author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | Georgia elects 11 Members of United States House of Representatives. Georgia's African-American voting age population is just over 1.7 mil, or about 27 percent of a total voting age population of about 6.5 mil. See In 1992 Georgia's Legislature redrew congressional district boundaries so as to create an African-American voting age majority in 3 of 11 This Court held that three-district unconstitutional. On remand, District Court, inter alia, drew up a new redistricting with one majorityminority district. The basic legal issue before us now is wher District Court should have retained (not one but) two majority-minority The majority holds that District Court could lawfully create a new districting that retained only one such district. But in my view that decision departs dramatically from Georgia Legislature's preference for two such districtsa preference embodied in legislature's earlier congressional district s. A two-district is not unconstitutional. And District Court here, like District Court in "was not free to disregard political program of Legislature." For that reason, and ors, I dissent. I The majority fully understands relevance, and importance, here of this Court's decision. In Court said: "`Just as a federal district court should follow policies and preferences of State, as expressed in reapportionment s proposed by state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from requirements of Federal Constitution, *104. a district court should similarly honor state policies in context of congressional reapportionment.' " ). The majority here, referring to this language, agrees: "[A] court, as a general rule, should be guided by legislative policies underlying existing to extent those policies do not lead to violations of Constitution or Voting Rights Act." Ante, at 79 (citing at ). It is refore common ground among us that District Court should have drawn boundaries so as to leave two majority-minority districts rar than oneunless re was no such state policy or preference; unless creation of two such districts would have violated Constitution or Voting Rights Act of 1965; or unless doing so simply would have proved impractical in light of or important districting objectives. See -42 (quoting at ). Unlike majority, I cannot find present here any of se three countervailing justifications. A No one denies that, if one looks at redistricting s proposed by Georgia Legislature, one will find in m expressions of state "`policies and preferences' " for two majority-minority 456 U.S., ; see also Appendix to this opinion (Appendix), 1991 Plan, infra. After 1990 Census, which increased size of Georgia's congressional delegation from 10 to 11, App. in O. T. No. 94-631, p. 9, state legislature began a lengthy political |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | No. 94-631, p. 9, state legislature began a lengthy political process of redistricting and considered majority-minority district issue, among ors. ; see also Deposition of Linda Record 11-17, 20-22, 32-33, 85 The legislature proposed one in 1991 with two such See Appendix, *105 1991 Plan, infra. When United States Department of Justice (DOJ or Justice Department) denied preclearance under 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S. C. legislature proposed a second which also contained two such Subsequently legislature proposed a third with three such districtsa approved by Justice Department but struck down by this Court in What District Court and majority deny is that "preferences" expressed in se three redistricting s reflect Georgia Legislature's true preference. The District Court said that "Georgia's current was not product of Georgia's legislative will," but rar "was tainted by unconstitutional DOJ interference" into "process" that produced The majority repeats District Court's comment about DOJ's "thorough `subversion of redistricting process' since 1990 census," ante, at 84, adds that "State was predominantly driven" by "steady Justice Department pressure," ante, at 86, and concludes: "Interference by Justice Department disturbed any sound basis to defer to 1991 unprecleared" Ante, at 90. I believe, however, that majority's conclusionits reason for refusing to recognize Georgia Legislature's twodistrict preferenceis wrong both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. The conclusion is factually inadequate because testimony cited, ante, at 86-87, to show unusual DOJ pressure in 1991 redistricting process shows nothing unusual. It shows only that Justice Department told Georgia that it must comply with VRA, which statement Georgia legislators might have considered an exhortation to create more than one majority-minority district. Tr. 16 ; at 1-3 ; Deposition of Linda *106 Indeed, record indicates that a number of Georgia legislators affirmatively wanted two majorityminority Tr. 1-2 ; Deposition of Linda It also shows that 1991 two-district was result of an "`understanding' between leadership in legislature and black caucus." Ante, at 87; see also Tr. 32 ; at 1-2 ; Deposition of Linda ; that 1991 "two district" (as State conceded) "was not perceived as a `racial gerrymander,' " ante, at 86 (quoting Brief for Appellants et al. in O. T. No. 94-631, p. 49); and that 1991 "two district" (as District Court found), "like most redistricting efforts, was culmination of committee meetings, public hearings, examination of various districting proposals, and many hours spent with an extremely sophisticated computer." Indeed, much of departmental "interference" to which majority refers took place after adoption of 1991 see ante, at 80; Tr. 21, 39-, 75 ; Deposition of |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | ante, at 80; Tr. 21, 39-, 75 ; Deposition of Linda ; 515 U. S., at -907; App. in No. 94-6, p. 16, and likely reflected departmental concern related to Georgia's voting discrimination history. See ; App. 139-1. The majority is legally wrong because this Court has said that a court should determine a State's redistricting preferences by looking to "`s proposed by state legislature,' " 456 U. S., (quoting 2 U. S., at ), not by evaluating various political pressures that might have led individual legislators to vote one way rar than anor (or, for that matter, by reviewing after--fact testimony regarding legislative intent). Cf. ; at ; see also "`Districting s,' " like or legislative Acts, "`are integrated bundles *107 of compromises, deals, and principles.' " v.Vera, ). District s, like or legislative Acts, may reflect not only reasoned argument but also political pressures, brought to bear by many different individuals and groups using subtle or unsubtle suggestions, promises, or threats of votes, support, publicity, and even lawsuits. How can a court say that a legislative Act is legitimate that it reflects legislative preferences or policieswhen those who reason or cajole (or threaten suit) are farmers, businessmen, or consumer groups, but that same legislative Act becomes illegitimatethat it does not reflect "true" legislative policy or preferencesimply because those who seek to persuade (or threaten suit) represent Justice Department. One cannot say that Justice Department's power is any less legitimate than that exercised by many or groups that seek to influence legislative decisions; and its employees' sworn duty to uphold law would seem more suitably characterized as a reason for paying greater attention to its views rar than as a reason for heeding m less. Regardless, I am not aware of any legal principle that supports kind of distinction (among legislative pressures) that District Court made; and District Court's necessary reliance upon such a distinction, by itself, should warrant vacating District Court's decision. Moreover, what reason is re to believe that Georgia's Legislature did not "really" want two majority-minority districts that its earlier s created? There isas I indicated earlierevidence that a number of legislators did want two majority-minority See And legislature was aware of Georgia's long, welldocumented history of past discrimination in voting. See ; ; see also ; ; Carrollton Branch of ; ; 7 F. Supp. 137, ; Pitts v., ; ; Wilkes ; see generally E. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, pp. 423-424 (1988); McDonald, Binford, & Johnson, Georgia, in Quiet Revolution in South: The Impact of Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990, pp. 67-74 The |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | The Impact of Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990, pp. 67-74 The Georgia Legislature was likely aware of many unfortunate consequences that have flowed from this history. They include facts that, when Congress first enacted VRA, fewer than 30 percent of African-Americans eligible to vote in Georgia had registered to vote, ib and that no African-American had represented Georgia in Congress since Reconstruction, App. 1, when Congressman Jefferson Franklin Long briefly represented State. B. Ragsdale & J. Treese, Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1989, p. 81 (1990). The Georgia Legislature also might have thought that some degree of (indeed, a less than proportionate amount of) majority-minority districting could help to overcome some of problems se facts suggest. Forty-two members of Georgia's (180 member) House of Representatives mselves were elected from majority-black districts; 30 of those members are black, 12 are white. App. 116. One hundred thirty-eight members of Georgia's House were elected from majority-white districts; 1 of those members is black, 137 are white. Forty-three members of Georgia's (56 member) *109 Senate are elected from majority-white districts; all of those members are white. Until 1972, Georgia had not elected any African-American Members of Congress since Reconstruction. 1 Reference Library of Black America 67 Since n, it has elected a total of four. Sherman, Diluting Black Votes for a Stronger Voice; Politicians Debate Impact of Remap, Atlanta JournalConstitution, Dec. 17, p. G3. Each of those Members originally represented a majority-minority district (although two of m were recently reelected as incumbents after boundary changes created white majorities in ir districts). Ante, at 93. These circumstances help to explain why 1991 Georgia Legislature might have thought that creation of two majority-minority districts would help overcome racerelated barriersbarriers erected by history and prejudice, reinforced by inertia and nonparticipation. Not only three-district but also 1991 and first (unprecleared) 1992 suggest that that is what legislature did think. And I can find no reason in record not to take at face value what all legislature's s reby suggest, namely, that two majority-minority districts represent a significant legislative "policy and preference." B The majority says that legislature's two-district preference is not owed deference because a that embodied that preference is (or would be) "flawed by evidence of predominant racial motive," ante, at 90, or based upon race to a degree not reasonably necessary to comply with 2 of VRA, 42 U.S. C. The majority means that a two-district would be unlawfulthat it would violate Constitution as interpreted in I cannot agree. considered constitutionality of a three -district Its five-Justice majority included one Member who *110 subsequently made clear that, even |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | included one Member who *110 subsequently made clear that, even if racial considerations "predominate" in a State's drawing of a district boundary, that district is noneless lawful (because re is a compelling, hence redeeming, interest) if State has "a strong basis in evidence for concluding" that district would orwise violate VRA 2. ; see also ; That "`strong basis in evidence' need not take any particular form," and where it is present, State "may create a majority-minority district without awaiting judicial findings," ibid.; see also ; 2 U.S. 39, The majority does not reject this standard. Ante, at 90-91. And it cannot deny that re is a "strong basis in evidence" for believing that, after 1990 census, VRA 2, 5, or both, required creation of a second majority-minority district. As majority agrees, 2 requires a second majorityminority district here, if "totality of [] circumstances" suggests that racial minorities are excluded from "participat[ing] in political process" and "elect[ing] representatives of ir choice," 42 U.S. C. (b), and evidence shows that (1) minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority" in a second "single-member district"; (2) minority group is "politically cohesive"; and (3) majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat minority's preferred candidate." The majority discusses only se last () requirements at any length. As to first requirementcompactness s before District Court raised two possibilities: first, creation of a majority-minority district in southwest Georgiain approximately area labeled District *111 2 in court's (Appendix, Court Plan, infra ); and second, creation of majority-minority district in souastern central Georgiain approximately area labeled District 11 in Justice Department's Illustrative Plan (Appendix, Illustrative Plan, infra ). The first possibility could have involved a compactly shaped district. Regardless, DOJ's Illustrative Plan (which District Court considered on n. 4) suggests a newly drawn District 11 with an African-American population of 54.60 percent, an African-American voting age population of 51.04 percent, and a population deviation of 0.10. (This deviation percentage highest in Illustrative Planwas still lower than deviation in two of districts contained in Court Plan.) It suggests that District Court's statement that " only way Georgia could create a majorityminority district out of minority concentrations in eastcentral Georgia was to link" rural and urban communities by using "land bridges and appendages" similar to those used in unconstitutional 1992 n. 15, was erroneous. The proposed district is different from its unconstitutional predecessor. It does not try to build a land bridge linking sourn Atlanta with Savannah. Cf. And its boundaries are far more regular. Moreover, it strikes me that District |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | are far more regular. Moreover, it strikes me that District Court's finding that a district in east-central Georgia that encompassed both rural and urban African-American communities could not be "compact" confuses a number of issues. and compactness, which concerns shape or boundaries of a district, differs from 2 compactness, which concerns a minority group's compactness. Additionally, where (as here) racial minority group is geographically compact, see Appendix, Illustrative Plan, infra, fact that communities are rural or urban has more to do with political cohesivenesswher communities share common interests than with 2 compactness. To my knowledge, no case has *112 ever held that rural and urban racial minorities cannot toger create a compact minority for 2 compactness purposes. Moreover, it seems clear that rural and urban African-American voters who live near each or might share important common interests; and I have found nothing in record that suggests that rural and urban black voters here, living near each or, do not share many common interestsin respect to many important legislative matters. See Karlan & Why Voting Is Different, ; see also at 64 and S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America 151-152 (1972)). The District Court considered remaining two factors ( minority's "political cohesiveness" and majority's "bloc voting") under a single rubric, which majority calls " extent of racially polarized voting." Ante, at 92. Of course, Georgia's history, including political results that I have mentioned before fact that AfricanAmerican representatives have come almost exclusively from majority-minority districtsstrongly support existence of that "polarization." Moreover, appellants produced experts who testified that percentage of District 11 white voters willing to vote for a black candidate varied from 0 to percent, while number of black voters willing to vote for a white candidate varied from 3 to 11 percent. App. 54-61, 69-70, 72. Or expert testimony suggested less polarization (placing relevant numbers at 22 to 38 percent white-for-black and 20 percent to 23 percent black-for-white). But that or testimony rested in considerable part on local (and judicial, and primary) election results with multiple candidates or or special features that discouraged racial bloc voting, and for that reason y may have overstated *113 significance of numerical results. See App. 93-94; nn. 25 and Regardless, as majority says, District Court found statistical evidence inconclusive and "conflicting." And District Court conceded existence of "some degree of vote polarization." (It simply said that "degree" was not "`alarming.' " ) That African-American incumbents were reelected does not, without more, disprove polarization. ("`[T]he election of a few minority candidates does not "necessarily foreclose possibility of dilution of black vote"` ") in |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | "necessarily foreclose possibility of dilution of black vote"` ") in turn quoting Zimmer v. McKein, aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School ); 478 U.S., (citing S. Rep. No. 97-7, ) (listing incumbency as a special factor in assessing vote polarization). The majority says that, despite this evidence, District Court's findingsof no 2 violation and no 5 violationare adequately supported. Ante, at 94, 97. But that is because District Court asked wrong question. We need not decide wher evidence shows failure to create a second majority-minority district violates 2. Cf. ante, at 90-95. (Nor, for that matter, need we decide wher consequent reduction of such districts from 1 in 10 to 1 in 11 would, or things being equal, violate 5which it might do. Cf. ante, at 95-98.) The question is not about wher evidence proves 2 in fact requires two majorityminority The question is wher evidence is strong enough to justify a legislature's reasonable belief that that was so. The record rar clearly demonstrates a "strong basis in evidence" for believing that 2 or 5 required two majority-minority The legislature thus could very reasonably have believed that was so. And, that is what I had believed law, as set forth in this *114 Court's opinions, required as legal justification for a district that orwise would violate basic predominant factor test of This legal distinctionbetween wher a really violates 2 or might well violate 2may seem technical. But it is not. A legal rule that permits legislatures to take account of race only when 2 really requires m to do so is a rule that shifts power to redistrict from legislatures to federal courts (for only latter can say what 2 really requires). A rule that rests upon a reasonable view of evidence (i. e., that permits legislature to use race if it has a "strong basis" for believing it necessary to do so) is a rule that leaves at least a modicum of discretionary (racerelated) redistricting authority in hands of legislators. Again (and at a minimum), District Court's use of wrong test requires vacating its judgment. C To create a second majority-minority district is not impractical nor would doing so significantly interfere with or important districting objectives. The easiest way to understand why this is so is to look at three s that I have placed in Appendix, infra. I shall call Georgia Legislature's 1991 two-district reapportionment Plan A. Appendix, 1991 Plan, infra. I shall call one-district adopted by court Plan B. Appendix, Court Plan, infra. And I shall call two-district Illustrative Plan proposed by Justice Department Plan C. |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | call two-district Illustrative Plan proposed by Justice Department Plan C. Appendix, Illustrative Plan, infra. Inspection of three s suggests that District Court's (B) is very similar to or two (A and C) but for one critical feature, namely, that it has one majority-minority district rar than two. Now consider three s in respect to each of five districting considerations that District Court called traditional and important. They are: (a) retaining one district in each corner of State; (b) creating an urban minority *115 district; (c) maintaining political subdivisions; (d) protecting incumbents; and (e) maintaining traditional district -1565. All three s are identical in respect to first two considerations. Each maintains districts in three of four state corners; each creates at least one urban minority district. Plan B District Court's is marginally superior in respect to third criterion (maintaining political subdivisions). Plan B splits six counties within Atlanta area but none outside Atlanta area. Plan C splits two counties (Bibb and Muscogee) outside Atlanta area. (Appellants, however, advance nonracial justifications for latter splits.) Plan C is superior to Plan B in respect to remaining two considerations. Plan C displaces no incumbents. Plan B displaces three incumbents (including two AfricanAmericans). Plan C maintains all district Plan B moves many more Georgians into new Plan C has certain or advantages: It maintains, as provided in legislature's 1991 138 of Georgia's 159 counties. Plan B maintains 123. Plan C has greater population uniformity among its And, of course, Plan C provides for two majority-minority districts number legislature provided in two of its three redistricting s. I add one point. This is not a suit in which re are claims of interference with right to cast a ballot or "dilution" of majority's vote. Cf. v. 2 U.S. 755 ; ; and ; see also Karlan & -1216. Rar, legislature's s, insofar as y were race conscious, sought only to prevent what legislature could reasonably have believed to be unlawful vote dilutioni. e., to prevent a violation of VRA 2, or perhaps 5. See Tr. 103 (testimony of Rep. Sanford Bishop). Given this fact and given three sets of considerations just mentioned, I do *116 not see how majority, consistently with can affirm District Court's determination. II In or cases dissenting judges have expressed concerns that Court's holdings and particularly its test"predominant racial motive"would prove unworkable, that y would improperly shift redistricting authority from legislatures to courts, and that y would prevent legitimate use (among ors remedial use) of race as a political factor in redistricting, sometimes making unfair distinctions between racial minorities and ors. See, |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | sometimes making unfair distinctions between racial minorities and ors. See, e. g., -679 ; ; ; ; ; ; This suit exacerbates those concerns. Legislators, for example, may ask just what words "predominant racial motive" mean. The question has no obvious answer because racial motives (here efforts to include some additional African-American voters in a particular district) never explain a predominant portion of a district's entire boundary (most of which inevitably reflects county lines, or geographical features, and sometimes even a discriminatory history, see App. 120-121); yet those motives always predominate in respect to those voters (wher few or many) whom legislature, with consciousness of race, places for that reason in one district rar than anor. More importantly, here, unlike or cases that use somewhat similar words, Court has not turned to or considerations, such as discriminatory intent, or vote dilution, or even a district's bizarre geographical shape, to help explain, or to limit scope of, words mselves. Cf. and Gomil- *117 Thus, given today's suit, a legislator might reasonably wonder wher he can ever knowingly place racial minorities in a district because, for example, he considers m part of a "community" already re; because he thinks doing so will favor Democrats (or Republicans); because he wants to help an African-American incumbent; because he believes doing so will encourage participation in political process by racial minorities in whom historical discrimination has induced apathy; because he believes that doing so will help those same voters secure representatives that better reflect ir needs and desires; or simply because he wants to see more racial minorities elected to office in a Nation that has become increasingly diverse. The Court has not said that Constitution forbids use of race in all se instances. See Adarand Constructors, ; see also ; ; ; ; If use of race as a criterion is wrong in some, but not all, of se instances, legislator will need to know when, and why. And legislator will need a legal principle that tells him wher, or when, answers to such questions vary depending upon wher group is racial or reflects, say, economics, education, or national origin. It seems particularly difficultwithout use of some guiding or limiting principle, such as intent, vote dilution, or even bizarre district shapeto find principled legal answers to what, in redistricting context, are traditionally political questions. The decision also increases risk of significant judicial entanglement in inherently political redistricting process. See, e. g., at 1035-10 ; -935 ; see also ; *118 ; ; ; ; A Court test that forbids overt use of race in |
Justice Breyer | 1,997 | 2 | dissenting | Abrams v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118129/abrams-v-johnson/ | A Court test that forbids overt use of race in any (or all) of circumstances listed above will simultaneously permit plaintiffs to bring lawsuits complaining about covert use of what was overtly forbidden. Any redistricting will generate potentially injured plaintiffs, willing and able to carry on ir political battles in a judicial forum. And judges (unable to refer, say, to intent, dilution, shape, or some or limiting principle) will find it difficult to dismiss those claimsparticularly if (as majority here says) law deprives legislature even of such defenses as a reasonable belief that a particular use of race was legally required. Nor can I find any legal principle that might constitute a simple, administrable stopping placea principle that could serve same function in this context as does oneperson, one-vote rule in context of reapportionment. See A simple "color blind" testa test that rules out race consciousness across boardwill not work. 0-1062 Legislators can and should use race consciously to prevent creating districting s that discriminate against racial minorities, say, by "diluting" ir votes. Cf. Adarand Constructors, 515 U. S., at Moreover, this Court, recognizing harm caused by slavery and 80 subsequent years of legal segregation, has held that legislators, within limits, can make conscious use of race in an effort to overcome present effects of past discrimination. ; see also ; 515 U. S., There may be or instances as well. Furr, any test that applied only to race, ignoring, say, religion or national origin, would place at a dis advantage very group, African-Americans, whom Civil War Amendments sought to help, see at 936 *119 938 But judicial administration of a test that applied to all such voter group characteristics would involve courts yet more deeply in basically political task of drawing and redrawing district boundaries. In focusing on se practical considerations, I repeat what previous dissents have argued. I do so because holding here underscores problems mentioned in those earlier dissents; and those problems, in turn, cast furr doubt upon soundness of today's decision. III I do not necessarily agree or disagree with those or aspects of majority's opinion that I have not mentioned. But I shall stop with main point. The Court, perhaps by focusing upon what it considered to be unreasonably pervasive positive use of race as a redistricting factor, has created a legal doctrine that will unreasonably restrict legislators' use of race, even for most benign, or antidiscriminatory, purposes. And that doctrine will draw Court too deeply into an area of legislative responsibility. For reasons set forth here, and in previous dissenting opinions, I do not |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | dissenting | Owen v. Owen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112598/owen-v-owen/ | The Court's analysis puts the cart before the horse. As I read the statute at issue, it is not necessary to reach the issue *315 the majority addresses. In construing the lien avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it is important to recognize a distinction between two classes of cases: those in which the lien attached to the exempt property before the debtor had any right to claim an exemption, and those in which the lien attached after the debtor acquired that right. This case falls in the former category. As I shall explain, I believe it was correctly decided by the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals, and that the judgment should be affirmed. I The facts raise a straightforward issue: whether the lien avoidance provisions in 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S. C. 522(f),[1] apply to a judicial lien that attached before the debtor had any claim to an exemption. It is undisputed that respondent's judicial lien attached to petitioner's Sarasota condominium when he acquired title to the property in November 1984. It is also undisputed that petitioner was not entitled to a homestead exemption when he acquired title because he was single. At that time, the exemption was available only to a "head of a household" under Article 10, 4, of the Florida Constitution. An amendment that became effective in 1985 broadened the exemption to extend to "a natural person." Fla. Const., Art. 10, 4. On the effective date of this amendment petitioner became entitled to the homestead exemption at issue in this case.[2] Thus, it is undisputed that petitioner had an exemption on his condominium when he filed his bankruptcy petition in 1986, but did not *316 have a right to that exemption in 1984 when respondent's judicial lien attached. As I read the text of 522(f), it does not authorize the avoidance of liens that were perfected at a time when the debtor could not claim an exemption in the secured property. The Bankruptcy Code deals with the subject of exemptions in two separate provisions that are relevant to this case. The first of these provisions, 522(b), identifies property that is exempt from the claims of general creditors.[3] Focusing on the legal interests in the property at the time of the bankruptcy, this section identifies property that is exempt from the bankrupt estate and therefore cannot be sold by the trustee to satisfy the claims of general creditors. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 360-361 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, pp. 75-76 (1978). In this case, petitioner's condominium in |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | dissenting | Owen v. Owen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112598/owen-v-owen/ | 95-989, pp. 75-76 (1978). In this case, petitioner's condominium in Sarasota, Florida, was entitled to a homestead exemption as a matter of Florida law when he filed for bankruptcy and therefore was properly excluded from the estate. See The property was fully protected from the claims of general creditors by the operation of 522(b). The second provision that is relevant to this suit, 522(f), is concerned with the priority of secured creditors, not the *317 claims of general creditors. Section 522(f) establishes a rule of priority between the debtor's legal interest and creditors' security interests in exempt property as opposed to the property of the estate. The statute establishes the priority by allowing the debtor to avoid the fixing of judicial liens and certain nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests under the right circumstances to the extent that they encumber the exemption. As it applies to judicial liens, 522(f) raises two questions: (1) whether the exemption provides a basis for avoidance of the lien; and (2) if so, to what extent should the lien be avoided? The first question concerns the relative priority of conflicting claims on the same asset; on such issues, the timing of the claims is often decisive. The second questionI shall call it the "impairment question"concerns the distribution of the proceeds of sale after the issue of priority has been resolved. This second question need not be reached unless the first question has been answered positively. In determining whether the exemption provides a basis for avoiding the lien, 522(f) turns our attention towards the exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled at the time the lien "fixed." In United 9 U.S. 70 this Court was presented with the question whether applying 522(f)(2) to avoid nonpossessory liens perfected before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 would be a taking of property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Court avoided deciding that precise question by holding that 522(f) did not apply retroactively to liens that had been perfected before the Bankruptcy Reform Act was enacted. Although there is no such constitutional question presented here, Security Industrial Bank establishes that the critical date for determining whether a lien may be avoided under the statute is the date of the fixing of that lien. *318 The date of the fixing of respondent's lien on petitioner's condominium is therefore controlling in this case. Because it is undisputed that petitioner was not entitled to an exemption when the lien attached, the subsequently acquired exemption does not provide a basis for avoidance of respondent's |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | dissenting | Owen v. Owen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112598/owen-v-owen/ | exemption does not provide a basis for avoidance of respondent's lien.[4] Thus, the priority question in this case was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals and its judgment should be affirmed. II The Court frames the question it decides as whether the lien avoidance provisions in 522(f) "can operate when the State has defined the exempt property in such a way as specifically to exclude property encumbered by judicial liens." Ante, at 306. That is an accurate description of the issue that has arisen in cases concerning the avoidability of non-possessory, nonpurchase-money liens on household goods. See cases cited, ante, at 310, nn. 1 and 2.[5] In each of those cases the State's definition of the exemption purported to *319 exclude property interests that were subject to otherwise avoidable liens under 522(f). Thus, the State's definition of the exemption itself defeated the purpose of the federal lien avoidance provisions by narrowing the category of exempt property.[6] The majority and dissenting opinions in In re McManus, adequately identify the issue to which the Court's opinion today is addressed. In that case a finance company (AVCO) held a promissory note secured by a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in the form of a chattel mortgage on some of the debtor's household goods and furnishings. The debtors sought to avoid AVCO's lien under 522(f) on the ground that their household goods and furniture were exempted under 522(b). The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court refused to avoid the lien. The Court of Appeals, following the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court, affirmed.[7] Louisiana had established a homestead exemption for certain household goods and furniture. Yet, it had also explicitly established in a separate code provision that notwithstanding its definitions of homestead exemptions, any household goods or furniture encumbered by a mortgage are not exempt property. The majority of the Court of Appeals held that the liens were not avoidable because the State of Louisiana had utilized its authority under 522(b) to define its exemptions to exclude household goods *320 subject to mortgages; hence the liens did not impair an exemption to which the debtors would have been entitled under 522(b). Under my reading of 522(f), the Court of Appeals erred because it focused its attention entirely on the situation at the time of the bankruptcy. If it had analyzed the case by noting that at the time AVCO's lien attached, the debtors were already entitled to an exemption, it should have concluded that the lien was avoidable. The dissenting judge came to that conclusion by correctly recognizing that the statutory text evidences an intent |
Justice Stevens | 1,991 | 16 | dissenting | Owen v. Owen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112598/owen-v-owen/ | by correctly recognizing that the statutory text evidences an intent to consider the situation at the time of attachment. He wrote: "The opening phrase of 522(f), `[n]otwithstanding any waiver of exemptions,' indicates that the subsection's import is to return the situation to the status quo ante, i.e., prior to any improvident waiver of an exemption by the debtor. When the debtors entered the creditors' office they enjoyed an exemption under Louisiana law from seizure and sale of their household goods; and when they left the office they could no longer claim an exemption for those goods solely because they had improvidently granted a security interest to the creditors covering such goods. I fail to see how this could be characterized as anything but a waiver of exemptions, subject to the avoiding power found in 522(f)."[8] *321 Although the Court's opinion today resolves the question that was presented in McManus by adopting the position of the dissent in McManus, I disagree with the Court's reasoning. The Court simply overlooks the fact that for purposes of determining whether a lien is avoidablerather than for the purpose of determining the extent to which the lien should be avoidedthe question whether the debtor "would have been entitled" to an exemption is addressed to the state of affairs that existed at the time the lien attached. Finally, I must comment on the Court's conclusion "that Florida's exclusion of certain liens from the scope of its homestead protection does not achieve a similar exclusion from the Bankruptcy Code's lien avoidance provision." Ante, at 313-314. This statement treats Florida's refusal to apply its broadened homestead exemption retroactively as the equivalent of Louisiana's narrowing definition of its household goods exemption to exclude properties subject to a chattel mortgage. The conclusion is flawed. Petitioner would not have been entitled to a homestead exemption at the time respondent's judicial lien attached; for that reason the lien avoidance provisions in 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code are not applicable. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice Stevens | 1,981 | 16 | concurring | Widmar v. Vincent | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110587/widmar-v-vincent/ | As the Court recognizes, every university must "make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources," ante, at 276. The Court appears to hold, however, that those judgments must "serve a compelling state interest" wherever they are based, even in part, on the content of speech. Ante, at 269-270. This conclusion apparently flows from the Court's suggestion that a student activities program from which the public may be excluded, ante, at 267-268, n. 5 must be managed as though it were a "public forum."[1] In my opinion, the use of the terms "compelling *278 state interest" and "public forum" to analyze the question presented in this case may needlessly undermine the academic freedom of public universities. Today most major colleges and universities are operated by public authority. Nevertheless, their facilities are not open to the public in the same way that streets and parks are. University facilities private or public are maintained primarily for the benefit of the student body and the faculty. In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a university routinely make countless decisions based on the content of communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curriculum, and they reward scholars for what they have written. In addition, in encouraging students to participate in extracurricular activities, they necessarily make decisions concerning the content of those activities. Because every university's resources are limited, an educational institution must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is available for extracurricular activities. In my judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity. I should think it obvious, for example, that if two groups of 25 students requested the use of a room at a particular time one to view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur performance of Hamlet the First Amendment would not require that the room he reserved for the group that submitted its application first. Nor do I see why a university should have to establish a "compelling state interest" to defend its decision to permit one group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, a university should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of Walt Disney should be given precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately covered in the classroom. Judgments of *279 this kind should |
Justice Stevens | 1,981 | 16 | concurring | Widmar v. Vincent | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110587/widmar-v-vincent/ | covered in the classroom. Judgments of *279 this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges,[2] and their standards for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like "compelling state interest."[3] *280 Thus, I do not subscribe to the view that a public university has no greater interest in the content of student activities than the police chief has in the content of a soapbox oration on Capitol Hill. A university legitimately may regard some subjects as more relevant to its educational mission than others. But the university, like the police officer, may not allow its agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to determine whether access to a forum will be granted. If a state university is to deny recognition to a student organization or is to give it a lesser right to use school facilities than other student it must have a valid reason for doing so.[4] In this case I agree with the Court that the University has not established a sufficient justification for its refusal to allow the Cornerstone group to engage in religious worship on the campus. The primary reason advanced for the discriminatory treatment is the University's fear of violating the Establishment Clause. But since the record discloses no danger *281 that the University will appear to sponsor any particular religion, and since student participation in the Cornerstone meetings is entirely voluntary, the Court properly concludes that the University's fear is groundless. With that justification put to one side, the University has not met the burden that is imposed on it by Healy. Nor does the University's reliance on the Establishment Clause of the Missouri State Constitution provide a sufficient justification for the discriminatory treatment in this case.[5] As I have said, I believe that the University may exercise a measure of control over the agenda for student use of school facilities, preferring some subjects over others, without needing to identify so-called "compelling state interests." Quite obviously, however, the University could not allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to meet while denying Democrats or Mormons the same privilege.[6] It seems apparent that the policy under attack would allow groups of young philosophers to meet to discuss their skepticism that a Supreme Being exists, or a group of political scientists to meet to debate the accuracy of the view that religion is the "opium of the people." If school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that comparable use by a group desiring to express a belief in God must also |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108529/sixty-seventh-minnesota-state-senate-v-beens/ | These two appeals are taken by the Minnesota State Senate from orders of a three-judge Federal District Court *188 reapportioning the Minnesota Legislature. The appeals do not challenge the District Court's conclusion that the legislature is now malapportioned. And at this point they are not concerned with population variances or with other issues of the type customarily presented in reapportionment litigation. The controversy focuses, instead, on (a) the District Court's refusal to honor the Minnesota statute fixing the number of the State's legislative districts at 67 and (b) the court's proceeding, over the initial opposition of all parties (but upon the suggestion of two amici, the Lieutenant Governor and a representative), to reduce the number of legislative districts to 35, the number of senators by almost 50%, and the number of representatives by nearly 25%. We conclude that the District Court erred in its rulings. Accordingly, we summarily vacate the court's orders and remand the cases for further proceedings promptly to be pursued. I The Minnesota Bicameral Legislature was last effectively apportioned in Ex. Sess. Laws c. 1.[1]*189 Section 2.021 of Minn. Stat. (1969), the very first section of the Act, states that, "until a new apportionment shall have been made," the State's senate shall consist of 67 members and its house of representatives of 135 members.[2] Section 2.031, subd. 1, from the second section of the Act, prescribes 67 legislative districts for both the senate and the house.[3] Sections 2.041-2.711, inclusive, then delineate these 67 districts.[4] The State's Constitution, Art. IV, 2, provides a legislator-population minimum ratio (one senator for every 5,000 inhabitants and one representative for every 2,000 inhabitants) and states, "The representation in both houses shall be apportioned equally throughout the different sections of the state, in proportion to the population thereof." The 1970 federal census took place in due course. The Minnesota Legislature did not produce a reapportionment act during its regular session in One was passed on October 29, during the reconvening of an extra session called that year. The lawmakers adjourned sine die on October 30. The Governor, however, vetoed the act on November 1 and *190 this reapportionment endeavor failed to become law.[5] The Governor has not called the legislature to another extra session for more work on reapportionment,[6] and it is not scheduled to meet again in regular session until January 1973. Minn. Const., Art. IV, 1; Minn. Stat. 3.01 (1969). The 1972 primary and general elections will take place in the interim. Minn. Stat. 202.02 and 203.02 (1969). Thus, the statute remains as the State's last effective legislative apportionment. II The |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108529/sixty-seventh-minnesota-state-senate-v-beens/ | remains as the State's last effective legislative apportionment. II The original plaintiffs, who are among the appellees here, are three qualified voters of the State. By their complaint, filed in April and asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1343 (3) and (4) and 42 U.S. C. 1983 and 1988, they sought (a) a declaratory judgment that the Act apportioning the legislature violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (b) an injunction restraining the Minnesota Secretary of State and all county auditors from conducting future elections for legislators pursuant to that Act, and (c) reapportionment of the legislature by the federal court itself. The three-judge court was convened. The appellant, the Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate, intervened as a party defendant under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a). The District Court, after hearings and with the assistance of stipulations, issued three significant orders: A. On November 15, it made appropriate findings, not challenged here as to their basic provisions, *191 and declared the Act in its entirety, Minn. Stat. 2.021-2.712 (1969), inclusive, violative of the Federal Constitution, enjoined the Secretary of State and the county auditors from conducting future elections under the Act, and appointed two Special Masters (a third was named later) to aid the court in formulating a new apportionment plan. See B. On December 3 it found "that it best can fulfill its duty of apportioning the Minnesota Legislature in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and with due regard for State policy" by dividing the State into 35 senatorial districts and dividing each senatorial district into three house districts, and ordered that the parties, intervenors, and amici could present plans for apportioning the legislature accordingly. In an accompanying memorandum the court said, "The only serious questions are whether we have the authority to change the size of the Legislature; and if so, to what extent." It answered the first of these questions in the affirmative, quoting the following sentence from : "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." The court stated that the legislature could not be apportioned into 67 senate districts and 135 house districts without violating either the Federal Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution; that the existing practice of dividing one senate district into three house districts and all others into two cannot be continued without violating the requirements of equal protection; that the greater the population of each district, the more closely *192 can the one |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108529/sixty-seventh-minnesota-state-senate-v-beens/ | of each district, the more closely *192 can the one man, one vote standard be met and still give effect to the state policy of adhering to the boundaries of political subdivisions; that state policy with respect to the legislature's size "is difficult to discern"; that the Governor had recommended a reduction in size; that there is merit in having an odd-numbered senate and house where, as in Minnesota, the State has "two strong and rather evenly divided political parties"; that federal constitutional and state policy requirements can best be harmonized by having 35 senate districts and by dividing each senate district into three house districts; that there are persuasive arguments that "positive benefits to the State will accrue by substantially reducing the size of the Senate and moderately reducing the size of the House"; and that "it is not our desire to fix for the future the size of the Senate and the House in Minnesota," for the legislature, if it wishes, may appropriately reapportion. See -721. C. On January 25, 1972, it entered its "Final Order and Plan of Apportionment" by which it adopted a plan therein described. The court also modified its injunction of November 15 so as to enjoin the state secretary and county auditors from conducting any future elections for the legislature under any plan other than the one adopted by the court "or a constitutional plan adopted after this date by the State of Minnesota." In accord with Minn. Const., Art. IV, 24, 1972 elections under the new plan for all positions in the senate and house were ordered. The senate, as intervenor, first appealed from the orders of November 15, and December 3, (case No. 71-1024), and then from the order of January 25, 1972 (case No. 71-1145). Both appeals are under 28 U.S. C. 1253. We denied the senate's motion to expedite the appeals, but granted its motion to consolidate *193 them. We then granted its application for a temporary stay pending further order of the Court. Post, p. 905. III The appellees have moved to dismiss. Two grounds are asserted: A. That the senate lacks authority and standing to prosecute the appeals. It is said that the senate's authorizing resolution does not entitle its counsel to take the appeals; that the resolution relates only to legislative district boundaries and not to their number; that the Office of Senate Counsel speaks only for certain members of the senate and not for the whole; that it is the legislature, and not just the senate, that is the legal entity concerned for purposes of |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108529/sixty-seventh-minnesota-state-senate-v-beens/ | senate, that is the legal entity concerned for purposes of the appeals; and that only the legislature has standing. The authorizing senate resolution, however, is in broad terms: "BE IT RESOLVED, by the Senate of the State of Minnesota, that the Office of Senate Counsel be and it is hereby authorized and directed to take such steps as may be necessary to represent the interests and will of this body to the extent deemed necessary in both state and federal court actions involving the prescription of the bounds of senatorial and representative districts, the apportionment of senators and representatives among those districts, and the orderly process of elections there-from." Journal of the Minnesota Senate 39th Day, p. 460. The resolution was adopted July 31, by a 56-to-0 vote. A motion to reconsider made two and a half months later failed by a vote of 33-31. 40th day, at 492. *194 We are not inclined to read this authorizing resolution restrictively, as the appellees suggest. Certainly the present appeals are in a federal court action that concerns apportionment "and the orderly process of elections therefrom." And certainly the senate is directly affected by the District Court's orders. That the senate is an appropriate legal entity for purpose of intervention and, as a consequence, of an appeal in a case of this kind is settled by our affirmance of aff'd, where it was said: "The California State Senate's motion to intervene as a substantially interested party was granted because it would be directly affected by the decree of this court." A group of senators thus had the right to intervene. The concurrence of the house was not necessary as it would have been to enact legislation. B. That the appeals are not from orders granting or denying injunctive relief, within the requirement of 28 U.S. C. 1253. Although the orders of November 15, and January 25, 1972, specifically enjoin state and county officers, the appellees assert that the restraining portions of those orders are not now attacked and are conceded by the appellant. This, in our view, is too narrow an analysis. The order of November 15 clearly enjoins the state and county officers "from holding or conducting any future elections under the present Apportionment Statutes." That of January 25 does the same except with respect to the plan then adopted by the court or one thereafter validly adopted by the State. The court's injunctive holding applies to 2.031 and 2.021, respectively fixing the number of legislative districts and the number of senators and representatives, as well as to the succeeding sections |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108529/sixty-seventh-minnesota-state-senate-v-beens/ | senators and representatives, as well as to the succeeding sections determining the *195 boundaries of the 67 districts. The appellant's appeal relates to 2.031 and 2.021. The court's injunction with respect to those sections is sufficient to justify a direct appeal under 1253. cited by the appellees, is inapposite. IV That the three-judge federal court possesses the power to reapportion the State's legislature when the applicable state statutes fall short of constitutional requirements is not questioned. The Minnesota apportionment legislation, the court found, in the light of the 1970 census figures no longer provided a constitutionally acceptable apportionment of either house. No one challenges that basic finding here, and we have no reason to rule otherwise. The legislature had endeavored to reapportion and, thus, to fulfill the requirement imposed upon it by Art. IV, 23, of the State's Constitution.[7] See and The legislature's efforts in that direction, however, were nullified by the Governor's veto of the Act it passed, an action the executive had the power to take. The net result was the continuing applicability of the act. Under these circumstances judicial relief was appropriate. *196 The three-judge court, however, was not content with devising judicial apportionment within the framework of the existing and otherwise valid statutory structure. Instead of recognizing the provision in Minn. Stat. 2.021 (1969), that the state senate "is composed of 67 members and the house of representatives is composed of 135 members," and the further provision in 2.031 that the senators and representatives "are apportioned throughout the state in 67 legislative districts," the court declared those sections invalid along with 2.041-2.711, the provisions that delineate the boundaries of the specified 67 legislative districts. We need not review at length the several pronouncements of this Court relating to state legislative reapportionment. The pertinent cases, particularly those of June 15, and the guidelines they provide are well-known. It suffices to note that in the Court stated that apportionment "is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites"[8] But we also stated, "With respect to the operation of the Equal Protection Clause, it makes no difference whether a State's apportionment scheme is embodied in its constitution or in statutory provisions," and, then, "Clearly, courts should attempt to accommodate the relief ordered to the apportionment provisions of state constitutions insofar as is possible." And the Minnesota Constitution, Art. IV, 23, vests the legislature with power to reapportion. *197 It follows from this that a federal reapportionment court should accommodate the relief ordered |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108529/sixty-seventh-minnesota-state-senate-v-beens/ | that a federal reapportionment court should accommodate the relief ordered to the appropriate provisions of state statutes relating to the legislature's size insofar as is possible. We do not have difficulty, as the District Court professed to have, in discerning the State's policy as to the legislature's size. That policy, long in effect in Minnesota and restated no longer than six years ago in 2.021, is for 67 senators and 135 representatives, and, in 2.031, is for 67 legislative districts. These are figures that have been determined by the legislature and approved by the Governor of the State. The present Governor's contrary recommendation, although certainly entitled to thoughtful consideration, represents only the executive's proffered current policy, just as the reapportionment plan he vetoed on November 1, represented only the legislature's proffered current policy. We note, in repetition, that the District Court invalidated the entire Act, 2.021-2.712, despite the fact that the details of the legislative districts' configurations are included only in 2.041-2.711. Section 2.021 merely specifies the number of senators and representatives; 2.031 calls for the apportionment of those legislators throughout the State in 67 districts; and 2.712 provided the effective date of the act, the efficacy of which, for the period prior to the 1970 census, is not at issue here. In the light of the State's policy of statutory severability, Minn. Stat. 645.20 (1969),[9]*198 and recognizing that this specific number of legislative districts has been in effect in Minnesota since 1913 and through two succeeding reapportionments, we necessarily conclude that the District Court's invalidation of the six-year-old reapportionment law swept too broadly in nullifying statutory sections that are capable of standing alone. We know of no federal constitutional principle or requirement that authorizes a federal reapportioning court to go as far as the District Court did and, thus, to bypass the State's formal judgment as to the proper size of its legislative bodies. No case decided by this Court has gone that far and we have found no district court decision that has employed such radical surgery in reapportionment. There are cases where judicial reapportionment has effectuated minor changes in a legislature's size. Nearly all those cases reflect an increase or decrease of only a few seats[10] and most appear to have been justified *199 by a state constitutional demand, agreement of the parties, the observance of geographical boundaries, or mathematical convenience. We do not disapprove a court-imposed minor variation from a State's prescribed figure when that change is shown to be necessary to meet constitutional requirements. And we would not oppose the District Court's reducing, in this |
per_curiam | 1,972 | 200 | per_curiam | Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108529/sixty-seventh-minnesota-state-senate-v-beens/ | we would not oppose the District Court's reducing, in this case, the number of representatives in the Minnesota house from 135 to 134, as the parties apparently have been willing to concede. That action would fit exactly the 67-district pattern. But to slash a state senate's size almost in half and a state house's size by nearly one-fourth is to make more than a mere minor variation. If a change of that extent were acceptable, so, too, would be a federal court's cutting or increasing size by 75% or 90% or, indeed, by prescribing a unicameral legislature for a State that has always followed the bicameral precedent. We repeat what was said recently in another legislative apportionment case: "The remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited." In summary, the number of a State's legislative districts or the number of members in each house of its legislature raises no issue of equal protection unless the *200 number so prescribed occasions significant and invalidating population deviations. "Determining the size of its legislative bodies is of course a matter within the discretion of each individual State. Nothing in this opinion should be read as indicating that there are any federal constitutional maximums or minimums on the size of state legislative bodies." n. 63. See also (SD Miss.), order stayed on other grounds, ; ; We conclude that the action of the three-judge court in so drastically changing the number of legislative districts and the size of the respective houses of the Minnesota Legislature is not required by the Federal Constitution and is not justified as an exercise of federal judicial power. Our ruling here, of course, is no expression of opinion on our part as to what is desirable by way of legislative size for the State of Minnesota or for any other State. It may well be that 67 senators and 135 representatives make a legislature of unwieldy size. That is a matter of state policy. We certainly are not equippedand it is not our function and taskto effectuate policy of that kind or to evaluate it once it has been determined by the State. Neither is it the function and task of the Federal District Court. Size is for the State to determine in the exercise of its wisdom and in the light of its awareness of the needs and desires of its people. The orders of the District Court are vacated and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent *201 with this opinion. The District Court is instructed to |
Justice Breyer | 2,000 | 2 | concurring | Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Shanklin | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118355/norfolk-southern-r-co-v-shanklin/ | I agree with Justice Ginsburg that "common sense and sound policy" suggest that federal minimum safety standards should not pre-empt a state tort action claiming that in the particular circumstance a railroad's warning device remains inadequate. Post, at 360 (dissenting opinion). But the Federal Government has the legal power to do more. And, as the majority points out, ante, at 353-356, the specific Federal Highway Administration regulations at issue here do, in fact, do morewhen read in light of CSX Transp., which faithfully replicates the Government's own earlier interpretation. So read, they say that once federal funds are requested and spent to install warning devices at a grade crossing, the regulations' standards of adequacy apply across the board and pre-empt state law seeking to impose an independent duty on a railroad with respect to the adequacy of warning devices installed. ; ante, at 357. I see no need here to reconsider the relevant language in this Court's earlier opinion because the Government itself can easily avoid the pre-emption that it previously sought. It can simply change the relevant regulations, for example, by specifying that federal money is sometimes used for "minimum," not "adequate," programs, which minimum programs lack pre-emptive force. The *360 agency remains free to amend its regulations to achieve the commonsense result that the Government itself now seeks. With that understanding, I join the majority's opinion. |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | concurring | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | It seems to me that the Court evades the constitutional issue presented, see ante, at 386, n. 8, and resolves this case on the basis of a construction of state law (a) that is inconsistent with the relevant state statute, (b) that does not appear in the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court in this or any other case, and (c) that was not asserted by the State in its arguments before this Court. The statute at issue states: "Notwithstanding the fixing of punishment at death by the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole, which shall be served without parole; or the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, may ingly sentence the defendant to death." (1975) The statutory language, particularly the italicized portions, clearly contemplates that a trial judge sentencing a capital defendant is to consider the jury's "fixing of the punishment at death" along with the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. But ing to the Court's opinion, the statute is ambiguous as to whether the judge must consider the jury's "sentence" in all cases or only in cases where he has decided that the death penalty may be appropriate. See ante, at 383. Even if the Court is correct on this point, the ambiguity is irrelevant in every case, including this one, in which the trial judge does in fact impose the death sentence. Given the clear import of the statutory language, it is difficult to see any reason to depart from the statute, absent an equally clear contrary statement by a state court. Throughout *391 its discussion of Alabama case law, however, the Court simply draws inferences from omissions. No Alabama decision holds affirmatively that the trial judge is not to consider the jury's "sentence."[*] The passages quoted by the Court, see ante, at 383-385, establish only that the judge, not the jury, is the sentencing authority. This proposition is not inconsistent with the judge's having to consider the jury's "sentence" in the sentencing process. The opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court does not support the Court's construction of Alabama law. Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion quotes the statement of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that "the statute 13-11-4] requires the judge to weigh the mandatory death sentence factor in the balance with his consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding to impose the death penalty.' " |
Justice Burger | 1,985 | 12 | concurring | Baldwin v. Alabama | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111473/baldwin-v-alabama/ | mitigating circumstances in deciding to impose the death penalty.' " Ex parte Baldwin, ); The Alabama court did not refute this construction of the statute; instead, it upheld the statute on the grounds that the jury's "sentence" was not binding on the trial judge and that the statute required the trial judge to consider the circumstances of the particular offense and the character and propensities of the offender. There is no inconsistency between this reasoning and the sentencing judge's having to consider the jury's conclusion along with the other relevant factors. If state law were as clear as the Court suggests, one would expect the State's otherwise thorough brief to include some support for the Court's view of Alabama law. According to the petitioner, the "very flaw which kills the statute" is that it requires the trial judge to consider the jury's "sentence" "as a factor in the sentencing process." Brief for Petitioner 13. In the face of this contention, it seems that if "[t]he *392 Alabama appellate courts have interpreted the 1975 Act expressly to mean that the sentencing judge is to impose a sentence without regard to the jury's mandatory `sentence,' " ante, at 383 the State would have mentioned that fact in its arguments here. It did not. The Court should decide whether the 1975 Alabama statute is unconstitutional because it requires the trial judge to consider the jury's "sentence" in determining the sentence actually to be imposed. In my view the statute passes constitutional muster. The 1975 statutory scheme limits capital offenses to murders involving statutorily specified aggravating circumstances. Because each capital offense already includes an aggravating circumstance in the definition of the offense, the jury's mandatory death "sentence" reflects the jury's determination that the State has proved the defined aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the trial judge must weigh that circumstance along with the other aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, Ex parte Kyzer, it makes complete sense for the judge to take into account the jury's finding on that issue. The statute requires no more in having the trial judge take into account the jury's "sentence" in the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may enjoin the issuance by Congress of a subpoena duces tecum that directs a bank to produce the bank records of an organization which claims a First Amendment *493 privilege status for those records on the ground that they are the equivalent of confidential membership lists. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that compliance with the subpoena "would invade the constitutional rights" of the organization, and that judicial relief is available to prevent implementation of the subpoena. I In early 1970 the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security was given broad authority by the Senate to "make a complete and continuing study and investigation of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950" S. Res. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The authority encompassed discovering the "extent, nature, and effect of subversive activities in the United" and the resolution specifically directed inquiry concerning "infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government" See also S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). Pursuant to that mandate the Subcommittee began an inquiry into the activities of respondent United Servicemen's Fund, Inc. (USSF). USSF describes itself as a nonprofit membership corporation supported by contributions.[1] Its stated purpose is "to further the welfare of persons who have served or are presently serving in the military." To accomplish its declared purpose USSF has engaged in various activities[2] directed at United servicemen. *494 It established "coffeehouses" near domestic military installations, and aided the publication of "underground" newspapers for distribution on American military installations throughout the world. The coffeehouses were meeting places for servicemen, and the newspapers were specialized publications which USSF claims dealt with issues of concern to servicemen. Through these operations USSF attempted to communicate to servicemen its philosophy and attitudes concerning United involvement in Southeast Asia. USSF claims the coffeehouses and newspapers became "the focus of dissent and expressions of opposition within the military toward the war in [Southeast Asia]."[3] In the course of its investigation of USSF, the Subcommittee concluded that a prima facie showing had been made of the need for further investigation, and it resolved that appropriate subpoenas, including subpoenas duces tecum could be issued. Petitioner a United Senator, is, as he was then, Chairman of the Subcommittee. On May 28, 1970, pursuant to the above authority, he signed a subpoena duces tecum, issued on behalf of the Subcommittee, to the bank where USSF then had an account. The subpoena commanded the bank to produce by June |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | account. The subpoena commanded the bank to produce by June 4, 1970: "any and all records appertaining to or involving the account or accounts of [USSF]. Such records to comprehend papers, correspondence, statements, checks, deposit slips and supporting documentation, or microfilm thereof within [the bank's] control or custody or within [its] means to produce." From the record it appears the subpoena was never actually served on the bank.[4] In any event, before the *495 return date, USSF and two of its members brought this action to enjoin implementation of the subpoena duces tecum. The complaint named as defendants Chairman nine other Senators, the Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee, and the bank.[5] The complaint charged that the authorizing resolutions and the Subcommittee's actions implementing them were an unconstitutional abuse of the legislative power of inquiry, that the "sole purpose" of the Subcommittee investigation was to force "public disclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions and associations of private citizens which may be unorthodox or unpopular," and that the "sole purpose" of the subpoena was to "harass, chill, punish and deter [USSF and its members] in their exercise of their rights and duties under the First Amendment and particularly to stifle the freedom of the press and association guaranteed by that amendment."[6] The subpoena was issued to the bank rather than to USSF and its members, the complaint claimed, "in order to deprive [them] of their rights to protect their private records, such as the sources of their contributions, as they would be entitled to do if the subpoenas had been issued against them directly." The complaint further claimed that financial support to *496 USSF is obtained exclusively through contributions from private individuals, and if the bank records are disclosed "much of that financial support will be withdrawn and USSF will be unable to continue its constitutionally protected activities."[7] For relief USSF and its members, the respondents, sought a permanent injunction restraining the Members of the Subcommittee and its Chief Counsel from trying to enforce the subpoena by contempt of Congress or other means and restraining the bank from complying with the subpoena.[8] Respondents also sought a declaratory judgment declaring the subpoena and the Senate resolutions void under the Constitution. No damages claim was made. Since the return date on the subpoena was June 4, 1970, three days after the action was begun, enforcement of the subpoena was stayed[9] in order to avoid mootness and to prevent possible irreparable injury. The District Court then held hearings and took testimony on the matter. That court ultimately held[10] that respondents *497 had not made a sufficient |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | ultimately held[10] that respondents *497 had not made a sufficient showing of irreparable injury to warrant an injunction. The court also purported to strike a balance between the legislative interest and respondents' asserted First Amendment rights, It concluded that a valid legislative purpose existed for the inquiry because Congress was pursuing its functions, under Art. I, 8, of raising and supporting an army, and had a legitimate interest in "scrutiniz[ing] closely possible infiltration of subversive elements into an organization which directly affects the armed forces of this country."[11] Relying on the District Court concluded that the legislative interest must prevail over respondents' asserted rights, and denied respondents' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions. It also dismissed as to the petitioner Senators after concluding that the Speech or Debate Clause immunizes them from suit. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding first that, although courts should hesitate to interfere with congressional actions even where First Amendment rights clearly are implicated, such restraint could not preclude judicial review where no alternative avenue of relief is available other than "through the equitable powers of the court." 159 U. S. App. D. C. 352, 359, Here the subpoena was directed to a third party which could not be expected to refuse *498 compliance; unless respondents could obtain judicial relief the bank might comply, the case would become moot, and the asserted violation of respondents' constitutional rights would be irreparable. Because the subpoena was not directed to respondents, the Court of Appeals noted, the traditional route for raising their defenses by refusing compliance and testing the legal issues in a contempt proceeding was not available to them. Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that if the subpoena were obeyed respondents' First Amendment rights would be violated. The court said: "The right of voluntary associations, especially those engaged in activities which may not meet with popular favor, to be free from having either state or federal officials expose their affiliation and membership absent a compelling state or federal purpose has been made clear a number of times. See ; ; affirming the judgment of the three-judge district court for the Eastern District of Arkansas," 159 U. S. App. D. C., at In this case that right would be violated, the Court of Appeals held, because discovery of the identities of donors was the admitted goal of the subpoena, and that information could be gained as easily from bank records as from membership lists. Moreover, if donors' identities were revealed, or if donors reasonably feared that result, USSF's contributions would *499 decrease substantially, as had already occurred merely |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | contributions would *499 decrease substantially, as had already occurred merely because of the threat posed by the subpoena.[12] The Court of Appeals then fashioned a remedy to deal with the supposed violation of rights. It ordered the District Court to "consider the extent to which committee counsel should properly be required to give evidence as to matters without the `legislative sphere.' "[13] It also ordered that the court should "be liberal in granting the right of amendment" to respondents to add other parties if thereby "the case can better proceed to a decision on the validity of the subpoena." Members of Congress could be added as parties, the Court of Appeals said, if their presence is "unavoidable if a valid order is to be entered by the court to vindicate rights which would otherwise go unredressed." The Court of Appeals concluded that *500 declaratory relief against Members is "preferable" to "any coercive order." The clear implication is that the District Court was authorized to enter a "coercive order" which in context could mean that the Subcommittee could be prevented from pursuing its inquiry by use of a subpoena to the bank. One judge dissented on the ground that the membership-list cases were distinguishable because in none of them was there a "showing that the lists were requested for a proper purpose." Here, on the other hand, the dissenting judge concluded, "there is a demonstrable relationship between the information sought and the valid legislative interest of the federal Congress" in discovering whether any money for USSF activities "came from foreign sources or subversive organizations," 1278; whether USSF activities may have constituted violations of 18 U.S. C. 2387 (a), which prohibits interference with the loyalty, discipline, or morale of the Armed Services; or whether the anonymity of USSF donors might have disguised persons who had not complied with the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S. C. 611 et seq. Finally, he noted that the prime purpose of the Subcommittee's inquiry was to investigate application of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S. C. 781 et seq., and that, too, provided a legitimate congressional interest. The dissenting judge then balanced the congressional interests against private rights, Watkins v. United and struck the balance in favor of the investigative role of Congress. He reasoned that there is no right to secrecy which can frustrate a legitimate congressional inquiry into an area where legislation may be had. 159 U. S. App. D. C., at -379, -1279, *501 1282. Absent a showing that the information sought could not be used in the legislative |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | the information sought could not be used in the legislative sphere, he concluded, judicial interference was unwarranted. We conclude that the actions of the Senate Subcommittee, the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, 6, cl. 1, and are therefore immune from judicial interference. We reverse. II The question[14] to be resolved is whether the actions of the petitioners fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." If they do, the petitioners "shall not be questioned in any other Place" about those activities since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause are absolute, ; United v. ; v. United ; ; -85; United v. ; Without exception, our cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly to effectuate its purposes. Kilbourn ; United v. ; at ; United v. ; v. United ; cf. 341 U.S. 376- The purpose of the Clause is to insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently. "The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators." United v. In our system "the clause serves the additional function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders." United v. The Clause is a product of the English experience. Kilbourn v. United v. Due to that heritage our cases make it clear that the "central role" of the Clause is to "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary, United v." v. United That role is not the sole function of the Clause, however, and English history does not totally define the reach of the Clause. Rather, it "must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government" United v. Thus we have long held that, when it applies, the Clause provides protection against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions brought by private individuals *503 as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch. Kilbourn v. The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is supported by the absoluteness of the term "shall not be questioned," and the sweep of the term "in any other Place." In reading the Clause broadly we have said that legislators acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity "should be protected not only from the consequences |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | legislative activity "should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves." Just as a criminal prosecution infringes upon the independence which the Clause is designed to preserve, a private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private civil actions also may be used to delay and disrupt the legislative function. Moreover, whether a criminal action is instituted by the Executive Branch, or a civil action is brought by private parties, judicial power is still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative independence is imperiled. We reaffirm that once it is determined that Members are acting within the "legitimate legislative sphere" the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference. III In determining whether particular activities other than literal speech or debate fall within the "legitimate legislative sphere" we look to see whether the activities took place "in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." 504 U. S., at 204. More specifically, we must determine whether the activities are "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House." v. United See The power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process plainly falls within that definition. This Court has often noted that the power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws because "[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change." See ; United v. Rumely,[15] Issuance of subpoenas such as the one in question here has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investigate. Watkins v. United "[W]here the legislative body does not itself possess *505 the requisite informationwhich not infrequently is truerecourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed." at It also has been held that the subpoena power may be exercised by a committee acting, as here, on behalf |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | be exercised by a committee acting, as here, on behalf of one of the Houses. Cf. 341 U. S., -. Without such power the Subcommittee may not be able to do the task assigned to it by Congress. To conclude that the power of inquiry is other than an integral part of the legislative process would be a miserly reading of the Speech or Debate Clause in derogation of the "integrity of the legislative process." United v. ; and United v. We have already held that the act "of authorizing an investigation pursuant to which materials were gathered" is an integral part of the legislative process. 412 U. S., The issuance of a subpoena pursuant to an authorized investigation is similarly an indispensable ingredient of lawmaking; without it our recognition that the act "of authorizing" is protected would be meaningless. To hold that Members of Congress are protected for authorizing an investigation, but not for issuing a subpoena in exercise of that authorization, would be a contradiction denigrating the power granted to Congress in Art. I and would indirectly impair the deliberations of Congress. The particular investigation at issue here is related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. *506 Watkins v. United On this record the pleadings show that the actions of the Members and the Chief Counsel fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." The Subcommittee was acting under an unambiguous resolution from the Senate authorizing it to make a complete study of the "administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950" S. Res. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). That grant of authority is sufficient to show that the investigation upon which the Subcommittee had embarked concerned a subject on which "legislation could be had." ; see Communist U.S. 1 The propriety of making USSF a subject of the investigation and subpoena is a subject on which the scope of our inquiry is narrow. Hutcheson v. United See Sinclair v. United "The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of determining that a committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province." at Cf. n. 10. Even the most cursory look at the facts presented by the pleadings reveals the legitimacy of the USSF subpoena. Inquiry into the sources of funds used to carry on activities suspected by a subcommittee of Congress to have a potential for undermining the morale of the Armed Forces is within the legitimate legislative sphere. Indeed, the complaint here tells us that USSF operated on or near military and naval bases, and that its |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | on or near military and naval bases, and that its facilities became the "focus of dissent" to declared national policy. Whether USSF activities violated any statute is not relevant; the inquiry was intended to inform Congress in an area where legislation may be had. USSF asserted it *507 does not know the sources of its funds; in light of the Senate authorization to the Subcommittee to investigate "infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of foreign government," and in view of the pleaded facts, it is clear that the subpoena to discover USSF's bank records "may fairly be deemed within [the Subcommittee's] province." at We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this subpoena. We draw no distinction between the Members and the Chief Counsel. In we made it clear that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they must be treated as [the Members'] alter egos" -617. See also Here the complaint alleges that the "Subcommittee members and staff caused the subpoena to be issued under the authority of Senate Resolution 366" The complaint thus does not distinguish between the activities of the Members and those of the Chief Counsel. Contrast, Since the Members are immune because the issuance of the subpoena is "essential to legislating," their aides share that immunity. v. United 408 U. S., ; IV Respondents rely on language in v. United : "[N]o prior case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded *508 the privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should be immune from liability or questioning in such circumstances." From this respondents argue that the subpoena works an invasion of their privacy, and thus cannot be immune from judicial questioning. The conclusion is unwarranted. The quoted language from referred to actions which were not "essential to legislating." See United v. For example, the arrest by the Sergeant at Arms was held unprotected in Kilbourn v. because it was not "essential to legislating." See Quite the contrary is the case with a routine subpoena intended to gather information about a subject on which legislation may be had. See Quinn v. United Respondents also contend that the subpoena cannot be protected by the speech or debate immunity because the "sole purpose" of the investigation is to force "public disclosure of beliefs, opinions, |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | the investigation is to force "public disclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions and associations of private citizens which may be unorthodox or unpopular." App. 16. Respondents view the scope of the privilege too narrowly. Our cases make clear that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it. Watkins v. United ; Hutcheson v. United In we said that "the Speech or Debate Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process and into the motivation for those acts." And in we said that "[t]he claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege." 341 U.S., If the mere allegation that a valid legislative *509 act was undertaken for an unworthy purpose would lift the protection of the Clause, then the Clause simply would not provide the protection historically undergirding it. "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed." at The wisdom of congressional approach or methodology is not open to judicial veto. 412 U. S., Nor is the legitimacy of a congressional inquiry to be defined by what it produces. The very nature of the investigative functionlike any researchis that it takes the searchers up some "blind alleys" and into nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result. Finally, respondents argue that the purpose of the subpoena was to "harass, chill, punish and deter" them in the exercise of their First Amendment rights, App. 16, and thus that the subpoena cannot be protected by the Clause. Their theory seems to be that once it is alleged that First Amendment rights may be infringed by congressional action the Judiciary may intervene to protect those rights; the Court of Appeals seems to have subscribed to that theory. That approach, however, ignores the absolute nature of the speech or debate protection[16]*510 and our cases which have broadly construed that protection. "Congressmen and their aides are immune from liability for their actions within the `legislative sphere,' v. United even though their conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes." 412 U. S., at For us to read the Clause as respondents suggest would create an exception not warranted by the language, purposes, or history of the Clause. Respondents make the familiar argument that the broad protection granted by the Clause creates a potential for abuse. That is correct, and in we noted that the |
Justice Burger | 1,975 | 12 | majority | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109257/eastland-v-united-states-servicemens-fund/ | abuse. That is correct, and in we noted that the risk of such abuse was "the conscious choice of the Framers" buttressed and justified by 408 U.S., at Our consistently broad construction of the Speech or *511 Debate Clause rests on the belief that it must be so construed to provide the independence which is its central purpose. This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial interference may cause. A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for nearly five years, during which the Members and their aide have been obliged to devote time to consultation with their counsel concerning the litigation, and have been distracted from the purpose of their inquiry. The Clause was written to prevent the need to be confronted by such "questioning" and to forbid invocation of judicial power to challenge the wisdom of Congress' use of its investigative authority.[17] V When the Senate case was in the Court of Appeals it was consolidated with three other cases[18] because it was assumed that "a decision in [the Senate] case might well control the disposition of [the others]." Those cases *512 involved subpoenas from the House Internal Security Committee to banks for the bank records of certain organizations. As in the Senate aspect of this case, the organizations whose bank records were sought sued, alleging that if the subpoenas were honored their constitutional rights would be violated. The issue of speech or debate protection for Members and aides is presented in all the cases consolidated in the Court of Appeals. However, the complaints in the House cases are different from the complaint in the Senate case, additional parties are involved, and consequently additional issues may be presented. Progress in the House cases was suspended when they were in the pleading stage awaiting the outcome of the Senate aspect of this case. The issues in them, therefore, have not been joined. Additionally, it appears that the Session in which the House subpoenas were issued has expired. Since the House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuing body, 273 U. S., at ; Gojack v. United a question of mootness may be raised. Moreover it appears that the Committee that issued the subpoenas has been abolished by the House, H. Res. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 14, 1975. In view of these problems, and because the House aspects of this case were not briefed or argued here, we conclude it would be unwise to attempt to decide any issues they might present that are not resolved in the Senate aspect of this case. n. 8; Judgment with respect to the |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Henderson v. Kibbe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109653/henderson-v-kibbe/ | Respondent is in petitioner's custody pursuant to a conviction for second-degree murder. The question presented to us is whether the New York State trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the issue of causation was constitutional error requiring a Federal District Court to grant habeas corpus relief. Disagreeing with a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we hold that it was not. On the evening of December 30, 1970, respondent and his codefendant encountered a thoroughly intoxicated man named Stafford in a bar in Rochester, N. Y.[1] After observing Stafford display at least two $100 bills,[2] they decided to rob him and agreed to drive him to a nearby town. While in the car, respondent slapped Stafford several times, took his money, and, in a search for concealed funds, forced Stafford to lower his trousers and remove his boots. They then abandoned him on an unlighted, rural road, still in a state of partial undress, and without his coat or his glasses. The temperature was near zero, visibility was obscured by blowing snow, and snow banks flanked the roadway. The time was between 9:30 and 9:40 p. m. At about 10 p. m., while helplessly seated in a traffic lane about a quarter mile from the nearest lighted building, Stafford was struck by a speeding pickup truck. The driver testified that while he was traveling 50 miles per hour in a 40-mile zone, the first of two approaching cars flashed its lights presumably as a warning which he did not understand. Immediately after the cars passed, the driver saw Stafford sitting in the road with his hands in the air. The driver neither swerved nor braked his vehicle before it hit Stafford. Stafford was pronounced dead upon arrival at the local hospital. *148 Respondent and his accomplice were convicted of grand larceny, robbery, and second-degree murder.[3] Only the conviction of murder, as defined in N. Y. Penal Law 125.25 (2) (McKinney 1975), is now challenged. That statute provides that "[a] person is guilty of murder in the second degree" when "[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person." (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel argued that it was the negligence of the truckdriver, rather than the defendants' action, that had caused Stafford's death, and that the defendants could not have anticipated the fatal accident.[4] On the other hand, the prosecution argued that the death was foreseeable and would not have occurred but |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Henderson v. Kibbe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109653/henderson-v-kibbe/ | the death was foreseeable and would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendants who *149 therefore were the cause of death.[5] Neither party requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on the meaning of the statutory requirement that the defendants' conduct "thereby cause[d] the death of another person," and no such instruction was given. The trial judge did, however, read the indictment and the statute to the jury and explained the meaning of some of the statutory language. He advised the jury that a "person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists." App. 89 (emphasis added). The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction. Although respondent did not challenge the sufficiency of the instructions to the jury in that court, Judge Cardamone dissented on the ground that the trial court's charge did not explain the issue of causation *150 or include an adequate discussion of the necessary mental state. That judge expressed the opinion that "the jury, upon proper instruction, could have concluded that the victim's death by an automobile was a remote and intervening cause."[6] The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It identified the causation issue as the only serious question raised by the appeal, and then rejected the contention that the conduct of the driver of the pickup truck constituted an intervening cause which relieved the defendants of criminal responsibility for Stafford's death. The court held that it was "not necessary that the ultimate harm be intended by the actor. It will suffice if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt, as indeed it can be here said, that the ultimate harm is something which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts of the accused."[7] The court refused to consider the adequacy of the charge to the jury because that question had not been raised in the trial court. *151 Respondent then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, relying on 28 U.S. C. 2254. The District Court held that the respondent's attack on the sufficiency of the charge failed to raise a question of constitutional dimension and that, without more, "the charge is not reviewable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." App. 21. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, In |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Henderson v. Kibbe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109653/henderson-v-kibbe/ | The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, In view of the defense strategy which consistently challenged the sufficiency of the proof of causation, the majority held that the failure to make any objection to the jury instructions was not a deliberate bypass precluding federal habeas corpus relief,[8] but rather was an "obviously inadvertent" omission. On the merits, the court held that since the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime, In re the failure to instruct the jury on an essential element as complex as the causation issue in this case created an impermissible risk that the jury had not made a finding that the Constitution requires.[9] *152 Because the Court of Appeals decision appeared to conflict with this Court's holding in we granted certiorari, Respondent argues that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on either of two independent grounds: (1) that the omission of an instruction on causation created the danger that the jurors failed to make an essential factual determination as required by ; or (2) assuming that they did reach the causation question, they did so without adequate guidance and might have rendered a different verdict under proper instructions. A fair evaluation of the omission in the context of the entire record requires rejection of both arguments.[10] *153 I The Court has held "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re at One of the facts which the New York statute required the prosecution to prove is that the defendants' conduct caused the death of Stafford. As the New York Court of Appeals held, the evidence was plainly sufficient to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. It is equally clear that the record requires us to conclude that the jury made such a finding. There can be no question about the fact that the jurors were informed that the case included a causation issue that they had to decide. The element of causation was stressed in the arguments of both counsel. The statutory language, which the trial judge read to the jury, expressly refers to the requirement that defendants' conduct "cause[d] the death of another person." The indictment tracks the statutory language; it was read to the jurors and they were given a copy for use during their deliberations. The judge instructed the jury that all elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Henderson v. Kibbe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109653/henderson-v-kibbe/ | the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether or not the arguments of counsel correctly characterized the law applicable to the causation issue, they surely made it clear to the jury that such an issue *154 had to be decided. It follows that the objection predicated on this Court's holding in is without merit. II An appraisal of the significance of an error in the instructions to the jury requires a comparison of the instructions which were actually given with those that should have been given. Orderly procedure requires that the respective adversaries' views as to how the jury should be instructed be presented to the trial judge in time to enable him to deliver an accurate charge and to minimize the risk of committing reversible error.[11] It is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.[12] The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal.[13] The question in such a collateral proceeding is "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process," not merely whether "the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even `universally condemned,' " *155 In this case, the respondent's burden is especially heavy because no erroneous instruction was given; his claim of prejudice is based on the failure to give any explanationbeyond the reading of the statutory language itselfof the causation element. An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Since this omission escaped notice on the record until Judge Cardamone filed his dissenting opinion at the intermediate appellate level, the probability that it substantially affected the jury deliberations seems remote. Because respondent did not submit a draft instruction on the causation issue to the trial judge, and because the New York courts apparently had no previous occasion to construe this aspect of the murder statute, we cannot know with certainty precisely what instruction should have been given as a matter of New York law. We do know that the New York Court of Appeals found no reversible error in this case; and its discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence gives us guidance about the kind of causation instruction that would have been acceptable. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence of causation |
Justice Stevens | 1,977 | 16 | majority | Henderson v. Kibbe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109653/henderson-v-kibbe/ | York Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence of causation was sufficient because it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the "ultimate harm" was "something which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts of the accused." It is not entirely clear whether the court's reference to "ultimate harm" merely required that Stafford's death was foreseeable, or, more narrowly, that his death by a speeding vehicle was foreseeable.[14] In either event, the court was satisfied that the "ultimate harm" was one which "should have been foreseen." Thus, an adequate instruction would have told the jury that if the *156 ultimate harm should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to defendants' conduct, that conduct should be regarded as having caused the death of Stafford. The significance of the omission of such an instruction may be evaluated by comparison with the instructions that were given. One of the elements of respondent's offense is that he acted "recklessly," By returning a guilty verdict, the jury necessarily found, in accordance with its instruction on recklessness, that respondent was "aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk"[15] that death would occur. A person who is "aware of and consciously disregards" a substantial risk must also foresee the ultimate harm that the risk entails. Thus, the jury's determination that the respondent acted recklessly necessarily included a determination that the ultimate harm was foreseeable to him. In a strict sense, an additional instruction on foreseeability would not have been cumulative because it would have related to an element of the offense not specifically covered in the instructions given. But since it is logical to assume that the jurors would have responded to an instruction on causation consistently with their determination of the issues that were comprehensively explained, it is equally logical to conclude that such an instruction would not have affected their verdict.[16] Accordingly, we reject the suggestion that the omission of more complete instructions on the causation issue "so *157 infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process." Even if we were to make the unlikely assumption that the jury might have reached a different verdict pursuant to an additional instruction, that possibility is too speculative to justify the conclusion that constitutional error was committed. The judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stewart | 1,975 | 18 | second_dissenting | Rose v. Locke | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109329/rose-v-locke/ | I would have denied the petition for certiorari in this but, now that the writ has been granted, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This is not of a piece with upon which the Court so heavily relies. There the Florida courts had repeatedly and explicitly ruled that the state law in question prohibited precisely the conduct in which the defendants were found to have engaged. Here, by contrast, the Tennessee courts had never ruled that the act that Locke was found to have committed was covered by the vague and cryptic language of the Tennessee statute. The Court today emphasizes that a previous Tennessee court opinion had cited a decision of a Maine court construing a similar statute "broadly," but even the cited Maine decision had not construed the statute to cover the conduct in question here. And a later Tennessee decision would have supported the inference that this conduct was not proscribed by the Tennessee statute. *60 In the Stone the Florida statute had "been construed to forbid identifiable conduct so that `interpretation by [the state court] puts these words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature' " In the present by contrast, the state courts had never held that the statutory language here at issue covered the respondent's conduct. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the respondent in this could, and probably should, be prosecuted for aggravated assault and battery. But I think the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the Tennessee statute under which the defendant was in fact prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague as here applied. |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | majority | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | Title 18 U.S. C. 924 (c) authorizes the imposition of enhanced penalties on a defendant who uses or carries a firearm while committing a federal felony. The question for decision in these cases is whether that section may be applied to a defendant who uses a firearm in the course of a felony that is proscribed by a statute which itself authorizes enhancement if a dangerous weapon is used. We hold that the sentence received by such a defendant may be enhanced *400 only under the enhancement provision in the statute defining the felony he committed and that 924 (c) does not apply in such a case. I Petitioners Anthony LaRocca, Jr., and Michael Busic were tried together on a multicount indictment charging drug, firearms, and assault offenses flowing from a narcotics conspiracy and an attempt to rob an undercover agent. The evidence showed that in May 1976 the two arranged a drug buy with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration who was to supply $30,000 in cash. When the agent arrived with the money, LaRocca attempted to rob him at gunpoint. The agent signalled for reinforcements, and as other officers began to close in LaRocca fired several shots at them. No one was hit and the agents succeeded in disarming and arresting LaRocca. Busic was also arrested and the officers seized a gun he was carrying in his belt but had not drawn. Additional weapons were found in the pair's automobile.[1] A jury in the United District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania convicted petitioners of narcotics and possession-of-firearms counts,[2] and of two counts of armed assault on federal officers in violation of 18 U.S. C. 111 LaRocca as the actual triggerman and Busic as an aider and abettor, and thus derivatively a principal under 18 U.S. C. 2. In addition, LaRocca was convicted of using a firearm in the commission of a federal felony in violation of 18 U.S. C. 924 (c) (1), and Busic was convicted of carrying a firearm in *401 the commission of a federal felony in violation of 18 U.S. C. 924 (c) (2).[3] Each petitioner was sentenced to a total of 30 years, of which 5 resulted from concurrent sentences on the narcotics charges, 5 were a product of concurrent terms on the firearms and assault charges, and 20 were imposed for the 924 (c) violations. The defendants appealed, contending, among other things, that they could not be sentenced consecutively for assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon as defined in 18 U.S. C. 111[4] and for the use of |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | majority | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | in 18 U.S. C. 111[4] and for the use of a firearm in connection with that crime as provided in 924 (c).[5] In an opinion announced *402 before was decided, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the imposition in LaRocca's case of enhanced sentences under both 924 (c) and 111 for a single assault with a firearm violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the two statutes required proof of identical elements. Accordingly, LaRocca's case was remanded to the District Court for resentencing under either 111 or 924 (c), at the Government's election. Since the 924 (c) charge against Busic alleged not that he used a firearm ( 924 (c) (1)), but rather that he carried one ( 924 (c) (2), the Court of Appeals held that no like infirmity invalidated his conviction and sentence. In its view, the 111 and 924 (c) charges against him did not require proof of the same elements and hence did not merge because the former could be established merely by showing that Busic had aided and abetted LaRocca's use of a gun to assault the federal officers, while the latter required proof of the additional fact that Busic had unlawfully carried a gun. Following this Court's decision in the Court of Appeals granted a petition for rehearing and vacated its double jeopardy holding with regard to LaRocca on grounds there was no reason to reach the constitutional -589. Thereafter, it proceeded as a matter of statutory construction to arrive at a nearly identical conclusionnamely, that LaRocca's sentence *403 could not be enhanced under both 111 and 924 (c) but that he could be sentenced under either at the Government's election. The Court of Appeals did not alter its holding with regard to Busic. We granted certiorari, and now reverse the enhanced sentences that were imposed on both petitioners under 924 (c). We turn first to the case of petitioner LaRocca because it poses most directly the key question of legislative intent. Our starting point, like that of the parties, is There we considered the relationship between 924 (c) and the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S. C. 2113, which, like the assault provision at issue here, 18 U.S. C. 111, predates 924 (c) and provides by its own terms for enhanced punishment where the felony is committed with a dangerous weapon.[6] Relying upon the legislative history and applicable canons of statutory construction, held that the Congress cannot be understood to have intended that a defendant who has been convicted of robbing a bank with a firearm |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | majority | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | has been convicted of robbing a bank with a firearm may be sentenced under both 924 (c) and 2113 (d). The parties to the instant cases agree that clearly prohibits the imposition on these petitioners of similarly enhanced sentences under both 924 (c) and 111. But the Government contends that resolved only the double enhancement questionthat the Court's holding and opinion should not be read to find 924 (c) inapplicable where the prosecution proceeds under that provision rather than the enhancement provision of a predicate felony statute like 111. Such a reading, the Government asserts, is supported by the facts presented in[7] the language used to describe the *404 actual "holding,"[8] the most likely inferences that may be drawn as to what Congress would have wanted had it focussed on the precise problem,[9] and the asserted irrationality of some of the consequences that would flow from a holding that 924 (c) is inapplicable in cases like the present cases.[10] We disagree. In our view, 's language and reasoning support one conclusion alonethat prosecution and enhanced sentencing under 924 (c) is simply not permissible where the predicate felony statute contains its own enhancement provision. This result is supported not only by the general principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis principles particularly apposite in cases of statutory construction but also by the legislative history and relevant canons of statutory construction. The Government has not persuaded us that this result is irrational or depends upon implausible inferences as to congressional intent. And to the *405 extent that cases can be hypothesized in which this holding may support curious or seemingly unreasonable comparative sentences, it suffices to say that the asserted unreasonableness flows not from and this decision, but rather from the statutes as Congress wrote them. If corrective action is needed, it is the Congress that must provide it. "It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated." Our reasoning has several strands. It begins, as indeed it must, with the text and legislative history of 924 (c). By its terms, that provision tells us nothing about the way Congress intended to mesh the new enhancement scheme with analogous provisions in pre-existing statutes defining federal crimes. Moreover, as and n. 7, 924 (c) was offered as an amendment on the House floor by Representative Poff, 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968), and passed on the same day. Accordingly, the committee reports and congressional hearings to which we normally turn for aid in these situations simply |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | majority | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | which we normally turn for aid in these situations simply do not exist, and we are forced in consequence to search for clues to congressional intent in the sparse pages of floor debate that make up the relevant legislative history. The crucial material for present purposes is the following observation by Representative Poff: "For the sake of legislative history, it should be that my substitute is not intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112, or 113 which already define the penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114 concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm felonies." pointed out that "[t]his statement is clearly probative of a legislative judgment that the purpose of 924 (c) is *406 already served whenever the substantive federal offense provides enhanced punishment for use of a dangerous weapon." Moreover, Representative Poff's remarks were the only ones touching on the present question that were before the House when 924 (c) was adopted, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they represent the understanding of the Congressmen who voted for the proposal.[11] Reliance on Representative Poff's statement of legislative intent is consistent with the position taken by the Department of Justice in 1971 when it advised prosecutors not to proceed under 924 (c) (1) if the predicate felony statute provided for "`increased penalties where a firearm is used in the commission of the offense.'" quoting 19 U. S. Attys. Bull. No. 3, p. 63 Moreover, this view is fully consistent with two tools of statutory construction relied upon in The first is the oft-cited rule that "`ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.'" United v. Bass, quoting Rewis v. United And the second is the principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence. In these principles counseled against double enhancement. They served as "an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent *407 a clear and definite legislative directive." -16. Here they play a similar role, and thus help confirm the conclusion that 924 (c) may not be applied at all in the present situation. The Government seeks to minimize the force of these principles of statutory construction by urging (1) that there is no ambiguity in 924 (c) and thus that the rule of lenity is not properly called into play and (2) that in fact it is |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | majority | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | called into play and (2) that in fact it is 924 (c) that is the more specific statute because it relates only to firearms while 111 would permit enhancement for any dangerous weapon. We find each contention flawed. As to the first, the claim that there exists no ambiguity does not stand up. Plainly the text of the statute fails to address the issue pertinent to decision of these caseswhether Congress intended (1) to provide for enhanced penalties only for crimes not containing their own enhancement provisions, (2) to provide an alternative enhancement provision applicable to all felonies, or (3) to provide a duplicative enhancement provision which would permit double enhancement where the underlying felony was proscribed by a statute like 111. Our task here, as in is to ascertain as best we can which approach Congress had in mind. The rule of lenity, like reference to appropriate legislative materials, is one of the tools we use to do so. The Government's second contentionthat 924 (c) rather than 111 should be viewed as the more specific statuteis both facially unpersuasive[12] and likely to lead to curious consequences. Indeed, were the Government correct we would be forced to conclude that with regard to firearms cases 924 (c) impliedly repealed all pre-existing enhancement provisions. Yet there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that this is what Congress intended. Moreover, such a result *408 would be inconsistent with [13] and in any event would not give the Government what it wants because it would not permit the prosecutor to choose between 924 (c) and 111. In addition to contesting the rule of lenity and specific-versus-general arguments, the Government contends that our reading of the legislative materials is unreasonable because those who supported the Poff amendmentincluding Representative Poff himselfwere clearly committed to meting out stiff penalties for use of a firearm in the course of a felony and would not have followed any course inconsistent with that commitment. The argument is overdrawn. In the first place, we do not think our construction is inconsistent with a congressional desire to deal severely with firearm abuses. As we understand it, the Government's argument is not that our construction reads Congress to have diminished the penalty for firearm use, but only that our construction fails to enhance that penalty to the hilt. Yet it is patently clear that Congress too has failed to enhance that penalty to the hiltit set maximum sentences as well as a variety of other limits on the available punishment. Thus, while Congress had a general desire to deter firearm abuses, |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | majority | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | while Congress had a general desire to deter firearm abuses, that desire was not unbounded. Our task here is to locate one of the boundaries, and the inquiry is not advanced by the assertion that Congress wanted no boundaries. More specifically, some accommodation between 924 (c) and statutes like 111 is obviously necessary. And since some pre-existing statutes provided for sentences less severe than 924 (c) and others for penalties more severe,[14] any rule *409 of priority would lead in certain circumstances to a punishment less severe than might have been achieved under another rule of priority. The Government in effect argues that had Representative Poff and his colleagues foreseen this problem they would have eschewed any priority rule and instead rested complete discretion in the prosecutor. We do not dispute that a rule permitting prosecutors freedom of choice might give greater effect to a legislative desire to increase the penalties for firearm use, but the same could be said of any number of constructions of the statute, including the one rejected in Indeed, by rejecting double enhancement exposes the stark and unidimensional quality of any calculus which attempts to construe the statute on the basis of an assumption that in enacting 924 (c) Congress' sole objective was to increase the penalties for firearm use to the maximum extent possible. The fact that the enhanced sentences authorized in some predicate felony statutes are greater than those set forth in 924 (c) while those in others are less provides a partial response to the Government's contention that our construction would lead to irrational sentencing patterns in which some less severe crimes are punished more than other more severe ones.[15] The fact is that any interpretation might have led *410 to differences in treatment that are not intuitively reasonable. In consequence, the presence of differences here fails to shake our confidence in our construction. More broadly, it is simply not for this Court to substitute its accommodation between old and new enhancement provisions for the one apparently chosen by Congress. On the contrary, "in our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with `common sense and the public weal.'" I What we have said thus far disposes of LaRocca's case by making it clear that he may not be sentenced under 924 (c) for using his gun to assault the federal officers. This holding also applies in Busic's case. But in that case the Government has a fallback position. Even if a person who uses a |
Justice Brennan | 1,980 | 13 | majority | Busic v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110258/busic-v-united-states/ | a fallback position. Even if a person who uses a gun to violate 111 may not be sentenced for doing so under 924 (c) (1), the argument goes, a person who carries a gun in the commission of a 111 violation may be sentenced under 924 (c) (2) because the enhancement provision of 111 does not apply to those who carry but do not use their weapons. Thus, the Government urges, whatever our holding with regard to LaRocca, Busic may be sentenced under 924 (c) (2) for carrying his gun while committing the crime of aiding and abetting LaRocca's violation of 111. The central flaw in this argument as applied here is that Busic is being punished for using a weapon. Through the combination of 111 and 18 U.S. C. 2, he was found guilty as a principal of using a firearm to assault the undercover agents.[16] LaRocca's gun, in other words, became Busic's as *411 a matter of law. And the Government's argument thus amounts to the contention that had Busic shot one gun at the officers and carried another in his belt he could have been punished under 111 for the one he fired and under 924 (c) (2) for the one he did not fire. Similarly, this argument would suggest, Busic might be punished for carrying a gun in his belt and also for shooting that same gun. Yet such results are wholly implausible. They would stand both and our holding in Part on their heads, impute to Congress the unlikely intention to punish each weapon as a separate offense, and create a situation in which aiders and abettors would often be more culpable and more severely punished than those whom they aid and abet.[17] We decline to read the statutes to produce such an ungainly result. It seems to us that our holding of Part is equally applicable hereBusic's vicarious assault and use of a dangerous weapon are subject to prosecution and punishment under 111 and he has been duly prosecuted and punished pursuant to that provision. In such a case, the legislative history, and applicable canons of statutory construction make it clear that neither subsection of 924 (c) is available.[18] *412 These cases are reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.[19] So ordered. MR. |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Antoine v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109193/antoine-v-washington/ | The appellants, husband and wife, are ndians. They were convicted in the Superior Court of the State of Washington[1] of the offenses of hunting and possession *196 of deer during closed season in violation of and 77.16.030[2] The offenses occurred on September 11, 1971, in Ferry County on unallotted non-ndian land in what was once the north half of the Colville ndian Reservation.[3] The Colville Confederated Tribes ceded to the United that northern half under a congressionally ratified and adopted Agreement, dated May 9, 1891. Article 6 of that ratified Agreement provided expressly that "the right to hunt and fish in common with all other persons on lands not allotted to said ndians shall not be taken away or in anywise abridged."[4] Appellants' defense was that congressional *197 approval of Art. 6 excluded from the cession and retained and preserved for the Confederated Tribes the exclusive, absolute, and unrestricted rights to hunt and fish that had been part of the ndians' larger rights in the ceded portion of the reservation, thus limiting governmental regulation of the rights to federal regulation and precluding application to them of and 77.16.030. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the Superior Court had properly rejected this defense and affirmed the convictions, We noted probable jurisdiction, We reverse. President Grant established the original Colville ndian Reservation by Executive Order of July 2, 1872. Washington became a State in 1889, and the next year, by the Act of Aug. 19, 1890, Congress created the Commission that negotiated the 1891 Agreement.[5] By its terms, the Tribes ceded the *198 northern half of the reservation in return for benefits which included the stipulations of Art. 6 and the promise of the United to pay $1,500,000 in five installments. The Agreement was to become effective, however, only "from and after its approval by Congress." Congressional approval was given in a series of statutes. The first statute was the Act of July 1, 1892, which "vacated and restored [the tract] to the public domain" and "open[ed] [it] to settlement." The second statute came 14 years later, the Act of June 21, 1906, 377-378. That statute in terms "carr[ied] into effect the agreement," and authorized the appropriation of the $1,500,000. Payment of the $1,500,000 was effected by five subsequent enactments from 1907 to 1911, each of which appropriated $300,000 and recited in substantially identical language that it was part payment "to the ndians on the Colville Reservation, Washington, for the cession of land opened to settlement by the Act of July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two being a part of the |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Antoine v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109193/antoine-v-washington/ | first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two being a part of the full sum set aside and held in the Treasury of the United in payment for said land under the terms of the Act of June twenty-first, nineteen hundred and six, ratifying the agreement ceding said land to the United under date of May ninth, eighteen hundred and ninety one." (Emphasis supplied.) 1050-1051 (1907); 96 ; 813 (1909); 6 (1910); 1075 (1911).[6] *199 The canon of construction applied over a century and a half by this Court is that the wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the ndians is not to be construed to their prejudice. See also The Kansas ndians, ; United ; Choctaw ; United ; ; Menominee n also a case involving a ratifying statute, the Court stated: "The construction, instead of being strict, is liberal; doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the United are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith." 224 U.S., at See also Seminole 316 U.S. 6, ; Thus, even if there were doubt, and there is none, that the words "[t]o carry into effect the [1891] agreement," in the 1906 Act, and the words "ratifying the [1891] agreement," in the 1907-1911 laws, ratified Art. 6, application of this canon would require that we construe the series of statutes as having ratified that article. Although admitted to statehood two years earlier, the State of Washington was not a party to the 1891 Agreement. The opinion of the State Supreme Court relies upon that fact to attempt a distinction for purposes of the Supremacy Clause[7] between the binding result upon *201 the State of ratification of a contract by treaty effected by concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, Art. 2, cl. 2, and the binding result of ratification of a contract effected by legislation passed by the House and the Senate. The opinion states that "[o]nce ratified, a treaty becomes the supreme law of the land" (emphasis supplied), but that the ratified 1891 Agreement was a mere contract enforceable "only against those party to it," and "not a treaty [and] not the supreme law of the land." 1358. The grounds of this attempted distinction do not clearly emerge from the opinion. The opinion states, however: "The statutes enacted by Congress in implementation of this [1891] agreement are the supreme law if they are within the power of the Congress to enact" at n the context of the discussion in the opinion |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Antoine v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109193/antoine-v-washington/ | at n the context of the discussion in the opinion we take this to mean that the Congress is not constitutionally empowered to inhibit a State's exercise of its police power by legislation ratifying a contract between the Executive Branch and an ndian tribe to which the State is not a party. The fallacy in that proposition is that a legislated ratification of an agreement between the Executive Branch and an ndian tribe is a "[] of the United made in Pursuance" of the Constitution and, therefore, like "all Treaties made," is made binding upon affected by the Supremacy Clause. The opinion seems to find support for the attempted distinction in the fact that, in 1891, the Executive Branch was not authorized to contract by treaty with ndian tribes as sovereign and independent nations. Twenty years earlier, in 1871, 566, Congress had forbidden thereafter recognition of ndian nations and tribes as sovereign independent nations, and thus had abrogated the contract-by-treaty *202 method of dealing with ndian tribes.[8] The Act of 1871 resulted from the opposition of the House of Representatives to its practical exclusion from any policy role in ndian affairs. For nearly a century the Executive Branch made treaty arrangements with the ndians "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," Art. 2, cl. 2. Although the House appropriated money to carry out these treaties, it had no voice in the development of substantive ndian policy reflected in them. House resentment first resulted in legislation in 1867 repealing "all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the nterior, or the commissioner of ndian affairs to enter into treaties with any ndian tribes," Act of Mar. 29, 1867, 9, but this was repealed a few months later, Act of July 20, 1867, After further unsuccessful House attempts to enter the field of federal ndian policy, the House refused to grant funds to carry out new treaties. United Department of the nterior, Federal ndian 211 (1958). Finally, the Senate capitulated and joined the House in passage of the 1871 Act as a rider to the ndian Appropriation Act of 1871. Federal ndian[9] *203 This meant no more, however, than that after 1871 relations with ndians would be governed by Acts of Congress and not by treaty. ; n re Heff, The change in no way affected Congress' plenary powers to legislate on problems of ndians, including legislating the ratification of contracts of the Executive Branch with ndian tribes to which affected were not parties. Several decisions of this Court have long settled that proposition. n the Court held that |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Antoine v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109193/antoine-v-washington/ | have long settled that proposition. n the Court held that tax exemptions contained in an 1897 agreement ratified by Congress between the United and ndian tribes as part of a cession of ndian lands were enforceable against the State of Oklahoma, which was not a party to the agreement. n the Court enforced a clause of an agreement ratified by Act of Congress that no intoxicating liquor should be sold on land in South Dakota ceded and relinquished to the United although South Dakota was not a party to the agreement. The Court expressly rejected the contention that the power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors upon all ceded lands rested exclusively in the State. Rather, because Congress was empowered, when securing the cession of part of an ndian reservation within a State, to prohibit the sale of intoxicants upon the ceded lands, "it follows that the State possesses no exclusive control over the subject and that the congressional prohibition is supreme." See also These decisions sustained the ratified agreements as the exercise by Congress of its "plenary power to deal with the special problems of ndians [that] is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself. Article 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to `regulate Commerce with the ndian Tribes,' and thus, to this extent, singles ndians out as a proper subject for separate legislation." ; see also 415 U. S., at Once ratified by Act of Congress, the provisions of the agreements become law, and like treaties, the supreme law of the land. Congress could constitutionally have terminated the northern half of the Colville ndian Reservation on the terms and conditions in the 1891 Agreement, even if that Agreement had never been made. The decisions in Choate, Perrin, and settle that Congress, by its legislation ratifying the 1891 Agreement, constituted those provisions, including Art. 6, "s of the United made in Pursuance" of the Constitution, and the supreme law of the land, "superior and paramount to the authority of any State within whose limits are ndian tribes." v. United[10] The opinion of the State Supreme Court also holds that in any event the implementing statutes cannot be *205 construed to render and 77.16.030 inapplicable to ndian beneficiaries of the Agreement since the implementing statutes "make no reference to the provision [Art. 6] relied upon by the appellants." 82 Wash. 2d, at The opinion reasons: "[]f it was thought that state regulation but not federal regulation would constitute an abridgement, an express provision to that effect should have been inserted, but only after the consent |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Antoine v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109193/antoine-v-washington/ | effect should have been inserted, but only after the consent of the state had been sought and obtained." This reasoning is fatally flawed. The proper inquiry is not whether the State was or should have been a consenting party to the 1891 Agreement, but whether appellants acquired federally guaranteed rights by congressional ratification of the Agreement. Plainly appellants acquired such rights. Congress exercised its plenary constitutional powers to legislate those federally protected rights into law in enacting the implementing statutes that ratified the Agreement. No congressional purpose to subject the preserved rights to state regulation is to be found in the Acts or their legislative history. Rather, the implementing statutes unqualifiedly, "carr[ied] into effect" and "ratif[ied]" the explicit and unqualified provision of Art. 6 that "the right to hunt and fish shall not be taken away or in anywise abridged." State qualification of the rights is therefore precluded by force of the Supremacy Clause, and neither an express provision precluding state qualification nor the consent of the State was required to achieve that result. V Finally, the opinion of the State Supreme Court construes Art. 6 as merely a promise by the United that so long as it retained any ceded land and allowed others to hunt thereon, ndians would be allowed also to *206 hunt -1358. But the provision of Art. 6 that the preserved rights are not exclusive and are to be enjoyed "in common with all other persons," does not support that interpretation or affect the Supremacy Clause's preclusion of qualifying state regulation. Non-ndians are, of course, not beneficiaries of the preserved rights, and the State remains wholly free to prohibit or regulate non-ndian hunting and fishing. The ratifying legislation must be construed to exempt the ndians' preserved rights from like state regulation, however, else Congress preserved nothing which the ndians would not have had without that legislation. For consistency with the canon that the wording is not to be construed to the prejudice of the ndians makes it impermissible in the absence of explicit congressional expression, to construe the implementing Acts as "an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word of the Nation for more." United ; Puyallup involved a treaty that reserved to the ndians in the area ceded to the United "the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory." Puyallup considered a provision that "[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said ndians, in common |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Antoine v. Washington | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109193/antoine-v-washington/ | and stations, is further secured to said ndians, in common with all citizens of the Territory" The Court held that rights so preserved "may, of course, not be qualified by the State" ; Article 6 presents an even stronger case since Congress' ratification of it included the flat prohibition that the right "shall not be taken away or in anywise abridged." *207 V n Puyallup we held that although, these rights "may not be qualified by the State, the manner of fishing [and hunting], the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing [and hunting], and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the ndians." The "appropriate standards" requirement means that the State must demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable and necessary conservation measure, Washington Game ; and that its application to the ndians is necessary in the interest of conservation. The United as amicus curiae invites the Court to announce that state restrictions "cannot abridge the ndians' federally protected rights without [the State's] demonstrating a compelling need" in the interest of conservation. Brief for United as Amicus Curiae 16. We have no occasion in this case to address this question. The State of Washington has not argued, let alone established, that applying the ban on out-of-season hunting of deer by the ndians on the land in question is in any way necessary or even useful for the conservation of deer. See Hunt v. United (19).[11] *208 The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington sustaining appellants' convictions is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. t is so ordered. MR. |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | The question whether the release-dismissal agreement signed by respondent is unenforceable is much more complex than the Court's opinion indicates. A complete analysis of the question presented by this case cannot end with the observation that respondent made a knowing and voluntary choice to sign a settlement agreement. Even an intelligent and informed, but completely innocent, person accused of crime should not be required to choose between a threatened indictment and trial, with their attendant publicity and the omnipresent possibility of wrongful conviction, and surrendering the right to a civil remedy against individuals who have violated his or her constitutional rights. Moreover, the prosecutor's representation of competing and possibly conflicting interests compounds the dangerous potential of release-dismissal *404 agreements. To explain my disagreement with the majority, I shall first discuss the dilemma confronted by respondent at the time his lawyer advised him to sign the agreement, then comment on the three different interests the prosecutor represented, and finally discuss the plurality's evaluation of the relevant public interests in this case. I Respondent is an innocent man. As a matter of law, he must be presumed to be innocent. As a matter of fact, the uncontradicted sworn testimony of respondent,[1] and his *40 lawyer,[2] buttressed by the circumstantial evidence,[3] overwhelmingly attest to his innocence.[4] There was no written statement by the alleged victim, sworn or unsworn, implicating respondent in any criminal activity. The charge that respondent had threatened the victim was reported to the police by the victim's daughter, and the substance of the conversation as summarized in Chief Barrett's report was based in part on his conversation with the daughter, in part on conversations between another police officer and the victim, and in part on his own conversation with the victim when she was *406 in a state of extreme emotional distress.[] Respondent was never indicted, and the warrant for his arrest was issued on the basis of a sketchy statement by Chief Barrett.[6] Even the assistant prosecutor who was in charge of the case was surprised to learn that Chief Barrett had arrested respondent on the basis of the information in the police report.[7]*407 Thus, when the Newton police officers arrested respondent in his home they had not even obtained a written statement from the complaining witness. Prior to the arrest, and prior to the police chief's press conference concerning it, respondent was a respected member of a small community who had never been arrested, even for a traffic offense. A few days before respondent was scheduled for a probable-cause hearing on the charge of witness tampering, respondent's attorney |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | probable-cause hearing on the charge of witness tampering, respondent's attorney advised him to sign a covenant not to sue the town of Newton, its police officers, or the witness Deary in exchange for dismissal of the charge against him. The advice was predicated on the lawyer's judgment that the value of a dismissal outweighed the harmful consequences of an almost certain indictment on a felony charge together with the risk of conviction in a case in which the outcome would depend on the jury's assessment of the relative credibility of respondent and his alleged victim. The lawyer correctly advised respondent that even if he was completely innocent, there could be no guarantee of acquittal.[8] He therefore *408 placed a higher value on his client's interest in terminating the criminal proceeding promptly than on the uncertain benefits of pursuing a civil remedy against the town and its police department.[9] After delaying a decision for three days, respondent reluctantly followed his lawyer's advice. From respondent's point of view, it is unquestionably true that the decision to sign the release-dismissal agreement was, as the Court emphasizes, "voluntary, deliberate, and informed." Ante, at 391. It reflected "a highly rational judgment that the certain benefits of escaping criminal prosecution exceed the speculative benefits of prevailing in a civil action." Ante, at 394. As the plurality iterates and reiterates, respondent made a "considered decision that he would benefit personally from the agreement." Ante, at 39. I submit, however, that the deliberate and rational character of respondent's decision is not a sufficient reason for concluding that the agreement is enforceable. Otherwise, a promise to pay a state trooper $20 for not issuing a ticket for a traffic violation, or a promise to contribute to the police department's retirement fund in exchange for the dismissal of a felony charge, would be enforceable. Indeed, I would suppose that virtually all contracts that courts refuse to enforce nevertheless reflect perfectly rational decisions by the parties who entered into them. There is nothing irrational about an agreement to bribe a police officer, to enter into a wagering arrangement, to pay usurious rates of interests, or to threaten to indict an innocent man in order to induce him to surrender something of value. *409 The "voluntary, deliberate, and informed" character of a defendant's decision generally provides an acceptable basis for upholding the validity of a plea bargain. But it is inappropriate to assume that the same standard determines the validity of a quite different agreement to forgo a civil remedy for the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in exchange for complete |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in exchange for complete abandonment of a criminal charge. The net result of every plea bargain is an admission of wrongdoing by the defendant and the imposition of a criminal sanction with its attendant stigma. Although there may be some cases in which an innocent person pleads guilty to a minor offense to avoid the risk of conviction on a more serious charge, it is reasonable to presume that such cases are rare and represent the exception rather than the rule. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) (court may not enter judgment on a guilty plea unless it is satisfied the plea has a factual basis). Like a plea bargain, an agreement by the suspect to drop 1983 charges and to pay restitution to the victim in exchange for the prosecutor's termination of criminal proceedings involves an admission of wrongdoing by the defendant.[10] The same cannot be said about an agreement that completely exonerates the defendant. Not only is such a person presumptively innocent as a matter of law; as a factual matter the prosecutor's interest in obtaining a covenant not to sue will be strongest in those cases in which he realizes that the defendant was innocent and was wrongfully accused. Moreover, the prosecutor will be most willing indeed, he is ethically obligated to drop charges when he believes that probable cause as established by the available, admissible evidence is lacking. The plea bargain represents a practical compromise between the prosecutor and the defendant that takes into account *410 the burdens of litigation and its probable outcome, as well as society's interest in imposing appropriate punishment upon an admitted wrongdoer. The defendant admits wrongdoing for conduct upon which the guilty plea is based and avoids further prosecution; the prosecutor need not go to trial; and an admitted wrongdoer is punished, all under close judicial supervision. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e). By simultaneously establishing and limiting the defendant's criminal liability, plea bargains delicately balance individual and social advantage. This mutuality of advantage does not exist in release-dismissal agreements. A defendant entering a release-dismissal agreement is forced to waive claims based on official conduct under color of state law, in exchange merely for the assurance that the State will not prosecute him for conduct for which he has made no admission of wrongdoing. The State is spared the necessity of going to trial, but its willingness to drop the charge completely indicates that it might not have proceeded with the prosecution in any event.[11] No social interest in the punishment of wrongdoers |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | any event.[11] No social interest in the punishment of wrongdoers is satisfied; the only interest vindicated is that of resolving once and for all the question of 1983 liability. Achieving this result has no connection with the give-and-take over the defendant's wrongdoing that is the essence of the plea-bargaining process, and thus cannot be justified by reference to the principles of mutual advantage that support plea bargaining. Although the outcome of a criminal proceeding may affect the value of the civil claim, as a matter of law the claims are quite distinct. Even a guilty defendant may be entitled to receive damages for physical abuse, and conversely, the fact that a defendant is ultimately acquitted is entirely consistent with the possibility that the police had *411 probable cause to arrest him and did not violate any of his constitutional rights.[12] The plurality assumes that many 1983 suits "are marginal and some are frivolous," ante, at 39. Whether that assumption is correct or incorrect, the validity of each ought to be tested by the adversary process.[13] Experience teaches us that some 1983 suits in which release-dismissal agreements are sought are meritorious.[14] Whatever the true value of a 1983 claim may be, a defendant who is required to give up such a claim in exchange for a dismissal of a criminal charge is being forced to pay a price that is unrelated to his possible wrongdoing as reflected in that charge. Indeed, if the defendant is forced to abandon a claim that has a value of $1,000, the price that he pays is the functional equivalent of a $1,000 payment to a police department's retirement benefit fund. Thus, even though respondent's decision in this case was deliberate, informed, and voluntary, this observation does not address two distinct objections to enforcement of the release-dismissal agreement. The prosecutor's offer to drop charges if the defendant accedes to the agreement is inherently coercive; moreover, the agreement exacts a price unrelated to the character of the defendant's own conduct. *412 II When the prosecutor negotiated the agreement with respondent, he represented three potentially conflicting interests. His primary duty, of course, was to represent the sovereign's interest in the evenhanded and effective enforcement of its criminal laws. See In addition, as the covenant demonstrates, he sought to represent the interests of the town of Newton and its Police Department in connection with their possible civil liability to respondent. Finally, as the inclusion of Mary Deary as a covenantee indicates, the prosecutor also represented the interest of a potential witness who allegedly accused both respondent and a mutual |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | potential witness who allegedly accused both respondent and a mutual friend of separate instances of wrongdoing. If we view the problem from the standpoint of the prosecutor's principal client, the State of New Hampshire, it is perfectly clear that the release-dismissal agreement was both unnecessary and unjustified. For both the prosecutor and the State of New Hampshire enjoy absolute immunity from common-law and 1983 liability arising out of a prosecutor's decision to initiate criminal proceedings. See The agreement thus gave the State and the prosecutor no protection that the law did not already provide. The record in this case indicates that an important reason for obtaining the covenant was "[t]o protect the police department."[1] There is, however, an obvious potential conflict between the prosecutor's duty to enforce the law and his objective of protecting members of the Police Department who are accused of unlawful conduct. The public is entitled to have the prosecutor's decision to go forward with a criminal case, or to dismiss it, made independently of his concerns about the potential damages liability of the Police Department. It is equally clear that this separation of functions *413 cannot be achieved if the prosecutor may use the threat of criminal prosecution as a weapon to obtain a favorable termination of a civil claim against the police. In negotiating a release-dismissal agreement, the prosecutor inevitably represents both the public and the police. When release agreements are enforceable, consideration of the police interest in avoiding damages liability severely hampers the prosecutor's ability to conform to the strictures of professional responsibility in deciding whether to prosecute. In particular, the possibility that the suspect will execute a covenant not to sue in exchange for a decision not to prosecute may well encourage a prosecutor to bring or to continue prosecutions in violation of his or her duty to "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(a) (1984).[16] This ethical obligation of every prosecutor is consistent with the general and fundamental rule that "[a] lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client." ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon (1980). Every attorney should avoid situations in which he is representing potentially conflicting interests. See at Ethical Consideration -2. As we noted in prosecutorial immunity from 1983 lawsuits "does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs," in large part because *414 "a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers."[17] The prosecutor's potential conflict of interest increases in magnitude in direct proportion to the seriousness of the charges of police wrongdoing. Yet a rule that determines the enforceability of a release-dismissal agreement by focusing entirely on the quality of the defendant's decision to sign the agreement cannot detect the seriousness of this conflict of interest because it cannot distinguish the meritorious 1983 claims from the frivolous ones. On the other hand, if the merits of the claim must be evaluated in each case in order to decide whether the agreement should be enforced, the agreement would not serve the goal of saving the litigation costs associated with a trial of the claim itself. The efficiency argument on behalf of enforcing a release-dismissal agreement thus requires inattention to conflicts of interest in precisely those circumstances in which the agreement to be enforced is most likely to have been exacted by a prosecutor serving the interests of more than one constituency. At bottom, the Court's holding in this case seems to rest on concerns related to the potential witness, Mary Deary.[18] As *41 is true with the prosecutor's concerns for police liability, there is a potential conflict between the public interest represented by the prosecutor and the private interests of a recalcitrant witness. As a general matter there is no reason to fashion a rule that either requires or permits a prosecutor always to defer to the interests of a witness. The prosecutor's law enforcement responsibilities will sometimes diverge from those interests; there will be cases in which the prosecutor has a plain duty to obtain critical testimony despite the desire of the witness to remain anonymous or to avoid a courtroom confrontation with an offender. There may be other cases in which a witness has given false or exaggerated testimony for malicious reasons. It would plainly be unwise for the Court to hold that a release-dismissal agreement is enforceable simply because it affords protection to a potential witness. Arguably a special rule should be fashioned for witnesses who are victims of sexual assaults. The trauma associated with such an assault leaves scars that may make it especially difficult for a victim to press charges or to testify publicly about the event. It remains true, however, that uncorroborated, unsworn statements by persons who claim to have been victims of any crime, including such an assault, may be inaccurate, exaggerated, or incomplete and sometimes even malicious. It is even more clear that hearsay descriptions |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | even malicious. It is even more clear that hearsay descriptions of statements by such persons may be unreliable. Rather than adopting a general rule that upholds a release-dismissal agreement whenever the criminal charge was based on a statement by the alleged victim of a sexual assault, I believe the Court should insist upon a "close examination" of the facts that purportedly justified the agreement. Thus, in this case JUSTICE O'CONNOR has suggested that three special facts support the conclusion that the prosecutor was legitimately interested in protecting the witness Deary from "further injury": (1) her "emotional distress"; (2) her *416 unwillingness to testify against Rumery; and (3) the necessity of her testimony in the pending sexual assault case against Champy. Ante, at 403. Each of these facts merits a brief comment. The only evidence of Deary's emotional distress in the record is found in Chief Barrett's report of his telephone conversation on the afternoon of May 11, 1983. While he was talking to Deary's daughter he "could hear an intense argument and sobbing in the background"; after he was finally able to talk to Deary herself, he characterized her conversation as "hysterical, distra[u]ght, and terrified." See n. It is, of course, reasonable to assume that Deary's emotional distress may have affected her unwillingness to testify against either Champy or Rumery, and thereby influenced the prosecutor's decision to dismiss the witness tampering charge. But the testimony of the prosecutor, who appears only to have talked to her about the sexual assault charge, does not even mention the possibility that she might have to testify in any civil litigation. App. 48. Deary's unwillingness to testify against Rumery is perfectly obvious.[19] That fact unquestionably supports the prosecutor's decision to dismiss the charge against respondent, but it is not a sufficient reason for exonerating police officers from the consequences of actions that they took when they must have known that Deary was unwilling to testify. For it was the precipitate character of the police decision to make an arrest without first obtaining a written statement from the witness and contrary to the expectations and presumably *417 the advice of the prosecutor that created the risk that the victim might have to testify in open court.[20] The need for Deary's testimony in the pending sexual assault case against Champy simply cannot justify denying this respondent a remedy for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Presumably, if there had been an actual trial of the pending charge against Champy,[21] that trial would have concluded long before Deary would have been required to testify |
Justice Stevens | 1,987 | 16 | dissenting | Newton v. Rumery | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111837/newton-v-rumery/ | concluded long before Deary would have been required to testify in any 1983 litigation. It may well be true that a full development of all the relevant facts would provide a legitimate justification for enforcing the release-dismissal agreement. In my opinion, however, the burden of developing those facts rested on the defendants in the 1983 litigation, and that burden has not been met by mere conjecture and speculation concerning the emotional distress of one reluctant witness. III Because this is the first case of this kind that the Court has reviewed, I am hesitant to adopt an absolute rule invalidating all such agreements.[22] I am, however, persuaded that the *418 federal policies reflected in the enactment and enforcement of 1983 mandate a strong presumption against the enforceability of such agreements and that the presumption is not overcome in this case by the facts or by any of the policy concerns discussed by the plurality.[23] The very existence of the statute identifies the important federal interests in providing a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights and in having *419 the merits of such claims resolved openly by an impartial adjudicator rather than sub silentio by a prosecutor whose primary objective in entering release-dismissal agreements is definitely not to ensure that all meritorious 1983 claims prevail. The interest in vindication of constitutional violations unquestionably outweighs the interest in avoiding the expense and inconvenience of defending unmeritorious claims. Paradoxically, the plurality seems more sensitive to that burden than to the cost to the public and the individual of denying relief in meritorious cases. In short, the plurality's decision seems to rest on the unstated premise that 1983 litigation imposes a net burden on society. If that were a correct assessment of the statute, it should be repealed. Unless that is done, however, we should respect the congressional decision to attach greater importance to the benefits associated with access to a federal remedy than to the burdens of defending these cases.[24] The plurality also suggests that these agreements must be enforced in order to give proper respect to the prosecutor's exercise of discretion. I must confess that I do not understand this suggestion.[2] The prosecutor is adequately protected *420 by the shield of absolute immunity. Moreover, in this case it is police misconduct not that of the prosecutor that is challenged in the 1983 litigation. A holding that the agreement is unenforceable need not rest on an assumption that "prosecutors will seize the opportunity for wrongdoing." Ante, at 396. On the contrary, it would merely respect the wholly unrelated premise that |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111866/arkansas-writers-project-inc-v-ragland/ | The question presented in this case is whether a state sales tax scheme that taxes general interest magazines, but exempts newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals, violates the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. *224 I Since 1935, Arkansas has imposed a tax on receipts from sales of tangible personal property. 1935 Ark. Gen. Acts 233, 4, pp. 593, 594, now codified at Ark. Stat. Ann. 84-1903(a) The rate of tax is currently four percent of gross receipts. 84-1903 (three percent); Ark. Stat. Ann. 84-1903.1 (additional one percent). Numerous items are exempt from the state sales tax, however. These include "[g]ross receipts or gross proceeds derived from the sale of newspapers," 84-1904(f) (newspaper exemption),[1] and "religious, professional, trade and sports journals and/or publications printed and published within this State when sold through regular subscriptions." 84-1904(j) (magazine exemption).[2] Appellant Arkansas Writers' Project, publishes Arkansas Times, a general interest monthly magazine with a circulation of approximately 28,000. The magazine includes articles on a variety of subjects, including religion and sports. It is printed and published in Arkansas, and is sold through mail subscriptions, coin-operated stands, and over-the-counter sales. In 1980, following an audit, appellee Commissioner of Revenue assessed tax on sales of Arkansas *225 Times. Appellant initially contested the assessment, but eventually reached a settlement with the State and agreed to pay the tax beginning in October 1982. However, appellant reserved the right to renew its challenge if there were a change in the tax law or a court ruling drawing into question the validity of Arkansas' exemption structure. Record 46-47. Subsequently, in Minneapolis & Tribune this Court held unconstitutional a Minnesota tax on paper and ink used in the production of newspapers. In January 1984, relying on this authority, appellant sought a refund of sales tax paid since October 1982, asserting that the magazine exemption must be construed to include Arkansas Times. It maintained that subjecting Arkansas Times to the sales tax, while sales of newspapers and other magazines were exempt, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Commissioner denied appellant's claim for refund. App. to Juris. Statement 12-14. Having exhausted available administrative remedies, appellant filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. The compliant also stated a claim under 42 U.S. C. 1983 and 1988 for injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The parties stipulated that Arkansas Times is not a "newspaper" or a "religious, professional, trade or sports journal" and that, during the relevant time period, appellant had paid $15,838.22 in sales tax. The Chancery Court granted |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111866/arkansas-writers-project-inc-v-ragland/ | had paid $15,838.22 in sales tax. The Chancery Court granted appellant summary judgment, construing 84-1904(j) to create two categories of tax-exempt magazines sold through subscriptions, one for religious, professional, trade, and sports journals, and one for publications published and printed within the State of Arkansas. No. 84-1268 Because Arkansas Times came within the second category, the court held that the magazine was exempt from sales tax and appellant was entitled to a refund. The court determined that resolution of the *226 dispute on statutory grounds made it unnecessary to address the constitutional issues raised in appellant's 1983 claim. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Chancery Court. It construed 84-1904(j) as creating a single exemption and held that, in order to qualify for this exemption, a magazine had to be a "religious, professional, trade, or sports periodical." Concluding that "neither party has questioned the constitutionality of the exemption," the State Supreme Court failed to address appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. On petition for rehearing, the court issued a supplementary opinion in which it acknowledged that appellant had pursued its constitutional claims and that they "should have been discussed" in the court's original opinion. A, B, It rejected appellant's claims of discriminatory treatment, reasoning that exemptions granted to other publications need not be considered, because: "[I]t would avail [appellant] nothing if it wins its argument. It is immaterial that an exemption in favor of some other taxpayer may be invalid, as discriminatory. If so, it is the exemption that would fall, not the tax against the [Arkansas] Times." A, 698 S.W.2d, at As to appellant's First Amendment objections, the court noted that this Court has held that "the owners of newspapers are not immune from any of the `ordinary forms of taxation' for support of the government." quoting In contrast to Minneapolis and the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the Arkansas sales tax was a permissible "ordinary form of taxation." Because the court did not find that appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated, it did not consider the claim for attorney's fees under 1988. *227 We noted probable jurisdiction, and we now reverse. II As a threshold matter, the Commissioner argues that appellant does not have standing to challenge the Arkansas sales tax scheme. Extending the reasoning of the court below, he contends that, since appellant has conceded that Arkansas Times is neither a newspaper nor a religious, professional, trade, or sports journal, it has not asserted an injury that can be redressed by a favorable decision of this Court and therefore does not meet |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111866/arkansas-writers-project-inc-v-ragland/ | favorable decision of this Court and therefore does not meet the requirements for standing set forth in Valley Forge Christian We do not accept the Commissioner's notion of standing, for it would effectively insulate underinclusive statutes from constitutional challenge, a proposition we soundly rejected in The Commissioner's position is inconsistent with numerous decisions of this Court in which we have considered claims that others similarly situated were exempt from the operation of a state law adversely affecting the claimant. See, e. g., Armco ; ; Police Dept. of Contrary to the Commissioner's assertion, appellant has alleged sufficient a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation. "The holding of the [Arkansas] cour[t] stand[s] as a total bar to appellant's relief; [its] constitutional attack holds the only promise of escape from the burden that derives from the challenged statut[e]." III A Our cases clearly establish that a discriminatory tax on the press burdens rights protected by the First Amendment.[3]*228 See Minneapolis -592; In Minneapolis the discrimination took two distinct forms. First, in contrast to generally applicable economic regulations to which the press can legitimately be subject, the Minnesota use tax treated the press differently from other Second, the tax targeted a small group of newspapers. This was due to the fact that the first $100,000 of paper and ink were exempt from the tax; thus "only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all, and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." Both types of discrimination can be established even where, as here, there is no evidence of an improper censorial motive. See This is because selective taxation of the press either singling out the press as a whole or targeting individual members of the press poses a particular danger of abuse by the State. "A power to tax differentially, as opposed to a power to tax generally, gives a government a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected. When the State imposes a generally applicable tax, there is little cause for concern. We need not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its constituency." Addressing only the first type of discrimination, the Commissioner defends the Arkansas sales tax as a generally applicable *229 economic regulation. He acknowledges the numerous statutory exemptions to the sales tax, including those exempting newspapers and religious, trade, professional, and sports magazines. Nonetheless, apparently because the tax is nominally imposed on receipts from sales of all tangible personal property, see 84-1903, he insists that the |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111866/arkansas-writers-project-inc-v-ragland/ | all tangible personal property, see 84-1903, he insists that the tax should be upheld. On the facts of this case, the fundamental question is not whether the tax singles out the press as a whole, but whether it targets a small group within the press. While we indicated in Minneapolis that a genuinely nondiscriminatory tax on the receipts of newspapers would be constitutionally permissible, and n. 9, the Arkansas sales tax cannot be characterized as nondiscriminatory, because it is not evenly applied to all magazines. To the contrary, the magazine exemption means that only a few Arkansas magazines pay any sales tax;[4] in that respect, it operates in much the same way as did the $100,000 exemption to the Minnesota use tax. Because the Arkansas sales tax scheme treats some magazines less favorably than others, it suffers from the second type of discrimination identified in Minneapolis Indeed, this case involves a more disturbing use of selective taxation than Minneapolis because the basis on which Arkansas differentiates between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dept. of Chicago v. *230 See also -463. "Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment." If articles in Arkansas Times were uniformly devoted to religion or sports, the magazine would be exempt from the sales tax under 84-1904(j). However, because the articles deal with a variety of subjects (sometimes including religion and sports), the Commissioner has determined that the magazine's sales may be taxed. In order to determine whether a magazine is subject to sales tax, Arkansas' "enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed" Such official scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. See Arkansas' system of selective taxation does not evade the strictures of the First Amendment merely because it does not burden the expression of particular views by specific magazines. We rejected a similar distinction between content and viewpoint restrictions in Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, As we stated in that case, "[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." See at -384; |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111866/arkansas-writers-project-inc-v-ragland/ | of public discussion of an entire topic." See at -384; Metro-media, v. San Diego, ; Nor are the requirements of the First Amendment avoided by the fact that Arkansas grants an exemption to other members of the media that might publish discussions of the various *231 subjects contained in Arkansas Times. For example, exempting newspapers from the tax, see 84-1904(f), does not change the fact that the State discriminates in determining the tax status of magazines published in Arkansas. "It hardly answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him." See also Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, B Arkansas faces a heavy burden in attempting to defend its content-based approach to taxation of magazines. In order to justify such differential taxation, the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Minneapolis -592. The Commissioner has advanced several state interests. First, he asserts the State's general interest in raising revenue. While we have recognized that this interest is an important one, see it does not explain selective imposition of the sales tax on some magazines and not others, based solely on their content. In Minneapolis this interest was invoked in support of differential treatment of the press in relation to other businesses. In that context, we noted that an interest in raising revenue, "[s]tanding alone, cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding *232 the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles out the press." The same is true of a tax that differentiates between members of the press. The Commissioner also suggests that the exemption of religious, professional, trade, and sports journals was intended to encourage "fledgling" publishers, who have only limited audiences and therefore do not have access to the same volume of advertising revenues as general interest magazines such as Arkansas Times. Brief for Appellee 16. Even assuming that an interest in encouraging fledgling publications might be a compelling one, we do not find the exemption in 84-1904(j) of religious, professional, trade, and sports journals narrowly tailored to achieve that end. To the contrary, the exemption is both overinclusive and underinclusive. The types of magazines enumerated in 84-1904(j) are exempt, regardless of whether they are "fledgling"; even the most lucrative and well-established religious, professional, trade, and sports journals |
Justice Marshall | 1,987 | 15 | majority | Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111866/arkansas-writers-project-inc-v-ragland/ | most lucrative and well-established religious, professional, trade, and sports journals do not pay sales tax. By contrast, struggling general interest magazines and struggling specialty magazines on subjects other than those specified in 84-1904(j) are ineligible for favorable tax treatment. Finally, the Commissioner asserted for the first time at oral argument a need to "foster communication" in the State. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28, 32. While this state interest might support a blanket exemption of the press from the sales tax, it cannot justify selective taxation of certain publishers. The Arkansas tax scheme only fosters communication on religion, sports, and professional and trade matters. It therefore does not serve its alleged purpose in any significant way. C Appellant argues that the Arkansas tax scheme violates the First Amendment because it exempts all newspapers from the tax, but only some magazines. Appellant contends that, under applicable state regulations, see nn. 1 and 2, *233 the critical distinction between newspapers and magazines is not format, but rather content: newspapers are distinguished from magazines because they contain reports of current events and articles of general interest. Just as content-based distinctions between magazines are impermissible under prior decisions of this Court, appellant claims that content-based distinctions between different members of the media are also impermissible, absent a compelling justification.[5] Because we hold today that the State's selective application of its sales tax to magazines is unconstitutional and therefore invalid, our ruling eliminates the differential treatment of newspapers and magazines. Accordingly, we need not decide whether a distinction between different types of periodicals presents an additional basis for invalidating the sales tax, as applied to the press. IV In the Chancery Court, appellant asserted its First and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S. C. 1983, as well as a corresponding entitlement to attorney's fees under 1988. Because this Court has found a constitutional violation, appellant urges us to consider its cause of action under 1983 and order an award of attorney's fees. However, the state courts have not yet indicated whether they will exercise jurisdiction over this claim[6] and we therefore remand to give them an opportunity to do so. *234 The parties recognize that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought under 1983, see, e. g., Martinez v. although the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S. C. 1341, ordinarily precludes federal courts from entertaining challenges to the assessment of state taxes. The parties disagree, however, on whether the state court must exercise jurisdiction in such cases.[7] We leave it to the courts on remand to consider the necessity of entertaining this claim. V |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | Under the Securities Exchange Act of 934, ch. 404, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority "summarily to suspend trading in any security for a period not exceeding ten days" if "in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors so require."[] Acting *06 pursuant to this authority the Commission issued a series of consecutive orders suspending trading in the common stock of Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL), for over a year. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that such a series of suspensions was beyond the scope of the Commission's statutory authority. We granted certiorari to consider this important question, and, finding ourselves in basic agreement with the Court of Appeals, we affirm. We hold that even though there be a periodic redetermination of whether such action is required by "the public interest" and for "the protection of investors," the Commission is not empowered to issue, based upon a single set of circumstances, a series of summary orders which would suspend trading beyond the initial 0-day I On November 29, 973, apparently because CJL had disseminated allegedly false and misleading press releases concerning certain of its business activities, the Commission issued the first of what was to become a series of summary 0-day suspension orders continuously suspending trading in CJL common stock from that date until January 26, App. 09. During this series of suspensions respondent Sloan, who owned 3 shares of CJL stock and had engaged in substantial purchases and short sales of shares of that stock, filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit challenging the orders on a variety of grounds. On October 5, the court dismissed as frivolous all respondent's claims, except his allegation that the "tacking" of 0-day summary suspension orders for an indefinite period was an abuse of the agency's authority and a deprivation of due process. It further concluded, however, that in light of two events which had occurred prior to argument, it could not address this question at that time. The first event of significance was the resumption of trading on January 26, *07 The second was the commencement of a second series of summary 0-day suspension orders, which was still in effect on October 5. This series had begun on April 29, when the Commission issued a 0-day order based on the fact that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had launched an extensive investigation into alleged manipulation of CJL common stock on the American Stock Exchange and several Canadian stock exchanges. App. -. This time 37 separate orders were |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | stock exchanges. App. -. This time 37 separate orders were issued, suspending trading continuously from April 29, to May 2, The court thought the record before it on October 5 inadequate in light of these events and dismissed respondent's appeal "without prejudice to his repleading after an administrative hearing before the SEC," which hearing, though apparently not required by statute or regulation, had been offered by the Commission at oral argument. cert. denied, Thereafter respondent immediately petitioned the Commission for the promised hearing. The hearing was not forthcoming, however, so on April 23, during the period when the second series of orders was still in effect, respondent brought the present action pursuant to 25 (a) () of the Act, 5 U.S. C. 78y (a)() ( ed.), challenging the second series of suspension orders. He argued, among other things, that there was no rational basis for the suspension orders, that they were not supported by substantial evidence in any event, and that the "tacking" of 0-day summary suspension orders was beyond the Commission's authority because the statute specifically authorized suspension "for a period not exceeding ten days."[2] The court held in respondent's favor on this latter point. It first concluded that despite the fact that there had been no 0-day suspension order in effect since May 2, *08 and the Commission had asserted that it had no plans to consider or issue an order against CJL in the foreseeable future, the case was not moot because it was "`capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" quoting from Southern Pacific Terminal The court then decided that the statutes which authorized summary suspensions (k) and its predecessorsdid not empower the Commission to issue successive orders to curtail trading in a security for a period beyond the initial 0-day 547 F.2d, at We granted certiorari, specifically directing the attention of the parties to the question of mootness, to which we now turn. II Respondent argues that this case is not moot because, as the Court of Appeals observed, it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."[3] The Commission, on the other hand, does not urge that the case is demonstrably moot, but rather that there simply are not enough facts on the record to allow a proper determination of mootness. It argues that there is no "reasonable expectation" that respondent will be harmed by further suspensions because, "`the investing public now ha[ving] been apprised of the relevant facts, the concealment of which had threatened to disrupt the market in CJL stock, there is no reason to believe that it will be necessary to suspend trading |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | to believe that it will be necessary to suspend trading again.'" Brief for Petitioner 5, quoting from Pet. for Cert. n. 7. Cf. The Commission concedes, however, that respondent, in his capacity as a diversified investor, might be harmed in the future by the suspension of some other *09 security which he owns. But it further contends that respondent has not provided enough data about the number or type of securities in his portfolio to enable the Court to determine whether there is a "reasonable" likelihood that any of those securities will be subjected to consecutive summary suspension orders.[4] Contrary to the Commission's contention, we think even on the record presently before us this case falls squarely within the general principle first enunciated in Southern Pacific Terminal and further clarified in that even in the absence of a class action a case is not moot when "() the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." That the first prong of this test is satisfied is not in dispute. A series of consecutive suspension orders may last no more than 20 days, making effective judicial review impossible during the life of the orders. We likewise have no doubt that the second part of the test also has been met here. CJL has, to put it mildly, a history of sailing close to the wind.[5] Thus, *0 the Commission's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, there is a reasonable expectation, within the meaning of that CJL stock will again be subjected to consecutive summary suspension orders and that respondent, who apparently still owns CJL stock, will suffer the same type of injury he suffered before. This is sufficient in and of itself to satisfy this part of the test. But in addition, respondent owns other securities, the trading of which may also be summarily suspended. As even the Commission admits, this fact can only increase the probability that respondent will again suffer the type of harm of which he is presently complaining. It thus can only buttress our conclusion that there is a reasonable expectation of recurring injury to the same complaining party. III A Turning to the merits, we note that this is not a case where the Commission, discovering the existence of a manipulative scheme affecting CJL stock, suspended trading for 0 days and then, upon the discovery of a second manipulative scheme or other improper activity unrelated to the |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | second manipulative scheme or other improper activity unrelated to the first scheme, ordered a second 0-day suspension.[6] Instead it is a case in which the * Commission issued a series of summary suspension orders lasting over a year on the basis of evidence revealing a single, though likely sizable, manipulative scheme.[7] Thus, the only question confronting us is whether, even upon a periodic redetermination of "necessity," the Commission is statutorily authorized to issue a series of summary suspension orders based upon a single set of events or circumstances which threaten an orderly market. This question must, in our opinion, be answered in the negative. The first and most salient point leading us to this conclusion is the language of the statute. Section (k) authorizes the Commission "summarily to suspend trading in any security for a period not exceeding ten days" 5 U.S. C. 78l (k) ( ed.) The Commission would have us read the underscored phrase as a limitation only upon the duration of a single suspension order. So read, the Commission could indefinitely suspend trading in a security without any hearing or other procedural safeguards as long as it redetermined every 0 days that suspension was required by * the public interest and for the protection of investors. While perhaps not an impossible reading of the statute, we are persuaded it is not the most natural or logical one. The duration limitation rather appears on its face to be just thata maximum time period for which trading can be suspended for any single set of circumstances. Apart from the language of the statute, which we find persuasive in and of itself, there are other reasons to adopt this construction of the statute. In the first place, the power to summarily suspend trading in a security even for 0 days, without any notice, opportunity to be heard, or findings based upon a record, is an awesome power with a potentially devastating impact on the issuer, its shareholders, and other investors. A clear mandate from Congress, such as that found in (k), is necessary to confer this power. No less clear a mandate can be expected from Congress to authorize the Commission to extend, virtually without limit, these periods of suspension. But we find no such unmistakable mandate in (k). Indeed, if anything, that section points in the opposite direction. Other sections of the statute reinforce the conclusion that in this area Congress considered summary restrictions to be somewhat drastic and properly used only for very brief periods of time. When explicitly longer term, though perhaps temporary, measures are to be |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | explicitly longer term, though perhaps temporary, measures are to be taken against some person, company, or security, Congress invariably requires the Commission to give some sort of notice and opportunity to be heard. For example, (j) of the Act authorizes the Commission, as it deems necessary for the protection of investors, to suspend the registration of a security for a period not exceeding months if it makes certain findings "on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing." 5 U.S. C. 78l (j) ( ed.) Another section of the Act empowers the Commission to suspend broker-dealer registration for a period not exceeding months upon certain findings made *3 only "on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing." 78o (b) (4) ( ed.) Still another section allows the Commission, pending final determination whether a broker-dealer's registration should be revoked, to temporarily suspend that registration, but only "after notice and opportunity for hearing." 78o (b) (5) ( ed.) Former 5 (b) (6), which dealt with the registration of broker-dealers, also lends support to the notion that as a general matter Congress meant to allow the Commission to take summary action only for the period specified in the statute when that action is based upon any single set of circumstances. That section allowed the Commission to summarily postpone the effective date of registration for 5 days, and then, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, to continue that postponement pending final resolution of the matter.[8] The section which replaced 5 (b) (6) even further underscores this general pattern. It requires the Commission to take some actioneither granting the registration or instituting proceedings to determine whether registration should be deniedwithin 45 days. 5 U.S. C. 78o (b) () ( ed.). In light of the explicit congressional recognition in other sections of the Act, both past and present, that any long-term sanctions or any continuation of summary *4 restrictions must be accompanied by notice and an opportunity for a hearing, it is difficult to read the silence in (k) as an authorization for an extension of summary restrictions without such a hearing, as the Commission contends. The more plausible interpretation is that Congress did not intend the Commission to have the power to extend the length of suspensions under (k) at all, much less to repeatedly extend such suspensions without any hearing. B The Commission advances four arguments in support of its position, none of which we find persuasive. It first argues that only its interpretation makes sense out of the statute. That is, if the Commission discovers a manipulative scheme and suspends trading |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | if the Commission discovers a manipulative scheme and suspends trading for 0 days, surely it can suspend trading 30 days later upon the discovery of a second manipulative scheme. But if trading may be suspended a second time 30 days later upon the discovery of another manipulative scheme, it surely could be suspended only 0 days later if the discovery of the second scheme were made on the eve of the expiration of the first order. And, continues the Commission, since nothing on the face of the statute requires it to consider only evidence of new manipulative schemes when evaluating the public interest and the needs of investors, it must have the power to issue consecutive suspension orders even in the absence of a new or different manipulative scheme, as long as the public interest requires it. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because the conclusion simply does not follow from the various premises. Even assuming the Commission can again suspend trading upon learning of another event which threatens the stability of the market, it simply does not follow that the Commission therefore must necessarily have the power to do so even in the absence of such a discovery. On its face and in the context of this statutory pattern, (k) is more properly viewed as a *5 device to allow the Commission to take emergency action for 0 days while it prepares to deploy its other remedies, such as a temporary restraining order, a preliminary or permanent injunction, or a suspension or revocation of the registration of a security. The Commission's argument would render unnecessary to a greater or lesser extent all of these other admittedly more cumbersome remedies which Congress has given to it. Closely related to the Commission's first argument is its secondits construction furthers the statute's remedial purposes. Here the Commission merely asserts that it "has found that the remedial purposes of the statute require successive suspension of trading in particular securities, in order to maintain orderly and fair capital markets." Brief for Petitioner 37. Other powers granted the Commission are, in its opinion, simply insufficient to accomplish its purposes. We likewise reject this argument. In the first place, the Commission has not made a very persuasive showing that other remedies are ineffective. It argues that injunctions and temporary restraining orders are insufficient because they take time and evidence to obtain and because they can be obtained only against wrongdoers and not necessarily as a stopgap measure in order to suspend trading simply until more information can be disseminated into the marketplace. The first of these alleged |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | be disseminated into the marketplace. The first of these alleged insufficiencies is no more than a reiteration of the familiar claim of many Government agencies that any semblance of an adversary proceeding will delay the imposition of the result which they believe desirable. It seems to us that Congress, in weighing the public interest against the burden imposed upon private parties, has concluded that 0 days is sufficient for gathering necessary evidence. This very case belies the Commission's argument that injunctions cannot be sought in appropriate cases. At exactly the same time the Commission commenced the first series of suspension orders it also sought a civil injunction against CJL and certain of its principals, alleging violations of the registration *6 and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 933, violations of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 934, and various other improper practices, including the filing of false reports with the Commission and the dissemination of a series of press releases containing false and misleading information. App. 09. And during the second series of suspension orders, the Commission approved the filing of an action seeking an injunction against those in the management of CJL to prohibit them from engaging in further violations of the Acts. The second of these alleged insufficiencies is likewise less than overwhelming. Even assuming that it is proper to suspend trading simply in order to enhance the information in the marketplace, there is nothing to indicate that the Commission cannot simply reveal to the investing public at the end of 0 days the reasons which it thought justified the initial summary suspension and then let the investors make their own judgments. Even assuming, however, that a totally satisfactory remedyat least from the Commission's viewpointis not available in every instance in which the Commission would like such a remedy, we would not be inclined to read (k) more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit. Indeed, the Commission's argument amounts to little more than the notion that (k) ought to be a panacea for every type of problem which may beset the marketplace. This does not appear to be the first time the Commission has adopted this construction of the statute. As early as 96 a recognized authority in this area of the law called attention to the fact that the Commission was gradually carrying over the summary suspension power granted in the predecessors of (k) into other areas of its statutory authority and using it as a pendente lite power to keep in effect a suspension of trading |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | lite power to keep in effect a suspension of trading pending final disposition of delisting proceedings. 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 854-855 (2d ed. 96). *7 The author then questioned the propriety of extending the summary suspension power in that manner, and we think those same questions arise when the Commission argues that the summary suspension power should be available not only for the purposes clearly contemplated by (k), but also as a solution to virtually any other problem which might occur in the marketplace. We do not think (k) was meant to be such a cure-all. It provides the Commission with a powerful weapon for dealing with certain problems. But its time limit is clearly and precisely defined. It cannot be judicially or administratively extended simply by doubtful arguments as to the need for a greater duration of suspension orders than it allows. If extension of the summary suspension power is desirable, the proper source of that power is Congress. Cf. The Commission next argues that its interpretation of the statutethat the statute authorizes successive suspension ordershas been both consistent and longstanding, dating from 944. It is thus entitled to great deference. See United ; While this undoubtedly is true as a general principle of law, it is not an argument of sufficient force in this case to overcome the clear contrary indications of the statute itself. In the first place it is not apparent from the record that on any of the occasions when a series of consecutive summary suspension orders was issued the Commission actually addressed in any detail the statutory authorization under which it took that action. As we said just this Term in Adamo Wrecking : "This lack of specific attention to the statutory authorization is especially important in light of this Court's pronouncement in that one factor to be considered in giving *8 weight to an administrative ruling is `the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.'" To further paraphrase that opinion, since this Court can only speculate as to the Commission's reasons for reaching the conclusion that it did, the mere issuance of consecutive summary suspension orders, without a concomitant exegesis of the statutory authority for doing so, obviously lacks "power to persuade" as to the existence of such authority. Nor does the existence of a prior administrative practice, even a well-explained one, relieve us of our responsibility to determine whether that practice is consistent with the agency's |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | to determine whether that practice is consistent with the agency's statutory authority. "The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction will be affirmed if it has a `reasonable basis in law.' ; Unemployment But the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction, 380 U.S. 3, and `are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.' And this is just such a casethe construction placed on the statute by the Commission, though of long standing, is, for the reasons given in Part III-A of this opinion, inconsistent with the statutory mandate. We explicitly contemplated just this *9 situation in at 5, where we said: "But the Commission contends that since it is charged with administration of the statutory scheme, its construction of the statute over an extended period should be given great weight. This proposition may, as a general matter, be conceded, although it must be tempered with the caveat that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its statutory mandate." And our clear duty in such a situation is to reject the administrative interpretation of the statute. Finally, the Commission argues that for a variety of reasons Congress should be considered to have approved the Commission's construction of the statute as correct. Not only has Congress re-enacted the summary suspension power without disapproving the Commission's construction, but the Commission participated in the drafting of much of this legislation and on at least one occasion made its views known to Congress in Committee hearings.[9] Furthermore, at least one Committee *0 indicated on one occasion that it understood and approved of the Commission's practice.[0] See ; United ; Fribourg Navigation 383 U.S. While we of course recognize the validity of the general principle illustrated by the cases upon which the Commission relies, we do not believe it to be applicable here. In at the Court stated that a contemporaneous administrative construction of an agency's own enabling legislation "is only one input in the interpretational equation. Its impact carries most weight when the administrators participated in drafting and directly made known their views to Congress in committee hearings." Here the administrators, so far as we are advised, made no reference at all to their present construction of (k) to the Congress which drafted the "enabling legislation" here in questionthe Securities Exchange Act |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | drafted the "enabling legislation" here in questionthe Securities Exchange Act of 934. They made known to at least one Committee their subsequent construction of that section 29 years later, at a time when the attention of the Committee and of the Congress was focused on issues not directly related to * the one presently before the Court.[] Although the section in question was re-enacted in 964, and while it appears that the Committee Report did recognize and approve of the Commission's practice, this is scarcely the sort of congressional approval referred to in We are extremely hesitant to presume general congressional awareness of the Commission's construction based only upon a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative documents. That language in a Committee Report, without additional indication of more widespread congressional awareness, is simply not sufficient to invoke the presumption in a case such as this. For here its invocation would result in a construction of the statute which not only is at odds with the language of the section in question and the pattern of the statute taken as a whole, but also is extremely far reaching in terms of the virtually untrammeled and unreviewable power it would vest in a regulatory agency. Even if we were willing to presume such general awareness on the part of Congress, we are not at all sure that such awareness at the time of re-enactment would be tantamount to amendment of what we conceive to be the rather plain meaning of the language of (k). On this point the present case differs significantly from United where the Court took pains to point out in relying on a construction of a tax statute by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that "to the extent that the words chosen by Congress cut in either direction, they tend to support rather than defeat the Commissioner's position" Subsequent congressional pronouncements also cast doubt on whether the prior statements called to our attention can be *2 taken at face value. When consolidating the former 5 (c) (5) and 9 (a) (4) in see n. Congress also enacted (j), which allows the Commission "to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or to revoke the registration of a security, if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the issuer of such security has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 5 U.S. C. 78l (j) ( ed.). While this particular power is not new, see 5 U.S. C. 78s (a) (2), |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,978 | 19 | majority | SEC v. Sloan | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109859/sec-v-sloan/ | is not new, see 5 U.S. C. 78s (a) (2), the effect of its exercise was expanded to include a suspension of trading.[]"With this change," stated the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "the Commission is expected to use this section rather than its ten-day suspension power, in cases of extended duration." S. Rep. No. 94-75, p. 06 Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the 963 statements have more force than we are willing to attribute to them, and that, as the Commission argues, (j) does not cover quite as broad a range of situations as (k), the congressional statements would still have to be read as seriously undermining the continued validity of the 963 statements as a basis upon which to adopt the Commission's construction of the statute. In sum, had Congress intended the Commission to have the power to summarily suspend trading virtually indefinitely we expect that it could and would have authorized it more clearly than it did in (k). The sweeping nature of that power supports this expectation. The absence of any truly persuasive legislative history to support the Commission's view, *3 and the entire statutory scheme suggesting that in fact the Commission is not so empowered, reinforce our conclusion that the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding no such power exists. Accordingly, its judgment is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice White | 1,987 | 6 | majority | Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111883/shaare-tefila-congregation-v-cobb/ | On November 2, 1982, the outside walls of the synagogue of the Shaare Tefila Congregation in Silver Spring, Maryland, were sprayed with red and black paint and with large anti-Semitic slogans, phrases, and symbols. A few months later, the Congregation and some individual members brought this suit in the Federal District Court, alleging that defendants' desecration of the synagogue had violated 42 U.S. C. 1981, 1982, 1985(3) and the Maryland common law of trespass, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On defendants' motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), the District Court dismissed all the claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. Petitioners petitioned for writ of certiorari. We granted the petition, and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Section 1982 guarantees all citizens of the United States, "the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." The section forbids both official and private racially discriminatory interference with property rights, Petitioners' allegation was that they were deprived of the right to hold property in violation of 1982 because the defendants were motivated by racial prejudice. They unsuccessfully argued in the District Court and Court of Appeals that Jews are not a racially distinct group, but that defendants' conduct is actionable because they viewed Jews as racially distinct and were motivated by racial prejudice. The *617 Court of Appeals held that 1982 was not "intended to apply to situations in which a plaintiff is not a member of a racially distinct group but is merely perceived to be so by defendants." The Court of Appeals believed that "[b]ecause discrimination against Jews is not racial discrimination," the District Court was correct in dismissing the 1982 claim. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a charge of racial discrimination within the meaning of 1982 cannot be made out by alleging only that the defendants were motivated by racial animus; it is necessary as well to allege that defendants' animus was directed towards the kind of group that Congress intended to protect when it passed the statute. To hold otherwise would unacceptably extend the reach of the statute. We agree with petitioners, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Jews cannot state a 1982 claim against other white defendants. That view rested on the notion that because Jews today are not thought to be members of a separate race, they cannot make out a claim of racial discrimination within the meaning of 1982. That construction of the section |
Justice White | 1,987 | 6 | majority | Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111883/shaare-tefila-congregation-v-cobb/ | within the meaning of 1982. That construction of the section we have today rejected in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, ante, p. 604. Our opinion in that case observed that definitions of race when 1982 was passed were not the same as they are today, ante, at 609-613, and concluded that the section was "intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." Ante, at 613. As Saint Francis makes clear, the question before us is not whether Jews are considered to be a separate race by today's standards, but whether, at the time 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of people that Congress intended to protect. It is evident from the legislative history of the section reviewed in Saint Francis College, a review that we need not repeat here, that Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then considered *618 to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the statute. Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause of action against other members of what today is considered to be part of the Caucasian race. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | majority | Shapiro v. McManus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3160677/shapiro-v-mcmanus/ | We consider under what circumstances, if any, a district judge is free to “determin[e] that three judges are not required” for an action “challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.” 28 U.S. C. (b)(1). I A Rare today, three-judge district courts were more com- mon in the decades before 1976, when they were required for various adjudications, including the grant of an “inter- locutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforce- ment, operation or execution of any State statute upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute.” 28 U.S. C. (1970 ed.), repealed, Pub. L. 94–381, 90 Stat. 1119. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 3–12 (1964). Decisions of three-judge courts could, then as now, be appealed as of right directly to this Court. 28 U.S. C. 2 SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS Opinion of the Court In 1976, Congress substantially curtailed the circum- stances under which a three-judge court is required. It was no longer required for the grant of an injunction against state statutes, see Pub. L. 94–381, 90 Stat. 1119 (repealing 28 U.S. C. ), but was mandated for “an action challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportion- ment of any statewide legislative body.” now codified at 28 U.S. C. Simultaneously, Congress amended the procedures governing three-judge district courts. The prior statute had provided: “The district judge to whom the application for injunction or other relief is presented shall constitute one member of [the three-judge] court. On the filing of the application, he shall immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges” to serve. 28 U.S. C. (1970 ed.). The amended statute provides: “Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are not required, immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges” to serve. 28 U.S. C. (2012 ed.) (emphasis added). The dispute here concerns the scope of the italicized text. B In response to the 2010 Census, Maryland enacted a statute in October 2011 establishing—or, more pejora- tively, gerrymandering—the districts for the State’s eight congressional seats. Dissatisfied with the crazy-quilt results, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a, petitioners, a bipar- tisan group of citizens, filed suit pro se in Federal District Court. Their amended complaint alleges, inter alia, that Maryland’s redistricting plan burdens their First Amend- ment right of political association. Petitioners also re- quested that a three-judge court be convened to hear the Cite as: 577 U. S. |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | majority | Shapiro v. McManus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3160677/shapiro-v-mcmanus/ | be convened to hear the Cite as: 577 U. S. (2015) 3 Opinion of the Court case. The District Judge, however, thought the claim “not one for which relief can be granted.” Benisek v. Mack, 11 F. Supp. 3d 516, 526 “[N]othing about the congressional districts at issue in this case affects in any proscribed way [petitioners’] ability to participate in the political debate in any of the Maryland congressional districts in which they might find themselves. They are free to join preexisting political committees, form new ones, or use whatever other means are at their disposal to influence the opinions of their congressional representa- tives.” (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, instead of notifying the Chief Judge of the Circuit of the need for a three-judge court, the District Judge dismissed the action. The Fourth Circuit summar- ily affirmed in an unpublished disposition. Benisek v. Mack, Seeking review in this Court, petitioners pointed out that at least two other Circuits consider it reversible error for a district judge to dismiss a case under for failure to state a claim for relief rather than refer it for transfer to a three-judge court. See 981–983 ; 55–56 (CA5 1997) (per curiam). We granted certiorari. Shapiro v. Mack, 576 U. S. (2015). II Petitioners’ sole contention is that the District Judge had no authority to dismiss the case rather than initiate the procedures to convene a three-judge court. Not so, argue respondents; the 1976 addition to of the clause “unless he determines that three judges are not required” is precisely such a grant of authority. Moreover, say respondents, Congress declined to specify a standard to constrain the exercise of this authority. Choosing, as 4 SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS Opinion of the Court the District Judge did, the familiar standard for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) best serves the purposes of a three-judge court, which (in respondents’ view) is to protect States from “hasty, imprudent invalida- tion” of their statutes by rogue district judges acting alone. Brief for Respondents 27. Whatever the purposes of a three-judge court may be, respondents’ argument needlessly produces a contradic- tion in the statutory text. That text’s initial prescription could not be clearer: “A district court of three judges shall be convened when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts” 28 U.S. C. (a) (emphasis added). Nobody disputes that the present suit is “an action challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.” It follows that the district judge was required to refer the case |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | majority | Shapiro v. McManus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3160677/shapiro-v-mcmanus/ | that the district judge was required to refer the case to a three-judge court, for (a) admits of no exception, and “the mandatory ‘shall’ normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Lexecon ; see also National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661–662 (same). The subsequent provision of that the dis- trict judge shall commence the process for appointment of a three-judge panel “unless he determines that three judges are not required,” need not and therefore should not be read as a grant of discretion to the district judge to ignore It is not even framed as a proviso, or an exception from that provision, but rather as an adminis- trative detail that is entirely compatible with The old triggered the district judge’s duty to refer the matter for the convening of a three-judge court “[o]n the filing of the application” to enjoin an unconstitutional state law. By contrast, the current triggers the district judge’s duty “[u]pon the filing of a request for Cite as: 577 U. S. (2015) 5 Opinion of the Court three judges” (emphasis added). But of course a party may—whether in good faith or bad, through ignorance or hope or malice—file a request for a three-judge court even if the case does not merit one under Section 2284(b)(1) merely clarifies that a district judge need not unthinkingly initiate the procedures to convene a three- judge court without first examining the allegations in the complaint. In short, all the district judge must “deter- min[e]” is whether the “request for three judges” is made in a case covered by (a)—no more, no less. That conclusion is bolstered by (b)(3)’s explicit command that “[a] single judge shall not enter judg- ment on the merits.” It would be an odd interpretation that allowed a district judge to do under what he is forbidden to do under (b)(3). More likely that Congress intended a three-judge court, and not a single district judge, to enter all final judgments in cases satisfy- ing the criteria of III Respondents argue in the alternative that a district judge is not required to refer a case for the convening of a three-judge court if the constitutional claim is (as they assert petitioners’ claim to be) “insubstantial.” In Goosby v. Osser, we stated that the filing of a “constitutionally insubstantial” claim did not trigger the three-judge-court requirement under the pre-1976 statu- tory regime. Goosby rested not on an interpre- tation of statutory text, but on the familiar proposition that “[i]n the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is es- sential to |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | majority | Shapiro v. McManus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3160677/shapiro-v-mcmanus/ | absence of diversity of citizenship, it is es- sential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal question should be presented.” Ex parte Poresky, (19) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Absent a substan- tial federal question, even a single-judge district court lacks jurisdiction, and “[a] three-judge court is not re- quired where the district court itself lacks jurisdiction of 6 SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS Opinion of the Court the complaint or the complaint is not justiciable in the federal courts.” In the present case, however, the District Judge dis- missed petitioners’ complaint not because he thought he lacked jurisdiction, but because he concluded that the allegations failed to state a claim for relief on the merits, citing and Bell Atlantic See 11 F. Supp. 3d, at 520. That was in accord with Fourth Cir- cuit precedent, which holds that where the “pleadings do not state a claim, then by definition they are insubstantial and so properly are subject to dismissal by the district court without convening a three-judge court.” Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 772– 773 (CA4 2003) (emphasis added). We think this standard both too demanding and incon- sistent with our precedents. “[C]onstitutional claims will not lightly be found insubstantial for purposes of ” the three-judge-court statute. 147–148 (1980). We have long distinguished between failing to raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes—which is what Goosby addressed—and failing to state a claim for relief on the merits; only “wholly insub- stantial and frivolous” claims implicate the former. Bell v. Hood, ; see also Hannis Distilling Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910) (“obviously frivolous or plainly in- substantial”); 369 U.S. (per curiam) (“wholly insubstantial,” “legally speaking non-existent,” “essentially fictitious”); Steel (“frivolous or immaterial”). Absent such frivolity, “the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Bell, Cite as: 577 U. S. (2015) 7 Opinion of the Court Consistent with this principle, Goosby clarified that “ ‘[c]onstitutional insubstantiality’ for this purpose has been equated with such concepts as ‘essen- tially fictitious,’ ‘wholly insubstantial,’ ‘obviously frivolous,’ and ‘obviously without merit.’ ” 409 U.S., (citations omitted). And the adverbs were no mere throwaways; “[t]he limiting words ‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent legal significance.” Without expressing any view on the merits of petition- ers’ claim, we believe it easily clears Goosby’s low bar; after all, the amended complaint specifically challenges Maryland’s apportionment “along the lines suggested by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Vieth [v. Jubelirer, ].” App. to Brief in |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | majority | Shapiro v. McManus | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3160677/shapiro-v-mcmanus/ | concurrence in Vieth [v. Jubelirer, ].” App. to Brief in Opposition 44. Although the Vieth plurality thought all political gerry- mandering claims nonjusticiable, JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment, surmised that if “a State did impose burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their views, there would likely be a First Amendment violation, unless the State shows some com- pelling interest. Where it is alleged that a gerryman- der had the purpose and effect of imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters, the First Amendment may offer a sounder and more prudential basis for intervention than does the Equal Protection Clause.” 5 Whatever “wholly in- substantial,” “obviously frivolous,” etc., mean, at a mini- mum they cannot include a plea for relief based on a legal theory put forward by a Justice of this Court and uncon- tradicted by the majority in any of our cases. Accordingly, the District Judge should not have dismissed the claim as “constitutionally insubstantial” under Goosby. Perhaps petitioners will ultimately fail on the merits of their suit, but entitles them to make their case before a three- judge district court. 8 SHAPIRO v. MCMANUS Opinion of the Court * * * The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Caceres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110049/united-states-v-caceres/ | The Court today holds that evidence obtained in patent violation of agency procedures is admissible in a criminal prosecution. In so ruling, the majority determines both that the Internal Revenue Service's failure to comply with its own mandatory regulations implicates no due process interest, and that the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate sanction for such noncompliance. Because I can subscribe to neither proposition, and because the Court's decision must inevitably erode respect for law among those charged with its administration, I respectfully dissent. I In a long line of cases beginning with this Court has held that "one under investigation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules" promulgated by an executive or legislative body for his protection. See United ; ; ; ; ; United ex rel. Underlying these decisions is a judgment, central to our concept of due process, that government officials no less than private citizens are bound by rules of law.[1] Where individual interests are implicated, the Due Process Clause requires that an executive agency adhere to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. See Despite these well-established precedents and the IRS's conceded failure to abide by mandatory investigative regulations, the Court finds no due process violation on the facts of this case. In reaching its conclusion, the majority relies on the absence of constitutional or statutory underpinnings for *759 the regulations and on respondent's inability to establish prejudice from their circumvention. This approach draws support neither from our prior holdings nor from the principles on which the Due Process Clause is founded. This Court has consistently demanded governmental compliance with regulations designed to safeguard individual interests even when the rules were not mandated by the Constitution or federal statute. In United ex rel. Accardi v. the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus where the Attorney General had disregarded applicable procedures for the Board of Immigration Appeals' suspension of deportation orders. Although the Attorney General had final power to deport the petitioner and had no statutory or constitutional obligation to provide for intermediate action by the Board, this Court held that while suspension procedures were in effect, "the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board or dictate its decision." On similar reasoning, the Court in vacated a Foreign Service officer's national security discharge. While acknowledging that the Secretary of State was not obligated to adopt "rigorous substantive and procedural safeguards," the Court nonetheless held that "having done so he could not, so long as the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard to them." Similarly, in we |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Caceres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110049/united-states-v-caceres/ | remained unchanged, proceed without regard to them." Similarly, in we demanded adherence to Department of the Interior employee-discharge procedures that were "generous beyond the requirements that bind [the] agency." 359 U.S., And most recently, in we declined to permit the Bureau of Indian Affairs to depart from internal rules for establishing assistance-eligibility requirements although the procedures were "more rigorous than otherwise would be required." 415 U.S., at See also United[2] Thus, where internal regulations do not merely facilitate internal agency housekeeping, cf. American Farm[3] but rather afford significant procedural protections, we have insisted on compliance. That the IRS regulations at issue here extend such protections is beyond dispute. As this Court recognized in "[f]ew threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices." An agency's self-imposed constraints on the use of these devices, no less than limitations mandated by statute or by the Fourth Amendment, operate to preserve a "measure of privacy and a sense of personal security" for individuals potentially subject to surveillance. See United v. White, Moreover, the history of the IRS authorization requirements clearly establishes that they were intended to protect privacy interests. The regulations were an outgrowth of investigations in 1965 and 1966 by a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning surveillance techniques of federal agencies. Testimony at Subcommittee hearings revealed that IRS agents had made extensive unauthorized use of a wide variety of eavesdropping techniques. *761 Hearings on S. Res. 39 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1206-1208, 1762-17, 1774-1777, 1828-1830, 1923-1935, 1999-2003 (1965-1966) (hereinafter S. Res. 39 Hearings).[4] Among the agency practices that the Subcommittee found offensive was the monitoring of certain conversations between taxpayers and IRS agents wired for sound. See, e. g., Of more general concern was the agency's total failure to detect or disapprove violations of its own internal rules. Evidence before the Subcommittee indicated that supervisory personnel had condoned the use of illegal wiretaps, see while upper level officials had remained ignorant of widespread departures from prescribed policies. See In response to that congressional investigation, the IRS convened a special Board of Inquiry to review agency surveillance practices and to recommend new procedures. Both the scope of the new regulations and the IRS Commissioner's representations to the Senate Subcommittee demonstrate that the agency was concerned not only with preventing "violation[s] of a person's constitutional or statutory rights," but also with "carefully control[ling]" certain investigatory techniques which, "although legal, nevertheless tend to be offensive to the public conscience." |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Caceres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110049/united-states-v-caceres/ | legal, nevertheless tend to be offensive to the public conscience." The Commissioner further assured the Subcommittee that detailed regulations adopted by the agency in 1967 would guarantee such control. -1126; CCH [1967] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ¶ 6711, p. 71,756. Those regulations, recodified without substantial modification, are *762 the basis of the instant proceedings. Compare Internal Revenue Service Manual ¶ 652.22 (Sept. 15) with Internal Revenue Service Manual Supplement, Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, No. 93G-70 Against this historical backdrop, it is inarguable that these IRS regulations affect substantial individual interests. Indeed the Court does not suggest otherwise. Rather, it places weight on respondent's failure to establish prejudice from agency illegality. Because Caceres cannot demonstrate that he "reasonably relied" on the regulations, ante, at 752, or that the failure to obtain proper authorization had any "discernible effect" on the IRS's decision to monitor his conversations with Agent Yee, ib the Court concludes that the agency's action implicates no due process interest. Such an approach is fundamentally misconceived. By assessing respondent's claim in terms of prejudice, the Court disregards not only its prior holdings, but also the principles of governmental regularity on which they rest. To make subjective reliance controlling in due process analysis deflects inquiry from the relevant constitutional issue, the legitimacy of government conduct. If an individual is entitled only to the process that he subjectively believes is due, an agency could disregard its investigative rules with impunity provided it did so with consistency. For no person could "reasonably rely," ib on rules that were generally ignored. And to the extent that the majority views reliance as critical in an investigative context, it effectively reduces mandatory regulations to hortatory policies. Presumably the only persons with occasion to discover breaches of investigative rules will be those facing criminal prosecution. Such individuals will rarely, if ever, be able to establish that they planned their conduct with internal agency regulations in view.[5] *7 Moreover, the Court's focus on subjective reliance is inconsistent with our prior decisions enforcing due process guarantees. In we vacated a deportation order because the Immigration and Naturalization Service had failed to observe regulations requiring that witness statements be made under oath, even though the petitioner's statements were not involved and he had not invoked the regulations at his deportation hearing. So too, in this Court overturned the defendant's contempt conviction for refusal to testify before Congress where the House Committee on Un-American Activities had ignored rules requiring it to consider formally the injuries to a witness' reputation that might attend public hearings. Yet as the dissent in Yellin pointed |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Caceres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110049/united-states-v-caceres/ | attend public hearings. Yet as the dissent in Yellin pointed out, the defendant had predicated his refusal to testify on First Amendment grounds, not on the public nature of the proceedings, and had in "no way indicated that an executive session would have made any difference in his willingness to answer questions." Nor has this Court required, as it does today, that procedural irregularity affect the outcome of the governmental action at issue. For example, there was no suggestion in Yellin that, had the Committee formally considered the injury to the defendant's reputation, it would have convened an executive session. Indeed, the Committee Chairman had testified that this was precisely the kind of case where a public hearing was appropriate. Nonetheless, the Court, even as it expressed doubt that procedural compliance *764 would have made a difference, insisted that the defendant was entitled to no less.[6] Similarly, the petitioner in was in no meaningful sense prejudiced by the Department of the Interior's departure from regulations governing employee discharges for national security reasons. After the petitioner filed suit, he received a revised notice of dismissal which complied with all applicable regulations. Despite the petitioner's inability to demonstrate that adherence to agency regulations would have affected the decision to discharge him, this Court ordered reinstatement. Implicit in these decisions,[7] and in the Due Process Clause itself, is the premise that regulations bind with equal force whether or not they are outcome determinative. As its very terms make manifest, the Due Process Clause is first and foremost a guarantor of process. It embodies a commitment to procedural regularity independent of result. To focus on the conduct of individual defendants rather than on that of the government necessarily qualifies this commitment. If prejudice becomes critical in measuring due process obligations, individual officials may simply dispense with whatever procedures are unlikely to prove dispositive in a given case. Thus, the majority's analysis invites the very kind of capricious and unfettered decisionmaking that the Due Process Clause in general and these regulations in particular were designed to prevent. *765 Any fair application of our prior holdings mandates a different result. When the Government engages to protect individual interests, it may not constitutionally abrogate that commitment at its own convenience. I would hold the IRS to its surveillance-authorization procedures regardless of whether a litigant can establish prejudice from their circumvention. II Having found a due process violation, I would require that the fruits of that illegality be suppressed in respondent's criminal prosecution. Accordingly, under my analysis, it would be unnecessary to consider the scope of our supervisory |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Caceres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110049/united-states-v-caceres/ | would be unnecessary to consider the scope of our supervisory powers, discussed in Part IV of the Court's opinion. Because, however, the Court addresses that issue, I must register my profound disagreement with both its reasoning and ultimate conclusion. In determining that the exclusionary rule is an unwarranted sanction for the agency misconduct here, the Court attaches great significance to the agents' ostensible "good faith" in construing their own regulations to permit "emergency" surveillance of respondent in January and February 15. Ante, at 757, 756. The record does not admit of such a charitable characterization. IRS Agent Yee alleged that respondent first attempted to bribe him in March 14. The IRS recorded a conversation between Caceres and Yee that same month. No further contact with Caceres concerning the bribe occurred until January 15, and no reasons have been offered for Agent Yee's failure to initiate surveillance during that 10-month hiatus. Nor does the record reflect any justification for the agency's failure to obtain approval for monitoring between the January 27 and January 31 meetings, to schedule meetings so as to permit timely authorization requests, or to process the January 31 authorization request expeditiously. In positing that the agents had a colorable basis for believing that the January 31 and February 6 meetings *766 constituted "emergency situation[s]," see ante, at 756-757, the Court simply ignores the findings below that Agent Yee had absolute control over the scheduling of those conversations, and that any exigency was solely of the Government's own making.[8] This is plainly not an instance in which law enforcement officers have failed to grasp the nuances of constitutional doctrine in an area where the Court itself is sharply divided. Cf. ; -540 Rather, the record demonstrates a breach of unambiguous and unquestionably applicable procedures. Moreover, even assuming the good faith which the agency has failed to demonstrate, that consideration should not figure in our present analysis. Restricting application of the exclusionary rule to instances of bad faith would invite law enforcement officials to gamble that courts would grant absolution for all but the most egregious conduct. Since judges do not lightly cast aspersions on the motives of government officials, the suppression doctrine would be relegated to those rare circumstances where a litigant can prove insolent or calculated indifference to agency regulations. As we have noted in the context of Fourth Amendment violations, "[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the people would be `secure' only in the discretion of the police." Just as intent has not been determinative in Fourth Amendment cases, see, e. g., (18); United v. |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Caceres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110049/united-states-v-caceres/ | in Fourth Amendment cases, see, e. g., (18); United v. Brignoni-Ponce, (15); Almeida-Sanchez v. United (13), it should not be material here. The Court next suggests that suppression is unnecessary in this case because "the Executive itself has provided for *767 internal sanctions in cases of knowing violations of the electronic-surveillance regulations." Ante, at 756 (footnote omitted). Significantly, however, the Court does not assert that the sanctions which exist in theory are effectively employed in practice. While "[s]elf-scrutiny is a lofty ideal," nothing in the record before us indicates why IRS disciplinary procedures should enjoy the Court's special confidence. Quite the contrary, the circumstances surrounding the conception and continued operation of IRS authorization requirements illustrate a persistent indifference toward enforcement.[9] And abdication by the courts is unlikely to increase the agency's vigilance in disciplining or even discovering *768 violations. To remove a defendant's incentive for exposing evasions or disingenuous constructions of applicable rules will inevitably diminish the agency's interest in self-monitoring.[10] Finally, the Court declines to order suppression because "a rigid application of an exclusionary rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and police procedures." Ante, at 755-756. No support is offered for that speculation. In fact, all available evidence is to the contrary. Since 1967, the IRS has retained regulations requiring agents to give Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings despite Court of Appeals decisions suppressing statements taken in violation of those rules. United v. Sourapas, (CA9 15); United v. Leahey, ; United v. Heffner, 0 F.2d 809 Significantly, the Court points to no instance in which an agency has withdrawn the procedural protections made meaningful by decisions such as United ex rel. Accardi v. and Even if the majority's concern about inhibiting agency self-regulation were more solidly grounded, it could not justify the result in this case. Under today's decision, regulations *769 largely unenforced by the IRS will be unenforceable by the courts.[11] I cannot share the Court's apparent conviction that much would be lost if the agency were to withdraw such rules in protest against judicial enforcement. Presumably Congress, which has been repeatedly dissuaded by the IRS from legislating in the area,[12] would then step into the breach. In the event of congressional action, this Court could not so cavalierly tolerate unauthorized electronic surveillance. See Miller v. United[13] Particularly where, as here, agency regulations were designed to stand in the place of legislative action, we should not hesitate to give them similar force and effect. In my judgment, the Court has utterly failed to demonstrate |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | dissenting | United States v. Caceres | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110049/united-states-v-caceres/ | In my judgment, the Court has utterly failed to demonstrate why the exclusionary rule is inappropriate under the circumstances presented here. Equally disturbing is the majority's refusal even to acknowledge countervailing considerations. Quite apart from specific deterrence, there are significant values served by a rule that excludes evidence secured by lawless enforcement of the law. Denying an agency the fruits of noncompliance gives credibility to the due *770 process and privacy interests implicated by its conduct.[14] Also, and perhaps more significantly, exclusion reaffirms the Judiciary's commitment to those values. Preservation of judicial integrity demands that unlawful intrusions on privacy should "find no sanction in the judgments of the courts." Weeks v. United See Elkins v. United Today's holding necessarily confers upon the Judiciary a "taint of partnership in official lawlessness." United v. Calandra, I decline to participate in that venture. I would affirm the judgment of the court below. |
per_curiam | 1,979 | 200 | per_curiam | Moore v. Duckworth | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110148/moore-v-duckworth/ | Upon a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the petitioner was found guilty by an Indiana jury of murder in the second degree. The Indiana Supreme Court upon direct appeal affirmed the conviction. The petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 2254. He claimed, inter alia, that he had been denied due process of law because he had been convicted upon evidence allegedly insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable *714 doubt that he was sane at the time the victim was killed.[*] The District Court denied the writ, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In holding that the District Court had been correct in rejecting the petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the Court of Appeals stated that such a challenge presents a federal due process issue "only where a state court conviction is totally devoid of evidentiary support." The petitioner claims that this was error, and he urges that under In re Winship, a state prisoner is entitled to a determination whether the record evidence could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. Jackson v. Virginia, ante, p. 307. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case we conclude that a remand for further consideration in light of Jackson v. Virginia would be inappropriate. The petitioner has contended that the prosecution failed to meet its burden because it relied upon lay witnesses to prove sanity without providing any expert testimony to rebut his expert opinion testimony. But, as the Court of Appeals noted, under Indiana law sanity may be established by either expert or lay testimony. The state appellate court, in an opinion thoroughly discussing the record evidence and the petitioner's sufficiency challenge, concluded that the lay evidence in this case could have been credited by the jury, and it held that the State's evidence was fully sufficient to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was sane at the time of the killing. The Court of Appeals properly deferred to the Indiana law governing proof of sanity. Although that court applied an improper legal standard when it considered the petitioner's *715 due process claim, it is clear from its opinion that the essence of that challenge concerned the rule of state law that permits the State to rely on lay proof of sanity. It is likewise clear from the record that under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, the evidence in support of this conviction was constitutionally adequate. |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Permanent Mission of India v. City of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145715/permanent-mission-of-india-v-city-of-ny/ | Diplomatic channels provide the normal method of resolving disputes between local governmental entities and foreign sovereigns. See Schooner Following well-established international practice, American courts throughout our history have consistently endorsed the general rule that foreign sovereigns enjoy immunity from suit in our courts. See ; The fact that the immunity is the product of comity concerns rather than a want of juridical power, see 461 U.S., at does not detract from the important role that it performs in ordering our affairs. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) both codified and modified that basic rule. The statute confirms that sovereigns are generally immune from suit in our courts, but identifies seven specific exceptions through which courts may accept jurisdiction, 1605(a). None of those exceptions pertains, or indeed makes any reference, to actions brought to establish a foreign sovereign's *2359 tax liabilities. Because this is such an action, I think it is barred by the general rule codified in the FSIA. It is true that the FSIA contains an exception for suits to resolve disputes over "rights in immovable property," 1605(a)(4), and New York City law provides that unpaid real estate taxes create a lien that constitutes an interest in such property, N.Y.C. Admin. Code 11-301 (Cum.Supp.2006). It follows that a literal application of the FSIA's text provides a basis for applying the exception to this case. See ante, at 2356. Given the breadth and vintage of the background general rule, however, it seems to me highly unlikely that the drafters of the FSIA intended to abrogate sovereign immunity in suits over property interests whose primary function is to provide a remedy against delinquent taxpayers. Under the majority's logic, since "a suit to establish the validity of a lien implicates `rights in immovable property,'" ante, at 2356, whenever state or municipal law recognizes a lien against a foreign sovereign's real property, the foreign government may be haled into federal court to litigate the validity of that lien. Such a broad exception to sovereign immunity threatens, as they say, to swallow the rule. Under the municipal law of New York City, for example, liens are available against real property, among other things, to compel landowners to pay for pest control, emergency repairs, and sidewalk upkeep. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code 17-145, 17-147, 17-151(b) (2000); see also M. Mitzner, Liens and Encumbrances, in Real Estate Titles 299, 311-314 (J. Pedowitz ed.1984). A whole host of routine civil controversies, from sidewalk slip-and-falls to landlord-tenant disputes, could be converted into property liens under local law, and then usedas the tax lien was in this caseto |
Justice Stevens | 2,007 | 16 | dissenting | Permanent Mission of India v. City of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145715/permanent-mission-of-india-v-city-of-ny/ | and then usedas the tax lien was in this caseto pierce a foreign sovereign's traditional and statutory immunity. In order to reclaim immunity, foreign governments might argue in those casesjust as the Governments of India and the People's Republic of Mongolia tried to argue herethat slip-and-fall claims, even once they are transformed into property liens, do not implicate "rights in immovable property." But the burden of answering such complaints and making such arguments is itself an imposition that foreign sovereigns should not have to bear. The force of the arguments of the Solicitor General as amicus curiae supporting petitioners buttresses my conviction that a narrow reading of the statutory exception is more faithful to congressional intent than a reading that enables a dispute over taxes to be classified as a dispute over "rights in immovable property." It is true that insofar as the FSIA transferred the responsibility for making immunity decisions from the State Department to the Judiciary, -488, the views of the Executive are not entitled to any special deference on this issue. But we have recognized that well-reasoned opinions of the Executive Branch about matters within its expertise may have the "power to persuade, if lacking power to control." And I am persuaded. At bottom, this case is not about the validity of the city's title to immovable property, or even the validity of its automatic prejudgment lien. Rather, it is a dispute over a foreign sovereign's tax liability. If Congress had intended the statute to waive sovereign immunity in tax litigation, I think it would have said so. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Harlan | 1,971 | 22 | concurring | Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108337/triangle-improvement-council-v-ritchie/ | In light of my Brother DOUGLAS' assertion, post, at 508, that today's disposition might be taken to impair the integrity of the "rule of four," see I deem it appropriate to set forth my reasons for joining in the dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted. *498 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 provided in pertinent part that: "The Secretary [of Transportation] shall not approve any project [such as that here involved] which will cause the displacement of any person unless he receives satisfactory assurances from the State Highway department that "(3) within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement there will be available, to the extent that can reasonably be accomplished, in areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the families and individuals displaced, decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings, as defined by the Secretary, equal in number to the number of and available to such displaced families and individuals and reasonably accessible to their places of employment." 23 U.S. C. 502 (1964 ed., Supp. V). The principal issue presented by this case is whether that statute, either of its own force or together with the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to it, prevents the Secretary from authorizing construction of a segment of the interstate highway system, even where the rights-of-way had been acquired and some persons displaced prior to the effective date of the 1968 Act, unless the State first compiles a comprehensive formal relocation plan. In short, the question is what constitutes "satisfactory assurances" in such a case. Since certiorari was granted, a number of events have occurred that, in my judgment, have rendered this case wholly inappropriate for our review. First, the Act upon which petitioners base their case has been repealed. Secondly, a new statute has been enacted by the Congress *499 that alters drastically the potential impact of any decision we might reach in this case. Third, we were informed that, as of the date of oral argument, less than 10 persons remained to be displaced by this federal project. Finally, in their brief on the merits in this Court, petitioners have almost completely abandoned their original claim for relief and now seek to broaden substantially the nature of the remedy they seek. The original prayer for relief simply sought to enjoin further displacement pending submission and implementation of a formal relocation plan by the West Virginia State Highway Department. The fact that the statute has been repealed since certiorari was granted and that less than 10 |
Justice Harlan | 1,971 | 22 | concurring | Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108337/triangle-improvement-council-v-ritchie/ | repealed since certiorari was granted and that less than 10 persons would be affected were we to accept petitioners' legal position renders this case, I think, a classic instance of a situation where the exercise of our powers of review would be of no significant continuing national import. Of course, every individual alleging he has been abused by the exercise of federal power should, as a general matter, be heard, even where his situation becomes unique due to repeal or cessation of the action he challenges. That is why federal district courts and courts of appeals are provided and vested with largely obligatory jurisdiction. Hearing such claims is not, however, a principal purpose for which this Court sits. See Rule 19 of the Rules of this Court. At the same time Congress repealed the 1968 Act it enacted the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Its principal purpose, as the title implies, was to establish a uniform governing rule of federal law for all federally directed and federally financed projects that cause displacement of persons and businesses. The 1970 Act was very consciously modeled on the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act, following "as closely as possible [its] substantive provisions," S. Rep. No. 91-488 (1969), in an *500 effort to assure that all persons uprooted by federal authority would receive the beneficent protection earlier extended to those situated in the path of highway construction. See especially 115 Cong. Rec. 31535 (remarks of Sen. Cooper). Section 210 of the new Act provides that: "[T]he head of a Federal agency shall not approve any grant to a State agency, under which Federal financial assistance will be available to pay all or part of the cost of any program or project which will result in the displacement of any person on or after the effective date of this title, unless he receives satisfactory assurances from such State agency that "(2) relocation assistance programs offering the services described in section 205 shall be provided to such displaced persons; "(3) within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement, decent, safe, and sanitary replacement dwellings will be available to displaced persons in accordance with section 205 (c) (3)." Section 205 (c) (3) describes in some detail the services that must be provided. It does not, however, explicitly state that such "program" shall include a comprehensive plan reflecting the projected relocation of each individual affected. Arguably, the presence of this provision would enhance the general significance of our construction of the relevant,[1] and similarly worded, section of the 1968 Act. *501 Indeed, my |
Justice Harlan | 1,971 | 22 | concurring | Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108337/triangle-improvement-council-v-ritchie/ | similarly worded, section of the 1968 Act. *501 Indeed, my Brother DOUGLAS asserts that "any necessary interpretation of the 1968 [Act] would be equally applicable to the 1970 Act." Post, at 504, n. 1. For me, however, this does not increase, but rather further diminishes, the appropriateness of our ruling in the instant case. This case comes to us on a record that sheds light only upon the proper construction of the 1968 Act which governed only federal programs, administered by one agency, that aid highway construction by the States. It now appears that anything we might hold in that regard may very well have to be carried over in full force to govern the administration of the large number of federal programs that bring about human displacement. To render our determination upon such a wide-ranging issue we should, at a minimum, have the benefit of the thinking of lower federal courts on this problem, as well as some knowledge of the responses of the various affected agencies to this new statute. Yet we are entirely without these essential aids. To the extent, then, that the instant case has any significance for the future, it seems to me that such issues should await a case arising under the new statute. Insofar as the case can be said to present an issue only as to the proper construction of the 1968 Act, events subsequent to the granting of the writ have, as noted previously, robbed it of all national significance. Finally, it is troublesome that petitioners have virtually abandoned their initial claim for relief. Instead of the preparation of a plan,[2] they now seek a decree to the effect that the District Court should bring before it all *502 persons displaced by the highway and inquire whether their new locations meet statutory standards. As to this issue, there is neither an opinion below nor a record upon which to judge the claim. The case was tried upon a theory that the statutes require a formal plan, not that numerous individuals had been improperly relocated in fact. And there would seem to be no bar to the initiation of subsequent proceedings, in the District Court, raising individual claims of this sort where they do exist. In light of this changed posture of the case, I do not think its adjudication would be a provident expenditure of the energies of the Court. Cf. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.