v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court At the beginning of his |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court At the beginning of his opening statement at the guilt phase of the trial, English told the jury there was “no way reasonably possible” that they could hear the prosecution’s evidence and reach “any other conclusion than Robert McCoy was the cause of these individuals’ death.” at 504. McCoy protested; out of earshot of the jury, McCoy told the court that English was “selling [him] out” by maintaining that McCoy “murdered [his] family.” at 505–506. The trial court reiterated that English was “representing” McCoy and told McCoy that the court would not permit “any other outbursts.” Continuing his opening statement, English told the jury the evidence is “unambiguous,” “my client committed three murders.” McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi difficult to fathom. In his closing argument, English reiterated that McCoy was the killer. On that issue, English told the jury that he “took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor].” The jury then returned a unan- imous verdict of guilty of first-degree murder on all three counts. At the penalty phase, English again conceded “Robert McCoy committed these crimes,” but urged mercy in view of McCoy’s “serious mental and emo- tional issues,” The jury returned three death verdicts. Represented by new counsel, McCoy unsuccessfully moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by allowing English to concede McCoy “committed three murders,” over McCoy’s objection. The Louisiana Supreme Court af- firmed the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel had authority so to concede guilt, despite the defendant’s opposition to any admission of guilt. See 20–49 (La. 10/19/16), The concession was permissible, the court concluded, because counsel reasonably believed that admitting guilt afforded McCoy the best chance to Cite as: U. S. (2018) 5 Opinion of the Court avoid a death sentence. We granted certiorari in view of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on the question whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection. 582 U. S. (2017). Compare with the instant case, e.g., 842–846 (counsel’s pursuit of a “guilty but mentally ill” ver- dict over defendant’s “vociferous and repeated protesta- tions” of innocence violated defendant’s “constitutional right to make the fundamental decisions regarding his case”); 18 (counsel’s admission of client’s involvement in murder when client adamantly maintained his innocence contravened Sixth Amendment right to counsel and due process right to a fair trial). II A The Sixth Amendment guarantees to each criminal defendant “the Assistance of Counsel for his |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | to each criminal defendant “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” At common law, self-representation was the norm. See Fa- (citing 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 211 (2d ed. 1909)). As the laws of England and the American Colonies developed, providing for a right to counsel in criminal cases, self-representation remained common and the right to proceed without counsel was recognized. –828. Even now, when most defendants choose to be represented by counsel, see, e.g., Goldschmidt & Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se Defense, 1996–2011: An Exploratory Study, 8 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 81, 91 (2015) (0.2% of federal felony defend- ants proceeded pro se), an accused may insist upon repre- senting herself—however counterproductive that course may be, see As this Court 6 MCCOY v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court explained, “[t]he right to defend is personal,” and a de- fendant’s choice in exercising that right “must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ ” (quoting 350–351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see McKaskle v. Wiggins, (“The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused.”). The choice is not all or nothing: To gain assistance, a defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel. For the Sixth Amendment, in “grant[ing] to the accused personally the right to make his defense,” “speaks of the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.” –820; see Gannett (1979) (the Sixth Amendment “contemplat[es] a norm in which the accused, and not a lawyer, is master of his own defense”). Trial management is the lawyer’s province: Counsel provides his or her assistance by making deci- sions such as “what arguments to pursue, what eviden- tiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Some decisions, however, are reserved for the client—notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs in this latter category. Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence against her, or reject the assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant’s own inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial. These are not strategic choices Cite as: U. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | capital trial. These are not strategic choices Cite as: U. S. (2018) 7 Opinion of the Court about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U. S. (2017) (slip op., at 6) (2017) (self-representation will often increase the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome but “is based on the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty”); (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Our system of laws generally presumes that the criminal defendant, after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the State.”). Counsel may reasonably assess a concession of guilt as best suited to avoiding the death penalty, as English did in this case. But the client may not share that objective. He may wish to avoid, above all else, the opprobrium that comes with admitting he killed family members. Or he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk death for any hope, however small, of exoneration. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21–22 (it is for the defendant to make the value judgment whether “to take a minuscule chance of not being convicted and spending a life in prison”); Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal De- fendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 B. U. L. Rev. 17, 1178 (for some defendants, “the possibility of an acquittal, even if remote, may be more valuable than the difference between a life and a death sentence”); cf. Jae Lee v. United States, 582 U. S. (2017) (slip op., at 12) (recognizing that a defendant might reject a plea and prefer “taking a chance at trial” despite “[a]lmost cer- tai[n]” conviction (emphasis deleted)). When a client expressly asserts that the objective of “his defence” is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his law- yer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt. U. S. Const., Amdt. 6 (emphasis add- 8 MCCOY v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court ed); see ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (2016) (a “lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions con- cerning the objectives of the representation”). Preserving for the defendant the ability to decide whether to maintain his innocence should not displace counsel’s, or the court’s, respective trial management roles. See (“[n]umerous choices affecting conduct of the trial” do not require client consent, including “the objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance”); cf. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance”); cf. post, at 8–9. Counsel, in any case, must still develop a trial strategy and discuss it with her client, see 543 U.S., explaining why, in her view, conceding guilt would be the best option. In this case, the court had determined that McCoy was competent to stand trial, i.e., that McCoy had “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reason- able degree of rational understanding.” ).3 If, after consultations with English concerning the management of the defense, McCoy disagreed with English’s proposal to concede McCoy committed three murders, it was not open to Eng- lish to override McCoy’s objection. English could not interfere with McCoy’s telling the jury “I was not the murderer,” although counsel could, if consistent with providing effective assistance, focus his own collaboration on urging that McCoy’s mental state weighed against conviction. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21–23. B see at 1–2, is not to the con- trary. ’s attorney did not negate ’s autonomy by overriding ’s desired defense objective, for —————— 3 Several times, English did express his view that McCoy was not, in fact, competent to stand trial. See App. 388, 436. Cite as: U. S. (2018) 9 Opinion of the Court never asserted any such objective. “was generally unresponsive” during discussions of trial strategy, and “never verbally approved or protested” counsel’s proposed 543 U.S., complained about the admission of his guilt only after trial. McCoy, in contrast, opposed English’s assertion of his guilt at every opportunity, before and during trial, both in confer- ence with his lawyer and in open court. See App. 286–287, 456, 505–506. See also A.2d, at 847 (distin- guishing because, “[i]n stark contrast to the defend- ant’s silence in that case, Cooke repeatedly objected to his counsel’s objective of obtaining a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and asserted his factual innocence consistent with his plea of not guilty”). If a client declines to partici- pate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant’s best interest. Presented with ex- press statements of the client’s will to maintain innocence, however, counsel may not steer the ship the other way. See (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“[A]ction taken by counsel over his client’s objection ha[s] the effect of revoking [counsel’s] agency with respect to the action in question.”). The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that English’s refusal to maintain McCoy’s innocence was necessitated by Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) (2017), which provides that “[a] |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) (2017), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” Presenting McCoy’s alibi defense, the court said, would put English in an “ethical conundrum,” implicating Eng- lish in perjury. at 565 ). But McCoy’s case does not resemble Nix, where the defendant told his lawyer that he intended to commit perjury. There was no such avowed perjury here. Cf. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 10 MCCOY v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court 3.3, Comment 8 (“The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evi- dence is false.”). English harbored no doubt that McCoy believed what he was saying, see App. 285–286; English simply disbelieved McCoy’s account in view of the prosecu- tion’s evidence. English’s express motivation for conceding guilt was not to avoid suborning perjury, but to try to build credibility with the jury, and thus obtain a sentence lesser than death. Louisiana’s ethical rules might have stopped English from presenting McCoy’s alibi evidence if English knew perjury was involved. But Loui- siana has identified no ethical rule requiring English to admit McCoy’s guilt over McCoy’s objection. See 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure p. 935 (4th ed. 2015) (“A lawyer is not placed in a professionally embarrassing position when he is reluc- tantly required to go to trial in a weak case, since that decision is clearly attributed to his client.”). The dissent describes the conflict between English and McCoy as “rare” and “unlikely to recur.” Post, at 2, 5–7, and n. 2. Yet the Louisiana Supreme Court parted ways with three other State Supreme Courts that have ad- dressed this conflict in the past twenty years. People v. Bergerud, (“Although defense counsel is free to develop defense theories based on reasonable assessments of the evidence, as guided by her professional judgment, she cannot usurp those funda- mental choices given directly to criminal defendants by the United States and the Colorado Constitutions.”); Cooke, ; Carter, P.3d 1138 In each of the three cases, as here, the defendant repeatedly and adamantly insisted on main- taining his factual innocence despite counsel’s preferred course: concession of the defendant’s commission of crimi- nal acts and pursuit of diminished capacity, mental ill- ness, or lack of premeditation defenses. See Bergerud, 223 Cite as: U. S. (2018) 11 Opinion of the Court P. 3d, at 690–; A.2d, at 8; Carter, 270 Kan., at P. 3d, at 11. These were not |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | 270 Kan., at P. 3d, at 11. These were not strategic disputes about whether to concede an element of a charged offense, cf. post, at 8; they were intractable disagreements about the fundamental objective of the defendant’s repre- sentation. For McCoy, that objective was to maintain “I did not kill the members of my family.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. In this stark scenario, we agree with the majority of state courts of last resort that counsel may not admit her client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s intransi- gent objection to that admission. III Because a client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence, is in issue, we do not apply our ineffective-assistance-of- counsel jurisprudence, v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 or United to McCoy’s claim. See Brief for Petitioner 43–48; Brief for Respondent 46–52. To gain redress for attorney error, a defendant ordinarily must show prejudice. See Here, however, the violation of McCoy’s protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue within McCoy’s sole prerogative. Violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy ranks as error of the kind our decisions have called “structural”; when present, such an error is not subject to harmless-error review. See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S., at 177, n. 8 (harmless-error analysis is inapplicable to deprivations of the self-representation right, because “[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless”); United States v. -Lopez, 548 U.S. 0, ; (public trial is structural). Structural error “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,” as distinguished from a 12 MCCOY v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court lapse or flaw that is “simply an error in the trial process itself.” An error may be ranked structural, we have explained, “if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,” such as “the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty.” Weaver, 582 U. S., at (slip op., at 6) (citing 422 U.S., at 834). An error might also count as structural when its effects are too hard to measure, as is true of the right to counsel of choice, or where the error will inevitably signal fundamental unfairness, as we have said of a judge’s failure to tell the jury that it may not convict unless it finds the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 582 U. S., at – (slip op., at 6–7) ). Under at least the first two rationales, counsel’s |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,018 | 5 | majority | McCoy v. Louisiana | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4497656/mccoy-v-louisiana/ | 6–7) ). Under at least the first two rationales, counsel’s admis- sion of a client’s guilt over the client’s express objection is error structural in kind. See A.2d, at 849 (“Counsel’s override negated Cooke’s decisions regarding his constitutional rights, and created a structural defect in the proceedings as a whole.”). Such an admission blocks the defendant’s right to make the fundamental choices about his own defense. And the effects of the admission would be immeasurable, because a jury would almost certainly be swayed by a lawyer’s concession of his client’s guilt. McCoy must therefore be accorded a new trial with- out any need first to show prejudice.4 —————— 4 The dissent suggests that a remand would be in order, so that the Louisiana Supreme Court, in the first instance, could consider the structural-error question. See post, at 10–11. “[W]e did not grant certiorari to review” that question. Post, at 10. But McCoy raised his structural-error argument in his opening brief, see Brief for Petitioner 38–43, and Louisiana explicitly chose not to grapple with it, see Brief Cite as: U. S. (2018) 13 Opinion of the Court * * * Larry English was placed in a difficult position; he had an unruly client and faced a strong government case. He reasonably thought the objective of his representation should be avoidance of the death penalty. But McCoy insistently maintained: “I did not murder my family.” App. 506. Once he communicated that to court and coun- sel, strenuously objecting to English’s proposed strategy, a concession of guilt should have been off the table. The trial court’s allowance of English’s admission of McCoy’s guilt despite McCoy’s insistent objections was incompati- ble with the Sixth Amendment. Because the error was structural, a new trial is the required corrective. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. —————— for Respondent 45, n. 5. In any event, “we have the authority to make our own assessment of the harmlessness of a constitutional error in the first instance.” ). Cite as: U. S. (2018) 1 ALITO, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 16–8255 ROBERT LEROY MCCOY, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | majority | Tuilaepa v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117875/tuilaepa-v-california/ | In California, to sentence a defendant to death for firstdegree murder the trier of fact must find the defendant guilty and also find one or more of 19 special circumstances listed in Cal. Penal Code Ann. 190.2 (West 1988 and Supp. 1994). The case then proceeds to the penalty phase, where the trier of fact must consider a number of specified factors in deciding whether to sentence the defendant to death. 190.3.[*] These two cases present the question whether three of the 190.3 penalty-phase factors are unconstitutionally vague under decisions of this Court construing the *970 Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. I Petitioner Tuilaepa's case arises out of a murder he committed in Long Beach, California, in October 1986. Tuilaepa and an accomplice walked into the Wander Inn Bar in Long Beach, where a small crowd had gathered to watch Monday Night Football. Tuilaepa, who was carrying a22-caliber rifle, approached the bartender, pointed the rifle at him, and demanded money from the cash register. After the bartender turned over the money, Tuilaepa and his accomplice began robbing the bar's patrons. When the accomplice demanded money from a man named Melvin Whiddon, Whiddon refused and knocked the accomplice to the floor. Tuilaepa shot Whiddon in the neck and next shot Whiddon's brother, Kelvin, who was standing nearby. Tuilaepa turned to another man, Bruce Monroe, and shot him in the stomach. As Tuilaepa and his accomplice ran toward the back door, they confronted Kenneth Boone. Tuilaepa shot Boone in the neck. Melvin Whiddon died at the scene from the gunshot wounds; the others suffered serious and in some cases permanent injuries. The State sought the death penalty against Tuilaepa, charging him with the murder of Melvin Whiddon and one special circumstance under 190.2: murder during the commission of a robbery. The jury found Tuilaepa guilty of first-degree murder and also found the special circumstance true. At the penalty phase, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider the relevant sentencing factors specified in 190.3. The jury was unanimous in sentencing Tuilaepa to death. Petitioner Proctor murdered Bonnie Stendal, a 55-year-old schoolteacher who lived in Burney, a small community in Shasta County, California. On a night in April 1982, Proctor entered Mrs. Stendal's home and beat her, causing numerous *971 cuts and bruises on her face. Proctor stabbed Mrs. Stendal in the neck several times and inflicted seven stab wounds in the area of the right breast. Proctor raped Mrs. Stendal and committed further sexual assaults with a foreign object. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | majority | Tuilaepa v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117875/tuilaepa-v-california/ | Stendal and committed further sexual assaults with a foreign object. After beating, torturing, and raping Mrs. Stendal, Proctor strangled her to death and dumped her body on the side of the road near Lake Britton, 12 miles from Burney. The body was found late the next afternoon, clad in a nightgown with hands tied behind the back. The State sought the death penalty against Proctor, charging him with murder and a number of special circumstances under 190.2 including murder during the commission of a rape, murder during the commission of a burglary, and infliction of torture during a murder. The jury found Proctor guilty of murder and found the three special circumstances true. After a mistrial at the penalty phase, Proctor's motion for change of venue was granted, and a new sentencing jury was empaneled in Sacramento County. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider the sentencing factors specified in 190.3. The jury was unanimous in sentencing Proctor to death. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of California, which affirmed their convictions and death sentences. No. 93-5131, and No. 93-5161, We granted certiorari, and now affirm. II A Our capital punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the capital decisionmaking process: the eligibility decision and the selection decision. To be eligible for the death penalty, the defendant must be convicted of a crime for which the death penalty is a proportionate punishment. To render a defendant eligible for the death penalty *972 in a homicide case, we have indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one "aggravating circumstance" (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase. See, e. g., ; v.Stephens, The aggravating circumstance may be contained in the definition of the crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or in both). at As we have explained, the aggravating circumstance must meet two requirements. First, the circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder. See Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague. ; see ). We have imposed a separate requirement for the selection decision, where the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence. "What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime." ; see also U.S. 280, That requirement is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | majority | Tuilaepa v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117875/tuilaepa-v-california/ | the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. ; see The eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined classification. Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an answer to a question with a factual nexus to the crime or the defendant so as to "make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." The selection decision, on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure an assessment of the defendant's culpability. The objectives of these two inquiries can be in some tension, at least when the inquiries occur at the same time. See Romano v. Oklahoma, ante, at 6 (referring to "two somewhat contradictory tasks"). There is one principle common to both decisions, however: The State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision. See U.S. 153, (procedures must "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"). That is the controlling objective when we examine eligibility and selection factors for vagueness. Indeed, it is the reason that eligibility and selection factors (at least in some sentencing schemes) may not be "too vague." at ; see -364 Because "the proper degree of definition" of eligibility and selection factors often "is not susceptible of mathematical precision," our vagueness review is quite deferential. ; see Relying on the basic principle that a factor is not unconstitutional if it has some "common-sense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding," U.S. 262, we *974 have found only a few factors vague, and those in fact are quite similar to one another. See Maynard ; ; cf. In providing for individualized sentencing, it must be recognized that the States may adopt capital sentencing processes that rely upon the jury, in its sound judgment, to exercise wide discretion. That is evident from the numerous factors we have upheld against vagueness challenges. See, e. g.,at 472-473 (question whether the defendant was a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" is not unconstitutionally vague); at ; U.S. 242, (various "mitigating" questions not unconstitutionally vague, nor is the question whether the crime was a "conscienceless or pitiless crime which [wa]s unnecessarily torturous to the victim") ; In our decisions holding a death sentence unconstitutional because of a vague sentencing factor, the State had presented a specific proposition that the sentencer had to find true or false (e. g., whether the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel). We have |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | majority | Tuilaepa v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117875/tuilaepa-v-california/ | the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel). We have held, under certain sentencing schemes, that a vague propositional factor used in the sentencing decision creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process *975 prohibited by See Those concerns are mitigated when a factor does not require a yes or a no answer to a specific question, but instead only points the sentencer to a subject matter. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. 190.3(a), (k) Both types of factors (and the distinction between the two is not always clear) have their utility. For purposes of vagueness analysis, however, in examining the propositional content of a factor, our concern is that the factor have some "common-sense core of meaning. that criminal juries should be capable of understanding." at B With those principles in mind, we consider petitioners' vagueness challenge to the California scheme. A defendant in California is eligible for the death penalty when the jury finds him guilty of first-degree murder and finds one of the 190.2 special circumstances true. See (Petitioners do not argue that the special circumstances found in their cases were insufficient, so we do not address that part of California's scheme save to describe its relation to the selection phase.) At the penalty phase, the jury is instructed to consider numerous other factors listed in 190.3 in deciding whether to impose the death penalty on a particular defendant. Petitioners contend that three of those 190.3 sentencing factors are unconstitutional and that, as a consequence, it was error to instruct their juries to consider them. Both Proctor and Tuilaepa challenge factor (a), which requires the sentencer to consider the "circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence *976 of any special circumstances found to be true." Tuilaepa challenges two other factors as well: factor (b), which requires the sentencer to consider "[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence"; and factor (i), which requires the sentencer to consider "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime." We conclude that none of the three factors is defined in terms that violate the Constitution. Petitioners' challenge to factor (a) is at some odds with settled principles, for our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See, e. g., U. S., at 304 |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | majority | Tuilaepa v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117875/tuilaepa-v-california/ | the death penalty. See, e. g., U. S., at 304 We would be hard pressed to invalidate a jury instruction that implements what we have said the law requires. In any event, this California factor instructs the jury to consider a relevant subject matter and does so in understandable terms. The circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the circumstances is neither vague nor otherwise improper under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Tuilaepa also challenges factor (b), which requires the sentencer to consider the defendant's prior criminal activity. The objection fails for many of the same reasons. Factor (b) is phrased in conventional and understandable terms and rests in large part on a determination whether certain events occurred, thus asking the jury to consider matters of historical fact. Under other sentencing schemes, in Texas for example, jurors may be asked to make a predictive judgment, such as "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would *977 constitute a continuing threat to society." See U. S., at 269. Both a backward-looking and a forwardlooking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process, however, and the States have considerable latitude in determining how to guide the sentencer's decision in this respect. Here, factor (b) is not vague. Tuilaepa's third challenge is to factor (i), which requires the sentencer to consider "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime." This again is an unusual challenge in light of our precedents. See The factual inquiry is of the most rudimentary sort, and there is no suggestion that the term "age" is vague. Petitioner contends, however, that the age factor is equivocal and that in the typical case the prosecution argues in favor of the death penalty based on the defendant's age, no matter how old or young he was at the time of the crime. It is neither surprising nor remarkable that the relevance of the defendant's age can pose a dilemma for the sentencer. But difficulty in application is not equivalent to vagueness. Both the prosecution and the defense may present valid arguments as to the significance of the defendant's age in a particular case. Competing arguments by adversary parties bring perspective to a problem, and thus serve to promote a more reasoned decision, providing guidance as to a factor jurors most likely would discuss in any event. We find no constitutional deficiency in factor (i). C Petitioners could not and do not take great issue with the conclusion that factors |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | majority | Tuilaepa v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117875/tuilaepa-v-california/ | do not take great issue with the conclusion that factors (a), (b), and (i) provide common and understandable terms to the sentencer. Cf. Petitioners argue, however, that selection factors must meet the requirements for eligibility *978 factors, Brief for Petitioner in No. 93-5161, pp. 10-25, and therefore must require an answer to a factual question, as eligibility factors do. According to petitioners, a capital jury may not be instructed simply to consider an open-ended subject matter, such as "the circumstances of the crime" or "the background of the defendant." Apart from the fact that petitioners' argument ignores the obvious utility of these open-ended factors as part of a neutral sentencing process, it contravenes our precedents. Our decisions in and reveal that, at the selection stage, the States are not confined to submitting to the jury specific propositional questions. In we found no constitutional difficulty where the jury had been told to consider "`all facts and circumstances presented in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for the State and for the Defense.' " 462 U.S., at -880, 889, n. 25. We also stated that "[n]othing in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take account of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination." And in we rejected a vagueness challenge to that same Georgia sentencing scheme in a case in which the "judge charged the jury that in determining what sentence was appropriate the jury was free to consider the facts and circumstances, if any, presented by the parties in mitigation or aggravation." U.S., at 161, 203-204. In both cases, therefore, the Court found no constitutional problem with a death sentence where the jury instructions directed consideration of the "facts and circumstances" of the case. In these cases as well, we must reject petitioners' suggestion that the Constitution prohibits sentencing instructions that require the trier of fact to consider a relevant subject matter such as the "circumstances of the crime." Petitioners also suggest that the 190.3 sentencing factors are flawed because they do not instruct the sentencer how to *979 weigh any of the facts it finds in deciding upon the ultimate sentence. In this regard, petitioners claim that a single list of factors is unconstitutional because it does not guide the jury in evaluating and weighing the evidence and allows the prosecution (as well as the defense) to make wide-ranging arguments about whether the defendant deserves the death penalty. This argument, too, is foreclosed by our cases. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,994 | 4 | majority | Tuilaepa v. California | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117875/tuilaepa-v-california/ | death penalty. This argument, too, is foreclosed by our cases. A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. In for example, we upheld an instruction informing the jury that the Governor had the power to commute life sentences and stated that "the fact that the jury is given no specific guidance on how the commutation factor is to figure into its determination presents no constitutional problem." 463 U.S., at -1009, n. 22. Likewise, in we upheld the Florida capital sentencing scheme even though "the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities [did] not have numerical weights assigned to them." U.S., at 258. In moreover, we "approved Georgia's capital sentencing statute even though it clearly did not channel the jury's discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." We also rejected an objection "to the wide scope of evidence and argument" allowed at sentencing U.S., at 203-204. In sum, "discretion to evaluate and weigh the circumstances relevant to the particular defendant and the crime he committed" is not impermissible in the capital sentencing process. 481 U.S. "Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." at Indeed, the sentencer may be given "unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be *980 imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty." ; see also In contravention of those cases, petitioners' argument would force the States to adopt a kind of mandatory sentencing scheme requiring a jury to sentence a defendant to death if it found, for example, a certain kind or number of facts, or found more statutory aggravating factors than statutory mitigating factors. The States are not required to conduct the capital sentencing process in that fashion. See The instructions to the juries in petitioners' cases directing consideration of factor (a), factor (b), and factor (i) did not violate the Constitution. The judgments of the Supreme Court of California are Affirmed. |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | majority | Papachristou v. Jacksonville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108472/papachristou-v-jacksonville/ | This case involves eight defendants who were convicted in a Florida municipal court of violating a Jacksonville, Florida, vagrancy ordinance.[1] Their convictions *157 were affirmed by the Florida Circuit Court in a consolidated appeal, and their petition for certiorari was denied by the District Court of Appeal on the authority of[2] The case is *158 here on a petition for certiorari, which we granted. For reasons which will appear, we reverse. At issue are five consolidated cases. Margaret Papachristou, Betty Calloway, Eugene Eddie Melton, and Leonard Johnson were all arrested early on a Sunday morning, and charged with vagrancy"prowling by auto." Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry were charged with vagrancy"vagabonds." Henry Edward Heath and a codefendant were arrested for vagrancy"loitering" and "common thief." Thomas Owen Campbell was charged with vagrancy "common thief." Hugh Brown was charged with vagrancy"disorderly loitering on street" and "disorderly conductresisting arrest with violence." The facts are stipulated. Papachristou and Calloway are white females. Melton and Johnson are black males. Papachristou was enrolled in a job-training program sponsored by the Employment Service at Florida Junior College in Jacksonville. Calloway was a typing and shorthand teacher at a state mental institution located near Jacksonville. She was the owner of the automobile in which the four defendants were arrested. Melton was a Vietnam war veteran who had been released from the Navy after nine months in a veterans' hospital. On the date of his arrest he was a part-time computer helper while attending college as a full-time student in Jacksonville. Johnson was a tow-motor operator in a grocery chain warehouse and was a lifelong resident of Jacksonville. At the time of their arrest the four of them were riding *159 in Calloway's car on the main thoroughfare in Jacksonville. They had left a restaurant owned by Johnson's uncle where they had eaten and were on their way to a nightclub. The arresting officers denied that the racial mixture in the car played any part in the decision to make the arrest. The arrest, they said, was made because the defendants had stopped near a used-car lot which had been broken into several times. There was, however, no evidence of any breaking and entering on the night in question. Of these four charged with "prowling by auto" none had been previously arrested except Papachristou who had once been convicted of a municipal offense. Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry (who is not a petitioner) were arrested between 9 and 10 a. m. on a weekday in downtown Jacksonville, while waiting for a friend who was to lend them a |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | majority | Papachristou v. Jacksonville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108472/papachristou-v-jacksonville/ | waiting for a friend who was to lend them a car so they could apply for a job at a produce company. Smith was a part-time produce worker and part-time organizer for a Negro political group. He had a common-law wife and three children supported by him and his wife. He had been arrested several times but convicted only once. Smith's companion, Henry, was an 18-year-old high school student with no previous record of arrest. This morning it was cold, and Smith had no jacket, so they went briefly into a dry cleaning shop to wait, but left when requested to do so. They thereafter walked back and forth two or three times over a two-block stretch looking for their friend. The store owners, who apparently were wary of Smith and his companion, summoned two police officers who searched the men and found neither had a weapon. But they were arrested because the officers said they had no identification and because the officers did not believe their story. Heath and a codefendant were arrested for "loitering" and for "common thief." Both were residents of Jacksonville, Heath having lived there all his life and being *160 employed at an automobile body shop. Heath had previously been arrested but his codefendant had no arrest record. Heath and his companion were arrested when they drove up to a residence shared by Heath's girl friend and some other girls. Some police officers were already there in the process of arresting another man. When Heath and his companion started backing out of the driveway, the officers signaled to them to stop and asked them to get out of the car, which they did. Thereupon they and the automobile were searched. Although no contraband or incriminating evidence was found, they were both arrested, Heath being charged with being a "common thief" because he was reputed to be a thief. The codefendant was charged with "loitering" because he was standing in the driveway, an act which the officers admitted was done only at their command. Campbell was arrested as he reached his home very early one morning and was charged with "common thief." He was stopped by officers because he was traveling at a high rate of speed, yet no speeding charge was placed against him. Brown was arrested when he was observed leaving a downtown Jacksonville hotel by a police officer seated in a cruiser. The police testified he was reputed to be a thief, narcotics pusher, and generally opprobrious character. The officer called Brown over to the car, intending at that time to arrest him |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | majority | Papachristou v. Jacksonville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108472/papachristou-v-jacksonville/ | to the car, intending at that time to arrest him unless he had a good explanation for being on the street. Brown walked over to the police cruiser, as commanded, and the officer began to search him, apparently preparatory to placing him in the car. In the process of the search he came on two small packets which were later found to contain heroin. When the officer touched the pocket where the packets were, Brown began to resist. He was charged with "disorderly loitering on street" and "disorderly *161 conductresisting arrest with violence." While he was also charged with a narcotics violation, that charge was nolled. Jacksonville's ordinance and Florida's statute were "derived from early English law," and employ "archaic language" in their definitions of vagrants. The history is an oftentold tale. The breakup of feudal estates in England led to labor shortages which in turn resulted in the Statutes of Laborers,[3] designed to stabilize the labor force by prohibiting increases in wages and prohibiting the movement of workers from their home areas in search of improved conditions. Later vagrancy laws became criminal aspects of the poor laws. The series of laws passed in England on the subject became increasingly severe.[4]*162 But "the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fits the facts," The conditions which spawned these laws may be gone, but the archaic classifications remain. This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," United s v. Harriss, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. ; Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the commands or forbids." Lanzetta is one of a well-recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending conduct. See ; ; United s v. Cohen Grocery Co., In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United s, ; United s v. National Dairy Products Corp., ; United s v. Petrillo, The poor among us, the minorities, the average house-holder are not in business and not alerted to the regulatory *163 schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | majority | Papachristou v. Jacksonville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108472/papachristou-v-jacksonville/ | caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United s, ; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United s, The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally innocent. "Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, 202 So. 2d, only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, "common night walkers." We know, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result. Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was a national virtue in his Commonwealth and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville. "[P]ersons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children"like habitually living "without visible means of support"might implicate unemployed pillars of the community who have married rich wives. "[P]ersons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children" may also embrace unemployed people out of the labor market, by reason of a recession[5] or disemployed by reason of technological or so-called structural displacements. *164 Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay.[6] The qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served" would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs. Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be "casing" a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes. The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence. They are embedded in Walt Whitman's writings, especially in his "Song of the Open Road." They are reflected, too, in the spirit of Vachel Lindsay's "I |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | majority | Papachristou v. Jacksonville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108472/papachristou-v-jacksonville/ | are reflected, too, in the spirit of Vachel Lindsay's "I Want to Go Wandering," and by Henry D. Thoreau.[7] *165 This aspect of the vagrancy ordinance before us is suggested by what this Court said in 1876 about a broad criminal statute enacted by Congress: "It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." United s v. Reese, While that was a federal case, the due process implications are equally applicable to the s and to this vagrancy ordinance. Here the net cast is large, not to give the courts the power to pick and choose but to increase the arsenal of the police. In the Court struck down a New York statute that made criminal the distribution of a magazine made up principally of items of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person. The infirmity the Court found was vaguenessthe absence of "ascertainable standards of guilt" (id., at 515) in the *166 sensitive First Amendment area.[8] Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented. But concerned as he, and many others,[9] had been over the vagrancy laws, he added: "Only a word needs to be said regarding The case involved a New Jersey statute of the type that seek to control `vagrancy.' These statutes are in a class by themselves, in view of the familiar abuses to which they are put. Definiteness is designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be cast at large, to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense. In short, these `vagrancy statutes' and laws against `gangs' are not fenced in by the text of the statute or by the subject matter so as to give notice of conduct to be avoided." Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized[10] as the one in this ordinance, those convicted *167 may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority: "The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits `conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems *168 that appear to have no other immediate solution." Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration,[11] |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | majority | Papachristou v. Jacksonville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108472/papachristou-v-jacksonville/ | have no other immediate solution." Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration,[11] Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus, not on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes, though long common in Russia,[12] are not compatible with our constitutional *169 system. We allow our police to make arrests only on "probable cause,"[13] a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to the s[14] as well as to the Federal Government. Arresting a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for investigation, is foreign to our system, even when the arrest is for past criminality. Future criminality, however, is the common justification for the presence of vagrancy statutes. See Florida has, indeed, construed her vagrancy statute "as necessary regulations," inter alia, "to deter vagabondage and prevent crimes." ; Smith v. A direction by a legislature to the police to arrest all "suspicious" persons[15] would not pass constitutional muster. A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the arrest. People : "It would be in the highest degree unfortunate if in any part of the country those who are responsible for setting in motion the criminal law should entertain, connive at or coquette with the idea that in a case where there is not enough evidence to charge the prisoner with an attempt to commit a crime, the prosecution may, nevertheless, on such insufficient evidence, succeed in obtaining and upholding a conviction under the Vagrancy Act, 1824." Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinancepoor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlersmay be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure." It results in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to "stand on a public sidewalk only at the whim of any police officer." Under this ordinance, "[I]f some carefree type of fellow is satisfied to work just so much, and no more, as will pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | majority | Papachristou v. Jacksonville | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108472/papachristou-v-jacksonville/ | pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse daily, but a court thinks this kind of living subhuman, the fellow can be forced to raise his sights or go to jail as a vagrant." Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, *171 Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standardsthat crime is being nipped in the budis too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together. The Jacksonville ordinance cannot be squared with our constitutional standards and is plainly unconstitutional. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Berghuis v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1725/berghuis-v-smith/ | The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community. See The ques tion presented in this case is whether that right was ac corded to respondent Diapolis an African-American convicted of second-degree murder by an all-white jury in Kent County, Michigan in 1993. At the time of ’s trial, African-Americans constituted 7.28% of Kent County’s jury-eligible population, and 6% of the pool from which potential jurors were drawn. In this Court three showings a criminal defendant must make to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amend ment’s fair-cross-section requirement. He or she must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘dis tinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representa tion of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under 2 BERGHUIS v. SMITH Opinion of the Court representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” The first show ing is, in most cases, easily made; the second and third are more likely to generate controversy. The defendant in readily met all three measures. He complained of the dearth of women in the Jackson County, Missouri, jury pool. To establish underrepresen tation, he proved that women were 54% of the jury-eligible population, but accounted for only 26.7% of the persons summoned for jury service, and only 14.5% of the persons on the postsummons weekly venires from which jurors were drawn. To show the “systematic” cause of the under representation, pointed to Missouri’s law exempt ing women from jury service, and to the manner in which Jackson County administered the exemption. Concluding that no significant state interest could justify Missouri’s explicitly gender-based exemption, this Court held the law, as implemented in Jackson County, violative of the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement. We here review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding that “sat isf[ied] the prima facie test established by” and granting him habeas corpus relief, i.e., release from im prisonment absent a new trial commenced within 180 days of the Court of Appeals’ order. Despite marked differences between ’s case and ’s, and a cogent Michigan Supreme Court decision holding that “ha[d] not shown systematic exclu sion,” 3 (2000), the Sixth Circuit found the matter settled. Cog nizant of the restrictions Congress placed on federal ha beas review of state-court convictions, the Court |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Berghuis v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1725/berghuis-v-smith/ | on federal ha beas review of state-court convictions, the Court of Ap peals considered that a decision contrary to its own would “involv[e] an unreasonable application o[f] clearly estab lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S. C. 543 F. 3d, Cite as: 559 U. S. (20) 3 Opinion of the Court at 335. The Sixth Circuit erred in so ruling. No decision of this Court “clearly establishe[s]” ’s entitlement to fed eral-court relief. According to the Sixth Circuit, had demonstrated that a Kent County prospective-juror assignment procedure, which calls “siphoning,” “systematic[ally] exclu[ded]” African-Americans. Under this procedure, Kent County assigned prospective jurors first to local district courts, and, only after filling local needs, made remaining persons available to the county wide Circuit Court, which heard felony cases like ’s. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, had rejected ’s “siphoning” plea for lack of proof that the assign ment procedure caused 463 Mich., at 615 N.W. 2d, at 3. As that determination was not at all unreasonable, the Sixth Circuit had no warrant to disturb it. See In addition to renewal of his “siphoning” argument, here urges that a host of factors combined to reduce systematically the number of African-Americans appear ing on Kent County jury lists, for example, the Kent County court’s practice of excusing people without ade quate proof of alleged hardship, and the refusal of Kent County police to enforce orders for prospective jurors to appear. Brief for Respondent 53–54. Our decisions do not address factors of the kind urges. We have cau tioned, however, that “[t]he fair-cross-section principle must have much leeway in application.” 419 U.S., –538; see (Court’s holding that Sixth Amendment is violated by systematic exclusion of women from jury service “does not augur or authorize the fashion ing of detailed jury-selection codes by federal courts.”). I A On November 7, 1991, Christopher Rumbley was shot 4 BERGHUIS v. SMITH Opinion of the Court and killed during a bar brawl in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The bar was crowded at the time of the brawl, with 200-to 300 people on the premises. All patrons of the bar were African-American. The State charged with the murder in Kent County Circuit Court. Voir dire for ’s trial took place in September 1993. The venire panel included between 60 and 0 individuals. The parties agree that, at most, three venire members were African-American. unsuccessfully objected to the composition of the venire panel. ’s case proceeded to trial before an all-white jury. The case for the prosecution turned on the identity of the man |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Berghuis v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1725/berghuis-v-smith/ | for the prosecution turned on the identity of the man who shot Rumbley. Thirty-seven witnesses from the bar, including testified at the trial. Of those, two testified that fired the gun. Five testified that the shooter was not and the remainder made no identi fications of the shooter. The jury convicted of sec ond-degree murder and possession of a firearm during a felony, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. B On first appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on ’s fair-cross-section claim. The hearing occurred in early 1998. ’s evidence showed that Grand Rapids, the largest city in Kent County, was home to roughly 37% of Kent County’s population, and to 85% of its African- American residents. Felony charges in Kent County were tried in a sole Circuit Court. Misdemeanors were prose cuted in 12 district courts, each covering a discrete geo graphical area. To fill the courts’ venires, Kent County sent questionnaires to prospective jurors. The Circuit Court Administrator testified that about 5% of the forms were returned as undeliverable, and another 15 to 20% were not answered. App. 13a. From the pool of prospec Cite as: 559 U. S. (20) 5 Opinion of the Court tive jurors who completed questionnaires, the County granted requests for hardship exemptions, e.g., for lack of transportation or child care. at 21a. Kent County then assigned nonexempt prospective jurors to their local district courts’ After filling the district courts’ needs, the County assigned the remaining prospective jurors to the Circuit Court’s panels. at 20a, 22a. The month after voir dire for ’s trial, Kent County reversed the assignment order. It did so, according to the Circuit Court Administrator, based on “[t]he belief that the respective districts essentially swallowed up most of the minority jurors,” leaving the Circuit Court with a jury pool that “did not represent the entire county.” at 22a. The Jury Minority Representation Committee, its co-chair testified, held the same view concerning the impact of choosing district court jurors first and not returning un used persons to the pool available for Circuit Court selec tions. 4a–65a. The trial court considered two means of measuring the extent of underrepresentation of African-Americans on Circuit Court venires: “absolute disparity” and “compara tive disparity.” “Absolute disparity” is determined by subtracting the percentage of African-Americans in the jury pool (here, 6% in the six months leading up to ’s trial) from the percentage of African-Americans in the local, jury-eligible population (here, 7.28%). By an abso lute disparity measure, therefore, African-Americans |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Berghuis v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1725/berghuis-v-smith/ | (here, 7.28%). By an abso lute disparity measure, therefore, African-Americans were underrepresented by 1.28%. “Comparative disparity” is determined by dividing the absolute disparity (here, 1.28%) by the group’s representation in the jury-eligible population (here, 7.28%). The quotient (here, 18%), showed that, in the six months prior to ’s trial, African-Americans were, on average, 18% less likely, when compared to the overall jury-eligible population, to be on the jury-service list. App. to Pet. for Cert. 215a. Isolating the month ’s jury was selected, ’s 6 BERGHUIS v. SMITH Opinion of the Court statistics expert estimated that the comparative disparity was 34.8%. App. 181a. In the 11 months after Kent County discontinued the district-court-first assignment policy, the comparative disparity, on average, dropped from 18% to 15.1%. at 2a–3a, 113a. also introduced the testimony of an expert in demographics and economics, who tied the underrepresen tation to social and economic factors. In Kent County, the expert explained, these forces made African-Americans less likely than whites to receive or return juror-eligibility questionnaires, and more likely to assert a hardship ex cuse. 9a–80a. The hearing convinced the trial court that African- Americans were underrepresented in Circuit Court veni res. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. But ’s evidence was insufficient, that court held, to prove that the juror assignment order, or any other part of the jury-selection process, had systematically excluded African-Americans. at 2a–212a. The court therefore rejected ’s fair-cross-section claim. C The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the juror allocation system in place at the relevant time did result in the underrepresentation of African-Americans. at 182a–183a. Reversing the trial court’s judgment, the intermediate appellate court ordered a new trial, with jurors selected under the Circuit-Court-first assignment order installed shortly after the voir dire in ’s case. ; see The Michigan Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, concluding that “ha[d] not established a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement.” 463 Mich., at 207, 615 N.W. 2d, at 4. The Michigan High Court observed, first, that this Court has specified “[no] Cite as: 559 U. S. (20) 7 Opinion of the Court preferred method for measuring whether representation of a distinctive group in the jury pool is fair and reasonable.” 615 N.W. 2d, at 2. The court then noted that lower federal courts had applied three different methods to measure fair and reasonable representation: the abso lute and comparative disparity tests, and “the standard deviation test.”1 Recognizing that no single test was entirely satisfactory, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case approach allowing consideration of all three means |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Berghuis v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1725/berghuis-v-smith/ | adopted a case-by-case approach allowing consideration of all three means of measuring 463 Mich., at 204, 615 N.W. 2d, at 3. ’s statistical evidence, the court found, “failed to establish a legally significant dis parity under either the absolute or comparative disparity tests.” at 204–, (The parties had presented no expert testimony regarding application of the standard deviation test. 615 N.W. 2d, at 3, n. 1; –6.) Nevertheless “grant[ing] [] the benefit of the doubt on unfair and unreasonable underrepresentation,” the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately determined that “he ha[d] not shown systematic ” 463 Mich., 615 N.W. 2d, at 2, 3. ’s evidence, the court said, did not show “how the alleged siphoning of African American jurors to district courts affected the circuit court jury pool.” at In particular, the court observed, “[t]he record does not dis close whether the district court jury pools contained more, fewer, or approximately the same percentage of minority jurors as the circuit court jury pool.” The court also ruled that “the influence of social and economic factors on —————— 1 Standard deviation analysis seeks to determine the probability that the disparity between a group’s jury-eligible population and the group’s percentage in the qualified jury pool is attributable to random chance. See 219–220, 9– (2000) (Cavanagh, J., concurring). 8 BERGHUIS v. SMITH Opinion of the Court juror participation does not demonstrate a systematic ” 615 N.W. 2d, at 3. D In February 2003, filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western Dis trict of Michigan, reasserting his fair-cross-section claim. Because is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), governed the District Court’s review of his application for federal habeas corpus relief. Under the controlling provision of AEDPA, codified in a state prisoner’s application may not be granted as to “any claim adjudicated in State court” unless the state court’s adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or “(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an un reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Applying these standards, the District Court dismissed ’s habeas petition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a–42a. The Court of Appeals reversed. Where, as here, the allegedly excluded group is small, the Sixth Circuit ruled, courts should use the comparative disparity test to meas ure In that court’s view, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Berghuis v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1725/berghuis-v-smith/ | comparative disparity test to meas ure In that court’s view, ’s comparative disparity statistics sufficed “to demonstrate that the representation of African American veniremen in Kent County was unfair and unreasonable.” As to systematic exclusion, the Sixth Circuit, in accord with the Michigan intermediate appel late court, believed that the juror-assignment order in effect when ’s jury was empaneled significantly Cite as: 559 U. S. (20) 9 Opinion of the Court reduced the number of African-Americans available for Circuit Court was entitled to relief, the court concluded, because no important state interest supported that allocation system.2 The State petitioned for certiorari attacking the Sixth Circuit’s decision on two principal grounds: First, the State charged that the federal appellate court erred in adopting the comparative disparity test to determine whether a distinctive group was underrepresented in the jury pool. Pet. for Cert. ii. Second, the State urged that, in any event, “there was no systematic exclusion of African Americans from juries in Kent County, Michigan,” and no warrant for the Sixth Circuit’s contrary determination.3 We granted review, 557 U. S. (2009), and now reverse the Sixth Circuit’s judgment. According to the Sixth Circuit, the Michigan Supreme Court’s rejection of ’s Sixth Amendment plea “in volved an unreasonable application o[f] clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this Court in ].” —————— 2 The Sixth Circuit also found that the Michigan Supreme Court had unreasonably applied when it declared that social and economic factors could not establish systematic –342. Because such factors disproportion ately affect African-Americans, the Sixth Circuit said, Kent County’s routine grants of certain hardship exemptions “produced systematic exclusion within the meaning of” The Sixth Circuit held, however, that the hardship exemptions could not establish a fair-cross section claim because the State “has a significant interest [in] avoiding undue burdens on individuals” by allowing such excuses. 3 Although the question presented by the State homes in on the proper measure for underrepresentation, it initially and more compre hensively inquires whether was denied his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. See Pet. for Cert. ii (asking “[w]hether the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that the Michigan Supreme Court failed to apply ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S. C. on the issue of the fair cross-section requirement under”). We therefore address that overarching issue. BERGHUIS v. SMITH Opinion of the Court (d)(1); see 543 F.3d, We disagree. As ex plained below, our decision hardly establishes—no less “clearly” so—that was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,010 | 5 | majority | Berghuis v. Smith | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1725/berghuis-v-smith/ | “clearly” so—that was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. II To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross section requirement, this Court’s pathmarking decision in instructs, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepre 439 U.S., ; see at 1–2. The defendant in successfully challenged Jackson County’s administration of a Missouri exemption permit ting any woman to opt out of jury service. 439 U.S., at 360. The Court explained why it was plain that defendant had established a prima facie case. First, women in Jackson County were both “numerous and distinct from men.” (quoting 419 U.S., 31). Second, ’s “statistical presentation” showed gross underrepresentation: Women were over half the jury eligible population; in stark contrast, they accounted for less than 15% of jury 439 U.S., –366. also demonstrated systematic exclusion with particularity. He proved that women’s underrepresenta tion was persistent—occurring in every weekly venire for almost a year—and he identified the two stages of the jury-selection process “when the systematic exclusion took place.” First, questionnaires for prospec tive jurors stated conspicuously that women could opt out of jury service. Less than 30% of those summoned were female, suggesting that women in large numbers claimed the exemption at the questionnaire stage. “More over, at the summons stage women were given another Cite as: 559 U. S. (20) 11 Opinion of the Court opportunity to [opt out].” –367. And if a woman ignored the summons, she was deemed to have opted out; no further inquiry was made. At this “final, venire, stage,” women’s representation plummeted to 14.5%. In the Federal District Court serving the same territory, the Court noted, despite a women-only childcare exemption, women accounted for nearly 40% of those actually serving on juries. See ib n. 25. The “disproportionate and consistent exclusion of women from the [Jackson County] jury wheel and at the venire stage,” the Court concluded, “was quite obviously due to the system by which juries were selected.” at 367. “[A]ppropriately tailored” hardship exemptions, the Court added, would likely survive a fair-cross-section challenge if justified by an important state interest. at 370. But no such interest, the Court held, could justify Missouri’s exemption for each and every woman—the altogether evident explanation for the underrepresenta tion. at 369–370. III A As the Michigan Supreme Court correctly observed, see neither nor any other decision of this Court specifies the method or test |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.