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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of certiorari was allowed to review a decree of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming a decree of the District Court of the United States for the District of Hawaii, 329 U. S. 697. The United States began the present proceedings by a petition, filed in the District Court, to quiet title in it to a group of islets in the Pacific, long known as Palmyra Island. Palmyra was annexed to the Kingdom of Hawaii on February 26, 1862, and the United States claims that it remained a part of the governmental lands of Hawaii and passed to the United States by the Joint Resolution of Congress of July 7, 1898, which annexed Hawaii to the United States and accepted for the United States all public, Government or Crown lands and all other public property then belonging to the Republic of Hawaii. The lands and sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hawaii previously had passed directly to the Republic of Hawaii, through the intervening Provisional Government.
Palmyra Island is around one thousand miles south of the main Hawaiian group. It is the first considerable body of land in that direction and lies between the Hawaiian Islands and Samoa. The Palmyra group is a coral covered atoll of about fifty islets, some with trees, and extends — reefs, intervening water and land — 5 2/3 sea miles in an easterly and westerly direction and 1 1/3 sea miles northwardly and southwardly. The observation spot for the map in the case is Latitude 5° 52' 18" N., Longitude 162° 05' 55" W. The British islands of Washington, Fanning and Christmas lie within a 500-mile radius to the southeast of Palmyra. Use of the islands by the respondents and their predecessors in title was intermittent. The question of title became important in 1939 when Congress authorized the construction at Palmyra of naval aviation facilities and appropriated $1,100,000 for their construction. 53 Stat. 590. Negotiations with these respondents, as owners, were undertaken in 1938 by the Navy Department for a lease of the property but were not completed. This suit was filed in 1939.
There have been two trials of this case. The records of both are before us, as the record of the first trial was made a part of the second. Certain contemporaneous written evidence of the early transactions was produced.
The findings of fact in the first trial show that two Hawaiian citizens, Johnson Wilkinson and Zenas Bent, made a representation concerning Palmyra Island to the King and the Cabinet Council. The minutes of a meeting of the Council which took place at Honolulu on February 26, 1862, are extant. The “representation” has not been found. The Council minutes show the following:
“P. Kamehameha read a Representation from Z Bent & Mr Wilkinson, about the Island Palmyra, requesting that the Island should be considered a Hawaiian possession & be placed under the Hawaiian Flag
“After some discussion it pleased the King to direct the Minister of the Interior, to grant what the Petitioners apply for, following the precedent of the Resolution regarding the Island Cornwallis & without exceeding the same.”
The action of the Council was communicated to Wilkinson and Bent through a letter by the Minister of the Interior on March 1,1862. In the letter it was said that the Hawaiian Government consented to the taking possession of Palmyra “for the purpose of increasing the trade and commerce of this Kingdom as well as offering protection to the interests of its subjects.” Accompanying the letter was a commission empowering Bent “to take possession in our name of Palmyra Island.” Explicit directions were contained in the commission that Bent was to sign a declaration and leave it in a bottle buried at the foot of a pole wrapped with the Hawaiian flag. The commission was signed jointly by the King and the Minister of Interior. On June 16,1862, Bent reported that he had carried out the commission and left a paper as directed. In the same report Bent told of the trees on the island and the kind of vegetables that would grow. He said that he had erected a dwelling house on the island and a curing house for biche de mer, a kind of edible sea slug that is prized in the Orient. It also said that he had left five men on the island and proposed to return in about ten days. Thereupon the Minister of the Interior duly issued a proclamation on June 18, as follows:
“Whereas, On the 15th day of April, 1862, Palmyra Island, in latitude 5° 50' North, and longitude 161° 53' West, was taken possession of, with the usual formalities, by Captain Zenas Bent, he being duly authorized to do so, in the name of Kamehameha IV, King of the Hawaiian Islands. Therefore, This is to give notice, that the said island, so taken possession of, is henceforth to be considered and respected as part of the Domain of the King of the Hawaiian Islands.”
A finding was made that certain comments on the expedition were published in the Honolulu papers between the representation to the Council and the proclamation which was only important in the present litigation as showing a contemporaneous understanding that possession was being taken of an island as part of the Domain of the King of the Hawaiian Islands.
As shown by the minutes of the Cabinet Council, the Minister of the Interior was directed to grant the application of Bent and Wilkinson “following the precedent of the Resolution regarding the Island Cornwallis & without exceeding the same.” The meaning of these words is not made clear by the record. The United States contends that the words limit any rights of Bent in Palmyra to “a five-year right to take guano,” and that he never was “granted or intended to be granted a fee simple title.” The trial court thought that the purpose of the Council might reasonably have been to limit the authority of Bent and Wilkinson to islands that were “not in possession of any other government or any other people.” The reason for this supposition lies in the fact that the commission of May 31, 1858, to Samuel Clesson Allen, who discovered Cornwallis Island for Hawaii, to take possession of the island contained the words just quoted. On the same day that the commission was issued, a contract was made with Edward P. Adams for him to take guano for five years from any islands acquired for Hawaii by Allen in the schooner, “Kalama.” Adams’ request for the grant of a fee to a ⅞ interest in any island discovered, so far as shown by the record, was not acted upon by the Hawaiian legislative body.
Allen took possession of Cornwallis Island and submitted a report of his expedition on July 12, 1858, to the Minister of the Interior. Thereupon at a meeting of the Privy Council on July 27, 1858, the following resolution was passed:
“Resolved that Cornwallis Island in latitude 16.43 North, and longitude 169.33 west from Greenwich, and Kalama Island, in latitude 16.44 North and longitude 169.21 west, having been taken possession of, with the usual formalities, on the 14th and 19th of June 1858, by Samuel C. Allen Esquire, in the name of Kamehameha IV, the said Islands are to be considered as part of His Majesty’s Domain.”
It will be noted that this resolution is substantially in the form of the later proclamation in regard to Palmyra.
The annexation of Cornwallis Island failed because of prior discovery by the United States and later, on October 16, 1858, the Minister of the Interior cancelled the contract which had been made with Adams.
Thus it will be seen that the meaning of the minutes concerning the acquisition of Palmyra, following the precedent of Cornwallis, is uncertain. The resolution annexing Cornwallis is substantially the same as the proclamation concerning Palmyra. The commission authorizing Bent to take possession of Palmyra is substantially the same as the commission to Allen that resulted in the discovery of Cornwallis. There is no evidence of a contract with Bent and Wilkinson similar to the guano contract made with Adams. We conclude that there is nothing in the requirement that the Palmyra acquisition should follow the precedent of the Cornwallis resolution to indicate anything more than that the sovereignty over Palmyra was to be acquired for Hawaii, as stated in the proclamation of possession. There is nothing to lead us to disagree with the trial court’s finding as to Palmyra, as follows:
“The words used in the formality of annexation and proclamation need not and likely would not have been different whether it was the intention that the act of annexion should constitute the vesting of a fee simple title to the lands in the King, or merely extend sovereignty over the domain annexed.”
We find no evidence of a consistent plan or custom of the Kingdom of Hawaii relating to title to lands on islands when possession was taken for the Kingdom. The instructions to Wilkinson and Bent were:
“I am authorized to state on the part of His Majesty’s Government that they consent to the taking possession of the island of Palmyra, situated in Longitude 161° 53' west and in Latitude 6° 4 North, as described by you in said memorial; for the purpose of increasing the trade and commerce of this Kingdom as well as offering protection to the interests of its subjects.”
The trial court ended its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the first trial in these words:
“My controlling finding is, that the sovereignty of the United States was extended over Palmyra Island by Annexation, but the Republic of Hawaii did not in fact or in form assert fee simple title to this land at the time of annexation, or at any other time, and it is sufficient to say, only, as a
Conclusion
I am decidedly of opinion that petitioner [The United States] does not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the Courts of the United States, and therefore, is not entitled to any relief prayed for.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. United States v. Fullard-Leo, 133 F. 2d 743. It concluded that the commission to Bent, heretofore referred to,
“makes it abundantly clear that Bent was merely acting as agent of the King. Under the principles of international law, the taking of possession by Bent perfected the title of the King. 1 Hyde, International Law, 167 § 100; 1 Oppenheim, International Law, 276-278, §§ 221-224; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 409, 41 U. S. 367, 409, 10 L. Ed. 997. Nothing in the resolution or the letter referred to is contrary to that view.” Id., 747.
It said there was no proof of subsequent alienation by any sovereign and that the evidence would not support a finding of a lost grant.
On remand of this case on the first appeal, the trial court entered further findings of fact and conclusions of law. It held:
“I believe and so hold that the evidence in this case is not only entirely consistent with but can reasonably and logically be accounted for only upon the presumption that a grant issued to Bent and Wilkinson by which the Hawaiian government parted with its title.”
This can only mean that in the trial court’s opinion, the Kingdom of Hawaii acquired sovereignty over Palmyra and Bent and Wilkinson obtained the private ownership of the islets. This holding was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Fullard-Leo, 156 F. 2d 756. Although only one of the questions presented on certiorari, our determination that the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals is correct disposes of the entire case.
Hawaii has been a territory of the United States since the Joint Resolution of Annexation of July 7, 1898. 30 Stat. 750. Before that the islands composing the present Territory of Hawaii had existed independent from the rest of the world and sovereign as far back as history and local tradition reaches. When American Christian missionaries arrived at the Islands in 1820, the Hawaiian civilization merged with that of the rest of the known world. At that time the principal islands of the present Territory had been united a few years before into a monarchy under a strong leader, Kamehameha I. Notwithstanding his death, a short time before the coming of the missionaries, the kingdom welded by him from the several island communities continued as a recognized monarchy under his successors until its fall in 1893. A Provisional Government succeeded the monarchy and was in turn followed by the Republic of Hawaii, the foreign governmental authority mentioned in the Congressional Resolution of Annexation as ceding Hawaii to the United States. From Kamehameha I to annexation, Hawaii made steady advances in conforming its laws and economy to the manner of life of the other civilized nations of the world.
At the time of the annexation of Palmyra Island by the Kingdom of Hawaii, April 15, 1862, that monarchy possessed a system of land ownership and land laws that were adequate to establish titles and maintain a proper record thereof in accordance with the contemporaneous practices of Anglo-American law. The earlier nineteenth century laws of the Kingdom had been codified into a Civil Code in 1859. In this code the Minister of the Interior was given supervision of the public lands with power to dispose of them with the authority of the King in Cabinet Council. Civil Code of the Hawaiian Islands, 1859, c. VII, Art. I. By c. XXVI, Art. LI, a Bureau of Conveyances with books of registry was required and by c. XXV, Art. L, §§ 1241-48, provision was made for probate and administration. Under treaties with foreign nations, Hawaii permitted the sale of local lands of deceased aliens and the withdrawal of the proceeds by their heirs. Id,., pp. 461 and 471.
Kamehameha I, as King and Conqueror, was recognized by Hawaiian law as the sole owner of all the soil of the Islands. Through a system of feudal tenures, not too clearly defined, large portions of the royal domains were divided among the chiefs by Kamehameha I and his successors and this process of infeudation continued to the lowest class of tenants. This system of tenures created dissatisfaction among the chiefs and people because of the burdens of service and produce that the inferior owed to the superior. Consequently by a series of royal and legislative steps, the King and the House of Nobles and Representatives provided for a land system which finally resulted in a separation of the lands into lands of the Government, the Crown and the People. This purpose finally was manifested by the Act of June 7, 1848. By this act, much of the land of Hawaii was allocated between the Crown and the Government. This division of lands became known as “The Great Mahele.” Nothing has been called to our attention limiting the power of the King to grant Crown Lands prior to the Act of January 3, 1865. Compare Jover v. Insular Government, 221 U. S. 623, 633. The requirement that the Minister of the Interior maintain a record of all royal grants refers only to those for government land. Civil Code, 1859, § 44. By enactment of the King and the Legislative Assembly in 1865, the Crown Lands became inalienable except by future legislative action. See “Crown Lands,” Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1905, pp. 1226-30. The private lands of the King or Crown Lands, confirmed to him by the Act of June 7, 1848, were taken over by the Government in 1895 and thus became government lands, also.
In order to establish private title to lands in the former tenants, a Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles was created in 1846. This Commission adopted “Principles” for adjudication of claims. These were approved by the Legislative Council the same year and throw strong light on the Hawaiian land system shortly before the annexation of Palmyra. This Commission dealt not only with lands included in the Great Mahele but also with lands that were not mentioned in that act and established titles for such lands. It apparently continued until March 31,1855. After the end of the Commission’s work, the Minister of the Interior and the King in Cabinet Council were charged May 17, 1859, with responsibility for government lands and the maintenance of records for all royal conveyances. This summary of the Hawaiian land laws at the time of the annexation of Palmyra brings before us the pattern of land ownership and the system of recor-dation of titles, both those stemming from royal grants of government lands and from private transactions. The claim of respondents to Palmyra must be adjudicated with this situation in mind. We are not dealing with an explorer’s claim of title to lands of a savage tribe or that of a discoverer of a hitherto unknown islet.
Whether we distinguish between Crown and Government lands, however, seems immaterial. No record appears of any conveyance from King or Minister to any land on Palmyra. We assume the law required a public record for any such conveyance from either from the time possession was taken for Hawaii. It is clear that both the King and the Minister of the Interior with the authority of the King in the Cabinet Council had power to convey the lands to private citizens. Civil Code, 1859, §§ 39-48; Act of January 3, 1865, Rev. Laws, Hawaii, 1905, p. 1226, § 3. We assume further that the formal claim to Palmyra for the Hawaiian Kingdom made by Bent, pursuant to his commission, gave Hawaii not only sovereignty over Palmyra but also the power to grant the lands of the newly annexed islets as part of its public lands to private owners.
In the circumstances heretofore described, were the district and circuit courts justified in quieting title to Palmyra in respondents on the theory of a lost grant? We take judicial notice of the laws of Hawaii prior to its annexation as a part of our domestic laws. The rules under which the Hawaiian people lived under the monarchy or republic define, for the sovereign of today, the rights acquired during those periods. While in matters of local law the federal courts defer to the decisions of the territorial courts, we are dealing here with a problem of federal law — the United States seeks to quiet its title to land now claimed by virtue of Hawaiian cession. The federal rights are partly dependent upon the Hawaiian law prior to annexation. Therefore while the Hawaiian law, as it existed before the annexation of the Territory, is controlling on rights in land that are claimed to have had their beginnings then the federal courts construe that law for themselves. The federal courts cannot be foreclosed by determinations of the Hawaiian law by the Hawaiian courts. They will lean heavily upon the Hawaiian decisions as to the Hawaiian law but they are not bound to follow those decisions where a claimed title to public lands of the United States is involved. The roots of respondents’ claim spring from Hawaiian law. As their claim to Palmyra continued after the United States acquired in 1898 whatever rights Hawaii then had, the validity of respondents’ claim must be judged, also, in the light of the public land law of the United States.
The presumption of a lost grant to land has received recognition as an appropriate means to quiet long possession. It recognizes that lapse of time may cure the neglect or failure to secure the proper muniments of title, even though the lost grant may not have been in fact executed. The doctrine first appeared in the field of incorporeal hereditaments but has been extended to realty. The rule applies to claims to land held adversely to the sovereign. The case from this Court most often cited is United States v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452. In that case, there was evidence of the prior existence of the lost grant. The title of the claimants was upheld but this Court then stated, at p. 464, conformably to Fletcher v. Fuller, supra:
“Without going at length into the subject, it may be safely said that by the weight of authority, as well as the preponderance of opinion, it is the general rule of American law that a grant will be presumed upon proof of an adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession for twenty years, and that such rule will be applied as a presumptio juris et de jure, wherever, by possibility, a right may be acquired in any manner known to the law.”
See United States v. Pendell, 185 U. S. 189, 200-201.
A few years later, in United States v. Chavez, 175 U. S. 509, the problem of the lost grant again arose. In this case, as to one tract, case No. 38 at 516, the existence of the grant to Joaquin Sedillo was not shown except by a statement of January 11, 1734, that the tract conveyed “was acquired by his [affiant’s] father in part by grant in the name of His Majesty [The King of Spain]...” P. 514. In referring to the recognition of title in the private owners, this Court said, at 520:
“Succeeding to the power and obligations of those Governments, must the United States do so? This is insisted by their counsel, and yet they have felt and expressed the equities which arise from the circumstances of the case. Whence arise those equities? That which establishes them may establish title. Upon a long and uninterrupted possession, the law bases presumptions as sufficient for legal judgment, in the absence of rebutting circumstances, as formal instruments, or records, or articulate testimony. Not that formal instruments or records are unnecessary, but it will be presumed that they once existed and have been lost. The inquiry then recurs, do such presumptions arise in this case and do they solve its questions?”
Thereafter the Court, 524, referred to the long possession and sustained the claimants in their title.
Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449, was decided on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. An Igorot chieftain sought to register his land in Benguet Province, long held by his family. Under claim of succession to the Spanish rights by the Treaty of Paris and an exception in the Act of July 1,1902, providing for temporary administration of civil government in the Philippines, the land had been taken for public purposes by the United States and the Philippine Government. Objection was made by the two governments and sustained by the Supreme Court of' the Philippines on the ground that the applicant did not show a grant from any sovereign. This Court thought it unjust, in the circumstances, to require a native to have a paper title.
“It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.” 212 U. S. at 460.
The Philippine judgment was reversed.
The law of the Territory of Hawaii recognizes and has applied the doctrine of the lost grant in controversies between a claimant to Government land and the Territory. In re Title of Kioloku (1920), 25 Haw. 357. The tract involved in that litigation had been held in “actual, open, continuous and uninterrupted possession” since 1870. No record or evidence of a grant by any governmental authority was produced. After a discussion of several of the cases just referred to and others, it was held that the doctrine of the lost grant, in claims to land against the state, was the “law of the land” in Hawaii. On appeal the holding was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court said:
“Under the rule of law applicable to the case, as we find it, it was not necessary that the appellee should prove the probability that a grant did in fact issue to one of its predecessors in interest. It was enough to show, as we think it was shown, that there was a legal possibility of a grant.” Territory of Hawaii v. Hutchinson Sugar Plantation Co., 272 F. 856, 860.
We are therefore of the opinion that where, as here, there was power in the King or the officials of the Kingdom of Hawaii to convey a title to Palmyra during the years immediately following its annexation to the Kingdom of Hawaii and prior to many of the private conveyances hereinafter referred to, the doctrine of a lost grant may be applied, in suitable circumstances, and its existence presumed in favor of the predecessors in title of these respondents. In order for the doctrine of a lost grant to be applicable, the possession must be under a claim of right, actual, open and exclusive. A chain of conveyances is important. So is the payment of taxes. A claim for government lands stands upon no different principle in theory so long as authority exists in government officials to execute the patent, grant or conveyance. As a practical matter it requires a higher degree of proof because of the difficulty for a state to protect its lands from use by those without right. We turn then to the circumstances relied upon by the lower courts as sustaining respondents’ contentions in respect to their claim to and occupation of Palmyra.
In the earlier part of this opinion, we have set out in detail the existing governmental record of the proceedings leading up to the annexation of Palmyra by the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1862. No positive evidence was produced as to any grant of Palmyra by Hawaii prior to the latter’s annexation by the United States in 1898. Nor does the record show the exercise of any direct governmental authority over Palmyra. In 1905, upon a request of the Governor for an opinion concerning the jurisdiction of Hawaii over islands to the northwest of Kauai, the Attorney General answered that Hawaii had power to lease them. It will be noted from the short opinion in the margin that Palmyra, though over 1000 miles to the southeast of Kauai, was included. Nothing appears as to any former or subsequent exercise by Hawaii of a power to lease Palmyra. No taxes were collected from those who claimed to be owners prior to 1885 when the Pacific Navigation Company paid taxes to Hawaii on Palmyra for three years. Assessments have been made annually since 1911 and taxes have been paid regularly since then by the claimants to the property. At the time of annexation by the United States, provision was made for commissioners to recommend to Congress legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands. 30 Stat. 750. A full report was made which was transmitted to Congress by the Pesident on December 6, 1898. U. S. Senate Document No. 16, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. It dealt with the Public Domain and shows that the Crown Lands had been taken over by the Hawaiian Government in 1894, p. 4 et seq. In 1894, the Crown Lands were in area 971,463 acres. There were no Crown Lands shown on the smaller islands. P. 102. An appendix shows the Government lands as of September 30, 1897, and lists in acres and values those of the principal islands of the group. Pp. 47-51. They amounted, in acres, to 1,744,713. In the recapitulation, though not included in the lists of public lands, there is an item that may include Palmyra. It reads, “Laysan, etc., islands, Acres-, Value $40,000.” At another point, p. 4, under “Area and Population” appears the only reference to Palmyra. The reference in its setting appears in the margin.
Respondents’ claim of title exists in a consistent series of transactions beginning in 1862 with a deed to Wilkinson from Bent. The deed was recorded in the Registry of Conveyances of Hawaii in 1885. It conveyed all Bent’s “right, title and interest in and to all the property of whatever description now lying or situated on Palmyra Island in the Pacific Ocean which Island by a proclamation of His Majesty Kamehameha IV at present belongs to the Hawaiian Kingdom. And also all my right, title and interest in and to any partnership property that I may have an interest in as co-partner with the said Johnson Wilkinson.” The language, we think, is consistent with an intention to convey a claimed interest in the realty “lying or situated on Palmyra Island” as well as any partnership personal property. Thereafter Wilkinson died in New Zealand in 1866 and left a will devising to his -wife, Kalama:
“And also all my landed freehold and leasehold Estates in the Province of Auckland aforesaid, at Honolulu in the Sandwich Islands in the Island of Palmyra in the South Sea Islands and wheresoever the same may be situated and whether in the said Colony of New Zealand or elsewhere To hold suach real and personal estate unto the said Kalama absolutely and forever.”
The will was proven and registered in New Zealand and was later admitted to probate in Hawaii in 1898. In 1885, after the death of Kalama, two of her heirs transferred all their “right, title and interest as heirs at law of the said Kalama or otherwise, in and to the Island of Palmyra” to one Wilcox, who conveyed to the Pacific Navigation Company. By a series of some four mesne conveyances between 1888 and 1911 the interest of Pacific Navigation Company in the island was eventually transferred to one Henry Cooper. A third heir of Kalama’s transferred his rights in the island to one Ringer, whose children transferred their rights in the Island to Henry Cooper in 1912. Ringer’s widow in 1912 sold all her right, title, and interest in the island to Maui and Clarke.
In 1912 Cooper petitioned the Land Court of Hawaii to confirm title in him. Maui and Clarke contested the petition, claiming to own a dower interest in an “undivided one-third of the Island.” Through its Attorney General, the Territory of Hawaii answered the petition and disclaimed “any interest in, to or concerning” Palmyra. The court decreed that Cooper was the owner in fee simple of the island subject to the dower interest of Annie Ringer held by Maui and Clarke. In 1920, Cooper leased the Island to Meng and White who assigned the lease to the Palmyra Copra Company. In 1922 Cooper sold for $15,000.00 all but two of the islets to Mr. and Mrs. Fullard-Leo, respondents here, who had taken over the lease. From the foregoing, it will be apparent that from 1862 to the breakdown of negotiations a paper title existed in respondents and their predecessors in title, except for the grant from the Kingdom, and that there has been a record of the conveyances in Hawaii since 1885. There was, during these years, a claim of right to exclusive possession.
That claim of right was manifested not only by transfers of paper title but also by actual user of the property. The sufficiency of actual and open possession of property is to be judged in the light of its character and location. It is hard to conceive of a more isolated piece of land than Palmyra, one of which possession need be less continuous to form the basis of a claim. This tiny atoll in the Pacific, however, far removed from any other lands and claimed by no sovereignty until 1862 was not wholly valueless, commercially, prior to the establishment of airways over the ocean.
From time to time, men thought there might be something gained from its exploitation. Bent’s "representation” in 1862 for annexation was preceded by an acquaintance with the locality for a number of years. When he went to take possession he planted vegetables and melons, built a house and sought sea products. The Pacific Navigation Company had men on the island during 1885 and 1886. Cooper visited the island in 1913 and 1914. He was then the owner of record. In 1912, at Cooper’s suggestion, the then Governor of Hawaii requested the Secretary of the Interior of the United States to send an American vessel to Palmyra to confirm American sovereignty. The Governor stated that Mr. Cooper was then the owner and that the private title to Palmyra had been in citizens of Hawaii since 1862. In 1920 and 1921 the Palmyra Copra Company was actively engaged on the island under a lease from Cooper. The Fullard-Leos, who acquired title to all but two of the islands from Cooper, visited the island in 1924 and again in 1935. On many occasions during the interim, they gave permission to various persons to visit the island.
From these evidences of claim of title and possession were the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals justified in entering a decree that the fee simple title to Palmyra is vested in respondents? The dissent in the Circuit Court of Appeals points out that our cases applying the lost grant doctrine required “uninterrupted and long continuing possession of a kind indicating the ownership of the fee.” This is the rule. But, as we have indicated above, uninterrupted and long-continued possession does not require a constant, actual occupancy where the character of the property does not lend itself to such use. No other private owner claims any rights in Palmyra. From the evidence of title and possession shown in this record, we cannot say that the decrees below are incorrect.
Judgment affirmed.
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197.
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 216.
Declaration of Rights, 1839.
Act to Organize Executive Departments and Joint Resolution, April 27, 1846, Hawaii, Statute Laws, 1845-46, vol. I, pp. 99, 277.
Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1905, p. 1197 et seq.
Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421, dissent, n. at 454.
The domain covered by the term seems to be not only the lands declared to be the private lands of the King by the Act of June 7, 1848, but also other unassigned lands later declared by legislative authority to be Crown Lands. Rev. Laws, Hawaii, 1905, p. 1227; Act of November 14, 1890, Laws, Hawaii, 1890, c. 75; Rev. Laws, Hawaii, 1905, p. 1229.
Hawaii, Statute Laws, 1845-46, vol. I, p. 107.
Hawaii, Statute Laws, 1847, vol. II, pp. 81-94; Revised Laws, Hawaii, 1905, p. 1164 et seq.
Thurston v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421, 429, 437.
“The. Commission was authorized to consider possession of land acquired by oral gift of Kamehameha I., or one of his high chiefs, as sufficient evidence of title to authorize an award therefor to the claimant. This we must consider as the foundation of all titles to land in this Kingdom, except such as come from the King, to any part of his reserved lands, and excepting also the lists of Government and Fort lands reserved. The land in dispute in this case is not one of
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Murphy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is a companion to Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., ante, p. 524.
The stipulated facts show that on March 16, 1936, the respondent taxpayer filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue a joint individual income tax return for himself and his wife for the calendar year 1935. This disclosed a tax liability of $8,017.01, which was duly paid. In the return the losses and gains from sales of capital assets by the taxpayer and his wife were reported together, the losses of the wife being deducted from the gains of the husband, resulting in a net loss in excess of $2,000. This amount (the allowable limit of loss) was deducted on the return.
On June 7, 1937, the taxpayer was advised at a conference with revenue agents that there was additional income tax due for the year 1935, aggregating $421.80. The taxpayer’s check, which was tendered for that amount, was later returned to him. Then by a letter dated June 11, 1937, a revenue agent notified the taxpayer that instead of a deficiency of $421.80 on the 1935 income tax return there was a deficiency of $19,973.93 and the taxpayer was furnished a computation showing the basis for such determination. The agent relied upon Article 117-5, Treasury Regulations 86, later declared void by this Court in Helvering v. Janney, 311 U. S. 189. After protest and further conference, the taxpayer gave the agent a check for $21,527.70, covering the then proposed deficiency assessment of $19,973.93, plus interest of $1,553.77. This check was remitted to the United States Treasury, after having been received by the Collector on July 21, 1937.
On July 14, 1937, the taxpayer and his wife executed an agreement waiving certain statutory restrictions in their favor and consenting to the immediate assessment and collection against them of 1935 income tax in the principal sum of $19,973.93, plus deficiency interest of $1,553.77, which the Commissioner thereafter assessed. The agreement specified in a footnote that it was not a final closing agreement under § 606 of the Revenue Act of 1928 and that it did not therefore preclude the assertion of a further deficiency if one should be determined, nor did it extend the statutory period of limitation for refund, assessment or collection of the tax.
On January 28, 1941, the taxpayer and his wife filed a claim for refund of $21,105.90, plus interest, on the ground that there had been an illegal assessment and collection since the revenue agents had “refused to allow the losses of one spouse against the gains of the other spouse in the joint return of husband and wife.” Reference was made to § 3313 of the Internal Revenue Code, specifying a four-year period of limitations. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected this claim in reliance upon § 322 (b) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1934 (the same as § 322 (b) (1) of the Code), establishing a two-year period of limitations; it was pointed out that § 3313 specifically excludes income taxes from those for which a claim may be filed within four years after payment.
On July 12, 1941, the taxpayer filed his individual claim for refund of $21,527.70 paid with respect to the year 1935. The claim was on the same grounds as the claim previously filed by the taxpayer and his wife. This claim was returned with the request that the wife join in the execution of the claim; this request was refused and the claim was returned to the Collector; once again the claim was returned to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer then brought this suit against the Collector to recover the amount alleged to be due in the refund claim. The District Court held that the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Lederer Terminal W. Co., 139 F. 2d 679, controlled the case and made it clear that the four-year period of § 3313 was applicable. Summary judgment was therefore entered for the taxpayer. 66 F. Supp. 258. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam, 160 F. 2d 104, citing its previous decision in the Lederer Terminal case.
For reasons which we have set forth in Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., ante, p. 524, the decision below cannot stand. The two-year period provided by § 322 (b) (1), rather than the four-year period of § 3313, governs income tax refund claims. The overpayment which brings § 322 (b) (1) into operation occurs whenever the taxpayer has paid an amount over and above his true liability. Hence, if we assume that the deficiency assessment and collection in this case were without legal authority, the taxpayer’s payment of that illegal assessment was an overpayment within the meaning of § 322 (b) (1). And he had two years from the date of that payment within which to file a claim for refund. Since he did not file his claim until three and a half years after payment, the claim was out of time.
It may well be that the taxpayer’s refund claim was prompted by this Court’s decision in Helvering v. Janney, supra, which set aside the Treasury regulation upon which the deficiency assessment was based. That decision was rendered on December 9, 1940, and the taxpayer filed his first refund claim on January 28, 1941. But assuming that the Janney decision makes clear that the taxpayer here made an overpayment, the loss which he now suffers from an application of § 322 (b) (1) is a loss which is inherent in the application of any period of limitations. Such periods are established to cut off rights, justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted and they must be strictly adhered to by the judiciary. Rosenman v. United States, 323 U. S. 658, 661. Remedies for resulting inequities are to be provided by Congress, not the courts.
Moreover, it is not our province to speculate as to why Congress established a shorter period of limitations relative to the income tax than is the case of those taxes governed by § 3313. It is enough that § 322 (b) (1) creates a two-year period applicable to all income tax refund claims and that the claim in this case is of that type.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Appellant, along with other railroads, has for years engaged in the “roller lumber traffic” by performing intentionally delayed service in the transportation of lumber from the West Coast to market. Six roads so engaged have filed tariffs covering such services at the same rate as their fast freight, and the Interstate Commerce Commission now has such tariffs under investigation and consideration. Appellant, however, has refused to file a tariff covering such service but continues to handle roller lumber traffic on the same tariff as its fast freight.
The United States, at the instance of the Interstate Commerce Commission, sought and obtained a permanent injunction restraining appellant from performing its roller lumber traffic service until it publishes and files a tariff covering the same. The District Court found that appellant renders a 14-day delayed lumber service over a route ordinarily requiring from two to four days. The delay is accomplished by the holding of cars on sidings at certain points on its trunk lines awaiting diversion orders to move the shipment forward over the railroad’s regular service. This affords the shipper additional time to find a market for the lumber while it is in transit. This service, the District Court found, incurred additional “operational problems and costs” for appellant, including switching, siding, storage and “per diem cost for the use of foreign cars” not present in its fast freight service and not included in its published tariff. We agree with the District Court that such delayed service constitutes the furnishing of additional “privileges or facilities” under § 6 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, and, therefore, must be published and filed in its tariff. 49 U. S. C. § 6 (1). See Turner Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 271 U. S. 259, 262 (1926).
If and when appellant publishes and files such a tariff, as other roads have already done, the Commission can then consider the reasonableness and justness of appellant’s service in the light of that rate, giving due regard to any unjust or unreasonable preferences or advantages that might result to shippers or other roads should the same not be approved.
Affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by owners and operators of tobacco warehouses in Georgia to enjoin officials of Georgia from enforcing certain provisions of the Georgia Tobacco Identification Act. Ga. Laws 1960, No. 557, p. 214. A three-judge court was convened, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, and it granted the relief. 189 F. Supp. 54. The case is here by direct appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
The provisions of the Georgia Act that are challenged concern type 14 flue-cured leaf tobacco. It is defined in § 1 of the Act as “that flue-cured leaf tobacco grown in the traditional loose-leaf area which consists of the State[s] of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.” By § 13 (A) of the Act type 14 tobacco received in a warehouse for sale shall be marked with a “white sheet ticket.”
Sales at these warehouses are sales within the competence of Congress to regulate. As stated in Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 47: “In Georgia nearly one hundred per cent, of the tobacco so sold is purchased by extra-state purchasers. In markets where tobacco is sold to both interstate and intrastate purchasers it is not known, when the grower places his tobacco on the warehouse floor for sale, whether it is destined for interstate or intrastate commerce. Regulation to be effective, must, and therefore may constitutionally, apply to all sales."
Congress in 1935 enacted the Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 Stat. 731, 7 U. S. C. § 511, and in its declaration of purpose, § 2, 7 U. S. C. § 511a, stated:
. . the classification of tobacco according to type, grade, and other characteristics affects the prices received therefor by producers; without uniform standards of classification and inspection the evaluation of tobacco is susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control, and unreasonable fluctuations in prices and quality determinations occur which are detrimental to producers and persons handling tobacco in commerce; such fluctuations constitute a burden upon commerce and make the use of uniform standards of classification and inspection imperative for the protection of producers and others engaged in commerce and the public interest therein.” (Italics added.)
By § 511b the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized “to establish standards for tobacco by which its type, grade, size, condition, or other characteristics may be determined, which standards shall be the official standards of the United States . . . .” (Italics added.)
Detailed standards have been prescribed by the Secretary. As to the “type” of tobacco, the regulations state: “. . . Tobacco which has the same characteristics and corresponding qualities, colors, and lengths shall be treated as one type, regardless of any factors of historical or geographical nature which cannot be determined by an examination of the tobacco.” 7 CFR, 1961 Cum. Supp., § 29.1096. (Italics added.)
Type 14 is defined as “That type of flue-cured tobacco commonly known as Southern Flue-cured or New Belt of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, produced principally in the southern section of Georgia and to some extent in Florida and Alabama.” 7 CFR, 1961 Cum. Supp., § 29.1100. (Italics added.)
The regulations also provide that the classification of the tobacco by type be placed on a federal inspection certificate and announced at the time the lot is offered in the auction (7 CFR § 29.80, 7 CFR, 1961 Cum. Supp., § 29.1144) — an identification made by a blue ticket.
The question is whether the federal scheme of regulation has left room for Georgia to identify type 14 tobacco with a white tag when it is grown in Georgia, Florida, or Alabama.
It is earnestly argued that there is no conflict between Georgia’s regulation and the federal law, as all that Georgia requires is that type 14 tobacco, grown in Georgia, be labeled as such. In that connection it is pointed out that type 14 tobacco as defined by the federal regulations includes tobacco “produced principally” in Georgia, Florida, and Alabama and that labeling it by its geographical origin merely supplements the federal regulation and does not conflict with it.
We do not have here the question whether Georgia’s law conflicts with the federal law. Rather we have the question of pre-emption. Under the federal law there can be but one “official” standard — one that is “uniform” and that eliminates all confusion by classifying tobacco not by geographical origin but by its characteristics. In other words, our view is that Congress, in legislating concerning the types of tobacco sold at auction, preempted the field and left no room for any supplementary state regulation concerning those same types. As we have seen, the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act in § 2, 7 U. S. C. § 511a, says that “uniform standards of classification and inspection” are “imperative for the protection of producers and others engaged in commerce and the public interest therein.” The House Report No. 1102, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., reviewed at length the harm to growers that resulted from the absence of regulations governing the “grades” of tobacco sold on the auction market. “There are between 60 and 100 grades in a single type of tobacco, and it is not practical for a farmer to familiarize himself with the technical factors on which these grades are based . . . .” Id., p. 2. The need for “a definite standard” of grading, id., p. 2, or of “standard grades,” id., p. 4, was repeated over and again. The importance of a “standard grade” was emphasized in the debates on the floor of the House. Congressman Hancock stated that this legislation provided that tobacco on the auction market “would be inspected by competent judges of tobacco in Government employ and graded according to United States standards of quality . . . .” 79 Cong. Rec. 11870. Congressman Mitchell added that “Standard grades would serve as a guide to farmers in classifying their tobacco for market.” Id., 11878. The Senate Report No. 1211, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., based its approval of the bill on a report made by the Department of Agriculture. After stating that the purpose of the bill was to provide “uniform standards” for the protection of farmers, the report added: “The bill would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to establish standards for tobacco by which its type, grade, size, condition, or other characteristics may be determined, and the standards so established would be the official standards of the United States for such purpose.” Id., p. 1.
The Act, as we have seen, adopts that view by making the “type, grade, size, condition” given inspected tobacco “the official standards of the United States." § 3, 7 U. S. C. § 511b. The regulations are precise and unequivocal in saying what those “official standards” are. Among other things they say, as already noted, that tobacco “which has the same characteristics and corresponding qualities, colors, and lengths shall be treated as one type, regardless of any factors of historical or geographical nature which cannot be determined by an examination of the tobacco.” 7 CFR, 1961 Cum. Supp., § 29.1096. Tobacco is includable in type 14, regardless of where it may have been grown, provided it meets the specifications of that type.
We have then a case where the federal law excludes local regulation, even though the latter does no more than supplement the former. Under the definition of types or grades of tobacco and the labeling which the Federal Government has adopted, complementary state regulation is as fatal as state regulations which conflict with the federal scheme. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341, 346; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230; Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 543.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Whittaker concurs in the result.
Of the several infirmities which Georgia’s law is alleged to have, only one was reached by the lower court, namely, the constitutionality of the law in light of the requirements of the Commerce Clause. The complaint also challenged the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that it violated both the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plainly the case was one to be heard by a three-judge court. See Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73.
The manner of sale is described in Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 446; Gurrin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 7-8; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 800.
The court below stated:
“The Georgia statute defines Type 14 tobacco on the basis of geographical origin and upon no other basis. If it is grown in Georgia, it would be Type 14 under the Georgia law and be given a white tag; while if it came from the other side of the Savannah River in South Carolina it would not be Type 14 and would be given a blue tag. . . .
“Both the purpose and effect of the Georgia enactment were to make a distinction at the markets, by the color tags, between tobacco grown in Georgia and that grown elsewhere. The effect was to create a wide disparity of price between the two groups of tobacco, the Carolina growers receiving a much lower amount. This resulted in losses of business to the plaintiff warehousemen.” 189 F. Supp. 54, 59.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether an employer necessarily violates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k), when it pays pension benefits calculated in part under an accrual rule, applied only prior to the PDA, that gave less retirement credit for pregnancy leave than for medical leave generally. We hold there is no necessary violation; and the benefit calculation rule in this case is part of a bona fide seniority system under § 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2QQ0e-2(h), which insulates it from challenge.
I
Since 1914, AT&T Corporation (then American Telephone & Telegraph Company) and its Bell System Operating Companies, including Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (hereinafter, collectively, AT&T), have provided pensions and other benefits based on a seniority system that relies upon an employee’s term of employment, understood as the period of service at the company minus uncredited leave time.
In the 1960s and early to mid-1970s, AT&T employees on “disability” leave got full service credit for the entire periods of absence, but those who took “personal” leaves of absence received maximum service credit of 30 days. Leave for pregnancy was treated as personal, not disability. AT&T altered this practice in 1977 by adopting its Maternity Payment Plan (MPP), entitling pregnant employees to disability benefits and service credit for up to six weeks of leave. If the absence went beyond six weeks, however, it was treated as personal leave, with no further benefits or credit, whereas employees out on disability unrelated to pregnancy continued to receive full service credit for the duration of absence. This differential treatment of pregnancy leave, under both the pre-1977 plan and the MPP, was lawful: in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), this Court concluded that a disability-benefits plan excluding disabilities related to pregnancy was not sex-based discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by passing the PDA, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(k), which superseded Gilbert so as to make it “clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions.” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 684 (1983). On April 29, 1979, the effective date of the PDA, AT&T adopted its Anticipated Disability Plan which replaced the MPP and provided service credit for pregnancy leave on the same basis as leave taken for other temporary disabilities. AT&T did not, however, make any retroactive adjustments to the service credit calculations of women who had been subject to the pre-PDA personnel policies.
Pour of those women are named respondents in this case. Each of them received less service credit for pregnancy leave than she would have accrued on the same leave for disability: seven months less for Noreen Hulteen; about six months for Eleanora Collet; and about two for Elizabeth Snyder and Linda Porter. Respondents Hulteen, Collet, and Snyder have retired from AT&T; respondent Porter has yet to. If her total term of employment had not been decreased due to her pregnancy leave, each would be entitled to a greater pension benefit.
Eventually, each of the individual respondents and respondent Communications Workers of America (CWA), the collective-bargaining representative for the majority of AT&T’s nonmanagement employees, filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy in violation of Title VII. In 1998, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that AT&T had discriminated against respondent Hulteen and “a class of other similarly-situated female employees whose adjusted [commencement of service] date has been used to determine eligibility for a service or disability pension, the amount of pension benefits, and eligibility for certain other benefits and programs, including early retirement offerings.” App. 54-55. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue to each named respondent and the CWA (collectively, Hulteen), and Hulteen filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
On dueling motions for summary judgment, the District Court held itself bound by a prior Ninth Circuit decision, Pallas v. Pacific Bell, 940 F. 2d 1324 (1991), which found a Title VII violation where post-PDA retirement eligibility calculations incorporated pre-PDA accrual rules that differentiated on the basis of pregnancy. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 121a-122a. The Circuit, en bane, affirmed and held that Pallas’s conclusion that “calculation of service credit excluding time spent on pregnancy leave violates Title VII was, and is, correct.” 498 F. 3d 1001, 1003 (2007).
The Ninth Circuit’s decision directly conflicts with the holdings of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits that reliance on a pre-PDA differential accrual rule to determine pension benefits does not constitute a current violation of Title VII. See Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers of Am., 220 F. 3d 814 (CA7 2000) (finding no actionable Title VII violation given the existence of a bona fide seniority system); Leffman v. Sprint Corp., 481 F. 3d 428 (CA6 2007) (characterizing claim as challenging the continuing effects of past discrimination rather than alleging a current Title VII violation). We granted certiorari in order to resolve this split, 554 U. S. 916 (2008), and now reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
II
Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice” for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l). Generally, a claim under Title VII must be filed “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” §2000e-5(e)(1). In this case, Hulteen has identified the challenged practice as applying the terms of AT&T’s seniority system to calculate and pay pension benefits to women who took pregnancy leaves before April 29, 1979. She says the claim is timely because the old service credit differential for pregnancy leave was carried forward through the system’s calculations so as to produce an effect in the amount of the benefit when payments began.
There is no question that the payment of pension benefits in this case is a function of a seniority system, given the fact that calculating benefits under the pension plan depends in part on an employee’s term of employment. As we have said, “[a] ‘seniority system’ is a scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-‘seniority’ criteria, allots to employees ever improving employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employment increase.” California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598, 605-606 (1980) (footnote omitted). Hulteen is also undoubtedly correct that AT&T’s personnel policies affecting the calculation of any employee’s start date should be considered “ancillary rules” and elements of the system, necessary for it to operate at all, being rules that “define which passages of time will ‘count’ towards the accrual of seniority and which will not.” Id., at 607.
But contrary to Hulteen’s position, establishing the continuity of a seniority system whose results depend in part on obsolete rules entailing disadvantage to once-pregnant employees does not resolve this case. Although adopting a service credit rule unfavorable to those out on pregnancy leave would violate Title VII today, a seniority system does not necessarily violate the statute when it gives current effect to such rules that operated before the PDA. “[S]eniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII,” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 81 (1977), reflecting Congress’s understanding that their stability is valuable in its own right. Hence, § 703(h): Benefit differentials produced by a bona fide seniority-based pension plan are permitted unless they are “the result of an intention to discriminate.” Ibid.
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(h).
In Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), advantages of a seniority system flowed disproportionately to white, as against minority, employees, because of an employer’s prior discrimination in job assignments. We recognized that this “disproportionate distribution of advantages does in a very real sense operate to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices[, b]ut both the literal terms of § 703(h) and the legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a measure of immunity to them.” Id., at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he unmistakable purpose of § 703(h) was to make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII.” Id., at 352. The seniority system in Teamsters exemplified a bona fide system without any discriminatory terms (the discrimination having occurred in executive action hiring employees and assigning jobs), so that the Court could conclude that the system “did not have its genesis in ... discrimination, and ... has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.” Id., at 356.
AT&T’s system must also be viewed as bona fide, that is, as a system that has no discriminatory terms, with the consequence that subsection (h) controls the result here, just as in Teamsters. It is true that in this case the pre-April 29, 1979, rule of differential treatment was an element of the seniority system itself; but it did not taint the system under the terms of subsection (h), because this Court held in Gilbert that an accrual rule limiting the seniority credit for time taken for pregnancy leave did not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of sex. As a matter of law, at that time, “an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage [was] not a gender-based discrimination at all.” 429 U. S., at 136. Although the PDA would have made it discriminatory to continue the accrual policies of the old rule, AT&T amended that rule as of the effective date of the Act, April 29,1979; the new one, treating pregnancy and other temporary disabilities the same way, remains a part of AT&T’s seniority system today.
This account of litigation, legislation, and the evolution of the system’s terms is the answer to Hulteen’s argument that Teamsters supports her position. She correctly points out that a “seniority system that perpetuates the effects of preAct discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent to discriminate entered into its very adoption,” 431 U. S., at 346, n. 28, and she would characterize AT&T’s seniority system as intentionally discriminatory, on the theory that the accrual rule for pregnancy leave was facially discriminatory from the start. She claims further support from Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187 (1991), in which we said that “explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination,” and that such facial discrimination is intentional discrimination even if not based on any underlying malevolence. Id., at 199. Hulteen accordingly claims that the superseded differential affecting current benefits was, and remains, “discriminatory in precisely the way the PDA prohibits,” Brief for Respondents 18.
But Automobile Workers is not on point. The policy in that case, prohibiting women from working in jobs with lead exposure unless they could show themselves incapable of childbearing, was put in place after the PDA became law and under its terms was facially discriminatory. In this case, however, AT&T’s intent when it adopted the pregnancy leave rule (before the PDA) was to give differential treatment that as a matter of law, as Gilbert held, was not gender-based discrimination. Because AT&T’s differential accrual rule was therefore a permissible differentiation given the law at the time, there was nothing in the seniority system at odds with the subsection (h) bona fide requirement. The consequence is that subsection (h) is as applicable here as it was in Teamsters, and the calculations of credited service that determine pensions are the results of a permissibly different standard under subsection (h) today.
The only way to conclude here that the subsection would not support the application of AT&T’s system would be to read the PDA as applying retroactively to recharacterize the acts as having been illegal when done, contra Gilbert. But this is not a serious possibility. As we have said:
“Because it accords with widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations. Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the eountervailing benefits.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 272-273 (1994).
There is no such clear intent here, indeed, no indication at all that Congress had retroactive application in mind; the evidence points the other way. Congress provided for the PDA to take effect on the date of enactment, except in its application to certain benefit programs, as to which effectiveness was held back 180 days. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, §2(b), 92 Stat. 2076, note following 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The House Report adverted to these benefit schemes:
“As the Gilbert decision permits employers to exclude pregnancy-related coverage from employee benefit plans, [the bill] provides for [a] transition period of 180 days to allow employees [sic] to comply with the explicit provisions of this amendment. It is the committee’s intention to provide for an orderly and equitable transition, with the least disruption for employers and employees, consistent with the purposes of the bill.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-948, p. 8 (1978).
This is the language of prospective intent, not retrospective revision.
Hulteen argues that she nonetheless has a challenge to AT&T’s current payment of pension benefits under § 706(e)(2) of Title VII, believing (again mistakenly) that this subsection affects the validity of any arrangement predating the PDA that would be facially discriminatory if instituted today. Brief for Respondents 27-29. Section 706(e)(2) provides that
“an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this sub-chapter (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision), when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or provision of the system.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(2).
But, as the text makes clear, this subsection determines the moments at which a seniority system violates Title VII only if it is a system “adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this subchapter.” As discussed above, the Court has unquestionably held that the feature of AT&T’s seniority system at issue was not discriminatory when adopted, let alone intentionally so in violation of this subchapter. That leaves § 706(e)(2) without any application here.
It is equally unsound for Hulteen to argue that when she retired AT&T could have chosen to give post-PDA credit to pre-PDA pregnancy leave, making its failure to do so facially discriminatory at that time. If a choice to rely on a favorable statute turned every past differentiation into contemporary discrimination, subsection (h) would never apply.
Hulteen’s remaining argument (as of the time the case was submitted to us) is that our decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (1986) (per curiam), is on her side. In Bazemore, black employees of the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, who received less pay than comparable whites under a differential compensation plan extending back to pre-Title VII segregation, brought suit in 1971 claiming that pay disparities persisted. Id., at 389-391 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). We concluded that “[a] pattern or practice that would have constituted a violation of Title VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective, became a violation upon Title VIPs effective date, and to the extent an employer continued to engage in that act or practice, it is liable under that statute.” Id., at 395.
Bazemore has nothing to say here. To begin with, it did not involve a seniority system subject to subsection (h); rather, the employer in Bazemore had a racially based pay structure under which black employees were paid less than white employees. Further, after Title VII became law, the employer failed to eliminate the discriminatory practice, even though the new statute had turned what once was legally permissible into something unlawful. Bazemore would be on point only if, after the PDA, AT&T continued to apply an unfavorable credit differential for pregnancy leave simply because it had begun to do that before the PDA. AT&T’s system, by contrast, provides future benefits based on past, completed events, that were entirely lawful at the time they occurred.
Ill
We have accepted supplemental briefing after the argument on the possible effect on this case of the recent amendment to § 706(e) of Title VII, adopted in response to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U. S. 618 (2007), and dealing specifically with discrimination in compensation: Hulteen argues that payment of the pension benefits at issue in this case marks the moment at which she “is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,” and she reads the statute as providing that such a “decision or other practice” may not be applied to her disadvantage.
“For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.” Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-2, §3,123 Stat. 5-6.
But the answer to this claim is essentially the same as the answer to Hulteen’s argument that § 706(e)(2) helps her, supra, at 713-714. For the reasons already discussed, AT&T’s pre-PDA decision not to award Hulteen service credit for pregnancy leave was not discriminatory, with the consequence that Hulteen has not been “affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.” §3, 123 Stat. 6.
IV
Bona fide seniority systems allow, among other things, for predictable financial consequences, both for the employer who pays the bill and for the employee who gets the benefit. Cf. Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U. S. 739, 743 (2004) (noting that the central feature of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., is its “object of protecting employees’ justified expectations of receiving the benefits their employers promise them”). As § 703(h) demonstrates, Congress recognized the salience of these reliance interests and, where not based upon or resulting from an intention to discriminate, gave them protection. Because the seniority system run by AT&T is bona fide, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
In 1982, a consent decree and modified final judgment (MFJ) were entered to resolve the Government’s antitrust suit against American Telephone & Telegraph Company. The MFJ resulted in the breakup of American Telephone & Telegraph and the divestiture of the local Bell System Operating Companies, including Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (PT&T). Many employees of the former Bell System Operating Companies became employees of the new AT&T Corporation. The Plan of Reorganization, approved by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, aff’d sub nom. California v. United States, 464 U. S. 1013 (1983), provided that “all employees will carry with them all pre-divestiture Bell System service regardless of the organizational unit or corporation by which they are employed immediately after divestiture.” App. 54. Respondents in this case were employed at PT&T. After the divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies in 1984, these women became employees of AT&T Corporation and their service calculations, as computed by PT&T under its accrual rules, were carried over to AT&T Corporation.
AT&T’s calculation of a term of employment is a more complicated endeavor, requiring the creation and maintenance of an individual “start date” for each employee, which is adjusted based on the relevant leave policy.
Section 701(k) of Title VII provides that “women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section [703(h)] of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k). Hulteen contends that, in light of this language, § 703(h) does not apply at all to claims of fringe-benefit discrimination under the PDA. We cannot agree. Hulteen’s reading would result in the odd scenario that pregnancy discrimination, alone among all categories of discrimination (race, color, religion, other sex-based claims, and national origin), would receive dispensation from the general application of subsection (h).
A better explanation is that § 701(k) refers only to the final sentence of § 703(h), which reads that “[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subehapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). This final sentence of subsection (h), referred to as the Bennett Amendment, served to reconcile the Equal Pay Act of 1963,77 Stat. 56,29 U. S. C. § 206(d), with Title VII. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 194 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), this Court had concluded that the amendment permitted wage discrimination based on pregnancy. Id., at 144-145. By adding the language, “nothing in section [703(h)] of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise,” to the PDA, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(k), Congress wanted to ensure that, in addition to replacing Gilbert with a rule that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination, it foreclosed the possibility that this Court’s interpretation of the Bennett Amendment could be construed, going forward, to permit wage discrimination based on pregnancy.
Gilbert recognized that differential treatment could still represent intentionally discriminatory treatment if pretextual, 429 U. S., at 136, and that a forbidden discriminatory effect could result if a disability-benefits plan produced overall preferential treatment for one sex, id,., at 138. Neither theory is advanced here.
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136 (1977), we reaffirmed our holding in Gilbert that Title VII “did not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other ‘because of their differing roles in “the scheme of human existence.’”” Id., at 142 (quoting Gilbert, supra, at 139, n. 17). But we noted that Gilberts holding did not extend to “permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their different role.” Satty, supra, at 142. Cancellation of benefits previously accrued, therefore, was considered facially violative at the time, but such a situation is not presented here.
Although certain Courts of Appeals had previously concluded that treating pregnancy leave less favorably than other disability leave constituted sex discrimination under Title VII, this Court in Gilbert clearly rejected that conclusion, 429 U. S., at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id., at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Gilbert declared the meaning and scope of sex discrimination under Title VII and held that previous views to the contrary were wrong as a matter of law. And “[a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 312-313 (1994); see also id., at 313, n. 12. It is therefore to no avail to argue that the pregnancy leave cap was unlawful before Gilbert and that the PDA returned the law to its prior state.
In so saying, we assume that § 701(k) has no application, as explained in footnote 3, supra. Cf. post, at 720-721 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
To the extent Hulteen means to claim, as a factual matter, that the accrual rule was merely advisory, requiring a fresh choice to apply it in the benefit context, she points to nothing in the record supporting such a proposition.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Reed
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark concurred.
Review was sought in this case to determine whether there had been a violation by Texas of petitioner’s federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial grand jury. The federal question was raised by a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that petitioner, a Negro, suffered unconstitutional discrimination through the selection of white men only for the grand jury that indicted him. After full hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and this action was sustained by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in affirming petitioner’s conviction. Cassell v. State, 154 Tex. Cr. R. -, 216 S. W. 2d 813.
The Court of Criminal Appeals accepted the federal rule that a Negro is denied the equal protection of the laws when he is indicted by a grand jury from which Negroes as a race have been intentionally excluded. Cassell v. State, supra, 154 Tex. Cr. R. at -, 216 S. W. 2d at 819; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 394; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404; Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403. It was from an examination of facts that the court deduced its conclusion that racial discrimination had not been practiced. Since the result reached may deny a federal right, we may reexamine the facts to determine whether petitioner has sustained by proof his allegation of discrimination. Certiorari was granted (336 U. S. 943) to consider petitioner’s claim that in this case Negroes were omitted from the list of grand jurymen either because of deliberate limitation by the Dallas County jury commissioners, or because of failure by the commissioners to acquaint themselves with available Negroes.
Acting under the Texas statutes, the Dallas County grand-jury commissioners chose a list of sixteen males for this September 1947 grand jury from citizens eligible under the statute. The judge chose twelve of these for the panel. No challenge is now made to the fairness of this statutory system. We have approved it.
Petitioner’s attack is upon the way the statutory method of grand-jury selection has been administered by the jury commissioners. One charge is that discrimination must have been practiced because the Negro proportion of grand jurors is less than the Negro proportion of the county’s population. Under the 1940 census the total population of Dallas County was 398,564, of whom 61,605 were Negroes. This is about 15.5%. In weighing this matter of custom, we limit ourselves, as do the parties, to the period between June 1, 1942, when Hill v. Texas, supra, was decided, and November 1947, when petitioner was indicted. There were 21 grand juries in this period; of the 252 members of the panels, 17, or 6.7%, were Negroes. But this apparent discrepancy may be explained by the fact that Texas grand jurors must possess certain statutory qualifications. Grand jurors must ordinarily be eligible to vote; eligibility requires payment of a poll tax; and the validity of the poll-tax requirement is not challenged. The record shows 5,500 current Negro poll-tax payers in Dallas County in 1947, and nothing indicates that this number varied substantially from year to year. The corresponding figure for all poll-tax payers, male and female, is 83,667. These figures would indicate that as a proportional matter 6.5% of grand jurors would be Negroes, a percentage approximating the ratio of Negroes actually sitting on the 21 grand jury panels. Without more it cannot be said that Negroes had been left off grand-jury panels to such a degree as to establish a prima jade case of discrimination.
A different question is presented by petitioner’s next charge that subsequent to the Hill case the Dallas County grand-jury commissioners for 21 consecutive lists had consistently limited Negroes selected for grand-jury service to not more than one on each grand jury. The contention is that the Akins case has been interpreted in Dallas County to allow a limitation of the number of Negroes on each grand jury, provided the limitation is approximately proportional to the number of Negroes eligible for grand-jury service. Since the Hill case the judges of the trial court have been careful to instruct their jury commissioners that discrimination on grounds of race or color is forbidden. The judge did so here. If, notwithstanding this caution by the trial court judges, commissioners should limit proportionally the number of Negroes selected for grand-jury service, such limitation would violate our Constitution. Jurymen should be selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race.
We have recently written why proportional representation of races on a jury is not a constitutional requisite. Succinctly stated, our reason was that the Constitution requires only a fair jury selected without regard to race. Obviously the number of races and nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our citizens would make it impossible to meet a requirement of proportional representation. Similarly, since there can be no exclusion of Negroes as a race and no discrimination because of color, proportional limitation is not permissible. That conclusion is compelled by the United States Code, Title 18,' § 243, based on § 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. While the language of the section directs attention to the right to serve as a juror, its command has long been recognized also to assure rights to an accused. Prohibiting racial disqualification of Negroes for jury service, this congressional enactment under the Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, has been consistently sustained and its violation held to deny a proper trial to a Negro accused. Proportional racial limitation is therefore forbidden. An accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion because of race.
Our holding that there was discrimination in the selection of grand jurors in this case, however, is based on another ground. In explaining the fact that no Negroes appeared on this grand-jury list, the commissioners said that they knew none available who qualified; at the same time they said they chose jurymen only from those people with whom they were personally acquainted. It may be assumed that in ordinary activities in Dallas County, acquaintanceship between the races is not on a sufficiently familiar basis to give citizens eligible for appointment as jury commissioners an opportunity to know the qualifications for grand-jury service of many members of another race. An individual’s qualifications for grand-jury service, however, are not hard to ascertain, and with no evidence to the contrary, we must assume that a large proportion of the Negroes of Dallas County met the statutory requirements for jury service. When the commissioners were appointed as judicial administrative officials, it was their duty to familiarize themselves fairly with the qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race and color. They did not do so here, and the result has been racial discrimination. We repeat the recent statement of Chief Justice Stone in Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404:
“Discrimination can arise from the action of commissioners who exclude all negroes whom they do not know to be qualified and who neither know nor seek to learn whether there are in fact any qualified to serve. In such a case, discrimination necessarily results where there are qualified negroes available for jury service. With the large number of colored male residents of the county who are literate, and in the absence of any countervailing testimony, there is no room for inference that there are not among them householders of good moral character, who can read and write, qualified and available for grand jury service.”
The existence of the kind of discrimination described in the Hill case does not depend upon systematic exclusion continuing over a long period and practiced by a succession of jury commissioners. Since the issue must be whether there has been discrimination in the selection of the jury that has indicted petitioner, it is enough to have direct evidence based on the statements of the jury commissioners in the very case. Discrimination may be proved in other ways than by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence of Negroes from many panels. The statements of the jury commissioners that they chose only whom they knew, and that they knew no eligible Negroes in an area where Negroes made up so large a proportion of the population, prove the intentional exclusion that is discrimination in violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
whom
Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Minton join, concurring in the judgment.
It has been settled law since 1880 that the Civil War Amendments barred the States from discriminating because of race in the selection of juries, whether grand or petty. As a result, a conviction cannot stand which is based on an indictment found by a grand jury from which Negroes were kept because of discrimination. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354. We ought not to reverse a course of decisions of long standing directed against racial discrimination in the administration of justice. But discrimination in this context means purposeful, systematic non-inclusion because of color. Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400. It does not mean an absence of proportional representation of the various racial components of the relevant political unit from which a grand jury is drawn or an isolated instance of disparity among such components. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403; Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 284. Assuming that the grand-jury pool fairly enough reflects the racial composition of the community, there is no basis for a claim of constitutional discrimination if without design it comes to pass that a particular grand jury has no representation of a particular race. The Civil War Amendments did not deprive the States of their power to define qualifications for grand-jury service relevant to the functions of a grand jury, nor did they turn matters that are inherently incommensurable into mere matters of arithmetic. The Constitution has not withdrawn the administration of criminal justice, of which the jury system is a part, from the States. It does command that no State purposefully make jury service turn on color.
A claim that the constitutional prohibition of discrimination was disregarded calls for ascertainment of two kinds of issues which ought not to be confused by being compendiously called “facts.” The demonstrable, outward events by which a grand jury came into being raise issues quite different from the fair inferences to be drawn from what took place in determining the constitutional question: was there a purposeful non-inclusion of Negroes because of race or a merely symbolic representation, not the operation of an honest exercise of relevant judgment or the uncontrolled caprices of chance?
This Court does not sit as a jury to weigh conflicting evidence on underlying details, as for instance what steps were taken to make up the jury list, why one person was rejected and another taken, whether names were picked blindly or chosen by judgment. This is not the place for disputation about what really happened. On that we accept the findings of the State court. But it is for this Court to define the constitutional standards by which those findings are to be judged. Thereby the duty of securing observance of these standards may fall upon this Court. The meaning of uncontrovertible facts in relation to the ultimate issue of discrimination is precisely the constitutional issue on which this Court must pass. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50-51. Of course even as to this, as always when a State court judgment is claimed to be in disregard of the Constitution, appropriate respect should be given to the judgment of the State court. And so we are brought to this case.
If the record here showed no more than that the grand-jury commissioners had considered the Negroes with whom they were acquainted — just as they considered white persons whom they knew — and had found them to be either unqualified for grand-jury service or qualified but unavailable, and did so not designedly to exclude Negroes, the State court’s validation of the local procedure would have to prevail. We ought not to go behind such a conscientious process, however rough and ready the procedure of selection by jury commissioners. To find in such honest even if pragmatic selection of grand jurors the operation of unconstitutional standards would turn this Court into an agency for supervising the criminal procedure of the forty-eight States. Such an assumption of authority by this Court would jeopardize the practical functioning of grand juries throughout the country in view of the great variety of minority groups that compose our society.
A different situation would be presented by an unquestioned showing that jury commissioners had such a limited personal knowledge of potentially qualified Negro jurors that their purposeful limitation of choice to the negligibly few Negroes known to them would inevitably imply designed exclusion of eligible Negroes. The record here affords no basis whatever for such a finding. It indicates the contrary.
The record does disclose stark facts requiring reversal on a very different basis. If one factor is uniform in a continuing series of events that are brought to pass through human intervention, the law would have to have the blindness of indifference rather than the blindness of impartiality not to attribute the uniform factor to man’s purpose. The purpose may not be of evil intent or in conscious disregard of what is conceived to be a binding duty. Prohibited conduct may result from misconception of what duty requires. Such misconception I believe to be the real situation on the record before us.
The governing facts are briefly stated. In Hill v. Texas, supra, this Court found discrimination in the selection of grand jurors in Dallas County, Texas, by virtue of the fact that, despite a large number of Negroes qualified for grand-jury service, none had been drawn. In the course of the five and a half years between that decision and the time of the drawing of the grand jury which found the indictment now challenged, there were twenty-one grand-jury panels. On each of these twenty-one consecutive panels there was never more than one Negro. This selection was made from lists which were not the result of a drawing of lots but the personal choice of the grand-jury commissioners. The available evidence clearly indicates that no more than one Negro was chosen by the commissioners for each of the twenty-one lists. Only one Negro was placed on the list — he did not serve on the panel — for the second grand jury in Dallas County after the decision in Hill v. Texas. Again, as to the grand jury which figured in Akins v. Texas, supra, only one Negro was placed on the list, and he served as a grand juror. 325 U. S. at 405. And in Weems v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 154, 157, 185 S. W. 2d 431, 433, it was stipulated that only one Negro, who did not serve on the panel, was on the list. In the present case it is conceded that no Negro was placed on the list. The State makes no contrary claim as to any of the other grand-jury lists though the facts regarding them are peculiarly within the State’s knowledge. In view of this background, the assumption that more than one Negro was placed on the lists is inconceivable.
To assume that the commissioners did tender to the judges lists containing more than one Negro would lead inescapably to the conclusion that the judges systematically discriminated against Negroes. This is so because it just does not happen that from lists of sixteen it is always Negroes (barring one) that judges unpurposefully reject. I cannot attribute such discrimination to the trial judges of Dallas County. I can decline to attribute such discrimination to these judges only by concluding that the judges were never given the opportunity to select more than one Negro.
The grand-jury commissioners here received instructions from the judge not to “discriminate,” and I have no doubt that they tried conscientiously to abide by them. The difficulty lies in what they conceived to be the standard for determining discrimination, as revealed by their action. The number of Negroes both qualified and available for jury service in Dallas County precluded such uniform presence of never more than one Negro on any other basis of good faith than that the commissioners were guided by the belief that one Negro on the grand jury satisfied the prohibition against discrimination in Hill v. Texas. That this was their view is compelled by their testimony at the hearing on the motion to quash the indictment.
This is of course a misconception. The prohibition of the Constitution against discrimination because of color does not require in and of itself the presence of a Negro on a jury. But neither is it satisfied by Negro representation arbitrarily limited to one. It is not a question of presence on a grand jury nor absence from it. The basis of selection cannot consciously take color into account. Such is the command of the Constitution. Once that restriction upon the State’s freedom in devising and administering its jury system is observed, the States are masters in their own household. If it is observed, they cannot be charged with discrimination because of color, no matter what the composition of a grand jury may turn out to be..
On this record I cannot escape the conclusion that the judgment below is not based on an allowable finding of facts behind which this Court cannot go. It derives from the ultimate constitutional significance of undisputed facts. These bear no other rational meaning than purposeful discrimination. It does not neutralize the discrimination that it may well have been due to a misconception by the grand-jury commissioners of the requirements of this Court’s decisions.
This compels reversal of the judgment.
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 590; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 358; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130; Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 272.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Vernon, 1948), Arts. 333-340.
Id., Art. 338. Under the Texas Constitution and statutes, women may not serve on Texas juries. Texas Constitution, Art. 5, § 13; Harper v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 252, 234 S. W. 909.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Vernon, 1948):
“Art. 339. . . . No person shall be selected or serve as a grand juror who does not possess the following qualifications:
“1. He must be a citizen of the State, and of the county in which he is to serve, and qualified under the Constitution and laws to vote in said county; but, whenever it shall be made to appear to the court that the requisite number of jurors who have paid their poll taxes can not be found within the county, the court shall not regard the payment of poll taxes as a qualification for service as a juror.
“2. He must be a freeholder within the State, or a householder within the county.
“3. He must be of sound mind and good moral character.
“4. He must be able to read and write.
“5. He must not have been convicted of any felony.
“6. He must not be under indictment or other legal accusation for theft or of any felony.”
Id,., Art. 357.
Smith v. Texas, supra, p. 130. See Zimmerman v. State, 59 A. 2d 675, 676-77, affirmed under title Zimmerman v. Maryland, 336 U. S. 901; Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 266, 272; Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, Part II, 10 Ore. L. Rev. 217, 226-239.
There is no suggestion in the case that any judge of the county trial courts discriminated against Negroes in his selection from the lists of the members for the grand juries.
Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population, Volume II, Part 6, p. 795.
We use the word “panel” to mean the grand jury which is the final result of the statutory procedure. See Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 360. The record does not indicate the number of Negroes who were placed on the lists of sixteen, but did not serve. All that appears in this connection is that no Negroes were placed on the list in this case.
See note 4, supra.
Texas Constitution, Art. 6, §2; Vernon’s Texas Statutes, 1948, Art. 2955; Conklin v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 210, 162 S. W. 2d 416.
There is some obscurity in the record as to whether the above figure of Negro poll-tax payers refers to males only or to men and women. 154 Tex. Cr. R. -, -, -, 216 S. W. 2d 813, 816, 819. The testimony and the statistics in the briefs cause us to conclude that the figure refers to all eligible Negro voters.
Texas Almanac, 1947-1948, p. 421.
In our computations we have used statistics which include both men and women, because in many cases statistical breakdowns in terms of sex are not available. Although only men may serve on the grand juries, the use of totals including both sexes should make for only minor variations in the percentages.
Compare Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 591; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 361; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 129; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 401-403.
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 404.
Cassell v. State, 154 Tex. Cr. R. -, 216 S. W. 2d 813.
Akins v. Texas, supra, 403.
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 394; Akins v. Texas, supra, 404.
“No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000.”
“Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
See Neal v. Delaware, supra, 385, 386; Hill v. Texas, supra, 404; Fay v. New York, supra, 284.
One commissioner said: “I was not personally acquainted with any negro citizen of Dallas County that I thought was qualified to sit on the Grand Jury, at that time. I did not know a one personally that I would recommend, myself, at that time.
"... The reason that I did not submit the name of a negro in my 6 names that I submitted was because I did not know any negro citizen that I felt was qualified with reference to education and business ability to serve on this Grand Jury.”
Another said:
“We did not select a negro when I served as a Commissioner; we did disregard color, race or creed; I did not know plenty of negroes that I said would be qualified. I know a lot of negroes that are qualified lawyers, doctors, Superintendents of Schools and that sort of thing but the particular thing is that their occupation precludes their serving. You could not ask a doctor or lawyer to serve 3 months of their time, either white or colored; that limited us as to the number that we could select. I knew a lot of white and colored people that were qualified.
“I did not select a negro on this Grand Jury Panel but I tried.” This commissioner had sought a Negro High School Principal for the list.
The third said: “The reason a negro was not selected was not because we discriminated; I only appointed those that I personally knew to be qualified.
“If the name of any qualified negro citizen — been submitted at that time, who had given his permission and said that he had time to serve, I certainly would have submitted his name along with the other 15 names, if it was somebody that would have been acceptable to me.”
See Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 339, 355.
In large centers methods of selection other than personal acquaintanceship have been found convenient. Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261.
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 360.
Smith v. Texas, supra, 131-132. There was a further discussion of the duty of jury commissioners to familiarize themselves with jury eligibles in Hill v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 415, 418, 157 S. W. 2d 369, 371. The commissioners’ lack of acquaintance with available Negroes was not deemed sufficient by the state court to justify reversal. We disagreed and reversed. 316 U. S. 400.
1 use the term “panel,” as does Mr. Justice Reed in his opinion, to mean the grand jury of twelve selected from the list of sixteen persons tendered to the judge by the grand-jury commissioners.
The following is a fair compilation of the testimony of the three grancl-jury commissioners on this point:
“. . . it was discussed in the Jury Room [among] we Commissioners that an effort had been made to secure a negro for the Grand Jury . . . .”
“The reason that a negro was not put on this Grand Jury Panel was not because I had not made an effort to secure one . . . .”
“I did not select a negro on this Grand Jury Panel but I tried.” "As far as I know, there was not a negro on the October, 1947, Term of Grand Jury; I have never seen them in a body. When the information came to me I tried to contact a negro . . . .”
“The reason a negro was not selected was not because we discriminated . . . .”
“If the name of any qualified negro citizen [had] been submitted at that time, who had given his permission and said that he had time to serve, I certainly would have submitted his name along with the other 15 names, if it was somebody that would have been acceptable to me.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), we gave a negative answer to this question:
“May a State appellate court refuse to provide counsel to brief and argue an indigent criminal defendant’s first appeal as of right on the basis of a conclusory statement by the appointed attorney on appeal that the case has no merit and that he will file no brief?” Brief for Petitioner in Anders v. California, O. T. 1966, No. 98, p. 2.
The question presented by this case is remarkably similar and therefore requires a similar answer.
I
Petitioner is indigent. After a trial in the Montgomery County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas, he and two codefendants were found guilty of several serious crimes. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 to 28 years. On January 8, 1985, new counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal. Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal.
On June 2, 1986, petitioner’s appellate counsel filed with the Montgomery County, Ohio, Court of Appeals a document captioned “Certification of Meritless Appeal and Motion.” Excluding this caption and the certificate evidencing its service on the prosecutor’s office and petitioner, the document in its entirety read as follows:
“Appellant’s attorney respectfully certifies to the Court that he has carefully reviewed the within record on appeal, that he has found no errors requiring reversal, modification and/or vacation of appellant’s jury trial convictions and/or the trial court’s sentence in Case No. 84-CR-1056, that he has found no errors requiring reversal, modification and/or vacation of appellant’s jury trial convictions and/or the trial court’s sentence in Case No. 84-CR-1401, and that he will not file a meritless appeal in this matter.
“MOTION
“Appellant’s attorney respectfully requests a Journal Entry permitting him to withdraw as appellant’s appellate attorney of record in this appeal thereby relieving appellant’s attorney of any further responsibility to prosecute this appeal with the attorney/client relationship terminated effective on the date file-stamped on this Motion.” App. 35-36.
A week later, the Court of Appeals entered an order allowing appellate counsel to withdraw and granting petitioner 30 days in which to file.an appellate brief pro se. Id., at 37. The order further specified that the court would thereafter “independently review the record thoroughly to determine whether any error exists requiring reversal or modification of the sentence . . . .” Ibid. Thus, counsel was permitted to withdraw before the court reviewed the record on nothing more than “a conclusory statement by the appointed attorney on appeal that the case has no merit and that he will file no brief.” Moreover, although granting petitioner several extensions of time to file a brief, the court denied petitioner’s request for the appointment of a new attorney. No merits brief was filed on petitioner’s behalf.
In due course, and without the assistance of any advocacy for petitioner, the Court of Appeals made its own examination of the record to determine whether petitioner received “a fair trial and whether any grave or prejudicial errors occurred therein.” Id., at 40. As an initial matter, the court noted that counsel’s certification that the appeal was meritless was “highly questionable.” Ibid. In reviewing the record and the briefs filed by counsel on behalf of petitioner’s codefendants, the court found “several arguable claims.” Id., at 41. Indeed, the court concluded that plain error had been committed in the jury instructions concerning one count. The court therefore reversed petitioner’s conviction and sentence on that count but affirmed the convictions and sentences on the remaining counts. It concluded that petitioner “suffered no prejudice” as a result of “counsel’s failure to give a more conscientious examination of the record” because the court had thoroughly examined the record and had received the benefit of arguments advanced by counsel for petitioner’s two codefendants. Ibid. Petitioner appealed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal. Id., at 45. We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 1059 (1988), and now reverse.
II
Approximately a quarter of a century ago, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), this Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal appellant the right to counsel on a first appeal as of right. We held that a procedure in which appellate courts review the record and “appoint counsel if in their opinion” the assistance of counsel “would be helpful to the defendant or the court,” id., at 355, is an inadequate substitute for guaranteed representation. Four years later, in Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), we held that a criminal appellant may not be denied representation on appeal based on appointed counsel’s bare assertion that he or she is of the opinion that there is no merit to the appeal.
The Anders opinion did, however, recognize that in some circumstances counsel may withdraw without denying the indigent appellant fair representation provided that certain safeguards are observed: Appointed counsel is first required to conduct “a conscientious examination” of the case. Id., at 744. If he or she is then of the opinion that the case is wholly frivolous, counsel may request leave to withdraw. The request “must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Ibid. Once the appellate court receives this brief, it must then itself conduct “a full examination of all the proceeding^] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Ibid. Only after this separate inquiry, and only after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits without the assistance of counsel. On the other hand, if the court disagrees with counsel — as the Ohio Court of Appeals did in this case — and concludes that there are nonfrivolous issues for appeal, “it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Ibid.
It is apparent that the Ohio Court of Appeals did not follow the Anders procedures when it granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, and that it committed an even more serious error when it failed to appoint new counsel after finding that the record supported several arguably meritorious grounds for reversal of petitioner’s conviction and modification of his sentence. As a result, petitioner was left without constitutionally adequate representation on appeal.
The Ohio Court of Appeals erred in two respects in granting counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw. First, the motion should have been denied because counsel’s “Certification of Meritless Appeal” failed to draw attention to “anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Ibid. The so-called “Anders brief” serves the valuable purpose of assisting the court in determining both that counsel in fact conducted the required detailed review of the case and that the appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary presentation. The importance of this twin function of the Anders brief was noted in Anders itself, 386 U. S., at 745, and was again emphasized last Term. In our decision in McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U. S. 429 (1988), we clearly stated that, the Anders brief is designed both “to provide the appellate courts with a basis for determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support their clients’ appeal to the best of their ability,” and also to help the court make “the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” Id., at 439. Counsel’s failure to file such a brief left the Ohio court without an adequate basis for determining that he had performed his duty carefully to search the case for arguable error and also deprived the court of the assistance of an advocate in its own review of the cold record on appeal.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals should not have acted on the motion to withdraw before it made its own examination of the record to determine whether counsel’s evaluation of the case was sound. This requirement was plainly stated in Ellis v. United States, 356 U. S. 674, 675 (1958), it was repeated in Anders, 386 U. S., at 744, and it was reiterated last Term in McCoy, 486 U. S., at 442. As we explained in McCoy:
“To satisfy federal constitutional concerns, an appellate court faces two interrelated tasks as it rules on counsel’s motion to withdraw. First, it must satisfy itself that the attorney has provided the client with a diligent and thorough search of the record for any arguable claim that might support the client’s appeal. Second, it must determine whether counsel has correctly concluded that the appeal is frivolous.” Ibid.
Most significantly, the Ohio court erred by failing to appoint new counsel to represent petitioner after it had determined that the record supported “several arguable claims.” App. 41. As Anders unambiguously provides, “if [the appellate court] finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” 386 U. S., at 744; see also McCoy, 486 U. S., at 444 (“Of course, if the court concludes that there are nonfrivolous issues to be raised, it must appoint counsel to pursue the appeal and direct that counsel to prepare an advocate’s brief before deciding the merits”). This requirement necessarily follows from an understanding of the interplay between Douglas and Anders. Anders, in essence, recognizes a limited exception to the requirement articulated in Douglas that indigent defendants receive representation on their first appeal as of right. The exception is predicated on the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment — although demanding active and vigorous appellate representation of indigent criminal defendants — does not demand that States require appointed counsel to press upon their appellate courts wholly frivolous arguments. However, once a court determines that the trial record supports arguable claims, there is no basis for the exception and, as provided in Douglas, the criminal appellant is entitled to representation. The Court of Appeals’ determination that arguable issues were presented by the record, therefore, created a constitutional imperative that counsel be appointed.
It bears emphasis that the right to be represented by counsel is among the most fundamental of rights. We have long recognized that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 (1963). As a general matter, it is through counsel that all other rights of the accused are protected: “Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.” Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 377 (1986); United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 654 (1984). The paramount importance of vigorous representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of justice. This system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth — as well as fairness — is “‘best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.’” Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A. B. A. J. 569, 569 (1975) (quoting Lord Eldon); see also Cronic, 466 U. S., at 655; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, 318-319 (1981). Absent representation, however, it is unlikely that a criminal defendant will be able adequately to test the government’s case, for, as Justice Sutherland wrote in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), “[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.” Id., at 69.
The need for forceful advocacy does not come to an abrupt halt as the legal proceeding moves from the trial to appellate stage. Both stages of the prosecution, although perhaps involving unique legal skills, require careful advocacy to ensure that rights are not forgone and that substantial legal and factual arguments are not inadvertently passed over. As we stated in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985):
“In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant is attempting to demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding that — like a trial — is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant— like an unrepresented defendant at trial — is unable to protect the vital interests at stake.” Id., at 396.
By proceeding to decide the merits of petitioner’s appeal without appointing new counsel to represent him, the Ohio Court of Appeals deprived both petitioner and itself of the benefit of an adversary examination and presentation of the issues.
Ill
The State nonetheless maintains that even if the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to withdraw and in failing to appoint new counsel, the court’s conclusion that petitioner suffered “no prejudice” indicates both that petitioner has failed to show prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), and also that any error was harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). In either event, in the State’s view, the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of petitioner’s conviction should stand. We disagree.
The primary difficulty with the State’s argument is that it proves too much. No one disputes that the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that the record below supported a number of arguable claims. Thus, in finding that petitioner suffered no prejudice, the court was simply asserting that, based on its review of the case, it was ultimately unconvinced that petitioner’s conviction — with the exception of one count— should be reversed. Finding harmless error or a lack of Strickland prejudice in cases such as this, however, would leave indigent criminal appellants without any of the protections afforded by Anders. Under the State’s theory, if on reviewing the bare appellate record a court would ultimately conclude that the conviction should not be reversed, then the indigent criminal appellant suffers no prejudice by being denied his right to counsel. Similarly, however, if on reviewing the record the court would find a basis for reversal, then the criminal defendant also suffers no prejudice. In either event, the criminal appellant is not harmed and thus has no basis for complaint. Thus, adopting the State’s view would render meaningless the protections afforded by Douglas and Anders.
Nor are we persuaded that the Court of Appeals’ consideration of the appellate briefs filed on behalf of petitioner’s codefendants alters this conclusion. One party’s right to representation on appeal is not satisfied by simply relying on representation provided to another party. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. To the contrary, “[t]he right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 70 [(1942)].” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 725 (1948) (plurality opinion). A criminal appellant is entitled to a single-minded advocacy for which the mere possibility of a coincidence of interest with a represented codefendant is an inadequate proxy. The State’s argument appears to suggest, however, that there would rarely, if ever, be a remedy for an indigent criminal appellant who only receives representation to the.extent a codefendant’s counsel happens to raise relevant arguments in which they share a common interest. Again, the State’s argument proves too much.
More significantly, the question whether the briefs filed by petitioner’s codefendants, along with the court’s own review of the record, adequately focused the court’s attention on the arguable claims presented in petitioner’s case is itself an issue that should not have been resolved without the benefit of an adversary presentation. An attorney acting on petitioner’s behalf might well have convinced the court that petitioner’s interests were at odds with his codefendants’ or that petitioner’s case involved significant issues not at stake in his codefendants’ cases. Mere speculation that counsel would not have made a difference is no substitute for actual appellate advocacy, particularly when the court’s speculation is itself unguided by the adversary process.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the denial of counsel in this case left petitioner completely without representation during the appellate court’s actual decisional process. This is quite different from a case in which it is claimed that counsel’s performance was ineffective. As we stated in Strickland, the “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.” 466 U. S., at 692. Our decision in United States v. Cronic, likewise, makes clear that “[t]he presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” 466 U. S., at 659 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Chapman recognizes that the right to counsel is “so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” 386 U. S., at 23, and n. 8. And more recently, in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U. S. 249, 256 (1988), we stated that a pervasive denial of counsel casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error. Because the fundamental importance of the assistance of counsel does not cease as the prosecutorial process moves from the trial to the appellate stage, see supra, at 85, the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal.
The present case is unlike a case in which counsel fails to press a particular argument on appeal, cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745 (1983), or fails to argue an issue as effectively as he or she might-. Rather, at the time the Court of Appeals first considered the merits of petitioner’s appeal, appellate counsel had already been granted leave to withdraw; petitioner was thus entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal. In fact, the only relief that counsel sought before the Court of Appeals was leave to withdraw, an action that can hardly be deemed advocacy on petitioner’s behalf. Cf. McCoy, 486 U. S., at 439-440, n. 13. It is therefore inappropriate to apply either the prejudice requirement of Strickland or the. harmless-error analysis of Chapman.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Petitioner was charged in counts 5 and 6 of the indictment with felonious assault. App. 6-7; see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.11(A)(2) (1987). In examining the record, the Court of Appeals discovered that the trial court neglected to instruct the jury concerning an element of this crime. Applying the State’s plain-error doctrine, which requires a showing of substantial prejudice, the Court of Appeals reversed petitioner’s conviction under count 6 of the indictment, but let stand his conviction under count 5. App. 41-43.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted:
“At this stage in the proceedings only the barren record speaks for the indigent, and, unless the printed pages show that an injustice has been committed, he is forced to go without a champion on appeal. Any real chance he may have had of showing that his appeal has hidden merit is deprived him wrhen the court decides on an ex parte examination of the record that the assistance of counsel is not required.” 372 U. S., at 356.
Counsel’s “Certification of Meritless Appeal,” which simply noted that counsel, after carefully reviewing the record, “found no errors requiring reversal, modification and/or vacation of appellant’s” conviction or sentence, App. 35, bears a marked resemblance to the no-merit letter we held inadequate in Anders. The no-merit letter at issue in Anders read as follows:
“Dear Judge Van Dyke:
“This is to advise you that I have received and examined the trial transcript of CHARLIE ANDERS as it relates to his conviction of the crime of possession of narcotics.
“I will not file a brief on appeal as I am of the opinion that there is no merit to the appeal. I have visited and communicated with Mr. Anders and have explained my views and opinions to him as they relate to his appeal.
“Mr. Anders has advised me that he wishes to file a brief in this matter on his own behalf. ...” Tr. of Record in Anders v. California, O. T. 1966, No. 98, p. 6.
Not only does the Anders brief assist the court in determining that counsel has carefully reviewed the record for arguable claims, but, in marginal cases, it also provides an independent inducement to counsel to perform a diligent review:
“The danger that a busy or inexperienced lawyer might opt in favor of a one sentence letter instead of an effective brief in an individual marginal ease is real, notwithstanding the dedication that typifies the profession. If, however, counsel’s ultimate evaluation of the case must be supported by a written opinion ‘referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal,’ [Anders,] 386 U. S., at 744 . . . , the temptation to discharge an obligation in summary fashion is avoided, and the reviewing court is provided with meaningful assistance.” Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 467, 470 (CA7 1971) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 408 U. S. 925 (1972).
In addition, simply putting pen to paper can often shed new light on what may at first appear to be an open-and-shut issue.
One hurdle faced by an appellate court in reviewing a record on appeal without the assistance of counsel is that the record may not accurately and unambiguously reflect all that occurred at the trial. Presumably, appellate counsel may contact the trial attorney to discuss the case and may thus, in arguing the appeal, shed additional light on the proceedings below. The court, of course, is not in the position to conduct such ex parte communications.
Obviously, a court cannot determine whether counsel is in fact correct in concluding that an appeal is frivolous without itself examining the record for arguable appellate issues. In granting counsel’s motion to withdraw, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted that it was deferring its independent review of the record for a later date. See App. 37.
The Court of Appeals’ finding of “no prejudice” is not free from ambiguity. The court wrote: “Because we have thoroughly examined the record and already considered the assignments of error raised in the other defendants’ appeals we find appellant has suffered no prejudice in his counsel’s failure to give a more conscientious examination of the record.” App. 40-41. Not only does this language leave unclear whether the court relied on Strickland, Chapman, or both cases in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to relief, but it also appears to limit the finding of no prejudice to “counsel’s failure to give a more conscientious examination of the record. ” The court did not recognize that petitioner’s rights were also violated by its own omission in failing to appoint new counsel, and thus did not consider whether this separate violation was prejudicial.
There is, of course, a significant distinction between joint representation on appeal, which is often appropriate, and the mere possibility of a coincidence of interest between represented and unrepresented criminal appellants.
Although petitioner has been represented by counsel in this Court, we decline to sit in place of the Ohio Court of Appeals in the first instance to determine whether petitioner was prejudiced as to any appellate issue by reason of either counsel’s failure to file an Anders brief or the court’s failure to appoint new counsel. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 390 (1986). It would be particularly inappropriate for us to do so in a case raising both factual issues and questions of Ohio law.
A number of the Federal Courts of Appeals have reached a like conclusion when faced with similar denials of appellate counsel. See United States ex rel. Thomas v. O’Leary, 856 F. 2d 1011 (CA7 1988); Freels v. Hills, 843 F. 2d 958 (CA6 1988); Jenkins v. Coombe, 821 F. 2d 158 (CA2 1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1008 (1988); Cannon v. Berry, 727 F. 2d 1020 (CA11 1984). But cf. Sanders v. Clarke, 856 F. 2d 1134 (CA8 1988); Lockhart v. McCotter, 782 F. 2d 1275 (CA5 1986), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 1030 (1987); Griffin v. West, 791 F. 2d 1578 (CA10 1986).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, codefendants at trial, made timely motions for appointment of separate counsel, based on the representations of their appointed counsel that, because of confidential information received from the codefendants, he was confronted with the risk of representing conflicting interests and could not, therefore, provide effective assistance for each client. We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by the denial of those motions. 430 U. S. 965 (1977).
I
Early in the morning of June 1, 1975, three men entered a Little Rock, Ark., restaurant and robbed and terrorized the five employees of the restaurant. During the course of the robbery, one of the two female employees was raped once; the other, twice. The ensuing police investigation led to the arrests of the petitioners.
On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall, a public defender, to represent all three defendants. Petitioners were then arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Two days later, their cases were set for a consolidated trial to' commence September 4.
On August 13, Hall moved the court to appoint separate counsel for each petitioner because “the defendants ha[d] stated to him that there is a possibility of a conflict of interest in each of their cases ...” After conducting a hearing on this motion, and on petitioners’ motions for a severance, the court declined to appoint separate counsel.
Before trial, the same judge who later presided at petitioners’ trial conducted a Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine the admissibility of a confession purportedly made by petitioner Campbell to two police officers at the time of his arrest. The essence of the confession was that Campbell had entered the restaurant with his codefendants and had remained, armed with a rifle, one flight of stairs above the site of the robbery and rapes (apparently serving as a lookout), but had not taken part in the rapes. The trial judge ruled the confession admissible, but ordered deletion of the references to Campbell’s codefendants. At trial one of the arresting officers testified to Campbell’s confession.
On September 4, before the jury was empaneled, Hall renewed the motion for appointment of separate counsel “on the grounds that one or two of the defendants may testify and, if they do, then I will not be able to cross-examine them because I have received confidential information from them.” The court responded, “I don’t know why you wouldn’t,” and again denied the motion.
The prosecution then proceeded to present its case. The manager of the restaurant identified petitioners Holloway and Campbell as two of the robbers. Another male employee identified Holloway and petitioner Welch. A third identified only Holloway. The victim of the single rape identified Holloway and Welch as two of the robbers but was unable to identify the man who raped her. The victim of the double rape identified Holloway as the first rapist. She was unable to identify the second rapist but identified Campbell as one of the robbers.
On the second day of trial, after the prosecution had rested its case, Hall advised the court that, against his recommendation, all three defendants had decided to testify. He then stated:
“Now, since I have been appointed, I had previously filed a motion asking the Court to appoint a separate attorney for each defendant because of a possible conflict of interest. This conflict will probably be now coming up since each one of them wants to testify.
“THE COURT: That’s all right; let them testify. There is no conflict of interest. Every time I try more than one person in this court each one blames it on the other one.
“MR. HALL: I have talked to each one of these defendants, and I have talked to them individually, not collectively.
“THE COURT: Now talk to them collectively.”
The court then indicated satisfaction that each petitioner understood the nature and consequences of his right to testify on his own behalf, whereupon Hall observed:
“I am in a position now where I am more or less muzzled as to any cross-examination.
“THE COURT: You have no right to cross-examine your own witness.
“MR. HALL: Or to examine them.
“THE COURT: You have a right to examine them, but have no right to cross-examine them. The prosecuting attorney does that.
“MR. HALL: If one '[defendant] takes the stand, somebody needs to protect the other two’s interest while that one is testifying, and I can’t do that since I have talked to each one individually.
“THE COURT: Well, you have talked to them, I assume, individually and collectively, too. They all say they want to testify. I think it’s perfectly alright [sic] for them to testify if they want to, or not. It’s their business.
“Each defendant said he wants to testify, and there will be no cross-examination of these witnesses, just a direct examination by you.
“MR. HALL: Your Honor, I can’t even put them on direct examination because if I ask them—
“THE COURT: (Interposing) You can just put them on the stand and tell the Court that you have advised them of their rights and they want to testify; then you tell the man to go ahead and relate what he wants to. That’s all you need to do.”
Holloway took the stand on his own behalf, testifying that during the time described as the time of the robbery he was at his brother’s home. His brother had previously given similar testimony. When Welch took the witness stand, the record shows Hall advised him, as he had Holloway, that “I cannot ask you any questions that might tend to incriminate any one of the three of you .... Now, the only thing I can say is tell these ladies and gentlemen of the jury what you know about this case . . . .” Welch responded that he did not “have any kind of speech ready for the jury or anything. I thought I was going to be questioned.” When Welch denied, from the witness stand, that he was at the restaurant the night of the robbery, Holloway interrupted, asking:
“Your Honor, are we allowed to make an objection?
“THE COURT: No, sir. Your counsel will take care of any objections.
“MR. HALL: Your Honor, that is what I am trying to say. I can’t cross-examine them.
“THE COURT: You proceed like I tell you to, Mr. Hall. You have no right to cross-examine your own witnesses anyhow.”
Welch proceeded with his unguided direct testimony, denying any involvement in the crime and stating that he was at his home at the time it occurred. Campbell gave .similar testimony when he took the stand. He also denied making any confession to the arresting officers.
The jury rejected the versions of events presented by the three defendants and the alibi witness, and returned guilty verdicts on all counts. On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, petitioners raised the claim that their representation by a single appointed attorney, over their objection, violated federal constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. In resolving this issue, the court relied on what it characterized as the majority rule:
“[T]he record must show some material basis for an alleged conflict of interest, before reversible error occurs in single representation of co-defendants.” 260 Ark. 250, 256, 539 S. W. 2d 435, 439 (1977).
Turning to the record in the case, the court observed that Hall had failed to outline to the trial court both the nature of the confidential information received from his clients and the manner in which knowledge of that information created conflicting loyalties. Because none of the petitioners had incriminated codefendants while testifying, the court concluded that the record demonstrated no actual conflict of interests or prejudice to the petitioners, and therefore affirmed.
II
More than 35 years ago, in Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942), this Court held that by requiring an attorney to represent two codefendants whose interests were in conflict the District Court had denied one of the defendants his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. In that case the Government tried five codefendants in a joint trial for conspiracy to defraud the United States. Two of the defendants, Glasser and Kretske, were represented initially by separate counsel. On the second day of trial, however, Kretske became dissatisfied with his attorney and dismissed him. The District Judge thereupon asked Glasser’s attorney, Stewart, if he would also represent Kretske. Stewart responded by noting a possible conflict of interests: His representation of both Glasser and Kretske might lead the jury to link the two men together. Glasser also made known that he objected to the proposal. The District Court nevertheless appointed Stewart, who continued as Glasser’s retained counsel, to represent Kretske. Both men were convicted.
Glasser contended in this Court that Stewart’s representation at trial was ineffective because of a conflict between the interests of his two clients. This Court held that “the ‘assistance of counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer should simultaneously represent conflicting interests.” Id., at 70. The record disclosed that Stewart failed to cross-examine a Government witness whose testimony linked Glasser with the conspiracy and failed to object to the admission of arguably inadmissible evidence. This failure was viewed by the Court as a result of Stewart’s desire to protect Kretske’s interests, and was thus “indicative of Stewart’s struggle to serve two masters . . . .” Id., at 75. After identifying this conflict of interests, the Court declined to inquire whether the prejudice flowing from it was harmless and instead ordered Glasser’s conviction reversed. Kretske’s conviction, however, was affirmed.
One principle applicable here emerges from Glasser without ambiguity. Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. This principle recognizes that in some cases multiple defendants can appropriately be represented by one attorney; indeed, in some cases, certain advantages might accrue from joint representation. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s view: “Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against a common attack.” Glasser v. United States, supra, at 92 (dissenting opinion).
Since Glasser was decided, however, the courts have taken divergent approaches to two issues commonly raised in challenges to joint representation where — unlike this case — trial counsel did nothing to advise the trial court of the actuality or possibility of a conflict between his several clients’ interests. First, appellate courts have differed on how strong a showing of conflict must be made, or how certain the reviewing court must be that the asserted conflict existed, before it will conclude that the defendants were deprived of their right to the effective assistance of counsel. Compare United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F. 2d 203 (CA3 1973); Lollar v. United States, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 200, 376 F. 2d 243 (1967); People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P. 2d 106 (1968); and State v. Kennedy, 8 Wash. App. 633, 508 P. 2d 1386 (1973), with United States v. Lovano, 420 F. 2d 769, 773 (CA2 1970); see also cases collected in Annot., 34 A. L. R. 3d 470, 477-507 (1970). Second, courts have differed with respect to the scope and nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure that criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to the effective assistance of counsel by joint representation of conflicting interests. Compare United States v. Lawriw, 568 F. 2d 98 (CA8 1977); United States v. Carrigan, 543 F. 2d 1053 (CA2 1976); and United States v. Foster, 469 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1972), with Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F. 2d 1072 (CA5 1975), and United States v. Williams, 429 F. 2d 158 (CA8 1970).
We need not resolve these two issues in this case, however. Here trial counsel, by the pretrial motions of August 13 and September 4 and by his accompanying representations, made as an officer of the court, focused explicitly on the probable risk of a conflict of interests. The judge then failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel. We hold that the failure, in the face of the representations made by counsel weeks before trial and again before the jury was empaneled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of “assistance of counsel.”
This conclusion is supported by the Court’s reasoning in Glasser:
“Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused. . . . The trial court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel. . . .
“Of equal importance with the duty of the court to see that an accused has the assistance of counsel is its duty to refrain from embarrassing counsel in the defense of an accused by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from those of his first client, when the possibility of that divergence is brought home to the court.” 315 U. S., at 71, 76 (emphasis added).
This reasoning has direct applicability in this case where the “possibility of [petitioners’] inconsistent interests” was “brought home to the court” by formal objections, motions, and defense counsel’s representations. It is arguable, perhaps, that defense counsel might have presented the requests for appointment of separate counsel more vigorously and in greater detail. As to the former, however, the trial court’s responses hardly encouraged pursuit of the separate-counsel claim; and as to presenting the basis for that claim in more detail, defense counsel was confronted with a risk of violating, by more disclosure, his duty of confidentiality to his clients.
Additionally, since the decision in Glosser, most courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted. See, e. g., Shuttle v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1315 (Vt. 1969); State v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29, 514 P. 2d 1025 (1973); State v. Brazile, 226 La. 254, 75 So. 2d 856 (1954); but see Commonwealth v. LaFleur, 1 Mass. App. 327, 296 N. E. 2d 517 (1973). In so holding, the courts have acknowledged and given effect to several interrelated considerations. An “attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.” State v. Davis, supra, at 31, 514 P. 2d, at 1027. Second, defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of the problem. Ibid. Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, and “ ‘when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.’ ” State v. Brazile, supra, at 266, 75 So. 2d, at 860-861. (Emphasis deleted.) We find these considerations persuasive.
The State argues, however, that to credit Hall’s representations to the trial court would be tantamount to transferring to defense counsel the authority of the trial judge to rule on the existence or risk of a conflict and to appoint separate counsel. In the State’s view, the ultimate decision on those matters must remain with the trial judge; otherwise unscrupulous defense attorneys might abuse their “authority,” presumably for purposes of delay or obstruction of the orderly conduct of the trial.
The State has an obvious interest in avoiding such abuses. But our holding does not undermine that interest. When an untimely motion for separate counsel is made for dilatory purposes, our holding does not impair the trial court’s ability to deal with counsel who resort to such tactics. Cf. United States v. Dardi, 330 F. 2d 316 (CA2), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 845 (1964); People v. Kroeger, 61 Cal. 2d 236, 390 P. 2d 369 (1964). Nor does our holding preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel’s representations regarding a conflict of interests without improperly requiring disclosure of the confidential communications of the client. See State v. Davis, supra. In this case the trial court simply failed to take adequate steps in response to the repeated motions, objections, and representations made to it, and no prospect of dilatory practices was present to justify that failure.
Ill
The issue remains whether the error committed at petitioners’ trial requires reversal of their convictions. It has generally been assumed that Glasser requires reversal, even in the absence of a showing of specific prejudice to the complaining codefendant, whenever a trial court improperly permits or requires joint representation. See Austin v. Erickson, 477 F. 2d 620 (CA8 1973); United States v. Gougis, 374 F. 2d 758 (CA7 1967); Hall v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 304, 217 N. W. 2d 352 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A. 2d 641 (1962); Note, Criminal Codefendants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Separate Counsel, 58 Geo. L. J. 369, 387 (1969). Some courts and commentators have argued, however, that appellate courts should not reverse automatically in such cases but rather should affirm unless the defendant can demonstrate prejudice. See United States v. Woods, 544 F. 2d 242 (CA6 1976), cert, denied, 430 U. S. 969 (1977); Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 119, 122-125 (1978). This argument rests on two aspects of the Court’s decision in Glasser. First, although it had concluded that Stewart was forced to represent conflicting interests, the Court did not reverse the conviction of Kretske, Stewart’s other client, because Kretske failed to “show that the denial of Glasser’s constitutional rights prejudiced [him] in some manner.” 315 U. S., at 76 (emphasis added). Second, the Court justified the reversal of Glasser’s conviction, in part, by emphasizing the weakness of the Government’s evidence against him; with guilt a close question, “error, which under some circumstances would not be ground for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial, since there is a real chance that it might have provided the slight impetus which swung the scales toward guilt.” Id., at 67 (emphasis added). Assessing the strength of the prosecution’s evidence against the defendant is, of course, one step in applying a harmless-error standard. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 427 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969).
We read the Court’s opinion in Glasser, however, as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic. The Glasser Court stated: This language presupposes that the joint representation, over his express objections, prejudiced the accused in some degree. But from the cases cited it is clear that the prejudice is presumed regardless of. whether it was independently shown. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927), for example, stands for the principle that “[a] conviction must be reversed if [the asserted trial error occurred], even if no particular prejudice is shown and even if the defendant was clearly guilty.” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 43 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id., at 23, and n. 8 (opinion of the Court). The Court’s refusal to reverse Kretske’s conviction is not contrary to this interpretation of Glosser. Kretske did not raise his own Sixth Amendment challenge to the joint representation. 315 U. S., at 77; see Brief for Petitioner Kretske in Glasser v. United States, O. T. 1941, No. 31. As the Court’s opinion indicates, some of the codefendants argued that the denial of Glasser’s right to the effective assistance of counsel prejudiced them as alleged co-conspirators. 315 U. S., at 76-77. In that context, the Court required a showing of prejudice; finding none, it affirmed the convictions of the codefendants, including Kretske.
“To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the [district] court’s appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 116; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535; Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 292.” 315 U. S., at 75-76.
Moreover, this Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those “constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” Chapman v. California, supra, at 23. Accordingly, when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963).
That an attorney representing multiple defendants with conflicting interests is physically present at pretrial proceedings, during trial, and at sentencing does not warrant departure from this general rule. Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. For example, in this case it may well have precluded defense counsel for Campbell from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another. Examples can be readily multiplied. The mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate’s conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters.
Finally, a rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests — which he and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections to the joint representation — prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded application. In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury. Compare Chapman v. California, supra, at 24-26, with Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 108 (1974), and United States v. Valle-Valdes, 554 F. 2d 911, 914-917 (CA9 1977). But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil — it bears repeating — is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney’s failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
No transcript of this hearing is included in the record, and we are not informed whether the hearing was transcribed.
See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964).
It is probable that the judge’s response, “I don’t know why you wouldn’t,” referred back to counsel’s statement, “I will not be able to cross-examine them . . . .” If the response is so read, the judge’s later statements, see infra, at 479 and 480, .are directly contradictory.
The record reveals that both the trial court and defense counsel were alert to defense counsel’s obligation to avoid assisting in the presentation of what counsel had reason to believe was false testimony, or, at least, testimony contrary to the version of facts given to him earlier and in confidence. Cf. ABA Project on Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Defense Function § 7.7 (c), p. 133 (1974).
By inquiring in Glasser whether there had been a waiver, the Court also confirmed that a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests. 315 U. S., at 70. In this case, however, Arkansas does not contend that petitioners waived that right.
See ABA Project on Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge § 3.4 (b), p. 171 (1974):
“Whenever two or more defendants who have been jointly charged, or whose cases have been consolidated, are represented by the same attorney, the trial judge should inquire into potential conflicts which may jeopardize the right of each defendant to the fidelity of his counsel.”
There is no indication in the record, and the State does not suggest, that the hearing held in response to the motion of August 13 disclosed information demonstrating the insubstantiality of Hall’s September 4 representations — based, as nearly as can be ascertained, on the codefendants’ newly formed decision to testify — respecting a probable conflict of interests. So far as we can tell from this record, the trial judge cut off any opportunity of defense counsel to do more than make conclusory representations. During oral argument in this Court, Hall represented that the trial court did not request him to disclose the basis for his representations as to a conflict of interests. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14r-15.
There is no occasion in this case to determine the constitutional significance, if any, of the trial court’s response to petitioners’ midtrial objections.
The American Bar Association in its Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Defense Function § 3.5(b), p. 123 (1974) cautions:
“Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or applications for bail, a lawyer or lawyers who. are associated in practice should not undertake to defend more than one defendant in the same criminal case if the duty to. one of the defendants may conflict with the duty to. another. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to. develop and when the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple representation.”
When a considered representation regarding a conflict in clients’ interests comes from an officer of the court, it should be given the weight commensurate with the grave penalties risked for misrepresentation.
Such risks are undoubtedly present; they are inherent in the adversary system. But courts have abundant power to deal with attorneys who misrepresent facts.
This case does not require an inquiry into the extent of a court’s power to compel an attorney to disclose confidential communications that he concludes would be damaging to his client. Cf. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, HR 4AL01 (C) (2) (1969). Such compelled disclosure creates significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when the disclosure is to a judge who may be called upon later to impose sentences on the attorney’s clients.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether an agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes bars the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief, such as backpay, reinstatement, and damages, in an enforcement action alleging that the employer has violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
I
In his application for employment with respondent, Eric Baker agreed that “any dispute or claim” concerning his employment would be “settled by binding arbitration.” As a condition of employment, all prospective Waffle House employees are required to sign an application containing a similar mandatory arbitration agreement. See App. 56. Baker began working as a grill operator at one of respondent’s restaurants on August 10,1994. Sixteen days later he suffered a seizure at work and soon thereafter was discharged. Id., at 43-44. Baker did not initiate arbitration proceedings, nor has he in the seven years since his termination, but he did file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that his discharge violated the ADA.
After an investigation and an unsuccessful attempt to conciliate, the EEOC filed an enforcement action against respondent in the Federal District Court for the District of South Carolina, pursuant to § 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U. S. C. § 12117(a) (1994 ed.), and §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as added, 105 Stat. 1072, 42 U. S. C. § 1981a (1994 ed.). Baker is not a party to the case. The EEOC’s complaint alleged that respondent engaged in employment practices that violated the ADA, including its discharge of Baker “because of his disability,” and that its violation was intentional, and “done with malice or with reckless indifference to [his] federally protected rights.” The complaint requested the court to grant injunctive relief to “eradicate the effects of [respondent’s] past and present unlawful employment practices/' to order specific relief designed to make Baker whole, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and to award punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. App. 38-40.
Respondent filed a petition under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., to stay the EEOC’s suit and compel arbitration, or to dismiss the action. Based on a factual determination that Baker’s actual employment contract had not included the arbitration provision, the District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted an interlocutory appeal and held that a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement between Baker and respondent did exist. 193 F. 3d 805, 808 (CA4 1999). The court then proceeded to consider “what effect, if any, the binding arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House has on the EEOC, which filed this action in its own name both in the public interest and on behalf of Baker.” Id., at 809. After reviewing the relevant statutes and the language of the contract, the court concluded that the agreement did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, and it has independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue is proper. Id., at 809-812. Nevertheless, the court held that the EEOC was precluded from seeking victim-specific relief in court because the policy goals expressed in the FAA required giving some effect to Baker’s arbitration agreement. The majority explained:
“When the EEOC seeks ‘make-whole’ relief for a charging party, the federal policy favoring enforcement of private arbitration agreements outweighs the EEOC’s right to proceed in federal court because in that circumstance, the EEOC’s public interest is minimal, as the EEOC seeks primarily to vindicate private, rather than public, interests. On the other hand, when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale injunctive relief, the balance tips in favor of EEOC enforcement efforts in federal court because the public interest dominates the EEOC’s action.” Id., at 812.
Therefore, according to the Court of Appeals, when an employee has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement, the EEOC’s remedies in an enforcement action are limited to injunctive relief.
Several Courts of Appeals have considered this issue and reached conflicting conclusions. Compare EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F. 3d 448 (CA6 1999) (employee’s agreement to arbitrate does not affect the EEOC’s independent statutory authority to pursue an enforcement action for injunctive relief, backpay, and damages in federal court), with EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F. 3d 298 (CA2 1998) (allowing the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief in federal court, but precluding monetary relief); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F. 3d 814 (CA8), cert. denied, 531 U. S. 958 (2000) (same). We granted the EEOC’s petition for certiorari to resolve this conflict, 532 U. S. 941 (2001), and now reverse.
II
Congress has directed the EEOC to exercise the same enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures that are set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it is enforcing the ADA’s prohibitions against employment discrimination on the basis of disability. 42 U. S. C. § 12117(a) (1994 ed.). Accordingly, the provisions of Title VII defining the EEOC’s authority provide the starting point for our analysis.
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, it authorized private actions by individual employees and public actions by the Attorney General in cases involving a “pattern or practice” of discrimination. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-6(a) (1994 ed.). The EEOC, however, merely had the authority to investigate and, if possible, to conciliate charges of discrimination. See General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318, 325 (1980). In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to authorize the EEOC to bring its own enforcement actions; indeed, we have observed that the 1972 amendments created a system in which the EEOC was intended “to bear the primary burden of litigation,” id., at 326. Those amendments authorize the courts to enjoin employers from engaging in unlawful employment practices, and to order appropriate affirmative action, which may include reinstatement, with or without backpay. Moreover, the amendments specify the judicial districts in which such actions may be brought. They do not mention arbitration proceedings.
In 1991, Congress again amended Title VII to allow the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages by a “complaining party.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(l) (1994 ed.). The term includes both private plaintiffs and the EEOC, § 1981a(d)(l)(A), and the amendments apply to ADA claims as well, §§ 1981a(a)(2), (d)(1)(B). As a complaining party, the EEOC may bring suit to enjoin an employer from engaging in unlawful employment practices, and to pursue reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory or punitive damages. Thus, these statutes unambiguously authorize the EEOC to obtain the relief that it seeks in its complaint if it can prove its case against respondent.
Prior to the 1991 amendments, we recognized the difference between the EEOC’s enforcement role and an individual employee’s private cause of action in Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355 (1977), and General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318 (1980). Occidental presented the question whether EEOC enforcement actions are subject to the same statutes of limitations that govern individuals’ claims. After engaging in an unsuccessful conciliation process, the EEOC filed suit in Federal District Court, on behalf of a female employee, alleging sex discrimination. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the EEOC’s claim was time barred; the EEOC filed suit after California’s 1-year statute of limitations had run. We reversed because “under the procedural structure created by the 1972 amendments, the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties,” 432 U. S., at 368. To hold otherwise would have undermined the agency’s independent statutory responsibility to investigate and conciliate claims by subjecting the EEOC to inconsistent limitations periods.
In General Telephone, the EEOC sought to bring a discrimination claim on behalf of all female employees at General Telephone’s facilities in four States, without being certified as the class representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 446 U. S., at 321-322. Relying on the plain language of Title VII and the legislative intent behind the 1972 amendments, we held that the EEOC was not required to comply with Rule 23 because it “need look no further than § 706 for its authority to bring suit in its own name for the purpose, among others, of securing relief for a group of aggrieved individuals.” Id., at 324. In light of the provisions granting the EEOC exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for 180 days after the employee files a charge, we concluded that “the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination and that [its] enforcement suits should not be considered representative actions subject to Rule 23.” Id., at 326.
Against the backdrop of our decisions in Occidental and General Telephone, Congress expanded the remedies available in EEOC enforcement actions in 1991 to include compensatory and punitive damages. There is no language in the statutes or in either of these cases suggesting that the existence of an arbitration agreement between private parties materially changes the EEOC’s statutory function or the remedies that are otherwise available.
III
The FAA was enacted in 1925, 43 Stat. 883, and then reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code. It has not been amended since the enactment of Title VII in 1964. As we have explained, its “purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 24 (1991). The FAA broadly provides that a written provision in “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as'exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. Employment contracts, except for those covering workers engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105 (2001).
The FAA provides for stays of proceedings in federal district courts when an issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration, and for orders compelling arbitration when one party has failed or refused to comply with an arbitration agreement. See 9 U. S. C. §§3 and 4. We have read these provisions to “manifest a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ ” Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983)). Absent some ambiguity in the agreement, however, it is the language of the contract that defines the scope of disputes subject to arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 57 (1995) (“[T]he FAA’s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties”). For nothing in the statute authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any issues, or by any parties, that are not already covered in the agreement. The FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies; it ensures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise does not purport to place any restriction on a nonparty’s choice of a judicial forum.
>
The Court of Appeals based its decision on its evaluation of the “competing policies” implemented by the ADA and the FAA, rather than on any language in the text of either the statutes or the arbitration agreement between Baker and respondent. 193 F. 3d, at 812. It recognized that the EEOC never agreed to arbitrate its statutory claim, id., at 811 (“We must also recognize that in this case the EEOC is not a party to any arbitration agreement”), and that the EEOC has “independent statutory authority” to vindicate the public interest, but opined that permitting the EEOC to prosecute Baker’s claim in court “would significantly trample” the strong federal policy favoring arbitration because Baker had agreed to submit his claim to arbitration. Id., at 812. To effectuate this policy, the court distinguished between injunctive and victim-specific relief, and held that the EEOC is barred from obtaining the latter because any public interest served when the EEOC pursues “make whole” relief is outweighed by the policy goals favoring arbitration. Only when the EEOC seeks broad injunctive relief, in the Court of Appeals’ view, does the public interest overcome the goals underpinning the FAA.
If it were true that the EEOC could prosecute its claim only with Baker’s consent, or if its prayer for relief could be dictated by Baker, the court’s analysis might be persuasive. But once a charge is filed, the exact opposite is true under the statute — the EEOC is in command of the process. The EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for 180 days. During that time, the employee must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the agency before prosecuting the claim. If, however, the EEOC files suit on its own, the employee has no independent cause of action, although the employee may intervene in the EEOC’s suit. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1994 ed.). In fact, the EEOC takes the position that it may pursue a claim on the employee’s behalf even after the employee has disavowed any desire to seek relief. Brief for Petitioner 20. The statute clearly makes the EEOC the master of its own case and confers on the agency the authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake. Absent textual support for a contrary view, it is the public agency’s province — not that of the court — to determine whether public resources should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief. And if the agency makes that determination, the statutory text unambiguously authorizes it to proceed in a judicial forum.
Respondent and the dissent contend that Title VII supports the Court of Appeals’ bar against victim-specific relief, because the statute limits the EEOC’s recovery to “appropriate” relief as determined by a court. See Brief for Respondent 19, and n. 8; post, at 301-303 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). They rely on § 706(g)(1), which provides that, after a finding of liability, “the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g)(l) (1994 ed.) (emphasis added). They claim this provision limits the remedies available and directs courts, hot the EEOC, to determine what relief is appropriate.
The proposed reading is flawed for two reasons. First, under the plain language of the statute the term “appropriate” refers to only a subcategory of claims for equitable relief, not damages. The provision authorizing compensatory and punitive damages is in a separate section o'f the statute, § 1981a(a)(l), and is not limited by this language. The dissent responds by pointing to the phrase “may recover” in § 1981a(a)(l), and arguing that this too provides authority for prohibiting victim-specific relief. See post, at 303, n. 7. But this contention only highlights the second error in the proposed reading. If “appropriate” and “may recover” can be read to support respondent’s position, then any discretionary language would constitute authorization for judge-made, per se rules. This is not the natural reading of the text. These terms obviously refer to the trial judge’s discretion in a particular case to order reinstatement and award damages in an amount warranted by the facts of that case. They do not permit a court to announce a categorical rule precluding an expressly authorized form of relief as inappropriate in all cases in which the employee has signed an arbitration agreement.
The Court of Appeals wisely did not adopt respondent’s reading of § 706(g). Instead, it simply sought to balance the policy goals of the FAA against the clear language of Title VII and the agreement. While this may be a more coherent approach, it is inconsistent with our recent arbitration cases. The FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, but it “does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 478 (1989). See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 404, n. 12 (1967) (“[T]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so”). Because the FAA is “at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements,” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 625 (1985), we look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals, to determine the scope of the agreement. Id., at 626. While ambiguities in the language of the agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration, Volt, 489 U. S., at 476, we do not override the clear intent of the parties, or reach a result inconsistent with the plain text of the contract, simply because the policy favoring arbitration is implicated. “Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Id., at 479. Here there is no ambiguity. No one asserts that the EEOC is a party to the contract, or that it agreed to arbitrate its claims. It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty. Accordingly, the proarbitration policy goals of the FAA do not require the agency to relinquish its statutory authority if it has not agreed to do so.
Even if the policy goals underlying the FAA did necessitate some limit on the EEOC’s statutory authority, the line drawn by the Court of Appeals between injunctive and victim-specific relief creates an uncomfortable fit with its avowed purpose of preserving the EEOC’s public function while favoring arbitration. For that purpose, the category of victim-specific relief is both overinclusive and under-inclusive. For example, it is overinclusive because while punitive damages benefit the individual employee, they also serve an obvious public function in deterring future violations. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 266-270 (1981) (“Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor..., and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1977). Punitive damages may often have a greater impact on the behavior of other employers than the threat of an injunction, yet the EEOC is precluded from seeking this form of relief under the Court of Appeals’ compromise scheme. And, it is underinclusive because injunctive relief, although seemingly not “victim-specific,” can be seen as more closely tied to the employees’ injury than to any public interest. See Occidental, 432 U. S., at 383 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“While injunctive relief may appear more ‘broad based,’ it nonetheless is redress for individuals”).
The compromise solution reached by the Court of Appeals turns what is effectively a forum selection clause into a waiver of a nonparty’s statutory remedies. But if the federal policy favoring arbitration trumps the plain language of Title VII and the contract, the EEOC should be barred from pursuing any claim outside the arbitral forum. If not, then the statutory language is clear; the EEOC has the authority to pursue victim-specific relief regardless of the forum that the employer and employee have chosen to resolve their disputes. Rather than attempt to split the difference, we are persuaded that, pursuant to Title VII and the ADA, whenever the EEOC chooses from among the many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief. To hold otherwise would undermine the detailed enforcement scheme created by Congress simply to give greater effect to an agreement between private parties that does not even contemplate the EEOC’s statutory function.
V
It is true, as respondent and its amici have argued, that Baker’s conduct may have the effect of limiting the relief that the EEOC may obtain in court. If, for example, he had failed to mitigate his damages, or had accepted a monetary settlement, any recovery by the EEOC would be limited accordingly. See, e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 231-232 (1982) (Title VII claimant “forfeits his right to back-pay if he refuses a job substantially equivalent to the one he was denied”); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F. 2d 1539, 1542 (CA9 1987) (employee’s settlement “rendered her personal claims moot”); EEOC v. U. S. Steel Corp., 921 F. 2d 489, 495 (CA3 1990) (individuals who litigated their own claims were precluded by res judicata from obtaining individual relief in a subsequent EEOC action based on the same claims). As we have noted, it “goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.” General Telephone, 446 U. S., at 333.
But no question concerning the validity of his claim or the character of the relief that could be appropriately awarded in either a judicial or an arbitral forum is presented by this record. Baker has not sought arbitration of his claim, nor is there any indication that he has entered into settlement negotiations with respondent. It is an open question whether a settlement or arbitration judgment would affect the validity of the EEOC’s claim or the character of relief the EEOC may seek. The only issue before this Court is whether the fact that Baker has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement limits the remedies available to the EEOC. The text of the relevant statutes provides a clear answer to that question. They do not authorize the courts to balance the competing policies of the ADA and the FAA or to second-guess the agency’s judgment concerning which of the remedies authorized by law that it shall seek in any given case.
Moreover, it simply does not follow from the cases holding that the employee’s conduct may affect the EEOC’s recovery that the EEOC’s claim is merely derivative. We have recognized several situations in which the EEOC does not stand in the employee’s shoes. See Occidental, 432 U. S., at 368 (EEOC does not have to comply with state statutes of limitations); General Telephone, 446 U. S., at 326 (EEOC does not have to satisfy Rule 23 requirements); Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 32 (EEOC is not precluded from seeking classwide and equitable relief in court on behalf of an employee who signed an arbitration agreement). And, in this context, the statute specifically grants the EEOC exclusive authority over the choice of forum and the prayer for relief once a charge has been filed. The fact that ordinary principles of res judicata, mootness, or mitigation may apply to EEOC claims does not contradict these decisions, nor does it render the EEOC a proxy for the employee.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The agreement states:
“The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant’s employment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such employment, including whether such dispute or claim is arbitrable, will be settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association in effect at the time a demand for arbitration is made. A decision and award of the arbitrator made under the said rules shall be exclusive, final and binding on both parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns. The costs and expenses of the arbitration shall be borne evenly by the parties.” App. 59.
Because no evidence of the employment practices alleged in the complaint has yet been presented, we of course express no opinion on the merits of the EEOC’s case. We note, on the one hand, that the state human rights commission also investigated Baker’s claim and found no basis for suit. On the other hand, the EEOC chooses to file suit in response to only a small number of the many charges received each year, see n. 7, infra. In keeping with normal appellate practice in cases arising at the pleading stage, we assume, arguendo, that the EEOC’s case is meritorious.
One member of the panel dissented because he agreed with the District Court that, as a matter of fact, the arbitration clause was not included in Baker’s actual contract of employment. 193 F. 3d, at 813.
Section 12117(a) provides:
“The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e~8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employment.”
“(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on judicial orders
“(1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g)(l) (1994 ed.).
Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides:
“Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subehapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.”
This framework assumes the federal policy favoring arbitration will be undermined unless the EEOC’s remedies are limited. The court failed to consider, however, that some of the benefits of arbitration are already built into the EEOC’s statutory duties. Unlike individual employees, the EEOC cannot pursue a claim in court without first engaging in a conciliation process. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994 ed.). Thus, before the EEOC ever filed suit in this case, it attempted to reach a settlement with respondent.
The court also neglected to take into account that the EEOC files suit in a small fraction of the charges employees file. For example, in fiscal year 2000, the EEOC received 79,896 charges of employment discrimination. Although the EEOC found reasonable cause in 8,248 charges, it only filed 291 lawsuits. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation (as visited Nov. 18, 2001), http:// www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html. In contrast, 21,032 employment discrimination lawsuits were filed in 2000. See Administrative Office, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2000, Table C-2A (Sept. 30, 2000). These numbers suggest that the EEOC files fewer than two percent of all antidiscrimination claims in federal court. Indeed, even among the cases where it finds reasonable cause, the EEOC files suit in fewer than five percent of those cases. Surely permitting the EEOC access to victim-specific relief in cases where the employee has agreed to binding arbitration, but has not yet brought a claim in arbitration, will have a negligible effect on the federal policy favoring arbitration.
Justice Thomas notes that our interpretation of Title VII and the FA A “should not depend on how many cases the EEOC chooses to prosecute in any particular year.” See post, at 314, n. 14 (dissenting opinion). And yet, the dissent predicts our holding will “reduce that arbitration agreement to all but a nullity,” post, at 309, “discourag[e] the use of arbitration agreements,” post, at 310, and “discourage employers from entering into settlement agreements,” post, at 312. These claims are highly implausible given the EEOC’s litigation practice over the past 20 years. When speculating about the impact this decision might have on the behavior of employees and employers, we think it is worth recognizing that the EEOC files suit in less than one percent of the charges filed each year.
Justice Thomas implicitly recognizes this distinction by qualifying his description of the courts’ role as determining appropriate relief “in any given case,” or “in a particular ease.” See post, at 301, 303. But the Court of Appeals’ holding was not so limited. 193 F. 3d 805, 812 (CA4 1999) (holding that the EEOC “may not pursue relief in court... specific to individuals who have waived their right to a judicial forum”).
In Volt, the parties to a construction contract agreed to arbitrate all disputes relating to the contract and specified that California law would apply. When one party sought to compel arbitration, the other invoked a California statute that authorizes a court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation with third parties not bound by the agreement when inconsistent rulings are possible. We concluded that the FAA did not pre-empt the California statute because “the FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties’] agreement.’ ” 489 U. S., at 474-475 (quoting 9 U. S. C. § 4). Similarly, the FAA enables respondent to compel Baker to arbitrate his claim, but it does not expand the range of claims subject to arbitration beyond what is provided for in the agreement.
Our decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52 (1995), is not inconsistent with this position. In Mastrobuono, we reiterated that clear contractual language governs our interpretation of arbitration agreements, but because the choice-of-law provision in that case was ambiguous, we read the agreement to favor arbitration under the FAA rules. Id., at 62. While we distinguished Volt on the ground that we were reviewing a federal court’s construction of the contract, 514 U. S., at 60, n. 4, regardless of the standard of review, in this case the Court of Appeals recognized that the EEOC was not bound by the agreement. When that much is clear, Volt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.
We have held that federal statutory claims may be the subject of arbitration agreements that are enforceable pursuant to the FAA because the agreement only determines the choice of forum. “In these cases we recognized that ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ [Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628 (1985)].” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 26 (1991). To the extent the Court of Appeals construed an employee’s agreement to submit his claims to an arbitral forum as a waiver of the substantive statutory prerogative of the EEOC to enforce those claims for whatever relief and ■ in whatever forum the EEOC sees fit, the court obscured this crucial distinction and ran afoul of our precedent.
If injunctive relief were the only
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the type of hearing to which an alien crewman is entitled on his claim that he would suffer persecution upon deportation to his native land. The Court of Appeals sustained the respondent crewman’s contention that he must be heard by a special inquiry officer in a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Petitioner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, argues that respondent’s claim was properly heard and determined by a district director. We brought the case here, 393 U. S. 912 (1968), to resolve the conflict on this score between the decision below and that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967).
I.
Respondent, a national of Yugoslavia, was a crewman aboard the Yugoslav vessel, M/V Sumadija, when it docked at Coos Bay, Oregon, in late December 1964. He requested and was issued a “D-l” conditional landing permit, in accordance with 8 CFR §252.1 (d)(1) and §252 (a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under these provisions, the Service may allow a non-immigrant alien crewman temporary shore leave for
“the period of time (not exceeding twenty-nine days) during which the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived remains in port, if the immigration officer is satisfied that the crewman intends to depart on the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived.” Ibid.
On January 6, 1965, while on shore leave, respondent appeared at the Portland, Oregon, office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He claimed that he feared persecution upon return to Yugoslavia, and he flatly stated that he would not return to the M/V Sumadija. On the basis of the latter statement, and in accordance with § 252 (b) of the Act, the District Director revoked respondent’s landing permit. Section 252 (b) provides:
“[A]ny immigration officer may, in his discretion, if he determines that an alien . . . does not intend to depart on the vessel or aircraft which brought him, revoke the conditional permit to land which was granted such crewman under the provisions of subsection (a)(1), take such crewman into custody, and require the master or commanding officer of the vessel or aircraft on which the crewman arrived to receive and detain him on board such vessel or aircraft, if practicable, and such crewman shall be deported from the United States at the expense of the transportation line which brought him to the United States. . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the procedure prescribed in section 242 of this Act to [sic] cases falling within the provisions of this subsection.”
Section 252 (b) makes no express exception for an alien whose deportation would subject him to persecution. However, § 243 (h) permits the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of any alien to a country in which he would be subject to persecution, and analogously, 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) then provided:
“Any alien crewman . . . whose conditional landing permit issued under § 252.1 (d) (1) of this chapter is revoked who alleges that he cannot return to a Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied country because of fear of persecution in that country on account of race, religion, or political opinion may be paroled into the United States . . . for the period of time and under the conditions set by the district director having jurisdiction over the area where the alien crewman is located.”
Thus, although respondent was admittedly deportable under the terms of § 252 (b), he was not immediately returned to his vessel. On January 7, he was offered the opportunity to present evidence to the District Director in support of his claim of persecution.
Respondent presented no evidence to the District Director. Rather, he contended that he had not been given sufficient time to prepare for the hearing, and he also argued that he was entitled to have his claim heard by a special inquiry officer in accordance with the general provisions of § 242 (b). The District Director ruled against respondent and, in the absence of any evidence of probable persecution, ordered him returned to the M/V Sumadija, which was then still in port.
Respondent immediately sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, which, without opinion, temporarily stayed his deportation and referred the matter back to the District Director for a hearing on the merits of respondent’s claim. On January 25, 1965, after a hearing at which respondent was represented by counsel and presented evidence, the District Director held that respondent “has [not] shown that he would be physically persecuted if he were to return to Yugoslavia.” Appendix 22.
On respondent’s supplemental pleadings, the District Court held that the District Director’s findings were supported by the record. The court rejected respondent’s claim that he was entitled to a § 242 (b) hearing before a special inquiry officer, relying on the last sentence of § 252 (b), which provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the procedure prescribed in section 242 of this Act to cases falling within the provisions of this subsection.” Vucinic [and Stanisic] v. Immigration Service, 243 F. Supp. 113 (1965).
Respondent did not appeal the District Court’s decision. Instead, in July 1965, he petitioned Congress for a private bill, pending action on which the Service stayed his deportation. Respondent’s effort proved unsuccessful, and on June 21, 1966, the Service ordered him to appear for deportation to Yugoslavia.
The following day, respondent reasserted his claim of persecution before the Service, and requested that the matter be heard by a special inquiry officer pursuant to § 242. The Service, and subsequently the District Court, denied relief, both holding that this issue had previously been determined adversely to respondent.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, Stanisic v. Immigration Service, 393 F. 2d 539 (1968), holding that the matter was not res judicata because of a significant change of circumstances: the District Director’s adverse determination in 1965, and the District Court’s unappealed approval thereof, were based on the unstated premise that the M/V Sumadija was still in port; but now the ship had long since sailed, and respondent still had not been deported. The court held that § 252 (b) only authorized respondent’s “summary deportation aboard the vessel on which he arrived or, within a very limited time after that vessel’s departure, aboard another vessel pursuant to arrangements made before . . . [his] vessel departed.” 393 F. 2d, at 542-543. Since neither of these conditions was met, respondent could no longer be deported pursuant to the District Director’s 1965 determination; he was entitled to a de novo hearing before a special inquiry officer under § 242 (b) of the Act.
II.
At the outset, it is important to recognize the distinction between a determination whether an alien is statutorily deportable — something never contested by respondent — and a determination whether to grant political asylum to an otherwise properly deportable alien.
Section 242 (b) provides a generally applicable procedure “for determining the deportability of an alien . . . .” Section 252 (b) provides a specific procedure for the deportation of alien crewmen holding D-l landing permits. Neither of these sections is concerned with the granting of asylum.
Relief from persecution, on the other hand, is governed by §§212 (d)(5) and 243 (h). The former section authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to
“parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States . . . .”
The latter authorizes the Attorney General
“to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.”
No statute prescribes by what delegate of the Attorney General, or pursuant to what procedure, relief shall be granted under these provisions. By regulation, the decision to grant parole pursuant to § 212 (d) (5) rests with a district director, 8 CFR §§ 212.5 (a), 253.2; and by regulation, the decision to withhold deportation of most aliens pursuant to § 243 (h) is presently made by a special inquiry officer. 8 CFR §§ 242.8 (a), 242.17 (c).
Prior to 1960, no regulation provided relief to an alien crewman whose D-l landing permit was revoked but who claimed that return to his country would subject him to persecution. In Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (1960), a district court held that a crewman in this situation was entitled to be heard. The Service responded by promulgating 8 CFR § 253.1 (e), supra, at 67, the regulation which it applied in the case at bar. 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) is a hybrid. The grounds for relief are, for present purposes, identical to those of § 243 (h) of the Act. However, because the Service adheres to the view that a crewman whose D-l permit has been revoked is not “within the United States” in the technical sense of that phrase, see Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185 (1958), it terms the relief “parole” into the United States rather than “withholding deportation.” Whatever terminological and conceptual differences may exist, the substance of the relief is the same.
The Service could provide that all persecution claims be heard by a district director, and we see no reason why the Service cannot validly provide that the persecution claim of an alien crewman whose D-l landing permit has been revoked be heard by a district director, whether or not the ship has departed. It might be argued, however, that the Service has not done so; that 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) was designed to govern the determination of persecution claims only when § 252 (b) of the Act governed determinations of deportability; and that if departure of the vessel renders § 252 (b) inapplicable (a suggestion we consider and reject in Part III, below), then 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) likewise becomes inapplicable.
Section 253.1 (e) applies, however, to “[a]ny alien crewman . . . whose conditional landing permit issued under §252.1 (d)(1) [of 8 CFR] ... is revoked” — precisely respondent’s situation — and makes no reference to the departure, vel non, of the vessel. Granting that this regulation and its successor provision are not free from ambiguity, we find it dispositive that the agency responsible for promulgating and administering the regulation has interpreted it to apply even when the vessel has departed. E. g., Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967); Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F. Supp. 24 (1963), aff’d, 340 F. 2d 91 (1964). “[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945).
In sum, it is immaterial to the decision in this case whether § 252 (b)’s exception to the § 242 (b) procedure is, or is not, applicable to respondent. These two provisions govern only the revocation of temporary landing permits and the determination of deportability, and we reiterate that respondent does not contest the District Director’s action on either of these scores. These sections do not state who should hear and determine a request for asylum. That is a matter governed by regulation, and under the applicable regulation the respondent received his due.
III.
We do not rest on this ground alone, however. Both the court below and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967), assumed that a crewman’s statutory entitlement to a § 242 (b) hearing on his request for asylum was coextensive with his right to a § 242 (b) hearing on his statutory deportability, and the case was argued here primarily on that basis. For the balance of the opinion we thus make, arguendo, the same assumption. We conclude, contrary to the court below, that an alien crewman may properly be deported pursuant to § 252 (b) even after his ship has sailed.
A.
Section 242 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides a generally applicable administrative procedure pursuant to which a special inquiry officer determines whether an alien is deportable. See nn. 1 and 2, supra.
The history of § 252 (b)’s narrow exception to the § 242 (b) deportation procedure is found in the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., which preceded the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Alien crewmen had traditionally been granted the privilege of temporary admission or shore leave “because of the necessity of freeing international commerce from unnecessary barriers and considerations of comity with other nations . . . .” Id., at 546. A serious problem was created, however, by alien crewmen who deserted their ships and secreted themselves in the United States. The Committee found that:
“[T]he temporary ‘shore leave’ admission of alien seamen who remain illegally constitutes one of the most important loopholes in our whole system of restriction and control of the entry of aliens into the United States. The efforts to apprehend these alien seamen for deportation are encumbered by many technicalities invoked in behalf of the alien seamen and create conditions incident to enforcement of the laws which have troubled the authorities for many years.” Id., at 550.
To ameliorate this problem, the Committee recommended that:
“Authority should be granted to immigration officers in a case where the alien crewman intends to depart on the same vessel on which he arrived, upon a satisfactory finding that an alien is not a bona fide crewman, to revoke the permission to land temporarily, to take the alien into custody, and to require the master of the vessel on which he arrived to detain him and remove him from the country.” Id., at 558.
Unlike § 242 (b), § 252 (b) does not prescribe the procedures governing the determination of the crewman’s deportability, nor does it confine that determination to a special inquiry officer.
B.
As the Court of Appeals noted, the § 252 (b) procedure governs a narrow range of cases only. It is entirely inapplicable to persons other than alien crewmen. It does not apply to an alien crewman who enters the United States illegally without obtaining any landing permit at all, or who enters on a “D-2” permit allowing him to depart on a different vessel. See n. 4, supra. The Service has held § 252 (b) to be inapplicable even to a crewman issued a D-l permit unless formal revocation— as distinguished from actual deportation — -takes place before his vessel leaves American shores. Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 127 (1953); 8 CFR § 252.2; see Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration Service, 392 U. S. 206, 207 (1968).
Section 252 (b) most plainly governs the situation in which a D-l landing permit is revoked and the alien crewman is immediately returned to the vessel on which he arrived, which, by hypothesis, is still in a United States port. At the time of revocation, the crewman usually has not traveled far from the port, so the burden of transporting him back to the vessel is small; there is a readily identifiable vessel and place to return him to; and during his brief shore leave, which cannot exceed 29 days, the crewman is unlikely to have established significant personal or business relationships in the United States. In short, the crewman’s deportation may be expedited, with minimum hardship and inconvenience to him, to the transportation company responsible for him, and to the Service.
That this is not the only situation to which the § 252 (b) procedure applies, however, is evident from the language of § 252 (b) itself and the related provisions of § 254. Section 252 (b) requires that where an alien crewman’s landing permit is revoked his transportation company must detain him aboard the vessel on which he arrived, and deport him. Section 254 (a) imposes a fine on the company and ship’s master, inter alia, for failure to detain or deport the crewman “if required to do so by an immigration officer.” However, § 252 (b)’s requirement is modified by the term, “if practicable”; and § 254 (c) eorrelatively provides:
“If the Attorney General finds that deportation of an alien crewman ... on the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived is impracticable or impossible, or would cause undue hardship to such alien crewman, he may cause the alien crewman to be deported from the port of arrival or any other port on another vessel or aircraft of the same transportation line, unless the Attorney General finds this to be impracticable.”
These provisions contemplate that an alien crewman whose temporary landing permit is revoked pursuant to § 252 (b) may be deported on a vessel other than the one on which he arrived. The other vessel should preferably be one owned by the transportation company which brought him to the United States, but if this is not feasible, the Attorney General may order him deported by other means, at the company’s expense.
The Court of Appeals recognized that an alien crewman might properly be deported on a vessel other than the one which brought him. It noted, however, that § 254 (c) holds the owner of that vessel responsible for all of the expenses of his deportation and further provides that the vessel shall not be granted departure clearance until those expenses are paid or their payment is guaranteed. From this it concluded that “the section contemplates that the alternative arrangement shall be made while the vessel upon which the crewman arrived is still in port . . . 393 F. 2d, at 546. Since arrangements for respondent’s deportation had not been made before the M/V Sumadija departed, the § 254 (c), and hence the § 252 (b), procedures were no longer applicable: with the ship’s departure, respondent became entitled to a hearing pursuant to § 242 (b).
We agree that the “clearance” provision of § 254 (c) contemplates that the crewman’s departure on another vessel may sometimes be accomplished or arranged before the vessel that brought him departs. If, however, the crewman’s vessel sails before its owner has .paid or guaranteed the expenses of deportation, the owner’s liability under § 254 (c) is in no way diminished. The Government has merely lost a useful means of compelling payment of costs which may still be collected by other methods. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals itself noted, § 254 (c)’s financial responsibility provision is not limited to instances of deportation pursuant to § 252 (b), but applies to the deportation of alien crewmen in a variety of situations, including those in which a § 242 (b) proceeding has been held, and thus those in which the crewman’s vessel may long since have departed.
Strong policies support the conclusion that a properly commenced § 252 (b) proceeding does not automatically abort upon the departure of the crewman’s vessel. If the crewman whose landing permit has been revoked pursuant to § 252 (b) attacks the district director’s action in a federal court, the court would usually stay his deportation pending at least a preliminary hearing. Even courts with dockets less crowded than those of most of our major port cities may not be able to hear the matter for several days or more, during which time the vessel may often have departed according to schedule. It requires little legal talent, moreover, to manufacture a colorable case for a temporary stay out of whole cloth, and to delay proceedings once in the federal courts. The Ninth Circuit’s construction would, thus, encourage frivolous applications and intentional delays designed to assure that the crewman’s vessel departed before the case was heard. Alternatively, it would so dispose federal judges not to grant stays that persons presenting meritorious applications might be deported without the opportunity to be heard.
We agree with the court below that § 252 (b) is a provision of limited applicability. But we conclude that the court’s construction would restrict its scope to a degree neither intended by Congress nor supported by the language of the Act, and that it would, as a practical matter, render § 252 (b) useless for the very function it was designed to perform.
We hold that an alien crewman whose temporary landing permit is properly revoked pursuant to § 252 (b) does not become entitled to a hearing before a special inquiry officer under § 242 (b) merely because his deportation is not finally arranged or effected when his vessel leaves, and that under these circumstances the Attorney General may provide — as he did in 8 CFR § 253.1 (e), now 8 CFR § 253.1 (f) — that the crewman’s request for political asylum be heard by a district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
IV.
At the time of respondent’s January 1965 hearing before the District Director, § 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided:
“The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution . . .
(Emphasis added.)
By the Act of October 3, 1965, § 11 (f), 79 Stat. 918, this section was amended by substituting for “physical persecution” the phrase “persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.” Although 8 CFR § 253.1 (e), the regulation under which respondent’s 1965 hearing was conducted, did not itself contain any restriction to “physical persecution,” it is apparent from the District Director’s findings that he read such a limitation into the regulation.
We believe, therefore, that it is appropriate that respondent be given a new hearing before the District Director under the appropriate standard, and we remand the case for that purpose.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
A special inquiry officer is “any immigration officer who the Attorney General deems specially qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings ...” Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101 (b)(4), 66 Stat. 171, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b)(4). The special inquiry officer has no enforcement duties. He performs “no functions other than the hearing and decision of issues in exclusion and deportation cases, and occasionally in other adjudicative proceedings.” 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.7b, at 5-49 (1967); see generally id., § 5.7.
66 Stat. 209, 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b):
“A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney General, shall make determinations, including orders of deportation. ... No special inquiry officer shall conduct a proceeding in any case under this section in which he shall have participated in investigative functions or in which he shall have participated (except as provided in this subsection) in prosecuting functions. Proceedings before a special inquiry officer acting under the provisions of this section shall be in accordance with such regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, as the Attorney General shall prescribe. Such regulations shall include requirements that—
“(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances, of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which the proceedings will be held;
“ (2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose;
“(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government; and
“(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.
“The procedure so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section.”
A district director is the officer in charge of a district office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He performs a wide range of functions. See 1 C. Gordon •& H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 1.9c (1967); 8 CFR § 103.1 (f).
Section 252 (a), 66 Stat. 220, 8 U. S. C. § 1282 (a) provides:
“No alien crewman shall be permitted to land temporarily in the United States except as provided in this section .... If an immigration officer finds upon examination that an alien crewman is a nonimmigrant . . . and is otherwise admissible and has agreed to accept such permit, he may, in his discretion, grant the crewman a conditional permit to land temporarily pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, subject to revocation in subsequent proceedings as provided in subsection (b), and for a period of time, in any event, not to exceed—
“(1) the period of time (not exceeding twenty-nine days) during which the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived remains in port, if the immigration officer is satisfied that the crewman intends to depart on the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived; or
“(2) twenty-nine days, if the immigration officer is satisfied that the crewman intends to depart, within the period for which he is permitted to land, on a vessel or aircraft other than the one on which he arrived.”
“D-l” and “D-2” landing permits are permits issued pursuant to 8 CFB, §§ 252.1 (d) (1) and 252.1 (d)(2), which implement §§ 252 (a) (1) and 252 (a) (2) of the Act.
26 Fed. Reg. 11797 (December 8, 1961). Effective March 22, 1967, the section was amended and redesignated § 253.1 (f), 32 Fed. Reg. 4341-4342.
Because the District Director’s determination was not pursuant to § 242 (b), the District Court had jurisdiction to review his action. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration Service, 392 U. S. 206 (1968); Stanisic v. Immigration Service, 393 F. 2d 539, 542 (1968); Vucinic [and Stanisic] v. Immigration Service, 243 F. Supp. 113, 115-117 (1965); 5 U. S. C. § 1009.
Actually, the ship sailed from the United States on or about January 16, 1965, or between the date on which the District Director revoked respondent’s landing permit (January 6, 1965), and the date on which, after a hearing, he denied respondent’s persecution claim (January 25, 1965). This fact was not in the record before the Court of Appeals.
This was not always so. Until 1962, the final determination was made by a regional commissioner of the Service. 8 CFR §243.3 (b)(2) (1958 rev.); see Foti v. Immigration Service, 375 U. S. 217, 230, n. 16 (1963).
The only substantial difference is that the regulation, but not the Statute, is limited to Communist-inspired persecution.
For this reason, we have no occasion to decide whether or not respondent was “within the United States.” Compare Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (1960), with Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967), and Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F. Supp. 24 (1963), aff'd, 340 F. 2d 91 (1964). It may further be noted that §243 (h), by its terms, “authorizes” but does not require the consideration of persecution claims.
This is responsive to the language of §252 (b). Permission to land terminates upon the vessel’s departure, and thereafter there is nothing to “revoke.”
8 CFR § 252.2 (d) provides that a “crewman granted a conditional permit to land under section 252 (a)(1) of the Act . . . is required to depart with his vessel from its port of arrival and from each other port in the United States to which it thereafter proceeds coastwise without touching at a foreign port or place; however, he may rejoin his vessel at another port in the United States before it touches at a foreign port or place if he has advance written permission from the master or agent to do so.” In the latter case the crewman may journey some distance from the port at which he arrived.
See infra, this page and at 76.
66 Stat. 221, 8 U. S. C. § 1284.
This is doubtless an accommodation made in the light of the transportation company’s liability for the expenses of deportation.
“All expenses incurred in connection with such deportation, including expenses incurred in transferring an alien crewman from one place in the United States to another under such conditions and safeguards as the Attorney General shall impose, shall be paid by the owner or owners of the vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived in the United States. The vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived shall not be granted clearance until such expenses have been paid or their payment guaranteed to the satisfaction of the Attorney General. . . .” § 264 (c).
Thus, if and when respondent is deported, the owners of the M/V Sumadija will be responsible for the related expenses incurred by the United States.
And, although we do not decide this question, § 254 (c) would appear to allow the Attorney General to require security for the payment of anticipated expenses of deporting an alien crewman, even though no final arrangements have been made before the vessel that brought him departs.
See generally 1968 Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep., Tables C, D, and X (1968).
66 Stat. 214.
See supra, at 68; Appendix 18-22 passim.
Respondent contends that his 1965 proceeding was infected with various constitutional errors, including the District Director’s alleged bias and his combination of prosecutorial, investigative, and adjudicatory functions. Because that proceeding is not before us, and because we remand for a new hearing, we have no occasion to consider these arguments, except to note that neither § 252 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act nor 8 CFR §253.1 (f), under which respondent will be heard on remand, is unconstitutional on its face. Likewise, it is premature to consider whether, and under what circumstances, an order of deportation might contravene the Protocol and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded on November 1, 1968. See Dept. State Bull., Vol. LIX, No. 1535, p. 538.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1963 the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, consolidated with adjoining Princess Anne County, which was both rural and urban; and a borough form of government was adopted. There are seven boroughs, one corresponding to the boundaries of the former city and six corresponding to the boundaries of the six magisterial districts. The consolidation plan was effected pursuant to Virginia law and the charter embodied in the plan was approved by the legislature.
Three boroughs — Bayside, Kempsville, and Lynn-haven — are primarily urban. Three — Blackwater, Princess Anne, and Pungo — are primarily rural. The borough of Virginia Beach, centering around its famous ocean beach and bay, is primarily tourist.
Electors of five boroughs, having exhausted attempts to obtain relief in the state courts, instituted this suit against local and state officials claiming that the consolidation plan in its distribution of voting rights violated the principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and asking for the convening of a three-judge court. The three-judge court held that its jurisdiction had not been established because the issue was local in character and transferred the cause to the District Court.
The District Court held the original allocation invalid as denying voter equality and stayed further proceedings to allow the city an opportunity to seek a charter amendment at the 1966 session of the State Legislature. The charter was amended to provide for the Seven-Four Plan now being challenged. Under the amended charter, the council is composed of 11 members. Four members are elected at large without regard to residence. Seven are elected by the voters of the entire city, one being required to reside in each of the seven boroughs. Pursuant to leave of the District Court, appellees filed an amended complaint challenging the validity of the Seven-Four Plan. The District Court approved this plan. The Court of Appeals reversed, 361 F. 2d 495. The case is here on appeal (28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2)) and we postponed the question of jurisdiction to the merits. 385 U. S. 999.
For the reasons stated in Moody v. Flowers, ante, p. 97, the case is not one for a three-judge court, the charter being local only and not of statewide application.
In Sailors v. Board of Education, ante, p. 105, we reserved the question whether the apportionment of municipal or county legislative agencies is governed by Reynolds v. Sims. But though we assume arguendo that it is, we reverse the Court of Appeals. It felt that Reynolds v. Sims required “that each legislator, State or municipal, represent a reasonably like number in population,” 361 F. 2d, at 497, pointing out that Blackwater, where 733 people live, will have the same representation as Lynnhaven with 23,731 and Bayside with 29,048 and Kempsville with 13,900. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed what it had decided in Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 352 F. 2d 123, 128, that “the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State.” And the court held that the provision for four city-wide members “does not remedy or in any way affect the disproportion of representation of the 7 borough members.” 361 F. 2d, at 497.
The Seven-Four Plan makes no distinction on the basis of race, creed, or economic status or location. Each of the 11 councilmen is elected by a vote of all the electors in the city. The fact that each of the seven councilmen must be a resident of the borough from which he is elected, is not fatal. In upholding a residence requirement for the election of state senators from a multi-district county we said in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438:
“It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district within the county wherein he resides. The statute uses districts in multi-district counties merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation. Each district’s senator must be a resident of that district, but since his tenure depends upon the county-wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district; thus in fact he is the county’s and not merely the district’s senator.”
By analogy the present consolidation plan uses boroughs in the city “merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation.” He is nonetheless the city’s, not the borough’s, councilman. In Fortson there was substantial equality of population in the senatorial districts, while here the population of the boroughs varies widely. If a borough’s resident on the council represented in fact only the borough, residence being only a front, different conclusions might follow. But on the assumption that Reynolds v. Sims controls, the constitutional test under the Equal Protection Clause is whether there is an “invidious” discrimination. 377 U. S., at 561. As stated by the District Court:
“The principal and adequate reason for providing for the election of one councilman from each borough is to assure that there will be members of the City Council with some general knowledge of rural problems to the end that this heterogeneous city will be able to give due consideration to questions presented throughout the entire area.
“ [T]he history — past and present — of the area and population now comprising the City of Virginia Beach demonstrates the compelling need, at least during an appreciable transition period, for knowledge of rural problems in handling the affairs of one of the largest area-wide cities in the United States. Bluntly speaking, there is a vast area of the present City of Virginia Beach which should never be referred to as a city. District representation from the old County of Princess Anne with elected members of the Board of Supervisors selected only by the voters of the particular district has now been changed to permit city-wide voting. The ‘Seven-Four Plan’ is not an evasive scheme to avoid the consequences of reapportionment or to perpetuate certain persons in office. The plan does not preserve any controlling influence of the smaller boroughs, but does indicate a desire for intelligent expression of views on subjects relating to agriculture which remains a great economic factor in the welfare of the entire population. As the plan becomes effective, if it then operates to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population, it will be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.”
The Seven-Four Plan seems to reflect a detente between urban and rural communities that may be important in resolving the complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and the rural countryside. Finding no invidious discrimination we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be and is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Hartan and Mr. Justice Stewart concur in the result.
Va. Code 1950, Tit. 15, Art. 4, c. 9 (1956 Repl. Vol.).
Va. Acts 1962, c. 147. The consolidation plan was an interim one, the idea being that another system would be initiated not sooner than 1968 and not later than 1971.
Davis v. Dusch, 205 Va. 676, 139 S. E. 2d 25.
Va. Acts 1966, c. 39.
The populations of the seven boroughs are:
Blaekwater . 733
Pungo . 2,504
Princess Anne. 7,211
Kempsville . 13,900
Lynnhaven . 23,731
Bayside . 29,048
Virginia Beach. 8,091
It is obvious that, if the percentage of qualified voters is in accord with the population, Lynnhaven and Bayside, if united in their efforts, could elect all 11 councilmen even though the election were at large.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a Texas property tax on bank shares, computed on the basis of the bank’s net assets without any deduction for tax-exempt United States obligations held by the bank, violates Rev. Stat. § 3701, as amended. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled that it did not.
I
Until 1959, Rev. Stat. §3701, 31 U. S. C. §742, provided, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.” This Court consistently held that this language prohibited state taxes imposed on federal obligations, either directly, or indirectly as part of a tax on the taxpayer’s total property or assets. See Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S. 143, 147-148 (1955). The Court also consistently held, however, that § 3701 did not prohibit nondiscriminatory taxes imposed on discrete property interests such as corporate shares or business franchises, even though the value of that discrete interest was measured by the underlying assets, including United States obligations. See Werner Machine Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U. S. 492, 493-494 (1956); Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 147-148; Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103, 112 (1923); Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 518-519 (1907); Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611, 629-632 (1868). Similarly, the Court interpreted Rev. Stat. § 3701 not to prohibit taxes imposed on a discrete transaction, such as an inheritance, even though the value of the inheritance was measured according to the value of the federal obligations transferred. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 133-134 (1900). In 1956, the Court observed that this formal but economically meaningless distinction between taxes on Government obligations and taxes on separate interests was “firmly embedded in the law.” Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148.
In 1959, Congress amended § 3701 by adding a second sentence: “This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax,” with exceptions only for nondiscriminatory franchise taxes or other nonproperty taxes, and for estate or inheritance taxes. Act of Sept. 22, 1959, § 105(a), 73 Stat. 622. The issue is whether this amendment extends to a state bank shares tax.
HH HH
In 1979 and 1980, Texas imposed a property tax on bank shares and a separate tax on the real estate holdings of banks. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 7166 (Vernon I960). It required each bank doing business in the State to report its real estate to the local tax assessor, and to submit a list of its shareholders with the number of shares owned by each. The shareholders were required to report the actual value of their shares to the assessor in the bank’s jurisdiction. To prevent double taxation, each share was to be taxed to the shareholder on the difference between the share’s cash value and the proportionate amount per share of the bank’s real estate assessment.
Petitioners are certain state and national banks and their shareholders. Respondents are taxing subdivisions of the State of Texas, and officers and Boards of Equalization of those subdivisions, that levied taxes on petitioners’ bank shares pursuant to Art. 7166. In determining the value of the bank shares subject to the tax, respondents included the value of United States obligations held by the banks. Petitioners sought mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief against respondents in state court, asserting that § 3701 required that the value of their bank shares be reduced by the proportionate value of the United States obligations held by the bank.
In its initial opinion concerning petitioner Bank of Texas, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the plain language of §3701, as amended, precludes consideration of United States obligations in the computation of any state or local tax. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. On motions for rehearing, the court withdrew its original opinion and, instead, upheld the tax. Bank of Texas v. Childs, 615 S. W. 2d 810 (1981). The court stated that, prior to the 1959 amendment to §3701, a different statute, Rev. Stat. § 5219, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §548, had authorized state taxation of shares of national banks without reduction in value for obligations of the United States held by the banks. 615 S. W. 2d, at 817-820. The court concluded that the 1959 amendment to § 3701 had not withdrawn this authorization. 615 S. W. 2d, at 819-820. The court reasoned that if the 1959 amendment had withdrawn the authorization granted by § 5219, in effect it would have repealed a portion of that statute, and that repeals by implication are not favored. 615 S. W. 2d, at 820-822. Similar judgments were entered in companion cases. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a, 41a. The Court of Civil Appeals denied motions for rehearing, 615 S. W. 2d, at 823-826; App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a, 42a. The Supreme Court of Texas denied applications for writs of error. Id., at 4a, 39a, 43a.
Because the decisions of the Court of Civil Appeals appeared to be inconsistent with decisions of the Supreme Court of Montana, and because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. 966 (1982).
Ill
A
“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). The exemption for federal obligations provided by §3701, as amended in 1959, is sweeping: with specific exceptions, it “extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax” (emphasis supplied). See Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 395-396 (1983) (the statute “establishes a broad exemption”).
The 1959 amendment rejected and set aside this Court’s rather formalistic pre-1959 approach to § 3701. Under that approach, if a tax were imposed on a property interest or transaction separate from the ownership of federal obligations, the method by which the tax was computed was entirely irrelevant. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S., at 129; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 600, 602, 606 (1890). This remained true despite the Court’s recognition that the practical impact of such a tax is indistinguishable from that of a tax imposed directly on corporate assets that include federal obligations. See Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148. Under the plain language of the 1959 amendment, however, the tax is barred regardless of its form if federal obligations must be considered, either directly or indirectly, in computing the tax.
Giving the words of amended § 3701 their ordinary meaning, there can be no question that federal obligations were considered in computing the bank shares tax at issue here. In context, the word “considered” means taken into account, or included in the accounting. The tax at issue was computed by use of an “equity capital formula,” which involved determining the amount of the bank’s capital assets, subtracting from that figure the bank’s liabilities and the assessed value of the bank’s real estate, and then dividing the result by the number of shares. 615 S. W. 2d, at 816. Plainly, such a tax takes into account, at least indirectly, the federal obligations that constitute a part of the bank’s assets. Cf. Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 146-147 (tax on total assets of corporation is tax on federal obligations it owns); New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 672-673 (1950) (same); Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200, 208-209 (1865) (same).
The express exceptions to the 1959 amendment — franchise taxes and estate and inheritance taxes — reinforce this conclusion. Just as state tax laws relating to corporate or bank shares generally assess the shares according to the value of the corporation’s assets, see Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148, franchise and estate and inheritance taxes customarily assess the franchise or the demise at the value of the assets of the business or at the value of the property inherited. See, e. g., Werner Machine Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U. S., at 492 (franchise tax measured by “net worth”); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S., at 134 (inheritance tax measured by “the value of the property passing”); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S., at 599 (franchise tax measured by “capital stock and dividends”).
Prior to the 1959 amendment, franchise and estate and inheritance taxes measured by the value of federal obligations, like bank shares taxes, were upheld on the theory that the tax was levied on the franchise or the transfer of property, rather than on the ownership interest in the federal securities themselves. By expressly exempting franchise and estate and inheritance taxes from the amended § 3701, Congress manifested its awareness that the new language would broaden significantly the prohibition as it had been construed by the courts. Congress must have believed that franchise and estate and inheritance taxes required federal obligations to “be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax”; otherwise, the specific exemptions for these taxes would have been superfluous. There is no reason to conclude that shares taxes are any different.
The language of § 3701 encompasses “every form of taxation,” and is inconsistent with implied exceptions. Cf. Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60-62 (1980). From the specific exceptions for franchise and estate and inheritance taxes, and the conspicuous omission of shares taxes from that group, only one inference is possible: Congress meant to bar shares taxes to the extent they consider federal obligations in the computation of the tax. Cf. Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U. S. 608, 616 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 56 (1979).
Respondents Dallas County et al. argue, however, that § 3701 does not prohibit the Texas tax because, on its face, the tax statute does not require use of the equity capital formula or any other formula based on the value of federal obligations. Brief for Respondents Dallas County et al. 10-11. In the present litigation, however, the assessors did use the equity capital formula, which is the usual method for assessing the value of bank shares, see Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148, and is “the usual and customary method used in Texas to arrive at such value.” City of Midland v. Midland National Bank, 607 S. W. 2d 303, 304 (1980). Respondents have not cited a single instance where a different formula was employed. Section 3701 prohibits any form of tax that would require consideration of federal obligations in computing the tax; it cannot matter whether such consideration is mandated by the tax assessor in practice or by the state statute in so many words. The taxes at issue therefore violated the plain language of § 3701.
B
The legislative history of the 1959 amendment to §3701, while not extensive, supports this construction of the amendment’s effect. The catalyst for the amendment was an Idaho tax “upon every individual... which shall be according to and measured by his net income.” See Idaho Code § 63-3011 (1948). Despite this Court’s holding that §3701 precluded direct state taxation of the interest on federal obligations, as well as taxation of the underlying obligations, see New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S., at 675-676, Idaho’s position was that its tax need not exempt the interest received on federal obligations, because it was imposed on the individual and was merely measured by his net income, rather than being imposed on the income itself. See Hearings on Public Debt Ceiling and Interest Rate Ceiling on Bonds before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 69-70 (1959) (supplemental statement of Secretary of the Treasury Anderson) (Hearings). In presenting the 1959 amendment to Congress, the Secretary described Idaho’s position as “resting] upon a distinction of words which is without substance.” Id., at 71. Similar accusations had been leveled at this Court’s analogous distinctions between shares taxes and franchise taxes on the one hand, and taxes on corporate assets on the other.
Respondents suggest, however, that the 1959 amendment was intended only to make clear that income taxes like Idaho’s, on interest from federal obligations, were unlawful. Congress, according to respondents, did not mean to set aside this Court’s well-established distinction between taxes on assets and taxes on shares. We, however, have found no evidence whatsoever in the legislative history to suggest that Congress considered shares taxes to fall outside the scope of the prohibition. The fact that the 1959 legislative history refers to the Idaho tax, but not specifically to bank shares taxes, does not raise a “negative inference” limiting the amendment to this specific problem. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 679 (1983). The amendment plainly did more than make clear that the interest on federal obligations was tax exempt. Idaho relied on the formal distinction between a tax on an individual, measured by his net income, and a tax on the income itself. See Hearings, at 70. To answer this argument, the amendment abolished the formalistic inquiry whether the tax is on a distinct interest, and replaced it with the inquiry whether “computation of the tax” requires consideration of federal obligations.
Nor can the 1959 amendment be read to apply only to income taxes; it reaches “every form of tax...” (emphasis supplied). Indeed, Congress felt compelled to exempt estate and inheritance and franchise taxes from the scope of its amendment precisely because the amendment was not limited to income taxes. Congress understood the amendment’s effect; both the Senate and House Reports explained that the amendment “makes it clear that both the principal and interest on U. S. obligations are exempt from all State taxes except nondiscriminatory franchise, etc., taxes” (emphasis supplied). Senate Report, at 2; House Report, at 2. Congress intended to sweep away formal distinctions and to invalidate all taxes measured directly or indirectly by the value of federal obligations, except those specified in the amendment.
IV
In an effort to avoid this result and to resurrect the formalistic approach, respondents embark on a tour of the history of an entirely different statute, Rev. Stat. § 5219, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 548. Section 5219, they argue, authorizes States to tax the full value of bank shares, and the 1959 amendment to § 3701 did not repeal that authorization by implication. Even if the 1959 Congress abolished the distinction between taxes on and taxes measured by the value of federal obligations, respondents conclude, the Texas tax is valid.
It is true, of course, that “repeals by implication are not favored.” Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). This doctrine flows from the basic principle that “courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). But, at the time the taxes at issue were assessed, § 5219 was clearly capable of coexistence with the plain language of § 3701 as amended in 1959, and there is no justification for construing § 5219 to create an inconsistency.
When the taxes challenged here were assessed, and now, § 5219 provided only that States could not impose discriminatory taxes on national banks: “For the purposes of any tax law enacted under authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located.” Section 3701’s requirement that shares taxes on all corporations not consider federal obligations in their computation easily coexists with §5219’s simple ban on discriminatory taxation of national banks. Giving each statute its common-sense meaning, the proper result in these cases could not be more clear.
Respondents, though, find an unexpressed exception for bank shares taxes in the plain language of § 3701 by reading into the plain language of §5219 an unexpressed congressional authorization to tax bank shares at their full value. Respondents argue that this silent authorization may be found in § 5219 by looking to the pre-1969 language of that section. Even assuming that such an adventure in statutory-revision would be an appropriate exercise of judicial power, respondents’ argument is based on an unnecessary construction of this earlier version of § 5219.
From 1926 until 1969, § 5219 provided that the States could tax national banks in only four ways: (1) by taxing bank shares, (2) by including bank share dividends in the taxable income of a shareholder, (3) by taxing national banks on their net income, or (4) by levying a franchise tax on national banks “according to or measured by their net income. ” Act of Mar. 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223; see n. 3, supra. Respondents argue that this statute not only permitted these forms of taxation of national banks, but that in so doing it also implicitly authorized the taxation of any federal obligations held by national banks, notwithstanding independent limitations placed on taxation of federal obligations.
Although respondents’ reading might be a plausible construction of the prior version of § 5219, the prior version need not be so construed. That version did not mention federal obligations; § 5219 was, and still is, addressed to the concern first considered in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), where this Court declared that any tax on the operation of a national bank unconstitutionally burdened this instrumentality of the Federal Government. The original predecessor of §5219, §41 of the 1864 National Bank Act, 13 Stat. Ill, permitted state taxation of national banks only on their real estate and shares; such taxes, McCulloch indicated, did not violate the Constitution’s protection of national banks. 4 Wheat., at 436-437. But whether a tax imposes an intolerable burden on national banks, and whether it imposes an intolerable burden on federal obligations by threatening to diminish their value, are questions that are historically and analytically distinct. Section 3701 responds to the latter concern, first addressed in Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (1829). Congress might well conclude that a tax not imposing an undue burden on national banks does unduly burden federal obligations, and § 5219 and § 3701 have always been directed to, and have protected, these separate federal interests.
A state tax affecting national banks holding federal obligations implicates both federal concerns, and therefore confronts both federal barriers to state taxation. Under the statutory scheme in effect in 1959, the year § 3701 was amended, a tax not satisfying the requirements of § 5219 was invalid whether or not it also satisfied the requirements of § 3701. Compare Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 676, 682-683 (1899) (franchise taxation of national bank violated predecessor to § 5219 prior to 1926 amendment of that statute, which permitted for the first time franchise taxes on national banks), with Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall., at 630-632 (franchise tax on state corporation not unlawful burden on federal obligations). Similarly, there was no reason to believe that a tax that violated § 3701 could be imposed on a bank merely because it did not also violate §5219. Indeed, while §5219 explicitly had permitted the levying of an income tax on national banks since 1923, see Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 267, 42 Stat. 1499, it was never contended that this permitted the inclusion of interest from federal obligations in the national banks’ taxable income.
Although it might be inferred from dicta in certain cases that the prior version of § 5219 implicitly authorized a State’s refusal to deduct the value of federal obligations from the assessed value of national bank shares, see, e. g., Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. 111, 115 (1902); Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 584-588 (1866), this implication has not been necessary for any of the Court’s decisions in this area. In the context of bank shares taxes, until the 1959 amendment of §3701 the prohibitions of §3701 and §5219 were coextensive. Because they were permitted expressly by § 5219, such taxes did not violate the proscription of taxes on national banks. And regardless of the manner in which a shares tax was computed, it did not violate § 3701 because it was assessed on an interest separate from the federal obligations held by the bank. See, e. g., Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 147. There was therefore no cause to consider whether § 5219 implicitly granted powers to burden federal obligations held by national banks that otherwise would have been denied by §3701.
The prior version of § 5219 thus need not be read as giving implied consent to taxation of federal obligations; on its face it was addressed only to the separate interdiction on taxation of national banks, and it never was necessary to decide whether implicitly it reached further. The plain language of §3701, as amended in 1959, therefore need not be seen as an “implied repeal” of the pre-1969 version of § 5219. The 1959 amendment of § 3701 left § 5219 entirely intact. All taxes on national banks except those enumerated in § 5219 still were unlawful. A shares tax on a national bank still was lawful. The 1959 amendment simply limited the ability of States to consider federal obligations when levying any form of tax, taxes on national banks included. States still could reach the value of federal obligations by imposing the other effective form of taxation permitted by § 5219, a franchise tax, which was expressly excepted from the prohibition contained in the amended language of §3701.
The doctrine disfavoring implied repeals thus is irrelevant for these cases. It does not justify the use of an unnecessary construction of the language of an ambiguous statute that no longer is on the books to defeat the plain language of an effective statute. This is particularly true when, as here, the “impairment” of the prior statute is minimal even if the prior statute is construed so as to maximize its conflict with the later one. See Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U. S., at 618-619. Given its current language, which does not mention or even arguably authorize any form of tax, it would be singularly inappropriate for this Court to hold for the first time that § 5219 authorizes the imposition of taxes that otherwise would violate §3701.
V
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1959 amendment to §3701 contradicts its plain language. Nor is the plain language of the amendment inconsistent with any other federal statute. In these circumstances, the plain language of § 3701 is controlling. The judgments of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals are therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Section § 3701, as so amended, 31 U. S. C. § 742, read:
“[A]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or inheritance taxes.”
Title 31 of the United States Code was not enacted into positive law until 1982, when it was reformulated without substantive change. Rev. Stat. § 3701, 31 U. S. C. § 742, then was replaced by 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) (1982 ed.). Act of Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 877, 945. Because the state taxes at issue here were levied in 1979 and 1980, the former Rev. Stat. § 3701, as amended, rather than the present 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) (1982 ed.) technically controls these cases.
As of January 1, 1982, Art. 7166 was replaced by substantively similar provisions of the Texas Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§21.09, 22.06, 23.11, 25.14 (1982). Until 1982, and at all times pertinent to these cases, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 7166 (Vernon 1960), read, in relevant part:
“Every banking corporation, State or national, doing business in the State shall, in the city or town in which it is located, render its real estate to the tax assessor at the time and in the manner required of individuals. At the time of making such rendition the president or some other officer of said bank shall file with said assessor a sworn statement showing the number and amount of shares of said bank, the name and residence of each shareholder, and the number and amount of shares owned by him. Every shareholder of said bank shall, in the city or town where said bank is located, render at their actual value to the tax assessor all shares owned by him in such bank; and in case of his failure to do so, the assessor shall assess such unrendered shares as other unrendered property. Each share in such bank shall be taxed only for the difference between its actual cash value and the proportionate amount per share at which its real estate is assessed.... Nothing herein shall be so construed as to tax national or State banks, or the shareholders thereof, at a greater rate than is assessed against other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals.”
Before its amendment in 1969, Rev. Stat. § 5219, as amended by the Act of Mar. 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223, 12 U. S. C. § 548, provided, in relevant part:
“The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associations located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4) according to or measured by their net income....”
The statute required that any such tax comply with certain conditions, principally designed to prohibit discrimination against national banks.
As amended in 1969, § 5219 provides: “For the purposes of any tax law enacted under authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located.” Pub. L. 91-156, § 2(a), 83 Stat. 434.
The court also rejected claims that the tax violated state law and the United States Constitution by placing a tax burden on banks heavier than it placed on other “moneyed capital” in the State. 615 S. W. 2d, at 813-816, 822-823. These holdings are not before us.
Montana Bankers Assn. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 177 Mont. 112, 580 P. 2d 909 (1978); First Security Bank of Bozeman v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 177 Mont. 119, 580 P. 2d 913 (1978). The Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld a similar bank shares tax. Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 285 S. E. 2d 920 (1982), appeal docketed, No. 81-1834.
Respondents Dallas County et al. suggest that “considered” may mean “characterized by deliberate thought,” so that a tax would be invalid under the section only if the tax assessor subjectively knew that the bank’s assets included federal obligations. Brief for Respondents Dallas County et al. 8-9. Respondents do not explain why Congress might have believed the subjective knowledge of the tax assessor worthy of federal concern. Moreover, on its face, the statute bars taxes requiring that federal obligations be considered “indirectly” in computing the tax.
A Texas Court of Civil Appeals itself has stated that each asset of a bank, apart from real estate holdings, is “included and considered in arriving at the value of the Bank’s shares.” City of Midland v. Midland National Bank, 607 S. W. 2d 303, 304 (1980).
The unenacted 31 U. S. C. §742, which codified Rev. Stat. §3701, included the introductory phrase “Except as otherwise provided by law....” Rev. Stat. § 3701 itself did not include that phrase, however, and the Statutes at Large prevail over the Code whenever the two are inconsistent. Stephan v. United States, 319 U. S. 423, 426 (1943). In fact, Congress was aware that Rev. Stat. § 3701 did not contain this phrase. Both the House and Senate Reports, although mentioning the phrase at one point, see S. Rep. No. 909, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1959) (Senate Report); H. R. Rep. No. 1148, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1959) (House Report), properly set forth the statute without the introductory clause. Senate Report, at 22; House Report, at 25. Moreover, the Reports summarized the amendment as making clear that, with specified exceptions, “both the principal and interest on U. S. obligations are exempt from all State taxes except....” Senate Report, at 2; House Report, at 2. There was no suggestion that some category of state taxes apart from those specifically preserved was to be impliedly excepted.
At the time the contested taxes were levied, at least six States other than Texas imposed a bank shares tax. Of the six statutes, five explicitly required that the share’s value be determined according to the value of the bank’s assets. See Ga. Code Ann. § 48-6-90 (1982); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §47:8 (West 1970) and §47:1967(0 (West Cum. Supp. 1982); Nev. Rev. Stat. §367:025 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5725.04 (1980) (repealed, effective Jan. 1, 1983, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5725.04 (Supp. 1982)); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, §7701 (Purdon Supp. 1982). One of the statutes, like Texas’, did not specify the method by which the assessment was to be made. See W. Va. Code § 11-3-14 (1974).
Accordingly, we need not decide whether Texas, by the use of some other method of assessing the shares, could avoid the plain prohibition of the statute.
See, e. g., Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 598-599 (1866) (Chase, C. J., concurring); 67 Cong. Rec. 6085-6986 (1926) (colloquy of Reps. Wingo and Cooper) (legalizing franchise tax measured by assets including federal obligations is “a use of words to conceal an idea”; “the decision of the Supreme Court which arrived at [that] conclusion gave me a headache, and it took me considerable time to be able to comprehend it”); id., at 6088 (remarks of Rep. Stevenson) (“the Supreme Court of the United States frequently obscures ideas by language as well as statesmen when they are on the stump.... When they held that the stock was taxable, although every dollar of it was invested in United States bonds, which were expressly exempt from taxation, they held practically the same thing”). See also Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 628-629 (1929); Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S., at 148.
The unenacted phrase “Except as otherwise provided by law,” added to the text of Rev. Stat. § 3701 by the codifiers of the United States Code in 1926, see n. 8, supra, almost certainly did not refer to §5219 or its predecessors. The drafters probably inserted the language as
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In federal court, petitioners asserted state law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1994 ed.), against respondent university, an arm of the State of Minnesota. Those claims were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and petitioners refiled them in state court past the period of limitations. The supplemental jurisdiction statute purports to toll the period of limitations for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. § 1367(d). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that provision unconstitutional when applied to claims against noncon-senting state defendants, such as respondent university, and dismissed petitioners’ claims. We affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that the tolling provision does not apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States.
I
In August 1995, petitioners Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charges alleged that their employer, the University of Minnesota, discriminated against them on the basis of age in December 1994 by attempting to compel them to accept early retirement at the age of 52. After petitioners refused to retire, the university allegedly reclassified petitioners’ jobs so as to reduce their salaries. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45; Brief for Petitioners 3.
The EEOC cross-filed petitioners’ charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and later issued a right-to-sue letter on June 6,1996, advising that petitioners could file a lawsuit within 90 days under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Brief for United States 5. The MDHR likewise issued right-to-sue letters on July 17,1996, advising petitioners that they could file suit within 45 days under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat., ch. 363 (1991). 620 N. W. 2d 680, 681 (Minn. 2001); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46 to A-47.
On or about August 29, 1996, each petitioner filed a separate complaint against respondent Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota (hereinafter respondent), in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 620 N. W. 2d, at 681; App. to Pet. for Cert. A-41. Each complaint alleged a federal cause of action under the ADEA and a state cause of action under the MHRA. The suits were subsequently consolidated. 604 N. W. 2d 128, 130 (Minn. App. 2000). Respondent filed answers to these complaints in September 1996, setting forth eight affirmative defenses, including that the suits were “ ‘barred in whole or in part by Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.’” Brief for Petitioners 4. The District Court entered a scheduling plan that the parties agreed upon. According to the plan, discovery would finish by May 30,1997, and dispositive motions would be filed by July 15,1997. Ibid. The parties then engaged in discovery as well as mediation. Ibid.
In early July 1997, respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Brief for Petitioners 5, n. 5. The motion argued that the federal and state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Respondent Regents of the University of Minnesota 5. Petitioners’ response acknowledged respondent’s “ ‘potential Eleventh Amendment immunity from state discrimination claims in Federal Court,’” but urged the District Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims if the federal claims were upheld. Brief for Petitioners 5-6. On July 11, 1997, the District Court granted respondent’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismissed all of petitioners’ claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-39. Petitioners appealed, but the appeal was stayed pending this Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000). 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Kimel held that the “ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.” 528 U. S., at 92. Given that result, petitioners moved to withdraw their appeal, and it was dismissed in January 2000. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682; Brief for Petitioners 6-7.
In the meantime, approximately three weeks after the Federal District Court had dismissed their state law claims, petitioners refiled their state law claims in Hennepin County District Court. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent’s answer asserted that “ ‘plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations.’” Brief for Petitioners 7. The state court initially stayed the lawsuit because of the pending federal appeal, but lifted the stay in December 1998 for the purpose of allowing respondent to move for dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent moved for summary judgment in February 1999, arguing that petitioners’ state claims were barred by the applicable 45 day statute of limitations. See Minn. Stat. §§363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000). Respondent also argued that the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, did not apply to toll the limitations period on the state law claims while they were pending in federal court because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ ADE A claims. Petitioners argued that the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute applied because their state law claims had been dismissed without prejudice. App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3, B-4. The State District Court treated respondent’s motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it, holding that § 1367(d) did “not apply ... because the federal district court never had ‘original jurisdiction’ over the controversy” since “both the state and federal claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at B-5, B-6.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court first decided that the Federal District Court had original jurisdiction over the case before respondent’s Eleventh Amendment defense was “successfully asserted.” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381 (1998)). The court then held that § 1367(d) applied to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims because that provision “allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal district court, whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the discretion of the federal district court under [§1367](c).” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132-133.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that respondent was an arm of the State, and found that the federal tolling provision facially applied to petitioners’ state law claims. 620 N. W. 2d, at 684, 687. The court concluded, however, “that application of section 1367(d) to toll the statute of limitations applicable to state law claims against an unconsenting state defendant first filed in federal court but then dismissed and brought in state court is an impermissible denigration of [respondent’s] Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id., at 687. The court thus concluded that § 1367(d) could not constitutionally apply to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims, and it dismissed those claims. We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 1065 (2001), on the question whether 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d) is unconstitutional as applied to a state defendant.
H-I l — l
In Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), this Court held that federal courts deciding claims within their federal-question subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, may decide state law claims not within their subject matter jurisdiction if the federal and state law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and comprise “but one constitutional 'case.’ ” Mine Workers, supra, at 725. Jurisdiction over state law claims in such instances was known as “pendent jurisdiction.” This Court later made clear that, absent authorization from Congress, a district court could not exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims involving parties who were not already parties to a claim independently within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989).
In the wake of Finley, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that “Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same ‘transaction or occurrence’ as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional parties.” Report of Federal Courts Study Committee 47 (Apr. 2, 1990). Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. Subsection (a) of § 1367 states that
“[ejxcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”
Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court’s original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Subsection (c) allows district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain situations, such as when a “claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” § 1367(c)(1) (1994 ed.).
Petitioners originally sought to have their state law claims heard in federal court as supplemental claims falling under § 1367(a). App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3. Prior to the enactment of § 1367, however, this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal court. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 120 (1984). In that context, the Eleventh Amendment was found to be an “explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction.” Id., at 118. Consequently, an express grant of jurisdiction over such claims would be an abrogation of the sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Before Congress could attempt to do that, it must make its intention to abrogate “‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)).
The most that can be said about subsection (a), however, is that it is a general grant of jurisdiction, no more specific to claims against nonconsenting States than the one at issue in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775 (1991). There, we considered whether 28 U. S. C. § 1362 contained a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. That grant of jurisdiction provides that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
Such a. facially broad grant of jurisdiction over “all civil actions” could be read to include claims by Indian tribes against nonconsenting States, but we held that such language was insufficient to constitute a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Blatchford, supra, at 786. Likewise, we cannot read § 1367(a) to authorize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States, even though nothing in the statute expressly excludes such claims. Thus, consistent with Blatch- ford, we hold that § 1367(a)’s grant of jurisdiction does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants.
Even so, there remains the question whether § 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations for claims against nonconsenting States that are asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Subsection (d) of § 1367 provides that
“[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”
On its face, subsection (d) purports to apply to dismissals of “any claim asserted under subsection (a).” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus, it could be broadly read to apply to any claim technically “asserted” under subsection (a) as long as it was later dismissed, regardless of the reason for dismissal. But reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims against nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of the provision given principles of state sovereign immunity. If subsection (d) applied in such circumstances, it would toll the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to however long the claim had been pending in federal court. This would require a State to defend against a claim in state court that had never been filed in state court until some indeterminate time after the original limitations period had elapsed.
When the sovereign at issue is the United States, we have recognized that a limitations period may be “a central condition” of the sovereign’s waiver of immunity. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 843 (1986); see also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity”)- In suits against the United States, however, there is a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling under federal law applies to waivers of the United States’ immunity. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990). From this, the dissent argues that any broadening of a State’s waiver of immunity through tolling under § 1367(d) presumptively does not violate the State’s sovereign immunity. Post, at 552-553, and n. 11 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But this Court has never held that waivers of a State’s immunity presumptively include all federal tolling rules, nor is it obvious that such a presumption would be “a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Irwin, supra, at 95.
Moreover, with respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State “may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued,” Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858), and that “[o]nly the sovereign’s own consent could qualify the absolute character of [its] immunity” from suit in its own courts, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414 (1979). Thus, although we have not directly addressed whether federal tolling of a state statute of limitations constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity with respect to claims against state defendants, we can say that the notion at least raises a serious constitutional doubt.
Consequently, we have good reason to rely on a clear statement principle of statutory construction. When “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 242). This principle applies when Congress “intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States” or when it legislates in “ ‘traditionally sensitive areas’ ” that “ ‘affec[t] the federal balance.’ ” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)). In such cases, the clear statement principle reflects “an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461, 464 (1991).
Here, allowing federal law to extend the time period in which a state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the federal balance in an area that has been a historic power of the States, whether or not it constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Thus, applying the clear statement principle helps “ ‘assur[e] that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.’” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting Bass, supra, at 349). This is obviously important when the underlying issue raises a serious constitutional doubt or problem. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 787 (2000) (relying in part on clear statement principle to decide the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729-3733 (1994 ed.), did not authorize “an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against a State” and avoiding whether such a suit would violate the Eleventh Amendment, an issue raising a serious constitutional doubt); Gregory, supra, at 464 (relying on clear statement principle to determine that state judges were excluded from the ADEA in order to “avoid a potential constitutional problem” given the constraints on the Court’s “ability to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places on Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause”).
The question then is whether § 1367(d) states a clear intent to toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting States that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Here the lack of clarity is apparent in two respects. With respect to the claims the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) to cover any claim “asserted” under subsection (a), but we have previously found similarly general language insufficient to satisfy clear statement requirements. For example, we have held that a statute providing civil remedies for violations committed by “ ‘any recipient of Federal assistance’” was “not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment” even when it was undisputed that a state defendant was a recipient of federal aid. Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 245-246 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982 ed.) (emphasis in original)). Instead, we held that “[w]hen Congress chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.” 473 U. S., at 246. Likewise, § 1367(d) reflects no specific or unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims asserted against nonconsenting States, especially considering that such claims do not fall within the proper scope of § 1367(a) as explained above.
With respect to the dismissals the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) in isolation to authorize tolling regardless of the reason for dismissal, but § 1367(d) occurs in the context of a statute that specifically contemplates only a few grounds for dismissal. The requirements of § 1367(a) make clear that a claim will be subject to dismissal if it fails to “form part of the same case or controversy” as a claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction. Likewise, § 1367(b) entails that certain claims will be subject to dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over them would be “inconsistent” with 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, § 1367(c) (1994 ed.) lists four specific situations in which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that particular context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”). In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, we are looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes, not a clear statement of what it excludes. See Gregory, supra, at 467. Section 1367(d) fails this test. As such, we will not read § 1367(d) to apply to dismissals of claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In anticipation of this result, petitioners argue that the tolling provision should be interpreted to apply to their claims because Congress enacted it to prevent due process violations caused by state claim preclusion and anti-claim-splitting laws. Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief for Petitioners 5-12. In other words, petitioners contend that Congress enacted the tolling provision to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against perceived state violations. We have previously addressed the argument that if a statute were passed pursuant to Congress’ §5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, federalism concerns “might carry less weight.” Gregory, 501 U. S., at 468. We concluded, however, that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism,” id., at 469, and held that insofar as statutory intent was ambiguous, we would “not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 470. That same rule applies here. As already demonstrated, it is far from clear whether Congress intended tolling to apply when claims against non-consenting States were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Thus, it is not relevant whether Congress acted pursuant to § 5.
Petitioners also argue that our construction of the statute does not resolve their case because respondent consented to suit in federal court. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. We have stated that “[a] sovereign’s immunity may be waived” and have “held that a State may consent to suit against it in federal court.” Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 99 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883)). Petitioners claim that respondent consented to suit by not moving to dismiss petitioners’ state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds until July 1997, some 10 months after the federal lawsuits were filed in August 1996. Yet respondent raised its Eleventh Amendment defense at the earliest possible opportunity by including that defense in its answers that were filed in September 1996. Given that, we cannot say that respondent “unequivocally expressed” a consent to be sued in federal court. Pennhurst, supra, at 99 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974)). The fact that respondent filed its motion in July 1997 is as consistent with adherence to the pretrial schedule as it is with anything else.
Indeed, such circumstances are readily distinguishable from the limited situations where this Court has found a State consented to suit, such as when a State voluntarily invoked federal court jurisdiction or otherwise “ma[de] a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.” College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 676 (1999). And even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that consent could be inferred “from the failure to raise the objection at the outset of the proceedings,” Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S., at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring) — a standard this Court has not adopted — consent would still not be found here since respondent raised the issue in its answer. Thus, we find no merit to petitioners’ argument that respondent was a consenting state defendant during the federal court proceedings. We express no view on the application or constitutionality of § 1367(d) when a State consents to suit or when a defendant is not a State.
l — l t — 1 I — (
We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal court on petitioners’ state law claims and that § 1367(d) does not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367(d) did not operate to toll the period of limitations for petitioners’ claims, and we affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissing those claims.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On July 13, 1966, the United States filed a civil antitrust suit against Phillips Petroleum Co. (Phillips) and petitioner Tidewater Oil Co. (Tidewater). The complaint alleged that Phillips’ acquisition of certain assets and operations of Tidewater violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 18. The District Court denied the United States’ motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent consummation of the acquisition, and its subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction to require either rescission of the acquisition or maintenance by Phillips of the going-concern value of the transferred assets and operations.
Petitioner continued as a party to the suit during some five years of pretrial discovery and preparation. Then in April 1971, following the Government’s announcement that it was ready for trial, petitioner moved to be dismissed as a party. The District Court denied the motion, but found that it involved “a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from [the] order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.” It therefore certified “its order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal under Section 1292 (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code.” As required by the statute, Tidewater then applied to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for leave to prosecute the appeal. That court, however, denied the application relying solely on its previous decision in United States v. FMC Corp., 321 F. 2d 534 (1963). There an attempt was made to appeal an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction in a Government civil antitrust case. Notwithstanding that 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1) provides for an appeal of right to the courts of appeals from an order granting or denying preliminary injunctions, the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over such an appeal in a Government civil antitrust case because of § 2 of the Expediting Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29, which provides that “[i]n every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under any of [the Antitrust] Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court.” In this case, then, the Court of Appeals extended its prior ruling to interlocutory orders within § 1292 (b). Because this decision raises an important question of federal appellate jurisdiction and because a conflict among the circuits subsequently developed on this question, we granted cer-tiorari. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I
To determine the relevance of 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) for Government civil antitrust cases, it is necessary first to consider the original purpose of § 2 of the Expediting Act and the over half-century of experience with that section in the context of interlocutory appeals provisions that preceded the enactment of § 1292 (b) in 1958.
In an effort to “expedite [certain] litigation of great and general importance,” 36 Cong. Rec. 1679 (remarks of Sen. Fairbanks), Congress enacted § 2 of the Expediting Act in 1903 to withdraw all intermediate appellate jurisdiction in Government civil antitrust cases. At the time of the passage of the Expediting Act, the then recently established circuit courts of appeals had jurisdiction under the Evarts Act over an appeal not only from a “final decision” but also from “an interlocutory order or decree” granting or continuing an injunction or appointing a receiver “in a cause in which an appeal from a final decree may he taken... to the circuit court of appeals.’’ Hence, by lodging exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the “final judgment of the district court” in this Court, the Expediting Act necessarily eliminated court of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory, as well as final, decrees in Government civil antitrust cases.
Congress thus initially determined to speed appellate review by channeling appeals in Expediting Act cases directly to this Court and to avoid the delay inherent in piecemeal appeal by conditioning appeal upon the presence of a “final judgment.” But mere speed in the disposition of Government civil antitrust cases was not Congress’ only concern; that result might have been achieved simply by establishing procedures for the expeditious handling of such cases in the courts of appeals. Congress was also intent upon facilitating review by this Court “of a class of antitrust cases deemed particularly important.” Because of the importance of uniform interpretation of the antitrust law, which was still in its infancy in 1903, it is understandable that Congress chose to establish this special appellate procedure for Government civil antitrust cases, which were thought generally to involve issues of wide importance.
During the 25 years following the enactment of the Expediting Act, Congress amended the Evarts Act provision governing interlocutory appeals to the courts of appeals on four separate occasions — in 1906, 1911, 1925, and 1928. It can be argued that on its face the very first of these amendments once again made interlocutory appeals available to the courts of appeals in Government civil antitrust cases and that the language of each successive amendment, where relevant, perpetuated that state of affairs. But, while the clear meaning of statutory language is not to be ignored, “words are inexact tools at best,” Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479 (1943), and hence it is essential that we place the words of a statute in their proper context by resort to the legislative history. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in this case. For we find it inconceivable that Congress, having purposefully withdrawn the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in certain antitrust cases in 1903, would re-establish it in the same cases — but only for interlocutory orders — just three years later in 1906, without making any reference to that purpose. Yet no mention of either the Expediting Act or Government civil antitrust cases is to be found in the legislative history of the 1906 amendment to the interlocutory appeals provision — or, for that matter, in that of the successive amendments insofar as they are relevant; rather, for each amendment some purpose wholly unrelated to Expediting Act cases is apparent from the relevant legislative materials. In light of this, we find it impossible to ascribe to Congress an intent to impair the original exclusivity of this Court’s jurisdiction under § 2 through any of these amendments to the interlocutory appeals provision.
This clearly was the view of the seven members of the unanimous Court in United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 U. S. 553 (1929). There, in rejecting the argument that an appeal lay to the court of appeals from an order denying a motion to intervene in a Government civil antitrust case, the Court stated:
“[The Evarts Act] provisions governing appeals in general were amended by the Expediting Act so that in suits in equity under the Anti-Trust Act ‘in which the United States is complainant,’ the appeal should be direct to this Court from the final decree in the trial court. Thus, Congress limited the right of review to an appeal from the decree which disposed of all matters... ; and it precluded the possibility of an appeal to either [this Court or the court of appeals] from an interlocutory decree.” Id., at 558 (emphasis added).
And a decade and a half later, in Allen Calculators v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U. S. 137, 142 (1944), the Court reiterated “that jurisdiction to review District Court decrees was not vested in the Circuit Courts of Appeals but solely in this court, and [the Expediting Act] limited the right of appeal to final decrees.” It is true that interlocutory orders in Government civil antitrust cases were subsequently held reviewable by way of extraordinary writs under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a), but application for the extraordinary writ must be made to this Court where “sole appellate jurisdiction lies” in such cases. United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U. S. 196, 201-203 (1945); De Beers Consolidated Mines v. United States, 325 U. S. 212, 217 (1945).
The wording of the interlocutory appeals provision was again altered in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. The result — after certain subsequent minor changes not here relevant — was the present 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a) (1), which allows “[ijnterlocutory orders of the district courts... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions...” to be appealed to the courts of appeals “except where a direct review may he had in the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.) This final clause is susceptible of two plausible constructions that yield opposite results in cases subject to the Expediting Act. A direct review of interlocutory orders in Government civil antitrust cases clearly may be had in this Court, thus barring resort to § 1292 (a)(1) — or so it would seem. But direct review may not be had when the interlocutory order is entered since there is no “final judgment,” the predicate of an appeal under the Expediting Act. Therefore, were the final clause construed as directed only at the present availability of review in this Court, it would not, on its face, bar an interlocutory appeal. However, the function of the Revisers of the 1948 Code was generally limited to that of consolidation and codification. Consequently, a well-established principle governing the interpretation of provisions altered in the 1948 revision is that “no change is to be presumed unless clearly expressed.” Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 228 (1957). We find no such clear expression here. To the contrary, the Revisers’ Notes fail to reveal any intention to expand the scope of the pre-existing jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over interlocutory appeals; the new § 1292 is described merely as a consolidation of a number of previously separate code provisions — including the general interlocutory appeals provision — “with necessary changes in phraseology to effect the consolidation.”
In sum, then, our examination of the history and evolution of the present § 1292 (a) (1) — the direct descendant of the original interlocutory appeals provision contained in the Evarts Act — has convinced us that at least up to the passage of § 1292 (b) in 1958, Congress had not impaired the original exclusivity of this Court’s jurisdiction under § 2 of the Expediting Act. As is usually true of questions of statutory construction, the issue is not totally free from doubt. Yet, in the last analysis, whatever ambiguity may exist in the lengthy history of the original interlocutory appeals provision relative to the Expediting Act, it results primarily from the absence of any consideration of Government civil antitrust cases in that history and thus emphasizes the extent to which appellate jurisdiction in such cases has long been viewed as a peculiarly distinct matter. Cf. United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U. S., at 202-203. Certainly, this conclusion finds substantial support in our prior decisions in which we have consistently interpreted our appellate jurisdiction under § 2 as exclusive.
II
With this background, the question becomes what effect, if any, the enactment of § 1292 (b) in 1958 had upon this Court's theretofore exclusive appellate jurisdiction in Government civil antitrust cases. Section 1292 (b) provides in relevant part:
“When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order....”
At the outset petitioner contends that there is simply no conflict between this provision and § 2 of the Expediting Act. It suggests that “civil action” must be read as an all-inclusive phrase that covers, inter alia, Government civil antitrust eases. At the same time, it points out that § 1292 (b) is concerned only with interlocutory orders, while the Expediting Act deals only with final judgments. Thus, petitioner concludes that the enactment of § 1292 (b) made discretionary interlocutory appeals available where none had previously existed, and that the two statutes are in complete harmony with one another.
Such a facile argument could also be made to support the contention that § 1292 (a)(1) can be invoked in Expediting Act cases — were it not for the fact that, as we have already seen, § 2 does not merely apply solely to a “final judgment” but also limits the right of appeal to a “final judgment.” Likewise, we can hardly accept petitioner’s suggestion that when Congress enacted § 1292 (b), it wrote upon a clean slate insofar as appeals from interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases are concerned. Nor do we find in § 1292 (b) the “sharp break with the traditional policy” of limited availability of interlocutory appeal so apparent to the dissent. The new provision hardly created a general right of interlocutory appeal; rather, it only extended the availability of such appeals to a limited group of orders — not previously covered by § 1292 (a) — that involve “a controlling question of law” the immediate appeal of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” In short, the consistent construction that had been accorded § 2 prior to the enactment of § 1292 (b) cannot simply be ignored in determining the impact of that section on Government civil antitrust cases, cf. Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm’n, 393 U. S. 186, 191-194 (1968). Acceptance of petitioner’s contention would require us to conclude that § 1292 (b) was intended to revise the policies underlying the Expediting Act for the first time — that it was intended as the first departure from the purposes of avoiding piecemeal appeal and of limiting review of important questions of antitrust law to this Court. We have been unable to discern any such intention.
The legislative history associated with § 1292 (b) contains no mention of cases within the Expediting Act. Reference, to be sure, was made to antitrust cases, but it is clear on the face of these statements that they refer only to private treble-damages actions. In fact, rather than indicating that § 1292 (b) was intended to apply to antitrust cases subject to final review in this Court under the Expediting Act, the legislative history strongly suggests an essentially contrary conclusion: the subsection was intended to apply only to interlocutory orders, “not otherwise appealable under” § 1292 (a), in civil actions in which the courts of appeals would have jurisdiction over an appeal from the final judgment under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. For instance, in explaining the proposed statute, the Senate Report on § 1292 (b) states:
“The bill results from a growing awareness of the need for expedition of cases pending before the district courts. Many cases which are filed in the Federal district courts require the district judge to entertain motions at an early stage in the proceedings which, if determined, against the plaintiff, result in a final order which would then be appealable to the circuit courts of appeals of the United States. However, such motions, if determined in the plaintiff’s favor, are interlocutory since they do not end the litigation and are not therefore, under existing provisions of law, appealable.”
This is hardly supportive of petitioner’s position, and yet throughout the legislative materials the focus similarly remains on interlocutory orders in civil cases that would be appealable to the courts of appeals upon final judgment.
Petitioner’s case is further weakened by the extraordinary result that acceptance of its position would yield. Section 1292 (a) provides for an appeal as a matter of right from a number of specified types of interlocutory orders — in particular, interlocutory orders granting or denying injunctions. Those interlocutory orders not within subsection (a), however, were made appeal-able in § 1292 (b), subject to the judgment and discretion of the district court and the court of appeals. Greater importance obviously was attached to those types of interlocutory orders specified in subsection (a) than to those covered by (b). Nevertheless, petitioner would have us conclude that Congress intended to establish court of appeals jurisdiction for all interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases, except those orders for which an appeal of right is provided in § 1292 (a)(1). As the Government notes, such a result would effectively turn § 1292 on its head. Consistent with the evident thrust of the statute’s legislative history, the much more sensible conclusion is that § 1292 (b) was intended to establish jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review interlocutory orders, other than those specified in § 1292 (a), in civil cases in which they would have jurisdiction were the judgments final.
At the foundation of the petitioner’s position in this case is the contention that § 1292 (b) is the panacea for the special burdens imposed on this Court by § 2 of the Expediting Act. Both the Court and various individual Members have on occasion commented that “[w]hatever may have been the wisdom of the Expediting Act in providing direct appeals in antitrust cases at the time of its enactment in 1903, time has proven it unsatisfactory,” for “[djirect appeals not only place a great burden on the Court but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Courts of Appeals.” United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U. S. 174, 175 n. 1 (1963); see Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U. S. 562, 595 n. 5 (1972) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Borden Co., 370 U. S. 460, 477n. (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 355 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring); id., at 364-365 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Further, in light of the present size of our docket, direct review “seldom results in much expedition” since we normally must examine the entire record and resolve all questions however unsubstantial. Id., at 355 (Clark, J., concurring); see id., at 364 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); United States v. Borden Co., supra, at 477 n. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Our action today should not be construed as a retreat from these previous remarks. On the contrary, we remain convinced that under present circumstances the Expediting Act fails to hasten substantially the final disposition of important antitrust actions while it unjustifiably burdens this Court with inadequately sifted records and with cases that could be disposed of by review in the courts of appeals. Uniformity in the interpretation and administration of the antitrust laws continues to be an important consideration. But such uniformity could be adequately ensured by the availability of review in this Court on certiorari of cases involving issues of general importance — together with the “[ljimited expediting of such cases, under the discretion of this Court,” Ford Motor Co. v. United States, supra, at 595 n. 5 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where time is a factor. The simple fact is that “[t]he legal issues in most [Government] civil antitrust cases are no longer so novel or unsettled as to make them especially appropriate for initial appellate consideration by this Court, as compared with those in a variety of other areas of federal law,” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, at 364 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Yet, despite all of these criticisms, our personal views as to the wisdom of § 2 are, of course, no basis for disregarding what we are bound to recognize as the plain and unaltered intent of Congress to require that appeals in Government civil antitrust cases be taken only from final judgments and only to this Court.
In any event, petitioner has failed to convince us that permitting appeals under § 1292 (b) would provide a meaningful solution — if any solution at all — to the various problems created for the Court by the Expediting Act. In the first place, the availability of interlocutory appeals under § 1292 (b) would not reduce the number of Government civil antitrust cases that could be brought. to this Court on direct appeal upon the entrance of a final judgment. Nor would it reduce the number of issues subject to review by this Court; any issue determined on interlocutory appeal would normally be open to consideration on final appeal, and doubtless some party would raise an issue appealed under § 1292 (b) since it must have involved “a controlling question of law.” Also, there would be the added problem of applications for certiorari following a certified appeal in Expediting Act cases. By definition, the issue will be a substantial one and, where the appellate decision is questionable, it would be necessary to decide whether to grant certiorari, which might require the Court to consider a particular case, on two separate occasions, or to deny certiorari, which might mean allowing the district court to proceed to final judgment on an erroneous basis. Given the potential waste of limited judicial resources — those either of this Court or of the district court — associated with each choice, neither can be considered attractive. Finally, in emphasizing the value of the screening function that court of appeals review would provide in Expediting Act cases, we have consistently focused upon the lengthy records and complex factual issues common to such cases. Yet, as is illustrated by this very case, in which the certified question relates to a motion to dismiss a party, questions that would be presented to the courts of appeals under § 1292 (b) would often involve threshold procedural issues not requiring extensive analysis of the record. With respect to such issues the screening function performed by intermediate appellate review is of far less significance than it would be with respect to questions of, say, relevant market, competition, or agreement. But these latter questions can be properly decided only after full development of the evidence, and it is therefore doubtful at best that interlocutory appeals would aid this Court in dealing with them on final review.
Nor are we even certain that the expeditious termination of litigation in the district courts — the express purpose of § 1292 (b) — would be materially advanced in the context of Government civil antitrust cases by acceptance of petitioner’s contention. Permitting interlocutory appeals under § 1292 (b) in Expediting Act eases would result in an anomalous situation: the court of appeals would have jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders but not over the final judgment, which would be appealable only to this Court. An interlocutory appeal taken under § 1292 (b) must, of course, involve “a controlling question of law” the immediate appeal of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” In the normal case, the decision of such a question on interlocutory appeal is final since the same court reviews the final judgment, and the likelihood of review in this Court on certiorari is very small. Here, however, the decision of the court of appeals on the interlocutory order would essentially be only an advisory opinion to the district court since the issue would usually be open to relitigation on appeal of the final judgment to this Court. The net result would be added work for the courts of appeals, with no assurance that there would ultimately be a saving of district court time.
Ill
Hence, we conclude that § 1292 (b) did not establish jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases. The exclusive nature of the jurisdiction created in § 2 of the Expediting Act has consistently been recognized by this Court, and we hold today that that exclusivity remains unimpaired. Despite our interest in a restructuring of our jurisdiction under the Expediting Act, we are neither willing nor able to adopt the ungainly half measure offered by the petitioner in this case.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice White joins the Court’s opinion except for the advisory to Congress reflecting one view of the relative merits of the Expediting Act.
Tidewater then transferred title to its Western Marketing and Manufacturing Division to Phillips.
Tidewater merged with Getty- Oil Co. on September 30, 1967. It has never been contended that that merger altered Tidewater’s legal status in this case.
In its motion to be dismissed, Tidewater contended “that Section 7 of the Clayton Act is directed only against the acquiring corporation and not against the seller, that the sale of assets by defendant Tidewater Oil Company to Phillips Petroleum Company has long ago been consummated, that no relief is obtainable against Tidewater Oil Company, and that its presence in the suit is no longer necessary or appropriate.”
Subsequent to the decision by the Ninth Circuit in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that § 1292 (b) could be used to take an interlocutory appeal in a Government civil antitrust case. See Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F. 2d 1241, 1244-1248, cert. denied, 405 U. S. 1041 (1972). The only other court of appeals to consider the question, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reached the same result as the Ninth Circuit in this case. See Farbenfabriken Bayer, A. G. v. United States, 1968 CCH Trade Cas. ¶ 72,570, cert. denied, 393 U. S. 959 (1968); Glaxo Group, Ltd. v. United States, Misc. No. 3261 (June 25, 1968).
405 U. S. 986 (1972). We had originally denied certiorari, 404 U. S.941 (1971).
Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770.
See also Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 375 U. S. 39, 40 (1963), modified, 375 U. S. 994 (1964).
Section 1 of the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. §28, requires that a three-judge district court be convened to hear any Governitíent civil antitrust case that the Attorney General certifies to be of “general public importance.” See also 49 U. S. C. § 44. This three-judge court provision is also a reflection of the “great importance” attached to Government civil antitrust cases and was intended to provide a mechanism for full consideration of such cases by a panel of judges “before presentation to the Supreme Court as if heard by the United States circuit court of appeals.” H. R. Rep. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1903). But this provision has been seldom used.
Act of Feb. 11, 1903, § 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, §291, 36 Stat. 1167; Act of June 9, 1944, c. 239, 58 Stat. 272; Act of June 25, 1948, § 17, 62 Stat. 989. As originally enacted, the statute read in relevant part as follows:
“That in every suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any circuit court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant,... an appeal from the final decree of the circuit court will lie only to the Supreme Court and must be taken within sixty days from the entry thereof
There is no contention here that the very minor changes in wording effected by the subsequent amendments and codifications of the statute in any way altered the original meaning of the Act.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 2, 26 Stat. 826.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, §6, 26 Stat. 828.
Act of June 6, 1900, c. 803, 31 Stat. 660, amending Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 7, 26 Stat. 828, as amended, Act of Feb. 18, 1895, 28 Stat. 666 (emphasis added).
In United States v. California Cooperative Canneries. 279 U. S. 553, 558 (1929), Mr. Justice Brandéis, speaking for the Court, detailed the causes of delay that prompted the Expediting Act:
“Congress sought by the Expediting Act to ensure speedy disposition of suits in equity brought by the United States under the Anti-Trust Act. Before the passage of the Expediting Act the opportunities for delay were many. From a final decree in the trial court under the Anti-Trust Act an appeal lay to the Circuit Court of Appeals; and six months were allowed for taking the appeal. From the judgment of the Court of Appeals an appeal lay to this Court; and one year was allowed for taking that appeal. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, §§ 6, 11, 26 Stat. 826, 828, 829. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 60 Fed. 306; 60 Fed. 934; 156 U. S. 1; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 53 Fed. 440; 58 Fed. 58; 166 U. S. 290. Moreover, there might be an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from a decree granting or denying an interlocutory injunction, Act of June 6, 1900, c. 803, 31 Stat. 660.”
See also United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U. S. 196, 203 (1945).
United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F. 2d 662, 664 (CA1 1969); see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 364 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); 36 Cong. Rec. 1679 (remarks of Sen. Fairbanks); cf. n. 7, supra.
Act of July 2,1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
In saying this, we are not to be understood as necessarily accepting today an important premise that underlies § 2 — namely, that the courts of appeals, subject to review on certiorari in this Court, are incapable of providing the uniformity of interpretation necessary to the administration of the antitrust laws. See infra, at 170. In 1903, the courts of appeals had been in existence for only 12 years and various reservations about them had not yet been dispelled. See F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 258 (1927). Since that time, we have had over a half-century of experience with the courts of appeals — including experience in the field of private antitrust litigation — which has resolved any initial doubts. See ibid.
Act of Apr. 14, 1906, c. 1627, 34 Stat. 116.
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 129, 36 Stat. 1134.
Act of Feb. 13,1925, amending § 129, 43 Stat. 937.
Act of Apr. 11, 1928, c. 354, 45 Stat. 422.
The 1906 amendment removed the limitation on interlocutory appeal to causes "in which an appeal from a final decree may be taken... to the circuit court of appeals” and provided simply that such an appeal may be taken to the court of appeals “in any cause.” Act of Apr. 14, 1906, c. 1627, 34 Stat. 116. In codifying the Evarts Act interlocutory appeals provision in 1911, “in any cause” was struck, and the provision was amended to allow the courts of appeals to entertain appeals from interlocutory orders “notwithstanding an appeal in such case might, upon final decree under the statutes regulating the same, be taken directly to the Supreme Court.” Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 129, 36 Stat. 1134. Finally, the famous Judges’ Bill of 1925, in turn struck the “notwithstanding” language, with the result that the codified provision, § 129, simply allowed an appeal to be “taken from [an] interlocutory order or decree [granting or denying an injunction or appointing a receiver] to the circuit court of appeals....” Act of Feb. 13, 1925, amending § 129, 43 Stat. 937.
The 1928 amendment is completely without relevance here since it merely extended the applicability of the statute to interlocutory orders issued by the District Courts of Alaska, Hawaii, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. Act of Apr. 11, 1928, c. 354, 45 Stat. 422.
See S. Rep. No. 2192, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906): H. R. Rep. No. 542, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906); 40 Cong. Rec. 1723, 1742, 4429, 4856-4857, 5056.
As to the 1911 amendment, see S. Rep. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 53 (1910); H. R. Doc. No. 783, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 57 (1910); H. R. Rep. No. 818, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910); S. Doc. No. 848
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is held in the custody of respondent, Warden of the Tennessee State Penitentiary, under a sentence of life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. Challenging the validity of that sentence under the Fourteenth Amendment, he commenced this action in the Tennessee courts to obtain his freedom. We granted certiorari, 347 U. S. 933, because of the substantial question presented by his constitutional claim.
The basic facts are undisputed. Petitioner is a middle-aged Negro of little education. He was indicted on March 10, 1949, for the offense of housebreaking and larceny, an offense punishable by a term of three to ten years. The indictment charged him with breaking and entering a business house and stealing therefrom sundry items of the aggregate value of $3. Following his arrest, petitioner was released on bond while awaiting trial set for May 17, 1949. On that day, without an attorney and without notice of any habitual criminal accusation against him, petitioner appeared in court intending to plead guilty to the indictment. He “felt that an attorney could do him no good on said charge [housebreaking and larceny] When his case was called for trial, he was orally advised by the trial judge that he would also be tried as an habitual criminal because of three alleged prior felonies. He was informed that conviction under the Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. Petitioner promptly asked for a continuance to enable him to obtain counsel on the habitual criminal accusation. His request was summarily denied, a jury was impaneled, and the case proceeded immediately to trial. Petitioner entered his plea of guilty to the housebreaking and larceny charge, and the prosecution introduced evidence in corroboration of the plea. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury to raise their right hands if they accepted petitioner’s guilty plea on the housebreaking and larceny charge and if they approved of a three-year sentence on that charge. The jury responded by raising their right hands. The judge then instructed the jury to raise their right hands a second time if they found petitioner to be an habitual criminal. Once again the jury, without ever having left the jury box, raised their right hands. The entire proceeding — from the impaneling of the jury to the passing of sentence — consumed between five and ten minutes.
Three years later, having served his sentence on the housebreaking and larceny charge, petitioner applied to the Circuit Court of Knox County for habeas corpus relief. He alleged that his sentence as an habitual criminal was invalid on the ground, among others, that he had been denied an opportunity to obtain counsel in his defense. At a hearing on the application, petitioner, his wife, his brother, a juror, and the prosecuting attorney testified as to their recollection of petitioner’s trial. All five witnesses were in full accord as to the above-stated facts. They differed only on whether petitioner had pleaded guilty to the habitual criminal accusation and whether the prosecution had introduced any evidence concerning petitioner’s prior convictions. The prosecuting attorney, the only witness for the state, testified that petitioner had pleaded guilty to the habitual criminal accusation as well as the housebreaking and larceny charge, and that the record of petitioner’s prior convictions had been read to the jury; the other four witnesses denied it. In all other respects, the testimony of the prosecuting attorney substantiated the testimony of the other four witnesses. Thus he conceded that petitioner had not been represented by counsel, that petitioner had not been given any pretrial notice of the habitual criminal accusation, that petitioner “said he wanted the case put off as he was advised by the Court that he was being tried as an habitual criminal in addition to house breaking and larceny. He asked that the case be put off so he could get a lawyer and [the trial judge] told him he had had since January up to May to get a lawyer.”
The Circuit Court, after hearing the. case on the merits, accepted — as does the respondent here — petitioner’s factual allegations as to the denial of counsel. The Circuit Court nevertheless upheld the validity of petitioner’s sentence and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. Both courts emphasized that the Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act, like similar legislation in other states, does not create a separate'offense but only enhances a defendant’s punishment on being convicted of his fourth felony. Tipton v. State, 160 Tenn. 664, 672-678, 28 S. W. 2d 635, 637-639. See also McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 313; Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 623-624. From that premise, the courts below reasoned that petitioner had waived any right to counsel on the habitual criminal accusation by waiving counsel on the housebreaking and larceny charge. With this conclusion, we cannot agree.
Section 1 of the Act defines “habitual criminal” in considerable detail. Section 7 prescribes standards for the admissibility of the record of the prior convictions of a defendant charged with being an habitual criminal. This section, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held, clearly authorizes “[a]n issue of fact as to the verity of such record, or as to the identity of the accused with the person named in such record . . . Tipton v. State, 160 Tenn. 664, 678, 28 S. W. 2d 635, 639. Proof of the defendant’s prior convictions is . . a condition precedent to the imposition of the increased punishment provided.” Tipton v. State, supra. Section 6 of the Act, moreover, provides that the increased punishment cannot be imposed unless the jury specially finds that the defendant is an habitual criminal as charged. “Under section 6 of the Act,” according to the Tennessee Supreme Court, “the question as to whether the defendant is an habitual criminal is one for the jury to decide.” McCummings v. State, 175 Tenn. 309, 311, 134 S. W 2d 151, 152. In short, even though the Act does not create a separate offense, its applicability to any defendant charged with being an habitual criminal must be determined by a jury in a judicial hearing. Compare Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241. That hearing and the trial on the felony charge, although they may be conducted in a single proceeding, are essentially independent of each other. Thus, for example, it is possible that the jury in the instant case might have found petitioner guilty on the housebreaking and larceny charge and yet found him innocent of being an habitual criminal. Apparently recognizing this possibility, petitioner at the earliest possible moment affirmatively sought an opportunity to obtain counsel on the habitual criminal accusation. Immediately on being informed of the accusation and suddenly finding himself in danger of life imprisonment, he requested a continuance so that he could engage the services of an attorney; but the trial court refused the request and forced him to stand immediate trial. On these undisputed facts, it is clear beyond question that petitioner did not waive counsel on the habitual criminal accusation. See Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 788-789.
The Tennessee Attorney General denies, however, that petitioner had any federal constitutional right to counsel. He relies on the doctrine enunciated in Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455. But that doctrine has no application here. Petitioner did not ask the trial judge to furnish him counsel; rather, he asked for a continuance so that he could obtain his own. The distinction is well established in this Court’s decisions. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 466, 468; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42, 46. Regardless of whether petitioner would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324-325. As this Court stated over 20 years ago in Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 68-69:
“What, then, does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of. evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.” (Italics added.)
A necessary corollary is that a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42, 46; White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764; Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 277-278. By denying petitioner any opportunity whatever to obtain counsel on the habitual criminal accusation, the trial court deprived him of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It follows that petitioner is being held by respondent under an invalid sentence. The judgment below, sustaining the denial of habeas corpus relief, is accordingly reversed.
Judgment reversed.
The Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act, at the time of petitioner’s trial, permitted an oral accusation. Williams’ Tenn. Code, 1934 (1949 Supp.), § 11863.5. It was subsequently amended to require the inclusion of the accusation in the indictment on the substantive offense. Tenn. Code, 1932 (1950 Supp.), § 11863.5.
Williams’ Tenn. Code, 1934 (1949 Supp.), § 11863.2.
Under Tennessee law, a defendant sentenced on both a felony charge and an habitual criminal accusation must serve his term on the felony charge before he can attack the validity of his habitual criminal sentence in habeas corpus proceedings. See State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore, 182 Tenn. 94, 98, 184 S. W. 2d 366, 367.
Petitioner also alleged, wholly apart from his claim of denial of counsel, that he was deprived of due process by the failure of the trial court to give him any pretrial notice of the habitual criminal accusation. We find it unnecessary to pass on this contention in view of our disposition of the case. We also note that in 1950, subsequent to petitioner’s trial, the Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act was amended to require pretrial notice. Tenn. Code, 1932 (1950 Supp.), § 11863.5.
The record of petitioner’s trial consists only of the indictment and the judgment of conviction. There was no stenographic transcript of the proceedings. The judgment recites that petitioner had “counsel present,” but it is conceded that the recital is not true.
Williams’ Tenn. Code, 1934 (1949 Supp.), § 11863.1:
“Any person who has either been three times convicted within this state of felonies, two of which, under section 11762 of the Code of Tennessee, rendered him infamous, or which were had under sections 10777, 10778, 10788, 10790 and 10797 of said Code, or which were for murder in the first degree, rape, kidnapping for ransom, treason or other crime punishable by death under existing laws, but for which the death penalty was not inflicted, or who has been three times convicted under the laws of any other state, government or country of crimes, two of which, if they had been committed in this state, would have rendered him infamous, or would have been punishable under said sections 10777, 10778, 10788, 10790 and 10797 of said Code, or would have been murder in the first degree, rape, kidnapping for ransom, treason or other crime punishable by death under existing laws, but for which the death penalty was not inflicted, shall be considered, for the purposes of this act, and is hereby declared to be an habitual criminal, provided that petit larceny shall not be counted as one of such three convictions, but is expressly excluded, and provided further that each of such three convictions shall be for separate offenses, committed at different times, and on separate occasions.”
Williams’ Tenn. Code, 1934 (1949 Supp.), § 11863.7.
Williams’ Tenn. Code, 1934 (1949 Supp.), § 11863.6.
Compare, e. g., the West Virginia procedure which provides for a separate hearing on the habitual criminal issue.” See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616.
Tennessee statutes appear to confer both rights on a defendant in a criminal case. Tenn. Code, 1932, §§ 11733, 11734, 11547, 11548. See also Art. I, § 9, of the Declaration of Rights in the Tennessee Constitution.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the remedy for missing a statutory deadline. The statute in question focuses upon mandatory restitution for victims of crimes. It provides that “the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” 18 U. S. C. § 3664(d)(5). We hold that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution — at least where, as here, the sentencing court made clear prior to the deadline’s expiration that it would order restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount.
I
On February 8,2007, petitioner Brian Dolan pleaded guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. 18 U. S. C. §§ 113(a)(6), 1153; App. 17. He entered into a plea agreement that stated that “restitution... may be ordered by the Court.” Id., at 18. The presentence report, provided to the court by the end of May, noted that restitution was required. But, lacking precise information about hospital costs and lost wages, it did not recommend a restitution amount. Id., at 27.
On July 30, the District Court held Dolan’s sentencing hearing. The judge sentenced Dolan to 21 months’ imprisonment along with 3 years of supervised release. Id., at 38. The judge, aware that restitution was “mandatory,” said that there was “insufficient information on the record at this time regarding possible restitution payments that may be owed,” that he would “leave that matter open, pending the receipt of additional information,” and that Dolan could “anticipate that such an award will be made in the future.” Id., at 39-40. A few days later (August 8) the court entered a judgment, which, among other things, stated:
“Pursuant to the Mandatory Restitution Act, restitution is applicable; however, no information has been received regarding possible restitution payments that may be owed. Therefore, the Court will not order restitution at this time.” Id., at 49 (boldface deleted).
The probation office later prepared an addendum to the pre-sentence report, dated October 5, which reflected the views of the parties, and which the judge later indicated he had received. Id., at 54. The addendum documents the “total amount of restitution” due in the case (about $105,000). Id., at 52. Its date, October 5, is 67 days after Dolan’s July 30 sentencing and 23 days before the statute’s “90 days after sentencing” deadline would expire. § 3664(d)(5).
The sentencing court nonetheless set a restitution hearing for February 4, 2008 — about three months after the 90-day deadline expired. As far as the record shows, no one asked the court for an earlier hearing. At the hearing, Dolan pointed out that the 90-day deadline had passed. Id., at 54-55. And he argued that the law no longer authorized the court to order restitution. Id., at 60-64.
The court disagreed and ordered restitution. See Memorandum Opinion and Restitution Order in No. CR 06-02173-RB (D NM, Apr. 24, 2008), App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 571 F. 3d 1022 (CA10 2009). And, in light of differences among the Courts of Appeals, we granted Dolan’s petition for certiorari on the question. Compare United States v. Cheal, 389 F. 3d 35 (CA1 2004) (recognizing court’s authority to enter restitution order past 90 days), and United States v. Balentine, 569 F. 3d 801 (CA8 2009) (same), with United States v. Maung, 267 F. 3d 1113 (CA11 2001) (finding no such authority), and United States v. Farr, 419 F. 3d 621 (CA7 2005) (same).
II
A
There is no doubt in this case that the court missed the 90-day statutory deadline “for the final determination of the victim’s losses.” § 3664(d)(5). No one has offered any excuse for the court’s doing so. Nor did any party seek an extension or “tolling” of the 90 days for equitable or for other reasons. All the information needed to determine the requisite restitution amount was available before the 90-day period had ended. Thus, the question before us concerns the consequences of the missed deadline where, as here, the statute does not specify them.
In answering this kind of question, this Court has looked to statutory language, to the relevant context, and to what they reveal about the purposes that a time limit is designed to serve. The Court’s answers have varied depending upon the particular statute and time limit at issue. Sometimes we have found that the statute in question imposes a “jurisdictional” condition upon, for example, a court’s authority to hear a case, to consider pleadings, or to act upon motions that a party seeks to file. See, e. g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205 (2007). But cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455 (2004) (finding bankruptcy rule did not show legislative intent to “delineat[e] the classes of cases” and “persons” properly “within a court’s adjudicatory authority”); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 160-161 (2010) (discussing use of term “jurisdictional”). The expiration of a “jurisdictional” deadline prevents the court from permitting or taking the action to which the statute attached the deadline. The prohibition is absolute. The parties cannot waive it, nor can a court extend that deadline for equitable reasons. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 133-134 (2008).
In other instances, we have found that certain deadlines are more ordinary “claims-processing rules,” rules that do not limit a court’s jurisdiction, but rather regulate the timing of motions or claims brought before the court. Unless a party points out to the court that another litigant has missed such a deadline, the party forfeits the deadline’s protection. See, e. g., Kontrick v. Ryan, supra, at 454-456 (60-day bankruptcy rule deadline for creditor’s objection to debtor discharge); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam) (7-day criminal rule deadline for filing motion for a new trial).
In still other instances, we have found that a deadline seeks speed by creating a time-related directive that is legally enforceable but does not deprive a judge or other public official of the power to take the action to which the deadline applies if the deadline is missed. See, e. g., United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 722 (1990) (missed deadline for holding bail detention hearing does not require judge to release defendant); Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253, 266 (1986) (missed deadline for making final determination as to misuse of federal grant funds does not prevent later recovery of funds); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 171-172 (2003) (missed deadline for assigning industry retiree benefits does not prevent later award of benefits).
After examining the language, the context, and the purposes of the statute, we conclude that the provision before us sets forth this third kind of limitation. The fact that a sentencing court misses the statute’s 90-day deadline, even through its own fault or that of the Government, does not deprive the court of the power to order restitution.
B
Several considerations lead us to this conclusion. First, where, as here, a statute “does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with” its “timing provisions,” “federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 63 (1993); see also Montalvo-Murillo, supra, at 717-721. Cf., e. g., Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. § 3161(c)(1); § 3162(a)(2) (statute specifying that missed 70-day deadline requires dismissal of indictment); Zedner v. United States, 547 U. S. 489, 507-509 (2006) (“The sanction for a violation of the Act is dismissal”).
We concede that the statute here uses the word “shall,” § 3664(d)(5), but a statute’s use of that word alone has not always led this Court to interpret statutes to bar judges (or other officials) from taking the action to which a missed statutory deadline refers. See, e. g., Montalvo-Murillo, supra, at 718-719 (use of word “shall” in context of bail hearing makes duty “mandatory” but does not mean that the “sanction for breach” is “loss of all later powers to act”); Brock, supra, at 262 (same in context of misuse of federal funds); Barnhart, supra, at 158-168 (same in context of benefits assignments). See also Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448, 459, n. 3 (1998) (same in respect to federal official’s reporting date).
Second, the statute’s text places primary weight upon, and emphasizes the importance of, imposing restitution upon those convicted of certain federal crimes. Amending an older provision that left restitution to the sentencing judge’s discretion, the statute before us (entitled “The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996”) says “[njotwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of [a specified] offense ... , the court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.” §3663A(a)(l) (emphasis added); cf. § 3663(a)(1) (stating that a court “may” order restitution when sentencing defendants convicted of other specified crimes). The Act goes on to provide that restitution shall be ordered in the “full amount of each victim’s losses” and “without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” § 3664(f)(1)(A).
Third, the Act’s procedural provisions reinforce this substantive purpose, namely, that the statute seeks primarily to ensure that victims of a crime receive full restitution. To be sure speed is important. The statute requires a sentencing judge to order the probation office to prepare a report providing “a complete accounting of the losses to each victim, any restitution owed pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the economic circumstances of each defendant.” § 3664(a). The prosecutor, after consulting with all identified victims, must “promptly provide” a listing of the amount subject to restitution “not later than 60 days prior to the date initially set for sentencing” § 3664(d)(1) (emphasis added). And the provision before us says:
“If the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to sentencing, the attorney for the Government or the probation officer shall so inform the court, and the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” § 3664(d)(5).
But the statute seeks speed primarily to help the victims of crime and only secondarily to help the defendant. Thus, in the sentence following the language we have just quoted, the statute continues:
“If the victim subsequently discovers further losses, the victim shall have 60 days after discovery of those losses in which to petition the court for an amended restitution order.” Ibid.
The sentence imposes no time limit on the victim’s subsequent discovery of losses. Consequently, a court might award restitution for those losses long after the original sentence was imposed and the 90-day time limit has expired. That fact, along with the Act’s main substantive objectives, is why we say that the Act’s efforts to secure speedy determination of restitution is primarily designed to help victims of crime secure prompt restitution rather than to provide defendants with certainty as to the amount of their liability. Cf. S. Rep. No. 104-179, p. 20 (1995) (recognizing “the need for finality and certainty in the sentencing process,” but also stating that the “sole due process interest of the defendant being protected ... is the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises or inaccurate information”); see also ibid. (“[Jjustiee cannot be considered served until full restitution is made”).
Fourth, to read the statute as depriving the sentencing court of the power to order restitution would harm those— the victims of crime — who likely bear no responsibility for the deadline’s being missed and whom the statute also seeks to benefit. Cf. § 3664(g)(1) (“No victim shall be required to participate in any phase of a restitution order”). The potential for such harm — to third parties — normally provides a strong indication that Congress did not intend a missed deadline to work a forfeiture, here depriving a court of the power to award restitution to victims. See Brock, 476 U. S., at 261-262 (parties concede and court assumes that official can “proceed after the deadline” where “inaction” would hurt third party); see also 3 N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §57:19, pp. 73-74 (7th ed. 2008) (hereinafter Singer, Statutory Construction) (missing a deadline does not remove power to exercise a duty where there is no “language denying performance after a specified time,” and especially “where a mandatory construction might do great injury to persons not at fault, as in a case where slight delay on the part of a public officer might prejudice private rights or the public interest” (footnote omitted)).
Fifth, we have previously interpreted similar statutes similarly. In Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, for example, we considered the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which states that a “judicial officer shall hold a hearing” to determine whether to grant bail to an arrested person and that “hearing shall be held immediately upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial officer.” (A continuance of up to five days may also be granted.) 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f) (emphasis added). The judicial officer missed this deadline, but the Court held that the judicial officer need not release the detained person. Rather, “once the Government discovers that the time limits have expired, it may [still] ask for a prompt detention hearing and make its case to detain based upon the requirements set forth in the statute.” 495 U. S., at 721.
The Court reasoned that “a failure to comply” with the hearing deadline “does not so subvert the procedural scheme ... as to invalidate the hearing.” Id., at 717. Missing the deadline did not diminish the strength of the Government’s interest in preventing release to avert the likely commission of crimes — the very objective of the Act. Id., at 720. Nor would mandatory release of the detained person “proportion-[atelyj” repair the “inconvenience and uncertainty a timely hearing would have spared him.” Id., at 721.
Here, as in Montalvo-Murillo, neither the language nor the structure of the statute requires denying the victim restitution in order to remedy a missed hearing deadline. As in Montalvo-Murillo, doing so would defeat the basic purpose of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. And, here, as in Montalvo-Murillo, that remedy does not “proportionately]” repair the harm caused the defendant through delay, particularly where, as here, the defendant “knew about restitution,” including the likely amount, well before expiration of the 90-day time limit. App. 62. Indeed, our result here follows from Montalvo-Murillo a fortiori, for here delay at worst postpones the day of financial reckoning. In Montalvo-Murillo, delay postponed a constitutionally guaranteed bail hearing with the attached risk that the defendant would remain improperly confined in jail. See 495 U. S., at 728 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the seriousness “of the deprivation of liberty that physical detention imposes”).
Nor does Montalvo-Murillo stand alone. The Court there found support in similar cases involving executive officials charged with carrying out mandatory public duties in a timely manner. See id., at 717-718 (citing French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 511 (1872); Brock, supra, at 260). Those cases, in turn, are consistent with numerous similar decisions made by courts throughout the Nation. See, e. g., Taylor v. Department of Transp., 260 N. W. 2d 521, 522-523 (Iowa 1977); Hutchinson v. Ryan, 154 Kan. 751, 756-757, 121 P. 2d 179, 182 (1942); State v. Industrial Comm’n, 233 Wis. 461, 466, 289 N. W. 769, 771 (1940); see also 3 Singer, Statutory Construction §57:19, at 74 (citing cases).
Sixth, the defendant normally can mitigate any harm that a missed deadline might cause — at least if, as here, he obtains the relevant information regarding the restitution amount before the 90-day deadline expires. A defendant who fears the deadline will be (or just has been) missed can simply tell the court, which will then likely set a timely hearing or take other statutorily required action. See § 3664(d)(4) (providing that “court may require additional documentation or hear testimony”); § 3664(d)(5). Though a deliberate failure of the sentencing court to comply with the statute seems improbable, should that occur, the defendant can also seek mandamus. See All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U. S. 249 (1957). Cf. Brock, supra, at 260, n. 7 (noting availability of district court action to compel agency compliance with time-related directive).
C
Petitioner Dolan, however, believes we have understated the harm to a defendant that a missed deadline can cause. To show this he makes a three-part argument: (1) A defendant cannot appeal a sentence unless it is part of a “final judgment”; (2) a judgment setting forth a sentence is not “final” until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution; and (3) to delay the determination of the amount of restitution beyond the 90-day deadline is to delay the defendant’s ability to appeal for more than 90 days — perhaps to the point where his due process rights are threatened. Brief for Petitioner 28-33.
The critical problem with this argument lies in its third step. As we have said, a defendant who, like petitioner here, knows that restitution will be ordered and is aware of the restitution amount prior to the expiration of the 90-day deadline can usually avoid additional delay simply by pointing to the statute and asking the court to grant a timely hearing. That did not happen here. And that minimal burden on the defendant is a small cost relative to the prospect of depriving innocent crime victims of their due restitution. (Should the court still refuse, the defendant could seek mandamus — which we believe will rarely be necessary.)
Even in the unlikely instances where that delay does cause the defendant prejudice — perhaps by depriving him of evidence to rebut the claimed restitution amount — the defendant remains free to ask the court to take that fact into account upon review. That inquiry might also consider the reason for the delay and the party responsible for its cause, i. e., whether the Government or the victim. Cf., e. g., United States v. Stevens, 211 F. 3d 1, 4-6 (CA2 2000) (tolling 90-day deadline for defendant’s bad-faith delay); United States v. Terlingo, 327 F. 3d 216, 218-223 (CA3 2003) (same). Adopting the dissent’s approach, by contrast, would permit a defendant’s bad-faith delay to prevent a timely order of restitution, potentially allowing the defendant to manipulate whether restitution could be awarded at all. But since we are not presented with such a case here, we need not decide whether, or how, such potential harm or equitable considerations should be taken into consideration.
In focusing upon the argument’s third step, we do not mean to imply that we accept the second premise, i. e., that a sentencing judgment is not “final” until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution. To the contrary, strong arguments favor the appealability of the initial judgment irrespective of the delay in determining the restitution amount. The initial judgment here imposed a sentence of imprisonment and supervised release, and stated that restitution would be awarded. This Court has previously said that a judgment that imposes “discipline” may still be “freighted with sufficiently substantial indicia of finality to support an appeal.” Corey v. United States, 375 U. S. 169, 174, 175 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Solicitor General points to statutes that say that a “judgment of conviction” that “includes” a “sentence to imprisonment” is a “final judgment.” 18 U. S. C. § 3582(b). So is a judgment that imposes supervised release (which can be imposed only in conjunction with a sentence of imprisonment). Ibid.; § 3583(a). So is a judgment that imposes a fine. § 3572(c). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-34.
Moreover, § 3664(o) provides that a “sentence that imposes an order of restitution,” such as the later restitution order here, “is a final judgment.” Thus, it is not surprising to find instances where a defendant has appealed from the entry of a judgment containing an initial sentence that includes a term of imprisonment; that same defendant has subsequently appealed from a later order setting forth the final amount of restitution; and the Court of Appeals has consolidated the two appeals and decided them together. See, e. g., United States v. Stevens, supra; United States v. Maung, 267 F. 3d, at 1117; cf. United States v. Cheat, 389 F. 3d, at 51-53.
That the defendant can appeal from the earlier sentencing judgment makes sense, for otherwise the statutory 90-day restitution deadline, even when complied with, could delay appeals for up to 90 days. Defendants, that is, would be forced to wait three months before seeking review of their conviction when they could ordinarily do so within 14 days. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(b). Nonetheless, in light of the fact that the interaction of restitution orders with appellate time limits could have consequences extending well beyond cases like the present case (where there was no appeal from the initial conviction and sentence), we simply note the strength of the arguments militating against the second step of petitioner’s argument without deciding whether or when a party can, or must, appeal. We leave all such matters for another day.
The dissent, however, creates a rule that could adversely affect not just restitution, but other sentencing practices beyond the narrow circumstances presented here. Consider, for example, a judge who (currently lacking sufficient information) wishes to leave open, say, the amount of a fine, or a special condition of supervised release. In the dissent’s view, the entry of any such judgment would immediately deprive the judge of the authority later to fill in that blank, in the absence of a statute specifically providing otherwise. See post, at 622-624 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). Thus, the sentencing judge would either have to (1) forgo the specific dollar amount or potential condition, or (2) wait to enter any judgment until all of the relevant information is at hand. The former alternative would sometimes deprive judges of the power to enter components of a sentence they may consider essential. The latter alternative would require the defendant to wait — perhaps months — before taking an appeal.
As we have pointed out, our precedents do not currently place the sentencing judge in any such dilemma. See supra, at 611-612, 614-615. And we need not now depart from those precedents when this case does not require us to do so; when the issue has not been adequately briefed; when the lower court had no opportunity to consider the argument (which the petitioner may well have forfeited); and when the rule would foreclose the current practices of some district courts and unnecessarily cabin the discretion they properly exercise over scheduling and sentencing matters. Cf., e. g., Stevens, supra, at 3; Cheat, supra, at 47 (illustrating district court practices).
Certainly there is no need to create this rule in the context of restitution, for provisions to which the dissent refers are silent about whether restitution can or cannot be ordered after an initial sentencing. See, e. g., §§ 3551(b), (c) (“A sanction authorized by [criminal forfeiture and restitution statutes] may be imposed in addition to the [rest of the] sentence”); § 3663A(c)(l) (mandatory orders of restitution “shall apply in all sentencing proceedings [for specified offenses]”). And even on the dissent’s theory, the statute elsewhere provides the necessary substantive authorization: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of [a specified] offense ..., the court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.” §3663A(a)(l) (emphasis added). The dissent cannot explain why a separate statutory provision regarding procedures as to when a “court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses,” § 3664(d)(5), automatically divests a eourt of this distinct substantive authority. While of course that provision does not “plainly” confer “power to act after sentencing,” post, at 625 (emphasis deleted), neither does it “plainly” remove it or require that all sentencing matters be concluded at one point in time. (And the dissent’s assertion, see post, at 626 — that it uses the term “authority” not in its “jurisdictional” sense, but rather in the sense that a court lacks “authority” to “impose a sentence above the . . . maximum” — introduces a tenuous analogy that may well confuse this Court’s precedents regarding the term “jurisdictional.” See supra, at 610-611.)
In any event, unless one reads the relevant statute’s 90-day deadline as an ironclad limit upon the judge's authority to make a final determination of the victim’s losses, the statute before us itself provides adequate authority to do what the sentencing judge did here — essentially fill in an amount-related blank in a judgment that made clear that restitution was “applicable.” App. 49 (boldface deleted). Since the sentencing judge’s later order did not “correct” an “error” in the sentence, Rule 35 does not apply. Compare Fed. Rule Crim. Proe. 35(a) with post, at 622-623. Hence the dissent’s claim that there is no other statute that creates authority (even were we to assume all else in its favor, which we do not) is merely to restate the question posed in this case, not to answer it.
Moreover, the dissent’s reading creates a serious statutory anomaly. It reads the statute as permitting a sentencing judge to order restitution for a “victim” who “subsequently discovers further losses” a month, a year, or 10 years after entry of the original judgment, while at the same time depriving that judge of the power to award restitution to a victim whose “losses are not ascertainable” within 90 days. Compare § 3664(d)(5) (first sentence) with § 3664(d)(5) (second sentence). How is that a sensible reading of a statute that makes restitution mandatory for victims?
Finally, petitioner asks ús to apply the “rule of lenity” in favor of his reading of the statute. Dolan has not provided us with an example of an instance in which the “rule of lenity” has been applied to a statutory time provision in the criminal context. See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820) (applying rule in interpreting substantive criminal statute); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381, 387, 400 (1980) (applying rule in interpreting “penalties”). But, assuming for argument’s sake that the rule might be so applied, and after considering the statute’s text, structure, and purpose, we nonetheless cannot find a statutory ambiguity sufficiently “grievous” to warrant its application in this case. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 139 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Caron v. United States, 524 U. S. 308, 316 (1998) (rejecting application of rule where the “ambiguous” reading “is an implausible reading of the congressional purpose”).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is
Affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1956 two informations were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio charging the petitioner with having robbed banks in Waterville, Ohio, and Forest, Ohio. Represented by-counsel of his own choice, the petitioner waived indictment and pleaded guilty to both charges. Sentence was deferred pending a presentence investigation, and in the interim petitioner appeared as a defense witness at the jury trial of Marvin Breaton, charged with participation in the Waterville bank robbery. At that trial the petitioner testified that he had robbed the Waterville bank, but denied that Breaton had been with him. Breaton was convicted by the jury. Three weeks later the petitioner appeared with counsel before the District Judge for sentencing. During the course of the proceedings the judge inquired if counsel had any statement to make, but did not direct any similar inquiry to the petitioner personally. The court imposed sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment on the first information and fifteen years on the second, the sentences to run consecutively.
In 1959 the petitioner instituted the present litigation by filing in the sentencing court a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, to vacate and set aside the sentence he was serving. The motion alleged three grounds upon which it was claimed relief should be granted: that the petitioner’s pleas of guilty had not been voluntary, but had been induced by promises made by the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution; that in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the court had accepted the guilty pleas without first determining that they had been made voluntarily; and that in violation of Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the court had not inquired if the defendant wished to speak in his own behalf before sentence was imposed. The motion was denied by the District Court without a hearing, 184 F. Supp. 881. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, 280 F. 2d 379. We granted certiorari to consider seemingly significant questions as to the scope of relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. 365 U. S. 842.
I.
For the reasons stated in Hill v. United States, ante, p. 424, we hold that the failure of the District Court specifically to inquire at the time of sentencing whether the petitioner personally wished to make a statement in his own behalf is not of itself an error that can be raised by motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
II.
In support of his claim that his pleas of guilty had been involuntarily made, the petitioner’s motion and supporting affidavit set out detailed factual allegations. Specifically, the motion and affidavit alleged that on three separate occasions, identified as to time and place, an Assistant United States Attorney had promised the petitioner that he would receive a total prison sentence of not more than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both infor-mations. These promises were said to have been made upon the authority of the United States Attorney and to be agreeable to the District Judge. It was alleged that the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell his own lawyer about the conversations. It was further alleged that when the petitioner threatened to advise his lawyer and the court of what had transpired, the Assistant United States Attorney had told him that if he “insisted in making a scene,” certain unsettled matters concerning two other robberies would be added to the petitioner’s difficulties. Finally, the motion and affidavit alleged that the petitioner had written two letters to the sentencing court and two letters to the Attorney General of the United States “relative to the misrepresentations” by the Assistant United States Attorney, to which he had received no reply.
The Government filed a memorandum in opposition to the petitioner’s motion, attaching an affidavit of the Assistant United States Attorney. The affidavit emphatically denied any promises or coercion with respect to the petitioner’s pleas of guilty, but did admit that the Assistant United States Attorney had had a conversation with the petitioner in the county jail the day before Breaton’s trial, at which time the petitioner was told he was about to be given his last opportunity to tell the truth and that the court, in sentencing, might well take into consideration the petitioner’s refusal to talk.
Without a hearing the District Judge determined that the petitioner’s allegations as to an agreement with the Assistant United States Attorney were false. The court noted that it had never received either of the two letters referred to by the petitioner, but had received a letter purportedly from him six months after sentencing, which did not mention any agreement, but simply requested that the sentences be made concurrent, rather than consecutive. The court further noted that the petitioner had not complained when no request for a reduction of sentence was made by the United States Attorney within sixty days after sentencing, and that instead, the petitioner had waited almost two and a half years to file the present motion.
There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the petitioner’s motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated. A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to collateral attack. See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101; Shelton v. United States, 356 U. S. 26, reversing, 246 F. 2d 571. “A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence. Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223.
The District Court recognized that the “charges of an agreement between a former Assistant United States Attorney and the defendant are serious,” and stated that if “this Court had any doubt as to their falsity it would require a hearing.” The court determined, however, that the combination of factual inferences already mentioned “conclusively indicates the falsity of the defendant’s allegations.” 184 F. Supp., at 883.
We think the District Court did not proceed in conformity with the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2255, when it made findings on controverted issues of fact without notice to the petitioner and without a hearing. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 220. The statute requires a District Court to “grant a prompt hearing” when such a motion is filed, and to “determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto” unless “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to-no relief.” This was not a case where the issues raised by the motion were conclusively determined either by the motion itself or by the “files and records” in the trial court. The factual allegations contained in the petitioner’s motion and affidavit, and put in issue by the affidavit filed with the Government’s response, related primarily to purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real light. Nor were the circumstances alleged of a kind that the District Judge could completely resolve by drawing upon his own personal knowledge or recollection.
We cannot agree with the Government that a hearing in this case would be futile because of the apparent lack of any eyewitnesses to the occurrences alleged, other than the petitioner himself and the Assistant United States Attorney. The petitioner’s motion and affidavit contain charges which are detailed and specific. It is not unreasonable to suppose that many of the material allegations can either be corroborated or disproved by the visitors’ records of the county jail where the petitioner was confined, the mail records of the penitentiary to which he was sent, and other such sources. “Not by the pleadings and the affidavits, but by the whole of the testimony, must it be determined whether the petitioner has carried his burden of proof and shown his right to a discharge. The Government’s contention that his allegations are improbable and unbelievable cannot serve to deny him an opportunity to support them by evidence. On this record it is his right to be heard.” Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, at 287.
What has been said is not to imply that a movant must always be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing if the record does not conclusively and expressly belie his claim, no matter how vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible his allegations may be. The language of the statute does not strip the district courts of all discretion to exercise their common sense. Indeed, the statute itself recognizes that there are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner. Whether the petition in the present case can appropriately be disposed of without the presence of the petitioner at the hearing is a question to be resolved in the further proceedings in the District Court.
There will always be marginal cases, and this case is not far from the line. But the specific and detailed factual assertions of the petitioner, while improbable, cannot at this juncture be said to be incredible. If the allegations are true, the petitioner is clearly entitled to relief. Accordingly, we think the function of 28 U. S. C. § 2255 can be served in this case only by affording the hearing which its provisions require.
Vacated and remanded.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan concur in the Court’s judgment and opinion except as to Part I, from which they dissent for the reasons set out in their dissent in Hill v. United States, ante, p. 430.
The affidavit filed with the petitioner’s motion was as follows:
“John Machibroda, having been duly sworn according to law deposes and says that he is the petitioner in an action filed in this Court entitled 'Motion To Vacate sentence’ and this affidavit is made in support thereof:
“1. That affiant was interviewed in the County Jail on or about February 21, 1956, by one Clarence M. Condon who represented himself to be as Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution of alleged bank robberies committed at the Waterville and Forest Banks. (Later designated as Cases 10345 and 10348). The County Jail where the interview took place is situated in Toledo, Ohio.
“2. That the said Clarence M. Condon represented to the Affiant that he had the authority to speak for the United States Attorney and the United States District Judge in the matter of the amount of sentence that would be imposed in Cases Nos. 10345 and 10348.
“3. That the said Clarence M. Condon represented to the Affiant that if the Affiant would waive indictment in case no. 10348 and plead guilty in cases Nos. 10345 and 10348 the Court would not impose a sentence in the excess of twenty (20) years in Case No. 10345 and that any sentence imposed in Case No. 10348 would not be in the excess of ten (10) years and would be ordered served concurrently with the term imposed in case No. 10345.
“4. That on the assurance of the said Clarence M. Condon that the sentences would be imposed as heretofore set out in paragraph 3, above, the Affiant agreed to waive indictment in case no. 10348 and plead guilty to both cases* (This interview was held on or about February 21, 1956.)
“ *At that time the Affiant had already waived indictment in case No. 10345.
“5. That the said Clarence M. Condon instructed the Affiant to advise his Attorney, John Schuchmann, that he would waive indictment in case no. 10348 and plead guilty to both eases.
“6. That the said Clarence M. Condon cautioned the Affiant to refrain from advising the said John Schuchmann of his interviews with Mr. Condon and that an agreement had been reached between the government as represented by Mr. Condon, and the Affiant in the matter of waiver, pleas and sentences.
“7. That on February 24, 1956, Affiant acting on the promises and representations of the said Clarence M. Condon waived indictment in case no. 10348.
“8. That on February 24, 1956, the Affiant acting on the promises and representations of the said Clarence M. Condon pleaded guilty in Cases Nos. 10345 and 10348.
“9. That on or about May 22, 1956, the said Clarence M. Condon again interviewed the Affiant at the County Jail and informed Affiant that because of Affiant’s unfavorable testimony at the trial of a co-defendant the Court was vexed and there might be some difficulty in regards to the promised twenty (20) year sentence.
“10. That the said Clarence M. Condon admonished the Affiant that he had tried to warn him during the trial of the co-defendant that Affiant would shortly appear before this Court for sentence*
“ *The exact words Mr. Condon used to warn the Affiant are to be found in the transcript of the trial of Marvin Ferris Breaton.
“11. That at no time did the Affiant ever represent to Mr. Condon or anyone else that he would testify one way or the other at the trial of the co-defendant. The promise of the maximum sentence of twenty (20) years was predicated solely on the Affiant’s agreement to waive indictment and plead guilty to both informations.
“12. That the Affiant immediately became agitated and hotly informed Mr. Condon that he was going to tell his Attorney the whole story and demand that the Court be informed of the agreement.
"13. That the said Clarence M. Condon assured the Affiant that in the event a sentence in the excess of twenty (20) years was imposed the United States Attorney, himself, would move within sixty (60) days for a reduction of the portion of the sentence in excess of twenty (20) years; that the Affiant had nothing to worry about if he kept his mouth shut; that on the other hand, if Affiant insisted in making a scene in a matter of his own making, there were the unsettled matters of the robberies of the Trotwood and Canal Fulton Banks which would be added to the Affiant’s present difficulties.
“14. That on May 23, 1956, the Affiant was sentenced by the Honorable Frank L. Kloeb to twenty-five (25) years in Case No. 10345 and fifteen (15) years in case no. 10348.
“15. That immediately after sentence in an interview with the said Clarence M. Condon, the Affiant was informed he had no reason to worry for as soon as the Judge ‘cooled off’ the United States Attorney would have the sentence reduced to twenty (20) years as had been promised.
“16. That within a few hours after sentence, the Affiant was on his way to the Federal Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas.
“17. That the sentence was not reduced in sixty (60) days and has not been reduced to date.
“18. That the petitioner wrote two (2) letters to the Honorable Frank L. Kloeb and two (2) letters to the Attorney General of the United States relative to the misrepresentations by the said Clarence M. Condon. These letters were posted in the official prisoner’s mail box and the Affiant has failed to receive a reply to any of them.
“19. That the Affiant’s previous experience with Court officials has been with the authorities representing the Canadian Government and he found them to honor their commitments. He had no reason to believe that the officials of the United States Courts would do otherwise. His naivete has cost him an extra twenty (20) years in prison.”
See also Daniel v. United States, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 110, 274 F. 2d 768; Teller v. United States, 263 F. 2d 871; Watson v. United States, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 262 F. 2d 33; Euziere v. United States, 249 F. 2d 293; Motley v. United States, 230 F. 2d 110; United States v. Paglia, 190 F. 2d 445.
Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, provides in part: “Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”
Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, also provides, in part: “A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The public schools of Columbus, Ohio, are highly segregated by race..In 1976, over 32% of the 96,000 students in the system were black. About 70% of all students attended schools that were at least 80% black or 80% white. 429 F. Supp. 229, 240 (SD Ohio 1977). Half of the 172 schools were 90% black or 90% white. 583 F. 2d 787, 800 (CA6 1978). Fourteen named students in the Columbus school system brought this case on June 21, 1973, against the Columbus Board of Education, the State Board of Education, and the appropriate local and state officials. The second amended complaint, filed on October 22, 1974, charged that the Columbus defendants had pursued and were pursuing a course of conduct having the purpose and effect of causing and perpetuating segregation in the public schools, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. A declaratory judgment to this effect and appropriate injunctive relief were prayed. Trial of the case began more than a year later, consumed 36 trial days, produced a record containing over 600 exhibits and a transcript in excess of 6,600 pages, and was completed in June 1976. Final arguments were heard in September, and in March 1977 the District Court filed an opinion and order containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 429 F. Supp. 229.
The trial court summarized its findings:
“From the evidence adduced at trial, the Court has found earlier in this opinion that the Columbus Public Schools were openly and intentionally segregated on the basis of race when Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 IT. S. 483 (Brown /)] was decided in 1954. The Court has found that the Columbus Board of Education never actively set out to dismantle this dual system. The Court has found that until legal action was initiated by the Columbus Area Civil Rights Council, the Columbus Board did not assign teachers and administrators to Columbus schools at random, without regard for the racial composition of the student enrollment at those schools. The Columbus Board even in very recent times... has approved optional attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas and boundary changes which have maintained and enhanced racial imbalance in the Columbus Public Schools. The Board, even in very recent times and after promising to do otherwise, has adjured [sic] workable suggestions for improving the racial balance of city schools.
“Viewed in the context of segregative optional attendance zones, segregative faculty and administrative hiring and assignments, and the other such actions and decisions of the Columbus Board of Education in recent and remote history, it is fair and reasonable to draw an inference of segregative intent from the Board’s actions and omissions discussed in this opinion.” Id., at 260-261.
The District Court’s ultimate conclusion was that at the time of trial the racial segregation in the Columbus school system “directly resulted from [the Board’s] intentional segre-gative acts and omissions,” id., at 269, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, judgment was entered against the local and state defendants enjoining them from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race in operating the Columbus public schools and ordering the submission of a systemwide desegregation plan.
Following decision by this Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (Dayton I), in June 1977, and in response to a motion by the Columbus Board, the District Court rejected the argument that Dayton I required or permitted any modification of its findings or judgment. It reiterated its conclusion that the Board’s “ ‘liability in this case concerns the Columbus School District as a whole,’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 94, quoting 429 F. Supp., at 266, asserting that, although it had “no real interest in any remedy plan which is more sweeping than necessary to correct the constitutional wrongs plaintiffs have suffered,” neither would it accept any plan “which fails to take into account the systemwide nature of the liability of the defendants.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 95. The Board subsequently presented a plan that complied with the District Court’s guidelines and that was embodied in a judgment entered on October 7. The plan was stayed pending appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Based on its own examination of the extensive record, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments entered against the local defendants. 583 F. 2d 787. The Court of Appeals could not find the District Court’s findings of fact clearly erroneous. Id., at 789. Indeed, the Court of Appeals examined in detail each set of findings by the District Court and found strong support for them in the record. Id., at 798, 804, 805, 814. The Court of Appeals also discussed in detail and found unexceptionable the District Court’s understanding and application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cases construing it.
Implementation of the desegregation plan was stayed pending our disposition of the case. 439 U. S. 1348 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). We granted the Board’s petition for certiorari, 439 U. S. 1066 (1979), and we now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The Board earnestly contends that when this case was brought and at the time of trial its operation of a segregated school system was not done with any general or specific racially discriminatory purpose, and that whatever unconstitutional conduct it may have been guilty of in the past such conduct at no time had systemwide segregative impact and surely no remaining systemwide impact at the time of trial. A systemwide remedy was therefore contrary to the teachings of the cases, such as Dayton I, that the scope of the constitutional violation measures the scope of the remedy.
We have discovered no reason, however, to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals, based on the findings and conclusions of the District Court, that the Board’s conduct at the time of trial and before not only was animated by an unconstitutional, segregative purpose, but also had current, segre-gative impact that was sufficiently systemwide to warrant the remedy ordered by the District Court.
These ultimate conclusions were rooted in a series of constitutional violations that the District Court found the Board to have committed and that together dictated its judgment and decree. In each instance, the Court of Appeals found the District Court’s conclusions to be factually and legally sound.
A
First, although at least since 1888 there had been no statutory requirement or authorization to operate segregated schools, the District Court found that in 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (Brown I), was decided, the Columbus Board was not operating a racially neutral, unitary school system, but was conducting “an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus,” and that “[t]he then-existing racial separation was the direct result of cognitive acts or omissions of those school board members and administrators who had originally intentionally caused and later perpetuated the racial isolation... 429 F. Supp., at 236. Such separateness could not “be said to have been the result of racially neutral official acts.” Ibid.
Based on its own examination of the record, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court in this respect, observing that, “[wjhile the Columbus school system's dual black-white character was not mandated by state law as of 1954, the record certainly shows intentional segregation by the Columbus Board. As of 1954 the Columbus School Board had ‘carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers and facilities within the school system.’ ” 583 F. 2d, at 798-799, quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189, 201-202 (1973).
The Board insists that, since segregated schooling was not commanded by state law and since not all schools were wholly black or wholly white in 1954, the District Court was not warranted in finding a dual system. But the District Court found that the “Columbus Public Schools were officially segregated by race in 1954,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 94 (emphasis added); and in any event, there is no reason to question the finding that as the “direct result of cognitive acts or omissions” the Board maintained “an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of Columbus.” 429 F. Supp., at 236. Proof of purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of separate black schools in a substantial part of the system itself is prima facie proof of a dual school system and supports a finding to this effect absent sufficient contrary proof by the Board, which was not forthcoming in this case. Keyes, supra, at 203.
B
Second, both courts below declared that since the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), the Columbus Board has been under a continuous constitutional obligation to disestablish its dual school system and that it has failed to discharge this duty. App. to Pet. for Cert. 94; 583 F. 2d, at 799. Under the Fourteenth Amendment and the cases that have construed it, the Board’s duty to dismantle its dual system cannot be gainsaid.
Where a racially discriminatory school system has been found to exist, Brown II imposes the duty on local school boards to “effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.” 349 U. S., at 301. “Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems,” and school boards operating such systems were “clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968). Each instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dayton I, 433 U. S., at 413-414; Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 460 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U. S. 484 (1972) (creation of a new school district in a city that had operated a dual school system but was not yet the subject of court-ordered desegregation).
The Green case itself was decided 13 years after Brown II. The core of the holding was that the school board involved had not done enough to eradicate the lingering consequences of the dual school system that it had been operating at the time Brown I was decided. Even though a freedom-of-choice plan had been adopted, the school system remained essentially a segregated system, with many all-black and many all-white schools. The board’s continuing obligation, which had not been satisfied, was “ 'to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work... now... until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.’ ” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 13 (1971), quoting Green,supra, at 439 (emphasis in original).
As The Chief Justice’s opinion for a unanimous Court in Swann recognized, Brown and Green imposed an affirmative duty to desegregate. “If school authorities fail in their affirmative- obligations under these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked.... In default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.” 402 U. S., at 15-16. In Swann, it should be recalled, an initial desegregation plan had been entered in 1965 and had been affirmed on appeal. But the case was reopened, and in 1969 the school board was required to come forth with a more effective plan. The judgment adopting the ultimate plan was affirmed here in 1971, 16 years after Brown II.
In determining whether a dual school system has been disestablished, Swann also mandates that matters aside from student assignments must be considered:
“[W]here it is possible to identify a ‘white school’ or a ‘Negro school’ simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of violation of substantive constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause is shown.” 402 U. S., at 18.
Further, Swann stated that in devising remedies for legally imposed segregation the responsibility of the local authorities and district courts is to ensure that future school construction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual school system. Id., at 20-21. As for student assignments, the Court said:
“No per se rule can adequately embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests involved; but in a system with a history of segregation the need for remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority’s compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition. Where the school authority’s proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all or predominantly of one race, they have the burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory.” Id., at 26.
The Board’s continuing “affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system” is therefore beyond question, McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 41 (1971), and it has pointed to nothing in the record persuading us that at the time of trial the dual school system and its effects had been disestablished. The Board does not appear to challenge the finding of the District Court that at the time of trial most blacks were still going to black schools and most whites to white schools. Whatever the Board’s current purpose with respect to racially separate education might be, it knowingly continued its failure to eliminate the consequences of its past intentionally segregative policies. The Board “never actively set out to dismantle this duál system.” 429 F. Supp., at 260.
C
Third, the District Court not only found that the Board had breached its constitutional duty by failing effectively to eliminate the continuing consequences of its intentional systemwide segregation in 1954, but also found that in the intervening years there had been a series of Board actions and practices that could not “reasonably be explained without reference to racial concerns,” id., at 241, and that “intentionally aggravated, rather than alleviated,” racial separation in the schools. App. to Pet. for Cert. 94. These matters included the general practice of assigning black teachers only to those schools with substantial black student populations, a practice that was terminated only in 1974 as the result of a conciliation agreement with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the intentionally segregative use of optional attendance zones, discon-tiguous attendance areas, and boundary changes; and the selection of sites for new school construction that had the foreseeable and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of the schools. The court generally noted that “[s]ince the 1954 Brown decision, the Columbus defendants or their predecessors were adequately put on notice of the fact that action was required to correct and to prevent the increase in” segregation, yet failed to heed their duty to alleviate racial separation in the schools. 429 F. Supp., at 255.
II
Against this background, we cannot fault the conclusion of the District Court and the Court of Appeals that at the time of trial there was systemwide segregation in the Columbus schools that was the result of recent and remote intentionally segregative actions of the Columbus Board. While appearing not to challenge most of the subsidiary findings of historical fact, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, petitioners dispute many of the factual inferences drawn from these facts by the two courts below. On this record, however, there is no apparent reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions entered by the District Court and strongly affirmed by the Court of Appeals after its own examination of the record.
Nor do we discern that the judgments entered below rested on any misapprehension of the controlling law. It is urged that the courts below failed to heed the requirements of Keyes, Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), that a plaintiff seeking to make out an equal protection violation on the basis of racial discrimination must show purpose. Both courts, it is argued, considered the requirement satisfied if it were shown that disparate impact would be the natural and foreseeable consequence of the practices and policies of the Board, which, it is said, is nothing more than equating impact with intent, contrary to the controlling precedent.
The District Court, however, was amply cognizant of the controlling cases. It is understood that to prevail the plaintiffs were required to “ 'prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action/ ” 429 F. Supp., at 251, quoting Keyes, 413 U. S., at 198 — that is, that the school officials had “intended to segregate.” 429 F. Supp., at 254. See also 583 F. 2d, at 801. The District Court also recognized that under those cases disparate impact and foreseeable consequences, without more, do not establish a constitutional violation. See, e. g., 429 F. Supp., at 251. Nevertheless, the District Court correctly noted that actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose. Those cases do not forbid “the foreseeable effects standard from being utilized as one of the several kinds of proofs from which an inference of segregative intent may be properly drawn.” Id., at 255. Adherence to a particular policy or practice, “with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among many others which may be considered by a court in determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be drawn.” Ibid. The District Court thus stayed well within the requirements of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 n. 25 (1979).
It is also urged that the District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to observe the requirements of our recent decision in Dayton I, which reiterated the accepted rule that the remedy imposed by a court of equity should be commensurate with the violation ascertained, and held that the remedy for the violations that had then been established in that case should be aimed at rectifying the “incremental segregative effect”, of the discriminatory acts identified. In Dayton I, only a few apparently isolated discriminatory practices had been found; yet a systemwide remedy had been imposed without proof of a systemwide impact. Here, however, the District Court repeatedly emphasized that it had found purposefully segregative practices with current, systemwide impact. 429 F. Supp., at 252, 259-260, 264, 266; App. to Pet. for Cert. 95; 583 F. 2d, at 799. And the Court of Appeals, responding to similar arguments, said:
“School board policies of systemwide application necessarily have systemwide impact. 1) The pre-1954 policy of creating an enclave of five schools intentionally designed for black students and known as 'black’ schools, as found by the District Judge, clearly had a'substantial’— indeed, a systemwide — impact. 2) The post-1954 failure of the Columbus Board to desegregate the school system in spite of many requests and demands to do so, of course, had systemwide impact. 3) So, too, did the Columbus Board’s segregative school construction and siting policy as we have detailed it above. 4) So too did its student assignment policy which, as shown above, produced the large majority of racially identifiable schools as of the school year 1975-76. 5) The practice of assigning black teachers and administrators only or in large majority to black schools likewise represented a systemwide policy of segregation. This policy served until July 1974 to deprive black students of.opportunities for contact with and learning from white teachers, and conversely to deprive white students of similar opportunities to meet, know and learn from black teachers. It also served as discriminatory, systemwide racial identification of schools.” 583 F. 2d, at 814.
Nor do we perceive any misuse of Keyes, where we held that purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a school system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of a systemwide discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted, and that given the purpose to operate a dual school system one could infer a connection between such a purpose and racial separation in other parts of the school system. There was no undue reliance here on the inferences permitted by Keyes, or upon those recognized by Swann. Furthermore, the Board was given ample opportunity to counter the evidence of segre-gative purpose and current, systemwide impact, and the findings of the courts below were against it in both respects. 429 F. Supp., at 260; App. to Pet. for Cert. 95, 102, 105.
Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals committed no prejudicial errors of fact or law, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.
So ordered.
A similar group of plaintiffs was allowed to intervene, and the original plaintiffs were allowed to file an amended complaint that was certified as a class action. 429 F. Supp. 229, 233-234 (SD Ohio 1977); App. 50.
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment against the state defendants and remanded for further proceedings regarding those parties. 583 F. 2d 787, 815-818 (CA6 1978). No issue with respect to the state defendants is before us now.
Petitioners also argue that the District Court erred in requiring that every school in the system be brought roughly within proportionate racial balance. We see no misuse of mathematical ratios under our decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 22-25 (1971), especially in light of the Board’s failure to justify the continued existence of “some schools that are all or predominantly of one race....” Id., at 26; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 102-103. Petitioners do not otherwise question the remedy if a systemwide violation was properly found.
In 1871, pursuant to the requirements of state law, Columbus maintained a complete separation of the races in the public schools. 429 F. Supp., at 234-235. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1888 that state law no longer required or permitted the segregation of schoolchildren. Board of Education v. State, 45 Ohio St. 555, 16 N. E. 373. Even prior to that, in 1881, the Columbus Board abolished its separate schools for black and white students, but by the end of the first decade of this century it had returned to a segregated school policy. Champion Avenue School was built in 1909 in a predominantly black area and was completely staffed with black teachers. Other black schools were established as the black population grew. The Board gerrymandered attendance zones so that white students who lived near these schools were assigned to or could attend white schools, which often were further from their homes. By 1943, a total of five schools had almost exclusively black student bodies, and each was assigned an all-black faculty, often through all-white to all-black faculty transfers that occurred each time the Board came to consider a particular school as a black school. 429 F. Supp., at 234-236.
Both our dissenting Brethren and the separate concurrence of Mr. Justice Stewart put great weight on the absence of a statutory mandate or authorization to discriminate, but the Equal Protection Clause was aimed at all official actions, not just those of state legislatures. “[N]o agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government,... denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws... violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347 (1880). Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), the discriminatory application of an ordinance fair on its face was found to be unconstitutional state action. Even actions of state agents that may be illegal under state law are attributable to the State. United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945). Our decision in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189 (1973), plainly demonstrates in the educational context that there is no magical difference between segregated schools mandated by statute and those that result from local segregative acts and policies. The presence of a statute or ordinance commanding separation of the races would ease the plaintiff’s problems of proof, but here the District Court found that the local officials, by their conduct and policies, had maintained a dual school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals agreed, and we fail to see why there should be a lesser constitutional duty to eliminate that system than there would have been had the system been ordained by law.
The dissenters in this ease claim a better grasp of the historical and ultimate facts than the two courts below had. But on the issue of whether there was a dual school system in Columbus, Ohio, in 1954, on the record before us we are much more impressed by the views of the judges who have lived with the case over the years. Also, our dissenting Brothers’ suggestion that this Court should play a special oversight role in reviewing the factual determinations of the lower courts in school desegregation cases, post, at 491-492 (RehNQUist, J., dissenting), asserts an omnipotence and omniscience that we do not have and should not claim.
It is argued that Dayton I, 433 U. S. 406 (1977), implicitly overruled or limited those portions of Keyes and Swann approving, in certain circumstances, inferences of general, systemwide purpose and current, system-wide impact from evidence of discriminatory purpose that has resulted in substantial current segregation, and approving a systemwide remedy absent a showing by the defendant of what part of the current imbalance was not caused by the constitutional breach. Dayton I does not purport to disturb any aspect of Keyes and Swann; indeed, it cites both cases with approval. On the facts found by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals at the time Dayton first came before us, there were only isolated instances of intentional segregation, which were insufficient to give rise to an inference of systemwide institutional purpose and which did not add up to a facially substantial systemwide impact. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II), post, at 531, and n. 5.
Despite petitioners’ avowedly strong preference for neighborhood schools, in times of residential racial transition the Board created optional attendance zones to allow white students to avoid predominantly black schools, which were often closer to the homes of the white pupils. For example, until well after the time the complaint was filed, petitioners allowed students in “a small, white enclave on Columbus’ predominantly black near-east side... to escape attendance at black” schools. 429 F. Supp., at 244. The court could perceive no racially neutral reasons for this optional zone. Id., at 245. “Quite frankly, the Near-Bexley Option appears to this Court to be a classic example of a segregative device designed to permit white students to escape attendance at predominantly black schools.” Ibid.
This technique was applied when neighborhood schools would have tended to desegregate the involved schools. In the 1960’s, a group of white students were bused past their neighborhood school to a “whiter” school. The District Court could “discern no other explanation than a racial one for the existence of the Moler discontiguous attendance area for the period 1963 through 1969.” Id., at 247. From 1957 until 1963, students living in a predominantly white area near Heimandale Elementary School attended a more remote, but identifiably white school. Id., at 247-248.
Gerrymandering of boundary lines also continued after 1954. The District Court found, for instance, that for one area on the west side of the city containing three white schools and one black school the Board had altered the lines so that white residential areas were removed from the black school’s zone and black students were contained within that zone. Id., at 245-247. The Court found that the segregative choice of lines was not justified “as a matter of academic administration” and “had a substantial and continuing segregative impact upon these four west side schools.” Id., at 247.
Another example involved the former Mifflin district that had been absorbed into the Columbus district. The Board staff presented two alternative means of drawing necessary attendance zones: one that was desegre-gative and one that was segregative. The Board chose the segregative option, and the District Court was unpersuaded that it had any legitimate educational reasons for doing so. Id., at 248-250.
The District Court found that, of the 103 schools built by the Board between 1950 and 1975, 87 opened with racially identifiable student bodies and 71 remained that way at the time of trial. This result was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances in light of the sites selected, and the Board was often specifically warned that it was, without apparent justification, choosing sites that would maintain or further segregation. Id., at 241-243. As the Court of Appeals noted:
“[T]his record actually requires no reliance upon inference, since, as indicated above, it contains repeated instances where the Columbus Board was warned of the segregative effect of proposed site choices, and was urged to consider alternatives which could have had an integrative effect. In these instances the Columbus Board chose the segregative sites. In this situation the District Judge was justified in relying in part on the history of the Columbus Board’s site choices and construction program in finding deliberate and unconstitutional systemwide segregation.” 583 F. 2d, at 804.
Local community and civil rights groups, the “Ohio State University Advisory Commission on Problems Facing the Columbus Public Schools, and officials of the Ohio State Board of Education all called attention to the problem [of segregation] and made certain curative recommendations.” 429 F. Supp., at 255. This was particularly important because the Columbus system grew rapidly in terms of geography and number of students, creating many crossroads where the Board could either turn toward segregation or away from it. See id., at 243. Specifically, for example, the University Commission in 1968 made certain recommendations that it thought not only would assist desegregation of the schools but also would encourage integrated residential patterns. Id., at 256. The Board itself came to similar conclusions about what could be done, but its response was “minimal.” Ibid. See also id., at 264. Additionally, the Board refused to create a site-selection advisory group to assist in avoiding sites with a segregative effect, refused to ask state education officials to present plans for desegregating the Columbus public schools, and refused to apply for federal desegregation-assistance funds. Id., at 257; see id., at 239. The District Court drew “the inference of segregative intent from the Columbus defendants’ failures, after notice, to consider predictable racial consequences of their acts and omissions when alternatives were available which would have eliminated or lessened racial imbalance.” Id., at 240.
Petitioners have indicated that a few of the recent violations specifically discussed by the District Court involved so few students and lasted for such a short time that they are unlikely to have any current impact. But that contention says little or nothing about the incremental impact of systemwide practices extending over many years. Petitioners also argue that because many of the involved schools were in areas that had become predominantly black residential areas by the time of trial, the racial separation in the schools would have occurred even without the unlawful conduct of petitioners. But, as the District Court found, petitioners’ evidence in this respect was insufiicient to counter respondents’ proof. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 271 n. 21 (1977); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977). And the phenomenon described by petitioners seems only to confirm, not disprove, the evidence accepted by the District Court that school segregation is a contributing cause of housing segregation. 429 F. Supp., at 259; see Keyes, 413 U. S., at 202-203; Swann, 402 U. S., at 20-21.
Although the District Court in this case discussed in its major opinion a number of specific instances of purposeful segregation, it made it quite clear that its broad findings were not limited to those instances: “Viewing the Court’s March 8 findings in their totality, this case does not rest on three specific violations, or eleven, or any other specific number. It concerns a school board which since 1954 has by its official acts intentionally aggravated, rather than alleviated, the racial imbalance of the public schools it administers. These were not the facts of the Dayton case.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 94.
Mr. Justice RehNQUist’s dissent erroneously states that we have “reliev[ed] school desegregation plaintiffs from any showing of a causal nexus between intentional segregative actions and the conditions they seek to remedy.” Post, at 501. As we have expressly noted, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the Board’s purposefully discriminatory conduct and policies had current, systemwide impact — an essential predicate, as both courts recognized, for a systemwide remedy. Those courts reveal a much more knowledgeable and reliable view of the facts and of the record than do our dissenting Brethren.
“For example, there is little dispute that Champion, Felton, Mt. Vernon, Pilgrim and Garfield were de jure segregated by direct acts of the Columbus defendants’ predecessors. They were almost completely segregated in 1954, 1964, 1974 and today. Nothing has occurred to substantially alleviate that continuity of discrimination of thousands of black students over the intervening decades.” 429 F. Supp., at 260 (footnote omitted).
“The finding of liability in this case concerns the Columbus school district as a whole. Actions and omissions by public officials which tend to make black schools blacker necessarily have the reciprocal effect of making white schools whiter
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether a suit against an employer by employees asserting breach of a collective-bargaining contract was properly dismissed where the accompanying complaint against the union for breach of duty of fair representation has withstood the union’s motion for summary judgment and remains to be tried.
I
Petitioners, who were formerly employed as truck drivers by respondent Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. (Anchor), were discharged on June 5, 1967. The applicable collective-bargaining contract forbade discharges without just cause. The company charged dishonesty. The practice at Anchor was to reimburse drivers for money spent for lodging while the drivers were on the road overnight. Anchor’s assertion was that petitioners had sought reimbursement for motel expenses in excess of the actual charges sustained by them. At a meeting between the company and the union, Local 377, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Union), which was also attended by petitioners, Anchor presented motel receipts previously submitted by petitioners which were in excess of the charges shown on the motel’s registration cards; a notarized statement of the motel clerk asserting the accuracy of the registration cards; and an affidavit of the motel owner affirming that the registration cards were accurate and that inflated receipts had been furnished petitioners. The Union claimed petitioners were innocent and opposed the discharges. It was then agreed that the matter would be presented to the joint arbitration committee for the area, to which the collective-bargaining contract permitted either party to submit an unresolved grievance. Pending this hearing, petitioners were reinstated. Their suggestion that the motel be investigated was answered by the Union representatives’ assurances that "there was nothing to worry about” and that they need not hire their own attorney.
A hearing before the joint area committee was held on July 26, 1967. Anchor presented its case. Both the Union and petitioners were afforded an opportunity to present their case and to be heard. Petitioners denied their dishonesty, but neither they nor the Union presented any other evidence contradicting the documents presented by the company. The committee sustained the discharges. Petitioners then retained an attorney and sought rehearing based on a statement by the motel owner that he had no personal knowledge of the events, but that the discrepancy between the receipts and the registration cards could have been attributable to the motel clerk’s recording on the cards less than was actually paid and retaining for himself the difference between the amount receipted and the amount recorded. The committee, after hearing, unanimously denied rehearing “because there was no new evidence presented which would justify a reopening of this case.” App. 212.
There were later indications that the motel clerk was in fact the culprit; and the present suit was filed in June 1969, against Anchor, the Union, and its International. The complaint alleged that the charges of dishonesty made against petitioners by Anchor were false, that there was no just cause for discharge, and that the discharges had been in breach of contract. It was also asserted that the falsity of the charges could have been discovered with a minimum of investigation, that the Union had made no effort to ascertain the truth of the charges, and that the Union had violated its duty of fair representation by arbitrarily and in bad faith depriving petitioners of their employment and permitting their discharge without sufficient proof.
The Union denied the charges and relied on the decision of the joint area committee. Anchor asserted that petitioners had been properly discharged for just cause. It also defended on the ground that petitioners, diligently and in good faith represented by the Union, had unsuccessfully resorted to the grievance and arbitration machinery provided by the contract and that the adverse decision of the joint arbitration committee was binding upon the Union and petitioners under the contractual provision declaring that “[a] decision by a majority of a Panel of any of the Committees shall be final and binding on all parties, including the employee and/or employees affected.” Discovery followed, including a deposition of the motel clerk revealing that he had falsified the records and that it was he who had pocketed the difference between the sums shown on.the receipts and the registration cards. Motions for summary judgment filed by Anchor and the Unions were granted by the District Court on the ground that the decision of the arbitration committee was final and binding on the employees and “for failure to show facts comprising bad faith, arbitrariness or perfunctoriness on the part of the Unions.” 72 CCH Lab. Cas. ¶ 13,987, p. 28,131 (ND Ohio 1973). Although indicating that the acts of the Union “may not meet professional standards of competency, and while it might have been advisable for the Union to further investigate the charges . . . ,” the District Court concluded that the facts demonstrated at most bad judgment on the part of the Union, which was insufficient to prove a breach of duty or make out a prima facie case against it. Id., at 28,132.
After reviewing the allegations and the record before it, the Court of Appeals concluded that there were sufficient facts from which bad faith or arbitrary conduct on the part of the local Union could be inferred by the trier of fact and that petitioners should have been afforded an opportunity to prove their charges. To this extent the judgment of the District Court was reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Anchor and the International. Saying that petitioners wanted to relitigate their discharges because of the recantation of the motel clerk, the Court of Appeals, quoting from its prior opinion in Balowski v. International Union, 372 F. 2d 829 (CA6 1967), concluded that the finality provision of collective-bargaining contracts must be observed because there was “[n]o evidence of any misconduct on the part of the employer . . .” and wholly insufficient evidence of any conspiracy between the Union and Anchor. 506 F. 2d, at 1157, 1158.
It is this judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to Anchor that is now before us on our limited grant of the employees’ petition for writ of certiorari. 421 U. S. 928 (1975). We reverse that judgment.
II
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185, provides for suits in the district courts for violation of collective-bargaining contracts between labor organizations and employers without regard to the amount in controversy. This provision reflects the interest of Congress in promoting “a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements . . ..” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., .17 (1947). The strong policy favoring judicial enforcement of collective-bargaining contracts was sufficiently powerful to sustain the jurisdiction of the district courts over enforcement suits even though the conduct involved was arguably or would amount to an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Rfg. Co., 370 U. S. 238 (1962); Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 (1962). Section 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications § 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate “uniquely personal” rights of employees such as wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful discharge. Smith v. Evening News Assn., supra, at 198-200. Petitioners' present suit against the employer was for wrongful discharge and is the kind of case Congress provided for in § 301.
Collective-bargaining contracts, however, generally contain procedures for the settlement of disputes through mutual discussion and arbitration. These provisions are among those which are to be enforced under § 301. Furthermore, Congress has specified in § 203 (d), 61 Stat. 154, 29 U. S. C. § 173 (d), that “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes . . . .” This congressional policy “can be effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining agreement is given full play.” Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 566 (1960). Courts are not to usurp those functions which collective-bargaining contracts have properly “entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.” Id., at 569. They should not undertake to review the merits of arbitration awards but should defer to the tribunal chosen by the parties finally to settle their disputes. Otherwise “plenary review by a court of the merits would make-meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator’s decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be final.” Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 599 (1960).
Pursuant to this policy, we later held that an employee could not sidestep the grievance machinery provided in the contract and that unless he attempted to utilize the contractual procedures for settling his dispute with his employer, his independent suit against the employer in the District Court would be dismissed. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965). Maddox nevertheless distinguished the situation where “the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the individual’s claim .... See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335; Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F. 2d 172.” Id., at 652 (footnote omitted).
The reservation in Maddox was well advised. The federal labor laws, in seeking to strengthen the bargaining position of the average worker in an industrial economy, provided for the selection of collective-bargaining agents with wide authority to negotiate and conclude collective-bargaining agreements on behalf of all employees in appropriate units, as well as to be the employee’s agent in the enforcement and administration of the contract. Wages, hours, working conditions, seniority, and job security therefore became the business of certified or recognized bargaining agents, as did the contractual procedures for the processing and settling of grievances, including those with respect to discharge.
Necessarily “[a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents . . . Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 338 (1953). The union’s broad authority in negotiating and administering effective agreements is “undoubted,” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 342 (1964), but it is not without limits. Because “[t]he collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of all. employees in a bargaining unit,” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 182 (1967), the controlling statutes have long beén interpreted as imposing upon the bargaining agent a responsibility equal in scope to its authority, “the responsibility and duty of fair representation.” Humphrey v. Moore, supra, at 342. The union as the statutory representative of the employees is “subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra, at 338. Since Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944), with respect to the railroad industry, and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra, and Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U. S. 892 (1955), with respect to those industries reached by the National Labor Relations Act, the duty of fair representation has served as a “bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law.” Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 182.
Claims of union breach of duty may arise during the life of a contract when individual employees claim wrongful discharge or other improper treatment at the hands of the employer. Contractual remedies, at least in their final stages controlled by union and employer, are normally provided; yet the union may refuse to utilize them or, if it does, assertedly may do so discriminatorily or in bad faith. “The problem then is to determine under what circumstances the individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach-of-contract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures.” Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 185.
Humphrey v. Moore, supra, involved a seniority dispute between the employees of two transportation companies whose operating authorities had been combined. The employees accorded lesser seniority were being laid off. Their grievances were presented to the company and taken by the union to the joint arbitration committee pursuant to contractual provisions very similar to those now before us. The decision was adverse. The employees then brought suit in the state court against the company, the union, and the favored employees, asserting breach of contract by the company and breach of its duty of fair representation by the union. They sought damages and an injunction to prevent implementation of the decision of the joint arbitration committee. The union was charged with dishonest and bad-faith representation of the employees before the joint committee. The unions and the defendant employees asserted the finality of the joint committee’s decision, if not as a final resolution of a dispute in the administration of a contract, as a bargained-for accommodation between the two parties. The state courts issued the injunction. Respondents argued here that “the decision of the Committee was obtained by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair representation and that a decision so obtained cannot be relied upon as a valid excuse for [their] discharge under the contract.” 375 U. S., at 342. We reversed the judgment of the state court but only after independently determining that the union’s conduct was not a breach of its statutory duties and that the joint committee’s decision was not infirm for that reason. Our conclusion was that the disfavored employees had not proved their case: “Neither the parties nor the Joint Committee exceeded their power under the contract and there was no fraud or breach of duty by the exclusive bargaining agent. The decision of the committee, reached after proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and binding upon the parties, just as the contract says it is.” Id., at 351.
In Vaca v. Sipes, supra, the discharged employee sued the union alleging breach of its duty of fair representation in that it had refused in bad faith to take the employee’s grievance to arbitration as it could have under the contract. In the course of rejecting the claim that the alleged conduct was arguably an unfair practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Board, we ruled that “the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee’s grievance.” 386 U. S., at 186 (footnote omitted). This was true even though “the employer in such a situation may have done nothing to prevent exhaustion of the exclusive contractual remedies . . . ,” for “the employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach of that agreement, a breach which could be remedied through the grievance process ... were it not for the union’s breach of its statutory duty of fair representation . . . .” Id., at 185. We could not “believe that Congress, in conferring upon employers and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures, intended to confer upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of contract.” Id., at 186. Nor did we “think that Congress intended to shield employers from the natural consequences of their breaches of bargaining agreements by wrongful union conduct in the enforcement of such agreements.” Ibid. At the same time “we conclude [d] that a union does not breach its duty of fair representation . . . merely because it settled the grievance short of arbitration.” Id., at 192. “If the individual employee could compel arbitration of his grievance regardless of its merit,” that is, compel both employers and unions to make full use of the contractual provisions for settling disputes by arbitration, “the settlement machinery provided by the contract would be substantially undermined,” for curtailing the “power to settle the majority of grievances short of the costlier and more time-consuming steps” might deter the parties to collective-bargaining agreements from making “provision] for detailed grievance and arbitration procedures of the kind encouraged by L. M. R. A. § 203 (d).” Id., at 191-192. We also expressly indicated that suit against the employer and suit against the union could be joined in one action. Id., at 187.
Ill
Even though under Vaca the employer may not insist on exhaustion of grievance procedures when the union has breached its representation duty, it is urged that when the procedures have been followed and a decision favorable to the employer announced, the employer must be protected from relitigation by the express contractual provision declaring a decision to be final and binding. We disagree. The union’s breach of duty relieves the employee of an express or implied requirement that disputes be settled through contractual grievance procedures; if it seriously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process the union’s breach also removes the bar of the finality provisions of the contract.
It is true that Vaca dealt with a refusal by the union to process a grievance. It. is also true that where the union actually utilizes the grievance and arbitration procedures on behalf of the employee, the focus is no longer on the reasons for the union’s failure to act but on whether, contrary to the arbitrator’s decision, the employer breached the contract and whether there is substantial reason to believe that a union breach of duty contributed to the erroneous outcome of the contractual proceedings. But the judicial remedy in Humphrey v. Moore was sought after the adverse decision of the joint arbitration committee. Our conclusion in that case was not that the committee’s decision was unreviewable. On the contrary, we proceeded on the basis that it was reviewable and vulnerable if tainted by breach of duty on the part of the union, even though the employer had not conspired with the union. The joint committee’s decision was held binding on the complaining employees only after we determined that the union had not been guilty of malfeasance and that its conduct was within the range of acceptable performance by a collective-bargaining agent, a wholly unnecessary determination if the union’s conduct was irrelevant to the finality of the arbitral process.
In Vaca “we accept [ed] the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion,” 386 U. S., at 191, and our ruling that the union had not breached its duty of fair representation in not pressing the employee’s case to the last step of the grievance process stemmed from our evaluation of the manner in which the union had handled the grievance in its earlier stages. Although “the Union might well have breached its duty had it ignored [the employee’s] complaint or had it processed the grievance in a perfunctory manner,” “the Union conclude [d] both that arbitration would be fruitless and that the grievance should be dismissed” only after it had “processed the grievance into the fourth step, attempted to gather sufficient evidence to prove [the employee’s] case, attempted to secure for [him] less vigorous work at the plant, and joined in the employer’s efforts to have [him] rehabilitated.” Id., at 194.
Anchor would have it that petitioners are foreclosed from judicial relief unless some blameworthy conduct on its part disentitles it to rely on the finality rule. But it was Anchor that originated the discharges for dishonesty. If those charges were in error, Anchor has surely played its part in precipitating this dispute. Of course, both courts below held there were no facts suggesting that Anchor either knowingly or negligently relied on false evidence. As far as the record reveals it also prevailed before the joint committee after presenting its case in accordance with what were ostensibly wholly fair procedures. Nevertheless there remains the question whether the contractual protection against re-litigating an arbitral decision binds employees who assert that the process has fundamentally malfunctioned by reason of the bad-faith performance of the union, their statutorily imposed collective-bargaining agent.
Under the rule announced by the Court of Appeals, unless the employer is implicated in the Union’s malfeasance or has otherwise caused the arbitral process to err, petitioners would have no remedy against Anchor even though they are successful in proving the Union’s bad faith, the falsity of the charges against them, and the breach of contract by Anchor by discharging without cause. This rule would apparently govern even in circumstances where it is shown that a union has manufactured the evidence and knows from the start that it is false; or even if, unbeknownst to the employer, the union has corrupted the arbitrator to the detriment of disfavored union members. As is the case where there has been a failure to exhaust, however, we cannot believe that Congress intended to foreclose the employee from his § 301 remedy otherwise available against the employer if the contractual processes have been seriously flawed by the union’s breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and in good faith and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct.
It is urged that the reversal of the Court of Appeals will undermine not only the finality rule but the entire collective-bargaining process. Employers, it is said, will be far less willing to give up their untrammeled right to discharge without cause and to agree to private settlement procedures. But the burden on employees will remain a substantial one, far too heavy in the opinion of some. To prevail against either the company or the Union, petitioners must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union. As the District Court indicated, this involves more than demonstrating mere errors in judgment.
Petitioners are not entitled to relitigate their discharge merely because they offer newly discovered evidence that the charges against them were false and that in fact they were fired without cause. The grievance processes cannot be expected to be error-free. The finality provision has sufficient force to surmount occasional instances of mistake. But it is quite another matter to suggest that erroneous arbitration decisions must stand even though the employee’s representation by the union has been dishonest, in bad faith, or discriminatory; for in that event error and injustice of the grossest sort would multiply. The contractual system would then cease to qualify as an adequate mechanism to secure individual redress for damaging failure of the employer to abide by the contract. Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement arrangements provided in collective agreements, but it was anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery would operate within some minimum levels of integrity. In our view, enforcement of the finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon the union’s having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connection with the arbitration proceedings. Wrongfully discharged employees would be left without jobs and without a fair opportunity to secure an adequate remedy.
Except for this case the Courts of Appeals have arrived at similar conclusions. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit put it in Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F. 2d 179, 180 (1974): “To us, it makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration process by refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follows the arbitration trail to the end, but in so doing subverts the arbitration process by failing to fairly represent the employee. In neither case, does the employee receive fair representation.”
Petitioners, if they prove an erroneous discharge and the Union’s breach of duty tainting the decision of the joint committee, are entitled to an appropriate remedy against the employer as well as the Union. It was error to affirm the District Court’s final dismissal of petitioners’ action against Anchor. To this extent the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
Mb. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Two of the original petitioners, Burtice A. Hines and Arthur D. Cartwright, are deceased. Charles A. Hines and Chyra J. Cartwright have been substituted as party petitioners. 423 U. S. 816, 982 (1975).
The contractual grievance procedure is set out in Art. 7 of the Central Conference Area Supplement to the National Master Automobile Transporters Agreement. App. 226-233. Grievances were to be taken up by the employee involved and if no settlement was reached, were then to be considered by the business agent of the local union and the employer representative. If the dispute remained unresolved, either party had the right to present the case for decision to the appropriate joint area arbitration committee. These committees are organized on a geographical area basis and hear grievances in panels made up of an equal number of representatives of the parties to the collective-bargaining agreement. Cases that deadlocked before the joint area committee could be taken to a panel of the national joint arbitration committee, composed like the area committee panels of an equal number of representatives of the parties to the agreement. If unresolved there, they would be resolved by a panel including an impartial arbitrator. The joint arbitration committee for the Detroit area is involved in this case.
The provision is contained in § 5 of Art. 7. App. 231. In addition, § 7 (e) of the same article provides that all decisions of the national and area committees with respect to the interpretation of the contract “shall be final and conclusive and binding upon the •Employer and the Union, and the employees involved.” App. 232.
As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the allegations relied on were:
“They consist of the motel clerk’s admission, made a year after the discharge was upheld in arbitration, that he, not plaintiffs, pocketed the money; the claim of the union’s failure to investigate the motel clerk’s original story implicating plaintiffs despite their requests; the account of the union officials’ assurances to plaintiffs that ‘they had nothing to worry about’ and ‘that there was no need for them to investigate’; the contention that no exculpatory evidence was presented at the hearing; and the assertion that there existed political antagonism between local union officials and plaintiffs because of a wildcat strike led by some of the plaintiffs and a dispute over the appointment of a steward, resulting in denunciation of plaintiffs as ‘hillbillies’ by Angelo, the union president.” 506 F. 2d 1153, 1156 (CA6 1974).
The quoted segment of the opinion in Balowski v. International Union, 372 F. 2d, at 833, was:
“ 'It is apparent that what plaintiff is attempting to do is to relitigate his grievance in this proceeding. This he cannot do when the collective bargaining agreement provides for final and binding arbitration of all disputes, absent a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, bad faith, dishonesty of purpose, or such gross mistake or inaction as to imply bad faith on the part of the Union or the employer.'” 506 F. 2d, at 1157 (citation omitted).
The rule in the Sixth Circuit, under Balowski, would appear to have been that an employee could litigate his discharge in court if he proved bad faith or gross mistake on the part of either the union or the employer.
One judge, otherwise concurring, dissented as to affirming summary judgment against Anchor because “issues of fact . . . presented by the pleadings concerning plaintiffs’ charges against the employer . . . should not have been dealt with on summary judgment.” 506 F. 2d, at 1158.
Our order of April 21, 1975, was as follows:
“Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition which reads as follows:
“ ‘1. Whether petitioners’ claim under LMRA § 301 for wrongful discharge is barred by the decision of a joint grievance committee upholding their discharge, notwithstanding that their union breached its duty of fair representation in processing their grievance so as to deprive them and the grievance committee of overwhelming evidence of their innocence of the alleged dishonesty for which they were discharged?”’
The affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the International is therefore not before us. Nor is the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the summary judgment in favor of Local 377, since the Union has not sought review of this ruling.
§301 (a), 29 U. S. C. §185 (a):
“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”
Czosek v. O’Mara, 397 U. S. 25 (1970), which arose under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., involved a claim that a railroad had wrongfully deprived plaintiff of his seniority and that the union had failed in its duty to protest. The suit against the union was sustained by the Court of Appeals, but dismissal of the claim against the railroad was affirmed absent allegation that the company had participated in the union’s breach. In affirming the judgment we upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling against the union, but did not reach the question whether the railroad was properly dismissed over the employee’s objections, since the latter did not challenge the judgment in this respect.
Mr. Justice Black, for one, was of the view that where the union refused to process a grievance, the employee should be allowed his suit in court without proof of the union’s breach of duty. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 203 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 441 F. 2d 599 (CA2 1971); Butler v. Local Union 823, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 514 F. 2d 442 (CA8), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 924 (1975); Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F. 2d 179 (CA9 1974); Local 13, International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Pacific Maritime Assn., 441 F. 2d 1061 (CA9 1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1016 (1972). See also Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F. 2d 32, 38 (CA3 1968); Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F. 2d 574, 579-580 (CA3 1968); Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F. 2d 167, 171 (CA5 1971); Andrus v. Convoy Co., 480 F. 2d 604, 606 (CA9), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 989 (1973).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this action petitioners assert materialmen's liens under state law for materials furnished to a prime contractor building boats for the United States, and seek just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for the value of their liens on accumulated materials and uncompleted work which have been conveyed to the United States.
The United States entered into a contract with the Rice Shipbuilding Corporation for the construction of 11 navy personnel boats. The contract provided that in the event of default by Rice, the Government could terminate the contract and require Rice to transfer title and deliver to the Government all completed and uncompleted work together with all manufacturing materials acquired by Rice for building the boats. Petitioners furnished various materials to Rice for use in construction of the boats. Upon Rice's default, the Government exercised its option as to 10 of the boat hulls still under construction; Rice executed an itemized “Instrument of Transfer of Title” conveying to the United States the hulls and all manufacturing materials then on hand; and the Government removed all of these properties to out-of-state naval shipyards for use in the completion of the boats. When the transfer occurred, petitioners had not been paid for their materials and they have not been paid since. Petitioners therefore contended that they had liens under Maine law which provides that “[wjhoever furnishes labor or materials for building a vessel has a lien on it therefor, which may be enforced by attachment thereof within 4 days after it is launched .... He also has a lien on the materials furnished before they become part of the vessel, which may be enforced by attachment . . . .” Maine Rev. Stat., 1954, c. 178, § 13.
Claiming valid liens on the hulls and manufacturing materials at the time they were transferred by Rice to the United States, petitioners asserted that the Government’s action destroyed their liens by making them unenforceable and that this constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Claims, relying on United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U. S. 452, held that petitioners never acquired valid liens on the hulls or the materials transferred to the Government and that therefore there had been no taking of any property owned by them. -Ct. Cl.-, 169 F. Supp. 259. We granted certiorari. 361 U. S. 812.
L
The Court of Claims reached its conclusion from the correct premise that laborers and materialmen can acquire no liens on a “public work.” Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U. S. 197, 203; Equitable Surety Co. v. McMillan, 234 U. S. 448, 455; United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U. S. 234, 241. It reasoned that because the contract between Rice and the United States contemplated that title to the vessels would eventually vest in the Government, the Government had “inchoate title” to the materials supplied by petitioners, rendering such materials “public works” immune from the outset to petitioners’ liens. We cannot agree that a mere prospect that property will later be owned by the United States renders that property immune from otherwise valid liens.
The sovereign’s immunity against materialmen’s liens has never been extended beyond property actually owned by it. The Ansonia case itself, upon which the Court of Claims relied, makes this clear, where in dealing with one aspect of the issues there involved, the Court said:
“We are not now dealing with the right of a State to provide for such liens while property to the chattel in process of construction remains in the builder, who may be constructing the same with a view to transferring title therein to the United States upon its acceptance under a contract with the Government. We are now treating of property which the United States owns. Such property, for the most obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be seized by authority of another sovereignty against the consent of the Government.” 218 U. S., at 471.
The terms of the contract between Rice and the United States show conclusively that Rice, not the United States, had title to the property when petitioners furnished their materials. The agreement provided for delivery, preliminary acceptance, and final acceptance of the boats, the contractor to remain responsible for all supplies until delivery. The contractor was required to insure the property for the Government’s benefit only to the extent of progress payments made and materials furnished by the Government. The very clause here invoked by the Government provided that upon default and termination of the contract the Government might “require the Contractor to transfer title and deliver” the work, supplies and materials on hand. (Emphasis added.) While the Government was obliged to make progress payments based on the percentage of the work completed, nothing in the contract provided that ownership of the portion of the work paid for should vest in the United States. On the contrary, it was stipulated that all progress payments should be secured by a paramount government lien on the property. And finally, the contractor was required to discharge immediately any lien or right in rem asserted against the property. In their totality, these provisions clearly recognize that title was to remain in Rice during performance of the work, and show that private liens could attach to the property while Rice owned it.
We think, therefore, that the Court of Claims was in error in holding as it did. This, however, does not end the case in petitioners’ favor since the United States urges other grounds to support its judgment.
II.
It is contended that petitioners’ asserted liens gave them no compensable property interests within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Under Maine law, material-men become entitled to a lien when they furnish supplies; however, the lien must subsequently be enforced by attachment of the vessel or supplies. There is no allegation that any of the petitioners had taken steps to attach the uncompleted work. Nevertheless, they were entitled to resort to the specific property for the satisfaction of their claims. That such a right is compensable by virtue of the Fifth Amendment was decided in Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555. In that case, a bank acquired a mortgage which under state law constituted a lien enforceable only by suit to foreclose. Subsequently, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act so as to deprive mortgagees of substantial incidents of their rights to resort to mortgaged property. This Court held that the bank’s property had been taken without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. No reason has been suggested why the nature of the liens held by petitioners should be regarded as any different, for this purpose, from the interest of the bank held compensable in the Radford case.
The Government, however, suggests that because it held a paramount lien on the property to secure its progress payments, petitioners’ claimed liens were in fact worthless. Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that when the Government chose to acquire title to the property rather than to enforce its lien, the lien merged with the title, thus making petitioners’ liens paramount, and that even if it did not, and their liens remained subordinate to that of the Government, the value of the hulls and materials would have been sufficient to satisfy the Government’s claims and some or all of petitioners’ claims as well.
We need not decide whether, as a matter of law, the Government’s lien "merged” in its title. At the very least, petitioners, prior to the transfer of title, had the right to whatever proceeds the property might bring over and above the Government’s claim to the amount of its progress payments. By the date of default, Rice had expended some $198,000, while the Government had advanced only about $141,000 in progress payments. We have no way of knowing what the property would have brought had it been sold, but it cannot be said with certainty that it would have brought no more than the amount of the Government’s claim. Moreover, petitioners themselves might have been able to purchase the property and realize some amount on their claims after the Government’s claims had been satisfied. While these factors may present a difficult problem of valuation, we cannot say on this record that petitioners’ interests were valueless.
The Government also seems to suggest that because the contract between Rice and the United States expressly gave the Government the option of requiring a conveyance of title upon default, petitioners’ liens attached subject to that limitation. Petitioners, however, were not parties to the contract. Furthermore, their liens attached by operation of law and nothing in the record indicates that the scope of such liens is affected by contractual arrangements into which the owner of the property may have entered.
We conclude, therefore, that on this record petitioners must be considered to have had compensable property interests within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment prior to transfer of title to the Government.
III.
The final question is whether the Government’s action constituted a “taking” of petitioners’ property interests within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Before the United States compelled Rice to transfer the hulls and all materials held for future use in building the boats, petitioners had valid liens under Maine law against both the hulls and whatever unused materials which petitioners had furnished. Before transfer these liens were enforceable by attachment against both the hulls and all materials. After transfer to the United States the liens were still valid, United States v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 274, 281-282, but they could not be enforced because of the sovereign immunity of the Government and its property from suit. The result of this was a destruction of all petitioners’ property rights under their liens, although, as we have pointed out, the liens were valid and had com-pensable value. Petitioners contend that destruction of their liens under the circumstances here is a “taking.” The United States denies this, largely on the premise that inability of petitioners to enforce their liens because of immunity of the Government and its property from suit cannot amount to a “taking.”
The Government argues that the Ansonia case is dis-positive of this Fifth Amendment issue. In that case, the contract between the shipbuilder and the United States provided, as to one of the ships contracted for, the dredge Benyuard, that as progress payments were made, the portion of the- work paid for should become the property of the United States. Subcontractors claimed liens on the uncompleted vessel under the Virginia supply-lien law. This Court merely held that, as the property had passed to the United States by virtue of the terms of the contract, no lien could be enforced against it. No question was raised as to the rights possessed by the subcontractors prior to the acquisition of title by the United States nor as to whether that event entitled them to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. There is, to be sure, reason to believe that the subcontractors’ liens in that case, like those of petitioners here, did attach as soon as materials were furnished, which would necessarily be prior to the making of a progress payment for the portion of the work incorporating those materiáls and the consequent passage of title to the United States. See Hawes & Co. v. Trigg Co., 110 Va. 165, 185-186, 199, 65 S. E. 538, 546-547, 551-552. But the Fifth Amendment question was not raised or passed upon. In these circumstances we cannot regard the court’s decision as dispositive on the precise point now under, consideration, and must proceed to decide that question.
We hold that there was a taking of these liens for which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment. It is true that not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a “taking” in the constitutional sense. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 508-510. This case and many others reveal the difficulty of trying to draw the line between what destructions of property by lawful governmental actions are compensable “takings” and what destructions are “consequential” and therefore not compensable. See, e. g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155; United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373; United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551.
The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment “taking” and is not a mere “consequential incidence” of a valid regulatory measure. Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders admittedly had compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had none. This was not because their property vanished into thin air. It was because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the value of the liens, something that the Government could do because its property was not subject to suit, but which no private purchaser could have done. Since this acquisition was for a public use, however accomplished, whether with an intent and purpose of extinguishing the liens or not, the Government’s action did destroy them and in the circumstances of this case did thereby take the property value of those liens within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Neither the boats’ immunity, after being acquired by the Government, from enforcement of the liens nor the use of a contract to take title relieves the Government from its constitutional obligation to pay just compensation for the value of the liens the petitioners lost and of which loss the Government was the direct, positive beneficiary.
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this constitutional protection entitles these lienholders to just compensation here. Cf. Thibodo v. United States, 187 F. 2d 249.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings to determine the value of the property taken. .
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the result.
The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment provides, "... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
While Rice was also liable to the Government for an additional amount approximating $146,000 representing the excess cost to the Government of having the boats completed, the contract does not provide, and there is no allegation, that this amount was secured by a lien on the property.
Questions of value of the liens were not determined by the Court of Claims since it entered a summary judgment for the United States for reasons stated on p. 42, supra.
United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U. S. 452; Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U. S. 197; Equitable Surety Co. v. McMillan, 234 U. S. 448; United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U. S. 234; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382; United States v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 274.
The Government also cites Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U. S. 89. The facts there, however, revealed that the Government’s action could not have destroyed any liens existing at the time the Government acquired the land because as the Court said, “None remained upon the land, when the purchases were consummated,” 290 U. S., at 95.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is one of a group of “obscenity-pornography” cases being reviewed by the Court in a re-examination of standards enunciated in earlier cases involving what Mr. Justice Harlan called “the intractable obscenity problem.” Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 704 (1968) (concurring and dissenting).
Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called “adult” material. After a jury trial, he was convicted of violating California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a misdemeanor, by knowingly distributing obscene matter, and the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, County of Orange, summarily affirmed the judgment without opinion. Appellant's conviction was specifically based on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail in an envelope addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. The envelope was opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not requested the brochures; they complained to the police.
The brochures advertise four books entitled “Intercourse,” “Man-Woman,” “Sex Orgies Illustrated,” and “An Illustrated History of Pornography,” and a film entitled “Marital Intercourse.” While the brochures contain some descriptive printed material, primarily they consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed.
I
This case involves the application of a State’s criminal obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated any desire to receive such materials. This Court has recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 567 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 637-643 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, supra, at 690; Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 769 (1967); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 195 (1964). See Robe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313, 317 (1972) (Burger, C. J., concurring); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 360-362 (1971) (opinion of Marshall, J.); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 502 (1952); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 644-645 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 88-89 (1949); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 169-170 (1944). Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 382-383 (1957); Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 464—465 (1952). It is in this context that we are called on to define the standards which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may regulate without infringing on the First Amendment as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan reviews the background of the obscenity problem, but since the Court now undertakes to formulate standards more concrete than those in the past, it is useful for us to focus on two of the landmark cases in the somewhat tortured history of the Court’s obscenity decisions. In Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957), the Court sustained a conviction under a federal statute punishing the mailing of “obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy...” materials. The key to that holding was the Court’s rejection of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First Amendment. Five Justices joined in the opinion stating:
“All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance- — unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion — have the full protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.... This is the same judgment expressed by this Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572:
“ ‘... There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality... [Emphasis by Court in Roth opinion.]
“We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.” 354 U. S., at 484-485 (footnotes omitted).
Nine years later, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966), the Court veered sharply away from the Roth concept and, with only three Justices in the plurality opinion, articulated a new test of obscenity. The plurality held that under the Roth definition
“as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.” Id., at 418.
The sharpness of the break with Roth, represented by the third element of the Memoirs test and emphasized by Mr. Justice White’s dissent, id., at 460-462, was further underscored when the Memoirs plurality went on to state:
“The Supreme Judicial Court erred in holding that a book need not be 'unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene.’ A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value.” Id., at 419 (emphasis in original).
While Roth presumed “obscenity” to be “utterly without redeeming social importance,” Memoirs required that to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively established that the material is “utterly without redeeming social value.” Thus, even as they repeated the words of Both, the Memoirs plurality produced a drastically altered test that called on the prosecution to prove a negative, i. e., that the material was “utterly without redeeming social value” — a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof. Such considerations caused Mr. Justice Harlan to wonder if the “utterly without redeeming social value” test had any meaning at all. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, id., at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also id., at 461 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577, 579-581 (CA5 1973).
Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no majority of the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’ police power. See, e. g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S., at 770-771. We have seen “a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication.” Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S., at 704-705 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted). This is not remarkable, for in the area of freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression. This is an area in which there are few eternal verities.
The case we now review was tried on the theory that the California Penal Code § 311 approximately incorporates the three-stage Memoirs test, supra. But now the Memoirs test has been abandoned as unworkable by its author, and no Member of the Court today supports the Memoirs formulation.
II
This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S., at 354; Roth v. United States, supra, at 485. “The First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes [footnote omitted].” Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S., at 642, and cases cited. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 47-50 (1961); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S., at 502. We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, supra, at 682-685. As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, at 230, quoting Roth v. United States, supra, at 489; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the “utterly without redeeming social value” test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S., at 419; that concept has never commanded the adherence of more than three Justices at one time. See supra, at 21. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary. See Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, at 232; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, at 459-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S., at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 284-285 (1964); Roth v. United States, supra, at 497—198 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the States. That must await their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, however, to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation under part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion, supra:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places. At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection. See Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, at 230-232; Roth v. United States, supra, at 487; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1940). For example, medical books for the education of physicians and related personnel necessarily use graphic illustrations and descriptions of human anatomy. In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact and law, we must continue to rely on the jury system, accompanied by the safeguards that judges, rules of evidence, presumption of innocence, and other protective features provide, as we do with rape, murder, and a host of other offenses against society and its individual members.
Mr. Justice Brennan, author of the opinions of the Court, or the plurality opinions, in Roth v. United States, supra; Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra; Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463 (1966), Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966); and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, has abandoned his former position and now maintains that no formulation of this Court, the Congress, or the States can adequately distinguish obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment from protected expression, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, post, p. 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Paradoxically, Mr. Justice Brennan indicates that suppression of unprotected obscene material is permissible to avoid exposure to un-consenting adults, as in this case, and to juveniles, although he gives no indication of how the division between protected and nonprotected materials may be drawn with greater precision for these purposes than for regulation of commercial exposure to consenting adults only. Nor does he indicate where in the Constitution he finds the authority to distinguish between a willing “adult” one month past the state law age of majority and a willing “juvenile” one month younger.
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive “hard core” sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution. See Roth v. United States, supra, at 491-492. Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S., at 643. If the inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision altogether removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then “hard core” pornography may be exposed without limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and the consenting adult alike, as, indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas contends. As to Mr. Justice Douglas’ position, see United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 379-380 (1971) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, supra, at 476, 491-492 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 196 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); Roth, supra, at 508-514 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In this belief, however, Mr. Justice Douglas now stands alone.
Mr. Justice Brennan also emphasizes “institutional stress” in justification of his change of view. Noting that “[t]he number of obscenity cases on our docket gives ample testimony to the burden that has been placed upon this Court,” he quite rightly remarks that the examination of contested materials “is hardly a source of edification to the members of this Court.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, post, at 92, 93. He also notes, and we agree, that “uncertainty of the standards creates a continuing source of tension between state and federal courts... “The problem is... that one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so.” Id., at 93, 92.
It is certainly true that the absence, since Roth, of a single majority view of this Court as to proper standards for testing obscenity has placed a strain on both state and federal courts. But today, fojr the first time since Roth was decided in 1957j a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate “hard core” pornography from expression protected fey the First Amendment. Now we may abandon the casual practice of Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967), and attempt to provide positive guidance to federal' and state courts alike.
This may not be an easy road, free from difficulty. But no amount of “fatigue” should lead us to adopt a convenient “institutional” rationale — an absolutist, “anything goes” view of the First Amendment — because it will lighten our burdens. “Such an abnegation of judicial supervision in this field would be inconsistent with our duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 187-188 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Nor should we remedy “tension between state and federal courts” by arbitrarily depriving the States of a power reserved to them under the Constitution, a power which they have enjoyed and exercised continuously from before the adoption of the First Amendment to this day. See Roth v. United States, supra, at 482-485. “Our duty admits of no'substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems of constitutional judgment involved in every obscenity case.’ [Roth v. United States, supra, at 498]; see Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478, 488 (opinion of Harlan, J.) [footnote omitted].” Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 188 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
III.
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what appeals to the “prurient interest” or is “patently offensive.” These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are asked to decide whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would consider certain materials “prurient,” it would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact to draw on the standards of their community, guided always by limiting instructions on the law. To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national “community standard” would be an exercise in futility.
As noted before, this case was tried on the theory that the California obscenity statute sought to incorporate the tripartite test of Memoirs. This, a “national” standard of First Amendment protection enumerated by a plurality of this Court, was correctly regarded at the time of trial as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case law. The jury, however, was explicitly instructed that, in determining whether the "dominant theme of the material as a whole... appeals to the prurient interest” and in determining whether the material “goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor and affronts contemporary community standards of decency,” it was to apply “contemporary community standards of the State of California.”
During the trial, both the prosecution and the defense assumed that the relevant “community standards” in making the factual determination of obscenity were those of the State of California, not some hypothetical standard of the entire United States of America. Defense counsel at trial never objected to the testimony of the State's expert on community standards or to the instructions of the trial judge on “statewide” standards. On appeal to the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, County of Orange, appellant for the first time contended that application of state, rather than national, standards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
We conclude that neither the State’s alleged failure to offer evidence of “national standards,” nor the trial court’s charge that the jury consider state community standards, were constitutional errors. Nothing in the First Amendment requires that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable “national standards” when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene as a matter of fact. Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointedly commented in his dissent in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 200:
“It is my belief that when the Court said in Both that obscenity is to be defined by reference to 'community standards/ it meant community standards — not a national standard, as is sometimes argued. I believe that there is no provable 'national standard’.... At all events, this Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one.”
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City. See Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U. S. 524-525 (1970) (Black-MUN, J., dissenting); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U. S. 434 (1970) (Burgee, C. J., dissenting); id., at 434-435 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U. S. 319 (1970) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 319-320 (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Groner, 479 F. 2d, at 581-583; O’Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in The Supreme Court: A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 Notre Dame Law. 1, 6-7 (1964). See also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S., at 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 203-204 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, supra, at 505-506 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. As the Court made clear in Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S., at 508-509, the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” is to be certain that, so far as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person — or indeed a totally insensitive one. See Roth v. United States, supra, at 489. Cf. the now discredited test in Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360. We hold that the requirement that the jury evaluate the materials with reference to “contemporary standards of the State of California” serves this protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate.
IV
The dissenting Justices sound the alarm of repression. But, in our view, to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom. It is a “misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free press... Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S., at 645. The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent. “The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people/' Roth v. United States, supra, at 484 (emphasis added). See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S., at 230-232; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S., at 101-102. But the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter.
There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that the stern 19th century American censorship of public distribution and display of material relating to sex, see Roth v. United States, supra, at 482-485, in any way limited or affected expression of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific ideas. On the contrary, it is beyond any question that the era following Thomas Jefferson to Theodore Roosevelt was an “extraordinarily vigorous period,” not just in economics and politics, but in belles lettres and in “the outlying fields of social and political philosophies.” We do not see the harsh hand of censorship of ideas — good or bad, sound or unsound— and “repression” of political liberty lurking in every state regulation of commercial exploitation of human interest in sex.
Mr. Justice Brennan finds “it is hard to see how state-ordered regimentation of our minds can ever be forestalled.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, post, at 110 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These doleful anticipations assume that courts cannot distinguish commerce in ideas, protected by the First Amendment, from commercial exploitation of obscene material. Moreover, state regulation of hard-core pornography so as to make it unavailable to nonadults, a regulation which Mr. Justice Brennan finds constitutionally permissible, has all the elements of “censorship” for adults; indeed even more rigid enforcement techniques may be called for with such dichotomy of regulation. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U. S., at 690. One can concede that the “sexual revolution” of recent years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no regulation of patently offensive “hard core” materials is needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow unregulated access to heroin because it is a derivative of medicinal morphine.
In sum, we (a) reaffirm the Both holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold that such material can be regulated by the States, subject to the specific safeguards enunciated above, without a showing that the material is “utterly without redeeming social value”; and (c) hold that obscenity is to be determined by applying “contemporary community standards,” see Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, at 230, and Roth v. United States, supra, at 489, not “national standards.” The judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court, Orange County, California, is vacated and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the First Amendment standards established by this opinion. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 130 n. 7.
Vacated and remanded.
At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, which was prior to June 25, 1969, §§ 311.2 (a) and 311 of the California Penal Code read in relevant part:
Ҥ 311.2 Sending or bringing into state for sale or distribution; printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within state
“(a) Every person who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor....”
Ҥ 311. Definitions
“As used in this chapter:
“(a) 'Obscene’ means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
“(b) ‘Matter’ means any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial representation or any statue or other figure, or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines or materials.
“(c) ‘Person’ means any individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other legal entity.
“(d) ‘Distribute’ means to transfer possession of, whether with or without consideration.
“(e) ‘Knowingly’ means having knowledge that the matter is obscene.”
Section 311 (e) of the California Penal Code, supra, was amended on June 25, 1969, to read as follows:
“(e) ‘Knowingly’ means being aware of the character of the matter.”
Cal. Amended Stats. 1969, c. 249, § 1, p. 598. Despite appellant’s contentions to the contrary, the record indicates that the new § 311 (e) was not applied ex post facto to his case, but only the old § 311 (e) as construed by state decisions prior to the commission of the alleged offense. See People v. Pinkus, 256 Cal. App. 2d 941, 948-950, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680, 685-686 (App. Dept., Superior Ct., Los Angeles, 1967); People v. Campise, 242 Cal. App. 2d 905, 914, 51 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821 (App. Dept., Superior Ct., San Diego, 1966). Cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964). Nor did § 311.2, supra, as applied, create any “direct, immediate burden on the per-formanee of the postal functions,” or infringe on congressional commerce powers under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 494 (1957), quoting Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 96 (1945). See also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 506 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U, S. 147, 150-152 (1959).
This Court has defined “obscene material” as “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest,” Roth v. United States, supra, at 487, but the Roth definition does not reflect the precise meaning of “obscene” as traditionally used in the English language. Derived from the Latin obscaenus, ob, to, plus caenum, filth, “obscene” is defined in the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged 1969) as “la: disgusting to the senses... b: grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is appropriate... 2: offensive or revolting as countering or violating some ideal or principle.” The Oxford English Dictionary (1933 ed.) gives a similar definition, “[o]ffensive to the senses, or to taste or refinement; disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable, loathsome.”
The material we are discussing in this case is more accurately defined as “pornography” or "pornographic material.” “Pornography” derives from the Greek {pome, harlot, and graphos, writing). The word now means “1: a description of prostitutes or prostitution 2: a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness: a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, supra. Pornographic material which is obscene forms a sub-group of all “obscene” expression, but not the whole, at least as the word “obscene” is now used in our language. We note, therefore, that the words "obscene material,” as used in this case, have a specific judicial meaning which derives from the Both case, i. e., obscene material “which deals with sex.” Roth, supra, at 487. See also ALI Model Penal Code § 251.4 (1) “Obscene Defined.” (Official Draft 1962.)
In the absence of a. majority view, this Court was compelled to embark on the practice of summarily reversing convictions for the dissemination of materials that at least five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, found to be protected by the First Amendment. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967). Thirty-one cases have been decided in this manner. Beyond the necessity of circumstances, however, no justification has ever been offered in support of the Redrwp “policy.” See Walker v. Ohio, 398 U. S. 434-435 (1970) (dissenting -opinions of Burger, C. J., and Harlan, J.). The Redrwp procedure has cast us in the role of an unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each piece of material brought' before us.
See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice BreNNan in Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. Slaton, post, p. 73.
As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, dissenting, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 200 (1964) :
“For all the sound and fury that the Both test has generated, it has not been proved unsound, and I believe that we should try to live with it — at least until a more satisfactory definition is evolved. No government — be it federal, state, or local — should be forced to choose between repressing all material, including that within the realm of decency, and allowing unrestrained license to publish any material, no matter how vile. There must be a rule of reason in this as in other areas of the law, and we have attempted in the Roth case to provide such a rule.”
See, e. g., Oregon Laws
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Pee Cukiam
and Supplemental Deceee.
The United States of America, Intervenor, State of Arizona, Complainant, the California Defendants (State of California, Palo Verde Irrigation District, Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella Valley County Water District, The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, City of Los Angeles, City of San Diego, County of San Diego), and State of Nevada, Intervenor, pursuant to Art. VI of the Decree entered in the case on March 9, 1964, at 376 U. S. 340, and amended on February 28, 1966, at 383 U. S. 268, have agreed to the present perfected rights to the use of mainstream water in each State and their priority dates as set forth herein. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the joint motion of the United States, the State of Arizona, the California Defendants, and the State of Nevada to enter a supplemental decree is granted and that said present perfected rights in each State and their priority dates are determined to be as set forth below, subject to the following:
(1) The following listed present perfected rights relate to the quantity of water which may be used by each claimant and the list is not intended to limit or redefine the type of use otherwise set forth in said Decree.
(2) This determination shall in no way affect future adjustments resulting from determinations relating to settlement of Indian reservation boundaries referred to in Art. II (D) (5) of said Decre^.
(3) Article IX of said Decree is not affected by this list of present perfected rights.
(4) Any water right listed herein may be exercised only for beneficial uses.
(5) In the event of a determination of insufficient mainstream water to satisfy present perfected rights pursuant to Art. II (B) (3) of said Decree, the Secretary of the Interior shall, before providing for the satisfaction of any of the other present perfected rights except for those listed herein as “MISCELLANEOUS PRESENT PERFECTED RIGHTS” (rights numbered 7-21 and 29-80 below) in the order of their priority dates without regard to State lines, first provide for the satisfaction in full of all rights of the Chemehuevi Indian Reservation, Cocopah Indian Reservation, Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, Colorado River Indian Reservation, and the Fort Mojave Indian Reservation as set forth in Art. II (D)(l)-(5) of said Decree, provided that the quantities fixed in paragraphs (1) through (5) of Art. II (D) of said Decree shall continue to be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined. Additional present perfected rights so adjudicated by such adjustment shall be in annual quantities not to exceed the quantities of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of the practicably irrigable acres which are included within any area determined to be within a reservation by such final determination of a boundary and for the satisfaction of related uses. The quantities of diversions are to be computed by determining net practicably irrigable acres within each additional area using the methods set forth by the Special Master in this case in his Report to this Court dated December 5, 1960, and by applying the unit diversion quantities thereto, as listed below:
Unit Diversion Quantity Acre-Feet Indian Reservation Per Irrigable Acre
Cocopah 6.37
Colorado River 6.67
Chemehuevi 5.97
Ft. Mojave 6.46
Ft. Yuma 6.67
The foregoing reference to a quantity of water necessary to supply consumptive use required for irrigation, and as that provision is included within paragraphs (1) through (5) of Art. II (D) of said Decree, shall constitute the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water rights but shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural application. If all or part of the adjudicated water rights of any of the five Indian Reservations is used other than for irrigation or other agricultural application, the total consumptive use, as that term is defined in Art. I (A) of said Decree, for said Reservation shall not exceed the consumptive use that would have resulted if the diversions listed in subparagraph (i) of paragraphs (1) through (5) of Art. II (D) of said Decree and the equivalent portions of any supplement thereto had been used for irrigation of the number of acres specified for that Reservation in said paragraphs and supplement and for the satisfaction of related uses. Effect shall be given to this paragraph notwithstanding the priority dates of the present perfected rights as listed below. However, nothing in this paragraph (5) shall affect the order in which such rights listed below as “MISCELLANEOUS PRESENT PERFECTED RIGHTS” (numbered 7-21 and 29-80 below) shall be satisfied. Furthermore, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to determine the order of satisfying any other Indian water rights claims not herein specified.
I
ARIZONA
A. Federal Establishments’ Present Perfected Rights
The federal establishments named in Art. II, subdivision (D), paragraphs (2), (4), and (5) of the Decree entered March 9, 1964, in this case, such rights having been decreed in Art. II:
Defined Area of Land Annual Diversions Net Priority (acre-feet) Acres1 Date
1) Cocopah Indian Reservation 2,744 431 Sept. 27, 1917
2) Colorado River Indian Reservation 358,400 53,768 Mar. 3, 1865 252,016 37,808 Nov. 22, 1873 51,986 7,799 Nov. 16, 1874
3) Fort Mojave Indian Reservation 27,969 4,327 Sept. 18, 1890 68,447 10,589 Feb. 2, 1911
B. Water Projects’ Present Perfected Rights
(4) The Valley Division, Yuma Project in annual quantities not to exceed (i) 254,200 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 43,562 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with a priority date of 1901.
(5) The Yuma Auxiliary Project, Unit B in annual quantities not to exceed (i) 6,800 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 1,225 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with a priority date of July 8, 1905.
(6) The North Gila Valley Unit, Yuma Mesa Division, Gila Project in annual quantities not to exceed (i) 24,500 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 4,030 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with a priority date of July 8, 1905.
C. Miscellaneous Present Perfected Rights
1. The following miscellaneous present perfected rights in Arizona in annual quantities of water not to exceed the listed acre-feet of diversion from the mainstream to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation and the satisfaction of related uses within the boundaries of the land described and with the priority dates listed :
Defined Area of Land Annual Diversions Priority (acre-feet) Date
7) 160 acres in Lots 21, 24, and 25, Sec. 29 and Lots 15, 16, 17 and 18, and the SW% of the SE^, Sec. 30, T.16S., R.22E., San Bernardino Base and Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona. (Powers) 2 960 1915
8) Lots 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 22 and SVs of SW%, Sec. 30, T.16S., R.22E., San Bernardino Base and Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona. (United States) 1,140 1915
Footnotes to table items 7 through 25 are on p. 428.
Defined Area of Land Annual Diversions (acre-feet) Priority-Date
9) 60 acres within Lot 2, Sec. 15 and Lots 1 and 2, Sec. 22, T.10N., R.19W, G&SRBM. (Graham) 2 360 1910
10) 180 acres within the N% of the S% and the S% of the N% of See. 13 and the SW% of the NE14 of Sec. 14, T.18N., R.22W., G&SRBM. (Hulet)2 1,080 1902
11) 45 acres within the NE% of the SW1^, the SW% of the SW% and the SE% of the SW% of Sec. 11, T.18N., R.22W., G&SRBM. 80 acres within the N% of the SW% of Sec. 11, T.18N., R.22W., G&SRBM. 10 acres within the NW% of the NE% of the NE% of Sec. 15, T.18N., R.22W., G&SRBM. 40 acres within the SE% of the SE^4 of Sec. 15, T.18N., R.22W., G&SRBM. (Hursehler) 1,050 1902
12) 40 acres within Sec. 13, T.17N., R.22W., G&SRBM. (Mifier)2 240 1902
13) 120 acres within Sec. 27, T.18N., R.21W.,) G&SRBM. 15 acres within the NW14 of the NW%, Sec. 23, T.18N., R.22W., G&SRBM. (McKellips and Granite Reef Farms) 810 1902
14) 180 acres within the NW% of the NE^, the SW^ of the NE(4, the NE% of the SW%, the NW% of the SE%, the NE% of the SE%, and the SW*4 of the SE%, and the SE% of the SE^, Sec. 31, T.18N., R.21W., G&SRBM. (Sherrill & Lafollette) 4 1,080 1902
Defined Area of Land Annual Diversions (acre-feet) Priority Date
16) 53.89 acres as follows: Beginning at a point 995.1 feet easterly of the NW comer of the NE% of Sec. 10, T.8S., R.22W., Gila and Salt River Base and Meridian; on the northerly boundary of the said NE%, which is the true point of beginning, then in a southerly direction to a point on the southerly boundary of the said NE% which is 991.2 feet E. of the SW comer of said NE% thence easterly along the S. line of the NE%, a distance of 807.3 feet to a point, thence N. 0°7' W., 768.8 feet to a point, thence E. 124.0 feet to a point, thence northerly 0°14' W., 1,067.6 feet to a point, thence E. 130 feet to a point, thence northerly 0°20' W., 405.2 feet to a point, thence northerly 63° 10' W., 506.0 feet to a point, thence northerly 90° 15' W., 562.9 feet to a point on the northerly boundary of the said NE^, thence easterly along the said northerly boundary of the said NE^, 116.6 feet to the true point of the beginning containing 53.89 acres. All as more particularly described and set forth in that survey executed by Thomas A. Yowell, Land Surveyor on June 24, 1969. (Molina) 4 318 1928
16) 60 acres within the NW1/^ of the NW% and the north half of the SW% of the NW^A of Sec. 14, T.8S., R.22W., G&SRBM. 70 acres within the S% of the SW^A of the ’ SW^, and the W% of the SW%, Sec. 14, T.8S., R.22W., G&SRBM. (Sturges) 4 780 1925
17) 120 acres within the N% NE^, NE% NW%, Section 23, T.18N., R.22W., G&SRBM. (Zozaya) 4 720 1912
Defined Area of Laud Annual Diversions Priority (acre-feet) Date
18) 40 acres in the W% of the NE% of Section 30, and 60 acres in the W% of the SE% of Section 30, and 60 acres in the E% of the NW% of Section 31, comprising a total of 160 acres all in Township 18 North, Range 21 West of the G&SRBM. (Swan) 4 960 1902
19) 7 acres in the East 300 feet of the W% of Lot 1 (Lot 1, being the SE1^ SE1^, 40 acres mofe or less), Section 28, Township 16 South, Range 22 East, San Bernardino Meridian, lying North of U. S. Bureau of Reclamation levee right of way. EXCEPT that portion conveyed to the United States of America by instrument recorded in Docket 417, page 150 EXCEPTING any portion of the East 300 feet of W% of Lot 1 within the natural bed of the Colorado River below the line of ordinary high water and also EXCEPTING any artificial accretions water-ward of said line of ordinary high water, all of which comprises approximately seven (7) acres. (Milton and Jean Phillips) 4 42 1900
2. The following miscellaneous present perfected rights in Arizona in annual quantities of water not to exceed the listed number of acre-feet of (i) diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use, whichever of (i) or (ii) is. less, for domestic, municipal, and industrial purposes within the boundaries of the land described and with the priority dates listed:
Annual Annual Consumptive Diversions Use Priority Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) (acre-feet) Date
20) City of Parker2 t-i CD O Ox O O O CO CD
21) City of Yuma2 f — i QO CD ÜO OO t*CO CO CO <N
II
CALIFORNIA
A. Federal Establishments’ Present Perfected Rights
The federal establishments named in Art. II, subdivision (D), paragraphs (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Decree entered March 9, 1964, in this case such rights having been decreed by Art. II:
Annual Diversions Net Priority Defined Area of Land _ (acre-feet) Acres5 Date
1,900 Feb. 2,1907 22) Chemehuevi Indian Reservation 11,340
7,743 Jam. 9,1884 23) Yuma Indian Reservation 51,616
Nov. 22,1873 Nov. 16,1874 May 15,1876 24) Colorado River Indian Reservation 10,745 40,241 3,760 Qi 1 — i Ox W0 'Oi Q CO H lil Nl W
2119 Sept. 18,1890 25) Fort Mojave Indian Reservation 13,698
B. Water Districts' and Projects’ Present Perfected Rights
26) The Palo Verde Irrigation District in annual quantities not to exceed (i) 219,780 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 33,604 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with a priority date of 1877.
27) The Imperial Irrigation District in annual quantities not to exceed (i) 2,600,000 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 424,145 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with a priority date of 1901.
28) The Reservation Division, Yuma Project, California (non-Indian portion) in annual quantities not to exceed (i) 38,270 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 6,294 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with a priority date of July 8, 1905.
C. Miscellaneous Present Perfected Rights
1. The following miscellaneous present perfected rights in California in annual quantities of water not to exceed the listed number of acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation and the satisfaction of related uses within the boundaries of the land described and with the priority dates listed: ■
Annual Diversions Priority Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) Date
29) 130 acres within Lots 1, 2, and 3, SE(4 of 780 1856 NE*4 of Section 27, T.16S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Wavers)6
Footnotes to table items 29 through 80 are on p. 435.
Annual Diversions Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) Priority Date
30) 40 acres within W%, W% of E% of Section 1, 240 T.9N., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Stephenson) 8 1923
31) 20 acres within Lots 1 and 2, Sec. 19, T.13S., 120 R.23E., and Lots 2, 3, and 4 of Sec. 24, T.13S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Mendivil)6 1893
32) 30 acres within NW% of SE%, S% of SE^, 180 Sec. 24, and NW% of NE%, Sec. 25, all in T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Grannis)6 1928
33) 25 acres within Lot 6, Sec. 5; and Lots 1 and 2, 150 SW% of NEÜ, and NE% of SE% of Sec. 8, and Lots 1 & 2 of Sec. 9, all in T.13S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Morgan)6 1913
34) 18 acres within E% of NW% and W% of 108 NE% of Sec. 14, T.10S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Milpitas) 6 1918
35) 10 acres within of NE%, SE% of NE%, 60 and NE% of SE*4, Sec. 30, T.9N., R.23E., S.B.B. & M. (Simons) 6 1889
36) 16 acres within E% of NW% and N% of 96 SW14, See. 12, T.9N., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Colo. R. Sportsmen’s League) 8 1921
37) 11.5 acres within E% of NW1^, Sec. 1, T.10S., 69 R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Milpitas) 8 1914
38) 11 acres within S% of SW%, Sec. 12, T.9N., 66 R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Andrade) 8 1921
39) 6 acres within Lots 2, 3, and 7 and NE% of 36 SW%, Sec. 19, T.9N., R.23E., S.B.B. & M. (Reynolds)8 1904
Defined Area of Land Annual Diversions Priority (acre-feet) Date
40) 10 acres within N% of NE%, SE% of NE^ 60 1905 and NE% of SE%, Sec. 24, T.9N., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Cooper)6
41) 20 acres within SW% of SW% (Lot 8), Sec. 19, 120 1925 T.9N., R.23E., S.B.B. & M. (Chagnon) 7
42) 20 acres within NE& of SW%, NV2 of SE%, 120 1915 SWA of SE&, Sec. 14, T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Lawrence) 7
2. The following miscellaneous present perfected rights in California in annual quantities of water not to exceed the listed number of acre-feet of (i) diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, for domestic, municipal, and industrial purposes within the boundaries of the land described and with the priority dates listed:
Annual Annual Consumptive Diversions Use Priority Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) (acre-feet) Date
43) City of Needles 1,500 950 1885
44) Portions of: Secs. 5, 6, 7 & 8, T.7N., 1,260 273 1896 R.24E.; Sec. 1, T.7N., R.23E.; Secs. 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, 22, 23, 25, 26, 35, & 36, T.8N., R.23E.; Secs. 19, 29, 30, 32 & 33, T.9N., R.23E., S.B.B. & M. (Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.) 6
45) Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & SW% NW±4 of 1.0 0.6 1921 Sec. 5, T.13S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Conger)7
Annual Annual Consumptive Diversions Use Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) (acre-feet) Priority Date
46) Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 of Sec. 32, T.11S., R.22E., 1.0 S.B.B. & M. (G. Draper) 7 0.6 1923
47) Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and SE% SW% of Sec. 1.0 20, T.11S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (McDonough) 7 0.6 1919
48) SW*4 of See. 25, T.8S., R.22E., S.B.B. 1.0 & M. (Faubion) 7 0.6 1925
49) Wy2 NW% of Sec. 12, T.9N., R.22E., 1.0 S.B.B. & M. (Dudley) 7 0.6 1922
50) N% SEy, and Lots 1 and 2 of Sec. 13, 1.0 T.8S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Douglas) 7 0.6 1916
51) N% SWÁ, NW% SE%, Lots 6 and 7, 1.0 Sec. 5, T.9S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Beauchamp) 7 0.6 1924
52) NE*4 SE%, SE% NE%, and Lot 1, 1.0 Sec. 26, T.8S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Clark) 7 0.6 1916
53) N% SW%, NW% SEyé, SW% NE%, 1.0 Sec. 13, T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Lawrence) 7 0.6 1915
54) N% NE%, W/z NWVi, Sec. 13, T.9S., 1.0 R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (J. Graham) 7 0.6 1914
55) SE%, Sec. 1, T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. 1.0 (Geiger)7 0.6 1910
Annual Diversions Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) Annual Consumptive Use (acre-feet) Priority-Date
56) Fractional of SW% (Lot 6) Sec. 1.0 6, T.9S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Schneider) 7 0.6 1917
57) Lot 1, See. 15; Lots 1 & 2, Sec. 14; 1.0 Lots 1 & 2, Sec. 23; all in T.13S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Martinez) 7 0.6 1895
58) NE14, Sec. 22, T.9S., R.21E, S.B.B. & 1.0 M. (Earle) 7 0.6 1925
59) NE& SE%, Sec. 22, T.9S., R.21E., 1.0 S.B.B. & M. (Diehl)7 0.6 1928
60) N% NW%, Ni/2 NE%, Sec. 23, T.9S., 1.0 R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Reid)7 0.6 1912
61) Wy2 SW%, Sec. 23, T.9S., R.‘2lE., 1.0 S.B.B. & M. (Graham)7 0.6 1916
62) Sy2 NW%, NE% SW%, SW% NE%, 1.0 Sec. 23, T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Cate)7 0.6 1919
63) SE% NE%, Ny2 SE%, SE% SEPA, 1.0 Sec. 23, T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (McGee)7 0.6 1924
64) SW% SEPA, SE% SW%, Sec. 23, NE% 1.0 NW%, NW% NE%, Sec. 26; afi in T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Stafiard) 7 0.6 1924
65) W2 SEPA, SE% SE%, Sec. 26, T.9S., 1.0 R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Randolph)7 0.6 1926
Annual Diversions Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) Annual Consumptive Use (acre-feet) Priority Date
66) E% NE%, SW% NE%, SE% NW%, 1-0 Sec. 26, T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Stallard)7 0.6 1928
67) S% SWJ4, See. 13, N% NW%, Sec. 1.0 24; all in T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Keefe)7 0.6 1926
68) SE14 NW%, NW% SE%, Lots 2, 3 & 1.0 4, Sec. 25, T.13S., R.23E., S.B.B. & M. (C. Ferguson)7 0.6 1903
69) Lots 4 & 7, Sec. 6; Lots 1 & 2, Sec. 7; 1.0 all in T.14S., R.24E., S.B.B. & M. (W. Ferguson)7 0.6 1903
70) SW(4 SE}4, Lots 2, 3, and 4, Sec. 24, 1.0 T.12S., R.21E., Lot 2, Sec. 19, T.12S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Vaulin)7 0.6 1920
71) Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Sec. 25, T.12S., 1.0 R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Salisbury)7 0.6 1920
72) Lots 2, 3, SE% SE%, Sec. 15, NE% 1.0 NE%, Sec. 22; all in T.13S., R.22E., 5.B.B. & M. (Hadlock)7 0.6 1924
73) SW% NE%, SE(4 NW)4, and Lots 7 1.0 & 8, Sec. 6, T.9S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Streeter) 7 0.6 1903
74) Lot 4, Sec. 5; Lots 1 & 2, Sec. 7; Lots 1.0 1 & 2, Sec. 8; Lot 1, Sec. 18; all in T.12S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (J. Draper) 7 0.6 1903
Defined Area of Land Annual Annual Consumptive Diversions Use (acre-feet) (acre-feet) Priority-Date
75) SW% NW%, Sec. 5; SE% NE% and 1.0 Lot 9, Sec. 6; all in T.9S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Fitz) ^ 0.6 1912
76) NW% NE%, Sec. 26; Lots 2 & 3, 1.0 W/2 SE%, Sec. 23; all in T.8S., R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Williams)7 0.6 1909
77) Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, Sec. 25, T.8S., 1.0 R.22E., S.B.B. & M. (Estrada)7 0.6 1928
78) S% NW%, Lot 1, frac. NE% SW%, 1.0 Sec. 25, T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Whittle)7 0.6 1925
79) W/z NW%, See. 25; S% SW%, Sec. 1.0 24; all in T.9S., R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Corington)7 0.6 1928
80) Sy2 NW%, N% SW%, See. 24, T.9S., 1.0 R.21E., S.B.B. & M. (Tolliver) 0.6 1928
III
NEVADA
A. Federal Establishments’ Present Perfected Rights
The federal establishments named in Art. II, subdivision (D), paragraphs (5) and (6) of the Decree entered on March 9, 1964, in this case, such rights having been decreed by Art. II:
Annual Diversions Net Priority-Defined Area of Land (acre-feet) Acres Date
81) 12,534 1,939 s Sept. 18,1890 Fort Mojave Indian Reservation
300 May 3, 1929 82) Lake Mead National Recreation 500 Area (The Overton Area of Lake Mead N.R.A. provided in Executive Order 5105)
It is ordered that Judge Elbert P. Tuttle be appointed Special Master in this case with authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings and to direct subsequent proceedings, and with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem necessary to call for. The Master is directed to submit such reports as he may deem appropriate.
The Master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic, and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses shall be charged against and borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court may hereafter direct.
It is further ordered that if the position of Special Master in this case becomes vacant during a recess of the Court, The Chief Justice shall have authority to make a new
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., provides that a noncitizen who has been convicted of an " aggravated felony" may be deported from this country. The INA also prohibits the Attorney General from granting discretionary relief from removal to an aggravated felon, no matter how compelling his case. Among the crimes that are classified as aggravated felonies, and thus lead to these harsh consequences, are illicit drug trafficking offenses. We must decide whether this category includes a state criminal statute that extends to the social sharing of a small amount of marijuana. We hold it does not.
I
A
The INA allows the Government to deport various classes of noncitizens, such as those who overstay their visas, and those who are convicted of certain crimes while in the United States, including drug offenses. § 1227. Ordinarily, when a noncitizen is found to be deportable on one of these grounds, he may ask the Attorney General for certain forms of discretionary relief from removal, like asylum (if he has a well-founded fear of persecution in his home country) and cancellation of removal (if, among other things, he has been lawfully present in the United States for a number of years). §§ 1158, 1229b. But if a noncitizen has been convicted of one of a narrower set of crimes classified as "aggravated felonies," then he is not only deportable, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), but also ineligible for these discretionary forms of relief. See §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i); §§ 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C).
The INA defines "aggravated felony" to include a host of offenses. § 1101(a)(43). Among them is "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." § 1101(a)(43)(B). This general term is not defined, but the INA states that it "includ[es] a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18 )." Ibid. In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) defines "drug trafficking crime" to mean "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act," or two other statutes not relevant here. The chain of definitions ends with § 3559(a)(5), which provides that a "felony" is an offense for which the "maximum term of imprisonment authorized" is "more than one year." The upshot is that a noncitizen's conviction of an offense that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment will be counted as an "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes. A conviction under either state or federal law may qualify, but a "state offense constitutes a 'felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act' only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law." Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006).
B
Petitioner Adrian Moncrieffe is a Jamaican citizen who came to the United States legally in 1984, when he was three. During a 2007 traffic stop, police found 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. This is the equivalent of about two or three marijuana cigarettes. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2007). Under a Georgia statute providing more lenient treatment to first-time offenders, § 42-8-60(a) (1997), the trial court withheld entering a judgment of conviction or imposing any term of imprisonment, and instead required that Moncrieffe complete five years of probation, after which his charge will be expunged altogether. App. to Brief for Petitioner 11-15.
Alleging that this Georgia conviction constituted an aggravated felony, the Federal Government sought to deport Moncrieffe. The Government reasoned that possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is an offense under the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, § 841(b)(1)(D), and thus an aggravated felony. An Immigration Judge agreed and ordered Moncrieffe removed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a-18a. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed that conclusion on appeal. Id., at 10a-13a.
The Court of Appeals denied Moncrieffe's petition for review. The court rejected Moncrieffe's reliance upon § 841(b)(4), a provision that, in effect, makes marijuana distribution punishable only as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration. It held that in a federal criminal prosecution, "the default sentencing range for a marijuana distribution offense is the CSA's felony provision, § 841(b)(1)(D), rather than the misdemeanor provision."
662 F.3d 387, 392 (C.A.5 2011). Because Moncrieffe's Georgia offense penalized possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the court concluded that it was "equivalent to a federal felony." Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 566 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1857, 182 L.Ed.2d 642 (2012), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals with respect to whether a conviction under a statute that criminalizes conduct described by both § 841's felony provision and its misdemeanor provision, such as a statute that punishes all marijuana distribution without regard to the amount or remuneration, is a conviction for an offense that "proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under" the CSA. Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625. We now reverse.
II
A
When the Government alleges that a state conviction qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under the INA, we generally employ a "categorical approach" to determine whether the state offense is comparable to an offense listed in the INA. See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-38, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) ; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185-187, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). Under this approach we look "not to the facts of the particular prior case," but instead to whether "the state statute defining the crime of conviction" categorically fits within the "generic" federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. Id., at 186, 127 S.Ct. 815 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ). By "generic," we mean the offenses must be viewed in the abstract, to see whether the state statute shares the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point of comparison. Accordingly, a state offense is a categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state offense " 'necessarily' involved... facts equating to [the] generic [federal offense]." Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (plurality opinion). Whether the noncitizen's actual conduct involved such facts "is quite irrelevant." United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (C.A.2 1939) (L. Hand, J.).
Because we examine what the state conviction necessarily involved, not the facts underlying the case, we must presume that the conviction " rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts" criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) ; see Guarino, 107 F.2d, at 400. But this rule is not without qualification. First, our cases have addressed state statutes that contain several different crimes, each described separately, and we have held that a court may determine which particular offense the noncitizen was convicted of by examining the charging document and jury instructions, or in the case of a guilty plea, the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or "'some comparable judicial record' of the factual basis for the plea." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 35, 129 S.Ct. 2294 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S., at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254). Second, our focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute is not an invitation to apply "legal imagination" to the state offense; there must be "a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime." Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S., at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815.
This categorical approach has a long pedigree in our Nation's immigration law. See Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1669, 1688-1702, 1749-1752 (2011) (tracing judicial decisions back to 1913). The reason is that the INA asks what offense the noncitizen was "convicted" of, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), not what acts he committed. "[C]onviction" is "the relevant statutory hook." Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. ----, ----, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 2588, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010); see United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 862 (C.A.2 1914).
B
The aggravated felony at issue here, "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance," is a "generic crim[e]." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294. So the categorical approach applies. Ibid. As we have explained, supra, at 1682 - 1683, this aggravated felony encompasses all state offenses that "proscrib[e] conduct punishable as a felony under [the CSA]." Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625. In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.
Moncrieffe was convicted under a Georgia statute that makes it a crime to "possess, have under [one's] control, manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, purchase, sell, or possess with intent to distribute marijuana." Ga.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1). We know from his plea agreement that Moncrieffe was convicted of the last of these offenses. App. to Brief for Petitioner 11; Shepard, 544 U.S., at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254. We therefore must determine whether possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is "necessarily" conduct punishable as a felony under the CSA.
We begin with the relevant conduct criminalized by the CSA. There is no question that it is a federal crime to "possess with intent to... distribute... a controlled substance," 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one of which is marijuana, § 812(c). So far, the state and federal provisions correspond. But this is not enough, because the generically defined federal crime is "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act," 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), not just any "offense under the CSA." Thus we must look to what punishment the CSA imposes for this offense.
Section 841 is divided into two subsections that are relevant here: (a), titled "Unlawful acts," which includes the offense just described, and (b), titled "Penalties." Subsection (b) tells us how "any person who violates subsection (a)" shall be punished, depending on the circumstances of his crime (e.g., the type and quantity of controlled substance involved, whether it is a repeat offense). Subsection (b)(1)(D) provides that if a person commits a violation of subsection (a) involving "less than 50 kilograms of marihuana," then "such person shall, except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years," i.e., as a felon. But one of the exceptions is important here. Paragraph (4) provides, "Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(D) of this subsection, any person who violates subsection (a) of this section by distributing a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration shall be treated as" a simple drug possessor, 21 U.S.C. § 844, which for our purposes means as a misdemeanant. These dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not. The only way to know whether a marijuana distribution offense is "punishable as a felony" under the CSA, Lopez, 549 U.S., at 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, is to know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent.
A conviction under the same Georgia statute for "sell[ing]" marijuana, for example, would seem to establish remuneration. The presence of remuneration would mean that paragraph (4) is not implicated, and thus that the conviction is necessarily for conduct punishable as a felony under the CSA (under paragraph (1)(D)). In contrast, the fact of a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, standing alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was involved. It is possible neither was; we know that Georgia prosecutes this offense when a defendant possesses only a small amount of marijuana, see, e.g., Taylor v. State, 260 Ga.App. 890, 581 S.E.2d 386, 388 (2003) (6.6 grams), and that "distribution" does not require remuneration, see, e.g., Hadden v. State, 181 Ga.App. 628, 628-629, 353 S.E.2d 532, 533-534 (1987). So Moncrieffe's conviction could correspond to either the CSA felony or the CSA misdemeanor. Ambiguity on this point means that the conviction did not "necessarily" involve facts that correspond to an offense punishable as a felony under the CSA. Under the categorical approach, then, Moncrieffe was not convicted of an aggravated felony.
III
A
The Government advances a different approach that leads to a different result. In its view, § 841(b)(4)'s misdemeanor provision is irrelevant to the categorical analysis because paragraph (4) is merely a "mitigating exception," to the CSA offense, not one of the "elements" of the offense. Brief for Respondent 12. And because possession with intent to distribute marijuana is "presumptive[ly]" a felony under the CSA, the Government asserts, any state offense with the same elements is presumptively an aggravated felony. Id., at 37. These two contentions are related, and we reject both of them.
First, the Government reads our cases to hold that the categorical approach is concerned only with the "elements" of an offense, so § 841(b)(4)"is not relevant" to the categorical analysis. Id., at 20. It is enough to satisfy the categorical inquiry, the Government suggests, that the "elements" of Moncrieffe's Georgia offense are the same as those of the CSA offense: (1) possession (2) of marijuana (a controlled substance), (3) with intent to distribute it. But that understanding is inconsistent with Carachuri-Rosendo, our only decision to address both "elements" and "sentencing factors." There we recognized that when Congress has chosen to define the generic federal offense by reference to punishment, it may be necessary to take account of federal sentencing factors too. See 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582. In that case the relevant CSA offense was simple possession, which "becomes a 'felony punishable under the [CSA]' only because the sentencing factor of recidivism authorizes additional punishment beyond one year, the criterion for a felony." Id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2590 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). We therefore called the generic federal offense "recidivist simple possession," even though such a crime is not actually "a separate offense" under the CSA, but rather an " 'amalgam' " of offense elements and sentencing factors. Id., at ----, and n. 3, ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582, and n. 3, 2583-2584 (majority opinion).
In other words, not only must the state offense of conviction meet the "elements" of the generic federal offense defined by the INA, but the CSA must punish that offense as a felony. Here, the facts giving rise to the CSA offense establish a crime that may be either a felony or a misdemeanor, depending upon the presence or absence of certain factors that are not themselves elements of the crime. And so to qualify as an aggravated felony, a conviction for the predicate offense must necessarily establish those factors as well.
The Government attempts to distinguish Carachuri-Rosendo on the ground that the sentencing factor there was a "narrow" aggravating exception that turned a misdemeanor into a felony, whereas here § 841(b)(4) is a narrow mitigation exception that turns a felony into a misdemeanor. Brief for Respondent 40-43. This argument hinges upon the Government's second assertion: that any marijuana distribution conviction is "presumptively" a felony. But that is simply incorrect, and the Government's argument collapses as a result. Marijuana distribution is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor until we know whether the conditions in paragraph (4)
attach: Section 841(b)(1)(D) makes the crime punishable by five years' imprisonment "except as provided" in paragraph (4), and § 841(b)(4) makes it punishable as a misdemeanor "[n]otwithstanding paragraph (1)(D)" when only "a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration" is involved. (Emphasis added.) The CSA's text makes neither provision the default. Rather, each is drafted to be exclusive of the other.
Like the BIA and the Fifth Circuit, the Government believes the felony provision to be the default because, in practice, that is how federal criminal prosecutions for marijuana distribution operate. See 662 F.3d, at 391-392; Matter of Aruna, 24 I. & N. Dec. 452, 456-457 (2008) ; Brief for Respondent 18-23. It is true that every Court of Appeals to have considered the question has held that a defendant is eligible for a 5-year sentence under § 841(b)(1)(D) if the Government proves he possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute it, and that the Government need not negate the § 841(b)(4) factors in each case. See, e.g., United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 636-639 (C.A.2 2002) (describing § 841(b)(4) as a "mitigating exception"); United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 670-671 (C.A.4 2003) (collecting cases). Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show that he qualifies for the lesser sentence under § 841(b) (4). Cf. id., at 671.
We cannot discount § 841's text, however, which creates no default punishment, in favor of the procedural overlay or burdens of proof that would apply in a hypothetical federal criminal prosecution. In Carachuri-Rosendo, we rejected the Fifth Circuit's " 'hypothetical approach,' " which examined whether conduct " 'could have been punished as a felony' 'had [it] been prosecuted in federal court.' " 560 U.S., at ----, ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2584, 2585-2586. The outcome in a hypothetical prosecution is not the relevant inquiry. Rather, our "more focused, categorical inquiry" is whether the record of conviction of the predicate offense necessarily establishes conduct that the CSA, on its own terms, makes punishable as a felony. Id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2588-2589.
The analogy to a federal prosecution is misplaced for another reason. The Court of Appeals cases the Government cites distinguished between elements and sentencing factors to determine which facts must be proved to a jury, in light of the Sixth Amendment concerns addressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The courts considered which "provision... states a complete crime upon the fewest facts, " Outen, 286 F.3d, at 638, which was significant after Apprendi to identify what a jury had to find before a defendant could receive § 841(b)(1)(D)'s maximum 5-year sentence. But those concerns do not apply in this context. Here we consider a "generic"
federal offense in the abstract, not an actual federal offense being prosecuted before a jury. Our concern is only which facts the CSA relies upon to distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors, not which facts must be found by a jury as opposed to a judge, nor who has the burden of proving which facts in a federal prosecution.
Because of these differences, we made clear in Carachuri-Rosendo that, for purposes of the INA, a generic federal offense may be defined by reference to both " 'elements' in the traditional sense" and sentencing factors. 560 U.S., at ----, n. 3, ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582, and n. 3, 2583-2584; see also id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2581-2582 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (describing the generic federal offense there as "the Controlled Substances Act felony of possession-plus-recidivism"). Indeed, the distinction between "elements" and "sentencing factors" did not exist when Congress added illicit drug trafficking to the list of aggravated felonies, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4469-4470, and most courts at the time understood both § 841(b)(1)(D) and § 841(b)(4) to contain sentencing factors that draw the line between a felony and a misdemeanor. See, e.g., United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d 677, 679 (C.A.2 1990). Carachuri-Rosendo controls here.
Finally, there is a more fundamental flaw in the Government's approach: It would render even an undisputed misdemeanor an aggravated felony. This is "just what the English language tells us not to expect," and that leaves us "very wary of the Government's position." Lopez, 549 U.S., at 54, 127 S.Ct. 625. Consider a conviction under a New York statute that provides, "A person is guilty of criminal sale of marihuana in the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully sells, without consideration, [marihuana] of an aggregate weight of two grams or less ; or one cigarette containing marihuana." N.Y. Penal Law Ann. § 221.35 (West 2008) (emphasis added). This statute criminalizes only the distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, and so all convictions under the statute would fit within the CSA misdemeanor provision, § 841(b)(4). But the Government would categorically deem a conviction under this statute to be an aggravated felony, because the statute contains the corresponding "elements" of (1) distributing (2) marijuana, and the Government believes all marijuana distribution offenses are punishable as felonies.
The same anomaly would result in the case of a noncitizen convicted of a misdemeanor in federal court under § 841(a) and (b)(4) directly. Even in that case, under the Government's logic, we would need to treat the federal misdemeanor conviction as an aggravated felony, because the conviction establishes elements of an offense that is presumptively a felony. This cannot be. "We cannot imagine that Congress took the trouble to incorporate its own statutory scheme of felonies and misdemeanors," only to have courts presume felony treatment and ignore the very factors that distinguish felonies from misdemeanors. Lopez, 549 U.S., at 58, 127 S.Ct. 625.
B
Recognizing that its approach leads to consequences Congress could not have intended, the Government hedges its argument by proposing a remedy: Noncitizens should be given an opportunity during immigration proceedings to demonstrate that their predicate marijuana distribution convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and no remuneration, just as a federal criminal defendant could do at sentencing. Brief for Respondent 35-39. This is the procedure adopted by the BIA in Matter of Castro Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 698, 702 (2012), and endorsed by Justice ALITO's dissent, post, at 1701 - 1702.
This solution is entirely inconsistent with both the INA's text and the categorical approach. As noted, the relevant INA provisions ask what the noncitizen was "convicted of," not what he did, and the inquiry in immigration proceedings is limited accordingly. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3) ; see Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2585-2586. The Government cites no statutory authority for such case-specific factfinding in immigration court, and none is apparent in the INA. Indeed, the Government's main categorical argument would seem to preclude this inquiry: If the Government were correct that "the fact of a marijuana-distribution conviction alone constitutes a CSA felony," Brief for Respondent 37, then all marijuana distribution convictions would categorically be convictions of the drug trafficking aggravated felony, mandatory deportation would follow under the statute, and there would be no room for the Government's follow-on factfinding procedure. The Government cannot have it both ways.
Moreover, the procedure the Government envisions would require precisely the sort of post hoc investigation into the facts of predicate offenses that we have long deemed undesirable. The categorical approach serves "practical" purposes: It promotes judicial and administrative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long after the fact. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) ; see also Mylius, 210 F., at 862-863. Yet the Government's approach would have our Nation's overburdened immigration courts entertain and weigh testimony from, for example, the friend of a noncitizen who may have shared a marijuana cigarette with him at a party, or the local police officer who recalls to the contrary that cash traded hands. And, as a result, two noncitizens, each "convicted of" the same offense, might obtain different aggravated felony determinations depending on what evidence remains available or how it is perceived by an individual immigration judge. The categorical approach was designed to avoid this "potential unfairness." Taylor, 495 U.S., at 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143; see also Mylius, 210 F., at 863.
Furthermore, the minitrials the Government proposes would be possible only if the noncitizen could locate witnesses years after the fact, notwithstanding that during removal proceedings noncitizens are not guaranteed legal representation and are often subject to mandatory detention, § 1226(c)(1)(B), where they have little ability to collect evidence. See Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 3, 5-10 (2008) ; Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 5-18; Brief for Immigration Law Professors as Amici Curiae 27-32. A noncitizen in removal proceedings is not at all similarly situated to a defendant in a federal criminal prosecution. The Government's suggestion that the CSA's procedures could readily be replicated in immigration proceedings is therefore misplaced. Cf. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2587-2588 (rejecting the Government's argument that procedures governing determination of the recidivism sentencing factor could "be satisfied during the immigration proceeding").
The Government defends its proposed immigration court proceedings as "a subsequent step outside the categorical approach in light of Section 841(b)(4)'s 'circumstance-specific'
nature." Brief for Respondent 37. This argument rests upon Nijhawan, in which we considered another aggravated felony, "an offense that... involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (i). We held that the $10,000 threshold was not to be applied categorically as a required component of a generic offense, but instead called for a " circumstance-specific approach" that allows for an examination, in immigration court, of the "particular circumstances in which an offender committed the crime on a particular occasion." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 38-40, 129 S.Ct. 2294. The Government suggests the § 841(b)(4) factors are like the monetary threshold, and thus similarly amenable to a circumstance-specific inquiry.
We explained in Nijhawan, however, that unlike the provision there, "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance" is a "generic crim[e]" to which the categorical approach applies, not a circumstance-specific provision. Id., at 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294; see also Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, n. 11, 130 S.Ct., at 2586-2587 n. 11. That distinction is evident in the structure of the INA. The monetary threshold is a limitation, written into the INA itself, on the scope of the aggravated felony for fraud. And the monetary threshold is set off by the words "in which," which calls for a circumstance-specific examination of "the conduct involved 'in'the commission of the offense of conviction." Nijhawan, 557 U.S., at 39, 129 S.Ct. 2294. Locating this exception in the INA proper suggests an intent to have the relevant facts found in immigration proceedings. But where, as here, the INA incorporates other criminal statutes wholesale, we have held it "must refer to generic crimes," to which the categorical approach applies. Id., at 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294.
Finally, the Government suggests that the immigration court's task would not be so daunting in some cases, such as those in which a noncitizen was convicted under the New York statute previously discussed or convicted directly under § 841(b)(4). True, in those cases, the record of conviction might reveal on its face that the predicate offense was punishable only as a misdemeanor. But most States do not have stand-alone offenses for the social sharing of marijuana, so minitrials concerning convictions from the other States, such as Georgia, would be inevitable. The Government suggests that even in these other States, the record of conviction may often address the § 841(b)(4) factors, because noncitizens "will be advised of the immigration consequences of a conviction," as defense counsel is required to do under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), and as a result counsel can build an appropriate record when the facts are fresh. Brief for Respondent 38. Even assuming defense counsel "will" do something simply because it is required of effective counsel (an assumption experience does not always bear out), this argument is unavailing because there is no reason to believe that state courts will regularly or uniformly admit evidence going to facts, such as remuneration, that are irrelevant to the offense charged.
In short, to avoid the absurd consequences that would flow from the Government's narrow understanding of the categorical approach, the Government proposes a solution that largely undermines the categorical approach. That the only cure is worse than the disease suggests the Government is simply wrong.
C
The Government fears the consequences of our decision, but its concerns are exaggerated. The Government observes that, like Georgia, about half the States criminalize marijuana distribution through statutes that do not require remuneration or any minimum quantity of marijuana. Id., at 26-28. As a result, the Government contends, noncitizens convicted of marijuana distribution offenses in those States will avoid "aggravated felony" determinations, purely because their convictions do not resolve whether their offenses involved federal felony conduct or misdemeanor conduct, even though many (if not most) prosecutions involve either remuneration or larger amounts of marijuana (or both).
Escaping aggravated felony treatment does not mean escaping deportation, though. It means only avoiding mandatory removal. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2589. Any marijuana distribution offense, even a misdemeanor, will still render a noncitizen deportable as a controlled substances offender. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). At that point, having been found not to be an aggravated felon, the noncitizen may seek relief from removal such as asylum or cancellation of removal, assuming he satisfies the other eligibility criteria. §§ 1158(b), 1229b(a)(1)-(2). But those forms of relief are discretionary. The Attorney General may, in his discretion, deny relief if he finds that the noncitizen is actually a member of one "of the world's most dangerous drug cartels," post, at 1696 (opinion of ALITO, J.), just as he
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault by a jury in Taylor County, Georgia, and sentenced to death. At trial, over petitioner’s objection, the court excused for cause five jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985), as “controlling authority” for a rule that appellate courts must defer to trial courts’ findings concerning juror bias. 266 Ga. 439, 440-442, 469 S. E. 2d 129, 134-135 (1996).
Wainwright v. Witt, supra, delineated the standard under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for determining when a juror may be excused for cause because of his views on the death penalty: whether these views would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Id., at 424. Addressing petitioner’s federal constitutional chai-lenge to the juror disqualifications in this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia correctly recognized that Witt is “the controlling authority as to the death-penalty qualification of prospective jurors . . . .” 266 Ga., at 440, 469 S. E. 2d, at 134.
spective . . . Witt also held that, under 28 U. S. C. § 34. courts must accord a presumption of correctness to state courts’ findings of juror bias. 469 U. S., at 426-430. The Supreme Court of Georgia said that Witt was also “controlling authority” on this point, and it therefore ruled that “[t]he conclusion that a prospective juror is disqualified for bias is one that is based upon findings of demeanor and credibility which are peculiarly within the trial court’s province and such findings are to be given deference by appellate courts. Wainwright v. Witt, [469 U. S.,] at 428.” 266 Ga., at 441, 469 S. E. 2d, at 134-135.
at 441, Witt is not “controlling authority” as to -135. review to be applied by state appellate courts reviewing trial courts’ rulings on jury selection. Witt was a case arising on federal habeas, where deference to state-court findings is mandated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). But this statute does not govern the standard of review of trial court findings by the Supreme Court of Georgia. There is no indication in that court’s opinion that it viewed Witt as merely persuasive authority, or that the court intended to borrow or adopt the Witt standard of review for its own purposes. It believed itself bound by Witt’s standard of review of trial court findings on jury-selection questions, and in so doing it mistaken.
In a similar case involving a state court’s that the First Amendment required it to reach a particular result, we said: “We conclude that although the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.” Zacchini v. Scripps- Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 578-579 (1977). Here, too, the Supreme Court of Georgia is free to adopt the rule laid down in Witt for review of trial court findings in jury-selection cases, but it need not do so. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are therefore granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
We express no opinion as to the correctness of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s application of the Witt standard in this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another” is not dischargeable. 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(6). The question before us is whether a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct, falls within this statutory exception. We hold that it does not and that the debt is dischargeable.
I
In January 1983, petitioner Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from respondent Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Geiger examined Kawaauhau and admitted her to the hospital to attend to the risk of infection resulting from the injury. Although Geiger knew that intravenous penicillin would have been more effective, he prescribed oral penicillin, explaining in his testimony that he understood his patient wished to minimize the cost of her treatment.
Geiger then departed on a business trip, leaving Kawaau-hau in the care of other physicians, who decided she should be - transferred to an infectious diseáse specialist. When Geiger returned, he canceled the transfer "and discontinued all antibiotics because'he believed the infection had subsided. Kawaauhau’s condition deteriorated over the next few days, requiring the amputation of her right leg below the knee.
KawaauhaUj joined by her husband Solomon, sued Geiger for malpractice. After a trial, the jury found Geiger liable and awarded the Kawaauhaus approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, moved to Missouri, where his wages were garnished by the Kawaauhaus. Geiger then petitioned for bankruptcy. The Kawaauhaus requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondisehargeable on the ground that it was a debt “for willful and malicious injury” excepted from discharge by 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(6). The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Geiger’s treatment fell far below the appropriate standard of care and therefore ranked as “willful and malicious.” Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court held the debt nondisehargeable. In re Geiger, 172 B. R. 916, 922-923 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Mo. 1994). In an unpublished order, the District Court affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-18 to A-22.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 93 F. 3d 443 (1996), and a divided en banc court adhered to the panel’s position, 113 F. 3d 848 (1997) (en banc). Section 523(a)(6)’s exemption from discharge, the en banc court held, is confined to debts “based on what the law has for generations called an intentional tort.” Id., at 852. On this view, a debt for malpractice, because it is based on conduct that is negligent or reckless, rather than intentional, remains dischargeable.
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that its interpretation of § 523(a)(6) diverged from previous holdings of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. See id., at 853 (citing Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F. 2d 392, 394 (CA6), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 853 (1987), and In re Franklin, 726 F. 2d 606, 610 (CA10 1984)). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 521 U. S. 1153 (1997), and now affirm the Eighth Circuit’s judgment.
II
Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
“(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
“(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.”
The Kawaauhaus urge that the malpractice award fits within this exception because Dr. Geiger intentionally rendered inadequate medical care to Margaret Kawaauhau that necessarily led to her injury. According to the Kawaauhaus, Geiger deliberately chose less effective treatment because he wanted to cut costs, all the while knowing that he was providing substandard care. Such conduct, the Kawaauhaus assert, meets the “willful and malicious” specification of § 528(a)(6).
We confront this pivotal question concerning the scope of the “willful and malicious injury” exception: Does §523(a)(6)’s compass cover acts, done intentionally, that cause injury (as the Kawaauhaus urge), or only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury (as the Eighth Circuit ruled)? The words of the statute strongly support the Eighth Circuit’s reading.
The word “willful” in (a)(6) modifies the word “injury,” indicating that nondisehargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead “willful acts that cause injury.” Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i. e., “reckless” or “negligent,” to modify “injury.” Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit observed, the (a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer’s mind the category “intentional torts,” as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend “the conse quences of an act,” not simply “the act itself.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Comment a, p. 15 (1964) (emphasis added).
The Kawaauhaus’ more encompassing interpretation could place within the excepted category a wide range of situations in which an act is intentional, but injury is unintended, i. e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor. Every traffic accident stemming from an initial intentional act — for example, intentionally rotating the wheel of an automobile to make a left-hand turn without first checking oncoming traffic — could fit the description. See 113 F. 3d, at 852. A “knowing breach of contract” could also qualify. See ibid. A construction so broad would be incompatible with the “well-known” guide that exceptions to discharge “should be confined to those plainly expressed.” Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U. S. 558, 562 (1915).
Furthermore, “we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837 (1988). Reading § 523(a)(6) as the Kawaauhaus urge would obviate the need for § 523(a)(9), which specifically exempts debts “for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance.” 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(9); see also §523(a)(12) (exempting debts for “malicious or reckless failure” to fulfill certain commitments owed to a federal depository institutions regulatory agency).
The Kawaauhaus heavily rely on Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473 (1904), which presented this question: Does an award of damages for “criminal conversation” survive bankruptcy under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act’s exception from discharge for judgments in civil actions for “ 'willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another’ ”? Id., at 480. The Tinker Court held such an award a nondis-ehargeable debt. The Kawaauhaus feature certain statements in the Tinker opinion, in particular: “[An] act is willful ... in the sense that it is intentional and voluntary” even if performed “without any particular malice,” id., at 485; an act that “necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and maliciously, so as to come within the [bankruptcy discharge] exception,” id., at 487. See also id., at 486 (the statute exempts from discharge liability for “‘a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse’ ”) (quoting from definition of malice in Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K. B. 1825)).
The exposition in the Tinker opinion is less than crystalline. Counterbalancing the portions the Kawaauhaus emphasize, the Tinker Court repeatedly observed that the tort in question qualified in the common law as trespassory. Indeed, it ranked as “trespass vi et armis.” 193 U. S., at 482, 483. Criminal conversation, the Court noted, was an action akin to a master’s “action of trespass and assault ... for the battery of his servant,” id., at 482. Tinker thus placed criminal conversation solidly within the traditional intentional tort category, and we so confine its holding. That decision, we clarify, provides no warrant for departure from the current statutory instruction that, to be nondischargeable, the judgment debt must be “for willful and malicious injury.”
Subsequent decisions of this Court are in accord with our construction. In McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916), a broker “deprive[d] another of his property forever by deliberately disposing of it without semblance of authority.” Id., at 141. The Court held that this act constituted an intentional injury to property of another, bringing it within the discharge exception. But in Davis v. Aetna Ac ceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328 (1934), the Court explained that not every tort judgment for conversion is exempt from discharge. Negligent or reckless acts, the Court held, do not suffice to establish that a resulting injury is “wilful and malicious.” See id., at 332.
Finally, the Kawaauhaus maintain that, as a policy matter, malpractice judgments should be excepted from discharge, at least when the debtor acted recklessly or carried no malpractice insurance. Congress, of course, may so decide. But unless and until Congress makes such a decision, we must follow the current direction § 523(a)(6) provides.
* * *
We hold that debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6). For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is
Affirmed.
The jury awarded Margaret Kawaauhau $203,040 in special damages •and $99,000 in general damages. In re Geiger, 172 B. R. 916, 919 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Mo. 1994). In addition, the jury awarded Solomon Kawaauhau $18,000 in general damages for loss of consortium and $35,000 for emotional distress. Ibid.
Although the record is not clear on this point, it appears that Dr. Geiger was not required by state law to cany .medical malpractice insurance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19.
The word “willful” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “voluntary” or “intentional.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979). Consistently, legislative reports note that the word “willful” in § 523(a)(6) means “deliberate or intentional.” See S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 365 (1977).
Sections 523(a)(9) and (12) were added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 and 1990 respectively. See Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 364 (1984), and Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4865 (1990).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases raise two important questions concerning the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) over the transmission of electricity. First, if a public utility “unbundles” — i. e., separates — the cost of transmission from the cost of electrical energy when billing its retail customers, may FERC require the utility to transmit competitors’ electricity over its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmissions? Second, must FERC impose that requirement on utilities that continue to offer only “bundled” retail sales?
In Order No. 888, issued in 1996 with the stated purpose of “Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities,” FERC answered yes to the first question and no to the second. It based its answers on provisions of the Federal Power Act (FPA), as added by §213, 49 Stat. 847, and as amended, 16 U. S. C. §824 et seq., enacted in 1935. Whether or not the 1935 Congress foresaw the dramatic changes in the power industry that have occurred in recent decades, we are persuaded, as was the Court of Appeals, that FERC properly construed its statutory authority.
I
In 1935, when the FPA became law, most electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had constructed their own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery systems. Although there were some interconnections among utilities, most operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation. Their sales were “bundled,” meaning that consumers paid a single charge that included both the cost of the electric energy and the cost of its delivery. Competition among utilities was not prevalent.
Prior to 1935, the States possessed broad authority to regulate public utilities, but this power was limited by our cases holding that the negative impact of the Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation that directly burdens interstate commerce. When confronted with an attempt by Rhode Island to regulate the rates charged by a Rhode Island plant selling electricity to a Massachusetts company, which resold the electricity to the city of Attleboro, Massachusetts, we invalidated the regulation because it imposed a “direct burden upon interstate commerce.” Public Util. Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 89 (1927). Creating what has become known as the “Attleboro gap,” we held that this interstate transaction was not subject to regulation by either Rhode Island or Massachusetts, but only “by the exercise of the power vested in Congress.” Id., at 90.
When it enacted the FPA in 1935, Congress authorized federal regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the gap identified in Attleboro, but it also extended federal coverage to some areas that previously had been state regulated, see, e. g., id., at 87-88 (explaining, prior to the FPA’s enactment, that state regulations affecting interstate utility transactions were permissible if they did not directly burden interstate commerce). The FPA charged the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the predecessor of FERC, “to provide effective federal regulation of the expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate commerce.” Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747, 758 (1973). Specifically, in § 201(b) of the FPA, Congress recognized the FPC’s jurisdiction as including “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). Furthermore, §205 of the FPA prohibited, among other things, unreasonable rates and undue discrimination “with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” 16 U. S. C. §§824d(a)-(b), and §206 gave the FPC the power to correct such unlawful practices, 16 U. S. C. § 824e(a).
Since 1935, and especially beginning in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the number of electricity suppliers has increased dramatically. Technological advances have made it possible to generate electricity efficiently in different ways and in smaller plants. In addition, unlike the local power networks of the past, electricity is now delivered over three major networks, or “grids,” in the continental United States. Two of these grids — the “Eastern Interconnect” and the “Western Interconnect” — are connected to each other. It is only in Hawaii and Alaska and on the “Texas Interconnect”— which covers most of that State — that electricity is distributed entirely within a single State. In the rest of the country, any electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy that is constantly moving in interstate commerce. As a result, it is now possible for power companies to transmit electric energy over long distances at a low cost. As FERC has explained, “the nature and magnitude of coordination transactions” have enabled utilities to operate more efficiently by transferring substantial amounts of electricity not only from plant to plant in one area, but also from region to region, as market conditions fluctuate. Order No. 888, at 31,641.
Despite these advances in technology that have increased the number of electricity providers and have made it possible for a “customer in Vermont [to] purchase electricity from an environmentally friendly power producer in California or a cogeneration facility in Oklahoma,” Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F. 3d 667, 681 (CADC 2000) (case below), public utilities retain ownership of the transmission lines that must be used by their competitors to deliver electric energy to wholesale and retail customers. The utilities’ control of transmission facilities gives them the power either to refuse to deliver energy produced by competitors or to deliver competitors’ power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. E. g., Order No. 888, at 31,643-31,644.
Congress has addressed these evolving conditions in the electricity market on two primary occasions since 1935. First, Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 92 Stat. 3117, 16 U. S. C. §2601 et seq., to promote the development of new generating facilities and to conserve the use of fossil fuels. Because the traditional utilities controlled the transmission lines and were reluctant to purchase power from “nontraditional facilities,” PURPA directed FERC to promulgate rules requiring utilities to purchase electricity from “qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities.” FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751 (1982); see 16 U.S.C. §824a-3(a).
Over a decade later, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), 106 Stat. 2776. This law authorized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission services to unaffiliated wholesale generators (i. e., to “wheel” power) on a case-by-case basis. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 824j-824k. Exercising its authority under the EPAct, FERC ordered a utility to “wheel” power for a complaining wholesale competitor 12 times, in 12 separate proceedings. Order No. 888, at 31,646. FERC soon concluded, however, that these individual proceedings were too costly and time consuming to provide an adequate remedy for undue discrimination throughout the market. Ibid.
Thus, in 1995, FERC initiated the rulemaking proceeding that led to the adoption of the order presently under review. FERC proposed a rule that would “require that public utilities owning and/or controlling facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce have on file tariffs providing for nondiscriminatory open-access transmission services.” Notice of Proposed Rule-making, FERC Stats. & Regs., Proposed Regs., 1988-1999, ¶ 32,514, p. 33,047, 60 Fed. Reg. 17662 (hereinafter NPRM). The stated purpose of the proposed rule was “to encourage lower electricity rates by structuring an orderly transition to competitive bulk power markets.” NPRM 33,048. The NPRM stated:
“The key to competitive bulk power markets is opening up transmission services. Transmission is the vital link between sellers and buyers. To achieve the benefits of robust, competitive bulk power markets, all wholesale buyers and sellers must have equal access to the transmission grid. Otherwise, efficient trades cannot take place and ratepayers will bear unnecessary costs. Thus, market power through control of transmission is the single greatest impediment to competition. Unquestionably, this market power is still being used today, or can be used, discriminatorily to block competition.” Id., at 33,049.
Rather than grounding its legal authority in Congress’ more recent electricity legislation, FERC cited §§205-206 of the 1935 FPA — the provisions concerning FERC’s power to remedy unduly discriminatory practices — as providing the authority for its rulemaking. See 16 U. S. C. §§824d-824e.
In 1996, after receiving comments on the NPRM, FERC issued Order No. 888. It found that electric utilities were discriminating in the “bulk power markets,” in violation of § 205 of the FPA, by providing either inferior access to their transmission networks or no access at all to third-party wholesalers of power. Order No. 888, at 31,682-31,684. Invoking its authority under §206, it prescribed a remedy containing three parts that are presently relevant.
First, FERC ordered “functional unbundling” of wholesale generation and transmission services. Id., at 31,654. FERC defined “functional unbundling” as requiring each utility to state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services, and to take transmission of its own wholesale sales and purchases under a single general tariff applicable equally to itself and to others.
Second, FERC imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce. Although the NPRM had not envisioned applying the open access requirements to retail transmissions, but rather “would have limited eligibility to wholesale transmission customers,” FERC ultimately concluded that it was “irrelevant to the Commission’s jurisdiction whether the customer receiving the unbundled transmission service in interstate commerce is a wholesale or retail customer.” Id., at 31,689. Thus, “if a public utility voluntarily offers unbundled retail access,” or if a State requires unbundled retail access, “the affected retail customer must obtain its unbundled transmission service under a non-discriminatory transmission tariff on file with the Commission.” Ibid.
Third, FERC rejected a proposal that the open access requirement should apply to “the transmission component of bundled retail sales.” Id., at 31,699. Although FERC noted that “the unbundling of retail transmission and generation... would be helpful in achieving comparability,” it concluded that such unbundling was not “necessary” and would raise “difficult jurisdictional issues” that could be “more appropriately considered” in other proceedings. Ibid.
In its analysis of the jurisdictional issues, FERC distinguished between transmissions and sales. It explained:
“[Our statutory jurisdiction] over sales of electric energy extends only to wholesale sales. However, when a retail transaction is broken into two products that are sold separately (perhaps by two different suppliers: an electric energy supplier and a transmission supplier), we believe the jurisdictional lines change. In this situation, the state clearly retains jurisdiction over the sale of power. However, the unbundled transmission service involves only the provision of ‘transmission in interstate commerce’ which, under the FPA, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Therefore, when a bundled retail sale is unbundled and becomes separate transmission and power sales transactions, the resulting transmission transaction falls within the Federal sphere of regulation.” Id., at 31,781.
In 1997, in response to numerous petitions for rehearing and clarification, FERC issued Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles, July 1996-Dec. 2001, ¶ 31,048, p. 30,172,62 Fed. Reg. 12274. With respect to various challenges to its jurisdiction, FERC acknowledged that it did not have the “authority to order, sua sponte, open-access transmission services by public utilities,” but explained that § 206 of the FPA explicitly required it to remedy the undue discrimination that it had found. Order No. 888-A, at 30,202; see 16 U. S. C. §824e(a). FERC also rejected the argument that its failure to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions was inconsistent with its assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions. FERC repeated its explanation that it did not believe that regulation of bundled retail transmissions (i. e., the “functional unbundling” of retail transmissions) “was necessary,” and again stated that such unbundling would raise serious jurisdictional questions. Order No. 888-A, at 30,225. FERC did not, however, state that it had no power to regulate the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Id., at 30,225-30,226. Rather, FERC reiterated that States have jurisdiction over the retail sale of power, and stated that, as a result, “[o]ur assertion of jurisdiction... arises only if the [unbundled] retail transmission in interstate commerce by a public utility occurs voluntarily or as a result of a state retail program.” Id., at 30,226.
II
A number of petitions, for review of Order No. 888 were consolidated for hearing in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. After considering a host of objections, the Court of Appeals upheld most provisions of the order. Specifically, it affirmed FERC’s jurisdictional rulings that are at issue in the present cases. 225 F. 3d, at 681.
The Court of Appeals first explained that the open access requirements in the orders — for both retail and wholesale transmissions — were “premised not on individualized findings of discrimination by specific transmission providers, but on FERC’s identification of a fundamental systemic problem in the industry.” Id., at 683. It held that FERC’s factual determinations were reasonable and that §§205 and 206 of the FPA gave the Commission authority to prescribe a mar-ketwide remedy for a marketwide problem. Interpreting Circuit precedent — primarily cases involving the transmission of natural gas, e. g., Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F. 2d 981 (CADC 1987) — the Court of Appeals concluded that even though FERC’s general authority to order open access was “limited,” the statute made an exception “where FERC finds undue discrimination.” 225 F. 3d, at 687-688.
In its discussion of “Federal Versus State Jurisdiction over Transmission Services,” id., at 690-696, the Court of Appeals also endorsed FERC’s reasoning. The Court of Appeals first addressed the complaints of the state regulatory commissions that Order No. 888 “went too far” by going beyond the regulation of wholesale transactions and “asserting] jurisdiction over all unbundled retail transmissions.” Id,, at 691,692. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of §201 of the FPA, which this Court has construed broadly, supported FERC’s regulation of transmissions in interstate commerce that were part of unbundled retail sales, as §201 gives FERC jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b)(1). Even if the FPA were ambiguous, the Court of Appeals explained that, given the technological complexities of the national grids, it would have deferred to the Commission’s interpretation of §201 “as giving it jurisdiction over both wholesale and retail transmissions.” 225 F. 3d, at 694.
The Court of Appeals next addressed the complaints of transmission-dependent producers and wholesalers that Order No. 888 did not “go far enough.” Id., at 692. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded that FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission required FERC to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions or to mandate unbundling of retail transmissions. Id., at 694. Noting that the FPA “clearly contemplates state jurisdiction over local distribution facilities and retail sales,” the Court of Appeals held:
“A regulator could reasonably construe transmissions bundled with generation and delivery services and sold to a consumer for a single charge as either transmission services in interstate commerce or as an integral component of a retail sale. Yet FERC has jurisdiction over one, while the states have jurisdiction over the other. FERC’s decision to characterize bundled transmissions as part of retail sales subject to state jurisdiction therefore represents a statutorily permissible policy choice to which we must also defer under Chevron [U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984)].” Id., at 694-695.
Because of the importance of the proceeding, we granted both the petition of the State of New York et al. (collectively New York) questioning FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions and the petition of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. (Enron), questioning FERC’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions. 531 U. S. 1189 (2001). We address these two questions separately. At the outset, however, we note that no petitioner questions the validity of the order insofar as it applies to wholesale transactions: The parties dispute only the proper scope of FERC’s jurisdiction over retail transmissions. Furthermore, we are not confronted with any factual issues. Finally, we agree with FERC that transmissions on the interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce. See, e. g., FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U. S. 453, 466-467 (1972); n. 5, supra.
Ill
The first question is whether FERC exceeded its jurisdiction by including unbundled retail transmissions within the scope of its open access requirements in Order No. 888. New York argues that FERC overstepped in this regard, and that such transmissions — because they are part of retail transactions — are properly the subject of state regulation. New York insists that the jurisdictional line between the States and FERC falls between the wholesale and retail markets.
As the Court of Appeals explained, however, the landscape of the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the electricity universe was “neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales.” 225 F. 3d, at 691. As the Court of Appeals also explained, the plain language of the FPA readily supports FERC’s claim of jurisdiction. Section 201(b) of the FPA states that FERC’s jurisdiction includes “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). The unbundled retail transmissions targeted by FERC are indeed transmissions of “electric energy in interstate commerce,” because of the nature of the national grid. There is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale. See ibid.; cf. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621, 636 (1972) (interpreting similar provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717(b), to mean that FPC jurisdiction “applies to interstate 'transportation’ regardless of whether the gas transported is ultimately sold retail or wholesale”).
In the face of this clear statutory language, New York advances three arguments in support of its submission that the statute draws a bright jurisdictional line between wholesale transactions and retail transactions. First, New York contends that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review because it ignored the presumption against federal pre-emption of state law; second, New York claims that other statutory language and legislative history shows a congressional intent to safeguard pre-existing state regulation of the delivery of electricity to retail customers; and third, New York argues that FERC jurisdiction over retail transmissions would impede sound energy policy. These arguments are unpersuasive.
The Presumption against Pre-emption
Pre-emption of state law by federal law can raise two quite different legal questions. The Court has most often stated a “presumption against pre-emption” when a controversy concerned not the scope of the Federal Government’s authority to displace state action, but rather whether a given state authority conflicts with, and thus has been displaced by, the existence of Federal Government authority. See, e. g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 715 (1985) (citing cases); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 518 (1992). In such a situation, the Court “‘start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Hillsborough County, 471 U. S., at 715 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977)). These are not such cases, however, because the question presented does not concern the validity of a conflicting state law or regulation.
The other context in which “pre-emption” arises concerns the rule “that a federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority[,]... [for] an agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U. S. 355, 374 (1986). This is the sort of case we confront here — defining the proper scope of the federal power. Such a case does not involve a “presumption against pre-emption,” as New York argues, but rather requires us to be certain that Congress has conferred authority on the agency. As we have explained, the best way to answer such a question— i. e., whether federal power may be exercised in an area of pre-existing state regulation — “is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency.” Ibid. In other words, we must interpret the statute to determine whether Congress has given FERC the power to act as it has, and we do so without any presumption one way or the other.
As noted above, the text of the FPA gives FERC jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and... the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). The references to “transmission” in commerce and “sale” at wholesale were made part of §201 of the statute when it was enacted in 1935. Subsections (c) and (d) of § 201 explain, respectively, the meaning of the terms “transmission” and “sale of electric energy at wholesale.” This statutory text thus unambiguously authorizes FERC to assert jurisdiction over two separate activities — transmitting and selling. It is true that FERC’s jurisdiction over the sale of power has been specifically confined to the wholesale market. However, FERC’s jurisdiction over electricity transmissions contains no such limitation. Because the FPA authorizes FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC’s exercise of this power is valid.
Legislative History
Attempting to discredit this straightforward analysis of the statutory language, New York calls our attention to numerous statements in the legislative history indicating that the 1935 Congress intended to do no more than close the “Attleboro gap,” by providing for federal regulation of wholesale, interstate electricity transactions that the Court had held to be beyond the reach of state authority in Attleboro, 273 U. S., at 89. To support this argument, and to demonstrate that the 1935 Congress did not intend to supplant any traditionally state-held jurisdiction, New York points to language added to the FPA in the course of the legislative process that evidences a clear intent to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities. For example, § 201(a) provides that federal regulation is “to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(a). And § 201(b) states that FERC has no jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b).
It is clear that the enactment of the FPA in 1935 closed the “Attleboro gap” by authorizing federal regulation of interstate, wholesale sales of electricity — the precise subject matter beyond the jurisdiction of the States in Attleboro. And it is true that the above-quoted language from § 201(a) concerning the States’ reserved powers is consistent with the view that the FPA was no more than a gap-closing statute. It is, however, perfectly clear that the original FPA did a good deal more than close the gap in state power identified in Attleboro. The FPA authorized federal regulation not only of wholesale sales that had been beyond the reach of state power, but also the regulation of wholesale sales that had been previously subject to state regulation. See, e. g., Attleboro, 273 U. S., at 85-86 (noting, prior to the enactment of the FPA, that States could regulate aspects of interstate wholesale sales, as long as such regulation did not directly burden interstate commerce). More importantly, as discussed above, the FPA authorized federal regulation of interstate transmissions as well as of interstate wholesale sales, and such transmissions were not of concern in Attle-boro. Thus, even if Attleboro catalyzed the enactment of the FPA, Attleboro does not define the outer limits of the statute’s coverage.
Furthermore, the portion of § 201(a) cited by New York concerning the preservation of existing state jurisdiction is actually consistent with Order No. 888, because unbundled interstate transmissions of electric energy have never been “subject to regulation by the States,” 16 U. S. C. § 824(a). Indeed, unbundled transmissions have been a recent development. As FERC explained, at the time that the FPA was enacted, transmissions were bundled with the energy itself, and electricity was delivered to both wholesale and retail customers as a complete, bundled package. Order No. 888, at 31,639. Thus, in 1935, there was neither state nor federal regulation of what did not exist.
Moreover, we have described the precise reserved state powers language in § 201(a) as a mere “ ‘policy declaration’ ” that “ ‘cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.’” FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U. S. 205, 215 (1964) (quoting Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 515, 527 (1945)); see also United States v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U. S. 295, 311 (1953). Because the FPA contains such “a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction” to FERC over interstate transmissions, as discussed above, the prefatory language cited by New York does not undermine FERC’s jurisdiction.
New York is correct to point out that the legislative history is replete with statements describing Congress’ intent to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities. The senti-. ment expressed in those statements is incorporated in the second sentence of § 201(b) of the FPA, as codified in 16 U. S. C. § 824(b), which provides:
“The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”
Yet, Order No. 888 does not even arguably affect the States’ jurisdiction over three of these subjects: generation facilities, transmissions in intrastate commerce, or transmissions consumed by the transmitter. Order No. 888 does discuss local distribution facilities, and New York argues that, as a result, FERC has improperly invaded the States’ authority “over facilities used in local distribution,” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). However, FERC has not attempted to control local distribution facilities through Order No. 888. To the contrary, FERC has made clear that it does not have jurisdiction over such facilities, Order No. 888, at 31,969, and has merely set forth a seven-factor test for identifying these facilities, without purporting to regulate them, id., at 31,770-31,771.
New York also correctly states that the legislative history demonstrates Congress’ interest in retaining state jurisdiction over retail sales. But again, FERC has carefully avoided assuming such jurisdiction, noting repeatedly that “the FPA does not give the Commission jurisdiction over sales of electric energy at retail.” Id., at 31,969. Because federal authority has been asserted only over unbundled transmissions, New York retains jurisdiction of the ultimate sale of the energy. And, as discussed below, FERC did not assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions, leaving New York with control over even the transmission component of bundled retail sales.
Our evaluation of the extensive legislative history reviewed in New York’s brief is affected by the importance of the changes in the electricity industry that have occurred since the FPA was enacted in 1935. No party to these cases has presented evidence that Congress foresaw the industry’s transition from one of local, self-sufficient monopolies to one of nationwide competition and electricity transmission. Nor is there evidence that the 1935 Congress foresaw the possibility of unbundling electricity transmissions from sales. More importantly, there is no evidence that if Congress had foreseen the developments to which FERC has responded, Congress would have objected to FERC’s interpretation of the FPA. Whatever persuasive effect legislative history may have in other contexts, here it is not particularly helpful because of the interim developments in the electric industry. Thus, we are left with the statutory text as the clearest guidance. That text unquestionably supports FERC’s jurisdiction to order unbundling of wholesale transactions (which none of the parties before us questions), as well as to regulate the unbundled transmissions of electricity retailers.
Sound Energy Policy
New York argues that FERC jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission will impede sound energy policy. Specifically, New York cites the States’ interest in overseeing the maintenance of transmission lines and the siting of new lines. It is difficult for us to evaluate the force of these arguments because New York has not separately analyzed the impact of the loss of control over unbundled retail transmissions, as opposed to the loss of control over retail transmissions generally, and FERC has only regulated unbundled transactions. Moreover, FERC has recognized that the States retain significant control over local matters even when retail transmissions are unbundled. See, e. g., Order No. 888, at 31,782, n. 543 (“Among other things, Congress left to the States authority to regulate generation and transmission siting”); id., at 31,782, n. 544 (“This Final Rule will not affect or encroach upon state authority in such traditional areas as the authority over local service issues, including reliability of local service; administration of integrated resource planning and utility buy-side and demand-side decisions, including DSM [demand-side management]; authority over utility generation and resource portfolios; and authority to impose nonbypassable distribution or retail stranded cost charges”). We do note that the Edison Electric Institute, which is a party to these cases, and which represents that its members own approximately 70% of the transmission facilities in the country, does not endorse New York’s objections to Order No. 888. And, regardless of their persuasiveness, the sort of policy arguments forwarded by New York are properly addressed to the Commission or to the Congress, not to this Court. E. g., Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 420 U. S. 395, 423 (1975).
IV
Objecting to FERC’s order from the opposite direction, Enron argues that the FPA gives FERC the power to apply its open access remedy to bundled retail transmissions of electricity, and, given FERC’s findings of undue discrimination, that FERC had a duty to do so. In making this argument, Enron persistently claims that FERC held that it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief that Enron seeks. That assumption is incorrect: FERC chose not to assert such jurisdiction, but it did not hold itself powerless to claim jurisdiction. Indeed, FERC explicitly reserved decision on the jurisdictional issue that Enron claims FERC decided. See Order No. 888, at 31,699 (explaining that Enron’s position raises “numerous difficult jurisdictional issues that we believe are more appropriately considered when the Commission reviews unbundled retail transmission tariffs that may come before us in the context of a state retail wheeling program”). Absent Enron’s flawed assumption, FERC’s ruling is clearly acceptable.
As noted above, in both Order No. 888 and rehearing Order No. 888-A, FERC gave two reasons for refusing to extend its open access remedy to bundled retail transmissions. First, FERC explained that such relief was not “necessary.” Order No. 888, at 31,699; see also Order No. 888-A, at 30,225. Second, FERC noted that the regulation of bundled retail transmissions “raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues” that did not need to be resolved in the present context. Order No. 888, at 31,699; see also Order No. 888-A, at 30,225-30,226. Both of these reasons provide valid support for FERC’s decision not to regulate bundled retail transmissions.
First, with respect to FERC’s determination that it was not “necessary” to include bundled retail transmissions in its remedy, it must be kept in mind exactly what it was that FERC sought to remedy in the first place: a problem with the wholesale power market. FERC’s findings, as Enron itself recognizes, concerned electric utilities’ use of their market power to “‘deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation,’” thereby “‘denying] consumers the substantial benefits of lower electricity prices.’ ” Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-809, pp. 12-13 (quoting NPRM 33,052) (emphasis added). The title of Order No. 888 confirms FERC’s focus: “Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-B
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Goldberg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, .the refusal by the police to honor petitioner’s request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of “the Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 342, and thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any incriminating statement elicited by the police during the interrogation.
On the night of January 19, 1960, petitioner’s brother-in-law was fatally shot. In the early hours of the next morning, at 2:30 a. m., petitioner was arrested without a warrant and interrogated. Petitioner made no statement to the police and was released at 5 that afternoon pursuant to a state court writ of habeas corpus obtained by Mr. Warren Wolfson, a lawyer who had been retained by petitioner.
On January 30, Benedict DiGerlando, who was then in police custody and who was later indicted for the murder along with petitioner, told the police that petitioner had fired the fatal shots. Between 8 and 9 that evening, petitioner and his sister, the widow of the deceased, were arrested and taken to police headquarters. En route to the police station, the police “had handcuffed the defendant behind his back,” and “one of the arresting officers told defendant that DiGerlando had named him as the one who shot” the deceased. Petitioner testified, without contradiction, that the “detectives said they had us pretty well, up pretty tight, and we might as well admit to this crime,” and that he replied, “I am sorry but I would like to have advice from my lawyer.” A police officer testified that although petitioner was not formally charged “he was in custody” and “couldn’t walk out the door.”
Shortly after petitioner reached police headquarters, his retained lawyer arrived. The lawyer described the ensuing events in the following terms:
“On that day I received a phone call [from “the mother of another defendant”] and pursuant to that phone call I went to the Detective Bureau at 11th and State. The first person I talked to was the Sergeant on duty at the Bureau Desk, Sergeant Pidgeon. I asked Sergeant Pidgeon for permission to speak to my client, Danny Escobedo. . . . Sergeant Pidgeon made a call to the Bureau lockup and informed me that the boy had been taken from the lockup to the Homicide Bureau. This was between 9:30 and 10:00 in the evening. Before I went anywhere, he called the Homicide Bureau and told them there was an attorney waiting to see Escobedo. He told me I could not see him. Then I went upstairs to the Homicide Bureau. There were several Homicide Detectives around and I talked to them. I identified myself as Escobedo’s attorney and asked permission to see him. They said I could not. . . . The police officer told me to see Chief Flynn who was on duty. I identified myself to Chief Flynn and asked permission to see my client. He said I could not. . . . I think it was approximately 11:00 o’clock. He said I couldn’t' see him because they hadn’t completed questioning. . . . [F]or a second or two I spotted him in an office in the Homicide Bureau. The door was open and I could see through the office. ... I waved to him and. he waved back and then the door was closed, by one of the officers at Homicide. There were four or five officers milling around the Homicide Detail that night. As to whether I talked to Captain Flynn any later that day, I waited around for another hour or two and went back again and renewed by [sic] request to see my client. He again told me I could not. . . . I filed an oficial complaint with Commissioner Phelan of the Chicago Police Department. I had a conversation with every police officer I could find. I was told at Homicide that I couldn’t see him and I would have to get a writ of habeas corpus. I left the Homicide Bureau and from the Detective Bureau at 11th and State at approximately 1:00 A. M. [Sunday morning] I had no opportunity to talk to my client that night. I quoted to Captain Flynn the Section of the Criminal Code which allows an attorney the right to see his client.”
Petitioner testified that during the course of the interrogation he repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer and that the police said that his lawyer “didn’t want to see” him. The testimony of the police officers confirmed these accounts in substantial detail.
Notwithstanding repeated requests by each, petitioner and his retained lawyer were afforded no opportunity to consult during the course of the entire interrogation. At one point, as previously noted, petitioner and his attorney came into each other’s view for a few moments but the attorney was quickly ushered away. Petitioner testified “that he heard a detective telling the attorney the latter would not be allowed to talk to [him] ‘until they were done’ ” and that he heard the attorney being refused permission to remain in the adjoining room. A police officer testified that he had told the lawyer that he could not see petitioner until “we were through interrogating” him.
There is testimony by the police that during the interrogation, petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction with no record of previous experience with the police, “was handcuffed” in a standing position and that he “was nervous, he had circles under his eyes and he was upset” and was “agitated” because “he had not slept well in over a week.”
It is undisputed that during the course of the interrogation Officer Montejano, who “grew up” in petitioner’s neighborhood, who knew his family, and who uses “Spanish language in [his] police work,” conferred alone with petitioner “for about a quarter of an hour. . . .” Petitioner testified that the officer said to him “in Spanish that my sister and I could go home if I pinned it on Benedict DiGerlando,” that “he would see to it that we would go home and be held only as witnesses, if anything, if we had made a statement against DiGerlando . . . , that we would be able to go home that night.” Petitioner testified that he made the statement in issue because of this assurance. Officer Montejano denied offering any such assurance.
A police officer testified that during the interrogation the following occurred:
“I informed him of what DiGerlando told me and when I did, he told me that DiGerlando was [lying] and I said, ‘Would you care to tell DiGer-lando that?’ and he said, ‘Yes, I will.’ So, I brought . . . Escobedo in and he confronted DiGer-lando and he told him that he was lying and said, 'I didn’t shoot Manuel, you did it.’ ”
In this way, petitioner, for the first time, admitted to some knowledge of the crime. After that he made additional statements further implicating himself in the murder plot. At this point an Assistant State’s Attorney, Theodore J. Cooper, was summoned “to take” a statement. Mr. Cooper, an experienced lawyer who was assigned to the Homicide Division to take “statements from some defendants and some prisoners that they had in custody,” “took” petitioner’s statement by asking carefully framed questions apparently designed to assure the admissibility into evidence of the resulting answers. Mr. Cooper testified that he did not advise petitioner of his constitutional rights, and it is undisputed that no one during the course of the interrogation so advised him.
Petitioner moved both before and during trial to suppress the incriminating statement, but the motions were denied. Petitioner was convicted of murder and he appealed the conviction.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in its original opinion of February 1, 1963, held the statement inadmissible and reversed the conviction. The court said:
“[I]t seems manifest to us, from the undisputed evidence and the circumstances surrounding defendant at the time of his statement and shortly prior thereto, that the defendant understood he would be permitted to go home if he gave the statement and would be granted an immunity from prosecution.”
Compare Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528.
The State petitioned for, and the court granted, rehearing. The court then affirmed the conviction. It said: “[T]he officer denied making the promise and the trier of fact believed him. We find no reason for disturbing the trial court’s finding that the confession was voluntary.” 28 Ill. 2d 41, 45-46, 190 N. E. 2d 825, 827. The court also held, on the authority of this Court’s decisions in Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, that the confession was admissible even though “it was obtained after he had requested the assistance of counsel, which request was denied.” 28 Ill. 2d, at 46, 190 N. E. 2d, at 827. We granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether the petitioner’s statement was constitutionally admissible at his trial. 375 U. S. 902. We conclude, for the reasons stated below, that it was not and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction.
In Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, this Court observed that “a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at . . . trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less . . . might deny a defendant 'effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.’ ” Id., at 204, quoting Douglas, J., concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 326.
The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that fact should make no difference. When petitioner requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of “an unsolved crime.” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J., concurring). Petitioner had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to “get him” to confess his guilt despite his constitutional right not to do so. At the time of. his arrest and throughout the course of the interrogation, the police told petitioner that they had convincing evidence that he had fired the fatal shots. Without informing him of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of this accusation, the police urged him to make a statement. As this Court observed many years ago:
“It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in which the accused was when the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had charged him with crime, the result was to produce upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty person, and it cannot be conceived that the converse impression would not also have naturally arisen, that by denying there was hope of removing the suspicion from himself.” Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 562.
Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an admission of “mere” complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing of the fatal shots. Illinois v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N. E. 2d 825. The “guiding hand of counsel” was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate situation. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 69. This was the “stage when legal aid and advice” were most critical to petitioner. Massiah v. United States, supra, at 204. It was a stage surely as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, and the preliminary hearing in White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59. What happened at this interrogation could certainly “affect the whole trial,” Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 54, since rights “may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes.” Ibid. It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the ¿uthorities had secured a formal indictment. Petitioner had, for all practical purposes, already been charged with murder.
The New York Court of Appeals, whose decisions this Court cited with approval in Massiah, 377 U. S. 201, at 205, has recently recognized that, under circumstances such as those here, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between interrogation of an accused before and after formal indictment. In People v. Donovan, 13 N. Y. 2d 148, 193 N. E. 2d 628, that court, in an opinion by Judge Fuld, held that a “confession taken from a defendant, during a period of detention [prior to indictment], after his attorney had requested and been denied access to him” could not be used against him in a criminal trial. Id., at 151, 193 N. E. 2d, at 629. The court observed that it “would be highly incongruous if our system of justice permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing the State, to extract a confession from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was kept from him by the police.” Id., at 152, 193 N. E. 2d, at 629.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, we held that every person accused of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at trial. The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the “right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.” In re Groban, 352 U. S. 330, 344 (Black, J., dissenting). “One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now. They can’t escape the noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.’ ” Ex parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-518.
It is argued that if the right to counsel is afforded prior to indictment, the number of confessions obtained by the police will diminish significantly, because most confessions are obtained during the period between arrest and indictment, and “any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This argument, of course, cuts two ways. The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its critical nature as a “stage when legal aid and advice” are surely needed. Massiah v. United States, supra, at 204; Hamilton v. Alabama, supra; White v. Maryland, supra. The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination. See Note, 73 Yale L. J. 1000, 1048-1051 (1964).
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the “confession” will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system, which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. As Dean Wigmore so wisely said:
“[A]ny system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of the other sources. The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected answer,— that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems to have been the course of experience in those legal systems where the privilege was not recognized.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 309. (Emphasis in original.)
This Court also has recognized that “history amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence . . . .” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 519.
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied “the Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., at 342, and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.
Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, does not compel a contrary result. In that case the Court merely rejected the absolute rule sought by petitioner, that “every state denial of a request to contact counsel [is] an infringement of the constitutional right without regard to the circumstances of the case.” Id., at 440. (Emphasis in original.) In its place, the following rule was announced:
“[S]tate refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process not only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the merits, . . . but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. . . .’ The latter determination necessarily depends upon all the circumstances of the case.” 357 U. S., at 439-440. (Emphasis added.)
The Court, applying “these principles” to “the sum total of the circumstances [there] during the time petitioner was without counsel,” id., at 440, concluded that he had not been fundamentally prejudiced by the denial of his request for counsel. Among the critical circumstances which distinguish that case from this one are that the petitioner there, but not here, was explicitly advised by the police of his constitutional right to remain silent and not to “say anything” in response to the questions, id., at 437, and that petitioner there, but not here, was a well-educated man who had studied criminal law while attending law school for a year. The Court’s opinion in Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, decided the same day, merely said that the “contention that petitioner had a constitutional right to confer with counsel is disposed of by Crooker v. California . . . That case adds nothing, therefore, to Crooker. In any event, to the extent that Cicenia or Crooker may be inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded as controlling.
Nothing we have said today affects the powers of the police to investigate “an unsolved crime,” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J., concurring), by gathering information from witnesses and by other “proper investigative efforts.” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 519. We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory — when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession— our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.
The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Petitioner testified that this ambiguous gesture “could have meant most anything,” but that he “took it upon [his] own to think that [the lawyer was telling him] not to say anything,” and that the lawyer “wanted to talk” to him.
The statute then in effect provided in pertinent part that: “All public officers . . . having the custody of any person . . . restrained of his liberty for any alleged cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, admit any practicing attorney . . . whom such person . . . may desire to see or consult . . . Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959), c. 38, §477. Repealed as of Jan. 1, 1964, by Act approved Aug. 14, 1963, H. B. No. 851.
The trial judge justified the handcuffing on the ground that it “is ordinary police procedure.”
Compare Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515 (decided on the same day as the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court here), where we said:
“Our conclusion is in no way foreclosed, as the State contends, by the fact that the state trial judge or the jury may have reached a different result on this issue.
“It is well settled that the duty of constitutional adjudication resting upon this Court requires that the question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated by admission into evidence of a coerced confession be the subject of an independent determination here, see, e. g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 147-148; ‘we cannot escape the responsibility of making our own examination of the record, Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 316.” (Emphasis in original.)
Although there is testimony in the record that petitioner and his lawyer had previously discussed what petitioner should do in the event of interrogation, there is no evidence that they discussed what petitioner should, or could, do in the face of a false accusation that he had fired the fatal bullets.
The English Judges’ Rules also recognize that a functional rather than a formal test must be applied and that, under circumstances such as those here, no special significance should be attached to formal indictment. The applicable Rule does not permit the police to question an accused, except in certain extremely limited situations not relevant here, at any time after the defendant “has been charged or informed that he may be 'prosecuted.” [1964] Crim. L. Rev. 166-170 (emphasis supplied). Although voluntary statements obtained in violation of these rules are not automatically excluded from evidence the judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, exclude them. “Recent eases suggest that perhaps the judges have been tightening up [and almost] inevitably, the effect of the new Rules will be to stimulate this tendency.” Id., at 182.
Canon 9 of the American Bar Association’s Canon of Professional Ethics provides that:
“A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.” See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Neb. L. Rev. 483, 599-604.
Twenty-two States, including Illinois, urged us so to hold.
The Soviet criminal code does not permit a lawyer to be present during the investigation. The Soviet trial has thus been aptly described as “an appeal from the pretrial investigation.” Feifer, Justice in Moscow (1964), 86.
See Barrett, Police Practices and the Law — From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 11, 43 (1962).
See Committee Print, Subcommittee to Investigate Administration of the Internal Security Act, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reporting and analyzing the proceedings at the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 25, 1956, exposing the false confessions obtained during the Stalin purges of the 1930’s. See also Miller v. United States, 320 F. 2d 767, 772-773 (opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon); Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (1961); Rogge, Why Men Confess (1959); Schein, Coercive Persuasion (1961).
See Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, quoted in 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 312; Report and Recommendations of the Commissioners’ Committee on Police Arrests for Investigation, District of Columbia (1962).
Cf. Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963), 10-11: “The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values which it advances depends upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process. . . . Persons [denied access to counsel] are incapable of providing the challenges that are indispensable to satisfactory operation of the system. The loss to the interests of accused, individuals, occasioned by these failures, are great and apparent. It' is also clear that a situation in which persons are required to contest a serious accusation but are denied access to the tools of contest is offensive to fairness and equity. Beyond these considerations, however, is the fact that [this situation is] detrimental to the proper functioning of the system of justice and that the loss in vitality of the adversary system, thereby occasioned, significantly endangers the basic interests of a free community.”
The accused may, of course, intelligently and knowingly waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel either at a pretrial stage or at the trial. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458. But no knowing and intelligent waiver of any constitutional right can be said to have occurred under the circumstances of this case.
The authority of Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, and Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, was weakened by the subsequent decisions of this Court in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59, and Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (as the dissenting opinion in the last-cited case recognized).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Appellees instituted this federal income tax refund suit, claiming that the 1976 amendments of the minimum tax provisions contained in § § 56 and 57 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §§ 56 and 57, could not be applied to a transaction that had taken place in 1976, prior to the enactment of the amendments, without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Appellees prevailed in the District Court. The United States has taken an appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252, which authorizes a direct appeal from the final judgment of a court of the United States holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action to which the United States is a party. And a direct appeal may be taken when, as here, a federal statute has been held unconstitutional as applied to a particular circumstance. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100 (1947). See United States v. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 404 U. S. 561, 563 (1972).
I
The appellees, E. M. Darusmont and B. L. Darusmont, are husband and wife. Mrs. Darusmont is a party to this action solely because she and her husband filed a joint federal income tax return for the calendar year 1976. We hereinafter sometimes refer to the appellees in the singular, either as “ap-pellee” or as “taxpayer.”
In April 1976, Mr. Darusmont was notified by his employer that he was to be transferred from Houston, Tex., to Bakersfield, Cal. Appellee, accordingly, undertook to dispose of his Houston home. That home was a triplex. One of the three units was occupied by the Darusmonts; taxpayer rented the other two. Appellee retained a real estate firm to list the property and to give him advice as to the most advantageous way to sell it. The firm suggested various alternatives (sale as separate condominium units, or as a whole, and either for cash or on the installment basis). The firm and appellee discussed the income tax consequences of each alternative, including the tax on capital gain, the installment method of reporting, and the possibility of deferring a portion of any capital gain by the timely purchase of a replacement home in California.
After considering the several possible methods of structuring the sale, and after computing the projected income tax consequences of each method, appellee decided on an outright sale. That sale was effected on July 15, 1976, for cash. This resulted in a long-term capital gain to the taxpayer. Because, however, appellee purchased a replacement residence in California, he was able, under § 1034 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1034, to defer recognition of that portion of the gain attributable to the unit of the Texas house that the Darusmonts had occupied. Appellee’s recognized gain on the sale of the other two units was $51,332. After taking into account the deduction of 50% of net capital gain then permitted by § 1202 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1202, appellee included the remainder of the gain in his reported taxable income. The Darusmonts timely filed their joint federal income tax return for the calendar year 1976. That return showed a tax of $25,384, which was paid.
The present controversy concerns $2,280, the portion of appellee’s 1976 income tax liability attributable to the minimum tax imposed by § 56 of the Code on items of tax preference as defined in § 57. These minimum tax provisions, which impose a tax in addition to the regular income tax, first appeared with the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 580. Originally, the minimum tax equaled 10% of the amount by which the aggregate of enumerated items of tax preference exceeded the sum of a $30,000 exemption plus the taxpayer’s regular income tax liability. For an individual, one of the items of tax preference was the deduction under § 1202 for net capital gain. See §57(a)(9)(A). Thus, appellee’s § 1202 deduction for 1976 for 50% of the capital gain recognized on the sale of the two units of the Texas triplex was an item of tax preference. If the statute’s original formulation, with its base of $30,000 plus the regular income tax liability, had been retained in the statute for 1976, appellee would not have owed any minimum tax as a result of the sale of the Houston house.
Oh October 4, 1976, however, the President signed the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94 — 455, 90 Stat. 1520. Section 301 of that Act, 90 Stat. 1549, amended § 56 (a) of the Code so as to increase the rate of the minimum tax and to reduce the amount of the exemption to $10,000 or one-half of the taxpayer’s regular income tax liability (with certain adjustments), whichever was the greater. Section 301 (g)(1), 90 Stat. 1553, with exceptions not pertinent here, then provided that “the amendments made by this section shall apply to items of tax preference for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975.” It is this stated effective date that creates the issue now in controversy for, in a certain sense, the October 4, 1976, amendment of § 56 operated “retroactively” to cover the portion of 1976 prior to that date. A result of the statutory change of October 4 was that appellee was subjected to the now contested minimum tax of $2,280 on the sale of the Texas house the preceding July 15.
A proper claim for refund of the minimum tax so paid was duly filed with the Internal Revenue Service. Upon the denial of that claim, the Darusmonts instituted this refund suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Taxpayer argued that the 1976 amendments could not be applied constitutionally to a transaction fully consummated prior to their enactment. He further argued that had he known that the sale of the house would have resulted in liability for the minimum tax, he could have structured the sale so as to avoid the tax. He has conceded, however, that when he was considering the various ways in which he could dispose of the Texas property, he was not aware of the existence of the minimum tax.
The District Court entered judgment in favor of appellee. It held that the application of the 1976 amendments to a transaction consummated in 1976 prior to October 4 subjected appellee “to a new, separate and distinct tax,” and was “so arbitrary and oppressive as to be a denial of due process” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. App. to Juris. Statement 3a; 80-2 USTC ¶ 9671, p. 85,208, 47 AFTR 2d ¶ 81-366, p. 81-519. We note that the District Court’s ruling is in conflict with the later decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Buttke v. Commissioner, 625 P. 2d 202 (1980), aff’g 72 T. C. 677 (1979).
II
In enacting general revenue statutes, Congress almost without exception has given each such statute an effective date prior to the date of actual enactment. This was true with respect to the income tax provisions of the Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, and the successive Revenue Acts of 1916 through 1938. It was also true with respect to the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939 and 1954. Usually the “retroactive” feature has application only to that portion of the current calendar year preceding the date of enactment, but each of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1926 was applicable to an entire calendar year that had expired preceding enactment. This “retroactive” application apparently has been confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation. We may safely say that it is a customary congressional practice.
The Court consistently has held that the application of an income tax statute to the entire calendar year in which enactment took place does not per se violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Stockdale v. Insurance Companies, 20 Wall. 323, 331, 332 (1874); id., at 341 (dissenting opinion); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 20 (1916); Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409, 411 (1930); Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 21 (1931); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 175 (1933); United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498, 500-501 (1937); Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 146, 148-150 (1938); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340, 355 (1945). See also Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 592 (1935); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 706-711 (1960).
Justice Miller succinctly stated the principle a century ago in writing for the Court in Stockdale, supra:
“The right of Congress to have imposed this tax by a new statute, although the measure of it was governed by the income of the past year, cannot be doubted; much less can it be doubted that it could impose such a tax on the income of the current year, though part of that year had elapsed when the statute was passed.” 20 Wall., at 331.
Justice Van Devanter in writing for the Court in Hudson, supra, similarly approved the congressional practice:
“As respects income tax statutes it long has been the practice of Congress to make them retroactive for relatively short periods so as to include profits from transactions consummated while the statute was in process of enactment, or within so much of the calendar year as preceded the enactment; and repeated decisions of this Court have recognized this practice and sustained it as consistent with the due process clause of the Constitution” 299 U. S., at 500.
The Court has stated the underlying rationale for allowing this “retroactivity”:
“Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process, and to challenge the present tax it is not enough to point out that the taxable event, the receipt of income, antedated the statute.” Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S., at 146-147.
Judge Learned Hand also commented upon the point and set forth the answer to the constitutional argument:
“Nobody has a vested right in the rate of taxation, which may be retroactively changed at the will of Congress at least for periods of less than twelve months; Congress has done so from the outset. . . . The injustice is no greater than if a man chance to make a profitable sale in the months before the general rates are retroactively changed. Such a one may indeed complain that, could he have foreseen the increase, he would have kept the transaction unliquidated, but it will not avail him; he must be prepared for such possibilities, the system being already in operation. His is a different case from that of one who, when he takes action, has no reason to suppose that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.” Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F. 2d 540, 545 (CA2 1930).
Appellee concedes that the Court “has held that a retroactive income tax statute does not violate the 'due process’ clause of the Constitution per se.” Motion to Affirm 6. Appellee asserts, however, that three tests have been developed for determining whether a particular tax is so harsh and oppressive as to be a denial of due process, namely, whether the taxpayer could have altered his behavior to avoid the tax if it could have been anticipated by him at the time the transaction was effected; whether the taxpayer had notice of the tax when he engaged in the transaction; and whether the tax is a new tax and not merely an increase in the rate of an existing income tax. Appellee argues that the altered minimum tax fits within these three tests.
In support of the first proposition, appellee cites Blodgett v. Holden 275 U. S. 142 (1927), modified, 276 U. S. 594 (1928), and Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928). These, however, are gift tax cases, and the gifts in question were made and completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute. We do not regard them as controlling authority with respect to any retroactive feature of a federal income tax. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S., at 147-148.
Regarding his second test, appellee states that he had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the forthcoming October changes in the minimum tax when he sold the triplex in July and that, as a consequence, the retroactive imposition of the tax after the sale was arbitrary, harsh, and oppressive. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that personal notice is relevant, appellee is hardly in a position to claim surprise at the 1976 amendments to the minimum tax. The proposed increase in rate had been under public discussion for almost a year before its enactment. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, pp. 130-132 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-938, pp. 108-114 (1976). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 reflected a compromise between the House and Senate proposals. Both bills, however, provided that the changes in the minimum tax were to be effective for taxable years beginning after 1975. Appellee, therefore, had ample advance notice of the increase in the- effective minimum rate.
Appellee’s “new tax” argument is answered completely by the fact that the 1976 amendments to the minimum tax did not create a new tax. To be sure, the minimum tax is described in the statute, § 56 (a), as one “[i]n addition to” the regular income tax. But the minimum tax provision was imposed in 1969, and one of the original items of tax preference subjected to the minimum tax was the untaxed portion of any net long-term capital gain. 83 Stat. 582.
Appellee’s position is far different, from that of the individual who, as Judge Hand stated in the language quoted above, “has no reason to suppose that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.” The 1976 changes affected appellee only by decreasing the allowable exemption and increasing the percentage rate of tax. “Congress intended these changes to raise the effective tax rate on tax preference items . . . .” Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (Comm. Print 1976). Congress possessed ample authority to make this kind of change effective as of the beginning of the year of enactment. We are not persuaded by appel-lee’s proffered distinction between his case and Buttke v. Commissioner, 625 F. 2d 202 (CA8 1980), that the taxpayer in Buttke, unlike appellee, would have incurred a tax anyway under the prior form of the statute. See Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 78, ¶ 80,106 P-H Memo TC (1980) (appeal pending CA5).
We think Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409 (1930), is particularly close to this case. There the taxpayer, on November 7, 1921, sold stock acquired by gift from her husband a week earlier. On November 23, however, the Revenue Act of 1921 was approved and became law. The new Act provided that the income tax basis of property received by gift after December 31, 1920, was the same as the donor’s basis, instead of being the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift, the rule which had theretofore prevailed. The taxpayer sought to avoid the lower carryover basis in computing her gain on the sale, and argued that the new provision should not be applied “to transactions fully completed before enactment of the statute.” Id., at 411. This Court, however, rejected that contention, saying, ibid.:
“That the questioned provision can not be declared in conflict with the Federal Constitution merely because it requires gains from prior but recent transactions to be treated as part of the taxpayer’s gross income has not been open to serious doubt since Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, and Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339.”
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with directions to enter judgment for the United States.
It is so ordered.
The Tax Court consistently has adhered to this position. See Estate of Kearns v. Commissioner, 73 T. C. 1223 (1980); Westwick v. Commissioner, 38 TCM 1269, ¶ 79,329 P-H Memo TC (1979) (appeal pending CA10); Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 78, ¶ 80,106 P-H Memo TC (1980) (appeal pending CA5); Schopp v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 276, ¶ 80,148 P-H Memo TC (1980); Witte v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 1259, ¶ 80,393 P-H Memo TC (1980).
Other rulings adverse to the taxpayer on this issue are Appendrodt v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 490 (WD Pa. 1980); Metzger v. United States, No. 78-0346-S (SD Cal. Feb. 16, 1979) (appeal pending CA9).
Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, §11, D, 38 Stat. 168; Revenue Act of 1916, §§ 8 (a) and (b), 13 (a) and (b), 39 Stat. 761,770, 771; War Revenue Act of 1917, §§ 1, 2, 4, 40 Stat. 300-302; Revenue Act of 1918, §200, 40 Stat. 1058; Revenue Act of 1921, §200(1), 42 Stat. 227; Revenue Act of 1924, § 200 (a), 43 Stat. 254; Revenue Act of 1926, § 200 (a), 44 Stat. (part 2) 10; Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 1, 48 (a), 45 Stat. 795, 807; Revenue Act of 1932, §§ 1, 48 (a), 47 Stat. 173, 187; Revenue Act of 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 683; Revenue Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 1014; Revenue Act of 1936, § 1, 49 Stat. 1652; Revenue Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 813; Revenue Act of 1938, § 1, 52 Stat. 452.
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 1, 53 Stat. 4; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §7851 (a)(1)(A), 68A Stat. 919.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341. The question we must decide in this case is whether an Illinois remedy which requires property owners contesting their property taxes to pay under protest and if successful obtain a refund without interest in two years is “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” within the meaning of the Act.
I
LaSalle National Bank is trustee of a land trust for Patricia Cook, the beneficial owner of property improved with a 22-unit apartment building in' the all-black low-income community of East Chicago Heights, Ill., located in Cook County. Respondent alleged that, as of January 1, 1977, her property had a fair market value of $46,000. In accordance with a Cook County ordinance, her property should have been assessed for property tax purposes at 33% of fair market value — $15,180. Instead, for the 1977 tax year, the County Assessor assessed the property at $52,150. As a result, respondent's property tax liability was $6,106 instead of $1,775, an overcharge of $4,331.
Respondent also claimed that the County Assessor “knowingly as official policy or governmental custom maintained, adopted or promulgated policy statements, regulations, decisions and systems of assessment which have produced egregious disparities in assessments throughout the County." Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 11, App. 7. In particular, she cited a study of the Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs showing that, for 1975, property in the same class as respondent's was assessed as low as 3% and as high as 973% of fair market value. She furthermore alleged that such disparities in assessments were “far greater in number and size in older, inner city and county areas, owned, inhabited or used to a larger extent by minorities and poorer people.” Ibid. Finally, she contended that the Assessor knew that she had previously challenged the 1974, 1975, and 1976 assessments of her property.
Respondent first exhausted her administrative remedy by appealing unsuccessfully for a correction of her 1977 assessment before the Cook County Board of Appeals. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 594 (1), 596, 597, 598, 599 (1977). Her only remaining state remedy was to pay the contested tax under protest, and then to file an objection to the Cook County Collector’s Application for Judgment before the Circuit Court of Cook County — in effect a reverse suit for refund. §§ 675, 716. Although Illinois’ statutory refund procedure could theoretically provide a final resolution of the dispute within one year of payment of the tax under protest, respondent alleged that the customary delay from the time of payment until the receipt of refund upon successful protest is two years. The tax refund is not accompanied by a payment of interest. Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 109, 306 N. E. 2d 299, 303 (1973); Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 422-423, 167 N. E. 2d 236, 240-241 (1960).
Respondent refused to pay her 1977 property taxes and instead brought this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent petitioner Rosewell from publishing an advertisement of notice and the intended date of Application for Judgment, from applying for judgment and order of sale against her property, and from selling it. Respondent contended that, by requiring payment of taxes times the lawful amount, petitioners deprived her of equal protection and due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and violated state constitutional and statutory rights as well. Respondent further alleged that she had no plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Illinois courts.
Petitioners moved to dismiss, claiming that actions challenging state tax assessments are not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343, and that Illinois’ statutory refund procedure is a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy even though it fails to pay interest. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, App. 11.
The District Court denied respondent’s motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1341. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-21a. However, the court enjoined petitioner Rose well from proceeding to judgment and order of sale against respondent’s property pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62 (c). The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal district court jurisdiction because Illinois’ procedure of no-interest refunds after two years was not “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” 604 F. 2d 530, 536-537 (1979). A petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied. Id., at 530. We granted certiorari, 445 U. S. 925 (1980), and now reverse.
II
At the outset, it must be recognized that the issue we decide is one of statutory construction. Our task is to determine whether the Illinois refund procedure constitutes “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy... in the courts of such State” within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, thereby barring federal jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Our review of the plain language of the Act, its legislative history, and its underlying purpose persuades us that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Illinois remedy is not “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.”
A
The starting point of our inquiry is the plain language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979); 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596 (1951). See ERA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64, 73 (1980). The Tax Injunction Act generally prohibits federal district courts from enjoining state tax administration except in instances where the state-court remedy is not “plain, speedy and efficient.” On its face, the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” exception appears to require a state-court remedy that meets certain minimal procedural criteria. The Court has only occasionally sought to define the meaning of the exception since passage of the Act in 1937. When it has done so, however, the Court has emphasized a procedural interpretation in defining both the entire phrase and its individual word components.
Discussing the general meaning of the phrase, the Court, in Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 74 (1976), described its “basic inquiry” as “whether under New York law there is a 'plain, speedy and efficient’ way for [the taxpayer] to press its constitutional claims while preserving the right to challenge the amount of tax due.” More directly, in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 300-301 (1943), the Court stated:
“[I]t is the court’s duty to withhold such relief when, as in the present case, it appears that the state legislature has provided that on payment of any challenged tax to the appropriate state officer, the taxpayer may maintain a suit to recover it back. In such a suit he may assert his federal rights and secure a review of them by this Court. This affords an adequate remedy to the taxpayer, and at the same time leaves undisturbed the state’s administration of its taxes.” (Emphasis added.)
See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 625 (1946) (issue is “whether the State affords full protection to the federal rights”).
What little can be gleaned from the legislative history of the Act on the phrase “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” lends further support to a procedural interpretation. Senator Bone, the Act’s primary sponsor, referred to the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” provision and then stated: “Thus a full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy is assured.” 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937). The Senate Report accompanying the Act mirrors Senator Bone’s understanding, adding that “[a]n appeal to the Supreme Court of the United State is available as in other cases.” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937).
The phrase “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in the Tax Injunction Act was “modeled” after verbatim language in the Johnson Act of 1934, an Act prohibiting federal-court interference with orders issued by state administrative agencies to public utilities. As Senator Bone made clear, “[m]ost of the arguments which were used in support of the Johnson Act... apply in like manner” to the Tax Injunction Act. 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937). Our examination of the Johnson Act and its legislative history reveals the same procedural emphasis as found in the Tax Injunction Act and its legislative history. As gloss on the words “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” the Senate Report on the Johnson Act spoke of state laws that provided for an appeal from the determination of the state agency by any dissatisfied party. S. Rep. No. 701, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1932). The Senate Report continued: “This appeal is taken to the courts of the State, thus giving to both sides of any controversy which may arise a full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy.” Id., at 2 (emphasis added).
There is no doubt that the Illinois state-court refund procedure provides the taxpayer with a “full hearing and judicial determination” at which she may ratee any and all constitutional objections to the tax. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N. E. 2d 252, 255-256 (1974). Appeal to the higher Illinois courts is authorized, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 675 (1977), and review is ultimately available in this Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Respondent does not allege any procedural defect in the Illinois remedy, other than delay, that would preclude preservation and consideration of her federal rights, since she is free to raise her equal protection and due process federal constitutional objections during the Application for Judgment proceedings before the Circuit Court of Cook County. Rather, respondent's argument — that Illinois’ failure to pay interest on the tax refund makes the remedy not “plain, speedy and efficient” — appears to address a more substantive concern. Whether she has any “federal right” to receive interest — a right she has not asserted and on which we express no view — it would appear that she could assert this right in the state-court proceeding. The procedural mechanism for correction of her tax bill remains the same, however, whether interest is paid or not.
B
A procedural interpretation of the phrase “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” and the procedural sufficiency of Illinois’ remedy, are supported further by analysis of the phrase’s individual words. According to the 1934 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary, plain means “clear” or “manifest,” speedy means “quick,” efficient means “characterized by effective activity,” and a remedy is the “legal means to recover a right... or obtain redress for... a wrong.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 819, 1878, 2106, 2418 (2d ed. 1934).
While the Court has never addressed the meaning of the word “speedy,” it has interpreted the words “plain” and “efficient.” Thus, the Court suggested that “uncertainty concerning a State’s remedy may make it less than ‘plain’ under 28 U. S. C. § 1341.” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 76. Earlier cases, without making a direct connection to the word “plain,” have held that “uncertainty” surrounding a state-court remedy lifts the bar to federal-court jurisdiction. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S., at 625-626. Respondent has made no argument that the Illinois refund procedure is uncertain or otherwise unclear. There is no question that under the Illinois procedure, the court will hear and decide any federal claim. Paying interest or eliminating delay would not make the remedy any more “plain.”
This Court’s interpretation of the word “efficient” has also stressed procedural elements. In Tully, the Court commented that “a State’s remedy does not become ‘inefficient,’ merely because a taxpayer must travel across a state line in order to resist or challenge the taxes sought to be imposed.” 429 U. S., at 73. In addition, without explicitly mentioning the word “efficient,” we have permitted federal-court jurisdiction when the taxpayer’s state-court remedy would require a multiplicity of suits, Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 303 (1952) (where remedy “would require the filing of over three hundred separate claims in fourteen different counties to protect the single federal claim asserted by [the taxpayer]”), or when the remedy would allow a challenge against only one of many taxing authorities, id., at 301, 303 (where suit-for-refund remedy-applied only to state taxes, yet taxpayer railroad also wanted to challenge on the same basis taxes paid to counties, school districts, and municipalities). Because the Illinois remedy imposes no unusual hardship on respondent requiring ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy, we cannot say that it is not “efficient.”
This Court has never expressly discussed the meaning of the word “speedy,” an issue that is squarely presented in this case. We must decide whether Illinois’ refund after two years qualifies as a “speedy” remedy. “Speedy” is perforce a relative concept, and we must assess the 2-year delay against the usual time for similar litigation. It surely is no secret that state and federal trial courts have been beset by docket congestion and delay for many years. Whether this is a necessary, let alone a reasonable, condition of 20th-century litigation is beside the point: The fact of the matter is that legal conflicts are not resolved as quickly as we would like.
In 1976, the median number of days from filing a complaint to disposition of a civil trial matter in 13 urban trial courts ranged from 357 to 980. National Center for State Courts, Justice Delayed 10-11 (1978). In 7 of the 13, over 30% of the civil cases took more than two years from start to finish. Id., at 13. The Cook County Circuit Court had a similar record: from 1974 to 1975, the average time from date of filing to verdict was about 40 months. U. S. Department of Justice, State Court Caseload Statistics: The State of the Art 7 (1978). Federal district courts have not fared much better. As of 1980, the median time interval from filing to disposition for civil cases going to trial was 20 months; 10% of those took more than 46 months. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 81, A-30 (1980). For the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the District in which respondent brought this suit, the median time interval was 23 months, with 10% of all cases over 53 months. Id., at A-31.
Cast in this light, respondent’s 2-year wait, regrettably, is not unusual. Nowhere in the Tax Injunction Act did Congress suggest that the remedy must be the speediest. The payment of interest might make the wait more tolerable, but it would not affect the amount of time necessary to adjudicate respondent’s federal claims. Limiting ourselves to the circumstances of the instant case, we cannot say that respondent’s 2-year delay falls outside the boundary of a “speedy” remedy.
c
The overall purpose of the Tax Injunction Act is consistent with the view that the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” exception to the Act’s prohibition was only designed to require that the state remedy satisfy certain procedural criteria, and that Illinois’ refund procedure meets such criteria. The statute “has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations.” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 73. This last consideration was the principal motivating force behind the Act: this legislation was first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes. 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 301 (Act “predicated upon the desirability of freeing, from interference by the federal courts, state procedures which authorize litigation challenging a tax after the tax has been paid”).
When it passed the Act, Congress knew that state tax systems commonly provided for payment of taxes under protest with subsequent refund as their exclusive remedy. The Senate Report to the Act noted:
“It is the common practice for statutes of the various States to forbid actions in State courts to enjoin the collection of State and county taxes unless the tax law is invalid or the property is exempt from taxation, and these statutes generally provide that taxpayers may contest their taxes only in refund actions after payment under protest. This type of State legislation makes it possible for the States and their various agencies to survive while long-drawn-out tax litigation is in progress.” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937).
See H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). See also Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 526 (1932).
It is only common sense to presume that Congress was also aware that some of these same States did not pay interest on their refunds to taxpayers, following the then-familiar rule that interest in refund actions was recoverable only when expressly allowed by statute. 3 T. Cooley, Law of Taxation § 1308, pp. 2596-2597 (4th ed. 1924). It would be wholly unreasonable, therefore, to construe a statute passed to limit federal-court interference in state tax matters to mean that Congress nevertheless wanted taxpayers from States not paying interest on refunds to have unimpaired access to the federal courts. If Congress had meant to carve out such an expansive exception, one would expect to find some mention of it. The statute’s broad prophylactic language is incompatible with such an interpretation.
Ill
For the most part, respondent rests her case on the persuasiveness of a syllogism: the Tax Injunction Act is coterminous with pre-1937 federal equity treatment of challenges to state taxes; federal equity practice at that time viewed a no-interest refund remedy as inadequate; therefore, it must follow that the Tax Injunction Act would view a no-interest refund remedy as inadequate, thereby authorizing federal jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent 21. This argument also forms part of the basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision. 604 F. 2d, at 533, n. 4. And even petitioners, Brief for Petitioners 40, suggest that the Tax Injunction Act is “a congressional confirmation of the Court’s prior federal equity practice in the area of state and local taxation.” We are unpersuaded. It is true that post-1937 Court cases have suggested that the Tax Injunction Act recognized and sanctioned pre-existing federal equity practice. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 470 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S., at 622-623; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 298-299. But these cases do no more than confirm that “the statute has its roots in equity practice,” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 73, and that it was a longstanding rule of federal equity to keep out of state tax matters as long as a “plain, adequate and complete remedy” could be had at law. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, supra, at 622-623. Nothing in our decisions suggests that every wrinkle of federal equity practice was codified, intact, by Congress.
Indeed, Congress, among other things, legislated to solve an existing problem by cutting back federal equity jurisdiction. Senator Bone commented that the “existing practice of the Federal courts to entertain tax-injunction suits make[s] it possible for foreign corporations to withhold from a State and its governmental subdivisions taxes in such vast amounts and for such long periods as to disrupt State and county finances, and thus make it possible for such corporations to determine for themselves the amount of taxes they will pay.” 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (emphasis added). See S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). He furthermore noted that “[p] revision is made that the bill is not to affect suits pending at the time of its enactment.” 81 Cong. Rec., at 1415. Thus, Congress plainly did not intend to permit the federal courts after passage of the Tax Injunction Act to entertain suits in all cases cognizable by them prior to the Act.
Furthermore, Congress did not equate § 1341’s “plain, speedy and efficient” with equity’s “plain, adequate and complete.” Ever since the early days of Congress, this “plain, adequate and complete”. standard of federal equity practice had been codified into statutory form. 1 Stat. 82. And it was not until 1948, more than 10 years after passage of the Tax Injunction Act, that the “Suits in Equity” statute was repealed. 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1946 ed.) (repealed June 25, 1948). Against this background, we will not interpret the Tax Injunction Act as substantially redundant of § 384.
IV
Finally, we note that the reasons supporting federal noninterference are just as compelling today as they were in 1937. If federal injunctive relief were available,
“state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The compelling nature of these considerations is underscored by the dependency of state budgets on the receipt of local tax revenues. In 1978, States derived over 61% of their revenue from property, sales, income, and other taxes. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 53, 56 (1980). For Illinois, the percentage was even higher — 67.4%. Ibid. The property tax is by far the most important source of tax revenue for cities and counties. For the year 1977-1978, almost 33% of all their income nationwide came from the local property tax; for Illinois’ local governments, the amount was greater — 39.2%. Id., at 78.
The experience of Cook County itself demonstrates how ominous would be the potential for havoc should federal injunctive relief be widely available. The county collected over $1.5 billion in real estate taxes for the tax year 1975. Ganz & Laswell, Review of Real Estate Assessments — Cook County (Chicago) vs. Remainder of Illinois, 11 John Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 19, and n. 2 (1977). During the same year, the number of complaints filed with the Cook County Board of Appeals totaled 22,262. Id., at 31, n. 61. We may readily appreciate the difficulties encountered by the county should a substantial portion of its rightful tax revenue be tied up in injunction actions. If each of these complaints alleged entitlement to a refund of around $5,000, as does respondent, over $113 million in revenues potentially could be encumbered in federal-court litigation. See also City of New York, Annual Report of the Tax Commission for Fiscal Year 1978-1979, p. 14 (1979) (41,449 applications for correction of taxes owed concerning 48,170 parcels of land, of which 40,793 applications concerning 47,512 parcels of land involved hearings).
Accordingly, we hold that Illinois' legal remedy that provides property owners paying property taxes under protest a refund without interest in two years is “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” under the Tax Injunction Act.
Reversed.
This Court expressly did not decide whether omission to provide interest on a successful refund application rendered a state remedy not “plain, speedy and efficient,” in Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 358 (1966).
Patricia Cook, the real party in interest, is the beneficial owner of Illinois Land Trust No. 44891, of which LaSalle National Bank serves as trustee. Although she was not a named party in this litigation, this opinion will nevertheless refer to her as the respondent.
The facts as stated in this opinion are drawn largely from respondent’s complaint. For purposes of our consideration, the allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 174-175 (1965).
Article IX, §4 (b), of the Illinois Constitution provides that, subject only to limitations prescribed by the State’s General Assembly, counties with populations of more than 200,000, which includes Cook County, may classify real property for purposes of taxation. The classification must be reasonable, and the assessments uniform within each class. Moreover, the level of assessment of the highest class canpot exceed 2% times the level of assessment of the lowest class in the county. Under authority of the Illinois Constitution, Art. IX, § 4, the Illinois General Assembly passed legislation requiring that any “such classification must be established by ordinance of the county board.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 501a (1977).
Pursuant to this authority, the Cook County Board of Commissioners passed the following ordinance:
“Section 2. Real estate is divided into the following assessment classes:
“Class 1: Unimproved real estate.
“Class 2: Real estate used as a farm, or real estate used for residential purposes when improved with a house, an apartment building of not more than six living units, or residential condominium, a residential cooperative or a government-subsidized housing project if required by statute to be assessed in the lowest assessment category.
“Class 3: All improved real estate used for residential purposes which is not included in Class 2.
“Class 4: Real estate owned and used by a not-for-profit corporation in furtherance of the purposes set forth in its charter unless used for residential purposes. If such real estate is used for residential purposes it shall be classified in the appropriate residential class.
“Class 5: All real estate not included in any of the above four classes.
“Section 3. The Assessor shall assess, and the Board of Appeals shall review assessments on real estate in the various classes at the following percentages of market value:
“Class 1: — 22%
“Class 2: — 17%
“Class 3: — 33%
“Class 4: — 30%
“Class 5: — 40%”
Cook County, Ill., Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance, §§ 2, 3 (originally enacted Dec. 17, 1973, as amended through June 6, 1977).
Respondent’s property qualified as Class 3 real estate.
Respondent had previously challenged her 1974, 1975, and 1976 property tax assessments, first by appealing to the Board of Appeals, and then by objecting in December 1975, November 1976, and December 1977 respectively to the Collector’s annual Applications for Judgment. The Circuit Court of Cook County, noting that the parties had agreed to a compromise and settlement at a pretrial conference, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 675a (1977), issued three separate judgments simultaneously on March 16, 1978, and ordered refunds to respondent on the erroneously collected portions of her protested tax payments, for $4,586.24, $3,656.29, and $3,937.66 respectively. Respondent had asked for refunds of $5,700, $4,750, and $5,452.41 for the three years.
To challenge a property tax assessment, a Cook County property owner must follow a specific statutory procedure. See generally Ganz & Laswell, Review of Real Estate Assessments — Cook County (Chicago) vs. Remainder of Illinois, 11 John Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 19 (1977); Par-ham, Procedures For Obtaining Relief With Respect To Property Tax Assessments and Rates, 61 Ill. Bar J. 306 (1973). The taxpayer may file a written complaint with the County Assessor and is thereafter entitled to a hearing. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §578 (1977). If no relief is obtained, the taxpayer may appeal to the Board of Appeals of Cook County for correction of the assessment. §§ 594 (1), 596, 597, 598, 599. The Board must forward one copy of the complaint to the County Assessor. § 598. Before seeking a legal remedy in state court, the taxpayer must exhaust the available administrative remedy before the Board of Appeals by filing a complaint. People ex rel. Korzen v. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co., 62 Ill. 2d 443, 446-447, 343 N. E. 2d 450, 452, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 833 (1976).
After exhaustion of the Board of Appeals’ administrative remedy, the taxpayer’s legal remedy requires payment of the tax under protest and a subsequent court challenge. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 675, 716 (1977). See Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 104, 306 N. E. 2d 299, 301 (1973). The tax is due in two installments. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 705, 705.1 (1977). The taxpayer must file a written protest along with the second installment payment setting forth grounds for the objection to the tax. § 675. Then, the Collector of -Cook County publishes an advertisement giving notice and stating the date of his intended application to the Circuit Court of Cook County for judgment fixing the correct amount of any tax paid under protest. § 706. Although the month of October is the apparent target date for applying for judgment, § 710, respondent contends that the Cook County Collector’s applications are not made until late November or early December, Brief for Respondent 14, n. 14. The Collector at the same time applies to the Circuit Court for judgment for sale of delinquent lands and lots whose owners have failed to pay their property tax bills. § 706.
Once the Collector’s Application for Judgment is filed with the Circuit Court, the taxpayer must file a written objection to the application within a period of time specified by the judge, stating his reasons for challenging the tax. The taxpayer may raise constitutional challenges to the assessment in his objection. LaSalle 'National Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N. E. 2d 252, 255-256 (1974). After the filing of the objection, the court must hold a settlement conference between the two sides within 90 days. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 675a (1977). If no settlement is reached, the court must upon demand of either party set the matter for hearing within 90 days of the conference, and decide the case. §§ 675a, 716. Finally, the court enters judgment and orders a refund for any or all of the tax erroneously paid by the taxpayer. §§ 675, 716. The dissatisfied taxpayer may appeal any such judgment to the higher courts of Illinois. § 675.
Illinois courts grant equitable relief by way of injunction against collection of property taxes only when the tax is unauthorized by law or when the tax is levied on exempt properties, LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, supra, at 323, 312 N. E. 2d, at 255, on the basis that the state statutory refund procedure is an adequate legal remedy. Ibid. It has been suggested, however, that in certain cases of fraudulently excessive assessments, the statutory remedy will be found inadequate and an equitable remedy will lie. See Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, supra, at 108, 306 N. E. 2d, at 303. Accord, Chicago Sheraton Corp. v. Zaban, 71 Ill. 2d 85, 92-93, 373 N. E. 2d 1318, 1322, appeal dism’d, 439 U. S. 998 (1978); LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, supra, at 323, 312 N. E. 2d, at 255; 28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Cullerton, 523 F. 2d 439, 441-442 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1073 (1976). Neither petitioners nor respondent suggests that respondent could have obtained equitable relief.
For instance, respondent’s 1976 tax protest was resolved within one year from the date of payment. Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 14, App. 9.
For purposes of their motion to dismiss
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider the reach of the private right of action the Court has found implied in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (2007). In this suit investors alleged losses after purchasing common stock. They sought to impose liability on entities who, acting both as customers and suppliers, agreed to arrangements that allowed the investors’ company to mislead its auditor and issue a misleading financial statement affecting the stock price. We conclude the implied right of action does not reach the customer/supplier companies because the investors did not rely upon their statements or representations. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
This class-action suit by investors was filed against Charter Communications, Inc., in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware, was the lead plaintiff and is petitioner here.
Charter issued the financial statements and the securities in question. It was a named defendant along with some of its executives and Arthur Andersen LLP, Charter’s independent auditor during the period in question. We are concerned, though, with two other defendants, respondents here. Respondents are Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Motorola, Inc. They were suppliers, and later customers, of Charter.
For purposes of this proceeding, we take these facts, alleged by petitioner, to be true. Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent practices so its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cashflow. The fraud included misclassification of its customer base; delayed reporting of terminated customers; improper capitalization of costs that should have been shown as expenses; and manipulation of the company’s billing cutoff dates to inflate reported revenues. In late 2000, Charter executives realized that, despite these efforts, the company would miss projected operating cashflow numbers by $15 to $20 million. To help meet the shortfall, Charter decided to alter its existing arrangements with respondents, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola. Petitioner’s theory as to whether Arthur Andersen was altogether misled or, on the other hand, knew the structure of the contract arrangements and was complicit to some degree, is not clear at this stage of the case. The point, however, is neither controlling nor significant for our present disposition, and in our decision we assume it was misled.
Respondents supplied Charter with the digital cable converter (set-top) boxes that Charter furnished to its customers. Charter arranged to overpay respondents $20 for each set-top box it purchased until the end of the year, with the understanding that respondents would return the overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter. The transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepted accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter to fool its auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met projected revenue and operating cashflow numbers. Respondents agreed to the arrangement.
So that Arthur Andersen would not discover the link between Charter’s increased payments for the boxes and the advertising purchases, the companies drafted documents to make it appear the transactions were unrelated and conducted in the ordinary course of business. Following a request from Charter, Scientific-Atlanta sent documents to Charter stating — falsely—that it had increased production costs. It raised the price for set-top boxes for the rest of 2000 by $20 per box. As for Motorola, in a written contract Charter agreed to purchase from Motorola a specific number of set-top boxes and pay liquidated damages of $20 for each unit it did not take. The contract was made with the expectation Charter would fail to purchase all the units and pay Motorola the liquidated damages.
To return the additional money from the set top box sales, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola signed contracts with Charter to purchase advertising time for a price higher than fair value. The new set-top box agreements were backdated to make it appear that they were negotiated a month before the advertising agreements. The backdating was important to convey the impression that the negotiations were unconnected, a point Arthur Andersen considered necessary for separate treatment of the transactions. Charter recorded the advertising payments to inflate revenue and operating cash-flow by approximately $17 million. The inflated number was shown on financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and reported to the public.
Respondents had no role in preparing or disseminating Charter’s financial statements. And their own financial statements booked the transactions as a wash, under generally accepted accounting principles. It is alleged respondents knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter’s intention to use the transactions to inflate its revenues and knew the resulting financial statements issued by Charter would be relied upon by research analysts and investors.
Petitioner filed a securities fraud class action on behalf of purchasers of Charter stock alleging that, by participating in the transactions, respondents violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.
The District Court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litigation, 443 F. 3d 987 (2006). In its view the allegations did not show that respondents made misstatements relied upon by the public or that they violated a duty to disclose; and on this premise it found no violation of § 10(b) by respondents. Id., at 992. At most, the court observed, respondents had aided and abetted Charter’s misstatement of its financial results; but, it noted, there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting a § 10(b) violation. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Den ver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164,191 (1994). The court also affirmed the District Court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to amend the complaint, as the revised pleading would not change the court’s conclusion on the merits. 443 F. 3d, at 993.
Decisions of the Courts of Appeals are in conflict respecting when, if ever, an injured investor may rely upon § 10(b) to recover from a party that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a duty to disclose but does participate in a scheme to violate § 10(b). Compare Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F. 3d 1040 (CA9 2006), with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F. 3d 372 (CA5 2007). We granted certiorari. 549 U. S. 1304 (2007).
II
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it
“unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange
“[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U. S. C. § 78j.
The SEC, pursuant to this section, promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful
“(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
“(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
“(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 CFR §240.10b-5.
Rule 10b-5 encompasses only conduct already prohibited by § 10(b). United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U. S. 642, 651 (1997). Though the text of the Securities Exchange Act does not provide for a private cause of action for § 10(b) violations, the Court has found a right of action implied in the words of the statute and its implementing regulation. Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13, n. 9 (1971). In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation. See Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 341-342 (2005).
In Central Bank, the Court determined that § 10(b) liability did not extend to aiders and abettors. The Court found the scope of § 10(b) to be delimited by the text, which makes no mention of aiding and abetting liability. 511 U. S., at 177. The Court doubted the implied § 10(b) action should extend to aiders and abettors when none of the express causes of action in the securities Acts included that liability. Id., at 180. It added the following:
“Were we to allow the aiding and abetting action proposed in this case, the defendant could be liable without any showing that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and abettor’s statements or actions. See also Chiarella [v. United States, 445 U. S. 222, 228 (1980)]. ' Allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the reliance requirement would disregard the careful limits on 10b-5 recovery mandated by our earlier cases.” Ibid.
The decision in Central Bank led to calls for Congress to create an express cause of action for aiding and abetting within the Securities Exchange Act. Then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, testifying before the Senate Securities Subcommittee, cited Central Bank and recommended that aiding and abetting liability in private claims be established. S. Hearing No. 103-759, pp. 13-14 (1994). Congress did not follow this course. Instead, in § 104 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 109 Stat. 757, it directed prosecution of aiders and abettors by the SEC. 15 U.S. C. § 78t(e).
The § 10(b) implied private right of action does not extend to aiders and abettors. The conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements or preconditions for liability; and we consider whether the allegations here are sufficient to do so.
Ill
The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner had not alleged that respondents engaged in a deceptive act within the reach of the § 10(b) private right of action, noting that only misstatements, omissions by one who has a duty to disclose, and manipulative trading practices (where “manipulative” is a term of art, see, e. g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 476-477 (1977)) are deceptive within the meaning of the Rule. 443 F. 3d, at 992. If this conclusion were read to suggest there must be a specific oral or written statement before there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, it would be erroneous. Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concede. In this case, moreover, respondents’ course of conduct included both oral and written statements, such as the backdated contracts agreed to by Charter and respondents.
A different interpretation of the holding from the Court of Appeals opinion is that the court was stating only that any deceptive statement or act respondents made was not actionable because it did not have the requisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm. That conclusion is consistent with our own determination that respondents’ acts or statements were not relied upon by the investors and that, as a result, liability cannot be imposed upon respondents.
A
Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action. It ensures that, for liability to arise, the “requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury” exists as a predicate for liability. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 243 (1988); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 154 (1972) (requiring “causation in fact”). We have found a rebuttable presumption of reliance in two different circumstances. First, if there is an omission of a material fact by one with a duty to disclose, the investor to whom the duty was owed need not provide specific proof of reliance. Id., at 153-154. Second, under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, reliance is presumed when the statements at issue become public. The public information is reflected in the market price of the security. Then it can be assumed that an investor who buys or sells stock at the market price relies upon the statement. Basic, supra, at 247.
Neither presumption applies here. Respondents had no duty to disclose; and their deceptive acts were not communicated to the public. No member of the investing public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents’ deceptive acts during the relevant times. Petitioner, as a result, cannot show reliance upon any of respondents’ actions except in an indirect chain that we find too remote for liability.
B
Invoking what some courts call “scheme liability,” see, e. g., In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative, & “ERISA” Litigation, 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 723 (SD Tex. 2006), petitioner nonetheless seeks to impose liability on respondents even absent a public statement. In our view this approach does not answer the objection that petitioner did not in fact rely upon respondents’ own deceptive conduct.
Liability is appropriate, petitioner contends, because respondents engaged in conduct with the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of material fact to further a scheme to misrepresent Charter’s revenue. The argument is that the financial statement Charter released to the public was a natural and expected consequence of respondents’ deceptive acts; had respondents not assisted Charter, Charter’s auditor would not have been fooled, and the financial statement would have been a more accurate reflection of Charter’s financial condition. That causal link is sufficient, petitioner argues, to apply Basic’s presumption of reliance to respondents’ acts. See, e. g., Simpson, 452 F. 3d, at 1051-1052; In re Parmalat Securities Litigation, 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 509 (SDNY 2005).
In effect petitioner contends that in an efficient market investors rely not only upon the public statements relating to a security but also upon the transactions those statements reflect. Were this concept of reliance to be adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does business; and there is no authority for this rule.
As stated above, reliance is tied to causation, leading to the inquiry whether respondents’ acts were immediate or remote to the injury. In considering petitioner’s arguments, we note § 10(b) provides that the deceptive act must be “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b). Though this phrase in part defines the statute’s coverage rather than causation (and so we do not evaluate the “in connection with” requirement of § 10(b) in this case), the emphasis on a purchase or sale of securities does provide some insight into the deceptive acts that concerned the enacting Congress. See Black, Securities Commentary:
The Second Circuit’s Approach to the Tn Connection With’ Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 539, 541 (1987) (“[WJhile the ‘in connection with’ and causation requirements are analytically distinct, they are related to each other, and discussion of the first requirement may merge with discussion of the second”). In all events we conclude respondents’ deceptive acts, which were not disclosed to the investing public, are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance. It was Charter, not respondents, that misled its auditor and filed fraudulent financial statements; nothing respondents did made it necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.
Petitioner invokes the private cause of action under § 10(b) and seeks to apply it beyond the securities markets — the realm of financing business — to purchase and supply contracts — the realm of ordinary business operations. The latter realm is governed, for the most part, by state law. It is true that if business operations are used, as alleged here, to affect securities markets, the SEC enforcement power may reach the culpable actors. It is true as well that a dynamic, free economy presupposes a high degree of integrity in all of its parts, an integrity that must be underwritten by rules enforceable in fair, independent, accessible courts. Were the implied cause of action to be extended to the practices described here, however, there would be a risk that the federal power would be used to invite litigation beyond the immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees. Our precedents counsel against this extension. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982) (“Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud”); Santa Fe, 430 U. S., at 479-480 (“There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards .... But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to ‘cover the corporate universe’” (quoting Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L. J. 663, 700 (1974))). Though § 10(b) is “not ‘limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets,’ ” Bankers Life, 404 U. S., at 12, it does not reach all commercial transactions that are fraudulent and affect the price of a security in some attenuated way.
These considerations answer as well the argument that if this were a common-law action for fraud there could be a finding of reliance. Even if the assumption is correct, it is not controlling. Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law. See, e. g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U. S. 813, 820 (2002) (“[Section 10(b)] must not be construed so broadly as to convert every common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation”); Central Bank, 511 U. S., at 184 (“Even assuming ... a deeply rooted background of aiding and abetting tort liability, it does not follow that Congress intended to apply that kind of liability to the private causes of action in the securities Acts”); see also Dura, 544 U. S., at 341. Just as § 10(b) “is surely badly strained when construed to provide a cause of action ... to the world at large,” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 733, n. 5 (1975), it should not be interpreted to provide a private cause of action against the entire marketplace in which the issuing company operates.
Petitioner’s theory, moreover, would put an unsupportable interpretation on Congress’ specific response to Central Bank in §104 of the PSLRA. Congress amended the securities laws to provide for limited coverage of aiders and abettors. Aiding and abetting liability is authorized in actions brought by the SEC but not by private parties. See 15 U. S. C. § 78t(e). Petitioner’s view of primary liability makes any aider and abettor liable under § 10(b) if he or she committed a deceptive act in the process of providing assistance. Reply Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 2; Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. Were we to adopt this construction of § 10(b), it would revive in substance the implied cause , of action against all aiders and abettors except those who committed no deceptive act in the process of facilitating the fraud; and we would undermine Congress’ determination that this class of defendants should be pursued by the SEC and not by private litigants. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 290 (2001) (“The express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 143 (2000) (“At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings”); see also Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 596 (1980) (“[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure” (citations omitted)).
This is not a case in which Congress has enacted a regulatory statute and then has accepted, over a long period of time, broad judicial authority to define substantive standards of conduct and liability. Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 899 (2007). And in accord with the nature of the cause of action at issue here, we give weight to Congress’ amendment to the Act restoring aiding and abetting liability in certain cases but not others. The amendment, in our view, supports the conclusion that there is no liability.
The practical consequences of an expansion, which the Court has considered appropriate to examine in circumstances like these, see Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1083, 1104-1105 (1991); Blue Chip, 421 U. S., at 737, provide a further reason to reject petitioner’s approach. In Blue Chip, the Court noted that extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit allow, plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies. Id., at 740-741. Adoption of petitioner’s approach would expose a new class of defendants to these risks. As noted in Central Bank, contracting parties might find it necessary to protect against these threats, raising the costs of doing business. See 511 U. S., at 189. Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing business here. See Brief for Organization for International Investment et al. as Amici Curiae 17-20. This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a publicly traded company under our law and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets. Brief for NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 12-14.
C
The history of the § 10(b) private right and the careful approach the Court has taken before proceeding without congressional direction provide further reasons to find no liability here. The § 10(b) private cause of action is a judicial construct that Congress did not enact in the text of the relevant statutes. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350, 358-359 (1991); Blue Chip, supra, at 729. Though the rule once may have been otherwise, see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1964), it is settled that there is an implied cause of action only if the underlying statute can be interpreted to disclose the intent to create one, see, e. g., Alexander, supra, at 286-287; Virginia Bankshares, supra, at 1102; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 575 (1979). This is for good reason. In the absence of congressional intent the Judiciary’s recognition of an implied private right of action
“necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve. This runs contrary to the established principle that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation . . . ,’ American Fire & Cas[ualty] Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951), and conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. III to set the limits of federal jurisdiction.” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 746-747 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
The determination of who can seek a remedy has significant consequences for the reach of federal power. See Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509, n. 9 (1990) (requirement of congressional intent “reflects a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes”).
Concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us. Though it remains the law, the § 10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries. See Virginia Bank-shares, supra, at 1102 (“[T]he breadth of the [private right of action] once recognized should not, as a general matter, grow beyond the scope congressionally intended”); see also Central Bank, supra, at 173 (determining that the scope of conduct prohibited is limited by the text of § 10(b)).
This restraint is appropriate in light of the PSLRA, which imposed heightened pleading requirements and a loss causation requirement upon “any private action” arising from the Securities Exchange Act. See 15 U. S. C. § 78u-4(b). It is clear these requirements touch upon the implied right of action, which is now a prominent feature of federal securities regulation. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 81-82 (2006); Dura, 544 U. S., at 345-346; see also S. Rep. No. 104-98, pp. 4-5 (1995) (recognizing the § 10(b) implied cause of action, and indicating the PSLRA was intended to have “Congress . . . reassert its authority in this area”); id., at 26 (indicating the pleading standards covered § 10(b) actions). Congress thus ratified the implied right of action after the Court moved away from a broad willingness to imply private rights of action. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 381-382, and n. 66 (1982); cf. Borak, supra, at 433. It is appropriate for us to assume that when § 78u-4 was enacted, Congress accepted the § 10(b) private cause of action as then defined but chose to extend it no further.
IV
Secondary actors are subject to criminal penalties, see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 78ff, and civil enforcement by the SEC, see, e. g., § 78t(e). The enforcement power is not toothless. Since September 30, 2002, SEC enforcement actions have collected over $10 billion in disgorgement and penalties, much of it for distribution to injured investors. See SEC, 2007 Performance and Accountability Report, p. 26, http:// www.sec.gov/about/secpar2007.shtml (as visited Jan. 2, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). And in this case both parties agree that criminal penalties are a strong deterrent. See Brief for Respondents 48; Reply Brief for Petitioner 17. In addition some state securities laws permit state authorities to seek fines and restitution from aiders and abettors. See, e. g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 6, § 7325 (2005). All secondary actors, furthermore, are not necessarily immune from private suit. The securities statutes provide an express private right of action against accountants and underwriters in certain circumstances, see 15 U. S. C. § 77k, and the implied right of action in § 10(b) continues to cover secondary actors who commit primary violations, Central Bank, 511 U. S., at 191.
Here respondents were acting in concert with Charter in the ordinary course as suppliers and, as matters then evolved in the not so ordinary course, as customers. Unconventional as the arrangement was, it took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere. Charter was free to do as it chose in preparing its books, conferring with its auditor, and preparing and then issuing its financial statements. In these circumstances the investors cannot be said to have relied upon any of respondents’ deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or sell securities; and as the requisite reliance cannot be shown, respondents have no liability to petitioner under the implied right of action. This conclusion is consistent with the narrow dimensions we must give to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
In conformity with Michigan procedure, petitioner moved for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial in the court in which he had been convicted of first-degree murder. Serious impairment of his constitutional rights at the arraignment and trial were asserted as grounds for the motion. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Michigan on appeal affirmed that ruling. 313 Mich. 548, 21 N. W. 2d 849. We granted certi-orari because of the importance of the constitutional issues presented.
The facts are not in dispute. On May 16, 1932, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of Lenawee County, Michigan, charging petitioner, then seventeen years of age, and one Virgil Scott with the crime of murder. On the same day, petitioner was arraigned, tried, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The record indicates that petitioner was without legal assistance throughout all these proceedings and was never advised of his right to counsel. The court did not explain the consequences of the plea of guilty, and the record indicates considerable confusion in petitioner’s mind at the time of the arraignment as to the effect of such a plea. No evidence in petitioner’s behalf was introduced at the trial and none of the State’s witnesses were subjected to cross-examination.
After reviewing the foregoing facts, the Supreme Court of Michigan determined that the record revealed no deprivation of petitioner’s constitutional rights. The court indicated that it had given consideration to the case of Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945), and the authorities cited therein, but concluded that the rule of the Michigan cases was determinative. See People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N. W. 818 (1923). In this there was error.
Here a seventeen-year-old defendant, confronted by a serious and complicated criminal charge, was hurried through unfamiliar legal proceedings without a word being said in his defense. At no time was assistance of counsel offered or mentioned to him, nor was he apprised of the consequences of his plea. Under the holdings of this Court, petitioner was deprived of rights essential to a fair hearing under the Federal Constitution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, supra. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
Reversed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
We previously remanded this case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and the other cases relating to legislative reapportionment decided with Reynolds. 378 U. S. 553. The District Court deferred action until the conclusion of the legislative session which convened on April 6, 1965, stating that it would reconsider its decision should the Florida Legislature fail to effect a valid reapportionment by July 1, 1965.
A reapportionment law was passed by the legislature on June 29, 1965. On July 6 the appellants filed a joint petition asking the District Court to declare the newly enacted plan unconstitutional and proposing an alternative plan. The District Court did not take action until October 5 when it ordered oral argument for November 2, 1965. On December 23 the District Court concluded that the newly passed reapportionment plan failed to “meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution as construed and applied in Reynolds v. Sims . . . .”
Although the District Court concluded that the plan did not comport with constitutional requirements, it approved the plan (making only minor changes) on an interim basis. Its approval was limited to the period ending 60 days after the adjournment of the 1967 session of the Florida Legislature.
We have no occasion to review the District Court’s determination that the legislative reapportionment plan fails to meet constitutional standards. Indeed, Florida does not contend that the District Court erred in this regard, having conceded below that the plan was constitutionally deficient. We hold, however, that in approving the plan on an interim basis, the District Court erred. This litigation was commenced in 1962. The effect of the District Court’s decision is to delay effectuation of a valid apportionment in Florida until at least 1969. While recognizing the desirability of permitting the Florida Legislature itself to determine the course of reapportionment, we find no warrant for perpetuating what all concede to be an unconstitutional apportionment for another three years.
We reverse and remand to the District Court so that a valid reapportionment plan will be made effective for the 1966 elections.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart would affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree after a jury trial in a California court. He did not testify at the trial on the issue of guilt, though he did testify at the separate trial on the issue of penalty. The trial court instructed the jury on the issue of guilt, stating that a defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. But it told the jury:
“As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.”
It added, however, that no such inference could be drawn as to evidence respecting which he had no knowledge. It stated that failure of a defendant to deny or explain the evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a presumption of guilt nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its burden of proof.
Petitioner had been seen with the deceased the evening of her death, the evidence placing him with her in the alley where her body was found. The prosecutor made much of the failure of petitioner to testify:
“The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at the time he left her apartment and went down the alley with her.
“What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a woman that beat up if she was beat up at the time he left?
“He would know that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how long he was with her in that box. He would know how her wig got off. He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber when he saw Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious of his own guilt and wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman.
“These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain.
“And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would know.
“Essie Mae is dead, she can’t tell you her side of the story. The defendant won’t.”
The death penalty was imposed and the California Supreme Court affirmed. 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P. 2d 432. The case is here on a writ of certiorari which we granted, 377 U. S. 989, to consider whether comment on the failure to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment which we made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, decided after the Supreme Court of California had affirmed the present conviction.
If this were a federal trial, reversible error would have been committed. Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60, so holds. It is said, however, that the Wilson decision rested not on the Fifth Amendment, but on an Act of Congress, now 18 U. S. C. § 3481. That indeed is the fact, as the opinion of the Court in the Wilson case states. And see Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 60, n. 6; Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287, 294. But that is the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The question remains whether, statute or not, the comment rule, approved by California, violates the Fifth Amendment.
We think it does. It is in substance a rule of evidence that allows the State the privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No formal offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor’s comment and the court’s acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance. The Court in the Wilson case stated:
. . the act was framed with a due regard also to those who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand. The statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a witness, particularly when they may have been in some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that the failure of the defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witness shall not create any presumption against him.” 149 U. S., p. 66.
If the words “Fifth Amendment” are substituted for “act” and for “statute,” the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected. For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the “inquisitorial system of criminal justice,” Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52, 55, which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and .that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 452-453, 398 P. 2d 753, 762-763. What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another. That the inference of guilt is not always so natural or irresistible is brought out in the Modesto opinion itself:
“Defendant contends that the reason a defendant refuses to testify is that his prior convictions will be introduced in evidence to impeach him ([Cal.] Code Civ. Proc. § 2051) and not that he is unable to deny the accusations. It is true that the defendant might fear that his prior convictions will prejudice the jury, and therefore another possible inference can be drawn from his refusal to take the stand.” Id., p. 453, 398 P. 2d, p. 763.
We said in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, p. 11, that “the same standards must determine whether an accused’s silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified.” We take that in its literal sense and hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.
Reversed.
The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case.
See Penal Code § 190.1, providing for separate trials on the two issues.
Article I, § 13, of the California Constitution provides in part:
“. . . in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.”
The California Supreme Court later held in People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P. 2d 753, that its ‘‘comment” rule squared with Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. The overwhelming consensus of the States, however, is opposed to allowing comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. The legislatures or courts of 44 States have recognized that such comment is, in light of the privilege against self-incrimination, “an unwarrantable line of argument.” State v. Howard, 35 S. C. 197, 203, 14 S. E. 481, 483. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272, n. 2 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 and 1964 Supp.). Of the six States which permit comment, two, California and Ohio, give this permission by means of an explicit constitutional qualification of the privilege against self-incrimination. Cal. Const., Art. I, § 13; Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10. New Jersey permits comment, State v. Corby, 28 N. J. 106, 145 A. 2d 289; cf. State v. Garvin, 44 N. J. 268, 208 A. 2d 402; but its constitution contains no provision embodying the privilege against self-incrimination (see Laba v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 23 N. J. 364, 389, 129 A. 2d 273, 287; State v. White, 27 N. J. 158, 168-169, 142 A. 2d 65, 70). The absence of an express constitutional privilege against self-incrimination also puts Iowa among the six. See State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 372-373, 283 N. W. 917, 923. Connecticut permits comment by the judge but not by the prosecutor. State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 A. 181. New Mexico permits comment by the prosecutor but holds that the accused is then entitled to an instruction that “the jury shall indulge no presumption against the accused because of his failure to testify.” N. M. Stat. Ann. § 41-12-19; State v. Sandoval, 59 N. M. 85, 279 P. 2d 850.
Section 3481 reads as follows:
“In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him.” June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 833.
The legislative history shows that 18 U. S. C. § 3481 was designed, inter alia, to bar counsel for the prosecution from commenting on the defendant’s refusal to testify. Mr. Frye of Maine, spokesman for the bill, said, “That is the law of Massachusetts, and we propose to adopt it as a law of the United States.” 7 Cong. Pee. 385. The reference was to Mass. Stat. 1866, c. 260, now Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., e. 233, §20, cl. Third (1959), which is almost identical with 18 U. S. C. § 3481. See also Commonwealth v. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411; Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239; Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N. E. 2d 662.
Our decision today that the Fifth Amendment prohibits comment on the defendant’s silence is no innovation, for on a previous occasion a majority of this Court indicated their acceptance of this proposition. In Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, the question was, as here, whether the Fifth Amendment proscribed California’s comment practice. The four dissenters (Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, JJ.) would have answered this question in the affirmative. A fifth member of the Court, Justice Frankfurter, stated in a separate opinion: “For historical reasons a limited imniunity from the common duty to testify was written into the Federal Bill of Rights, and I am prepared to agree that, as part of that immunity, comment on the failure of an accused to take the witness stand is forbidden in federal prosecutions.” Id., p. 61. But, though he agreed with the dissenters on this point, he also agreed with Justices Vinson, Reed, Jackson, and Burton that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States; thus he joined the opinion of the Court which so held (the Court’s opinion assumed that the Fifth Amendment barred comment, but it expressly disclaimed any intention to decide the point. Id., p.50).
We reserve decision on whether an accused can require, as in Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287, that the jury be instructed that his silence must be disregarded.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663.
Mr. Justice Black dissents for the reasons given in his dissenting opinion in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, supra.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, dissents for the reasons given in his dissenting opinion in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, supra.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
PER CURIAM.
Federal habeas courts generally refuse to hear claims "defaulted ... in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). State rules count as "adequate" if they are "firmly established and regularly followed." Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Like all States, California requires criminal defendants to raise available claims on direct appeal. Under the so-called "Dixon bar," a defendant procedurally defaults a claim raised for the first time on state collateral review if he could have raised it earlier on direct appeal. See In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759, 264 P.2d 513, 514 (1953). Yet, in this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the Dixon bar is inadequate to bar federal habeas review. Because California's procedural bar is longstanding, oft-cited, and shared by habeas courts across the Nation, this Court now summarily reverses the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
I
Respondent Donna Kay Lee and her boyfriend Paul Carasi stabbed to death Carasi's mother and his ex-girlfriend. A California jury convicted the pair of two counts each of first-degree murder. Carasi received a death sentence, and Lee received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In June 1999, Lee unsuccessfully raised four claims on direct appeal. After the California appellate courts affirmed, Lee skipped state postconviction review and filed the federal habeas petition at issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition raised mostly new claims that Lee failed to raise on direct appeal. Because Lee had not exhausted available state-court remedies, however, the District Court temporarily stayed federal proceedings to allow Lee to pursue her new claims in a state habeas petition. The California Supreme Court denied Lee's petition in a summary order citing Dixon .
Having exhausted state remedies, Lee returned to federal court to litigate her federal habeas petition. The District Court dismissed her new claims as procedurally defaulted. Then, for the first time on appeal, Lee challenged the Dixon bar's adequacy. In her brief, Lee presented a small sample of the California Supreme Court's state habeas denials on a single day about six months after her default. Lee claimed that out of the 210 summary denials on December 21, 1999, the court failed to cite Dixon in 9 cases where it should have been applied. The court instead denied the nine petitions without any citation at all. In Lee's view, these missing citations proved that the California courts inconsistently applied the Dixon bar. Without evaluating this evidence, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded "to permit the Warden to submit evidence to the contrary, and for consideration by the district court in the first instance." Lee v. Jacquez, 406 Fed.Appx. 148, 150 (2010).
On remand, the warden submitted a study analyzing more than 4,700 summary habeas denials during a nearly 2-year period around the time of Lee's procedural default. From August 1998 to June 2000, the study showed, the California Supreme Court cited Dixon in approximately 12% of all denials-more than 500 times. In light of this evidence, the District Court held that the Dixon bar is adequate.
The Ninth Circuit again reversed. Lee v. Jacquez, 788 F.3d 1124 (2015). Lee's 1-day sample proved the Dixon bar's inadequacy, the court held, because the "failure to cite Dixon where Dixon applies ... reflects [its] irregular application." 788 F.3d, at 1130. The general 12% citation rate proved nothing, the court reasoned, because the warden "d[id] not purport to show to how many cases the Dixon bar should have been applied." Id., at 1133. In the Ninth Circuit's view, without this "baseline number" the warden's 2-year study was "entirely insufficient" to prove Dixon 's adequacy. 788 F.3d, at 1133.
II
The Ninth Circuit's decision profoundly misapprehends what makes a state procedural bar "adequate." That question is a matter of federal law. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002). "To qualify as an 'adequate' procedural ground," capable of barring federal habeas review, "a state rule must be 'firmly established and regularly followed.' " Martin, supra, at 316, 131 S.Ct. 1120 (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60, 130 S.Ct. 612, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009) ).
California's Dixon bar satisfies both adequacy criteria. It is "firmly established" because, decades before Lee's June 1999 procedural default, the California Supreme Court warned defendants in plain terms that, absent "special circumstances," habeas "will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction." Dixon, supra, at 759, 264 P.2d, at 514. And the California Supreme Court eliminated any arguable ambiguity surrounding this bar by reaffirming Dixon in two cases decided before Lee's default. See In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 813, 825, n. 3, 829-841, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391, 395, n. 3, 398-407 (1993) ; In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 814-815, and n. 34, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 340-341, and n. 34 (1998).
The California Supreme Court's repeated Dixon citations also prove that the bar is "regularly followed." Martin recently held that another California procedural bar-a rule requiring prisoners to file state habeas petitions promptly-met that requirement because "[e]ach year, the California Supreme Court summarily denies hundreds of habeas petitions by citing" the timeliness rule. 562 U.S., at 318, 131 S.Ct. 1120. The same goes for Dixon . Nine purportedly missing Dixon citations from Lee's 1-day sample of summary orders hardly support an inference of inconsistency. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410, n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989) (holding that the Florida Supreme Court applied its similar procedural bar "consistently and regularly" despite "address[ing] the merits in several cases raising [new] claims on postconviction review"). Indeed, all nine orders in that sample were denials. None ignored the Dixon bar to grant relief, so there is no sign of inconsistency.
Nor is California's rule unique. Federal and state habeas courts across the country follow the same rule as Dixon . "The general rule in federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal is barred from raising the claim on collateral review." Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350-351, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006). Likewise, state postconviction remedies generally "may not be used to litigate claims which were or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal." 1 D. Wilkes, State Postconviction Remedies and Relief Handbook § 1:2, p. 3 (2015-2016 ed.). It appears that every State shares this procedural bar in some form. See Brief for State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae 1, n. 2 (collecting citations). For such well-established and ubiquitous rules, it takes more than a few outliers to show inadequacy. Federal habeas courts must not lightly "disregard state procedural rules that are substantially similar to those to which we give full force in our own courts."
Kindler, 558 U.S., at 62, 130 S.Ct. 612. And it would be "[e]ven stranger to do so with respect to rules in place in nearly every State." Ibid. Nothing suggests, moreover, that California courts apply the Dixon bar in a way that disfavors federal claims. The Court therefore holds that it qualifies as adequate to bar federal habeas review.
III
The Ninth Circuit's contrary reasoning is unpersuasive and inconsistent with this Court's precedents. Applying the Dixon bar may be a "straightforward" or "mechanica[l]" task for state courts. 788 F.3d, at 1130. But simplicity does not imply that missing citations reflect state-court inconsistency. To begin with, since the Dixon bar has several exceptions, see Robbins, supra, at 814-815, and n. 34, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d, at 340-341, and n. 34, the California Supreme Court can hardly be faulted for failing to cite Dixon whenever a petitioner raises a claim that he could have raised on direct appeal.
More importantly, California courts need not address procedural default before reaching the merits, so the purportedly missing citations show nothing. Cf. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451, n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 847, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005) ( per curiam ) (declining to address the warden's procedural-default argument); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (explaining that "[j]udicial economy might counsel" bypassing a procedural-default question if the merits "were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner"). Ordinarily, "procedural default ... is not a jurisdictional matter." Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89, 118 S.Ct. 478, 139 L.Ed.2d 444 (1997). As a result, the appropriate order of analysis for each case remains within the state courts' discretion. Such discretion will often lead to "seeming inconsistencies." Martin, 562 U.S., at 320, and n. 7, 131 S.Ct. 1120. But that superficial tension does not make a procedural bar inadequate. "[A] state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default." Id., at 311, 131 S.Ct. 1120 ; see Kindler, supra, at 60-61, 130 S.Ct. 612.
The Ninth Circuit's attempt to get around Martin and Kindler fails. The Court of Appeals distinguished those cases on the ground that California's Dixon bar is "mandatory" rather than discretionary because it involves a discretion-free general rule, notwithstanding exceptions that might involve discretion. 788 F.3d, at 1130. The Court assumes, without deciding, that this description is accurate and the Dixon bar's exceptions leave some room for discretion. Even so, there is little difference between discretion exercised through an otherwise adequate procedural bar's exceptions and discretion that is a part of the bar itself. In any event, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning ignores the state courts' discretion to assume, without deciding, that a claim is not procedurally defaulted and instead hold that the claim lacks merit.
The Ninth Circuit was accordingly wrong to dismiss the 500-plus summary denials citing Dixon simply because they do not reveal which cases potentially implicate the bar. 788 F.3d, at 1133. Martin already rejected this precise reasoning. There, the habeas petitioner unsuccessfully argued that "[u]se of summary denials makes it impossible to tell why the California Supreme Court decides some delayed petitions on the merits and rejects others as untimely." 562 U.S., at 319, 131 S.Ct. 1120 (internal quotation marks omitted). So too here, "[w]e see no reason to reject California's [procedural] bar simply because a court may opt to bypass the [Dixon ] assessment and summarily dismiss a petition on the merits, if that is the easier path." Ibid.
By treating every missing citation as a sign of inconsistency, the Court of Appeals "pose[d] an unnecessary dilemma" for California. Kindler, 558 U.S., at 61, 130 S.Ct. 612. The court forced the State to choose between the "finality of [its] judgments" and a burdensome opinion-writing requirement. Ibid. ; see Martin, supra, at 312-313, 131 S.Ct. 1120 (noting that the California Supreme Court "rules on a staggering number of habeas petitions each year"); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (discussing the advantages of summary dispositions). "[F]ederal courts have no authority," however, "to impose mandatory opinion-writing standards on state courts" as the price of federal respect for their procedural rules. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1095, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013). The Ninth Circuit's decision is thus fundamentally at odds with the "federalism and comity concerns that motivate the adequate state ground doctrine in the habeas context." Kindler, supra, at 62, 130 S.Ct. 612.
* * *
"A State's procedural rules are of vital importance to the orderly administration of its criminal courts; when a federal court permits them to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal justice system." Lambrix, supra, at 525, 117 S.Ct. 1517. Here, the Ninth Circuit permitted California prisoners to evade a well-established procedural bar that is adequate to bar federal habeas review. The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this ease we consider whether an airport terminal operated by a public authority is a public forum and whether a regulation prohibiting solicitation in the interior of an airport terminal violates the First Amendment.
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members perform a ritual known as sankirtan. The ritual consists of “ ‘going into public places, disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds to support the religion.’ ” 925 F. 2d 576, 577 (CA2 1991). The primary purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the movement. Ibid.
Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and was charged with enforcing the regulation at issue. The Port Authority owns and operates three major airports in the greater New York City area: John P. Kennedy International Airport (Kennedy), La Guardia Airport (La Guardia), and Newark International Airport (Newark). The three airports collectively form one of the world’s busiest metropolitan airport complexes. They serve approximately 8% of this country’s domestic airline market and more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic market. By decade’s end they are expected to serve at least 110 million passengers annually. Id., at 578.
The airports are funded by user fees and operated to make a regulated profit. Id., at 581. Most space at the three airports is leased to commercial airlines, which bear primary responsibility for the leasehold. The Port Authority retains control over unleased portions, including La Guardia’s Central Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy’s International Arrivals Building, and Newark’s North Terminal Building (we refer to these areas collectively as the "terminals”). The terminals are generally accessible to the general public and contain various commercial establishments such as restaurants, snack stands, bars, newsstands, and stores of various types. Id., at 578. Virtually all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related to air travel. These visitors principally include passengers, those meeting or seeing off passengers, flight crews, and terminal employees. Ibid.
The Port Authority has adopted a regulation forbidding within the terminals the repetitive solicitation of money or distribution of literature. The regulation states:
“1, The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person.to or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner:
“(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing.
“(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any other printed or written material.
“(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.” Id., at 578-579.
The regulation governs only the terminals; the Port Authority permits solicitation and distribution on the sidewalks outside the terminal buildings. The regulation effectively prohibits ISKCON from performing sankirtan in the terminals. As a result, ISKCON brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the regulation worked to deprive its members of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment. The District Court analyzed the claim under the “traditional public forum” doctrine. It concluded that the terminals were akin to public streets, 721 F. Supp. 572, 577 (SONY 1989), the quintessential traditional public fora. This conclusion in turn meant that the Port Authority’s terminal regulation could be sustained only if it was narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest. Id., at 579. In the absence of any argument that the blanket prohibition constituted such narrow tailoring, the District Court granted ISKCON summary judgment. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 925 F. 2d 576 (1991). Relying on our recent decision in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720 (1990), a divided panel concluded that the terminals are not public fora. As a result, the restrictions were required only to satisfy a standard of reasonableness. The Court of Appeals then concluded that, presented with the issue, this Court would find that the ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on distribution was not. ISKCON and one of its members, also a petitioner here, sought certiorari respecting the Court of Appeals’ decision that the terminals are not public fora and upholding the solicitation ban. Respondent cross-petitioned respecting the court’s holding striking down the distribution ban. We granted both petitions, 502 U. S. 1022 (1992), to resolve whether airport terminals are public fora, a question on which the Circuits have split and on which we once before granted certiorari but ultimately failed to reach. Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987).
It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment. Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Kokinda, supra, at 725 (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 629 (1980)); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 788-789 (1988). But it is also well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976). Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject. Kokinda, supra, at 725 (plurality opinion) (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961)). Thus, we have upheld a ban on political advertisements in city-operated transit vehicles, Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), even though the city permitted other types of advertising on those vehicles. Similarly, we have permitted a school district to limit access to an internal mail system used to communicate with teachers employed by the district. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37 (1983).
These cases reflect, either implicitly or explicitly, a “forum based” approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985). Under this approach, regulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny. Such regulations survive only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest. Perry, 460 U. S., at 45. The second category of public property is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character— property that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public. Ibid. Regulation of such property is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public forum. Id., at 46. Finally, there is all remaining public property. Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this last category of property must survive only a much more limited review. The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view. Ibid.
The parties do not disagree that this is the proper framework. Rather, they disagree whether the airport terminals are public fora or nonpublie fora. They also disagree whether the regulation survives the “reasonableness” review governing nonpublic fora, should that prove the appropriate category. Like the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the terminals áre nonpublie fora and that the regulation reasonably limits solicitation.
The suggestion that the government has a high burden in justifying speech restrictions relating to traditional public fora made its first appearance in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515, 516 (1939). Justice Roberts, concluding that individuals have a right to use “streets and parks for communication of views,” reasoned that such a right flowed from the fact that “streets and parks ... have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” We confirmed this observation in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988), where we held that a residential street was a public forum.
Our recent cases provide additional guidance on the characteristics of a public forum. In Cornelius we noted that a traditional public forum is property that has as “a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas.” 473 U. S., at 800. Moreover, consistent with the notion that the government— like other property owners — “has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,” Greer, 424 U. S., at 836, the government does not create a public forum by inaction. Nor is a public forum created “whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a plaee owned or operated by the Government.” Ibid. The decision to create a public forum must instead be made “by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius, supra, at 802. Finally, we have recognized that the location of property also has bearing because separation from acknowledged public areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is a special enclave, subject to greater restriction. United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 179-180 (1983).
These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport terminals are public fora. Reflecting the general growth of the air travel industry, airport terminals have only recently achieved their contemporary size and character. See H. Hubbard, M. MeClintock, & F. Williams, Airports: Their Location, Administration and Legal Basis 8 (1930) (noting that the United States had only 807 airports in 1930). But given the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having “immemorially... time out of mind” been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity. Hague, supra, at 516. Moreover, even within the rather short history of air transport, it is only “[i]n recent years [that] it has become a common practice for various religious and nonprofit organizations to use commercial airports as a forum for the distribution of literature, the solicitation of funds, the proselytizing of new members, and other similar activities.” 45 Fed. Reg. 35314 (1980). Thus, the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity. Nor can we say that these particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally opened by their operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing litigation evidene-ing the operators’ objections belies any such claim. See n. 2, supra. In short, there can be no argument that society’s time-tested judgment, expressed through acquiescence in a continuing practice, has resolved the issue in petitioners’ favor.
Petitioners attempt to circumvent the history and practice governing airport activity by pointing our attention to the variety of speech activity that they claim historically occurred at various “transportation nodes” such as rail stations, bus stations, wharves, and Ellis Island. Even if we were inclined to accept petitioners’ historical account describing speech activity at these locations, an account respondent contests, we think that such evidence is of little import for two reasons. First, much of the evidence is irrelevant to public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail terminals traditionally have had private ownership. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 687 (1982); H. Grant & C. Bohi, The Country Railroad Station in America 11-15 (1978); U. S. Dept, of Transportation, The Intercity Bus Terminal Study 31 (Dec. 1984). The development of privately owned parks that ban speech activity would not change the public fora status of publicly held parks. But the reverse is also true. The practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the government’s regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport.
Second, the relevant unit for our inquiry is an airport, not “transportation nodes” generally. When new methods of transportation develop, new methods for accommodating that transportation are also likely to be needed. And with each new step, it therefore will be a new inquiry whether the transportation necessities are compatible with various kinds of expressive activity. To make a category of “transportation nodes,” therefore, would unjustifiably elide what may prove to be critical differences of which we should rightfully take account. The “security magnet,” for example, is an airport commonplace that lacks a counterpart in bus terminals and train stations. And public access to air terminals is also not infrequently restricted — -just last year the Federal Aviation Administration required airports for a 4-month period to limit access to areas normally publicly accessible. See 14 CFR 107.11(f) (1991) and U. S. Dept, of Transportation News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Jan. 18, 1991. To blithely equate airports with other transportation centers, therefore, would be a mistake.
The differences among such facilities are unsurprising since, as the Court of Appeals noted, airports are commercial establishments funded by users fees and designed to make a regulated profit, 925 F. 2d, at 581, and where nearly all who visit do so for some travel related purpose, id., at 578. As commercial enterprises, airports must provide services attractive to the marketplace. In light of this, it cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promoting “the free exchange of ideas.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985). To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Port Authority management considers the purpose of the terminals to be the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion of expression. Sloane Affidavit, ¶ 11, App. 464; Defendant’s Civil Rule 3(g) Statement, ¶ 39, App. 453. Even if we look beyond the intent of the Port Authority to the manner in which the terminals have been operated, the terminals have never been dedicated (except under the threat of court order) to expression in the form sought to be exercised here: i. e., the solicitation of contributions and the distribution of literature.
The terminals here are far from atypical. Airport builders and managers focus their efforts on providing terminals that will contribute to efficient air travel. See, e. g., R. Hor-onjeff & F. McKelvey, Planning and Design of Airports 326 (3d ed. 1983) (“The terminal is used to process passengers and baggage for the interface with aircraft and the ground transportation modes”). The Federal Government is in accord; the Secretary of Transportation has been directed to publish a plan for airport development necessary “to anticipate and meet the needs of civil aeronautics, to meet requirements in support of the national defense... and to meet identified needs of the Postal Service.” 49 U. S. C. App. § 2203(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 35817 (1980) (“The purpose for which the [Dulles and National airport] terminals] [were] built and maintained is to process and serve air travelers efficiently”). Although many airports have expanded their function beyond merely contributing to efficient air travel, few have included among their purposes the designation of a forum for solicitation and distribution activities. See supra, at 680-681. Thus, we think that neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be described as satisfying the standards we have previously set out for identifying a public forum.
The restrictions here challenged, therefore, need only satisfy a requirement of reasonableness. We reiterate what we stated in Kokinda: The restriction “‘need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.’ ” 497 U. S., at 730 (plurality opinion) (quoting Cornelius, supra, at 808). We have no doubt that under this standard the prohibition on solicitation passes muster.
We have on many prior occasions noted the disruptive effect that solicitation may have on business. “Solicitation requires action by those who would respond: The individual solicited must decide whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the solicitor’s literature or hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach for a wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce a credit card.” Kokinda, supra, at 734; see Heffron, 452 U. S., at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Passengers who wish to avoid the solicitor may have to alter their paths, slowing both themselves and those around them. The result is that the normal flow of traffic is impeded. Id., at 653. This is especially so in an airport, where “[a]ir travelers, who are often weighted down by cumbersome baggage . . . may be hurrying to catch a plane or to arrange ground transportation.” 925 F. 2d, at 582. Delays may be particularly costly in this setting, as a flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours worth of subsequent inconvenience..
In addition, face-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation. See, e. g., International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-163 (NDNY 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F. 2d 430 (CA21981). The unsavory solicitor can also commit fraud through concealment of his affiliation or through deliberate efforts to shortchange those who agree to purchase. 506 F. Supp., 159-163. See 45 Fed. Reg. 35314-35315 (1980). Compounding this problem is the fact that, in an airport, the targets of such activity frequently are on tight schedules. This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to stop and formally complain to airport authorities. As a result, the airport faces considerable difficulty in achieving its legitimate interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure that travelers are not interfered with unduly.
The Port Authority has concluded that its interest in monitoring the activities can best be accomplished by limiting solicitation and distribution to the sidewalk areas outside the terminals. Sloane Supp. Affidavit, ¶ 11, App. 514. This sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport users, see id., at ¶ 14, App. 515-516 (noting that no more than 3% of air travelers passing through the terminals are doing so on intraterminal flights, i. e., transferring planes). Thus the resulting access of those who would solicit the general public is quite complete. In turn we think it would be odd to conclude that the Port Authority’s terminal regulation is unreasonable despite the Port Authority having otherwise assured access to an area universally traveled.
The inconveniences to passengers and the burdens on Port Authority officials flowing from solicitation activity may seem small, but viewed against the fact that “pedestrian congestion is one of the greatest problems facing the three terminals,” 925 F. 2d, at 582, the Port Authority could reasonably worry that even such incremental effects would prove quite disruptive. Moreover, “[t]he justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.” Heffron, supra, at 652. For if ISKCON is given access, so too must other groups. “Obviously, there would be a much larger threat to the State’s interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations could likewise move freely.” 452 U. S., at 653. As a result, we conclude that the solicitation ban is reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the ban on solicitation in Port Authority terminals is
Affirmed.
The suit was filed in 1975. ISKCON originally sought access to both the airline controlled areas and tó the terminals and as a result sued both respondent and various private airlines. The suit worked a meandering course, see 721 F. Supp. 572, 573-574 (SDNY 1989), with the private airlines eventually being dismissed and leaving, as the sole remaining issue, ISKCON’s claim against respondent seeking a declaration and injunction against the regulation. The regulation at issue was not formally promulgated until 1988 although it represents a codification of presuit policy. App. to Pet. for Cert. 52. As noted in the text, supra this page, respondent concedes that sankirtan may be performed on the sidewalks outside the terminals.
Compare decision below with Jamison v. St. Louis, 828 F. 2d 1280 (CA8 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 987 (1988); Chicago Area Military Project v. Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F. 2d 619 (CA5 1981), cert. dism’d, 458 U. S. 1124 (1982); U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 228 U. S. App. D. C. 191, 708 F. 2d 760 (1983); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles, 785 F. 2d 791 (CA9 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 482 U. S. 569 (1987).
We deal here only with petitioners’ claim regarding the permissibility of solicitation. Respondent’s cross-petition concerning the leafletting ban is disposed of in the companion case, Lee v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., post, p. 830.
Respondent also argues that the regulations survive under the strict scrutiny applicable to public fora. We find it unnecessary to reach that question.
The congestion problem is not unique to these airports. See 45 Fed. Reg. 35314-35315 (1980) (describing congestion at Washington's Dulles and National Airports) and 49 U. S. C. App. §2201(a)(ll) (congressional declaration that as part of the national airport system plan airport projects designed to increase passenger capacity “should be undertaken to the maximum feasible extent”).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes it a felony “to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating” certain felonies prohibited by the statute. 84 Stat. 1263, 21 U. S. C. § 843(b). The question here is whether someone violates § 843(b) in making a misdemeanor drug purchase because his phone call to the dealer can be said to facilitate the felony of drug distribution. The answer is no.
I
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents believed Mohammed Said was selling cocaine and got a warrant to tap his cell phone. In the course of listening in, they recorded six calls between Said and petitioner Salman Khade Abuelhawa, during which Abuelhawa arranged to buy cocaine from Said in two separate transactions, each time a single gram. Abuelhawa’s two purchases were misdemeanors, §844, while Said’s two sales were felonies, §§ 841(a)(1) and (b). The Government nonetheless charged Abuelhawa with six felonies on the theory that each of the phone calls, whether placed by Abuelhawa or by Said, had been made “in causing or facilitating” Said’s felonies, in violation of § 843(b). Abuelhawa moved for acquittal as a matter of law, arguing that his efforts to commit the misdemeanors of buying cocaine could not be treated as causing or facilitating Said’s felonies, but the District Court denied his motion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-25a, and the jury convicted him on all six felony counts.
Abuelhawa argued the same point to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with as much success. The Circuit reasoned that “for purposes of § 843(b), ‘facilitate’ should be given its ‘common meaning — to make easier or less difficult, or to assist or aid.’” 523 F. 3d 415, 420 (2008) (quoting United States v. Lozano, 839 F. 2d 1020, 1023 (CA4 1988)). The court said Abuelhawa’s use of a phone to buy cocaine counted as ordinary facilitation because it “undoubtedly made Said’s cocaine distribution easier; in fact, ‘it made the sale possible.’” 523 F. 3d, at 421 (quoting United States v. Binkley, 903 F. 2d 1130, 1136 (CA7 1990); emphasis deleted). We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1028 (2008), to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on the scope of § 843(b), and we now reverse.
II
The Government’s argument is a reprise of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, that Abuelhawa’s use of his cell phone satisfies the plain meaning of “facilitate” because it “allow[ed] the transaction to take place more efficiently, and with less risk of detection, than if the purchaser and seller had to meet in person.” Brief for United States 10. And of course on the literal plane, the phone calls could be described as “facilitating” drug distribution; they “undoubtedly made... distribution easier.” 523 F. 3d, at 421. But stopping there would ignore the rule that, because statutes are not read as a collection of isolated phrases, see United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439, 455 (1993), “[a] word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities,” Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). We think the word here does not.
To begin with, the Government’s literal sweep of “facilitate” sits uncomfortably with common usage. Where a transaction like a sale necessarily presupposes two parties with specific roles, it would be odd to speak of one party as facilitating the conduct of the other. A buyer does not just make a sale easier; he makes the sale possible. No buyer, no sale; the buyer’s part is already implied by the term “sale,” and the word “facilitate” adds nothing. We would not say that the borrower facilitates the bank loan.
The Government, however, replies that using the instrument of communication under § 843(b) is different from borrowing the money or merely handing over the sale price for cocaine. Drugs can be sold without anyone’s mailing a letter or using a cell phone. Because cell phones, say, really do make it easier for dealers to break the law, Congress probably meant to ratchet up the culpability of the buyer who calls ahead. But we think that argument comes up short against several more reasons that count against the Government’s position.
The common usage that limits “facilitate” to the efforts of someone other than a primary or necessary actor in the commission of a substantive crime has its parallel in the decided cases. The traditional law is that where a statute treats one side of a bilateral transaction more leniently, adding to the penalty of the party on that side for facilitating the action by the other would upend the calibration of punishment set by the legislature, a line of reasoning exemplified in the courts’ consistent refusal to treat noncriminal liquor purchases as falling under the prohibition against aiding or abetting the illegal sale of alcohol. See Lott v. United States, 205 F. 28, 29-31 (CA9 1913) (collecting cases). And this Court followed the same course in rejecting the broadest possible reading of a similar provision in Gebardi v. United States, 287 U. S. 112 (1932). The question there was whether a woman who voluntarily crossed a state line with a man to engage in “illicit sexual relations” could be tagged with “aid[ing] or assist[ing] in ... transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce . .. any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or of debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose” in violation of the Mann Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825. Gebardi, 287 U. S., at 116-118 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the statutory penalties were “clearly directed against the acts of the transporter as distinguished from the consent of the subject of the transportation,” we refused to “infer that the mere acquiescence of the woman transported was intended to be condemned by the general language punishing those who aid and assist the transporter, any more than it has been inferred that the purchaser of liquor was to be regarded as an abettor of the illegal sale.” Id., at 119 (footnote omitted).
These cases do not strictly control the outcome of this one, but we think they have a bearing here, in two ways. As we have said many times, we presume legislatures act with case law in mind, e. g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 380-381, and n. 12 (2000), and we presume here that when Congress enacted § 843(b), it was familiar with the traditional judicial limitation on applying terms like “aid,” “abet,” and “assist.” We thus think it likely that Congress had comparable scope in mind when it used the term “facilitate,” a word with equivalent meaning, compare Black’s Law Dictionary 76 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “aid and abet” as to “facilitate the commission of a crime”) with id., at 627 (defining “facilitation” as “[t]he act or an instance of aiding or helping; . .. the act of making it easier for another person to commit a crime”).
And applying the presumption is supported significantly by the fact that here, as in the earlier cases, any broader reading of “facilitate” would for practical purposes skew the congressional calibration of respective buyer-seller penalties. When the statute was enacted, the use of land lines in drug transactions was common, and in these days when everyone over the age of three seems to carry a cell phone, the Government’s interpretation would skew the calibration of penalties very substantially. The respect owed to that penalty calibration cannot be minimized. Prior to 1970, Congress punished the receipt, concealment, purchase, or sale of any narcotic drug as a felony, see 21 U. S. C. § 174 (1964 ed.) (repealed), and on top of that added a minimum of two years, and up to five, for using a communication facility in committing, causing, or facilitating, any drug “offense,” 18 U. S. C. § 1403 (1964 ed.). In 1970, however, the CSA, 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. § 801 et seq., downgraded simple possession of a controlled substance to a misdemeanor, 21 U. S. C. § 844(a) (2006 ed.), and simultaneously limited the communications provision to prohibiting only the facilitation of a drug “felony,” § 843(b). This history drives home what is already clear in the current statutory text: Congress meant to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than the felony of distributing drugs, and to narrow the scope of the communications provision to cover only those who facilitate a drug felony. Yet, under the Government’s reading of § 843(b), in a substantial number of cases Congress would for all practical purposes simultaneously have graded back up to felony status with the left hand the same offense it had dropped to a misdemeanor with the right. As the Government sees it, Abuelhawa’s use of a phone in making two small drug purchases would subject him, in fact, to six felony counts and a potential sentence of 24 years in prison, even though buying the same drugs minus the phone would have supported only two misdemeanor counts and 2 years of prison. Given the CSA’s distinction between simple possession and distribution, and the background history of these offenses, it is impossible to believe that Congress intended “facilitating” to cause that 12-fold quantum leap in punishment for simple drug possessors.
The Government suggests that this background usage and the 1970 choice to reduce culpability for possession is beside the point because Congress sometimes incorporates aggravating factors into the Criminal Code, and the phone use here is just one of them; the Government mentions possession by a prior drug offender, a felony punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment. And, for perspective, the Government points to unauthorized possession of flunitrazepam, a drug used to incapacitate rape victims, which is punishable by imprisonment up to three years. Brief for United States 20. It would not be strange, the Government says, for Congress to “decid[e] to treat the use of a communication facility in a drug transaction as a significant act warranting additional punishment” because “[tjoday’s communication facilities . . . make illicit drug transactions easier and more efficient . . . [and] greatly reduce the risk that the participants will be detected while negotiating a transaction.” Id., at 23-24.
We are skeptical. There is no question that Congress intended § 843(b) to impede illicit drug transactions by penalizing the use of communication devices in coordinating illegal drug operations, and no doubt that its purpose will be served regardless of the outcome in this case. But it does not follow that Congress also meant a first-time buyer’s phone calls to get two small quantities of drugs for personal use to expose him to punishment 12 times more severe than a purchase by a recidivist offender and 8 times more severe than the unauthorized possession of a drug used by rapists. To the contrary, Congress used no language spelling out a purpose so improbable, but legislated against a background usage of terms such as “aid,” “abet,” and “assist” that points in the opposite direction and accords with the CSA’s choice to classify small purchases as misdemeanors. The Government’s position is just too unlikely.
Ill
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
In full, § 843(b) provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. Each separate use of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘communication facility’ means any and all public and private instrumentalities used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of communication.”
Section 843(d) provides, subject to exceptions not at issue here, that “any person who violates this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 4 years, a fine ..., or both.”
Compare, e. g., United States v. Binkley, 903 F. 2d 1130, 1135-1136 (CA7 1990) (buyer’s use of phone in purchasing drugs facilitates seller’s drug distribution), with United States v. Baggett, 890 F. 2d 1095, 1097-1098 (CA10 1989) (buyer’s use of phone in purchasing drugs does not facilitate seller’s drug distribution); United States v. Martin, 599 F. 2d 880, 888-889 (CA9 1979) (same), overruled on other grounds, United States v. De Bright, 730 F 2d 1255 (CA9 1984).
The Government’s suggestion that a result like this is not anomalous because a prosecutor could exercise his discretion to seek a lower sentence, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, simply begs the question. Of course, Congress legislates against a background assumption of prosecutorial discretion, but this tells us nothing about the boundaries of punishment within which Congress intended the discretion to be exercised; prosecutorial discretion is not a reason for courts to give improbable breadth to criminal statutes. And it ill behooves the Government to invoke discretionary power in this case, with the prosecutor seeking a sentencing potential of 24 years when the primary offense is the purchase of two grams of cocaine. For that matter, see id., at 41-43 (concession by Government that current Department of Justice guidelines require individual prosecutors who bring charges to charge the maximum crime supported by the facts in a case).
The Government does nothing for its own cause by noting that 21 U. S. C. §856 makes it a felony to facilitate “the simple possession of drugs by others by making available for use... a place for the purpose of unlawfully using a controlled substance” even though the crime facilitated may be a mere misdemeanor. Brief for United States 21 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This shows that Congress knew how to be clear in punishing the facilitation of a misdemeanor as a felony, and it only highlights Congress’s decision to limit § 843(b) to the facilitation of a “felony.”
The Government asks us to affirm the Fourth Circuit on an alternative ground: that Abuelhawa used a communication facility “in causing” Said’s drug felony rather than “in ... facilitating” the felony. But the Government’s argument on this point takes the same form as its argument about the term “facilitate,” and the reasons that lead us to reject the one argument apply just as well to the other.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case concerns the validity of a criminal contempt judgment entered against petitioner by reason of certain events occurring in the course of a criminal trial in the courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Petitioner was retained counsel for Narvel Tinsley, a Negro, who along with his brother Michael was charged with the murders of two police officers. According to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the “murders created some considerable sensation in Louisville . . . and . . . newspaper coverage was overly abundant.” 494 S. W. 2d 737, 739 (1973). Trial before respondent trial judge began on October 18, 1971, and was completed on October 29.
On nine different occasions during this turbulent trial, respondent, out of the hearing of the jury and most often in chambers, informed petitioner that he was in contempt of court. The first charge was immediately reduced to a warning and no sentence was imposed at the time of charge- in that or any other instance. Petitioner was permitted to respond to most, but not all, of the charges.
At the conclusion of the trial on October 29 and after a guilty verdict had been returned, respondent, in the presence of the jury, made a statement concerning petitioner’s trial conduct. Refusing petitioner’s request to respond and declaring that “I have you” on nine counts, respondent proceeded to impose a jail term on each count totaling almost four and one-half years: 30 days on the first count, 60 days on the second, 90 days on the third, six months on counts four, five, six, and seven, and one year each on counts eight and nine, “all to run consecutive.” A few days later, petitioner was also barred from practicing law by respondent in his division of the Criminal Branch of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
While petitioner’s appeal was pending, on March 2, 1972, respondent entered a corrected judgment containing a “certificate” which described the nine charges of contempt but eliminated the first charge as having been reduced to a warning and reduced the sentence on each of the last two counts to six months in jail. The corrected judgment was silent as to whether the sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner was guilty of each and every contempt charged. In its view, petitioner’s actions “were deliberate, delaying, or planned disruptive tactics which did in fact create such an atmosphere in the court that he, if permitted to continue, would have appeared to be the star performer in the center ring of a three-ring circus.” 494 S. W. 2d, at 740. Petitioner had committed “innumerable acts . . . which clearly reflected his contempt for the court as well as the judicial system of this Commonwealth . . .” and had been “overbearing, contemptuous, and obnoxiously persistent in his questions and objections . . . .” Id., at 741. The Court of Appeals also concluded that petitioner had not launched any “personal attack” on the trial judge and that the judge had neither conducted himself as an “ 'activist seeking combat’ ” nor had become so personally embroiled that he was disqualified to sit in judgment on the charges of contempt, although his remarks prior to entering judgment of contempt at the conclusion of the trial were “inappropriate.” Id., at 744^745.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that because the amended judgment did not “direct that the sentences, as amended, be served consecutively . . . they must be served concurrently.” Id., at 746. Thus, “[t]he penalty actually imposed on Daniel Taylor [was] six months in jail,” and his conviction and sentence without a jury trial were deemed constitutionally permissible. Id., at 747. The Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled, however, that it had exclusive authority to discipline or disbar attorneys and that, in any event, the rule in Kentucky since 1917 had been that suspension from practice was not a permissible punishment for criminal contempt. The order prohibiting petitioner from practicing in the Jefferson Circuit Court, Criminal Branch, Second Division, was therefore reversed. We granted certiorari limited to specified issues, 414 U. S. 1063 (1973).
I
Petitioner contends that any charge of contempt of court, without exception, must be tried to a jury. Quite to the contrary, however, our cases hold that petty contempt like other petty criminal offenses may be tried without a jury and that contempt of court is a petty offense when the penalty actually imposed does not exceed six months or a longer penalty has not been expressly authorized by statute. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373 (1966); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., Inc., 391 U. S. 216 (1968); Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147 (1969) ; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970). Hence, although petitioner was ultimately found guilty and sentenced separately on eight counts of contempt, the sentences were to run concurrently and were, as the Kentucky Court of Appeals held, equivalent to a single sentence of six months. Cf. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, post, p. 506. The original sentences imposed on the separate counts were to run consecutively and totaled almost four and one-half years, with two individual counts each carrying a year’s sentence. But the trial court itself entered an amended judgment which was understood by the Kentucky Court of Appeals to impose no more than a six-month sentence. The eight contempts, whether considered singly or collectively, thus constituted petty offenses, and trial by jury was not required.
It is argued that a State should not be permitted, after conviction, to reduce the sentence to less than six months and thereby obviate a jury trial. The thrust of our decisions, however, is to the contrary: in the absence of legislative authorization of serious penalties for contempt, a State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if it determines not to impose a sentence longer than six months. We discern no material difference between this choice and permitting the State, after conviction, to reduce a sentence to six months or less rather than to retry the contempt with a jury. Cf. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, supra, at 380. In either case, the State itself has determined that the contempt is not so serious as to warrant more than a six-month sentence. We remain firmly committed to the proposition that “criminal contempt is not a crime of the sort that requires the right to jury trial regardless of the penalty involved.” Bloom v. Illinois, supra, at 211; cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 30 (1972).
II
We are more persuaded by petitioner’s contention that he was entitled to more of a hearing and notice than he received prior to final conviction and sentence. In each instance during the trial when respondent considered petitioner to be in contempt, petitioner was informed of that fact and, in most instances, had opportunity to respond to the charge at that time. It is quite true, as the Kentucky Court of Appeals held, that “[t]he contempt citations and the sentences coming at the end of the trial were not and could not have been a surprise to Taylor, because upon each occasion and immediately following the charged act of contempt the court informed Taylor that he was at that time in contempt of court.” 494 S. W. 2d, at 741-742. But no sentence was imposed during the trial, and it does not appear to us that any final adjudication of contempt was entered until after the verdict was returned. It was then that the court proceeded to describe and characterize petitioner’s various acts during trial as contemptuous, to find him guilty of nine acts of contempt, and to sentence him immediately for each of those acts.
It is also plain from the record that when petitioner sought to respond to what the Kentucky Court of Appeals referred to as the trial court’s “declaration of a charge against Taylor based upon the judge’s observations” during trial, respondent informed him that “[yjou’re not responding to me on anything” and even indicated that petitioner might be gagged if he insisted on defending himself. The trial court then proceeded without further formality to impose consecutive sentences totaling almost four and one-half years in the county jail and to bar petitioner forever from practicing before the court in which the case at issue had been tried.
This procedure does not square with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We are not concerned here with the trial judge’s power, for the purpose of maintaining order in the courtroom, to punish summarily and without notice or hearing contemptuous conduct committed in his presence and observed by him. Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1888). The usual justification of necessity, see Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954), is not nearly so cogent when final adjudication and sentence are postponed until after trial. Our decisions establish that summary punishment need not always be imposed during trial if it is to be permitted at all. In proper circumstances, particularly where the offender is a lawyer representing a client on trial, it may be postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings. Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1 (1952); cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455, 463 (1971). But Sacher noted that “[s]ummary punishment always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor ... .” 343 U. S., at 8. “[W]e have stated time and again that reasonable notice of a charge and an opportunity to be heard in defense before punishment is imposed are 'basic in our system of jurisprudence.’ ” Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 502 (1972), quoting In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948). Even where summary punishment for contempt is imposed during trial, “the contemnor has normally been given an opportunity to speak in his own behalf in the nature of a right of allocution.” Groppi v. Leslie, supra, at 504 (and cases cited therein).
On the other hand, where conviction and punishment are delayed, “it is much more difficult to argue that action without notice or hearing of any kind is necessary to preserve order and enable [the court] to proceed with its business.” Ibid. As we noted in Groppi, the contem-nors in the Sacher case were “given an opportunity to speak” and the “trial judge would, no doubt[,] have modified his action had their statements proved persuasive.” Id., at 506, and n. 11. Groppi counsels that before an attorney is finally adjudicated in contempt and sentenced after trial for conduct during trial, he should have reasonable notice of the specific charges and opportunity to be heard in his own behalf. This is not to say, however, that a full-scale trial is appropriate. Usually, the events have occurred before the judge’s own eyes, and a reporter’s transcript is available. But the contemnor might at least urge, for example, that the behavior at issue was not contempt but the acceptable conduct of an attorney representing his client; or, he might present matters in mitigation or otherwise attempt to make amends with the court. Cf. Groppi v. Leslie, supra, at 503, 506 n. 11.
These procedures are essential in view of the heightened potential for abuse posed by the contempt power. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S., at 202; Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S., at 12. The provision of fundamental due process protections for contemnors accords with our historic notions of elementary fairness. While we have no desire “to imprison the discretion of judges within rigid mechanical rules,” Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S., at 15, we remain unpersuaded that “the additional time and expense possibly involved . . . will seriously handicap the effective functioning of the courts.” Bloom v. Illinois, supra, at 208-209. Due process cannot be measured in minutes and hours or dollars and cents. For the accused contemnor facing a jail sentence, his “liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however informal.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 482 (1972).
Because these minimum requirements of due process of law were not extended to petitioner in this case, the contempt judgment must be set aside.
III
We are also convinced that if petitioner is to be tried again, he should not be tried by respondent. We agree with the Kentucky Court of Appeals that petitioner’s conduct did not constitute the kind of personal attack on respondent that, regardless of his reaction or lack of it, he would be "[un]likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.” Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S., at 465.
But contemptuous conduct, though short of personal attack, may still provoke a trial judge and so embroil him in controversy that he cannot “hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused . . . .” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532 (1927). In making this ultimate judgment, the inquiry must be not only whether there was actual bias on respondent’s part, but also whether there was “such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575, 588 (1964). “Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties,” but due process of law requires no less. In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955).
With these considerations in mind, we have examined the record in this case, and it appears to us that respondent did become embroiled in a running controversy with petitioner. Moreover, as the trial progressed, there was a mounting display of an unfavorable personal attitude toward petitioner, his ability, and his motives, sufficiently so that the contempt issue should have been finally adjudicated by another judge.
Early in the trial respondent cautioned petitioner against “putting on a show” and added that “if you give him an inch, he'll take a mile. I might as well sit on him now.” App. 31, 40. On another occasion when petitioner asserted that his purpose was to defend his case, respondent replied, “I’m not sure.” Id., at 61. When petitioner remarked that he had five months wrapped up in the case, respondent retorted that “[b]e-fore it's over, you might have a lot more than that.” Id., at 98. On the other hand, petitioner complained of respondent’s “overbearing contentiousness in regard to me, both by phrase and by its utterances,” and asserted that the court was prejudicing the trial of his case. Id., at 60. Respondent was likewise said to be “using [the] brute power of your office” in saying that petitioner was damaging his client. Id., at 61. On another occasion, respondent understood petitioner to be asserting that he, respondent, had rigged the jury. Id., at 85-86.
That respondent had reacted strongly to petitioner’s conduct throughout the 10-day trial clearly emerged in the statement which he made prior to sentencing petitioner and which the Court of Appeals characterized as “inappropriate.” There he said petitioner had put on “the worst display” he had seen in many years at the bar — “[a]s far as a lawyer is concerned, you’re not.” Id., at 28. Furthermore, respondent denied petitioner the opportunity to make any statement at that time, threatened to gag him and forthwith sentenced him to almost four and one-half years in jail, not to mention later disbarring him from further practice in his court. He also refused to grant him bail pending appeal. We assume for the purposes of this case that each of the charged acts was contemptuous; nevertheless, a sentence of this magnitude reflects the extent to which the respondent became personally involved. Cf. Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S., at 17.
From our own reading of the record, we have concluded that “marked personal feelings were present on both sides” and that the marks of “unseemly conduct [had] left personal stings,” Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S., at 464. A fellow judge should have been substituted for the purpose of finally disposing of the charges of contempt made by respondent against petitioner. Respondent relies on Ungar v. Sarafite, supra, but we were impressed there with the fact that the judge “did not purport to proceed summarily during or at the conclusion of the trial, but gave notice and afforded an opportunity for a hearing which was conducted dispassionately and with a decorum befitting a judicial proceeding.” 376 U. S., at 588.
Nothing we have said here should be construed to condone the type of conduct described in the opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals and found by that court to have been engaged in by petitioner. Behavior of this nature has no place in the courtroom which, in a free society, is a forum for the courteous and reasoned pursuit of truth and justice.
The judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas joins Parts II and III of the Court’s opinion.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, see post, p. 523.]
When for the sixth time petitioner was informed that he was in contempt, he sought to reply and was informed he could do so at the next recess. Nothing more appears in the record with respect to this episode. On the seventh occasion, petitioner undertook to respond but respondent left the chambers, and any further discussion of this charge was apparently ordered excluded from the record by respondent. Petitioner was denied the right to respond when he was informed of the eighth charge of contempt. As far as the record shows, there was neither a request to respond nor denial of response in connection with the ninth contempt charge.
The following is the complete transcript of the proceedings on October 29, 1971, with respect to the contempt charges against petitioner:
“The Court: Mr. Taylor, the Court has something to take up with you sir, at this time.
“Mr. Taylor: Well, I’ll be right here, Judge.
“The Court: I’ve for two weeks sit here and listen to you. Now, you’re going to listen to me. Stand right here, sir.
“For two weeks I’ve seen you put on the worst display I’ve ever seen an attorney in my two years of this court and 15 years of practicing law. You’ve quoted that you couldn’t do it any other way. You know our court system is completely based upon, particularly criminal law, the Doctrine of Eeasonable Doubt. That’s exactly what it means, reason. It doesn’t mean that it’s based upon deceit; it doesn’t mean that it’s based upon trickery; it doesn’t mean it’s based upon planned confusion.
“Sometimes I wonder really what your motive is, if you’re really interested in the justice of your client, or if you have some ulterior motive, if you’re interested in Dan Taylor or Narvel Tinsley.
“It’s a shame that this court has to do something that the Bar Association of this State should have done a long time ago.
“As far as a lawyer is concerned, you’re not. I want the jury to hear this; I want the law students of this community to hear this, that you’re not the rule, you’re the exception to the rule.-
“Mr. Taylor: (Interrupting) Thank you.
“The Court: I want them to understand that your actions should not be their actions because this is not the way that a court is conducted. This is not the way an officer of a court should conduct itself.
“Mr. Taylor: I would respond to you, sir-
“The Court: (Interrupting) You’re not responding to me on anything.
“Mr. Taylor: (Interrupting) Oh yes, I will.
“The Court: Yes, you’re not, either.
“Mr. Taylor: Yes, I will.
“The Court: The sentence is on Count One-
“Mr. Taylor: (Interrupting) Unless you intend to gag me-
“The Court: (Interposing) I’ll do that-
“Mr. Taylor: (Interposing) My lawyers will respond to you-
“The Court: (Interposing) I’ll do that, sir.
“Mr. Taylor: My lawyers will respond to you, sir.
“The Court: You be quiet, or you’ll — there will be some more contempts-
“Mr. Taylor: (Interrupting) No, you heard what I said.
“The Court: I have you nine counts. First Count, 30 days in jail; Second Count, 60 days in jail; Third Count, 90 days in jail; Fourth Count, six months in jail; Fifth Count, six months in jail; Sixth Count, six months in jail; Seventh Count, six months in jail; Eighth Count, one year in jail; Ninth Count, one year in jail, all to run consecutive.
“Take him away.
“Mr. Taylor: We will answer you in court.
“The Court: I’d be glad to see you.” App. 28-29.
The nine charges of contempt were described in the certificate as follows:
“Contempt 1. Mr. Taylor, in questioning a prospective juror, on the second day of Voir Dire, repeatedly ignored the Court’s order not to continue a certain line of questioning and to ask his questions of the jury as a whole, He evidenced utter disrespect for prospective jurors (T. E. 335-347).
“Contempt 2. The court sustained the Commonwealth objection on the use of a prior statement to cross examine Officer Hogan and not to go into the escape of Narvel Tinsley. Mr. Taylor repeatedly and completely ignored the court’s ruling (T. E. 1071-1080).
“Contempt S. During the playing of a tape recording of the voice of witness David White, Mr. Taylor wrote on a blackboard. After the playing of the tape it was ordered that the blackboard be removed from the court and Mr. Taylor was advised by the court that he could use it in his final summation to the jury. Mr. Taylor was disrespectful to the court by his tone of voice and manner when he replied, ‘I’ll certainly keep that in mind, your Honor’ (T. E. 1355).
“Contempt 4- During cross-examination of Narvel Tinsley, by Mr. Schroering, Mr. Taylor interrupted and moved for a recess, was overruled by the court, and then became most disrespectful to the court and refused to take his seat at counsel’s table as ordered. “Contempt 6. Complete and utter disrespect by Mr. Taylor in the questioning of Mr. Irvin Foley, and (sic) attorney and Legal Advisor to the Louisville Police Department when he continually disobeyed the court’s ruling regarding a press conference which the court had ruled on unadmissible (sic). Mr. Taylor accused the court of disallowing admittance of black persons in the courtroom during the examination of this witness and made a statement in the presence of the jury inferring that only white police officers could enter the courtroom. It has always been the rule of this court that there will be no interruption during the examination of a witness or during closing arguments by people coming and going into and from the courtroom, which rule was known to Mr. Taylor, (T. E. 1950-1955). “Contempt 6. The witness Jesse Taylor, a Louisville Police Officer, read a statement by witness, David White. A Ruling was made by the court that the statement spoke for itself, had been introduced in evidence and could not be commented on by Officer Taylor, who merely took the statement. Mr. Taylor continued to disregard the court’s order and ruling by continually reading parts of the statement out of context (T. E. 2008-2016).
“Contempt 7. Mr. Taylor in examining Mr. Norbert Brown, again referred to a press conference that the court had previously ordered him not to go into. He also waved his arms at the witness in a derogatory manner indicating the witness was not truthful and showing utter contempt of the court’s ruling (T. E. 2030-2032). “Contempt 8. The court directed Mr. Taylor to call his next witness. He called Lt. Garrett, Louisville Police Department. After the witness was sworn and took the stand, a deputy Sheriff advised the court that Mr. Taylor’s aide was not searched, as everyone else had been upon entering the courtroom. Mr. Taylor ordered the deputy to search his aide. The court ordered Mr. Taylor to begin his examination, which he refused to do until he was cited for contempt in the court’s chamber (T. E. 2068-2069).
“Contempt 9. Mr. Taylor repeatedly asked the same question of witness Floyd Miller that the court had held improper. He was also disrespectful in his tone of voice when referring to a certain police officer as ‘this nice police officer’ (T. E. 2169-2172).” App. 24-26.
494 S. W. 2d 737, 744 (1973).
App. 29.
“Punishment without issue or trial [is] so contrary to the usual and ordinarily indispensable hearing before judgment, constituting due process, that the assumption that the court saw everything that went on in open court [is] required to justify the exception; but the need for immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the court created it.” Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 536 (1925).
Groppi dealt with contempt of a state legislative body, and the contempt action was not taken until several days later without notice or opportunity for Groppi to be heard.
The American Bar Association Advisory Committee on the Judge’s Function has recommended, inter alia:
“Notice of charges and opportunity to be heard.
“Before imposing any punishment for criminal contempt, the judge should give the offender notice of the charges and at least a summary opportunity to adduce evidence or argument relevant to guilt or punishment.
“Commentary
“Although there is authority that in-court contempts can be punished without notice of charges or an opportunity to be heard, Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1888), such a procedure has little to commend it, is inconsistent with the basic notions of fairness, and is likely to bring disrespect upon the court. Accordingly, notice and at least a brief opportunity to be heard should be afforded as a matter of course. Nothing in this standard, however, implies that a plenary trial of contempt charges is required.” American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge § 7.4, p. 95 (Approved Draft 1972).
Cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42 (b); Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162 (1965). State courts have reached a similar conclusion. See, e. g., New York State Appellate Division, First and Second Departments, Special Rules Concerning Court Decorum § 609.2 (b) (1971) in N. Dorsen & L. Friedman, Disorder in the Court: Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on Courtroom Conduct 352 (1973).
My Brother Rehnquist’s dissent insists that the Court has rejected the teaching of Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1 (1952), that in a posttrial contempt proceeding, the court need not afford the contemnor the full panoply of procedures such as "the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.” Id., at 9 (emphasis added). But all we have decided today is that a contemnor is entitled to the elementary due process protections of “reasonable notice of the specific charges and opportunity to be heard in his own behalf,” supra, at 499, neither of which petitioner received. Nowhere do we intimate that “a full-scale trial is appropriate.” Ibid.; see also n. 8, supra. Moreover, whatever justifications may sometimes necessitate immediate imposition of summary punishment during trial “to maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process in the face of an ‘actual obstruction of justice,’ ” Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, post, at 513, “[rjeasons for permitting straightway exercise of summary power are not reasons for compelling or encouraging its immediate exercise.” Sacher v. United States, supra, at 9-10.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent also asserts that our decision provides the means whereby “a judge can be driven out of a case by any counsel sufficiently astute to read the new-found constitutional principles enunciated [here and in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455 (1971)].” Post, at 530. But this statement — perhaps dissenter’s license — misconceives our holding and undervalues the import of the Due Process Clause. As expressly noted in the text, we by no means equate this case with Mayberry v. Pennsylvania. It is not petitioner’s conduct, considered alone, that requires recusal in this case; rather, the critical factor, as revealed by the record before us, is the character of respondent’s response to misbehavior during the course of the trial. The dissent, of course, may view the record differently, but on that issue we are in unavoidable disagreement.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
We noted probable jurisdiction in this case to decide whether § 52-542 of the Connecticut General Statutes requiring a bond for the protection of his landlord from a tenant who wished to appeal from a judgment in a summary eviction proceeding, offends either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if applied to foreclose appellate review for those too poor to post the bond, 394 U. S. 957 (1969).
Because of an ambiguity in the record concerning the underlying reason these appellants were denied an opportunity to appeal the trial court's judgment ordering that they be evicted, we now conclude that this appeal should be dismissed, DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U. S. 28 (1969); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549 (1947).
After unsuccessfully litigating in the trial court a summary eviction proceeding begun by their landlords, appellants moved in the trial court for a waiver of the bond requirement so that they might appeal. The trial court, apparently of the view that it had the power to waive the statutory bond requirement in an appropriate case, denied appellants’ motion on a finding that “this appeal is being taken for the purpose of delay.” App. 23. Appellants sought review of the trial court’s denial of their motion in the Connecticut Circuit Court, and that court denied review and dismissed appellants’ appeal. It is unclear from that court’s opinion, however, whether it thought the bond requirement of § 52-542 left no room for a waiver, or instead based its refusal to hear appellants’ appeal in part on the trial court’s finding— cited in the Circuit Court’s opinion — that the appeal before it was taken only for purpose of delay. 5 Conn. Cir. 282, 250 A. 2d 527 (1968). Appellants’ petition to the Supreme Court of Connecticut to certify the case for review was declined.
In these circumstances, we deem it inappropriate for this Court to decide the constitutional issue tendered by appellants.
Dismissed.
Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
At the time of the decisions below in this case, § 52-542 provided:
“Bond on appeal; stay of execution. When any appeal is taken by the defendant in an action of summary process, he shall give a sufficient bond with surety to the adverse party, to answer for all rents that may accrue or, where no lease had existed, for the reasonable value for such use and occupancy, during the pendency of such appeal, or which may be due at the time of its final disposal; and execution shall be stayed for five days from the date judgment has been rendered, but any Sunday or legal holiday intervening shall be excluded in computing such five days. No appeal shall be taken except within said period, and if an appeal is taken within said period execution shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause, unless it appears to the judge who tried the case that the appeal was taken for the purpose of delay; and if execution has not been stayed, as hereinbefore provided, execution may then issue, except as otherwise provided in sections 52-543 to 52-548, inclusive.”
This version of § 52-542 has been repealed and a revision substituted effective as of October 1, 1969, see Conn. Pub. Acts No. 296 (1969).
The opinion states in one place that “[a] sufficient bond with surety is essential to a valid appeal.” 5 Conn. Cir. 282, 285, 250 A. 2d 527, 529 (1968). The court also said that “[w]ant of bond with surety, where bond with surety is by statute a prerequisite of review, furnishes a sufficient ground of dismissal of the appeal.” Id., at 288, 250 A. 2d, at 531. At oral argument here, however, the State of Connecticut, appearing as amicus curiae, contended that the statutory bond requirement could, in an appropriate ease, be waived. The opinion of the Circuit Court did not expressly pass on this issue, which it appears was not settled under Connecticut law at the time of its decision. A subsequent decision of a Connecticut circuit court suggests that the bond requirement is an absolute and necessary condition for an appeal, but it too did not consider the waiver contention made by the State before this Court, see Housing Authority v. Jones, 5 Conn. Cir. 350, 252 A. 2d 465 (1968), Moreover, this decision did not consider the effect of the 1969 amendment to § 52-542, see n. 1, supra.
The opinion states in another place:
“On January 19, 1968, the trial court held a special hearing on the defendants’ application for waiver of security on appeal. The court found that no rent had been paid since May 1, 1967, nor had the defendants offered to pay any part of the rent due; that the record contained ‘dilatory tactics, and [was] loaded with defenses interposed to delay and obstruct the summary process action’; and that the ‘appeal is being taken for the purpose of delay.’ Accordingly, the court denied the application for waiver of security on appeal.” 5 Conn. Cir., at 284, 250 A. 2d, at 529.
The same Circuit Court, in later granting the landlord’s motion for an order terminating a stay of execution of the eviction order, expressly affirmed the trial court’s findings saying:
“We have before us the entire file in the case. The record and briefs comprise some 140 typewritten pages. Upon a review of the whole matter, we are satisfied that [the trial judge] was justified in concluding, as he did when he denied the defendants’ application for a waiver of security on appeal, ‘that this appeal is being taken for the purpose of delay.’ ” 5 Conn. Cir., at 290, 250 A. 2d, at 532.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
On November 7, 1968, after having been granted immunity, petitioner refused to answer questions put to him before a duly convened Kings County, N. Y., grand jury which was investigating a murder conspiracy. On March 18, 1969, petitioner refused to obey a court order to return to testify before the same grand jury in connection with the same investigation. On that date, petitioner was adjudicated in contempt of court under N. Y. Jud. Law § 750 (1968) for his failure to testify before the grand jury; and, on March 21, 1969, after declining an offer to purge his contempt, petitioner was sentenced to a flat 30-day term in civil jail. Petitioner served his sentence.
On June 10, 1970, petitioner was indicted for his refusal to answer questions before the grand jury on November 7, 1968. After asserting unsuccessfully that this indictment should be dismissed under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, petitioner pleaded guilty to the indictment and was sentenced on his plea.
Petitioner appealed, claiming that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the State from haling him into court on the charge to which he had pleaded guilty. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, declining to address the double jeopardy claim on the merits. It held, relying, inter alia, on Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973), that the double jeopardy claim had been “waived” by petitioner’s counseled plea of guilty.
We reverse. Where the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21, 30 (1974). The motion for leave to proceed in forma pawperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, and the case is remanded to the New York Court of Appeals for a determination of petitioner’s double jeopardy claim on the merits, a claim on which we express no view.
So ordered.
The State concedes that petitioner’s double jeopardy claim is a strong one on the merits. In light of the flat 30-day sentence imposed, the earlier contempt adjudication was a criminal conviction, People v. Colombo, 31 N. Y. 2d 947, 293 N. E. 2d 247 (1972), on remand from Colombo v. New York, 405 U. S. 9 (1972), and New York law supports the proposition that the earlier conviction was based, at least in part, on the failure to answer questions on November 7, 1968, and was thus for the same crime as the one charged in the instant indictment. In re Capio v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 41 App. Div. 2d 235, 342 N. Y. S. 2d 100 (1973), aff’d, 34 N. Y. 2d 603, 310 N. E. 2d 547 (1974); People v. Matra, 42 App; Div. 2d 865, 346 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (1973).
Neither Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973), nor our earlier cases on which it relied, e. g., Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759 (1970), stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably “waive” all antecedent constitutional violations. If they did so hold, the New York Court of Appeals might be correct. However, in Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases, 411 U. S., at 266. The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt i's a sufficient basis for the State’s imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guEt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established. Here, however, the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guEt is established. The guilty plea, therefore, does not bar the claim.
We do not hold that a double jeopardy claim may never be waived. We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
This tort action was removed from the Texas state courts to the United States District Court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship but was remanded as having been “improperly removed” when it seemed that there was not complete diversity among the parties. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, by mandamus, ordered the District Court to vacate its remand order because the latter had employed erroneous principles in concluding that it was without jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals erred. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (c) provides for remanding a removed action when the district court determines that “the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction”; and when a remand has been ordered on these grounds, 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (d) unmistakably commands that the order “remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .” The District Court’s remand order was plainly within the bounds of § 1447 (c) and hence was unreviewable by the Court of Appeals, by mandamus or otherwise. Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), is not to the contrary, for there the District Court remanded “on grounds wholly different from those upon which § 1447 (c) permits remand." Id., at 344. Thermtron did not question but re-emphasized the rule that § 1447 (c) remands are not reviewable.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a proceeding arising out of a determination by the Tax Commission of the State of New York, sustained by the courts of the State, whereby § 186-a of the New York Tax Law was construed to impose a tax on appellant’s gross receipts from transportation between points within the State but over routes that utilize the highways of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The appellant contends, against contrary conclusions below, that since the taxed transportation was interstate commerce, New York may not constitutionally tax the gross receipts from such transportation. In any event, it submits that the State may validly tax only so much of these gross receipts as are attributable to the mileage within the State. Before dealing with these issues, we must dispose of an objection to our right to deal with them.
The State urges that the constitutional claims here pressed by the appellant were not passed upon by the New York Court of Appeals. The record does not sustain this challenge to our jurisdiction. The constitutional issues were undeniably raised before the State Tax Commission and on review before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, 266 App. Div. 648. The suggestion that these issues were not before the Court of Appeals is based on its statement that the question urged there was “not one of constitutional taxing power but of statutory construction.” 296 N. Y. 18, 24. But the court proceeded to pass upon the constitutional issues and expressly held that “there is no constitutional objection to taxation of the total receipts here. This is not interstate commerce . . . .” 296 N. Y. at 25. Its amended re-mittitur stated explicitly that a question arising under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution “was presented and passed upon,” and that in sustaining the tax the court “held that the aforesaid statute as so construed is not repugnant to that provision of the Federal Constitution.” This amendment was not a retrospective injection of a non-existent federal question, but a formal certification that a federal claim had been presented and was adjudicated by the Court of Appeals. It is properly here for review. § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a).
This case serves to remind once more that courts do not adjudicate abstractions, such as, “What is interstate commerce?” Also, it again illustrates that even if it be found that certain transactions in fact constitute interstate commerce, such conclusion does not answer the further inquiry whether a particular assertion of power by a State over such transactions offends the Commerce Clause.
It is too late in the day to deny that transportation which leaves a State and enters another State is “Commerce . . . among the several States” simply because the points from and to are in the same State. Hanley v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 187 U. S. 617; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404. In reaching the opposite conclusion the State court relied upon three decisions of this Court: Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192; Ewing v. Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464; New York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549. The Ewing case was based on the Lehigh Valley case; the Cornell Steamboat case relied on the Ewing and the Lehigh Valley decisions. The holding in the Lehigh Valley case was defined with precision by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Hanley case. He accounted for some State decisions which disregarded interstate commerce as a matter of fact, tested by the actual transaction, as “made simply out of deference to conclusions drawn from Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, and we are of opinion that they carry their conclusions too far.” He pointed out that in the Lehigh Valley case “the tax 'was determined in respect of receipts for the proportion of the transportation within the State.’ 145 U. S. 201. Such a proportioned tax had been sustained in the case of commerce admitted to be interstate.” Hanley v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., supra, at 621. This limited scope of the Lehigh Valley case was the basis of decision in United States Express Company v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335. In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted the Lehigh Valley decision “as allowing a recovery of taxes upon that proportion of the earnings derived from the carriage wholly within the state. This seems to us the safer rule, and avoids any question of taxing interstate commerce, and we adopt and apply it to this case. Nine per cent, of the taxes recovered on this class of earnings should be deducted from the amount of the recovery.” 114 Minn. 346, 350. On writ of error to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, this Court upheld the State court’s application of the Lehigh Valley decision. 223 U.S. 335, 341-42.
In view, however, of some contrariety of views to which the opinion in the Lehigh Valley case has given rise, it calls for a more candid consideration than merely quoting phrases from it congenial to a particular decision. The Lehigh Valley case was this. The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company attacked the validity of a Pennsylvania statute taxing the company’s gross receipts from its line between Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania, and Phillipsburg, New Jersey. The Pennsylvania Railroad operated a connecting line between Phillipsburg and Philadelphia. The Lehigh and the Pennsylvania had arranged for continuous transportation of through passengers and freight between Mauch Chunk and Philadelphia. The trial court had found, as appears from the record, that the “total receipts from this transportation, seven per cent, of which were collected by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company at point of shipment and the remainder by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company at point of destination, were apportioned between the companies upon a mileage basis — that is to say, each company’s share was in the proportion that the number of miles carried by it bore to the total number of miles carried.” It sustained the tax on the ground that the transportation was in substance “purely internal.” The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed on the trial court’s opinion. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 1 Monag. 45, 17Atl. 179.
When the case got here, the Lehigh Valley contended that the transportation between Mauch Chunk and Phil-lipsburg constituted interstate commerce and therefore beyond the taxing power of Pennsylvania, because Phil-lipsburg, while on the Delaware River border between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, was in New Jersey and reached by the railroad via an interstate bridge. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, ignoring the stretch over the interstate bridge (apparently on the theory of de minimis) insisted that the gross receipts were deemed to be “wholly from traffic within the state” because so treated by the railroad itself. This was based on the fact that the Lehigh Valley and the Pennsylvania Railroad had apportioned the receipts from their through traffic, and the amount of the gross receipts which Pennsylvania taxed was the proportion which the railroads inter se attributed to the Lehigh Valley as its share of the earnings within Pennsylvania. This fiscal arrangement between the two railroads is the explanation and justification for the statement in this Court’s opinion that “The tax under consideration here was determined in respect of receipts for the proportion of the transportation within the State.” 145 U. S. at 201. And so, naturally enough, in the Hanley case the Court called the tax which had been sustained in the Lehigh Valley case “a proportioned tax,” and as such it “had been sustained in the case of commerce admitted to be interstate.” Hanley v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., supra, at 621.
In support of the proposition that “a proportioned tax had been sustained in the case of commerce admitted to be interstate” the Hanley case invoked Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217. Unfortunately, the opinion in Lehigh Valley did not rely on that case. It did not even mention it. This silence is explicable by the fact that only a few months before, in the same term, the Court had sharply divided on this very issue in the Grand Trunk case. In the Lehigh Valley case Mr. Chief Justice Fuller spoke for a unanimous court. One is entitled to infer that such accord was obtainable by not renewing the battle of the Grand Trunk case. It would not be the first time in the history of this Court that agreement could be reached by one mode of reasoning but not by another. Mr. Justice Bradley and his fellow dissenters in the Grand, Trunk case were evidently content to sustain the Pennsylvania tax as a tax on “domestic transportation,” “internal intercourse,” in short as not “interstate commerce,” for thereby they would not bring into question the views so vigorously expressed by them a few months before.
It was reasonable enough to disregard the short distance in which the transportation in the Lehigh Valley case went over the interstate bridge on the Delaware River büt otherwise was wholly in Pennsylvania, and to treat it as de minimis when the railroad’s accounting itself treated the receipts as proportioned. “Regulation and commerce among the States both are practical rather than technical conceptions, and, naturally, their limits must be fixed by practical lines.” Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 225. But to label transportation across an interstate stream “local commerce” for some purposes when it is “interstate commerce” in other relations, see, e. g., Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, is to use loosely terms having connotations of constitutional significance. To call commerce in fact interstate “local commerce” because under a given set of circumstances, as in the Lehigh Valley case, a particular exertion of State power is not rendered invalid by the Commerce Clause is to indulge in a fiction. Especially in the disposition of constitutional issues are legal fictions hazardous, because of the risk of confounding users and not merely readers. The kind of confusion to which the Lehigh Valley opinion has given rise results from employing a needless fiction — calling commerce local which in fact is interstate — as a manner of stating that a particular exercise of State power is not invalid even though it affects interstate commerce. The difficult task of determining whether a phase of commerce, concededly interstate, is subject to a particular incidence of State regulation, through taxation or otherwise, is not lessened by calling interstate commerce local commerce in order to sustain its local control. To state this persistent and protean problem of our federalism in the form of a question-begging fiction, is not to answer it.
This brings us to the facts of the case before us. New York claims the right to tax the gross receipts from transportation which traverses New Jersey and Pennsylvania as well as New York. To say that this commerce is confined to New York is to indulge in pure fiction. To do so, does not eliminate the relation of Pennsylvania and New Jersey to the transactions nor eliminate the benefits which those two States confer upon the portions of the transportation within their borders. Neither their interests nor their responsibilities are evaporated by the verbal device of attributing the entire transportation to New York. There is no suggestion here that the interstate routes were utilized as a means of avoiding even in part New York’s taxation. Compare, e. g., Eichholz v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 306 U. S. 268, and Ryan v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 143 Pa. Super. 517. We are not dealing with a necessary deviation or a calculated detour. Nor is New York seeking to tax transactions physically outside its borders but so trifling in quantity to the New York commerce, of which they form a part, as to be constitutionally insignificant. New York seeks to tax the total receipts from transportation of which nearly 43% of the mileage lay in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Transactions which to such a substantial extent actually take place in New Jersey and Pennsylvania cannot be deemed legally to take place in New York.
Of course we are dealing here with “interstate commerce.” Of course Congress did not exceed its power to regulate such commerce when in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 it explicitly included commerce such as that before us within the scope of that Act: “The term ‘interstate commerce’ means commerce between any place in a State and any place in another State or between places in the same State through another State, whether such commerce moves wholly by motor vehicle or partly by motor vehicle and partly by rail, express, or water.” 49 Stat. 543, 544, 49 U. S. C. § 303 (a) (10). In a case like this nothing is gained, and clarity is lost, by not starting with recognition of the fact that it is interstate commerce which the State is seeking to reach and candidly facing the real question whether what the State is exacting is a constitutionally fair demand by the State for that aspect of the interstate commerce to which the State bears a special relation. See Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, and Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28. Such being the real issue inevitably “nice distinctions are to be expected.” Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio R. Co. v. Texas, supra, at 225. But such distinctions would be clearer and more reasonably made if, for instance, a fiat privilege tax applied by a municipality to an express company shipping packages between points within a State, but over routes which for a very short distance pass out of the State, had been frankly sustained on the ground that the tax did not burden interstate commerce in the constitutional sense rather than on the ground that it was not interstate commerce. Compare Ewing v. Leavenworth, supra, with Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568. Again, it would have made for a less dialectical, if not more coherent, development of the law to sustain a New York gross receipts tax on a New York corporation, engaged in towing vessels between ports in the State of New York on the Hudson River traversing the New Jersey side but not touching its shore, on the ground that upon the facts of that case, and more particularly New Jersey’s relation to the transactions (very different from those now before us), New York was not burdening interstate commerce, rather than to hold that “transportation between the ports of the State is not interstate commerce, excluded from the taxing power of the State, because as to a part of the journey the course is over the territory of another State.” Compare New York ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, supra, at 560, with Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 634.
It is significant that, so far as we are advised, no State other than New York seeks to tax the unapportioned receipts from transportation going through more than one State, (except to an extent so insignificant as to be disregarded), merely because such transportation returns to the State of its origin. If New Jersey and Pennsylvania could claim their right to make appropriately apportioned claims against that substantial part of the business of appellant to which they afford protection, we do not see how on principle and in precedent such a claim could be denied. This being so, to allow New York to impose a tax on the gross receipts for the entire mileage — on the 57.47% within New York as well as the 42.53% without— would subject interstate commerce to the unfair burden of being taxed as to portions of its revenue by States which give protection to those portions, as well as to a State which does not. This is not to conjure up remote possibilities. Pennsylvania’s claim to tax a portion of appellant’s gross receipts from the transportation which New York has taxed is not a matter of speculation. Apparently, Pennsylvania has so taxed since 1931. Penn. Laws 1931, No. 255, as amended by Act of June 5, 1947, No. 204. New York does not deny that Pennsylvania in fact so taxes, though there is dispute as to the meaning of the formula by which she does so. But even if neither Pennsylvania nor New Jersey sought to tax their proportionate share of the revenue from this transportation, such abstention would not justify the taxing by New York of the entire revenue. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256. By its very nature an unapportioned gross receipts tax makes interstate transportation bear more than “a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.” Id. at 253. The vice of such a tax is that it lays “a direct burden upon every transaction in [interstate] commerce by withholding, for the use of the State, a part of every dollar received in such transactions.” Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 297; see Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311; Freeman v. Hewit, supra; Joseph v. Carter and Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422.
However, while the New York courts have construed the statute as levying an unapportioned gross receipts tax on this transaction, the entire tax need not fall. The tax may be “fairly apportioned” to the “business done within the state by a fair method of apportionment.” Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255. There is no dispute as to feasibility in apportioning this tax. On the record before us the tax may constitutionally be sustained on the receipts from the transportation apportioned as to the mileage within the State. See Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S. 411, 427-28. There is no question as to the fairness of the suggested method of apportionment. Compare Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., supra, with New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessments, 280 U. S. 338; cf. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66. Both appellant and appellee have indicated here that, as a matter of construction, the statute under consideration permits such apportionment, but that is a matter for the New York courts to determine.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Rutledge concurs in the result.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Arizona has levied a tax of 2% on the “gross proceeds of sales, or gross income” of appellant Warren Trading Post Company, which does a retail trading business with Indians on the Arizona part of the Navajo Indian Reservation under a license granted by the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs pursuant to 19 Stat. 200, 25 U. S. C. § 261 (1958 ed.). Appellant claimed that as applied to its income from trading with reservation Indians on the reservation the state tax was invalid as (1) in violation of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes”; (2) inconsistent with the comprehensive congressional plan, enacted under authority of Art. I, § 8, to regulate Indian trade and traders and to have Indian tribes on reservations govern themselves. The State Supreme Court rejected these contentions and upheld the tax, one Justice dissenting. 95 Ariz. 110, 387 P. 2d 809. The case is properly here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) (1958 ed.). Since we hold that this state tax cannot be imposed consistently with federal statutes applicable to the Indians on the Navajo Reservation, we find it unnecessary to consider whether the tax is also barred by that part of the Commerce Clause giving Congress power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.
The Navajo Reservation was set apart as a “permanent home” for the Navajos in a treaty made with the “Navajo nation or tribe of Indians” on June 1, 1868. Long before that, in fact from the very first days of our Government, the Federal Government had been permitting the Indians largely to govern themselves, free from state interference, and had exercised through statutes and treaties a sweeping and dominant control over persons who wished to trade with Indians and Indian tribes. As Chief Justice John Marshall recognized in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 556-557:
“From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.”
He went on to say that:
“The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.” Id., at 557,
See also, e. g., United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188. In the very first volume of the federal statutes is found an Act, passed in 1790 by the first Congress, “to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes,” requiring that Indian traders obtain a license from a federal official, and specifying in detail the conditions on which such licenses would be granted.
Such comprehensive federal regulation of Indian traders has continued from that day to this. Existing statutes make specific restrictions on trade with the Indians, and one of them, passed in 1876 and tracing back to comprehensive enactments of 1802 and 1834, provides that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have “the sole power and authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes” and to specify “the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be sold to the Indians.” Acting under authority of this statute and one added in 1901, the Commissioner has promulgated detailed regulations prescribing in the most minute fashion who may qualify to be a trader and how he shall be licensed; penalties for acting as a trader without a license; conditions under which government employees may trade with Indians; articles that cannot be sold to Indians; and conduct forbidden on a licensed trader’s premises. He has ordered that detailed business records be kept and that government officials be allowed to inspect these records to make sure that prices charged are fair and reasonable; that traders pay Indians in money; that bonds be executed by proposed licensees; and that the governing body of an Indian reservation may assess from a trader “such fees, etc., as it may deem appropriate.” It was under these comprehensive statutes and regulations that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs licensed appellant to trade with the Indians on the Navajo Reservation. These apparently all-inclusive regulations and the statutes authorizing them would seem in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders. In fact, the Solicitor’s Office of the Department of the Interior in 1940 and again in 1943 interpreted these statutes to bar States from taxing federally licensed Indian traders on their sales to reservation Indians on a reservation. We think those rulings were correct.
Congress has, since the creation of the Navajo Reservation nearly a century ago, left the Indians on it largely free to run the reservation and its affairs without state control, a policy which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens for carrying on those same responsibilities. And in compliance with its treaty obligations the Federal Government has provided for roads, education and other services needed by the Indians. We think the assessment and collection of this tax would to a substantial extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose of ensuring that no burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians on reservations except as authorized by Acts of Congress or by valid regulations promulgated under those Acts. This state tax on gross income would put financial burdens on appellant or the Indians with whom it . deals in addition to those Congress or the tribes have prescribed, and could thereby disturb and disarrange the statutory plan Congress set up in order to protect Indians against prices deemed unfair or unreasonable by the Indian Commissioner. And since federal legislation has left the State with no duties or responsibilities respecting the reservation Indians, we cannot believe that Congress intended to leave to the State the privilege of levying this tax. Insofar as they are applied to this federally licensed Indian trader with respect to sales made to reservation Indians on the reservation, these state laws imposing taxes cannot stand. Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings npt inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-1309, 42-1312. The tax is applicable to “every person engaging or continuing within this state in the business of selling any tangible personal property whatever at retail,” with stated exceptions. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-1312. Appellant’s challenge to these statutes is limited to the State’s attempt to apply them to gross income from sales made on the reservation to reservation Indians.
15 Stat. 667.
Arizona was admitted to the Union on its agreement that
“the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to . . . all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States . . . Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557, 569. See also Act of Aug. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 39.
Certain state laws have been permitted to apply to activities on Indian reservations, where those laws are specifically authorized by acts of Congress, or where they clearly do not interfere with federal policies concerning the reservations. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 72-75; Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219-221; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264; Utah & N. R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28, 31-32. Compare, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1161 (1958 ed.) (permitting application of state liquor law standards within an Indian reservation under certain conditions); 45 Stat. 1185, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 231 (1958 ed.) (permitting application of state health and education laws within a reservation under certain conditions); 18 U. S. C. § 1162 .(1958 ed.) and 28 U. S. C. § 1360 (1958 ed.) (respectively granting certain States criminal and civil jurisdiction over offenses and causes of action involving Indians within specified Indian reservations).
In 1778, in its first treaty with an Indian tribe, the United States promised to provide for the Delaware Nation
“a well-regulated trade, under the conduct of an intelligent, candid agent, with an adequate sallery, one more influenced by the love of his country, and a constant attention to the duties of his department by promoting the common interest, than the sinister purposes of converting and binding all the duties of his office to his private emolument Treaty of Sept. 17, 1778, Art. V, 7 Stat. 13, 14.
Similar provisions were found in other early treaties, concluded before the first Congress legislated on the subject of Indian trade. See United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 96 (hereafter cited as Federal Indian Law). In 1871 Congress forbade future treaties with the Indian tribes but left the obligations of existing treaties unimpaired. 16 Stat. 544, 566, now 25 U. S. C. § 71 (1958 ed.).
Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137.
See generally Federal Indian Law 94 — 138, 373-381.
E. g., 4 Stat. 729, now 25 U. S. C. § 263 (1958 ed.) (empowering the President in the public interest to forbid introduction of any or all goods into the territory of a tribe, and to revoke and refuse all licenses to trade with that tribe); 4 Stat. 729, as amended, now 25 U. S. C. § 264 (1958 ed.) (establishing penalties for trading without a license and forbidding traders to hire white persons as clerks unless licensed to do so); 18 U. S. C. § 3113 (1958 ed.) (forbidding unlawful introduction of liquor into Indian country and providing for revocation of the license of any trader violating this prohibition).
Act of March 30, 1802, 2 Stat. 139.
Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729.
19 Stat. 200, 25 U. S. C. § 261 (1958 ed.), provides:
“The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power and authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper specifying the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which, such goods shall be sold to the Indians.”
31 Stat. 1066, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 262 (1958 ed.), provides:
“Any person desiring to trade with the Indians on any Indian reservation shall, upon establishing the fact, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that he is a proper person to engage in such trade, be permitted to do so under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may prescribe for the protection of said Indians.”
25 CFR §§251.9, 252.6, 251.3, 252.3, 251.5, 251.8, 251.18, 251.19, 251.21, 252.15.
25 CFR §§252.7, 251.22, 251.24, 251.10, 252.9, 252.27c. See generally 25 CFR §§ 251, 252.
These statutes and regulations apply only to activities on reservations. See Taylor v. United States, 44 F. 2d 531 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 820; 57 I. D. 124, 125.
57 I. D. 124.
58 I. D. 562.
Since 1950 Congress has authorized expenditure of over $100,-000,000 as part of an extensive plan to rehabilitate the Navajo and Hopi tribes of Arizona. 64 Stat. 44, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §§631-640 (1958 ed.). Detailed accounts of the ways in which the Federal Government has aided and supported the Navajos and other tribes may be found in Secretary of the Interior, Annual Report, 1963, pp. 11-47; id., 1962, pp. 7-44; id., 1961, pp. 277-318. See also Federal Indian Law 268-306; Young, The Navajo Yearbook, Report No. viii, 1951-1961, A Decade of Progress (1961).
The Buck Act, now 4 U. S. C. §§ 105-110 (1964 ed.), in which Congress permitted States to levy sales or use taxes within certain federal areas, has been interpreted by what appears to be the only court to consider the question before this ease, and by the Interior Department, as not applying to Indian reservations. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 68 N. M. 327, 334, 361 P. 2d 950, 955-956; 58 I. D. 562. Cf. 4 U. S. C. § 109 (1964 ed.), excepting taxes on Indians from the scope of the Act. We think that interpretation was correct. See S. Rep. No. 1625, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2, 3. Moreover, we hold that Indian traders trading on a reservation with reservation Indians are immune from a state tax like Arizona’s, not simply because those activities take place on a reservation, but rather because Congress in the exercise of its power granted in Art. I, § 8, has undertaken to regulate reservation trading in such a comprehensive way that there is no room for the States to legislate on the subject. Cf. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 651. Even assuming that the Arizona tax here is of a kind to which the Buck Act applies, nothing whatever in that Act suggests to us that Congress meant to give States new power to tax federally licensed Indian traders. See 58 I. D. 562.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Sotomayok
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under this Court’s state-action immunity doctrine, when a local governmental entity acts pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition, it is exempt from scrutiny under the federal antitrust laws. In this case, we must decide whether a Georgia law that creates special-purpose public entities called hospital authorities and gives those entities general corporate powers, including the power to acquire hospitals, clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses a state policy to permit acquisitions that substantially lessen competition. Because Georgia’s grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively, we hold that the clear-articulation test is not satisfied and state-action immunity does not apply.
f—4
A
In 1941, the State of Georgia amended its Constitution to ■ allow political subdivisions to provide health care services. 1941 Ga. Laws p. 50. The State concurrently enacted the Hospital Authorities Law (Law), id., at 241, Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-70 et seq. (2012), “to provide a mechanism for the operation and maintenance of needed health care facilities in the several counties and municipalities of th[e] state.” §31-7-76(a). “The purpose of the constitutional provision and the statute based thereon was to... create an organization which could carry out and make more workable the duty which the State owed to its indigent sick.” DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth. of Albany, 195 Ga. 189, 200, 23 S. E. 2d. 716, 723 (1942) (citations omitted). As amended, the Law. authorizes each county and municipality, and certain combinations of counties or municipalities, to create “a public body corporate and politic” called a “hospital authority.” §§ 31-7-72(a), (d). Hospital authorities are governed by five-to nine-member boards that are appointed by the governing body of the county or municipality in their area of operation. § 31-7-72(a).
Under the Law, a hospital authority “exercise[s] public and essential governmental functions” and is delegated “all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate” the Law’s purposes. §31-7-75. Giving more content to that general delegation, the Law enumerates 27 powers conferred upon hospital authorities, including the power “[t]o acquire by purchase, lease, or otherwise and to operate projects,” § 31-7-75(4), which are defined to include hospitals and other public health facilities, §31-7-71(5); “[t]o construct, reconstruct, improve, alter, and repair projects,” §31-7-75(5); “[t]o lease... for operation by others any project” provided certain conditions are satisfied, § 31-7-75(7); and “[t]o establish rates and charges for the services and use of the facilities of the authority,” §31-7-75(10). Hospital authorities may not operate or construct any project for profit, and accordingly they must set rates so as only to cover operating expenses and create reasonable reserves. § 31-7-77.
B
In the same year that the Law was adopted, the city of Albany and Dougherty County established the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (Authority) and the Authority promptly acquired Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (Memorial), which has been in operation in Albany since 1911. In 1990, the Authority restructured its operations by forming two private nonprofit corporations to manage Memorial: Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. (PPHS), and its subsidiary, Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Inc. (PPMH). The Authority leased Memorial to PPMH for $1 per year for 40 years. Under the lease, PPMH has exclusive authority over the operation of Memorial, including the ability to set rates for services. Consistent with §31-7-75(7), PPMH is subject to lease conditions that require provision of care to the indigent sick and limit its rate of return.
Memorial is one of two hospitals in Dougherty County. The second, Palmyra Medical Center (Palmyra), was established in Albany in 1971 and is located just two miles from Memorial. At the time suit was brought in this case, Palmyra was operated by a national for-profit hospital network, HCA, Inc. (HCA). Together, Memorial and Palmyra account for 86 percent of the market for acute-care hospital services provided to commercial health care plans and their customers in the six counties surrounding Albany. Memorial accounts for 75 percent of that market on its own.
In 2010, PPHS began discussions with HCA about acquiring Palmyra. Following negotiations, PPHS presented the Authority with a plan under which the Authority would purchase Palmyra with PPHS controlled funds and then lease Palmyra to a PPHS subsidiary for $1 per year under the Memorial lease agreement. The Authority unanimously approved the transaction.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) shortly thereafter issued an administrative complaint alleging that the proposed purchase-and-lease transaction would create a virtual monopoly and would substantially reduce competition in the market for acute-care hospital services, in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U. S. C. § 45, and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 18. The FTC, along with the State of Georgia, subsequently filed suit against the Authority, HCA, Palmyra, PPHS, PPMH, and the new PPHS subsidiary created to manage Palmyra (collectively respondents), seeking to enjoin the transaction pending administrative proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. §§26, 53(b).
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia denied the request for a preliminary injunction and granted respondents’ motion to dismiss. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (2011). The District Court held that respondents are immune from antitrust liability under the state-action doctrine. See id., at 1366-1381.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 663 F. 3d 1369 (2011). As an initial matter, the court “agree[d] with the [FTC] that, on the facts alleged, the joint operation of Memorial and Palmyra woúld substantially lessen competition or tend to create, if not create, a monopoly.” Id., at 1375. But the court concluded that the transaction was immune from antitrust liability. See id., at 1375-1378. The Court of Appeals explained that as a local governmental entity, the Authority was entitled to state-action immunity if the challenged anticompetitive conduct was a “ ‘foreseeable result’ ” of Georgia’s legislation. Id., at 1375. According to the court, anticompetitive conduct is foreseeable if it could have been “ ‘reasonably anticipated’ ” by the state legislature; it is not necessary, the court reasoned, for an anticompetitive effect to “be ‘one that ordinarily occurs, routinely occurs, or is inherently likely to occur as a result of the empowering legislation.’” Id., at 1375-1376 (quoting FTC v. Hospital Bd. of Directors of Lee Cty., 38 P. 3d 1184, 1188, 1190-1191 (CA11 1994)). Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Law contemplated the anticompetitive conduct challenged by the FTC. The court noted the “impressive breadth” of the powers given to hospital authorities, which include traditional powers of private corporations and a few additional capabilities, such as the power to exercise eminent domain. See 663 F. 3d, at 1376. More specifically, the court reasoned that the Georgia Legislature must have anticipated that the grant of power to hospital authorities to acquire and lease projects would produce anticompetitive effects because “[fjoresee-ably, acquisitions could consolidate ownership of competing hospitals, eliminating competition between them.” Id., at 1377.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the FTC’s alternative argument that state-action immunity did not apply because the transaction in substance involved a transfer of control over Palmyra from one private entity to another, with the Authority acting as a mere conduit for the sale to evade antitrust liability. See id., at 1376, n. 12.
We granted certiorari on two questions: whether the Georgia Legislature, through the powers it vested in hospital authorities, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy to displace competition in the market for hospital services; and if so, whether state-action immunity is nonetheless inapplicable as a result of the Authority’s minimal participation in negotiating the terms of the sale of Palmyra and the Authority’s limited supervision of the two hospitals’ operations. See 567 U. S. 933 (2012). Concluding that the answer to the first question is “no,” we reverse without reaching the second question.
II
In Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), this Court held that because “nothing in the language of the Sherman Act [15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.] or in its history” suggested that Congress intended to restrict the sovereign capacity of the States to regulate their economies, the Act should not be read to bar States from imposing market restraints “as an act of government.” Id., at 350, 352. Following Parker, we have held that under certain circumstances, immunity from the federal antitrust laws may extend to nonstate actors carrying out the State’s regulatory program. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U. S. 94, 99-100 (1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U. S. 48, 66-57 (1985).
But given the fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws, “state-action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication.” FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, 636 (1992). Consistent with this preference, we recognize state-action immunity only when it is clear that the challenged anticompetitive conduct is undertaken pursuant to a regulatory scheme that “is the State’s own.” Id., at 635. Accordingly, “[c]loser analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of” the State itself, but rather “is carried out by others pursuant to state authorization.” Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U. S. 558, 568 (1984). When determining whether the anticompetitive acts of private parties are entitled to immunity, we employ a two-part test, requiring first that “the challenged restraint... be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” and second that “the policy... be actively supervised by the State.” California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 105 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case involves allegedly anticompetitive conduct undertaken by a substate governmental entity. Because municipalities and other political subdivisions are not themselves sovereign, state-action immunity under Parker does not apply to them directly. See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U. S. 365, 370 (1991); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 411-413 (1978) (plurality opinion). At the same time, however, substate governmental entities do receive immunity from antitrust scrutiny when they act “pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.” Id., at 413. This rule “preserves to the States their freedom... to use their municipalities to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation’s free-market goals.” Id., at 415-416.
As with private parties, immunity will only attach to the activities of local governmental entities if they are undertaken pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” state policy to displace competition. Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 52 (1982). But unlike private parties, such entities are not subject to the “active state supervision requirement” because they have less of an incentive to pursue their own self-interest under the guise of implementing state policies. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 46-47 (1985).
“[T]o pass the ‘clear articulation’ test,” a state legislature need not “expressly state in a statute or its legislative history that the legislature intends for the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects.” Id., at 43. Rather, we explained in Hallie that state-action immunity applies if the anticompetitive effect was the “foreseeable result” of what the State authorized. Id., at 42. We applied that principle in Omni, where we concluded that the clear-articulation test was satisfied because the suppression of competition in the billboard market was the foreseeable result of a state statute authorizing municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances regulating the construction of buildings and other structures. 499 U. S., at 373.
Ill
A
Applying the clear-articulation test to the Law before us, we conclude that respondents’ claim for state-action immunity fails because there is no evidence the State affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership. The acquisition and leasing powers exercised by the Authority in the challenged transaction, which were the principal powers relied upon by the Court of Appeals in finding state-action immunity, see 663 F. 3d, at 1377, mirror general powers routinely conferred by state law upon private corporations. Other powers possessed by hospital authorities that the Court of Appeals characterized as having “impressive breadth,” id., at 1376, also fit this pattern, including the ability to make and execute contracts, § 31-7-75(3), to set rates for services, §31-7-75(10), to sue and be sued, §31-7-75(1), to borrow money, §31-7-75(17), and the residual authority to exercise any or all powers possessed by private corporations, §31-7-75(21).
Our case law makes clear that state-law authority to act is insufficient to establish state-action immunity; the substate governmental entity must also show that it has been delegated authority to act or regulate anticompetitively. See Omni, 499 U. S., at 372. In Boulder, we held that Colorado’s Home Rule Amendment allowing municipalities to govern local affairs did not satisfy the clear-articulation test. 455 U. S., at 55-56. There was no doubt in that case that the city had authority as a matter of state law to pass an ordinance imposing a moratorium on a cable provider’s expansion of service. Id,., at 45-46. But we rejected the proposition that “the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anticom-petitive ordinances” because such an approach “would wholly eviscerate the concepts of ‘clear articulation and affirmative expression’ that our precedents require.” Id., at 56. We explained that when a State’s position “is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anti-competitive,” the State cannot be said to have “‘contemplated’ ” those anticompetitive actions. Id., at 55.
The principle articulated in Boulder controls this case. Grants of general corporate power that allow substate governmental entities to participate in a competitive marketplace should be, can be, and typically are used in ways that raise no federal antitrust concerns. As a result, a State that has delegated such general powers “can hardly be said to have ‘contemplated’” that they will be used anticompeti-tively. Ibid. See also 1A P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶225⅜ p. 131 (3d ed. 2006) (hereinafter Areeda & Hovenkamp) (“When a state grants power to an inferior entity, it presumably grants the power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so anticompetitively”). Thus, while the Law does allow the Authority to acquire hospitals, it does not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a state policy empowering the Authority to make acquisitions of existing hospitals that will substantially lessen competition.
B
In concluding otherwise, and specifically in reasoning that the Georgia Legislature “must have anticipated” that acquisitions by hospital authorities “would produce anticompeti-tive effects,” 663 F. 3d, at 1377, the Court of Appeals applied the concept of “foreseeability” from our clear-articulation test too loosely.
In Hattie, we recognized that it would “embod[y] an unrealistic view of how legislatures work and of how statutes are written” to require state legislatures to explicitly authorize specific anticompetitive effects before state-action immunity could apply. 471 U. S., at 43. “No legislature,” we explained, “can be expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects” of a statute delegating authority to a substate governmental entity. Ibid. Instead, we have approached the clear-articulation inquiry more practically, but without diluting the ultimate requirement that the State must have affirmatively contemplated the displacement of competition such that the challenged anticompetitive effects can be attributed to the “state itself.” Parker, 317 U. S., at 352. Thus, we have concluded that a state policy to displace federal antitrust law was sufficiently expressed where the displacement of competition was the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature. In that scenario, the State must have foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive effects as consistent with its policy goals.
For example, in Hattie, Wisconsin statutory law regulating the municipal provision of sewage services expressly permitted cities to limit their service to surrounding unincorporated areas. See 471 U. S., at 41. While unincorporated towns alleged that the city’s exercise of that power constituted an unlawful tying arrangement, an unlawful refusal to deal, and an abuse of monopoly power, we had no trouble concluding that these alleged anticompetitive effects were affirmatively contemplated by the State because it was “clear” that they “logically would result” from the grant of authority. Id., at 42. As described by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the state legislature “ Viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before extending sewer services to the area.’” Id., at 44-45, n. 8 (quoting Hallie v. Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 540-541, 314 N. W. 2d 321, 325 (1982)). Without immunity, federal antitrust law could have undermined that arrangement and taken completely off the table the policy option that the State clearly intended for cities to have.
Similarly, in Omni, where the respondents alleged that the city had used its zoning power to protect an incumbent billboard provider against competition, we found that the clear-articulation test was easily satisfied even though the state statutes delegating zoning authority to the city did not explicitly permit the suppression of competition. We explained that “[t]he very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition” and that a zoning ordinance regulating the size, location, and spacing of billboards “necessarily protects existing billboards against some competition from newcomers.” 499 U. S., at 373. Other cases in which we have found a “clear articulation” of the State’s intent to displace competition without an explicit statement have also involved authorizations to act or regulate in ways that were inherently anticompetitive.
By contrast, “simple permission to play in a market” does not “foreseeably entail permission to roughhouse in that market unlawfully.” Kay Elec. Cooperative v. Newkirk, 647 F. 3d 1039, 1043 (CA10 2011). When a State grants some entity general power to act, whether it is a private corporation or a public entity like the Authority, it does so against the backdrop of federal antitrust law. See Ticor Title, 504 U. S., at 632. Of course, both private parties and local governmental entities conceivably may transgress antitrust requirements by exercising their general powers in anti-competitive ways. But a reasonable legislature’s ability to anticipate that (potentially undesirable) possibility falls well short of clearly articulating an affirmative state policy to displace competition with a regulatory alternative.
Believing that this case falls within the scope of the foreseeability standard applied in Hallie and Omni, the Court of Appeals stated that “[i]t defies imagination to suppose the [state] legislature could have believed that every geographic market in Georgia was so replete with hospitals that authorizing acquisitions by the authorities could have no serious anticompetitive consequences.” 663 F. 3d, at 1377. Respondents echo this argument, noting that each of Georgia’s 159 counties covers a small geographical area and that most of them are sparsely populated, with nearly three-quarters having fewer than 50,000 residents as of the 2010 Census. Brief for Respondents 46.
Even accepting, arguendo, the premise that facts about a market could make the anticompetitive use of general corporate powers “foreseeable,” we reject the Court of Appeals’ and respondents’ conclusion because only a relatively small subset of the conduct permitted as a matter of state law by Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-75(4) has the potential to negatively affect competition. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ and respondents’ characterization, § 31-7-76(4) is not principally concerned with hospital authorities’ ability to acquire multiple hospitals and consolidate their operations. Section 31-7-75(4) allows authorities to acquire “projects,” which includes not only “hospitals,” but also “health care facilities, dormitories, office buildings, clinics, housing accommodations, nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, extended care facilities, and other public health facilities.” §31-7-71(5). Narrowing our focus to the market for hospital services, the power to acquire hospitals still does not ordinarily produce anticompetitive effects. Section 31-7-75(4) was, after all, the source of power for newly formed hospital authorities to acquire a hospital in the first instance—a transaction that was unlikely to raise any antitrust concerns even in small markets because the transfer of ownership from private to public hands does not increase market concentration. See 1A Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶224e(c), at 126 (“[Substitution of one monopolist for another is not an antitrust violation”). While subsequent acquisitions by authorities have the potential to reduce competition, they will raise federal antitrust concerns only in markets that are large enough to support more than one hospital but sufficiently small that the merger of competitors would lead to a significant increase in market concentration. This is too slender a reed to support the Court of Appeals’ and respondents’ inference.
IV
A
Taking a somewhat different approach than the Court of Appeals, respondents insist that the Law should not be read as a mere authorization for hospital authorities to participate in the hospital-services market and exercise general corporate powers. Rather, they contend that hospital authorities are granted unique powers and responsibilities to fulfill the State’s objective of providing all residents with access to adequate and affordable health and hospital care. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-75(22). Respondents argue that in view of hospital authorities’ statutory objective, their specific attributes, and the regulatory context in which they operate, it was foreseeable that authorities facing capacity constraints would decide they could best serve their communities’ needs by acquiring an existing local hospital rather than incur the additional expense and regulatory burden of expanding a facility or constructing a new one. See Brief for Respondents 33-39.
In support of this argument, respondents observe that hospital authorities are simultaneously empowered to act in ways private entities cannot while also being subject to significant regulatory constraints. On the power side, as the Court of Appeals noted, 663 F. 3d, at 1376-1377, hospital authorities may acquire through eminent domain property that is “essential to the [authority’s] purposes.” § 31-7-75(12). On the restraint side, hospital authorities are managed by a publicly accountable board, §§31-7-74.1, 31-7-76; they must operate on a nonprofit basis, §31-7-77; and they may only lease a project for others to operate after determining that doing so will promote the community’s public health needs and that the lessee will not receive more than a reasonable rate of return on its investment, §31-7-75(7). Moreover, hospital authorities operate within a broader regulatory context in which Georgia requires any party seeking to establish or significantly expand certain medical facilities, including hospitals, to obtain a certificate of need from state regulators. See §31-6-40 et seq.
We have no doubt that Georgia’s hospital authorities differ materially from private corporations that offer hospital services. But nothing in the Law or any other provision of Georgia law clearly articulates a state policy to allow authorities to exercise their general corporate powers, including their acquisition power, without regard to negative effects on competition. The state legislature’s objective of improving access to affordable health care does not logically suggest that the State intended that hospital authorities pursue that end through mergers that create monopolies. Nor do the restrictions imposed on hospital authorities, including the requirement that they operate on a nonprofit basis, reveal such a policy. Particularly in light of our national policy favoring competition, these restrictions should be read to reflect more modest aims. The legislature may have viewed profit generation as incompatible with its goal of providing care for the indigent sick. In addition, the legislature may have believed that some hospital authorities would operate in markets with characteristics of natural monopolies, in which case the legislature could not rely on competition to control prices. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579, 595-596 (1976).
We recognize that Georgia, particularly through its certificate of need requirement, does limit competition in the market for hospital services in some respects. But regulation of an industry, and even the authorization of discrete forms of anticompetitive conduct pursuant to a regulatory structure, does not establish that the State has affirmatively contemplated other forms of anticompetitive conduct that are only tangentially related. Thus, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), we rejected a state-action defense to price-fixing claims where a state bar adopted a compulsory minimum fee schedule. Although the State heavily regulated the practice of law, we found no evidence that it had adopted a policy to displace price competition among lawyers. Id., at 788-792. And in Cantor, we concluded that a state commission’s regulation of rates for electricity charged by a public utility did not confer state-action immunity for a claim that the utility’s free distribution of light bulbs restrained trade in the light-bulb market. 428 U. S., at 596.
In this case, the fact that Georgia imposes limits on entry into the market for medical services, which apply to both hospital authorities and private corporations, does not clearly articulate a policy favoring the consolidation of existing hospitals that are engaged in active competition. Accord, FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F. 2d 1206, 1213, n. 13 (CA11 1991). As to the Authority’s eminent domain power, it was not exercised here and we do not find it relevant to the question whether the State authorized hospital authorities to consolidate market power through potentially anticompetitive acquisitions of existing hospitals.
B
Finally, respondents contend that to the extent there is any doubt about whether the clear-articulation test is satisfied in this context, federal courts should err on the side of recognizing immunity to avoid improper interference with state policy choices. See Brief for Respondents 43-44. But we do not find the Law ambiguous on the question whether it clearly articulates a policy authorizing anticom-petitive acquisitions; it does not.
More fundamentally, respondents’ suggestion is inconsistent with the principle that “state-action immunity is disfavored.” Ticor Title, 504 U. S., at 636. Parker and its progeny are premised on an understanding that respect for the States’ coordinate role in government counsels against reading the federal antitrust laws to restrict the States’ sovereign capacity to regulate their economies and provide services to their citizens. But federalism and state sovereignty are poorly served by a rule of construction that would allow “essential national policies” embodied in the antitrust laws to be displaced by state delegations of authority “intended to achieve more limited ends.” 504 U. S., at 636. As an amici brief filed by 20 States in support of the FTC contends, loose application of the clear-artieulation test would attach significant unintended consequences to States’ frequent delegations of corporate authority to local bodies, effectively requiring States to disclaim any intent to displace competition to avoid inadvertently authorizing anticompeti-tive conduct. Brief for State of Illinois et al. 12-17; see also Surgical Care Center of Hammond, L. C. v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171 F. 3d 231, 236 (CA5 1999) (en banc). We decline to set such a trap for unwary state legislatures.
* * *
We hold that Georgia has not clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy to allow hospital authorities to make acquisitions that substantially lessen competition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Georgia did not join the notice of appeal filed by the FTC and is no longer a party in the case.
In tension with the Court of Appeals’ decision, other Circuits have held in analogous circumstances that substate governmental entities exercising general corporate powers were not entitled to state-action immunity. See Kay Elec. Cooperative v. Newkirk, 647 P. 3d 1039, 1043, 1045-1047 (CA10 2011); First Am. Title Co. v. Devaugh, 480 P. 3d 438, 456-457 (CA6 2007); Surgical Care Center of Hammond, L. C. v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171F. 3d 231, 235-236 (CA5 1999) (en banc); Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital Dist., 940 P. 2d 397, 402-403 (CA9 1991).
After issuing'its decision, the Court of Appeals dissolved the temporary injunction that it had granted pending appeal and the transaction closed. The case is not moot, however, because the District Court on remand could enjoin respondents from taking actions that would disturb the status quo and impede a final remedial decree. See Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 307 (2012) (“A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F. 3d 1028, 1033-1034 (CADC 2008) (opinion of Brown, J.) (rejecting a mootness argument in a similar posture).
An amicus curiae contends that we should recognize and apply a “market participant” exception to state-action immunity because Georgia’s hospital authorities engage in proprietary activities. Brief for National Federation of Independent Business 6-24; see also Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U. S. 365, 374-375, 379 (1991) (leaving open the possibility of a market participant exception). Because this argument was not raised by the parties or passed on by the lower courts, we do not consider it. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that while Georgia’s hospital authorities are “unique entities” that lie “somewhere between a local, general-purpose governing body (such as a city or county) and a corporation,” they qualify as “an instrumentality, agency, or ‘political subdivision’ of Georgia for purposes of state action immunity.” Crosby v. Hospital Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes Cty., 93 F. 3d 1515, 1524-1526 (1996). The FTC has not challenged that characterization of Georgia’s hospital authorities, and we accordingly operate from the assumption that hospital authorities are akin to political subdivisions.
Compare Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-7-75(4), (7) (2012) (authorizing hospital authorities to acquire projects and enter lease agreements) with § 14-2-302 (outlining general powers of private corporations in Georgia, which include the ability to acquire and lease property), § 14-2-1101 (allowing corporate mergers), and §§ 14-2-1201,14-2-1202 (allowing sales of corporate assets to other corporations).
See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U. S. 48, 64, 66, and n. 25 (1985) (finding that a state commission’s decision to encourage collective ratemaking by common carriers was entitled to state-action immunity where the legislature had left “[t]he details of the inherently anticompetitive rate-setting process... to the agency’s discretion”); Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 42 (1985) (describing New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978), as a case where there was not an “express intent to displace the antitrust laws” but where the regulatory structure at issue restricting the establishment or relocation of automobile dealerships “inherently displaced unfettered business freedom” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
The Court of Appeals also invoked Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-84, which provides that hospital authorities do not have the power to assess taxes, but allows the applicable governing body in the authority’s area of operation to impose taxes to cover the authority’s expenses. See 663 F. 3d, at 1377. This provision applies in cases in which the county or municipality has entered into a contract with a hospital authority for the use of its facilities. See §§31-7-84(a), 31-7-85. No such contract exists in this case, and respondents have not relied on this provision in briefing or argument
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This litigation presents for review the denial of a motion, filed in the District Court on behalf of the President of the United States, in the case of United States v. Mitchell (D. C. Crim. No. 74-110), to quash a third-party-subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c). The subpoena directed the President to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides and advisers. The court rejected the President’s claims of absolute executive privilege, of lack of jurisdiction, and of failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 17 (c). The President appealed to the Court of Appeals. We granted both the United States’ petition for certiorari before judgment (No. 73-1766), and also the President’s cross-petition for certiorari before judgment (No. 73-1834), because of the public importance of the issues presented and the need for their prompt resolution. 417 U. S. 927 and 960 (1974).
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven named individuals with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although he was not designated as such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President, among others, as an unindicted co-conspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, see n. 8, infra, a subpoena duces tecum was issued pursuant to Rule 17 (c) to the President by the United States District Court and made returnable on May 2, 1974. This subpoena required the production, in advance of the September 9 trial date, of certain tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the President and others. The Special Prosecutor was able to fix the time, place, and persons present at these discussions because the White House daily logs and appointment records had been delivered to him. On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations; portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the present case were included. On May 1, 1974, the President’s counsel filed a “special appearance” and a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17 (c). This motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege. At a subsequent hearing, further motions to expunge the grand jury’s action naming the President as an unindicted coconspirator and for protective orders against the disclosure of that information were filed or raised orally by counsel for the President.
On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the motions to expunge and for protective orders. 377 F. Supp. 1326. It further ordered “the President or any subordinate officer, official, or employee with custody or control of the documents or objects subpoenaed,” id., at 1331, to deliver to the District Court, on or before May 31, 1974, the originals of all subpoenaed items, as well as an index and analysis of those items, together with tape copies of those portions of the subpoenaed recordings for which transcripts had been released to the public by the President on April 30. The District Court rejected jurisdictional challenges based on a contention that the dispute was non justiciable because it was between the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and hence “intra-executive” in character; it also rejected the contention that the Judiciary was without authority to review an assertion of executive privilege by the President. The court’s rejection of the first challenge was based on the authority and powers vested in the Special Prosecutor by the regulation promulgated by the Attorney General; the court concluded that a justiciable controversy was presented. The second challenge was held to be foreclosed by the decision in Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 58, 487 P. 2d 700 (1973).
The District Court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim of executive privilege. The court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the presumptive privilege was overcome by the Special Prosecutor’s prima facie “demonstration of need sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers....” 377 F. Supp., at 1330. The court held, finally, that the Special Prosecutor had satisfied the requirements of Rule 17 (c). The District Court stayed its order pending appellate review on condition that review was sought before 4 p. m., May 24. The court further provided that matters filed under seal remain under seal when transmitted as part of the record.
On May 24, 1974, the President filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court order, and the certified record from the District Court was docketed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On the same day, the President also filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals seeking review of the District Court order.
Later on May 24, the Special Prosecutor also filed, in this Court, a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment. On May 31, the petition was granted with an expedited briefing schedule. 417 U. S. 927. On June 6, the President filed, under seal, a cross-petition for writ of certiorari before judgment. This cross-petition was granted June 15, 1974, 417 U. S. 960, and the case was set for argument on July 8, 1974.
I
JURISDICTION
The threshold question presented is whether the May 20, 1974, order of the District Court was an appeal-able order and whether this case was properly “in” the Court of Appeals when the petition for certiorari was filed in this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1254. The Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 encompasses only “final decisions of the district courts.” Since the appeal was timely filed and all other procedural requirements were met, the petition is properly before this Court for consideration if the District Court order was final. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1254 (1), 2101 (e).
The finality requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 embodies a strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstructing or impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals. See, e. g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 324-326 (1940). This requirement ordinarily promotes judicial efficiency and hastens the ultimate termination of litigation. In applying this principle to an order denying a motion to quash and requiring the production of evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, it has been repeatedly held that the order is not final and hence not appealable. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530, 532 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, supra; Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117 (1906). This Court has
“consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the production of desired information to a choice between compliance with a trial court’s order to produce prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal.” United States v. Ryan, supra, at 533.
The requirement of submitting to contempt, however, is not without exception and in some instances the purposes underlying the finality rule require a different result. For example, in Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), a subpoena had been directed to a third party requesting certain exhibits; the appellant, who owned the exhibits, sought to raise a claim of privilege. The Court held an order compelling production was appeal-able because it was unlikely that the third party would risk a contempt citation in order to allow immediate review of the appellant’s claim of privilege. Id., at 12-13. That case fell within the “limited class of cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual’s claims.” United States v. Ryan, supra, at 533.
Here too, the traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal is peculiarly inappropriate due to the unique setting in which the question arises. To require a President of the United States to place himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of the ruling would be unseemly, and would present an unnecessary occasion for constitutional confrontation between two branches of the Government. Similarly, a federal judge should not be placed in the posture of issuing a citation to a President simply in order to invoke review. The issue whether a President can be cited for contempt could itself engender protracted litigation, and would further delay both review on the merits of his claim of privilege and the ultimate termination of the underlying criminal action for which his evidence is sought. These considerations lead us to conclude that the order of the District Court was an appealable order. The appeal from that order was therefore properly “in” the Court of Appeals, and the case is now properly before this Court on the writ of certiorari before judgment. 28 U. S. C. § 1254; 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (e). Gay v. Buff, 292 U. S. 25, 30 (1934).
II
JUSTICIABILITY
In the District Court, the President’s counsel argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena because the matter was an intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive Branch and hence not subject to judicial resolution. That argument has been renewed in this Court with emphasis on the contention that the dispute does not present a “case” or “controversy” which can be adjudicated in the federal courts. The President’s counsel argues that the federal courts should not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of Government. He views the present dispute as essentially a “jurisdictional” dispute within the Executive Branch which he analogizes to a dispute between two congressional committees. Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869) ; United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d 167, 171 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U. S. 935 (1965), it is contended that a President’s decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. Although his counsel concedes that the President has delegated certain specific powers to the Special Prosecutor, he has not “waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor the President’s duty to claim privilege as to all materials... which fall within the President’s inherent authority to refuse to disclose to any executive officer.” Brief for the President 42. The Special Prosecutor’s demand for the items therefore presents, in the view of the President’s counsel, a political question under Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), since it involves a “textually demonstrable” grant of power under Art. II.
The mere assertion of a claim of an “intra-branch dispute,” without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry. In United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426 (1949), the Court observed, “courts must look behind names that symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is presented.” Id., at 430. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 (1944); United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153 (1953); Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U. S. 645 (1954); PMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 483 n. 2 (1958); United States v. Marine Bancorporation ante, p. 602; and United States v. Connecticut National Bank, ante, p. 656.
Our starting point is the nature of the proceeding for which the evidence is sought — here a pending criminal prosecution. It is a judicial proceeding in a federal court alleging violation of federal laws and is brought in the name of the United States as sovereign. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). Under the authority of Art. II, § 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U. S. C. § 516. It has also vested in him the power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 U. S. C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533. Acting pursuant to those statutes, the Attorney General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and tenure. The regulation gives the Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these specially delegated duties. 38 Fed. Reg. 30739, as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32805.
So long as this regulation is extant it has the force of law. In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954), regulations of the Attorney General delegated certain of his discretionary powers to the Board of Immigration Appeals and required that Board to exercise its own discretion on appeals in deportation cases. The Court held that so long as the Attorney General’s regulations remained operative, he denied himself the authority to exercise the discretion delegated to the Board even though the original authority was his and he could reassert it by amending the regulations. Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363, 388 (1957), and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (1959), reaffirmed the basic holding of Accardi.
Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor’s authority. But he has not done so. So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it. Moreover, the delegation of authority to the Special Prosecutor in this case is not an ordinary delegation by the Attorney General to a subordinate officer: with the authorization of the President, the Acting Attorney General provided in the regulation that the Special Prosecutor was not to be removed without the “consensus” of eight designated leaders of Congress. N. 8, supra.
The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an obvious controversy in the ordinary sense, but that alone is not sufficient to meet constitutional standards. In the constitutional sense, controversy means more than disagreement and conflict; rather it means the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve. Here at issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case. It is sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the communications of the President. Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are “of a type which are traditionally justiciable.” United States v. ICC, 337 U. S., at 430. The independent Special Prosecutor with his asserted need for the subpoenaed material in the underlying criminal prosecution is opposed by the President with his steadfast assertion of privilege against disclosure of the material. This setting assures there is “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204. Moreover, since the matter is one arising in the regular course of a federal criminal prosecution, it is within the traditional scope of Art. Ill power. Id., at 198.
In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that both parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciability. It would be inconsistent with the applicable law and regulation, and the unique facts of this case to conclude other than that the Special Prosecutor has standing to bring this action and that a justiciable controversy is presented for decision.
Ill
RULE 17 (c)
The subpoena duces tecum is challenged on the ground that the Special Prosecutor failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c), which governs the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum in federal criminal proceedings. If we sustained this challenge, there would be no occasion to reach the claim of privilege asserted with respect to the subpoenaed material. Thus we turn to the question whether the requirements of Rule 17 (c) have been satisfied. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 304 U. S. 61, 64 (1938); Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
Rule 17 (c) provides:
“A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.”
A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be “unreasonable or oppressive,” but not otherwise. The leading case in this Court interpreting this standard is Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 214 (1951). This case recognized certain fundamental characteristics of the subpoena duces tecum in criminal cases: (1) it was not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases, id., at 220; (2) its chief innovation was to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial for the inspection of subpoenaed materials, ibid. As both parties agree, cases decided in the wake of Bowman have generally-followed Judge Weinfeld’s formulation in United States v. Iozia, 13 F. R. D. 335, 338 (SDNY 1952), as to the required showing. Under this test, in order to require production prior to trial, the moving party must show: (1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general “fishing expedition.”
Against this background, the Special Prosecutor, in order to carry his burden, must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity. Our own review of the record necessarily affords a less comprehensive view of the total situation than was available to the trial judge and we are unwilling to conclude that the District Court erred in the evaluation of the Special Prosecutor’s showing under Rule 17 (c). Our conclusion is based on the record before us, much of which is under seal. Of course, the contents of the subpoenaed tapes could not at that stage be described fully by the Special Prosecutor, but there was a sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment. United States v. Gross, 24 F. R. D. 138 (SDNY 1959). With respect to many of the tapes, the Special Prosecutor offered the sworn testimony or statements of one or more of the participants in the conversations as to what was said at the time. As for the remainder of the tapes, the identity of the participants and the time and place of the conversations, taken in their total context, permit a rational inference that at least part of the conversations relate to the offenses charged in the indictment.
We also conclude there was a sufficient preliminary showing that each of the subpoenaed tapes contains evidence admissible with respect to the offenses charged in the indictment. The most cogent objection to the admissibility of the taped conversations here at issue is that they are a collection of out-of-court statements by declarants who will not be subject to cross-examination and that the statements are therefore inadmissible hearsay. Here, however, most of the tapes apparently contain conversations to which one or more of the defendants named in the indictment were party. The hearsay rule does not automatically bar all out-of-court statements by a defendant in a criminal case. Declarations by one defendant may also be admissible against other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy. The same is true of declarations of coconspirators who are not defendants in the case on trial. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 81 (1970). Recorded conversations may also be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of any defendant who testifies or any other coconspirator who testifies. Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial. See, e. g., United States v. Carter, 15 F. R. D. 367, 371 (DC 1954). Here, however, there are other valid potential evidentiary uses for the same material, and the analysis and possible transcription of the tapes may take a significant period of time. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in authorizing the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum.
Enforcement of a pretrial subpoena duces tecum must necessarily be committed to the sound discretion of the trial court since the necessity for the subpoena most often turns upon a determination of factual issues. Without a determination of arbitrariness or that the trial court finding was without record support, an appellate court will not ordinarily disturb a finding that the applicant for a subpoena complied with Rule 17 (c). See, e. g., Sue v. Chicago Transit Authority, 279 F. 2d 416, 419 (CA7 1960); Shotkin v. Nelson, 146 F. 2d 402 (CA10 1944).
In a case such as this, however, where a subpoena is directed to a President of the United States, appellate review, in deference to a coordinate branch of Government, should be particularly meticulous to ensure that the standards of Rule 17 (c) have been correctly applied. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). From our examination of the materials submitted by the Special Prosecutor to the District Court in support of his motion for the subpoena, we are persuaded that the District Court's denial of the President's motion to quash the subpoena was consistent with Rule 17 (c). We also conclude that the Special Prosecutor has made a sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for production before trial. The subpoenaed materials are not available from any other source, and their examination and processing should not await trial in the circumstances shown. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 214 (1951); United States v. Iozia, 13 F. R. D. 335 (SDNY 1952).
IV
THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE A
Having determined that the requirements of Rule 17 (c) were satisfied, we turn to the claim that the subpoena should be quashed because it demands “confidential conversations between a President and his close advisors that it would be inconsistent with the public interest to produce.” App. 48a. The first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President’s claim of privilege. The second contention is that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, the court should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the privilege prevails over the subpoena duces tecum.
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. The President’s counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id., at 177.
No holding of the Court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution, but other exercises of power by the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch have been found invalid as in conflict with the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). In a series of cases, the Court interpreted the explicit immunity conferred by express provisions of the Constitution on Members of the House and Senate by the Speech or Debate Clause, U. S. Const. Art. I, § 6. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169 (1966). Since this Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and delineate claims arising under express powers, it must follow that the Court has authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated powers.
Our system of government “requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.” Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 211, the Court stated:
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the “judicial Power of the United States” vested in the federal courts by Art. Ill, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (S. Mittell ed. 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is” with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison, supra, at 177.
B
In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President’s counsel urges two grounds, one of which is common to all governments and one of which is peculiar to our system of separation of powers. The first ground is the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process. Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings.
The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in support of the claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 629-630 (1935); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 190-191 (1881), insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications.
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President’s need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III. In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence.
“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S., at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of “a workable government” and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.
C
Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch. The right and indeed the duty to resolve that question does not free the Judiciary from according high respect to the representations made on behalf of the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190, 191-192 (No. 14,694) (CCVa. 1807).
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. In Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 58, 487 F. 2d 700 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that such Presidential communications are “presumptively privileged,” id., at 75, 487 F. 2d, at 717, and this position is accepted by both parties in the present litigation. We agree with Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s observation, therefore, that “[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas., at 192.
But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that “the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.” Berger v. United States, 295 U. S., at 88. We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.
Only recently the Court restated the ancient proposition of law, albeit in the context of a grand jury inquiry rather than a trial,
“that ‘the public... has a right to every man’s evidence,’ except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege, United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. [323, 331 (1950)] ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932)....” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 (1972).
The privileges referred to by the Court are designed to protect weighty and legitimate competing interests. Thus, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no man “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” And, generally, an attorney or a priest may not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence. These and other interests are recognized in law by privileges against forced
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The two cases before us raise a single question. Can courts toll, for nonstatutory equitable reasons, the statutory time (and related amount) limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in §6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986? We hold that they cannot.
These two cases present similar circumstances. In each case a taxpayer initially paid the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) several thousand dollars that he did not owe. In each case the taxpayer (or his representative) filed an administrative claim for refund several years after the relevant statutory time period for doing so had ended. In each case the taxpayer suffered a disability (senility or alcoholism), which, he said, explained why the delay was not his fault. And in each case he asked the court to extend the relevant statutory time period for an “equitable” reason, namely, the existence of a mental disability — a reason not mentioned in §6511, but which, we assume, would permit a court to toll the statutory limitations period if but only if, §6511 contains an implied “equitable tolling” exception. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1056 (2d ed. 1987 and Supp. 1996); see also Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 88 F. 3d 847, 852 (CA7 1996) (defining equitable tolling).
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit read §6511 as if it did contain an implied exception that would permit “equitable tolling.” It then applied principles of equity to each case. It found those principles justified tolling the statutory time period. And it permitted the actions to proceed. 67 F. 3d 260 (1995); judgt. order reported at 70 F. 3d 120 (1995). All other Circuits that have considered the matter, however, have taken the opposite view. They have held that §6511 does not authorize equitable tolling. See Amoco Production Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F. 3d 1464 (CA10 1996); Lovett v. United States, 81 F. 3d 143 (CA Fed. 1996); Webb v. United States, 66 F. 3d 691 (CA4 1995); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F. 2d 25 (CA1 1993) (per curiam); and Vintilla v. United States, 931 F. 2d 1444 (CA11 1991). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. And we conclude that the latter Circuits are correct.
The taxpayers rest their claim for equitable tolling upon Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), a case in which this Court considered the timeliness of an employee’s lawsuit charging his Government employer with discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The Court found the lawsuit untimely, but nevertheless tolled the limitations period. It held that the “rule of equitable tolling” applies “to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable” to Title VII suits against private employers. 498 U. S., at 94-95. The Court went on to say that the “same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.” Id., at 95-96.
The taxpayers, pointing to Irwin, argue that principles of equitable tolling would have applied had they sued private
defendants, e. g., had they sought restitution from private defendants for “Money Had and Received.” See C. Keigwin, Cases in Common Law Pleading 220 (2d ed. 1934). They add that given Irwin’s language, there must be a “presumption” that limitations periods in tax refund suits against the Government can be equitably tolled. And, they say, that “presumption,” while “rebuttable,” has not been rebutted. They conclude that, given Irwin, the Ninth Circuit correctly tolled the statutory period for “equitable” reasons.
In evaluating this argument, we are willing to assume, favorably to the taxpayers but only for argument’s sake, that a tax refund suit and a private suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to warrant asking Irwin’s negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply? But see Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 153-154 (1960) (citing Curtis’s Administratrix v. Fiedler, 2 Black 461, 479 (1863)) (distinguishing common-law suit against the tax collector from action of assumpsit for money had and received); George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 382-383 (1933); see also Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 685, 687 (1947) (describing collector suit as a fiction solely designed to bring the Government into court). We can travel no further, however, along Irwin’s road, for there are strong reasons for answer-Irwin’s question in the Government’s favor.
Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form. Ordinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple language, which one can often plausibly read as containing an implied “equitable tolling” exception. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c) (requiring suit for employment discrimination to be filed “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of notice of final [EEOC] action ... ”). But § 6511 uses language that is not simple. It sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner, that, linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as containing implicit exceptions. Moreover, §6511 reiterates its limitations several times in several different ways. Section 6511 says, first, that a
“[c]laim for ... refund ... of any tax ... shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed . . . within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.” 26 U. S. C. §6511(a).
It then says that
“[n]o credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund is filed . . . within such period.” § 6511(b)(1).
It reiterates the point by imposing substantive limitations:
“If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period ... the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return. .. .” § 6511(b)(2)(A).
And
“[i]f the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.” § 6511(b)(2)(B).
The Tax Code reemphasizes the point when it says that refunds that do not comply with these limitations “shall be considered erroneous,” §6514, and specifies procedures for the Government’s recovery of any such “erroneous” refund payment. §§ 6532(b), 7405. In addition, §6511 sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits, and those very specific exceptions do not include “equitable tolling.” See § 6511(d) (establishing special time limit rules for refunds related to operating losses, credit self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad debts); see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 610 (1990) (discussing mitigation provisions' set forth in 26 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1314); §507 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 961 (temporarily tolling limitations period during wartime).
To read an “equitable tolling” provision into these provisions, one would have to assume an implied exception for tolling virtually every time a number appears. To do so would work a kind of linguistic havoc. Moreover, such an interpretation would require tolling, not only procedural limitations, but also substantive limitations on the amount of recovery — a kind of tolling for which we have found no direct precedent. Section 6511’s detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, “equitable” exceptions into the statute that it wrote. There are no counter-indications. Tax law, after all, is not normally characterized case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.
The nature of the underlying subject matter — tax collection — underscores the linguistic point. The IRS processes more than 200 million tax returns each year. It issues more than 90 million refunds. See Dept, of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1995 Data Book 8-9. To read an “equitable tolling” exception into §6511 could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for “equitable tolling” which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification* See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1926) (deleting provision excusing tax deficiencies in the estates of insane or deceased individuals because of difficulties involved in defining incompetence). The nature and potential magnitude of the administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement system. At the least it tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute’s limitations periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity so requires.
The taxpayers’ counterrebuttal consists primarily of an interesting historical analysis of the Internal Revenue Code’s tax refund provisions. They try to show that §6511’s specific, detailed language reflects congressional concern about matters not related to equitable tolling. They explain some language, for example, in terms of a congressional effort to stop taxpayers from keeping the refund period open indefinitely through the device of making a series of small tax payments. See S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 (1924). They explain other language as an effort to make the refund time period and the tax assessment period coextensive. See H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 52 (1942). Assuming all that is so, however, such congressional efforts still seem but a smaller part of a larger congressional objective: providing the Government with strong statutory “protection against stale demands.” Cf. United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U. S. 528, 533 (1938) (statute of limitations bars untimely amendment of claim for additional refund). Moreover, the history to which the taxpayers point reveals that §6511’s predecessor tax refund provisions, like §6511, contained highly detailed language with clear time limits. See, e. g., § 281(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 301 (4-year limit on claims for overpayment of income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax and cap on refund amount); § 322(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209,47 Stat. 242 (2-year limit for claim filing and corresponding limit on refund amount); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 808 (adopting current alternative time and amount limitations); see also §810 of the Revenue Act. of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 283 (imposing time and amount limits for estate tax refunds). And that history lacks any instance (but for the present cases) of equitable tolling. On balance, these historical considerations help the Government’s argument.
For these reasons, we conclude that Congress did not intend the “equitable tolling” doctrine to apply to §6511’s time limitations. The Ninth Circuit’s decisions are
Reversed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a novel question concerning § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The setting, in a nutshell: A covered State passed a law adopting a new election practice, obtained the preclearance required by § 5, and held an election. Soon thereafter, the law under which the election took place was invalidated by the State’s highest court on the ground that it violated a controlling provision of the State’s Constitution. The question presented: Must the State obtain fresh preclearance in order to reinstate the election practice prevailing before enactment of the law struck down by the State’s Supreme Court? We hold that, for §5 purposes, the invalidated law never gained “force or effect.” Therefore, the State’s reversion to its prior practice did not rank as a “change” requiring preclearance.
I
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., “was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which ha[d] infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966). In three earlier statutes, passed in 1957,1960, and 1964, Congress had empowered the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) to combat voting discrimination through “case-by-case litigation.” Id., at 313. These lawsuits, however, made little headway. Voting-rights suits were “unusually onerous to prepare” and the progress of litigation was “exceedingly slow,” in no small part due to the obstructionist tactics of state officials. Id., at 314. Moreover, some States “resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees.” Id., at 335.
The VRA reflected Congress’ determination that “sterner and more elaborate measures” were needed to counteract these formidable hindrances. Id., at 309. Sections 4 and 5 impose the most stringent of the Act’s remedies. Under §4(b), as amended, a State or political subdivision is a so-called “covered jurisdiction” if, on one of three specified coverage dates: (1) it maintained a literacy requirement or other “test or device” as a prerequisite to voting, and (2) fewer than 50% of its voting-age citizens were registered to vote or voted in that year’s Presidential election. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(b). Section 4(a) suspends the operation of all such “test[s] or devicefs]” in covered jurisdictions. §1973b(a). Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to obtain what has come to be known as “preclearance” from the District Court for the District of Columbia or the DOJ before “enact[ing] or seeking] to administer” any alteration of their practices or procedures affecting voting. § 1973c(a).
A change will be precleared only if it “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or [because of membership in a language minority group].” Ibid. An election practice has the “effect” of “denying or abridging the right to vote” if it “lead[s] to a retrogression in the position of racial [or language] minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). See also Young v. Fordice, 520 U. S. 273, 276 (1997); 28 CFR §51.54 (2007). As amended in 2006, the statute defines “purpose” to include “any discriminatory purpose.” 120 Stat. 581, codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1973c(c).
Congress took the extraordinary step of requiring covered jurisdictions to preclear all changes in their voting practices because it “feared that the mere suspension of existing tests [in § 4(a)] would not completely solve the problem, given the history some States had of simply enacting new and slightly different requirements with the same discriminatory effect.” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544,548 (1969). By putting the burden on covered jurisdictions to demonstrate that future changes would not be discriminatory, § 5 served to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 328.
Sections 4 and 5 were originally scheduled to lapse once a covered jurisdiction complied with § 4(a)’s ban on the use of tests and devices for five years. See 79 Stat. 438. Finding continuing discrimination in access to the ballot, however, Congress renewed and expanded §§ 4 and 5 on four occasions, most recently in 2006. Sections 4 and 5 are now set to expire in 2031, see 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(a)(8), but a covered jurisdiction may “bail out” at any time if it satisfies certain requirements, see § 1973b(a)(l).
II
The voting practice at issue in this litigation is the method used to fill midterm vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, the governing body of Mobile County, Alabama. Composed of three members elected by separate districts to four-year terms, the Commission has the power to levy taxes, make appropriations, and exercise other countywide executive and administrative functions. See Ala. Code § 11— 3-11 (1975).
We set out first, as pivotal to our resolution of this ease, a full account of two disputes over the means of filling midterm vacancies on the Commission. The first occurred between 1985 and 1988; the second began in 2004 and culminates in the appeal now before us.
A
Alabama is a covered jurisdiction with a coverage date of November 1, 1964. See 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965). As of that date, Alabama law provided that midterm vacancies on all county commissions were to be filled by gubernatorial appointment. See Ala. Code §12-6 (1958). The relevant provision was later recodified without substantive change as Ala. Code § 11-3-6 (1975), which stated:
“In case of a vacancy, it shall be filled by appointment by the governor, and the person so appointed shall hold office for the remainder of the term of the commissioner in whose place he is appointed.”
In 1985, however, the state legislature passed a “local law” providing that any vacancy on the Mobile County Commission occurring “with twelve months or more remaining on the term of the vacant seat” would be filled by special election rather than gubernatorial appointment. 1985 Ala. Acts no. 85-237 (1985 Act). The DOJ precleared this new law in June 1985.
The first midterm opening on the Commission postpassage of the 1985 Act occurred in 1987, when the seat for District One — a majority African-American district — became vacant. In accord with the 1985 Act, the Governor called a special election. A Mobile County voter, Willie Stokes, promptly filed suit in state court seeking to enjoin the election. The 1985 Act, he alleged, violated Art. IV, § 105, of the Alabama Constitution, which provides that no “local law... shall be enacted in any case which is provided for by a general law.” On Stokes’s reading, the 1985 Act conflicted with § 105 because the Act addressed a matter already governed by Ala. Code §11-3-6.
The state trial court rejected Stokes’s argument and entered judgment for the state defendants. Stokes immediately appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court and sought an order staying the election pending that court’s decision. The requested stay was denied, and the special election went forward in June 1987. The winner, Samuel Jones, took office as District One’s Commissioner in July 1987. Approximately 14 months later, however, in September 1988, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment. Finding that the 1985 Act “clearly offend[ed] §105 of the [Alabama] Constitution,” the court declared the Act unconstitutional. Stokes v. Noonan, 534 So. 2d 237, 238-239.
The Alabama Supreme Court’s decree cast grave doubt on the legitimacy of Jones’s election and, consequently, on his continued tenure in office. The Governor, however, defused any potential controversy by immediately invoking his authority under Ala. Code § 11-3-6 and appointing Jones to the Commission.
B
The next midterm vacancy on the Commission did not occur until October 2005, when Jones — who had been reelected every four years since 1988 — was elected mayor of the city of Mobile. Once again, the method of filling the vacancy became the subject of litigation. In 2004, the state legislature had passed (and the DOJ had precleared) an amendment to Ala. Code § 11-3-6 providing that vacancies on county commissions were to be filled by gubernatorial appointment “[u]nless a local law authorizes a special election.” 2004 Ala. Acts no. 2004-455 (2004 Act). When the 2005 vacancy arose, three Mobile County voters and Alabama state legislators — appellees Yvonne Kennedy, James Buskey, and William Clark (hereinafter Kennedy) — filed suit against Alabama’s Governor, Bob Riley, in state court. The 2004 Act’s authorization of local laws providing for special elections, they urged, had revived the 1985 Act and cured its infirmity under § 105 of the Alabama Constitution. Adopting Kennedy’s view, the state trial court ordered Governor Riley to call a special election.
While the Governor’s appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court was pending, Mobile County’s election officials obtained preclearance of procedures for a special election, scheduled to take place in January 2006. In November 2005, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order. Holding that the 2004 Act “provide[d] for prospective application only” and thus did not resurrect the 1985 Act, Alabama’s highest court ruled that “Governor Riley [wa]s authorized to fill the vacancy on the Mobile County Commission by appointment.” Riley v. Kennedy, 928 So. 2d 1013,1017. Governor Riley promptly exercised that authority by appointing Juan Chastang.
The day after the Alabama Supreme Court denied rehearing, Kennedy commenced the instant suit in Federal District Court. Invoking §5, she sought declaratory relief and an injunction barring Governor Riley from filling the Commission vacancy by appointment unless and until Alabama gained preclearance of the decisions in Stokes and Kennedy. As required by § 5, a three-judge District Court convened to hear the suit. See 42 U. S. C. §1973c(a); Allen, 393 U. S., at 563.
In August 2006, the three-judge court, after a hearing, granted the requested declaration. The court observed first that for purposes of §5’s preclearance requirement, “[cjhanges are measured by comparing the new challenged practice with the baseline practice, that is, the most recent practice that is both precleared and in force or effect.” 445 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1336 (MD Ala.). It then determined that the 1985 Act’s provision requiring special elections had been both precleared and put into “force or effect” with the special election of Jones in 1987. It followed, the District Court reasoned, that the gubernatorial appointment called for by Stokes and Kennedy ranked as a change from the baseline practice; consequently “the two [Alabama Supreme Court] decisions... should have been precleared before they were implemented.” 445 F. Supp. 2d, at 1336.
Deferring affirmative relief, the District Court gave the State 90 days to obtain preclearance of Stokes and Kennedy. 445 F. Supp. 2d, at 1336. Without conceding that preclearance was required, the State submitted the decisions to the DOJ. Finding that the State had failed to prove that the reinstatement of gubernatorial appointment would not be retrogressive, the Department denied preclearance. See App. to Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 2a-8a. “The African-American voters of District 1,” the DOJ explained, “enjoy the opportunity to elect minority candidates of their choice” under the 1985 Act. Id., at 6a. A change to gubernatorial appointment would be retrogressive because it “would transfer this electoral power to a state official elected by a statewide constituency whose racial make-up and electoral choices regularly differ from those of the voters of District 1.” Ibid.
After the State unsuccessfully sought DOJ'reconsideration, Kennedy returned to the District Court and filed a motion for further relief. On May 1, 2007, the District Court ruled that “Governor Bob Riley’s appointment of Juan Chastang to the Mobile County Commission... was unlawful under federal law” and vacated the appointment. App. to Juris. Statement la-2a. Governor Riley filed a notice of appeal in the District Court on May 18, 2007, and a jurisdictional statement in this Court on July 17, 2007. In November 2007, we postponed a determination of jurisdiction until our consideration of the case on the merits. 552 U. S. 1035.
In the meantime, a special election was held in Mobile County in October 2007 to fill the vacancy resulting from the District Court’s order vacating Chastang’s appointment. Chastang ran in the election but was defeated by Merceria Ludgood, who garnered nearly 80% of the vote. See Certification of Results, Special Election, Mobile County (Oct. 16, 2007), http://records.mobile-county.net/ViewImagesPDFAll. Aspx?ID=2007081288 (as visited May 22, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Ludgood continues to occupy the District One seat on the Commission. Her term will expire in November 2008.
Ill
Before reaching the merits of Governor Riley’s appeal, we first take up Kennedy’s threshold objection. The appeal, Kennedy urges, must be dismissed as untimely.
Section 5 provides that “any appeal” from the decision of a three-judge district court “shall lie to the Supreme Court.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c(a). Such an appeal must be filed within 60 days of the District Court’s entry of a final judgment. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(b). Kennedy maintains that Governor Riley’s May 18, 2007 notice of appeal came too late because the District Court’s August 2006 order qualified as a final judgment. If Kennedy’s characterization is correct, then Governor Riley’s time to file an appeal expired in October 2006, and his appeal must be dismissed. But if, as Governor Riley maintains, the District Court did not issue a final judgment until the order vacating Chastang’s appointment on May 1, 2007, then the Governor filed his appeal well within the required time.
A final judgment is “one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945). The District Court’s August 2006 order declared that the Alabama Supreme Court’s decisions in Stokes and Kennedy required preclearance, but that order left unresolved Kennedy’s demand for injunctive relief. We have long held that an order resolving liability without addressing a plaintiff’s requests for relief is not final. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737, 742-743 (1976). See also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3915.2, p. 271 (2d ed. 1992).
Resisting the conclusion these authorities indicate, Kennedy maintains that the August 2006 order ranked as a final decision for two reasons. First, she contends, that order conclusively settled the key remedial issue, for it directed Governor Riley to seek preclearance of the Alabama Supreme Court’s decisions in Stokes and Kennedy. See Brief for Appellees 26-27. This argument misapprehends the District Court’s order: Far from requiring the Governor to seek preclearance, the District Court expressly allowed for the possibility that he would elect not to do so. See 445 F. Supp. 2d, at 1337 (“Defendant Riley is to keep the court informed of what action, if any, the State decides to take....” (emphasis added)). Second, Kennedy notes that the District Court directed entry of its August 2006 order “as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” ibid. See Brief for Appellees 27. “The label used by the District Court,” however, “cannot control [an] order’s appealability.” Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 628, n. 7 (1990). See also Wetzel, 424 U. S., at 741-743.
Because the District Court did not render its final judgment until May 1, 2007, Governor Riley’s May 18 notice of appeal was timely. We therefore proceed to the merits.
IV
Prior to 1985, Alabama filled midterm vacancies on the Mobile County Commission by gubernatorial appointment. The 1985 Act adopted a different practice — special elections. That new practice was used in one election only, held in 1987. The next year, the Alabama Supreme Court determined, in Stokes v. Noonan, that the Act authorizing special elections was invalid under the State’s Constitution. Properly framed, the issue before us is whether § 5 required Alabama to obtain preclearance before reinstating the practice of gubernatorial appointment in the wake of the decision by its highest court invalidating the special-election law.
It is undisputed that a “change” from election to appointment is a change “with respect to voting” and thus covered by § 5. See Allen, 393 U. S., at 569-570; Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U. S. 491, 502-503 (1992). We have also stated that the preclearance requirement encompasses “voting changes mandated by order of a state court.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 262 (2003). See also Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 265-266, and n. 16 (1982). The question is whether, given the circumstances here presented, any “change” within the meaning of § 5 occurred in this case.
In order to determine whether an election practice constitutes a “change” as that term is defined in our § 5 precedents, we compare the practice with the covered jurisdiction’s “baseline.” We have defined the baseline as the most recent practice that was both precleared and “in force or effect”— or, absent any change since the jurisdiction’s coverage date, the practice that was “in force or effect” on that date. See Young, 520 U. S., at 282-283. See also Presley, 502 U. S., at 495. The question is “whether a State has ‘enact[ed]’ or is ‘seeking] to administer’ a ‘practice or procedure’ that is ‘different’ enough” from the baseline to qualify as a change. Young, 520 U. S., at 281 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 1973c).
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 1985 Act was never “in force or effect” within the meaning of § 5. At all relevant times, therefore, the baseline practice for filling midterm vacancies on the Commission was the pre-1985 practice of gubernatorial appointment. The State’s reinstatement of that practice thus did not constitute a change requiring preclearance.
A
We have directly addressed the § 5 term of art “in force or effect” on three prior occasions. As will become clear, these precedents do not control this case because they differ in a critical respect. They do, however, provide the starting point for our inquiry.
In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), the question was what practice had been “in force or effect” in the city of Canton, Mississippi, on that State’s §5 coverage date, November 1, 1964. A 1962 state law required selection of city aldermen by at-large elections rather than by ward. Canton, however, “ignored the mandate [of the statute] in the conduct of the 1965 municipal elections and, as in 1961, elected aldermen by wards.” Id., at 394. In the 1969 election, the city sought to switch to at-large elections. We held that this move was a change requiring preclearance because election by ward was “the procedure in fact ‘in force or ef-. feet’ in Canton on November 1, 1964.” Id., at 395.
We endeavored to determine in Perkins the voting procedure that would have been followed on the coverage date, November 1, 1964. Two choices were apparent: the state law on the books since 1962 calling for at-large elections, or the practice Canton actually used, without challenge, in 1965 — election by wards. We picked the 1965 practice as the more likely indicator of the practice Canton would have employed had it held an election on the coverage date, just seven months earlier. See id., at 394-395.
Similarly, in City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125 (1983), the question was what practice had been “in force or effect” in Lockhart, Texas, on the relevant §5 coverage date, November 1, 1972. For more than 50 years, without challenge, the city had used a “numbered-post” system to elect its city council. See id., at 182, n. 6. A group of plaintiffs nonetheless contended that the numbered-post system was never “in force or effect” because it lacked state-law authorization. We noted that the validity of the numbered-post system under state law was “not entirely clear.” Id., at 132. Relying on Perkins, we considered the uncertain state of Texas law “irrelevant,” for “[t]he proper comparison [wa]s between the new system and the system actually in effect on November 1, 1972, regardless of what state law might have required.” 460 U. S., at 132 (footnote omitted).
Finally, in Young v. Fordice, decided in 1997, the question was whether a provisional voter registration plan implemented by Mississippi election officials had been “in force or effect.” Believing that the state legislature was about to amend the relevant law, the officials had prepared and obtained preclearance for a new voter registration scheme. See 520 U. S., at 279. Roughly one-third of the State’s election officials implemented the plan, registering around 4,000 voters. See id., at 278, 283. As it turned out, however, the state legislature failed to pass the amendment, and the voters who had registered under the provisional plan were required to reregister. See id., at 278. When the case reached us, we rejected the argument that “the [provisional [p]lan, because it was precleared by the Attorney General, became part of the baseline against which to judge whether a future change must be precleared.” Id., at 282. Regarding the provisional plan as a “temporary misapplication of state law,” we held that, for § 5 purposes, the plan was “never ‘in force or effect.’ ” Ibid. We emphasized that the officials who implemented the provisional plan “did not intend to administer an unlawful plan” and that they abandoned it “as soon as its unlawfulness became apparent.” Id., at 283. We also noted that the provisional plan had been used for only 41 days and that the State “held no elections” during that period. Ibid.
B
Perkins and Lockhart established that an election practice may be “in force or effect” for § 5 purposes despite its illegality under state law if, as a practical matter, it was “actually in effect.” Lockhart, 460 U. S., at 132. Our more recent decision in Young, however, qualified that general rule: A practice best characterized as nothing more than a “temporary misapplication of state law,” we held, is not “ ‘in force or effect,’” even if actually implemented by state election officials. 520 U. S., at 282.
If the only relevant factors were the length of time a practice was in use and the extent to which it was implemented, this would be a close case falling somewhere between the two poles established by our prior decisions. On one hand, as in Young, the 1985 Act was a “temporary misapplication” of state law: It was on the books for just over three years and applied as a voting practice only once. In Lockhart, by contrast, the city had used the numbered-post system “for over 50 years without challenge.” 460 U. S., at 132, n. 6. (Perkins is a less clear case: The city failed to alter its practice in response to changed state law for roughly seven years, but only a single election was held during that period. See 400 U. S., at 394.) On the other hand, in Young no election occurred during the time the provisional registration plan was in use, while in this case one election was held under the later invalidated 1985 Act.
We are convinced, however, that an extraordinary circumstance not present in any past case is operative here, impelling the conclusion that the 1985 Act was never “in force or effect”: The Act was challenged in state court at first opportunity, the lone election was held in the shadow of that legal challenge, and the Act was ultimately invalidated by the Alabama Supreme Court.
These characteristics plainly distinguish the present case from Perkins and Lockhart. The state judiciary had no involvement in either of those cases, as the practices at issue were administered without legal challenge of any kind. And in Lockhart, we justified our unwillingness to incorporate a practice’s legality under state law into the §5 “force or effect” inquiry in part on this ground: “We doubt[ed] that Congress intended” to require “the Attorney General and the District Court for the District of Columbia” to engage in “speculation as to state law.” 460 U. S., at 133, n. 8. Here, in contrast, the 1985 Act’s invalidity under the Alabama Constitution has been definitively established by the Alabama Supreme Court.
The prompt legal challenge and the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision not only distinguish this case from Perkins and Lockhart; they also provide strong cause to conclude that, in the context of § 5, the 1985 Act was never “in force or effect.” A State’s highest court is unquestionably “the ultimate exposito[r] of state law.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691 (1975). And because the prerogative of the Alabama Supreme Court to say what Alabama law is merits respect in federal forums, a law challenged at first opportunity and invalidated by Alabama’s highest court is properly regarded as null and void ab initio, incapable of effecting any change in Alabama law or establishing a voting practice for §5 purposes. Indeed, Kennedy and the United States appear to concede that the 1985 Act would not have been “in force or effect” had the Alabama Supreme Court stayed the 1987 election pending its decision in Stokes (or simply issued its decision sooner). See Brief for Appellees 51; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23-24.
There is no good reason to hold otherwise simply because Alabama’s highest court, proceeding at a pace hardly uncommon in litigated controversies, did not render its decision until after an election was held. In this regard, we have recognized that practical considerations sometimes require courts to allow elections to proceed despite pending legal challenges. Cf. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 5-6 (2006) (per curiam) (“Given the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow the election to proceed without an injunction suspending the [challenged] rules.”).
Ruling as Kennedy and the United States urge, moreover, would have the anomalous effect of binding Alabama to an unconstitutional practice because of a state trial court’s error. If the trial court had gotten the law of Alabama right, all agree, there would have been no special election and no tenable argument that the 1985 Act had ever gained “force or effect.” But the trial court misconstrued the State’s law and, due to that court’s error, an election took place. That sequence of events, the District Court held, made the Act part of Alabama’s § 5 baseline. No precedent of this Court calls for such a holding.
The District Court took care to note that its decision “d[id] not in any way undermine [Stokes and Kennedy] under state law.” 445 F. Supp. 2d, at 1337. In some theoretical sense, that may be true. Practically, however, the District Court’s decision gave controlling effect to the erroneous trial court decision and rendered the Alabama Supreme Court’s corrections inoperative. Alabama’s Constitution, that State’s Supreme Court determined, required that, in the years here involved, vacancies on the Mobile County Commission be filled by appointment rather than special election. Nothing inherent in the practice of -appointment violates the Fifteenth Amendment or the VRA. The DOJ, however, found that a change from special elections to appointment had occurred in District One, and further found that the change was retrogressive, hence barred by § 5. The District Court’s final decision, tied to the DOJ determination, thus effectively precluded the State from reinstating gubernatorial appointment, the only practice consistent with the Alabama Constitution pre-2006. Indeed, Kennedy’s counsel forthrightly acknowledged that the position she defends would “loc[k] into place” an unconstitutional practice. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32.
The dissent, too, appears to concede that its reading of § 5 would bind Alabama to an unconstitutional practice because of an error by the state trial court. See post, at 435. But it contends that this imposition is no more “offensive to state sovereignty” than “effectively requiring a State to administer a law it has repealed,” post, at 436 — a routine consequence of § 5. The result described by the dissent, however, follows directly from the Constitution’s instruction that a state law may not be enforced if it conflicts with federal law. See Art. VI, cl. 2. Section 5 prohibits States from making retrogressive changes to their voting practices, and thus renders any such changes unenforceable. To be sure, this result constrains States’ legislative freedom. But the rule advocated by the dissent would effectively preclude Alabama’s highest court from applying to a state law a provision of the State Constitution entirely harmonious with federal law. That sort of interference with a state supreme court’s ability to determine the content of state law, we think it plain, is a burden of a different order.
This burden is more than a hypothetical concern. The realities of election litigation are such that lower state courts often allow elections to proceed based on erroneous interpretations of state law later corrected on appeal. See, e.g., Akins v. Secretary of State, 154 N. H. 67, 67-68, 74, 904 A. 2d 702, 703,708 (2006) (preelection challenge rejected by a state trial court but eventually sustained in a postelection decision by the State Supreme Court); Cobb v. State Canvassing Bd., 2006-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 1-17,140 N. M. 77, 79-83 (same); Maryland Green Party v. Maryland Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 137-139, 832 A. 2d 214,220-221 (2003) (same); O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P. 2d 1250,1263-1264 (Alaska 1996) (same); Peloza v. Freas, 871 P. 2d 687, 688, 692 (Alaska 1994) (same). We decline to adopt a rigid interpretation of “in force or effect” that would deny state supreme courts the opportunity to correct similar errors in the future.
C
Although our reasoning and the particular facts of this case should make the narrow scope of our holding apparent, we conclude with some cautionary observations. First, the presence of a judgment by Alabama’s highest court declaring the 1985 Act invalid under the State Constitution is critical to our decision. We do not suggest the outcome would be the same if a potentially unlawful practice had simply been abandoned by state officials after initial use in an election. Cf. Perkins, 400 U. S., at 395. Second, the 1985 Act was challenged the first time it was invoked and struck down shortly thereafter. The same result would not necessarily follow if a practice were invalidated only after enforcement without challenge in several previous elections. Cf. Young, 520 U. S., at 283 (“[T]he simple fact that a voting practice is unlawful under state law does not show, entirely by itself, that the practice was never fin force or effect.’... A State, after all, might maintain in effect for many years a plan that technically... violated some provision of state law.”). Finally, the consequence of the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Stokes was to reinstate a practice — gubernatorial appointment — identical to the State’s §5 baseline. Preclearance might well have been required had the court instead ordered the State to adopt a novel practice.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting.
Voting practices in Alabama today are vastly different from those that prevailed prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq. Even though many of those changes are, at least in part, the consequence of vigorous and sustained enforcement of the VRA, it may well be true that today the statute is
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Jeeps were first mass-produced in 1941 for the U. S. Army by the Willys-Overland Motor Company in Toledo, Ohio. Nearly 60 years later, the city of Toledo and State of Ohio sought to encourage the current manufacturer of Jeeps— DaimlerChrysler — to expand its Jeep operation in Toledo, by offering local and state tax benefits for new investment. Taxpayers in Toledo sued, alleging that their local and state tax burdens were increased by the tax breaks for Daimler-Chrysler, tax breaks that they asserted violated the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals agreed that a state tax credit offered under Ohio law violated the Commerce Clause, and state and local officials and DaimlerChrysler sought review in this Court. We are obligated before reaching this Commerce Clause question to determine whether the taxpayers who objected to the credit have standing to press their complaint in federal court. We conclude that they do not, and we therefore can proceed no further.
I
Ohio levies a franchise tax “upon corporations for the privilege of doing business in the state, owning or using a part or all of its capital or property in [the] state, or holding a certificate of compliance authorising it to do business in [the] state.” Wesnovtek Corp. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 312, 313, 2005-Ohio-1826, ¶ 2, 825 N. E. 2d 1099, 1100; see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.01 (Lexis 2005). A taxpayer that purchases “new manufacturing machinery and equipment” and installs it at sites in the State receives a credit against the franchise tax. See § 5733.33(B)(1) (Lexis 1999). Municipalities in Ohio may also offer partial property tax waivers to businesses that agree to invest in qualifying areas. See § 5709.62(C)(1)(a) (Lexis 2005). With consent from local school districts, the partial property tax waiver can be increased to a complete exemption. See § 5709.62(D)(1).
In 1998, DaimlerChrysler entered into a contract with the city of Toledo. Under the contract, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its Jeep assembly plant at Stickney Avenue in Toledo. In exchange, the city agreed to waive the property tax for the plant, with the consent of the two school districts in which the plant is located. Because DaimlerChrysler undertook to purchase and install “new manufacturing machinery and equipment,” it was also entitled to a credit against thé state franchise tax. See § 5733.33(B)(1) (Lexis 1999).
Plaintiffs filed suit against various state and local officials and DaimlerChrysler in state court, alleging that these tax benefits violated the Commerce Clause. Most of the plaintiffs were residents of Toledo, who paid taxes to both the city of Toledo and State of Ohio. They claimed that they were injured because the tax breaks for DaimlerChrysler diminished the funds available to the city and State, imposing a “disproportionate burden” on plaintiffs. App. 18a, 23a, 28a.
Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. See 28 U. S. C. § 1441. Plaintiffs filed motions to remand the case to state court. See § 1447(c). One of the grounds on which they sought remand concerned their standing. They professed “substantial doubts about their ability to satisfy either the constitutional or the prudential limitations on standing in the federal court,” and urged the District Court to avoid the issue entirely by remanding. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion for Remand to State Court in No. 3:00cv7247, p. 13, Record, Doc. 17 (footnote omitted).
The District Court declined to remand the case, concluding that, “[a]t the bare minimum, the Plaintiffs who are taxpayers have standing to object to the property tax exemption and franchise tax credit statutes under the ‘municipal taxpayer standing’ rule articulated in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).” App. 78a (citations omitted). On the merits, the District Court found that neither tax benefit violated the Commerce Clause. See 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (2001). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the District Court as to the municipal property tax exemption, but held that the state franchise tax credit violated the Commerce Clause. See 386 F. 3d 738 (2004). The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of standing.
Defendants sought certiorari to review the Sixth Circuit’s invalidation of the franchise tax credit and plaintiffs sought certiorari to review the upholding of the property tax exemption. We granted certiorari to consider whether the franchise tax credit violates the Commerce Clause, 545 U. S. 1165 (2005); the Michigan Supreme Court had decided a similar question contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis here. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 440 Mich. 400, 488 N. W. 2d 182 (1992). We also asked the parties to address whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge the franchise tax credit in this litigation.
II
We have “an obligation to assure ourselves” of litigants’ standing under Article III. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180 (2000). We therefore begin by addressing plaintiffs’ claims that they have standing as taxpayers to challenge the franchise tax credit.
A
Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), grounded the Federal Judiciary’s authority to exercise judicial review and interpret the Constitution on the necessity to do so in the course of carrying out the judicial function of deciding cases. As Marshall explained, “[tjhose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Id., at 177. Determining that a matter before the federal courts is a proper case or controversy under Article III therefore assumes particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects “ ‘the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society,’ ” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975)). If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.
This Court has recognized that the case-or-controversy limitation is crucial in maintaining the “‘tripartite allocation of power’ ” set forth in the Constitution. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968)). Marshall again made the point early on, this time in a speech in the House of Representatives. “A case in law or equity,” Marshall remarked,
“was a term... of limited signification. It was a controversy between parties which had taken a shape for judicial decision. If the judicial power extended to every question under the constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost every subject on which the executive could act. The division of power [among the branches of government] could exist no longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.” 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (C. Cullen ed. 1984).
As this Court has explained, “ ‘[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of govern-, ment than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 37 (1976)).
The case-or-controversy requirement thus plays a critical role, and “Article III standing... enforces the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 11 (2004). The “core component” of the requirement that a litigant have standing to invoke the authority of a federal court “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992). The requisite elements of this “core component derived directly from the Constitution” are familiar: “A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen, supra, at 751. We have been asked to decide an important question of constitutional law concerning the Commerce Clause. But before we do so, we must find that the question is presented in a “case” or “controversy” that is, in James Madison’s words, “of a Judiciary Nature.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 430 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). That requires plaintiffs, as the parties now asserting federal jurisdiction, to carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III.
B
Plaintiffs principally claim standing by virtue of their status as Ohio taxpayers, alleging that the franchise tax credit “depletes the funds of the State of Ohio to which the Plaintiffs contribute through their tax payments” and thus “diminish[es] the total funds available for lawful uses and impos[es] disproportionate burdens on” them. App. 28a; see also Brief for Respondents 24. On several occasions, this Court has denied federal taxpayers standing under Article III to object to a particular expenditure of federal funds simply because they are taxpayers. Thus the alleged “deprivation of the fair and constitutional use of [a federal taxpayer’s] tax dollar” cannot support a challenge to the conveyance of Government land to a private religious college, Valley Forge, supra, at 476, 482 (internal quotation marks and some brackets omitted), and “the interest of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury furnishes no basis” to argue that a federal agency’s loan practices are unconstitutional, Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 478 (1938); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974).
The animating principle behind these cases was announced in their progenitor, Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923). In rejecting a claim that improper federal appropriations would “increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take [the plaintiff’s] property without due process of law,” the Court observed that a federal taxpayer’s
“interest in the moneys of the Treasury... is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.” Id., at 486, 487.
This logic is equally applicable to taxpayer challenges to expenditures that deplete the treasury, and to taxpayer challenges to so-called “tax expenditures,” which reduce amounts available to the treasury by granting tax credits or exemptions. In either case, the alleged injury is based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on public revenues, to which the taxpayer contributes.
Standing has been rejected in such cases because the alleged injury is not “concrete and particularized,” Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 560, but instead a grievance the taxpayer “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally,” Frothingham, supra, at 488. In addition, the injury is not “actual or imminent,” but instead “conjectural or hypothetical.” Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). As an initial matter, it is unclear that tax breaks of the sort at issue here do in fact deplete the treasury: The very point of the tax benefits is to spur economic activity, which in turn increases government revenues. In this very action, the Michigan plaintiffs claimed that they were injured because they lost out on the added revenues that would have accompanied Daimler-Chrysler’s decision to expand facilities in Michigan. See n. 2, supra.
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is also “conjectural or hypothetical” in that it depends on how legislators respond to a reduction in revenue, if that is the consequence of the credit. Establishing injury requires speculating that elected officials will increase a taxpayer-plaintiff’s tax bill to make up a deficit; establishing redressability requires speculating that abolishing the challenged credit will redound to the benefit of the taxpayer because legislators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions. Neither sort of speculation suffices to support standing. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 614 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“[I]t is pure speculation whether the lawsuit would result in any actual tax relief for respondents”); Warth, 422 U. S., at 509 (criticizing a taxpayer standing claim for the “conjectural nature of the asserted injury”).
A taxpayer plaintiff has no right to insist that the government dispose of any increased revenue it might experience as a result of his suit by decreasing his tax liability or bolstéring programs that benefit him. To the contrary, the decision of how to allocate any such savings is the very epitome of a policy judgment committed to the “broad and legitimate discretion” of lawmakers, which “the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.” ASARCO, supra, at 615 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Under such circumstances, we have no assurance that the asserted injury is “imminent”— that it is “certainly impending.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 158 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 564-565, n. 2.
The foregoing rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer standing applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers. We indicated as much in Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429 (1952). In that case, we noted our earlier holdings that “the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect” to support standing to challenge “their manner of expenditure.” Id., at 433. We then “reiterate^]” what we had said in rejecting a federal taxpayer challenge to a federal statute “as equally true when a state Act is assailed: ‘The [taxpayer] must be able to show... that he has sustained... some direct injury... and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’ ” Id., at 433-434 (quoting Frothingham, supra, at 488); see ASARCO, supra, at 613-614 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“[W]e have likened state taxpayers to federal taxpayers” for purposes of taxpayer standing (citing Doremus, supra, at 434)).
The allegations of injury that plaintiffs make in their complaint furnish no better basis for finding standing than those made in the cases where federal taxpayer standing was denied. Plaintiffs claim that DaimlerChrysler’s tax credit depletes the Ohio fisc and “impos[es] disproportionate burdens on [them].” App. 28a. This is no different from similar claims by federal taxpayers we have already rejected under Article III as insufficient to establish standing. See, e. g., Frothingham, 262 U. S., at 486 (allegation of injury that the effect of government spending “will be to increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take [plaintiff’s] property without due process of law”).
State policymakers, no less than their federal counterparts, retain broad discretion to make “policy decisions” concerning state spending “in different ways... depending on their perceptions of wise state fiscal policy and myriad other circumstances.” ASARCO, supra, at 615 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Federal courts may not assume a particular exercise of this state fiscal discretion in establishing standing; a party seeking federal jurisdiction cannot rely on such “[speculative inferences... to connect [his] injury to the challenged actions of [the defendant],” Simon, 426 U. S., at 45; see also Allen, 468 U. S., at 759. Indeed, because state budgets frequently contain an array of tax and spending provisions, any number of which may be challenged on a variety of bases, affording state taxpayers standing to press such challenges simply because their tax burden gives them an interest in the state treasury would interpose the federal courts as “ Virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness’” of state fiscal administration, contrary to the more modest role Article III envisions for federal courts. See id., at 760-761 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15 (1972)).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that state taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.
c
Plaintiffs argue that an exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing should exist for Commerce Clause challenges to state tax or spending decisions, analogizing their Commerce Clause claim to the Establishment Clause challenge we permitted in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83. Flast held that because “the Establishment Clause... specifically limit[s] the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, §8,” “a taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of” the Establishment Clause. Id., at 105-106. Flast held out the possibility that “other specific [constitutional] limitations” on Article I, § 8, might surmount the “barrier to suits against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert only the interest of federal taxpayers.” 392 U. S., at 105, 85. But as plaintiffs candidly concede, “only the Establishment Clause” has supported federal taxpayer suits since Flast. Brief for Respondents 12; see Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 618 (1988) (“Although we have considered the problem of standing and Article III limitations on federal jurisdiction many times since [Flast], we have consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow exception it created to the general rule against taxpayer standing”).
Quite apart from whether the franchise tax credit is analogous to an exercise of congressional power under Article I, § 8, plaintiffs’ reliance on Flast is misguided: Whatever rights plaintiffs have under the Commerce Clause, they are fundamentally unlike the right not to “ ‘contribute three pence... for the support of any one [religious] establishment.’ ” 392 U. S., at 103 (quoting 2 Writings of James Madison 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)). Indeed, plaintiffs compare the Establishment Clause to the Commerce Clause at such a high level of generality that almost any constitutional constraint on government power would “specifically limit” a State’s taxing and spending power for Flast purposes. 392 U. S., at 105; see Brief for Respondents 14 (“In each case, the harm to be avoided by [the two Clauses] is the loss of governmental neutrality”). And even if the two Clauses are similar in that they often implicate governments’ fiscal decisions, see id., at 13-14, a finding that the Commerce Clause satisfies the Flast test would leave no principled way of distinguishing those other constitutional provisions that we have recognized constrain governments’ taxing and spending decisions, see, e. g., Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221 (1987) (invalidating state sales tax under the Free Press Clause). Yet such a broad application of Flast’s exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing would be quite at odds with its narrow application in our precedent and Flast’s own promise that it would not transform federal courts into forums for taxpayers’ “generalized grievances.” 392 U. S., at 106.
Flast is consistent with the principle, underlying the Article III prohibition on taxpayer suits, that a litigant may not assume a particular disposition of government funds in establishing standing. The Flast Court discerned in the history of the Establishment Clause “the specific evils feared by [its drafters] that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.” Id., at 103. The Court therefore understood the “injury” alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very “extraction] and spen[ding]” of “tax money” in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff. Id., at 106. And an injunction against the spending would of course redress that injury, regardless of whether lawmakers would dispose of the savings in a way that would benefit the taxpayer-plaintiffs personally. See Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 514 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ invocation of the Establishment Clause was of decisive importance in resolving the standing issue in [Flast]”).
Plaintiffs thus do not have state taxpayer standing on the ground that their Commerce Clause challenge is just like the Establishment Clause challenge in Flast.
Ill
Plaintiffs also claim that their status as municipal taxpayers gives them standing to challenge the state franchise tax credit at issue here. The Frothingham Court noted with approval the standing of municipal residents to enjoin the “illegal use of the moneys of a municipal corporation,” relying on “the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the corporation” to distinguish such a case from the general bar on taxpayer suits. 262 U. S., at 486, 487; see ASARCO, 490 U. S., at 613-614 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (reiterating distinction). Plaintiffs here challenged the municipal property tax exemption as municipal taxpayers. That challenge was rejected by the Court of Appeals on the merits, and no issue regarding plaintiffs’ standing to bring it has been raised. In plaintiffs’ challenge to the state franchise tax credit, however, they identify no municipal action contributing to any claimed injury. Instead, they try to leverage the notion of municipal taxpayer standing beyond challenges to municipal action, in two ways.
A
First, plaintiffs claim that because state law requires revenues from the franchise tax to be distributed to local governments, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5733.12 (Lexis 2005), the award of a credit to DaimlerChrysler reduced such distributions and thus depleted the funds of “local governments to which Respondents pay taxes.” Brief for Respondents 16. But plaintiffs’ challenge is still to the state law and state decision, not those of their municipality. We have already explained why a state taxpayer lacks standing to challenge a state fiscal decision on the grounds that it might affect his tax liability. All plaintiffs have done in recasting their claims as ones brought by municipal taxpayers whose municipalities receive funding from the State — the level of which might be affected by the same state fiscal decision — is introduce yet another level of conjecture to their already hypothetical claim of injury.
And in fact events have highlighted the peril of assuming that any revenue increase resulting from a taxpayer suit will be put to a particular use. Ohio’s General Assembly suspended the statutory budget mechanism that distributes franchise tax revenues to local governments in 2001 and again in its subsequent biennial budgets. See Amended Substitute H. B. 94, 124th General Assembly §140 (2001), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillTextl24/ 124_HB_94_ENR.pdf (all Internet materials as visited May 12, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); Amended Substitute H. B. 95, 125th General Assembly § 139 (2003), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/ BillTextl25/125_HB_95_EN2_N.pdf; Amended Substitute H. B. 66, 126th General Assembly §557.12 (2005), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillTextl26/126_HB_ 66_EN2d.pdf. Any effect that enjoining DaimlerChrysler’s credit will have on municipal funds, therefore, will not result from automatic operation of a statutory formula, but from a hypothesis that the state government will choose to direct the supposed revenue from the restored franchise tax to municipalities. This is precisely the sort of conjecture we may not entertain in assessing standing. See ASARCO, supra, at 614 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
B
The second way plaintiffs seek to leverage their standing to challenge the municipal property tax exemption into a challenge to the franchise tax credit is by relying on Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966). According to plaintiffs, the “supplemental jurisdiction” recognized in that case supports jurisdiction over all their claims, once the District Court determined they had standing to challenge the property tax exemption. Brief for Respondents 17-18.
Gibbs held that federal-question jurisdiction over a claim may authorize a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims that may be viewed as part of the same case because they “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” as the federal claim. 383 U. S., at 725. Plaintiffs assume that Gibbs stands for the proposition that federal jurisdiction extends to all claims sufficiently related to a claim within Article III to be part of the same case, regardless of the nature of the deficiency that would keep the former claims out of federal court if presented on their own.
Our general approach to the application of Gibbs, however, has been markedly more cautious. For example, as a matter of statutory construction of the pertinent jurisdictional provisions, we refused to extend Gibbs to allow claims to be asserted against nondiverse parties when jurisdiction was based on diversity, see Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365 (1978), and we refused to extend Gibbs to authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims that do not satisfy statutory amount-in-controversy requirements, see Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989). As the Court explained just last Term, “[w]e have not... applied Gibbs’ expansive interpretive approach to other aspects of the jurisdictional statutes.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 553 (2005) (applying 28 U. S. C. § 1367, enacted in 1990, to allow a federal court in a diversity action to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional diverse plaintiffs whose claims failed to meet the amount-in-controversy threshold).
What we have never done is apply the rationale of Gibbs to permit a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy those elements of the Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing, that “serv[e] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore, 495 U. S., at 155. We see no reason to read the language of Gibbs so broadly, particularly since our standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press. See Allen, 468 U. S., at 752 (“[T]he standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted” (emphasis added)). We have insisted, for instance, that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Laidlaw, 528 U. S., at 185; see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 109 (1983). But if standing were commutative, as plaintiffs claim, this insistence would make little sense when all claims for relief derive from a “common nucleus of operative fact,” as they certainly appear to have in both Laidlaw, supra, at 175-179, and Lyons, supra, at 97-98.
Plaintiffs’ reading of Gibbs to allow standing as to one claim to suffice for all claims arising from the same “nucleus of operative fact” would have remarkable implications. The doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and political question all originate in Article Ill’s “case” or “controversy” language, no less than standing does. See, e. g., National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Department of Interior, 538 U. S. 803, 808 (2003) (ripeness); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 67 (1997) (mootness); Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 215 (political question). Yet if Gibbs’ “common nucleus” formulation announced a new definition of “case” or “controversy” for all Article III purposes, a federal court would be free to entertain moot or unripe claims, or claims presenting a political question, if they “derived from” the same “operative fact[s]” as another federal claim suffering from none of these defects. Plaintiffs’ reading of Gibbs, therefore, would amount to a significant revision of our precedent interpreting Article III. With federal courts thus deciding issues they would not otherwise be authorized to decide, the “ ‘tripartite allocation of power’ ” that Article III is designed to maintain, Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 474, would quickly erode; our emphasis on the standing requirement’s role in maintaining this separation would be rendered hollow rhetoric. As we have explained, “[t]he actual-injury requirement would hardly serve the purpose... of preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches[,] if once a plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration, the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 357 (1996).
Lewis emphasized that “[t]he remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” Ibid. Plaintiffs’ theory of ancillary standing would contravene this principle. Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III injury with respect to their state taxes, and even if they did do so with respect to their municipal taxes, that injury does not entitle them to seek a remedy as to the state taxes. As the Court summed up the point in Lewis, “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Id., at 358, n. 6.
* * *
All the theories plaintiffs have offered to support their standing to challenge the franchise tax credit are unavailing. Because plaintiffs have no standing to challenge that credit, the lower courts erred by considering their claims against it on the merits. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit is therefore vacated in part, and the cases are remanded for dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenge to the franchise tax credit.
It is so ordered.
Ohio has begun phasing out the franchise tax and has discontinued offering new credits against the tax like the one DaimlerChrysler received. See §§ 5733.01(G), 5733.33(B)(1) (Lexis 2005). Where relevant, therefore, the citations in this opinion are to the statutes in effect at the time DaimlerChrysler made its investment.
Other plaintiffs were residents of Toledo who claimed they were injured because they were displaced by the DaimlerChrysler expansion and Michigan residents who claimed injury because DaimlerChrysler would have expanded its operations in Michigan but for the Ohio investment tax credit. Plaintiffs neither identified these allegations as a basis for standing in their merits brief before this Court nor referred to them at oral argument. Any argument based on these allegations is therefore abandoned. See, e. g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, and n. 3 (1996).
Because defendants removed the case from state court to District Court, plaintiffs were not initially the parties that invoked federal jurisdiction. Indeed, plaintiffs initially expressed doubts as to their standing. Nonetheless, because “[w]e presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record,” Renne v. Geary, 501 U. S. 312, 316 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), the party asserting federal jurisdiction when it is challenged has the burden of establishing it. Whatever the parties’ previous positions on the propriety of a federal forum, plaintiffs, as the parties seeking to establish federal jurisdiction, must make the showings required for standing.
The majority of the Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have reached a similar conclusion. See, e. g., Booth v. Hvass, 302 F. 3d 849 (CA8 2002); Board of Ed. of Mt. Sinai Union Free School Dist. v. New York State Teachers Retirement System, 60 F. 3d 106 (CA2 1995); Colorado Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F. 2d 1394 (CA10 1992); Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F. 2d 912 (CA6 1988); Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F. 2d 1271 (CA5 1975); but cf. Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 F. 3d 954, 967-969 (CA9 2005) (finding state taxpayer standing in light of Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F. 2d 1169 (CA9 1984), but noting that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605 (1989), would “carry persuasive value” absent Hoohuli).
In defending the contrary position, plaintiffs rely on three cases from the Courts of Appeals. But two of those cases hold only that, once a litigant has standing to request invalidation of a particular agency action, it may do so by identifying all grounds on which the agency may have “ ‘failed to comply with its statutory mandate.’ ” Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F. 2d 389, 392 (CADC 1978) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 737 (1972
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Both •§ 1331 and § 1362 of Title 28 of the United States Code confer jurisdiction on the district courts to hear cases “aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Section 1331 requires that the amount in controversy exceed $10,000. Under § 1362, Indian tribes may bring such suits without regard to the amount in controversy. The question now before us is whether the District Court had jurisdiction over this case under either of these sections.
I
The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York State and the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin against the Counties of Oneida and Madison in the State of New York. The complaint alleged that from time immemorial down to the time of the American Revolution the Oneidas had owned and occupied some six million acres of land in the State of New York. The complaint also alleged that in the 1780’s and 1790’s various treaties had been entered into between the Oneidas and the United States confirming the Indians’ right to possession of their lands until purchased by the United States and that in 1790 the treaties had been implemented by federal statute, the Nonintercourse Act, 1 Stat. 137, forbidding the conveyance of Indian lands without the consent of the United States. It was then alleged that in 1788 the Oneidas had ceded five million acres to the State of New York, 300,000 acres being withheld as a reservation, and that in 1795 a portion of these reserved lands was also ceded to the State. Assertedly, the 1795 cession was without the consent of the United States and hence ineffective to terminate the Indians’ right to possession under the federal treaties and the applicable federal statutes. Also alleging that the 1795 cession was for an unconscionable and inadequate price and that portions of the premises were now in possession of and being used by the defendant counties, the complaint prayed for damages representing the fair rental value of the land for the period January 1, 1968, through December 31, 1969.
The District Court ruled that the cause of action, regardless of the label given it, was created under state law and required only allegations of the plaintiffs’ pos-sessory rights and the defendants’ interference therewith. The possible necessity of interpreting a federal statute or treaties to resolve a potential defense was deemed insufficient to sustain federal-question jurisdiction. The complaint was accordingly dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction for failure of the complaint to raise a question arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of either § 1331 or § 1362.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, ruling that the jurisdictional claim “shatters on the rock of the 'well-pleaded complaint’ rule for determining federal question jurisdiction.” 464 F. 2d 916, 918 (CA2 1972). Although “[d]ecision would ultimately turn on whether the deed of 1795 complied with what is now 25 U. S. C. § 177 and what the consequences would be if it did not,” id., at 919, this alone did not establish “arising under” jurisdiction because the federal issue was not one of the necessary elements of the complaint, which was read as essentially seeking relief based on the right to possession of real property. The Court of Appeals thought Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74 (1914), directly in point. There, a complaint in ejectment did not state a claim arising under the laws of the United States even though it alleged that the defendants were claiming under a deed that was void under acts of Congress restraining the alienation of lands allotted to Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians. The Court applied the principle that whether a case arises under federal law for purposes of the jurisdictional statute “must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” Id., at 75-76. Because the only essential allegations were plaintiffs’ rights to possession, defendants’ wrongful holding and the damage claim, the complaint did not properly assert a federal issue, however likely it might be that it would be relevant to or determinative of a defense. In the present case, noting that the District Judge was correct in holding that under New York law these allegations would suffice to state a cause of action in ejectment, the Court of Appeals considered Taylor to be dispositive.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals were in error, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
Accepting the premise of the Court of Appeals that the case was essentially a possessory action, we are of the view that the complaint asserted a current right to possession conferred by federal law, wholly independent of state law. The threshold allegation required of such a well-pleaded complaint — the right to possession — was plainly enough alleged to be based on federal law. The federal law issue, therefore, did not arise solely in anticipation of a defense. Moreover, we think that the basis for petitioners’ assertion that they had a federal right to possession governed wholly by federal law cannot be said to be so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits. See, e. g., The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 (1913); Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U. S. 118, 130 (1906); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103, 105-106 (1933); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 249 (1951). Given the nature and source of the possessory rights of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands, particularly when confirmed by treaty, it is plain that the complaint asserted a controversy arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of both § 1331 and § 1362.
It very early became accepted doctrine in this Court that although fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign — first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the United States — a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. That right, sometimes called Indian title and good against all but the sovereign, could be terminated only by sovereign act. Once the United States was organized and the Constitution adopted, these tribal rights to Indian lands became the exclusive province of the federal law. Indian title, recognized to be only a right of occupancy, was extinguishable only by the United States. The Federal Government took early steps to deal with the Indians through treaty, the principal purpose often being to recognize and guarantee the rights of Indians to specified areas of land. This the United States did with respect to the various New York Indian tribes, including the Oneidas. The United States also asserted the primacy of federal law in the first Nonintercourse Act passed in 1790, 1 Stat. 137, 138, which provided that “no sale of lands made by any Indians... within the United States, shall be valid to any person... or to any state... unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.” This has remained the policy of the United States to this day. See 25 U. S. C. § 177.
In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific B. Co., 314 U. S. 339, 345 (1941), a unanimous Court succinctly summarized the essence of past cases in relevant respects:
“ 'Unquestionably it has been the policy of the Federal Government from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy, which could only be interfered with or determined by the United States. Cramer v. United States, 261 U. S. 219, 227. This policy was first recognized in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, and has been repeatedly reaffirmed. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515; Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711; Chouteau v. Molony, 16 How. 203; Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211; Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad[, 119 U. S. 55]; United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111. As stated in Mitchel v. United States, supra, p. 746, Indian ‘right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.’ ”
The Santa Fe case also reaffirmed prior decisions to the effect that a tribal right of occupancy, to be protected, need not be “based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal government action.” Id., at 347. Tribal rights were nevertheless entitled to the protection of federal law, and with respect to Indian title based on aboriginal possession, the “power of Congress... is supreme.” Ibid.
As indicated in Santa Fe, the fundamental propositions which it restated were firmly rooted in earlier cases. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823), the Court refused to recognize land titles originating in grants by Indians to private parties in 1773 and 1775; those grants were contrary to the accepted principle that Indian title could be extinguished only by or with the consent of the general government. The land in question, when ceded to the United States by the State of Virginia, was “occupied by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians; but the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title, and to grant the soil, has never, we believe, been doubted.” Id., at 586. See also id., at 591-597, 603. The possessory and treaty rights of Indian tribes to their lands have been the recurring theme of many other cases.
The rudimentary propositions that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal consent apply in all of the States, including the original 13. It is true that the United States never held fee title to the Indian lands in the original States as it did to almost all the rest of the continental United States and that fee title to Indian lands in these States; or the pre-emptive right to purchase from the Indians, was in the State, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810). But this reality did not alter the doctrine that federal law, treaties, and statutes protected Indian occupancy and that its termination was exclusively the province of federal law.
For example, in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), the State of Georgia sought to prosecute a white man for residing in Indian country contrary to the laws of the State. This Court held the prosecution a nullity, the Chief Justice referring to the treaties with the Cherokees and to the
“universal conviction that the Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they occcupied, until that right should be extinguished by the United States, with their consent: that their territory was separated from that of any state within whose chartered limits they might reside, by a boundary line, established by treaties: that, within their boundary, they possessed rights with which no state could interfere: and that the whole power of regulating the intercourse with them, was vested in the United States.” Id., at 560.
The Cherokee Nation was said to be occupying its own territory “in which the laws of Georgia can have no force....” The Georgia law was declared unconstitutional because it interfered with the relations “between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union.” Id., at 561.
There are cases of similar import with respect to the New York Indians. These cases lend substance to petitioners’ assertion that the possessory right claimed is a federal right to the lands at issue in this case. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366, 372 (1857), which concerned the Seneca Indians, held that the “forcible removal [of Indians] must be made, if made at all, under the direction of the United States [and] that this interpretation is in accordance with the usages and practice of the Government in providing for the removal of Indian tribes from their ancient possessions.” In The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867), the State sought to tax the reservation lands of the Senecas. The Court held the tax void. The Court referred to the Indian right of occupancy as creating “an indefeasible title to the reservations that may extend from generation to generation, and will cease only by the dissolution of the tribe, or their consent to sell to the party possessed of the right of pre-emption,” id., at 771, and noted that New York “possessed no power to deal with Indian rights or title,” id., at 769. Of major importance, however, was the treaty of 1794 in which the United States acknowledged certain territory to be the property of the Seneca Nation and promised that “it shall remain theirs until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States... Id., at 766-767. The rights of the Indians to occupy those lands “do not depend on... any... statutes of the State, but upon treaties, which are the supreme law of the land; it is to these treaties we must look to ascertain the nature of these rights, and the extent of them.” Id., at 768. The State’s attempt to tax reservation lands was invalidated as an interference with Indian possessory rights guaranteed by the Federal Government.
Much later, in United States v. Forness, 125 F. 2d 928 (CA2), cert. denied, sub nom. City of Salamanca v. United States, 316 U. S. 694 (1942), the Government sued to set aside certain leases granted by the Seneca tribe on certain reservation lands. It was argued in opposition that the suit was merely an action for ejectment which under state law could be defeated by a tender; but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Indian rights were federal and that “state law cannot be invoked to limit the rights in lands granted by the United States to the Indians, because, as the court below recognized, state law does not apply to the Indians except so far as the United States has given its consent.” Id., at 932. There being no federal statute making the statutory or decisional law of the State of New York applicable to the reservations, the controlling law remained federal law; and, absent federal statutory guidance, the governing rule of decision would be fashioned by the federal court in the mode of the common law.
III
Enough has been said, we think, to indicate that the complaint in this case asserts a present right to possession under federal law. The claim may fail at a later stage for a variety of reasons; but for jurisdictional purposes, this is not a case where the underlying right or obligation arises only under state law and federal law is merely alleged as a barrier to its effectuation, as was the case in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109 (1936). There, the suit was on a contract having its genesis in state law, and the tax that the defendant had promised to pay was imposed by a state statute. The possibility that a federal statute might bar its collection was insufficient to make the case one arising under the laws of the United States.
Nor in sustaining the jurisdiction of the District Court do we disturb the well-pleaded complaint rule of Taylor v. Anderson, supra, and like cases. Here, the right to possession itself is claimed to arise under federal law in the first instance. Allegedly, aboriginal title of an Indian tribe guaranteed by treaty and protected by statute has never been extinguished. In Taylor, the plaintiffs were individual Indians, not an Indian tribe; and the suit concerned lands allocated to individual Indians, not tribal rights to lands. See 32 Stat. 641. Individual patents had been issued with only the right to alienation being restricted for a period of time. Cf. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 n. 1 (1939); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458 (1907). Insofar as the underlying right to possession is concerned, Taylor is more like those cases indicating that “a controversy in respect of lands has never been regarded as presenting a Federal question merely because one of the parties to it has derived his title under an act of Congress.” Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 570 (1912). Once patent issues, the incidents of ownership are, for the most part, matters of local property law to be vindicated in local courts, and in such situations it is normally insufficient for “arising under” jurisdiction merely to allege that ownership or possession is claimed under a United States patent. Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, 342-343 (1906). As the Court stated in Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 669 (1891):
“The courts of the United States will construe the grants of the general government without reference to the rules of construction adopted by the States for their grants; but whatever incidents or rights attach to the ownership of property, conveyed by the government will be determined by the States, subject to the condition that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the grants or the use and enjoyment of the property by the grantee.”
In the present case, however, the assertion of a federal controversy does not rest solely on the claim of a right to possession derived from a federal grant of title whose scope will be governed by state law. Rather, it rests on the not insubstantial claim that federal law now protects, and has continuously protected from the time of the formation of the United States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession.
For the same reasons, we think the complaint before us satisfies the additional requirement formulated in some cases that the complaint reveal a “dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends.” Shulthis v. McDougal, supra, at 569; Gold-Washing Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203 (1878). Here, the Oneidas assert a present right to possession based in part on their aboriginal right of occupancy which was not terminable except by act of the United States. Their claim is also asserted to arise from treaties guaranteeing their possessory right until terminated by the United States, and “it is to these treaties [that] we must look to ascertain the nature of these [Indian] rights, and the extent of them.” The New York Indians, 5 Wall., at 768. Finally, the complaint asserts a claim under the Nonintercourse Acts which put in statutory form what was or came to be the accepted rule — that the extinguishment of Indian title required the consent of the United States. To us, it is sufficiently clear that the controversy stated in the complaint arises under the federal law within the meaning of the jurisdictional statutes and our decided cases.
IV
This is not to ignore the obvious fact that New York had legitimate and far-reaching connections with its Indian tribes antedating the Constitution and that the State has continued to play a substantial role with respect to the Indians in that State. There has been recurring tension between federal and state law; state authorities have not easily accepted the notion that federal law and federal courts must be deemed the controlling considerations in dealing with the Indians. Fellows v. Blacksmith, The New York Indians, United States v. Forness, and the Tuscarora litigation are sufficient evidence that the reach and exclusivity of federal law with respect to reservation lands and reservation Indians did not go unchallenged; and it may be that they are to some extent challenged here. But this only underlines the legal reality that the controversy alleged in the complaint may well depend on what the reach and impact of the federal law will prove to be in this case.
We are also aware that New York and federal authorities eventually reached partial agreement in 1948 when criminal jurisdiction over New York Indian reservations was ceded to the State. 62 Stat. 1224, 25 U. S. C. § 232. In addition, in 1950 civil disputes between Indians or between Indians and others were placed within the jurisdiction of the state courts “to the same extent as the courts of the State shall have jurisdiction in other civil actions and proceedings, as now or hereafter defined by the laws of such State.” 64 Stat. 845, 25 U. S. C. § 233. The latter statute, however, provided for the preservation of tribal laws and customs and saved Indian reservation lands from taxation and, with certain exceptions, from execution to satisfy state court judgments. Furthermore, it provided that nothing in the statute “shall be construed as authorizing the alienation from any Indian nation, tribe, or band of Indians of any lands within any Indian reservation in the State of New York” or as “conferring jurisdiction on the courts of the State of New York or making applicable the laws of the State of New York in civil actions involving Indian lands or claims with respect thereto which relate to transactions or events transpiring prior to September 13, 1952.” The Senate report on the bill disclaimed any intention of “impairing any of their property or rights under existing treaties with the United States.” S. Rep. No. 1836, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950). Under the penultimate proviso the matter of alienating tribal reservation lands would appear to have been left precisely where it was prior to the Act. Moreover, the final proviso of the statute negativing the application of state law with respect to transactions prior to the adoption of the Act was added by amendment on the floor of the Senate, and its purpose was explained by the gentleman who offered it to be as follows:
“Mr. Chairman, I do not think there will be any objection from any source with regard to this particular amendment. This just assures the Indians of an absolutely fair and impartial determination of any claims they might have had growing out of any.relationship they have had with the great State of New York in regard to their lands.
“I think there will be no objection to that; they certainly ought to have a right to have those claims properly adjudicated....
“In addition thereto, of course, they may go into the Federal courts and adjudicate any differences they have had between themselves and the great State of New York relative to their lands, or claims in regard thereto, and I am sure that the State of New York should have and no doubt will have, ho objection to such provision.” 96 Cong. Rec. 12460 (1950) (remarks of Congressman Morris).
Our conclusion that this case arises under the laws of the United States is, therefore, wholly consistent with and in furtherance of the intent of Congress as expressed by its grant of civil jurisdiction to the State of New York with the indicated exceptions.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 1331 (a) provides:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Under §1362:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Initially, only diversity jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332 was alleged in the complaint. The necessary jurisdictional amount was averred. Federal-question jurisdiction was asserted by an amendment to the complaint. Jurisdiction under § 1332 was rejected by the District Court and the Court of Appeals and is not at issue here.
Three treaties with the Six Indian Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy in New York were alleged: the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784, which provides in part that “[t]he Oneida and Tuscarora nations shall be secured in the possession of the lands on which they are settled”; The Treaty of Fort Harmar of 1789 where the Oneida and the Tuscarora nations were “again secured and confirmed in the possession of their respective lands”; and the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794, Art. II of which provides: "The United States acknowledge the lands reserved to the Oneida, Onondaga and Cayuga Nations, in their respective treaties with the state of New-York, and called their reservations, to be their property; and the United States will never claim the same, nor disturb them... in the free use and enjoyment thereof: but the said reservations shall remain theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States, who have the right to purchase.” The treaties referred to are found at 7 Stat. 15, 7 Stat. 33, and 7 Stat. 44, respectively.
Section 4 of the Act provided that “no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.” The second Nonintercourse Act passed in 1793 made it a misdemeanor to negotiate for Indian lands without federal authority, but it was made lawful for state agents who were present at any treaty held with the Indians under the authority of the United States, in the presence and with the approbation of the United States Commissioner, “to propose to, and adjust with the Indians, the compensation to be made for their claims to lands within such state, which shall be extinguished by the treaty.” 1 Stat. 329, 330-331, § 8. This statutory policy, without major change, was carried forward in § 12 of the 1796 Act, 1 Stat. 469, 472; § 12 of the 1799 Act, 1 Stat. 743, 746; § 12 of the 1802 Act, 2 Stat. 139, 143; §12 of the Act of 1834, 4 Stat. 729, 730-731; and in Rev. Stat. § 2116, now 25 U. S. C. § 177.
Representative of almost countless eases are Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831); United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567 (1846); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1866); The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211 (1872); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517 (1877); United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886); Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U. S. 394 (1896); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28 (1913); Nadeau v. Union Pacific R. Co., 253 U. S. 442 (1920); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382 (1939); United States v. Tillamooks, 329 U. S. 40 (1946); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U. S. 272 (1955). U. S. Dept. of Interior, Federal Indian Law 32-43, 583-645, 675-687 (1958) (hereinafter Federal Indian Law), sets out some of the fundamentals of the law dealing with Indian possessory rights to real property stemming from aboriginal title, treaty, and statute.
See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, at 38; Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 (1839); Lattimer v. Poteet, 14 Pet. 4 (1840); Seneca Nation v. Christy, 162 U. S. 283 (1896). “Outside of the territory of the original colonies, the ultimate fee is located in the United States and may be granted to individuals subject to the Indian right of occupancy.” Federal Indian Law 599; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660 (1849).
In an earlier case, New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 21 How. 366 (1859), the Court had upheld New York statutes which protected the Indians from intrusion by others on their tribal lands, and had asserted that “ [n] otwithstanding the peculiar relation which these Indian nations hold to the Government of the United States, the State of New York had the power of a sovereign over their persons and property, so far as it was necessary to preserve the peace of the Commonwealth, and protect' these feeble and helpless bands from imposition and intrusion.” Id., at 370. It is apparent that by the later decision in The New York Indians, supra, the Court did not consider the potential implications of the dictum expressed in Dibble applicable in situations where the State’s power was exercised other than for the protection of the Indians on their tribal lands. In any event, whatever Dibble may have held with respect to state power to protect Indian possession, it does not question the Indians’ right to possession under federal law.
The question of the application of federal law to Indian tribal property in New York was litigated in the state courts in the intervening years as well. In 1870, an unreported decision of the New York Supreme Court held that tribal leases of Seneca reservation lands, ratified by the New York Legislature, were invalid in the absence of approval from the United States. See United States v. Forness, supra, at 930-931; H. R. Rep. Misc. Doc. No. 75, 43d Cong., 2d Sess. (1875); Brief for the Warden and the State of New York 26-27, New York ex rel. Bay v. Martin, No. 158, O. T. 1945, 326 U. S. 496 (1946). In the mid-1890’s in Buffalo, R. & P. B. Co. V. Lavery, 75 Hun. 396, 27 N. Y. S. 443 (5th Dept., App. Div. 1894), affirmed on opinion below, 149 N. Y. 576, 43 N. E. 986 (1896), a private non-Indian lessee of Indian land under a lease first granted by the Senecas in 1866, which was concededly not legally effective until an 1875 Act of Congress validated such leases, was nonetheless held to have priority over a railroad claiming under an 1872 lease from the Senecas and a state statute purportedly validating the lease as one to a railroad which had been ratified by a state court, because the state statute which would have given the railroad a superior right to possession was incapable of confirming possessory rights to Indian tribal lands without federal authority. The New York courts held that it was "not within the legislative power of the State to enable the Indian nation to make, or others to take from the Indians, grants or leases of lands within their reservations. In that matter the Federal government, having the power under the Constitution to do so, has assumed to control it by... act of Congress [referring to the Indian Nonintercourse Act],... As respects their lands, subject only to the pre-emptive title, the Indians are treated as the wards of the 'United States, and it is only pursuant to the Federal authority that their lands can be granted or demised by or acquired by conveyance or leased from them.” 75 Hun., at 399-400, 27 N. Y. S., at 445.
Still later, in People ex rel. Cusick v. Daly, 212 N. Y. 183, 105 N. E. 1048 (1914), the New York Court of Appeals held that without the consent of Congress New York could not prosecute Indian crimes on reservations. Relying on the classic federal cases, the court held that federal power was pre-eminent and that the Federal Government had made treaties with the Indians which confirmed their territorial possession, although the Federal Government never owned the fee of the land within the State’s confines. Id., at 192, 105 N. E., at 1050. Within the reservation federal power, when exercised, foreclosed the exercise of power by the State. “It is said that there is a difference between the Indians whose reservations are the direct gift of the Federal Government and those whose reservations have been derived from the state or from other sources. We find no such distinction in the statute, and we can think of none that logically differentiates one from the other. Even if we assume that, in the absence of Federal legislation, the state has the most ample power to legislate for the Indians within its borders, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that when Congress does act the power of the state must yield to the paramount authority of the Federal government.” Id., at 196-197, 105 N. E., at 1052.
Still later, federal authority over Indian lands was again challenged. In Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority, 257 F. 2d 885 (1958), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected New York’s claim that the Nonintercourse Act did not apply to the State of New York and that, as one of the original 13 States, it never surrendered to the United States its power to condemn Indian lands. The Court of Appeals also held that the Act of Sept. 13, 1950, 64 Stat. 845, 25 U. S. C. § 233, whereby the United States ceded civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations to the State of New York, expressly and effectively excepted from its coverage the alienation of reservation lands, a matter over which the United States had reaffirmed its paramount authority. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that the Niagara River Power Project Act, 71 Stat. 401 (1957), 16 U. S. C. §§ 836, 836a, by which Congress directed the Federal Power Commission to issue a license to the New York Power Authority for the construction and operation of a power project to utilize water made available to the United States by a 1950 treaty with Canada, constituted federal authorization for the Power Authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, but only in
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell joined.
We granted certiorari to consider a facial constitutional challenge to a requirement in a congressional spending program that, absent an administrative waiver, 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used' by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from businesses owned and controlled by members of statutorily identified minority groups. 441 Ü. S. 960 (1979).
I
In May 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, which amended the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999, 42 U. S. C. § 6701 et seg. The 1977 amendments authorized an additional $4 billion appropriation for federal grants to be made by the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Economic Development Administration (EDA), to state and local governmental entities for use in local public works projects. Among the changes made was the addition of the provision that has become the focus of this litigation. Section 103 (f) (2) of the 1977 Act, referred to as the “minority business enterprise” or “MBE” provision, requires that:
“Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘minority business enterprise’ means a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”
In late May 1977, the Secretary promulgated regulations governing administration of the grant program which were amended two months later. In August. 1977, the EDA issued guidelines supplementing the statute and regulations with respect to minority business participation in local public works grants, and in October 1977, the EDA issued a technical bulletin promulgating detailed instructions and information to assist grantees and their contractors in meeting the 10% MBE requirement.
On November 30, 1977, petitioners filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the MBE provision. Named as defendants were the Secretary of Commerce, as the program administrator, and the State and City of New York, as actual and potential project grantees. Petitioners are several associations of construction contractors and subcontractors, and a firm engaged in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work. Their complaint alleged that they had sustained economic injury due to enforcement of the 10% MBE requirement and that the MBE provision on its face violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and various statutory antidiscrimination provisions.
After a hearing held the day the complaint was filed, the District Court denied a requested temporary restraining order and scheduled the matter for an expedited hearing on the merits. On December 19, 1977, the District Court issued a memorandum opinion upholding the validity of the MBE program and denying the injunctive relief sought. Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (1977).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 584 F. 2d 600 (1978), holding that “even under the most exacting standard of review the MBE provision passes constitutional muster.” Id., at 603. Considered in the context of many years of governmental efforts to remedy past racial and ethnic discrimination, the court found it “difficult to imagine” any purpose for the program other than to remedy such discrimination. Id., at 605. In its view, a number of factors contributed to the legitimacy of the MBE provision, most significant of which was the narrowed focus and limited extent of the statutory and administrative program, in size, impact, and duration, id., at 607-608; the court looked also to the holdings of other Courts of Appeals and District Courts that the MBE program was constitutional, id., at 608-609. It expressly rejected petitioners’ contention that the 10% MBE requirement violated the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Id., at 609.
II
A
The MBE provision was enacted as part of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, which made various amendments to Title I of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976. The 1976 Act was intended as a short-term measure to alleviate the problem of national unemployment and to stimulate the national economy by assisting state and local governments to build needed public facilities. To accomplish these objectives, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the EDA, to make grants to state and local governments for construction, renovation, repair, or other improvement of local public works projects. The 1976 Act placed a number of restrictions on project eligibility designed to assure that federal moneys were targeted to accomplish the legislative purposes. It established criteria to determine grant priorities and to apportion federal funds among political jurisdictions. Those criteria directed grant funds toward areas of high unemployment. The statute authorized the appropriation of up to $2 billion for a period ending in September 1977; this appropriation was soon consumed by grants made under the program.
Early in 1977, Congress began consideration of expanded appropriations and amendments to the grant program. Under administration of the 1976 appropriation, referred to as “Round I” of the local public works program, applicants seeking some $25 billion in grants had competed for the $2 billion in available funds; of nearly 25,000 applications, only some 2,000 were granted. The results provoked widespread concern for the fairness of the allocation process. Because the 1977 Act would authorize the appropriation of an additional $4 billion to fund “Round II” of the grant program, the congressional hearings and debates concerning the amendments focused primarily on the politically sensitive problems of priority and geographic distribution of grants under the supplemental appropriation. The result of this attention was inclusion in the 1977 Act of provisions revising the allocation criteria of the 1976 legislation. Those provisions, however, retained the underlying objective to direct funds into areas of high unemployment. The 1977 Act also added new restrictions on applicants seeking to qualify for federal grants; among these was the MBE provision.
The origin of the provision was an amendment to the House version of the 1977 Act, H. R. 11, offered on the floor of the House on February 23, 1977, by Representative Mitchell of Maryland. As offered, the amendment provided:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, materials, and supplies which will be used in such project are procured from minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘minority business enterprise’ means a business at least 50 percent of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of publicly owned businesses, at least 51 percent of the stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”
The sponsor stated that the objective of the amendment was to direct funds into the minority business community, a sector of the economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience with Government procurement programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from the public works program as then formulated. He cited the marked statistical disparity that in fiscal year 1976 less than 1% of all federal procurement was concluded with minority business enterprises, although minorities comprised 15-18% of the population. When the amendment was put forward during debate on H. R. 11, Representative Mitchell reiterated the need to ensure that minority firms would obtain a fair opportunity to share in the benefits of this Government program.
The amendment was put forward not as a new concept, but rather one building upon prior administrative practice. In his introductory remarks, the sponsor rested his proposal squarely on the ongoing program under § 8 (a) of the Small Business Act, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2, 72 Stat. 389, which, as will become evident, served as a model for the administrative program developed to enforce the MBE provision:
“The first point in opposition will be that you cannot have a set-aside. Well, Madam Chairman, we have been doing this for the last 10 years in Government. The 8-A set-aside under SBA has been tested in the courts more than 30 times and has been found to be legitimate and bona fide. We are doing it in this bill.”
Although the proposed MBE provision on its face appeared mandatory, requiring compliance with the 10% minority participation requirement “[notwithstanding any other provision of law,” its sponsor gave assurances that existing administrative practice would ensure flexibility in administration if, with respect to a particular project, compliance with the 10% requirement proved infeasible.
Representative Roe of New Jersey then suggested a change of language expressing the twin intentions (1) that the federal administrator would have discretion to waive the 10% requirement where its application was not feasible, and (2) that the grantee would be mandated to achieve at least 10% participation by minority businesses unless infeasibility was demonstrated. He proposed as a substitute for the first sentence of the amendment the language that eventually was enacted:
“Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 percent of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises.”
The sponsor fully accepted the suggested clarification because it retained the directive that the initial burden of compliance would fall on the grantee. That allocation of burden was necessary because, as he put it, “every agency of the Government has tried to figure out a way to avoid doing this very thing. Believe me, these bureaucracies can come up with 10,000 ways to avoid doing it.”
Other supporters of. the MBE amendment echoed the sponsor’s concern that a number of factors, difficult to isolate or quantify, seemed to impair access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities. Representative Con-yers of Michigan spoke of the frustration of the existing situation, in which, due to the intricacies of the bidding process and through no fault of their own, minority contractors and businessmen were unable to gain access to government contracting opportunities.
Representative Biaggi of New York then spoke to the need for the amendment to “promote a sense of economic equality in this Nation.” He expressed the view that without the amendment, “this legislation may be potentially inequitable to minority businesses and workers” in that it would perpetuate the historic practices that have precluded minority businesses from effective participation in public contracting opportunities. The amendment was accepted by the House.
Two weeks later, the Senate considered S. 427, its package of amendments to the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976. At that time Senator Brooke of Massachusetts introduced an MBE amendment, worded somewhat differently than the House version, but aimed at achieving the same objectives. His statement in support of the 10% requirement reiterated and summarized the various expressions on the House side that the amendment was necessary to ensure that minority businesses were not deprived of access to the government contracting opportunities generated by the public works program.
The Senate adopted the amendment without debate. The Conference Committee, called to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, adopted the language approved by the House for the MBE provision. The Conference Reports added only the comment: “This provision shall be dependent on the availability of minority business enterprises located in the project area.”
The device of a 10% MBE participation requirement, subject to administrative waiver, was thought to be required to assure minority business participation; otherwise it was thought that repetition of the prior experience could be expected, with participation by minority business accounting for an inordinately small percentage of government contracting. The causes of this disparity were perceived as involving the longstanding existence and maintenance of barriers impairing access by minority enterprises to public contracting opportunities, or sometimes as involving more direct discrimination, but not as relating to lack — as Senator Brooke put it — “of capable and qualified minority enterprises who are ready and willing to work.” In the words of its sponsor, the MBE provision was “designed to begin to redress this grievance that has been extant for so long.”
B
The legislative objectives of the MBE provision must be considered against the background of ongoing efforts directed toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of economic opportunity. The sponsors of the MBE provision in the House and the Senate expressly linked the provision to the existing administrative programs promoting minority opportunity in government procurement, particularly those related to § 8 (a) of the Small Business Act of 1953. Section 8 (a) delegates to the Small Business Administration (SBA) an authority and an obligation “whenever it determines such action is necessary” to enter into contracts with any procurement agency of the Federal Government to furnish required goods or services, and, in turn, to enter into subcontracts with small businesses for the performance of such contracts. This authority lay dormant for a decade. Commencing in 1968, however, the SBA was directed by the President to develop a program pursuant to its § 8 (a) authority to assist small business concerns owned and controlled by “socially or economically disadvantaged” persons to achieve a competitive position in the economy.
At the time the MBE provision was enacted, the regulations governing the § 8 (a) program defined “social or economic disadvantage” as follows:
“An applicant concern must be owned and controlled by one or more persons who have been deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic disadvantage. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, social, chronic economic circumstances or background, or other similar cause. Such persons include, but are not limited to, black Americans, American Indians, Spanish-Americans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts....”
The guidelines accompanying these regulations provided that a minority business could not be maintained in the program, even when owned and controlled by members of the identified minority groups, if it appeared that the business had not been deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic disadvantage.
As the Congress began consideration of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, the House Committee on Small Business issued a lengthy Report summarizing its activities, including its evaluation of the ongoing § 8 (a) program. One chapter of the Report, entitled “Minority Enterprises and Allied Problems of Small Business,” summarized a 1975 Committee Report of the same title dealing with this subject matter. The original Report, prepared by the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise, observed:
“The subcommittee is acutely aware that the economic policies of this Nation must function within and be guided by' our constitutional system which guarantees ‘equal protection of the laws.’ The effects of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice have not remained in the past. The Congress has recognized the reality that past discriminatory practices have, to some degree, adversely affected our present economic system.
“While minority persons comprise about 16 percent of the Nation’s population, of the 13 million businesses in the United States, only 382,000, or approximately 3.0 percent, are owned by minority individuals. The most recent data from the Department of Commerce also indicates that the gross receipts of all businesses in this country totals about $2,540.8 billion, and of this amount only $16.6 billion, or about 0.65 percent was realized by minority business concerns.
“These statistics are not the result of random chance. The presumption must be made that past discriminatory systems have resulted in present economic inequities. In order to right this situation, the Congress has formulated certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially or economically disadvantaged persons to a level where they may effectively participate in the business mainstream of our economy.*
“*For the purposes of this report the term ‘minority’ shall include only such minority individuals as are considered to be economically or socially disadvantaged.”
The 1975 Report gave particular attention to the § 8 (a) program, expressing disappointment with its limited effectiveness. With specific reference to Government construction contracting, the Report concluded, “there are substantial § 8 (a) opportunities in the area of Federal construction, but... the practices of some agencies preclude the realization of this potential.” The Subcommittee took “full notice... as evidence for its consideration” of reports submitted to the Congress by the General Accounting Office and by the TJ. S. Commission on Civil Rights, which reflected a similar dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the § 8 (a) program. The Civil Rights Commission report discussed at some length the barriers encountered by minority businesses in gaining access to government contracting opportunities at the federal, state, and local levels. Among the major difficulties confronting minority businesses were deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, disabilities caused by an inadequate “track record,” lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, preselection before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of discretion by government procurement officers to disfavor minority businesses.
The Subcommittee Report also gave consideration to the operations of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, an agency of the Department of Commerce organized pursuant to Executive Orders to formulate and coordinate federal efforts to assist the development of minority businesses. The Report concluded that OMBE efforts were “totally inadequate” to achieve its policy of increasing opportunities for subcontracting by minority businesses on public contracts. OMBE efforts were hampered by a “glaring lack of specific objectives which each prime contractor should be required to achieve,” by a “lack of enforcement provisions,” and by a “lack of any meaningful monitoring system.”
Against this backdrop of legislative and administrative programs, it is inconceivable that Members of both Houses were not fully aware of the objectives of the MBE provision and of the reasons prompting its enactment.
c
Although the statutory MBE provision itself outlines only the bare bones of the federal program, it makes a number of critical determinations: the decision to initiate a limited racial and ethnic preference; the specification of a minimum level for minority business participation; the identification of the minority groups that are to be encompassed by the program; and the provision for an administrative waiver where application of the program is not feasible. Congress relied on the administrative agency to flesh out this skeleton, pursuant to delegated rulemaking authority, and to develop an administrative operation consistent with legislative intentions and objectives.
As required by the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations to set into motion “Round II” of the federal grant program. The regulations require that construction projects funded under the legislation must be performed under contracts awarded by competitive bidding, unless the federal administrator has made a determination that in the circumstances relating to a particular project some other method is in the public interest. Where competitive bidding is employed, the regulations echo the statute’s requirement that contracts are to be awarded on the basis of the “lowest responsive bid submitted by a bidder meeting established criteria of responsibility,” and they also restate the MBE requirement.
EDA also has published guidelines devoted entirely to the administration of the MBE provision. The guidelines outline the obligations of the grantee to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBE’s, to provide technical assistance as needed, to lower or waive bonding requirements where feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, the SBA, or other sources for assisting MBE’s in obtaining required working capital, and to give guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process.
EDA regulations contemplate that, as anticipated by Congress, most local public works projects will entail the award of a predominant prime contract, with the prime contractor assuming the above grantee obligations for fulfilling the 10% MBE requirement. The EDA guidelines specify that when prime contractors are selected through competitive bidding, bids for the prime contract “shall be considered by the Grantee to be responsive only if at least 10 percent of the contract funds are to be expended for MBE’s.” The administrative program envisions that competitive incentive will motivate aspirant prime contractors to perform their obligations under the MBE provision so as to qualify as “responsive” bidders. And, since the contract is to be awarded to the lowest responsive bidder, the same incentive is expected to motivate prime contractors to seek out the most competitive of the available, qualified, bona fide minority firms. This too is consistent with the legislative intention.
The EDA guidelines also outline the projected administration of applications for waiver of the 10% MBE requirement, which may be sought by the grantee either before or during the bidding process. The Technical Bulletin issued by EDA discusses in greater detail the processing, of waiver requests, clarifying certain issues left open by the guidelines. It specifies that waivers may be total or partial, depending on the circumstances, and it illustrates the projected operation of the waiver procedure by posing hypothetical questions with projected administrative responses. One such hypothetical is of particular interest, for it indicates the limitations on the scope of the racial or ethnic preference contemplated by the federal program when a grantee or its prime contractor is confronted with an available, qualified, bona fide minority business enterprise who is not the lowest competitive bidder. The hypothetical provides:
“Question: Should a request for waiver of the 10% requirement based on an unreasonable price asked by an MBE ever be granted?
“Answer: It is possible to imagine situations where an MBE might ask a price for its product or services that is unreasonable and where, therefore, a waiver is justified. However, before a waiver request will be honored, the following determinations will be made:
“a) The MBE’s quote is unreasonably priced. This determination should, be based on the nature of the product or service of the subcontractor, the geographic location of the site and of the subcontractor, prices of similar products or services in the relevant market area, and general business conditions in the market area. Furthermore, a subcontractor’s price should not be considered unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs because the price results from disadvantage which affects the MBE’s cost of doing business or results from discrimination.
“b) The contractor has contacted other MBEs and has no meaningful choice but to accept an unreasonably high price.”
This announced policy makes clear the administrative understanding that a waiver or partial waiver is justified (and will be granted) to avoid subcontracting with a minority business enterprise at an “unreasonable” price, i. e., a price above competitive levels which cannot be attributed to the minority firm’s attempt to cover costs inflated by the present effects of disadvantage or discrimination.
This administrative approach is consistent with the legislative intention. It will be recalled that in the Report of the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise the Subcommittee took special care to note that when using the term “minority” it intended to include “only such minority individuals as are -considered to be economically or socially disadvantaged.” The Subcommittee also was cognizant of existing administrative regulations designed to ensure that firms maintained on the lists of bona fide minority business enterprises be those whose competitive position is impaired by the effects of disadvantage and discrimination. In its Report, the Subcommittee expressed its intention that these criteria continue to govern administration of the SBA’s § 8 (a) program. The sponsors of the MBE provision, in their reliance on prior administrative practice, intended that the term “minority business enterprise” would be given that same limited application; this even found expression in the legislative debates, where Representative Roe made the point:
“[W]hen we are talking about companies held by minority groups... [c]ertainly people of a variety of backgrounds are included in that. That is not really a measurement. They are talking about people in the minority and deprived.”
The EDA Technical Bulletin provides other elaboration of the MBE provision. It clarifies the definition of “minority group members.” It also indicates EDA’s intention “to allow credit for utilization of MBEs only for those contracts in which involvement constitutes a basis for strengthening the long-term and continuing participation of the MBE in the construction and related industries.” Finally, the Bulletin outlines a procedure for the processing of complaints of “unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the MBE program,” or of improper administration of the MBE requirement.
Ill
When we are required to pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, we assume “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.). A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to “provide for the... general Welfare of the United States” and “to enforce, by. appropriate legislation,” the equal protection guarantees of the-Fourteenth Amendment. Art. I, §8, cl. 1; Arndt. 14,
§ 5. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973), we accorded “great weight to the decisions of Congress” even though the legislation implicated fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. The rule is not different when a congressional program raises equal protection concerns. See, e. g., Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U. S. 213 (1978); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 (1976).
Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a school board, but on a considered decision of the Congress and the President. However, in no sense does that render it immune from judicial scrutiny, and it “is not to say we ‘defer’ to the judgment of the Congress... on a constitutional question,” or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution should we determine that Congress has overstepped the bounds of its constitutional power. Columbia Broadcasting, supra, at 103.
The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by our necessarily extended review of its legislative and administrative background. The program was designed to ensure that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, grantees who elect to participate would not employ procurement practices that Congress had decided might result in perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities. The MBE program does not mandate the allocation of federal funds according to inflexible percentages solely based on race or ethnicity.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. At the outset, we must inquire whether the objectives of this legislation are within the power of Congress. If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives and does not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A
(1)
In enacting the MBE provision, it is clear that Congress employed an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers. The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, by its very nature, is primarily an exercise of the Spending Power. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This Court has recognized that the power to “provide for the... general Welfare” is an independent grant of legislative authority, distinct from other broad congressional powers. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 90-91 (1976); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Congress has frequently employed the Spending Power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives. This Court has repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenge the use of this technique to induce governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy. E. g., California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974); Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U. S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937).
The MBE program is structured within this familiar legislative pattern. The program conditions receipt of public works grants upon agreement by the state or local governmental grantee that at least 10% of the federal funds will be devoted to contracts with minority businesses, to the extent this can be accomplished by overcoming barriers to access and by awarding contracts to bona fide MBE’s. It is further conditioned to require that MBE bids on these contracts are competitively priced, or might have been competitively priced but for the present effects of prior discrimination. Admittedly, the problems of administering this program with respect to these conditions may be formidable. Although the primary responsibility for ensuring minority participation falls upon the grantee, when the procurement practices of the grantee involve the award of a prime contract to a general or prime contractor, the obligations to assure minority participation devolve upon the private contracting party; this is a contractual condition of eligibility for award of the prime contract.
Here we need not explore the outermost limitations on the objectives attainable through such an application of the Spending Power. The reach of the Spending Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its regulatory powers, Congress could have achieved the objectives of the MBE program, then it may do so under the Spending Power. And we have no difficulty perceiving a basis for accomplishing the objectives of the MBE program through the Commerce Power insofar as the program objectives pertain to the action of private contracting parties, and through the power to enforce the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as the program objectives pertain to the action of state and local grantees.
(2)
We turn first to the Commerce Power. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Had Congress chosen to do so, it could have drawn on the Commerce Clause to regulate the practices of prime contractors on federally funded public works projects. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964). The legislative history of the MBE provision shows that there was a rational basis for Congress to conclude that the subcontracting practices of prime contractors could perpetuate the prevailing impaired access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities, and that this inequity has an effect on interstate commerce. Thus Congress could take necessary and proper action to remedy the situation. Ibid.
It is not necessary that these prime contractors be shown responsible for any violation of antidiscrimination laws. Our cases dealing with application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, express no doubt of the congressional authority to prohibit practices “challenged as perpetuating the effects of [not unlawful] discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act.” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 761 (1976); see California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598 (1980); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the actions of private prime contractors, the Congress could have achieved its objectives under the Commerce Clause. We conclude that in this respect the objectives of the MBE provision are within the scope of the Spending Power.
(3)
In certain contexts, there are limitations on the reach of the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state and local governments. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). To avoid such complications, we look to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the power to regulate the procurement practices of state and local grantees of federal funds. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). A review of our cases persuades us that the objectives of the MBE program are within the power of Congress under § 5 “to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), we equated the scope of this authority with the broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. “Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 384 U. S., at 651. In Katzenbach, the Court upheld § 4 (e) of the Voting Eights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (e), which prohibited application of state English-language literacy requirements to otherwise qualified voters who had completed the sixth grade in an accredited American school in which a language other than English was the predominant medium of instruction. To uphold this exercise of congressional authority, the Court found no prerequisite that application of a literacy requirement violate the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U. S.. at 648-649. It was enough that the Court could perceive a basis upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a judgment that application of literacy qualifications within the compass of § 4 (e) would discriminate in terms of access to the ballot and consequently in terms of access to the provision or administration of governmental programs. Id., at 652-653.
Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), we upheld §201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 315, which imposed a 5-year nationwide prohibition on the use of various • voter-qualification tests and devices in federal, state, and local elections. The Court was unanimous, albeit in separate opinions, in concluding that Congress was within its authority to prohibit the use of such voter qualifications; Congress could reasonably determine that its legislation was an appropriate method of attacking the perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimination, even though the use of these tests or devices might have discriminatory effects only. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 176-177 (1980). Our cases reviewing the parallel power of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, TJ. S. Const., Amdt. 15, § 2,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to the provisions of the National Housing Act of 1934, as amended, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is authorized, in certain instances, to insure the partial repayment of loans secured by mortgages executed to finance the purchase of private residential properties. When duly requested to do so by a qualified lender, the FHA, through its appraisal staff, makes an inspection of property offered for sale in order to determine whether the property is eligible for FHA mortgage insurance, and to assign an appraised value establishing the maximum amount of mortgage insurance obtainable.
The question for decision in this case is whether the United States may be held liable, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b), to a purchaser of residential property who has been furnished a statement reporting the results of an inaccurate FHA inspection and appraisal, and who, in reliance thereon, has been induced by the seller to pay a purchase price in excess of the property’s fair market value. The answer turns upon the correct interpretation of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), which precludes recovery under the Tort Claims Act upon “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation.” The material facts giving rise to the controversy are not in dispute, and may be summarized as follows.
Early in 1957, the property in question, consisting of a 16-year-old single-family brick house and lot located in Alexandria, Virginia, was offered for sale by its owners. To assure that FHA mortgage insurance would be available to secure a loan in the event that the purchaser, when ascertained, might desire to finance the purchase by that method, the owners requested a qualified lending institution to take the necessary steps to have the property inspected and appraised by the FHA; and pursuant to the lending agent’s application, an FHA appraiser visited and inspected the premises. On the basis of that inspection, which disclosed no defects that would disqualify the property for mortgage insurance, the FHA issued to the lending agency a “conditional commitment,” stating that the property had been approved for mortgage insurance and, for that purpose, had been assigned an appraised value of $22,750. Under § 203 (b) (2) of the National Housing Act, the maximum amount of mortgage insurance obtainable on an appraised value of $22,750 was $18,800.
Shortly thereafter, the respondents,- Mr. and Mrs. Stanley S. Neustadt, examined the property and became interested in buying it. After negotiations extending over the period of a month, in the course of which respondents were advised by the sellers that the property had been appraised by the FHA at a value of $22,750 for mortgage insurance purposes, respondents entered into a conditional contract to purchase the property at a price of $24,000. The contract was conditioned upon the respondents’ obtaining a loan secured by an FHA-insured mortgage in the amount of $18,800. In accordance with § 226 of the National Housing Act, the contract also provided that the sellers would deliver to respondents, prior to the sale of the property, a written statement setting forth the FHA-appraised value. Both conditions were fulfilled, and on the settlement date, July 2, 1957, respondents took title to the property, and acknowledged by their signatures that they had been furnished with a written “Statement of FHA Appraisal.” This was an official FHA document, stating that the FHA “has appraised the property identified . . . and for mortgage insurance purposes has placed an FHA-appraised value of $22,750 on such property as of the date of this statement. (The FHA appraised value does not establish sales price.)” (Emphasis in original.)
Respondents moved into the house on July 10, 1957. According to their testimony, they had previously inspected the house “quite carefully,” and had found “absolutely nothing which would indicate the necessity for any redecoration at all.” The house was “immaculately clean” and the walls and ceilings “looked fine.” However, within a month after respondents moved in, substantial cracks developed in the ceilings and in the interior and exterior walls throughout the house. When building repair contractors were unable to ascertain the cause of the cracks, the original builder of the house and four FHA field inspectors were summoned, and a thorough investigation was made by them. By drilling a hole through the concrete floor of the basement, it was discovered that the subsoil was composed of a type of clay which becomes pliable when moist. Due to poor drainage conditions on the surface, water had seeped into the clay, causing it to shift beneath the foundations of the house and to produce the cracks which had appeared in the walls and ceilings.
Ten months thereafter, respondents commenced this action against the Government, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking recovery of the difference between the fair market value of the property and the purchase price of $24,000. The complaint alleged that the FHA’s inspection and appraisal of the property for mortgage insurance purposes had been conducted negligently; that respondents were justified in relying upon the results of that inspection and appraisal; and that they “would not have purchased the property for $24,000 but for the carelessness and negligence of [FHA].”
After trial, the District Court found that respondents “in good faith relied upon the [FHA’s] appraisal in consummating their contract of purchase,” and that “reasonable care by a qualified appraiser would have warned” respondents of the “serious structural defects” in the house which had been “preponderantly proved.” On that basis, the court adjudged the Government liable in the amount of $8,000, which it found to be the difference between the property’s fair market value at the time of sale ($16,000) and the purchase price ($24,000).
On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 281 F. 2d 596, over the Government’s sedulous objection that recovery was barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), which excepts from the coverage of the Tort Claims Act “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation.” Because of- the importance of the question, and to resolve an apparent conflict between the Fourth Circuit’s decision and the holdings of other Circuits uniformly construing the “misrepresentation” exception of § 2680 (h) to preclude recovery on closely analogous facts, we granted certiorari. 364 U. S. 926. We have concluded that the interpretation adopted by the Fourth Circuit is erroneous, and that the Government must be absolved from liability.
In its complete form, § 2680 (h) excludes recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act upon “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” (Emphasis added.) The Government’s position is that, since Congress employed both the terms “misrepresentation” and “deceit” in § 2680 (h), it clearly meant to exclude claims arising out of negligent, as well as deliberate, misrepresentation; and therefore, even assuming that the District Court correctly found that the inaccurate FHA appraisal in this case resulted from a negligent inspection, and that respondents relied upon that appraisal to their detriment, the claim must nevertheless fail as one “arising out of . . . [negligent] misrepresentation. ”
We are in accord with the view urged by the Government, and unanimously adopted by all Circuits which have previously had occasion to pass on the question, that § 2680 (h) comprehends claims arising out of negligent, as well as willful, misrepresentation.
The leading precedent has been the Second Circuit’s decision in Jones v. United States, 207 F. 2d 563, which involved, a statement issued to the plaintiffs-by the United States Geological Survey erroneously estimating the oil-producing capacity of certain land. In reliance upon that statement, plaintiffs sold securities representing oil and gas rights in the land for less than their actual value, and later sought to recoup their loss from the Government under the Tort Claims Act on a complaint alleging negligent misrepresentation. Affirming a dismissal of the complaint, the -Second Circuit tersely, pointed out that § 2680 (h) applies to both “misrepresentation” and “deceit,” and, “[a]s ‘deceit’ means fraudulent misrepresentation, ‘misrepresentation’ must have been meant to include negligent misrepresentation, since otherwise the word ‘misrepresentation’ would be duplicative.” 207 F. 2d, at 564. Following this interpretation, in an unbroken line, are the cases of National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Clark v. United States, 218 F. 2d 446 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Miller Harness Co. v. United States, 241 F. 2d 781 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Anglo-American Corp. v. United States, 242 F. 2d 236 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Hall v. United States, 274 F. 2d 69 (C. A. 10th Cir.). In accord also are Social Security Adm’n v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 639 (D. C. D. Md.), and United States v. Van Meter, 149 F. Supp. 493 (D. C. N. D. Cal.).
Throughout this line of decisions, the argument has been made by plaintiffs, and consistently rejected by the courts, until this case, that the bar of § 2680 (h) does not apply when the gist of the claim lies in negligence underlying the inaccurate representation, i. e., when the claim is phrased as one “arising out of” negligence rather than “misrepresentation.” But this argument, as was forcefully demonstrated by the Tenth Circuit in Hall v. United States, supra, is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent § 2680 (h) by denying that it applies to negligent misrepresentation. In the Hall case, it was alleged that agents of the Department of Agriculture had negligently inspected the plaintiff’s cattle and, as a result, mistakenly reported that the cattle were diseased. Relying upon that report, plaintiff sold the cattle at less than their fair value, and sought recovery from the Government of his loss on the ground that it had been caused by the negligent inspection underlying the agents’ report, rather than by the report itself. The Tenth Circuit rejected the claim, stating:
“We must then look beyond the literal meaning of the language to ascertain the real cause of complaint. . . . Plaintiff’s loss came about when the Government agents misrepresented the condition of the cattle, telling him they were diseased when, in fact, they were free from disease. . . . This stated a cause of action predicated on a misrepresentation. Misrepresentation as used in the exclusionary provision [of § 2680 (h)] was meant to include negligent misrepresentation.” 274 F. 2d, at 71.
In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit took the opposite view, and held that respondents could recover on the sole basis of the underlying negligence. Although it agreed that § 2680 (h) embraces both “negligent” and “willful” misrepresentation, and that respondents’ claim “might form the basis of an action for misrepresentation under general common-law principlés,” 281 F. 2d, at 601, it deemed § 2680 (h) inapplicable here for the reason that the misrepresentation was “merely incidental” to the “gravamen” of the claim, i. e., “the careless making of an excessive appraisal so that [respondents were] . . . deceived and suffered substantial loss.” Id., at 602. Since § 226 of the National Housing Act requires that a seller of property approved for FHA mortgage insurance “shall agree to deliver, prior to the sale of the property, to the person purchasing such [property], a written statement setting forth the amount of the [FHA] appraised value . . . ,” the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the FHA appraisal procedure was designed to protect prospective home' purchasers; that the Government (through the FHA) therefore “owed a specific duty” to respondents to make a careful appraisal; and that “if the government assumes a duty and negligently performs it, a party injured thereby may recover damages from the United States even though the careless performance of the duty may have been accompanied by some misrepresentation of fact.” Id., at 599.
Whether or not this analysis accords with the law of States which have seen fit to allow recovery under analogous circumstances, it does not meet the question of whether this claim is outside the intended scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which depends solely upon what Congress meant by the language it used in §2680 (h).
To say, as the Fourth Circuit did, that a claim arises out of “negligence,” rather than “misrepresentation,” when the loss suffered by the injured party is caused by the breach of a “specific duty” owed by the Government to him, i. e., the duty to use due care in obtaining and communicating information upon which that party may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of his economic affairs, is only to state the traditional and commonly understood legal definition of the tort of “negligent misrepresentation,” as is clearly, if not conclusively, shown by the authorities set forth in the margin, and which there is every reason to believe Congress had in mind when it placed the word “misrepresentation” before the word “deceit” in § 2680 (h). As the Second Circuit observed in Jones v. United States, supra, “deceit” alone would have been sufficient had Congress intended only to except deliberately false representations. Certainly there is no warrant for assuming that Congress was unaware of established tort definitions when it enacted the Tort Claims Act in 1946, after spending “some twenty-eight years of congressional drafting and redrafting, amendment and counter-amendment.” United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, 219-220. Moreover, as we have said in considering other aspects of the Act: “There is nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that Congress intended to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 68.
Regarding the Court of Appeals’ assertion that the Government owed respondents a “specific duty” to make and communicate an accurate appraisal of the property, by virtue of the provisions of the National Housing Act, we have carefully examined the rather extensive legislative history of that statute, giving particular attention to § 226 thereof, and have found nothing from which we may reasonably infer that Congress intended, in a case such as this, to limit or suspend the application of the “misrepresentation” exception of the Tort Claims Act. Long before § 226 was added to the National Housing Act, in 1954, requiring sellers to inform prospective buyers of FHA-appraised value, it had been recognized in Congress that FHA appraisals would be a matter of public record, and would thus inure, incidentally, to the benefit of prospective home purchasers, by affording them the “benefit of knowing the appraised value set upon the property ... by a trained valuator acting in accordance with a procedure designed to reduce to a minimum, errors that might result from casual or hasty conclusions.” But at the same time, it was repeatedly emphasized that the primary and predominant objective of the appraisal system was the “protection of the Government and its insurance funds”; that the mortgage insurance program was not designed to insure anything other than the repayment of loans made by lender-mortgagees; and that “there is no legal relationship between the FHA and the individual mortgagor.” Never once was it even intimated that, by an FHA appraisal, the Government would, in any sense, represent or guarantee to the purchaser that he was receiving a certain value for his money.
Nor is there any indication that Congress intended, by its 1954 addition of § 226, to modify the legislation's fundamental design from a system of mortgage repayment insurance to one of guaranty or warranty to the purchaser of value received. On its face, § 226 goes no further than to require that a seller of property approved for FHA mortgage insurance shall furnish to the buyer, prior to sale, a written statement disclosing the FHA-appraised value. That Congress did not thereby intend to convert the FHA appraisal into a warranty of value, or otherwise to extend to the purchaser any actionable right of redress against the Government in the event of a faulty appraisal, was made irrefutably clear in the Committee Hearings in both Houses of Congress, the pertinent excerpts from which are set forth in the margin. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, at the time § 226 was adopted, Congress was aware of the “misrepresentation” exception in the Tort Claims Act, and that it had been construed by the courts to include “negligent misrepresentation.”
The compulsory disclosure provision of § 226 is but one of numerous instances in which Congress has relegated to a governmental agency the duty either to disclose directly', or to require private persons to disclose, information for the assistance and guidance of other persons in the conduct of their economic and commercial affairs. In practically all such instances, it may be said that the Government owes a “specific duty” to obtain and communicate information carefully, lest the intended recipient be misled to his financial harm. While we do not condone carelessness by government employees in gathering and promulgating such information, neither can we justifiably ignore the plain words Congress has used in limiting the scope of the Government’s tort liability.
It follows that respondents’ claim is one “arising out of . . . misrepresentation,” within the meaning of § 2680 (h), and hence is not actionable against the Government under the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, the judgment below must be
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
48 Stat. 1246, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1701 et seq.
Section 203 of the National Housing Act of 1934, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1709, provided at the times here pertinent that:
“(a) . . . The [Federal Housing] Commissioner is authorized, upon application by the mortgagee, to insure as hereinafter provided any mortgage offered to him which is eligible for insurance as hereinafter provided, and, upon such terms as the Commissioner may prescribe, to make commitments for the insuring of such mortgages prior to the date of their execution or disbursement thereon ....
“(b) . . . To be eligible for insurance under this section a mortgage shall—
“(2) Involve a principal obligation . . . not to exceed an amount equal to the sum of (i) 95 per centum ... of $9,000. of the [FHA] appraised value (as of the date the mortgage is accepted for insurance), and (ii) 75 per centum of such value in excess of $9,000 . . .
24 CFR §§200.145, 200.146, 200.148 (1959 ed.).
“[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
An application for FHA mortgage insurance may be made only by a financial institution approved as a mortgagee by the FHA. §203 (a), National Housing Act, supra, 12 U. S. C. § 1709 (a). Applications may be, and commonly are, made in advance of actual sale and execution of the mortgage, 24 CFR §221.9 (1959 ed.), in order that the seller may have the property inspected, approved, and appraised for mortgage insurance while the purchaser is still unknown.
The commitment to insure a mortgage is conditioned upon the mortgagor’s being found financially able to carry the mortgage. 24 CFR §§200.147, 200.148 (1) (1959 ed.).
Note 2, supra.
Under § 203 (b) (2), the maximum insurable amount was $18,862.50 (95% of $9,000, plus 75% of $13,750). By FHA regulations, mortgages were insurable only in multiples of $100. 24 CFR § 221.17 (a) (1958 Supp.).
Section 226 was enacted in 1954 (68 Stat. 607, 12 U. S. C. § 1715q) and provides in pertinent part as follows:
“The Commissioner is hereby authorized and directed to require that, in connection with any property . . . approved for mortgage insurance . . . the seller or builder . . . shall agree to deliver, prior to the sale of the property, to the person purchasing such dwelling for his own occupancy, a written statement setting forth the amount of the appraised value of the property as determined by the Commissioner. . . .”
There is no right to a jury trial under the Tort Claims Act. 28 U. S. C. § 2402.
The cases are cited and discussed at pp. 702-705, infra.
Neither in the Court of Appeals, nor in this Court, has the Government chosen to contest these findings.
In Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 242 F. 2d 236, the Second Circuit analyzed a similar claim and exposed its true basis: “[Plaintiff] contracted to sell tomato paste to the United States, which required as a condition precedent to its acceptance of the paste that it satisfy the standards of the Food and Drug Administration. The paste was imported; and the Food and Drug Administration, after sampling it, issued ‘release notices’ that notified Customs officers that the tomato paste could enter the country. [Plaintiff] then accepted delivery. When it in turn delivered the paste to the government, federal officials once again inspected the paste, found that it did not satisfy the standards of the Food and Drug Administration, and ordered it destroyed. [Plaintiff] sues now on the ground that the negligence of officials of the Food and Drug Administration in sampling the tomato paste and in issuing the ‘release notices’ induced it to accept the paste and thus suffer damages.
“This claim, it is clear, ‘arose out of’ the assertedly negligent representation of the quality of the tomato paste by federal employees. Such a claim is barred by . . . Section 2680 (h) . . . [which excepts] from liability negligent as well as intentional misrepresentation.” Id., at 237.
Note 9, supra.
The Fourth Circuit sought primary support from the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, in which the defendants, who were public weighers, were requested by a vendor to weigh certain goods and to issue a certificate of weight to the buyer. The goods were weighed inaccurately, and on the strength of the erroneous weight certificate, the buyer paid an excessive purchase price. In allowing the buyer to recover from defendants, the New York court looked primarily to the negligence in performing the act of weighing, and stated that defendants were liable both for their “careless words” and their “careless performance of a service.” The case has been widely discussed by tort authorities as epitomizing “negligent misrepresentation.” See, e. g., 1 Harper and James, Torts, 546-548 (1956); Prosser, Torts, 734, 737 (1941 ed.); Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud? 18 Va. L. Rev. 703, 708 (1932). Glanzer has been followed in a number of States which have broken from the earlier, virtually unanimous, American view subscribing to the English case of Derry v. Peek, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337, 58 L. J. Rep. Ch. 864 (1889) (refusing to allow recovery for negligent misrepresentation). See cases cited in 1 Harper and James, Torts, 546, n. 5 (1956). Cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, when a claim is not barred by one of the Act’s exclusionary provisions, the liability of the Government must be determined “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b). The Fourth Circuit’s opinion, although it concluded that § 2680 (h) did not bar respondents’ claim, did not indicate whether Virginia law follows the New York rule of Glanzer v. Shepard, supra. In view of our conclusion that § 2680 (h) applies, we need not explore this question.
The American Law Institute’s Restatement of Torts (1938), c. 22, “Deceit: Business Transactions,” Topic 3, “Negligent Misrepresentations,” states as follows:
Ҥ 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.
“One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information if
“(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and
“(b) the harm is suffered
“ (i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and
“(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical therewith.”
Prosser, Torts (1941 ed.), c. 16, “Misrepresentation,” §87, “Basis of Responsibility,” states:
“Responsibility for misrepresentation may be divided into the usual tort classifications. It may rest upon:
“a. An intent to deceive, consisting of belief that the representation is false .... [S]uch an intent is required for the action of deceit.
“b. Negligence in obtaining information or in making the representation. . . .
“c. A policy holding the maker strictly responsible for the truth of the representation
See also Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 735-739 (1929); 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, §126, “Negligent Representations” (1939).
See 2 Harper and James, Torts, § 29.13, The Federal Tort Claims Act: Exceptions to Liability, p. 1655 (1956).
78 Cong. Rec. 11980 et seq.; 1st Annual Report of FHA (1935) (passim); 100 Cong. Rec. 12349-12360; S. Rep. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1429, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on the Housing Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on Housing Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
First Annual Report of FHA 17 (1935). See also 90 Cong. Rec. A2985; 78 Cong. Rec. 11981.
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66.
78 Cong. Rec. 11981; 1st Annual Report of FHA 15 (1935).
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 66-67.
Note 9, supra.
It was stated by Representative Dollinger, in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency on “Housing Constructed Under VA and FHA Programs,” 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 163:
“The Government did not guarantee, on your getting the home, that the home would be in good condition. As I pointed out before, there has been a misconception of the idea. The Government never approved the building. All it says is that the FHA loans are guaranteed to the builder or to the bank.”
In the Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Housing Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1402-1403, the following colloquy was recorded between Senator Bennett and Home Finance Administrator Cole:
“Mr. Cole: ... I agree with the Senator that the home buyer should understand that the Federal Government is not guaranteeing his home.
“Senator Bennett: That is correct. . . . The idea of the inspection service under title II is to protect the Federal Government, which undertakes to insure the'loan. The fact that the inspection is made, provides collateral benefits to the property owner. There is no question about that. But in the last analysis the property owner cannot say to the Federal Government, ‘Well, your inspector inspected my house, and now look what’s happened; therefore, you are responsible; therefore, you must come down here and fix it up.’ ”
Jones v. United States, supra, and National Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra, had both been decided, by the Second and Eighth Circuits, respectively, when Congress enacted § 226 in 1954.
Our conclusion neither conflicts with nor impairs the authority of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, which held cognizable a Torts Act claim for property damages suffered when a vessel ran aground as a result of the Coast Guard’s allegedly negligent failure to maintain the beacon lamp in a lighthouse. Such a claim does not “arise out of . . . misrepresentation,” any more than does one based upon a motor vehicle operator’s negligence in giving a misleading turn signal. As Dean Prosser has observed, many familiar forms of negligent conduct may be said to involve an element of “misrepresentation,” in the generic sense of that word, but “[s]o far as misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in and of itself to a distinct cause of action in tort, it has been identified with the common law action of deceit,” and has been confined “very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the course of business dealings.” Prosser, Torts, § 85, “Remedies for Misrepresentation,” at 702-703 (1941 ed.). See also 2 Harper and James, Torts, §29.13, at 1655 (1956).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the latest episode in litigation beginning in 1948 which has been waged in five tribunals and has produced more than 125 printed pages of administrative and judicial opinions. It concerns the plan of the City of Tacoma, a municipal corporation in the State of Washington, to construct a power project on the Cowlitz River, a navigable water of the United States, in accordance with a license issued by the Federal Power Commission under the Federal Power Act. The question presented for decision here is whether under the facts of this case the City of Tacoma has acquired federal eminent domain power and capacity to take, upon the payment of just compensation, a fish hatchery owned and operated by the State of Washington, by virtue of the license issued to the City under the Federal Power Act and more particularly § 21 thereof. The project cannot be built without taking the hatchery because it necessarily must be inundated by a reservoir that will be created by one of the project’s dams.
The question has arisen under the following circumstances and proceedings. Having earlier filed its declaration of intention to construct the project, the City of Tacoma, a “municipality” in the State of Washington, on December 28, 1948, filed with the Commission, under § 4 (e) of the Federal Power Act, an application for a federal license to construct a power project, including two dams (known as Mossyrock and Mayfield) and appurtenant facilities, on the Cowlitz River.
The Mossyrock development was proposed to be located at Mile 65 and to consist of a concrete dam across the Cowlitz rising 510 feet above bedrock (creating a reservoir covering about 10,000 acres extending 21 miles upstream) and an integral powerhouse containing, initially, three generators each of 75,000-kilowatt capacity and provisions for a fourth generator of like capacity. The Mayfield development was proposed to be located at Mile 52 and to consist of a concrete dam across the Cowlitz rising 240 feet above bedrock (creating a reservoir covering about 2,200 acres extending 13.5 miles upstream to the tailwaters of the Mossyrock Dam, which would inundate the State’s fish hatchery) and an integral powerhouse containing, initially, three generators each of 40,000-kilowatt capacity and provisions for a fourth generator of like capacity. The project — estimated to cost $146,000,000, including $9,465,000 for devices to enable anadromous fish to pass to spawning grounds upstream and their young to pass to the sea, and for new fish hatcheries — would thus have initial capacity to produce 345,000 kilowatts or 474,000 horsepower, and eventually 460,000 kilowatts or 632,000 horsepower, of electrical energy.
The Commission ordered a public hearing to determine whether the license should issue, and gave notice of the hearing to the Governor of the State of Washington. In response, the Attorney General of the State filed an intervening petition, in the names of the State’s Directors of Fisheries and of Game, alleging in substance that the State’s Departments of Fisheries and of Game are subdivisions of the sovereign State, and that the respective Directors are charged with the duty of enforcing its laws concerning the conservation of fish and game; that the dams and fish-handling facilities proposed by the City would destroy fishery resources of the State; that construction of proposed dams would violate Wash. Rev. Code 90.28.060, requiring the State’s permission to construct any dam for the storage of 10 acre-feet or more of water, and Wash. Rev. Code 75.20.010, prohibiting the construction of any dam higher than 25 feet across any river tributary to the Columbia, downstream from the McNary Dam, within the migratory range of anadromous fish; and “[t]hat the reservoirs which would be created by the proposed dams would inundate a valuable and irreplaceable fish hatchery owned by the State of Washington, as well as... productive spawning areas.” The City's answer admitted that the State’s fish hatchery would be inundated by the Mayfield Reservoir. The State’s Attorney General also appointed a Special Assistant Attorney General to represent all persons of the State whose views were in conflict with the State’s official position.
Upon the issues thus framed a hearing, consuming 24 days, was conducted by a Commission examiner, throughout which the Attorney General of the State, by his designated assistant, actively participated in opposition to the application, and the Special Assistant Attorney General, appointed for the purpose stated, also participated in the proceedings before the Commission. Thereafter the Commission, on November 28,1951, rendered its opinion, findings, and order granting the license. Re City of Tacoma, 92 P. U. R. (N. S.) 79. The State petitioned for a rehearing which was denied.
Pursuant to § 313 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 825i, the State, in its proper name and also on behalf of its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, petitioned for review of the Commission's order by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The City intervened. The State there challenged the Commission’s authority to issue the license principally upon the grounds that the City had not complied with applicable state laws nor obtained state permits and approvals required by state statptes; that “Tacoma, as a creature of the State of Washington, cannot act in opposition to the policy of the State or in derogation of its laws” (emphasis added); and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the Commission’s findings and order. The Court of Appeals, holding that “state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States” and that there was ample evidence to sustain the Commission’s findings and its order, affirmed. Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm’n, 207 F. 2d 391, 396. (Emphasis added.) The State then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied. 347 U. S. 936.
While the petition for review was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the City, on February 3, 1952, commenced an action in the Superior Court of Pierce County, Washington, against the taxpayers of Tacoma and the State's Directors of Fisheries and of Game, seeking a judgment declaring valid a large issue of revenue bonds, authorized by the City’s Ordinance (No. 14386) of January 9, 1952, to be issued and sold by Tacoma to finance the construction of the Cowlitz project — a proceeding specifically authorized by Wash. Rev. Code 7.25.010 through 7.25.040. As required by those statutes the court named representative taxpayers of Tacoma as class defendants and also appointed their counsel who.demurred to the City’s complaint. The State’s Directors of Fisheries and of Game, acting through an Assistant Attorney General- of the State, filed an answer and also a cross-complaint (reasserting substantially the same objections that they and the State had made before the Commission, and that had been made in, and rejected by, the Court of Appeals on their petition for review) to which the City demurred. The judge of the Superior Court sustained the Taxpayers’ demurrer and dismissed the suit. Tacoma appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington. That court, three justices dissenting, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause with instructions to overrule the Taxpayers’ demurrer and to proceed further consistently with the court’s opinion. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 43 Wash. 2d 468, 262 P. 2d 214.
Following that opinion the City, on June 21, 1955, accepted bids for a block of its revenue bonds totaling $15,000,000, and on the next day it awarded contracts for construction of the Mayfield Dam aggregating $16,120,870. Two days later, June 24, 1955, the Directors “acting for and on behalf of the State” moved in the Superior Court for, and obtained, ex parte, an order enjoining the City, pending determination of the suit, from proceeding to construct the Cowlitz project or to sell any of its revenue bonds. That order was modified on June 30, 1955, to permit such construction work as would not in any manner interfere with the bed or waters of the Cowlitz River. Promptly thereafter the City began construction of the project, within the limits of the injunction, and had expended about $7,000,000 thereon to the time the work was completely enjoined as later stated.
On July 27, 1955, Tacoma amended its complaint merely to assert the intervening facts that the Commission, upon application of the City which was opposed by the State, had, on the basis of delays entailed by this litigation, entered an order on February 24, 1954, amending Articles 28 and 33 of the City’s license by extending the time for commencing and for completing the project to December 31, 1955, and December 31, 1958, respectively, and that the City had amended its pertinent ordinance (No. 14386) accordingly and in other minor respects. On August 8, 1955, on motion made by.the State’s Attorney General (in the names of the Directors of Fisheries and of Game), the State, “in its sovereign capacity,” was formally made a defendant in the action. The State and those Directors answered, and also filed a cross-complaint again reviving the objections previously made by the Directors in their earlier cross-complaint and alleging further that the project would interfere with navigation of the Cowlitz River in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 80.40.010. Upon pretrial conference the Superior Court found that the navigation issue was the only one open and ordered that the evidence at the trial be limited to that issue. On January 11, 1956, the case was tried and the testimony taken was limited solely to the navigation issue. On March 6, 1956, the court, holding that the State’s statutes proscribing the construction of dams (note 11) are “inapplicable,” but that the City “is acting illegally and in excess of its authority in the construction of the... project as presently proposed for the reason that said project would necessarily impede, obstruct or interfere with public navigation contrary to the proviso of R. C. W. 80.40.010 et seq.,” entered judgment in favor of the Taxpayers and the State, and enjoined the City from proceeding to construct the project.
Tacoma appealed, and the Taxpayers, the State and its Directors cross-appealed, to the Supreme Court of Washington. On February 7, 1957, that court, three justices dissenting, affirmed. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P. 2d 567. It agreed that the Washington-statutes proscribing the construction of dams (note 11) were “inapplicable... insofar as the same conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of [the City’s] License for said project, or insofar as they would enable State officials to exercise a veto over said project” (49 Wash. 2d, at 801, 307 P. 2d, at 577), but it disapproved the action of the trial court in sustaining the State’s objection that the project would interfere with navigation in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 80.40.010. However, upon the declared premise that though the trial court’s judgment was based upon an erroneous ground it would sustain it if correct on any ground within the pleadings and established by proof, it held that, though the State Legislature has given the City the right to construct and operate facilities for the production and distribution of electric power and a general power of condemnation for those purposes, “the legislature has [not] expressly authorized a municipal corporation to condemn state-owned land previously dedicated to a public use [and] that the city of Tacoma has not been endowed with [State] statutory capacity to condemn [the State’s fish hatchery]”; that “the city of Tacoma [may not] receive the power and capacity to condemn [the State’s fish hatchery] previously dedicated to a public use, from the license issued to it by the Federal power commission in the absence of such power and capacity under state statutes” (emphasis added); and that the City’s “inability so to act can be remedied only by state legislation that expands its capacity.” (Emphasis in original.) 49 Wash. 2d, at 798, 799, 307 P. 2d, at 576, 577. This, it said, “is not a question of the right of the Federal government to control all phases of activity on navigable streams, nor a question of its power, under the Federal power act, to delegate that right. It only questions the capacity of a municipal corporation of this state to act under such license when its exercise requires the condemnation of state-owned property dedicated to a public use.” 49 Wash. 2d, at 798, 307 P. 2d, at 576. (Emphasis added.) We granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 888.
At the outset respondents ask dismissal of our writ on the ground that the case is moot. They argue that it is evident the Cowlitz project cannot be completed by December 31, 1958, which is the date now stated in the license for its completion. There is no merit in this contention because § 13 of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1071, 16 U. S. C. § 806, expressly provides that “the period for the completion of construction carried on in good faith and with reasonable diligence may be extended by the Commission when not incompatible with the public interests,” and an application by the City is now pending before the Commission for an extension of completion time based upon delays entailed by these proceedings.
We come now to the core of the controversy between the parties, namely, whether the license issued by the Commission under the Federal Power Act to the City of Tacoma gave it capacity to act under that federal license in constructing the project and delegated to it federal eminent domain power to take, upon the payment of just compensation, the State’s fish hatchery — essential to the construction of the project — in the absence of state legislation specifically conferring such authority.
At the threshold of this controversy petitioner, the City, asserts that, under the express terms of § 313 (b) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 8251 (b), this question has been finally determined by the decision of the Court of Appeals (207 F. 2d 391) and this Court’s denial of certiorari (347 U. S. 936); and that respondents’ cross-complaints, and proceedings thereon, in the subsequent bond validation suit in the Washington courts have been only impermissible collateral attacks upon the final judgment of the Court of Appeals. If this assertion is correct, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington now before us would necessarily have to be reversed, for obviously that court, like this one, may not, in such a case, re-examine and decide a question which has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in earlier litigation between the parties. We must turn then to an examination of petitioner’s contention.
It is no longer open to question that the Federal Government under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) has dominion, to the exclusion of the States, over navigable waters of the United States. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196; New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 337; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 424; First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm’n, 328 U. S. 152, 173; United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222, 224-225. Congress has elected to exercise this power under the detailed and comprehensive plan for development of the Nation’s water resources, which it prescribed in the Federal Power Act, to be administered by the Federal Power Commission. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm’n, supra; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., supra.
Section 313 (b) of that Act, upon which petitioner’s claim of finality depends, provides, in pertinent part:
“(b) Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the United States court of appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the order relates is located... by filing in such court, within 60 days after the order of [the] Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of such petition shall forthwith be served upon any member of the Commission and thereupon the Commission shall certify and file with the court a transcript of the record upon which the order complained of was entered. Upon the filing of such transcript such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part. No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure so to do. The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.... The judgment and decree of the court, affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in sections 846 and 8Iff of Title 28.” 16 U. S. C. § 825Z (b). (Emphasis added.)
This statute is written in simple words of plain meaning and leaves no room to doubt the congressional purpose and intent. It can hardly be doubted that Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, may prescribe the procedures and conditions under which,.and the courts in which, judicial review of administrative orders may be had. Cf. Labor Board v. Cheney California Lumber Co., 327 U. S. 385, 388. So acting, Congress in § 313 (b) prescribed the specific, complete and exclusive mode for judicial review of the Commission’s orders. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 124 F. 2d 800, 804, cert. denied, 316 U. S. 663. It there provided that any party aggrieved by the Commission’s order may have judicial review, upon all issues raised before the Commission in the motion for rehearing, by the Court of Appeals which “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part,” and that “[t]he judgment and decree of the court, affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification....” (Emphasis added.) It thereby necessarily precluded de novo litigation between the parties of all issues inhering in the controversy, and all other modes of judicial review. Hence, upon judicial review of the Commission’s order, all objections to the order, to the license it directs to be issued, and to the legal competence of the licensee to execute its terms, must be made in the Court of Appeals or not at all. For Congress, acting within its powers, has declared that the Court of Appeals shall have “exclusive jurisdiction” to review such orders, and that its judgment “shall be final,” subject to review by this Court upon certiorari or certification. Such statutory finality need not be labeled res judicata, estoppel, collateral estoppel, waiver or the like either by Congress or the courts.
The State participated in the hearing before the Commission. It there vigorously objected to the issuance of the license upon the grounds, among others, “[t]hat the reservoirs which would be created by the proposed dams would inundate a valuable and irreplaceable fish hatchery owned by the State” and, hence, necessarily require the taking of it by the City under the license sought; that the City had not complied with the applicable laws of the State respecting construction of the project and performance of the acts necessarily incident thereto (note 11); and that the City was not authorized by the laws of the State to engage in such business. The Commission rejected these contentions of the State and made all the findings required by the Act to support its order granting the license (note 9) including the finding that:
“The Applicant... has submitted satisfactory evidence of compliance with the requirements of all applicable State laws insofar as necessary to effect the purposes of a license for the project; and it is a municipality within the meaning of Section 3 (7) of the Act.”
The State then petitioned the Commission for a rehearing, reviving the foregoing contentions and raising others. The petition was denied.
Thereafter, the State, following the procedures prescribed by § 313 (b), petitioned the proper Court of Appeals for review of the Commission’s findings and order. After full hearing, that court rejected all contentions there raised by the State, did not disturb any of the Commission’s findings, and affirmed its order without modification. Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm’n, 207 F. 2d 391. It made particular mention of, and approved, the Commission’s finding, as rephrased by the court, that the City had submitted “such evidence of compliance with state law as, in the Commission’s judgment, would be ‘appropriate to effect the purposes of a Federal license on the navigable waters of the United States.’ ” Id., at 396.
Moreover, in its briefs in the Court of Appeals, the State urged reversal of the Commission’s order on the grounds that the City “has not shown, nor could it show, that [it] has availed itself of... any right to take or destroy the property of the State of Washington [and that] Tacoma, as a creature of the State of Washington, cannot act [under the license] in opposition to the policy of the State or in derogation of its laws.” (Emphasis added.) In rejecting these contentions — that the City does not have “any right to take or destroy property of the State” and “cannot act” in accordance with the terms of its federal license — the Court of Appeals said:
“Again, we turn to the First Iowa case, supra. There, too, the applicant for a federal license was a creature of the state and the chief opposition came from the state itself. Yet, the Supreme Court permitted the applicant to act inconsistently with the declared policy of its creator, and to prevail in obtaining a license.
“Consistent with the First Iowa case, supra, we conclude that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States.” Id., at 396. (Emphasis added.)
We think these recitals show that the very issue upon which respondents stand here was raised and litigated in the Court of Appeals and decided by its judgment. But even if it might be thought that this issue was not raised in the Court of Appeals, it cannot be doubted that it could and should have been, for that was the court to which Congress had given “exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside” the Commission’s order. And the State may not reserve the point, for another round of piecemeal litigation, by remaining silent on the issue while its action to review and reverse the Commission’s order was pending in that court — which had “exclusive jurisdiction” of the proceeding and whose judgment therein as declared by Congress “shall be final,” subject to review by this Court upon certiorari or certification. After the Court of Appeals’ judgment was rendered, the State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied. 347 U. S. 936.
These were precisely the proceedings prescribed by Congress in § 313 (b) of the Act for judicial review of the Commission’s findings and order. They resulted in affirmance. That result, Congress has declared, “shall be final.”
But respondents say that the Court of Appeals did not decide the question of legal capacity of the City to act under the license and, therefore, its decision is not final on that question, but left it open to further litigation. They rely upon the following language of the opinion:
“However, we do not touch the question as to the legal capacity of the City of Tacoma to initiate and act under the license once it is granted. There may be limitations in the City Charter, for instance, as to indebtedness limitations. Questions of this nature may be inquired into by the Commission as relevant to the practicability of the plan, but the Commission has no power to adjudicate them.” Id., at 396-397.
We believe that respondents’ construction of this language is in error. The questioned language expressly refers to possible “indebtedness limitations” in the City’s Charter and “questions of this nature,” not to the right of the City to receive and perform, as licensee of the Federal Government under the Federal Power Act, the federal rights determined by the Commission and delegated to the City as specified in the license. That this was the meaning of the court, if its meaning might otherwise be doubtful, is made certain by the facts that the court did not disturb a single one of the Commission’s findings; affirmed its order without modification; and said, in the sentence immediately preceding the questioned language: “Consistent with the First Iowa case, supra, we conclude that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a' navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States.” Id., at 396. (Emphasis added.)
The final judgment of the Court of Appeals was effective, not only against the State, but also against its citizens, including the taxpayers of Tacoma, for they, in their common public rights as citizens of the State, were represented by the State in those proceedings, and, like it, were bound by the judgment. Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U. S. 494, 506-509; cf. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 142; s. c. 206 U. S. 46, 49; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 591, 595; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 373.
We conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals, upon this Court’s denial of the State’s petition for certiorari, became final under § 313 (b) of the Act, and is binding upon the State of Washington, its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, and its citizens, including the taxpayers of Tacoma; and that the objections and claims to the contrary asserted in the cross-complaints of the State, its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, and the Taxpayers of Tacoma, in this bond validation suit, were impermissible collateral attacks upon, and de novo litigation between the same parties of issues determined by, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
41 Stat. 1063 et seq., 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq.
41 Stat. 1074, 16 U. S. C. § 814.
On August 6, 1948, the City filed with the Commission its declaration of intention to build this power project. On March 18, 1949, the Commission ruled that the Cowlitz River was navigable below the proposed project and that its construction would affect navigation and interstate commerce and, hence, could not be built without a license from the Commission, because of the provisions of §23 of the Federal Power Act. 41 Stat. 1075, 16 U. S. C. §816.
“ ‘Municipality’ [as used in the Federal Power Act] means a city, county, irrigation district, drainage district, or other political subdivision or agency of a State competent under the laws thereof to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing, or distributing power.” §3 (7), 41 Stat. 1063, 16 U. S. C. § 796 (7).
By a Washington statute all cities and towns of that State are made legally competent to “construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, add to, maintain, and operate works, plants, and facilities for the purpose of furnishing the city or town and its inhabitants, and any other persons, with gas, electricity, and other means of power and facilities for lighting, heating, fuel, and power purposes....” Wash. Rev. Code 80.40.050. Tacoma has exercised such powers since 1893.
41 Stat. 1065, 16 U. S. C. § 797 (e). That subsection, so far as presently pertinent, provides:
"The commission is authorized and empowered—
“(e) To issue licenses to citizens of the United States, or to any association of such citizens, or to any corporation organized under the- laws of the United States or any State thereof, or to any State or municipality for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, powerhouses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States....”
The application was accompanied by the maps, plans, specifications and estimates of cost covering the proposed project, as required by § 9 (a) of the Act. 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (a). Those maps, plans and specifications made clear that the State’s hatchery would be inundated by the proposed Mayfield Reservoir.
The Cowlitz River is a tributary of the Columbia in southwestern Washington. It drains an area of 2,490 square miles of the western slope of the Cascade Range, and flows westerly for about 100 miles and thence southerly for 30 miles to its confluence with the Columbia at Longview which is about 65 miles above the mouth of the Columbia. It is conceded to be navigable at all points below the projected May-field Dam and, at the point of confluence with the Columbia, is a tidal river with an average flow of about 10,000 cubic feet per second.
The Commission’s opinion discussed at length the State’s basic contention that the river should be left in its natural state for the unobstructed use and propagation of anadromous fish and, upon that contention, concluded:
“The question posed does not appear to us to be between all power and no fish but rather between large power benefits (needed particularly for defense purposes), important flood control benefits and navigation benefits, with incidental recreation and intangible benefits, balanced against some fish losses, or a retention of the stream in its present natural condition until such time in the fairly near future when economic pressures will force its full utilization. With proper testing and experimentation by the city of Tacoma, in co-operation with interested state and.Federal agencies, a fishery protective program can be evolved which will prevent undue loss of fishery values in relation to the other values. For these reasons we are issuing the license with certain conditions which are set forth in our accompanying order.” 92 P. U. R. (N. S.) 79, 85.
In its order granting the license the Commission made 66 findings in which, among other things, it found that the Cowlitz is a navigable water of the United States below the site of the proposed project and that the dams and reservoirs will affect the interests of interstate or foreign commerce (see §§ 4 (e) and 23 of the Act, 41 Stat. 1065, 1075, 16 U. S. C. §§ 797 (e), 816); that a critical shortage of electric* power exists on the west side of the Cascade Range; that the project “will be an exceptionally valuable addition to the Northwest Region power supply”; that “none of the hydroelectric projects suggested for construction in lieu of the Cowlitz Project can be constructed as quickly or as economically as the Cowlitz Project”; that the project has been approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army (see §4 (e), 41 Stat. 1065, 16 U. S. C. §797 (e)); that the project is financially and economically feasible; that “the Applicant... has submitted satisfactory evidence of compliance with the requirements of all applicable State laws insofar as necessary to effect the purposes of a license for the project [see § 9 (b), 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (b)] and it is a municipality within the meaning of Section 3 (7) of the Act”; and that “[u]nder present circumstances and conditions and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter included in the license, the project is best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing the waterway involved for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, for the conservation and preservation of fish and wildlife resources, and for other beneficial public uses including recreational purposes.” See § 10 (a), 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (a). (Emphasis added.)
The license was issued on November 28, 1951, for a period of 50 years from January 1, 1952 — the first day of the month in which the City filed with the Commission its ordinance, No. 14386, enacted on January 9, 1952, formally accepting the license and all its requirements and conditions. See § 6, 41 Stat. 1067, 16 U. S. C. § 799. The license, among other things, incorporated the City’s maps, plans, specifications, and estimates of cost for the construction of the project (see § 9 (a), 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (a)); incorporated by reference all provisions of the Federal Power
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case lies at the crossroads of the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments. Petitioner was arrested without probable cause and without a warrant. He was given, in full, the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Thereafter, while in custody, he made two inculpatory statements. The issue is whether evidence of those statements was properly admitted, or should have been excluded, in petitioner’s subsequent trial for murder in state court. Expressed another way, the issue is whether the statements were to be excluded as the fruit of the illegal arrest, or were admissible because the giving of the Miranda warnings sufficiently attenuated the taint of the arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). The Fourth Amendment, of course, has been held to be applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
I
As petitioner Richard Brown was climbing the last of the stairs leading to the rear entrance of his Chicago apartment in the early evening of May 13, 1968, he happened to glance at the window near the door. He saw, pointed at him through the window, a revolver held by a stranger who was inside the apartment. The man said: “Don’t move, you are under arrest.” App. 42. Another man, also with a gun, came up behind Brown and repeated the statement that he was under arrest. It was about 7:45 p. m. The two men turned out to be Detectives William Nolan and William Lenz of the Chicago police force. It is not clear from the record exactly when they advised Brown of their identity, but it is not disputed that they broke into his apartment, searched it, and then arrested Brown, all without probable cause and without any warrant, when he arrived. They later testified that they made the arrest for the purpose of questioning Brown as part of their investigation of the murder of a man named Roger Corpus.
Corpus was murdered one week earlier, on May 6, with a .38-caliber revolver in his Chicago West Side second-floor apartment. Shortly thereafter, Detective Lenz obtained petitioner’s name, among others, from Corpus’ brother. Petitioner and the others were identified as acquaintances of the victim, not as suspects.
On the day of petitioner’s arrest, Detectives Lenz and Nolan, armed with a photograph of Brown, and another officer arrived at petitioner’s apartment about 5 p. m. App. 77, 78. While the third officer covered the front entrance downstairs, the two detectives broke into Brown’s apartment and searched it. Id., at 86. Lenz then positioned himself near the rear door and watched through the adjacent window which opened onto the back porch. Nolan sat near the front door. He described the situation at the later suppression hearing:
“After we were there for a while, Detective Lenz told me that somebody was coming up the back stairs. I walked out the front door through the hall and around the corner, and I stayed there behind a door leading on to the back porch. At this time I heard Detective Lenz say, 'Don’t move, you are under arrest.’ I looked out. I saw Mr. Brown backing away from the window. I walked up behind him, I told him he is under arrest, come back inside the apartment with us.” Id., at 42.
As both officers held him at gunpoint, the three entered the apartment. Brown was ordered to stand against the wall and was searched. No weapon was found. Id., at 93. He was asked his name. When he denied being Richard Brown, Detective Lenz showed him the photograph, informed him that he was under arrest for the murder of Roger Corpus, id., at 16, handcuffed him, id., at 93, and escorted him to the squad car.
The two detectives took petitioner to the Maxwell Street police station. During the 20-minute drive Nolan again asked Brown, who then was sitting with him in the back seat of the car, whether his name was Richard Brown and whether he owned a 1966 Oldsmobile. Brown alternately evaded these questions or answered them falsely. Tr. 74. Upon arrival at the station house Brown was placed in the second-floor central interrogation room. The room was bare, except for a table and four chairs. He was left alone, apparently without handcuffs, for some minutes while the officers obtained the file on the Corpus homicide. They returned with the file, sat down at the table, one across from Brown and the other to his left, and spread the file on the table in front of him. App. 19.
The officers warned Brown of his rights under Miranda. Ibid. They then informed him that they knew of an incident that had occurred in a poolroom on May 5, when Brown, angry at having been cheated at dice, fired a shot from a revolver into the ceiling. Brown answered: “Oh, you know about that.” Id., at 20. Lenz informed him that a bullet had been obtained from the ceiling of the poolroom and had been taken to the crime laboratory to be compared with bullets taken from Corpus’ body. Ibid. Brown responded: “Oh, you know that, too.” Id., at 20-21. At this point — it was about 8:45 p. m. — Lenz asked Brown whether he wanted to talk about the Corpus homicide. Petitioner answered that he did. For the next 20 to 25 minutes Brown answered questions put to him by Nolan, as Lenz typed. Id., at 21-23.
This questioning produced a two-page statement in which Brown acknowledged that he and a man named Jimmy Claggett visited Corpus on the evening of May 5; that the three for some time sat drinking and smoking marihuana; that Claggett ordered him at gunpoint to bind Corpus’ hands and feet with cord from the headphone of a stereo set; and that Claggett, using a .38-caliber revolver sold to him by Brown, shot Corpus three times through a pillow. The statement was signed by Brown. Id., at 9, 38.
About 9:30 p. m. the two detectives and Brown left the station house to look for Claggett in an area of Chicago Brown knew him to frequent. They made a tour of that area but did not locate their quarry. They then went to police headquarters where they endeavored, without success, to obtain a photograph of Claggett. They resumed their search — it was now about 11 p. m. — and they finally observed Claggett crossing at an intersection. Lenz and Nolan arrested him. All four, the two detectives and the two arrested men, returned to the Maxwell Street station about 12:15 a. m. Id., at 39.
Brown was again placed in the interrogation room. He was given coffee and was left alone, for the most part, until 2 a. m. when Assistant State’s Attorney Crilly arrived.
Crilly, too, informed Brown of his Miranda rights. After a half hour’s conversation, a court reporter appeared. Once again the Miranda warnings were given: “I read him the card.” Id., at 30. Crilly told him that he “was sure he would be charged with murder.” Id., at 32. Brown gave a second statement, providing a factual account of the murder substantially in accord with his first statement, but containing factual inaccuracies with respect to his personal background. When the statement was completed, at about 3 a. m., Brown refused to sign it. Id., at 57. An hour later he made a phone call to his mother. At 9:30 that morning, about 14 hours after his arrest, he was taken before a magistrate.
On June 20 Brown and Claggett were jointly indicted by a Cook County grand jury for Corpus’ murder. Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress the two statements he had made. He alleged that his arrest and detention had been illegal and that the statements were taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights. After a hearing, the motion was denied. R. 46.
The case proceeded to trial. The State introduced evidence of both statements. Detective Nolan testified as to the contents of the first, App. 89-92, but the writing itself was not placed in evidence. The second statement was introduced and was read to the jury in full. Tr. 509-528. Brown was 23 at the time of the trial. Id., at 543.
The jury found petitioner guilty of murder. R. 80. He was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 15 years nor more than 30 years. Id., at 83.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment of conviction. 56 Ill. 2d 312, 307 N. E. 2d 356 (1974). The court refused to accept the State’s argument that Brown’s arrest was lawful. “Upon review of the record, we conclude that the testimony fails to show that at the time of his apprehension there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest, [and] that his arrest was, therefore, unlawful.” Id., at 315, 307 N. E. 2d, at 357. But it went on to hold in two significant and unembellished sentences:
“[W]e conclude that the giving of the Miranda warnings, in the first instance by the police officer and in the second by the assistant State’s Attorney, served to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that defendant’s act in making the statements was ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’ (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, at 486.) We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in admitting the statements into evidence.” Id., at 317, 307 N. E. 2d, at 358.
Aside from its reliance upon the presence of the Miranda warnings, no specific aspect of the record or of the circumstances was cited by the court in support of its conclusion. The court, in other words, appears to have held that the Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Because of our concern about the implication of our holding in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), to the facts of Brown’s case, we granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 894 (1974).
II
In Wong Sun, the Court pronounced the principles to be applied where the issue is whether statements and other evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded. In that case, federal agents elicited an oral statement from defendant Toy after forcing entry at 6 a. m. into his laundry, at the back of which he had his living quarters. The agents had followed Toy down the hall to the bedroom and there had placed him under arrest. The Court of Appeals found that there was no probable cause for the arrest. This Court concluded that that finding was “amply justified by the facts clearly shown on this record.” 371 U. S., at 479. Toy’s statement, which bore upon his participation in the sale of narcotics, led the agents to question another person, Johnny Yee, who actually possessed narcotics. Yee stated that heroin had been brought to him earlier by Toy and another Chinese known to him only as “Sea Dog.” Under questioning, Toy said that “Sea Dog” was Wong Sun. Toy led agents to a multifamily dwelling where, he said, Wong Sun lived. Gaining admittance to the building through a bell and buzzer, the agents climbed the stairs and entered the apartment. One went into the back room and brought Wong Sun out in handcuffs. After arraignment, Wong Sun was released on his own recognizance. Several days later, he returned voluntarily to give an unsigned confession.
This Court ruled that Toy’s declarations and the contraband taken from Yee were the fruits of the agents’ illegal action and should not have been admitted as evidence against Toy. Id., at 484-488. It held that the statement did not result from “ 'an intervening independent act of a free will,’ ” and that it was not “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.” Id., at 486. With respect to Wong Sun’s confession, however, the Court held that in the light of his lawful arraignment and release on his own recognizance, and of his return voluntarily several days later to make the statement, the connection between his unlawful arrest and the statement “had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’ Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341.” Id., at 491. The Court said:
“We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959).” Id., at 487-A88.
The exclusionary rule thus was applied in Wong Sun primarily to protect Fourth Amendment rights. Protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court’s paramount concern there. To the extent that the question whether Toy’s statement was voluntary was considered, it was only to judge whether it “was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.” Id., at 486 (emphasis added).
The Court in Wong Sun, as is customary, emphasized that application of the exclusionary rule on Toy’s behalf protected Fourth Amendment guarantees in two respects: “in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers,” and by “closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.” Ibid. These considerations of deterrence and of judicial integrity, by now, have become rather commonplace in the Court’s cases. See, e. g., United States v. Peltier, ante, at 535-538; United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13, 28-29 (1968). “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960). But “[d]e-spite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 446-447 (1974).
III
The Illinois courts refrained from resolving the question, as apt here as it was in Wong Sun, whether Brown’s statements were obtained by exploitation of the illegality of his arrest. They assumed that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, assured that the statements (verbal acts, as contrasted with physical evidence) were of sufficient free will as to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest. Wong Sun, of course, preceded Miranda.
This Court has described the Miranda warnings as a “prophylactic rule,” Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 53 (1973), and as a “procedural safeguard,” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 457, 478, employed to protect Fifth Amendment rights against “the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” Id., at 458. The function of the warnings relates to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against coerced self-incrimination, and the exclusion of a statement made in the absence of the warnings, it is said, serves to deter the taking of an incriminating statement without first informing the individual of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Although, almost 90 years ago, the Court observed that the Fifth Amendment is in “intimate relation” with the Fourth, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633 (1886), the Miranda warnings thus far have not been regarded as a means either of remedying or deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights. Frequently, as here, rights under the two Amendments may appear to coalesce since “the ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment.” Ibid.; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S., at 646 n. 5. The exclusionary rule, however, when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth. It is directed at all unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that happen to produce incriminating material or testimony as fruits. In short, exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth Amendment, but it would not be sufficient fully to protect the Fourth. Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.
Thus, even if the statements in this case were found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue remains. In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” 371 U. S., at 486. Wong Sun thus mandates consideration of a statement’s admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969). Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or “investigation,” would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a “cure-all,” and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to “a form of words.” See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S., at 648.
It is entirely possible, of course, as the State here argues, that persons arrested illegally frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality. But the Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited. See Westover v. United States, 384 U. S. 436, 496-497 (1966).
While we therefore reject the per se rule which the Illinois courts appear to have accepted, we also decline to adopt any alternative per se or “but for” rule. The petitioner himself professes not to demand so much. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 45, 47. The question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356, 365 (1972), and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S., at 491. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 3501. And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.
IV
Although the Illinois courts failed to undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun to evaluate the circumstances of this case in the light of the policy served by the exclusionary rule, the trial resulted in a record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which the determination may be made. We therefore decline the suggestion of the United States, as amicus curiae, see Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102 (1969), to remand the case for further factual findings. We conclude that the State failed to sustain the burden of showing that the evidence in question was admissible under Wong Sun.
Brown’s first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two hours, and there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever. In its essentials, his situation is remarkably like that of James Wah Toy in Wong Sun. We could hold Brown’s first statement admissible only if we overrule Wong Sun. We decline to do so. And the second statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the first.
The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was “for investigation” or for “questioning.” App. 35, 43, 78, 81, 83, 88, 89, 94. The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. The manner in which Brown’s arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.
We emphasize that our holding is a limited one. We decide only that the Illinois courts were in error in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The brother, however, when asked at the trial whether any of the victim’s family suggested to the police that petitioner was possibly responsible for the victim's death, answered: “Nobody asked.” App. 74.
There is no assertion here that he did not understand those rights.
It was stipulated at the trial that if expert testimony were taken, it would be to the effect that the bullet eventually was ascertained to be a “wiped bullet,” that is, that its sides were “clean and therefore it was not ballistically comparable to any other bullets, specifically the bullets taken from the body of the deceased, Roger Corpus.” Tr. 543.
In response to questions from Mr. Crilly, Brown stated that he was employed at E. I. Guffman Company in Niles, 111., and that he was a punch press operator, App. 97, whereas he later conceded that he worked at Arnold Schwinn Bicycle Company and had never worked at any other place. Id., at 63. He also remarked in the Crilly statement that he had completed three years of high school, id., at 96, whereas later he conceded that he “never went to high school.” Id., at 58.
Members of the Court on occasion have indicated disenchantment with the rule. See, e. g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 492 (Burger, C. J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id., at 493 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id., at 510 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Its efficacy has been subject to some dispute. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 n. 5 (1974). See Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960).
The Miranda warnings in no way inform a person of his Fourth Amendment rights, including his right to be released from unlawful custody following an arrest made without a warrant or without probable cause.
A great majority of the commentators have taken the same position. See, e. g., Pitler, “The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Revisited and Shepardized, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 579, 603-604 (1968); Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 32, 70 (1967); Comment, 1 Fla. St. L. Rev. 533, 539-540 (1973); Note, Admissibility of Confessions Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest: Wong Sun v. United States Revisited, 61 J. Crim. L. 207, 212 n. 58 (1970); Comment, Scope of Taint Under the Exclusionary Rule of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 570, 574 (1966). But see Comment, Voluntary Incriminating Statements Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest — A Proposed Modification of the Exclusionary Rule, 71 Dick. L. Rev. 573, 582-583 (1967).
See United States v. Owen, 492 F. 2d 1100, 1107 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 965 (1974); Hale v. Henderson, 485 F. 2d 266, 267-269 (CA6 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 930 (1974); United States v. Fallon, 457 F. 2d 15, 19-20 (CA10 1972); Leonard v. United States, 391 F. 2d 537, 538 (CA9 1968); Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F. 2d 22, 29 (CA3 1965),
See United States v. Edmons, 432 F. 2d 577 (CA2 1970). See also United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 450 F. 2d 232, 236 (CA3 1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1063 (1972); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F. 2d 287, 289 (CA5 1971).
Our approach relies heavily, but not excessively, on the “learning, good sense, fairness and courage of federal trial judges.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 342 (1939).
The situation here is thus in dramatic contrast to that of Wong Sun himself. Wong Sun’s confession, which the Court held admissible, came several days after the illegality, and was preceded by a lawful arraignment and a release from custody on his own recognizance. 371 U. S., at 491.
The fact that Brown had made one statement, believed by him to be admissible, and his cooperation with the arresting and interrogating officers in the search for Claggett, with his anticipation of leniency, bolstered the pressures for him to give the second, or at least vitiated any incentive on his part to avoid self-incrimination. Cf. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S. 85 (1963).
Detective Lenz had been a member of the Chicago police force for 14 years and a detective for 12 years. App. 6. Detective Nolan had been a detective on the force for 5% years. Id., at 87.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to apply the materiality requirement of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq., and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5, 17 CPR § 240.10b-5 (1987), promulgated thereunder, in the context of preliminary corporate merger discussions. We must also determine whether a person who traded a corporation’s shares on a securities exchange after the issuance of a materially misleading statement by the corporation may invoke a rebut-table presumption that, in trading, he relied on the integrity of the price set by the market.
I
Prior to December 20,1978, Basic Incorporated was a publicly traded company primarily engaged in the business of manufacturing chemical refractories for the steel industry. As early as 1965 or 1966, Combustion Engineering, Inc., a company producing mostly alumina-based refractories, expressed some interest in acquiring Basic, but was deterred from pursuing this inclination seriously because of antitrust concerns it then entertained. See App. 81-83. In 1976, however, regulatory action opened the way to a renewal of Combustion’s interest. The “Strategic Plan,” dated October 25, 1976, for Combustion’s Industrial Products Group included the objective: “Acquire Basic Inc. $30 million.” App. 337.
Beginning in September 1976, Combustion representatives had meetings and telephone conversations with Basic officers and directors, including petitioners here, concerning the possibility of a merger. During 1977 and 1978, Basic made three public statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations. On December 18, 1978, Basie asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its shares and issued a release stating that it had been “approached” by another company concerning a merger. Id., at 413. On December 19, Basic’s board endorsed Combustion’s offer of $46 per share for its common stock, id., at 335, 414-416, and on the following day publicly announced its approval of Combustion’s tender offer for all outstanding shares.
Respondents are former Basic shareholders who sold their stock after Basic’s first public statement of October 21, 1977, and before the suspension of trading in December 1978. Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors, asserting that the defendants issued three false or misleading public statements and thereby were in violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule 10b-5. Respondents alleged that they were injured by selling Basic shares at artificially depressed prices in a market affected by petitioners’ misleading statements and in reliance thereon.
The District Court adopted a presumption of reliance by members of the plaintiff class upon petitioners’ public statements that enabled the court to conclude that common questions of fact or law predominated over particular questions pertaining to individual plaintiffs. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3). The District Court therefore certified respondents’ class. On the merits, however, the District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants. It held that, as a matter of law, any misstatements were immaterial: there were no negotiations ongoing at the time of the first statement, and although negotiations were taking place when the second and third statements were issued, those negotiations were not “destined, with reasonable certainty, to become a merger agreement in principle.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 103a.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the class certification, but reversed the District Court’s summary judgment, and remanded the case. 786 F. 2d 741 (1986). The court reasoned that while petitioners were under no general duty to disclose their discussions with Combustion, any statement the company voluntarily released could not be “‘so incomplete as to mislead.’” Id., at 746, quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 862 (CA2 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969). In the Court of Appeals’ view, Basic’s statements that no negotiations were taking place, and that it knew of no corporate developments to account for the heavy trading activity, were misleading. With respect to materiality, the court rejected the argument that preliminary merger discussions are immaterial as a matter of law, and held that “once a statement is made denying the existence of any discussions, even discussions that might not have been material in absence of the denial are material because they make the statement made untrue.” 786 F. 2d, at 749.
The Court of Appeals joined a number of other Circuits in accepting the “fraud-on-the-market theory” to create a rebut-table presumption that respondents relied on petitioners’ material misrepresentations, -noting that without the presumption it would be impractical to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See 786 F. 2d, at 750-751.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), to resolve the split, see Part III, infra, among the Courts of Appeals as to the standard of materiality applicable to preliminary merger discussions, and to determine whether the courts below properly applied a presumption of reliance in certifying the class, rather than requiring each class member to show direct reliance on Basic’s statements.
II
The 1934 Act was designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Underlying the adoption of extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: “There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secreey.” H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1934). This Court “repeatedly has described the ‘fundamental purpose’ of the Act as implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure.’” Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 477-478 (1977), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963).
Pursuant to its authority under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5. Judicial interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s requirements. See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975).
The Court previously has addressed various positive and common-law requirements for a violation of § 10(b) or of Rule 10b-5. See, e. g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, supra (“manipulative or deceptive” requirement of the statute); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, supra (“in connection with the purchase or sale” requirement of the Rule); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983) (duty to disclose); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U. S. 222 (1980) (same); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra (scienter). See also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19 (1987) (confidentiality). The Court also explicitly has defined a standard of materiality under the securities laws, see TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438 (1976), concluding in the proxy-solicitation context that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” Id., at 449. Acknowledging that certain information concerning corporate developments could well be of “dubious significance,” id., at 448, the Court was careful not to set too low a standard of materiality; it was concerned that a minimal standard might bring an overabundance of information within its reach, and lead management “simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information — a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.” Id., at 448-449. It further explained that to fulfill the materiality requirement “there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id., at 449. We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.
Ill
The application of this materiality standard to preliminary merger discussions is not self-evident. Where the impact of the corporate development on the target’s fortune is certain and clear, the TSC Industries materiality definition admits straightforward application. Where, on the other hand, the event is contingent or speculative in nature, it is difficult to ascertain whether the “reasonable investor” would have considered the omitted information significant at the time. Merger negotiations, because of the ever-present possibility that the contemplated transaction will not be effectuated, fall into the latter category.
A
Petitioners urge upon us a Third Circuit test for resolving this difficulty. See Brief for Petitioners 20-22. Under this approach, preliminary merger discussions do not become material until “agreement-in-principle” as to the price and structure of the transaction has been reached between the would-be merger partners. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d 751, 757 (CA3 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1215 (1985). By definition, then, information concerning any negotiations not yet at the agreement-in-principle stage could be withheld or even misrepresented without a violation of Rule 10b-5.
Three rationales have been offered in support of the “agreement-in-principle” test. The first derives from the concern expressed in TSC Industries that an investor not be overwhelmed by excessively detailed and trivial information, and focuses on the substantial risk that preliminary merger discussions may collapse: because such discussions are inherently tentative, disclosure of their existence itself could mislead investors and foster false optimism. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d, at 756; Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F. 2d 11, 14 (CA2 1983). The other two justifications for the agreement-in-principle standard are based on management concerns: because the requirement of “agreement-in-principle” limits the scope of disclosure obligations, it helps preserve the confidentiality of merger discussions Where earlier disclosure might prejudice the negotiations; and the test also provides a usable, bright-line rule for determining when disclosure must be made. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d, at 757; Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d 1169, 1176-1178 (CA7), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 853 (1987).
None of these policy-based rationales, however, purports to explain why drawing the line at agreement-in-principle reflects the significance of the information upon the investor’s decision. The first rationale, and the only one connected to the concerns expressed in TSC Industries, stands soundly rejected, even by a Court of Appeals that otherwise has accepted the wisdom of the agreement-in-principle test. “It assumes that investors are nitwits, unable to appreciate— even when told — that mergers are risky propositions up until the closing.” Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1175. Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress. We have recognized time and again, a “fundamental purpose” of the various Securities Acts, “was to substitute a philosophy of full.disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S., at 186. Accord, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S., at 477. The role of the materiality requirement is not to “attribute to investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the probabilistic significance of negotiations,” Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1175, but to filter out essentially useless information that a reasonable investor would not consider significant, even as part of a larger “mix” of factors to consider in making his investment decision. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S., at 448-449.
The second rationale, the importance of secrecy during the early stages of merger discussions, also seems irrelevant to an assessment whether their existence is significant to the trading decision of a reasonable investor. To avoid a “bidding war” over its target, an acquiring firm often will insist that negotiations remain confidential, see, e. g., In re Car nation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 S. E. C. Docket 1025 (1985), and at least one Court of Appeals has stated that “silence pending settlement of the price and structure of a deal is beneficial to most investors, most of the time.” Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F. 2d, at 1177.
We need not ascertain, however, whether secrecy necessarily maximizes shareholder wealth — although we note that the proposition is at least disputed as a matter of theory and empirical research — for this case does not concern the timing of a disclosure; it concerns only its accuracy and completeness. We face here the narrow question whether information concerning the existence and status of preliminary merger discussions is significant to the reasonable investor’s trading decision. Arguments based on the premise that some disclosure would be “premature” in a sense are more properly considered under the rubric of an issuer’s duty to disclose. The “secrecy” rationale is simply inapposite to the definition of materiality.
The final justification offered in support of the agreement-in-principle test seems to be directed solely at the comfort of corporate managers. A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress’ policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive. In TSC Industries this Court explained: “The determination [of materiality] requires delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him....” 426 U. S., at 450. After much study, the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure cautioned the SEC against administratively confining materiality to a rigid formula. Courts also would do well to heed this advice.
We therefore find no valid justification for artificially excluding from the definition of materiality information concerning merger discussions, which would otherwise be considered significant to the trading decision of a reasonable investor, merely because agreement-in-principle as to price and structure has not yet been reached by the parties or their representatives.
B
The Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the agreement-in-principle test, as we do today, but in its place adopted a rule that, if taken literally, would be equally insensitive, in our view, to the distinction between materiality and the other elements of an action under Rule 10b-5:
“When a company whose stock is publicly traded makes a statement, as Basic did, that ‘no negotiations’ are underway, and that the corporation knows of ‘no reason for the stock’s activity,’ and that ‘management is unaware of any present or pending corporate development that would result in the abnormally heavy trading activity,’ information concerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes material by virtue of the statement denying their existence....
“... In analyzing whether information regarding merger discussions is material such that it must be affirmatively disclosed to avoid a violation of Rule 10b-5, the discussions and their progress are the primary considerations. However, once a statement is made denying the existence of any discussions, even discussions that might not have been material in absence of the denial are material because they make the statement made untrue.” 786 F. 2d, at 748-749 (emphasis in original).
This approach, however, fails to recognize that, in order to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is not enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise insignificant.
C
Even before this Court’s decision in TSC Industries, the Second Circuit had explained the role of the materiality requirement of Rule 10b-5, with respect to contingent or speculative information or events, in a manner that gave that term meaning that is independent of the other provisions of the Rule. Under such circumstances, materiality “will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.” SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 849. Interestingly, neither the Third Circuit decision adopting the agreement-in-principle test nor petitioners here take issue with this general standard. Rather, they suggest that with respect to preliminary merger discussions, there are good reasons to draw a line at agreement on price and structure.
In a subsequent decision, the late Judge Friendly, writing for a Second Circuit panel, applied the Texas Gulf Sulphur probability/magnitude approach in the specific context of preliminary merger negotiations. After acknowledging that materiality is something to be determined on the basis of the particular facts of each case, he stated:
“Since a merger in which it is bought out is the most important event that can occur in a small corporation’s life, to wit, its death, we think that inside information, as regards a merger of this sort, can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser transactions — and this even though the mortality rate of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high.” SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F. 2d 39, 47-48 (1976).
We agree with that analysis.
Whether merger discussions in any particular case are material therefore depends on the facts. Generally, in order to assess the probability that the event will occur, a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest corporate levels. Without attempting to catalog all such possible factors, we note by way of example that board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, and actual negotiations between principals or their intermediaries may serve as indicia of interest. To assess the magnitude of the transaction to the issuer of the securities allegedly manipulated, a factfinder will need to consider such facts as the size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market value. No particular event or factor short of closing the transaction need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to render merger discussions material.
As we clarify today, materiality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information. The fact-specific inquiry we endorse here is consistent with the approach a number of courts have taken in assessing the materiality of merger negotiations. Because the standard of materiality we have adopted differs from that used by both courts below, we remand the case for reconsideration of the question whether a grant of summary judgment is appropriate on this record.
IV
A
We turn to the question of reliance and the fraud-on-the-market theory. Succinctly put:
“The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business.... Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.... The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.” Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1160-1161 (CA3 1986).'
Our task, of course, is not to assess the general validity of the theory, but to consider whether it was proper for the courts below to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance, supported in part by the fraud-on-the-market theory. Cf. the comments of the dissent, post, at 252-255.
This case required resolution of several common questions of law and fact concerning the falsity or misleading nature of the three public statements made by Basic, the presence or absence of scienter, and the materiality of the misrepresentations, if any. In their amended complaint, the named plaintiffs alleged that in reliance on Basic’s statements they sold their shares of Basic stock in the depressed market created by petitioners. See Amended Complaint in No. C79-1220 (ND Ohio), ¶¶ 27, 29, 35, 40; see also id., ¶33 (alleging effect on market price of Basic’s statements). Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones. The District Court found that the presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-market theory provided “a practical resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.” The District Court thus concluded that with reference to each public statement and its impact upon the open market for Basic shares, common questions predominated over individual questions, as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and (b)(3).
Petitioners and their amici complain that the fraud-on-the-market theory effectively eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff asserting a claim under Rule 10b-5 prove reliance. They note that reliance is and long has been an element of common-law fraud, see, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 108 (5th ed. 1984), and argue that because the analogous express right of action includes a reliance requirement, see, e. g., § 18(a) of the 1934 Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78r(a), so too must an action implied under § 10(b).
We agree that reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 206 (quoting Senate Report). Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury. See, e. g., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F. 2d 88, 92 (CA2 1981); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F. 2d 457, 462 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U. S. 811 (1965). There is, however, more than one way to demonstrate the causal connection. Indeed, we previously have dispensed with a requirement of positive proof of reliance, where a duty to disclose material information had been breached, concluding that the necessary nexus between the plaintiffs’ injury and the defendant’s wrongful conduct had been established. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at 153-154. Similarly, we did not require proof that material omissions or misstatements in a proxy statement decisively affected voting, because the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the defect in the solicitation materials, served as an essential link in the transaction. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 384-385 (1970).
The modern securities markets, literally involving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud cases, and our understanding of Rule 10b-5’s reliance requirement must encompass these differences.
“In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor’s reliance upon information is into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor. With the presence of a market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.” In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F. R. D. 134, 143 (ND Tex. 1980).
Accord, e. g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d, at 1161 (“In an open and developed market, the dissemination of material misrepresentations or withholding of material information typically affects the price of the stock, and purchasers generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its value”); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d 891, 908 (CA9 1975) (“[T]he same causal nexus can be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the common sense that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock”), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 816 (1976).
B
Presumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, is rendered difficult. See, e. g., 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 541-542 (1977). The courts below accepted a presumption, created by the fraud-on-the-market theory and subject to rebuttal by petitioners, that persons who had traded Basic shares had done so in reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market, but because of petitioners’ material misrepresentations that price had been fraudulently depressed. Requiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts, i. e., how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at 153-154, or if the misrepresentation had not been made, see Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F. 2d 175, 188 (CA3 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 938 (1982), would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market. Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S., at 385.
Arising out of considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy, presumptions are also useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between parties. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 968-969 (3d ed. 1984); see also Fed. Rule Evid. 301 and Advisory Committee Notes, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 685. The presumption of reliance employed in this case is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports, the congressional policy embodied in the 1934 Act. In drafting that Act, Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those markets:
“No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges without having an intelli.gent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as in-dices of real value.” H. R. Rep. No. 1383, at 11.
See Lipton v. Domination, Inc., 734 F. 2d 740, 748 (CA11 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1132 (1985).
The presumption is also supported by common sense and probability. Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations. It has been noted that “it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?” Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (SDNY 1982). Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed. Commentators generally have applauded the adoption of one variation or another of the fraud-on-the-market theory. An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.
C
The Court of Appeals found that petitioners “made public, material misrepresentations and [respondents] sold Basic stock in an impersonal, efficient market. Thus the class, as defined by the district court, has established the threshold facts for proving their loss.” 786 F. 2d, at 751. The court acknowledged that petitioners may rebut proof of the elements giving rise to the presumption, or show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price or that an individual plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his knowing the statement was false. Id., at 750, n. 6.
Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance. For example, if petitioners could show that the “market makers” were privy to the truth about the merger discussions here with Combustion, and thus that the market price would not have been affected by their misrepresentations, the causal connection could be broken: the basis for finding that the fraud had been transmitted through market price would be gone. Similarly, if, despite petitioners’ allegedly fraudulent attempt to manipulate market price, news of the merger discussions credibly entered the market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, those who traded Basic shares after the corrective statements would have no direct or indirect connection with the fraud. Petitioners also could rebut the presumption of reliance as to plaintiffs who would have divested themselves of their Basic shares without relying on the integrity of the market. For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic’s statements were false and that Basic was indeed engaged in merger discussions, and who consequently believed that. Basic stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because of other unrelated concerns, e. g., potential antitrust problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated.
V
In summary:
1. We specifically adopt, for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context, the standard of materiality set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S., at 449.
. 2. We reject “agreement-in-principle as to price and structure” as the bright-line rule for materiality.
3. We also reject the proposition that “information becomes material by virtue of a public statement denying it.”
4. Materiality in the merger context depends on the probability that the transaction will be consummated, and its significance to the issuer of the securities. Materiality depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
5. It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.
6. That presumption, however, is rebuttable.
7. The District Court’s certification of the class here was appropriate when made but is subject on remand to such adjustment, if any, as developing circumstances demand.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
In what are known as the Kaiser-Lavino proceedings, the Federal Trade Commission took the position in 1976 that basic or chemical refractories were in a market separate from nonbasic or acidic or alumina refractories; this would remove the antitrust barrier to a merger between Basic and Combustion’s refractories subsidiary. On October 12,1978, the Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that position. See In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F. T. C. 764, 771, 809-810 (1979). See also the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case, 786 F. 2d 741, 745 (CA6 1986).
In addition to Basie itself, petitioners are individuals who had been members of its board of directors prior to 1979: Anthony M. Caito, Samuel Eels, Jr., John A. Gelbach, Harley C. Lee, Max Muller, H. Chapman Rose, Edmund G. Sylvester, and John C. Wilson, Jr. Another former director, Mathew J. Ludwig, was a party to the proceedings below but died on July 17, 1986, and is not a petitioner here. See Brief for Petitioners ii.
In light of
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 2004, voters in the State of Washington passed an initiative changing the State’s primary election system. The People’s Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872 (1-872), provides that candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-designated “party preference”; that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the top two votegetters for each office, regardless of party preference, advance to the general election. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 1-872 facially invalid as imposing an unconstitutional burden on state political parties’ First Amendment rights. Because 1-872 does not on its face impose a severe burden on political parties’ associational rights, and because respondents’ arguments to the contrary rest on factual assumptions about voter confusion that can be evaluated only in the context of an as-applied challenge, we reverse.
I
For most of the past century, Washington voters selected nominees for state and local offices using a blanket primary. From 1935 until 2003, the State used a blanket primary that placed candidates from all parties on one ballot and allowed voters to select a candidate from any party. See 1935 Wash. Laws §§1-5, pp. 60-64. Under this system, the candidate who won a plurality of votes within each major party became that party’s nominee in the general election. See 2003 Wash. Laws § 919, p. 775.
California used a nearly identical primary in its own elections until our decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 (2000). In Jones, four political parties challenged California’s blanket primary, arguing that it unconstitutionally burdened their associational rights by forcing them to associate with voters who did not share their beliefs. We agreed and struck down the blanket primary as inconsistent with the First Amendment. In so doing, we emphasized the importance of the nomination process as “ ‘the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the community.’” Id., at 575 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 216 (1986)). We observed that a party’s right to exclude is central to its freedom of association, and is never “more important than in the process of selecting its nominee.” 530 U. S., at 575. California’s blanket primary, we concluded, severely burdened the parties’ freedom of association because it forced them to allow nonmembers to participate in selecting the parties’ nominees. That the parties retained the right to endorse their preferred candidates did not render the burden any less severe, as “[t]here is simply no substitute for a party’s selecting its own candidates.” Id., at 581.
Because California’s blanket primary severely burdened the parties’ associational rights, we subjected it to strict scrutiny, carefully examining each of the state interests offered by California in support of its primary system. We rejected as illegitimate three of the asserted interests: “producing elected officials who better represent the electorate,” “expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns,” and ensuring “the right to an effective vote” by allowing nonmembers of a party to vote in the majority party’s primary in “ ‘safe’ ” districts. Id., at 582-584. We concluded that the remaining interests — promoting fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter participation, and protecting privacy — were not compelling on the facts of the case. Even if they were, the partisan California primary was not narrowly tailored to further those interests because a nonpartisan blanket primary, in which the top two votegetters advance to the general election regardless of party affiliation, would accomplish each of those interests without burdening the parties’ associational rights. Id., at 585-586. The nonpartisan blanket primary had “all the characteristics of the partisan blanket primary, save the constitutionally crucial one: Primary voters [were] not choosing a party’s nominee.” Ibid.
After our decision in Jones, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down Washington’s primary as “materially indistinguishable from the California scheme.” Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, 343 F. 3d 1198, 1203 (2003). The Washington State Grange promptly proposed 1-872 as a replacement. It passed with nearly 60% of the vote and became effective in December 2004.
Under 1-872, all elections for “partisan offices” are conducted in two stages: a primary and a general election. To participate in the primary, a candidate must file a “declaration of candidacy” form, on which he declares his “major or minor party preference, or independent status.” Wash. Rev. Code §29A.24.030 (Supp. 2005). Each candidate and his party preference (or independent status) is in turn designated on the primary election ballot. A political party cannot prevent a candidate who is unaffiliated with, or even repugnant to, the party from designating it as his party of preference. See App. 396-397, 595 (declaration of James K. Pharris, Exhibit C: Ruling Order, May 18, 2005, Wash. Admin. Code §434-215-015). In the primary election, voters may select “any candidate listed on the ballot, regardless of the party preference of the candidates or the voter.” Id., at 606, §434-262-012.
The candidates with the highest and second-highest vote totals advance to the general election, regardless of their party preferences. Ibid. Thus, the general election may pit two candidates with the same party preference against one another. Each candidate’s party preference is listed on the general election ballot, and may not be changed between the primary and general elections. See id., at 601, § 434-230-040.
Immediately after the State enacted regulations to implement 1-872, the Washington State Republican Party filed suit against a number of county auditors challenging the law on its face. The party contended that the new system violates its associational rights by usurping its right to nominate its own candidates and by forcing it to associate with candidates it does not endorse. The Washington State Democratic Central Committee and Libertarian Party of Washington State joined the suit as plaintiffs. The Washington State Grange joined as a defendant, and the State of Washington was substituted for the county auditors as defendant. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted the political parties’ motions for summary judgment and enjoined the implementation of 1-872. See Washington State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 932 (2005).
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 460 F. 3d 1108, 1125 (CA9 2006). It held that the 1-872 primary severely burdens the political parties’ associational rights because the party-preference designation on the ballot creates a risk that primary winners will be perceived as the parties’ nominees and produces an “impression of associatio[n]” between a candidate and his party of preference even when the party does not associate, or wish to be associated, with the candidate. Id., at 1119. The Court of Appeals noted a “constitutionally significant distinction between ballots and other vehicles for political expression,” reasoning that the risk of perceived association is particularly acute when ballots include party labels because such labels are typically used to designate candidates’ views on issues of public concern. Id., at 1121. And it determined that the State’s interests underlying 1-872 were not sufficiently compelling to justify the severe burden on the parties’ association. Concluding that the provisions of 1-872 providing for the party-preference designation on the ballot were not severable, the court struck down 1-872 in its entirety.
We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1251 (2007), to determine whether 1-872, on its face, violates the political parties’ associational rights.
II
Respondents object to 1-872 not in the context of an actual election, but in a facial challenge. Under United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 (1987), a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by “establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” i. e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications. Id., at 745. While some Members of the Court have criticized the Salerno formulation, all agree that a facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 739-740, and n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments). Washington’s primary system survives under either standard, as we explain below. In determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about “hypothetical” or “imaginary” cases. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 22 (1960) (“The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined”). The State has had no opportunity to implement 1-872, and its courts have had no occasion to construe the law in the context of actual disputes arising from the electoral context, or to accord the law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions. Cf. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217, 220 (1912) (“How the state court may apply [a statute] to other cases, whether its general words may be treated as more or. less restrained, and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail are matters upon which we need not speculate now”). Exercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge “frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy.” Raines, supra, at 22.
Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of “premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.” Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 609 (2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither “ ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it’ ” nor “ ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885)). Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution. We must keep in mind that “ ‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.’ ” Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion)). It is with these principles in view that we turn to the merits of respondents’ facial challenge to 1-872.
A
The States possess a “‘broad power to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, which power is matched by state control over the election process for state offices.’ ” Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U. S. 581, 586 (2005) (quoting Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 217); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 358 (1997) (same). This power is not absolute, but is “subject to the limitation that [it] may not be exercised in a way that violates . . . specific provisions of the Constitution.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968). In particular, the State has the “ ‘responsibility to observe the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the State’s citizens,’ ” including the freedom of political association. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 222 (1989) (quoting Tashjian, supra, at 217).
Election regulations that impose a severe burden on associational rights are subject to strict scrutiny, and we uphold them only if they are “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Clingman, supra, at 586; see also Rhodes, supra, at 31 (“ ‘[0]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms’ ” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963))). If a statute imposes only modest burdens, however, then “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” on election procedures. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 788 (1983). “Accordingly, we have repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the polls.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 438 (1992).
The parties do not dispute these general principles; rather, they disagree about whether 1-872 severely burdens respondents’ associational rights. That disagreement begins with Jones. Petitioners argue that the 1-872 primary is indistinguishable from the alternative Jones suggested would be constitutional. In Jones we noted that a nonpartisan blanket primary, where the top two votegetters proceed to the general election regardless of their party, was a less restrictive alternative to California’s system because such a primary does not nominate candidates. 530 U. S., at 585-586 (The nonpartisan blanket primary “has all the characteristics of the partisan blanket primary, save the constitutionally crucial one: Primary voters are not choosing a party’s nominee”). Petitioners are correct that we assumed that the nonpartisan primary we described in Jones would be constitutional. But that is not dispositive here because we had no occasion in Jones to determine whether a primary system that indicates each candidate’s party preference on the ballot, in effect, chooses the parties’ nominees.
That question is now squarely before us. Respondents argue that 1-872 is unconstitutional under Jones because it has the same “constitutionally crucial” infirmity that doomed California’s blanket primary: It allows primary voters who are unaffiliated with a party to choose the party’s nominee. Respondents claim that candidates who progress to the general election under 1-872 will become the de facto nominees of the parties they prefer, thereby violating the parties’ right to choose their own standard bearers, see Timmons, supra, at 359, and altering their messages. They rely on our statement in Jones reaffirming “the special place the First Amendment reserves for, and the special protection it accords, the process by which a political party ‘select[s] a standard bearer who best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.’” Jones, 530 U.S., at 575 (quoting Eu, supra, at 224).
The flaw in this argument is that, unlike the California primary, the 1-872 primary does not, by its terms, choose parties’ nominees. The essence of nomination — the choice of a party representative — does not occur under 1-872. The law never refers to the candidates as nominees of any party, nor does it treat them as such. To the contrary, the election regulations specifically provide that the primary “does not serve to determine the nominees of a political party but serves to winnow the number of candidates to a final list of two for the general election.” App. 606, Wash. Admin. Code §434-262-012. The top two candidatés from the primary election proceed to the general election regardless of their party preferences. Whether parties nominate their own candidates outside the state-run primary is simply irrelevant. In fact, parties may now nominate candidates by whatever mechanism they choose because 1-872 repealed Washington’s prior regulations governing party nominations.
Respondents counter that, even if the 1-872 primary does not actually choose parties’ nominees, it nevertheless burdens their associational rights because voters will assume that candidates on the general election ballot are the nominees of their preferred parties. This brings us to the heart of respondents’ case — and to the fatal flaw in their argument. At bottom, respondents’ objection to 1-872 is that voters will be confused by candidates’ party-preference designations. Respondents’ arguments are largely variations on this theme. Thus, they argue that even if voters do not assume that candidates on the general election ballot are the nominees of their parties, they will at least assume that the parties associate with, and approve of, them. This, they say, compels them to associate with candidates they do not endorse, alters the messages they wish to convey, and forces them to engage in counterspeech to disassociate themselves from the candidates and their positions on the issues.
We reject each of these contentions for the same reason: They all depend, not on any facial requirement of 1-872, but on the possibility that voters will be confused as to the meaning of the party-preference designation. But respondents’ assertion that voters will misinterpret the party-preference designation is sheer speculation. It “depends upon the belief that voters can be ‘misled’ by party labels. But ‘[o]ur cases reflect a greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues.’” Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 220 (quoting Anderson, swpra, at 797). There is simply no basis to presume that a well-informed electorate will interpret a candidate’s party-preference designation to mean that the candidate is the party’s chosen nominee or representative or that the party associates with or approves of the candidate. See New York State Clubn Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1988) (rejecting a facial challenge to a law regulating club membership and noting that “[w]e could hardly hold otherwise on the record before us, which contains no specific evidence on the characteristics of any club covered by the [l]aw”). This strikes us as especially true here, given that it was the voters of Washington themselves, rather than their elected representatives, who enacted 1-872.
Of course, it is possible that voters will misinterpret the candidates’ party-preference designations as reflecting endorsement by the parties. But these cases involve a facial challenge, and we cannot strike down 1-872 on its face based on the mere possibility of voter confusion. See Yazoo, 226 U. S., at 219 (“[T]his court must deal with the case in hand and not with imaginary ones”); Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23, 26 (1914) (A statute “is not to be upset upon hypothetical and unreal possibilities, if it would be good upon the facts as they are”). Because respondents brought their suit as a facial challenge, we have no evidentiary record against which to assess their assertions that voters will be confused. See Timmons, 520 U. S., at 375-376 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting judgments based on “imaginative theoretical sources of voter confusion” and “entirely hypothetical” outcomes). Indeed, because 1-872 has never been implemented, we do not even have ballots indicating how party preference will be displayed. It stands to reason that whether voters will be confused by the party-preference designations will depend in significant part on the form of the ballot. The Court of Appeals assumed that the ballot would not place abbreviations like “ ‘D’ ” and “ ‘R,’ ” or “ ‘Dem.’ ” and “‘Rep.’” after the names of candidates, but would instead “clearly state that a particular candidate ‘prefers’ a particular party.” 460 F. 3d, at 1121, n. 20. It thought that even such a clear statement did too little to eliminate the risk of voter confusion.
But we see no reason to stop there. As long as we are speculating about the form of the ballot — and we can do no more than speculate in this facial challenge — we must, in fairness to the voters of the State of Washington who enacted 1-872 and in deference to the executive and judicial officials who are charged with implementing it, ask whether the ballot could conceivably be printed in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of widespread voter confusion and with it the perceived threat to the First Amendment. See Ayotte, 546 U. S., at 329 (noting that courts should not nullify more of a state law than necessary so as to avoid frustrating the intent of the people and their duly elected representatives); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 795-796 (1989) (“ ‘[I]n evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must... consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered’ ” (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 494, n. 5 (1982))).
It is not difficult to conceive of such a ballot. For example, petitioners propose that the actual 1-872 ballot could include prominent disclaimers explaining that party preference reflects only the self-designation of the candidate and not an official endorsement by the party. They also suggest that the ballots might note preference in the form of a candidate statement that emphasizes the candidate’s personal determination rather than the party’s acceptance of the candidate, such as “my party preference is the Republican Party.” Additionally, the State could decide to educate the public about the new primary ballots through advertising or explanatory materials mailed to voters along with their ballots. We are satisfied that there are a variety of ways in which the State could implement 1-872 that would eliminate any real threat of voter confusion. And without the specter of widespread voter confusion, respondents’ arguments about forced association and compelled speech fall flat.
Our conclusion that these implementations of 1-872 would be consistent with the First Amendment is fatal to respondents’ facial challenge. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 264 (1984) (a facial challenge fails where “at least some” constitutional applications exist). Each of their arguments rests on factual assumptions about voter confusion, and each fails for the same reason: In the absence of evidence, we cannot assume that Washington’s voters will be misled. See Jones, 530 U. S., at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n empirically debatable assumption ... is too thin a reed to support a credible First Amendment distinction” between permissible and impermissible burdens on association). That factual determination must await an as-applied challenge. On its face, 1-872 does not impose any severe burden on respondents’ associational rights.
B
Because we have concluded that 1-872 does not severely burden respondents, the State need not assert a compelling interest. See Clingman, 544 U. S., at 593 (“When a state electoral provision places no heavy burden on associational rights, ‘a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ ” (quoting Timmons, 520 U. S., at 358)). The State’s asserted interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballot is easily sufficient to sustain 1-872. See Anderson, 460 U. S., at 796 (“There can be no question about the legitimacy of the State’s interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular will in a general election”).
Ill
Respondents ask this Court to invalidate a popularly enacted election process that has never been carried out. Immediately after implementing regulations were enacted, respondents obtained a permanent injunction against the enforcement of 1-872. The First Amendment does not require this extraordinary and precipitous nullification of the will of the people. Because 1-872 does not on its face provide for the nomination of candidates or compel political parties to associate with or endorse candidates, and because there is no basis in this facial challenge for presuming that candidates’ party-preference designations will confuse voters, 1-872 does not on its face severely burden respondents’ associational rights. We accordingly hold that 1-872 is facially constitutional. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The term “blanket primary” refers to a system in which “any person, regardless of party affiliation, may vote for a party’s nominee.” California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 576, n. 6 (2000). A blanket primary is distinct from an “open primary,” in which a person may vote for any party’s nominees, but must choose among that party’s nominees for all offices, ibid., and the more traditional “closed primary,” in which “only persons who are members of the political party . . . can vote on its nominee,” id., at 570.
The Washington State Grange is a fraternal, social, and civic organization chartered by the National Grange in 1889. Although originally formed to represent the interests of farmers, the organization has advocated a variety of goals, including women’s suffrage, rural electrification, protection of water resources, and universal telephone service. The State
Grange also supported the Washington constitutional amendment establishing initiatives and referendums and sponsored the 1934 blanket primary initiative.
Respondents make much of the fact that the promoters of 1-872 presented it to Washington voters as a way to preserve the primary system in place from 1935 to 2003. But our task is not to judge 1-872 based on its promoters’ assertions about its similarity, or lack thereof, to the unconstitutional primary; we must evaluate the constitutionality of 1-872 on its own terms. Whether the language of 1-872 was purposely drafted to survive a Jones-type constitutional challenge is irrelevant to whether it has successfully done so.
“ ‘Partisan office’ means a public office for which a candidate may indicate a political party preference on his or her declaration of candidacy and have that preference appear on the primary and general election ballot in conjunction with his or her name.” Wash. Rev. Code §29A.04.110 (Supp. 2005).
This is not a hypothetical outcome. The Court of Appeals observed that, had the 1996 gubernatorial primary been conducted under the L-872 system, two Democratic candidates and no Republican candidate would have advanced from the primary to the general election. See 460 F. 3d 1108,1114, n. 8 (CA9 2006).
Our eases recognize a second type of facial challenge in the First Amendment context under which a law may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a “substantial number” of its applications are unconstitutional, ‘“judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769-771 (1982) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973)). We generally do not apply the “‘strong medicine’” of overbreadth analysis where the parties fail to describe the instances of arguable overbreadth of the contested law. See New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1, 14 (1988).
It is true that parties may no longer indicate their nominees on the ballot, but that is unexceptionable: The First Amendment does not give political parties a right to have their nominees designated as such on the ballot. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U. S. 351, 362-363 (1997) (“We are unpersuaded, however, by the party’s contention that it has a right to use the ballot itself to send a particularized message, to its candidate and to the voters, about the nature of its support for the candidate”). Parties do not gain such a right simply because the State affords candidates the opportunity to indicate their party preference on the ballot. “Ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression.” Id., at 363.
Washington counties have broad authority to conduct elections entirely by mail ballot rather than at in-person polling places. See Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.48.010. As a result, over 90% of Washington voters now vote by mail. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.
Respondents rely on Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557 (1995) (holding that a State may not require a parade to include a group if the parade’s organizer disagrees with the group’s message), and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association was violated by a state law requiring the organization to admit a homosexual scoutmaster). In those cases, actual association threatened to distort the groups’ intended messages. We are aware of no case in which the mere impression of association was held to place a severe burden on a group’s First Amendment rights, but we need not decide that question here.
Relying on Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1 (1986) (holding that a state agency may not require a utility company to include a third-party newsletter in its billing envelope), respondents argue that the threat of voter confusion will force them to speak to clarify their positions. Because 1-872 does not actually force the parties to speak, however, Pacific Gas & Elec, is inapposite. 1-872 does not require the parties to reproduce another’s speech against their will; nor does it co-opt the parties’ own conduits for speech. Rather, it simply provides a place on the ballot for candidates to designate their party preferences. Facilitation of speech to which a political party may choose to respond does not amount to forcing the political party to speak. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 64-65 (2006).
Respondent Libertarian Party of Washington argues that 1-872 is unconstitutional because of its implications for ballot access, trademark protection of party names, and campaign finance. We do not consider the ballot access and trademark arguments as they were not addressed below and are not encompassed by the question on which we granted certiorari: “Does Washington’s primary election system .. . violate the associational rights of political parties because candidates are permitted to identify their political party preference on the ballot?” Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-730, p. i. The campaign finance issue also was not addressed below and is more suitable for consideration on remand.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The States of Delaware and New Jersey seek this Court’s resolution of a dispute concerning their respective regulatory authority over a portion of the Delaware River within a circle of twelve miles centered on the town of New Castle, Delaware. In an earlier contest between the two States, this Court upheld the title of Delaware to “the river and the subaqueous soil” within the circle “up to [the] low water mark on the easterly or New Jersey side.” New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U. S. 361, 385 (1934) (New Jersey v. Delaware II) Prior to that 1934 boundary determination, in 1905, the two States had entered into an accord (1905 Compact or Compact), which Congress ratified in 1907. The Compact accommodated both States’ concerns on matters over which the States had crossed swords: service of civil and criminal process on vessels and rights of fishery within the twelve-mile zone. Although the parties were unable to reach agreement on the interstate boundary at that time, the 1905 Compact contained two jurisdictional provisions important to the current dispute:
“Art. VII. Each State may, on its own side of the river, continue to exercise riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature, and to make grants, leases, and conveyances of riparian lands and rights under the laws of the respective States.
“Art. VIII. Nothing herein contained shall affect the territorial limits, rights, or jurisdiction of either State of, in, or over the Delaware River, or the ownership of the subaqueous soil thereof, except as herein expressly set forth.” Act of Jan. 24, 1907, 34 Stat. 860.
The controversy we here resolve was sparked by Delaware’s refusal to grant permission for construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) unloading terminal that would extend some 2,000 feet from New Jersey’s shore into territory New Jersey v. Delaware II adjudged to belong to Delaware. The LNG plant, storage tanks, and other structures would be maintained onshore in New Jersey. Relying on Article VII of the 1905 Compact, New Jersey urged that it had exclusive jurisdiction over all projects appurtenant to its shores, including wharves extending past the low-water mark on New Jersey’s side into Delaware territory. Delaware asserted regulatory authority, undiminished by Article VII, over structures located within its borders; in support, Delaware invoked, inter alia, Article VIII of the 1905 Compact and our decision in New Jersey v. Delaware II. The Special Master we appointed to superintend the proceedings filed a report recommending a determination that Delaware has authority to regulate the proposed construction, concurrently with New Jersey, to the extent that the project reached beyond New Jersey’s border and extended into Delaware’s domain.
We accept the Special Master’s recommendation in principal part. Article VII of the 1905 Compact, we hold, did not secure to New Jersey exclusive jurisdiction over all riparian improvements commencing on its shores. The parties’ own conduct, since the time Delaware has endeavored to regulate coastal development, supports the conclusion to which other relevant factors point: New Jersey and Delaware have overlapping authority to regulate riparian structures and operations of extraordinary character extending outshore of New Jersey’s domain into territory over which Delaware is sovereign.
I
Disputes between New Jersey and Delaware concerning the boundary along the Delaware River (or River) separating the two States have persisted “almost from the beginning of statehood.” New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U. S., at 376. The history of the States’ competing claims of sovereignty, rehearsed at length in New Jersey v. Delaware II, need not be detailed here. In brief, tracing title through a series of deeds originating with a 1682 grant from the Duke of York to William Penn, Delaware asserted dominion, within the twelve-mile circle, over the River and its subaqueous lands up to the low-water mark on the New Jersey side. Id., at 364, 374. New Jersey claimed sovereign ownership up to the middle of the navigable channel. Id., at 363-364.
The instant proceeding is the third original action New Jersey has commenced against Delaware involving the Delaware River boundary between the two States. The first action, New Jersey v. Delaware, No. 1, Orig. (filed 1877) (New Jersey v. Delaware I), was propelled by the States’ disagreements over fishing rights. See Report of Special Master 3 (Report). That case “slumbered for many years.” New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U. S., at 377. Eventually, the parties negotiated a Compact, which both States approved in 1905, and Congress ratified in 1907. See Act of Jan. 24,1907, ch. 394, 34 Stat. 858. Modest in comparison to the parties’ initial aim, the Compact left location of the interstate boundary an unsettled question. New Jersey then withdrew its complaint and this Court dismissed the case without prejudice. New Jersey v. Delaware I, 205 U. S. 550 (1907).
The second original action, New Jersey v. Delaware II, was fueled by a dispute over ownership of an oyster bed in the River below the twelve-mile circle. See Report 14. In response to New Jersey’s complaint, the Court conclusively settled the boundary between the States. Confirming the Special Master’s report, the Court held that, within the twelve-mile circle, Delaware owns the River and the sub-aqueous soil up to the low-water mark on the New Jersey side. 291 U. S., at 385. But New Jersey gained the disputed oyster bed: South of the circle, the Court adjudged the boundary “to be the middle of the main ship channel in Delaware River and Bay.” Ibid. See also New Jersey v. Delaware II, 295 U. S. 694, 699 (1935) (Decree) (perpetually enjoining the States from further disputing the boundary).
In upholding Delaware’s title to the area within the twelve-mile circle, the Court rejected an argument pressed by New Jersey based on the 1905 Compact: By agreeing to the Compact, New Jersey urged, Delaware had abandoned any claim of ownership beyond the middle of the River. The Court found New Jersey’s argument “wholly without force.” 291 U. S., at 377. “The compact of 1905,” the Court declared, “provides for the enjoyment of riparian rights, for concurrent jurisdiction in respect of civil and criminal process, and for concurrent rights of fishery. Beyond that it does not go.” Id., at 377-378. The Court next recited in full the text of Article VIII of the Compact: “Nothing herein contained shall affect the territorial limits, rights, or jurisdiction of either State of, in, or over the Delaware River, or the ownership of the subaqueous soil thereof, except as herein expressly set forth.” Id., at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
II
The current controversy arose out of the planned construction of facilities to import, store, and vaporize foreign-source LNG; the proposed project would be operated by Crown Landing, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of British Petroleum (BP). See Report 19; 6 App. of Delaware on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 3793, 3804-3807 (hereinafter Del. App.) (Request for Coastal Zone Status Decision). The “Crown Landing” project would include a gasification plant, storage tanks, and other structures onshore in New Jersey, and a pier and related structures extending some 2,000 feet from New Jersey’s shore into Delaware. Report 19-20; 6 Del. App. 3804. Supertankers with capacities of up to 200,000 cubic meters (more than 40 percent larger than any ship then carrying natural gas) would berth at the pier. Id., at 3810. A multipart transfer system — including, inter alia, cryogenic piping, a containment trough, and utility lines — would be installed on the 6,000-square-foot unloading platform and along the pier to transport the LNG (at sufficiently cold temperatures to keep it in a liquid state) from ships to three 158,000-cubic-meter storage tanks onshore; vapor byproducts resulting from the onshore gasification would be returned to the tankers. Report 19-20; 6 Del. App. 3804; 7 id., at 4307 (Cherry Affidavit). Even “[djuring the holding mode of terminal operation (when no ship is unloading),” LNG would circulate through the piping along the pier to “keep the line cold.” 6 id., at 3804. Construction of the Crown Landing project would require dredging 1.24 million cubic yards of subaqueous soil, affecting approximately 29 acres of the riverbed within Delaware’s territory. Report 19-20.
In September 2004, BP sought permission from Delaware’s Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC) to construct the Crown Landing unloading terminal. See id., at 20. DNREC refused permission some months later on the ground that the terminal was barred by Delaware’s Coastal Zone Act (DCZA), Del. Code Ann., Tit. 7, § 7001 et seq. (2001), as a prohibited “offshore... bulk product transfer facility] ” as well as a prohibited “[hjeavy industry us[e],” § 7003; Report 20.
Reactions to DNREC’s decision boiled over on both sides. New Jersey threatened to withdraw state pension funds from Delaware banks, and Delaware considered authorizing the National Guard to protect its border from encroachment. See Report 21. One New Jersey legislator looked into recommissioning the museum-piece battleship U. S. S. New Jersey, in the event that the vessel might be needed to repel an armed invasion by Delaware. See ibid.
New Jersey commenced the instant action in 2005, seeking a declaration that Article VII of the 1905 Compact establishes its exclusive jurisdiction “to regulate the construction of improvements appurtenant to the New Jersey shore of the Delaware River within the Twelve-Mile Circle, free of regulation by Delaware.” Motion to Reopen and for Supplemental Decree 35; see Report 22, 29. We granted leave to file a bill of complaint. 546 U. S. 1028 (2005). Delaware opposed New Jersey’s reading of Article VII, and maintained that the 1905 Compact did not give New Jersey exclusive authority to “approve projects that encroach on Delaware submerged lands without any say by Delaware.” Brief for Delaware in Opposition to New Jersey’s Motion to Reopen and for Supplemental Decree 21; see Report 23, 29.
The Special Master appointed by the Court, Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr., 546 U. S. 1147 (2006), superintended discovery and carefully considered nearly 6,500 pages of materials presented by the parties in support of cross-motions for summary judgment. Report 27. He ultimately determined that the “riparian jurisdiction” preserved to New Jersey by Article VII of the 1905 Compact “is not exclusive” and that Delaware “has overlapping jurisdiction to regulate... improvements outshore of the low water mark on the New Jersey side of the River.” Id., at 32. New Jersey filed exceptions to which we now turn.
III
At the outset, we summarize our decision and the principal reasons for it. In accord with the Special Master, we hold that Article VII of the 1905 Compact does not grant New Jersey exclusive jurisdiction over all riparian improvements extending outshore of the low-water mark. First, the novel term “riparian jurisdiction,” which the parties employed in the Compact, is properly read as a limiting modifier and not as synonymous with “exclusive jurisdiction.” Second, an 1834 compact between New Jersey and New York casts informative light on the later New Jersey-Delaware accord. Third, our decision in Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U. S. 56 (2003), provides scant support for New Jersey’s claim. We there held that a Maryland-Virginia boundary settlement gave Virginia “sovereign authority, free from regulation by Maryland, to build improvements appurtenant to [Virginia’s] shore and to withdraw water from the [Potomac] River.” Id., at 75. Delaware’s 1905 agreement to New Jersey’s exercise of “riparian jurisdiction,” made when the boundary was still disputed, cannot plausibly be read as an equivalent recognition of New Jersey’s sovereign authority. Finally, Delaware’s claim to regulating authority is supported by New Jersey’s acceptance (until the present controversy) of Delaware’s jurisdiction over water and land within its domain to preserve the quality and prevent deterioration of the State’s coastal areas.
A
New Jersey hinges its case on Article VII of the 1905 Compact, which it reads as conferring on “each. State complete regulatory authority over the construction and operation of riparian improvements on its shores, even if the improvements extend past the low-water mark.” Exceptions by New Jersey to Report of Special Master and Supporting Brief 16 (hereinafter New Jersey Exceptions). New Jersey v. Delaware II, New Jersey recognizes, confirmed Delaware’s sovereign ownership of the River and subaqueous soil within the twelve-mile circle. But, New Jersey emphasizes, the Court expressly made that determination “subject to the Compact of 1905.” 291 U. S., at 385. New Jersey acknowledges that Delaware “unquestionably can exercise its police power outshore of the low-water mark.” New Jersey Exceptions 16. New Jersey contends, however, that Delaware cannot do so in a manner that would interfere with the authority over riparian rights that Article VII of the 1905 Compact preserves for New Jersey. Ibid.
Because the meaning of the 1905 Compact and, in particular, Article VII, is key to the resolution of this controversy, we focus our attention on that issue. Significantly, Article VII provides that “[e]ach State may, on its own side of the river, continue to exercise” not “exclusive jurisdiction” or “jurisdiction” unmodified, but “riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature.” 34 Stat. 860. New Jersey argues that “riparian jurisdiction” should be read broadly to encompass full police-power jurisdiction over activities carried out on riparian structures. New Jersey Exceptions 36-37. If New Jersey enjoys full police power over improvements extending from its shore, New Jersey reasons, then necessarily Delaware cannot encroach on that authority. See Report 54.
1
We agree with the Special Master that “ ‘riparian’ is a limiting modifier.” Report 57. Interpreting an interstate compact, “[j]ust as if [we] were addressing a federal statute,” New Jersey v. New York, 523 U. S. 767, 811 (1998), it would be appropriate to construe a compact term in accord with its common-law meaning, see Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952). The term “riparian jurisdiction,” however, was not a legal term of art in 1905, nor is it one now. See 7 Del. App. 4279, 4281 (Expert Report of Professor Joseph L. Sax (Nov. 7, 2006)). As the Special Master stated, “riparian jurisdiction” appears to be a verbal formulation “devised by the [1905 Compact] drafters specifically for Article VII.” Report 54.
Elsewhere in the Compact, one finds the more familiar terms “jurisdiction” (in the introductory paragraphs and, most notably, in Article VIII) or “exclusive jurisdiction” (in Article IV). To attribute to “riparian jurisdiction” the same meaning as “jurisdiction” unmodified, or to equate the novel term with the distinct formulation “exclusive jurisdiction,” would deny operative effect to each word in the Compact, contrary to basic principles of construction. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955).
In this regard, Article VIII bears reiteration:
“Nothing herein contained shall affect the territorial limits, rights, or jurisdiction of either State of, in, or over the Delaware River, or the ownership of the sub-aqueous soil thereof, except as herein expressly set forth.” 34 Stat. 860.
Presumably drafted in recognition of the still-unresolved boundary dispute, see supra, at 603-606, Article VIII requires an express statement in the Compact in order to “affect the territorial... jurisdiction of either State... over the Delaware River.” We resist reading the uncommon term “riparian jurisdiction,” even when aggrandized by the phrase “of every kind and nature,” as tantamount to an express cession by Delaware of its entire “territorial... jurisdiction... over the Delaware River.”
2
Endeavoring to fathom the import of the novel term “riparian jurisdiction,” the Special Master recognized that a riparian landowner ordinarily enjoys the right to build a wharf to access navigable waters far enough to permit the loading and unloading of ships. Report 47-49, 58-59. Accord 1 H. Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights § 62, p. 279 (1904) (“The riparian owner is also entitled to have his contact with the water remain intact. This is what is known as the right of access, and includes the right to erect wharves to reach the navigable portion of the stream.”); id., § 111, p. 520 (“A wharf is a structure on the margin of navigable water, alongside of which vessels are brought for the sake of being conveniently loaded or unloaded.”). But the Special Master also recognized that the right of a riparian owner to wharf out is subject to state regulation. Report 58; see 1 Farnham, supra, § 63, p. 284 (rights of riparian owner “are always subordinate to the public rights, and the state may regulate their exercise in the interest of the public”); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 40 (1894) (“[A] riparian proprietor... has the right of access to the navigable part of the stream in front of his land, and to construct a wharf or pier projecting into the stream..., subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature may prescribe for the protection of the public....” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
New Jersey took no issue with the Special Master’s recognition that States, in the public interest, may place restrictions on a riparian proprietor’s activities. In its response to Delaware’s request for admissions, New Jersey readily acknowledged that a person wishing to conduct a particular activity on a wharf, in addition to obtaining a riparian grant, would have to comply with all other “applicable New Jersey laws, and local laws.” 6 Del. App. 4147, 4156 (New Jersey’s Responses to Delaware’s First Request for Admissions ¶ 22 (Sept. 8, 2006)). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 856, Comment e, pp. 246-247 (1977) (“[A] state may exercise its police power by controlling the initiation and conduct of riparian and nonriparian uses of water.”). But New Jersey sees itself, to the exclusion of Delaware, as the State empowered to regulate, for the benefit of the public, New Jersey landowners’ exercise of riparian rights.
In the ordinary case, the State that grants riparian rights is also the State that has regulatory authority over the exercise of those rights. But cf. Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, 431 (1903) (federal regulation of wharfing out in the Calumet River did not divest local government of regulatory authority based on location of project within that government’s territory). In this regard, the negotiators of the 1905 Compact faced an unusual situation: As long as the boundary issue remained unsettled, they could not know which State was sovereign within the twelve-mile circle beyond New Jersey’s shore. They likely knew, however, that “[i]n a case of wharfing out... ‘[t]he rights of a riparian owner upon a navigable stream in this country are governed by the law of the State in which the stream is situated.’” 1 S. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States § 898, p. 934 (3d ed. 1911) (quoting Weems Steamboat Co. of Baltimore v. People’s Steamboat Co., 214 U. S. 345, 355 (1909)). With the issue of sovereignty reserved by the 1905 Compact drafters for another day, the Special Master’s conclusion that Article VII’s reference to “riparian jurisdiction” did not mean “exclusive jurisdiction” is difficult to gainsay.
The Special Master pertinently observed that, as New Jersey read the 1905 Compact, Delaware had given up all governing authority over the disputed area while receiving nothing in return. He found New Jersey’s position “implausible.” Report 63. “Delaware,” the Special Master stated, “would not have willingly ceded all jurisdiction over matters taking place on land that [Delaware adamantly] contended it owned exclusively and outright.” Id., at 64.
New Jersey asserts that Delaware did just that, as shown by representations made during proceedings in New Jersey v. Delaware II. New Jersey Exceptions 44. Delaware’s reply brief before the Special Master in that case stated: “Article VII of the Compact is obviously merely a recognition of the rights of the riparian owners of New Jersey and a cession to the State of New Jersey by the State of Delaware of jurisdiction to regulate those rights.” 1 App. of New Jersey on Motion for Summary Judgment 123a. Further, at oral argument before the Special Master in that earlier fray, Delaware’s counsel said that, in his view, the 1905 Compact “ceded to the State of New Jersey all the right to control the erection of [wharves extending into the Delaware River from New Jersey’s shore] and to say who shall erect them.” Id., at 126a-l.
The Special Master in the instant case found New Jersey’s position dubious, as do we. The representations Delaware made in the course of New Jersey v. Delaware II, the Special Master here observed, were “fully consistent with [the Master’s] interpretation of Article VII [of the 1905 Compact].” Report 89. New Jersey did indeed preserve “the right to exercise its own jurisdiction over riparian improvements appurtenant to its shore.” Ibid. But, critically, Delaware nowhere “suggested that New Jersey would have the exclusive authority to regulate all aspects of riparian improvements, even if on Delaware’s land.” Ibid.
Delaware, in its argument before the Special Master, was equally uncompromising. As a result of the 1934 boundary determination, Delaware urged, “the entire River is on Delaware’s ‘own side,’ and New Jersey consequently ha[d] no ‘side’ of the River on which to exercise any riparian rights or riparian jurisdiction.” Id., at 36. Article VII of the 1905 Compact, according to Delaware, was a “temporary” measure, “entirely... contingent on the ultimate resolution of the boundary.” Id., at 39. That reading, the Special Master demonstrated, was altogether fallacious. Id., at 36-40.
Seeking to harmonize Article VII with the boundary determination, the Special Master reached these conclusions. First, the 1905 Compact gave New Jersey no authority to grant lands owned by Delaware. Id., at 45-46. Second, Article VII’s preservation to each State of “riparian jurisdiction” means that New Jersey may control the riparian rights ordinarily and usually enjoyed by landowners on New Jersey’s shore. For example, New Jersey may define “how far a riparian owner can wharf out, the quantities of water that a riparian owner can draw from the River, and the like.” Id., at 57-58. Nevertheless, New Jersey’s regulatory authority is qualified once the boundary line at low water is passed. Id., at 58. Just as New Jersey cannot grant land belonging to Delaware, so New Jersey cannot authorize activities that go beyond the exercise of ordinary and usual riparian rights in the face of contrary regulation by Delaware.
B
Interstate compacts, like treaties, are presumed to be “the subject of careful consideration before they are entered into,
and are drawn by persons competent to express their meaning and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes of the high contracting parties.” Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S. 317, 332 (1912). Accordingly, the Special Master found informative a comparison of language in the 1905 Compact with language contained in an 1834 compact between New Jersey and New York. See Report 65. That compact established the two States’ common boundary along the Hudson River. Act of June 28, 1834, ch. 126, 4 Stat. 708. Similar to the boundary between New Jersey and Delaware settled in 1934 in New Jersey v. Delaware II, the 1834 accord located the New Jersey-New York boundary at “the low water-mark on the westerly or New Jersey side [of the Hudson River].” Art. Third, 4 Stat. 710; cf. supra, at 602. The 1834 agreement, however, expressly gave to New Jersey “the exclusive right of property in and to thé land under water lying west of the middle of the bay of New York, and west of the middle of that part of the Hudson river which lies between Manhattan island and New Jersey” and “the exclusive jurisdiction of and over the wharves, docks, and improvements, made and to be made on the shore of the said state...” Art. Third, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4 Stat. 710 (emphasis added).
“Comparable language [conferring exclusive authority],” the Special Master observed, “is noticeably absent in the [1905] Compact.” Report 66. The Master found this disparity “conspicuous,” id., at 68, for “[s]everal provisions in the two interstate compacts [contain] strikingly similar language,” id., at 66; see id., App. J (Table Comparing Similar Provisions in the New Jersey-New York Compact of 1834 and the New Jersey-Delaware Compact of 1905). Given that provisions of the 1905 Compact appear to have been adopted almost verbatim from New Jersey’s 1834 accord with New York, see ibid., New Jersey could hardly claim ignorance that Article VII could have been drafted to grant New Jersey “exclusive jurisdiction” (not merely “riparian jurisdiction”) over wharves and other improvements extending from its shore into navigable Delaware River waters, id., at 67.
C
New Jersey urged before the Special Master, and in its exceptions to his report, that Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U. S. 56, is dispositive of this case. Both cases involved an interstate compact, which left the boundary between the contending States unresolved, and a later determination settling the boundary. And both original actions were referred to Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr., as Special Master. We find persuasive the Special Master’s reconciliation of his recommendations in the two actions. See Report 64-65, n. 118.
Virginia v. Maryland involved a 1785 compact and an 1877 arbitration award. Agreeing with the Special Master, we held that the arbitration award permitted Virginia to construct a water intake structure extending into the Potomac River, even though the award placed Virginia’s boundary at the low-water mark on its own side of the Potomac. See 540 U. S., at 75. “Superficially,” the Special Master said, “that holding would appear to support New Jersey’s argument here, i. e., that construction of wharves off New Jersey’s shore should not be subject to regulation by Delaware.” Report 64, n. 118. But, the Special Master explained, the result in Virginia v. Maryland turned on “the unique language of the compact and arbitration award involved in that case.” Report 64, n. 118.
The key provision of the 1785 compact between Maryland and Virginia, we observed, addressed only “the right [of the citizens of each State] to build wharves and improvements regardless of which State ultimately was determined to be sovereign over the River.” 540 U. S., at 69. Concerning the rights of the States, the 1877 arbitration award, not the 1785 compact, was definitive. See id., at 75. The key provision of that award recognized the right of Virginia, “qua sovereign,” “to use the River beyond low-water mark,” a right “nowhere made subject to Maryland’s regulatory authority.” Id., at 72.
Confirming the “sovereign character” of Virginia’s right, we noted, Maryland had proposed to the arbitrators that the boundary line between the States be drawn around “all wharves and other improvements now extending or which may hereafter be extended, by authority of Virginia from the Virginia shore into the [Potomac] beyond low water mark.” Id., at 72, n. 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the formulation Maryland proposed was not used in the arbitration award, the arbitrators plainly manifested their intention to accomplish the same end: to safeguard “Virginia’s authority to construct riparian improvements outshore of the low water mark without regulation by Maryland.” Report 65, n. 118; see Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U. S., at 73, n. 7. By contrast, in the instant case, neither the 1905 Compact, nor New Jersey v. Delaware II, the 1934 decision settling the boundary dispute, purported to give New Jersey “all regulatory oversight (as opposed to merely riparian oversight)” or to endow New Jersey with authority “exclusive of jurisdiction by Delaware.” Report 65, n. 118; see supra, at 610-615.
D
We turn, finally, to the parties’ prior course of conduct, on which the Special Master placed considerable weight. See Report 68-84; cf. O’Connor v. United States, 479 U. S. 27, 33 (1986) (“The course of conduct of parties to an international agreement, like the course of conduct of parties to any contract, is evidence of its meaning.”).
Until the 1960’s, wharfing out from the New Jersey shore into Delaware territory was not a matter of controversy between the two States. From 1851, when New Jersey began issuing grants for such activity, through 1969, only 11 constructions straddled the interstate boundary. Report 74. At the time of the 1905 Compact and continuing into the 1950’s, Delaware, unlike New Jersey, issued no grants or leases for its subaqueous lands. Delaware regulated riparian improvements solely under its common law, which limited developments only to the extent they constituted public nuisances. Id., at 69.
In 1961, Delaware enacted its first statute regulating submerged lands, and in 1966, it enacted broader legislation governing leases of state-owned subaqueous lands. Id., at 70. The State grandfathered piers and wharves built prior to the effective date of the regulations implementing the 1966 statute. Id., at 70-71. Permits were required, however, for modifications to the grandfathered structures and for new structures. Id., at 71.
Then, in 1971, Delaware enacted the DCZA to prevent “a significant danger of pollution to the coastal zone.” Del. Code Ann., Tit. 7, §7001. The DCZA prohibits within the coastal zone “[h]eavy industry uses of any kind” and “offshore gas, liquid or solid bulk product transfer facilities.” §7003. In 1972, Delaware rejected as a prohibited bulk transfer facility El Paso Eastern Company’s request to build an LNG unloading facility extending from New Jersey into Delaware. 5 Del. App. 3483 (Letter from David Keifer, Director of Delaware State Planning Office, to Barry Hunt-singer, El Paso Eastern Company (Feb. 23, 1972)). Shortly before denying El Paso’s application, Delaware notified New Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), which raised no objection to Delaware’s refusal to permit the LNG terminal. Delaware similarly relied on the DCZA to deny permits for construction of the Crown Landing unloading facility at issue in this case. Report 20.
Also in 1972, Congress enacted the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 86 Stat. 1280, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., which required States to submit their coastal management programs to the Secretary of Commerce for review and approval. In return, States with approved programs would receive federal funding for coastal management. See §§ 1454-1455. Delaware’s coastal management program, approved by the Secretary in 1979, specifically addressed LNG facilities and reported that “ ‘no site in Delaware [is] suitable for the location of any LNG import-export facility.’” Report 72 (quoting 4 Del. App. 2591 (Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA), Delaware Coastal Management Program and Final Environmental Impact Statement 57 (Mar. 1980))). The next year, 1980, New Jersey gained approval for its coastal management program. The Special Master found telling, as do we, a representation New Jersey made in its submission to the Secretary:
“The New Jersey and Delaware Coastal Management agencies... have concluded that any New Jersey project extending beyond mean low water must obtain coastal permits from both states. New Jersey and Delaware, therefore, will coordinate reviews of any proposed development that would span the interstate boundary to ensure that no development is constructed unless it would be consistent with both state coastal management programs.” Report 81 (quoting 4 Del. App. 2657 (NOAA, N. J. Coastal Management Program and Final Environmental Impact Statement 20 (Aug. 1980)); emphasis added).
See also Report 72-73. That representation, the Special Master observed, “is fundamentally inconsistent with the position advanced by New Jersey here, i. e., that only New Jersey has the right to regulate such projects.” Id., at 73.
As the Special Master reported, just three structures extending from New Jersey into Delaware were built between 1969 and 2006. Delaware’s DNREC issued permits for each of them. Id., at 74-76. One of those projects was undertaken by New Jersey itself. The State, in 1996, sought to refurbish a stone pier at New Jersey’s Fort Mott State Park. Id., at 75-76. New Jersey issued a waterfront development permit for the project, but that permit approved structures only to the low-water mark. Delaware’s approval was sought and obtained for structures outshore of that point. Even during the pendency of this action, New Jersey applied to Delaware for renewal of the permit covering the portion of the Fort Mott project extending into Delaware. Ibid.
IV New Jersey v. Delaware II upheld Delaware’s ownership of the River and subaqueous soil within the twelve-mile circle. The 1905 Compact did not ordain that this Court’s 1934 settlement of the boundary would be an academic exercise with slim
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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C
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is the first contested licensing proceeding to be decided by the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. It presents the question whether the Commission erred in continuing in effect a provisional construction permit which authorizes the petitioner Power Reactor Development Company to construct, but not to operate, a fast-neutron breeder reactor for the generation of electric power. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set that order aside. 108 U. S. App. D. C. 97, 280 F. 2d 645 (1960). We granted certiorari, 364 U. S. 889 (1960), on petitions of the United States and of Power Reactor Development Company (hereafter PRDC), to decide an important question of the scope of the Commission’s power under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Stated more precisely, the question before us is whether the Commission, in issuing a permit for the construction of a facility which will utilize nuclear materials, such as the power reactor presently involved, must make the same definitive finding of safety of operation as it admittedly will have to make before it licenses actual operation of the facility. The Court of Appeals said: “It is undisputed that the Commission must make such a finding when it authorizes operation. The question is whether it must make such a finding when it authorizes construction. In our opinion it must.” 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 100, 280 F. 2d, at 648. Petitioners agree that some finding directed to safety of operation must be made at the construction-permit stage of the proceeding, but argue that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Commission must have the same degree of certitude at this preliminary point as when it licenses operation. In order to understand how the controversy arises and what is involved in its resolution, it will be necessary to state the proceedings in the case at some length, and then describe in detail the governing statute and administrative regulations. For the decision of this case ultimately turns on a comparison of what the Commission found with what the statute and regulations require.
The case began on January 7, 1956, when PRDC filed with the Commission (hereafter sometimes referred to as the AEC) an application to construct and operate a developmental power reactor of a relatively new type. This device has two characteristics which distinguish it from other nuclear reactors. First, the neutrons which fly about inside the reactor (to use crude but graphic layman’s terminology) and split atoms of fissionable Uranium-235 — thus releasing new neutrons and energy in the form of heat — are “fast” neutrons. That is, they travel at a velocity of about 10,000 miles per second, much faster than neutrons in ordinary reactors. Second, this réactor is a “breeder”: it has the property of being able to produce about 1.2 times as much fissionable material as it consumes. This result comes about through a sort of modern alchemy; when the neutrons fly outside the inner core of the reactor, which is composed of fissionable U-235, they enter a blanket of nonfissionable U-238. Atoms in this blanket are changed, when struck by a neutron, into Plutonium, itself a fissionable fuel which can be removed from the reactor and be put to possible use in other installations. Thus, the reactor “breeds” Plutonium faster than it uses up U-235. It not only generates energy to produce electric power, it also creates new reactor fuel. This “breeder” effect is attainable because of the use of fast neutrons. Two boron control rods inserted into the reactor are a means designed to reduce its power level at any time. And in addition to these rods, eight more boron rods are suspended by an electromagnet over the reactor; in case the reactivity rises to a dangerously high level, these safety rods are intended to drop into the reactor automatically and shut it down immediately. The whole machine is housed in a series of thick concrete, graphite, and steel layers, all underground. Over this entire complex is placed a football-shaped building, enclosed in a two-inch steel shield capable of containing an explosion equal in force to 1,000 pounds of TNT, which is greater than any explosion which any of the experts who testified in this case believes is at all likely to result from an accident in the operation of the reactor. The application, after describing the reactor in much greater detail than this rudimentary summary, went on to provide that the reactor would be located at Lagoona Beach, Mich., on the shores of Lake Erie, about 35 miles from the center of Detroit, Mich., and about 30 miles from the center of Toledo, Ohio.
The Commission took the case under advisement and, on August 4, 1956, despite a report of its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards which was at best noncommittal about the probable safety of the proposed reactor in operation, issued a provisional construction permit without having held public hearings, as the law at that time permitted it to do. This permit was subject to the following condition:
“The conversion of this permit to a license is subject to submittal by PRDC to the Commission (by amendment of the application) of the complete, final Hazards Summary Report (portions of which may be submitted and evaluated from time to time). The final Hazards Summary Report must show that the final design provides Reasonable assurance . . . that the health and safety''of the public will not be endangered by operation of the reactor
On August 31, 1956, in accordance with the Commission’s then existing rules of practice, the respondents in this Court, International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, and United Papermakers and Paperworkers, petitioned the Commission for permission to intervene and oppose continuation in effect of PRDC’s provisional construction permit. The AEC granted permission to intervene on October 8, 1956, and set the case down for a hearing before one of its hearing examiners. Extensive hearings were held between January 8, 1957, and August 7, 1957, and on November 22, 1957, in accordance with the AEC’s order setting the case for hearing before him, the examiner, instead of issuing an initial decision and opinion of his own, transferred and certified the record of the hearings to the full Commission for its consideration. Oral argument was had before the Commission on May 29, 1958. On December 10, 1958, the Commission rendered its “Opinion and Initial Decision” continuing PRDC’s permit in effect, subject to the same condition recited above. To its opinion were appended extensive findings of fact, including Finding 22, which is of central importance to the decision of this case. That finding reads as follows:
“22. The Commission finds reasonable assurance in the record that a utilization facility of the general type proposed in the PRDC application and amendments thereto can be constructed and will be able to be operated at the location proposed without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.”
Commissioners Vance and Floberg joined in the opinion. Commissioner Graham filed a short concurring opinion agreeing with the Commission’s basic safety findings, just quoted, but doing so in much shorter compass than the majority. Commissioners Libby and McCone (the chairman) took no part in the decision. The result of this initial opinion was an order continuing PRDC’s provisional construction permit in effect, but containing the same condition which the original permit, issued on August 4, 1956, had contained.
The intervening unions, as was their right, filed detailed exceptions to this initial decision. The Commission fully reconsidered all the contentions and reviewed the evidence presented at the lengthy hearings, with particular attention to the testimony of the scientific experts, several of them members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, who had testified. On May 26,1959, the Commission issued its “Opinion and Final Decision,” dealing with all questions presented in even greater detail and reaffirming its initial decision. The Commission emphasized that “public safety is the first, last, and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility.” Even after operation of the reactor is licensed — if it ever is — the Commission, it said, will retain jurisdiction over PRDC’s activities to ensure that the highest safety standards are maintained. The opinion went on to examine the suitability of the proposed site, noted that it was near a great population center, and nevertheless concluded that at the present stage there was reasonable assurance that the general type of reactor proposed by PRDC would be safe enough at that location. The Commission pointed out, however, that its action in allowing PRDC to proceed with construction was by its nature tentative and preliminary, and that it was by no means committed to the issuance of an operating license. “PRDC has been on notice since before the first shovel of dirt was moved,” it said, “that its construction permit is provisional upon further demonstration of many technological and financial facts, including the complete safety of the reactor.” A more severe safety test would have to be passed when the reactor was completed, the opinion said, since “[t]he degree of ‘reasonable assurance’. . . that satisfies us . . . for purposes of the provisional construction permit would not be the same as we would require in considering the issuance of the operating license.” The Commission then made new findings of fact, including the following counterpart of its initial Finding 22:
“22. The Commission finds reasonable assurance in the record, for the purposes of this provisional construction permit, that a utilization facility of the general type proposed in the PRDC Application and amendments thereto can be constructed and operated at the location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.”
All three of the Commissioners who took part in the case joined in this final decision, and the Commission entered its final order continuing in effect the PRDC provisional construction permit, but again subject to the condition that a more extensive safety investigation, and a definitive safety finding, would have to be made before operation was permitted.
The intervening unions, respondents in this Court, then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review and set aside this order of the Commission. Only the final order continuing the permit in effect was drawn in question. No complaint was made of the original ex parte grant of the permit in 1956. PRDC intervened in the Court of Appeals in support of the AEC. On June 10, 1960, by a divided vote, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals set aside the AEC’s order and remanded the case to the Commission. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, two judges dissenting, and we brought the case here.
We turn now to an examination of the statutes and regulations pursuant to which the Commission purported to continue in effect PRDC’s construction permit. The basic provision is § 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U. S. C. § 2134 (b), which authorizes the AEC to “issue licenses to persons applying therefor for utilization and production facilities involved in the conduct of research and development activities .... In issuing licenses under this subsection, the Commission shall impose the minimum amount of such regulations and terms of license as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this chapter to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public . . . .” Two things about this section should be emphasized. First, there is no doubt that the term “licenses” as used therein includes the provisional construction permit which PRDC has received. The last sentence of § 185, 42 U. S. C. § 2235, expressly so provides, as we shall soon see. And second, there is also no doubt that construction permits, like all other licenses, can be issued only consistently with the health and safety of the public. But the responsibility for safeguarding that health and safety belongs under the statute to the Commission. And § 104b, especially when read in connection with the general rule-making power conferred by § 161i (3), 42 U. S. C. § 2201 (i) (3), clearly contemplates that the Commission shall by regulation set forth what the public safety requires as a prerequisite to the issuance of any license or permit under the Act.
The issuance of construction permits is subject to § 185, 42 U. S. C. § 2235. That section provides that
“All applicants for licenses to construct or modify production or utilization facilities shall, if the application is otherwise acceptable to the Commission, be initially granted a construction permit. The construction permit shall state the earliest and latest dates for the completion of the construction or modification. Unless the construction or modification of the facility is completed by the completion date, the construction permit shall expire, and all rights thereunder be forfeited, unless upon good cause shown, the Commission extends the completion date. Upon the completion of the construction or modification of the facility, upon the filing of any additional information needed to bring the original application up to date, and upon finding that the facility authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the application as amended and in conformity with the provisions of this chapter and of the rules and regulations of the Commisson, and in the absence of any good cause being shown to the Commission why the granting of a license would not be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall thereupon issue a license to the applicant. For all other purposes of this chapter, a construction permit is deemed to be a ‘license.’ ”
It is clear from the face of this statute — and all parties agree — that Congress contemplated a step-by-step procedure. First an applicant would have to get a construction permit, then he would have to construct his facility, and then he would have to ask the Commission to grant him a license to operate the facility. This procedure is described in its general outlines in Marks and Trowbridge, Framework for Atomic Industry, 76-77 (1955). See also Green, The Law of Reactor Safety, 12 Yand. L. Rev. 112, 121-127 (1958). The second step of the procedure, the application for and granting of an operating license, is governed by § 182a, 42 U. S. C. § 2232 (a). That provision reads, in pertinent part:
“In connection with applications for licenses to operate production or utilization facilities, the applicant shall state such technical specifications . . . and such other information as the Commission may, by rule or regulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to find that the utilization or production of special nuclear material will be in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.”
It is clear from this provision that before licensing the operation of PRDC’s reactor, the AEC will have to make a positive finding that operation of the facility will “provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.” What is not clear, and what is at the center of the controversy in this case, is whether the Commission must also have made such a finding when it issued PRDC’s construction permit. There is nothing on the face of either § 182 or f 185 which tells us what safety findings must be made before this preliminary step is taken. We know, however, from § 104b that some such finding must be made. For enlightenment on the nature of this finding, both parties urge us to examine the Commission’s regulations, and accordingly we proceed to do so.
The crucial regulation for our purposes is the Commission’s regulation 50.35, 10 CFR § 50.35:
“§ 50.35. Extended time for providing technical information. Where, because of the nature of a proposed project, an applicant is not in a position to supply initially all of the technical information otherwise required to complete the application, he shall indicate the reason, the items or kinds of information omitted, and the approximate times when such data will be produced. If the Commission is satisfied that it has information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type proposed can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public and that the omitted information will be supplied, it may process the application and issue a construction permit on a provisional basis without the omitted information subject to its later production and an evaluation by the Commission that the final design provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.”
This regulation, obviously, elaborates upon and describes in fuller detail the step-by-step licensing procedure contemplated by §§ 182 and 185. It states, pursuant to the authority conferred by §§ 104b and 161i (3), what safety findings shall be required at each stage of the proceeding. There is general agreement that the second safety finding referred to, “that the final design provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered,” comports with the requirements of § 182 concerning the issuance of a license to operate. There is also agreement that the regulation’s first required safety finding, “that [the AEC] has information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type proposed can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public,” is a valid exercise of the rule-making power conferred upon the AEC by statute, and requires that some finding as to safety of operation be made even before a provisional construction permit is granted. The question is whether that first finding must be backed up with as much conviction as to the safety of the final design of the specific reactor in operation as the second, final finding must be.
We think the great weight of the argument supports the position taken by PRDC and by the Commission, that Reg. 50.35 permits the Commission to defer a definitive safety finding until operation is actually licensed. The words of the regulation themselves certainly lean strongly in that direction. The first finding is to be made, by definition, on the basis of incomplete information, and concerns only the “general type” of reactor proposed. The second finding is phrased unequivocally in terms of “reasonable assurance,” while the first speaks more tentatively of “information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance.” The Commission, furthermore, had good reason to make this distinction. For nuclear reactors are fast-developing and fast-changing. What is up to date now may not, probably will not, be as acceptable tomorrow. Problems which seem insuperable now may be solved tomorrow, perhaps in the very process of construction itself. We see no reason why we should not accord to the Commission's interpretation of its own regulation and governing statute that respect which is customarily given to a practical administrative construction of a disputed provision. Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake “involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.” Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933). And finally, and perhaps demanding particular weight, this constructtion has time and again been brought to the attention of the Joint Committee of Congress on Atomic Energy, which under § 202 of the Act, 42 TJ. S. C. § 2252, has a special duty during each session of Congress to “conduct hearings in either open or executive session for the purpose of receiving information concerning the development, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry,” and to oversee the operations of the AEC. See, e. g., Hearings on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 106 (1956); Hearings on Development, etc., 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 119-121 (1958) ; Hearings on Development, etc., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 103-109, 677-678 (1960); Hearings on Development, etc., 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 29-32 (1961); Hearings on Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 62-65 (1956); A Study of AEC Procedures and Organization in the Licensing of Reactor Facilities, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 11-14, 100-108 (Joint Comm. Print 1957). No change in this procedure has ever been suggested by the Committee, although it has on occasion been critical of other aspects of the PRDC proceedings not before us. It may often be shaky business to attribute significance to the inaction of Congress, but under these circumstances, and considering especially the peculiar responsibility and place of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the statutory scheme, we think it fair to read this history as a de jacto acquiescence in and ratification of the Commission’s licensing procedure by Congress. Cf., e. g., Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 292-294 (1958); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. S. 354, 360-361 (1941). This same procedure has been used in each of the nine instances in which The Commission has granted a provisional construction permit for a developmental nuclear power reactor, e. g., Yankee Atomic Elec. Co., CPPR-5 (AEC 1957), and we hold that it was properly used in this case.
It is plain that the statute and regulations, as so construed and applied, were complied with fully. The Commission did not, as respondents’ argument seems at times to suggest, find merely that the construction of the reactor would present no safety problem. The Commission’s opinion and findings clearly were deeply concerned about the prospective safety of operation of the proposed reactor. Admitting that on the basis of the facts before it it was unable to make a definitive finding of safety, the Commission nevertheless found — and respondents do not deny that the finding was supported by substantial evidence — that it had information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the general type of reactor proposed could be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Its Finding 22, which we have quoted, was in the very words of Reg. 50.35, except for the insertion of the phrase, “for the purposes of this provisional construction permit.” This phrase was merely declaratory of the nature of the proceeding before the Commission, and in no way denigrated the finding as to safety of operation.
Respondents contend nevertheless that their construction of the statute is compelled by the legislative history. Since the Court of Appeals relied heavily on this history, we have studied it carefully. Two incidents are cited in particular. First, the Joint Committee stated in its report on the bill which became the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and which when reported contained §§ 182 and 185 in substantially their present shape, that “[s]ection 185 . . . requires the issuance of a license if the construction is carried out in accordance with the terms of the construction permit.” S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28 (1954). The best we can say about this statement, with all deference, is that it must have been inadvertent. Witnesses who appeared before the Joint Committee at the hearings on the bill had made the very complaint that under the words of the bill as proposed a company might invest large sums in construction of a reactor, and then be denied the right to operate it. This situation, they claimed, was unfair, and would substan-. tially discourage the private investment in the field of atomic power which it was one of thp bill’s major purposes to stimulate. See Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Bill to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. I., pp. 113, 119 (statement of Paul W. McQuillen, representing the Dow Chemical-Detroit Edison and Associates atomic power development project, predecessors of PRDC); pp. 226-227 (statement of E. H. Dixon, chairman of the Committee on Atomic Power of the Edison Electric Institute and president of Middle-South Utilities, Inc.); p. 417 (statement of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). In spite of these pleas, however, the bill was unchanged. Industry spokesmen renewed the argument the next year when they sought unsuccessfully to have § 185 amended. Hearings on Development, etc., 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 258, 261 (1955). Even a glance at § 185 suffices to show that issuance of a construction permit does not make automatic the later issuance of a license to operate. For that section sets forth three conditions, in addition to the completion of the construction, which must be met before an operating license is granted: (1) filing of any additional information necessary to bring the application up to date — information which will necessarily in this case include detailed safety data concerning the final design of petitioner’s reactor; (2) a finding that the reactor will operate in accordance with the act and regulations — i. e., that the safety and health of the public will be adequately protected — and with the construction permit itself, which is expressly conditioned upon a full investigation and finding of safety before operation is permitted; and (3) the absence of any good cause why the granting of a license to operate would not be in accordance with the Act — e. g., a showing by respondent unions, who will have full rights to appear and contest the issuance of an operating license, that the reactor may not be reasonably safe.
Respondents rely more heavily on another event during the debates on this bill on the floor of the Senate. Senator Humphrey, an opponent of the bill, expressed a desire that it be made clear that “the construction permit is equivalent to a license,” and that “the revised section 182 on license application . . . appl[ies] directly to construction permits.” 100 Cong. Rec. 12014 (July 26,1954). Senator Hickenlooper, floor manager of the bill and the ranking Senate member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, indicated that he agreed with this construction of §§ 182 and 185. Senator Humphrey wanted these matters made clear because he feared that otherwise a construction permit could be easily obtained and substantial investment made in construction, and then the Commission would feel obliged, perhaps under pressure, to issue an operating license in order that this investment should not go to waste. The language used in the exchange between Senators Humphrey and Hickenlooper is susceptible, if read broadly and out of context, of the construction which respondents attribute to it, namely, that no § 185 construction permit may be issued unless the Commission has made the same safety-of-operation finding which it must make under § 182a before allowing actual operation. But the context of the exchange makes it clear that no such implication was intended by the participants. Senator'Humphrey’s statements were made during the consideration of an amendment which he had himself proposed on July 16. This amendment would have ádded the following clause to the end of § 185:
“and no construction permit shall be issued by the Commission until after the completion of the procedures established by section 182 for the consideration of applications for licenses under this act.”
Upon being assured by Senator Hickenlooper that an earlier amendment which Senator Hickenlooper himself had offered to § 189 took care of the problem, Senator Humphrey withdrew his proposal. This amendment to § 189, which was adopted, was concerned solely with hearings and judicial review. Plainly Senator Humphrey’s concern was not with the substantive safety findings necessary to the issuance of a construction permit, but rather with the procedural safeguards with which that issuance should, in his opinion, be surrounded. The reference to the application of § 182 to construction permits was made not with § 182a in mind — that subsection sets out the substantive safety standard for the issuance of an operating license — but rather with a view to the application of § 182b, about which Senator Humphrey particularly asked Senator Hickenlooper during the exchange on the floor referred to, and which merely provides that notice of a license application must be published and given to any appropriate regulatory agencies, a procedural requirement which was fully satisfied in this case. This interpretation of the meaning of Senator Humphrey’s remarks is borne out by a statement of Representative Holifield, who, together with Representative Price, had dissented from the favorable report of the Joint Committee, precisely because, inter alia, under the bill as reported a construction permit did not have to be preceded by the same procedures as an operating license. See S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 123 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 123 (1954). Representative Price wanted the same amendment added to § 185 which Senator Humphrey proposed, and he characterized this amendment as necessary to ensure “that the same procedural safeguards in the case of licenses be applied to construction permits.” 100 Cong. Rec. 10959 (July 19,1954). We think, therefore, that Senator Humphrey’s statement referred only to procedural prerequisites of construction permits, and had nothing to do with the substantive safety considerations which this case involves. If there were any doubt about this matter, the consistent administrative practice, made known to Congress many times and never disturbed by it, would dictate this conclusion.
The Court of Appeals put forward as an alternative basis for its decision the holding that under the law the Commission may not authorize the construction of a reactor near a large population center without “compelling reasons” for doing so, 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 103-104, 280 F. 2d, at 651-652, and that no such reasons had been found by the AEC in this case. It is not clear whether respondents have abandoned that contention in this Court, and it is likewise uncertain whether they ever presented it to the Commission, a step which would ordinarily be a prerequisite to its consideration by the Court of Appeals. In any event, the position is without merit. The statute and regulations say nothing about “compelling reasons.” Of course Congress (and the Commission, too, for that matter) had the problem of safety uppermost in mind, and of course that problem is most acute when a reactor, potentially dangerous, is located near a large city. But the Commission found reasonable assurance, for present purposes, that the reactor could be safely operated at the proposed location, and that is enough to. satisfy the requirements of law. The Commission recognized that the site and all its properties are among the most important ingredients of a finding of safety vel non. It considered the site along with all the other relevant data. There is no warrant in the statute for setting aside the Commission's conclusion.
We hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the order of the AEC continuing PRDC's provisional construction permit in effect. We deem it appropriate to add a few words concerning the fears of nuclear disaster which respondents so urgently place before us. The respondents’ argument is tantamount to an insistence that the Commission cannot be counted on, when the time comes to make a definitive safety finding, wholly to exclude the consideration that PRDC will have made an enormous investment. The petitioners concede that the Commission is absolutely denied any authority to consider this investment when acting upon an application for a license for operation. PRDC has been on notice long since that it proceeds with construction at its own risk, and that all its funds may go for naught. With its eyes open, PRDC has willingly accepted that risk, however great. No license to operate may be issued to PRDC until a full hazards report has been filed, until the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards makes a full investigation and public report on safety to the Commission, until the Commission itself, after notice and hearings at which respondents, if they desire, may be heard, has made the safety-of-operation finding required by § 182a and Reg. 50.35, and until the other requirements of § 185 have been met. It may be that an operating license will never be issued. If one is, that will not be the end of the matter. The respondents may have judicial review. Moreover, the Commission’s responsibility for supervision of PRDC continues. For, under Reg. 50.57, 10 CFR § 50.57, operation at full power (100,000 electric kilowatts) will not be permitted until several steps of gradually increasing operation have been successfully mastered, with a full public hearing at each step, and no further advance permitted without the AEC’s being fully satisfied that a step-up will meet the high safety standards imposed by law. This is the multi-step scheme which Congress and the Commission have devised to protect the public health and safety. We hold that the actions of the Commission up to now have been within the Congressional authorization. We cannot assume that the Commission will exceed its powers, or that these many safeguards to protect the public interest will not be fully effective.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the causes are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C), requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements (EIS’s) to accompany appropriation requests. We hold that it does not.
I
NEPA sets forth its purposes in bold strokes:
“The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation_” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321.
Congress recognized, however, that these desired goals could be incorporated, into the everyday functioning of the Federal Government only with great difficulty. See S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 19 (1969). NEPA therefore contains “action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the policies [of the Act] are implemented.” Ibid. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 409 (1976). Section 102 (2)(C) of the Act sets out one of these procedures:
“The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
“(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on- — •
“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
“(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
“(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
“(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
“(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C) (emphasis supplied).
The thrust of § 102 (2) (C) is thus that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decision-making. The “detailed statement” it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions. If environmental concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency planning, the “action-forcing” characteristics of § 102 (2)(C) would be lost. “In the past, environmental factors have frequently been ignored and omitted from consideration in the early stages of planning.... As a result, unless the results of planning are radically revised at the policy level— and this often means the Congress — environmental enhancement opportunities may be foregone and unnecessary degradation incurred.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, supra, at 20. For this reason the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) require federal agencies to “integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values....” 43 Fed. Reg. 55992 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1501.2).
In 1974, respondents, three organizations with interests in the preservation of the environment, brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that § 102 (2) (C) requires federal agencies to prepare EIS’s to accompany their appropriation requests. Respondents named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of'the Office of Mangement and Budget (OMB), and alleged that proposed curtailments in the budget of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS), 80 Stat. 927, 16 U. S. C. § 668dd, would “cut back significantly the operations, maintenance, and staffing of units within the System.” Complaint ¶ 17. The System is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, and consists of more than 350 refuges encompassing more than 30 million acres in 49 States. The primary purpose of the NWRS is to provide a national program “for the restoration, preservation, development and management of wildlife and wildlands habitat; for the protection and preservation of endangered or threatened species and their habitat; and for the management of wildlife and wildlands to obtain the maximum benefits from these resources.” 50 CFR § 25.11 (b) (1978). Respondents alleged that the proposed budget curtailments would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and hence should have been accompanied by an EIS prepared both by the Fish and Wildlife Service and by OMB.
The District Court agreed with respondents’ contentions. Relying on provisions of the then applicable CEQ guidelines, and on the Department of the Interior’s Manual, the District Court held that “appropriation requests are 'proposals for legislation’ within the meaning of NEPA,” and also that “annual proposals for financing the Refuge System are major Federal actions which clearly have a significant effect on the environment.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188, 1189 (1975). The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and provided declaratory and injunctive relief. It stated that the Department of the Interior and OMB were required “to prepare, consider, and disseminate environmental impact statements on annual proposals for financing the National Wildlife Refuge System.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit modified the holding of the District Court. The Court of Appeals was apprehensive because “[a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 125, 581 F. 2d 895, 903 (1978). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 102 (2) (C) required the preparation of an EIS only when an appropriation request accompanies “a 'proposal’ for taking new action which significantly changes the status quo,” or when “the request for budget approval and appropriations is one that ushers in a considered programmatic course following a programmatic review.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. Section 102 (2) (C) would thus have no application to “a routine request for budget approval and appropriations for continuance and management of an ongoing program.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals held, however, that there was no need for injunctive relief because the Fish and Wildlife Service had completed during the pendency of the appeal a “Programmatic EIS” that adequately evaluated the environmental consequences for the NWRS of various budgetary alternatives. Id., at 126, 581 F. 2d, at 904. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976).
We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1065 (1979), and we now reverse.
II
NEPA requires EIS’s to be included in recommendations or reports on both “proposals for legislation... significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” and “proposals for... major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See CEQ regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 56001 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1506.8 (a)). Petitioners argue, however, that the requirements of § 102 (2)(C) have no application to the budget process. The contrary holding of the Court of Appeals rests on two alternative interpretations of § 102 (2)(C). The first is that appropriation requests which are the result of “an agency’s painstaking review of an ongoing program,” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903, are “proposals for legislation” within the meaning of § 102 (2) (C). The second is that appropriation requests which are the reflection of “new” agency initiatives constituting “major Federal actions” under NEPA, are themselves “proposals for... major Federal actions” for purposes of § 102 (2)(C). We hold that neither interpretation is correct.
A
We note initially that NEPA makes no distinction between “proposals for legislation” that are the result of “painstaking review,” and those that are merely “routine.” When Congress has thus spoken “in the plainest of words,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978), we will ordinarily decline to fracture the clear language of a statute, even for the purpose of fashioning from the resulting fragments a rule that “accords with ‘common sense and the public weal.’ ” Id., at 195. Therefore, either all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation,” or none does.
There is no direct evidence in the legislative history of NEPA that enlightens whether Congress intended the phrase “proposals for legislation” to include requests for appropriations. At the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, however, CEQ guidelines provided that § 102 (2) (C) applied to “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a)(1) (1977). At that time CEQ’s guidelines were advisory in nature, and were for the purpose of assisting federal agencies in complying with NEPA. § 1500.1 (a).
In 1977, however, President Carter, in order to create a single set of uniform, mandatory regulations, ordered CEQ, “after consultation with affected agencies,” to “[i]ssue regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions” of NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 124 (1978). The President ordered the heads of federal agencies to “comply with the regulations issued by the Council....” Ibid. CEQ has since issued these regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-56007 (1978), and they reverse CEQ’s prior interpretation of § 102 (2)(C). The regulations provide specifically that “'[1] egislation’ includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress... but does not include requests for appropriations.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.17). (Emphasis supplied.) CEQ explained this reversal by noting that, on the basis of “traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, considerations of timing and confidentiality, and other factors,... the Council in its experience found that preparation of EISs is ill-suited to the budget preparation process.” 43 Fed. Reg., at 55989.
CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U. S. 1301, 1309-1310 (1974) (Douglas, J., in chambers). The Council was created by NEPA, and charged in that statute with the responsibility “to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth in... this Act..., and to, make recommendations to the President with respect thereto.” 83 Stat. 855, 42 U. S. C. § 4344 (3).
It is true that in the past we have been somewhat less inclined to defer to “administrative guidelines” when they have “conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency.” General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976). But CEQ’s reversal of interpretation occurred during the detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the President, of transforming advisory guidelines into mandatory regulations applicable to all federal agencies. See American Trucking Assns. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967). A mandatory requirement that every federal agency submit EIS’s with its appropriation requests raises wholly different and more serious issues “of fair and prudent administration,” ibid., than does nonbinding advice. This is particularly true in light of the Court of Appeals’ correct observation that “ [a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals accurately noted that such an interpretation of NEPA would be a “reductio ad absurdum.... It would be absurd to require an EIS on every decision on the management of federal land, such as fluctuation in the number of forest fire spotters.” Id., at 124, 581 F. 2d, at 902. Even respondents do not now contend that NEPA should be construed so that all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation.” Brief for Respondents 13 n. 6, 55-61.
CEQ’s interpretation of the phrase “proposals for legislation” is consistent with the traditional distinction which Congress has drawn between “legislation” and “appropriation.” The rules of both Houses “prohibit ‘legislation’ from being added to an appropriation bill.” L. Fisher, Budget Concepts and Terminology: The Appropriations Phase, in 1 Studies in Taxation, Public Finance and Related Subjects — A Compendium 437 (Fund for Public Policy Research 1977). See Standing Rules of the United States Senate, Rule 16 (4) (“No amendment which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill Rules of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Rule XXI (2) (1979); 7 C. Cannon, Precedents of the House of Representatives §§ 1172,1410,1443,1445,1448,1459, 1463, 1470, 1472 (1936). The distinction is maintained “to assure that program and financial matters are considered independently of one another. This division of labor is intended to enable the Appropriations Committees to concentrate on financial issues and to prevent them from trespassing on substantive legislation.” House Budget Committee, Congressional Control of Expenditures 19 (Comm. Print 1977). House and Senate rules thus require a “previous choice of policy... before any item of appropriations might be included in a general appropriations bill.” United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153, 164 n. 5 (1953). Since appropriations therefore “have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 190, and since the “action-forcing” provisions of NEPA are directed precisely at the processes of “planning and... decisionmak-ing,” 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (A), which are associated with underlying legislation, we conclude that the distinction made by CEQ’s regulations is correct and that “proposals for legislation” do not include appropriation requests.
B
The Court of Appeals’ alternative interpretation of NEPA is that appropriation requests constitute “proposals for... major Federal actions.” But this interpretation distorts the language of the Act, since appropriation requests do not “propose” federal actions at all; they instead fund actions already proposed. Section 102 (2) (C) is thus best interpreted as applying to those recommendations or reports that actually propose programmatic actions, rather than to those which merely suggest how such actions may be funded. Any other result would create unnecessary redundancy. For example, if the mere funding of otherwise unaltered agency programs were construed to constitute major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, the resulting EIS’s would merely recapitulate the EIS’s that should have accompanied the initial proposals of the programs. And if an agency program were to be expanded or revised in a manner that constituted major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, an EIS would'have been required to accompany the underlying programmatic decision. An additional EIS at the appropriation stage would add nothing.
Even if changes in agency programs occur because of budgetary decisions, an EIS at the appropriation stage would only be repetitive. For example, respondents allege in their complaint that OMB required the Fish and Wildlife Service to decrease its appropriation request for the NWRS, and that this decrease would alter the operation of the NWRS in a manner that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. See n. 9, supra. But since the Fish and Wildlife Service could respond to OMB’s budgetary curtailments in a variety of ways, see United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976), it is impossible to predict whether or how any particular budget cut will in fact significantly affect the quality of the human environment. OMB’s determination to cut the Service’s budget is not a programmatic proposal, and therefore requiring OMB to include an EIS in its budgetary cuts would be premature. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 320 (1975). And since an EIS must be prepared if any of the revisions the Fish and Wildlife Service proposes in its ongoing programs in response to OMB’s budget cuts would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, requiring the Fish and Wildlife Service to include an EIS with its revised appropriation request would merely be redundant. Moroever, this redundancy would have the deleterious effect of circumventing and eliminating the careful distinction Congress has maintained between appropriation and legislation. It would flood House and Senate Appropriations Committees with EIS’s focused on the policy issues raised by underlying authorization legislation, thereby dismantling the “division of labor” so deliberately created by congressional rules.
C
We conclude therefore, for the reasons given above, that appropriation requests constitute neither “proposals for legislation” nor “proposals for... major Federal actions,” and that therefore the procedural requirements of § 102 (2) (C) have no application to such requests. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
Section 101 (b) articulates these purposes with even greater particularity :
“In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may—
“(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
“ (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings ;
“(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
“(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
“(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and
“(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4331 (b).
Of course, an EIS need not be promulgated unless an agency’s planning ripens into a “recommendation or report on proposals for legislation [or] other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390 (1976). Moreover, although NEPA requires compliance “to the fullest extent possible,” we have held that the duty to prepare an EIS must yield before “a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority.” Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn., 426 U. S. 776, 788 (1976).
CEQ regulations state that “[t]he primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.... An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.” 43 Fed. Reg. 55994 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.1).
In Exec. Order No. 11991, President Carter required the CEQ to issue regulations that included procedures “for the early preparation of environmental impact statements.” 3 CFR 124 (1978). As a consequence, CEQ regulations provide:
“An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal... so that preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal. The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaldng process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made.... For instance:
“(a) For projects directly undertaken by Federal agencies the environmental impact statement shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented at a later stage if necessary....” 43 Fed. Reg. 55995 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.5).
Respondents are the Sierra Club, the National Parks and Conservation Association, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
CEQ regulations define an “environmental impact statement” to mean “a detailed written statement as required by See. 102 (2) (C) of [NEPA].” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.11).
See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System 1-8 to 1-9 (Nov. 1976).
The System is administered according to the provisions of several statutes. The most significant of these are the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 401, as amended, 72 Stat. 563, 16 U. S. C. § 661 et seq.; the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 1119,16 U. S. C. § 742a et seq.; the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, ch. 257, 45 Stat. 1222, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 715 et seq.; and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq.
Respondents brought suit on behalf of themselves, claiming that they had organizational interests in monitoring and publicizing the management of the NWRS, and on behalf of their members, alleging that the latter used the NWRS for recreational and other purposes and would be affected by the proposed budget curtailments.
Respondents alleged that OMB had “significantly reduced the Interior Department’s request for appropriations for the operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System during fiscal year 1974 and during other years without preparing or considering the environmental-impact statement required by NEPA.” Complaint ¶ 25.
Respondents also contended that § 102 (2) (B) of NEPA required OMB to develop procedures to assure consideration of environmental factors in the budget process. Section 102 (2) (B) requires all federal agencies to "identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (B).
At that time, CEQ was authorized by Exec. Order No. 11514, § 3 (h), to issue nonbinding “guidelines to Federal agencies for the preparation of detailed statements on proposals for legislation and other Federal actions affecting the environment.” 3 CFR 904 (1966-1970 Comp.). These guidelines stated that the “major Federal actions” to which § 102 (2) (C) applied included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a) (1) (1974). See § 1500.3.
At that time the Department of the Interior’s Manual, following CEQ’s proposed guidelines, provided:
“The following criteria are to be used in deciding whether a proposed action requires the preparation of an environmental statement:
“A. Types of Federal actions to be considered include, but are not limited to:
“(1) Recommendations or favorable reports to the Congress relating to legislation, including appropriations.” Department of the Interior Manual, §516.5, 36 Fed. Reg. 19344 (1971).
Without additional discussion, the District Court also stated that the Director of OMB was required “to develop formal methods and procedures which will, with respect to [OMB]’s own administrative actions and proposals, identify those agency actions requiring environmental statements to be prepared, considered, and disseminated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. See n. 9, supra.
Respondents do not now challenge this holding.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed what it took to be the District Court’s declaratory relief requiring OMB “to adopt procedures and appropriate regulations to comply with the obligations NEPA imposes on the budget process... 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 127, 581 F. 2d, at 905. See n. 12, supra.
CEQ had taken this position from the first draft of its guidelines. CEQ was required by President Nixon to issue guidelines on March 5, 1970. See Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 CPR 902 (1966-1967 Comp.). On April 30, 1970, CEQ promulgated interim guidelines which provided that “major Federal actions” included “[r]ecommendations or reports relating to legislation and appropriations.” Council on Environmental Quality, First Annual Report: Environmental Quality 288 (1970). On April 23, 1971, the guidelines were revised to state that “major Federal actions” included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including that for appropriations.” 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). On August 1, 1973, the guidelines were once again revised, this time to the form noted by the Court of Appeals. 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (1973).
Relying on the CEQ guidelines, two prior decisions by Courts of Appeals have both interpreted “proposals for legislation” to include appropriation requests. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1181 (CA6 1972); Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 395, 404, 481 F. 2d 1079, 1088 (1973).
These regulations become effective July 30, 1979. 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978).
The CEQ also noted that “[n]othing in the Council’s determination, however, relieves agencies of responsibility to prepare statements when otherwise required on the underlying program or other actions.” Id., at 55989.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 directs the Comptroller General of the United States, “in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, [to] develop, establish, maintain, and publish standard terminology, definitions, classifications, and codes for Federal fiscal, budgetary, and program-related data and information.” 88 Stat. 327, 31 U. S. C. § 1152 (a) (1). Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Comptroller General has published definitions distinguishing “authorizing legislation” from “appropriation.” Authorizing legislation is defined in the following manner:
“Basic substantive legislation enacted by Congress which sets up or continues the legal operation of a Federal program or agency either indefinitely or for a specific period of time or sanctions a particular type of obligation or expenditure within a program. Such legislation is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropriations or other kinds of budget authority to be contained in appropriations acts. It may limit the amount of budget authority to be provided subsequently or may authorize the appropriation of'such sums as may be necessary.’ ” Comptroller General of the United States, Terms Used in the Budgetary Process 4 (1977).
Appropriation, on the other hand, is defined as:
“An authorization by an act of the Congress that permits Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation usually follows.enactment of authorizing legislation.... Appropriations do not represent cash actually set aside in the Treasury for purposes specified in the appropriation act; they represent limitations of amounts which agencies may obligate during the time period specified in the respective appropriations acts.” Id., at 3.
Congressional enactments employ this distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, the Budget and Accounting Act requires the President to include in the proposed budget he submits to Congress
“with respect to each- proposal in the Budget for new or additional legislation which would create or expand any function, activity, or authority, in addition to those functions, activities, and authorities then existing or as then being administered and operated, a tabulation showing—
“(A) the amount proposed in the Budget for appropriation and for expenditure in the ensuing fiscal year on account of such proposal; and
“(B) the estimated appropriation required on account of such proposal in each of the four fiscal years, immediately following that ensuing fiscal year, during which such proposal is to be in effect....” As added, 84 Stat. 1169, 31 U. S. C. § 11 (a) (12) (emphasis supplied).
See also 18 TJ. S. C. § 1913; 22 U. S. C. § 2394 (c).
The Executive Branch also recognizes the distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, OMB distinguishes its function “[t]o supervise and control the administration of the budget” from its task of assisting “the President by clearing and coordinating departmental advice on proposed legislation.” Requiring Confirmation of Future Appointments of the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, H. R. Rep. No. 93-697, p. 18 (1973). See Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 641 (1954). OMB Circular No. A-19 (1972) establishes OMB’s procedures for “legislative coordination and clearance,” whereas OMB Circular No. A-ll (1978) sets out OMB’s guidelines for the “Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates.” OMB Circular No. A-19, §6 (a), requires each federal agency to “prepare and submit to OMB annually its proposed legislative program for the next session of Congress. These programs must be submitted at the same time as the initial submissions of an agency’s annual budget request as required by OMB Circular A-ll.” OMB Circular A-ll, § 13.2, on the other hand, provides:
“If, in addition to the regular appropriation requests, it appears probable that proposals for new legislation may require a further budget request or result in a change in revenues or outlays, a tentative forecast of the supplemental estimate will be set forth separately.... Such proposed supplemental must be consistent with items appearing in the agency’s legislative program as required by OMB Circular No. A-19....”
L. Deschler, Procedure in the U. S. House of Representatives §26-1.2 (1977) states that “[¡language in an appropriation bill changing existing law is legislation and not in order.” Conversely, “ [restrictions against the inclusion of appropriations in legislative bills are provided for by House rule....” Id., §25-3.1.
CEQ regulations define “major Federal action” in the following manner:
“ 'Major Federal action’ includes actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of significantly.... Actions include the circumstance where the responsible oifi-cials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law as agency action.
“(a) Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative proposals....
“(b) Federal actions tend to fall within one of the following categories:
“(1) Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and interpretations adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 651 et seq.; treaties and international conventions or agreements; formal documents establishing an agency's policies which will result in or substantially alter agency programs.
“(2) Adoption of formal plans, such as official documents prepared or approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses of federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be based.
“(3) Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive.
“(4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area. Projects include actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as federal and federally assisted activities.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004-56005 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.18).
“[M]ajor Federal actions” include the “expansion or revision of ongoing programs.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 20 (1969).
For example, if an agency were to seek an appropriation to initiate a major new program that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, or if it were to decline to ask for funding so as to terminate a program with a
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari in this case is dismissed as improvidently granted. See Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U. S. 387; Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 335 U. S. 701, 707-708; General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U. S. 159, 165.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Eortas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The facts and the contentions of counsel raise a number of disturbing questions concerning the administration by the police and the Juvenile Court authorities of the District of Columbia laws relating to juveniles. Apart from raising questions as to the adequacy of custodial and treatment facilities and policies, some of which are not within judicial competence, the case presents important challenges to the procedure of the police and Juvenile Court officials upon apprehension of a juvenile suspected of serious offenses. Because we conclude that the Juvenile Court’s order waiving jurisdiction of petitioner was entered without compliance with required procedures, we remand the case to the trial court.
Morris A. Kent, Jr., first came under the authority of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia in 1959. He was then aged 14. He was apprehended as a result of several housebreakings and an attempted purse snatching. He was placed on probation, in the custody of his mother who had been separated from her husband since Kent was two years old. Juvenile Court officials interviewed Kent from time to time during the probation period and accumulated a “Social Service” file.
On September 2, 1961, an intruder entered the apartment of a woman in the District of Columbia. He took her wallet. He raped her. The police found in the apartment latent fingerprints. They were developed and processed. They matched the fingerprints of Morris Kent, taken when he was 14 years old and under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. At about 3 p. m. on September 5, 1961, Kent was taken into custody by the police. Kent was then 16 and therefore subject to the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the Juvenile Court. D. C. Code § 11-907 (1961), now § 11-1551 (Supp. IV, 1965). He was still on probation to that court as a result of the 1959 proceedings.
Upon being apprehended, Kent was taken to police headquarters where he was interrogated by police officers. It appears that he admitted his involvement in the offense which led to his apprehension and volunteered information as to similar offenses involving housebreaking, robbery, and rape. His interrogation proceeded from about 3 p. m. to 10 p. m. the same evening.
Some time after 10 p. m. petitioner was taken to the Receiving Home for Children. The next morning he was released to the police for further interrogation at police headquarters, which lasted until 5 p. m.
The record does not show when his mother became aware that the boy was in custody, but shortly after 2 p. m. on September 6, 1961, the day following petitioner’s apprehension, she retained counsel.
Counsel, together with petitioner’s mother, promptly conferred with the Social Service Director of the Juvenile Court. In a brief interview, they discussed the possibility that the Juvenile Court might waive jurisdiction under D. C. Code § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965) and remit Kent to trial by the District Court. Counsel made known his intention to oppose waiver.
Petitioner was detained at the Receiving Home for almost a week. There was no arraignment during this time, no determination by a judicial officer of probable cause for petitioner’s apprehension.
During this period of detention and interrogation, petitioner’s counsel arranged for examination of petitioner by two psychiatrists and a psychologist. He thereafter filed with the Juvenile Court a motion for a hearing on the question of waiver of Juvenile Court jurisdiction, together with an affidavit of a psychiatrist certifying that petitioner “is a victim of severe psychopathology” and recommending hospitalization for psychiatric observation. Petitioner’s counsel, in support of his motion to the effect that the Juvenile Court should retain jurisdiction of petitioner, offered to prove that if petitioner were given adequate treatment in a hospital under the aegis of the Juvenile Court, he would be a suitable subject for rehabilitation.
At the same time, petitioner’s counsel moved that the Juvenile Court should give him access to the Social Service file relating to petitioner which had been accumulated by the staff of the Juvenile Court during petitioner’s probation period, and which would be available to the Juvenile Court judge in considering the question whether it should retain or waive jurisdiction. Petitioner’s counsel represented that access to this file was essential to his providing petitioner with effective assistance of counsel.
The Juvenile Court judge did not rule on these motions. He held no hearing. He did not confer with petitioner or petitioner’s parents or petitioner’s counsel. He entered an order reciting that after “full investigation, I do hereby waive” jurisdiction of petitioner and directing that he be “held for trial for [the alleged] offenses under the regular procedure of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia.” He made no findings. He did not recite any reason for the waiver. He made no reference to the motions filed by petitioner’s counsel. We must assume that he denied, sub silentio, the motions for a hearing, the recommendation for hospitalization for psychiatric observation, the request for access to the Social Service file, and the offer to prove that petitioner was a fit subject for rehabilitation under the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction.
Presumably, prior to entry of his order, the Juvenile Court judge received and considered recommendations of the Juvenile Court staff, the Social Service file relating to petitioner, and a report dated September 8, 1961 (three days following petitioner’s apprehension), submitted to him by the Juvenile Probation Section. The Social Service file and the September 8 report were later sent to the District Court and it appears that both of them referred to petitioner’s mental condition. The September 8 report spoke of “a rapid deterioration of [petitioner’s] personality structure and the possibility of mental illness.” As stated, neither this report nor the Social Service file was made available to petitioner’s counsel.
The provision of the Juvenile Court Act governing waiver expressly provides only for “full investigation.” It states the circumstances in which jurisdiction may be waived and the child held for trial under adult procedures, but it does not state standards to govern the Juvenile Court’s decision as to waiver. The provision reads as follows:
“If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and. order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and disposing of such cases.”
Petitioner appealed from the Juvenile Court’s waiver order to the Municipal Court of Appeals, which affirmed, and also applied to the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. On appeal from these judgments, the United States Court of Appeals held on January 22, 1963, that neither appeal to the Municipal Court of Appeals nor habeas corpus was available. In the Court of Appeals’ view, the exclusive method of reviewing the Juvenile Court’s waiver order was a motion to dismiss the indictment in the District Court. Kent v. Reid, 114 U. S. App. D. C. 330, 316 F. 2d 331 (1963).
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1961, shortly after the Juvenile Court order waiving its jurisdiction, petitioner was indicted by a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The indictment contained eight counts alleging two instances of housebreaking, robbery, and rape, and one of housebreaking and robbery. On November 16, 1961, petitioner moved the District Court to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the waiver was invalid. He also moved the District Court to constitute itself a Juvenile Court as authorized by D. C. Code § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965). After substantial delay occasioned by petitioner’s appeal and habeas corpus proceedings, the District Court addressed itself to the motion to dismiss on February 8, 1963.
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. The District Court ruled that it would not “go behind” the Juvenile Court judge’s recital that his order was entered “after full investigation.” It held that “The only matter before me is as to whether or not the statutory provisions were complied with and the Courts have held... with reference to full investigation, that that does not mean a quasi judicial or judicial hearing. No hearing is required.”
On March 7, 1963, the District Court held a hearing on petitioner’s motion to determine his competency to stand trial. The court determined that petitioner was competent.
At trial, petitioner’s defense was wholly directed toward proving that he was not criminally responsible because “his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.” Durham v. United States, 94 U. S. App. D. C. 228, 241, 214 F. 2d 862, 875 (1954). Extensive evidence, including expert testimony, was presented to support this defense. The jury found as to the counts alleging rape that petitioner was “not guilty by reason of insanity.” Under District of Columbia law, this made it mandatory that petitioner be transferred to St. Elizabeths Hospital, a mental institution, until his sanity is restored. On the six counts of housebreaking and robbery, the jury found that petitioner was guilty.
Kent was sentenced to serve five to 15 years on each count as to which he was found guilty, or a total of 30 to 90 years in prison. The District Court ordered that the time to be spent at St. Elizabeths on the mandatory commitment after the insanity acquittal be counted as part of the 30- to 90-year sentence. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court affirmed. 119 U. S. App. D. C. 378, 343 F. 2d 247 (1964).
Before the Court of Appeals and in this Court, petitioner’s counsel has urged a number of grounds for reversal. He argues that petitioner’s detention and interrogation, described above, were unlawful. He contends that the police failed to follow the procedure prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act in that they failed to notify the parents of the child and the Juvenile Court itself, note 1, supra; that petitioner was deprived of his liberty for about a week without a determination of probable cause which would have been required in the case of an adult, see note 3, supra; that he was interrogated by the police in the absence of counsel or a parent, cf. Harling v. United States, 111 U. S. App. D. C. 174, 176, 295 F. 2d 161, 163, n. 12 (1961), without warning of his right to remain silent or advice as to his right to counsel, in asserted violation of the Juvenile Court Act and in violation of rights that he would have if he were an adult; and that petitioner was fingerprinted in violation of the asserted intent of the Juvenile Court Act and while unlawfully detained and that the fingerprints were unlawfully used in the District Court proceeding.
These contentions raise problems of substantial concern as to the construction of and compliance with the Juvenile Court Act. They also suggest basic issues as to the justifiability of affording a juvenile less protection than is accorded to adults suspected of criminal offenses, particularly where, as here, there is an absence of any indication that the denial of rights available to adults was offset, mitigated or explained by action of the Government, as parens patriae, evidencing the special solicitude for juveniles commanded by the Juvenile Court Act. However, because we remand the case on account of the procedural error with respect to waiver of jurisdiction, we do not pass upon these questions.
It is to petitioner’s arguments as to the infirmity of the proceedings by which the Juvenile Court waived its otherwise exclusive jurisdiction that we address our attention. Petitioner attacks the waiver of jurisdiction on a number of statutory and constitutional grounds. He contends that the waiver is defective because no hearing was held; because no findings were made by the Juvenile Court; because the Juvenile Court stated no reasons for waiver; and because counsel was denied access to the Social Service file which presumably was considered by the Juvenile Court in determining to waive jurisdiction.
We agree that the order of the Juvenile Court waiving its jurisdiction and transferring petitioner for trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia was invalid. There is no question that the order is reviewable on motion to dismiss the indictment in the District Court, as specified by the Court of Appeals in this case. Kent v. Reid, supra. The issue is the standards to be applied upon such review.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute contemplates that the Juvenile Court should have considerable latitude within which to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over a child or — subject to the statutory delimitation — should waive jurisdiction. But this latitude is not complete. At the outset, it assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a “full investigation.” Green v. United States, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 348, 308 F. 2d 303 (1962). The statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial degree of discretion as to the factual considerations to be evaluated, the weight to be given them and the conclusion to be reached. It does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure. The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in isolation and without the participation or any representation of the child the “critically important” question whether a child will be deprived of the special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. It does not authorize the Juvenile Court, in total disregard of a motion for hearing filed by counsel, and without any hearing or statement or reasons, to decide — as in this case — that the child will be taken from the Receiving Home for Children and transferred to jail along with adults, and that he will be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence instead of treatment for a maximum, in Kent’s case, of five years, until he is 21.
We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been transferred; but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony — without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society’s special concern for children, as reflected in the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. We hold that it does not.
1. The theory of the District’s Juvenile Court Act, like that of other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris. Its proceedings are designated as civil rather than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge. But the admonition to function in a “parental” relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.
2. Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of the child as parens patriae and not as adversary, courts have relied on the premise that the proceedings are “civil” in nature and not criminal, and have asserted that the child cannot complain of the deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases. It has been asserted that he can claim only the fundamental due process right to fair treatment. For example, it has been held that he is not entitled to bail; to indictment by grand jury; to a speedy and public trial; to trial by jury; to immunity against self-incrimination; to confrontation of his accusers; and in some jurisdictions (but not in the District of Columbia, see Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 371, 236 F. 2d 666 (1956), and Black v. United States, supra) that he is not entitled to counsel.
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
This concern, however, does not induce us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with allegations of law violation. The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no further.
3. It is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is a “critically important” action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has so held. See Black v. United States, supra; Watkins v. United States, 119 U. S. App. D. C. 409, 343 F. 2d 278 (1964). The statutory scheme makes this plain. The Juvenile Court is vested with “original and exclusive jurisdiction” of the child. This jurisdiction confers special rights and immunities. He is, as specified by the statute, shielded from publicity. He may be confined, but with rare exceptions he may not be jailed along with adults. He may be detained, but only until he is 21 years of age. The court is admonished by the statute to give preference to retaining the child in the custody of his parents “unless his welfare and the safety and protection of the public can not be adequately safeguarded without... removal.” The child is protected against consequences of adult conviction such as the loss of civil rights, the use of adjudication against him in subsequent proceedings, and disqualification for public employment. D. C. Code §§ 11-907, 11-915, 11-927, 11-929 (1961).
The net, therefore, is that petitioner — then a boy of 16 — was by statute entitled to certain' procedures and benefits as a consequence of his statutory right to the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. In these circumstances, considering particularly that decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the matter to the District Court was potentially as important to petitioner as the difference between five years’ confinement and a death sentence, we conclude that, as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision. We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.
The Court of Appeals in this case relied upon Wilhite v. United States, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 279, 281 F. 2d 642 (1960). In that case, the Court of Appeals held, for purposes of a determination as to waiver of jurisdiction, that no formal hearing is required and that the “full investigation” required of the Juvenile Court need only be such “as is needed to satisfy that court... on the question of waiver.” (Emphasis supplied.) The authority of Wilhite, however, is substantially undermined by other, more recent, decisions of the Court of Appeals.
In Black v. United States, decided by the Court of Appeals on December 8, 1965, the court held that assistance of counsel in the “critically important” determination of- waiver is essential to the proper administration of juvenile proceedings. Because the juvenile was not advised of his right to retained or appointed counsel, the judgment of the District Court, following waiver of jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court, was reversed. The court relied upon its decision in Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 371, 236 F. 2d 666 (1956), in which it had held that effective assistance of counsel in juvenile court proceedings is essential. See also McDaniel v. Shea, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 15, 278 F. 2d 460 (1960). In Black, the court referred to the Criminal Justice Act, enacted four years after Shioutakon, in which Congress provided for the assistance of counsel “in proceedings before the juvenile court of the District of Columbia.” D. C. Code § 2-2202 (1961). The court held that “The need is even greater in the adjudication of waiver [than in a case like Shioutakon] since it contemplates the imposition of criminal sanctions.” 122 U. S. App. D. C., at 395, 355 F. 2d, at 106.
In Watkins v. United States, 119 U. S. App. D. C. 409, 343 F. 2d 278 (1964), decided in November 1964, the Juvenile Court had waived jurisdiction of appellant who was charged with housebreaking and larceny. In the District Court, appellant sought disclosure of the social record in order to attack the validity of the waiver. The Court of Appeals held that in a waiver proceeding a juvenile’s attorney is entitled to access to such records. The court observed that
“All of the social records concerning the child are. usually relevant to waiver since the Juvenile Court must be deemed to consider the entire history of the child in determining waiver. The relevance of particular items must be construed generously. Since an attorney has no certain knowledge of what the social records contain, he cannot be expected to demonstrate the relevance of particular items in his request.
“The child’s attorney must be advised of the information upon which the Juvenile Court relied in order to assist effectively in the determination of the waiver question, by insisting upon the statutory command that waiver can be ordered only after ‘full investigation,’ and by guarding against action of the Juvenile Court beyond its discretionary authority.” 119 U. S. App. D. C., at 413, 343 F. 2d, at 282.
The court remanded the record to the District Court for a determination of the extent to which the records should be disclosed.
The Court of Appeals’ decision in the present case was handed down on October 26, 1964, prior to its decisions in Black and Watkins. The Court of Appeals assumed that since petitioner had been a probationer of the Juvenile Court for two years, that court had before it sufficient evidence to make an informed judgment. It therefore concluded that the statutory requirement of a “full investigation” had been met. It noted the absence of “a specification by the Juvenile Court Judge of precisely why he concluded to waive jurisdiction.” 119 U. S. App. D. C., at 384, 343 F. 2d, at 253. While it indicated that “in some cases at least” a useful purpose might be served “by a discussion of the reasons motivating the determination,” id., at 384, 343 F. 2d, at 253, n. 6, it did not conclude that the absence thereof invalidated the waiver.
As to the denial of access to the social records, the Court of Appeals stated that “the statute is ambiguous.” It said that petitioner’s claim, in essence, is “that counsel should have the opportunity to challenge them, presumably in a manner akin to cross-examination.” Id., at 389, 343 F. 2d, at 258. It held, however, that this is “the kind of adversarial tactics which the system is designed to avoid.” It characterized counsel’s proper function as being merely that of bringing forward affirmative information which might help the court. His function, the Court of Appeals said, “is not to denigrate the staff’s submissions and recommendations.” Ibid. Accordingly, it held that the Juvenile Court had not abused its discretion in denying access to the social records.
We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals misconceived the basic issue and the underlying values in this case. It did note, as another panel of the same court did a few months later in Black and Watkins, that the determination of whether to transfer a child from the statutory structure of the Juvenile Court to the criminal processes of the District Court is “critically important.” We hold that it is, indeed, a “critically important” proceeding. The Juvenile Court Act confers upon the child a right to avail himself of that court’s “exclusive” jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals has said, “[I]t is implicit in [the Juvenile Court] scheme that non-criminal treatment is to be the rule — and the adult criminal treatment, the exception which must be governed by the particular factors of individual cases.” Harling v. United States, 111 U. S. App. D. C. 174, 177-178, 295 F. 2d 161, 164-165 (1961).
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may not “assume” that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that “full investigation” has been made. Accordingly, we hold that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor. We do not read the statute as requiring that this statement must be formal or that it should necessarily include conventional findings of fact. But the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of “full investigation” has been met; and that the question has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.
Correspondingly, we conclude that an opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver order. Under Black, the child is entitled to counsel in connection with a waiver proceeding, and under Watkins, counsel is entitled to see the child’s social records. These rights are meaningless — an illusion, a mockery — unless counsel is given an opportunity to function.
The right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of justice. Appointment of counsel without affording an opportunity for hearing on a “critically important” decision is tantamount to denial of counsel. There is no justification for the failure of the Juvenile Court to rule on the motion for hearing filed by petitioner’s counsel, and it was error to fail to grant a hearing.
We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Pee v. United States, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 47, 50, 274 F. 2d 556, 559 (1959).
With respect to access by the child’s counsel to the social records of the child, we deem it obvious that since these are to be considered by the Juvenile Court in making its decision to waive, they must be made available to the child’s counsel. This is what the Court of Appeals itself held in Watkins. There is no doubt as to the statutory basis for this conclusion, as the Court of Appeals pointed out in Watkins. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals in the present case that the statute is “ambiguous.” The statute expressly provides that the record shall be withheld from “indiscriminate” public inspection, “except that such records or parts thereof shall be made available by rule of court or special order of court to such persons... as have a legitimate interest in the protection... of the child....” D. C. Code § 11-929 (b) (1961), now § 11-1586 (b) (Supp. IV, 1965). (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals has held in Black, and we agree, that counsel must be afforded to the child in waiver proceedings. Counsel, therefore, have a “legitimate interest” in the protection of the child, and must be afforded access to these records.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ statement, attempting to justify denial of access to these records, that counsel’s role is limited to presenting “to the court anything on behalf of the child which might help the court in arriving at a decision; it is not to denigrate the staff’s submissions and recommendations.” On the contrary, if the staff’s submissions include materials which are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to “denigrate” such matter. There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy attached to staff reports. If a decision on waiver is “critically important” it is equally of “critical importance” that the material submitted to the judge — which is protected by the statute only against “indiscriminate” inspection — be subjected, within reasonable limits having regard to the theory of the Juvenile Court Act, to examination, criticism and refutation. While the Juvenile Court judge may, of course, receive ex parte analyses and recommendations from his staff, he may not, for purposes of a decision on waiver, receive and rely upon secret information, whether emanating from his staff or otherwise. The Juvenile Court is governed in this respect by the established principles which control courts and quasi-judicial agencies of the Government.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Court of Appeals and the District Court erred in sustaining the validity of the waiver by the Juvenile Court. The Government urges that any error committed by the Juvenile Court was cured by the proceedings before the District Court. It is true that the District Court considered and denied a motion to dismiss on the grounds of the invalidity of the waiver order of the Juvenile Court, and that it considered and denied a motion that it should itself, as authorized by statute, proceed in this case to “exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court.” D. C. Code § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965). But we agree with the Court of Appeals in Black, that “the waiver question was primarily and initially one for the Juvenile Court to decide and its failure to do so in a valid manner cannot be said to be harmless error. It is the Juvenile Court, not the District Court, which has the facilities, personnel and expertise for a proper determination of the waiver issue.” 122 U. S. App. D. C., at 396, 355 F. 2d, at 107.
Ordinarily we would reverse the Court of Appeals and direct the District Court to remand the case to the Juvenile Court for a new determination of waiver. If on remand the decision were against waiver, the indictment in the District Court would be dismissed. See Black v. United States, supra. However, petitioner has now passed the age of 21 and the Juvenile Court can no longer exercise jurisdiction over him. In view of the unavailability of a redetermination of the waiver question by the Juvenile Court, it is urged by petitioner that the conviction should be vacated and the indictment dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, and in light of the remedy which the Court of Appeals fashioned in Black, supra, we do not consider it appropriate to grant this drastic relief. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court for a hearing de novo on waiver, consistent with this opinion. If that court finds that waiver was inappropriate, petitioner’s conviction must be vacated. If, however, it finds that the waiver order was proper when originally made, the District Court may proceed, after consideration of such motions as counsel may make and such further proceedings, if any, as may be warranted, to enter an appropriate judgment. Cf. Black v. United States, supra.
Reversed and remanded.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Policy Memorandum No. 7, November 30,1959.
The authority of the Judge of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia to waive or transfer jurisdiction to the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia is contained in the Juvenile Court Act (§ 11-914 D. C. Code, 1951 Ed.). This section permits the Judge to waive jurisdiction “after full investigation” in the case of any child “sixteen years of age or older [who is] charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment.”
The statute sets forth no specific standards for the exercise of this important discretionary act, but leaves the formulation of such criteria to the Judge. A knowledge of the Judge’s criteria is important to the child, his parents, his attorney, to the judges of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, to the United States Attorney and his assistants, and to the Metropolitan Police Department, as well as to the staff of this court, especially the Juvenile Intake Section.
Therefore, the Judge has consulted with the Chief Judge and other judges of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with the United States Attorney, with representatives of the Bar, and with other groups concerned and has formulated the following criteria and principles concerning waiver of jurisdiction which are consistent with the basic aims and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act.
An offense falling within the statutory limitations (set forth above) will be waived if it has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an aggravated character, or— even though less serious — if it represents a pattern of repeated offenses which indicate that the juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under Juvenile Court procedures, or if the public needs the protection afforded by such action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in deciding whether the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought as an original proceeding in the Supreme Court of Arizona by the State on the relation of its Highway Department. The Department seeks to prohibit the application by the State Land Commissioner of rules governing the acquisition of rights of way and material sites in federally donated lands held in trust by the State. The Commissioner’s rules provide in pertinent part that “Rights of Way and Material Sites may be granted ... for an indefinite period . . . after full payment of the appraised value . . . has been made to the State Land Department. The appraised value . . . shall be determined in accordance with the principles established in A. R. S. 12-1122.” Rule 12. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that it may be conclusively presumed that highways constructed across trust lands always enhance the value of the remaining trust lands in amounts at least equal to the value of the areas taken. It therefore ordered the Commissioner to grant without actual compensation material sites and rights of way upon trust lands. 99 Ariz. 161, 407 P. 2d 747.
The lands at issue here are among some 10,790,000 acres granted by the United States to Arizona in trust for the use and benefit of designated public activities within the State. The Federal Government since the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 has made such grants to States newly admitted to the Union. Although the terms of these grants differ, at least the most recent commonly make clear that the United States has a continuing interest in the administration of both the lands and the funds which derive from them. The grant involved here thus expressly requires the Attorney General of the United States to maintain whatever proceedings may be necessary to enforce its terms. We brought this case here because of the importance of the issues presented both to the United States and to the States which have received such lands. 384 U. S. 926.
The issues here stem chiefly from ambiguities in the grant itself. The terms under which the United States provided these lands were included in the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act. 36 Stat. 557. The Act describes with particularity the disposition Arizona may make of the lands and of the funds derived from them, but it does not directly refer to the conditions or consequences of the use by the State itself of the trust lands for purposes not designated in the grant. Of the issues which may arise from the Act’s silence, we need now reach only two: first, whether Arizona is permitted to obtain trust lands for such uses without first satisfying the Act’s restrictions on disposition of the land; and second, what standard of compensation Arizona must employ to recompense the trust for the land it uses. Both issues require consideration of the Act’s language and history.
I.
We turn first to the question of the method by which Arizona may obtain trust lands for purposes not included in the grant. The constraints imposed by the Act upon the methods by which trust lands may be transferred are few and simple. Section 28, which is reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion, requires, with exceptions inapplicable here, that lands be sold or leased only to “the highest and best bidder at a public auction to be held at the county seat of the county wherein the lands . . . shall lie . . . .” The section prescribes the terms, form and frequency of the notice which must be given of the auction. It requires that no lands be sold for a price less than their appraised value. The Act imposes two sanctions upon transactions which fail to satisfy its requirements. First, § 28 provides broadly that trust lands must be “disposed of in whole or in part only in manner as herein provided . . . It adds that “Disposition of any of said lands ... in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust.” Finally, it provides that “Every sale, lease, conveyance, or contract of or concerning any of the lands hereby granted or confirmed . . . not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void . . .
The parties urge, and the state court assumed, that Arizona need not follow these procedures when it seeks material sites and rights of way upon trust lands. The Commissioner’s rules thus do not require an auction or other public sale. This view has been taken by other state courts construing similar grants. Ross v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 433; 222 P. 3, State v. Walker, 61 N. M. 374, 301 P. 2d 317. We have concluded, for the reasons which follow, that the restrictions of the Act are inapplicable to acquisitions by the State for its highway program.
The Act’s silence obliges us to examine its purposes, as evidenced by its terms and its legislative history, to determine whether these restrictions should be imposed here. The grant was plainly expected to produce a fund, accumulated by sale and use of the trust lands, with which the State could support the public institutions designated by the Act. It was not supposed that Arizona would retain all the lands given it for actual use by the beneficiaries; the lands were obviously too extensive and too often inappropriate for the selected purposes. Congress could scarcely have expected, for example, that many of the 8,000,000 acres of its grant “for the support of the common schools,” all chosen without regard to topography or school needs, would be employed as building sites. It intended instead that Arizona would use the general powers of sale and lease given it by the Act to accumulate funds with which it could support its schools.
The central problem which confronted the Act’s draftsmen was therefore to devise constraints which would assure that the trust received in full fair compensation for trust lands. The method of transfer and the transferee were material only so far as necessary to assure that the trust sought and obtained appropriate compensation. This is confirmed by the legislative history of the Enabling Act. All the restrictions on the use and disposition of the trust lands, including those on the powers of sale and lease, were first inserted by the Senate Committee on the Territories. Senator Bev-eridge, the committee’s chairman, made clear on the floor of the Senate that the committee’s determination to require the restrictions sprang from its fear that the trust would be exploited for private advantage. He emphasized that the committee was influenced chiefly by the repeated violations of a similar grant made to New Mexico in 1898. The violations had there allegedly consisted of private sales at unreasonably low prices, and the committee evidently hoped to prevent such depredations here by requiring public notice and sale. The restrictions were thus intended to guarantee, by preventing particular abuses through the prohibition of specific practices, that the trust received appropriate compensation for trust lands. We see no need to read the Act to impose these restrictions on transfers in which the abuses they were intended to prevent are not likely to occur, and in which the trust may in another and more effective fashion be assured full compensation.
Further, we should not fail to recognize that, were we to require Arizona to follow precisely these procedures, we would sanction an empty formality. There would not often be others to bid for the material sites and rights of way which the State might seek. More important, even if such bidders appeared and proved successful, nothing in the grant would prevent Arizona from thereafter condemning the land which it had failed to purchase; the anticipation of condemnation would leave the auction without any real significance. We cannot see that the trust would materially benefit from this circuity.
We conclude that it is consonant with the Act’s essential purposes to exclude from the restrictions in question the transactions at issue here. The trust will be protected, and its purposes entirely satisfied, if the State is required to provide full compensation for the land it uses. We hold, therefore, that Arizona need not offer public notice or conduct a public sale when it seeks trust lands for its highway program. The State may instead employ the procedures established by the Commissioner’s rules, or any other procedures reasonably calculated to assure the integrity of the trust and to prevent misapplication of its lands and funds.
II.
The second issue here is the standard of compensation which Arizona must employ to recompense the trust for the land it acquires. The Land Commissioner’s rules provide simply that the State must pay the appraised value, as measured by the State’s condemnation statute, of the right of way or material site. The Highway Department urges, and the Arizona Supreme Court held, that nothing need ever be actually paid since it may be conclusively presumed that all highways enhance the value of the remaining trust lands in amounts at least equal to the value of the lands which were taken. The United States, as amicus curiae, suggests that the Highway Department be obliged to pay the land’s appraised value, but that it be permitted to reduce that sum by the amount of any enhancement shown in the value of the remaining trust lands. The rule urged by the United States differs from that adopted by the state court only in that the United States would not permit the Highway Department to presume enhancement, but would instead require that it be established by the Department in each instance with reasonable certainty and precision. Under this rule, enhancement would have to be individually proved and computed for small tracts of land checkered over the entire State.
We are urged by the United States to determine only the validity of the rule of law stated by the Arizona Supreme Court, and to defer the broader question of whether enhancement may ever be permitted to diminish the actual compensation payable to the trust. The United States emphasizes that the broader issue does not directly arise under the Commissioner’s rules, since the Arizona condemnation statute incorporated by those rules does not permit benefits to reduce the compensation payable for the condemned land’s fair market value. We are unable to take so narrow a view. The rule adopted by the state court clearly stemmed from, and depended upon, the premise that enhancement may be balanced against the value of the trust lands taken by the State. If we severed the conclusion from its premise, we would halt short of a full adjudication of the validity of the Commissioner’s rules, and unnecessarily prolong the litigation of this important question. We have therefore reached the broader issue, and have concluded that the terms and purposes of the grant do not permit Arizona to diminish the actual compensation, meaning thereby monetary compensation, payable to the trust by the amount of any enhancement in the value of the remaining trust lands.
The Enabling Act unequivocally demands both that the trust receive the full value of any lands transferred from it and that any funds received be employed only for the purposes for which the land was given. First, it requires that before trust lands or their products are offered for sale they must be “appraised at their true value,” and that “no sale or other disposal . . . shall be made for a consideration less than the value so ascertained . . . The Act originally provided in addition that trust lands should not be sold for a price less than a statutory minimum. Second, it imposes a series of careful restrictions upon the use of trust funds. As this Court has noted, the Act contains “a specific enumeration of the purposes for which the lands were granted and the enumeration is necessarily exclusive of any other purpose.” Ervien v. United States, 251 U. S. 41, 47. The Act thus specifically forbids the use of “money or thing of value directly or indirectly derived” from trust lands for any purposes other than those for which that parcel of land was granted. It requires the creation of separate trust accounts for each of the designated beneficiaries, prohibits the transfer of funds among the accounts, and directs with great precision their administration. “Words more clearly designed ... to create definite and specific trusts and to make them in all respects separate and independent of each other could hardly have been chosen.” United States v. Ervien, 246 P. 277, 279. All these restrictions in combination indicate Congress’ concern both that the grants provide the most substantial support possible to the beneficiaries and that only those beneficiaries profit from the trust.
This is confirmed by the background and legislative history of the Enabling Act. The restrictions placed upon land grants to the States became steadily more rigid and specific in the 50 years prior to this Act, as Congress sought to require prudent management and thereby to preserve the usefulness of the grants for their intended purposes. The Senate Committee on the Territories, with the assistance of the Department of Justice, adopted for the New Mexico-Arizona Act the most satisfactory of the restrictions contained in the earlier grants. Its premise was that the grants cannot “be too carefully safeguarded for the purpose for which they are appropriated.” Senator Beveridge described the restrictions as “quite the most important item” in the Enabling Act, and emphasized that his committee believed that “we were giving the lands to the States for specific purposes, and that restrictions should be thrown about it which would assure its being used for those purposes.”
Nothing in these restrictions is explicitly addressed to acquisitions by the State for its other public activities; the Enabling Act is, as we have noted, entirely silent on these questions. We must nevertheless conclude that the purposes of Congress require that the Act’s designated beneficiaries “derive the full benefit” of the grant. The conclusive presumption of enhancement which the Arizona Supreme Court found does not in our view adequately assure fulfillment of that purpose, particularly in the context of lands that are as variegated and far-flung as those comprised in this grant. And we think that the more particularized showing of enhancement advocated by the United States, resting as it largely would upon the forecasts of experts which by nature are subject to the imponderables and hazards of the future, also falls short of assuring accomplishment of the basic intendment of Congress. Acceptance of either of these courses for reimbursing the trust in these circumstances might well result in diminishing the benefits conferred by Congress and in effect deflecting a portion of them to the State’s highway program.
We hold therefore that Arizona must actually compensate the trust in money for the full appraised value of any material sites or rights of way which it obtains on or over trust lands. This standard most nearly reproduces the results of the auction prescribed by the
Act, and most consistently reflects the essential purposes of the grant.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Section 28 of New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, as Amended.
Sec. 28. That it is hereby declared that all lands hereby granted, including those which, having been heretofore granted to the said Territory, are hereby expressly transferred and confirmed to the said State, shall be by the said State held in trust, to be disposed of in whole or in part only in manner as herein provided and for the several objects specified in the respective granting and confirmatory provisions, and that the natural products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same.
Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or indirectly derived therefrom, for any object other than for which such particular lands, or the lands from which such money or thing of value shall have been derived, were granted or confirmed, or in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust.
No mortgage or other encumbrance of the said lands, or any part thereof, shall be valid in favor of any person or for any purpose or under any circumstances whatsoever. Said lands shall not be sold or leased, in whole or in part, , except to the highest and best bidder at a public auction to be held at the county seat of the county wherein the lands to be affected, or the major portion thereof, shall lie, notice of which public auction shall first have been duly given by advertisement, which shall set forth the nature, time, and place of the transaction to be had, with a full description of the lands to be offered, and be published once each week for not less than ten successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published regularly at the State capital, and in that newspaper of like circulation which shall then be regularly published nearest to the location of the lands so offered; nor shall any sale or contract for the sale of any timber or other natural product of such lands be made, save at the place, in the manner, and after the notice by publication provided for sales and leases of the lands themselves. Nothing herein contained shall prevent: (1) the leasing of any of the lands referred to in this section, in such manner as the Legislature of the State of Arizona may prescribe, for grazing, agricultural, commercial, and homesite purposes, for a term of ten years or less; (2) the leasing of any of said lands, in such manner as the Legislature of the State of Arizona may prescribe, whether or not also leased for grazing and agricultural purposes, for mineral purposes, other than for the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon substances, for a term of twenty years or less; (3) the leasing of any said lands, whether or not also leased for other purposes, for the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances on, in, or under said lands for an initial term of twenty years or less and as long thereafter as oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substance may be procured therefrom in paying quantities, the leases to be made in any manner, with or without advertisement, bidding, or appraisement, and under such terms and provisions as the Legislature of the State of Arizona may prescribe, the terms and provisions to include a reservation of a royalty to said State of not less than 12% per centum of production; or (4) the Legislature of the State of Arizona from providing by proper laws for the protection of lessees of said lands, whereby such lessees shall be protected in their rights to their improvements (including water rights) in such manner that in case of lease or sale of said lands to other parties the former lessee shall be paid by the succeeding lessee or purchaser the value of such improvements and rights placed thereon by such lessee.
All lands, leaseholds, timber, and other products of land, before being offered, shall be appraised at their true value, and-no sale or other disposal thereof shall be made for a consideration less than the value so ascertained, nor upon credit unless accompanied by ample security, and the legal title shall not be deemed to have passed until the consideration shall have been paid.
No lands shall be sold for less than their appraised value, and no lands which are or shall be susceptible of irrigation under any projects now or hereafter completed or adopted by the United States under legislation for the reclamation of lands, or under any other project for the reclamation of lands, shall be sold at less than twenty-five dollars per acre: Provided, That said State, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, shall from time to time relinquish such of its lands to the United States as at any time are needed for irrigation works in connection with any such government project. And other lands in lieu thereof are hereby granted to said State, to be selected from lands of the character named and in the manner prescribed in section twenty-four of this Act.
The State of Arizona is authorized to exchange any lands owned by it for other lands, public or private, under such regulations as the legislature thereof may prescribe: Provided, That such exchanges involving public lands may be made only as authorized by Acts of Congress and regulations thereunder.
There is hereby reserved to the United States and excepted from the operation of any and all grants made or confirmed by this Act to said proposed State all land actually or prospectively valuable for the development of water power or power for hydro-electric use or transmission and which shall be ascertained and designated by the Secretary of the Interior within five years after the proclamation of the President declaring the admission of the State; and no lands so reserved and excepted shall be subject to any disposition whatsoever by said State, and any conveyance or transfer of such land by said State or any officer thereof shall be absolutely null and void within the period above named; and in lieu of the land so reserved to the United States and excepted from the operation of any of said grants there be, and is hereby, granted to the proposed State an equal quantity of land to be selected from land of the character named and in the manner prescribed in section twenty-four of this Act.
A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund corresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. The state treasurer shall keep all such moneys invested in safe, interest-bearing securities, which securities shall be approved by the governor and secretary o.f state of said proposed State, and shall at all times be under a good and sufficient bond or bonds conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties in regard thereto, as defined by this Act and the laws of the State not in conflict herewith.
Every sale, lease, conveyance, or contract of or concerning any of the lands hereby granted or confirmed, or the use thereof or the natural products thereof, not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void, any provision of the constitution or laws of the said State to the contrary notwithstanding.
It shall be the duty of the Attorney-General of the United States to prosecute, in the name of the United States and in its courts, such proceedings at law or in equity as may from time to time be necessary and appropriate to enforce the provisions hereof relative to the application and disposition of the said lands and the products thereof and the funds derived therefrom.
Nothing herein contained shall be taken as in limitation of the power of the State or of any citizen thereof to enforce the provisions of this Act.
This action is in form and substance a controversy between two agencies of the State of Arizona, both formally represented by the State’s Attorney General. We have nonetheless concluded that this is a. case with which we may properly deal. The Land Commissioner is apparently a substantially independent state officer, appointed for a term of years and removable only for cause. He is essentially the trustee of the trust at issue here, with custody of the trust lands. In addition, both the Commissioner and the Highway Department are represented by special counsel appointed by the Attorney General to advocate the divergent positions of the parties.
The grants consisted of four sections in each township for the support of common schools, plus specified acreages for other designated purposes. The other acreages were granted for the support of agricultural and mechanical colleges, a school of mines, military institutes, the payment of bonds, miners’ hospitals, penitentiaries, and similar purposes. Of the 10,790,000 acres granted to Arizona for all designated uses, some 9,180,000 acres were earmarked for various educational purposes, of which some 8,000,000 acres were given for the support of common schools.
Between 1803 and 1962, the United States granted a total of some 330,000,000 acres to the States for all purposes. Of these, some 78,000,000 acres were given in support of common schools. The Public Lands, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 60 (Comm. Print 1963).
36 Stat. 575.
Nine States urged as amici curiae that we review the judgment below. One of the nine, New Mexico, received lands in trust under the very grant in issue here. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has held in closely similar circumstances that actual compensation must be paid to the trust. State v. Walker, 61 N. M. 374, 301 P. 2d 317.
In addition, the court suggested that the restrictions of the Enabling Act are inapplicable here because the State obtains less than a fee interest. This contention is plainly foreclosed by the language of § 28, by which “Every sale, lease, conveyance, or contract of or concerning any of the lands” is void unless in substantial conformity with the Act.
The school lands were granted according to the rigid checkerboard pattern of the federal survey. Four sections per township were granted by number for the support of common schools, instead of the one section per township ordinarily given in the earlier grants, because the unappropriated lands in Arizona and New Mexico were largely of so little value. Orfield, Federal Land Grants to the States 45.
S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 18.
Remarks of Senator Beveridge, 45 Cong. Rec. 8227.
Ibid. These violations culminated in a series of lawsuits brought by the Department of Justice against those privy to them. These, lawsuits were pending when the Enabling Act was under study by Congress. The importance of this episode is also indicated in the committee’s report. S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20.
Ariz. Fev. Stat. Ann. §12-1122. The statute permits benefits to reduce any damages caused by severance to the uncondemned portions of a parcel of land, but not to reduce the compensation paid for the land which is condemned.
36 Stat. 574.
Ibid. The Act fixed a minimum price of $3 per acre in Arizona. This requirement was removed by the Act of June 5, 1936. 49 Stat. 1477. The Act still requires that land “susceptible of irrigation” under federal or other projects not be sold for less than $25 per acre. 36 Stat. 574.
36 Stat. 574.
Orfield, Federal Land Grants to the States 48-52.
S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 20.
Ibid.
Remarks of Senator Beveridge, 45 Cong. Rec. 8227.
Letter from former Secretary of the Interior Garfield to the House Committee on the Territories. H. R. Rep. No. 152, 61st Cong.-, 2d Sess., 3.
Despite widespread use of the value of benefits in computing condemnation awards, the various rules adopted for that purpose have created confusion and difficulties. See Haar & Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 833. These problems would be aggravated in the context of this situation, since the benefits would have to be individually computed for tracts of land scattered over the entire State.
We do not mean to suggest that deferred payment arrangements might not be appropriate. Cf. the provisions of §28 (see Appendix): “no sale or other disposal thereof shall be made for a consideration less than the value so ascertained, nor upon credit unless accompanied by ample security, and the legal title shall not be deemed to have passed until the consideration shall have been paid.” Nor do we mean that exchanges, in the situations in which they are permitted by the Act, would not be appropriate. Cf. the provisions of § 28 (see Appendix): “The State of Arizona is authorized to exchange any lands owned by it for other lands, public or private, under such regulations as the legislature thereof may prescribe: Provided, That such exchanges involving public lands may be made only as authorized by Acts of Congress and regulations thereunder.”
We are informed by counsel that over a period of years Arizona has obtained the use of large areas of trust lands on bases that may not have accorded with those set forth in this opinion. We wish to make it plain that we do not reach either the validity of any such transfers or the obligations of the State, if any, with respect thereto.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Appellants are women who contend that an Indiana welfare regulation governing eligibility for state and federal aid to dependent children contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (10). The regulation provides that a person who seeks assistance due to separation or the desertion of a spouse is not entitled to aid until the spouse has been continuously absent for at least six months, unless there are exceptional circumstances of need. Burns Ind. Admin. Rules & Regs. (52-1001 )-2 (1967). Appellants brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, basing jurisdiction on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343, and seeking both declaratory and injunc-tive relief. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281. After a “preliminary hearing on defendants’ ” motion to dismiss “at which the court” received evidence upon which to resolve the matter, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that none of the claimants had exercised her right under Indiana law to appeal from a county decision denying welfare assistance, Burns Ind. Admin. Rules & Regs. (52-1211)-1 (Supp. 1970), and therefore appellants had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. In the alternative, the court held that the pleadings did not present a substantial federal question and that the court lacked jurisdiction under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202. Carter v. Stanton, No. IP 70-C-124 (SD Ind., Dec. 11, 1970). This direct appeal followed and we noted probable jurisdiction. 402 U. S. 994 (1971).
Contrary to the State’s view, our jurisdiction of this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 is satisfactorily established. Sullivan v. Alabama State Bar, 394 U. S. 812, aff’g 295 F. Supp. 1216 (MD Ala. 1969); Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Summerford, 393 U. S. 9, aff’g 280 F. Supp. 406 (SC 1968). Also, the District Court plainly had jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343. Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Damico, an indistinguishable case, likewise establishes that exhaustion is not required in circumstances such as those presented here. Cf. McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961).
Finally, if the court’s characterization of the federal question presented as insubstantial was based on the face of the complaint, as it seems to have been, it was error. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Damico v. California, supra. But it appears that at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, which was based in part on the asserted failure “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” (App. 19), matters outside the pleadings were presented and not excluded by the court. The court was therefore required by Rule 12 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and to dispose of it as provided in Rule 56. Under Rule 56, summary judgment cannot be granted unless there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If this is the course the District Court followed, its order is opaque and unilluminating as to either the relevant facts or the law with respect to the merits of appellants’ claim. In this posture of the case, we are unconvinced that summary judgment was properly entered. The judgment of the District Court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Douglas.
I agree that both this Court and the District Court have jurisdiction to entertain this case and that the appellants were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before launching their challenge. But, although the District Court should have made more complete findings of fact and conclusions of law, I would not remand simply on this score but would hold that the appellants are entitled to judgment.
The problem is simple and should be disposed of here.
The federal Act defines a “dependent child” as a “needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of . . . continued absence from the home.” Indiana by its Board of Public Welfare has adopted the federal definition of “needy child.”
The term “continued absence from the home” is not defined in the federal Act, though HEW recommends “that no period of time be specified as a basis for establishing continued absence as an eligibility factor.” Indiana, however, has established by rule a definition of “continued absence” in case of “desertion or separation.” In those two instances it makes “continued absence” mean that “the absence shall have been continuous” for at least six months, except when the department of welfare finds there are “exceptional circumstances of need.”
A dependent child gets aid immediately and continuously in case the parent is incarcerated or in case the parent is inducted into the armed services. The six-month rule creates a separate class of needy children who by the federal standard may be as “needy” as those in the other two categories.
The federal Act directs that “aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” The federal regulation requires decisions on applications to be made “promptly” and “not in excess of” 30 days and that the assistance check or notification of denial be mailed within that period. As noted, the federal Act contains no waiting period to establish “continued absence.” And the HEW Handbook, already referred to, states as respects “continued absence” that “[a] child comes within this interpretation if for any reason his parent is absent.”
Here, as in California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121, 135, the State’s program “tends to frustrate” the Social Security Act. King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, “establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286. While a State has a legitimate interest in preventing fraud, there are, as we said in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 637, “less drastic means” available “to minimize that hazard.” Rather than remanding for a lower court determination of the law of the case, the merits ought to be decided now inasmuch as (a) the facts are essentially undisputed, (b) the appellants’ claim based on the federal Act is plainly correct, and (c) further litigation would work a hardship upon welfare recipients affected by the Indiana rule. See generally Note, Individualized Criminal Justice In The Supreme Court: A Study Of Dispositional Decision Making, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1260 (1968); Bell, Appellate Court Opinions And The Remand Process, 2 Ga. L. Rev. 526, 536 (1968).
The Indiana regulation so plainly collides with the federal Act that I would end this frivolous defense to this welfare litigation by deciding the merits and reversing by reason of the Supremacy Clause.
49 Stat. 629, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a).
Ind. State Bd. of Pub. Welfare Reg. 2-400 (a).
Dept. of Health, Education, & Welfare Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §3422.5 (1968).
Bums, Ind. Admin. Rules & Regs. (52-1001)-2 (1967): “When the continued absence is due to desertion or separation, the absence shall have been continuous for a period of at least six [6] months prior to the date of application for assistance to dependent children; except that under exceptional circumstances of need and where it is determined that the absence of a parent is actual and bona fide an application may be filed and a child may be considered immediately eligible upon a special finding of the county department of public welfare setting forth the facts and reasons for such action.”
42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (10).
45 CFR §206.10 (3), 36 Fed. Reg. 3864.
N. 3, supra.
Part IV, §3422.2, of the Handbook provides:
“Continued absence of the parent from the home constitutes the reason for deprivation of parental support or care under the following circumstances:
“1. When the parent is out of the home;
“2. When the nature of the absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent’s functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the child; and
“3. When the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on the parent’s performance of his function in planning for the present support or care of the child.
“A child comes within this interpretation if for any reason his parent is absent, and this absence interferes with the child’s receiving maintenance, physical care, or guidance from his parent, and precludes the parent’s being counted on for support or care of the child. For example: The child’s father has left home, without forewarning his family, and the mother really does not know why he left home, nor when or whether he will return.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner brought a wrongful death action against respondent in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy. The jury returned a verdict for petitioner in the amount of $25,000, and the trial court denied respondent’s motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury and remanded the case to the District Court "with directions to enter a judgment for the defendant unless plaintiff . . . makes a satisfactory showing that on another trial evidence of sufficient probative force to justify submission of the cause to the jury will be offered, in which event the judgment shall be for a new trial.” 262 F. 2d 754, 761. The court also held that there were prejudicial errors in the conduct of the trial which would have required a new trial even if there had been sufficient evidence. 262 F. 2d, at 758-759. At that stage in the litigation, this Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. 359 U. S. 983.
Petitioner then submitted to the District Court additional evidence in support of a motion for a new trial. The district judge, regarding himself bound by the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient, denied the motion on the ground that the additional “evidence, while persuasive, would be inadmissible in a new trial under the hearsay rule.” The Court of Appeals sitting en banc, over the dissent of four judges, affirmed the denial of a new trial. 316 F. 2d 635. Petitioner then sought, and we granted, a writ of certiorari. 375 U. S. 920.
We now “consider all of the substantial federal questions determined in the earlier stages of the litigation . . . ,” Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 87, for it is settled that we may consider questions raised on the first appeal, as well as “those that were before the Court of Appeals upon the second appeal.” Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 257. Cf. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 171-173; Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444.
We consider first the alleged errors in the conduct of the trial. The Court of Appeals deemed the trial court’s instruction regarding circumstantial evidence to be “highly prejudicial error” because it included a statement that “[tjhe testimony of all of the witnesses for the plaintiff has made out what we call in law a circumstantial case . . . .” 262 F. 2d, at 758. But as soon as this was called to the court’s attention, the following instruction was given:
“What I meant to say was that the witnesses for the Plaintiff . . . have sought to make out . . . through their evidence a circumstantial case. The question as to whether or not the case of the Plaintiff has been proved is for the Jury to determine.”
There was no objection to this re-instruction. We conclude that it properly stated the law and that it would have remedied any erroneous impression the jury may have received from the first instruction. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial judge committed a “grievous” error by permitting the introduction of certain hearsay evidence. Id., at 757. Counsel for the respondent did not object to this evidence but in fact elicited the same evidence in his examination of the witness. On this record, the admission of the evidence cannot be deemed a deprivation of “substantial justice.” Rule 61, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the inflammatory nature of the opening statement of petitioner’s counsel required a new trial. Counsel told the jury that he would establish that respondent “was a hit-and-run driver,” with “a complete disregard for . . . life.” Id., at 758. In the context of this case, however, those remarks do not seem significantly outside the bounds of permissible advocacy. If respondent knowingly struck the deceased, then he was a hit-and-run driver with little regard for human life, for it was undisputed that the driver of the automobile that hit the decedent did not stop to render aid or to report the accident.
Our examination of the trial record reveals not only that there were no errors affecting substantial justice, but also that the trial judge conducted the trial with scrupulous regard for the litigants’ rights.
We must consider next the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial. Our examination of the record indicates that the jury could reasonably have found the following facts: Decedent’s body was discovered on an island on the right side of a black top road; the body was two or three feet off the edge of the road; near the body tire marks ran off the road for some distance; death resulted from a violent blow; the time of death was fixed at about 7:30 p. m. ; the road was the only highway leading from the island to the respondent’s home; the respondent had spent that afternoon at a bar on the island and had consumed between 8 and 10 drinks of whiskey; he left the bar at about 7:30 p. m. and drove toward his home on the road on which decedent was killed; at the time of decedent’s death, few people were traveling that highway; on the day following the accident respondent’s automobile was without a right headlight rim and bore marks of a recent blow to the right headlight and to the right front of the hood; some blue coloring which “had an appearance that it could have been done by clothing ...” was on the hood; the decedent was wearing blue coveralls when he was struck; a towel with red stains which appeared to be blood was found concealed between the driver’s seat and seat cover; particles which looked like hair were found underneath the right side of the car; and the automobile was covered with a white substance which appeared to be a film of soap left after a washing.
We believe that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that this evidence was insufficient to support the jury-verdict. The evidence was sufficient under any standard which might be appropriate — state or federal. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 437, 444-445. The jury’s verdict, therefore, should not have been disturbed. Accordingly, the case is reversed and remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.
It is so ordered.
Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary for us to consider the correctness of the trial court’s disposition of the motion for a new trial.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy join.
In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the jury venire be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. The Court stated, however, that “in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.” Id., at 538. The principal question presented in this case is whether the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement should now be extended to the petit jury. Because we adopt Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review, we leave the resolution of that question for another dav.
I
Petitioner, a black man, was convicted by an all-white Illinois jury of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. During jury selection for petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner’s counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner’s counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. App. 2-3. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner’s counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was “entitled to a jury of his peers.” Id., at 3. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning' that the jury “appealed] to be a fair [one].” Id., at 4.
On appeal, petitioner argued that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner’s fair cross section claim. People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895-897, 439 N. E. 2d 1066, 1069-1071 (1982). The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and we denied certiorari. 464 U. S. 867 (1983).
Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim, and argued that the opinions of several Justices concurring in, or dissenting from, the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (1983), had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), which prohibited States from purposefully and systematically denying blacks the opportunity to serve on juries. He also argued, for the first time, that under Swain a prosecutor could be questioned about his use of peremptory challenges once he volunteered an explanation. The District Court, though sympathetic to petitioner’s arguments, held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent. App. 5-6.
On appeal, petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim and his McCray argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement applied to the petit jury and held that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, and the panel opinion was vacated. United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F. 2d 1332 (CA7 1985) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Rehearing was postponed until after our decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), which overruled a portion of Swain. After Batson was decided, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not benefit from the rule in that case because Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per curiam), had held that Batson would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 820 F. 2d 832, 834, n. 4 (CA7 1987) (en banc). The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner’s Stvain claim was procedurally barred and in any event merit-less. Id., at 834, n. 6. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s fair cross section claim, holding that the fair cross section requirement was limited to the jury venire. Id., at 834-843. Judge Cudahy dissented, arguing that the fair cross section requirement should be extended to the petit jury. Id., at 844.
II
Petitioner’s first contention is that he should receive the benefit of our decision in Batson even though his conviction became final before Batson was decided. Before addressing petitioner’s argument, we think it helpful to explain how Batson modified Swain. Swam held that a “State’s purposeful or deliberate denial” to blacks of an opportunity to serve as jurors solely on account of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 380 U. S., at 203-204. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Swam, a defendant had to demonstrate that the peremptory challenge system had been “perverted.” A defendant could raise an inference of purposeful discrimination if he showed that the prosecutor in the county where the trial was held “in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be,” has been responsible for the removal of qualified' blacks who had survived challenges for cause, with the result that no blacks ever served on petit juries. Id., at 223.
In Batson, the Court overruled that portion of Swain setting forth the evidentiary showing necessary to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that a defendant can establish a prima facie case by showing that he is a “member of a cognizable racial group,” that the prosecutor exercised “peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race,” and that those “facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” 476 U. S., at 96. Once the defendant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor “to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” Id., at 97.
In Allen v. Hardy, the Court held that Batson constituted an “explicit and substantial break with prior precedent” because it overruled a portion of Swain. 478 U. S., at 258. Employing the retroactivity standard of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636 (1965), the Court concluded that the rule announced in Batson should not be applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final before Batson was announced. The Court defined final to mean a case “‘where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in’ Batson....” 478 U. S., at 258, n. 1 (citation omitted).
Petitioner’s conviction became final 2/> years prior to Batson, thus depriving petitioner of any benefit from the rule announced in that case. Petitioner argues, however, that Batson should be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review at the time certiorari was denied in McCray because the opinions filed in McCray destroyed the preceden-tial effect of Swain. Brief for Petitioner 23. The issue in McCray and its companion cases was whether the Constitution prohibited the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group from the jury, based on the prosecutor’s assumption that they would be biased in favor of other members of that same group. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari, expressing the views that Swain should be reexamined and that the conduct complained of violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 461 U. S., at 964-970. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell concurred in the denial of certiorari. They agreed that the issue was an important one, but stated that it was a “sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed.” Id., at 963.
We reject the basic premise of petitioner’s argument. As we have often stated, the “denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.” United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 (1923) (Holmes, J.). Accord, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U. S. 363, 366, n. 1 (1973); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 489-497 (1963). The “variety of considerations [that] underlie denials of the writ,” Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 917 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), counsels against according denials of certiorari any precedential value. Concomitantly, opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits. We find that Allen v. Hardy is dis-positive, and that petitioner cannot benefit from the rule announced in Batson.
I — H J-H
Petitioner s second contention is that he has established a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Siva in. Recognizing that he has not shown any systematic exclusion of blacks from petit juries in case after case, petitioner contends that when the prosecutor volunteers an explanation for the use of his peremptory challenges, Swain does not preclude an examination of the stated reasons to determine the legitimacy of the prosecutor’s motive. Brief for Petitioner 35 (citing Batson, 476 U. S., at 101, n. (White, J., concurring)). See Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F. 2d 1493, 1495-1496 (CA9 1983) (supporting petitioner’s interpretation of Swain), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1046 (1984).
Petitioner candidly admits that he did not raise the Swain claim at trial or on direct appeal. Brief for Petitioner 38-39. Because of this failure, petitioner has forfeited review of the claim in the Illinois courts. “It is well established that ‘where an appeal was taken from a conviction, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata as to all issues actually raised, and those that could have been presented but were not are deemed waived.’” People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 87-88, 473 N. E. 2d 868, 873 (1984) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1131 (1985). The default prevents petitioner from raising the Swain claim in collateral proceedings under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 122-1 et seq. (1987), unless fundamental fairness requires that the default be overlooked. People v. Brown, 52 Ill. 2d 227, 230, 287 N. E. 2d 663, 665 (1972).
The fundamental fairness exception is a narrow one, and has been applied in limited circumstances. Compare People v. Goerger, 52 Ill. 2d 403, 406, 288 N. E. 2d 416, 418 (1972) (improper instruction on reasonable doubt “does not constitute such fundamental unfairness as to obviate the res judicata and waiver doctrines”), with People v. Ikerd, 47 Ill. 2d 211, 212, 265 N. E. 2d 120, 121 (1970) (fundamental fairness exception applies “where the right relied on has been recognized for the first time after the direct appeal”), and People v. Hamby, 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294-295, 205 N. E. 2d 456, 458 (1965) (fundamental fairness exception applies to claims that defendant asked counsel to raise on direct appeal). It is clear that collateral relief would be unavailable to petitioner. See People v. Beamon, 31 Ill. App. 3d 145, 145-146, 333 N. E. 2d 575, 575-576 (1975) (abstract of decision) (not invoking fundamental fairness exception and holding that Swain claim not raised on direct appeal could not be raised for the first time in collateral proceedings). As a result, petitioner has exhausted his state remedies under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b) with respect to the Swain claim. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 125-126, n. 28 (1982); United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, 502 F. 2d 1383, 1385-1386 (CA7 1974).
Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87-91 (1977), petitioner is barred from raising the Swain claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless he can show cause for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom. See Engle v. Isaac, supra, at 113-114, 117, 124-135 (applying procedural default rule to claim that had never been raised in state court). Petitioner does not attempt to show cause for his default. Instead, he argues that the claim is not barred because it was addressed by the Illinois Appellate Court. Cf. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 327-328 (1985). We cannot agree with petitioner’s argument. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner’s Sixth Amendment fair cross section claim ivithout mentioning the Equal Protection Clause on which Swain was based or discussing whether Swain allows a prosecutor to be questioned about his use of peremptory challenges once he volunteers an explanation. See People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d, at 895-896, 439 N. E. 2d, at 1070. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner’s Swain claim is procedurally barred, and do not address its merits.
Our application of the procedural default rule here is consistent with Hands v. Reed, ante, at 263, which holds that a “procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar” (citations and internal quotations omitted). The rule announced in Harris v. Reed assumes that a state court has had the opportunity to address a claim that is later raised in a federal habeas proceeding. It is simply inapplicable in a case such as this one, where the claim was never presented to the state courts. See ante, at 268-270 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
IV
Petitioner’s third and final contention is that the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section requirement applies to the petit jury. As we noted at the outset, Taylor expressly stated that the fair cross section requirement does not apply to the petit jury. See 419 U. S., at 538. Petitioner nevertheless contends that the ratio decidendi of Taylor cannot be limited to the jury venire, and he urges adoption of a new rule. Because we hold that the rule urged by petitioner should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, we decline to address petitioner’s contention.
A
In the past, the Court has, without discussion, often applied a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure to the defendant in the case announcing the new rule, and has confronted the question of retroactivity later when a different defendant sought the benefit of that rule. See, e. g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323 (1980) (addressing retroactivity of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979)); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505 (1973) (addressing retroactivity of Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387 (1970)); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967) (addressing retroactivity of United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967)); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 (1966) (addressing retroactivity of Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965)). In several cases, however, the Court has addressed the retroactivity question in the very case announcing the new rule. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 490 (1972); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 523, n. 22 (1968). These two lines of cases do not have a unifying theme, and we think it is time to clarify how the question of retroactivity should be resolved for cases on collateral review.
The question of retroactivity with regard to petitioner’s fair cross section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief. See Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 22-24. Nevertheless, that question is not foreign to the parties, who have addressed retroactivity with respect to petitioner’s Batson claim. See Brief for Petitioner 21-32; Brief for Respondent 31-38. Moreover, our sua sponte consideration of retroactivity is far from novel. In Allen v. Hardy, we addressed the retroactivity of Batson even though that question had not been presented by the petition for certiorari or addressed by the lower courts. See 478 U. S., at 261-262 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 646, n. 3 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to the States even although such a course of action was urged only by amicus curiae).
In our view, the question “whether a decision [announcing a new rule should] be given prospective or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of [that] decision.” Mish-kin, Foreword: the High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 64 (1965). Cf. Bowen v. United States, 422 U. S. 916, 920 (1975) (when “issues of both retroactivity and application of constitutional doctrine are raised,” the retroactivity issue should be decided first). Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated. Thus, before deciding whether the fair cross section requirement should be extended to the petit jury, we should ask whether such a rule would be applied retroactively to the case at issue. This retroactivity determination would normally entail application of the Linkletter standard, but we believe that our approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review requires modification.
It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule, and we do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes. In general, however, a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. See, e. g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 62 (1987) (per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringes impermissibly on a criminal defendant’s right to testify on his behalf); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 410 (1986) (Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of prisoners who are insane). To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. See generally Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U. S. 527, 528-529 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting). Given the strong language in Taylor and our statement in Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945), that “[fjairness in [jury] selection has never been held to require proportional representation of races upon a jury,” application of the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would be a new rule.
Not all new rules have been uniformly treated for retro-activity purposes. Nearly a quarter of a century ago, in Linkletter, the Court attempted to set some standards by which to determine the retroactivity of new rules. The question in Linkletter was whether Mapp v. Ohio, which made the exclusionary rule applicable to the States, should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court determined that the retroactivity of Mapp should be determined by examining the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the reliance of the States on prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the exclusionary rule. Using that standard, the Court held that Mapp would only apply to trials commencing after that case was decided. 381 U. S., at 636-640.
The Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results. Instead, it has been used to limit application of certain new rules to cases on direct review, other new rules only to the defendants in the cases announcing such rules, and still other new rules to cases in which trials have not yet commenced. See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 256-267 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing examples). Not surprisingly, commentators have “had a veritable field day” with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being “more than mildly negative.” Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1557, 1558, and n. 3 (1975) (citing sources).
Application of the Linkletter standard led to the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants on direct review. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467-473 (1966), the Court held that, absent other effective measures to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a person in custody must be warned prior to interrogation that he has certain rights, including the right to remain silent. The Court applied that new rule to the defendants in Miranda and its companion cases, and held that their convictions could not stand because they had been interrogated without the proper warnings. Id., at 491-499. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 733-735 (1966), the Court held, under the Linkletter standard, that Miranda would only be applied to trials commencing after that decision had been announced. Because the defendant in Johnson, like the defendants in Miranda, was on direct review of his conviction, see 384 U. S., at 721, the Court’s refusal to give Miranda retroactive effect resulted in unequal treatment of those who were similarly situated. This inequity also generated vehement criticism. See, e. g., A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 54-57 (1978) (decrying the “plain” injustice in Johnson and suggesting that the Court should have distinguished between direct and collateral review for purposes of retroactivity).
Dissatisfied with the Linkletter standard, Justice Harlan advocated a different approach to retroactivity. He argued that new rules should always be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, but that generally they should not be applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part); Desist, 394 U. S., at 256 (dissenting opinion).
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), we rejected as unprincipled and inequitable the Linkletter standard for cases pending on direct review at the time a new rule is announced, and adopted the first part of the retroactivity approach advocated by Justice Harlan. We agreed with Justice Harlan that “failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.” 479 U. S., at 322. We gave two reasons for our decision. First, because we can only promulgate new rules in specific cases and cannot possibly decide all cases in which review is sought, “the integrity of judicial review” requires the application of the new rule to “all similar cases pending on direct review.” Id., at 323. We quoted approvingly from Justice Harlan’s separate opinion in Mackey, supra, at 679:
“ ‘If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all.... In truth, the Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the full course of appellate review is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation.’” 479 U. S., at 323.
Second, because “selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same,” we refused to continue to tolerate the inequity that resulted from not applying new rules retroactively to defendants whose cases had not yet become final. Id., at 323-324 (citing Desist, supra, at 258-259 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Although new rules that constituted clear breaks with the past generally were not given retroactive effect under the Linkletter standard, we held that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” 479 U. S., at 328.
The Linkletter standard also led to unfortunate disparity in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review. An example will best illustrate the point. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484-487 (1981), the Court held that once a person invokes his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be inferred from the fact that the person responded to police-initiated questioning. It was not until Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638 (1984), that the Court held, under the Linkletter standard, that Edwards was not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. In the interim, several lower federal courts had come to the opposite conclusion and had applied Edwards to cases that had become final before that decision was announced. See Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F. 2d 1069, 1072-1074 (CA11 1983); Sockwell v. Maggio, 709 F. 2d 341, 343-344 (CA5 1983); McCree v. Housewright, 689 F. 2d 797, 800-802 (CA8 1982), cert. denied sub nom. McCree v. Lockhart, 460 U. S. 1088 (1983). Thus, some defendants on collateral review whose Edwards claims were adjudicated prior to Stumes received the benefit of Edwards, while those whose Edwards claims had not been addressed prior to Stumes did not. This disparity in treatment was a product of two factors: our failure to treat retroactivity as a threshold question and the Linkletter standard’s inability to account for the nature and function of collateral review. Having decided to rectify the first of those inadequacies, see supra, at 300-301, we now turn to the second.
B
Justice Harlan believed that new rules generally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. He argued that retroactivity for cases on collateral review could “be responsibly [determined] only by focusing, in the first instance, on the nature, function, and scope of the adjudicatory process in which such cases arise. The relevant frame of reference, in other words, is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the [defendant] seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 682 (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). With regard to the nature of habeas corpus, Justice Harlan wrote:
“Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not designed as a substitute for direct review. The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is, reducing the controversy to a final judgment not subject to further judicial revision, may quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed.” Id. at 682-683.
Given the “broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on habeas,” Justice Harlan argued that it is “sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.” Id., at 689. As he had explained in Desist, “the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards. In order to perform this deterrence function,... the habeas court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place.” 394 U. S., at 262-263. See also Stumes, 465 U. S., at 653 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“Review on habeas to determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the time of the conviction is all that is required to ‘forc[e] trial and appellate courts... to toe the constitutional mark’ ”) (citation omitted).
Justice Harlan identified only two exceptions to his general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review. First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 692. Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of “those procedures that... are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id., at 698 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 819, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)).
Last Term, in Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211 (1988), we were asked to decide whether the rule announced in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985), should be applied to a de: fendant on collateral review at the time that case was decided. We held that Francis did not announce a new rule because it “was merely an application of the principle that governed our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana [,442 U. S. 510 (1979)], which had been decided before [the defendant’s] trial took place.” 484 U. S., at 216-217. We therefore found it unnecessary to adopt Justice Harlan’s view of retro-activity for cases on collateral review. We stated, however, that our recent decisions had noted, as had Justice Harlan, “the important distinction between direct review and collateral review.” Id., at 215. See also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555 (1987) (distinguishing between direct and collateral review for purposes of Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal). Indeed, we have expressly reconciled some of our retroactivity decisions with Justice Harlan’s approach. See Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51, 58, n. 4 (1985) (giving Edwards retroactive effect on direct, but not collateral, review “is fully congruent with both aspects of the approach to retroactivity propounded by Justice Harlan”).
We agree with Justice Harlan’s description of the function of habeas corpus. “[T]he Court never has defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion). Rather, we have recognized that interests of comity and finality must also be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review. Thus, if a defendant fails to comply with state procedural rules and is barred from litigating a particular constitutional claim in state court, the claim can be considered on federal habeas only if the defendant shows cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S., at 87-91. We have declined to make the application of the procedural default rule dependent on the magnitude of the constitutional claim at issue, see Engle v. Isaac, 466 U. S., at 129, or on the State’s interest in the enforcement of its procedural rule, see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 493-496 (1986).
This Court has not “always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ. Our development of the law of
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress has prohibited the provision of “material support or resources” to certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity. 18 U. S. C. § 2339B(a)(l). That prohibition is based on a finding that the specified organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247, note following 18 U. S. C. §2339B (Findings and Purpose). The plaintiffs in this litigation seek to provide support to two such organizations. Plaintiffs claim that they seek to facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent purposes of those groups, and that applying the material-support law to prevent them from doing so violates the Constitution. In particular, they claim that the statute is too vague, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that it infringes their rights to freedom of speech and association, in violation of the First Amendment. We conclude that the material-support statute is constitutional as applied to the particular activities plaintiffs have told us they wish to pursue. We do not, however, address the resolution of more difficult cases that may arise under the statute in the future.
I
This litigation concerns 18 U. S. C. § 2339B, which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” Congress has amended the definition of “material support or resources” periodically, but at present it is defined as follows:
“[T]he term “material support or resources’ means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” § 2339A(b)(l); see also § 2339B(g)(4).
The authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” rests with the Secretary of State. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). She may, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, so designate an organization upon finding that it is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” or “terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). “‘[N]ational security’ means the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.” § 1189(d)(2). An entity designated a foreign terrorist organization may seek review of that designation before the D. C. Circuit within 30 days of that designation. § 1189(e)(1).
In 1997, the Secretary of State designated 30 groups as foreign terrorist organizations. See 62 Fed. Reg. 52650. Two of those groups are the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The PKK is an organization founded in 1974 with, the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180-1181 (CD Cal. 1998); Brief for Petitioners in No. 08-1498, p. 6 (hereinafter Brief for Government). The LTTE is an organization founded in 1976 for the purpose of creating an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182; Brief for Government 6. The District Court in this action found that the PKK and LTTE engage in political and humanitarian activities. See 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1180-1182. The Government has presented evidence that both groups have also committed numerous terrorist attacks, some of which have harmed American citizens. See App. 128-133. The LTTE sought judicial review of its designation as a foreign terrorist organization; the D. C. Circuit upheld that designation. See People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State, 182 F. 3d 17, 18-19, 25 (1999). The PKK did not challenge its designation. 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1180.
Plaintiffs in this litigation are two U. S. citizens and six domestic organizations: the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) (a human rights organization with consultative status to the United Nations); Ralph Fertig (the HLP’s president, and a retired Administrative Law Judge); Nagalingam Jeyalingam (a Tamil physician, born in Sri Lanka and a naturalized U. S. citizen); and five nonprofit groups dedicated to the interests of persons of Tamil descent. Brief for Petitioners in No. 09-89, pp. ii, 10 (hereinafter Brief for Plaintiffs); App. 48. In 1998, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the material-support statute, § 2339B. Plaintiffs claimed that they wished to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of the PKK and LTTE in the form of monetary contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and political advocacy, but that they could not do so for fear of prosecution under §2339B. 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1180-1184.
As relevant here, plaintiffs claimed that the material-support statute was unconstitutional on two grounds: First, it violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association under the First Amendment, because it criminalized their provision of material support to the PKK and LTTE, without requiring the Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those organizations. Id., at 1184. Second, plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1184-1185.
Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court granted in part. The District Court held that plaintiffs had not established a probability of success on their First Amendment speech and association claims. See id., at 1196-1197. But the court held that plaintiffs had established a probability of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the statutory terms “personnel” and “training” in the definition of “material support” were impermissibly vague. See id., at 1204.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 205 F. 3d 1130, 1138 (CA9 2000). The court rejected plaintiffs’ speech and association claims, including their claim that § 2339B violated the First Amendment in barring them from contributing money to the PKK and LTTE. See id., at 1133-1136. But the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the terms “personnel” and “training” were vague because it was “easy to imagine protected expression that falls within the bounds” of those terms. Id., at 1138; see id., at 1137.
With the preliminary injunction issue decided, the action returned to the District Court, and the parties moved for summary judgment on the merits. The District Court entered a permanent injunction against applying to plaintiffs the bans on “personnel” and “training” support. See No. CV-98-1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 WL 36105333 (CD Cal., Oct. 2, 2001). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 352 F. 3d 382 (CA9 2003).
Meanwhile, in 2001, Congress amended the definition of “material support or resources” to add the term “expert advice or assistance.” Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), § 805(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 377. In 2003, plaintiffs filed a second action challenging the constitutionality of that term as applied to them. 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1192 (CD Cal. 2004).
In that action, the Government argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their preenforcement claims were not ripe. Id., at 1194. The District Court held that plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable because plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated a “genuine threat of imminent prosecution,” id., at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted), and because § 2339B had the potential to chill plaintiffs’ protected expression, see id., at 1197-1198. On the merits, the District Court held that the term “expert advice or assistance” was impermissibly vague. Id., at 1201. The District Court rejected, however, plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims that the new term was substantially overbroad and criminalized associational speech. See id., at 1202, 1203.
The parties cross-appealed. While the cross-appeals were pending, the Ninth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of the panel’s 2003 decision in plaintiffs’ first action (involving the terms “personnel” and “training”). See 382 F. 3d 1154, 1155 (2004). The en banc court heard reargument on December 14, 2004. See 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (CD Cal. 2005). Three days later, Congress again amended §2339B and the definition of “material support or resources.” Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), §6603, 118 Stat. 3762-3764.
In IRTPA, Congress clarified the mental state necessary to violate § 2339B, requiring knowledge of the foreign group’s designation as a terrorist organization or the group’s commission of terrorist acts. §2339B(a)(l). Congress also added the term “service” to the definition of “material support or resources,” § 2339A(b)(l), and defined “training” to mean “instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge,” § 2339A(b)(2). It also defined “expert advice or assistance” to mean “advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.” § 2339A(b)(3). Finally, IRTPA clarified the scope of the term “personnel” by providing:
“No person may be prosecuted under [§2339B] in connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.” §2339B(h).
Shortly after Congress enacted IRTPA, the en banc Court of Appeals issued an order in plaintiffs’ first action. 393 F. 3d 902, 903 (CA9 2004). The en banc court affirmed the rejection of plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims for the reasons set out in the Ninth Circuit’s panel decision in 2000. See ibid. In light of IRTPA, however, the en banc court vacated the panel’s 2003 judgment with respect to vagueness, and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit panel assigned to the cross-appeals in plaintiffs’ second action (relating to “expert advice or assistance”) also remanded in light of IRTPA. See 380 F. Supp. 2d, at 1139.
The District Court consolidated the two actions on remand. See ibid. The court also allowed plaintiffs to challenge the new term “service.” See id., at 1151, n. 24. The parties moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted partial relief to plaintiffs on vagueness grounds. See id., at 1156.
The Court of Appeals affirmed once more. 552 F. 3d 916, 933 (CA9 2009). The court first rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the material-support statute would violate due process unless it were read to require a specific intent to further the illegal ends of a foreign terrorist organization. See id., at 926-927. The Ninth Circuit also held that the statute was not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. See id., at 931-932. As for vagueness, the Court of Appeals noted that plaintiffs had not raised a “facial vagueness challenge.” Id., at 929, n. 6. The court held that, as applied to plaintiffs, the terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance” (when derived from “other specialized knowledge”), and “service” were vague because they “continue [d] to cover constitutionally protected advocacy,” but the term “personnel” was not vague because it “no longer criminalize[d] pure speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id., at 929-931.
The Government petitioned for certiorari, and plaintiffs filed a conditional cross-petition. We granted both petitions. 557 U. S. 966 (2009).
II
Given the complicated 12-year history of this litigation, we pause to clarify the questions before us. Plaintiffs challenge § 2339B’s prohibition on four types of material support— “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.” They raise three constitutional claims. First, plaintiffs claim that § 2339B violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because these four statutory terms are impermissibly vague. Second, plaintiffs claim that §2339B violates their freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Third, plaintiffs claim that §2339B violates their First Amendment freedom of association.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the above statutory terms in all their applications. Rather, plaintiffs claim that §2339B is invalid to the extent it prohibits them from engaging in certain specified activities. See Brief for Plaintiffs 16-17, n. 10. With respect to the HLP and Judge Fertig, those activities are: (1) “train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes”; (2) “engaging] in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey”; and (3) “teach[ing] PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1; see 380 F. Supp. 2d, at 1136. With respect to the other plaintiffs, those activities are: (1) “train[ing] members of [the] LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international bodies”; (2) “offering] their legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government”; and (3) “engag[ing] in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1; see 380 F. Supp. 2d, at 1137.
Plaintiffs also state that “the LTTE was recently defeated militarily in Sri Lanka,” so “[m]uch of the support the Tamil organizations and Dr. Jeyalingam sought to provide is now moot.” Brief for Plaintiffs 11, n. 5. Plaintiffs thus seek only to support the LTTE “as a political organization outside Sri Lanka advocating for the rights of Tamils.” Ibid. Counsel for plaintiffs specifically stated at oral argument that plaintiffs no longer seek to teach the LTTE how to present claims for tsunami-related aid, because the LTTE now “has no role in Sri Lanka.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 63. For that reason, helping the LTTE negotiate a peace agreement with Sri Lanka appears to be moot as well. Thus, we do not consider the application of § 2339B to those activities here.
One last point. Plaintiffs seek preenforcement review of a criminal statute. Before addressing the merits, we must be sure that this is a justiciable case or controversy under Article III. We conclude that it is: Plaintiffs face “a credible threat of prosecution” and “should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 128-129 (2007).
Plaintiffs claim that they provided support to the PKK and LTTE before the enactment of § 2339B and that they would provide similar support again if the statute’s allegedly unconstitutional bar were lifted. See 309 F. Supp. 2d, at 1197. The Government tells us that it has charged about 150 persons with violating § 2339B, and that several of those prosecutions involved the enforcement of the statutory terms at issue here. See Brief for Government 5. The Government has not argued to this Court that plaintiffs will not be prosecuted if they do what they say they wish to do. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-58. See Babbitt, supra, at 302. See also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U. S. 229, 234, 248-249 (2010) (considering an as-applied preenforcement challenge brought under the First Amendment). Based on these considerations, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are suitable for judicial review (as one might hope after 12 years of litigation).
Ill
Plaintiffs claim, as a threshold matter, that we should affirm the Court of Appeals without reaching any issues of constitutional law. They contend that we should interpret the material-support statute, when applied to speech, to require proof that a defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist organization’s illegal activities. That interpretation, they say, would end the litigation because plaintiffs’ proposed activities consist of speech, but plaintiffs do not intend to further unlawful conduct by the PKK or LTTE.
We reject plaintiffs’ interpretation of §2339B because it is inconsistent with the text of the statute. Section 2339B(a)(l) prohibits “knowingly” providing material support. It then specifically describes the type of knowledge that is required: “To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization..., that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity..., or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism....” Ibid. Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities.
Plaintiffs’ interpretation is also untenable in light of the sections immediately surrounding § 2339B, both of which do refer to intent to further terrorist activity. See § 2339A(a) (establishing criminal penalties for one who “provides material support or resources... knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of” statutes prohibiting violent terrorist acts); § 23390(a)(1) (setting criminal penalties for one who “unlawfully and willfully provides or collects funds with the intention that such funds be used, or with the knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” other unlawful acts). Congress enacted §2339A in 1994 and §2339C in 2002. See § 120005(a), 108 Stat. 2022 (§ 2339A); § 202(a), 116 Stat. 724 (§ 2339C). Yet Congress did not import the intent language of those provisions into §2339B, either when it enacted §2339B in 1996, or when it clarified § 2339B’s knowledge requirement in 2004.
Finally, plaintiffs give the- game away when they argue that a specific intent requirement should apply only when the material-support statute applies to speech. There is no basis whatever in the text of § 2339B to read the same provisions in that statute as requiring intent in some circumstances but not others. It is therefore clear that plaintiffs are asking us not to interpret § 2339B, but to revise it. “Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute.” Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 211 (1961).
Scales is the case on which plaintiffs most heavily rely, but it is readily distinguishable. That case involved the Smith Act, which prohibited membership in a group advocating the violent overthrow of the government. The Court held that a person could not be convicted under the statute unless he had knowledge of the group’s illegal advocacy and a specific intent to bring about violent overthrow. Id., at 220-222, 229. This action is different: Section 2339B does not criminalize mere membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization. It instead prohibits providing “material support” to such a group. See infra, at 26, 39. Nothing about Scales suggests the need for a specific intent requirement in such a case. The Court in Scales, moreover, relied on both statutory text and precedent that had interpreted closely related provisions of the Smith Act to require specific intent. 367 U. S., at 209, 221-222. Plaintiffs point to nothing similar here.
We cannot avoid the constitutional issues in this litigation through plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation of § 2339B.
IV
We turn to the question whether the material-support statute, as applied to plaintiffs, is impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. “A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standard-less that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 (2008). We consider whether a statute is vague as applied to the particular facts at issue, for “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 495 (1982). We have said that when a statute “interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” Id., at 499. “But 'perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.’” Williams, supra, at 304 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 794 (1989)).
The Court of Appeals did not adhere to these principles. Instead, the lower court merged plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge with their First Amendment claims, holding that portions of the material-support statute were unconstitutionally vague because they applied to protected speech — regardless of whether those applications were clear. The court stated that, even if persons of ordinary intelligence understood the scope of the term “training,” that term would “remai[n] impermissibly vague” because it could “be read to encompass speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment.” 552 F. 3d, at 929. It also found “service” and a portion of “expert advice or assistance” to be vague because those terms covered protected speech. Id., at 929-930.
Further, in spite of its own statement that it was not addressing a “facial vagueness challenge,” id., at 929, n. 6, the Court of Appeals considered the statute’s application to facts not before it. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Government’s statement that §2339B would bar filing an amicus brief in support of a foreign terrorist organization— which plaintiffs have not told us they wish to do, and which the Ninth Circuit did not say plaintiffs wished to do — to conclude that the statute barred protected advocacy and was therefore vague. See id., at 930. By deciding how the statute applied in hypothetical circumstances, the Court of Appeals’ discussion of vagueness seemed to incorporate elements of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. See id., at 929-930 (finding it “easy to imagine” protected expression that would be barred by §2339B (internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 930 (referring to both vagueness and overbreadth).
In both of these respects, the Court of Appeals contravened the rule that “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Hoffman Estates, supra, at 495. That rule makes no exception for conduct in the form of speech. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 755-757 (1974). Thus, even to the extent a heightened vagueness standard applies, a plaintiff whose speech is clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for lack of notice. And he certainly cannot do so based on the speech of others. Such a plaintiff may have a valid overbreadth claim under the First Amendment, but our precedents make clear that a Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge does not turn on whether a law applies to a substantial amount of protected expression. See Williams, supra, at 304; Hoffman Estates, supra, at 494-495, 497. Otherwise the doctrines would be substantially redundant.
Under a proper analysis, plaintiffs’ claims of vagueness lack merit. Plaintiffs do not argue that the material-support statute grants too much enforcement discretion to the Government. We therefore address only whether the statute “provide[s] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 304.
As a general matter, the statutory terms at issue here are quite different from the sorts of terms that we have previously declared to be vague. We have in the past “struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant’s conduct was ‘annoying’ or ‘indecent’ — wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.” Id., at 306; see also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, n. 1 (1972) (holding vague an ordinance that punished “vagrants,” defined to include “[r]ogues and vagabonds,” “persons who use juggling,” and “common night walkers” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Applying the statutory terms in this action — “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” — does not require similarly untethered, subjective judgments.
Congress also took care to add narrowing definitions to the material-support statute over time. These definitions increased the clarity of the statute’s terms. See § 2339A(b)(2) (“ ‘training’ means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge”); §2339A(b)(3) (“‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge”); §2339B(h) (clarifying the scope of “personnel”). And the knowledge requirement of the statute further reduces any potential for vagueness, as we have held with respect to other statutes containing a similar requirement. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703, 732 (2000); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U. S. 513, 523, 526 (1994); see also Hoffman Estates, supra, at 499.
Of course, the scope of the material-support statute may not be clear in every application. But the dispositive point here is that the statutory terms are clear in their application to plaintiffs’ proposed conduct, which means that plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge must fail. Even assuming that a heightened standard applies because the material-support statute potentially implicates speech, the statutory terms are not vague as applied to plaintiffs. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104,114-115 (1972) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a criminal law that implicated First Amendment activities); Scales, 367 U. S., at 223 (same).
Most of the activities in which plaintiffs seek to engage readily fall within the scope of the terms “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” Plaintiffs want to “train members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes,” and “teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1. A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that instruction on resolving disputes through international law falls within the statute’s definition of “training” because it imparts a “specific skill,” not “general knowledge.” §2339A(b)(2). Plaintiffs’ activities also fall comfortably within the scope of “expert advice or assistance”: A reasonable person would recognize that teaching the PKK how to petition for humanitarian relief before the United Nations involves advice derived from, as the statute puts it, “specialized knowledge.” § 2339A(b)(3). In fact, plaintiffs themselves have repeatedly used the terms “training” and “expert advice” throughout this litigation to describe their own proposed activities, demonstrating that these common terms readily and naturally cover plaintiffs’ conduct. See, e. g., Brief for Plaintiffs 10, 11; App. 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 80, 81, 98, 99, 106, 107, 117.
Plaintiffs respond by pointing to hypothetical situations designed to test the limits of “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” They argue that the statutory definitions of these terms use words of degree — like “specific,” “general,” and “specialized” — and that it is difficult to apply those definitions in particular cases. See Brief for Plaintiffs 27 (debating whether teaching a course on geography would constitute training); id., at 29. And they cite Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U. S. 1030 (1991), in which we found vague a state bar rule providing that a lawyer in a criminal case, when speaking to the press, “may state without elaboration... the general nature of the... defense.” Id., at 1048 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Whatever force these arguments might have in the abstract, they are beside the point here. Plaintiffs do not propose to teach a course on geography, and cannot seek refuge in imaginary cases that straddle the boundary between “specific skills” and “general knowledge.” See Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S., at 756. We emphasized this point in Scales, holding that even if there might be theoretical doubts regarding the distinction between “active” and “nominal” membership in an organization — also terms of degree — the defendant’s vagueness challenge failed because his “case presented] no such problem.” 367 U. S., at 223.
Gentile was different. There the asserted vagueness in a state bar rule was directly implicated by the facts before the Court: Counsel had reason to suppose that his particular statements to the press would not violate the rule, yet he was disciplined nonetheless. See 501 U. S., at 1049-1051. We did not suggest that counsel could escape discipline on vagueness grounds if his own speech were plainly prohibited.
Plaintiffs also contend that they want to engage in “political advocacy” on behalf of Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka. 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1. They are concerned that such advocacy might be regarded as “material support” in the form of providing “personnel” or “service[s],” and assert that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because they cannot tell.
As for “personnel,” Congress enacted a limiting definition in IRTPA that answers plaintiffs’ vagueness concerns. Providing material support that constitutes “personnel” is defined as knowingly providing a person “to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.” §2339B(h). The statute makes clear that “personnel” does not cover independent advocacy: “Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.” Ibid.
“[Sjervice” similarly refers to concerted activity, not independent advocacy. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075 (1993) (defining “service” to mean “the performance of work commanded or paid for by another: a servant’s duty: attendance on a superior”; or “an act done for the benefit or at the command of another”). Context confirms that ordinary meaning here. The statute prohibits providing a service “to a foreign terrorist organization.” §2339B(a)(l) (emphasis added). The use of the word “to” indicates a connection between the service and the foreign group. We think a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that independently advocating for a cause is different from providing a service to a group that is advocating for that cause.
Moreover, if independent activity in support of a terrorist group could be characterized as a “service,” the statute’s specific exclusion of independent activity in the definition of “personnel” would not make sense. Congress would not have prohibited under “service” what it specifically exempted from prohibition under “personnel.” The other types of material support listed in the statute, including “lodging,” “weapons,” “explosives,” and “transportation,” § 2339A(b)(l), are not forms of support that could be provided independently of a foreign terrorist organization. We interpret “service” along the same lines. Thus, any independent advocacy in which plaintiffs wish to engage is not prohibited by § 2339B. On the other hand, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand the term “service” to cover advocacy performed in coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization.
Plaintiffs argue that this construction of the statute poses difficult questions of exactly how much direction or coordination is necessary for an activity to constitute a “service.” See Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 09-89, p. 14 (hereinafter Reply Brief for Plaintiffs) (“Would any communication with any member be sufficient? With a leader? Must the ‘relationship’ have any formal elements, such as
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the
This appeal is'the latest step in the long and fitful attempt. to devise a constitutionally valid reapportionment scheme for the State of Arizona. For the reasons given, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
In April 1964, shortly-before this Court’s decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), and in its companion cases, suit was filed in the District Court for the District of Arizona attacking the then-existing state dis-tricting laws as unconstitutional. Following those decisions, the three-judge District Court ordered all proceed-; ings stayed “until the expiration of a period of 30 days-next following adjournment of the next session” of the Arizona Legislature. (App. 2-3, unreported.) Nearly ' a year later, on May. 18, 1965, after the legislature had failed to act, the court again deferred trial pending a special legislative session called by the Governor to deal with the necessity of reapportionment. The special session enacted Senate Bill 11, which among other things provided one senator for a county of 7,700 and another for a county of 55,000. The session did not undertake to reapportion the House. Trial was had in November 1965 and on February 2, 1966, the court enjoined enforcement of Senate Bill, 11, which, it held, “bears'evidence of having been thrown together .as a result of considerations wholly apart from those laid down as compulsory-by the decisions of the Supreme Court.” Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F. Supp. 537, 541 (Ariz. 1966). The plan, said the court, was “shot through with invidious discrimination.” Id., at 546. The court also held that the existing House plan produced disparities of nearly four to one, which was clearly impermissible under our decisions.
Noting that the legislature “has had ample opportunity” to produce a valid reapportionment plan, the court formulated its own plan as a “temporary and provisional reapportionment,” designed to govern the impending preparation for the 1966 elections. The plan was to be in effect “for the 1966 primary and general elections and for such further elections as may follow until such time as the Legislature itself may adopt different and valid plans for districting and reapportionmerit.” Id., at 543. It retained jurisdiction, as it has done since.
Some 16 months later, in June 1967, the Arizona Legislature enacted “Chapter 1, 28th Legislature,” which again attempted reapportionment of the State. Within the month, suit was filed charging that this Act also was unconstitutional, but the court deferred action pending the outcome of a referendum scheduled with the November 1968 election for the legislature and Congress. It ordered those elections to be held in accordance with its own 1966 plan, as supplemented. Klahr v. Williams, 289 F. Supp. 829 (Ariz. 1967). The legislative plan was approved by the voters in the referendum and signed into law by the Governor on January 17, 1969. A hearing on the plan was commenced the same day. The court concluded on July 22, 1969, that the plan, which set up “election districts” based on population and “legislative” subdistricts based on voter registration, would allow deviations among the legislative subdistricts of up to 40% from ideal until 1971, and up to 16% thereafter. The court properly concluded that this plan was invalid under Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 (1969), and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542 (1969), since the legislature had operated on the notion that a 16% deviation was de minimis and consequently, made no effort, to achieve greater equality. The court ordered its 1966 plan continued once again “until the Legislature shall have adopted different, valid, and effective plans for redistricting and reapportionment . . . .” (App. 85, unreported.) It refused to order the 1970 elections to be held at large, since there was “ample time” for the legislature “to meet its obligation” before the machinery for conducting the 1970 elections would be engaged.
' The legislature attempted a third time to enact a valid plan. It passed “Chapter 1, House Bill No.- 1, 29th Legislature,” which was signed. into law by the Governor on. January 22, 1970, and which is the plan involved in the decision from which this appeal is taken. Appellant challenged the bill, alleging that it “substantially disenfranchises, unreasonably and unnecessarily, a large number of the citizens of the state,” App.-106, and “creates legislative districts that are grossly unequal.” App. 108. Appellant at that time submitted his own plan for the court’s consideration. Appellant’s primary dispute with the new plan was that it substantially misconceived the current population distribution in Arizona. The court agreed that appellant’s plan, which utilized 1968 projections of 1960 and 1965 Arizona censuses, could “very likely [result in] a valid reapportionment plan” but it declined to implement the plan, since it was based on census tracts, rather than the existing precinct boundaries, and “the necessary reconstruction of the election precincts could not be accomplished in time” to serve the ■ 1970 ■ election, whose preliminary preparations were to begin in a few weeks. Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148, 150 (Ariz. 1970). At the same time, the court observed that its 1966 plan had fallen béhind contemporary constitutional requirements, due to more recent voter registration data (which increased the deviation between high and low districts to 47.09%) and the intervening decisions of this. Court in Kirkpatrick and Wells, supra, and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966).
Turning to the legislature’s plan, the court found it wanting in several respects. First, though the result indicated population deviation between high and low districts of only 1.8%, the population formula used did not “truly represent the population within [the] precincts in either 1960 or 1968,” and thus “the figures produced . . . are not truly population figures.” 313 F. Supp., at 152. Second, the computer that devised the plan had been programmed to assure that the plan would not-require any -incumbent legislator to face any other incumbent for re-election. Third, the programming gave priority to one-party districts over districts drawn without regard to party strength. The court held that “the incumbency factor has no place in any reapportionment or redistricting” and found “inapposite” the “consideration of party strength as a factor . . . .Ibid.
The court was thus faced with a situation where both its 1966 plan and the legislature’s latest attempt fell short of the constitutional standard. At. that time, however, the 1970 elections were “close at hand.” The court concluded that another legislative effort was “out of the question” due to the time and felt that it could not itself devise a new plan without delaying primary elections, “a course which would involve serious risk of confusion and chaos.” Ibid. It considered at-large elections, but the prospect of electing 90 legislators at large was deemed so repugnant as to be justified only if the legislature’s actions had been “deliberate and inexcusable”; the court instead believed that the large population increase in Arizona since the last reliable census in 1960 was more to blame. Concluding that the 1970 elections would be the last to be held .before the 1970 census data became available for new plans, the court chose what it considered the lesser of two evils and ordered the elections to be conducted under the legislature’s plan. In its order to this effect, the court noted that it “assumes that the Arizona Legislature will by November 1, 1971, enact a valid plan of reapportionment,” but that “[u]pon failure of the Legislature so to do, any party to this action may apply to the court for appropriate relief.” Id., at 154.
The state officials did not seek review of the District Court’s judgment declaring Chapter 1 unconstitutional. Appellant, however, appealed to this Court. His notice of appeal was filed on June 18,'1970, his jurisdictional statement on August 17, 1970. The latter presented the single question whether it was error for the United States District Court to refuse to enjoin the enforcement of the Arizona Legislature’s most recent effort to reapportion the State. Appellees’ motion to dismiss or affirm was filed on November' 24. We noted probable jurisdiction on December 21, 400 U. S. 963.
Meanwhile, the 1970 elections were* held in accordance with the District Court’s decree. Appellees suggest that the issue presented is moot and appellant concedes “the 1970 general election has already been held so that that aspect of the wrong cannot be remedied.” Brief 8. But appellant now argues that however that may be, the District Court should now proceed to adopt a plan of reapportionment which would be displaced only upon the adoption of a valid plan by the legislature. Appellant doubts that postponing judicial action until after November 1 will give the District Court sufficient time, prior to June 1972, when the election process must begin in Arizona, to consider the. legislative plan and to prepare, its own plan if the legislative effort does, not comply with the Constitution. The feared result is that another election under an unconstitutional plan would be held in Arizona.
Reapportionment history in the State lends some substance to these fears, but as we have often noted, district-ing and apportionment are legislative tasks in the first instance, and the court did not err in giving the legislature a reasonable time to act based on the 1970 census figures which the court thought would be available in the summer of 1971. We agree with appellant that the District Court should make very sure that the 1972 elections are held under a constitutionally adequate apportionment plan. But the District Court knows better than we whether the November 1 deadline will afford it ample opportunity to assess the legality of a new apportionment statute if one is forthcoming and to prepare its own plan by June 1, 1972, if the official version proves insufficient. The 1970 census figures, if not now available, will be forthcoming soon; and appellant, if he is so inclined, can begin to assemble the necessary information and witnesses and himself prepare and have ready for submission what he deems to. be an adequate apportionment plan. Surely, had a satisfactory substitute for Chapter 1, held unconstitutional by the District Court, been prepared and ready the court would have ordered the 1970 elections held under that plan rather than the invalid legislative scheme. . And surely if appellant has ready for court use on November 1, 1971, a suitable alternative for an unacceptable legislative effort, or at least makes sure that the essential information is on hand, there is no justifiable ground for thinking the District Court could not, prior to June 1, 1972, complete its hearings and consideration of a new apportionment statute and, if that is rejected, adopt a plan of its own for use in the 1972 elections. Nor do we read the District Court decree as forbidding appellant from petitioning for reopening of the case prior to November 1, 1971, and presenting to the District Court the problem which it has now raised here but which we prefer at this juncture to leave in the hands of the District Court. The judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Throughout this litigation, congressional districting has been at issue as well and has suffered the same fate as reapportionment of the legislature. However, appeal has been • taken , here only with respect to the lower court’s decree goncerhing legislative reapportionment.
The court issued two supplemental decrees in 1966 which modified and clarified .the original order. 254 F. Supp. 997, 289 F. Supp. 827.
Apparently under Arizona law, a referendum is required before a bill can become law where, as here, sufficient signatures against the bill are filed with the Secretary of State. See Klahr v. Williams, 289 F. Supp. 829 (Ariz. 1967).
“The population factor in each of the election precincts comprising part of a legislative'district was obtained by instructing the computer to take the 1968 voter registration for the precinct and divide it by the 1968 voter registration for the county in which the precinct was located, thereby obtaining the percentage of registered voters of the county residing within the precinct. The computer was then directed to multiply that percentage figure by the 1960 census for the county in which the precinct was located, thereby obtaining the population factor for the precinct.” 313 F. Supp., at 151-152.
Though wé noted in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 89 n. 16, that “[t]he fact that district boundaries may have been drawn in' a way that- minimizes the number of contests between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness,”' it is sufficient to note here, that the District Court did not base' its decision solely on this factor.
E. g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 586 (1964):
“[Legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.”
Appellant has contended here that the use of voter registration figures, rather than actual population, to determine district size operates to the detriment of the poor, blacks, Mexican-Americans, and American Indians. In light of our disposition of this case, we need only advert to our admonition in Burns v. Richardson, supra, that use of voter registration as a basis may “perpetuate under-representation of groups constitutionally entitled to participate in the electoral process,” 384 U. S., at 92, and is allowable only if it produces “a distribution of legislators not substantially different from that which would have resulted from the use of a permissible population basis.” Id., at 93. We presúme, of course, that any plan submitted, and certainly any- plan approved by the District Court, will be faithful to this requirement.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An Arizona trial judge granted the prosecutor’s motion for a mistrial predicated on improper and prejudicial comment during defense counsel’s opening statement. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, a Federal District Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protected the defendant from another trial. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The questions presented are whether the record reflects the kind of “necessity” for the mistrial ruling that will avoid a valid plea of double jeopardy, and if so, whether the plea must nevertheless be allowed because the Arizona trial judge did not fully explain the reasons for his mistrial ruling.
I
In 1971 respondent was found guilty of murdering a hotel night clerk. In 1973, the Superior Court of Pima County, Ariz., ordered a new trial because the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the new trial order in an unpublished opinion.
Respondent’s second trial began in January 1975. During the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, the prosecutor made reference to the fact that some of the witnesses whose testimony the jurors would hear had testified in proceedings four years earlier. Defense counsel told the prospective jurors “that there was evidence hidden from [respondent] at the last trial.” In his opening statement, he made this point more forcefully:
“You will hear testimony that notwithstanding the fact that we had a trial in May of 1971 in this matter, that the prosecutor hid those statements and didn’t give those to the lawyer for George saying the man was Spanish speaking, didn’t give those statements at all, hid them.
“You will hear that that evidence was suppressed and hidden by the prosecutor in that case. You will hear that that evidence was purposely withheld. You will hear that because of the misconduct of the County Attorney at that time and because he withheld evidence, that the Supreme Court of Arizona granted a new trial in this case.” App. 180-181, 184.
After opening statements were completed, the prosecutor moved for a mistrial. In colloquy during argument of the motion, the trial judge expressed the opinion that evidence concerning the reasons for the new trial, and specifically the ruling of the Arizona Supreme Court, was irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence and therefore inadmissible. Defense counsel asked for an opportunity “to find some law” that would support his belief that the Supreme Court opinion would be admissible. After further argument, the judge stated that he would withhold ruling on the admissibility of the evidence and denied the motion for mistrial. Two witnesses then testified.
The following morning the prosecutor renewed his mistrial motion. Fortified by an evening’s research, he argued that there was no theory on which the basis for the new trial ruling could be brought to the attention of the jury, that the prejudice to the jury could not be repaired by any cautionary instructions, and that a mistrial was a “manifest necessity.” Defense counsel stated that he still was not prepared with authority supporting his belief that the Supreme Court opinion was admissible. He argued that his comment was invited by the prosecutor’s reference to the witnesses’ earlier testimony and that any prejudice could be avoided by curative instructions. During the extended argument, the trial judge expressed his concern about the possibility that an erroneous mistrial ruling would preclude another trial.
Ultimately the trial judge granted the motion, stating that his ruling was based upon defense counsel’s remarks in his opening statement concerning the Arizona Supreme Court opinion. The trial judge did not expressly find that there was “manifest necessity” for a mistrial; nor did he expressly state that he had considered alternative solutions and concluded that none would be adequate. The Arizona Supreme Court refused to review the mistrial ruling.
Respondent then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that another trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. After reviewing the transcript of the state proceeding, and hearing the arguments of counsel, the Federal District Judge noted that the Arizona trial judge had not canvassed on the record the possibility of alternatives to a mistrial and expressed the view that before granting a mistrial motion the judge was required “to find that manifest necessity exists for the granting of it.” Because the record contained no such finding, and because the federal judge was not prepared to make such a finding himself, he granted the writ. He agreed with the State, however, that defense counsel’s opening statement had been improper.
The Ninth Circuit also characterized the opening statement as improper, but affirmed because, absent a finding of manifest necessity or an explicit consideration of alternatives, the court was unwilling to infer that the jury was prevented from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict. In a concurring opinion, two judges noted that, while the question of manifest necessity had been argued, most of the argument on the mistrial motion had concerned the question whether the opening statement was improper. They concluded that, “absent findings that manifest necessity existed, it... '[was] quite possible that the grant of mistrial was based on the fact that the impropriety of counsel’s conduct had been established without reaching the question whether there could, nevertheless, be a fair trial.” 546 F. 2d, at 833.
We are persuaded that the Court of Appeals applied an inappropriate standard of review to mistrial rulings of this kind, and attached undue significance to the form of the ruling. We therefore reverse.
II
A State may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal. The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though “the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.” See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 143. If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the constitutional protection also embraces the defendant’s “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” The reasons why this “valued right” merits constitutional protection are worthy of repetition. Even if the first trial is not completed, a second prosecution may be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused, prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted. The danger of such unfairness to the defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it is completed. Consequently, as a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand trial.
Unlike the situation in which the trial has ended in an acquittal or conviction, retrial is not automatically barred when a criminal proceeding is terminated without finally resolving the merits of the charges against the accused. Because of the variety of circumstances that may make it necessary to discharge a jury before a trial is concluded, and because those circumstances do not invariably create unfairness to the accused, his valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury. Yet in view of the importance of the right, and the fact that it is frustrated by any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar. His burden is a heavy one. The prosecutor must demonstrate “manifest necessity” for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant.
The words “manifest necessity” appropriately characterize the magnitude of the prosecutor’s burden. For that reason Mr. Justice Story’s classic formulation of the test has been quoted over and over again to provide guidance in the decision of a wide variety of cases. Nevertheless, those words do not describe a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge. Indeed, it is manifest that the key word “necessity” cannot be interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are degrees of necessity and we require a “high degree” before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate.
The question whether that “high degree” has been reached is answered more easily in some kinds of cases than in others. At one extreme are cases in which a prosecutor requests a mistrial in order to buttress weaknesses in his evidence. Although there was a time when English judges served the Stuart monarchs by exercising a power to discharge a jury whenever it appeared that the Crown’s evidence would be insufficient to convict, the prohibition against double jeopardy as it evolved in this country was plainly intended to condemn this “abhorrent” practice. As this Court noted in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U. S. 600, 611:
“The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. It bars retrials where ‘bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor’... threatens the ‘[hjarassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict’ the defendant.”
Thus, the strictest scrutiny is appropriate when the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution evidence, or when there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is using the superior resources of the State to harass or to achieve a tactical advantage over the accused.
At the other extreme is the mistrial premised upon the trial judge's belief that the jury is unable to peach a verdict, long considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial. The argument that a jury’s inability to agree establishes reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, and therefore requires acquittal, has been uniformly rejected in this country. Instead, without exception, the courts have held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second trial. This rule accords recognition to society’s interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.
Moreover, in this situation there are especially compelling reasons for allowing the trial judge to exercise broad discretion in deciding whether or not “manifest necessity” justifies a discharge of the jury. On the one hand, if he discharges the jury when further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, the defendant is deprived of his “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” But if he fails to discharge a jury which is unable to reach a verdict after protracted and exhausting deliberations, there exists a significant risk that a verdict may result from pressures inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of all the jurors. If retrial of the defendant were barred whenever an appellate court views the “necessity” for a mistrial differently from the trial judge, there would be a danger that the latter, cognizant of the serious societal consequences of air erroneous ruling, would employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. Such a rule would frustrate the public interest in just judgments. The trial judge’s decision to declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by a reviewing court.
We are persuaded that, along the spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a mistrial and which vary in their amenability to appellate scrutiny, the difficulty which led to the mistrial in this case also falls in an area where the trial judge’s determination is entitled to special respect.
In this case the trial judge ordered a mistrial because the defendant’s lawyer made improper and prejudicial remarks during his opening statement to the jury. Although respondent insists that evidence of prosecutorial misconduct was admissible as a matter of Arizona law, and therefore that the opening statement was proper, we regard this issue as foreclosed by respondent’s failure to proffer any Arizona precedent supportive of his contention and by the state court’s interpretation of its own law, buttressed by the consistent opinion of the Federal District Court and the Court of Appeals. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346-347. We therefore start from the premise that defense counsel’s comment was improper and may have affected the impartiality of the jury.
We recognize that the extent of the possible bias cannot be measured, and that the District Court was quite correct in believing that some trial judges might have proceeded with the trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions. In a strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not “necessary.” Nevertheless, the overriding interest in the evenhanded administration of justice requires that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper comment.
The consistent course of decision in this Court in cases involving possible juror bias supports this conclusion. Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148, involved the possibility of bias caused by a newspaper story describing a letter written by defense counsel denying a charge by a third party that one of the jurors was acquainted with the defendant. Without determining the truth or falsity of the charge, and without examining the jurors to ascertain what influence the story had upon them, the trial judge declared a mistrial because he considered it “ ‘impossible that in the future consideration of this case by the jury there can be that true independence and freedom of action on the part of each juror which is necessary to a fair trial of the accused.’ ” Id., at 150. This Court affirmed, holding that the judge was justified in concluding that the publication of the letter had made it impossible for the jury “to act with the independence and freedom on the part of each juror requisite to a fair trial of the issue between the parties.” Id., at 155.
In Thompson v. United States, 155 U. S. 271, 279, the Court concluded that a mistrial was required when it was revealed that one of the trial jurors had served on the grand jury that indicted the defendant. Since it is possible that the grand jury had heard no more evidence — and perhaps even less— than was presented at the trial, and since the juror in question may have had no actual bias against the defendant, the record did not demonstrate that the mistrial was strictly “necessary.” There can be no doubt, however, about the validity of the conclusion that the possibility of bias justified the mistrial.
An improper opening statement unquestionably tends to frustrate the public interest in having a just judgment reached by an impartial tribunal. Indeed, such statements create a risk, often not present in the individual juror bias situation, that the entire panel may be tainted. The trial judge, of course, may instruct the jury to disregard the improper comment. In extreme cases, he may discipline counsel, or even remove him from the trial as he did in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U. S. 600. Those actions, however, will not necessarily remove the risk of bias that may be created by improper argument. Unless unscrupulous defense counsel are to be allowed an unfair advantage, the trial judge must have the power to declare a mistrial in appropriate cases. The interest in orderly, impartial procedure would be impaired if he were deterred from exercising that power by a concern that any time a reviewing court disagreed with his assessment of the trial situation a retrial would automatically be barred. The adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in this area, therefore, would seriously impede the trial judge in the proper performance of his “duty, in order to protect the integrity of the trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to stop... professional misconduct.” Id., at 612.
There are compelling institutional considerations militating in favor of appellate deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of the significance of possible juror bias. He has seen and heard the jurors during their voir dire examination. He is the judge most familiar with the evidence and the background of the case on trial. He has listened to the tone of the argument as it was delivered and has observed the apparent reaction of the jurors. In short, he is far more “conversant with the factors relevant to the determination” than any reviewing court can possibly be. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 687.
Ill
Our conclusion that a trial judge’s decision to declare a mistrial based on his assessment of the prejudicial impact of improper argument is entitled to great deference does not, of course, end the inquiry. As noted earlier, a constitutionally protected interest is inevitably affected by any mistrial decision. The trial judge, therefore, “must always temper the decision whether or not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S., at 486 (Harlan, J.). In order to ensure that this interest is adequately protected, reviewing courts have an obligation to satisfy themselves that, in the words of Mr. Justice Story, the trial judge exercised “sound discretion” in declaring a mistrial.
Thus, if a trial judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly, cf. United States v. Jorn, supra; see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S., at 469, his action cannot be condoned. But our review of this record indicates that this was not such a case. Defense counsel aired improper and highly prejudicial evidence before the jury, the possible impact of which the trial judge was in the best position to assess. The trial judge did not act precipitately in response to the prosecutor's request for a mistrial. On the contrary, evincing a concern for the possible double jeopardy consequences of an erroneous ruling, he gave both defense counsel and the prosecutor full opportunity to explain their positions on the propriety of a mistrial. We are therefore persuaded by the record that the trial judge acted responsibly and deliberately, and accorded careful consideration to respondent’s interest in having the trial concluded in a single proceeding. Since he exercised “sound discretion” in handling the sensitive problem of possible juror bias created by the improper comment of defense counsel, the mistrial order is supported by the “high degree” of necessity which is required in a case of this kind. Neither party has a right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias; in these circumstances, “the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgements” must prevail over the defendant’s “valued right” to have his trial concluded before the first jury impaneled.
IY
One final matter requires consideration. The absence of an explicit finding of “manifest necessity” appears to have been determinative for the District Court and may have been so for the Court of Appeals. If those courts regarded that omission as critical, they required too much. Since the record provides sufficient justification for the state-court ruling, the failure to explain that ruling more completely does not render it constitutionally defective.
Review of any trial court decision is, of course, facilitated by findings and by an explanation of the reasons supporting the decision. No matter how desirable such procedural assistance may be, it is not constitutionally mandated in a case such as this. Cf. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 146. The basis for the trial judge’s mistrial order is adequately disclosed by the record, which includes the extensive argument of counsel prior to the judge’s ruling. The state trial judge’s mistrial declaration is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court simply because he failed to find “manifest necessity” in those words or to articulate on the record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of his discretion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Blackmun concurs in the result.
546 F. 2d 829 (1977). The order discharging respondent from custody has been stayed pending completion of appellate review.
The prosecutor’s reference was in the context of asking the venire whether they would be able to credit the testimony of a witness if there were inconsistencies between his present testimony and that given in earlier proceedings.
“THE COURT: I cannot conceive how the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in this case would be admissible on any basis whatsoever.
“MR. BOLDING: I’ll really try to do some additional work, then your Honor, to try to find some law for it. I believe it would be admissible. It’s corroborative of the testimony that the jury will hear.
“THE COURT: I’m afraid, and I don’t know how we stop it, we’re getting to the point where we’re trying the County Attorney’s office and the County Attorney's office, conduct, whatever it was in the last case, and I simply, I am not going to allow it if this trial goes on and I'm very sorely tempted to grant the State’s motion at this time.
“MR. BOLDING: Well your Honor, that’s — I will be — sorry if that happens and if the Court tells me now that I cannot examine any witness about that Supreme Court decision until I furnish you some law that says yes, that can come in, then I will abide by that decision, your Honor. I will be working on it and I would like to reserve my right to present that to the Court outside the hearing of the jury at another time. I just, I believe that it is, it’s credible evidence. It’s, thinking, you know, off the top of my head here, it’s opinion evidence from experts. It’s evidence that I believe is truly corroborative of the evidence that the jury will hear and I would certainly like to reserve my right to present some, if I can find you some written law, which would allow this type of testimony, your Honor, as evidence.” App. 209-210.
Later, the trial judge expressed disagreement with defense counsel’s argument that evidence of prosecutorial misconduct could be admitted on an impeachment theory: “I don’t think you’re entitled to prove all this misconduct if such is the case, to impeach every witness, and I think that’s what you’re saying to me.” Id,., at 217-218.
“I have not worked on that because I’m not at that stage yet where I think it’s necessary to bring that into evidence.” Id., at 243. Apparently when counsel made his opening statement, he was not prepared to support the admissibility of the testimony with legal authority.
“[Prosecutor:] The only cure, your Honor, is a mistrial. The State is well aware that if the position I’m taking is wrong, if a mistrial is not proper, that man walks, I know that.
“THE COURT: And I expressed my concern about that, Mr. Butler.” Id,., at 253.
Respondent filed both a “special action” — a proceeding in the nature of a common-law writ of mandamus or prohibition, see 17A Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, Rule 1 (1973) — and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent also moved in the trial court to dismiss or quash the information. Petitioner does not raise any question about the adequacy of respondent’s exhaustion of available state remedies.
App. 129.
The District Court indicated that a simple statement by the trial judge to the effect that there was “manifest necessity” for the mistrial would have sufficed to defeat the double jeopardy claim. Id., at 130-140.
In his opinion for the Court of Appeals, Judge Kilkenny stated:
“In the absence of clear abuse, we are normally inclined to uphold discretionary orders of this nature. In the usual case, the trial judge has observed the complained-of event, heard counsel, and made specific findings. Under such circumstances, a mistrial declaration accompanied by a finding that the jury could no longer render an impartial verdict would not be lightly set aside.” 546 F. 2d, at 832.
The importance of the absence of express findings or reasons to the decision below seems apparent. The Arizona trial judge “observed the complained-of event” and patiently "heard counsel.” Had he taken the additional step of making an express finding of “manifest necessity,” it appears that Judge Kilkenny would have reviewed the mistrial ruling under a less exacting abuse-of-discretion standard.
In its opinion as originally released, the court stated: “[W]e decline to imply from this impropriety that the jury was completely prevented from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.” App. 29-30. The court subsequently amended its opinion to delete the word “completely” from that sentence. As originally written, the opinion implied that the probability of jury prejudice would not be a sufficient ground for mistrial; only the certainty of prejudice would suffice.
This description of the right, which was quoted by Mr. Justice Harlan in his plurality opinion in United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 484, and by the Court in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458, 466, was formulated by Mr. Justice Black in his opinion for the Court in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 689. His complete sentence identifies that right as sometimes subordinate to a larger interest in having the trial end in a just judgment:
“What has been said is enough to show that a defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.” Ibid.
"Reprosecution after a mistrial has unnecessarily been declared by the trial court obviously subjects the defendant to the same personal strain and insecurity regardless of the motivation underlying the trial judge’s action.” United States v. Jorn, supra, at 483.
As Mr. Justice Black stated in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187-188:
“The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” (Emphasis added.)
In Carsey v. United States, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 205, 208-209, 392 F. 2d 810, 813-814 (1967), Judge Leventhal described how subtle changes in the State’s testimony, initially favorable to the defendant, may occur during the course of successive prosecutions:
"[T]he Government witnesses came to drop from their testimony impressions favorable to defendant. Thus a key prosecution witness, the last person to see appellant and the deceased together, who began by testifying that they had acted that evening like newlyweds on a honeymoon, without an unfriendly word spoken, ended up by saying for the first time in four trials that the words between them had been ‘firm,’ and possibly harsh and ‘cross.’
“We also' note that the police officer who readily acquiesced in the two ‘hung jury’ trials that appellant was ‘hysterical,’ later withheld that characterization. This shift, though less dramatic, was by no means inconsequential in view of the significance of appellant’s condition at the time he made a statement inconsistent with what he later told another officer.”
See also n. 13, supra.
As the Court stated in Illinois v. Somerville, supra, at 471:
“The determination by the trial court to abort a criminal proceeding where jeopardy has attached is not one to be lightly undertaken, since the interest of the defendant in having his fate determined by the jury first impaneled is itself a weighty one.... Nor will the lack of demonstrable additional prejudice preclude the defendant’s invocation of the double jeopardy bar in the absence of some important countervailing interest of proper judicial administration.”
In his opinion announcing the Court’s judgment in United States v. Jorn, supra, at 479-480, Mr. Justice Harlan explained why a rigid application of the “particular tribunal” principle is unacceptable:
“[A] criminal trial is, even in the best of circumstances, a complicated affair to manage.... [It is] readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant’s consent would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a mechanical rule would provide.”
Whether the phrase “manifest necessity,” “evident necessity,” see Winsor v. The Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289, 305 (1866) (Cockbum, C. J.), or “imperious necessity,” see Downum, v. United States, 372 U. S. 734, 736, is used, the meaning is apparently the same.
“We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.... But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the Judges, under their oaths of office.” United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580.
See, e. g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684 (court-martial proceeding terminated because of military necessity); Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148 (possible juror bias); United States v. Perez, supra (hung jury).
As the Court noted in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S., at 462, the Perez “formulation, consistently adhered to... in subsequent decisions, abjures the application of any mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying and often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal trial.”
The English courts have long recognized the truth of this proposition in the “hung jury” context:
“This rule if taken literally seems to command the confinement of the jury till death if they do not agree, and to avoid any such consequence an exception was introduced in practice which Blackstone has described by the words 'except in case of evident necessity.'
“But the exception so expressed has given rise to further doubts, because necessity is an equivocal word, meaning either irresistible compulsion or a high degree of need. Those who have been interested in objecting to a discharge of a jury before verdict, have disputed whether the discharge was necessary in the stricter sense of the word. The same dispute about the meaning of the word necessity in the exception to this rule is the source of the main questions raised upon this writ of error, and they are in substance answered when we decide on the meaning of that word in the exception to this rule, and apply that meaning to the facts appearing on this record. We assume it to be clear that the discharge of the jury before verdict may be lawful at some time and under some circumstances. Then with reference to the facts on this record, we hold that the judge at the first trial had by law power to discharge the jury before verdict, when a high degree of need for such discharge was made evident to his mind from the facts which he had ascertained. We cannot define the degree of need without some standard for comparison; we cannot approach nearer to precision than by describing the degree as a high degree such as in the wider sense of the word might be denoted by necessity.” Winsor v. The Queen, supra, at 390, 394.
E. g., Whitebread, 7 How. St. Tr. 311 (1679). See also The Queen v. Charlesworth, 1 B. & S. 460, 500, 121 Eng. Rep. 786, 801 (Q. B. 1861); Friedland, Double Jeopardy 13-14, 21-25 (1969); Sigler, Double Jeopardy 87 (1969); Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty 143 (1954). In reaction, the rule developed in England that the judge should not discharge the jury prior to verdict except in cases of “evident necessity.” Winsor v. The Queen, supra, at 304-305. However, if, for example, the judge discharged the jury because a key witness for the Crown refused to testify, see The Queen v. Charlesworth, supra, the accused could nevertheless be retried because jeopardy had not attached under the English rule. Winsor v. The Queen, supra, at 390; The Queen v. Charlesworth, supra; Friedland, supra, at 22-23.
“[I]n the reigns of the latter sovereigns of the Stuart family, a different rule prevailed, that a jury in such case might be discharged for the purpose of having better evidence against him at a future day; and this power was exercised for the benefit of the crown only; but it is a doctrine so abhorrent to every principle of safety and security that it ought not to receive the least countenance in the courts of this country. In the time of James II, and since the Revolution, this doctrine came under examination, and the rule as laid down by my Lord Coke was revived State v. Garrigues, 2 N. C. 188, 189 (1795).
If, for example, a prosecutor proceeds to trial aware that key witnesses are not available to give testimony and a mistrial is later granted for that reason, a second prosecution is barred. Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734. The prohibition against double jeopardy unquestionably “forbids the prosecutor to use the first proceeding as a trial run of his case.” Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 287-288 (1965).
As Mr. Justice Douglas noted in Downum v. United States, supra, at 736:
“Harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict are examples when jeopardy attaches.”
Yet, as Mr. Justice Douglas further noted, “those extreme cases do not mark the limits of the guarantee.” Ibid. The “particular tribunal” principle is implicated whenever a mistrial is declared over the defendant's objection and without regard to the presence or absence of governmental overreaching. If the “right to’ go to a particular tribunal is valued, it is because, independent of the threat of bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor, the defendant has a significant interest in the decision whether or not to take the case from the jury.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S., at 485. See discussion in Part III, infra.
Downum v. United States, supra, at 735-736.
This public interest in fair judgments is not of recent origin:
“We do take upon ourselves, without the consent of the parties..., to discharge the jury when we are satisfied that they have fully considered the case and cannot agree; and I hope no Judge will shrink from taking that course; for, if a jury cannot agree, we ought not to coerce
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Opinion of the Court, by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
announced by Mr. Justice Clark.
In view of this Court’s prior decisions, our limited grant of certiorari in this case brings a narrow question here. We are to determine whether, in the particular circumstances of this record, petitioner’s conviction at his see-ond trial for violation of 18 U. S. C. § 659, after his first trial had been terminated by the trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial sua sponte and without petitioner’s “active and express consent,” violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in baric affirmed petitioner’s conviction (one judge dissenting), holding his constitutional objection without merit. 282 F. 2d 43. We agree that the Fifth Amendment does not require a contrary result.
Petitioner was brought to trial before a jury in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York on February 4, 1959, on an information charging that he had knowingly received and possessed goods stolen in interstate commerce. That same afternoon, during the direct examination of the fourth witness for the Government, the presiding judge, on his own motion and with neither approval nor objection by petitioner’s counsel, withdrew a juror and declared a mistrial. It is unclear what reasons caused the court to take this action, which the Court of Appeals characterized as “overassiduous” and criticized as premature. Apparently the trial judge inferred that the prosecuting attorney’s line of questioning presaged inquiry calculated to inform the jury of other crimes by the accused, and took action to forestall it. In any event, it is obvious, as the Court of Appeals concluded, that the judge “was acting according to his convictions in protecting the rights of the accused.” 282 F. 2d, at 46. The court below did not hold the mistrial ruling erroneous or an abuse of discretion. It did find the prosecutor’s conduct unexceptionable and the reason for the mistrial, therefore, not “entirely clear.” It did say that “the judge should have awaited a definite question which would have permitted a clear-cut ruling,” and that, in failing to do so, he displayed an “overzealousness” and acted “too hastily.” Id,., at 46, 48. But after discussing the wide range of discretion which the “fundamental concepts of the federal administration of criminal justice” allow to the trial judge in determining whether or not a mistrial is appropriate — a responsibility which “is particularly acute in the avoidance of prejudice arising from nuances in 'the heated atmosphere of trial, which cannot be fully depicted in the cold record on appeal,” id., at 47 — and the corresponding affirmative responsibility for the conduct of a criminal trial which the federal precedents impose, it concluded:
“On this basis we do not believe decision should be difficult, for the responsibility and discretion exercised by the judges below seem to us sound. . . .” Id., at 48.
Certainly, on the skimpy record before us it would exceed the appropriate scope of review were we ourselves to attempt to pass an independent judgment upon the propriety of the mistrial, even should we be prone to do so — as we are not, with due regard for the guiding familiarity with district judges and with district court conditions possessed by the Courts of Appeals.
On March 9, 1959, petitioner moved to dismiss the information on the ground that to try him again would constitute double jeopardy. The motion was denied and he was retried in April. He now attacks the conviction in which the second trial resulted.
In this state of the record, we are not required to pass upon the broad contentions pressed, respectively, by counsel for petitioner and for the Government. The case is one in which, viewing it most favorably to petitioner, the mistrial order upon which his claim of jeopardy is based was found neither apparently justified nor clearly erroneous by the Court of Appeals in its review of a cold record. What that court did find and what is unquestionable is that the order was the product of the trial judge’s extreme solicitude — an overeager solicitude, it may be — in favor of the accused.
Since 1824 it has been settled law in this Court that “The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment . . . does not mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final judgment.” Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 688. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; Thompson v. United States, 155 U. S. 271; Keerl v. Montana, 213 U. S. 135, 137-138; see Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 173-174; Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 188. Where, for reasons deemed compelling by the trial judge, who is best situated intelligently to make such a decision, the ends of substantial justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be declared without the defendant’s consent and even over his objection, and he may be retried consistently with the Fifth Amendment. Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 85-86. It is also clear that “This Court has long favored the rule of discretion in the trial judge to declare a mistrial and to require another panel to try the defendant if the ends of justice will be best served . . . ,” Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U. S. 424, 427, and that we have consistently declined to scrutinize with sharp surveillance the exercise of that discretion. See Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U. S. 199; cf. Wade v. Hunter, supra. In the Perez case, the authoritative starting point of our law in this field, Mr. Justice Story, for a unanimous Court, thus stated the principles which have since guided the federal courts in their application of the concept of double jeopardy to situations giving rise to mistrials:
“. . . We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of office. ...” 9 Wheat., at 580.
The present case falls within these broad considerations. Judicial wisdom counsels against-anticipating hypothetical situations in which the discretion of the trial judge may be abused and so call for the safeguard of the Fifth Amendment — cases in which the defendant would be harassed by successive, oppressive prosecutions, or in which a judge exercises his authority to help the prosecution, at a trial in which its case is going badly, by affording it another, more favorable opportunity to convict the accused. Suffice that we are unwilling, where it clearly appears that a mistrial has been granted in the sole interest of the defendant, to hold that its necessary consequence is to bar all retrial. It would hark back to the formalistic artificialities of seventeenth century criminal procedure so to confine our federal trial courts by compelling them to navigate a narrow compass between Scylla and Charybdis. We would not thus make them unduly hesitant conscientiously to exercise their most sensitive judgment — according to their own lights in the immediate exigencies of trial — for the more effective protection of the criminal accused.
Affirmed.
364 U. S. 917.
Prior to the proceedings in the two trials which are relevant for present purposes, denominated the “first” and “second” trials herein, there had been a mistrial granted upon motion of petitioner.
The statute makes unlawful, inter alia, the receipt or possession of any goods stolen from a vehicle and moving as, or constituting, an interstate shipment of freight, knowing the goods to be stolen.
282 F. 2d 43,46.
We cannot, of course, determine what result would obtain had the Court of Appeals, in light of its close acquaintance with the local situation, decided that petitioner’s mistrial operated to bar his further prosecution, and were such a decision before us.
In light of our disposition, we need not reach the Government’s suggestion that petitioner’s failure to object to the mistrial adversely affects his claim. We note petitioner’s argument that, because of the precipitous course of events, there was no opportunity for such objection.
“The colloquy [immediately preceding the mistrial] . . . demonstrates that the prosecutor did nothing to instigate the declaration of a mistrial and that he was only performing his assigned duty under trying conditions. This is borne out by the entire transcript, including also that covering the morning session. Nor does it make entirely clear the reasons which led the judge to act, though the parties appear agreed that he intended to prevent the prosecutor from bringing out evidence of other crimes by the accused. Even so, the judge should have awaited a definite question which would have permitted a clear-cut ruling. . . .” 282 F. 2d, at 46.
The record here contains, with respect to the February 4 trial, two paragraphs from the Government’s opening, four paragraphs from the petitioner’s opening, a six-line colloquy between the court and prosecuting counsel, a portion of the examination of the third of the Government’s first three witnesses, and the entire transcript of the testimony of the fourth witness. The last two items are set out in the affidavit of the Assistant United States Attorney in opposition to petitioner’s motion to dismiss the information following the mistrial.
Brock v. North Carolina was a state prosecution and therefore arose, of course, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The passage quoted from Brock, however, related to the application in federal prosecutions of the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are actions brought by the Secretary of Labor under § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, 63 Stat. 910, 29 U. S. C. § 201, to enjoin respondents from violating the minimum wage, § 6, and record-keeping provisions, § 11, of the Act. The employees concerned work in tobacco-bulking plants operated by respondents in Quincy, Florida, which has a population in excess of 2,500. Respondents claim these employees are exempt from the Act. The District Court ruled against the respondents. 114 F. Supp. 865. The Court of Appeals reversed. 221 F. 2d 406. We granted certiorari, 350 U. S. 859, because of the importance of the problems presented and of the apparent conflicts between the decision below and Tobin v. Traders Compress Co., 199 F. 2d 8, and Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U. S. 254.
The processing operations involve U. S. Type 62 Sumatra tobacco, a leaf tobacco used exclusively for cigar wrappers. This type of tobacco requires special cultivation. It is grown in fields that are completely enclosed and covered with cheesecloth shade. The leaves of the plant are picked in stages, as each matures. The leaves are taken immediately to a tobacco barn, located on the farm, where they are strung on sticks and dried by heat. Before the drying process is completed, the leaves are allowed to absorb moisture. Then they are dried again. There is some fermentation at this stage. But the treatment in the tobacco barns is essentially a drying operation during which the moisture content is reduced to between 10% and 25%.
At the end of the drying operation, the leaves are packed in boxes and taken from the farm to a bulking plant for further processing. At the bulking plant, the leaves are placed in piles, known as “bulks,” aggregating from 3,500 to 4,500 pounds of tobacco. This is the “sweating” or fermentation process, which requires carefully controlled regulation of temperature and humidity. Proper heat control includes, among other things, breaking up the bulk, redistributing the tobacco, and adding water. Proper fermentation or aging requires the bulk to be reconstructed several times. The bulking process lasts from four to eight months, after which the tobacco is baled. The bulking process requires a large amount of equipment, including a steam-heated plant, platforms, thermometers, bulk covers, baling boxes and presses, baling mats and packing, sorting and grading tables. The bulking process substantially changes the physical properties and chemical content of the tobacco, improving the color, increasing combustibility, and eliminating the rawness and harshness of the freshly cured leaf.
The overwhelming majority of farmers in the region in litigation in this case have their tobacco processed by others. In that region there are 300 farmers who grow this type of tobacco. Of these, only 9 maintain and operate bulking plants; and only 5 maintain and operate bulking plants processing tobacco grown only by themselves. It appears that bulking cannot be economically done by the ordinary small farmer growing less than 100 acres. Of the 300 farmers in the present group, 80% grow less than 25 acres per year, while the majority grow from iy2 to 10 acres a year.
Respondent Budd grows no tobacco itself and confines its operations to processing the tobacco grown on 263 acres by 52 farmers. Budd employs about 108 workers for bulking, sorting, grading, and baling tobacco.
Respondent King Edward processes in the bulking plant involved in this litigation only tobacco produced on farms operated by it. (It has two other bulking plants that process tobacco purchased from other growers.) The bulking plant involved here is about 13 miles from King Edward’s farms. A majority of the 120 employees in the bulking plant also work on King Edward’s farms.
May has its own bulking plant and processes there only the tobacco which it grows on its own farms. This plant is about 10 miles from the farms. The employees, who work the farms, work in the bulking plant, being transported back and forth by May. Seventy are employed in the bulking plant.
Area of Production. — Section 13 (a) of the Act creates several exemptions from the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the Act. One of those exemptions contained in § 13 (a) (10) includes:
“any individual employed within the area of production (as defined by the Administrator), engaged in handling, packing, storing, ginning, compressing, pasteurizing, drying, preparing in their raw or natural state, or canning of agricultural or horticultural commodities for market, or in making cheese or butter or other dairy products.”
The Administrator’s definition of “area of production” provides that a plant is within the “area of production” if it is located (1) “in the open country or in a rural community,” which is defined as not including “any city, town or urban place of 2,500 or greater population,” and (2) within a specified mileage distance from the source of 95% of its commodities.
The Court of Appeals, following its earlier decisions in Jenkins v. Durkin, 208 F. 2d 941, and Lovvorn v. Miller, 215 F. 2d 601, held that the regulation was invalid. It concluded that once “geographic lines of the area of production have been established, the act makes the exemption effective within that area,” and that any qualification by reason of size of the town where the establishment is located is invalid. 215 F. 2d, at 603. For that conclusion the Court of Appeals found comfort in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607.
Holly Hill involved one of the alternative definitions of “area of production.” That alternative defined “area of production” in geographic terms and then added another standard — whether the employee was in an establishment having no more than seven employees. We held that “. . . Congress did not leave it to the Administrator to decide whether within geographic bounds defined by him the Act further permits discrimination between establishment and establishment based upon the number of employees.” Id., at 616. We said that the phrase “area of production” had “plain geographic implications” with which the size of a plant within the area was not consistent. Id., at 618. That definition, therefore, was struck down. But its alternative, substantially the one that is involved here, was not passed upon. In fact, we reserved decision in Holly Hill as to whether the population criterion, now presented for decision, was valid. Id., 610.
We think the present regulation is a valid definition of “area of production.” We think it valid by the standard we used in Holly Hill. In that case we said that “. . . ‘area’ calls for delimitation of territory in relation to the complicated economic factors that operate between agricultural labor conditions and the labor market of enterprises concerned with agricultural commodities and more or less near their production.” Id., at 613-614. The aim of Congress was to exempt employees “employed in agriculture,” § 13 (a) (6), and those engaged in agricultural enterprises in the “area of production,” § 13 (a) (10). That meant drawing a line between agricultural enterprises operating under rural-agricultural conditions and those subject to urban-industrial conditions. An individual working in an agricultural packing plant on the edge of Los Angeles is in a strikingly different environment from one doing the same work in a small town in the heart of Kansas. Nearness to a large city has relation to the problem of the Administrator in making his definition. For the proximity of the plant to a metropolitan center, like the size of the town where the plant is located, may make the decisive difference between an agricultural and an urban environment. Likewise, nearness of the plant to its supplies cannot be considered an irrelevancy. For “area” is understandable in terms of nearness and farness. Distance is an important factor in any formula which seeks to treat more or less as a unity labor on farms and labor in agricultural enterprises in the “area of production.”
No definition of “area of production” could produce complete equality, for the variables are too numerous. The Administrator fulfills his role when he makes a reasoned definition. See Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 411. On no phase of this problem can we say that the Administrator proceeded capriciously or by the use of inadmissible standards. Experts might disagree over the desirability of one formula rather than another. It is enough for us that the expert stayed within the allowable limits. We think he did here and that the definition of “area of production” under § 13 (a) (10) is a valid one.
Agriculture. — The Court of Appeals held that the employees in the bulking plants of King Edward and May were exempt under § 13 (a)(6) which covers “any employee employed in agriculture.” It relied on the broad definition of “agriculture” contained in § 3 (f) of the Act which provides, in relevant part, that the term “includes farming in all its branches and among other things includes . . . any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to . . . market or to carriers for transportation to market.” The work in the bulking plants, the court ruled, was “preparation for market” within the meaning of § 3 (f).
The exemption of § 13 (a) (6) read with § 3 (f) covers large operators as well as small ones, as we recently said in Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., supra, at 260. It also includes “extraordinary methods” of agriculture as well as the more conventional ones. Id., at 261. The question in the Waialua case was whether sugar milling was included in the agriculture exemption of §13 (a)(6). We said that it was necessary to look to all the facts surrounding the process to determine whether that process was incident to farming. Id., at 264-265. We held that sugar milling was not, even when done by the grower. We think like considerations indicate that in this case the agriculture operation does not extend through the bulking plants but ends, as the District Court ruled, with the delivery of the tobacco at the receiving platform of the bulking plant. That is the “delivery ... to market” within the meaning of § 3 (f) of the Act.
It is true that King Edward and May are farmers and process in their bulking plants only the tobacco they raise. It is also true that many employees who work their farms also work in their bulking plants. These are heavily stressed as indicia that bring the bulking plants into the agriculture exemption. But there are two other factors which in our view tip the scales the other way.
First, tobacco farmers do not ordinarily perform the bulking operation. As already mentioned, of the 300 farmers who grow this type of tobacco in this area, only 9 maintain and operate their own bulking plants. The remaining farmers have their crops processed by others. The bulking operation is for the most part divorced from the cultivation of tobacco and from the drying operation in the tobacco barns on the farm. The bulking process for the most part is a separate processing stage.
Second, the bulking operation is a process which changes the natural state of the freshly cured tobacco as significantly as milling changes sugar cane. As indicated above, the bulking process changes and improves the leaf in many ways and turns it into an industrial product. What we said in Waialua concerning sugar milling is apt here: a process that results in such important changes is “more akin to manufacturing than to agriculture.” 349 U. S., at 265.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed and those of the District Court affirmed.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
The Administrator defined “area of production,” as used in § 13 (a) (10) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as follows (29 CFR, c. V, § 536.2):
(a) An individual shall be regarded as employed in the “area of production” within the meaning of section 13 (a) (10) of the Fair Labor Standards Act in handling, packing, storing, ginning, compressing, pasteurizing, drying, preparing in their raw or natural state, or canning of agricultural or horticultural commodities for market, or in making cheese or butter or other dairy products:
(1) If the establishment where he is employed is located in the open country or in a rural community and 95 percent of the commodities on which such operations are performed by the establishment come from normal rural sources of supply located not more than the following air line distances from the establishment:
(i) With respect to the ginning of cotton — 10 miles;
(ii) With respect to operations on fresh fruits and vegetables — 15 miles;
(iii) With respect to the storing of cotton and any operations on commodities not otherwise specified in this subsection — 20 miles;
(iv) With respect to the compressing and compress-warehousing of cotton, and operations on tobacco, grain, soybeans, poultry or eggs — 50 miles.
(b) For the purposes of this section:
(1) “open country or rural community” shall not include any city, town or urban place of 2,500 or greater population or any area within:
(i) One air-line mile of any city, town, or urban place with a population of 2,500 up to but not including 50,000 or
(ii) Three air-line miles of any city, town or urban place with a population of 50,000 up to but not including 500,000, or
(iii) Five air-line miles of any city with a population of 500,000 or greater,
according to the latest available United States Census.
(2) The commodities shall be considered to come from “normal rural sources of supply” within the specified distances from the establishment if they are received
(i) from farms within such specified distances, or
(ii) from farm assemblers or other establishments through which the commodity customarily moves, which are within such specified distances and located in the open country or in a rural community, or
(iii) from farm assemblers or other establishments not located in the open country or in a rural community provided it can be demonstrated that the commodities were produced on farms within such specified distances.
(3) The period for determining whether 95 percent of the commodities are received from normal rural sources of supply shall be the last preceding calendar month in which operations were carried on for two workweeks or more, except that until such time as an establishment has operated for such a calendar month the period shall be the time during which it has been in operation.
(4) The percentage of commodities received from normal rural sources of supply within the specified distances shall be determined by weight, volume or other physical unit of measure, except that dollar value shall be used if different commodities received in the establishment are customarily measured in physical units that are not comparable.
The entire regulation is set forth in the Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 482.
On this phase of the problem the Administrator said in his findings dated December 18, 1946:
“Although it is clear that any line attempting to distinguish between ‘urban-industrial’ and ‘rural-agricultural’ communities on the basis of population can at best be only an approximation, it is equally clear that none of the proposals advanced at the hearing would accomplish the objectives of such a test with as much accuracy as the 2,500 population test. As a class, places of 2,500 population or more are predominantly industrial, while places with populations of less than 2,500 are predominantly agricultural. A population limit of 2,500, moreover, has for over 35 years been the official dividing line between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ employed by the Bureau of the Census in its studies. This dividing line has also been accepted and used in studies made by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Works Progress Administration and other government agencies. It has furnished the definition of ‘rural’ communities which has been the basis of studies of rural and urban communities by many sociologists. It has been incorporated into statute by the Congress of the United States in special legislation for rural communities To a very great extent the handling and processing of agricultural and horticultural commodities is carried on in the open country or in towns of less than 2,500. For example, only about 10% of grain elevators are located in towns of 2,500 or more. Only about 11% of cotton gins are located in such populated places. About two-thirds of all fresh fruit and vegetable canning and packing, cheese manufacturing and poultry and egg assembling are' carried on in the open country or in towns of 2,500 or less.
“On the basis of all the evidence, it is my conclusion that a population test of 2,500, while not drawing a line between 'urban-industrial’ and ‘rural-agricultural’ conditions with a fine precision, will come as close to accomplishing this objective as it is possible to come in a general rule applicable to many situations.”
The references were to 39 Stat. 356, 40 Stat. 1200.
On this phase of the problem the Administrator said:
“The selection of appropriate distances for the different commodities and groups of commodities has been no easy task, and was accomplished only after carefully weighing and synthesizing a large variety of complicated economic factors. Among the many factors taken into consideration were the following: the kind of crop; the distances from which the establishments in each industry receive the agricultural or horticultural commodities upon which they perform the operations specified in the pertinent sections of the Act; the geography and topography of the various sections of the country in which the different commodities are normally produced; the location of the plants within these areas; the concentration of cultivation of the different commodities in various sections of the country; the pattern of concentration of agricultural production with respect to the location of the establishment; differences in practice as between single crop areas and diversified farming areas; the perishability of the commodities received; the extent to which the plants deal with a single commodity rather than a variety of commodities; the nature of the operations performed on the commodities received, including the degree of industrialization of the various operations; the number of hands or operations through which the particular commodity has moved since leaving the farm, including the possibility of passing increased labor costs back to the farmer; the marketing practices of the particular industries; and the wage rates paid, and overtime practices in the various communities concerned with particular commodities.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Souter join, dissenting.
This case involves a patent that claims a process for helping to diagnose deficiencies of two vitamins, folate and cobalamin. The process consists of using any test (whether patented or unpatented) to measure the level in a body fluid of an amino acid called homocysteine and then noticing whether its level is elevated above the norm; if so, a vitamin deficiency is likely.
The lower courts held that the patent claim is valid. They also found the petitioner, Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (LabCorp), liable for inducing infringement of the claim when it encouraged doctors to order diagnostic tests for measuring homocysteine. The courts assessed damages. And they enjoined LabCorp from using any tests that would lead the doctors it serves to find a vitamin deficiency by taking account of elevated homocysteine levels.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the patent claim is invalid on the ground that it improperly seeks to “claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship,” Pet. for Cert, i, namely, the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency. The Court has dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. In my view, we should not dismiss the writ. The question presented is not unusually difficult. We have the authority to decide it. We said that we would do so. The parties and amici have fully briefed the question. And those who engage in medical research, who practice medicine, and who as patients depend upon proper health care might well benefit from this Court’s authoritative answer.
I
A
The relevant principle of law “[e]xelude[s] from .. . patent protection . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185 (1981). This principle finds its roots in both English and American law. See, e. g., Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 (1854); The Telephone Cases, 126 U. S. 1 (1888). The principle means that Einstein could not have “patented] his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 309 (1980). Neither can one patent “a novel and useful mathematical formula,” Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 585 (1978), the motive power of electromagnetism or steam, Morse, supra, at 116, “the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals,” Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948).
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that “laws of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly and time consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.
Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail between these opposing and risky shoals is through rules that bring certain types of invention and discovery within the scope of patentability while excluding others. And scholars have noted that “patent law[’s] exclusion of] fundamental scientific (including mathematical) and technological principles” (like copyright’s exclusion of “ideas”) is a rule of the latter variety. W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 305 (2003). That rule reflects “both . . . the enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if property rights could be obtained in [those basic principles] and . . . the enormous transaction costs that would be imposed on would-be users.” Id., at 305-306; cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119, 122 (CA2 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
Thus, the Court has recognized that “[phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are . . . the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 67 (1972). It has treated fundamental scientific principles as “part of the storehouse of knowledge” and manifestations of laws of nature as “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros., supra, at 130. And its doing so reflects a basic judgment that protection in such cases, despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely interfere with, or discourage, development and the further spread of useful knowledge itself.
B
In the 1980’s three university doctors, after conducting research into vitamin deficiencies, found a correlation between high levels of homocysteine in the blood and deficiencies of two essential vitamins, folate (folic acid) and cobalamin (vitamin B12). They also developed more accurate methods for testing body fluids for homocysteine, using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry. They published their findings in 1985. They obtained a patent. And that patent eventually found its commercial way into the hands of Competitive Technologies, Inc. (CTI), and its licensee Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (Metabolite), the respondents here.
The patent contains several claims that cover the researchers’ new methods for testing homocysteine levels using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry. Supp. App. 30. In 1991, LabCorp (in fact, a corporate predecessor) took a license from Metabolite permitting it to use the tests described in the patent in return for 27.5% of related revenues. Their agreement permitted LabCorp to terminate the arrangement if “a more cost effective commercial alternative is available that does not infringe a valid and enforceable claim of” the patent. App. 305 (emphasis added).
Until 1998, LabCorp used the patented tests and paid royalties. By that time, however, growing recognition that elevated homocysteine levels might predict risk of heart disease led to increased testing demand. Other companies began to produce alternative testing procedures. And LabCorp decided to use one of these other procedures—a test devised by Abbott Laboratories that LabCorp concluded was “far superior.” Id., at 167 (testimony of Peter Wentz).
LabCorp continued to pay royalties to respondents whenever it used the patented tests. But it concluded that Abbott’s test did not fall within the patent’s protective scope. And LabCorp consequently refused to pay royalties when it used the Abbott test. Id., at 237 (payment eliminated due to “change in methodology”).
In response, respondents brought this suit against Lab-Corp for patent infringement and breach of the license agreement. They did not claim that LabCorp’s use of the Abbott test infringed the patent’s claims describing methods for testing for homocysteine. Instead, respondents relied on a broader claim not limited to those tests, namely, claim 13, the sole claim at issue here. That claim—set forth below in its entirety—seeks patent protection for:
“A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: “assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and
“correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.” Supp. App. 30.
Claim 13, respondents argued, created a protected monopoly over the process of “correlating” test results and potential vitamin deficiencies. The parties agreed that the words “assaying a body fluid” refer to the use of any test at all, whether patented or not patented, that determines whether a body fluid has an “elevated level of total homocysteine.” And at trial, the inventors testified that claim 13’s “correlating” step consists simply of a physician’s recognizing that a test that shows an elevated homocysteine level—by that very fact—shows the patient likely has a cobalamin or folate deficiency. App. 108-111 (testimony of Dr. Sally Stabler); id., at 137-142, 155-161 (testimony of Dr. Robert Allen). They added that, because the natural relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency was now well known, such “correlating” would occur automatically in the mind of any competent physician. Id., at 137-138 (same).
On this understanding of the claim, respondents argued, LabCorp was liable for inducing doctors to infringe. More specifically, LabCorp would conduct homocysteine tests and report the results measured in micromoles (millionths of a mole) per liter (symbolized mol/L). Doctors, because of their training, would know that a normal homocysteine range in blood is between 7 and 22 mol/L (and in urine between 1 and 20 mol/L), Supp. App. 14, and would know that an elevated homocysteine level is correlated with a vitamin deficiency. Hence, in reviewing the test results, doctors would look at the mol/L measure and automatically reach a conclusion about whether or not a person was suffering from a vitamin deficiency. Claim 13 therefore covered every homo-cysteine test that a doctor reviewed. And since LabCorp had advertised its tests and educated doctors about the correlation, LabCorp should be liable for actively inducing the doctors’ infringing acts. See 35 U. S. C. § 271(b).
The jury found LabCorp liable on this theory. The District Court calculated damages based on unpaid royalties for some 350,000 homocysteine tests performed by LabCorp using the Abbott method. The court also enjoined LabCorp from performing “any homocysteine-only test, including, without limitation homocysteine-only tests via the Abbott method.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-37a (internal quotation marks omitted).
LabCorp appealed. It argued to the Federal Circuit that the trial court was wrong to construe claim 13 so broadly that infringement took place “every time a physician does nothing more than look at a patient’s homocysteine level.” Corrected Brief for Appellant in No. 03-1120 (CA Fed.), p. 28 (hereinafter Brief for Appellant). Indeed, if so construed (rather than construed, say, to cover only patented tests), then claim 13 was “invalid for indefiniteness, lack of written description, non-enablement, anticipation, and obviousness.” Id., at 38. LabCorp told the Federal Circuit:
“If the Court were to uphold this vague claim, anyone could obtain a patent on any scientific correlation—that there is a link between fact A and fact B—merely by drafting a patent claiming no more than ‘test for fact A and correlate with fact B’.. . . Claim 13 does no more than that. If it is upheld, CTI would improperly gain a monopoly over a basic scientific fact rather than any novel invention of its own. The law is settled that no such claim should be allowed. See, e. g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185 (1981).. .; Chisum on Patents § 1.03[6].” Id., at 41.
The Federal Circuit rejected LabCorp’s arguments. It agreed with the District Court that claim 13’s “correlating” step simply means “relating total homocysteine levels to cobalamin or folate deficiency, a deficiency in both, or a deficiency in neither.” 370 F. 3d 1354, 1363 (2004). That meaning, it said, is “discernible and clear”; it is definite, it is described in writing, and it would enable virtually anyone to follow the instruction it gives. And that is sufficient. Id., at 1366-1367. The Court did not address LabCorp’s argument that, if so construed, claim 13 must be struck down as an improper effort to obtain patent protection for a law of nature.
Moreover, the Circuit concluded, because any competent doctor reviewing test results would automatically correlate those results with the presence or absence of a vitamin deficiency, virtually every doctor who ordered and read the tests was a direct infringer. And because LabCorp “publishes ... Continuing Medical Education articles” and other pieces, which urge doctors to conduct the relevant tests and to reach a conclusion about whether a patient is suffering from a vitamin deficiency based upon the test results, LabCorp induces infringement. Id., at 1365. Finally, the court rejected LabCorp’s challenge to the injunction. Id., at 1372.
LabCorp filed a petition for certiorari. Question Three of the petition asks “[wjhether a method patent. .. directing a party simply to ‘correlat[e]’ test results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship . . . such that any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test result.” Pet. for Cert. i. After calling for and receiving the views of the Solicitor General, 543 U. S. 1185 (2005), we granted the petition, limited to Question Three.
II
The question before us is whether claim 13, as construed and applied in the way I have described in Part I-B, is invalid in light of the “law of nature” principle, described in Part I-A. I believe that we should answer that question. There is a technical procedural reason for not doing so, namely, that LabCorp did not refer in the lower courts to § 101 of the Patent Act, which sets forth subject matter that is patentable, and within the bounds of which the “law of nature” principle most comfortably fits. See 35 U. S. C. §101 (patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”); Flook, 437 U. S., at 588-589. There is also a practical reason for not doing so, namely, that we might benefit from the views of the Federal Circuit, which did not directly consider the question. See, e. g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 72-73 (1998).
Nonetheless, stronger considerations argue for our reaching a decision. For one thing, the technical procedural objection is tenuous. LabCorp argued the essence of its present claim below. It told the Federal Circuit that claim 13 as construed by the District Court was too “vague” because that construction would allow “anyone” to “obtain a patent on any scientific correlation”; it would permit the respondents “improperly [to] gain a monopoly over a basic scientific fact” despite “settled” law “that no such claim should be allowed.” Brief for Appellant 41 (citing Diehr, 450 U. S., at 185; 1 D. Chisum, Patents §1.03[6] (2006 ed.) (hereinafter Chisum)). LabCorp explicitly stated in its petition for certiorari that, “[i]f the Court allows the Federal Circuit opinion to stand ... [respondents] would improperly gain monopolies over basic scientific facts rather than any novel inventions of their own.” Pet. for Cert. 25 (citing Diehr, supra; Gottschalk, 409 U. S. 63; Funk Bros., 333 U. S. 127; Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U. S. 86 (1939)). And after considering the Solicitor General’s advice not to hear the case (primarily based upon LabCorp’s failure to refer to 35 U. S. C. § 101), we rejected that advice, thereby “necessarily considering] and rejecting] that contention as a basis for denying review.” United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 40 (1992).
For another thing, I can find no good practical reason for refusing to decide the case. The relevant issue has been fully briefed and argued by the parties, the Government, and 20 amici. The record is comprehensive, allowing us to learn the precise nature of the patent claim, to consider the commercial and medical context (which the parties and amici have described in detail), and to become familiar with the arguments made in all courts. Neither the factual record nor the briefing suffers from any significant gap. No party has identified any prejudice due to our answering the question. And there is no indication that LabCorp’s failure to cite § 101 reflected unfair gamesmanship.
Of course, further consideration by the Federal Circuit might help us reach a better decision. Lower court consideration almost always helps. But the thoroughness of the briefing leads me to conclude that the extra time, cost, and uncertainty that further proceedings would engender are not worth the potential benefit.
Finally, I believe that important considerations of the public interest—including that of clarifying the law in this area sooner rather than later—argue strongly for our deciding the question presented now. See Part IV, infra.
Ill
I turn to the merits. The researchers who obtained the present patent found that an elevated level of homocysteine in a warmblooded animal is correlated with folate and cobalamin deficiencies. As construed by the Federal Circuit, claim 13 provides those researchers with control over doctors’ efforts to use that correlation to diagnose vitamin deficiencies in a patient. Does the law permit such protection or does claim 13, in the circumstances, amount to an invalid effort to patent a “phenomenon of nature”?
I concede that the category of nonpatentable “[phenomena of nature,” like the categories of “mental processes” and “abstract intellectual concepts,” is not easy to define. See Flook, supra, at 589 (“The line between a patentable ‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear”); cf. Nichols, 45 F. 2d, at 122 (“[W]e are as aware as anyone that the line [between copyrighted material and non-copyrightable ideas], wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary”). After all, many a patentable invention rests upon its inventor’s knowledge of natural phenomena; many “process” patents seek to make abstract intellectual concepts workably concrete; and all conscious human action involves a mental process. See generally 1 Chisum § 1.03, at 1-78 to 1-295. Nor can one easily use such abstract categories directly to distinguish instances of likely beneficial, from likely harmful, forms of protection. Cf. FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, ch. 3, p. 1 (Oct. 2003) (hereinafter FTC) (collecting evidence that “issues of fixed cost recovery, alternative appropriability mechanisms, and relationships between initial and follow-on innovation” vary by industry); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1577-1589 (2003) (“Recent evidence has demonstrated that this complex relationship [between patents and innovation] is . . . industry-specific at each stage of the patent process”).
But this case is not at the boundary. It does not require us to consider the precise scope of the “natural phenomenon” doctrine or any other difficult issue. In my view, claim 13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that doctrine.
There can be little doubt that the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a “natural phenomenon.” That is what the petitioner argues. It is what the Solicitor General has told us. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (filed Dec. 23, 2005) (“The natural relationship between elevated total homocysteine and deficiencies in the B vitamins is an unpatentable ‘principle in natural philosophy or physical science’ ” (quoting Morse, 15 How., at 116)). Indeed, it is close to what the respondents concede. Brief for Respondents 31 (“The correlation between total homocysteine and deficiencies in cobalamin and folate that the Inventors discovered could be considered, standing alone, a ‘natural phenomenon’ in the literal sense: It is an observable aspect of biochemistry in at least some human populations”).
The respondents argue, however, that the correlation is nonetheless patentable because claim 13 packages it in the form of a “process” for detecting vitamin deficiency, with discrete testing and correlating steps. They point to this Court’s statements that a “process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature,” Flook, 437 U. S., at 590; see also Gottschalk, supra, at 67, and that “an application of a law of nature ... to a known . . . process may well be deserving of patent protection,” Diehr, supra, at 187. They add that claim 13 is a patentable “application of a law of nature” because, considered as a whole, it (1) “Entails A Physical Transformation Of Matter,” namely,' the alteration of a blood sample during whatever test is used, Brief for Respondents 33 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 788 (1877); Gottschalk, 409 U. S., at 70), and because it (2) "produces a 'useful, concrete, and tangible result,’” namely, detection of a vitamin deficiency, Brief for Respondents 36 (citing State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368, 1373 (CA Fed. 1998)).
In my view, however, the cases to which the respondents refer do not support their claim. Neither Cochrane nor Gottschalk can help them because the process described in claim 13 is not a process for transforming blood or any other matter. Claim 13’s process instructs the user to (1) obtain test results and (2) think about them. Why should it matter if the test results themselves were obtained through an unpatented procedure that involved the transformation of blood? Claim 13 is indifferent to that fact, for it tells the user to use any test at all. Indeed, to use virtually any natural phenomenon for virtually any useful purpose could well involve the use of empirical information obtained through an unpatented means that might have involved transforming matter. Neither Cochrane nor Gottschalk suggests that that fact renders the phenomenon patentable. See Cochrane, supra, at 785 (upholding process for improving quality of flour by removing impurities with blasts of air); Gottschalk, supra, at 71-73 (rejecting process for converting numerals to binary form through mathematical formula).
Neither does the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank help the respondents. That case does say that a process is patentable if it produces a " 'useful, concrete and tangible result.’ ” 149 F. 3d, at 1373. But this Court has never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary. The Court, for example, has invalidated a claim to the use of electromagnetic current for transmitting messages over long distances even though it produces a result that seems “useful, concrete, and tangible.” Morse, supra, at 116. Similarly the Court has invalidated a patent setting forth a system for triggering alarm limits in connection with catalytic conversion despite a similar utility, concreteness, and tangibility. Flook, supra. And the Court has invalidated a patent setting forth a process that transforms, for computer-programming purposes, decimal figures into binary figures—even though the result would seem useful, concrete, and at least arguably (within the computer’s wiring system) tangible. Gottschalk, supra.
Even were I to assume (purely for argument’s sake) that claim 13 meets certain general definitions of process patent-ability, however, it still fails the one at issue here: the requirement that it not amount to a simple natural correlation, i. e., a “natural phenomenon.” See Flook, supra, at 588, n. 9 (even assuming patent for improved catalytic converter system meets broad statutory definition of patentable “process,” it is invalid under natural phenomenon doctrine); Diehr, 450 U. S., at 184-185 (explaining that, even if patent meets all other requirements, it must meet the natural phenomena requirement as well).
At most, respondents have simply described the natural law at issue in the abstract patent language of a “process.” But they cannot avoid the fact that the process is no more than an instruction to read some numbers in light of medical knowledge. Cf. id., at 192 (warning against “allowing] a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection”). One might, of course, reduce the “process” to a series of steps, e. g., Step 1: gather data; Step 2: read a number; Step 3: compare the number with the norm; Step 4: act accordingly. But one can reduce any process to a series of steps. The question is what those steps embody. And here, aside from the unpatented test, they embody only the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency that the researchers uncovered. In my view, that correlation is an unpatentable “natural phenomenon,” and I can find nothing in claim 13 that adds anything more of significance.
IV
If I am correct in my conclusion in Part III that the patent is invalid, then special public interest considerations reinforce my view that we should decide this case. To fail to do so threatens to leave the medical profession subject to the restrictions imposed by this individual patent and others of its kind. Those restrictions may inhibit doctors from using their best medical judgment; they may force doctors to spend unnecessary time and energy to enter into license agreements; they may divert resources from the medical task of health care to the legal task of searching patent files for similar simple correlations; they may raise the cost of health care while inhibiting its effective delivery. See Brief for American Clinical Laboratory Association as Amicus Curiae 8-13.
Even if Part III is wrong, however, it still would be valuable to decide this case. Our doing so would help diminish legal uncertainty in the area, affecting a “substantial number of patent claims.” See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12-14 (filed Aug. 26, 2005). It would permit those in the medical profession better to understand the nature of their legal obligations. It would help Congress determine whether legislation is needed. Cf. 35 U. S. C. § 287(c) (limiting liability of medical practitioners for performance of certain medical and surgical procedures).
In either event, a decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately reflects the “careful balance” that “the federal patent laws . . . em-bod[y].” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 146 (1989). See also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C, 547 U. S. 388, 396-397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); FTC, ch. 4, at 1-44; Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L. J. 61 (2002); Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 535, 542-546 (2001).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the congressional reapportionment of the State of Texas.
On June 17, 1971, the Governor of the State of Texas signed into law Senate Bill One (S. B. 1), Tex. Acts, 62d Leg., 1st Called Sess., c. 12, p. 38, providing for the congressional redistricting of the State. S. B. 1 divided the State into 24 congressional districts for the ensuing decennium. Based upon 1970 census figures, absolute population equality among the 24 districts would mean a population of 466,530 in each district. The districts created by S. B. 1 varied from a high of 477,856 in the 13th District to a low of 458,581 in the 15th District. The 13th District exceeded the ideal district by 2.43% and the 15th District was smaller by 1.7%. The population difference between the two districts was 10,275 persons, and their total percentage deviation was 4.13%. The ratio of the 13th District to the 15th was 1.04 to 1. The average deviation of all districts from the ideal district of 466,530 was .745% or 3,421 persons.
On October 19, 1971, appellees, residents of the 6th, 13th, 16th, and 19th congressional districts, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against appellant, the Secretary of State of Texas and the chief election officer of the State. Ap-pellees alleged that the reapportionment of the Texas congressional seats as embodied in S. B. 1 violated their rights under Art. I, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They requested an injunction against the use of S. B. 1, an order requiring a new apportionment or the use of a plan submitted with their complaint, or at-large elections. The plan appended to appellees’ original complaint, which came to be called Plan B, generally followed the redistricting pattern of S. B. 1. However, the district lines were adjusted where necessary so as to achieve smaller population variances among districts. Plan B created districts varying from 466,930 to 466,234, for a total absolute deviation between the largest and smallest district of 696 persons. District 12 exceeded the ideal by .086% and District Four was under the ideal by .063%, for a total percentage deviation of .149%. Although the plan followed the district lines of S. B. 1 where possible, in order to achieve maximum population equality, Plan B cut across 18 more county lines than did S. B. I.
A three-judge court was convened. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. On January 10, 1972, several days prior to the scheduled hearing of the case, appellees filed an amended complaint suggesting an alternative plan, which came to be called Plan C. Plan C, unlike Plan B, substantially disregarded the configuration of the districts in S. B. 1. Instead, as the authors of the plan frankly admitted and the District Court found, Plan C represented an attempt to attain lower deviations without regard to any consideration other than population. The districts in Plan C varied in population from 467,173 as a high to 465,855 as a low, a difference of 1,318 persons. The largest district was overpopulated by .139%, and the smallest underpopulated by .145%, the total percentage deviation being .284%. Plan C had 14 districts with greater deviations than Plan B, eight districts with deviations equal to those found in Plan B, and two districts with deviations smaller than those in Plan B.
On January 21, 1972, the District Court heard argument and received into evidence various depositions. The next day, the court announced its decision. Relying upon this Court’s decision in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 (1969), the District Court declared S. B. 1 unconstitutional and enjoined appellant from “conducting or permitting any primary or general elections based upon the districts established by S. B. 1.” The District-Court ordered the adoption of Plan C as “the plan of this Court for the congressional districts of the State of Texas.” Noting that its order was entered “without prejudice to the legislative and executive branches of the State of Texas to proceed with the consideration and adoption of any other constitutionally permissible plan of congressional redistricting at a called or regular session of the Legislature,” the District Court retained jurisdiction “for the purposes of considering any such plan which might be adopted by the Legislature of the State of Texas until congressional reapportionment is enacted based on the Twentieth Decennial Census to be conducted in 1980.”
This Court, on application of appellant, granted a stay of the order of the District Court. 404 TJ. S. 1065 (1972). The 1972 congressional elections were therefore conducted under the plan embodied in S. B. 1. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. 409 U. S. 947 (1972).
I
The command of Art. I, § 2, that representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States” was elucidated in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), and in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S., at 527-528, to permit only those population variances among congressional districts that “are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.” Id., at 531. See also Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 546 (1969). Kirkpatrick and Wells invalidated state reapportionment statutes providing for federal congressional districts having total percentage deviations of 5.97% and 13.1%, respectively. In both cases, we concluded that the deviations did not demonstrate a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality and were not sufficiently justified.
The percentage deviations now before us in S. B. 1 are smaller than those invalidated in Kirkpatrick and Wells, but we agree with the District Court that, under the standards of those cases, they were not “unavoidable,” and the districts were not as mathematically equal as reasonably possible. Both Plans B and C demonstrate this much, and the State does not really dispute it.' Also, as in Kirkpatrick and Wells, “we do not find legally acceptable the argument that variances are justified if they necessarily result from a State’s attempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing congressional district lines along existing county, municipal, or other political subdivision boundaries.” Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra, at 533-534.
The State asserts that the variances present in S. B. 1 nevertheless represent good-faith efforts • by the State to promote “constituency-representative relations,” a policy frankly aimed at maintaining existing relationships between incumbent congressmen and their constituents and preserving the seniority the members of the State’s delegation have achieved in the United States House of Representatives. We do not disparage this interest. We have, in the context of state reapportionment, said that the fact that “district boundaries may have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness.” Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 89 n. 16 (1966). Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, at 752. But we need not decide whether this state interest is sufficient to justify the deviations at issue here, for Plan B admittedly serves this purpose as well as S. B. 1 while adhering more closely to population equality. S. B. 1 and its population variations, therefore, were not necessary to achieve the asserted state goal, and the District Court was correct in rejecting it.
Appellant also straightforwardly argues that Kirkpatrick and Wells should be modified so as not to require the “small” population variances among congressional districts involved in this case to be justified by the State. S. B. 1, it is urged, absent proof of invidiousness over and above the population variances among its districts, does not violate Art. I, § 2. It is clear, however, that at some point or level in size, population variances do import invidious devaluation of the individual's vote and represent a failure to accord him fair and effective representation. Appellant concedes this and would locate the line differently than the Court did in Kirkpatrick and Wells. Keeping in mind that congressional districts are not so intertwined and freighted with strictly local interests as are state legislative districts and that, as compared with the latter, they are relatively enormous, with each percentage point of variation representing almost 5,000 people, we are not inclined to disturb Kirkpatrick and Wells. This is particularly so in light of Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973), decided earlier this Term, where we reiterated that the Wesberry, Kirkpatrick, and Wells line of cases would continue to govern congressional reapportionments, although holding that the rigor of the rule of those cases was inappropriate for state reapportionments challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
The District Court properly rejected S. B. 1, but it had before it both Plan B and Plan C, and there remains the question whether the court correctly chose to implement the latter. Plan B adhered to the basic district configurations found in S. B. 1, but adjusted the district lines, where necessary, in order to achieve maximum population equality among districts. Each district in Plan B contained generally the same counties as the equivalent district in S. B. I. Plan C, on the other hand, was based entirely upon population considerations and made no attempt to adhere to the district configurations found in S. B. I. Both plans were submitted to the District Court by appellees. After deciding that S. B. 1 was unacceptable, the District Court ordered the implementation of Plan C. In announcing its decision, the court said only:
“Plan C is based solely on population and is significantly more compact and contiguous than either S. B. 1 or Plan B. . . . The Court has considered Plans B and C . . . and concludes that Plan C best effectuates the principle of 'one man, one vote’ enunciated by the Supreme Court.”
Appellant argues that, even if the District Court properly struck down S. B. 1, it should have selected Plan B rather than Plan C. Appellees defend the selection of Plan C as an exercise of the remedial discretion of the District Court, although in doing so they argue against a plan that they proposed and frequently urged upon the District Court.
From the beginning, we have recognized that “reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 586 (1964). See also, id., at 584, 586-587; id., at 588-589 (opinion of Stewart, J.). We have adhered to the view that state legislatures have “primary jurisdiction” over legislative reapportionment. See Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 676 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678, 693 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695, 709-710, 711-712 (1964); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S., at 84-85; Ely v. Klahr, 403 U. S. 108, 114 (1971); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 160-161 (1971); Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187, 195-201 (1972); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S., at 327. Just as a federal district court, in the context of legislative reapportionment, should follow the policies and preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution, we hold that a district court should similarly honor state policies in the context of congressional reapportionment. In fashioning a reapportionment plan or in choosing among plans, a district court should not pre-empt the legislative task nor “intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 160.
Here, it is clear that Plan B, to a greater extent than did Plan C, adhered to the desires of the state legislature while attempting to achieve population equality among districts. S. B. 1, a duly enacted statute of the State of Texas, established the State’s 24 congressional districts with locations and configurations found appropriate by the duly elected members of the two houses of the Texas Legislature. As we have often noted, reapportionment is a complicated process. Districting inevitably has sharp political impact and inevitably political decisions must be made by those charged with the task. See Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, at 753. Here those decisions were made by the legislature in pursuit of what were deemed important state interests. Its decisions should not be unnecessarily put aside in the course of fashioning relief appropriate to remedy what were held to be impermissible population variations between congressional districts.
Plan B, as all parties concede, represented an attempt to adhere to the districting preferences of the state legislature while eliminating population variances. Indeed, Plan B achieved the goal of population equality to a greater extent than did Plan C. Despite the existence of Plan B, the District Court ordered implementation of Plan C, which, as conceded by all parties, ignored legislative districting policy and constructed districts solely on the basis of population considerations. The District Court erred in -this choice. Given the alternatives, the court should not have imposed Plan C, with its very different political impact, on the State. It should have implemented Plan B, which most clearly approximated the reapportionment plan of the state legislature, while satisfying constitutional requirements. The court said only that Plan C is “significantly more compact and contiguous” than Plan B. But both Plan B and Plan C feature contiguous districts, and, even if the districts in Plan C can be called more compact, the District Court’s preferences do not override whatever state goals were embodied in S. B. 1 and, derivatively, in Plan B. “The remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited. Here the District Court erred in so broadly brushing aside state apportionment policy without solid constitutional or equitable grounds for doing so.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 161. If there was a good reason for adopting Plan C rather than Plan B, the District Court failed to state it.
Of course, the District Court should defer to state policy in fashioning relief only where that policy is consistent with constitutional norms and is not itself vulnerable to legal challenge. The District Court should not, in the name of state policy, refrain from providing remedies fully adequate to redress constitutional violations which have been adjudicated and must be rectified. But here, the District Court did not suggest or hold that the legislative policy of districting so as to preserve the constituencies of congressional incumbents was unconstitutional or even undesirable. We repeat what we have said in the context of state legislative reapportionment: “The fact that district boundaries may have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish invidiousness.” Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S., at 89 n. 16. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, at 752; Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U. S. 191 (1972). And we note that appellees themselves submitted Plan B to the District Court and defended it on the basis that it adhered to state goals, as embodied in S. B. 1, while eliminating impermissible deviations.
The judgment of the District Court invalidating S. B. 1 is affirmed. The adoption of Plan C is, however, reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Prior to the passage of S. B. 1, the Texas Senate had twice defeated redistricting bills, passed by the House, with total deviations smaller than the total deviation in S. B. 1.
The redistricting of the 24 Texas congressional districts under S. B. 1 follows:
At a subsequent pretrial conference, the Fourteenth Amendment claims were eliminated.
Plan B resulted in the following districting:
District Population Absolute Variance from Ideal
1 466,545 + 15
2 466,565 + 35
3 466,266 -264
4 466,234 -296
5 466,620 + 90
District Population Absolute Variance from Ideal
466,285 6 -245
466,336 7 -194
466,704 8 + 174
466,678 9 + 148
466,313 10 -217
466,258 11 -272
466,930 12 +400
466,663 13 + 133
466,437 14 - 93
466,359 15 -171
466,663 16 + 133
466,432 17 - 98
466,520 18 - 10
466,649 19 + 119
466,514 20 - 16
466,753 21 +223
466,707 22 + 177
466,424 23 -106
466,875 24 +345
Plan C resulted in the following districts:
District Population Absolute Variance from Ideal
1 465,986 -544
2 466,817 +287
3 466,835 +305
4 467,108 +578
5 466,258 -272
6 467,023 +493
7 466,336 -194
8 466,704 +174
9 466,678 +148
10 466,303 -227
11 466,569 + 39
12 466,926 +396
13 467,173 +648
14 466,437 - 93
15 466,359 -171
16 465,941 -589
17 466,340 -190
18 466,520 - 10
19 466,154 -376
20 466,654 +124
21 466,875 +345
22 466,707 +177
23 466,167 -363
24 465,855 -675
The District Court’s entire discussion of its reasons for selecting Plan C follows:
“Defendant has not submitted any plan of reapportionment as an alternative to S. B. 1. Plaintiffs have proposed two plans, B and C. Plan B is based on S. B. 1, but has a significantly lower deviation than S. B. 1. Plan C is based solely on population and is significantly more compact and contiguous than either S. B. 1 or Plan B. . . . The Court has considered Plans B and C, as well as the plan submitted by the intervening plaintiffs, and concludes that Plan C best effectuates the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ enunciated by the Supreme Court.”
The District Court's order also granted leave to intervene to Van Henry Archer, Chairman of the Bexar County Republican Party, and others. The intervenors, appellees in this Court, filed a suggested reapportionment plan with their complaint-in-intervention which was rejected by the District Court and is not pressed here. The District Court also retained jurisdiction for the purpose of extending the impending February 7, 1972, filing date for congressional candidates “in the event it is made known to [the District] Court that a called session of the Legislature will include congressional reapportionment.” However, the Governor refused to call a special session of the legislature.
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler “reject[ed] Missouri’s argument that there is a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy without question the ‘as nearly as practicable’ standard.” 394 U. S., at 530. We concluded, “Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such [good-faith] effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small.” Id., at 531.
Prior to the passage of S. B. 1, the Texas House twice passed a congressional reapportionment bill with lower deviations. Each bill had a total deviation of 2.5%. Although both bills were ultimately defeated in the Senate, their passage by the House, and indeed their very existence, indicates that it was possible and practicable to construct a redistricting scheme with lower population deviations among districts than those embodied in S. B. 1.
“Appellant earnestly submits that the term 'constituency-representative relations’ is the more accurate term; indeed it is very hard to see why those who are so concerned about representation should stigmatize as a mere euphemism a term which brings in both parties to the representational relationship .... (The assumptions seem to be that while a Congressman may like his job, no constituency can like its Congressman, or care whether he continues to represent it or not — and that no Congressman can possibly learn to know his constituency well enough to serve it better than he can serve another constituency selected for him by, it may be, a young mathematician in Dallas.) Under either name, appellant would defend this motive as entirely proper, if the burden of that defense fell upon him on the facts herein.” Brief for Appellant 72.
It appears that the two plans passed by the House and defeated by the Senate may also have fostered this goal while achieving lower population variances.
Appellant contends that the authors of S. B. 1, and the legislature in passing on the plan, took into account projected population shifts among the districts. Remembering that the congressional districting plan will be in effect for at least 10 years and five congressional elections, the appellant argues that the legislature might properly consider population changes in devising a redistricting plan. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, we recognized that “[w]here these shifts can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy, States that are redistrieting may properly consider them.” 394 U. S., at 535. We were, however, careful to note:
“By this we mean to open no avenue for subterfuge. Findings as to population trends must be thoroughly documented and applied throughout the State in a systematic, not an ad hoc, manner.” Ibid.
In the present case, we conclude that Texas’ attempt to justify the deviations found in S. B. 1 falls far short of this standard. The record is barren, with the exception of scattered and vague assertions in deposition testimony, of adequate documentation of the projected population shifts and firm evidence that the alleged shifts were in fact relied upon.
There is also some suggestion that passage of S. B. 1 was preceded by a dispute as to who would fill the Second District congressional seat. The State does not urge this alleged goal as a justification for the deviations in S. B. 1, nor can we tell from this record whether S. B. 1 in fact resolved this dispute.
The court had before it a plan submitted by the plaintiffs-intervenors and, possibly, other plans. Only Plan B and Plan C appear to have been seriously urged by the parties and considered by the court, and only those plans are defended before this Court.
“Plan B, presented by Appellees, merely took the plan of the legislature and adjusted that plan to achieve greater equality to present to the court, in a graphic manner, what the legislature could have done if it had been disposed to make an attempt at population equality . . . Brief for Appellees 25.
Appellees’ amended complaint explained Plan C, as follows:
“That had the legislature desired to enact a statute consonant with the mandate of Article I, § 2 of the U. S. Constitution, that is a plan which made each district as compact and contiguous and as nearly equal in population to each other district as practicable, taking into account solely population and not taking into account 'social/ 'cultural/ 'economic’ or ‘other factors’ including preservation of incumbent congressman, it could have enacted a plan the same as or substantially similar to that plan set forth in Exhibit C annexed hereto and herewith incorporated by reference as though set forth at length herein. That such plan is hereinafter referred to as ‘Plan C.’”
S. B. 1 is conceded also to have sought adherence to county lines. While Plan B admittedly cuts more county lines than does Plan C, it also achieves lower deviations. Because both Plan B and Plan C were required to fracture more political boundaries than did S. B. 1, in order to achieve population equality among districts, appellant does not contend that Plan B is unacceptable because of more cutting of county lines.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment. In Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), we decided that the defendant also “has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Id., at 807. Although that statement arguably embraces the entire judicial proceeding, we also phrased the question as whether a State may “constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” Ibid. Our conclusion in Faretta extended only to a defendant’s “constitutional right to conduct his own defense.” Id., at 836. Accordingly, our specific holding was confined to the right to defend oneself at trial. We now address the different question whether the reasoning in support of that holding also applies when the defendant becomes an appellant and assumes the burden of persuading a reviewing court that the conviction should be reversed. We have concluded that it does not.
I
Martinez describes himself as a self-taught paralegal with 25 years’ experience at 12 different law firms. See App. 13. While employed as an office assistant at a firm in Santa Ana, California, Martinez was accused of converting $6,000 of a client’s money to his own use. He was charged in a two-count information with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. He chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, because he claimed “‘there wasn’t an attorney on earth who’d believe me once he saw my past [criminal record].’ ” Id., at 15. The jury acquitted him on Count 1, grand theft, but convicted him on Count 2, embezzlement. The jury also found that he had three prior convictions; accordingly, under California’s “three strikes” law, the court imposed a mandatory sentence of 25-years-to-life in prison. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 667(d) and (e)(2) (West 1999). Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal as well as a motion to represent himself and a waiver of counsel. The California Court of Appeal denied his motion, and the California Supreme Court denied his application for a writ of mandate. While the California Supreme Court did not issue an opinion in this ease, the Court of Appeal previously had explained:
“There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment, which is the foundation on which Faretta is based. The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees.” People v. Scott, 64 Cal. App. 4th 550, 554, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 318 (1998).
We granted certiorari because Martinez has raised a question on which both state and federal courts have expressed conflicting views. 526 U. S. 1064 (1999). We now affirm.
II
The Faretta majority based its conclusion on three interrelated arguments. First, it examined historical evidence identifying a right of self-representation that had been protected by federal and state law since the beginning of our Nation, 422 U. S., at 812-817. Second, it interpreted the structure of the Sixth Amendment, in the light of its English and colonial background, id., at 818-832. Third, it concluded that even though it “is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts,” a knowing and intelligent waiver “must be honored out of That respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350-351 [(1970)].” Id., at 834. Some of the Court’s reasoning is applicable to appellate proceedings as well as to trials. There are, however, significant distinctions.
The historical evidence relied upon by Faretta as identifying a right of self-representation is not always useful because it pertained to times when lawyers were scarce, often mistrusted, and not readily available to the average person accused of crime. For one who could not obtain a lawyer, self-representation was the only feasible alternative to asserting no defense at all. Thus, a government’s recognition of an indigent defendant’s right to represent himself was comparable to bestowing upon the homeless beggar a “right” to take shelter in the sewers of Paris. Not surprisingly, early precedent demonstrates that this “right” was not always used to the defendant’s advantage as a shield, but rather was often employed by the prosecution as a sword. The principal ease cited in Faretta is illustrative. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942), the Court relied on the existence of the right of self-representation as the basis for finding that an unrepresented defendant had waived his right to a trial by jury.
It has since been recognized, however, that an indigent defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to the assistance of appointed counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). Thus, an individual’s decision to represent himself is no longer compelled by the necessity of choosing self-representation over incompetent or nonexistent representation; rather, it more likely reflects a genuine desire to “ 'conduct his own cause in his own words.’ ” Faretta, 422 U. S., at 823 (footnote omitted). Therefore, while Faretta is correct in concluding that there is abundant support for the proposition that a right to self-representation has been recognized for centuries, the original reasons for protecting that right do not have the same force when the availability of competent counsel for every indigent defendant has displaced the need — although not always the desire — for self-representation.
The scant historical evidence pertaining to the issue of self-representation on appeal is even less helpful. The Court in Faretta relied upon the description of the right in §35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, which states that “the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel. . . .” 422 U. S., at 812. It is arguable that this language encompasses appeals as well as trials. Assuming it does apply to appellate proceedings, however, the statutory right is expressly limited by the phrase “as by the rules of the said courts.” 1 Stat. 92. Appellate courts have maintained the discretion to allow litigants to “manage their own causes” — and some such litigants have done so effectively. That opportunity, however, has been consistently subject to each court’s own rules.
We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal. We might, nonetheless, paraphrase Faretta and assert: No State or Colony ever forced counsel upon a convicted appellant, and no spokesman ever suggested that such a practice would be tolerable or advisable. 422 U. S., at 832. Such negative historical evidence was meaningful to the Faretta Court, because the fact that the “[dog] had not barked” arguably demonstrated that early lawmakers intended to preserve the “long-respected right of self-representation” at trial. Ibid. Historical silence, however, has no probative foree in the appellate context because there simply was no long-respected right of self-representation on appeal. In fact, the right of appeal itself is of relatively recent origin.
Appeals as of right in federal courts were nonexistent for the first century of our Nation, and appellate review of any sort was “rarely allowed.” Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 656, n. 3 (1977). The States, also, did not generally recognize an appeal as of right until Washington became the first to constitutionalize the right explicitly in 1889. There was similarly no right to appeal in criminal eases at common law, and appellate review of any sort was “limited” and “rarely used.” Thus, unlike the inquiry in Faretta, the historical evidence does not provide any support for an affirmative constitutional right to appellate self-representation.
The Faretta majority’s reliance on the structure of the Sixth Amendment is also not relevant. The Sixth Amendment identifies the basic rights that the accused shall enjoy in “all criminal prosecutions.” They are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself. The Sixth Amendment does not include any right to appeal. As we have recognized, “[t]he right of appeal, as we presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute.” Abney, 431 U. S., at 656. It necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal.
The Faretta majority’s nontextual interpretation of the Sixth Amendment also included an examination of British criminal jurisprudence and a reference to the opprobrious trial practices before the Star Chamber. 422 U. S., at 821-824. These inquiries into historical English practices, however, again do not provide a basis for extending Faretta to the appellate process, because there was no appeal from a criminal conviction in England until 1907. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment); 7 Edw. VII, ch. 23 (1907). Indeed, none of our many cases safeguarding the rights of an indigent appellant has placed any reliance on either the Sixth Amendment or on Faretta. See, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 356-358 (1963); Griffin, 351 U. S., at 12.
Finally, the Faretta majority found that the right to self-representation at trial was grounded in part in a respect for individual autonomy. See 422 U. S., at 834. This consideration is, of course, also applicable to an appellant seeking to manage his own case. As we explained in Faretta, at the trial level “[t]o force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.” Ibid. On appellate review, there is surely a similar risk that the appellant will be skeptical of whether a lawyer, who is employed by the same government that is prosecuting him, will serve his cause with undivided loyalty. Equally true on appeal is the related observation that it is the appellant personally who will bear the consequences of the appeal. See ibid.
In light of our conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to appellate proceedings, any individual right to self-representation on appeal based on autonomy principles must be grounded in the Due Process Clause. Under the practices that prevail in the Nation today, however, we are entirely unpersuaded that the risk of either disloyalty or suspicion of disloyalty is a sufficient concern to conclude that a constitutional right of self-representation is a necessary component of a fair appellate proceeding. We have no doubt that instances of disloyal representation are rare. In both trials and appeals there are, without question, cases in which counsel’s performance is ineffective. Even in those cases, however, it is reasonable to assume that counsel’s performance is more effective than what the unskilled appellant could have provided for himself.
No one, including Martinez and the Faretta majority, attempts to argue that as a rule pro se representation is wise, desirable, or efficient. Although we found in Faretta that the right to defend oneself at trial is “fundamental” in nature, id., at 817, it is clear that it is representation by counsel that is the standard, not the exception. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 307 (1988) (noting the “strong presumption against” waiver of right to counsel). Our experience has taught us that “a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.”
As the Faretta opinion recognized, the right to self-representation is not absolute. The defendant must “ Voluntarily and intelligently”’ elect to conduct his own defense, 422 U. S., at 835 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464-465 (1938)), and most courts require him to do so in a timely manner. He must first be “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” 422 U. S., at 835. A trial judge may also terminate self-representation or appoint “standby counsel” — even over the defendant’s objection — if necessary. Id., at 834, n. 46. We have further held that standby counsel may participate in the trial proceedings, even without the express consent of the defendant, as long as that participation does not “seriously undermin[e]” the “appearance before the jury” that the defendant is representing himself. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 187 (1984). Additionally, the trial judge is under no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal “chores” for the defendant that counsel would normally carry out. Id., at 183-184. Even at the trial level, therefore, the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.
In the appellate context, the balance between the two competing interests surely tips in favor of the State. The status of the accused defendant, who retains a presumption of innocence throughout the trial process, changes dramatically when a jury returns a guilty verdict. We have recognized this shifting focus and noted:
“[T]here are significant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage from the State’s point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt....
“By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State’s prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or a jury below.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 610 (1974).
In the words of the Faretta majority, appellate proceedings are simply not a case of “halting] a person into its criminal courts.” 422 U. S., at 807.
The requirement of representation by trained counsel implies no disrespect for the individual inasmuch as it tends to benefit the appellant as well as the court. Courts, of course, may still exercise their discretion to allow a lay person to proceed pro se. We already leave to the appellate courts’ discretion, keeping “the best interests of both the prisoner and the government in mind,” the decision whether to allow a pro se appellant to participate in, or even to be present at, oral argument. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 284 (1948). Considering the change in position from defendant to appellant, the autonomy interests that survive a felony conviction are less compelling than those motivating the decision in Faretta. Yet the overriding state interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice remains as strong as at the trial level. Thus, the States are clearly within their discretion to conclude that the government’s interests outweigh an invasion of the appellant’s interest in self-representation.
Ill
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the holding nor the reasoning in Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. Our holding is, of course, narrow. It does not preclude the States from recognizing such a right under their own constitutions. Its impact on the law will be minimal, because a lay appellant’s rights to participate in appellate proceedings have long been limited by the well-established conclusions that he has no right to be present during appellate proceedings, Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442 (1892), or to present oral argument, Price, 334 U. S., at 285-286. Meanwhile the rules governing appeals in California, and presumably those in other States as well, seem to protect the ability of indigent litigants to make pro se filings. See, e. g., People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436, 440, 600 P. 2d 1071, 1074 (1979); see also Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). In requiring Martinez, under these circumstances, to accept against his will a state-appointed attorney, the California courts have not deprived him of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the judgment of the California Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
See, e. g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).
Compare Myers v. Collins, 8 F. 3d 249, 252 (CA5 1993) (finding right of self-representation extends to appeals); Campbell v. Blodgett, 940 F. 2d 549 (CA9 1991) (same); Chamberlain v. Ericksen, 744 F. 2d 628, 630 (CA8 1984) (same); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 537 Pa. 581, 583, 645 A. 2d 223, 224 (1994) (same); State v. Van Pelt, 305 Ark. 125, 127, 810 S. W. 2d 27, 28 (1991) (same); Webb v. State, 274 Ind. 540, 542, 412 N. E. 2d 790, 792 (1980) (same); Webb v. State, 533 S. W. 2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (same), with United States v. Gillis, 773 F. 2d 549, 560 (CA4 1985) (finding no right of self-representation on appeal); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F. 2d 239, 246 (CA7 1984) (same); Hill v. State, 656 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1995) (same); State v. Gillespie, 898 S. W. 2d 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (same).
“The colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues of self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers. When the Colonies were first settled, ‘the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing Attorneys-General and Solidtors-General of the Crown and the arbitrary Justices of the King’s Court, all bent on the conviction of those who opposed the King’s prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions.’ This prejudice gained strength in the Colonies where ‘distrust of lawyers became an institution.’ Several Colonies prohibited pleading for hire in the 17th century. The prejudice persisted into the 18th century as ‘the lower classes came to identify lawyers with the upper class.’ The years of Revolution and Confederation saw an upsurge of antilawyer sentiment, a ‘sudden revival, after the War of the Revolution, of the old dislike and distrust of lawyers as a class.’ ” Faretta, 422 U. S., at 826-827 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, in the state eases cited by the Court in Faretta, see 422 U. S., at 813, n. 9, the defendant’s right to represent himself was often the predicate for upholding the waiver of an important right. See, e. g., Mackreth v. Wilson, 31 Ala. App. 191, 193, 15 So. 2d 112, 113 (1943) (failure of the defendant to request counsel equaled an “election” to proceed pro se); Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 822, 451 P. 2d 1014, 1023 (1969) (court relied on defendant’s right of self-representation to uphold an uncounseled guilty plea, despite claims that it was coerced); People v. Nelson, 47 Ill. 2d 570, 268 N. E. 2d 2, 3 (1971) (defendant’s pro se status is predicate for upholding waiver of indictment and jury trial and also to uphold guilty plea); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 562-563, 87 N. E. 2d 192, 195 (1949) (life sentence upheld despite fact that indigent defendant was unable to procure counsel); Westberry v. State, 254 A. 2d 44, 46 (Me. 1969) (guilty plea upheld because defendant failed to claim indigency or to request counsel); State v. Hollman, 232 S. C. 489, 499, 102 S. E. 2d 873, 878 (1958) (right of defendant to represent himself used as basis for finding he had no right to appointed counsel). But see State v. Thomlinson, 78 S. D. 235, 237, 100 N. W. 2d 121, 122 (1960) (vacating conviction based on court’s failure to allow defendant to represent himself); State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 287, 272 P. 2d 195, 199 (1954) (same); Cappetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. App. 1967) (same), rerid, State v. Cappetta, 216 So. 2d 749, 760 (Fla. 1968) (finding voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to proceed pro sé).
See, e. g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103 (1978) (pro se respondent argued, briefed, and prevailed in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and this Court).
A. Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 383, 400 (1938).
See Lobsenz, A Constitutional Right to An Appeal: Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 375,376 (1985). Although Washington was the first State to constitution-alize an appeal as of right, almost all of the States historically had some form of discretionary appellate review. See generally L. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 215-231 (1939).
1J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 308-310 (1883).
Some critics argue that the right to proceed pro se at trial in certain cases is akin to allowing the defendant to waive his right to a fair trial. See, e. g., United States v. Farhad, 190 F. 3d 1097, 1106-1107 (CA9 1999) (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially), cert. pending, No. 99-7127.
Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years after Faretta, 6 Seton Hall Const. L. J. 483, 598 (1996).
See id., at 544-550 (collecting cases).
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On November 24, 1948, the respondent's vessel, the S. S. Oregon, was berthed at a pier in the North River, New York City. About noon on that day Joseph Kermarec came aboard to visit Henry Yves, a member of the ship’s crew. The purpose of the visit was entirely personal, to pay a social call upon Yves and to give him a package to be delivered to a mutual friend in France. In accordance with customary practice permitting crew members to entertain guests aboard the vessel, Yves had obtained a pass from the executive officer authorizing Kermarec to come aboard. As he started to leave the ship several hours later, Kermarec fell and was injured while descending a stairway.
On the theory that his fall had been caused by the defective manner in which a canvas runner had been tacked to the stairway, Kermarec brought an action for personal injuries in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging unseaworthiness of the vessel and negligence on the part of its crew. Federal jurisdiction was invoked by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties, and a jury trial was demanded.
The district judge was of the view that the substantive law of New York was applicable. Accordingly, he eliminated the unseaworthiness claim from the case and instructed the jury that Kermarec was “a gratuitous licensee” who could recover only if the defendant had failed to warn him of a dangerous condition within its actual knowledge, and only if Kermarec himself had been entirely free of contributory negligence.
The jury returned a verdict in Kermarec’s favor. Subsequently the trial court granted a motion to set the verdict aside and dismiss the complaint, ruling that there had been a complete failure of proof that the shipowner had actually known that the stairway was in a dangerous or defective condition. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The opinion of that court does not make clear whether affirmance was based upon agreement with the trial judge that New York law was applicable, or upon a determination that the controlling legal principles would in any event be no different under maritime law. 245 F. 2d 175. Certiorari was granted to examine both of these issues. 355 U. S. 902.
The District Court was in error in ruling that the governing law in this case was that of the State of New York. Kermarec was injured aboard a ship upon navigable waters. It was there that the conduct of which he complained occurred. The legal rights and liabilities arising from that conduct were therefore within the full reach of the admiralty jurisdiction and measurable by the standards of maritime law. See The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Philadelphia & Havre de Grace Steam Tugboat Co., 23 How. 209, 215; The Commerce, 1 Black 574, 579; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213, 215; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 640; Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626, 630; The Admiral Peoples, 295 U. S. 649, 651. If this action had been brought in a state court, reference to admiralty law would have been necessary to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255, 259. Where the plaintiff exercises the right conferred by diversity of citizenship to choose a federal forum, the result is no different, even though he exercises the further right to a jury trial. Whatever doubt may once have existed on that score was effectively laid to rest by Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 410-411. It thus becomes necessary to consider whether prejudice resulted from the court’s application of the substantive law of New York.
In instructing the jury that contributory negligence on Kermarec’s part would operate as a complete bar to recovery, the district judge was clearly in error. The jury should have been told instead that Kermarec’s contributory negligence was to be considered only in mitigation of damages. The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1; Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, 408-409. It is equally clear, however, that this error did not prejudice Kermaree. By returning a verdict in his favor, the jury necessarily found that Kermaree had not in fact been guilty of contributory negligence “even in the slightest degree.”
The district judge refused to submit the issue of unseaworthiness to the jury for the reason that an action for unseaworthiness is unknown to the common law of New York. Although the basis for its action was inappropriate, the court was correct in eliminating the unseaworthiness claim from this case.- Kermaree was not a member of the ship’s company, nor of that broadened class of workmen to whom the admiralty law has latterly extended the absolute right to a seaworthy ship. See Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85; Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406. Kermaree was aboard not to perform ship’s work, but simply to visit a friend.
It is apparent, therefore, that prejudicial error occurred in this case only if the maritime law imposed upon the shipowner a standard of care higher than the duty which the district judge found owing to a gratuitous licensee under the law of New York. If, in other words, the shipowner owed Kermaree the duty of exercising ordinary care, then upon this record Kermaree was entitled to judgment, the jury having resolved the factual issues in his favor under instructions less favorable to him than should have been given. Stated broadly, the decisive issue is thus whether admiralty recognizes the same distinctions between an invitee and a licensee as does the common law.
It is a settled principle of maritime law that a shipowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not members of the crew. Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626; The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1; The Admiral Peoples, 295 U. S. 649. But this Court has never determined whether a different and lower standard of care is demanded if the ship’s visitor is a person to whom the label “licensee” can be attached. The issue must be decided in the performance of the Court’s function in declaring the general maritime law, free from inappropriate common-law concepts. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; The Max Morris, 137 U. S. I.
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism. In an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban society, with its complex economic and individual relationships, modern common-law courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclassifications among traditional common-law categories, and to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and sub-classifications bred by the common law have produced confusion and conflict. As new distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become obscured. Through this semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, towards “imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances.”
For the admiralty law at this late date to import such conceptual distinctions would be foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, at 575. The incorporation of such concepts appears particularly unwarranted when it is remembered that they originated under a legal system in which status depended almost entirely upon the nature of the individual’s estate with respect to real property, a legal system in that respect entirely alien to the law of the sea. We hold that the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case. It follows that in the present case the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded to the District Court with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment accordingly.
It is so ordered.
The pass contained the following language: “The person accepting this pass in consideration thereof assumes all risks of accidents, and expressly agrees that the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique shall not be held liable under any circumstances whether by negligence of their employees, or otherwise, for any injury to his person or for any loss or injury to his property.” The district judge instructed the jury that this attempted disclaimer could have no effect unless it had been made known to Kermarec. The evidence showed that Kermarec had not seen the pass. By its verdict the jury implicitly found that Kermarec had not been informed of the language appearing on- it. Since that finding is not disputed here, we need not consider what effect the attempted disclaimer would have had if Kermarec had been aware of it. See Moore v. American Scantic Line, Inc., 121 F. 2d 767. Compare 46 U. S. C. § 183c.
“With respect to the first issue of fact, namely, the alleged negligence of the defendant, you must bear in mind that the owner of a ship such as the defendant is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to a gratuitous licensee, such as the plaintiff, by any artificial condition on board the ship, only if both of the following conditions are present: (1) if the defendant knows of the unsafe condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff and has reason to believe that the plaintiff will not discover the condition or realize the risk; and (2) if the defendant invites or permits the plaintiff to enter or remain upon the ship without exercising reasonable care either to make the condition reasonably safe or to warn the plaintiff of the condition and risk involved therein.
“In short, in order that the plaintiff recover in this case, he must establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knew of the unsafe condition and invited the plaintiff aboard without either correcting the condition or warning him of it.
“In connection with damages, if you find that the plaintiff’s injuries were the proximate result óf the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence, even in the slightest degree, then the plaintiff cannot recover at all.”
The record clearly justifies a finding that the canvas runner was defectively tacked to the stairway, and that this caused a dangerous condition of which the shipowner’s agent would have known in the exercise of ordinary care. By its verdict, the jury found that much and more.
Cf. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158.
Where there is no impingement upon legislative policy. Cf. United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 236; Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U. S. 282.
Random selection of almost any modern decision will serve to illustrate the point. E. g., Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F. 2d 394 (licensee by express invitation; licensee by implied invitation; bare licensee).
For example, the duty of an occupier toward a licensee under the law of New York, which the District Court thought applicable in the present case, appears far from clear. Compare Fox v. Warner-Quinlan Asphalt Co., 204 N. Y. 240, 245, 97 N. E. 497, 498; Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N. Y. 181, 184, 179 N. E. 378, 379; Paquet v. Barker, 250 App. Div. 771, 293 N. Y. S. 983 (2d Dept.); Byrne v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 362, 10 N. E. 539; Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 109, 174 N. E. 77, 79; Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N. Y. 198, 208, 199 N. E. 56, 60; Mayer v. Temple Properties, 307 N. Y. 559, 563-564, 122 N. E. 2d 909, 911-913; Friedman v. Berkowitz, 206 Misc. 889, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 81.
See Chief Judge Clark’s dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals. 245 F. 2d 175, at 180. A survey here of the thousands of judicial decisions in this area during the last hundred years is as unnecessary as it would be impossible. A recent critical review is to be found in 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, c. xxvn, passim (1956). See also, Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573; Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L. Q. Rev. 182, 359.
This is not to say that concepts of status are not relevant in the law of maritime torts, but only that the meaningful categories are quite different. Membership in the ship’s company, for example, a status that confers an absolute right to a seaworthy ship, is peculiar to the law of the sea. Such status has now been extended to others aboard “doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards.” Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, at 99.
The inconsistent and diverse results reached by courts which have tried to apply to the facts of shipboard life common-law distinctions between licensees and invitees reinforce the conclusion here reached. As to a seaman crossing another vegsel to reach the pier, see Radoslovich v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S. A., 72 F. 2d 367 (invitee); Aho v. Jacobsen, 249 F. 2d 309 (licensee); Anderson v. The E. B. Ward, Jr., 38 F. 44 (invitee); Griffiths v. Seaboard Midland Petroleum Corp., D. C. Md., 1933 A. M. C. 911 (invitee); see also Lauchert v. American S. S. Co., 65 F. Supp. 703 (licensee). As to a guest of a passenger, see McCann v. Anchor Line, 79 F. 2d 338 (invitee); Zaia v. “Italia” Societa Anonyma di Navigazione, 324 Mass. 547, 87 N. E. 2d 183 (licensee); The Champlain, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1934 A. M, C. 25 (invitee). See also Metcalfe v. Cunard S. S. Co., 147 Mass. 66, 16 N. E. 701 (licensee).
The English courts appear to have differentiated between an invitee and a licensee in eases of personal injury on shipboard, without critical inquiry. See, e. g., Smith v. Steele, L. R. 10 Q. B. 125 (1875) and Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co., Ltd., [1943] 2 All E. R. 621. These distinctions have after thorough study (Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. No. 9305 (1954)) been eliminated entirely from the English law by statutory enactment. Occupiers’ Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether the introduction into evidence of a person’s business records, seized during a search of his offices, violates the Fifth Amendment’s command that “[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” We also must determine whether the particular searches and seizures here were “unreasonable” and thus violated the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment.
I
In early 1972, a Bi-County Fraud Unit, acting under the joint auspices of the State’s Attorneys’ Offices of Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, Md., began an investigation of real estate settlement activities in the Washington, D. C., area. At the time, petitioner Andre-sen was an attorney who, as a sole practitioner, specialized in real estate settlements in Montgomery County. During the Fraud Unit’s investigation, his activities came under scrutiny, particularly in connection with a transaction involving Lot 13T in the Potomac Woods subdivision of Montgomery County. The investigation, which included interviews with the purchaser, the mortgage holder, and other lienholders of Lot 13T, as well as an examination of county land records, disclosed that petitioner, acting as settlement attorney, had defrauded Standard-Young Associates, the purchaser of Lot 13T. Petitioner had represented that the property was free of liens and that, accordingly, no title insurance was necessary, when in fact, he knew that there were two outstanding liens on the property. In addition, investigators learned that the lienholders, by threatening to foreclose their liens, had forced a halt to the purchaser’s construction on the property. When Standard-Young had confronted petitioner with this information, he responded by issuing, as an agent of a title insurance company, a title policy guaranteeing clear title to the property. By this action, petitioner also defrauded that insurance company by requiring it to pay the outstanding liens.
The investigators, concluding that there was probable cause to believe that petitioner had committed the state crime of false pretenses, see Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 140 (1976), against Standard-Young, applied for warrants to search petitioner’s law office and the separate office of Mount Vernon Development Corporation, of which petitioner was incorporator, sole shareholder, resident agent, and director. The application sought permission to search for specified documents pertaining to the sale and conveyance of Lot 13T. A judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Montgomery County concluded that there was probable cause and issued the warrants.
The searches of the two offices were conducted simultaneously during daylight hours on October 31, 1972. Petitioner was present during the search of his law office and was free to move about. Counsel for him was present during the latter half of the search. Between 2% and 3% of the files in the office were seized. A single investigator, in the presence of a police officer, conducted the search of Mount Vernon Development Corporation. This search, taking about four hours, resulted in the seizure of less than 5% of the corporation’s files.
Petitioner eventually was charged, partly by information and partly by indictment, with the crime of false pretenses, based on his misrepresentation to Standard-Young concerning Lot 13T, and with fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary, based on similar false claims made to three home purchasers. Before trial began, petitioner moved to suppress the seized documents. The trial court held a full suppression hearing. At the hearing, the State returned to petitioner 45 of the 52 items taken from the offices of the corporation. The trial court suppressed six other corporation items on the ground that there was no connection between them and the crimes charged. The net result was that the only item seized from the corporation’s offices that was not returned by the State or suppressed was a single file labeled “Potomac Woods General.” In addition, the State returned to petitioner seven of the 28 items seized from his law office, and the trial court suppressed four other law office items based on its determination that there was no connection between them and the crime charged.
With respect to all the items not suppressed or returned, the trial court ruled that admitting them into evidence would not violate the Fifth and Fourth Amendments. It reasoned that the searches and seizures did not force petitioner to be a witness against himself because he had not been required to produce the seized documents, nor would he be compelled to authenticate them. Moreover, the search warrants were based on probable cause, and the documents not returned or suppressed were either directly related to Lot 13T, and therefore within the express language of the warrants, or properly seized and otherwise admissible to show a pattern of criminal conduct relevant to the charge concerning Lot 13T.
At trial, the State proved its case primarily by public land records and by records provided by the complaining purchasers, lienholders, and the title insurance company. It did introduce into evidence, however, a number of the seized items. Three documents from the “Potomac Woods General” file, seized during the search of petitioner's corporation, were admitted. These were notes in the handwriting of an employee who used them to prepare abstracts in the course of his duties as a title searcher and law clerk. The notes concerned deeds of trust affecting the Potomac Woods subdivision and related to the transaction involving Lot 13T. Five items seized from petitioner's law office were also admitted. One contained information relating to the transactions with one of the defrauded home buyers. The second was a file partially devoted to the Lot 13T transaction; among the documents were settlement statements, the deed conveying the property to Standard-Young Associates, and the original and a copy of a notice to the buyer about releases of liens. The third item was a file devoted exclusively to Lot 13T. The fourth item consisted of a copy of a deed of trust, dated March 27, 1972, from the seller of certain lots in the Potomac Woods subdivision to a lienholder. The fifth item contained drafts of documents and memoranda written in petitioner’s handwriting.
After a trial by jury, petitioner was found guilty upon five counts of false pretenses and three counts of fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary. He was sentenced to eight concurrent two-year prison terms.
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, four of the five false-pretenses counts were reversed because the indictment had failed to allege intent to defraud, a necessary element of the state offense. Only the count pertaining to Standard-Young’s purchase of Lot 13T remained. With respect to this count of false pretenses and the three counts of misappropriation by a fiduciary, the Court of Special Appeals rejected petitioner’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims. Specifically, it held that the warrants were supported by probable cause, that they did not authorize a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the items admitted into evidence against petitioner at trial were within the scope of the warrants or were otherwise properly seized. It agreed with the trial court that the search had not violated petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights because petitioner had not been compelled to do anything. 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A. 2d 78 (1975).
We granted certiorari limited to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues. 423 U. S. 822 (1975).
II
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 (1964), provides that “[n]o person.,. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” As the Court often has noted, the development of this protection was in part a response to certain historical practices, such as ecclesiastical inquisitions and the proceedings of the Star Chamber, “which placed a premium on compelling subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their own lips.” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 440 (1974). See generally L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968). The “historic function” of the privilege has been to protect a “ ‘natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records.' ” Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85, 89-90 (1974), quoting from United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 701 (1944).
There is no question that the records seized from petitioner’s offices and introduced against him were incriminating. Moreover, it is undisputed that some of these business records contain statements made by petitioner. Cf. United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 21-22 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 266-267 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967); and Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966). The question, therefore, is whether the seizure of these business records, and their admission into evidence at his trial, compelled petitioner to testify against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This question may be said to have been reserved in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 302-303 (1967), and it was adverted to in United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 441 n. 3 (1976).
Petitioner contends that “the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination applies as well to personal business papers seized from his offices as it does to the same papers being required to be produced under a subpoena.” Brief for Petitioner 9. He bases his argument, naturally, on dicta in a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search for and seizure of a person's private papers violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633 (1886), the Court said: “[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.” And in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76 (1906), it was observed that “the substance of the offense is the compulsory production of private papers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum, against which the person... is entitled to protection.”
We do not agree, however, that these broad statements compel suppression of this petitioner’s business records as a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In the very recent case of Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 (1976), the Court held that an attorney’s production, pursuant to a lawful summons, of his client’s tax records in his hands did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege of the taxpayer “because enforcement against a taxpayer’s lawyer would not ‘compel’ the taxpayer to do anything — and certainly would not compel him to be a ‘witness’ against himself.” Id., at 397. We recognized that the continued validity of the broad statements contained in some of the Court’s earlier cases had been discredited by later opinions. Id., at 407-409. In those earlier cases, the legal predicate for the inadmissibility of the evidence seized was a violation of the Fourth Amendment; the unlawfulness of the.search and seizure was thought to supply the compulsion of the accused necessary to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Compulsion of the accused was also absent in Couch v. United States, 409 TJ. S. 322 (1973), where the Court held that a summons served on a taxpayer’s accountant requiring him to produce the taxpayer’s personal business records in his possession did not violate the taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Similarly, in this case, petitioner was not asked to say or to do anything. The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search for and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when these records were introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner to speak, other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not present.
This case thus falls within the principle stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: “A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457, 458 (1913). This principle recognizes that the protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment “adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him.” Couch v. United States, 409 U. S., at 328. Thus, although the Fifth Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information, see Fisher v. United States, supra, a seizure of the same materials by law enforcement officers differs in a crucial respect — the individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence.
A contrary determination that the seizure of a person’s business records and their introduction into evidence at a criminal trial violates the Fifth Amendment, would undermine the principles announced in earlier cases. Nearly a half century ago, in Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927), the Court upheld, against both Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, the admission into evidence of business records seized during a search of the accused’s illegal liquor business. And in Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 (1960), the Court again upheld, against both Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, the introduction into evidence at an espionage trial of false identity papers and a coded message seized during a search of the accused’s hotel room. These cases recognize a general rule: "There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant.” Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 309 (1921).
Moreover, a contrary determination would prohibit the admission of evidence traditionally used in criminal cases and traditionally admissible despite the Fifth Amendment. For example, it would bar the admission of an accused’s gambling records in a prosecution for gambling; a note given temporarily to a bank teller during a robbery and subsequently seized in the accused's automobile or home in a prosecution for bank robbery; and incriminating notes prepared, but not sent, by an accused in a kidnaping or blackmail prosecution.
We find a useful analogy to the Fifth Amendment question in those cases that deal with the “seizure” of oral communications. As the Court has explained, “‘[t]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimination... is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to force him to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him.' ” Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S., at 88, quoting United States v. White, 322 U. S., at 698. The significant aspect of this principle was apparent and applied in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966), where the Court rejected the contention that an informant's “seizure” of the accused’s conversation with him, and his subsequent testimony at trial concerning that conversation, violated the Fifth Amendment. The rationale was that, although the accused’s statements may have been elicited by the informant for the purpose of gathering evidence against him, they were made voluntarily. We see no reasoned distinction to be made between the compulsion upon the accused in that case and the compulsion in this one. In each, the communication, whether oral or written, was made voluntarily. The fact that seizure was contemporaneous with the communication in Hoffa but subsequent to the communication here does not affect the question whether the accused was compelled to speak.
Finally, we do not believe that permitting the introduction into evidence of a person’s business records seized during an otherwise lawful search would offend or undermine any of the policies undergirding the privilege. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964).
In this case, petitioner, at the time he recorded his communication, at the time of the search, and at the time the records were admitted at trial, was not subjected to “the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Ibid. Indeed, he was never required to say or to do anything under penalty of sanction. Similarly, permitting the admission of the records in question does not convert our accusatorial system of justice into an inquisitorial system. “The requirement of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the protection of the accused from confessions extorted through whatever form of police pressures, the right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate, the right to assistance of counsel, to be supplied by government when circumstances make it necessary, the duty to advise an accused of his constitutional rights — these are all characteristics of the ac-cusatorial system and manifestations of its demands.” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 54 (1949). None of these attributes is endangered by the introduction of business records “independently secured through skillful investigation.” Ibid. Further, the search for and seizure of business records pose no danger greater than that inherent in every search that evidence will be “elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses.” 378 U. S., at 55. In this case, the statements seized were voluntarily committed to paper before the police arrived to search for them, and petitioner was not treated discourteously during the search. Also, the “good cause” to “disturb,” ibid., petitioner was independently determined by the judge who issued the warrants; and the State bore the burden of executing them. Finally, there is no chance, in this case, of petitioner’s statements being self-deprecatory and untrustworthy because they were extracted from him — they were already in existence and had been made voluntarily.
We recognize, of course, that the Fifth Amendment protects privacy to some extent. However, “the Court has never suggested that every invasion of privacy violates the privilege.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S., at 399. Indeed, we recently held that unless incriminating testimony is “compelled,” any invasion of privacy is outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s protection, saying that “the Fifth Amendment protects against ‘compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.’ ” Id., at 401. Here, as we have already noted, petitioner was not compelled to testify in any manner.
Accordingly, we hold that the search of an individual’s office for business records, their seizure, and subsequent introduction into evidence do not offend the Fifth Amendment’s proscription that “[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
Ill
We turn next to petitioner’s contention that rights guaranteed him by the Fourth Amendment were violated because the descriptive terms of the search warrants were so broad as to make them impermissible “general” warrants, and because certain items were seized in violation of the principles of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967).
The specificity of the search warrants. Although petitioner concedes that the warrants for the most part were models of particularity, Brief for Petitioner 28, he contends that they were rendered fatally “general” by the addition, in each warrant, to the exhaustive list of particularly described documents, of the phrase “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown.” App. A. 95-A. 96, A. 115. The quoted language, it is argued, must be read in isolation and without reference to the rest of the long sentence at the end of which it appears. When read “properly/’ petitioner contends, it permits the search for and seizure of any evidence of any crime.
General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he problem [posed by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.... [The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem] by requiring a 'particular description’ of the things to be seized.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 467 (1971). This requirement '"makes general searches... impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.’ ” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 485 (1965), quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U. S., at 196.
In this case we agree with the determination of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland that the challenged phrase must be read as authorizing only the search for and seizure of evidence relating to “the crime of false pretenses with respect to Lot 13T.” 24 Md. App., at 167, 331 A. 2d, at 103. The challenged phrase is not a separate sentence. Instead, it appears in each warrant at the end of a sentence containing a lengthy list of specified and particular items to be seized, all pertaining to Lot 13T. We think it clear from the context that the term “crime” in the warrants refers only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of Lot 13T. The “other fruits” clause is one of a series that follows the colon after the word “Maryland.” All clauses in the series are limited by what precedes that colon, namely, “items pertaining to... lot 13, block T.” The warrants, accordingly, did not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for evidence of other crimes but only to search for and seize evidence relevant to the crime of false pretenses and Lot 13T.
The admissibility of certain items of evidence in light of Warden v. Hayden. Petitioner charges that the seizure of documents pertaining to' a lot other than Lot 13T violated the principles of Warden v. Hayden and therefore should have been suppressed. His objection appears to be that these papers were not relevant to the Lot 13T charge and were admissible only to prove another crime with which he was charged after the search. The fact that these documents were used to help form the evidentiary basis for another charge, it is argued, shows that the documents were seized solely for that purpose.
The State replies that Warden v. Hayden was not violated and that this is so because the challenged evidence is relevant to the question whether petitioner committed the crime of false pretenses with respect to Lot 13T. In Maryland, the crime is committed when a person makes a false representation of a past or existing fact, with intent to defraud and knowledge of its falsity, and obtains any chattel, money, or valuable security from another, who relies on the false representation to his detriment. Polisher v. State, 11 Md. App. 555, 560, 276 A. 2d 102, 104 (1971). Thus, the State is required to prove intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. The State consequently argues that the documents pertaining to another lot in the Potomac Woods subdivision demonstrate that the misrepresentation with respect to Lot 13T was not the result of mistake on the part of petitioner.
In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S., at 307, the Court stated that when the police seize “ ‘mere evidence,’ probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. In so doing, consideration of police purposes will be required.” In this case, we conclude that the trained special investigators reasonably could have believed that the evidence specifically dealing with another lot in the Potomac Woods subdivision could be used to show petitioner’s intent with respect to the Lot 13T transaction.
The Court has often recognized that proof of similar acts is admissible to show intent or the absence of mistake. In Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613 (1949), for example, a case involving a scheme of fraudulent conduct, it was said:
“The evidence showed the presentation of eleven other false invoices.... The trial court also admitted it at the conclusion of the case ‘for the sole purpose of proving guilty intent, motive, or guilty knowledge’ of the defendants. Evidence that similar and related offenses were committed in this period tended to show a consistent pattern of conduct highly relevant to the issue of intent.” Id., at 618.
In the present case, when the special investigators secured the search warrants, they had been informed of a number of similar charges against petitioner arising out of Potomac Woods transactions. And, by reading numerous documents and records supplied by the Lot 13T and other complainants, and by interviewing witnesses, they had become familiar with petitioner's method of operation. Accordingly, the relevance of documents pertaining specifically to a lot other than Lot 13T, and their admissibility to show the Lot 13T offense, would have been apparent. Lot 13T and the other lot had numerous features in common. Both were in the same section of the Potomac Woods subdivision; both had been owned by the same person; and transactions concerning both had been handled extensively by petitioner. Most important was the fact that there were two deeds of trust in which both lots were listed as collateral. Unreleased liens respecting both lots were evidenced by these deeds of trusts. Petitioner’s transactions relating to the other lot, subject to the same liens as Lot 13T, therefore, were highly relevant to the question whether his failure to deliver title to Lot 13T free of all encumbrances was mere inadvertence. Although these records subsequently were used to secure additional charges against petitioner, suppression of this evidence in this case was not required. The fact that the records could be used to show intent to defraud with respect to Lot 13T permitted the seizure and satisfied the requirements of Warden v. Hayden.
The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Before these search warrants were executed, the Bi-County Fraud Unit had also received complaints concerning other Potomac Woods real estate transactions conducted by petitioner. The gist of the complaints was that petitioner, as settlement attorney, took money from three sets of home purchasers upon assurances that he would use it to procure titles to their properties free and clear of all encumbrances. It was'charged that he had misappropriated the money so that they had not received clear title to the properties as promised.
It is established that the privilege against self-incrimination may not be invoked with respect to corporate records. Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S. 85, 88-89 (1974); Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 70 (1906). It appears, however, that the records seized at the corporation’s office were really not corporate records, but were records generated by petitioner’s practice as a real estate lawyer. United States Appendix of Exhibits 1-3.
This item was introduced as proof that petitioner failed to pay recording taxes, a charge that was abandoned before the ease was submitted to the jury.
The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed with this Court, has suggested that the evidence forming the basis of two of the counts of misappropriation by a fiduciary, which were upheld on appeal, was obtained entirely from sources other than petitioner’s offices. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12-14, 24-25, n. 17. This fact, if true, does not, of course, affect our jurisdiction but it would permit us to apply the discretionary concurrent-sentence doctrine, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 791 (1969), and thereby decline to consider petitioner’s constitutional claims. Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837, 848 n. 16 (1973).
Both the trial and appellate courts in this case recognized the conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals over whether documentary evidence not obtainable by means of a subpoena or a summons may be obtained by means of a search warrant. Thus, in Hill v. Philpott, 445 F. 2d 144 (CA7), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 991 (1971), the Court of Appeals held that evidence not obtainable by means of a subpoena could not be seized by means of a search warrant. The substantial majority position is of the opposite view. Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F. 2d 175 (CA10 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-601; United States v. Murray, 492 F. 2d 178, 191 (CA9 1973); Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 F. 2d 1119 (CA8 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 956 (1973); United States v. Blank, 459 F. 2d 383 (CA6), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 887 (1972); United States v. Scharfman, 448 F. 2d 1352 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 919 (1972); United States v. Bennett, 409 F. 2d 888, 896 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Jessup v. United States, 396 U. S. 852 (1969). The majority position accords with the views of Wigmore. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2264, p. 380 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
The Court of Special Appeals adopted the majority position and, therefore, upheld the admission of the records into evidence.
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), for example, it was held that the Government could not, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, obtain “mere evidence” from the accused; accordingly, a subpoena seeking “mere evidence” constituted compulsion of the accused against which he could invoke the Fifth Amendment, The “mere evidence” rule was overturned in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 301-302 (1967).
The “convergence theory” of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is also illustrated by Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925), where the seizure of contraband pursuant to a search hot incident to arrest and otherwise unlawful in violation of the Fourth Amendment was held to permit the accused to invoke the Fifth Amendment when the Government sought to introduce this evidence in a criminal proceeding against him.
Petitioner relies on the statement in Couch that “possession bears the closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment,” 409 U. S., at 331, in support of his argument that possession of incriminating evidence itself supplies the predicate for invocation of the privilege. Couch, of course, was concerned with the production of documents pursuant to a summons directed to the accountant where there might have been a possibility of compulsory self-incrimination by the principal’s implicit or explicit “testimony” that the documents were those identified in the summons. The risk of authentication is not present where the documents are seized pursuant to a search warrant.
“The privilege against self-incrimination... reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusa-torial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load’... ; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual ‘to a private enclave where he may lead a private life’... ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,’ is often ‘a protection to the innocent.’ ”
Petitioner also contends that the affidavits do not establish probable cause and that the failure of the State formally to introduce the warrants into evidence violated his constitutional rights. These contentions may be disposed of summarily.
The bases of petitioner’s argument that the affidavits failed to establish probable cause are two: The affidavits, in violation of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), did not establish the reliability of the information or the credibility of the informants; and the information on which they were based was so stale that there was no reason to believe that the documents sought were still in petitioner’s possession.
The affidavits clearly establish the reliability of the information related and the credibility of its sources. The complainants are named, their positions are described, and their transactions with petitioner are related in a comprehensive fashion. In addition, the special-agent affiants aver that they have verified, at least in part, the complainants’ charges by examining their correspondence with petitioner, numerous documents reflecting the transactions, and public land records. Copies of many of these records and documents are attached to the affidavits; others are described in detail. Finally, the agents aver that they have interviewed, with positive results, other persons involved in the real estate transactions that were the object of the investigation. Rarely have we seen warrant-supporting affidavits so complete and so thorough. Petitioner’s probable-cause argument is without merit. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102 (1965).
It is also argued that there was a three-month delay between the completion of the transactions on which the warrants were based, and the ensuing searches, and that this time lapse precluded a determination that there was probable cause to believe that petitioner’s offices contained evidence of the crime. This contention is belied by the particular facts of the case. The business records sought were prepared in the ordinary course of petitioner’s business in his law office or that of his real estate corporation. It is eminently reasonable to expect that such records would be maintained in those offices for a period of time and surely as long as the three months required for the investigation of a complex real estate scheme. In addition, special investigators knew that petitioner had secured a release on Lot 13T with respect to one lien-holder only three weeks before the searches and that another lien remained to be released. All this, when considered with other information demonstrating that Potomac Woods was still a current concern of petitioner, amply supports the belief that petitioner retained the sought-for records.
The final contention is that under Bumper v. North Garolina, 391 U. S. 543, 550 n.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mb,. Justice Stewart
delivered .the opinion of the Court.
.. Section 302 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides: “(b) It shall be unlawful for any representative of any employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce to receive or accept, or to agree to receive or accept, from the employer of such employees any money or other thing of value.” Under § 302 (c) of the Act: this broad prohibition is made inapplicable in five situations, one being, “with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and'exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer . . .” pro- . vided that the trust fund meets certain standards specified in that subsection.
The petitioner, a representative of employees in an industry affecting commerce, was convicted in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico of violating § 302 (b) of the' Act by receiving $15,000 from two of their employers. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 256 F. 2d 549. Certiorari was granted because the case presents an important question as to the scope of this provision of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. 358 U. S. 812.
The facts are substantially undisputed. In 1953 the petitioner was president of a union which represented the employees of two affiliated corporations. In that capacity he negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the employers. This agreement provided for the establishment of a welfare fund, which, it is unquestioned, met the requisite criteria of § 302 (c) (5) of the Act. It was agreed that the petitioner would be the union repre--sentative on the joint committee which was to administer the fund. After the agreement was signed, the petitioner told the employers’ representative that there was to be a union meeting that evening, and that he wanted to exhibit the welfare fund checks to the union members. Accordingly, the petitioner was given two checks for $7,500. Attached vouchers identified the checks as the employers’ contributions to the welfare fund.
Instead of subsequently depositing the checks in the existing welfare- fund bank account, however, the petitioner used them to opén an account in the name of the fund in another bank. A few days thereafter, he gave the bank a purported resolution from the union’s board of directors authorizing withdrawals from this account upon his signature alone. As soon as the employers learned what had happened, they attempted to secure performance of the agreement for joint administration of the fund. Over a period of several months, however, the petitioner used the money for his own personal purposes and, after transferring the funds to another account, for nonwelfare union purposes as well.
The Government does not maintain that embezzlement by an employee representative from an employer-financed welfare fund would violate the federal statute under which the petitioner was convicted. It contends, however, that in this case the jury could properly find that the petitioner when he accepted the two checks intended to use the funds for his personal purposes, and that he was therefore guilty not of embezzlement, but of conduct amounting to larceny, by trick. We agree that the evidence could properly support an inference that the petitioner’s purpose from the outset was to appropriate the two checks for his own usé. We cannot agree, however, that this conduct violated § 302 (b) of the Act.
Section 302 (b) is a reciprocal of § 302 (a), applicable to employers, which provides that “(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay or deliver, or to agree to pay or deliver, any money or other thing of value to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce.” The good faith of the employers in delivering the two checks to the petitioner— their intent that the money go to the welfare fund created by .the collective bargaining agreement — was not questioned throughout the trial and is not questioned here. The sole purpose of the delivery of the checks, therefore, was /to make a lawful payment. What the petitioner received were checks “paid to a trust fund.” The transaction, therefore, was within the precise language of § 302 (c), and thus was not a violation of § 302 (b).
This is not to say that the statute requires mutuality of guilt for the conviction of éither the employer or the representative of employees. An employer might be guilty under subsection (a) if he paid money to a representative of employees even though the latter had no .intention of accepting. Cf. Lunsford v. United States, 200 F. 2d 237; Schneider v. United States, 192 F. 2d 498. A representative might be guilty if he coerced payments from an innocent and unwilling employer. Cf. United States v. Waldin, 149 F. Supp. 912, aff’d 253 F. 2d 551. Both would be guilty if the payment were ostensibly made for one of the lawful purposes’specified in § 302 (c) if both knew that such a purpose, was merely a sham.
The present case, however, is not an analogue to any of those situations. The checks were drawn by the employers and delivered to the petitioner as payment to a union welfare- fund. Their receipt by him,-therefore, was not a violation of the federal statute, whether his intent to misappropriate existed at the time of receipt or was formed later.
We cpnstrue a criminal statute. “It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95; United States v. Halseth, 342 U. S. 277; Krichman v. United States, 256 U. S. 363. We are mindful, :'of course, that, “though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.” United States v. Wiltberger, supra, at 95. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it, “Wp* agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws-with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying, what they obviously mean.” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339.
An examination o.f the legislative history confirms that á literal construction of this-statute does no violence to common sense') .When Congress enacted § 302 its purpose was not .to assist the States in punishing criminal.conduct traditionally within their jurisdiction, but to deal with problems peculiar to collective bargaining. The provision was enacted as part of a comprehensive revision of federal labor policy in the light of experience acquired during the years following passage of the Wagner Act, .and was aimed at practices which Congress considered inimical to the integrity of the collective bargaining process.
Throughout the. debates in the Seventy-ninth and Eightieth Congresses there was not the slightest indication that § 302 was intended to duplicate state criminal laws. Those members of Congress who supported the amendment were concerned with corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of employee representatives by employers, with extortion by employee representatives, and with the possible abuse by union officers of the power which they might achieve if welfare funds were left to their sole control. Congressional attention was focussed particularly upon the latter problem because of the demands which had then recently been made by a large international union for the establishment of a welfare fund to be financed by employers’ contributions and administered exclusively by union officials. See United States v. Ryan, 350 U. S. 299.
Congress believed that if welfare funds were established which did not define with specificity the benefits payable thereunder, a substantial danger existed' that such funds might be employed to perpetuate control of .union officers, for political purposes,' or even for personal gain. See 92 Cong. Rec. 4892-4894, 4899, 5181, 5345-5346; S. Rep.. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 52; 93 Cong; Rec. 4678, 4746-4747.' To remove these dangers, specific standards were established to assure that welfare funds would be established only for purposes which Congress' considered proper and expended-only for the purposes for which they were established. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev¡ 274, 290. Continuing compliance with these standards in the administration of welfare funds was made explicitly enforceable in federal district courts by civil proceedings under § 302 (e). The legislative history is devoid of any suggestion that defalcating trustees were to be held accountable under federal law, except by way of the injunctive remedy provided in that subsection.
Without doubt the petitioner’s conduct was reprehensible and immoral. It can be assumed also that he offended local criminal law. But, for the reasons stated, we hold that he did not criminally violate § 302 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
Reversed.
The relevant text of §302 (c), as it appears in 29 U. S. C. § 186 (e) is .as follows: “(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable ... (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either fronrprineipal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on- retirement or death of .employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, ór accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a .written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provision for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such'pensions or annuities.”
Sentence was imposed under authority of § 302 (d) of the Act, which provides: “(d) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction' thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. . .
The fund was to be-identical in amount and purpose to a weliare fund which had been created in 1952 under a previous collective bargaining agreement. The petitioner had also been the union representative on the committee which administered that fund.
Compare S. 3974, § 109 (a), 85th Cong., 2d Sess., the so-called Kennedy-Ives bill, which would have provided criminal penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of $10,000 for “Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or .converts to his own use or the use of another any of the moneys, funds, securities, property, or other assets of an organization which is exempt from taxation under section 501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 of which he is an officer or by whom he is employed directly or indirectly . . .
In argument to the trial court, government counsel made the following statement: “The employer in this case, I would like to say, complied with the law. The employer set up a welfare fund in accordance with the law, and in accordance with the testimony by Mr. Goyco and other documentary evidence, the letter to the Banco de Ponce, the employer did all it could to make compliance with the law, because there could be a lawful welfare fund, so that’s as far as the employer is concerned.”
Section 302 had its origin in an amendment to the Case bill, H. R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., proposed by Senator Byrd, 92 Cong. Rec. 4809, which prohibited payment by an employer, or receipt by a representative, of any money or other thing of value unless the payment was for wages or for union dues withheld by the employer under a checkoff agreement. After several modifications, including one substantially similar to subsection (c) (5) which was proposed by Senators Taft and Ball, the amendment was agreed to by the Senate, 92 Cong. Rec. 5521-5522, and the Case bill passed. 92 Cong. Rec. 5739. The House accepted the Senate amendments, 92 Cong. Rec. 5946, but the President vetoed the bill, 92 Cong. Rec. 6674^6678, and it failed of passage over his veto. 92 Cong. Rec. 6678.
In the Eightieth Congress the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported out an original bill, S. 1126, containing no reference to payments by an employer to a representative other than that which had been contained in § 8 (2) of the Wagner Act. A minority of the Committee, including Senators Taft and Ball, filed their “Supplemental Views” in which they stated their intention to offer from the floor “an amendment reinserting in the bill, a provision regarding so-called welfare funds similar to the section in the Case' bill approved by the Senate at the last session.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 52. The amendment was adopted by the Senate, 93 Cong. Rec. 4754, accepted by the Conference Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 24-25, 67, and enacted as § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
In explaining the necessity for adoption of the amendment which he offered to the Case bill, Senator Byrd stated: “My amendment would prevent an employer from paying a royalty to the representative of a union. He would be clearly liable, under the provisions of this amendment, if he paid a royalty or other'money to the representative of a labor union, the purpose mf which was to bribe that representative.” 92 Cong. Rec. 4893. See also 92 Cong. Rec. 5428; 93 Cong. Rec. 4678.
Senator Taft, in speaking for the amendment to S. 1126 which had previously been proposed on the floor of the Senate by Senator Ball, stated that it was intended to deal with “extortion or a case where the union representative is shakihg down the employer.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4746.
“(e) The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of the Territories and possessions shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, and subject to the provisions of section 381 of Title 28 (relating to notice to opposite party) to restrain violations of this section, without regard to the provisions of section 17 of Title 15 and section 52 of this title, and the provisions of sections 101-110 and 113-115 of this title.” 29 U. S. C. § 186 (e).
“(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable . . . (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or 'accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree/upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in the event of their failure .to agree within a' reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities.”
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case centers around the respondent union’s peaceful handbilling of the businesses operating in a shopping mall in Tampa, Florida, owned by petitioner, the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo). The union’s primary labor dispute was with H. J. High Construction Company (High) over alleged substandard wages and fringe benefits. High was retained by the H. J. Wilson Company (Wilson) to construct a department store in the mall, and neither DeBartolo nor any of the other 85 or so mall tenants had any contractual right to influence the selection of contractors.
The union, however, sought to obtain their influence upon Wilson and High by distributing handbills asking mall customers not to shop at any of the stores in the mall “until the Mall’s owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits.” The handbills’ message was that “[t]he payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working person’s ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage standard of the entire community.” The handbills made clear that the union was seeking only a consumer boycott against the other mall tenants, not a secondary strike by their employees. At all four entrances to the mall for about three weeks in December 1979, the union peacefully distributed the handbills without any accompanying picketing or patrolling.
After DeBartolo failed to convince the union to alter the language of the handbills to state that its dispute did not involve DeBartolo or the mall lessees other than Wilson and to limit its distribution to the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s construction site, it filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), charging the union with engaging in unfair labor practices under § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4). The Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint, but the Board eventually dismissed it, concluding that the handbilling was protected by the publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4). Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun cil, 252 N. L. R. B. 702 (1980). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board, 662 F. 2d 264 (1981), but this Court reversed in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U. S. 147 (1983). There, we concluded that the handbilling did not fall within the proviso’s limited scope of exempting “publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer’s product is ‘distributed by’ the secondary employer” because DeBartolo and the other tenants, as opposed to Wilson, did not distribute products of High. Id., at 155-157. Since there had not been a determination below whether the union’s handbilling fell within the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), and, if so, whether it was protected by the First Amendment, we remanded the case.
On remand, the Board held that the union’s handbilling was proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 273 N. L. R. B. 1431 (1985). It stated that under its prior cases “handbilling and other activity urging a consumer boycott constituted coercion.” Id., at 1432. The Board reasoned that “[appealing to the public not to patronize secondary employers is an attempt to inflict economic harm on the secondary employers by causing them to lose business,” and “such appeals constitute ‘economic retaliation’ and are therefore a form of coercion.” Id., at 1432, n. 6. It viewed the object of the hand-billing as attempting “to force the mall tenants to cease doing business with DeBartolo in order to force DeBartolo and/or Wilson’s not to do business with High.” Id., at 1432. The Board observed that it need not inquire whether the prohibition of this handbilling raised serious questions under the First Amendment, for “the statute’s literal language and the applicable case law require[d]” a finding of a violation. Ibid. Finally, it reiterated its longstanding position that “as a congressionally created administrative agency, we will presume the constitutionality of the Act we administer.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F. 2d 1328, 1346 (1986). Because there would be serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4) could constitutionally ban peaceful hand-billing not involving nonspeech elements, such as patrolling, the court applied our decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979), to determine if there was a clear congressional intent to proscribe such handbilling. The language of the section, the court held, revealed no such intent, and the legislative history indicated that Congress, by using the phrase “threaten, coerce, or restrain,” was concerned with secondary picketing and strikes rather than appeals to consumers not involving picketing. 796 F. 2d, at 1336-1340. The court also concluded that the publicity proviso did not manifest congressional intent to ban all speech not coming within its terms because it was “drafted as an interpretive, explanatory section” and not as an exception to an otherwise all-encompassing prohibition on publicity in § 8(b)(4). Id., at 1344. The court went on to construe the section as not prohibiting consumer publicity; DeBartolo petitioned for certiorari. Because this case presents important questions of federal constitutional and labor law, we granted the petition, 482 U. S. 913 (1987), and now affirm.
The Board, the agency entrusted by Congress with the authority to administer the NLRA, has the “special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963); see Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U. S. 95, 114 (1985); NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1958). Here, the Board has construed § 8(b)(4) of the Act to cover handbilling at a mall entrance urging potential customers not to trade with any retailers in the mall, in order to exert pressure on the proprietor of the mall to influence a particular mall tenant not to do business with a nonunion construction contractor. That statutory interpretation by the Board would normally be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to the intent of Congress. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843, and n. 9 (1984).
Another rule of statutory construction, however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Catholic Bishop, supra, at 499-501, 504. This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate. E. g., Catholic Bishop, supra, at 500-501; Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408 (1909); Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448-449 (1830) (Story, J.). As was stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895), “[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it. See Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 269 (1884).
We agree with the Court of Appeals and respondents that this case calls for the invocation of the Catholic Bishop rule, for the Board’s construction of the statute, as applied in this case, poses serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)(4) under the First Amendment. The handbills involved here truthfully revealed the existence of a labor dispute and urged potential customers of the mall to follow a wholly legal course of action, namely, not to patronize the retailers doing business in the mall. The handbilling was peaceful. No picketing or patrolling was involved. On its face, this was expressive activity arguing that substandard wages should be opposed by abstaining from shopping in a mall where such wages were paid. Had the union simply been leafletting the public generally, including those entering every shopping mall in town, pursuant to an annual educational effort against substandard pay, there is little doubt that legislative proscription of such leaflets would pose a substantial issue of validity under the First Amendment. The same may well be true in this case, although here the handbills called attention to a specific situation in the mall allegedly involving the payment of unacceptably low wages by a construction contractor.
That a labor union is the leafletter and that a labor dispute was involved does not foreclose this analysis. We do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. The handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical commercial speech such as advertising the price of a product or arguing its merits, for they pressed the benefits of unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living of the populace. Of course, commercial speech itself is protected by the First Amendment, Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976), and however these handbills are to be classified, the Court of Appeals was plainly correct in holding that the Board’s construction would require deciding serious constitutional issues. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 534-535, 537 (1980); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 102-103 (1979); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419-420 (1971).
The Board was urged to construe the statute in light of the asserted constitutional considerations, but thought that it was constrained by its own prior authority and cases in the Courts of Appeals, as well' as by the express language of the Act, to hold that § 8(b)(4) must be construed to forbid the handbilling involved here. Even if this construction of the Act were thought to be a permissible one, we are quite sure that in light of the traditional rule followed in Catholic Bishop, we must independently inquire whether there is another interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly be ascribed to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). This the Court has done in several cases.
In NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 284 (1960), for example, the Court rejected the Board’s interpretation of the phrase “restrain or coerce” to include peaceful recognitional picketing and stated:
“In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established flow from such picketing. Therefore, unless there is the clearest indication in the legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(A) supporting the Board’s claim of power under that section, we cannot sustain the Board’s order here. We now turn to an examination of the legislative history.”
That examination of the legislative history failed to yield the requisite “clearest indication.” Similarly, in NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 63 (1964) (Tree Fruits), we disagreed with the Board’s determination that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited all consumer picketing at a secondary establishment, no matter the economic consequences of that picketing, because our examination of the legislative history led us to “conclude that it does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and, particularly, any concern with peaceful picketing when it is limited, as here, to persuading” customers not to purchase a specific product of the secondary establishment. We once more looked for the “isolated evils” that Congress had focused on because “[b]oth the congressional policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Id., at 62-63; see id., at 67, 71. Because there was not the required “clearest indication in the legislative history,” we rejected the Board’s interpretation that limited expressive activities. Again, in Catholic Bishop, we independently determined whether the Board’s jurisdiction extended to parochial schools in the face of a substantial First Amendment challenge, although the Board itself had previously considered the First Amendment challenge and presumably interpreted the statute cognizable of those limits. 440 U. S., at 497-499.
We follow this course here and conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the section is open to a construction that obviates deciding whether a congressional prohibition of handbilling on the facts of this case would violate the First Amendment.
The case turns on whether handbilling such as involved here must be held to “threaten, coerce, or restrain any person” to cease doing business with another, within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). We note first that “inducting] or encouragting]” employees of the secondary employer to strike is proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(i). But more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or restraints. Those words, we have said, are “nonspecific, indeed vague,” and should be interpreted with “caution” and not given a “broad sweep,” Drivers, supra, at 290; and in applying § 8(b)(1)(A) they were not to be construed to reach peaceful recognitional picketing. Neither is there any necessity to construe such language to reach the handbills involved in this case. There is no suggestion that the leaflets had any coercive effect on customers of the mall. There was no violence, picketing, or patrolling and only an attempt to persuade customers not to shop in the mall.
The Board nevertheless found that the handbilling “coerced” mall tenants and explained in a footnote that “[a]p-pealing to the public not to patronize secondary employers is an attempt to inflict economic harm on the secondary employers by causing them to lose business. As the case law makes clear, such appeals constitute ‘economic retaliation’ and are therefore a form of coercion.” 273 N. L. R. B., at 1432, n. 6. Our decision in Tree Fruits, however, makes untenable the notion that any kind of handbilling, picketing, or other appeals to a secondary employer to cease doing business with the employer involved in the labor dispute is “coercion” within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it has some economic impact on the neutral. In that case, the union picketed a secondary employer, a retailer, asking the public not to buy a product produced by the primary employer. We held that the impact of this picketing was not coercion within the meaning of § 8(b)(4) even though, if the appeal succeeded, the retailer would lose revenue.
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607 (1980) (Safeco), in turn, held that consumer picketing urging a general boycott of a secondary employer aimed at causing him to sever relations with the union’s real antagonist was coercive and forbidden by § 8(b)(4). It is urged that Safeco rules this case because the union sought a general boycott of all tenants in the mall. But “picketing is qualitatively ‘different from other modes of communication,'” Babbitt v. Farm, Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 311, n. 17 (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 465 (1950)), and Safeco noted that the picketing there actually threatened the neutral with ruin or substantial loss. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence in Safeco, 447 U. S., at 619, picketing is “a mixture of conduct and communication” and the conduct element “often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establishment.” Handbills containing the same message, he observed, are “much less effective than labor picketing” because they “depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea.” Ibid. Similarly, the Court stated in Hughes v. Superior Court, supra, at 465:
“Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication.”
In Tree Fruits, we could not discern with the “requisite clarity” that Congress intended to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites. There is even less reason to find in the language of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), standing alone, any clear indication that handbilling, without picketing, “coerces” secondary employers. The loss of customers because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a business, and not because they are intimidated by a line of picketers, is the result of mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no more than what its customers honestly want it to do.
The Board argues that our first DeBartolo case goes far to dispose of this case because there we said that the only non-picketing publicity “exempted from the prohibition is publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer’s product is ‘distributed by’ the secondary employer.”. 463 U. S., at 155. We also indicated that if the handbilling were protected by the proviso, the distribution requirement would be without substantial practical effect. Id., at 157. But we obviously did not there conclude or indicate that the handbills were covered by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), for we remanded the case on this very issue. Id., at 157-158.
It is nevertheless argued that the second proviso to § 8(b)(4) makes clear that that section, as amended in 1959, was intended to proscribe nonpicketing appeals such as hand-billing urging a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. That proviso reads as follows:
“Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.”
By its terms, the proviso protects nonpicketing communications directed at customers of a distributor of goods produced by an employer with whom the union has a labor dispute. Because handbilling and other consumer appeals not involving such a distributor are not within the proviso, the argument goes, those appeals must be considered coercive within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Otherwise, it is said, the proviso is meaningless, for if handbilling and like communications are never coercive and within the reach of the section, there would have been no need whatsoever for the proviso.
This approach treats the proviso as establishing an exception to a prohibition that would otherwise reach the conduct excepted. But this proviso has a different ring to it. It states that § 8(b)(4) “shall not be construed” to forbid certain described nonpicketing publicity. That language need not be read as an exception. It may indicate only that without the proviso, the particular nonpicketing communication the proviso protects might have been considered to be coercive, even if other forms of publicity would not be. Section 8(b)(4), with its proviso, may thus be read as not covering nonpicketing publicity, including appeals to customers of a retailer as they approach the store, urging a complete boycott of the retailer because he handles products produced by nonunion shops.
The Board’s reading of § 8(b)(4) would make an unfair labor practice out of any kind of publicity or communication to the public urging a consumer boycott of employers other than those the proviso specifically deals with. On the facts of this case, newspaper, radio, and television appeals not to patronize the mall would be prohibited; and it would be an unfair labor practice for unions in their own meetings to urge their members not to shop in the mall. Nor could a union’s handbills simply urge not shopping at a department store because it is using a nonunion contractor, although the union could safely ask the store’s customers not to buy there because it is selling mattresses not carrying the union label. It is difficult, to say the least, to fathom why Congress would consider appeals urging a boycott of a distributor of a nonunion product to be more deserving of protection than non-picketing persuasion of customers of other neutral employers such as that involved in this case.
Neither do we find any clear indication in the relevant legislative history that Congress intended § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to proscribe peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied by picketing, urging a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. That section was one of several amendments to the NLRA enacted in 1959 and aimed at closing what were thought to be loopholes in the protections to which secondary employers were entitled. We recounted the legislative history in Tree Fruits and NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46 (1964), and the Court of Appeals carefully reexamined, it in this case and found “no affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed to prohibit nonpicketing labor publicity.” 796 F. 2d, at 1346. For the following reasons, for the most part expressed by the Court of Appeals, we agree with that conclusion.
First, among the concerns of the proponents of the provision barring threats, coercion, or restraints aimed at secondary employers was consumer boycotts of neutral employers carried out by picketing. At no time did they suggest that merely handbilling the customers of the neutral employer was one of the evils at which their proposals were aimed. Had they wanted to bar any and all nonpicketing appeals, through newspapers, radio, television, handbills, or otherwise, the debates and discussions would surely have reflected this intention. Instead, when asked, Congressman Griffin, cosponsor of the bill that passed the House, stated that the bill covered boycotts carried out by picketing neutrals but would not interfere with the constitutional right of free speech. 105 Cong. Rec. 15673, 2 Leg. Hist. 1615.
Second, the only suggestions that the ban against coercing secondary employers would forbid peaceful persuasion of customers by means other than picketing came from the opponents of any proposals to close the perceived loopholes in § 8(b)(4). Among their arguments in both the House and the Senate was that picketing and handbilling a neutral employer to force him to cease dealing in the products of an employer engaged in labor disputes, appeals which were then said to be legal, would be forbidden by the proposal that became § 8(b) (4)(ii)(B). The prohibition, it was said, “reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering -with freedom of speech.” 105 Cong. Rec. 15540, 2 Leg. Hist. 1576. The views of opponents of a bill with respect to its meaning, however, are not persuasive:
“[W]e have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. 'The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is-in doubt.’” Tree Fruits, 377 U. S., at 66 (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951)).
Without more, the interpretation put on the words “threaten, coerce, or restrain” by those opposed to the amendment hardly settles the matter.
Third, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was one of the amendments agreed upon by a House-Senate Conference on the House’s LandrumGriffin bill and the Senate’s Kennedy-Ervin bill. An analysis of the Conference bill was presented in the House by Representative Griffin and in the Senate by Senator Goldwater. With respect to appeals to consumers, the summary said that the House provision prohibiting secondary consumer picketing was adopted but “with clarification that other forms of publicity are not prohibited.” 105 Cong. Rec. 18706, Leg. Hist. 1454 (Sen. Goldwater); 105 Cong. Rec. 18022, Leg. Hist. 1712 (Rep. Griffin). The clarification referred to was the second proviso to § 8(b)(4). See supra, at 581-582. The Court of Appeals held that although the proviso was itself confined to advising the customers of an employer that the latter was distributing a product of another employer with whom the union had a labor dispute, the legislative history did not foreclose understanding the proviso as a clarification of the meaning of § 8(b)(4) rather than an exception to a general ban on consumer publicity. We agree with this view.
In addition to the summary presented by Senator Goldwater and Representative Griffin, Senator Kennedy, the Chairman of the Conference Committee, in presenting the Conference Report on the Senate floor, 105 Cong. Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg. Hist. 1431-1432, stated that under the amendments as reported by the Conference Committee, a “union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.” And he assured Senator Goldwater that union buy-American campaigns — that is, publicity requesting that consumers not buy foreign-made products, even though there is no ongoing labor dispute with the actual producer — would not be prohibited by the section.
Senator Kennedy included in his statement, however, the following:
“Under the Landrum-Griffin Bill it would have been impossible for a union to inform the customers of a secondary employer that that employer or store was selling goods which were made under racket conditions or sweatshop conditions, or in a plant where an economic strike was in progress. We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the union shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing.” 105 Cong. Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg. Hist. 1432.
The Board relies on this part of the Senator’s exposition as an authoritative interpretation of the words “threaten, coerce, or restrain” and argues that except as saved by the express language of the proviso, informational appeals to customers not to deal with secondary employers are unfair labor practices. The Senator’s remarks about the meaning of §8(b)(4)(ii) echoed his views, and that of others, expressed in opposing and defeating in the Senate any attempts to give more protection to secondary employers from consumer boycotts, whether carried out by picketing or non-picketing means. See n. 8, supra, and accompanying text. And if the proviso added in conference were an exception rather than a clarification, it surely would not follow, as the Senator said, that under the Conference bill, unions would be free to “conduct informational activity short of picketing” and could handbill, advertise in newspapers, and carry out all publicity short of ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site. Nor would buy-American appeals be permissible, for they do not fall within the proviso’s terms. At the very least, the Kennedy-Goldwater colloquy falls far short of revealing a clear intent that all nonpicketing appeals to customers urging a secondary boycott were unfair practices unless protected by the express words of the proviso. Nor does that exchange together with the other bits of legislative history relied on by the Board rise to that level.
In our view, interpreting § 8(b)(4) as not reaching the hand-billing involved in this case is not foreclosed either by the language of the section or its legislative history. That construction makes unnecessary passing on the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by the Board’s understanding of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia concur in the judgment.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Handbill read:
“PLEASE DON’T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE
“The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO, is requesting that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because of The Mall ownership’s contribution to substandard wages.
“The Wilson’s Department Store under construction on these premises is being built by contractors who pay substandard wages and fringe benefits. In the past, the Mall’s owner, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, has supported labor and our local economy by insuring that the Mall and its stores be built by contractors who pay fair wages and fringe benefits. Now, however, and for no apparent reason, the Mall owners have taken a giant step backwards by permitting our standards to be torn down. The payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working person’s ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage standard of the entire community. Since low construction wages at this time of inflation means decreased purchasing power, do the owners of East Lake Mall intend to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of workers of the community by encouraging the stores in East Lake Mall to cut their prices and lower their profits?
“CUT-RATE WAGES ARE NOT FAIR UNLESS MERCHANDISE PRICES ARE ALSO CUT-RATE.
‘We ask for your support in our protest against substandard wages. Please do not patronize the stores in the East Lake Square Mall until the Mall’s owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits.
“IF YOU MUST ENTER THE MALL TO DO BUSINESS, please express to the store managers your concern over substandard wages and your support of our efforts.
We are appealing only to the public — the consumer. We are not seeking to induce any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries.”
That section provides in pertinent part:
Ҥ 158. Unfair labor practices
“(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents —
“(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is —
“(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
“... Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.”
The Board cited two of its decisions that had been enforced by the Courts of Appeals as authority for its construction of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The court in Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 131 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 6, 401 F. 2d 952, 957 (1968), enf’g 167 N. L. R. B. 1030 (1967), upheld the Board’s determination that the handbilling there violated § 8(b) (4)(ii)(B), but that handbilling was part and parcel of a consumer picketing campaign in which the handbills were distributed at the edge of a line of picketers who were patrolling the entrance to
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-D-2.
We consider whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial.
I
On September 29, 2002, petitioner Dwayne Giles shot his ex-girlfriend, Brenda Avie, outside the garage of his grandmother’s house. No witness saw the shooting, but Giles’ niece heard what transpired from inside the house. She heard Giles and Avie speaking in conversational tones. Avie then yelled “Granny” several times and a series of gunshots sounded. Giles’ niece and grandmother ran outside and saw Giles standing near Avie with a gun in his hand. Avie, who had not been carrying a weapon, had been shot six times. One wound was consistent with Avie’s holding her hand up at the time she was shot, another was consistent with her having turned to her side, and a third was consistent with her having been shot while lying on the ground. Giles fled the scene after the shooting. He was apprehended by police about two weeks later and charged with murder.
At trial, Giles testified that he had acted in self-defense. Giles described Avie as jealous, and said he knew that she had once shot a man, that he had seen her threaten people with a knife, and that she had vandalized his home and car on prior occasions. He said that on the day of the shooting, Avie came to his grandmother’s house and threatened to kill him and his new girlfriend, who had been at the house earlier. He said that Avie had also threatened to kill his new girlfriend when Giles and Avie spoke on the phone earlier that day. Giles testified that after Avie threatened him at the house, he went into the garage and retrieved a gun, took the safety off, and started walking toward the back door of the house. He said that Avie charged at him, and that he was afraid she had something in her hand. According to Giles, he closed his eyes and fired several shots, but did not intend to kill Avie.
Prosecutors sought to introduce statements that Avie had made to a police officer responding to a domestic-violence report about three weeks before the shooting. Avie, who was crying when she spoke, told the officer that Giles had accused her of having an affair, and that after the two began to argue, Giles grabbed her by the shirt, lifted her off the floor, and began to choke her. According to Avie, when she broke free and fell to the floor, Giles punched her in the face and head, and after she broke free again, he opened a folding knife, held it about three feet away from her, and threatened to kill her if he found her cheating on him. Over Giles’ objection, the trial court admitted these statements into evidence under a provision of California law that permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or threat of physical injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the prior statements are deemed trustworthy. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1370 (West Supp. 2008).
A jury convicted Giles of first-degree murder. He appealed. While his appeal was pending, this Court decided in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53-54 (2004), that the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant have the opportunity to confront the witnesses who give testimony against him, except in cases where an exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the time of the founding. The California Court of Appeal held that the admission of Avie’s unconfronted statements at Giles’ trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause as construed by Crawford because Crawford recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (2004) (officially depublished). It concluded that Giles had forfeited his right to confront Avie because he had committed the murder for which he was on trial, and because his intentional criminal act made Avie unavailable to testify. The California Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground. 40 Cal. 4th 833, 837, 152 P. 3d 433, 435 (2007). We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. 1136 (2008).
II
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The Amendment contemplates that a witness who makes testimonial statements admitted against a defendant will ordinarily be present at trial for cross-examination, and that if the witness is unavailable, his prior testimony will be introduced only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. Crawford, 541 U. S., at 68. The State does not dispute here, and we accept without deciding, that Avie’s statements accusing Giles of assault were testimonial. But it maintains (as did the California Supreme Court) that the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit prosecutors from introducing the statements because an exception to the confrontation guarantee permits the use of a witness’s unconfronted testimony if a judge finds, as the judge did in this ease, that the defendant committed a wrongful act that rendered the witness unavailable to testify at trial. We held in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Id., at 54. We therefore ask whether the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing accepted by the California Supreme Court is a founding-era exception to the confrontation right.
A
We have previously acknowledged that two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even though they were unconfronted. See id., at 56, n. 6, 62. The first of these were declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and aware that he was dying. See, e. g., King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 501-504, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353-354 (1789); State v. Moody, 3 N. C. 31 (Super. L. & Eq. 1798); United States v. Veitch, 28 F. Cas. 367, 367-368 (No. 16,614) (CC DC 1803); King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 78, 80-81 (Gen. Ct. 1817). Avie did not make the unconfronted statements admitted at Giles’ trial when she was dying, so her statements do not fall within this historic exception.
A second common-law doctrine, which we will refer to as forfeiture by wrongdoing, permitted the introduction of statements of a witness who was “detained” or “kept away” by the “means or procurement” of the defendant. See, e. g., Lord Motley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H. L. 1666) (“detained”); Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H. L. 1692) (“made him keep away”); Queen v. Scaife, 117 Q. B. 238, 242, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (Q. B. 1851) (“kept away”); see also 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 425 (4th ed. 1762) (hereinafter Hawkins) (same); T. Peake, Compendium of the Law of Evidence 62 (2d ed. 1804) (“sent” away); 1 G. Gilbert, Law of Evidence 214 (1791) (“detained and kept back from
appearing by the means and procurement of the prisoner”). The doctrine has roots in the 1666 decision in Lord Motley’s Case, at which judges concluded that a witness’s having been “detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner” provided a basis to read testimony previously given at a coroner’s inquest. 6 How. St. Tr., at 770-771. Courts and commentators also concluded that wrongful procurement of a witness’s absence was among the grounds for admission of statements made at bail and committal hearings conducted under the Marian statutes, which directed justices of the peace to take the statements of felony suspects and the persons bringing the suspects before the magistrate, and to certify those statements to the court, Crawford, supra, at 43-44; J. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance 10-12, 16-20 (1974). See 2 Hawkins 429. This class of confronted statements was also admissible if the witness who made them was dead or unable to travel. Ibid.
The terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. The rule required the witness to have been “kept back” or “detained” by “means or procurement” of the defendant. Although there are definitions of “procure” and “procurement” that would merely require that a defendant have caused the witness’s absence, other definitions would limit the causality to one that was designed to bring about the result “procured.” See 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (defining “procure” as “to contrive and effect” (emphasis added)); ibid, (defining “procure” as “[t]o get; to gain; to obtain; as by request, loan, effort, labor or purchase”); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 559 (2d ed. 1989) (def. 1(3)) (defining “procure” as “[t]o contrive or devise with care (an action or proceeding); to endeavour to cause or bring about (mostly something evil) to or for a person”). Similarly, while the term “means” could sweep in all cases in which a defendant caused a witness to fail to appear, it can also connote that a defendant forfeits confrontation rights when he uses an intermediary for the purpose of making a witness absent. See 9 id., at 516 (“[A] person who intercedes for another or uses influence in order to bring about a desired result”); N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 822 (1869) (“That through which, or by the help of which, an end is attained”).
Cases and treatises of the time indicate that a purpose-based definition of these terms governed. A number of them said that prior testimony was admissible when a witness was kept away by the defendant’s “means and contrivance.” See 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 81 (1816) (“kept away by the means and contrivance of the prisoner”); S. Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 165 (1814) (“kept out of the way by the means and contrivance of the prisoner”); Drayton v. Wells, 10 S. C. L. 409, 411 (S. C. 1819) (“kept away by the contrivance of the opposite party”). This phrase requires that the defendant have schemed to bring about the absence from trial that he “contrived.” Contrivance is commonly defined as the act of “inventing, devising or planning,” 1 Webster, supra, at 47 (1828), “ingeniously endeavouring' the accomplishment of anything,” “the bringing to pass by planning, scheming, or stratagem,” or “[a]daption of means to an end; design, intention,” 3 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 850.
An 1858 treatise made the purpose requirement more explicit still, stating that the forfeiture rule applied when a witness “had been kept out of the way by the prisoner, or by some one on the prisoner’s behalf, in order to prevent him from giving evidence against him” E. Powell, The Practice of the Law of Evidence 166 (1858) (emphasis added). The wrongful-procurement exception was invoked in a manner consistent with this definition. We are aware of no case in which the exception was invoked although the defendant had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying, such as offering a bribe.
B
The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant had caused a person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from testifying — as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim — the testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dying-declarations exception. Prosecutors do not appear to have even argued that the judge could admit the unconfronted statements because the defendant committed the murder for which he was on trial.
Consider King v. Woodcock. William Woodcock was accused of killing his wife Silvia, who had been beaten and left near death. A Magistrate took Silvia Woodcock’s account of the crime, under oath, and she died about 48 hours later. The judge stated that “[g]reat as a crime of this nature must always appear to be, yet the inquiry into it must proceed upon the rules of evidence.” 1 Leach, at 500, 168 Eng. Rep., at 352. Aside from testimony given at trial in the presence of the prisoner, the judge said, there were “two other species which are admitted by law: The one is the dying declaration of a person who has received a fatal blow; the other is the examination of a prisoner, and the depositions of the witnesses who may be produced against him” taken under the Marian bail and committal statutes. Id., at 501, 168 Eng. Rep., at 352-353 (footnote omitted). Silvia Woodcock’s statement could not be admitted pursuant to the Marian statutes because it was unconfronted — the defendant had not been brought before the examining Magistrate and “the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the facts it contains.” Id., at 502, 168 Eng. Rep., at 353. Thus, the statements were admissible only if the witness “apprehended that she was in such a state of mortality as would inevitably oblige her soon to answer before her Maker for the truth or falsehood of her assertions.” Id., at 503, 168 Eng. Rep., at 353-354 (footnote omitted). Depending on the account one credits, the court either instructed the jury to consider the statements only if Woodcock was “in fact under the apprehension of death,” id., at 504,168 Eng. Rep., at 354, or determined for itself that Woodcock was “quietly resigned and submitting to her fate” and admitted her statements into evidence, 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown 356 (1803).
King v. Dingier, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791), applied the same test to exclude unconfronted statements by a murder victim. George Dingier was charged with killing his wife Jane, who suffered multiple stab wounds that left her in the hospital for 12 days before she died. The day after the stabbing, a Magistrate took Jane Dingier’s deposition — as in Woodcock, under oath — “of the facts and circumstances which had attended the outrage committed upon her.” 2 Leach, at 561, 168 Eng. Rep., at 383. George Dingier’s attorney argued that the statements did not qualify as dying declarations and were not admissible Marian examinations because they were not taken in the presence of the prisoner, with the result that the defendant did not “have, as he is entitled to have, the benefit of cross-examination.” Id., at 562, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384. The prosecutor agreed, but argued the deposition should still be admitted because “it was the best evidence that the nature of the case would afford.” Id., at 563, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384. Relying on Woodcock, the court “refused to receive the examination into evidence.” 2 Leach, at 563, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384.
Many other cases excluded victims’ statements when there was insufficient evidence that the witness was aware he was about to die. See Thomas John’s Case, 1 East 357, 358 (P. C. 1790); Welbourn’s Case, 1 East 358, 360 (P. C. 1792); United States v. Woods, 28 F. Cas. 762, 763 (No. 16,760) (CC DC 1834); Lewis v. State, 17 Miss. 115, 120 (1847); Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio 424, 425-426 (1842); Nelson v. State, 26 Tenn. 542, 543 (1847); Smith v. State, 28 Tenn. 9, 23 (1848). Courts in all these cases did not even consider admitting the statements on the ground that the defendant’s crime was to blame for the witness’s absence — even when the evidence establishing that was overwhelming. The reporter in Woodcock went out of his way to comment on the strength of the case against the defendant: “The evidence, independent of the information or declarations of the deceased, was of a very pressing and urgent nature against the prisoner.” 1 Leach, at 501, 168 Eng. Rep., at 352.
Similarly, in Smith v. State, supra, the evidence that the defendant had caused the victim’s death included, but was not limited to, the defendant’s having obtained arsenic from a local doctor a few days before his wife became violently ill; the defendant’s paramour testifying at trial that the defendant admitted to poisoning his wife; the defendant’s having asked a physician “whether the presence of arsenic could be discovered in the human stomach a month after death”; and, the answer to that inquiry apparently not having been satisfactory, the defendant’s having tried to hire a person to burn down the building containing his wife’s body. Id., at 10-11. If the State’s reading of common law were correct, the dying declarations in these cases and others like them would have been admissible.
Judges and prosecutors also failed to invoke forfeiture as a sufficient basis to admit unconfronted statements in the cases that did apply the dying-declarations exception. This failure, too, is striking. At a murder trial, presenting evidence that the defendant was responsible for the victim’s death would have been no more difficult than putting on the government’s case in chief. Yet prosecutors did not attempt to obtain admission of dying declarations on wrongful-procurement-of-absence grounds before going to the often considerable trouble of putting on evidence to show that the crime victim had not believed he could recover. See, e. g., King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va., at 80-81 (three witnesses called to testify on the point); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. Ill, 116-117 (Gen. Ct. 1817) (testimony elicited from doctor and witness); Anthony v. State, 19 Tenn. 265, 278-279 (1838) (doctor questioned about expected fatality of victim’s wound and about victim’s demeanor).
The State offers another explanation for the above cases. It argues that when a defendant committed some act of wrongdoing that rendered a witness unavailable, he forfeited his right to object to the witness’s testimony on confrontation grounds, but not on hearsay grounds. See Brief for Respondent 23-24. No case or treatise that we have found, however, suggested that a defendant who committed wrongdoing forfeited his confrontation rights but not his hearsay rights. And the distinction would have been a surprising one, because courts prior to the founding excluded hearsay evidence in large part because it was unconfronted. See, e.g., 2 Hawkins 606 (6th ed. 1787); 2 M. Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law 313 (1736). As the plurality said in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 86 (1970), “[i]t seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots.”
The State and the dissent note that common-law authorities justified the wrongful-procurement rule by invoking the maxim that a defendant should not be permitted to benefit from his own wrong. See, e. g., G. Gilbert, Law of Evidence 140-141 (1756) (if a witness was “detained and kept back from appearing by the means and procurement” testimony would be read because a defendant “shall never be admitted to shelter himself by such evil Practices on the Witness, that being to give him Advantage of his own Wrong”). But as the evidence amply shows, the “wrong” and the “evil Practices” to which these statements referred was conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying. The absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of conduct would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them. There is nothing mysterious about courts’ refusal to carry the rationale further. The notion that judges may strip the defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well with the right to trial by jury. It is akin, one might say, to “dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.” Crawford, 541 U. S., at 62.
c
Not only was the State’s proposed exception to the right of confrontation plainly not an “exceptio[n] established at the time of the founding,” id., at 54; it is not established in American jurisprudence since the founding. American courts never—prior to 1985—invoked forfeiture outside the context of deliberate witness tampering.
This Court first addressed forfeiture in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879), where, after hearing testimony that suggested the defendant had kept his wife away from home so that she could not be subpoenaed to testify, the trial court permitted the Government to introduce testimony of the defendant’s wife from the defendant’s prior trial. See id., at 148-150. On appeal, the Court held that admission of the statements did not violate the right of the defendant to confront witnesses at trial, because when a witness is absent by the defendant’s “wrongful procurement,” the defendant “is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated” if “their evidence is supplied in some lawful way.” Id., at 158. Reynolds invoked broad forfeiture principles to explain its holding. The decision stated, for example, that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts,” ibid., and that the wrongful-procurement rule “has its foundation” in the principle that no one should be permitted to take advantage of his wrong, and is “the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common honesty,” id., at 159.
Reynolds relied on these maxims (as the common-law authorities had done) to be sure. But it relied on them (as the common-law authorities had done) to admit prior testimony in a case where the defendant had engaged in wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony. The Court’s opinion indicated that it was adopting the common-law rule. It cited leading common-law cases—Lord Motley's Case, Harrison’s Case, and Scaife—described itself as “content with” the “long-established usage” of the forfeiture principle, and admitted prior confronted statements under circumstances where admissibility was open to no doubt under Lord Morley’s Case. Reynolds, supra, at 158-159.
If the State’s rule had a historical pedigree in the common law or even in the 1879 decision in Reynolds, one would have expected it to be routinely invoked in murder prosecutions like the one here, in which the victim’s prior statements inculpated the defendant. It was never invoked in this way. The earliest case identified by the litigants and amici curiae which admitted unconfronted statements on a forfeiture theory without evidence that the defendant had acted with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying was decided in 1985. United States v. Rouco, 765 F. 2d 983 (CA11).
In 1997, this Court approved a Federal Rule of Evidence, entitled “Forfeiture by wrongdoing,” which applies only when the defendant “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(6). We have described this as a rule “which codifies the forfeiture doctrine.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 833 (2006). Every commentator we are aware of has concluded the requirement of intent “means that the exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.” 5 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:134, p. 235 (3d ed. 2007); 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 804.03[7][b], p. 804-32 (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence 176 (6th ed. 2006). The commentators come out this way because the dissent’s claim that knowledge is sufficient to show intent is emphatically not the modern view. See 1 W. LaPave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2, p. 340 (2d ed. 2003).
In sum, our interpretation of the common-law forfeiture rule is supported by (1) the most natural reading of the language used at common law; (2) the absence of common-law cases admitting prior statements on a forfeiture theory when the defendant had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying; (3) the common law’s uniform exclusion of unconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims (except testimony given with awareness of impending death) in the innumerable cases in which the defendant was on trial for killing the victim, but was not shown to have done so for the purpose of preventing testimony; (4) a subsequent history in which the dissent’s broad forfeiture theory has not been applied. The first two and the last are highly persuasive; the third is in our view conclusive.
D
1
The dissent evades the force of that third point by claiming that no testimony would come in at common law based on a forfeiture theory unless it was confronted. It explains the exclusion of murder victims’ testimony by arguing that wrongful procurement was understood to be a basis for admission of Marian depositions — which the defendant would have had the opportunity to confront — but not for the admission of unconfronted testimony. See post, at 394.
That explanation is not supported by the cases. In Harrison’s Case, the leading English case finding wrongful procurement, the witness’s statements were admitted without regard to confrontation. An agent of the defendant had attempted to bribe a witness, who later disappeared under mysterious circumstances. The prosecutor contended that he had been “spirited, or withdrawn from us, by a gentleman that said he came to [the witness] from the prisoner, and desired him to be kind to the prisoner.” 12 How. St. Tr., at 851. The court allowed the witness’s prior statements before the coroner to be read, id., at 852, although there was no reason to think the defendant would have been present at the prior examination.
The reasoning of the common-law authorities reinforces the conclusion that the wrongful-procurement rule did not depend on prior confrontation. The judge in Harrison’s Case, after being told that “Mr. Harrison’s agents or friends have, since the last sessions, made or conveyed away a young man that was a principal evidence against him,” declared that if this were proved, “it will no way conduce to Mr. Harrison’s advantage.” Id., at 835-836. Similarly, a leading treatise’s justification of the use of statements from coroner’s inquests when a witness was “detained and kept back from appearing by the means and procurement” of the defendant was that the defendant “shall never be admitted to shelter himself by such evil Practices on the Witness, that being to give him Advantage of his own Wrong.” G. Gilbert, Law of Evidence 141 (1756). But if the defendant could keep out unconfronted prior testimony of a wrongfully detained witness he would profit from “such evil Practices.”
While American courts understood the admissibility of statements made at prior proceedings (including coroner’s inquests like the one in Harrison’s Case) to turn on prior opportunity for cross-examination as a general matter, see Crawford, 541 U. S., at 47, n. 2, no such limit was applied or expressed in early wrongful-procurement eases. In Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775), “[o]ne White, who had testified before the justice and before the grand-jury against Barber, and minutes taken of his testimony, was sent away by one Bullock, a friend of Barber’s, and by his instigation; so that he could not be had to testify before the petitjury. The court admitted witnesses to relate what White had before testified.” Two leading evidentiary treatises and a Delaware case reporter cite that case for the proposition that grand jury statements were admitted on a wrongful-procurement theory. See Phillipps, Treatise on Evidence, at 200, n. (a); T. Peake, Compendium of the Law of Evidence 91, n. (m) (American ed. 1824); State v. Lewis, 1 Del. Cas. 608, 609, n. 1 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1818). (Of course the standard practice since approximately the 17th century has been to conduct grand jury proceedings in secret, without confrontation, in part so that the defendant does not learn the State’s case in advance. S. Beale, W. Bryson, J. Felman, & M. Elston, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 5.2 (2d ed. 2005); see also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2360, pp. 728-735 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).)
The Georgia Supreme Court’s articulation of the forfeiture rule similarly suggests that it understood forfeiture to be a basis for admitting unconfronted testimony. The court wrote that Lord Morley’s Case established that if a witness “who had been examined by the Crown, and was then absent, was detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner,” “then the examination should be read” into evidence. Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 402, 403 (1856). Its rule for all cases in which the witness “had been examined by the Crown” carried no confrontation limit, and indeed, the court adopted the rule from Lord Morley’s Case which involved not Marian examinations carrying a confrontation requirement, but coroner’s inquests that lacked one.
The leading American case on forfeiture of the confrontation right by wrongful procurement was our 1879 decision in Reynolds. That case does not set forth prior confrontation as a requirement for the doctrine’s application, and begins its historical analysis with a full description of the rule set forth in Lord Motley’s Case, which itself contained no indication that the admitted testimony must have been previously confronted. It followed that description with a citation of Harrison’s Case—which, like Lord Motley’s Case, applied wrongful procurement to coroner’s inquests, not confronted Marian examinations—saying that the rule in those cases “seems to have been recognized as the law in England ever since.” 98 U. S., at 158. The opinion’s description of the forfeiture rule is likewise unconditioned by any requirement of prior confrontation:
“The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he kept away.... [The Constitution] grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated.” Ibid.
There is no mention in this paragraph of a need for prior confrontation, even though if the Court believed such a limit applied, the phrase “their evidence is supplied” would more naturally have read “their previously confronted evidence is supplied.” Crawford reaffirmed this understanding by citing Reynolds for a forfeiture exception to the confrontation right. 541 U. S., at 54. And what Reynolds and Crawford described as the law became a seeming holding of this Court in Davis, which, after finding an absent witness’s unconfronted statements introduced at trial to have been testimonial, and after observing that “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation,” 547 U. S., at 833, remanded with the instruction that “[t]he Indiana courts may (if they are asked) determine on remand whether... a claim of forfeiture is properly raised and, if so, whether it is meritorious,” id., at 834.
Although the case law is sparse, in light of these decisions and the absence of even a single case declining to admit unconfronted statements of an absent witness on wrongful-procurement grounds when the defendant sought to prevent the witness from testifying, we are not persuaded to displace the understanding of our prior cases that wrongful procurement permits the admission of prior unconfronted testimony.
But the parsing of cases aside, the most obvious problem with the dissent’s theory that the forfeiture rule applied only to confronted testimony is that it amounts to self-immolation. If it were true, it would destroy not only our case for a narrow forfeiture rule, but the dissent’s case for a broader one as well. Prior confronted statements by witnesses who are unavailable are admissible whether or not the defendant was responsible for their unavailability. 541 U. S., at 68. If the forfeiture doctrine did not admit unconfronted prior testimony at common law, the conclusion must be, not that the forfeiture doctrine requires no specific intent in order to render unconfronted testimony available, but that unconfronted testimony is subject to no forfeiture doctrine at all.
2
Having destroyed its own case, the dissent issues a thinly veiled invitation to overrule Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the regime of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), under which the Court would create the exceptions that it thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood. The “basic purposes and objectives” of forfeiture doctrine, it says, require that a defendant who wrongfully caused the absence of a witness be deprived of his confrontation rights, whether or not there was any such
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to review a state court order enjoining the operation of a school desegregation plan. The action was brought in the Superior Court of Clarke County, Georgia, by parents of children attending public elementary schools in that county. Named as defendants were the Superintendent of Education and members of the Clarke County Board of Education. The trial court denied respondents’ request for an injunction, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, 226 Ga. 456, 175 S. E. 2d 649 (1970). This Court then granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 804 (1970).
Beginning in 1963, the Clarke County Board of Education began a voluntary program to desegregate its public schools. The student-assignment plan presently at issue, involving only elementary schools, has been in effect since the start of the 1969 academic year. The plan, adopted by the Board of Education and approved by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, relies primarily upon geographic attendance zones drawn to achieve greater racial balance. Additionally, the pupils in five heavily Negro “pockets” either walk or are transported by bus to schools located in other attendance zones. As a consequence the Negro enrollment of each elementary school in the system varies generally between 20% and 40%, although two schools have a 50% Negro enrollment. The white-Negro ratio of elementary pupils in the system is approximately two to one.
Respondents contend in this action that the board’s desegregation plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Title IY of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld both contentions, concluding first that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause “by treating students differently because of their race.” The court concluded also that Title IV prohibited the board from “requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another ... in order to achieve such racial balance . . . .” We reject these contentions.
The Clarke County Board of Education, as part of its affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system, properly took into account the race of its elementary school children in drawing attendance lines. To have done otherwise would have severely hampered the board’s ability to deal effectively with the task at hand. School boards that operated dual school systems are “clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968). In this remedial process, steps will almost invariably require that students be assigned “differently because of their race.” See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, ante, p. 1; Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction, 430 F. 2d 625, 630 (CA5 1970). Any other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes.
Nor is the board’s plan barred by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The sections relied upon by respondents (42 U. S. C. §§ 2000c (b), 2000c-6) are directed only at federal officials and are designed simply to foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding the powers of federal officials to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Swann, supra, at 17. Title IV clearly does not restrict state school authorities in the exercise of their discretionary powers to assign students within their school systems.
Reversed.
It may well be that the Board of Education adopted the present student-assignment plan because of urgings of federal officials and fear of losing federal financial assistance. The state trial court, however, made no findings on these matters. No federal officials are parties in this case.
Where the distance between the student's residence and his assigned school is more than 1% miles, free transportation is provided. There is no challenge here to the feasibility of the transportation provisions of the plan. The annual transportation expenses of the present plan are reported in the record to be $11,070 less than the school system spent on transportation during the 1968-1969 school year under dual operation.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion to add the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company et al., as parties appellee, is granted. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Arizona provides tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations, or STOs. STOs use these contributions to provide scholarships to students attending private schools, many of which are religious. Respondents are a group of Arizona taxpayers who challenge the STO tax credit as a violation of Establishment Clause principles under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a similar Establishment Clause claim on the merits, respondents sought intervention from the Federal Judiciary.
To obtain a determination on the merits in federal court, parties seeking relief must show that they have standing under Article III of the Constitution. Standing in Establishment Clause cases may be shown in various ways. Some plaintiffs may demonstrate standing based on the direct harm of what is claimed to be an establishment of religion, such as a mandatory prayer in a public school classroom. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 224, n. 9 (1963). Other plaintiffs may demonstrate standing on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of their religion. Those costs and benefits can result from alleged discrimination in the tax code, such as when the availability of a tax exemption is conditioned on religious affiliation. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1, 8 (1989) (plurality opinion).
For their part, respondents contend that they have standing to challenge Arizona’s STO tax credit for one and only one reason: because they are Arizona taxpayers. But the mere fact that a plaintiff is a taxpayer is not generally deemed sufficient to establish standing in federal court. To overcome that rule, respondents must rely on an exception created in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968). For the reasons discussed below, respondents cannot take advantage of Flast’s narrow exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing. As a consequence, respondents lacked standing to commence this action, and their suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
r-H
Respondents challenged § 43-1089, a provision of the Arizona Tax Code. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws § 43-1087, codified, as amended, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1089 (West Supp. 2010). Section 43-1089 allows Arizona taxpayers to obtain dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $500 per person and $1,000 per married couple for contributions to STOs. § 43-1089(A). If the credit exceeds an individual’s tax liability, the credit’s unused portion can be carried forward up to five years. § 43-1089(D). Under a version of § 43-1089 in effect during the pendency of this lawsuit, a charitable organization could be deemed an STO only upon certain conditions. See § 43-1089 (West 2006). The organization was required to be exempt from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. § 43-1089(G)(3) (West Supp. 2005). It could not limit its scholarships to students attending only one school. Ibid. And it had to allocate “at least ninety per cent of its annual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition grants” to children attending qualified schools. Ibid. A “qualified school,” in turn, was defined in part as a private school in Arizona that did not discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status, or national origin. § 43-1089(G)(2).
In an earlier lawsuit filed in state court, Arizona taxpayers challenged § 43-1089, invoking both the United States Constitution and the Arizona Constitution. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers’ claims on the merits. Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P. 2d 606 (1999). This Court denied certiorari. Rhodes v. Killian, 528 U. S. 810 (1999); Kotterman v. Killian, 528 U. S. 921 (1999).
The present action was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. It named the director of the Arizona Department of Revenue as defendant. The Arizona taxpayers who brought the suit claimed that §43-1089 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents alleged that §43-1089 allows STOs “to use State income-tax revenues to pay tuition for students at religious schools,” some of which “discriminate on the basis of religion in selecting students.” Complaint in No. 00-0287 (D Ariz.), ¶¶ 29-31, App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 09-987, pp. 125a-126a. Respondents requested, among other forms of relief, an injunction against the issuance of §43-1089 tax credits for contributions to religious STOs. The District Court dismissed respondents’ suit as jurisdictionally barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341. The Court of Appeals reversed. This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88 (2004).
On remand, the Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization and other interested parties intervened. The District Court once more dismissed respondents’ suit, this time for failure to state a claim. Once again, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that respondents had standing under Flast v. Cohen, supra. 562 F. 3d 1002 (CA9 2009). Reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals ruled that respondents had stated a claim that § 43-1089 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The full Court of Appeals denied en banc review, with eight judges dissenting. 586 F. 3d 649 (CA9 2009). This Court granted certiorari. 560 U. S. 924 (2010).
II
The concept and operation of the separation of powers in our National Government have their principal foundation in the first three Articles of the Constitution. Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the “Power” to resolve not questions and issues but “Cases” or “Controversies.” This language restricts the federal judicial power “to the traditional role of the Anglo-American courts.” Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 492 (2009). In the English legal tradition, the need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute taught the efficacy of judicial resolution and gave, legitimacy to judicial decrees. The importance of resolving specific eases was visible, for example, in the incremental approach of the common law and in equity’s consideration of exceptional circumstances. The Framers paid heed to these lessons. See U. S. Const., Art. Ill, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity . . . ”). By rules consistent with the longstanding practices of Anglo-American courts a plaintiff who seeks to invoke the federal judicial power must assert more than just the “generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 217 (1974).
Continued adherence to the case-or-eontroversy requirement of Article III maintains the public’s confidence in an uneleeted but restrained Federal Judiciary. If the judicial power were “extended to every question under the constitution,” Chief Justice Marshall once explained, federal courts might take possession of “almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision.” 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (C. Cullen ed. 1984) (quoted in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332,341 (2006)). The legislative and executive departments of the Federal Government, no less than the judicial department, have a duty to defend the Constitution. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. That shared obligation is incompatible with the suggestion that federal courts might wield an “unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471 (1982). For the federal courts to decide questions of law arising outside of cases and controversies would be inimical to the Constitution’s democratic character. And the resulting conflict between the judicial and the political branches would not, “in the long run, be beneficial to either.” United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188-189 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Instructed by Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition, this Court takes care to observe the “role assigned to the judiciary” within the Constitution’s “tripartite allocation of power.” Valley Forge, supra, at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ill
To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). The minimum constitutional requirements for standing were explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992).
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be 'fairly .. . tracefable] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be 'likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Id., at 560-561 (citations and footnote omitted).
In requiring a particular injury, the Court meant “that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id., at 560, n. 1. The question now before the Court is whether respondents, the plaintiffs in the trial court, satisfy the requisite elements of standing.
A
Respondents suggest that their status as Arizona taxpayers provides them with standing to challenge the STO tax credit. Absent special circumstances, however, standing cannot be based on a plaintiff’s mere status as a taxpayer. This Court has rejected the general proposition that an individual who has paid taxes has a “continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring that those funds are not used by the Government in a way that violates the Constitution.” Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U. S. 587, 599 (2007) (plurality opinion). This precept has been referred to as the rule against taxpayer standing.
The doctrinal basis for the rule was discussed in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). There, a taxpayer-plaintiff had alleged that certain federal expenditures were in excess of congressional authority under the Constitution. The plaintiff argued that she had standing to raise her claim because she had an interest in the Government Treasury and because the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of Government funds would affect her personal tax liability. The Court rejected those arguments. The “effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of funds,” was too “remote, fluctuating and uncertain” to give rise to a ease or controversy. Id., at 487. And the taxpayer-plaintiff’s “interest in the moneys of the Treasury,” the Court recognized, was necessarily “shared with millions of others.” Ibid. As a consequence, Frothingham held that the taxpayer-plaintiff had not presented a “judicial controversy” appropriate for resolution in federal court but rather a “matter of public . . . concern” that could be pursued only through the political process. Id., at 487-489.
In a second pertinent case, Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), the Court considered Frothingham’s prohibition on taxpayer standing in connection with an alleged Establishment Clause violation. A New Jersey statute had provided that public school teachers would read Bible verses to their students at the start of each schoolday. A plaintiff sought to have the law enjoined, asserting standing based on her status as a taxpayer. Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson reiterated the foundational role that Article III standing plays in our separation of powers.
“‘The party who invokes the power [of the federal courts] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’ ” Doremus, supra, at 434 (quoting Frotkingham, supra, at 488).
The plaintiff in Doremus lacked any “direct and particular financial interest” in the suit, and, as a result, a decision on the merits would have been merely “advisory.” 342 U. S., at 434-435. It followed that the plaintiff’s allegations did not give rise to a case or controversy subject to judicial resolution under Article III. Ibid. Cf. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 224, n. 9 (finding standing where state laws required Bible readings or prayer in public schools, not because plaintiffs were state taxpayers but because their children were enrolled in public schools and so were “directly affected” by the challenged laws).
In holdings consistent with Frothingham and Doremus, more recent decisions have explained that claims of taxpayer standing rest on unjustifiable economic and political speculation. ' When a government expends resources or declines to impose a tax, its budget does not necessarily suffer. On the contrary, the purpose of many governmental expenditures and tax benefits is “to spur economic activity, which in turn increases government revenues.” Daimler Chrysler, 547 U. S., at 344.
Difficulties persist even if one assumes that an expenditure or tax benefit depletes the government’s coffers. To find injury, a court must speculate “that elected officials will increase a taxpayer-plaintiff’s tax bill to make up a deficit.” Ibid. And to find redressability, a court must assume that, were the remedy the taxpayers seek to be allowed, “legislators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions.” Ibid. It would be “pure speculation” to conclude that an injunction against a government expenditure or tax benefit “would result in any actual tax relief” for a taxpayer-plaintiff. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 614 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, X).
These well-established principles apply to the present cases. Respondents may be right that Arizona’s STO tax credits have an estimated annual value of over $50 million. See Brief for Respondent Winn et al. 42; see also Arizona Dept, of Revenue, Revenue Impact of Arizona’s Tax Expenditures FY 2009/10, p. 48 (preliminary Nov. 15, 2010) (reporting the total estimated “value” of STO tax credits claimed over a 1-year period). The education of its young people is, of course, one of the State’s principal missions and responsibilities; and the consequent costs will make up a significant portion of the state budget. That, however, is just the beginning of the analysis.
By helping students obtain scholarships to private schools, both religious and secular, the STO program might relieve the burden placed on Arizona’s public schools. The result could be an immediate and permanent cost savings for the State. See Brief for Petitioner Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization 31 (discussing studies indicating that the STO program may on net save the State money); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 395 (1983) (“By educating a substantial number of students [private] schools relieve public schools of a correspondingly great burden — to the benefit of all taxpayers”). Underscoring the potential financial benefits of the STO program, the average value of an STO scholarship may be far less than the average cost of educating an Arizona public school student. See Brief for Petitioner Garriott 38. Because it encourages scholarships for attendance at private schools, the STO tax credit may not cause the State to incur any financial loss.
Even assuming the STO tax credit has an adverse effect on Arizona’s annual budget, problems would remain. To •conclude there is a particular injury in fact would require speculation that Arizona lawmakers react to revenue shortfalls by increasing respondents’ tax liability. Daimler-Ckrysler, 547 U. S., at 344. A finding of causation would depend on the additional determination that any tax increase would be traceable to the STO tax credits, as distinct from other governmental expenditures or other tax benefits. Respondents have not established that an injunction against application of the STO tax credit would prompt Arizona legislators to “pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions.” Ibid. Those matters, too, are conjectural.
Each of the inferential steps to show causation and redressability depends on premises as to which there remains considerable doubt. The taxpayers have not shown that any interest they have in protecting the state treasury would be advanced. Even were they to show some closer link, that interest is still of a general character, not particular to certain persons. Nor have the taxpayers shown that higher taxes will result from the tuition credit scheme. The rule against taxpayer standing, a rule designed both to avoid speculation and to insist on particular injury, applies to respondents’ lawsuit. The taxpayers, then, must rely on an exception to the rule, an exception next to be considered.
B
The primary contention of respondents, of course, is that, despite the general rule that taxpayers lack standing to object to expenditures alleged to be unconstitutional, their suit falls within the exception established by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83. It must be noted at the outset that, as this Court has explained, Flast’s holding provides a “narrow exception” to “the general rule against taxpayer standing.” Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 618 (1988).
At issue in Flast was the standing of federal taxpayers to object, on First Amendment grounds, to a congressional statute that allowed expenditures of federal funds from the General Treasury to support, among other programs, “instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such schools.” 392 U. S., at 85-86. Flast held that taxpayers have standing when two conditions are met.
The first condition is that there must be a “logical link” between the plaintiff’s taxpayer status “and the type of legislative enactment attacked.” Id., at 102. This condition was not satisfied in Doremus because the statute challenged in that case — providing for the recitation of Bible passages in public schools — involved at most an “incidental expenditure of tax funds.” Flast, 392 U. S., at 102. In Flast, by-contrast, the allegation was that the Federal Government violated the Establishment Clause in the exercise of its legislative authority both to collect and spend tax dollars. Id., at 103. In the decades since Flast, the Court has been careful to enforce this requirement. See Hein, 551 U. S. 587 (no standing under Flast to challenge federal executive actions funded by general appropriations); Valley Forge, 454 U. S. 464 (no standing under Flast to challenge an agency’s decision to transfer a parcel of federal property pursuant to the Property Clause).
The second condition for standing under Flast is that there must be “a nexus” between the plaintiff’s taxpayer status and “the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.” 392 U. S., at 102. This condition was deemed satisfied in Flast based on the allegation that Government funds had been spent on an outlay for religion in contravention of the Establishment Clause. Id., at 85-86. In Frothingkam, by contrast, the claim was that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority without regard to any specific prohibition. 392 U. S., at 104-105. Confirming that Flast turned on the unique features of Establishment Clause violations, this Court has “declined to lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits alleging violations of any constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause.” Hein, supra, at 609 (plurality opinion); see also Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (Statement and Account Clause); Schlesinger, 418 U. S. 208 (Incompatibility Clause).
After stating the two conditions for taxpayer standing, Flast considered them together, explaining that individuals suffer a particular injury for standing purposes when, in violation of the Establishment Clause and by means of “the taxing and spending power,” their property is transferred through the Government's Treasury to a sectarian entity. 392 U. S., at 105-106. As Flast put it: “The taxpayer’s allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.” Id., at 106. Flast thus “understood the 'injury’ alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very ‘extraction] and spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff.” DaimlerChrysler, 547 U. S., at 348 (quoting Flast, 392 U. S., at 106). “Such an injury,” Flast continued, is unlike “generalized grievances about the conduct of government” and so is “appropriate for judicial redress.” Ibid.
Flast found support for its finding of personal injury in “the history of the Establishment Clause,” particularly James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. DaimlerChrysler, supra, at 348. In 1785, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia considered a “tax levy to support teachers of the Christian religion.” Flast, supra, at 104, n. 24; see A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 74 (1947) (supplemental appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.). Under the proposed assessment bill, taxpayers would direct their payments to Christian societies of their choosing. Ibid. If a taxpayer made no such choice, the General Assembly was to divert his funds to “seminaries of learning,” at least some of which “undoubtedly would have been religious in character.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 869, n. 1 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 853, n. 1 (Thomas, J., concurring). However the “seminaries” provision might have functioned in practice, critics took the position that the proposed bill threatened compulsory religious contributions. See, e. g., T. Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787, pp. 133-134 (1977); H. Eckenrode, Separation of Church and State in Virginia 106-108 (1910).
In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison objected to the proposed assessment on the ground that it would coerce a form of religious devotion in violation of conscience. In Madison’s view, government should not “'force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment.’” Flast, supra, at 103 (quoting 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)). This Madisonian prohibition does not depend on the amount of property conscripted for sectarian ends. Any such taking, even one amounting to “three pence only,” violates conscience. 392 U. S., at 103; cf. supra, at 134-135. The proposed bill ultimately died in committee; and the General Assembly instead enacted legislation forbidding “compelled” support of religion. See A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545-546 (J. Boyd ed. 1950); see also Flast, 392 U. S., at 104, n. 24. Madison himself went on to become, as Flast put it, “the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.” Id., at 103. Flast was thus informed by “the specific evils” identified in the public arguments of “those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption.” Id., at 103-104; see also Feldman, Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 346,351 (2002) (“[T]he Framers’ generation worried that conscience would be violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose beliefs they disagreed”); McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933, 936-939 (1986).
Respondents contend that these principles demonstrate their standing to challenge the STO tax credit. In their view the tax credit is, for Flast purposes, best understood as a governmental expenditure. That is incorrect.
It is easy to see that tax credits and governmental expenditures can have similar economic consequences, at least for beneficiaries whose tax liability is sufficiently large to take full advantage of the credit. Yet tax credits and governmental expenditures do not both implicate individual taxpayers in sectarian activities. A dissenter whose tax dollars are “extracted and spent” knows that he has in some small measure been made to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience. Flast, supra, at 106. In that instance the taxpayer’s direct and particular connection with the establishment does not depend on economic speculation or political conjecture. The connection would exist even if the conscientious dissenter’s tax liability were unaffected or reduced. See Daimler Chrysler, supra, at 348-349. When the government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, there is no such connection between dissenting taxpayer and alleged establishment. Any financial injury remains speculative. See supra, at 134-138. And awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other citizens to retain control over their own funds in accordance with their own consciences.
The distinction between governmental expenditures and tax credits refutes respondents’ assertion of standing. When Arizona taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their own money, not money the State has collected from respondents or from other taxpayers. Arizona’s § 43-1089 does not “extrac[t] and spen[d]” a conscientious dissenter’s funds in service of an establishment, Flast, 392 U. S., at 106, or “ ‘force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property’ ” to a sectarian organization, id., at 103 (quoting 2 Writings of James Madison, supra, at 186). On the contrary, respondents and other Arizona taxpayers remain free to pay their own tax bills, without contributing to an STO. Respondents are likewise able to contribute to an STO of their choice, either religious or secular. And respondents also have the option of contributing to other charitable organizations, in which case respondents may become eligible for a tax deduction or a different tax credit. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1088 (West Supp. 2010). The STO tax credit is not tantamount to a religious tax or to a tithe and does not visit the injury identified in Flast. It follows that respondents have neither alleged an injury for standing purposes under general rules nor met the Flast exception. Finding standing under these circumstances would be more than the extension of Flast “to the limits of its logic.” Hein, 551U. S., at 615 (plurality opinion). It would he a departure from Flast's stated rationale.
Furthermore, respondents cannot satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. When the government collects and spends taxpayer money, governmental choices are responsible for the transfer of wealth. In that case a resulting subsidy of religious activity is, for purposes of Flast, traceable to the government’s expenditures. And an injunction against those expenditures would address the objections of conscience raised by taxpayer-plaintiffs. See Daimler-Chrysler, 547 U. S., at 344. Here, by contrast, contributions result from the decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds. Private citizens create private STOs; STOs choose beneficiary schools; and taxpayers then contribute to STOs. While the State, at the outset, affords the opportunity to create and contribute to an STO, the tax credit system is implemented by private action and with no state intervention. Objecting taxpayers know that their fellow citizens, not the State, decide to contribute and in fact make the contribution. These considerations prevent any injury the objectors may suffer from being fairly traceable to the government. And while an injunction against application of the tax credit most likely would reduce contributions to STOs, that remedy would not affect noncontributing taxpayers or their tax payments. As a result, any injury suffered by respondents would not be remedied by an injunction limiting the tax credit’s operation.
Resisting this conclusion, respondents suggest that Arizonans who benefit from § 43-1089 tax credits in effect are paying their state income tax to STOs. In respondents’ view, tax credits give rise to standing even if tax deductions do not, since only the former yield a dollar-for-dollar reduction in final tax liability. See Brief for Respondent Winn et al. 5-6; Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36. But what matters under Flast is whether sectarian STOs receive government funds drawn from general tax revenues, so that moneys have been extracted from a citizen and handed to a religious institution in violation of the citizen’s conscience. Under that inquiry, respondents’ argument fails. Like contributions that lead to charitable tax deductions, contributions yielding STO tax credits are not owed to the State and, in fact, pass directly from taxpayers to private organizations. Respondents’ contrary position assumes that income should be treated as if it were government property even if it has not come into the tax collector’s hands. .That premise finds no basis in standing jurisprudence. Private bank accounts cannot be equated with the Arizona state treasury.
The conclusion that the Flast exception is inapplicable at first may seem in tension with several earlier cases, all addressing Establishment Clause issues and all decided after Flast. See Mueller, 463 U. S. 388; Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); cf. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88 (reaching only threshold jurisdictional issues). But those cases do not mention standing and so are not contrary to the conclusion reached here. When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed. See, e. g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 535, n. 5 (1974) (“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us”); United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 38 (1952) (“Even as to our own judicial power of jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio”); Frothingkam, 262 U. S., at 486. The Court would risk error if it relied on assumptions that have gone unstated and unexamined.
Furthermore, if a law or practice, including a tax credit, disadvantages a particular religious group or a particular nonreligious group, the disadvantaged party would not have to rely on Flast to obtain redress for a resulting injury. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S., at 8 (plurality opinion) (finding standing where a general interest magazine sought to recover tax payments on the ground that religious periodicals were exempt from the tax). Because standing in Establishment Clause cases can be shown in various ways, it is far from clear that any nonbinding sub silentio holdings in the cases respondents cite would have depended on Flast. See, e. g., Walz, supra, at 666-667 (explaining that the plaintiff was an “owner of real estate” in New York City who objected to the city’s issuance of “property tax exemptions to religious organizations”). That the plaintiffs in those cases could have advanced arguments for jurisdiction independent of Flast makes it particularly inappropriate to determine whether or why standing should have been found where the issue was left unexplored.
If an establishment of religion is alleged to cause real injury to particular individuals, the federal courts may adjudicate the matter. Like other constitutional provisions, the Establishment Clause acquires substance and meaning when explained, elaborated, and enforced in the context of actual disputes. That reality underlies the case-or-controversy requirement, a requirement that has not been satisfied here.
* * *
New exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with them. In an era of frequent litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with prospective effect, and continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts must be more careful to insist on the formal rules of standing, not less so. Making the Article III standing inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of constitutional litigation, which can result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress’ power to change.
The present suit serves as an illustration of these principles. The fact that respondents are state taxpayers does not give them standing to challenge the subsidies that § 43-1089 allegedly provides to religious STOs. To alter the rules of standing or weaken their requisite elements would be inconsistent with the case-or-controversy limitation on federal jurisdiction imposed by Article III.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
PER CURIAM.
Around one o'clock in the morning on May 27, 2008, Officer Mike Stanton and his partner responded to a call about an "unknown disturbance" involving a person with a baseball bat in La Mesa, California. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6. Stanton was familiar with the neighborhood, known for "violence associated with the area gangs." Ibid. The officers-wearing uniforms and driving a marked police vehicle-approached the place where the disturbance had been reported and noticed three men walking in the street. Upon seeing the police car, two of the men turned into a nearby apartment complex. The third, Nicholas Patrick, crossed the street about 25 yards in front of Stanton's car and ran or quickly walked toward a residence. Id., at 7, 17. Nothing in the record shows that Stanton knew at the time whether that residence belonged to Patrick or someone else; in fact, it belonged to Drendolyn Sims.
Stanton did not see Patrick with a baseball bat, but he considered Patrick's behavior suspicious and decided to detain him in order to investigate. Ibid.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Stanton exited his patrol car, called out "police," and ordered Patrick to stop in a voice loud enough for all in the area to hear. App. to Pet. for Cert. 7. But Patrick did not stop. Instead, he "looked directly at Stanton, ignored his lawful orders[,] and quickly went through [the] front gate" of a fence enclosing Sims' front yard. Id., at 17 (alterations omitted). When the gate closed behind Patrick, the fence-which was more than six feet tall and made of wood-blocked Stanton's view of the yard. Stanton believed that Patrick had committed a jailable misdemeanor under California Penal Code § 148 by disobeying his order to stop; * Stanton also "fear [ed] for [his] safety." App. to Pet. for Cert. 7. He accordingly made the "split-second decision" to kick open the gate in pursuit of Patrick. Ibid. Unfortunately, and unbeknownst to Stanton, Sims herself was standing behind the gate when it flew open. The swinging gate struck Sims, cutting her forehead and injuring her shoulder.
Sims filed suit against Stanton in Federal District Court under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Stanton unreasonably searched her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Stanton, finding that: (1) Stanton's entry was justified by the potentially dangerous situation, by the need to pursue Patrick as he fled, and by Sims' lesser expectation of privacy in the curtilage of her home; and (2) even if a constitutional violation had occurred, Stanton was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law put him on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional.
Sims appealed, and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 706 F.3d 954 (2013). The court held that Stanton's warrantless entry into Sims' yard was unconstitutional because Sims was entitled to the same expectation of privacy in her curtilage as in her home itself, because there was no immediate danger, and because Patrick had committed only the minor offense of disobeying a police officer. Id., at 959-963. The court also found the law to be clearly established that Stanton's pursuit of Patrick did not justify his warrantless entry, given that Patrick was suspected of only a misdemeanor. Id., at 963-964. The court accordingly held that Stanton was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 964-965. We address only the latter holding here, and now reverse.
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' "
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments," and "protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' " Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). "We do not require a case directly on point" before concluding that the law is clearly established, "but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." al-Kidd, 563 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2083.
There is no suggestion in this case that Officer Stanton knowingly violated the Constitution; the question is whether, in light of precedent existing at the time, he was "plainly incompetent" in entering Sims' yard to pursue the fleeing Patrick. Id., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2085. The Ninth Circuit concluded that he was. It did so despite the fact that federal and state courts nationwide are sharply divided on the question whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect. Compare, e.g.,Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 45, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (2002) ( "We ... hold today that when officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being arrested is a misdemeanor"), and State v. Ricci, 144 N.H. 241, 244, 739 A.2d 404, 407 (1999) ("the facts of this case demonstrate that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for the misdemeanor offense of disobeying a police officer" where the defendant had fled into his home with police officers in hot pursuit), with Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d 1198, 1207 (C.A.10 2011) ("The warrantless entry based on hot pursuit was not justified" where "[t]he intended arrest was for a traffic misdemeanor committed by a minor, with whom the officer was well acquainted, who had fled into his family home from which there was only one exit" (footnote omitted)), and Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 217, 829 S.W.2d 412, 415 (1992) ("even though Officer Sudduth might have been under the impression that he was in continuous pursuit of Butler for what he considered to be the crime of disorderly conduct, ... since the crime is a minor offense, under these circumstances there is no exigent circumstance that would allow Officer Sudduth's warrantless entry into Butler's home for what is concededly, at most, a petty disturbance").
Other courts have concluded that police officers are at least entitled to qualified immunity in these circumstances because the constitutional violation is not clearly established. E.g., Greiner v. Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (C.A.8 1994) ("Putting firmly to one side the merits of whether the home arrests were constitutional, we cannot say that only a plainly incompetent policeman could have thought them permissible at the time," where officers entered a home without a warrant in hot pursuit of misdemeanor suspects who had defied the officers' order to remain outside (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Notwithstanding this basic disagreement, the Ninth Circuit below denied Stanton qualified immunity. In its one-paragraph analysis on the hot pursuit point, the panel relied on two cases, one from this Court, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), and one from its own, United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 908 (2001)
(en banc) ( per curiam ). Neither case clearly establishes that Stanton violated Sims' Fourth Amendment rights.
In Welsh, police officers learned from a witness that Edward Welsh had driven his car off the road and then left the scene, presumably because he was drunk. Acting on that tip, the officers went to Welsh's home without a warrant, entered without consent, and arrested him for driving while intoxicated-a nonjailable traffic offense under state law. 466 U.S., at 742-743, 104 S.Ct. 2091. Our opinion first noted our precedent holding that hot pursuit of a fleeing felon justifies an officer's warrantless entry. Id., at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976)). But we rejected the suggestion that the hot pursuit exception applied: "there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of [Welsh] from the scene of a crime." 466 U.S., at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091. We went on to conclude that the officers' entry violated the Fourth Amendment, finding it "important" that "there [was] probable cause to believe that only a minor offense ... ha[d] been committed." Ibid. In those circumstances, we said, "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned." Ibid. But we did not lay down a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is "usually" required. Id., at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091.
In Johnson, police officers broke into Michael Johnson's fenced yard in search of another person (Steven Smith) whom they were attempting to apprehend on five misdemeanor arrest warrants. 256 F.3d, at 898-900. The Ninth Circuit was clear that this case, like Welsh, did not involve hot pursuit: "the facts of this case simply are not covered by the 'hot pursuit' doctrine" because Smith had escaped from the police 30 minutes prior and his whereabouts were unknown. 256 F.3d, at 908. The court held that the officers' entry required a warrant, in part because Smith was wanted for only misdemeanor offenses. Then, in a footnote, the court said: "In situations where an officer is truly in hot pursuit and the underlying offense is a felony, the Fourth Amendment usually yields [to law enforcement's interest in apprehending a fleeing suspect]. See [Santana, supra, at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406]. However, in situations where the underlying offense is only a misdemeanor, law enforcement must yield to the Fourth Amendment in all but the 'rarest' cases. Welsh, [ supra, at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091]." Johnson, supra, at 908, n. 6.
In concluding-as it must have-that Stanton was "plainly incompetent," al-Kidd, 563 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2085, the Ninth Circuit below read Welsh and the footnote in Johnson far too broadly. First, both of those cases cited Santana with approval, a case that approved an officer's warrantless entry while in hot pursuit. And though Santana involved a felony suspect, we did not expressly limit our holding based on that fact. See 427 U.S., at 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406 ("The only remaining question is whether [the suspect's] act of retreating into her house could thwart an otherwise proper arrest. We hold that it could not"). Second, to repeat, neither Welsh nor Johnson involved hot pursuit. Welsh, supra, at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091;Johnson, supra, at 908. Thus, despite our emphasis in Welsh on the fact that the crime at issue was minor-indeed, a mere nonjailable civil offense-nothing in the opinion establishes that the seriousness of the crime is equally important in cases of hot pursuit. Third, even in the portion of Welsh cited by the Ninth Circuit below, our opinion is equivocal: We held not that warrantless entry to arrest a misdemeanant is never justified, but only that such entry should be rare. 466 U.S., at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091.
That is in fact how two California state courts have read Welsh. In both People v. Lloyd, 216 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1430, 265 Cal.Rptr. 422, 425 (1989), and In re Lavoyne M., 221 Cal.App.3d 154, 159, 270 Cal.Rptr. 394, 396 (1990), the California Court of Appeal refused to limit the hot pursuit exception to felony suspects. The court stated in Lloyd : "Where the pursuit into the home was based on an arrest set in motion in a public place, the fact that the offenses justifying the initial detention or arrest were misdemeanors is of no significance in determining the validity of the entry without a warrant." 216 Cal.App.3d, at 1430, 265 Cal.Rptr., at 425. It is especially troubling that the Ninth Circuit would conclude that Stanton was plainly incompetent-and subject to personal liability for damages-based on actions that were lawful according to courts in the jurisdiction where he acted. Cf. al-Kidd, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2086-2087 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).
Finally, our determination that Welsh and Johnson are insufficient to overcome Stanton's qualified immunity is bolstered by the fact that, even after Johnson, two different District Courts in the Ninth Circuit have granted qualified immunity precisely because the law regarding warrantless entry in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant is not clearly established. See Kolesnikov v. Sacramento County, No. S-06-2155, 2008 WL 1806193, at *7 (E.D.Cal., Apr. 22, 2008) ("since Welsh, it has not been clearly established that there can never be warrantless home arrests in the context of a 'hot pursuit' of a suspect fleeing from the commission of misdemeanor offenses"); Garcia v. Imperial, No. 08-2357, 2010 WL 3834020, at *6, n. 4 (S.D.Cal., Sept. 28, 2010). In Garcia, a case with facts similar to those here, the District Court distinguished Johnson as a case where "the officers were not in hot pursuit of the suspect, had not seen the suspect enter the neighbor's property, and had no real reason to think the suspect was there." 2010 WL 3834020, at *6, n. 4. Precisely the same facts distinguish this case from Johnson : Stanton was in hot pursuit of Patrick, he did see Patrick enter Sims' property, and he had every reason to believe that Patrick was just beyond Sims' gate. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6-7, 17.
To summarize the law at the time Stanton made his split-second decision to enter Sims' yard: Two opinions of this Court were equivocal on the lawfulness of his entry; two opinions of the State Court of Appeal affirmatively authorized that entry; the most relevant opinion of the Ninth Circuit was readily distinguishable; two Federal District Courts in the Ninth Circuit had granted qualified immunity in the wake of that opinion; and the federal and state courts of last resort around the Nation were sharply divided.
We do not express any view on whether Officer Stanton's entry into Sims' yard in pursuit of Patrick was constitutional. But whether or not the constitutional rule applied by the court below was correct, it was not "beyond debate." al-Kidd, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2083. Stanton may have been mistaken in believing his actions were justified, but he was not "plainly incompetent." Malley, 475 U.S., at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092.
The petition for certiorari and respondent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Cheek Wells was killed in Alabama when a grinding wheel with which he was working burst. The wheel had been manufactured by the respondent, a corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The ad-ministratrix of the estate of Cheek Wells brought an action for damages in the federal court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania after one year, but within two years, after the death. Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship.
The section of the Alabama Code upon which petitioner predicated her action for wrongful death provided that action “. . . must be brought within two years from and after the death . . . .” The respondent moved for summary judgment on the ground the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute required suit to be commenced within one year. In an opinion on that motion, the district judge found that the Pennsylvania statute, which was analogous to the Alabama statute, had a one-year limitation. He further found that the Pennsylvania conflict of laws rule called for the application of its own limitation rather than that of the place of the accident. Deeming himself bound by the Pennsylvania conflicts rule, he ordered summary judgment for the respondent. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
We granted certiorari limited to the question whether this Pennsylvania conflicts rule violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution.
The states are free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws as they choose, Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171 (1916), subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other constitutional restrictions. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state to adopt any particular set of rules of conflict of laws; it merely sets certain minimum requirements which each state must observe when asked to apply the law of a sister state.
Long ago, we held that applying the statute of limitations of the forum to a foreign substantive right did not deny full faith and credit, McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (1839); Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407 (1850); Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22 (1857). Recently we referred to “. . . the well-established principle of conflict of laws that ‘If action is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be maintained though action is not barred in the state where the cause of action arose.’ Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 603 (1934).” Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586, 607 (1947).
The rule that the limitations of the forum apply (which this Court has said meets the requirements of full faith and credit) is the usual conflicts rule of the states. However, there have been divergent views when a foreign statutory right unknown to the common law has a period of limitation included in the section creating the right. The Alabama statute here involved creates such a right and contains a built-in limitation. The view is held in some jurisdictions that such a limitation is so intimately connected with the right that it must be enforced in the forum state along with the substantive right.
We are not concerned with the reasons which have led some states for their own purposes to adopt the foreign limitation, instead of their own, in such a situation. The question here is whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels them to do so. Our prevailing rule is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the forum state to use the period of limitation of a foreign state. We see no reason in the present situation to graft an exception onto it. Differences based upon whether the foreign right was known to the common law or upon the arrangement of the code of the foreign state are too unsubstantial to form the basis for constitutional distinctions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
We agree with the respondent that Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33 (1926), has no application here. It presented an entirely different problem. Congress had given a statutory cause of action to seamen for certain personal injuries, placing concurrent jurisdiction in the state and federal courts. In Engel, supra, the two-year federal limitation rather than the one-year California limitation for similar actions was held controlling in an action brought in the California courts. Once it was decided that the intention of Congress was that the two-year limitation was meant to apply in both federal and state courts under our Federal Constitution, that was the supreme law of the land.
Our decisions in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609 (1951), and First National Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U. S. 396 (1952), do not call for a change in the well-established rule that the forum state is permitted to apply its own period of limitation. The crucial factor in those two cases was that the forum laid an uneven hand on causes of action arising within and without the forum state. Causes of action arising in sister states were discriminated against. Here Pennsylvania applies her one-year limitation to all wrongful death actions wherever they may arise. The judgment is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Clark, not having heard oral argument, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“A personal representative may maintain an action, and recover such damages as the jury may assess in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama, and not elsewhere for the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of any person or persons, or corporation, his or their servants or agents, whereby the death of his testator or intestate was caused, if the testator or intestate could have maintained an action for such wrongful act, omission, or negligence, if it had not caused death. Such action shall not abate by the death of the defendant, but may be revived against his personal representative; and may be maintained, though there has not been prosecution, or conviction, or acquittal of the defendant for the wrongful act, or omission, or negligence; and the damages recovered are not subject to the payment of the debts or liabilities of the testator or intestate, but must be distributed according to the statute of distributions. Such action must be brought within two years from and after the death of the testator or intestate.” Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 7, § 123.
Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1931, Tit. 12, § 1603.
102 F. Supp. 519 (1951).
195 F. 2d 814 (1952). See also Quinn v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 199 F. 2d 416 (1952).
344 U. S. 815 (1952).
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, el. 1.
Cf. dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black, Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 625 (1947).
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 603 (1934).
Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 A. 711 (1913), overruled on another ground, Daury v. Ferraro, 108 Conn. 386, 143 A. 630 (1928); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Burkhart, 154 Ky. 92, 157 S. W. 18 (1913) (dictum); Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. Co., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 620 (1904). Contra: White v. Govatos, 40 Del. 349, 10 A. 2d 524 (1939); Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857 (1930); Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 A. 346 (1931). See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 397, Comment b, and § 605 (1934).
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case Bentex and some 20 other firms that market drugs containing pentylenetetrazol filed this suit for a declaratory judgment that their drugs containing pentylenetetrazol are generally recognized as safe and effective, and thus not “new drugs” within the meaning of §201 (p) (1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as amended, 76 Stat. 781, 21 U. S. C. § 321 (p) (1). They also sought exemption from the new effectiveness requirements by reason of § 107 (c) (4) of the 1962 amendments to the Act, known as the “grandfather” clause.
As part of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program, three separate National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) panels reviewed the evidence concerning these drugs, and each concluded that the drug was “ineffective” for the indicated use. The Commissioner concluded there was a lack of substantial evidence that these drugs were effective for their intended uses and gave notice of his intention to initiate proceedings to withdraw approval of the new drug applications (NDA’s). FDA had taken the position that withdrawal of approval of an NDA would operate to remove marketing approval for all drugs of similar composition, known as “me-too” drugs, whether or not they were expressly covered by an effective NDA. Aecord-ingly, the notice invited the holders of the NDA’s for drugs containing pentylenetetrazol, “and any interested person who might be adversely affected by their removal from the market/’ to submit “adequate and well-controlled studies” to establish the effectiveness of the drugs. See § 505 (d), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (d). Only one NDA holder submitted further evidence, which the Commissioner held did not satisfy the statutory standard. He thereupon gave notice of intent to issue an order withdrawing approval of the NDA’s under § 505 (e), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (e). Again, all those who might be adversely affected by withdrawal of the NDA’s were given the opportunity to participate. Only one NDA holder requested a hearing but filed no data to support it. The Commissioner issued orders withdrawing approval of the three NDA’s (35 Fed. Reg. 14412); no appeal was taken. This suit in the District Court followed. It appears that all of the parties to this suit market “me-too” drugs, none of which was expressly covered by an effective NDA.
The District Court held that although it could determine whether the drugs were “new” or “grandfathered” drugs, its jurisdiction was concurrent with that of FDA and that FDA should resolve the “new drug” issue in an administrative proceeding. It entered an injunction to preserve the status quo and ruled that if FDA should decline to hold a hearing it would determine the issue. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions that the District Court determine whether the challenged drugs may lawfully be marketed without approved NDA’s. 463 F. 2d 363. It held that FDA has no jurisdiction, either primary or concurrent, to decide in an administrative proceeding what is a “new drug” for which an NDA is required. In its view the 1962 Act established two forums for the regulation of drugs: an administrative one for premarketing clear-anees for “new drugs” or withdrawal of previously approved NDA’s, with the right of appeal; and, second, a judicial one for enforcement of the requirement that “new drugs” be cleared as safe and effective before marketing by providing the Government with judicial remedies of seizure, injunction, and criminal prosecution available solely in the District Court. Id., at 371-372.
We reverse the Court of Appeals.
FDA, as a result of an NAS-NRC study and after due notice, faced up to the problem of proposing withdrawal of drugs found to be lacking in substantial evidence of effectiveness. One method would be to have 1,000 withdrawal hearings — perhaps as many as 3,500, each one lasting probably for weeks. The cost in time and budget would be enormous. Accordingly, FDA issued regulations, already discussed in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., ante, p. 609, defining the “scientific principles which characterize an adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation,” which elaborates on the statutory “substantial evidence” test. And, as we held in Hynson, no basis for a hearing under these regulations would be laid unless a party seeking a hearing proffered at least some evidence of that nature and quality.
By May 1972, 102 final orders effecting withdrawal of approval for 452 NDA's had been issued; and they resulted in the removal from the market of an additional 1,473 “me-too” drugs. FDA was still troubled because under the 1962 Act no census of the marketplace was authorized. That is why Congress enacted the Drug Listing Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 559, 21 U. S. C. §§ 331 (p), 335 (e), 360 (e), (f), (c), (d) (1970 ed., Supp. II). That Act requires manufacturers to submit to FDA a list of all drugs they market, including data showing their composition, labeling, and advertising. The Senate Report stated:
“The effective enforcement of the drug provisions of the Act requires the ready availability of a current inventory of all marketed drugs. The Secretary is just completing a thorough review of the effectiveness of drugs marketed pursuant to new drug applications during the period 1938-1962, as required by the Drug Amendments of 1962. Application of the results of this important review to related drugs would be frustrated if a list of all marketed drugs were not easily obtained.”
FDA also realized that it is impossible to apply the 1962 amendments to over-the-counter (OTC) drugs on a case-by-case basis. There are between 100,000 and 500,000 of these products, few of which were previously approved by FDA. In May 1972 FDA adopted a procedure for determining whether particular OTC products, not covered by NDA’s are safe products, not ineffective, and not misbranded. 37 Fed. Reg. 9464. The procedure involves the establishment of independent expert panels for different categories of OTC drugs (e. g., antacids, laxatives, analgesics) which would review all available data and prepare monographs prescribing drug composition, labeling, and manufacturing controls. OTC’s conforming to the monograph will not be considered either misbranded or a “new drug” requiring an NDA. The regulation provides for a hearing before the expert panel, comments and rebuttal comments on the monograph, and finally a hearing before the Commissioner and judicial review. Id., at 9475.
This case, like the cross-petition in the Hynson case (No. 72-414) raises the question whether FDA has authority to decide in an administrative hearing whether a drug satisfies the new effectiveness requirements of the Act. As noted, the Commissioner ordered that three NDA’s for the drugs in question be withdrawn. Review of the order was not sought in the Court of Appeals as provided in § 505 (h), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (h). Rather, the aggrieved manufacturers of “me-too” drugs filed suit in the District Court, with the results we have already detailed. The narrow question is whether the FDA may decide whether a drug is a “new drug” on referral from a district court.
As already noted, an order denying an NDA or withdrawing one is reviewable by the Court of Appeals, § 505 (h); and we see no reason why Congress could not make one method of review the exclusive one. Certainly an order that does not deny or withdraw an NDA is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, if it declares a “new drug” status. See Hynson, supra, at 627. In bolstering that conclusion we should note in passing that Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 144, said that the provisions stated in this Act for judicial review do not manifest “a congressional purpose to eliminate judicial review of other kinds of agency action.” While § 505 (h) would appear to be the exclusive method of obtaining judicial review of FDA’s order withdrawing an NDA covering the instant drugs, the Government apparently did not oppose the District Court’s taking jurisdiction, or appeal from its action, and presents no objection to the exercise by the courts of jurisdiction in this case. It does, however, strenuously oppose the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.
That court, in holding that FDA has no jurisdiction to determine the “new drug” status of a drug, stated that the question of “new drug” status is never presented when an application of a manufacturer for approval is filed. Parties, of course, cannot confer jurisdiction; only Congress can do so. The line sought to be drawn by the Court of Appeals is FDA action on NDA’s pursuant to § 505 (d) and § 505 (e), on the one hand, and the question of “new drug” determination on the other. We can discern no such jurisdictional line under the Act. The FDA, as already stated, may deny an NDA where there is a lack of “substantial evidence” of the drug’s effectiveness, based, as we have outlined, on clinical investigation by experts. But the “new drug” definition under § 201 (p) encompasses a drug “not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use.” Whether a particular drug is a “new drug,” depends in part on the expert knowledge and experience of scientists based on controlled clinical experimentation and backed by substantial support in scientific literature. One function is not peculiar to judicial expertise, the other to administrative expertise. The two types of cases overlap and strongly suggest that Congress desired that the administrative agency make both kinds of determination. Even where no such administrative determination has been made and the issue arises in a district court in enforcement proceedings, it would be commonplace for the court to await an appropriate administrative declaration before it acted. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51; FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621, 647. It may, of course, be true that in some cases general recognition that a drug is efficacious might be made without the kind of scientific support necessary to obtain approval of an NDA. But, as we indicate in Hynson, supra, at 631, the reach of scientific inquiry under both § 505 (d) and § 201 (p) is precisely the same.
We think that it is implicit in the regulatory scheme, not spelled out in haec verba, that FDA has jurisdiction to decide with administrative finality, subject to the types of judicial review provided, the “new drug” status of individual drugs or classes of drugs. The deluge of litigation that would follow if “me-too” drugs and OTC drugs had to receive de novo hearings in the courts would inure to the interests of manufacturers and merchants in drugs, but not to the interests of the public that Congress was anxious to protect by the 1962 amendments, as well as OTC drugs and drugs covered by the 1972 Act. We are told that FDA is incapable of handling a caseload of more than perhaps 10 or 15 de novo judicial proceedings in a year. Clearly, if FDA were required to litigate, on a case-by-case basis, the “new drug” status of each drug now marketed, the regulatory scheme of the Act would be severely undermined, if not totally destroyed. Moreover, a case-by-case approach is inherently unfair because it requires compliance by one manufacturer while his competitors marketing similar drugs remain free to violate the Act. In a case much more clouded with doubts than this one, we held that we would not “in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress’ intention . . . prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency’s ultimate purposes.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 780. And see Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U. S. 289, 304-306.
We conclude that the District Court’s referral of the “new drug” and the “grandfather” issues to FDA was appropriate, as these are the kinds of issues peculiarly suited to initial determination by the FDA. As the District Court said: “Evaluation of conflicting reports as to the reputation of drugs among experts in the field is not a matter well left to a court without chemical or medical background.” The determination whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective within the meaning of §201(p)(l) necessarily implicates complex chemical and pharmacological considerations. Threshold questions within the peculiar expertise of an administrative agency are appropriately routed to the agency, while the court stays its hand. As we stated in Far Eastern Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574-575: “[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.” And see Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 68; Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra, at 304-306.
Reversed.
MR. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case.
Volume 37 Fed. Reg. 23187, adding § 130.40 to 21 CFR, defines “identical, related, or similar drug” as used in this Act to include “other brands, potencies, dosage forms, salts, and esters of the same drug moiety as well as of any drug moiety related in chemical structure or known pharmacological properties.” It also provides all persons with an interest in such drugs an opportunity for hearing on any proposed withdrawal of NDA approval for the basic drug. A district court order directing FDA to apply the NAS-NRC evaluation to all “me-too” drugs is reproduced in 37 Fed. Reg. 26623-26624.
35 Fed. Reg. 3073 and 7250.
See the Appendix in Hynson, ante, p. 634.
Hearings on the Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 22, p. 8525.
Filings are due in June 1973. 37 Fed. Reg. 26432.
S. Rep. No. 92-924, p. 2.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises important questions concerning the interrelationship of the antimerger and private damages action provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Act.
I
Petitioner is one of the two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment in the United States. Respondents are three of the 10 bowling centers owned by Treadway Companies, Inc. Since 1965, petitioner has acquired and operated a large number of bowling centers, including six in the markets in which respondents operate. Respondents instituted this action contending that these acquisitions violated various provisions of the antitrust laws.
In the late 1950’s, the bowling industry expanded rapidly, and petitioner’s sales of lanes, automatic pinsetters, and ancillary equipment rose accordingly. Since this equipment requires a major capital expenditure — $12,600 for each lane and pinsetter, App. A1576 — most of petitioner’s sales were for secured credit.
In the early 1960’s, the bowling industry went into a sharp decline. Petitioner’s sales quickly dropped to preboom levels. Moreover, petitioner experienced great difficulty in collecting money owed it; by the end of 1964 over $100,000,000, or more than 25%, of petitioner’s accounts were more than 90 days delinquent. Id., at A1884. Repossessions rose dramatically, but attempts to sell or lease the repossessed equipment met with only limited success. Because petitioner had borrowed close to $250,000,000 to finance its credit sales, id., at A1900, it was, as the Court of Appeals concluded, “in serious financial difficulty.” NBO Industries Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F. 2d 262, 267 (CA3 1975).
To meet this difficulty, petitioner began acquiring and operating defaulting bowling centers when their equipment could not be resold and a positive cash flow could be expected from operating the centers. During the seven years preceding the trial in this case, petitioner acquired 222 centers, 54 of which it either disposed of or closed. Ibid. These acquisitions made petitioner by far the largest operator of bowling centers, with over five times as many centers as its next largest competitor. Ibid. Petitioner’s net worth in 1965 was more than eight times greater, and its gross revenue more than seven times greater, than the total for the 11 next largest bowling chains. App. A1675. Nevertheless, petitioner controlled only 2% of the bowling centers in the United States. Id., at A1096.
At issue here are acquisitions by petitioner in the three markets in which respondents are located: Pueblo, Colo., Poughkeepsie, N. Y., and Paramus, N. J. In 1965, petitioner acquired one defaulting center in Pueblo, one in Poughkeepsie, and two in the Paramus area. In 1969, petitioner acquired a third defaulting center in the Paramus market, and in 1970 petitioner acquired a 'fourth. Petitioner closed its Poughkeepsie center in 1969 after three years of unsuccessful operation; the Paramus center acquired in 1970 also proved unsuccessful, and in March 1973 petitioner gave notice that it would cease operating the center when its lease expired. The other four centers were operational at the time of trial.
Respondents initiated this action in June 1966, alleging, inter alia, that these acquisitions might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 18. Respondents sought damages, pursuant to § 4 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15, for three times “the reasonably expectable profits to be made [by respondents] from the operation of their bowling centers.” App. A24. Respondents also sought a divestiture order, an injunction against future acquisitions, and such “other further and different relief” as might be appropriate under § 16 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 26. App. A27.
Trial was held in the spring of 1973, following an initial mistrial due to a hung jury. To establish a § 7 violation, respondents sought to prove that because of its size, petitioner had the capacity to lessen competition in the markets it had entered by driving smaller competitors out of business. To establish damages, respondents attempted to show that had petitioner allowed the defaulting centers to close, respondents’ profits would have increased. At respondents’ request, the jury was instructed in accord with respondents’ theory as to the nature of the violation and the basis for damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of respondents in the amount of $2,358,030, which represented the minimum estimate by respondents of the additional income they would have realized had the acquired centers been closed. Id., at A1737. As required by law, the District Court trebled the damages. It also awarded respondents costs and attorneys’ fees totaling $446,977.32, and, sitting as a court of equity, it ordered petitioner to divest itself of the centers involved here, Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 389 F. Supp. 996 (NJ 1974). Petitioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals, while endorsing the legal theories upon which respondents’ claim was based, reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. NBO Industries Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., supra. The court found that a properly instructed jury could have concluded that petitioner was a “giant” whose entry into a “market of pygmies” might lessen horizontal retail competition, because such a “giant”
“has greater ease of entry into the market, can accomplish cost-savings by investing in new equipment, can resort to low or below cost sales to sustain itself against competition for a longer period, and can obtain more favorable credit terms.” 523 F. 2d, at 268.
The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to conclude that but for petitioner’s actions, the acquired centers would have gone out of business. Id., at 273, 275-277. And the court held that if a jury were to make such findings, respondents would be entitled to damages for threefold the income they would have earned. After reviewing the instructions on these issues, however, the court decided that the jury had not been properly charged and that therefore a new trial was required. Id., at 275-277. It also decided that since “an essential predicate” for the District Court’s grant of equitable relief was the jury verdict on the § 7 claim, the equitable decree should be vacated as well. Id., at 277-278. And it concluded that in any event equitable relief “should be restricted to preventing those practices by which a deep pocket market entrant harms competition .... [D]ivestiture was simply inappropriate.” Id., at 279.
Both sides petitioned this Court for writs of certiorari. Brunswick’s petition challenged the theory the Court of Appeals had approved for awarding damages; the plaintiffs’ petition challenged the Court of Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the jury instructions and the appropriateness of a divestiture order. We granted Brunswick’s petition. 424 U. S. 908 (1976).
II
The issue for decision is a narrow one. Petitioner does not presently contest the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a properly instructed jury could have found the acquisitions unlawful. Nor does petitioner challenge the Court of Appeals’ determination that the evidence would support a finding that had petitioner not acquired these centers, they would have gone out of business and respondents’ income would have increased. Petitioner questions only whether antitrust damages are available where the sole injury alleged is that competitors were continued in business, thereby denying respondents an anticipated increase in market shares.
To answer that question it is necessary to examine the anti-merger and treble-damages provisions of the Clayton Act. Section 7 of the Act proscribes mergers whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” (Emphasis added.) It is, as we have observed many times, a prophylactic measure, intended “primarily to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil . . . .” United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 597 (1957). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 317-318 (1962); United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 362-363 (1963); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U. S. 158, 170-171 (1964); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U. S. 270, 277 (1966); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U. S. 568, 577-578 (1967); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 201 (1974).
Section 4, in contrast, is in essence a remedial provision. It provides treble damages to “[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .” Of course, treble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U. S. 495, 502 (1969); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U. S. 100, 130 (1969); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251, 262 (1972). It nevertheless is true that the treble-damages provision, which makes awards available only to injured parties, and measures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is designed primarily as a remedy.
Intermeshing a statutory prohibition against acts that have a potential to cause certain harms with a damages action intended to remedy those harms is not without difficulty. Plainly, to recover damages respondents must prove more than that petitioner violated § 7, since such proof establishes only that injury may result. Respondents contend that the only additional element they need demonstrate is that they are in a worse position than they would have been had petitioner not committed those acts. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding compensable any loss “causally linked” to “the mere presence of the violator in the market.” 523 F. 2d, at 272-273. Because this holding divorces antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws without a clear statutory command to do so, we cannot agree with it.
Every merger of two existing entities into one, whether lawful or unlawful, has the potential for producing economic readjustments that adversely affect some persons. But Congress has not condemned .mergers _on UAatme,count,i t has condemned them only when they may produce anticompetitive effects. Yet under the Court of Appeals’ holding, once a merger is found to violate § 7, all dislocations caused by the merger are actionable, regardless of whether those dislocations have anything to do with the reason the merger was condemned. This holding would make § 4 recovery entirely fortuitous, and would authorize damages for losses which are of no concern to the antitrust laws.
Both of these consequences are well illustrated by the facts of this case. If the acquisitions here were unlawful, it is because they brought a “deep pocket” parent into a market of “pygmies.” Yet respondents’ injury — the loss of income that would have accrued had the acquired centers gone bankrupt — bears no relationship to the size of either the acquiring company or its competitors. Respondents would have suffered the identical “loss” — but no compensable injury — had the acquired centers instead obtained refinancing or been purchased by “shallow pocket” parents, as the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged, 523 F. 2d, at 279. Thus, respondents’ injury was not of “the type that the statute was intended to forestall,” Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 191, 202 (1967).
But the antitrust laws are not merely indifferent to the injury claimed here. At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of increased concentration. The damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits they would have realized had competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted for “the protection of competition, not competitors,” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S., at 320. It is inimical to the purposes of these laws to award damages for the type of injury claimed here.
Of course, Congress is free, if it desires, to mandate damages awards for all dislocations caused by unlawful mergers despite the peculiar consequences of so doing. But because of these consequences, “we should insist upon a clear expression of a congressional purpose,” Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S., at 264, before attributing such an intent to Congress. We can find no such expression in either the language or the legislative history of § 4. To the contrary, it is far from clear that the loss of windfall profits that would have accrued had the acquired centers failed even constitutes “injury” within the meaning of § 4. And it is quite clear that if respondents were injured, it was not “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws”: while respondents’ loss occurred “by reason of” the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur “by reason of” that which made the acquisitions unlawful.
We therefore hold that for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U. S., at 125.
Ill
We come, then, to the question of appropriate disposition of this case. At the very least, petitioner is entitled to a new trial, not only because of the instructional errors noted by the Court of Appeals that are not at issue here, see n. 6, supra, but also because the District Court’s instruction as to the basis for damages was inconsistent with our holding as outlined above., Our review of the record, however, persuades us that a new trial on the damages claim is unwarranted. Respondents based their case solely on their novel damages theory which we have rejected. While they produced some conclusory testimony suggesting that in operating the acquired centers petitioner had abused its deep pocket by engaging in anticompetitive conduct, they made no attempt to prove that they had lost any income as a result of such predation. Rather, their entire proof of damages was based on their claim to profits that would have been earned had the acquired centers closed. Since respondents did not prove any cognizable damages and have not offered any justification for allowing respondents, after two trials and over 10 years of litigation, yet a third opportunity to do so, it follows that, petitioner is entitled, in accord with its motion made pursuant to Rule 50 (b), to judgment on the damages claim notwithstanding the verdict. Neely v. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U. S. 317, 326-330 (1967); United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 106-107 (1972).
Respondents’ complaint also prayed for equitable relief, and the Court of Appeals held that if respondents established a § 7 violation, they might be entitled to an injunction against “those practices by which a deep pocket market entrant harms competition.” 523 F. 2d, at 279. Because petitioner has not contested this holding, respondents remain free, on remand, to seek such a decree.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Sales of automatic pinsetters, for example, went from 1,890 in 1956 to 16,288 in 1961. App. A1866.
Repossessions of pinsetters increased from 300 in 1961 to 5,996 in 1965. Ibid. In 1963, petitioner resold over two-thirds of the pinsetters repossessed; more typically, only one-third were resold, and in 1965, less than one-quarter were resold. Id., at A1879.
The complaint contained two additional counts. Count one alleged that petitioner had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, by-fixing resale prices for bowling supplies sold by petitioner to respondents. This count was abandoned prior to trial. Count two alleged that by virtue of the acquisitions and other acts, petitioner was guilty of monopolization or an attempt to monopolize in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 2. The jury found for petitioner on this count, and respondents did not appeal.
The complaint also named as plaintiffs National Bowl-O-Mat, the predecessor to Treadway Companies, and the seven other bowling center subsidiaries of Treadway. These plaintiffs were unsuccessful on all counts, however, and they did not appeal the judgments entered against them.
Judgment ultimately was entered for $6,575,040, which is $499,050 less than three times the jury’s damages award, after respondent Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat consented to a remittitur which the District Court proposed as an alternative to a retrial on damages. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F. Supp. 316, 324-326 (NJ 1973). The remittitur was deemed necessary because the jury apparently awarded damages to that respondent in accord with its minimum claim dating back to 1963, when the alleged § 2 violation began, rather than back to 1965, when the alleged § 7 violation began. The District Court thought that the jury might have been confused by the instruction to use the same" methods for calculating damages under the two sections. Ibid.
Petitioner’s appeal and respondents’ cross-appeal with respect to the amount of the attorneys’ fee award initially were dismissed by the Court of Appeals for want of jurisdiction because the District Court had neither disposed of respondents’ equitable claim nor certified the judgment entered on the legal claims pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b). Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 500 F. 2d 1400 (CA3 1974) (order reported) ; App. A1563-A1566 {per curiam opinion reprinted). The District Court then certified the previously entered judgment, and the parties reappealed. While the appeals were pending, the District Court granted equitable relief, and the appeal from that judgment was consolidated with the pending appeals.
With respect to the instruction on the issue of liability, the court concluded that since petitioner’s acquisitions “did not increase concentration,” the District Court had erred by focusing on the size of the market shares acquired by petitioner rather than on “indicators of qualitative substantiality” such as the “relative financial strength of Brunswick, Treadway, and other competitors,” or “any retail market advantage” enjoyed by petitioner because of its status as financier and manufacturer. NBO Industries Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F. 2d, at 274-275 (CA3 1975). With respect to the instruction on damages, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had failed to direct the jury to decide whether petitioner’s actions were responsible for keeping the acquired centers in business before considering how much additional income respondents would have earned if the acquired centers had been closed. Id., at 276-277.
The Court of Appeals also held, id., at 275, that in instructing the jury on the statutory requirement that the acquired company be “engaged ... in commerce,” the District Court had not anticipated this Court’s decision in United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Industries, 422 U. S. 271 (1975), which read the “in commerce” requirement more restrictively than had the leading decision of the Third Circuit, Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F. 2d 163, cert. denied, 346 U. S. 901 (1953). Indeed, the court indicated that there might not be sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the “in commerce” test. 523 F. 2d, at 271. The court concluded, however, that given the change in the law, it would be “unjust” to find the evidence insufficient and thereby deny plaintiffs an opportunity to meet the new test on retrial.
Both petitions also questioned the Court of Appeals’ decision to require relitigation of the “in commerce” issue, see n. 6, supra. Brunswick maintained it was entitled to a directed verdict on this issue; plaintiffs argued that they had satisfied the new test and that therefore no new trial was required.
The grant of certiorari excluded the question Brunswick sought to present concerning the suificiency of the evidence that the acquired companies were engaged “in commerce,” see nn. 6, 7, supra.
No action has been taken with respect to respondents’ petition.
Petitioner raises this issue directly through the first question presented, and indirectly through the second, which asks:
“Does not the ‘failing company’ principle require dismissal of a treble-damage action based on alleged violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act where the plaintiffs’ entire damage theory is based on the premise that the ‘acquired’ businesses would have failed and disappeared from the market had the defendant not kept them alive by making the challenged ‘acquisitions?’ ” Pet. for Cert. 3.
In light of our holding, we have no occasion to consider the applicability of the failing-company defense to the conglomerate-like acquisitions involved here.
Treble-damages antitrust actions were first authorized by § 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). The discussions of this section on the floor of the Senate indicate that it was conceived of primarily as a remedy for "[t]he people of the United States as individuals,” especially consumers. 21 Cong. Rec. 1767-1768 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George); see id., at 2612 (Sens. Teller and Reagan), 2615 (Sen. Coke), 3146-3149. Treble damages were provided in part for punitive purposes, id., at 3147 (Sen. George), but also to make the remedy meaningful by counterbalancing “the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is described” in the Act. Id., at 2456 (Sen. Sherman).
When Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914, it “extend[ed] the remedy under section 7 of the Sherman Act” to persons injured by virtue of any antitrust violation. H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1914). The initial House debates concerning provisions related to private damages actions reveal that these actions were conceived primarily as “open[ing] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered.” 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb); see, e. g., id., at 9079 (Rep. Volstead), 9270 (Rep. Carlin), 9414-9417, 9466-9467, 9487-9495. The House debates following the conference committee report, however, indicate that the sponsors of the bill also saw treble-damages suits as an important means of enforcing the law. Id., at 16274H6275 (Rep. Webb), 16317-16319 (Rep. Floyd). In the Senate there was virtually no discussion of the enforcement value of private actions, even though the bill was attacked as lacking meaningful sanctions, e. g., id., at 15818-15821 (Sen. Reed), 16042-16046 (Sen. Norris).
See Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1130-1136 (1976); Symposium, Private Enforcement of the Antimerger Laws, 31 Record of N. Y. C. B. A., 239, 260-261 (1976).
Conversely, had petitioner acquired thriving centers — acquisitions at least as violative of § 7 as the instant acquisitions — respondents would not have lost any income that they otherwise would have received.
For instances in which plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought damages for injuries unrelated to the reason the merger was prohibited, see Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F. 2d 727 (CA10), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 938 (1973); Peterson v. Borden Co., 50 F. 2d 644 (CA7 1931); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72 (Haw. 1969); Goldsmith v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 201 F. Supp. 867 (WDNC 1962).
See generally GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F. 2d 752 (CA2 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U. S. 901 (1973); Comment, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The Private Plaintiff’s Remedies, 7 B. C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 333 (1966); Comment, Treble Damage Actions for Violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 404 (1971).
This does not necessarily mean, as the Court of Appeals feared, 523 F. 2d, at 272, that § 4 plaintiffs must prove an actual lessening of competition in order to recover. The short-term effect of certain anticompetitive behavior — predatory below-cost pricing, for example — may be to stimulate price competition. But competitors may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from the market and competition is thereby lessened. Of course, the case for relief will be strongest where competition has been diminished. See, e. g., Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F. 2d 674 (CA9 1976); Metric Hosiery Co. v. Spartans Industries, Inc., 50 F. R. D. 50 (SDNY 1970); Klingsberg, Bull’s Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 Antitrust Bull. 351, 364 (1971).
Respondents’ testimony concerned price reductions at three centers, App. A170, A420, A431; unjustified capital expenses at three centers, id., at A503-A506, A829-A830; and extravagant “give-aways,” id., at A169-A170, A222-A223, A413-A414, A569. This testimony is rather unimpressive when viewed against both petitioner’s contemporaneous business records which reveal that it did not lower prices when it took over the centers, Defendant’s Exhibits D-32, D-33, D-36, D-38, and respondents’ own exhibits, which demonstrate that petitioner made a profit at two centers, App. A1700, generated a positive cash flow at three others, id., at A1717, A1720, and closed the two centers that were unsuccessful, id., at A1725, A1733.
One of respondents’ witnesses did testify that he knew of one bowling league in Pueblo that had shifted from a respondent to petitioner after petitioner installed faster automatic pinsetters. Id., at 508. Assuming, arguendo, that such installations were not cost justified and constituted a form of predation, respondents still made no attempt to quantify the loss.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Presented for decision in this case is the constitutional validity, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, of the apportionment of seats in the Delaware General Assembly.
I.
Shortly after this Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, plaintiffs below, residents, taxpayers and qualified voters of New Castle County, Delaware, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, in their own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, challenging the apportionment of the Delaware Legislature. Defendants, sued in their representative capacities, were various officials charged with the performance of certain duties in connection with state elections. The complaint alleged deprivation of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and asserted that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 and 2201.
Plaintiffs below alleged that the apportionment of seats in the Delaware Legislature resulted in an “invidious discrimination as to the inhabitants of New Castle County and the City of Wilmington,” operated to deny them the right to cast votes for Delaware legislators “that are of equal effect with that of every other citizen of the State of Delaware,” and was arbitrary and capricious in failing to provide a reasonable classification of those voting for members of the Delaware General Assembly. Plaintiffs also asserted that they were without any other adequate remedy since the existing legislative apportionment was frozen into the 1897 Delaware Constitution; that the present legislature was dominated by legislators representing the two less populous counties; that it was, as a practical matter, impossible to amend the State Constitution or convene a constitutional convention for the purpose of reapportioning the General Assembly; and that the Delaware Legislature had consistently failed to take,appropriate action with respect to reapportionment.
Plaintiffs below sought a declaration that Art. II, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution, which established the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Delaware Legislature, is unconstitutional, and an injunction against defendants to prevent the holding of any further elections under the existing apportionment scheme. Plaintiffs also requested that the District Court either reapportion the Delaware Legislature on a population basis or, alternatively, direct that the November 1962 general election be conducted on an at-large basis. A three-judge District Court was asked for by plaintiffs, and was promptly convened.
On July 25, 1962, the District Court entered an order staying the proceedings until August 7, 1962, in order to permit the Delaware Legislature to take “some appropriate action.” 207 F. Supp. 205. The court noted that, since publication of any proposed constitutional amendment at least three months prior to the next general election was required under Delaware law, it would serve no useful purpose to grant a stay beyond August 7, 1962.
On July 30, 1962, the General Assembly approved a proposed amendment to the legislative apportionment provisions of the Delaware Constitution, based upon recommendations of a bipartisan reapportionment committee appointed by the Delaware Governor. Under Delaware law this amendment could not, however, become effective unless again approved during the next succeeding session of the General Assembly.
On August 7, 1962, the District Court entered an order refusing to dismiss the suit, and stated that, while it had no desire to substitute its judgment for the collective wisdom of the Delaware General Assembly in matters of legislative apportionment, it had no alternative but to proceed promptly in deciding the case. 210 F. Supp. 395. Some of the defendants applied for a further stay of proceedings so that the General Assembly coming into office in January 1963 would have an opportunity to approve the proposed constitutional amendment. On August 8, 1962, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction against the conducting of the November 1962 general election under the existing apportionment provisions. Plaintiffs were thereafter permitted to amend their complaint to request that the proposed constitutional amendment also be declared unconstitutional and that the court order a provisional reapportionment of the Delaware Legislature.
On October 16, 1962, the District Court denied both the applications for a preliminary injunction and for a further stay. 210 F. Supp. 396. Denial of a preliminary injunction effectively permitted the holding of the November 1962 general election pursuant to the legislative apportionment provisions of the 1897 Delaware Constitution. After extended pretrial proceedings, the court, on November 27, 1962, entered a pretrial order in which the parties agreed to the accuracy of a series of exhibits, statistics and various statistical computations. In early January 1963, the Delaware General Assembly, elected in November 1962, approved the proposed constitutional amendment by the requisite two-thirds vote. As a result, the amendment to the legislative apportionment provisions of Art. II, § 2, became effective on January 17, 1963, having been passed by two successive General Assemblies. Trial before the District Court ensued, with the expert testimony of various political scientists being presented.
On April 17, 1963, the District Court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Biggs, held that Art. II, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution, both before and after the 1963 amendment, resulted in gross and invidious discrimination against the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 215 F. Supp. 169. Stating that “the fundamental issue presented for . . . adjudication is whether or not the apportioning of members of the General Assembly of the State of Delaware offends the electors of the State because of an alleged debasement of their voting rights,” the court indicated that it would pass upon the constitutional validity of both the provisions of the 1897 Constitution and the provisions of the 1963 constitutional amendment. After considering in detail the apportionment of legislative seats under the provisions of the 1897 Delaware Constitution, the court below concluded that “[t]he uneven growth of the different areas of the State created a condition because of which the numbers of inhabitants in representative and senatorial districts differed not only on an intercounty basis but also on an intracounty basis.” After discussing the effect of the 1963 reapportionment amendment, the District Court turned to a consideration of plaintiffs’ claim under the Federal Constitution. Stating that the rights asserted by plaintiffs are “personal civil rights” of great importance, the court below continued:
. . Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution of Delaware as it existed prior to the 1963 Amendment and as it exists today creates such an inequality in voting power, resulting in invidious discrimination, as to bring it within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. . . . This is true as to the apportionment of the Senate as well as to the apportionment of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Delaware. While mathematical exactitude in apportionment cannot be expected, and indeed is not possible in an absolute sense, disparities created by Section 2 of Article II, as it was prior to the 1963 Amendment and as it is now, are of such a startling nature as to demonstrate a debasement of franchise of individual electors of this State which the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution cannot tolerate.”
After holding that the apportionment of at least one house of a bicameral state legislature must be based substantially on population, the District Court rejected the relevancy of the so-called federal analogy as a justification for departures from a population-based apportionment scheme in the other house of a state legislature. Although finding no rational or reasonable basis for the Delaware apportionment, either as it previously existed or as amended, the court nevertheless concluded that reapportionment was basically a legislative function, and that a further opportunity should be given to the General Assembly to reapportion itself properly in accordance with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. After attempting to delineate some guidelines for the Delaware Legislature to follow in reapportioning, the court below, with an eye toward the impending 1964 elections, gave the General Assembly until October 1, 1963, to adopt a constitutionally valid plan. The District Court entered a decree declaring Art. II, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution to be unconstitutional, and retained jurisdiction to order injunctive or other relief if it became necessary to do so.
On May 6, 1963, the Supreme Court of Delaware advised the Delaware Governor that, notwithstanding the holding of the District Court, he should proceed according to the provisions of the invalidated 1963 constitutional amendment to proclaim a redistricting plan for House of Representatives seats. The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion was predicated on the view that the District Court’s decision was not a final one, since it was appealable and since no injunctive relief had been granted. Acting on this advice, while making reference to the District Court’s decision, the Governor, on May 17, 1963, proclaimed a plan providing for the redistricting of certain House districts in accordance with the provisions of the 1963 reapportionment amendment. Under these circumstances, on May 20,1963, the District Court entered an injunction against the holding of any elections for General Assembly seats under Art. II, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution, either as it had previously existed or as amended, and again reserved jurisdiction to make such further orders as it might deem necessary. The District Court denied a motion to stay its injunction pending appeal, but, on application by defendants below, Mr. Justice Brennan, on June 27, 1963, stayed the operation of the District Court’s injunction pending final disposition of the case by this Court. Notices of appeal from the District Court’s final decree, and from its injunction and denial of the motion for a stay, were timely filed by defendants. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 15 (3), both appeals have been treated as a single case. When appellees filed a motion to affirm, appellants countered with a motion to advance. On October 21, 1963, we noted probable jurisdiction and granted appellants’ motion to advance. 375 U. S. 877.
II.
Under the provisions of the 1897 Delaware Constitution relating to legislative apportionment, in force when this litigation was commenced, the State was geographically divided into 17 Senate and 35 House districts for the purpose of electing members of the Delaware Legislature. Delaware senators serve four-year terms, with approximately half of the senators elected every two years, and all representatives are elected for two-year terms. Qualified voters in each Senate and House district elect one senator and one representative, under the 1897 Constitution's apportionment plan. Delaware is comprised of only three counties, and only one sizable metropolitan area — Wilmington. Under the 1897 apportionment, five senatorial districts and 10 representative districts were allocated to Kent County, to Sussex County, and to “rural” New Castle County (that part of the county outside of the City of Wilmington), and Wilmington was given two senatorial and five representative districts. The number and boundaries of both' the senatorial and representative districts were specifically fixed and described in the constitutional provisions, and no provision was made for their alteration. When the constitutional provisions were adopted, the population of the State of Delaware was approximately 180,000, with about 32,000 living in Kent County, 38,000 residing in Sussex County, and 105,000 living in New Castle County (of whom about 70,000 lived in the City.of Wilmington). By 1960, the total population of Delaware had increased to 446,292, of which 307,446 resided in New Castle County, 95,827 in Wilmington and 211,619 in “rural” New Castle County. And, under the 1960 census figures, 65,651 lived in Kent County and 73,195 resided in Sussex County.
Under the 1897 apportionment scheme, as perpetuated over 65 years later, Senate districts ranged in population from 4,177 to 64,820, resulting in a maximum population-variance ratio, between the most populous and least populous Senate districts, of about 15-to-l. Senatorial districts in Kent and Sussex Counties were consistently much smaller in population than those in New Castle County, with the exception of one New Castle County district which, with a population of only 4,177, was the smallest senatorial district in the State. Only 22% of the State’s total population resided in districts electing a majority of the members of the 17-member Senate, applying 1960 census figures to the senatorial apportionment scheme existing when this litigation was commenced.
Representative districts ranged in population, as of 1960, from 1,643 to 58,228, under Art. II, § 2, of the 1897 Delaware Constitution, resulting in a maximum population-variance ratio, in the Delaware House, of about 35-to-1. Again, the average population of House districts in Kent and Sussex Counties was significantly smaller than that of those in New Castle County, although several of the “rural” New Castle County districts were among the smallest in the State. Applying 1960 census figures to the 1897 apportionment scheme, with respect to the Delaware House, the 18 most sparsely populated representative districts, containing only about 18.5% of the State’s total 1960 population, elected a majority of the members of the House of Representatives. Persons living in the six most populous representative districts, 233,718, more than one-half of the total state population, had only the same voting power, under the 1897 Constitution’s scheme, as those 16,552 persons living in the six least populous districts, with respect to electing members of the Delaware House. Serious disparities in the population of districts, both House and Senate, within each county were also presented in the district population figures considered by the District Court.
Evidence before the District Court showed that, despite repeated attempts to reapportion the legislature or to call a constitutional convention for that purpose, the Delaware Legislature had consistently failed to take any action to change the existing apportionment of legislative seats. No initiative and referendum procedure exists in Delaware. Legislative apportionment has been traditionally provided for wholly by constitutional provisions in Delaware, and a concurrence of two-thirds of both houses of two consecutive state legislatures is required in order to amend the State Constitution. The Delaware General Assembly may also, by a two-thirds vote, submit to the State’s voters the question of whether to hold a constitutional convention.
Under the 1963 amendment to Art. II, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution, the size of the Senate is increased from 17 to 21 members, and the four added seats are allotted equally to Kent and Sussex Counties, giving each of the State’s three counties seven senators. The added senators are to be elected at large from districts comprising about one-half of the House districts in each of the two counties. As a result of this change, each voter in Kent and Sussex Counties is entitled to vote for two senators and one representative. With respect to the House of Representatives, the amendment provides that each existing representative district with a population in excess of 15,000 persons is to be allotted an additional representative for each additional 15,000 persons or major fraction thereof. The boundaries of the original 35 representative districts are not affected, and districts receiving additional representatives are to be divided, by a redistricting commission headed by the Governor, so that each of the new districts elects one representative. The net effect of the 1963 amendment, as regards immediate changes in House representation, is to allot 10 additional representatives to various districts in New Castle County, increasing the size of the House to 45 members. Representation of Kent and Sussex Counties is to be unaffected. Under the revised apportionment, the maximum population-variance ratio is reduced to about 12-to-l with respect to the House, but remains about 15-to-l in the Senate. A majority of the members of the House would be elected, under the 1963 amendment, from districts with only about 28% of the State’s total population. And, since the 1963 amendment added two Senate seats each for the two smaller counties, the change in senatorial apportionment would result in two-thirds of the Senate being elected from districts where only about 31% of the State’s population reside. About 21% of the State’s population would be represented by a majority of the members of the Delaware Senate, under the 1963 reapportionment.
The 1963 amendment also provided that, if a constitutional convention were to be called, the number of delegates and the method of their election were not to be affected by the amended apportionment provisions, and, for the purpose of any future constitutional convention, the representative districts were to elect delegates on the basis of the apportionment provided by Art. II, § 2, as it existed prior to the amendment. Thus, the number of constitutional convention delegates would continue to be 41, one from each of the 35 representative districts provided for under the 1897 scheme, with two elected at large from each of the three counties.
III.
In Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 533, decided also this date, we held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature-must be apportioned substantially on a population basis. Neither of the houses of the Delaware General Assembly, either before or after the 1963 constitutional amendment, was so apportioned. Thus, we hold that the District Court correctly found the Delaware legislative apportionment constitutionally invalid, and affirm the decisions below.
For the reasons stated in our opinion in Reynolds appellants’ reliance upon the so-called federal analogy to justify the deviations from a population basis in the apportionment of seats in the Delaware Legislature is misplaced. And appellants’ argument that the Delaware apportionment scheme should be upheld since Congress has admitted various States into the Union although the apportionment of seats in their legislatures was based on factors other than population is also unconvincing. In giving the Delaware Legislature an opportunity to adopt a constitutionally valid plan of legislative apportionment, and in deferring decision until after the November 1962 general election, because of the imminence of that election and the disruptive effect which its decision might have had, the District Court acted in a wise and temperate manner. And the court below did not err in granting injunctive relief after it had become apparent that, despite its decree holding that the 1963 constitutional amendment reapportioning seats in the Delaware Legislature failed to comply with federal constitutional requirements, no further reapportionment by the Delaware General Assembly was probable.
Our affirmance of the decision below is not meant to indicate approval of the District Court’s attempt to state in mathematical language the constitutionally permissible bounds of discretion in deviating from apportionment according to population. In our view the problem does not lend itself to any such uniform formula, and it is neither practicable nor desirable to establish rigid mathematical standards for evaluating the constitutional validity of a state legislative apportionment scheme under the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the proper judicial approach is to ascertain whether, under the particular circumstances existing in the individual State whose legislative apportionment is at issue, there has been a faithful adherence to a plan of population-based representation, with such minor deviations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.
Apart from what we said in Reynolds, we express no view on questions relating to remedies at the present time. Regardless of the requirements of the Delaware Constitution and the fact that legislative apportionment has traditionally been considered a constitutional matter in Delaware, the delay inherent in following the state constitutional prescription for approval of constitutional amendments by two successive General Assemblies cannot be allowed to result in an impermissible deprivation of appellees’ right to an adequate voice in the election of legislators to represent them. Acting under general equitable principles, the court below must now determine whether it would be advisable, so as to avoid a possible disruption of state election processes and permit additional time for the Delaware Legislature to adopt a constitutionally valid apportionment scheme, to allow the 1964 election of Delaware legislators to be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the 1963 constitutional amendment, or whether those factors are insufficient to justify any further delay in the effectuation of appellees’ constitutional rights. We therefore affirm the decisions of the District Court here appealed from, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the views stated here and in our opinion in Reynolds v. Sims.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark concurs in the affirmance for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 587, decided this date.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante, p. 589.]
Mr. Justice Stewart.
In this case the appellees showed that the apportionment of seats among the districts represented in the Delaware House of Representatives and within the counties represented in the Delaware Senate, apparently reflects "no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.” The appellants have failed to dispel this showing by suggesting any possible rational explanation for these aspects of Delaware’s system of legislative apportionment. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, post, p. 744, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it holds that Delaware’s system of apportionment violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Interestingly, Art. I, § 3, of the Delaware Constitution provides : "All elections shall be free and equal.”
See 207 F. Supp., at 207. The decisions of the court below are reported sub nom. Sincock v. Terry and Sincock v. Duffy.
By the requisite two-thirds vote in both houses of the General Assembly, pursuant to Art. XVI, § 1, of the Delaware Constitution.
Under Art. XVI, § 1, of the Delaware Constitution, a constitutional amendment must be passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses of successive General Assemblies before becoming part of the State Constitution.
53 Del. Laws, c. 425 (1962); 54 Del. Laws, c. 1 (1963).
215 F. Supp., at 184.
The other two judges both wrote short opinions. Chief District Judge Wright indicated that he concurred in the view that Art. II, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution, before and after amendment, was unconstitutional, since at least one house of a state legislature must be apportioned strictly on a population basis. He indicated that he also agreed with the “precatory observation” of Judge Biggs that the other house must also be apportioned substantially on a population basis.
District Judge Layton concurred in the result reached, finding that Art. II, §2, of the Delaware Constitution, prior to as well as after the 1963 amendment, was unconstitutional with respect to the House of Representatives. He stated that, since the 1963 amendment contained no severability clause, the whole amendment was unconstitutional because of the provisions relating to the House, and that therefore there was no need to consider whether the senatorial provisions were valid. He indicated, however, that he thought that it was permissible to apportion one house on a nonpopulation, area basis where the other house was apportioned strictly on population, since such a system would be patterned on the scheme of representation in the Federal Congress.
Included in the District Court’s opinion is a chart showing the population of the 17 senatorial districts established by Art. II, § 2, of the 1897 Delaware Constitution, and tracing the population changes in each during the period 1930-1960. 215 F. Supp., at 176.
A chart showing the population of the 35 representative districts established by Art. II, § 2, of the 1897 Delaware Constitution, and tracing the population changes in each during the period 1890-1960, is included in the District Court’s opinion. 215 F. Supp., at 17ár-175.
And, as pointed out by the court below, under the apportionment of House seats contained in Art. II, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution, “The inhabitants of the 18 least populated representative districts are less in number than those of the two districts having the heaviest concentration of population; nonetheless, the former elect 18 representatives in the House of Representatives, while the latter elect 2 representatives in the House of Representatives of the Delaware General Assembly.” 215 F. Supp., at 176.
The 35 representative districts tended to follow generally the boundaries of a “hundred,” a geographical subdivision of counties in Delaware since its founding, and the 17 senatorial districts, which were also described in a detailed fashion in Art. II, § 2, of the 1897 Delaware Constitution, were composed either of two representative districts each or two or more hundreds or portions of hundreds.
For a discussion of the lack of federal constitutional significance of the presence or absence of an available political remedy, see Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, post, pp. 736-737, decided also this date.
Under Art. XVI, § 1, of the Delaware Constitution.
Under Art. XVI, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution.
A chart showing the composition of the Senate and the population of each of the 21 senatorial districts under the 1963 amendment is included in the District Court’s opinion. 215 F. Supp., at 181.
Included in the District Court’s opinion are charts indicating the effect of the 1963 amendment on the representation of New Castle County in the House of Representatives and showing the composition of the Delaware House, as reapportioned, including the population of each of its 45 districts under 1960 census figures. 215 F. Supp., at 179-180.
Under Art. XVI, § 2, of the Delaware Constitution.
See Reynolds v. Sims, ante, pp. 571-576.
That the three Delaware counties may have possessed some attributes of limited sovereignty prior to the inception of Delaware as a State provides no basis for applying the federal analogy to legislative apportionment in Delaware while holding it inapplicable in other States. Whatever the role of counties in Delaware during the colonial period, they never have had those aspects of sovereignty which the States possessed when our federal system of government was adopted. And it could hardly be contended that Delaware’s counties retained any elements of sovereign power, when the State was formed, that at all compare with those retained by the States under our Federal Constitution. See 215 F. Supp., at 186, where the District Court stated that “there never was much and there is now no sovereignty in the Counties of Delaware . . . .”
Additionally, the Delaware legislative apportionment scheme here challenged, even after the 1963 constitutional amendment, fails to resemble the plan of representation in the Federal Congress in several significant respects: the Delaware House of Representatives is plainly not apportioned in accordance with population, and senators in Delaware are not chosen as representatives of counties. Although, under the 1963 amendment, each county is given an equal number of senators, the 21 senators are chosen one each from the 21 senatorial districts, seven per county, established solely for the purpose of their election. Each Delaware senator represents his district and not the county in which the district is located. Members of the Federal Senate are of course elected from a State at large, and represent the entire State.
See the discussion of and the reasons for rejecting this argument in Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 582.
The court below suggested that population-variance ratios smaller than 1%-to-l would presumably comport with minimal constitutional requisites, while ratios in excess thereof would necessarily involve deviations from population-based apportionment too extreme to be constitutionally sustainable. See 215 F. Supp., at 190.
See Reynolds v. Sims, ante, p. 585.
Particularly Art. XVI, § 1, which requires the approval by successive state legislatures before a proposed constitutional amendment can be adopted.
In its initial opinion, incident to its order granting a limited stay, the District Court suggested that the Delaware Legislature might desire to amend the State Constitution so as to make legislative apportionment a statutory instead of a constitutional matter, in order to obviate the delay inherently involved in complying with the requirement of the Delaware Constitution that constitutional amendments must be approved by two successive General Assemblies before becoming effective. 207 F. Supp., at 206-207. In this manner, the District Court suggested, if the Delaware Legislature's attempt at reapportionment should be found deficient under the Federal Constitution, the General Assembly elected in November 1962 would be free, under state law, to proceed expeditiously with the enactment of a revised statutory reapportionment plan consonant with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Unfortunately, the Delaware Legislature failed to act on the Court’s suggestion, and instead proposed the constitutional amendment hereinbefore discussed, which was .approved by two consecutive state legislatures in late 1962 and in early 1963. However, in its opinion on the merits, the District Court intimated that, with the Delaware constitutional provisions relating to legislative apportionment declared invalid, the Delaware Legislature could “then proceed to pass an apportionment statute meeting the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” 215 F. Supp., at 191.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The single question of statutory construction presented by these cases is whether injuries to longshoremen occurring on piers permanently affixed to shore are compen-sable under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927 (Longshoremen’s Act), 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950.
Johnson and Klosek were employed by the Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen; Avery was similarly employed by the Old Dominion Stevedoring Corporation. All three men were engaged at the time of their accidents in performing similar operations as “slingers,” attaching cargo from railroad cars located on piers to ships’ cranes for removal to the ships. Klosek was killed, and each of the other men was injured, when cargo hoisted by the ship’s crane swung back and knocked him to the pier or crushed him against the side of the railroad car. Deputy Commisioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims for compensation in each case on the ground that the injuries had not occurred “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required by the Act. The District Courts upheld the Deputy Commissioners’ decisions. 243 E. Supp. 184 (D. C. Md. 1965); 245 F. Supp. 51 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1965). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. 398 F. 2d 900 (1968). We granted certiorari, 393 U. S. 976 (1968), to resolve the resulting conflict with decisions in other circuits holding that pier injuries are not covered by the Act. We have concluded from an examination of the language, purpose, and legislative history of the Act, as well as prior decisions of this Court, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
Since long before the Longshoremen’s Act was passed, it has been settled law that structures such as wharves and piers, permanently affixed to land, are extensions of the land. Thus, literally read, a statute that covers injuries “upon the navigable waters” would not cover injuries on a pier even though the pier, like a bridge, extends over navigable waters.
Respondents urge, however, that the 1927 Act, though it employs language that determines coverage by the “situs” of the injury, was nevertheless aimed at broader coverage: coverage of the “status” of the longshoreman employed in performing a maritime contract. We do not agree. Congress might have extended coverage to all longshoremen by exercising its power over maritime contracts. But the language of the Act is to the contrary and the background of the statute leaves little doubt that Congress’ concern in providing compensation was a narrower one.
Ten years before the Act was passed this Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917), held that a State was without power to extend a compensation remedy to a longshoreman injured on the gangplank between the ship and the pier. The decision left longshoremen injured on the seaward side of the pier without a compensation remedy, while longshoremen injured on the pier enjoyed the protection of state compensation acts. State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922).
Twice Congress attempted to fill this gap by passing legislation that would have extended state compensation remedies beyond the line drawn in Jensen. Each time, this Court struck down the statute as an unlawful delegation of congressional power. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920). Finally, responding to this Court’s suggestion that what Congress could not empower the States to do, it could do itself, Congress passed the Longshoremen’s Act. The clear implication is that in enacting its own compensation statute, Congress w.as trying to do what it had failed to do in earlier attempts: to extend a compensation remedy to workmen injured beyond the pier and hence beyond the jurisdiction of the States. This purpose was clearly expressed in the language limiting coverage to injuries occurring “upon the navigable waters/’ and permitting recovery only “if recovery . . . through workmen’s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.”
This conclusion is fully supported by the legislative history. As originally drafted, § 3 extended coverage to injuries “on a place within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, except employment of local concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce.” During the hearings, it was repeatedly emphasized and apparently assumed by representatives from both the shipping industry and the unions that a “place within the admiralty jurisdiction” did not include a dock or pier. In fact, a representative of the Labor Department objected to the bill precisely for that reason, urging the Committee to extend coverage to embrace the contract, “and not the man simply when he is on the ship.” If Congress had intended to adopt that suggestion, it could not have chosen a more inappropriate way of expressing its intent than by substituting the words “upon the navigable waters” for the words “within the admiralty jurisdiction.” Indeed, the Senate Report that accompanied the revised bill, containing the language of the present Act, makes clear that the suggestion was rejected, rather than adopted: “[Ijnjuries occurring in loading or unloading are not covered unless they occur on the ship or between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the maritime jurisdiction of the United States.” S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 16. We decline to ignore these explicit indications of a design to provide compensation only beyond the pier where the States could not reach. “That is the gap that we are trying to fill.” In filling that gap Congress did not extend coverage to longshoremen like those respondents whose injuries occurred on the landward side of the Jensen line, clearly entitling them to protection under state compensation Acts.
Decisions of this Court have more than once embraced this interpretation. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1 (1946), held that neither the Jones Act nor the Longshoremen’s Act covered a longshoreman injured on the dock in the course of his employment even if the injury was caused by a vessel on navigable waters. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244, 249 (1941), concluded that the purpose of the Act “was to provide for federal compensation in the area which the specific decisions referred to placed beyond the reach of the states.” Davis v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 317 U. S. 249, 256 (1942), noted that in passing the Longshoremen’s Act, Congress had specifically adopted the Jensen line. The interpretation endorsed by these cases is also reflected in a consistent course of administrative construction commencing immediately after the enactment of the Act. Employees’ Compensation Commission Opinions Nos. 5 and 16, 1927 A. M. C. 1558 and 1855; No. 30, 1928 A. M. C. 417.
It is true that since Jensen this Court has permitted recovery under state remedies in particular situations seaward of the pier, Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, supra, and in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U. S. 114 (1962), approved recovery under - the Longshoremen’s Act for injuries occurring on navigable waters which might also have been compensable under state law. Calbeck made it clear that Congress intended to exercise its full jurisdiction seaward of the Jensen line and to cover all injuries on navigable waters, whether or not state compensation was also available in particular situations. The proviso to § 3 (a) conditioning coverage on the unavailability of state remedies was not meant to deny federal relief where the injury occurred on navigable waters. But removing uncertainties as to the Act’s coverage of injuries occurring on navigable waters is a far cry from construing the Act to reach injuries on land traditionally within the ambit of state compensation acts.
Indeed, Calbeck freely cited the Parker and Davis declarations that the Longshoremen’s Act adopted the Jensen line, and Calbeck’s holding rejected the notion that the line should advance or recede simply because decisions of this Court had permitted state remedies in narrow areas seaward of that line. Otherwise, the reach of the federal Act would be subject to uncertainty, and its coverage would “expand and recede in harness with developments in constitutional interpretation as to the scope of state power to compensate injuries on navigable waters,” with the result “that every litigation raising an issue of federal coverage would raise an issue of constitutional dimension, with all that that implies . . . .” 370 U. S., at .126. As in Calbeck, we refuse to impute to Congress the intent of burdening the administration of compensation by perpetuating such confusion.
Nor can we agree that what Congress did not do in 1927, it did in 1948 when it passed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (Extension Act), 62 Stat. 496, 46 U. S. C. § 740. In pertinent part, that Act provides:
“The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.”
By its very choice of language, the Act re-enforces the conclusion that Congress was well aware of the distinction between land injuries and water injuries and that when it limited recovery to injuries on navigable waters, it did not mean injuries on land. The Act no doubt extended the admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship-caused injuries on a pier. But far from modifying the clear understanding in the law that a pier was an extension of land and that a pier injury was not on navigable waters but on land, the Act accepts that rule and nevertheless declares such injuries to be maritime torts if caused by a vessel on navigable waters.
The Extension Act was passed to remedy the completely different problem that arose from the fact that parties aggrieved by injuries done by ships to bridges, docks, and the like could not get into admiralty at all. There is no evidence that Congress thereby intended to amend or affect the coverage of the Longshoremen’s Act or to overrule Swanson v. Marra Bros., supra, decided just two years earlier. While the Extension Act may have the effect of permitting respondents to maintain an otherwise unavailable libel in admiralty, see Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 373 U. S. 206 (1963), the Act has no bearing whatsoever on their right to a compensation remedy under the Longshoremen’s Act.
There is much to be said for uniform treatment of longshoremen injured while loading or unloading a ship. But even construing the Extension Act to amend the Longshoremen’s Act would not effect this result, since longshoremen injured on a pier by pier-based equipment would still remain outside the Act. And construing the Longshoremen’s Act to coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction — whatever they may be and however they may change — simply replaces one line with another whose uncertain contours can only perpetuate on the landward side of the Jensen line, the same confusion that previously existed on the seaward side. While we have no doubt that Congress had the power to choose either of these paths in defining the coverage of its compensation remedy, the plain fact is that it chose instead the line in Jensen separating water from land at the edge of the pier. The invitation to move that line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this Court.
Reversed.
The piers involved extended from shore into the Patapsco River at Sparrows Point, Maryland, and into the Elizabeth River at Norfolk, Virginia.
§3 (a) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §903 (a), provides in relevant part:
“(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen’s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. . . .”
The three cases were consolidated on appeal. In a fourth case, an award to a longshoreman who had drowned after being knocked off a pier into the water was affirmed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1965).
Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F. 2d 221 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1051 (1968); Houser v. O’Leary, 383 F. 2d 730 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 954 (1968); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Shea, 382 F. 2d 344 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. McCollough v. Travelers Insurance Co., 389 U. S. 1050 (1968); Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, 344 F. 2d 640 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 835 (1965).
Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1 (1946); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U. S. 647 (1935); T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 (1928); State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316 (1908); The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (1866); 1 E. Benedict, The Law of American Admiralty §§ 28, 29 (6th ed. 1940); G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty §§ 6-46, 7-17 (1957); G. Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States § 11 (1939).
We reject the alternative holding of the Court of Appeals that all injuries on these piers, despite settled doctrine to the contrary, may now be considered injuries on navigable waters — a proposition rejected implicitly by a unanimous Court just last Term. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U. S. 352, 360, 366 (1969). Piers, like bridges, are not transformed from land structures into floating structures by the mere fact that vessels may pass beneath them.
The admiralty jurisdiction in tort was traditionally “bounded by locality,” De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C. C. D. Mass. 1815) (Story, J.) (followed in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1 (1871)), encompassing all torts that took place on navigable waters. By contrast, admiralty contract jurisdiction “extends over all contracts, (wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations,) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea.” De Lovio v. Boit, supra, at 444. Since a workmen’s compensation act combines elements of both tort and contract, Congress need not have tested coverage by locality alone. As the text indicates, however, the history of the Act shows that Congress did indeed do just that.
Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634.
Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 227 (1924). The passage from Dawson & Co. was referred to in the hearings in both the Senate and the House. See Hearings on S. 3170 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 31, 103 and n. 3 (1926) (hereinafter “Senate Hearings”) ; Hearing on H. R. 9498 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, pp. 18, 119 and n. 3 (1926) (hereinafter “House Hearing”).
Drydocks were conceded to be within the admiralty jurisdiction in both the hearings and the debates, even though such structures are not always floating structures. See House Hearing 34; 68 Cong. Rec. 5403 (1927). If Congress had thought the words “upon the navigable waters” were broad enough to embrace the limits of admiralty jurisdiction, there would have been no need to add the parenthetical “(including any dry dock).”
See Senate Hearings 2.
Mr. Dempsey, representing the International Longshoremen’s Association, testified that the bill would cover injuries on the dock as well as on the ship. When pressed as to how injuries on the dock could come within the admiralty jurisdiction, he confessed he did not understand the legal theory, and would defer to the longshoremen’s attorney, Mr. Austin. Mr. Austin proceeded to testify: that the dock was not within the admiralty jurisdiction; that injuries on the dock were compensable under state law; that the problem arose because the longshoreman was left “high and dry” once he left the State’s jurisdiction and stepped on the gangplank; and that “[t]hat is the gap that we are trying to fill . . . .” Senate Hearings 28, 30-31. Testimony that longshoremen injured on the docks would not be covered by the Act also came from representatives of the shipbuilders. See Senate Hearings 68, 95, 103. See also n. 15, infra; Hearing on S. 3170 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69tb Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, pt. 2, pp. 141, 157 (1926) (testimony on the revised bill, containing the language of the present §3).
Senate Hearings 40.
While the reason for the change in the language concerning the bill’s coverage is not expressly indicated, it appears to have been a response to objections that the original language, carving out an exception for employment of “local concern,” was too vague to define clearly the line being drawn, and might even encounter problems once again at the hands of this Court. See Senate Hearings 56-57, 95; House Hearing 77, 100. In fact, the same spokesman for the shipbuilders who objected to the vagueness of the “local concern” exception, also objected that the bill as written might “upset all the present arrangements with respect to compensating men on the dock.” Senate Hearings 57. The implication is that no one expected the federal law to extend into the area of the State’s jurisdiction on the dock, but that confusion existed as to whether, conversely, state remedies would be exclusive as to injuries “on navigable waters” but within the “maritime but local” exception created by Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922). This reading of the legislative history was adopted in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U. S. 114, 121-127 (1962), where the Court concluded that the Act did not prevent recovery for injuries on navigable waters, even though a state remedy would also have been available under Rohde.
See n. 12, supra. Other indications that Congress had no intention of replacing or overlapping state compensation- remedies for dockside injuries can be found throughout the hearings. At one point, in attempting to calculate the increased costs involved in the federal Act, Senator Cummins, Chairman of the Committee, pointed out that “we are proceeding on the theory that these people can not be compensated under the New York compensation law or any other compensation law.” “[T]he purpose of this law,” he agreed with a witness, was simply to cover the men who “are going to be exposed a part of the time on board vessels . . . and therefore will have to be compensated in some other way where the New York law is not the remedy available.” Senate Hearings 84-85. Similarly, Representative Graham, Chairman of the House Committee, agreed that “the real necessity for this legislation” was to provide workers with compensation when they stepped from dock to ship. House Hearing 25. In fact, the labor representative who was testifying at that point in the hearing insisted that the legislation sought was only for “[tjhose who are injured on board vessels at the dock.” Those injured on the dock “are taken care of under the State law.” Id., at 28. There was also testimony by a longshoremen's representative that “65 per cent of the accidents in the courts of New York happen on board ships or on gangplanks; . . . therefore . . . 65 per cent of the accidents of the men who are injured by performing this work will be compensable under this bill.” Id., at 35. See also id., at 44. Another noted that “our men that are working on the dock are protected, and well protected, under the New York compensation act, but our men on board ship are not protected. We feel that Congress wants to protect them . . . .” Senate Hearings 42.
Both Johnson and Klosek’s widow and minor children have filed claims, and are concededly entitled to benefits, under the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act. Avery has already been awarded benefits under the Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Law.
See Gilmore & Black, supra, n. 5, § 7-17.
The legislative history of the Extension Act is devoid of any reference to the Longshoremen’s Act, as might well be expected in an Act dealing with a wholly unrelated problem. See S. Rep. No. 1593, 80th Gong., 2d Sess. (1948); H. R. Rep. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
The House Report accompanying the Extension Act notes that “the bill will not create new causes of action,” id., at 3, and the statute speaks of extending jurisdiction to suits “in rem or in per-sonam” for “damage” to “person or property” — concepts wholly at odds with the theory of workmen’s compensation — awards made in an administrative proceeding. The conclusion of the District Court is inescapable. “The two statutes do not deal with the same subject matter, are inherently inconsistent with each other, and cannot be read as being in pari materia.” 243 F. Supp. 184, 194 (1965).
It is worth noting that a contemporaneous amendment of the Longshoremen’s Act contains no cross reference to the Extension Act. See Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 602 (a bill to increase benefits under the Longshoremen’s Act, passed five days after the Extension Act). And, a House Report dated July 28, 1958 — 10 years after enactment of the Extension Act — points out that employees “on the navigable waters of the United States” are covered under the Longshoremen’s Act, but are under state protection “when performing work on docks and in other shore areas.” H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (accompanying a bill to provide safety programs for longshoremen).
We were informed in argument that two of the parties have in fact already commenced actions against the shipowner.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan dissent for the reasons stated in their opinions in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S., at 358, 360.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The operative facts herein are substantially identical to those in United States v. Morrison, ante, p. 1, and United States v. Rose, ante, p. 5. Respondent’s car was stopped by Border Patrol agents; a search disclosed marihuana. Respondent lost a motion to suppress and was found guilty after a bench trial. Following this trial, but before sentencing, the District Court, relying upon our decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, as it did in Morrison and Rose, found the Government’s appeal barred by double jeopardy.
In United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332 (1975), we held that double jeopardy would not bar a Government appeal if success on that appeal would result in the reinstatement of a verdict of guilty. The fact that the dismissal of the indictment here occurred after a general finding of guilt rendered- by the court in a bench trial, rather than after a return of a verdict of guilty by a jury, is immaterial. Morrison, supra. Double jeopardy therefore does not bar an appeal by the Government.
We grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand to that court for proceedings consistent herewith.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in these cases to determine whether § 441 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 26 U. S. C. § 167 (l), circumscribes the authority of the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seg., to permit a regulated utility to change its method of computing depreciation for ratemaking purposes from “flow-through” to “normalization” with respect to property acquired prior to 1970 as well as “replacement” property.
Since the resolution of this issue depends largely on the background and history of § 441 and the Commission’s regulatory powers, a brief review is in order at the outset. Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code authorized taxpayers, including regulated utilities, to use accelerated or liberalized depreciation in calculating their federal income taxes. The Commission retained jurisdiction to prescribe the depreciation method to be used by regulated utilities in calculating their federal income tax expense for ratemaking purposes. Initially, the Commission required utilities to compute their cost of service, which includes federal income taxes, as if they were using straight-line depreciation. This method, referred to as “normalization,” was designed to avoid giving the present customers of a utility the benefits of tax deferral attributable to accelerated depreciation. If a utility used accelerated depreciation in determining its actual tax liability, the difference between the taxes actually paid and the higher taxes reflected as a cost of service for ratemaking purposes was required to be placed in a deferred tax reserve account. See Amere Gas Utilities Co., 15 F. P. C. 760.
It soon became apparent that accelerated depreciation in practice resulted in permanent tax savings. Because most utilities had growing or at least stable plant investments, the depreciation allowances from additional and replacement equipment offset the declining depreciation allowance on existing property. Accordingly, the Commission required utilities using accelerated depreciation for tax purposes to use the same method for calculating their cost of service and, thus, to “flow through” any tax savings to their customers. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 31 F. P. C. 208, aff'd sub nom. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F. 2d 318 (CA5). Subsequently, the Commission decided that it would impute the use of accelerated depreciation for ratemaking purposes regardless of the method used for computing actual taxes. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 36 F. P. C. 61, aff’d sub nom. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 388 F. 2d 444 (CA7).
When the House and Senate considered tax reform legislation in 1969, both were concerned with the loss of tax revenues that stemmed from the combined effect of accelerated depreciation for computing federal taxes (leading to higher deductions) and flow-through for fixing rates (leading to lower rates and thus lower gross revenues) . Section 441 of the Tax Reform Act, which added § 167 (l) to the Internal Revenue Code, was designed in general to “freeze” existing depreciation practices. As passed by the House, § 441 would have established three rules with respect to existing depreciable property:
“(1) If straight line depreciation is presently being taken, then no faster depreciation is to be permitted as to that property.
“(2) If the taxpayer is taking accelerated depreciation and is 'normalizing’ its deferred taxes, then it must go to the straight line method unless it continues to normalize as to that property.
“(3) If the taxpayer is taking accelerated depreciation and flowing through to its customers the benefits of the deferred taxes, then the taxpayer must continue to do so, unless the appropriate regulatory agency permits a change as to that property.”
The Senate bill as passed was similar to that of the House, except that utilities on flow-through were given the right to elect within 180 days “to shift from the flow-through to the straight-line method, with or without the permission of the appropriate regulatory agency, or . . . with the permission of the regulatory agency to shift to the normalization method . This election was to apply both to new and existing property. In conference, however, it was agreed that this right of election would apply only to property acquired by the utility after 1969 to expand its facilities.
Thus, as added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1969, § 167 (Z) distinguishes between two basic types of “public utility property”: “pre-1970 property,” which is property acquired by the taxpayer before January 1, 1970 (§ 167 (l)(3)(B)), and all other property, referred to as “post-1969 property” (§ 167 (Z) (3) (C)). A further distinction is drawn between post-1969 property “which increases the productive or operational capacity of the taxpayer” (expansion property) and post-1969 property which merely replaces existing property (§ 167 (l) (4) (A)). With respect to pre-1970 property, a utility may use (1) straight-line depreciation, (2) the method used prior to August 1969 if it also employs normalization, or (3) accelerated depreciation with flow-through, but only if that method was used prior to August 1969 (§167 (J)(l)). With respect to post-1969 property, a utility may use (1) straight-line depreciation, (2) accelerated depreciation with normalization, or (3) accelerated depreciation with flow-through if the utility used flow-through prior to August 1969 (§ 167 (l) (2)). In addition, under § 167 (1) (4) (A), a utility may elect to abandon accelerated depreciation with flow-through with respect to post-1969 expansion property.
The proceedings in issue here involve Texas Gas Transmission Corp., the operator of a major interstate pipeline system certificated by the Federal Power Commission. Although Texas Gas utilized accelerated depreciation with flow-through prior to the adoption of the Tax Reform Act, it filed a proposed rate increase with the Commission on June 27, 1969, based upon “the proposed discontinuance of the use of liberalized depreciation and the reversion to a straight-line method of tax depreciation.” After § 167 (l) was enacted, Texas Gas advised the Commission that it intended to exercise the election provided in § 167 (l) (4) (A) and sought permission to use accelerated depreciation with normalization with respect to its post-1969 expansion property. It also sought assurance, before it made the election, that it would be able to change from flow-through to straight-line or, preferably, accelerated depreciation with normalization with respect to its pre-1970 property and post-1969 replacement property.
The Commission, holding that its authority “to determine whether a company may effect such a change is not diminished” under the Tax Reform Act, permitted Texas Gas to change from flow-through to normalization for ratemaking purposes. Opinion No. 578, 43 F. P. C. 824, 828, rehearing denied, 44 F. P. C. 140. The Commission reasoned that the basis of its decisions in Alabama-Tennessee and Midwestern would no longer be applicable if Texas Gas were to switch to normalization with respect to post-1969 expansion property. In that event, the tax savings resulting from the deferral attributable to accelerated depreciation would not be permanent. Rather, if Texas Gas were required to continue flow-through for all but its new expansion property, it would be faced with a steadily increasing cost of service which would necessitate repeated rate increases. Under these circumstances, the Commission concluded: “Texas Gas is correct in contending that normalization in computing the tax allowance for rate purposes with respect to its pre-1970 facilities offers more hope for stability of rates for its customers and more assurance that the company can earn its fair rate of return without future rate increases. Further benefits of normalization are that it will improve the company’s before tax coverage of interest, thereby enhancing the quality of its securities, and that it will help alleviate present day cash shortages.” Id., at 829-830.
The Court of Appeals, on petitions for review, reversed the Commission’s order. 149 U. S. App. D. C. 238, 462 F. 2d 853, rehearing denied, id., at 250, 462 F. 2d, at 865. Although the Court recognized that the version of the Tax Reform Act passed by the House would have supported the Commission’s order, it held that the limited nature of the election provision as finally passed deprived the Commission of authority to permit regulated utilties to abandon flow-through with respect to their existing and replacement property. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The present cases concern solely the depreciation methods used by utilities in calculating their federal income tax expenses for ratemaking purposes.
In § 441 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress dealt primarily with a revenue measure under the tax laws and only indirectly with the regulatory power of the Commission under the Natural Gas Act. We have had before us on numerous occasions cases arising under the Natural Gas Act. In the early case of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, we emphasized two aspects of the power of the Commission to fix “just and reasonable” rates under 15 U. S. C. § 717. First, was the desire “to protect consumers against exploitation,” 320 U. S., at 610, and second, was the aim to promote the “financial integrity” of the natural gas companies as measured, not only by revenues sufficient to recover operating expenses and capital costs, id., at 603, but also by revenues “sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.” Ibid. We mention those matters because (1) the treatment of depreciation bears on rates and (2) there is no indication in the legislative history of this tax measure that Congress desired to modify, as respects the precise issue involved here, the broad discretion of the Commission delineated in Hope Natural Gas and in other rate cases.
Under § 4 (a) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a), all rates and charges made by a natural gas company subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction must be “just and reasonable.” Section 4 (e), 15 U. S. C. § 717c (e), sets forth the procedures whereby the Commission can determine whether a proposed rate schedule is lawful, and § 5, 15 U. S. C. § 717d, gives the Commission certain powers to fix rates and charges. Finally, under § 9 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 717h (a), the Commission may “require natural-gas companies to carry proper and adequate depreciation and amortization accounts in accordance with such rules, regulations, and forms of account as the Commission may prescribe.” In FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 386 U. S. 237, 243, the Court stated:
“One of [the Commission’s] statutory duties is to determine just and reasonable rates which will be sufficient to permit the company to recover its costs of service and a reasonable return on its investment. Cost of service is therefore a major focus of inquiry. Normally included as a cost of service is a proper allowance for taxes, including federal income taxes. The determination of this allowance, as a general proposition, is obviously within the jurisdiction of the Commission.”
The lower courts have allowed the Commission broad discretion in determining proper depreciation methods for ratemaking purposes. See, e. g., Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F. 2d 318; Midwestern Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 388 F. 2d 444.
Section 167 (l), to be sure, does not leave this discretion untouched. For example, a utility using straight-line depreciation with respect to its pre-1970 property could not switch to accelerated depreciation, nor could a utility be required to switch to flow-through with respect to pre-1970 property. See §167(i)(l). But § 167 (l) on its face does not preclude the Commission from éxercising its statutory powers to permit a utility to abandon flow-through. Section 167(1) (1)(B) provides that “[i]n the case of any pre-1970 public utility property, the taxpayer may use the applicable 1968 method for such property if — (i) the taxpayer used a flow-through method of accounting” prior to August 1969. (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals, however, found error in the Commission’s action based on its detailed and considered analysis of the legislative history of § 167 (l). It concluded that “the final version of the bill limits the applicability of the right of election to post-1969 expansion (non-replacement) property alone.” 149 U. S. App. D. C., at 246, 462 F. 2d, at 861 (emphasis in original). It reasoned as follows. At the House stage the action of the Commission would have been justified to switch to normalization because, as already noted, the House Report stated:
“Your committee’s bill provides that, in the case of existing property, the following rules are to apply:
“(1) If straight line depreciation is presently being taken, then no faster depreciation is to be permitted as to that property.
“(2) If the taxpayer is taking accelerated depreciation and is 'normalizing’ its deferred taxes, then it must go to the straight line method unless it continues to normalize as to that property.
“(3) If the taxpayer is taking accelerated depreciation and flowing through to its customers the benefits of the deferred taxes, then the taxpayer must continue to do so, unless the appropriate regulatory agency permits a change as to that property.” (Emphasis added.)
The word “existing” property as used in that Report included “replacement” property in the mind of the Court of Appeals.
The Senate version of the bill would have permitted Texas Gas to shift from liberalized depreciation with flow-through either to straight-line depreciation or with the Commission’s approval to liberalized depreciation with normalization. 149 U. S. App. D. C., at 247, 462 F. 2d, at 862.
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that because the right of election was restricted while the bill was in conference to apply only to post-1969 expansion property, the Commission could not permit a utility to change its method with respect to existing or replacement property. Ibid. It relied on the following four paragraphs from the Conference Report.
“The House bill provides that in the case of certain listed regulated industries (the furnishing or sale of . . . gas through a local distribution system, . . . and transportation of gas by pipeline) a taxpayer is not permitted to use accelerated depreciation unless it ‘normalizes’ the current income tax reduction resulting from the use of such accelerated depreciation. . . .
“This rule is not to apply in the case of a taxpayer that is at present flowing through the tax reduction to earnings for purposes of computing its allowable expenses on its regulated books of account. Also, if the taxpayer is now using straight line depreciation as to any public utility property it may not change to accelerated depreciation as to that property.
“The Senate amendment makes the following changes in the House bill: . . . (d) an election is permitted to be made within 180 days after the date of enactment by a company at present on flow-through to come under the rules of the bill . . . .
“The conference substitute (sec. 44-1 of the substitute and sec. 167 (l) of the code) follows the Senate amendment except that the special provision referred to in (e) above is stricken and the 180-day election (item (d), above) is modified to apply to new property and not to replacement property. Even in the case of new property, however, the right to change over from the flowthrough method is to be available only to the extent the new property increases the productive or operational capacity of the company” (Emphasis added.)
From these four paragraphs the Court of Appeals concluded that the second paragraph of the Conference Report prohibits Texas Gas from abandoning liberalized depreciation with flow-through and that the right of election was restricted to post-1969 expansion property only.
The second paragraph, however, as we read it, when it uses the words “This rule” refers, not to the final bill, but to the initial House bill. That initial bill, as summarized in the House Report, as already noted, had somewhat different provisions for depreciation. The first paragraph of the quotation from the Conference Report in our view summarized the House’s proposed second rule. The words “This rule” in the second paragraph, therefore, refer to the House’s proposed second rule. Only the third paragraph of the excerpt reached the changes made by the Senate. Only the fourth paragraph resolved the differences between the two bills. There is nothing in either the third or the fourth paragraph to indicate that the election authorized by the Conference Report was to limit or replace the three general rules proposed by the House, the third House-proposed rule authorizing precisely what the Commission allowed in this case. The second paragraph, read in the context of the Conference Report, does not state that the Commission-lacks authority to permit a company on flow-through to abandon it with respect to existing property. It only states that a company on flow-through may remain on flow-through. Thus, it is solely a limitation on the requirement that a company must normalize if it wants to continue accelerated depreciation with respect to pre-1970 property. This is entirely consistent with the structure of § 167 (l) (1).
Nor is the extension of the 180-day election to post-1969 expansion property a limiting factor. The “reasonable” allowance for depreciation of post-1969 property as used in § 167 (l)(2) includes in subparagraph (C) “the applicable 1968 method, if, with respect to its pre-1970 public utility property of the same (or similar) kind most recently placed in service, the taxpayer used a flow-through method of accounting for its July 1969 accounting period.” But § 167 (l) (4) (A) provides that where the taxpayer makes an election within the 180-day period, paragraph (2)(C) shall not apply with respect to any post-1969 public utility property “to the extent that such property constitutes property which increases the productive or operational capacity of the taxpayer” and does not represent “the replacement of existing capacity.”
Thus, the Act recognizes ways for a utility to abandon flow-through with respect to existing property. A utility cannot do so on its own; the overriding authority is in the Federal Power Commission. The staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation prepared a General Explanation of this tax measure in which it stated:
“If the taxpayer was taking accelerated depreciation and flowing through to its customers the benefits of the deferred taxes as of August 1, 1969, then the taxpayer would continue to do so (except for a special election procedure discussed below), unless the appropriate regulatory agency permits a change as to that property.”
This document goes on to state that as respects new property a utility on flow-through must remain on flow-through “unless the regulatory agency permits it to change (or unless the election below applies).”
This document provides a compelling contemporary indication that the Federal Power Commission was not deprived of its authority to permit abandonment of flow-through, even though utilities had the right not to have flow-through apply to their expansion property.
The Court of Appeals relied on comments both in the House and in the Senate Reports of the desire of Congress to “freeze” the current practices relating to depreciation especially as respects “the more flourishing utility industries.”
As we read the Reports, the purpose was to forestall switches to faster methods of depreciation, to guard against widespread rate increases, and to avoid putting some utilities at a competitive disadvantage. But the “freeze” was not put in absolute terms. Shifts from straight-line to accelerated depreciation were outlawed, as were shifts from normalization to flow-through on existing property. We find no trace of a suggestion that the Federal Power Commission was denied authority to determine whether on particular facts the abandonment of flow-through by a utility within the parameter of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 would be in the public interest as envisaged by the Natural Gas Act, even though it might increase rates. The “freeze” certainly was designed to cover changes to faster methods of tax depreciation but not changes to slower methods of tax depreciation that the Commission might permit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Commission as respects the post-1969 expansion property of Texas Gas, and reversed it as respects the pre-1970 and post-1969 nonexpansion property. The Court of Appeals did not reach the validity of the Commission’s order, assuming the Commission was correct in its reading of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, as we think it was. The Court of Appeals did, however, state that § 167 (l) “should not be construed to prevent” the Commission from finding in “extraordinary circumstances” that consumer interests “would be furthered by permitting the abandonment of flow-through.” But it added: “It is clear, however, that such consumer interests would not be furthered by permitting Texas Gas to abandon flow-through in the circumstances presented by the case at bar.” 149 U. S. App. D. C., at 250, 462 F. 2d, at 865. The Commission in its petition for certiorari states that in connection with the main question raised it would argue, if the petition were granted, that its decision on the merits was correct in all respects. And in its brief on the merits it urges us to decide the merits. But by statute the Court of Appeals is the tribunal where review must be sought; and we remand the cases to it for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note in closing, however, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in toto. Its holding that the consumer interests were not furthered by the Commission's action is short of the application of the appropriate standard for review. As already noted, under Hope Natural Gas rates are “just and reasonable” only if consumer interests are protected and if the financial health of the pipeline in our economic system remains strong.
Reversed and remanded.
Section 167 (a) provides that “[t]here shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)” of qualified property. Section 167 (b) defines “reasonable allowance” to include an allowance computed under the declining balance method and the sum-of-the-years-digits method, as well as the straight-line method. Under the declining-balance and sum-of-the-years-digits method, both commonly referred to as accelerated or liberalized depreciation methods, depreciation allowances in the early years are higher than under the straight-line method, but steadily decrease over the useful life of the asset. Under the straight-line method, the depreciation allowance for an asset remains equal over its useful life.
Federal income taxes are properly included as an expense under the cost-of-service ratemaking utilized by the Commission in the regulation of rates for sales of natural gas subject to its jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. See FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 386 U. S. 237, 243.
See H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, pp. 131-132; S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 172.
See H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, pp. 132-133; S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 172.
H R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, p. 133.
S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 173.
See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-782, p. 313.
Section 167 (l) (3) (A) provides:
“The term ‘public utility property’ means property used predominantly in the trade or business of the furnishing or sale of—
“(i) electrical energy, water, or sewage disposal services,
“ (ii) gas or steam through a local distribution system,
"(in) telephone services, or other communication services if furnished or sold by the Communications Satellite Corporation for purposes authorized by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (47 U. S. C. [§] 701), or
“(iv) transportation of gas or steam by pipeline,
“if the rates for such furnishing or sale, as the case may be, have been established or approved by a State or political subdivision thereof, by any agency or instrumentality of the United States, or by a public service or public utility commission or other similar body of any State or political subdivision thereof.”
In Order No. 404, 43 F. P. C. 740, rehearing denied, 44 F. P. C. 16, the Commission announced that as a general policy it would permit utilities making the election under § 167 (l) (4) (A) to use accelerated depreciation with normalization with respect to their expansion property. The Court of Appeals, in the same decision under review here, affirmed this order. 149 U. S. App. D. C. 238, 250, 462 F. 2d 853, 865. That part of the court’s decision is not before us.
The Commission’s order reads:
“ (A) In the computation of its Federal Income Tax allowance for ratemaking purposes as well as for accounting purposes, Texas Gas is permitted to use liberalized depreciation with normalization with respect to its property other than that subject to election under Section 167 (l) (4) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code as amended by Section 441 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Such election applies to property constructed or acquired on or after January 1, 1970, to the extent it increases the productive or operational capacity of the company and does not represent the replacement of existing capacity. Texas Gas may reflect any such change in its rates, as well as any change in costs arising from its proposed election. In computing its cost-of-service for ratemaking purposes balances in Account 282 [deferred tax reserve account] should continue to be deducted from the rate base.” 43 F. P. C. 824, 831.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, a municipally owned distributor of natural gas and a city-gate customer of Texas Gas, and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the Commission’s Opinion No. 578. Each had filed an application for rehearing before the Commission which was denied in Opinion No. 578-A. Both the Federal Power Commission (in No. 72-486) and Texas Gas (in No. 72-488) petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, p. 133.
S. Rep. No. 91-552, pp. 173-174
“The [Senate] committee amendments, while in most respects the same as the House provisions, differ in one principal area. The amendments permit an election to be made within 180 days after the date of enactment of the bill for a utility covered by this provision to shift from the flow-through to the straight-line method, with or without the permission of the appropriate regulatory agency, or permit it with the permission of the regulatory agency to shift to the normalization method (that is, to come under general rules of the bill).
“This election applies both as to new and existing property. . . . Since the company would no longer be permitted to use accelerated depreciation (unless the agency later permits it to normalize), the agency would not be able to impute the use of accelerated depreciation with flow-through.” (Emphasis added.)
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-782, pp. 312-313.
H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, p. 133.
The second rule, as noted, provided, “If the taxpayer is taking accelerated depreciation and is ‘normalizing’ its deferred taxes, then it must go to the straight line method unless it continues to normalize as to that property.” Ibid.
The third rule, as noted, provided, “If the taxpayer is taking accelerated depreciation and flowing through to its customers the benefits of the deferred taxes, then the taxpayer must continue to do so, unless the appropriate regulatory agency permits a change as to that property.” Ibid.
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, H. R. 13270, 91st Cong., p. 151.
Ibid.
H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, pp. 132-133.
S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 172
Ibid.
Section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b), provides:
“Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit wherein the natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia [Circuit] . . .
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Me. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Basing his complaint on the Illinois wrongful death statute, appellant administrator brought this action in the Wisconsin state court to recover damages for the death of Harold Hughes, who was fatally injured in an automobile accident in Illinois. The allegedly negligent driver and an insurance company were named as defendants. On their motion the trial court entered summary judgment “dismissing the complaint on the merits.” It held that a Wisconsin statute, which creates a right of action only for deaths caused in that state, establishes a local public policy against Wisconsin’s entertaining suits brought under the wrongful death acts of other states. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, notwithstanding the contention that the local statute so construed violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution. The case is properly here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257.
We are called upon to decide the narrow question whether Wisconsin, over the objection raised, can close the doors of its courts to the cause of action created by the Illinois wrongful death act. Prior decisions have established that the Illinois statute is a “public act” within the provision of Art. IV, § 1 that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts ... of every other State.” It is also settled that Wisconsin cannot escape this constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under the laws of other states by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent. We have recognized, however, that full faith and credit does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state; rather, it is for this Court to choose in each case between the competing public policies involved. The clash of interests in cases of this type has usually been described as a conflict between the public policies of two or more states. The more basic conflict involved in the present appeal, however, is as follows: On the one hand is the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states; on the other hand is the policy of Wisconsiri, as interpreted by its highest court, against permitting Wisconsin courts to entertain this wrongful death action.
We hold that Wisconsin’s policy must give way. That state has no real feeling of antagonism against wrongful death suits in general. To the contrary, a forum is regularly provided for cases of this nature, the exclusionary rule extending only so far as to bar actions for death not caused locally. The Wisconsin policy, moreover, cannot be considered as an application of the jorum non con-veniens doctrine, whatever effect that doctrine might be given if its use resulted in denying enforcement to public acts of other states. Even if we assume that Wisconsin could refuse, by reason of particular circumstances, to hear foreign controversies to which nonresidents were parties, the present case is not one lacking a close relationship with the state. For not only were appellant, the decedent and the individual defendant all residents of Wisconsin, but also appellant was appointed administrator and the corporate defendant was created under Wisconsin laws. We also think it relevant, although not crucial here, that Wisconsin may well be the only jurisdiction in which service could be had as an original matter on the insurance company defendant. And while in the present case jurisdiction over the individual defendant apparently could be had in Illinois by substituted service, in other cases Wisconsin’s exclusionary statute might amount to a deprivation of all opportunity to enforce valid death claims created by another state.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that Wisconsin’s statutory policy which excludes this Illinois cause of action is forbidden by the national policy of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Smith-Hurd’s Ill. Ann. Stat., 1936, c. 70, §§ 1, 2.
Wis. Stat., 1949, §331.03. This section contains language typically found in wrongful death acts but concludes as follows: “provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this state.”
257 Wis. 35,42 N. W. 2d 452.
The parties concede, as they must, that if the same cause of action had previously been reduced to judgment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would compel the courts of Wisconsin to entertain an action to enforce it. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411.
E. g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 644; Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 154-155; John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 183.
E. g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 642-643; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 260-261; cf. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 415; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 188. The reliance of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on Chambers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, was misplaced. That case does not hold that one state, consistently with Art. IV, § 1, can exclude from its courts causes of action created by another state for, as pointed out in Broderick v. Rosner, supra at 642, n. 3, in Chambers “no claim was made under the full faith and credit clause.”
E. g., Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, 314 U. S. 201, 210-211; Pacific Ins. Co. v. Commission, 306 U. S. 493, 502; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 547.
See, e. g., Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 547-550.
This clause “altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation . . . .” Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 439. See also Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 276-277; Order of Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586.
The present case is not one where Wisconsin, having entertained appellant’s lawsuit, chose to apply its own instead of Illinois’ statute to measure the substantive rights involved. This distinguishes the present case from those where we have said that “Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted.” Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 547; see also, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 295-296.
It may well be that the wrongful death acts of Wisconsin and Illinois contain different provisions in regard to such matters as maximum recovery and disposition of the proceeds of suit. Such differences, however, are generally considered unimportant. See cases collected 77 A. L. R. 1311, 1317-1324.
See note 2, supra.
See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 643; compare Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Co., 191 U. S. 373, with Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411.
Cf. Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 359-360.
Smith-Hurd’s Ill. Ann. Stat., 1950, c. 95%, § 23.
In certain previous cases, e. g., Pacific Ins. Co. v. Commission, 306 U. S. 493, 502; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 547, this Court suggested that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause a forum state might make a distinction between statutes and judgments of sister states because of Congress’ failure to prescribe the extra-state effect to be accorded public acts. Subsequent to these decisions the Judicial Code was revised so as to provide: “Such Acts [of the legislature of any state] . . . and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have ... in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken.” (Italics added.) 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. Ill) § 1738. In deciding the present appeal, however, we have found it unnecessary to rely on any changes accomplished by the Judicial Code revision.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mb. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here concerns the proper venue for a suit against a labor union, an unincorporated association, under 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b), which at the time this action was brought read as follows: “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.”
In December 1959 and January 1960, the National Railroad Adjustment Board issued monetary awards in favor of certain members of respondent union on their claims for breach of collective bargaining contracts between the union and petitioner, the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company. The railroad refused to honor the awards, the union struck to enforce them and the strike was permanently enjoined by the District Court. 185 F. Supp. 369, aff’d, 290 F. 2d 266, cert, denied, 366 U. S. 966. The railroad then sued the union for damages in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, also joining as defendants R. E. Carroll, chairman of the union’s General Grievance Committee on the property of petitioner, and the chairmen of various local lodges of the union. The complaint alleged that the defendants had breached their duties under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The District Court overruled the union’s motion to dismiss for improper venue, held the strike illegal because the union had failed to exhaust its statutory remedies to enforce the Adjustment Board awards, and awarded damages based on the railroad’s loss of traffic caused by the illegal strike. The judgment ran against both the union and Carroll, the case against the other defendants being dismissed for failure of proof. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the union could be sued under § 1391 (b) only in the district of its residence and that its residence was not in Colorado. Because of the seeming conflict with Rutland R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 307 F. 2d 21, we granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 1000. We reverse.
Section 1391 (b) is the general venue statute governing transitory causes of action in the federal courts where jurisdiction does not depend wholly on diversity of citizenship. Following its amendment in 1966, 80 Stat. 1111, the section permits suit either in the district where all of the defendants reside or in the district where the claim arose. At the time this suit was brought, however, venue lay only at the defendant’s residence, as had been the case since 1887. 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by 25 Stat. 433 (1888). Thus for almost 80 years proper venue in federal-question cases was limited to the district of the defendant’s residence, whether the defendant was an individual, a corporation, or an unincorporated association such as this respondent. During all of this time, down to and including the 1966 amendment, Congress has not expressly defined the residence of an unincorporated association for purposes of the general venue statute. The same was true with respect to corporations until 1948 when Congress directed that a corporation could be sued in the judicial district “in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.” 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c). Congress has maintained its silence, however, with respect to the residence of the unincorporated association. The resolution of that issue, as was true for the corporation prior to 1948, has been left to the courts. The issue is now here for the first time.
Of course, venue for a suit against an unincorporated association becomes important only if the association is itself suable. At common law, such an association could be sued only in the names of its members and liability had to be enforced against each member. This principle was rejected in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344, where this Court, recognizing the growth and pervasive influence of labor organizations and noting that the suability of trade unions “is of primary importance in the working out of justice and in protecting individuals and society . . . ,” 259 U. S., at 390, held that such organizations were suable in the federal courts and that funds accumulated by them were subject to execution in suits for torts committed during strikes. The Coronado holding is now reflected in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 17 (b).
The Coronado case dealt with capacity to be sued, not with venue, but it did legitimate suing the unincorporated association as an entity. Although that entity has no citizenship independent of its members for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145, a case relied upon by the Court of Appeals here, we think that the question of the proper venue for such a defendant, like the question of capacity, should be determined by looking to the residence of the association itself rather than that of its individual members. Otherwise, § 1391 (b) would seem to require either holding the association not suable at all where its members are residents of different States, or holding that the association “resides” in any State in which any of its members resides. The first alternative seems wholly at odds with Coronado and in addition removes federal-question litigation from the federal courts unnecessarily; the second is patently unfair to the association when it is remembered that venue is primarily a matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses. H. R. Rep. No. 1893, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. Of course, having concluded that the unincorporated association should be viewed as an entity for purposes of residence under § 1391 (b), that residence must still be ascertained, an inquiry requiring examination of congressional intent and the interests reflected in Coronado and in principles underlying venue limitations.
In Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F. 2d 408, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with the issue of what district an unincorporated association may be said to inhabit under the special venue statute governing patent suits, then 28 U. S. C. § 109 (1940 ed.), now 28 U. S. C. § 1400. That court thought the association should be treated like a corporation. Under the decisions of this Court, corporations had a single residence for venue purposes, the State of their incorporation. Likewise, the Sperry court thought the unincorporated association should be considered as having a single residence, in its case its principal place of business. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165, had already determined, however, that corporations, while having only one residence, nevertheless consented to be sued in federal diversity suits where they were licensed to do business. And Neirbo had much to do with producing the 1948 congressional definition of corporate residence as including not only the State of incorporation but wherever the corporation is licensed to do business or is doing business.
It can be argued, as respondent does, that had the 1948 Congress intended the expanded definition of corporate residence to apply to labor unions and other unincorporated associations, it would have said so. But even accepting this, the question of what the association’s residence is for venue purposes remains unanswered. Saying that Congress did not intend to “change” the venue law with respect to unincorporated associations assumes a settled meaning to the prior law. This was not the ease. There was no settled construction of the law in the courts in 1948, and there is none yet. Nor was there anything to indicate that Congress had considered a labor union’s residence to be in only one place or had ever intended a limited view of residence with respect to unincorporated associations. Rather than accepting respondent’s position, we view the action of Congress in 1948 as simply correcting an unacceptably narrow definition of corporate residence which had been adopted by the courts, while maintaining its silence with respect to the unincorporated association. And if it is assumed that Congress was aware of Sperry at all, it is surely reasonable to think that Congress anticipated that the approach of that case, analogizing incorporated and unincorporated entities, would continue to be followed by the courts so that if corporate residence were broadly defined by the Congress, the courts would similarly construe the concept of residence of the unincorporated association. This was the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rutland R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, supra.
We think it most nearly approximates the intent of Congress to recognize the reality of the multi-state, unincorporated association such as a labor union and to permit suit against that entity, like the analogous corporate entity, wherever it is “doing business.” Congress has itself recognized as much in a special venue statute, § 301 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U. S. C. § 185 (c), which provides that actions against labor unions governed by the Labor Management Relations Act may be brought in any district where the union maintains its principal office or in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members. That statute was enacted but a year before the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, and while it does not mention residence, it is a considerable indication that Congress had no desire, then or at any previous time, to construe “residence” as used in the general venue provision so as to confine suits against a labor union to the district where its principal office is located. Moreover, from the standpoint of convenience to parties and witnesses, there would be little merit in holding that suits against unions covered by the National Labor Relations Act may be brought anywhere the responsible representatives of the union take concrete action and yet hold that suits for similar conduct against unions subject to a parallel federal labor statute, the Railway Labor Act, may be brought only where the union’s principal office is located. Nor need we here be concerned, as in Bouligny, with possible effects on the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Under these circumstances, for this Court to create such a distinction without some positive lead from Congress and in the face of sound policy considerations to the contrary would be unjustified.
We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals improperly applied § 1391 (b) as it read when this suit was brought. But even if we instead agreed with the Court of Appeals on this question, the case must be considered in light of the present form of that section, that is, as amended by the Act of November 2, 1966, which provides for venue not only at the place of a defendant’s residence but also in the district where the claim arose. This amendment does not change the substantive law applicable to this lawsuit. It is wholly procedural. Absent some contrary indications by the Congress and absent any procedural prejudice to either party, the 1966 amendment to § 1391 is applicable to this suit. See United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602; Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55; American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 201; Pruess v. Udall, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 359 F. 2d 615. As this Court said in applying 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a) to pending actions, “No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.” Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S¡, at 71. And in any event, if the decision below were affirmed, the petitioner could reinstitute the same action in the same District Court and seek the benefits of the current version of § 1391, absent the barrier of any applicable statute of limitations. We do not, of course, intimate any views as to whether this claim “arose” in the District of Colorado. That would be an issue for the District Court should it now be determined, in light of this opinion, that respondent was not doing business in Colorado when this suit was instituted.
Reversed and remanded.
The Court of Appeals also reversed the damage. award against respondent Carroll, concluding that Carroll was not responsible for the strike in question. We do not disturb this factual determination of the Court of Appeals. Carroll’s residence is admittedly within the District of Colorado.
Other lower court cases are divided on the question whether an unincorporated association can be sued at a place other than its principal place of business. Cases restricting venue to the association’s principal place of business include Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 67, 69, n. 2, 175 F. 2d 802, 804, n. 2, rev’d on other grounds, 338 U. S. 232; McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chem. Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871, 875; Salvant v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 83 F. Supp. 391, 396; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 92 F. Supp. 841, aff’d without discussion, 194 F. 2d 770; Chenco v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635, 637-638; cf. Hadden v. Small, 145 F. Supp. 387 (partnership). Cases holding that unincorporated associations may be sued where they do business: Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F. Supp. 922; Eastern Motor Express v. Espen-shade, 138 F. Supp. 426, 432; American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 169 F. Supp. 777, 781-783; R & E Dental Supply Co. v. Ritter Co., 185 F. Supp. 812; cf. Joscar Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 634.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The petition for rehearing and the motion to remand for trial on unresolved issues are granted as herein indicated. The judgment of this Court of May 3, 1965, 381 U. S. 41, is vacated, and in lieu thereof the following judgment is entered; “The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is modified to direct that the case be remanded to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for further proceedings with respect to the unresolved issues tendered in petitioners’ bill of complaint, and is in all other respects affirmed.”
R ü SQ Qrdered
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan, believing that a remand is legally unjustified, dissent from that part of the Court’s order.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
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sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 522(l) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor to file a list of the property that the debtor claims as statutorily exempt from distribution to creditors. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003 affords creditors and the bankruptcy trustee 30 days to object to claimed exemptions. We must decide in this case whether the trustee may contest the validity of an exemption after the 30-day period if the debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the exemption.
I
The debtor in this case, Emily Davis, declared bankruptcy while she was pursuing an employment discrimination claim in the state courts. The relevant proceedings began in 1978 when Davis filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations. Davis alleged that her employer, Trans World Airlines (TWA), had denied her promotions on the basis of her race and sex. The Commission held for Davis as to liability but did not calculate the damages owed by TWA. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas reversed the Commission, but the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed that court and reinstated the Commission’s determination of liability. TWA next appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In October 1984, while that appeal was pending, Davis filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Petitioner, Robert J. Taylor, became the trustee of Davis’ bankruptcy estate. Respondents, Wendell G. Freeland, Richard F. Kronz, and their law firm, represented Davis in the discrimination suit. On a schedule filed with the Bankruptcy Court, Davis claimed as exempt property the money that she expected to win in her discrimination suit against TWA. She described this property as “Proceeds from lawsuit — [Davis] v. TWA” and “Claim for lost wages” and listed its value as “unknown.” App. 18.
Performing his duty as a trustee, Taylor held the required initial meeting of creditors in January 1985. See 11 U. S. C. § 341; Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 2003(a). At this meeting, respondents told Taylor that they estimated that Davis might win $90,000 in her suit against TWA. Several days after the meeting, Taylor wrote a letter to respondents telling them that he considered the potential proceeds of the lawsuit to be property of Davis’ bankruptcy estate. He also asked respondents for more details about the suit. Respondents described the procedural posture of the case and expressed optimism that they might settle with TWA for $110,000.
Taylor decided not to object to the claimed exemption. The record reveals that Taylor doubted that the lawsuit had any value. Taylor at one point explained: “I have had past experience in examining debtors ...[.] [M]any of them . .. indicate they have potential lawsuits.... [M]any of them do not turn out to be advantageous and ... many of them might wind up settling far within the exemption limitation.” App. 52. Taylor also said that he thought Davis’ discrimination claim against TWA might be a “nullity.” Id., at 58. '
Taylor proved mistaken. In October 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s determination that TWA had discriminated against Davis. In a subsequent settlement of the issue of damages, TWA agreed to pay Davis a total of $110,000. TWA paid part of this amount by issuing a check made to both Davis and respondents for $71,000. Davis apparently signed this check over to respondents in payment of their fees. TWA paid the remainder of the $110,000 by other means. Upon learning of the settlement, Taylor filed a complaint against respondents in the Bankruptcy Court. He demanded that respondents turn over the money that they had received from Davis because he considered it property of Davis’ bankruptcy estate. Respondents argued that they could keep the fees because Davis had claimed the proceeds of the lawsuit as exempt.
The Bankruptcy Court sided with Taylor. It concluded that Davis had “no statutory basis” for claiming the proceeds of the lawsuit as exempt and ordered respondents to “return” approximately $23,000 to Taylor, a sum sufficient to pay off all of Davis’ unpaid creditors. In re Davis, 105 B. R. 288 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Pa. 1989). The District Court affirmed, In re Davis, 118 B. R. 272 (WD Pa. 1990), but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, 938 F. 2d 420 (1991). The Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court could not require respondents to turn over the money because Davis had claimed it as exempt, and Taylor had failed to object to the claimed exemption in a timely manner. We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 976 (1991), and now affirm.
II
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, all of his property becomes property of a bankruptcy estate. See 11 U. S. C. § 541. The Code, however, allows the debtor to prevent the distribution of certain property by claiming it as exempt. Section 522(b) allowed Davis to choose the exemptions afforded by state law or the federal exemptions listed in § 522(d). Section 522(l) states the procedure for claiming exemptions and objecting to claimed exemptions as follows:
“The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section.... Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”
Although § 522(l) itself does not specify the time for objecting to a claimed exemption, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b) provides in part:
“The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule 2003(a) . . . unless, within such period, further time is granted by the court.”
In this case, as noted, Davis claimed the proceeds from her employment discrimination lawsuit as exempt by listing them in the schedule that she filed under § 522(7). The parties agree that Davis did not have a right to exempt more than a small portion of these proceeds either under state law or under the federal exemptions specified in § 522(d). Davis in fact claimed the full amount as exempt. Taylor, as a result, apparently could have made a valid objection under § 522(l) and Rule 4003 if he had acted promptly. We hold, however, that his failure to do so prevents him from challenging the validity of the exemption now.
A
Taylor acknowledges that Rule 4003(b) establishes a 30-day period for objecting to exemptions and that §522(l) states that “[ujnless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt... is exempt.” He argues, nonetheless, that his failure to object does not preclude him from challenging the exemption at this time. In Taylor’s view, §522(l) and Rule 4003(b) serve only to narrow judicial inquiry into the validity of an exemption after 30 days, not to preclude judicial inquiry altogether. In particular, he maintains that courts may invalidate a claimed exemption after expiration of the 30-day period if the debtor did not have a good-faith or reasonably disputable basis for claiming it. In this case, Taylor asserts, Davis did not have a colorable basis for claiming all of the lawsuit proceeds as exempt and thus lacked good faith.
Taylor justifies his interpretation of § 522(l) by arguing that requiring debtors to file claims in good faith will discourage them from claiming meritless exemptions merely in hopes that no one will object. Taylor does not stand alone in this reading of § 522(b). Several Courts of Appeals have adopted the same position upon similar reasoning. See In re Peterson, 920 F. 2d 1389, 1393-1394 (CA8 1990); In re Dembs, 757 F. 2d 777, 780 (CA6 1985); In re Sherk, 918 F. 2d 1170, 1174 (CA5 1990).
We reject Taylor’s argument. Davis claimed the lawsuit proceeds as exempt on a list filed with the Bankruptcy Court. Section 522(1), to repeat, says that “[ujnless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.” Rule 4003(b) gives the trustee and creditors 30 days from the initial creditors’ meeting to object. By negative implication, the Rule indicates that creditors may not object after 30 days “unless, within such period, further time is granted by the court.” The Bankruptcy Court did not extend the 30-day period. Section 522(l) therefore has made the property exempt. Taylor cannot contest the exemption at this time whether or not Davis had a colorable statutory basis for claiming it.
Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality. In this case, despite what respondents repeatedly told him, Taylor did not object to the claimed exemption. If Taylor did not know the value of the potential proceeds of the lawsuit, he could have sought a hearing on the issue, see Rule 4003(c), or he could have asked the Bankruptcy Court for an extension of time to object, see Rule 4003(b). Having done neither, Taylor cannot now seek to deprive Davis and respondents of the exemption.
Taylor suggests that our holding will create improper incentives. He asserts that it will lead debtors to claim property exempt on the chance that the trustee and creditors, for whatever reason, will fail to object to the claimed exemption on time. He asserts that only a requirement of good faith can prevent what the Eighth Circuit has termed “exemption by declaration.” Peterson, supra, at 1393. This concern, however, does not cause us to alter our interpretation of §6220).
Debtors and their attorneys face penalties under various provisions for engaging in improper conduct in bankruptcy proceedings. See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 727(a)(4)(B) (authorizing denial of discharge for presenting fraudulent claims); Rule 1008 (requiring filings to “be verified or contain an unsworn declaration” of truthfulness under penalty of perjury); Rule 9011 (authorizing sanctions for signing certain documents not “well grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”); 18 U. S. C. § 152 (imposing criminal penalties for fraud in bankruptcy cases). These provisions may limit bad-faith claims of exemptions by debtors. To the extent that they do not, Congress may enact comparable provisions to address the difficulties that Taylor predicts will follow our decision. We have no authority to limit the application of § 522(l) to exemptions claimed in good faith.
B
Taylor also asserts that courts may consider the validity of the exemption under a different provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 105(a), despite his failure to object in a timely manner. That provision states:
“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process” Ibid, (emphasis added).
Although Taylor stresses that he is not asserting that courts in bankruptcy have broad authorization to do equity in derogation of the Code and Rules, he maintains that § 105 permits courts to disallow exemptions not claimed in good faith. Several courts have accepted this position. See, e. g., Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc., 674 F. 2d 277, 278 (CA4 1982); In re Staniforth, 116 B. R. 127, 131 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Wis. 1990); In re Budinsky, No. 90-01099, 1991 WL 105640 (WD Pa., June 10, 1991).
We decline to consider § 105(a) in this case because Taylor raised the argument for the first time in his opening brief on the merits. Our Rule 14.1(a) makes clear that “[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition [for certiorari], or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court,” and our Rule 24.1(a) states that a brief on the merits should not “raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented” in the petition. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 535 (1992). In addition, we have said that “[o]rdinarily, this Court does not decide questions not raised or resolved in the lower court[s].” Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam). These principles help to maintain the integrity of the process of certio-rari. Cf. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 816 (1985). The Court decides which questions to consider through well-established procedures; allowing the able counsel who argue before us to alter these questions or to devise additional questions at the last minute would thwart this system. We see no “unusual circumstances” that warrant addressing Taylor’s § 105(a) argument at this time. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 443, n. 38 (1984).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C) (NEPA), requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of any major federal action. As part of its generic rule-making proceedings to evaluate the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear powerplants, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) decided that licensing boards should assume, for purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage of certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact and thus should not affect the decision whether to license a particular nuclear power-plant. We conclude that the Commission complied with NEPA and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §706.
The environmental impact of operating a light-water nuclear powerplant includes the effects of offsite activities necessary to provide fuel for the plant (“front end” activities), and of offsite activities necessary to dispose of the highly toxic and long-lived nuclear wastes generated by the plant (“back end” activities). The dispute in these cases concerns the Commission’s adoption of a series of generic rules to evaluate the environmental effects of a nuclear power-plant’s fuel cycle. At the heart of each rule is Table S-3, a numerical compilation of the estimated resources used and effluents released by fuel cycle activities supporting a year’s operation of a typical light-water reactor. The three versions of Table S-3 contained similar numerical values, although the supporting documentation has been amplified during the course of the proceedings.
The Commission first adopted Table S-3 in 1974, after extensive informal rulemaking proceedings. 39 Fed. Reg. 14188 et seq. (1974). This “original” rule, as it later came to be described, declared that in environmental reports and impact statements for individual licensing proceedings the environmental costs of the fuel cycle “shall be as set forth” in Table S-3 and that “[n]o further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required.” Id., at 14191. The original Table S-3 contained no numerical entry for the long-term environmental effects of storing solidified transuranic and high-level wastes, because the Commission staff believed that technology would be developed to isolate the wastes from the environment. The Commission and the parties have later termed this assumption of complete repository integrity as the “zero-release” assumption: the reasonableness of this assumption is at the core of the present controversy.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a respondent in the present cases, challenged the original rule and a license issued under the rule to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Table S-3’s treatment of the “front end” of the fuel cycle, but vacated and remanded the portion of the rule relating to the “back end” because of perceived inadequacies in the rulemaking procedures. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 178 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 547 F. 2d 633 (1976). Judge Tamm disagreed that the procedures were inadequate, but concurred on the ground that the record on waste storage was inadequate to support the zero-release assumption. Id., at 361, 547 F. 2d, at 658.
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978), this Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision that the Commission had used inadequate procedures, finding that the Commission had done all that was required by NEPA and the APA and determining that courts generally lack the authority to impose “hybrid” procedures greater than those contemplated by the governing statutes. We remanded for review of whether the original rule was adequately supported by the administrative record, specifically stating that the court was free to agree or disagree with Judge Tamm’s conclusion that the rule pertaining to the “back end” of the fuel cycle was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of § 10(e) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 706. Id., at 536, n. 14.
While Vermont Yankee was pending in this Court, the Commission proposed a new “interim” rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to adopt a revised Table S-3. The proposal explicitly acknowledged that the risks from long-term repository failure were uncertain, but suggested that research should resolve most of those uncertainties in the near future. 41 Fed. Reg. 45850-45851 (1976). After further proceedings, the Commission promulgated the interim rule in March 1977. Table S-3 now explicitly stated that solidified high-level and transuranic wastes would remain buried in a federal repository and therefore would have no effect on the environment. 42 Fed. Reg. 13807 (1977). Like its predecessor, the interim rule stated that “[n]o further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required.” Id., at 13806. The NRDC petitioned for review of the interim rule, challenging the zero-release assumption and faulting the Table S-3 rule for failing to consider the health, cumulative, and socioeconomic effects of the fuel cycle activities. The Court of Appeals stayed proceedings while awaiting this Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee. In April 1978, the Commission amended the interim rule to clarify that health effects were not covered by Table S-3 and could be litigated in individual licensing proceedings. 43 Fed. Reg. 15613 et seq. (1978).
In 1979, following further hearings, the Commission adopted the “final” Table S-3 rule. 44 Fed. Reg. 45362 et seq. (1979). Like the amended interim rule, the final rule expressly stated that Table S-3 should be supplemented in individual proceedings by evidence about the health, socioeconomic, and cumulative aspects of fuel cycle activities. The Commission also continued to adhere to the zero-release assumption that the solidified waste would not escape and harm the environment once the repository was sealed. It acknowledged that this assumption was uncertain because of the remote possibility that water might enter the repository, dissolve the radioactive materials, and transport them to the biosphere. Nevertheless, the Commission predicted that a bedded-salt repository would maintain its integrity, and found the evidence “tentative but favorable” that an appropriate site would be found. Id., at 45368. The Commission ultimately determined that any undue optimism in the assumption of appropriate selection and perfect performance of the repository is offset by the cautious assumption, reflected in other parts of the Table, that all radioactive gases in the spent fuel would escape during the initial 6- to 20-year period that the repository remained open, ibid., and thus did not significantly reduce the overall conservatism of Table S-3. Id., at 45369.
The Commission rejected the option of expressing the uncertainties in Table S-3 or permitting licensing boards, in performing the NEPA analysis for individual nuclear plants, to consider those uncertainties. It saw no advantage in reassessing the significance of the uncertainties in individual licensing proceedings:
“In view of the uncertainties noted regarding waste disposal, the question then arises whether these uncertainties can or should be reflected explicitly in the fuel cycle rule. The Commission has concluded that the rule should not be so modified. On the individual reactor licensing level, where the proceedings deal with fuel cycle issues only peripherally, the Commission sees no advantage in having licensing boards repeatedly weigh for themselves the effect of uncertainties on the selection of fuel cycle impacts for use in cost-benefit balancing. This is a generic question properly dealt with in the rule-making as part of choosing what impact values should go into the fuel cycle rule. The Commission concludes, having noted that uncertainties exist, that for the limited purpose of the fuel cycle rule it is reasonable to base impacts on the assumption which the Commission believes the probabilities favor, i. e., that bedded-salt repository sites can be found which will provide effective isolation of radioactive waste from the biosphere. ” Id., at 45369.
The NRDC and respondent State of New York petitioned for review of the final rule. The Court of Appeals consolidated these petitions for all purposes with the pending challenges to the initial and interim rules. By a divided panel, the court concluded that the Table S-3 rules were arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with NEPA because the Commission had not factored the consideration of uncertainties surrounding the zero-release assumption into the licensing process in such a manner that the uncertainties could potentially affect the outcome of any decision to license a particular plant. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 9, 685 F. 2d 459 (1982). The court first reasoned that NEPA requires an agency to consider all significant environmental risks from its proposed action. If the zero-release assumption is taken as a, finding that long-term storage poses no significant environmental risk, which the court acknowledged may not have been the Commission’s intent, it found that the assumption represents a self-evident error in judgment and is thus arbitrary and capricious. As the evidence in the record reveals and the Commission itself acknowledged, the zero-release assumption is surrounded with uncertainty.
Alternatively, reasoned the Court of Appeals, the zero-release assumption could be characterized as a decision-making device whereby the Commission, rather than individual licensing boards, would have sole responsibility for considering the risk that long-lived wastes will not be disposed of with complete success. The court recognized that the Commission could use generic rulemaking to evaluate environmental costs common to all licensing decisions. Indeed, the Commission could use generic rulemaking to balance generic costs and benefits to produce a generic “net value.” These generic evaluations could then be considered together with case-specific costs and benefits in individual proceedings. The key requirement of NEPA, however, is that the agency consider and disclose the actual environmental effects in a manner that will ensure that the overall process, including both the generic rulemaking and the individual proceedings, brings those effects to bear on decisions to take particular actions that significantly affect the environment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the zero-release assumption was not in accordance with this NEPA requirement because the assumption prevented the uncertainties — which were not found to be insignificant or outweighed by other generic benefits — from affecting any individual licensing decision. Alternatively, by requiring that the licensing decision ignore factors that are relevant under NEPA, the zero-release assumption is a clear error in judgment and thus arbitrary and capricious.
We granted certiorari. 459 U. S. 1034 (1982). We reverse.
h-4 I — I
We are acutely aware that the extent to which this Nation should rely on nuclear power as a source of energy is an important and sensitive issue. Much of the debate focuses on whether development of nuclear generation facilities should proceed in the face of uncertainties about their long-term effects on the environment. Resolution of these fundamental policy questions lies, however, with Congress and the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority, as well as with state legislatures and, ultimately, the populace as a whole. Congress has assigned the courts only the limited, albeit important, task of reviewing agency action to determine whether the agency conformed with controlling statutes. As we emphasized in our earlier encounter with these very proceedings, “[administrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute..., not simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.” Vermont Yankee, 435 U. S., at 558.
The controlling statute at issue here is NEPA. NEPA has twin aims. First, it “places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action.” Vermont Yankee, supra, at 553. Second, it ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U. S. 139, 143 (1981). Congress in enacting NEPA, however, did not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. See Stryckers’ Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U. S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam). Rather, it required only that the agency take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences before taking a major action. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976). The role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 415-417 (1971).
In its Table S-3 rule here, the Commission has determined that the probabilities favor the zero-release assumption, because the Nation is likely to develop methods to store the wastes with no leakage to the environment. The NRDC did not challenge and the Court of Appeals did not decide the reasonableness of this determination, 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 28, n. 96, 685 F. 2d, at 478, n. 96, and no party seriously challenges it here. The Commission recognized, however, that the geological, chemical, physical, and other data it relied on in making this prediction were based, in part, on assumptions which involve substantial uncertainties. Again, no one suggests that the uncertainties are trivial or the potential effects insignificant if time proves the zero-release assumption to have been seriously wrong. After confronting the issue, though, the Commission has determined that the uncertainties concerning the development of nuclear waste storage facilities are not sufficient to affect the outcome of any individual licensing decision.
It is clear that the Commission, in making this determination, has made the careful consideration and disclosure required by NEPA. The sheer volume of proceedings before the Commission is impressive. Of far greater importance, the Commission’s Statement of Consideration announcing the final Table S-3 rule shows that it has digested this mass of material and disclosed all substantial risks. 44 Fed. Reg. 45367-45369 (1979). The Statement summarizes the major uncertainty of long-term storage in bedded-salt repositories, which is that water could infiltrate the repository as a result of such diverse factors as geologic faulting, a meteor strike, or accidental or deliberate intrusion by man. The Commission noted that the probability of intrusion was small, and that the plasticity of salt would tend to heal some types of intrusions. The Commission also found the evidence “tentative but favorable” that an appropriate site could be found. Table S-3 refers interested persons to staff studies that discuss the uncertainties in greater detail. Given this record and the Commission’s statement, it simply cannot be said that the Commission ignored or failed to disclose the uncertainties surrounding its zero-release assumption.
Congress did not enact NEPA, of course, so that an agency would contemplate the environmental impact of an action as an abstract exercise. Rather, Congress intended that the “hard look” be incorporated as part of the agency’s process of deciding whether to pursue a particular federal action. It was on this ground that the Court of Appeals faulted the Commission’s action, for failing to allow the uncertainties potentially to “tip the balance” in a particular licensing decision. As a general proposition, we can agree with the Court of Appeals’ determination that an agency must allow all significant environmental risks to be factored into the decision whether to undertake a proposed action. We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Commission had not complied with this standard.
As Vermont Yankee made clear, NEPA does not require agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking structure. Here, the agency has chosen to evaluate generically the environmental impact of the fuel cycle and inform individual licensing boards, through the Table S-3 rule, of its evaluation. The generic method chosen by the agency is clearly an appropriate method of conducting the “hard look” required by NEPA. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U. S., at 535, n. 13. The environmental effects of much of the fuel cycle are not plant specific, for any plant, regardless of its particular attributes, will create additional wastes that must be stored in a common long-term repository. Administrative efficiency and consistency of decision are both furthered by a generic determination of these effects without needless repetition of the litigation in individual proceedings, which are subject to review by the Commission in any event. See generally Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F. 2d 998, 1002, n. 5 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J.) (quoting Administrative Conference Proposed Recommendation 73-6).
The Court of Appeals recognized that the Commission has discretion to evaluate generically the environmental effects of the fuel cycle and require that these values be “plugged into” individual licensing decisions. The court concluded that the Commission nevertheless violated NEPA by failing to factor the uncertainty surrounding long-term storage into Table S-3 and precluding individual licensing decisionmakers from considering it.
The Commission’s decision to affix a zero value to the environmental impact of long-term storage would violate NEPA, however, only if the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding generically that the uncertainty was insufficient to affect any individual licensing decision. In assessing whether the Commission’s decision is arbitrary and capricious, it is crucial to place the zero-release assumption in context. Three factors are particularly important. First is the Commission’s repeated emphasis that the zero-release assumption — and, indeed, all of the Table S-3 rule — was made for a limited purpose. The Commission expressly noted its intention to supplement the rule with an explanatory narrative. It also emphasized that the purpose of the rule was not to evaluate or select the most effective long-term waste disposal technology or develop site selection criteria. A separate and comprehensive series of programs has been undertaken to serve these broader purposes. In the proceedings before us, the Commission’s staff did not attempt to evaluate the environmental effects of all possible methods of disposing of waste. Rather, it chose to analyze intensively the most probable long-term waste disposal method — burial in a bedded-salt repository several hundred meters below ground — and then “estimate its impacts conservatively, based on the best available information and analysis.” 44 Fed. Reg. 45863 (1979). The zero-release assumption cannot be evaluated in isolation. Rather, it must be assessed in relation to the limited purpose for which the Commission made the assumption.
Second, the Commission emphasized that the zero-release assumption is but a single figure in an entire Table, which the Commission expressly designed as a risk-averse estimate of the environmental impact of the fuel cycle. It noted that Table S-3 assumed that the fuel storage canisters and the fuel rod cladding would be corroded before a repository is closed and that all volatile materials in the fuel would escape to the environment. Given that assumption, and the improbability that materials would escape after sealing, the Commission determined that the overall Table represented a conservative (i. e., inflated) statement of environmental impacts. It is not unreasonable for the Commission to counteract the uncertainties in postsealing releases by balancing them with an overestimate of presealing releases. A reviewing court should not magnify a single line item beyond its significance as only part of a larger Table.
Third, a reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential. See, e. g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion); id., at 705-706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
With these three guides in mind, we find the Commission’s zero-release assumption to be within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking required by the APA. We have already noted that the Commission’s Statement of Consideration detailed several areas of uncertainty and discussed why they were insubstantial for purposes of an individual licensing decision. The Table S-3 rule also refers to the staff reports, public documents that contain a more expanded discussion of the uncertainties involved in concluding that long-term storage will have no environmental effects. These staff reports recognize that rigorous verification of long-term risks for waste repositories is not possible, but suggest that data and extrapolation of past experience allow the Commission to identify events that could produce repository failure, estimate the probability of those events, and calculate the resulting consequences. NUREG-0116, at 4-86. The Commission staff also modeled the consequences of repository failure by tracing the flow of contaminated water, and found them to be insignificant. Id., at 4-89 through 4-94. Ultimately, the staff concluded that
“[t]he radiotoxic hazard index analyses and the modeling studies that have been done indicate that consequences of all but the most improbable events will be small. Risks (probabilities times consequences) inherent in the long term for geological disposal will therefore also be small.” Id., at 2-11.
We also find significant the separate views of Commissioners Bradford and Gilinsky. These Commissioners expressed dissatisfaction with the zero-release assumption and yet emphasized the limited purpose of the assumption and the overall conservatism of Table S-3. Commissioner Bradford characterized the bedded-salt repository as a responsible working assumption for NEPA purposes and concurred in the zero-release figure because it does not appear to affect Table S-3’s overall conservatism. 44 Fed. Reg. 45372 (1979). Commissioner Gilinsky was more critical of the entire Table, stating that the Commission should confront directly whether it should license any nuclear reactors in light of the problems of waste disposal, rather than hide an affirmative conclusion to this issue behind a table of numbers. He emphasized that the “waste confidence proceeding,” see n. 14, supra, should provide the Commission an appropriate vehicle for a thorough evaluation of the problems involved in the Government’s commitment to a waste disposal solution. For the limited purpose of individual licensing proceedings, however, Commissioner Gilinsky found it “virtually inconceivable” that the Table should affect the decision whether to license, and characterized as “naive” the notion that the fuel cycle effluents could tip the balance in some cases and not in others. 44 Fed. Reg. 45374 (1979).
In sum, we think that the zero-release assumption — a policy judgment concerning one line in a conservative Table designed for the limited purpose of individual licensing decisions — is within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking. It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners, would have reached. Our only task is to determine whether the Commission has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 285-286 (1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971). Under this standard, we think the Commission's zero-release assumption, within the context of Table S-3 as a whole, was not arbitrary and capricious.
r-4 1 — 4 HH
As we have noted, n. 5, supra, Table S-3 describes effluents and other impacts in technical terms. The Table does not convert that description into tangible effects on human health or other environmental variables. The original and interim rules declared that “the contribution of the environmental effects of... fuel cycle activities... shall be as set forth in the following Table S-3 [and] [n]o further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required.” 39 Fed. Reg. 14191 (1974); 42 Fed. Reg. 13806 (1977). Since the Table does not specifically mention health effects, socioeconomic impacts, or cumulative impacts, this declaration does not clearly require or preclude their discussion. The Commission later amended the interim rule to clarify that health effects were not covered by Table S-3 and could be litigated in individual licensing proceedings. In the final rule, the Commission expressly required licensing boards to consider the socioeconomic and cumulative effects in addition to the health effects of the releases projected in the Table. 44 Fed. Reg. 45371 (1979).
The Court of Appeals held that the original and interim rules violated NEPA by precluding licensing boards from considering the health, socioeconomic, and cumulative effects of the environmental impacts stated in technical terms. As does the Commission, we agree with the Court of Appeals that NEPA requires an EIS to disclose the significant health, socioeconomic, and cumulative consequences of the environmental impact of a proposed action. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U. S. 766 (1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S., at 410; 40 CFR §§ 1508.7, 1508.8 (1982). We find no basis, however, for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Commission ever precluded a licensing board from considering these effects.
It is true, as the Commission pointed out in explaining why it modified the language in the earlier rules, that the original Table S-3 rule “at least initially was apparently interpreted as cutting off” discussion of the effects of effluent releases. 44 Fed. Reg. 45364 (1979). But even the notice accompanying the earlier versions stated that the Table was “to be used as a basis for evaluating the environmental effects in a cost-benefit analysis for a reactor,” 39 Fed. Reg. 14190 (1974) (emphasis added), suggesting that individual licensing boards were to assess the consequences of effluent releases. And when, operating under the initial rule, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board suggested the desirability of discussing health effects for comparing nuclear with coal plants, In re Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant Units), 5 N. R. C. 92, 103, n. 52 (1977), the Commission staff was allowed to introduce evidence of public health consequences. Cf. In re Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station), 7 N. R. C. 179, 187 (1978).
Respondents have pointed to no case where evidence concerning health or other consequences of the data in Table S-3 was excluded from licensing proceedings. We think our admonition in Vermont Yankee applies with equal force here:
“[WJhile it is true that NEPA places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action, it is still incumbent upon intervenors who wish to participate to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the intervenors’ position and contentions.” 435 U. S., at 553.
In short, we find it totally inappropriate to cast doubt on licensing proceedings simply because of a minor ambiguity in the language of the earlier rule under which the environmental impact statement was made, when there is no evidence that this ambiguity prevented any party from making as full a presentation as desired, or ever affected the decision to license the plant.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is
Reversed.
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
APPENDIX TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT
Section 102(2)(C) provides:
“The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
“(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
“(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, [and]
“(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.”
The original Table S-3 rule was promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Congress abolished the AEC in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 U. S. C. § 5801 et seq., and transferred its licensing and regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The interim and final rules were promulgated by the NRC. This opinion will use the term “Commission” to refer to both the NRC and the predecessor AEC.
Title 5 U. S. C. § 706 states in part:
“The reviewing court shall—
“(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—
“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
A light-water nuclear powerplant is one that uses ordinary water (H20), as opposed to heavy water (D20), to remove the heat generated in the nuclear core. See Van Nostrand’s Scientific Encyclopedia 1998, 2008 (D. Considine & G. Considine eds., 6th ed. 1983). The bulk of the reactors in the United States are light-water nuclear reactors. NRC Ann. Rep., Appendix 6 (1980).
For example, the tabulated impacts include the acres of land committed to fuel cycle activities, the amount of water discharged by such activities, fossil fuel consumption, and chemical and radiological effluents (measured in curies), all normalized to the annual fuel requirement for a model 1,000 megawatt light-water reactor. See Table S-3, reprinted in the Appendix, infra.
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq., a utility seeking to construct and operate a nuclear powerplant must obtain a separate permit or license at both the construction and the operation stage of the project. After the Commission’s staff has examined the application for a construction license, which includes a review of possible environmental effects as required by NEPA, a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board conducts a public adjudicatory hearing and reaches a decision which can be appealed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board and, in the Commission’s discretion, to the Commission itself. The final agency decision may be appealed to the courts of appeals. A similar procedure occurs when the utility applies for an operating license, except that a hearing need be held only in contested cases. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 526-527 (1978).
High-level wastes, which are highly radioactive, are produced in liquid form when spent fuel is reprocessed. Transuranic wastes, which are also highly toxic, are nuclides heavier than uranium that are produced in the reactor fuel. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 9, 16, n. 11, 685 F. 2d, 459, 466, n. 11 (1982).
In Vermont Yankee, we indicated that the Court of Appeals could consider any additions made to the record by the Commission, and could consolidate review of the initial review with review of later rules. 435 U. S., at 537, n. 14. Consistent with this direction, the parties stipulated that all three versions of the rule could be reviewed on the basis of the whole record. See 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 21, n. 39, 685 F. 2d, at 471, n. 39.
Judge Bazelon wrote the opinion for the court. Judge Wilkey joined the section of the opinion that rejected New York’s argument that the waste-disposal technology assumed for calculation of certain effluent release values was economically infeasible. That issue is not before us. Judge Wilkey filed a dissenting opinion on the issues that are under review here. Judge Edwards of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation, joined these sections of Judge Bazelon’s opinion, and also filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting on the economic infeasibility issue.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 31, n. 118, 685 F. 2d, at 481, n. 118, the Commission became increasingly candid in acknowledging the uncertainties underlying permanent waste disposal. Because all three versions of Table S-3 use the same zero-release assumption, and the parties stipulated that the entire record be used in reviewing all three versions, see n. 8, supra, we need review only the propriety of the final Table S-3 rule. We leave for another day any general concern with an agency whose initial Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is insufficient but who later adequately supplements its consideration and disclosure of the environmental impact of its action.
The record includes more than 1,100 pages of prepared direct testimony, two rounds of questions by participants and several hundred pages of responses, 1,200 pages of oral hearings, participants’ rebuttal testimony, concluding statements, the 137-page report of the hearing board, further written statements from participants, and oral argument before the Commission. The Commission staff has prepared three studies of the environmental effects of the fuel cycle: Environmental Survey of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, WASH-1248 (Apr. 1974); Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing and Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle, NUREG-0116 (Supp. 1 to WASH-1248) (Oct. 1976) (hereinafter cited as NUREG-0116); and Public Comments and Task Force Responses Regarding the Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing and Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle, NUREG-0216 (Supp. 2 to WASH-1248) (Mar. 1977).
We are reviewing here only the Table S-3 rulemaking proceedings, and do not have before us an individual EIS that incorporates Table S-3. It is clear that the Statement of Consideration supporting the Table S-3 rule adequately discloses the environmental uncertainties considered by the Commission. However, Table S-3 itself refers to other documents but gives only brief descriptions of the environmental effects it encapsulates. There is some concern with an EIS that relies too heavily on separate documents rather than addressing the concerns directly. Although we do not decide whether they have binding effect on an independent agency such as the Commission, it is worth noting that the guidelines from the Council on Environmental Quality in effect during these proceedings required that “care should be taken to ensure that the statement remains an essentially self-contained instrument, capable of being understood by the reader without the need for undue cross reference.” 38 Fed. Reg. 20554 (1973), 40 CFR § 1500.8(b) (1974). The present regulations state that incorporation by reference is permissible if it will not “imped[e] agency and public review of the action. The incorporated material shall be cited in the statement and its content briefly described.” 40 CFR § 1502.21 (1982). The Court of Appeals noted that NEPA “requires an agency to do more than to scatter its evaluation of environmental damage among various public documents,” 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 34, 685 F. 2d, at 484, but declined to find that the incorporation of other documents by reference would invalidate an EIS that used Table S-3 to describe the environmental impact of the fuel cycle
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Michael Wayne Williams received a capital sentence for the murders of Morris Keller, Jr., and Keller’s wife, Mary Elizabeth. Petitioner later sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Accompanying his petition was a request for an evidentiary hearing on constitutional claims which, he alleged, he had been unable to develop in state-court proceedings. The question in this case is whether 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. Ill), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, bars the evidentiary hearing petitioner seeks. If petitioner “has failed to develop the factual basis of [his] claim[s] in State court proceedings,” his case is subject to § 2254(e)(2), and he may not receive a hearing because he concedes his inability to satisfy the statute’s further stringent conditions for excusing the deficiency.
I
On the evening of February 27,1993, Verena Lozano James dropped off petitioner and his friend Jeffrey Alan Cruse near a local store in a rural area of Cumberland County, Virginia. The pair planned to rob the store’s employees and customers using a.357 revolver petitioner had stolen in the course of a quadruple murder and robbery he had committed two months earlier. Finding the store closed, petitioner and Cruse walked to the Kellers’ home. Petitioner was familiar with the couple, having grown up down the road from where they lived. He told Cruse they would have “a couple thousand dollars.” App. 78. Cruse, who had been holding the.357, handed the gun to petitioner and knocked on the door. When Mr. Keller opened the door, petitioner pointed the gun at him as the two intruders forced their way inside. Petitioner and Cruse forced Mr. Keller to the kitchen, where they discovered Mrs. Keller. Petitioner ordered the captives to remove their clothing. While petitioner kept guard on the Kellers, Cruse searched the house for money and other valuables. He found a.38-caliber handgun and bullets. Upon Cruse’s return to the kitchen, petitioner had Cruse tie their captives with telephone cords. The Kellers were confined to separate closets while the intruders continued ransacking the house.
When they gathered all they wanted, petitioner and Cruse decided to rape Mrs. Keller. With Mrs. Keller pleading with them not to hurt her or her husband, petitioner raped her. Cruse did the same. Petitioner then ordered the Kellers to shower and dress and “take a walk” with him and Cruse. Id., at 97. As they were leaving, petitioner told Mrs. Keller he and Cruse were going to burn down the house. Mrs. Keller begged to be allowed to retrieve her marriage license, which she did, guarded by petitioner.
As the prosecution later presented the case, details of the murders were as follows. Petitioner, now carrying the.38, and Cruse, carrying the.357, took the Kellers to a thicket down a dirt road from the house. With petitioner standing behind Mr. Keller and Cruse behind Mrs. Keller, petitioner told Cruse, “We’ll shoot at the count of three.” Id., at 103. At the third count, petitioner shot Mr. Keller in the head, and Mr. Keller collapsed to the ground. Cruse did not shoot Mrs. Keller at the same moment. Saying “he didn’t want to leave no witnesses,” petitioner urged Cruse to shoot Mrs. Keller. Ibid. Cruse fired one shot into her head. Despite his wound, Mr. Keller stood up, but petitioner shot him a second time. To ensure the Kellers were dead, petitioner shot each of them two or three more times.
After returning to the house and loading the stolen property into the Kellers’ jeep, petitioner and Cruse set fire to the house and drove the jeep to Fredericksburg, Virginia, where they sold some of the property. They threw the remaining property and the.357 revolver into the Rappahan-nock River and set fire to the jeep.
Pursuing a lead from Verena James, the police interviewed Cruse about the fire at the Kellers’ home. Petitioner had fled to Florida. Cruse provided no useful information until the police discovered the bodies of the victims, at which point Cruse consulted counsel. In a plea bargain Cruse agreed to disclose the details of the crimes in exchange for the Commonwealth’s promise not to seek the death penalty against him. Cruse described the murders but made no mention of his own act of rape. When the Commonwealth discovered the omission, it revoked the plea agreement and charged Cruse with capital murder.
Petitioner was arrested and charged with robbery, abduction, rape, and the capital murders of the Kellers. At trial in January 1994, Cruse was the Commonwealth’s main witness. He recounted the murders as we have just described. Cruse testified petitioner raped Mrs. Keller, shot Mr. Keller at least twice, and shot Mrs. Keller several times after she had been felled by Cruse’s bullet. He also described petitioner as the mastermind of the murders. The circumstances of the first plea agreement between the Commonwealth and Cruse and its revocation were disclosed to the jury. Id., at 158-159. Testifying on his own behalf, petitioner admitted he was the first to shoot Mr. Keller and it was his idea to rob the store and set fire to the house. He denied, however, raping or shooting Mrs. Keller, and claimed to have shot Mr. Keller only once. Petitioner blamed Cruse for the remaining shots and disputed some other parts of Cruse’s testimony.
The jury convicted petitioner on all counts. After considering the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented during the sentencing phase, the jury found the aggravating circumstances of future dangerousness and vileness of the crimes and recommended a death sentence. The trial court imposed the recommended sentence. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentence, Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 450 S. E. 2d 365 (1994), and we denied certiorari, Williams v. Virginia, 515 U. S. 1161 (1995). In a separate proceeding, Cruse pleaded guilty to the capital murder of Mrs. Keller and the first-degree murder of Mr. Keller. After the prosecution asked the sentencing court to spare his life because of his testimony against petitioner, Cruse was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Petitioner filed a habeas petition in state court alleging, in relevant part, that the Commonwealth failed to disclose a second agreement it had reached with,Cruse after the first one was revoked. The new agreement, petitioner alleged, was an informal undertaking by the prosecution to recommend a life sentence in exchange for Cruse’s testimony. Finding no merit to petitioner’s claims, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the habeas petition^ and we again denied certiorari. Williams v. Netherland, 519 U. S. 877 (1996).
Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on November 20,1996. In addition to his claim regarding the alleged undisclosed agreement between the Commonwealth and Cruse, the petition raised three claims relevant to questions now before us. First, petitioner claimed the prosecution had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), in failing to disclose a report of a confidential pretrial psychiatric examination of Cruse. Second, petitioner alleged his trial was rendered unfair by the seating of a juror who at voir dire had not revealed possible sources of bias. Finally, petitioner alleged one of the prosecutors committed misconduct in failing to reveal his knowledge of the juror’s possible bias.
The District Court granted an evidentiary hearing on the undisclosed agreement and the allegations of juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct but denied a hearing on the psychiatric report. Before the evidentiary hearing could be held, the Commonwealth filed an application for an emergency stay and a petition for a writ of mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. The Commonwealth argued that petitioner’s evidentiary hearing was prohibited by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals granted the emergency stay and remanded for the District Court to apply the statute to petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the District Court vacated its order granting an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the petition, having determined petitioner could not satisfy §2254(e)(2)’s requirements.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It first considered petitioner’s argument that §2254(e)(2) did not apply to his case because he had been diligent in attempting to develop his claims in.state court. Citing its decision in Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F. Sd 331 (CA4), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1037 (1998), the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that § 2254(e)(2) would not apply if he had exercised diligence in state court. The court held, however, that petitioner had not been diligent and so had “failed to develop” in state court the factual bases of his Brady, juror bias, and prosecutorial misconduct claims. See 189 F. 3d 421, 426 (CA4 1999). The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner could not satisfy the statute’s conditions for excusing his failure to develop the facts and held him barred from receiving an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals ruled in the alternative that, even if § 2254(e)(2) did not apply, petitioner would be ineligible for an evidentiary hearing under the cause and prejudice standard of pre-AEDPA law. See id., at 428.
Addressing petitioner’s claim of an undisclosed informal agreement between the Commonwealth and Cruse, the Court of Appeals rejected it on the merits under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) and, as a result, did not consider whether § 2254(e)(2) applied. See 189 F. 3d, at 429.
On October 18,1999, petitioner filed an application for stay of execution and a petition for a writ of certiorari. On October 28, we stayed petitioner’s execution and granted certio-rari to decide whether § 2254(e)(2) precludes him from receiving an evidentiary hearing on his claims. See 528 U. S. 960 (1999). We now affirm in part and reverse in part.
II
A
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition after AEDPA’s effective date, so the statute applies to his case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 326-327 (1997). The Commonwealth argues AEDPA bars petitioner from receiving an evidentiary hearing on any claim whose factual basis was not developed in state court, absent narrow circumstances not applicable here. Petitioner did not develop, or raise, his claims of juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct, or the prosecution’s alleged Brady violation regarding Cruse’s psychiatric report until he filed his federal habeas petition. Petitioner explains he could not have developed the claims earlier because he was unaware, through no fault of his own, of the underlying facts. As a consequence, petitioner contends, AEDPA erects no barrier to an evidentiary hearing in federal court.
Section 2254(e)(2), the provision which controls whether petitioner may receive an evidentiary hearing in federal district court on the claims that were not developed in the Virginia courts, becomes the central point of our analysis. It provides as follows:
“If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that—
“(A) the claim relies on—
“(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
“(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
“(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
By the terms of its opening clause the statute applies only to prisoners who have “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” If the prisoner has failed to develop the facts, an evidentiary hearing earinot be granted unless the prisoner’s case meets the other conditions of § 2254(e)(2). Here, petitioner concedes his case does not comply with § 2254(e)(2)(B), see Brief for Petitioner 25, so he may receive an evidentiary hearing only if his claims fall outside the opening clause.
There was no hearing in state court on any of the claims for which petitioner now seeks an evidentiary hearing. That, says the Commonwealth, is the end of the matter. In its view petitioner, whether or not through his own fault or neglect, still “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” Petitioner, on the other hand, says the phrase "failed to develop” means lack of diligence in developing the claims, a defalcation he contends did not occur since he made adequate efforts during state-court proceedings to discover and present the underlying facts. The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner’s interpretation of § 2254(e)(2) but believed petitioner had not exercised enough diligence to avoid the statutory bar. See 189 F. 3d, at 426. We agree with petitioner and the Court of Appeals that “failed to develop” implies some lack of diligence; but, unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no lack of diligence on petitioner’s part with regard to two of his three claims.
B
We start, as always, with the language of the statute. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989). Section 2254(e)(2) begins with a conditional clause, “[i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” which directs attention to the prisoner’s efforts in state court. We ask first whether the factual basis was indeed developed in state court, a question susceptible, in the normal course, of a simple yes or no answer. Here the answer is no.
The Commonwealth would have the analysis begin and end there. Under its no-fault reading of the statute, if there is no factual development in the state court, the federal ha-beas court may not inquire into the reasons for the default when determining whether the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) applies. We do not agree with the Commonwealth’s interpretation of the word “failed.”
We do not deny “fail” is sometimes used in a neutral way, not importing fault or want of diligence. So the phrase ‘We fail to understand his argument” can mean simply ‘We cannot understand his argument.” This is not the sense in which the word “failed” is used here, however.
We give the words of a statute their “ ‘ordinary, contempo^ rary, common meaning,’ ” absent an indication Congress intended them to bear some different import. Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S. 202, 207 (1997) (quoting Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380 (1993)). See also Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 141 (1995). In its customary and preferred sense, “fail” connotes some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person who has failed to do something. See, e. g., Webster’s New International Dictionary 910 (2d ed. 1939) (defining “fail” as “to be wanting; to fall short; to be or become deficient in any measure or degree,” and “failure” as “a falling short,” “a deficiency or lack,” and an “[o]mission to perform”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 814 (3d ed. 1993) (“to leave some possible or expected action unperformed or some condition un-achieved”).' See also Black’s Law Dictionary 594 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “fail” as “[f]ault, negligence, or refusal”). To say a person has failed in a duty implies he did not take the necessary steps to fulfill it. He is, as a consequence, at fault and bears responsibility for the failure. In this sense, a person is not at fault when his diligent efforts to perform an act are thwarted, for example, by the conduct of another or by happenstance. Fault lies, in those circumstances, either with the person who interfered with the accomplishment of the act or with no one at all. We conclude Congress used the word “failed” in the sense just described. Had Congress intended a no-fault standard, it would have had no difficulty in making its intent plain. It would have had to do no more than use, in lieu of the phrase “has failed to,” the phrase “did not.”
Under the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2), a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel. In this we agree with the Court of Appeals and with all other courts of appeals which have addressed the issue. See, e. g., Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F. 3d 1075, 1078-1079 (CA9 1999); Miller v. Champion, 161 F 3d 1249, 1253 (CA10 1998); Cardwell, 152 F 3d, at 337; McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F 3d 1056, 1059 (CA5 1998); Burris v. Parke, 116 F 3d 256, 258 (CA7 1997); Love v. Morton, 112 F 3d 131, 136 (CA3 1997).
Our interpretation of § 2254(e)(2)’s opening clause has support in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1 (1992), a case decided four years before AEDPA’s enactment. In Keeney, a prisoner with little knowledge of English sought an eviden-tiary hearing in federal court, alleging his nolo contendere plea to a manslaughter charge was not knowing and voluntary because of inaccuracies in the translation of the plea proceedings. The prisoner had not developed the facts of his claim in state collateral proceedings, an omission caused by the negligence of his state postconviction counsel. See id., at 4, 8-9. The Court characterized this as the “prisoner’s failure to develop material facts in state court.” Id., at 8. We required the prisoner to demonstrate cause and prejudice excusing the default before he could receive a hearing on his claim, ibid., unless the prisoner could “show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing,” id., at 12.
Section 2254(e)(2)’s initial inquiry into whether “the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings” echoes Keeney’s language regarding “the state prisoner’s failure to develop material facts in state court.” In Keeney, the Court borrowed the cause and prejudice standard applied to procedurally defaulted claims, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87-88 (1977), deciding there was no reason “to distinguish between failing to properly assert a federal claim in state court and failing in state court to properly develop such a claim.” Keeney, supra, at 8. As is evident from the similarity between the Court’s phrasing in Keeney and the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2), Congress intended to preserve at least one aspect of Keeney’s, holding: prisoners who are at fault for the deficiency in the state-court record must satisfy a heightened standard to obtain an evidentiary hearing. To be sure, in requiring that prisoners who have not been diligent satisfy § 2254(e)(2)’s provisions rather than show cause and prejudice, and in eliminating a freestanding “miscarriage of justice” exception, Congress raised the bar Keeney imposed on prisoners who were not diligent in state-court proceedings. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s position, however, there is no basis in the text of § 2254(e)(2) to believe Congress used “fail” in a different sense than the Court did in Keeney or otherwise intended the statute’s further, more stringent requirements to control the availability of an evidentiary hearing in a broader class of cases than were covered by Keeney’s cause and prejudice standard.
In sum, the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney's threshold standard of diligence, so that prisoners who would have had to satisfy Keeney’s test for excusing the deficiency in the state-court record prior to AEDPA are now controlled by § 2254(e)(2). When the words of the Court are used in a later statute governing the same subject matter, it is respectful of Congress and of the Court’s own processes to give the words the same meaning in the absence of specific direction to the contrary. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978) (“[WJhere... Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute”). See also Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 562 (1991).
Interpreting § 2254(e)(2) so that “failed” requires lack.of diligence or some other fault avoids putting it in needless tension with § 2254(d). A prisoner who developed his claim in state court and can prove the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” is not barred from obtaining relief by § 2254(d)(1). See Williams v. Taylor, ante, at 412-413 (majority opinion). If the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) covers a request for an evidentiary hearing on a claim which was pursued with diligence but remained undeveloped in state court because, for instance, the prosecution concealed the facts, a prisoner lacking clear and convincing evidence of innocence could be barred from a hearing on the claim even if he could satisfy § 2254(d). See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). The “failed to develop” clause does not bear this harsh reading, which would attribute to Congress a purpose or design to bar evidentiary hearings for diligent prisoners with meritorious claims just because the prosecution’s conduct went undetected in state court. We see no indication that Congress by this language intended to remove the distinction between a prisoner who is at fault and one who is not.
The Commonwealth argues a reading of “failed to develop” premised on fault empties § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) of its meaning. To treat the prisoner’s lack of diligence in state court as a prerequisite for application of § 2254(e)(2), the Commonwealth contends, renders a nullity of the statute’s own diligence provision requiring the prisoner to show “a factual predicate [of his claim] could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2254(e)(2) (A)(ii). We disagree.
The Commonwealth misconceives the inquiry mandated by the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2). The question is not whether the facts could have been discovered but instead whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts. The purpose of the fault component of “failed” is to ensure the prisoner undertakes his own diligent search for evidence. Diligence for purposes of the opening clause depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court; it does not depend, as the Commonwealth would have it, upon whether those efforts could have been successful. Though lack of diligence will not bar an evidentiary hearing if efforts to discover the facts would have been in vain, see § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), and there is a convincing claim of innocence, see § 2254(e)(2)(B), only a prisoner who has neglected his rights in state court need satisfy these conditions. The statute’s later reference to diligence pertains to cases in which the facts could not have been discovered, whether there was diligence or not. In this important respect § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) bears a close resemblance to (e)(2)(A)(i), which applies to a new rule that was not available at the time of the earlier proceedings. Cf. Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 255 (2000) (“[W]ords and people are known by their companions”). Cf. also United States v. Locke, ante, at 105. In these two parallel provisions Congress has given prisoners who fall within §2254(e)(2)’s opening clause an opportunity to obtain an evidentiary hearing where the legal or factual basis of the claims did not exist at the time of state-court proceedings.
We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth’s further argument that anything less than a no-fault understanding of the opening clause is contrary to AEDPA’s purpose to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. There is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance these doctrines. Federal habeas corpus principles must inform and shape the historic and still vital relation of mutual respect and common purpose existing between the States and the federal courts. In keeping this delicate balance we have been careful to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the States’ interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings. See, e. g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 726 (1991) (“This is a case about federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts owe the States and the States’ procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas corpus”); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 493 (1991) (“[T]he doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ are both designed to lessen the injury to a State that results through reexamination of a state conviction on a ground that the State did not have the opportunity to address at a prior, appropriate time; and both doctrines seek to vindicate the State’s interest in the finality of its criminal judgments”).
It is consistent with these principles to give effect to Congress’ intent to avoid unneeded evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus, while recognizing the statute does not equate prisoners who exercise diligence in pursuing their claims with those who do not. Principles of exhaustion are premised upon recognition by Congress and the Court that state judiciaries have the duty and competence to vindicate rights secured by the Constitution in state criminal proceedings. Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law. “Comity... dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 844 (1999). For state courts to have their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error. If the prisoner fails to do so, himself or herself contributing to the absence of a full and fair adjudication in state court, § 2254(e)(2) prohibits an evidentiary hearing to develop the relevant claims in federal court, unless the statute’s other stringent requirements are met. Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings. Yet comity is not served by saying a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim” where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2).
III
Now we apply the statutory test. If there has been no lack of diligence at the relevant stages in the state proceedings, the prisoner has not “failed to develop” the facts under § 2254(e)(2)’s opening clause, and he will be excused from showing compliance with the balance of the subsection’s requirements. We find lack of diligence as to one of the three claims but not as to the other two.
A
Petitioner did not exercise the diligence required to preserve the claim that nondisclosure of Cruse’s psychiatric report was in contravention of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). The report concluded Cruse “ha[d] little recollection of the [murders of the Kellers], other than vague memories, as he was intoxicated with alcohol and marijuana at the time.” App. 495. The report had been prepared in September 1993, before petitioner was tried; yet it was not mentioned by petitioner until he filed his federal habeas petition and attached a copy of the report. Petitioner explained that an investigator for his federal habeas counsel discovered the report in Cruse’s court file but state habeas counsel had not seen it when he had reviewed the same file. State habeas counsel.averred as follows:
“Prior to filing [petitioner’s] habeas corpus petition with the Virginia Supreme Court, I reviewed the Cumberland County court files of [petitioner] and of his co-defendant, Jeffrey Cruse.... I have reviewed the attached psychiatric evaluation of Jeffrey Cruse.... I have no recollection of seeing this report in Mr. Cruse’s court file when I examined the file. Given the contents of the report, I am confident that I would remember it.” Id., at 625-626.
The trial court was not satisfied with this explanation for the late discovery. Nor are we.
There are repeated references to a “psychiatric” or “mental health” report in a transcript of Cruse’s sentencing proceeding, a copy of which petitioner’s own state habeas counsel attached to the state habeas petition he filed with the Virginia Supreme Court. The transcript reveals that Cruse’s attorney described the report with details that should have alerted counsel to a possible Brady claim. As Cruse’s attorney said:
“The psychiatric report... point[s] out that [Cruse] is significantly depressed. He suffered from post traumatic stress. His symptoms include nightmares, sleeplessness, sobbing, reddening of the face, severe depression, flash hacks.... [T]he psychological report states he is overwhelmed by feelings of gnilt and shame in his actions. He is numb. He is trying to suppress his feelings, but when he has feelings, there is only pain and sadness.” App. 424.
The description accords with the contents of the psychiatric report, which diagnosed Cruse as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder:
“[Cruse] has recurrent nightmares and visualizes the face of the woman that he killed. When attempting to describe this nightmare, he breaks openly into tears and his face reddens.... He continues to feel worthless as a person.... He has no hope for his future and has been thinking of suicide constantly.... He does describe inability to sleep, often tossing and turning, waking up, and feeling fatigued during the day.... He described neurovegetative symptoms of major depression and post-traumatic nightmares, recurrent in nature, of the [murders].” Id., at 495-499.
The transcript put petitioner’s state habeas counsel on notice of the report’s existence and possible materiality. The sole indication that counsel made some effort to investigate the report is an October 30, 1995, letter to the prosecutor in which counsel requested “[a]ll reports of physical and mental examinations, scientific tests, or experiments conducted in connection with the investigation of the offense, including but not limited to:... [a]ll psychological test or polygraph examinations performed upon any prosecution witness and all documents referring or relating to such tests....” Id., at 346-347. After the prosecution declined the requests absent a court order, id., at 353, it appears counsel made no farther efforts to find the specific report mentioned by Cruse’s attorney. Given knowledge of the report’s existence and potential importance, a diligent attorney would have done more. Counsel’s failure to investigate these references in anything but a cursory manner triggers the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2).
As we hold there was a failure to develop the factual basis of this Brady claim in state court, we must determine if the requirements in the balance of § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied so that petitioner’s failure is excused. Subparagraph (B) of § 2254(e)(2) conditions a hearing upon a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner guilty of capital murder but for the alleged constitutional error. Petitioner concedes he cannot make this showing, see Brief for Petitioner 25, and the case has been presented to us on that premise. For these reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment barring an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
B
We conclude petitioner has met the burden of showing he was diligent in efforts to develop the facts supporting his juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct claims in collateral proceedings before the Virginia Supreme Court.
Petitioner’s claims are based on two of the questions posed to the jurors by the trial judge at voir dire. First, the judge asked prospective jurors, “Axe any of you related to the following people who may be called as’witnesses?” Then he read the jurors a list of names, one of which was “Deputy Sheriff Claude Meinhard.” Bonnie Stinnett, who would later become the jury foreperson, had divorced Meinhard in 1979, after a 17-year marriage with four children. Stinnett remained silent, indicating the answer was “no.” Meinhard, as the officer who investigated the crime scene and interrogated Cruse, would later become the prosecution’s lead-off witness at trial.
After reading the names of the attorneys involved in the case, including one of the prosecutors, Robert Woodson, Jr., the judge asked, “Have you or any member of your immediate family ever been represented by any of the aforementioned attorneys?” Stinnett again said nothing, despite the fact Woodson had represented her during her divorce from Meinhard. App. 483, 485.
In an affidavit she provided in the federal habeas proceedings, Stinnett claimed “[she] did not respond to the judge’s [first] question because [she] did not consider [herself] ‘related’ to Claude Meinhard in 1994
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Kagan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A federal statute, § 3599 of Title 18, entitles indigent defendants to the appointment of counsel in capital cases, including habeas corpus proceedings. The statute contemplates that appointed counsel may be “replaced . . . upon motion of the defendant,” § 3599(e), but it does not specify the standard that district courts should use in evaluating those motions. We hold that courts should employ the same “interests of justice” standard that they apply in non-capital cases under a related statute, § 3006A of Title 18. We also hold that the District Court here did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent Kenneth Clair’s motion to change counsel.
I
This case arises from the murder of Linda Rodgers in 1984. Rodgers resided at the home of Kai Henriksen and Margaret Hessling in Santa Ana, California. Clair was a squatter in a vacant house next door. About a week prior to the murder, police officers arrested Clair for burglarizing the Henriksen-Hessling home, relying on information Henriksen had provided. On the night the police released Clair from custody, Hessling returned from an evening out to find Rodgers’ dead body in the master bedroom, naked from the waist down and beaten, stabbed, and strangled. Some jewelry and household items were missing from the house. See People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629, 644-647, 828 P. 2d 705, 713-714 (1992); App. to Pet. for Cert. 23-24.
The district attorney charged Clair with Rodgers’ murder and sought the death penalty. No forensic evidence linked Clair to the crime; instead, the main evidence against Clair came from his former girlfriend, Pauline Flores. Although she later recanted her testimony, see App. 36-42, Flores stated at trial that she and Clair were walking in the neighborhood on the night of the murder and split up near the Henriksen-Hessling house. When they reunited about an hour later, Flores recounted, Clair was carrying jewelry and other items and had blood on his right hand. According to Flores, Clair explained to her that he had “just finished beating up a woman.” Clair, 2 Cal. 4th, at 647, 828 P. 2d, at 714. The prosecution then introduced a tape recording of a talk between Flores and Clair several months after the murder, which Flores had made in cooperation with the police. On that tape, Clair at one point denied committing the murder, but also made several inculpatory statements. For example, when Flores told Clair that she had seen blood on him, he replied “Ain’t on me no more” and “They can’t prove nothing.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in response to her continued probing, Clair explained “[W]hat you fail to realize, how . . . they gonna prove I was there? . . . There ain’t no . . . fingerprints, ain’t no . . . body seen me go in there and leave out there.” Id., at 53-54 (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury convicted Clair and sentenced him to death. The California Supreme Court upheld the verdict, and this Court denied review, Clair v. California, 506 U. S. 1063 (1993).
Clair commenced federal habeas proceedings by filing a request for appointment of counsel, which the District Court granted under §3599. Clair and his counsel filed an initial petition for habeas relief in 1994 and, after exhausting state remedies, an amended petition the following year. The petition alleged more than 40 claims, involving such matters as jury selection and composition, sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, nondisclosure of exculpatory materials relating to state witnesses, and ineffectiveness of trial counsel. In the late 1990⅛, two associates from the firm representing Clair took jobs at the Office of the Federal Public Defender (FPD), and the court substituted that office as counsel of record. The court held an evidentiary hearing on Clair’s habeas petition in August 2004, and the parties submitted post-hearing briefs by February 2005. The court subsequently informed the parties that it viewed the briefing “to be complete and d[id] not wish to receive any additional material” about the petition. App. 3-4.
On March 16, 2005, Clair sent a letter to the court stating that the FPD attorneys “no longer . .. ha[d] [his] best interest at hand” and that he did not want them to continue to represent him. Id., at 24; see id., at 18-25. Clair alleged that the lawyers had repeatedly dismissed his efforts to participate in his own defense. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Clair wrote, he had become so frustrated with the attorneys that he enlisted a private detective to look into his case. But the lawyers, Clair charged, refused to cooperate with the investigator; they were seeking only to overturn his death sentence, rather than to prove his innocence. As a result, Clair felt that he and his counsel were not “on the same team.” Id., at 23.
The District Court responded by asking both parties to address Clair’s motion to substitute counsel. See id., at 18. The State noted that “[w]hat the trial court does with respect to appointing counsel is within its discretion, providing the interests of justice are served.” Id., at 29. The State further advised the court that “nothing in [Clair’s] letter required] a change” of counsel because the FPD lawyers had provided appropriate representation and substitution would delay the case. Ibid. Clair replied to the court’s request through his FPD attorneys on April 26, 2005. Their letter stated: “After meeting with Mr. Clair, counsel understands that Mr. Clair wants the [FPD] to continue to serve as his counsel in this case at this time.” Id., at 27. On the basis of that representation, the court determined that it would “take no further action on the matter at this time.” Id., at 33.
But the issue resurfaced just six weeks after the court’s decision. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a second letter to the court asking for substitution of counsel. That letter again asserted a “total break down of communication” between Clair and the FPD; according to Clair, he was “no longer able to trust anybody within that office.” Id., at 62-63. In explaining the source of the problem, Clair reiterated each of the points made in his prior complaint. And then he added one more. Clair recounted that his private investigator had recently learned that the police and district attorney’s office were in possession of fingerprints and other physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been fully tested. The FPD lawyers, Clair asserted, were doing nothing to analyze this evidence or otherwise follow up on its discovery. Clair attributed this failure, too, to the FPD’s decision to focus on his sentence, rather than on questions of guilt.
Two weeks later, the District Court denied Clair’s renewed request for substitution without further inquiry. The court stated: “It does not appear to the Court that a change of counsel is appropriate. It appears that [Clair’s] counsel is doing a proper job. No conflict of interest or inadequacy of counsel is shown.” Id., at 61. On the same day, the court denied Clair’s habeas petition in a detailed opinion. Clair v. Brown, Case No. CV 93-1133 GLT (CD Cal., June 30, 2005), App. to Pet. for Cert. 20-91.
Clair sought review of his substitution motion pro se, while the FPD filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his habeas petition. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit instructed the FPD to address whether substitution of counsel was now warranted, and in October 2005, the FPD informed the court that “the attorney-client relationship ha[d] broken down to such an extent that substitution of counsel [would be] appropriate.” Attorney for Appellant’s Response to Court’s Sept. 15, 2005 Order, in No. 05-99005 (CA9), Record, Doc. 9, p. 1. The State did not comment or object, and the Court of Appeals provided Clair with a new lawyer going forward. Clair then asked the District Court to vacate the denial of his habeas petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that he should be allowed to explore the significance of the new physical evidence for his case. The District Court (with a new judge assigned, because the judge previously handling the ease had retired) rejected that request on the ground that the new evidence did not pertain to any of the claims presented in Clair’s habeas petition. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 9-10. Clair appealed that decision as well.
After consolidating Clair’s appeals, the Ninth Circuit vacated the trial court’s denial of both Clair’s request for new counsel and his habeas petition. See Clair v. Ayers, 403 Fed. Appx. 276 (2010). The Court of Appeals’ opinion focused on Clair’s substitution motion. Holding that the “interests of justice” standard should apply to that motion, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to inquire into the complaints in Clair’s second letter. See id., at 278. The Court of Appeals then considered how to remedy that error, given that Clair had received new counsel while on appeal. It decided that “the most reasonable solution” was to “treat Clair’s current counsel as if he were the counsel who might have been appointed” in June 2005, and to allow him to make whatever submissions he would have made then, including a motion to amend Clair’s habeas petition in light of new evidence. Id., at 279.
We granted certiorari to review this judgment, 564 U. S. 1036 (2011), and now reverse.
HH
We first consider the standard that district courts should use to adjudicate federal habeas petitioners’ motions to substitute counsel in capital cases. The question arises because the relevant statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3599, contains a notable gap. Section 3599 first guarantees that indigent defendants in federal capital cases will receive the assistance of counsel, from pretrial proceedings through stay applications. See §§ 3599(a)(1), (a)(2), (e). It next grants a corresponding right to people like Clair who seek federal habeas relief from a state death sentence, for all post-conviction proceedings and related activities. See §§ 3599(a)(2), (e); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849, 854-855 (1994); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U. S. 180, 183-185 (2009). And the statute contemplates that both sets of litigants may sometimes substitute counsel; it notes that an attorney appointed under the section may be “replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own motion or upon motion of the defendant.” § 3599(e). But here lies the rub: The statute fails to specify how a court should decide such a motion. Section 3599 says not a word about the standard a court should apply when addressing a request for a new lawyer.
The parties offer us two alternative ways to fill this statutory hole. Clair argues, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that district courts should decide substitution motions brought under § 3599 “in the interests of justice.” That standard derives from 18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which governs the appointment and substitution of counsel in federal wow-capital litigation. By contrast, the State contends that district courts may replace an appointed lawyer under § 3599 only when the defendant has suffered an “actual or constructive denial” of counsel. Brief for Petitioner 33. That denial occurs, the State asserts, in just three situations: when the lawyer lacks the qualifications necessary for appointment under the statute; when he has a “disabling conflict of interest”; or when he has “completely abandoned” the client. Id., at 34. On this matter, we think Clair, not the State, gets it right.
A trip back in time begins to show why. Prior to 1988, §3006A governed the appointment of counsel in all federal criminal cases and habeas litigation, regardless whether the matter involved a capital or a non-capital offense. That section provided counsel as a matter of right to most indigent criminal defendants, from pretrial proceedings through appeal. See §§3006A(a)(l), (c) (1982 ed.). In addition, the statute authorized courts to appoint counsel for federal ha-beas petitioners when “the interests of justice so require[d],” §3006A(g); and under that provision, courts almost always appointed counsel to represent petitioners convicted of capital offenses, see Ruthenbeck, Dueling With Death in Federal Courts, 4 ABA Crim. Justice, No. 3, pp. 2, 42 (Fall 1989). In all cases in which a court had appointed counsel, §3006A further provided (as it continues to do) that substitution motions should be decided “in the interests of justice.” § 3006A(c). So in those days, a court would have used that standard to evaluate a request like Clair’s.
In 1988, Congress enacted the legislation now known as § 3599 to govern appointment of counsel in capital cases, thus displacing § 3006A for persons facing execution (but retaining that section for all others). See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 102 Stat. 4393-4394, 21 U. S. C. §§848(q)(4)-(10) (1988 ed.) (recodified at 18 U. S. C. §3599 (2006 ed. and Supp. IV)). The new statute grants federal capital defendants and capital habeas petitioners enhanced rights of representation, in light of what it calls “the seriousness of the possible penalty and . . . the unique and complex nature of the litigation.” § 3599(d) (2006 ed.). Habeas petitioners facing execution now receive counsel as a matter of right, not an exercise of the court’s discretion. See § 3599(a)(2). And the statute aims in multiple ways to improve the quality of representation afforded to capital petitioners and defendants alike. Section 3599 requires lawyers in capital cases to have more legal experience than §3006A demands. Compare §§ 3599(b)-(d) with §3006A(b). Similarly, §3599 authorizes higher rates of compensation, in part to attract better counsel. Compare § 3599(g)(1) with §3006A(d) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV). And § 3599 provides more money for investigative and expert services. Compare §§ 3599(f) (2006 ed.), (g)(2) (2006 ed., Supp. IV), with §3006A(e) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV). As we have previously noted, those measures “refiec[t] a determination that quality legal representation is necessary” in all capital proceedings to foster “fundamental fairness in the imposition of the death penalty.” McFarland, 512 U. S., at 855, 859.
That understanding of § 3599⅛ terms and origins goes far toward resolving the parties’ dispute over what standard should apply. We know that before § 3599’s passage, courts used an “interests of justice” standard to decide substitution motions in all cases — and that today, they continue to do so in all non-capital proceedings. We know, too, that in spinning off § 3599, Congress enacted a set of reforms to improve the quality of lawyering in capital litigation. With all those measures pointing in one direction, we cannot conclude that Congress silently prescribed a substitution standard that would head the opposite way. Adopting a more stringent test than § 3006A’s would deprive capital defendants of a tool they formerly had, and defendants facing lesser penalties still have, to handle serious representational problems. That result clashes with everything else §3599 does. By contrast, utilizing § 3006A’s standard comports with the myriad ways that § 3599 seeks to promote effective representation for persons threatened with capital punishment.
The dearth of support for the State’s alternative standard reinforces the case for borrowing from § 3006A. Recall that the State thinks substitution proper “only when . . . counsel is completely denied” — which, the State says, occurs when counsel lacks the requisite experience; “actively represents conflicting interests”; or has “total[ly] desert[ed]” the client. Brief for Petitioner 15, 35, 38. As the State acknowledges, this test comes from . . . well, from nowhere. The State conceded during argument that Congress has not considered (much less adopted) the standard in any context; neither has a federal court used it in any case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Indeed, the standard is new to the State’s own attorneys. As noted earlier, when Clair first requested a change of counsel, the State responded that substitution is a “matter ... of trial court discretion,” based on “the interests of justice.” App. 29; see supra, at 654. Only later did the State devise its present proposal. Inventiveness is often an admirable quality, but here we think the State overdoes it. To be sure, we must infer a substitution standard for §3599; in that sense, we are writing on a blank slate. But in undertaking that task, we prefer to copy something familiar than concoct something novel. That enables courts to rely on experience and precedent, with a standard already known to work effectively.
Still worse, the State’s proposed test guts §3599’s provision for substitution motions. See § 3599(e) (2006 ed.) (appointed counsel may be “replaced . . . upon motion of the defendant”). According to the State, a court may not change counsel under § 3599 even if the attorney-client relationship has broken down, so long as the lawyer has the required qualifications and is “act[ing] as an advocate.” Brief for Petitioner 35. And that is so, continues the State, even when substitution will not cause delay or other prejudice— because again, the defendant retains a functioning lawyer. See id., at 34. That approach, as already noted, undermines Congress’s efforts in § 3599 to enhance representation in capital cases. See supra, at 659-660. And beyond that, it renders § 3599’s substitution provision superfluous. Even in the absence of that provision, a court would have to ensure that the defendant’s statutory right to counsel was satisfied throughout the litigation; for example, the court would have to appoint new counsel if the first lawyer developed a conflict with or abandoned the client. So by confining substitution to cases in which the defendant has no counsel at all, the State’s proposal effectively deletes § 3599’s substitution clause.
The State counters that only its approach comports with “this Court’s long-established jurisprudence that habeas prisoners, including capital prisoners,” have no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Brief for Petitioner 18; see Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 10, 12 (1989) (plurality opinion); id., at 14-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 755 (1991) (reserving question of whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel when a habeas proceeding provides the first opportunity to raise a claim). But we do not understand the State’s basis for linking use of the “interests of justice” standard to cases in which an individual has a Sixth Amendment right. A statute need not draw the same lines as the Constitution, and neither § 3006A nor § 3599 does so in addressing the substitution of counsel. Section 3006A applies the “interests of justice” standard to substitution motions even when the Sixth Amendment does not require representation; that is presumptively so, for example, when a court provides counsel to a non-capital habeas petitioner. See §§ 3006A(a)(2)(B), (c). And whatever standard we adopt for §3599 will likewise apply both to litigants who have and to litigants who lack a Sixth Amendment right, because the section offers counsel on the same terms to capital defendants and habeas petitioners. In providing statutory rights to counsel, Congress declined to track the Sixth Amendment; accordingly, the scope of that Amendment cannot answer the statutory question presented here.
The State’s stronger argument relates to delay in capital proceedings. Under the “interests of justice” standard, the State contends, substitution motions will become a mechanism to defer enforcement of a death sentence, contrary to historic restrictions on “abuse of the writ” and to the goals of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See Brief for Petitioner 19-22. But this argument, like the last, forgets that § 3599 reaches not just habeas petitioners but also criminal defendants, who have not been convicted or sentenced and therefore have no incentive to delay. Moreover, the State’s claim misjudges the capacity of the “interests of justice” standard to deal with such issues. Protecting against abusive delay is an interest of justice. Because that is so, courts addressing substitution motions in both capital and non-capital cases routinely consider issues of timeliness. See, e. g., Hunter v. Delo, 62 F. 3d 271, 274 (CA8 1995) (citing “the need to thwart abusive delay” in affirming the denial of a habeas petitioner's substitution motion); United States v. White, 451 F. 2d 1225,1226 (CA6 1971) (per curiam) (approving a District Court’s refusal to change counsel under § 3006A(e) “on the morning of the trial”). Indeed, we will do so, just paragraphs from here, in this very case. See infra, at 665. The standard we adopt thus takes account of, rather than ignores or opposes, the State’s interest in avoiding undue delay.
( — l f — 1 ( — I
The remaining question is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Clair’s second request for néw counsel under §3599’s “interests of justice” standard. We do not think the court did so, although the court’s failure to make any inquiry into Clair’s allegations makes this decision harder than necessary.
As its name betrays, the “interests of justice” standard contemplates a peculiarly context-specific inquiry. So we doubt that any attempt to provide a general definition of the standard would prove helpful. In reviewing substitution motions, the courts of appeals have pointed to several relevant considerations. Those factors may vary a bit from circuit to circuit, but generally include: the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint, including the extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication between lawyer and client (and the client’s own responsibility, if any, for that conflict). See, e.g., United States v. Prime, 431 F. 3d 1147, 1154 (CA9 2005); United States v. Doe, 272 F. 3d 116, 122-123 (CA2 2001); Hunter, 62 F. 3d, at 274; United States v. Welty, 674 F. 2d 185,188 (CA3 1982). Because a trial court’s decision on substitution is so fact-specific, it deserves deference; a reviewing court may overturn it only for an abuse of discretion.
The District Court here received Clair’s second substitution motion on the eve of deciding his 10-year-old habeas petition. Recall that three months earlier, following an evi-dentiary hearing and post-hearing briefing, Clair had written the court to complain about his attorneys. In that first letter, Clair accused his lawyers of refusing to cooperate with a private detective and, more generally, of forgoing efforts to prove his innocence. After making proper inquiry, the court learned that Clair and his attorneys had worked through their dispute and Clair no longer wanted to substitute counsel. The court thus turned its attention once again to ruling on Clair’s habeas petition — only to receive another letter requesting a change in representation.
If that second letter had merely recapitulated the charges in the first, this case would be relatively simple. Even then, the court might have done well to make further inquiry of Clair and his counsel. As all Circuits agree, courts cannot properly resolve substitution motions without probing why a defendant wants a new lawyer. See, e. g., United States v. lies, 906 F. 2d 1122, 1130 (CA6 1990) (“It is hornbook law that ‘[w]hen an indigent defendant makes a timely and good faith motion requesting that appointed counsel be discharged and new counsel appointed, the trial court clearly has a responsibility to determine the reasons for defendant’s dissatisfaction . . . ’ ” (quoting 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.4, p. 36 (1984))). Moreover, an on-the-record inquiry into the defendant’s allegations “permit[s] meaningful appellate review” of a trial court’s exercise of discretion. United States v. Taylor, 487 U. S. 326, 336-337 (1988). But here the court had inquired, just a short time earlier, into Clair’s relationship with his lawyers. The court knew that Clair had responded to that inquiry by dropping his initial complaints. And the court had reason to think, based on 10 years of handling the case, that those charges lacked merit: Perhaps most important, the court knew that the lawyers had raised many challenges not just to Clair’s sentence, but to his conviction, including to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. See, e. g., App. to Pet. for Cert. 27-69. Especially at this stage of the litigation, those factors would have provided ample basis to reject a simple reprise of Clair’s allegations.
What complicates this case is that in his second letter, Clair added a new and significant charge of attorney error. Beyond asserting generally that his lawyers were not trying to prove his innocence, Clair now alleged that counsel had refused to investigate particular, newly located physical evidence. That evidence, according to Clair, might have shown that the police had suppressed Brady material, that his trial counsel had been ineffective in investigating the murder, or that he had not committed the offense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45-46. Especially in a case lacking physical evidence, built in part on since-recanted witness testimony, those possibilities cannot be blithely dismissed. In the mine run of circumstances, Clair’s new charge would have required the court to make further inquiry before ruling on his motion for a new attorney.
But here, the timing of that motion precludes a holding that the District Court abused its discretion. The court received Clair’s second letter while putting the finishing touches on its denial of his habeas petition. (That lengthy decision issued just two weeks later.) After many years of litigation, an evidentiary hearing, and substantial post-hearing briefing, the court had instructed the parties that it would accept no further submissions. See App. 3-4; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. The case was all over but the deciding; counsel, whether old or new, could do nothing more in the trial court proceedings. At that point and in that forum, Clair’s conflict with his lawyers no longer mattered.
Clair, to be sure, wanted to press his case further in the District Court. He desired a new lawyer, after examining the physical evidence, to make whatever claims followed from it. But, notably, all of those claims would have been new; as the District Court later found in ruling on Clair’s Rule 60(b) motion, the physical evidence did not relate to any of the claims Clair had previously made in his habeas petition. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 9-10. A substitute lawyer thus would have had to seek an amendment of that petition, as well as an evidentiary hearing or, more likely, a stay to allow exhaustion of remedies in state court. See 403 Fed. Appx., at 279. The District Court could properly have rejected that motion, consistent with its order precluding further submissions (effectively remitting Clair to state court to pursue the matter). See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U. S. 644, 663 (2005). And if that is so, the court also acted within its discretion in denying Clair’s request to substitute counsel, even without the usually appropriate inquiry. The court was not required to appoint a new lawyer just so Clair could file a futile motion. We accordingly find that the Court of Appeals erred in overturning the District Court’s decision.
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
While litigating his Rule 60(b) motion in the District Court, Clair also pursued discovery in the California state courts relating to the newly found physical evidence. On the basis of material he obtained, Clair filed another petition for state habeas relief, alleging (among other claims) actual innocence and improper suppression of exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). The California Supreme Court summarily denied that petition. See In re Clair, No. S169188 (Aug. 24, 2011).
Section 3599(e) provides in full:
“Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall also represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant.”
The State also makes a more specific argument based on AEDPA, see Brief for Petitioner 26-29, but we think it is not well taken. The State notes that the “interests of justice” standard enables a court, when ruling on a substitution motion, to take account of a lawyer’s effectiveness. That consideration, according to the State, conflicts with AEDPA’s injunction that “[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a [habeas] proceeding arising under section 2254.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(i); see § 2261(e) (using similar language). But most naturally read, § 2254(i) prohibits a court from granting substantive habeas relief on the basis of a lawyer’s ineffectiveness in post-conviction proceedings, not from substituting counsel on that ground. Cf. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 650-651 (2010) (holding that §2254(i) does not preclude equitable tolling of a statute of limitations based on attorney misconduct in habeas proceedings). Indeed, if the State were right, we would also have to find that AEDPA silently repealed § 3006A’s instruction to courts to apply the “interests of justice” standard in non-capital habeas cases. We see nothing to suggest that Congress had that result in mind.
We note as well that the Court of Appeals ordered the wrong remedy even assuming the District Court had abused its discretion in denying Clair’s substitution motion without inquiry. The way to cure that error would have been to remand to the District Court to decide whether substitution was appropriate at the time of Clair’s letter. Unless that court determined that counsel should have been changed, the Court of Appeals had no basis for vacating the denial of Clair’s habeas petition.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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A
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390, 393 (1932), the Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, held that a logical inconsistency between a guilty verdict and a verdict of acquittal does not impugn the validity of either verdict. The question presented in this case is whether an apparent inconsistency between a jury’s verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a verdict on other counts affects the preclusive force of the acquittals under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We hold that it does not.
I
In 1997, Enron Corporation (Enron) acquired a telecommunications business that it expanded and ultimately renamed Enron Broadband Services (EBS). Petitioner F. Scott Yeager served as Senior Vice President of Strategic Development for EBS from October 1, 1998, until his employment was terminated a few months before Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001. During his tenure, petitioner played an active role in EBS’s attempt to develop a nationwide fiber-optic telecommunications system called the Enron Intelligent Network (EIN).
In the summer of 1999, Enron announced that EBS would become a “‘core’” Enron business and a major part of its overall strategy. App. 11. Thereafter, Enron issued press releases touting the advanced capabilities of EIN and claiming that the project was “‘lit,’” or operational. Id., at 10. On January 20, 2000, at the company’s annual equity analyst conference, petitioner and others allegedly made false and misleading statements about the value and performance of the EIN project. On January 21, 2000, the price of Enron stock rose from $54 to $67. The next day it reached $72. At that point petitioner sold more than 100,000 shares of Enron stock that he had received as part of his compensation. During the next several months petitioner sold an additional 600,000 shares. All told, petitioner’s stock sales generated more than $54 million in proceeds and $19 million in personal profit. As for the EIN project, its value turned out to be illusory. The “intelligent” network showcased to the public in the press releases and at the analyst conference was riddled with technological problems and never fully developed.
On November 5, 2004, a grand jury returned a “Fifth Superseding Indictment” charging petitioner with 126 counts of five federal offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud; (2) securities fraud; (3) wire fraud; (4) insider trading; and (5) money laundering. The Government’s theory of prosecution was that petitioner — acting in concert with other Enron executives — purposefully deceived the public about the EIN project in order to inflate the value of Enron’s stock and, ultimately, to enrich himself. Id., at 6.
Count 1 of the indictment described in some detail the alleged conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud and included as overt acts the substantive offenses charged in counts 2 through 6. Count 2, the securities fraud count, alleged that petitioner made false and misleading statements at the January 20, 2000, analyst conference or that he failed to state facts necessary to prevent statements made by others from being misleading. Counts 3 through 6 alleged that petitioner and others committed four acts of wire fraud when they issued four EBS-related press releases in 2000. Counts 27 through 46, the insider trading counts, alleged that petitioner made 20 separate sales of Enron stock “while in the possession of material non-public information regarding the technological capabilities, value, revenue and business performance of [EBS].” Id., at 31. And counts 67 through 165, the money laundering counts, described 99 financial transactions involving petitioner’s use of the proceeds of his sales of Enron stock, which the indictment characterized as “criminally derived property.” Id., at 37. To simplify our discussion, we shall refer to counts 1 through 6 as the “fraud counts” and the remaining counts as the “insider trading counts.”
The trial lasted 13 weeks. After four days of deliberations, the jury notified the court that it had reached agreement on some counts but had deadlocked on others. The judge then gave the jury an Allen charge, see Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492, 501-502 (1896), urging the jurors to reexamine the grounds for their opinions and to continue deliberations “until the end of the day” to achieve a final verdict on all counts. 56 Tr. 13724 (July 20, 2005). When the jury failed to break the deadlock, the court told the jurors that it would “take their verdict” instead of prolonging deliberations. Id., at 13725. The jury acquitted petitioner on the fraud counts but failed to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts. The court entered judgment on the acquittals and declared a mistrial on the hung counts.
On November 9, 2005, the Government obtained a new indictment against petitioner. This “Eighth Superseding Indictment” recharged petitioner with some, but not all, of the insider trading counts on which the jury had previously hung. App. 188. The new indictment refined the Government’s ease: Whereas the earlier indictment had named multiple defendants, the new indictment dealt exclusively with petitioner. And instead of alleging facts implicating a broader fraudulent scheme, the new indictment focused on petitioner’s knowledge of the EIN project and his failure to disclose that information to the public before selling his Enron stock.
Petitioner moved to dismiss all counts in the new indictment on the ground that the acquittals on the fraud counts precluded the Government from retrying him on the insider trading counts. He argued that the jury’s acquittals had necessarily decided that he did not possess material, nonpublic information about the performance of the EIN project and its value to Enron. In petitioner’s view, because re-prosecution for insider trading would require the Government to prove that critical fact, the issue-preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second trial of that issue and mandated dismissal of all of the insider trading counts.
The District Court denied the motion. After reviewing the trial record, the court disagreed with petitioner’s reading of what the jury necessarily decided. In the court’s telling, the jury likely concluded that petitioner “did not knowingly and willfully participate in the scheme to defraud described in the conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud counts.” 446 F. Supp. 2d 719,735 (SD Tex. 2006). The court therefore concluded that the question whether petitioner possessed insider information was not necessarily resolved in the first trial and could be litigated anew in a second prosecution.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s-analysis of the record, but nevertheless affirmed. It reasoned that petitioner “did not dispute” the Government’s theory that he “helped shape the message” of the allegedly fraudulent presentations made at the analyst conference, and therefore rejected the District Court’s conclusion that the jury had “acquitted [petitioner] on the groun[d] that he did not participate in the fraud.” 521 F. 3d 367, 377 (CA5 2008). Based on its independent review of the record, the Court of Appeals instead concluded that “the jury must have found when it acquitted [petitioner] that [he] did not have any insider information that contradicted what was presented to the public.” Id., at 378. The court acknowledged that this factual determination would normally preclude the Government from retrying petitioner for insider trading or money laundering.
The court was nevertheless persuaded that a truly rational jury, having concluded that petitioner did not have any insider information, would have acquitted him on the insider trading counts. That the jury failed to acquit, and instead hung on those counts, was pivotal in the court’s issue-preclusion analysis. Considering “the hung counts along with the acquittals,” the court found it impossible “to decide with any certainty what the jury necessarily determined.” Ibid. Relying on Circuit precedent, United States v. Larkin, 605 F. 2d 1360 (1979), the court concluded that the conflict between the acquittals and the hung counts barred the application of issue preclusion in this case. 521 F. 3d, at 378-379.
Several courts have taken the contrary view and have held that a jury’s failure to reach a verdict on some counts should play no role in determining the preclusive effect of an acquittal. See United States v. Ohayon, 483 F. 3d 1281 (CA11 2007); United States v. Romeo, 114 F. 3d 141 (CA9 1997); United States v. Bailin, 977 F. 2d 270 (CA7 1992); United States v. Frazier, 880 F. 2d 878 (CA6 1989). Others have sided with the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Howe, 538 F. 3d 820 (CA8 2008); United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F. 2d 18 (CA1 1992); United States v. White, 936 F. 2d 1326 (CADC 1991). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 555 U. S. 1028 (2008), and now reverse.
II
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
While we have decided an exceptionally large number of cases interpreting this provision, see, e. g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 126-127 (1980) (collecting cases), most of our decisions have found more guidance in the common-law ancestry of the Clause than in its brief text. Thus, for example, while the risk of being fined or imprisoned implicates neither “life” nor “limb,” our early cases held that double jeopardy protection extends to punishments that are not “positively covered by the language of [the] amendment.” Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 170 (1874). As we explained, “[i]t is very clearly the spirit of the instrument to prevent a second punishment under judicial proceedings for the same crime, so far as the common law gave that protection.” Ibid.
Our cases have recognized that the Clause embodies two vitally important interests. The first is the “deeply in-, grained” principle that “the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187-188 (1957); see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 795 (1969); DiFrancesco, 449 U. S., at 127-128. The second interest is the preservation of “the finality of judgments.” Crist v. Bretz, 437 U. S. 28, 33 (1978).
The first interest is implicated whenever the State seeks a second trial after its first attempt to obtain a conviction results in a mistrial because the jury has failed to reach a verdict. In these circumstances, however, while the defendant has an interest in avoiding multiple trials, the Clause does not prevent the Government from seeking to reprosecute. Despite the argument’s textual appeal, we have held that the second trial does not place the defendant in jeopardy “twice.” Richardson v. United States, 468 U. S. 317, 323 (1984); see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution §1781, pp. 659-660 (1833). Instead, a jury’s inability to reach a decision is the kind of “manifest necessity” that permits the declaration of a mistrial and the continuation of the initial jeopardy that commenced when the jury was first impaneled. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497, 505-506 (1978); United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (1824). The “interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws” justifies treating the jury’s inability to reach a verdict as a nonevent that does not bar retrial. Washington, 434 U. S., at 509.
While the case before us involves a mistrial on the insider trading counts, the question presented cannot be resolved by asking whether the Government should be given one complete opportunity to convict petitioner on those charges. Rather, the case turns on the second interest at the core of the Clause. We must determine whether the interest in preserving the finality of the jury’s judgment on the fraud counts, including the jury’s finding that petitioner did not possess insider information, bars a retrial on the insider trading counts. This requires us to look beyond the Clause’s prohibition on being put in jeopardy “twice”; the jury’s acquittals unquestionably terminated petitioner’s jeopardy with respect to the issues finally decided in those counts. The proper question, under the Clause’s text, is whether it is appropriate to treat the insider trading charges as the “same offence” as the fraud charges. Our opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970), provides the basis for our answer.
In Ashe, we squarely held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial. In that case, six poker players were robbed by a group of masked men. Ashe was charged with — and acquitted of — robbing Donald Knight, one of the six players. The State sought to retry Ashe for the robbery of another poker player only weeks after the first jury had acquitted him. The second prosecution was successful: Facing “substantially stronger” testimony from “witnesses [who] were for the most part the same,” id., at 439-440, Ashe was convicted and sentenced to a 35-year prison term. We concluded that the subsequent prosecution was constitutionally prohibited. Because the only contested issue at the first trial was whether Ashe was one of the robbers, we held that the jury’s verdict of acquittal collaterally estopped the State from trying him for robbing a different player during the same criminal episode. Id., at 446. We explained that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment” of acquittal, it “cannot again be litigated” in a second trial for a separate offense. Id., at 443. To decipher what a jury has necessarily decided, we held that courts should “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Id., at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). We explained that the inquiry “must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.” Ibid. (quoting Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575, 579 (1948); internal quotation marks omitted).
Unlike Ashe, the case before us today entails a trial that included multiple counts rather than a trial for a single offense. And, while Ashe involved an acquittal for that single offense, this case involves an acquittal on some counts and a mistrial declared on others. The reasoning in Ashe is nevertheless controlling because, for double jeopardy purposes, the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts was a nonevent and the acquittals on the fraud counts are entitled to the same effect as Ashe’s acquittal.
As noted above, see supra, at 116, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the hung counts must be considered to determine what issues the jury decided in the first trial. Viewed in isolation, the court explained, the acquittals on the fraud charges would preclude retrial because they appeared to support petitioner’s argument that the jury decided he lacked insider information. 521 F. 3d, at 378. Viewed alongside the hung counts, however, the acquittals appeared less decisive. The problem, as. the court saw it, was that, if “the jury found that [petitioner] did not have insider information, then the jury, acting rationally, would also have acquitted [him] of the insider trading counts.” Ibid. The fact that the jury hung was a logical wrinkle that made it impossible for the court “to decide with any certainty what the jury necessarily determined.” Ibid. Because petitioner failed to show what the jury decided, id., at 380, the court refused to find the Government precluded from pursuing the hung counts in a new prosecution.
The Court of Appeals’ issue-preclusion analysis was in error. A hung count is not a “relevant” part of the “record of [the] prior proceeding.” See Ashe, 397 U. S., at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because a jury speaks only through its verdict, its failure to reach a verdict cannot — by negative implication — yield a piece of information that helps put together the trial puzzle. A mistried count is therefore nothing like the other forms of record material that Ashe suggested should be part of the preclusion inquiry. Ibid.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1301 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “record” as the “official report of the proceedings in a case, including the filed papers, a verbatim transcript of the trial or hearing (if any), and tangible exhibits”).. Unlike the pleadings, the jury charge, or the evidence introduced by the parties, there is no way to decipher what a hung count represents. Even in the usual sense of “relevance,” a hung count hardly “make[s] the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less probable.” Fed. Rule Evid. 401. A host of reasons — sharp disagreement, confusion about the issues, exhaustion after a long trial, to name but a few — could work alone or in tandem to cause a jury to hang. To ascribe meaning to a hung count would presume an ability to identify which factor was at play in the jury room. But that is not reasoned analysis; it is guesswork. Such conjecture about possible reasons for a jury’s failure to reach a decision should play no part in assessing the legal consequences of a unanimous verdict that the jurors did return.
A contrary conclusion would require speculation into what transpired in the jury room. Courts properly avoid such explorations into the jury’s sovereign space, see United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57, 66 (1984); Fed. Rule Evid. 606(b), and for good reason. The jury’s deliberations are secret and not subject to outside examination. If there is to be an inquiry into what the jury decided, the “evidence should be confined to the points in controversy on the former trial, to the testimony given by the parties, and to the questions submitted to the jury for their consideration.” Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580, 593 (1867); see also Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K. B. 1785) (Lord Mansfield, C. J.) (refusing to rely on juror affidavits to impeach a verdict reached by a coin flip); J. Wigmore, Evidence §2349 (McNaughton rev. 1961 and Supp. 1991).
Accordingly, we hold that the consideration of hung counts has no place in the issue-preclusion analysis. Indeed, if it were relevant, the fact that petitioner has already survived one trial should be a factor cutting in favor of, rather than against, applying a double jeopardy bar. To identify what a jury necessarily determined at trial, courts should scrutinize a jury’s decisions, not its failures tó decide. A jury’s verdict of acquittal represents the community’s collective judgment regarding all the evidence and arguments presented to it. Even if the verdict is “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation,” Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam), its finality is unassailable. See, e. g., Washington, 434 U. S., at 503; Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54, 64 (1978). Thus, if the possession of insider information was a critical issue of ultimate fact in all of the charges against petitioner, a jury verdict that necessarily decided that issue in his favor protects him from prosecution for any charge for which that is an essential element.
Ill
The Government relies heavily on two of our cases, Richardson v. United States, 468 U. S. 317, and United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57, to argue that it is entitled to retry petitioner on the insider trading counts. Neither precedent can bear the weight the Government places on it.
In Richardson, the defendant was indicted on three counts of narcotics violations. The jury acquitted him on one count but hung on the others. Richardson moved to bar retrial on the hung counts, insisting that reprosecution would place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Unlike petitioner in this case, Richardson did not argue that retrial was barred because the jury’s verdict of acquittal meant that it necessarily decided an essential fact in his favor. He simply asserted that the hung counts, standing alone, shielded him from reprosecution. We disagreed and held that “the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy.” 468 U. S., at 325. “[T]he failure of the jury to reach a verdict,” we explained, “is not an event which terminates jeopardy.” Ibid. From this the Government extrapolates the altogether different principle that retrial is always permitted whenever a jury convicts on some counts and hangs on others. Brief for United States 23-24. But Richardson was not so broad. Rather, our conclusion was a rejection of the argument— similar to the one the Government urges today — that a mistrial is an event of significance. In so holding, we did not open the door to using a mistried count to ignore the preclusive effect of a jury’s acquittal.
The Government next contends that an acquittal can never preclude retrial on a mistried count because it would impute irrationality to the jury in violation of the rule articulated in Powell, 469 U. S. 57. In Powell, the defendant was charged with various drug offenses. The jury acquitted Powell of the substantive drug charges but convicted her of using a telephone in “ ‘committing and in causing and facilitating’ ” those same offenses. Id., at 59-60. Powell attacked the verdicts on appeal as irrationally inconsistent and urged the reversal of her convictions. She insisted that “collateral estoppel should apply to verdicts rendered by a single jury, to preclude acceptance of a guilty verdict on a telephone facilitation count where the jury acquits the defendant of the predicate felony.” Id., at 64. We rejected this argument, reasoning that issue preclusion is “predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally.” Id., at 68.
Arguing that a jury that acquits on some counts while inexplicably hanging on others is not rational, the Government contends that issue preclusion is as inappropriate in this case as it was in Powell. There are two serious flaws in this line of reasoning. First, it takes Powell’s treatment of inconsistent verdicts and imports it into an entirely different context involving both verdicts and seemingly inconsistent hung counts. But the situations are quite dissimilar. In Powell, respect for the jury’s verdicts counseled giving each verdict full effect, however inconsistent. As we explained, the jury’s verdict “brings to the criminal process, in addition to the collective judgment of the community, an element of needed finality.” Id., at 67. By comparison, hung counts have never been accorded respect as a matter of law or history, and are not similar to jury verdicts in any relevant sense. By equating them, the Government’s argument fails. Second, the Government’s reliance on Powell assumes that a mistried count can, in context, be evidence of irrationality. But, as we explained above, see supra, at 121-122, the fact that a jury hangs is evidence of nothing — other than, of course, that it has failed to decide anything. By relying on hung counts to question the basis of the jury’s verdicts, the Government violates the very assumption of rationality it invokes for support.
At bottom, the Government misreads our cases that have rejected attempts to question the validity of a jury’s verdict. In Powell and, before that, in Dunn, 284 U. S. 390, we were faced with jury verdicts that, on their face, were logically inconsistent and yet we refused to impugn the legitimacy of either verdict. In this case, there is merely a suggestion that the jury may have acted irrationally. And instead of resting that suggestion on a verdict, the Government relies on a hung count, the thinnest reed of all. If the Court in Powell and Dunn declined to use a clearly inconsistent verdict to second-guess the soundness of another verdict, then, a fortiori, a potentially inconsistent hung count could not command a different result.
IV
One final matter requires discussion. The Government argues that even if we conclude (as we do) that acquittals can preclude retrial on counts on which the same jury hangs, we should nevertheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because petitioner failed to show that the jury necessarily resolved in his favor an issue of ultimate fact that the Government must prove in order to convict him of insider trading and money laundering. See Brief for United States 41-45. Given the length and complexity of the proceedings, this factual dispute is understandable. The District Court and Court of Appeals each read the record differently, disagreeing as to what the jury necessarily decided in its acquittals. Compare 446 F. Supp. 2d, at 735 (“[T]he jury necessarily determined that Defendant Yeager did not knowingly and willfully participate or agree to participate in a scheme to defraud in connection with the alleged false statements or material omissions made at the analyst conference and press releases”), with 521 F. 3d, at 378 (“[T]he jury must have found when it acquitted Yeager that Yeager himself did not have any insider information that contradicted what was presented to the public”). Our grant of certiorari was based on the assumption that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the record was correct. We recognize the Government’s right, as the prevailing party in the Court of Appeals, to “defend its judgment on any ground properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied upon, rejected, or even considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals.” Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 476, n. 20 (1979). But we decline to engage in a fact-intensive analysis of the voluminous record, an undertaking unnecessary to the resolution of the narrow legal question we granted certiorari to answer. If it chooses, the Court of Appeals may revisit its factual analysis in light of the Government’s arguments before this Court.
V
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See 18 U. S. C. § 371 (conspiracy to commit fraud against the United States); 15 U. S. C. §78j(b) (1994 ed.), §78ff (2000 ed.), and 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (2004) (securities fraud); 18 U. S. C. §1343 (2000 ed.) (wire fraud); 15 U. S. C. §78j(b) (1994 ed.), §78ff (2000 ed.), and 17 CFR § 240.10b5-l (insider trading); 18 U. S. C. § 1957 (money laundering).
While petitioner was charged with 126 counts, the indictment included 176 counts in all, covering conduct by executives purportedly involved in the alleged fraud.
Petitioner had also moved to dismiss the relevant counts in the earlier indictment in response to the Government’s assertion that it could reprosecute petitioner for the previously hung counts under that indictment as well. See 521 F. 3d 367, 370, n. 4 (CA5 2008).
Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. The justification for this application was first offered by Justice Holmes, who observed that “[i]t cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt.” United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 87 (1916). Currently, the more descriptive term “issue preclusion” is often used in lieu of “collateral estoppel.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §27 (1980).
Indeed, there were many indications that the jury in this case could have been exhausted after the 13-week trial. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 9-10 (cataloging numerous “statements on the record [that] reveal the very real possibility that the jurors cut their deliberations short out of exhaustion”).
It would also require too much of the defendant. To preclude retrial, he must show that the jury necessarily decided an issue in his favor. Yet, to borrow from the Court of Appeals, “[b]ecause it is impossible to determine why [a] jury hung,” 521 F. 3d, at 379, the defendant will have to rebut all inferences about what may have motivated the jury to hang without the ability to seek conclusive proof. See Fed. Rule Evid. 606(b). There is no reason to impose such a burden on a defendant.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
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B
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sc_decisiondirection
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and this usually requires the police to have probable cause or a warrant before making an arrest. What if an officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant, but that belief turns out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another police employee? The parties here agree that the ensuing arrest is still a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but dispute whether contraband found during a search incident to that arrest must be excluded in a later prosecution.
Our cases establish that such suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, the question turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct. Here the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest. We hold that in these circumstances the jury should not be barred from considering all the evidence.
I
On July 7, 2004, Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Dean Herring had driven to the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department to retrieve something from his impounded truck. Herring was no stranger to law enforcement, and Anderson asked the county’s warrant clerk, Sandy Pope, to check for any outstanding warrants for Herring’s arrest. When she found none, Anderson asked Pope to check with Sharon Morgan, her counterpart in neighboring Dale County. After checking Dale County’s computer database, Morgan replied that there was an active arrest warrant for Herring’s failure to appear on a felony charge. Pope relayed the information to Anderson and asked Morgan to fax over a copy of the warrant as confirmation. Anderson and a deputy followed Herring as he left the impound lot, pulled him over, and arrested him. A search incident to the arrest revealed methamphetamine in Herring’s pocket, and a pistol (which as a felon he could not possess) in his vehicle. App. 17-23.
There had, however, been a mistake about the warrant. The Dale County sheriff’s computer records are supposed to correspond to actual arrest warrants, which the office also maintains. But when Morgan went to the files to retrieve the actual warrant to fax to Pope, Morgan was unable to find it. She called a court clerk and learned that the warrant had been recalled five months earlier. Normally when a warrant is recalled the court clerk’s office or a judge’s chambers calls Morgan, who enters the information in the sheriff’s computer database and disposes of the physical copy. For whatever reason, the information about the recall of the warrant for Herring did not appear in the database. Morgan immediately called Pope to alert her to the mixup, and Pope contacted Anderson over a secure radio. This all unfolded in 10 to 15 minutes, but Herring had already been arrested and found with the gun and drugs, just a few hundred yards from the sheriff’s office. Id., at 26, 35-42, 54-55.
Herring was indicted in the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama for illegally possessing the gun and drugs, violations of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) and 21 U. S. C. § 844(a). He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that his initial arrest had been illegal because the warrant had been rescinded. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the motion because the arresting officers had acted in a good-faith belief that the warrant was still outstanding. Thus, even if there were a Fourth Amendment violation, there was “no reason to believe that application of the exclusionary rule here would deter the occurrence of any future mistakes.” App. 70. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (2005), and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 492 F. 3d 1212 (2007).
The Eleventh Circuit found that the arresting officers in Coffee County “were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing or carelessness.” Id., at 1218. The court assumed that whoever failed to update the Dale County sheriff’s records was also a law enforcement official, but noted that “the conduct in. question [wa]s a negligent failure to act, not a deliberate or tactical choice to act.” Ibid. Because the error was merely negligent and attenuated from the arrest, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the benefit of suppressing the evidence “would be marginal or nonexistent,” ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted), and the evidence was therefore admissible under the good-faith rule of United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984).
Other courts have required exclusion of evidence obtained through similar police errors, e. g., Hoay v. State, 348 Ark. 80, 86-87, 71 S. W. 3d 573, 577 (2002), so we granted Herring’s petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict, 552 U. S. 1178 (2008). We now affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment.
II
When a probable-cause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a constitutional violation. The very phrase “probable cause” confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision. And whether the error can be traced to a mistake by a state actor or some other source may bear on the analysis. For purposes of deciding this case, however, we accept the parties’ assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment violation. The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied.
A
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” but “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands,” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 10 (1995). Nonetheless, our decisions establish an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial. See, e. g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398 (1914). We have stated that this judicially created rule is “designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974).
In analyzing the applicability of the rule, Leon admonished that we must consider the actions of all the police officers involved. 468 U. S., at 923, n. 24 (“It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the probable-cause determination”). The Coffee County officers did nothing improper. Indeed, the error was noticed so quickly because Coffee County requested a faxed confirmation of the warrant.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, however, that somebody in Dale County should have updated the computer database to reflect the recall of the arrest warrant. The court also concluded that this error was negligent, but did not find it to be reckless or deliberate. 492 F. 3d, at 1218. That fact is crucial to our holding that this error is not enough by itself to require “the extreme sanction of exclusion.” Leon, supra, at 916.
B
The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred— i. e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable — does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223 (1983). Indeed, exclusion “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 591 (2006), and our precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule.
First, the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it “‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’” Leon, supra, at 909 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454 (1976)). We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation. Leon, supra, at 905-906; Evans, supra, at 13-14; Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 363 (1998). Instead we have focused on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future. See Calandra, supra, at 347-355; Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976).
In addition, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs. Leon, supra, at 910. “We have never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.” Scott, supra, at 368. “[T]o the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social costs.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 352-353 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free — something that “offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.” Leon, supra, at 908. “[T]he rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.” Scott, supra, at 364-365 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626-627 (1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 (1980).
These principles are reflected in the holding of Leon: When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted “in objectively reasonable reliance” on the subsequently invalidated search warrant. 468 U. S., at 922. We (perhaps confusingly) called this objectively reasonable reliance “good faith.” Ibid., n. 23. In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), we held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when a warrant was invalid because a judge forgot to make “clerical corrections” to it. Id., at 991.
Shortly thereafter we extended these holdings to warrant-less administrative searches performed in good-faith reliance on a statute later declared unconstitutional. Krull, supra, at 349-350. Finally, in Evans, 514 U. S. 1, we applied this good-faith rule to police who reasonably relied on mistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant was outstanding. We held that a mistake made by a judicial employee could not give rise to exclusion for three reasons: The exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct; court employees were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and “most important, there [was] no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in [those] circumstances” would have any significant effect in deterring the errors. Id., at 15. Evans left unresolved “whether the evidence should be suppressed if police personnel were responsible for the error,” an issue not argued by the State in that case, id., at 16, n. 5, but one that we now confront.
The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct. As we said in Leon, “an assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus” of applying the exclusionary rule. 468 U. S., at 911. Similarly, in Krull we elaborated that “evidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” 480 U. S., at 348-349 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542 (1975)).
Anticipating the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Judge Friendly wrote that “[t]he beneficent aim of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can be sufficiently accomplished by a practice . . . outlawing evidence obtained by flagrant or deliberate violation of rights.” The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 953 (1965) (footnotes omitted); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 610-611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be effective” when “official conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights”).
Indeed, the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional. In Weeks, 232 U. S. 383, a foundational exclusionary rule case, the officers had broken into the defendant’s home (using a key shown to them by a neighbor), confiscated incriminating papers, then returned again with a U. S. Marshal to confiscate even more. Id., at 386. Not only did they have no search warrant, which the Court held was required, but they could not have gotten one had they tried. They were so lacking in sworn and particularized information that “not even an order of court would have justified such procedure.” Id., at 393-394. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920), on which petitioner repeatedly relies, was similar; federal officials “without a shadow of authority” went to the defendants’ office and “made a clean sweep” of every paper they could find. Id., at 390. Even the Government seemed to acknowledge that the “seizure was an outrage.” Id., at 391.
Equally flagrant conduct was at issue in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), which overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), and extended the exclusionary rule to the States. Officers forced open a door to Ms. Mapp’s house, kept her lawyer from entering, brandished what the court concluded was a false warrant, then forced her into handcuffs and canvassed the house for obscenity. 367 U. S., at 644-645. See Friendly, supra, at 953, and n. 127 (“[T]he situation in Mapp” featured a “flagrant or deliberate violation of rights”). An error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is thus far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the rule in the first place. And in fact since Leon, we have never applied the rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was no more intentional or culpable than this.
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that level.
Our decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978), provides an analogy. Cf. Leon, supra, at 914. In Franks, we held that police negligence in obtaining a warrant did not even rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, let alone meet the more stringent test for triggering the exclusionary rule. We held that the Constitution allowed defendants, in some circumstances, “to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting the warrant,” even after the warrant had issued. 438 U. S., at 155-156. If those false statements were necessary to the Magistrate Judge’s probable-cause determination, the warrant would be “voided.” Ibid. But we did not find all false statements relevant: “There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth,” and “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.” Id., at 171.
Both this case and Franks concern false information provided by police. Under Franks, negligent police miscommunications in the course of acquiring a warrant do not provide a basis to rescind a warrant and render a search or arrest invalid. Here, the miscommunications occurred in a different context — after the warrant had been issued and recalled — but that fact should not require excluding the evidence obtained.
The pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an “inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers,” Reply Brief for Petitioner 4-5. See also post, at 157, n. 7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). We have already held that “our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal” in light of “all of the circumstances.” Leon, 468 U. S., at 922, n. 23. These circumstances frequently include a particular officer’s knowledge and experience, but that does not make the test any more subjective than the one for probable cause, which looks to an officer’s knowledge and experience, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 699-700 (1996), but not his subjective intent, Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 812-813 (1996).
We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. In Leon, we held that “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” 468 U. S., at 922. The same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant.
If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. We said as much in Leon, explaining that an officer could not “obtain a warrant on the basis of a ‘bare bones’ affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search.” Id., at 923, n. 24 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971)). Petitioner’s fears that our decision will cause police departments to deliberately keep their officers ignorant, Brief for Petitioner 37-39, are thus unfounded.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent also adverts to the possible unreliability of a number of databases not relevant to this case. Post, at 155-156. In a case where systemic errors were demonstrated, it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable warrant system. See Evans, 514 U. S., at 17 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Surely it would not be reasonable for the police to rely ... on a recordkeeping system ... that routinely leads to false arrests” (second emphasis added)); Hudson, 547 U. S., at 604 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring, in judgment) (“If a widespread pattern of violations were shown . . . there would be reason for grave concern” (emphasis added)). But there is no evidence that errors in Dale County’s system are routine or widespread. Officer Anderson testified that he had never had reason to question information about a Dale County warrant, App. 27, and both Sandy Pope and Sharon Morgan testified that they could remember no similar miscommunication ever happening on their watch, id., at 33, 61-62. That is even less error than in the database at issue in Evans, where we also found reliance on the database to be objectively reasonable. 514 U. S., at 15 (similar error “every three or four years”). Because no such showings were made here, see 451 F. Supp. 2d, at 1292, the Eleventh Circuit was correct to affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
* * *
Petitioner’s claim that police negligence automatically triggers suppression cannot be squared with the principles underlying the exclusionary rule, as they have been explained in our cases. In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system, e. g., Leon, 468 U. S., at 909-910, we conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not “pay its way.” Id., at 907-908, n. 6. In such a case, the criminal should not “go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587 (1926) (opinion of the Court by Cardozo, J.).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
At an earlier point in its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit described the error as “ 'at the very least negligent,’ ” 492 F. 3d 1212, 1217 (2007) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 (1974)). But in the next paragraph, it clarified that the error was “a negligent failure to act, not a deliberate or tactical choice to act,” 492 F. 3d, at 1218. The question presented treats the error as a “negligent]” one, see Pet. for Cert, i; Brief in Opposition (I), and both parties briefed the case on that basis.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent champions what she describes as ‘“a more majestic conception’ of . . . the exclusionary rule,” post, at 151 (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), which would exclude evidence even where deterrence does not justify doing so. Majestic or not, our cases reject this conception, see, e. g., United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 921, n. 22 (1984), and perhaps for this reason, her dissent relies almost exclusively on previous dissents to support its analysis.
We thus reject Justice Breyer’s suggestion that Evans was entirely “premised on a distinction between judicial errors and police errors,” post, at 158 (dissenting opinion). Were that the only rationale for our decision, there would have been no reason for us expressly and carefully to leave police error unresolved. In addition, to the extent Evans is viewed as presaging a particular result here, it is noteworthy that the dissent’s view in that case was that the distinction Justice Breyer regards as determinative was instead “artificial.” 514 U. S., at 29 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
We do not quarrel with Justice Ginsburg’s claim that “liability for negligence ... creates an incentive to act with greater care,” post, at 153, and we do not suggest that the exclusion of this evidence could have no deterrent effect. But our cases require any deterrence to “be weighed against the ‘substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule,’” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 352-353 (1987) (quoting Leon, 468 U. S., at 907), and here exclusion is not worth the cost.
Justice Ginsburg notes that at an earlier suppression hearing Morgan testified — apparently in confusion — that there had been miscommunieations “‘[s]everal times.’” Post, at 150, n. 2 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a). When she later realized that she had misspoken, Morgan emphatically corrected the record. App. 61-62. Noting this, the District Court found that “Morgan’s ‘several times’ statement is confusing and essentially unhelpful,” and concluded that there was “no credible evidence of routine problems with disposing of recalled warrants.” 451 F. Supp. 2d, at 1292. This factual determination, supported by the record and credited by the Court of Appeals, see 492 F. 3d, at 1219, is of course entitled to deference.
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On September 10, 1960, three days before the New Hampshire Democratic Party’s primary election of candidates for the United States Senate, the Concord Monitor, a daily newspaper in Concord, New Hampshire, published a syndicated “D. C. Merry-Go-Round” column discussing the forthcoming election. The column spoke of political maneuvering in the primary campaign, referred to the criminal records of several of the candidates, and characterized Alphonse Roy, one of the candidates, as a “former small-time bootlegger.” Roy was not elected in the primary, and he subsequently sued the Monitor Patriot Co. and the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA), the distributor of the column, for libel.
The newspaper and NANA offered “truth” as their primary defense at trial, and evidence was presented on the issue of whether or not Roy had in fact been a bootlegger during the prohibition era. The defendants also alleged that they had published in good faith, without malice, with a reasonable belief in the probable truth of the charge, and on a lawful occasion. At the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury at great length on the law to be applied to the case. Three possible defenses emerged from these jury instructions.
First, the trial judge told the jury that Roy was a “public official” by virtue of his candidacy in the primary. As a consequence, a special rule, requiring a showing that the article was false and had been published with “knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless disregard of whether it was false or true,” would apply so long as the libel concerned “official conduct” as opposed to “private conduct.” This private-public distinction was elaborated as follows: “Is it more probable than otherwise that the publication that the plaintiff was a former small-time bootlegger was a public affair on a par with official conduct of public officials?” The trial judge went on:
“As a candidate for the United States Senate, the plaintiff was within the public official concept, and a candidate must surrender to public scrutiny and discussion so much of his private character as affects his fitness for office. That is, anything which might touch on Alphonse Roy’s fitness for the office of United States Senator would come within the concept of official conduct. If it would not touch upon or be relevant to his fitness for the office for which he was a candidate but was rather a bringing forward of the plaintiff’s long forgotten misconduct in which the public had no interest, then it would be a private matter in the private sector.”
The judge then instructed the jury that if it found the libel to be in the “public sector” it must bring in a verdict for NANA, since there had been no evidence that NANA had engaged in knowing or reckless falsehood, but that it still had to decide on the “preponderance of the evidence” whether the newspaper was liable.
Supposing the publication to be in the “private sector,” the trial judge instructed the jury that there were two possible defenses available to the newspaper and NANA. The first was “justification,” which would prevail if the jury found that the article was both true and published on a “lawful occasion.” The second defense was “conditional privilege,” which could prevail even if the jury found the article to be false, but only if it also found that its publication was “on a lawful occasion, in good faith, for a justifiable purpose, and with a belief founded on reasonable grounds of the truth of the matter published.”
The jury returned a verdict of $20,000, of which $10,000 was against the newspaper and $10,000 against NANA. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial judge properly sent to the jury the question of whether or not the particular libel alleged was “relevant” to Roy’s fitness for office. 109 N. H. 441, 254 A. 2d 832. We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional issues presented by the case. 397 U. S. 904.
I
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280, we held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require “a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” The rule of New York Times was based on a recognition that the First Amendment guarantee of a free press is inevitably in tension with state libel laws designed to secure society’s interest in the protection of individual reputation. The approach of New York Times was to identify a class of person- — ■ there public officials — and a type of activity — there official conduct — and to require as to defamations respecting them a particularly high standard of liability — knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth. Later cases have made it clear that the applicability of this basic approach is not limited to those in public office or to the performance of official acts, or, for that matter, to conventional civil libel suits. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130; Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U. S. 6.
This case went to the jury in December 1966, after our decisions in New York Times and Garrison, but before Curtis and Greenbelt. The trial judge instructed the jury that Roy, as a candidate for elective public office, was a “public official,” and that characterization has not been challenged here. Given the later cases, it might be preferable to categorize a candidate as a “public figure,” if for no other reason than to avoid straining the common meaning of words. But the question is of no importance so far as the standard of liability in this case is concerned, for it is abundantly clear that, whichever term is applied, publications concerning candidates must be accorded at least as much protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as those concerning occupants of public office. That New York Times itself was intended to apply to candidates, in spite of the use of the more restricted “public official” terminology, is readily apparent from that opinion’s text and citations to case law. And if it be conceded that the First Amendment was “fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484, then it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.
II
The jury in this case returned verdicts against both the newspaper and NANA. It is clear, therefore, that it found the bootlegger charge to be in the “private sector,” since it had been instructed that unless it so found it could not impose liability on NANA. It is possible that having made this determination, it then concluded that the charge was true but “unjustified”— that is, that it had been published without a “lawful occasion.” In any event, under the trial judge’s instructions it was also free to return a money verdict if it found that the publication was false and had not been made “in good faith,” for a “justifiable purpose,” and with a “belief founded on reasonable grounds of the truth of the matter published.” Since this standard is far less stringent than that of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth, the judgment must be reversed unless it can be shown that the New York Times rule is not applicable because of the nature of the libel in question. Cf. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, post, p. 295.
The respondent argues that under New York Times a plaintiff has a special burden of proof only as to libels “relating to official conduct,” that for a candidate “official conduct” means “conduct relevant to fitness for office,” and that the public-private issue is one of fact for the jury. In our view, however, the syllogistic manipulation of distinctions between “private sectors” and “public sectors,” or matters of fact and matters of law, is of little utility in resolving questions of First Amendment protection.
In Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, we reversed a conviction for criminal libel of a man who had charged that a group of state court judges were inefficient, took excessive vacations, opposed official investigations of vice, and were possibly subject to “racketeer influences.” The Louisiana Supreme Court had held that these statements were not “criticisms. ... of the manner in which any one of the eight judges conducted his court when in session,” but rather were accusations of crime and “personal attacks upon the integrity and honesty” of the judges. This Court rejected the proposed distinction:
“Of course, any criticism of the manner in which a public official performs his duties will tend to affect his private, as well as his public, reputation. The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an official’s private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. The public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. New personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official’s private character.” 379 U. S., at 76-77.
Cf. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, supra.
The considerations that led us thus to reformulate the “official conduct” rule of New York Times in terms of “anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office” apply with special force to the case of the candidate. Indeed, whatever vitality the “official conduct” concept may retain with regard to occupants of public office, cf. Garrison, supra, at 72 n. 8, it is clearly of little applicability in the context of an election campaign. The principal activity of a candidate in our political system, his “office,” so to speak, consists in putting before the voters every conceivable aspect of his public and private life that he thinks may lead the electorate to gain a good impression of him. A candidate who, for example, seeks to further his cause through the prominent display of his wife and children can hardly argue that his qualities as a husband or father remain of “purely private” concern. And the candidate who vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry “Foul!” when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary. Any test adequate to safeguard First Amendment guarantees in this area must go far beyond the customary meaning of the phrase “official conduct.”
Given the realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks. The clash of reputations is the staple of election campaigns, and damage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel. But whether there remains some exiguous area of defamation against which a candidate may have full recourse is a question we need not decide in this case. The trial judge presented the issue to the jury in the form of the question: “Is it more probable than otherwise that the publication that the plaintiff was a former small-time bootlegger was a public affair on a par with official conduct of public officials?” This instruction, and the others like it, left the jury far more leeway to act as censors than is consistent with the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in the setting of a political campaign.
The application of the traditional concepts of tort law to the conduct of a political campaign is bound to raise dangers for freedom of speech and of the press. The reasonable-man standard of liability, for example, serves admirably the essential function of imposing an objective and socially acceptable limit on the freedom of an individual to act with relation to others. But under our system of government, we have chosen to afford protection even to “opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). A community that imposed legal liability on all statements in a political campaign deemed “unreasonable” by a jury would have abandoned the First Amendment as we know it. Likewise, a “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof plays an indispensable role in the control of private negligence. But we have recognized that in the realm of political belief “the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor,” and that the advocates whom we protect may resort to “exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement,” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310. It is simply inconsistent with this commitment to permit the imposition of liability for political speech that “more probably than otherwise” in the opinion of the jury “would not touch upon or be relevant” to a candidate’s fitness for office. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525-526; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147.
It is perhaps unavoidable that in the area of tension between the Constitution and the various state laws of defamation there will be some uncertainty as to what publications are and what are not protected. The mental element of “knowing or reckless disregard” required under the New York Times test, for example, is not always easy of ascertainment. “Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal standards for judging concrete cases, whether the standard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case law.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730-731. But there is a major, and in this case decisive, difference between liability based on a standard of care, and liability based on a judgment of the “relevance” of a past incident of criminal conduct to an official’s or a candidate’s fitness for office. A standard of care “can be neutral with respect to content of the speech involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair balance between the interests of the community in free circulation of information and those of individuals in seeking recompense for harm done by the circulation of defamatory falsehood.” Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, at 153 (opinion of Harlan, J.). A standard of “relevance,” on the other hand, especially such a standard applied by a jury under the preponderance-of-the-evidence test, is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of those “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,” New York Times, supra, at 270, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail.
We therefore hold as a matter of constitutional law that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant to an official’s or a candidate’s fitness for office for purposes of application of the “knowing falsehood or reckless disregard” rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Since the jury in this case was permitted to make its own unguided determination that the charge of prior criminal activity was not “relevant,” and that the New York Times standard was thus inapplicable, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, see post, p. 301.]
The text of the portion of the column concerning the New Hampshire primary was as follows:
“Political Snafu
“Rock-ribbed Republican New Hampshire, whose ex-Gov. Sherman Adams was top kick in the White House for years and whose Sen. Styles Bridges is still top kick on the GOP side of the Senate, is so fouled up in a primary snafu that the state may go Democratic this year. The primary verdict is due next Tuesday.
“Even that able Senate stalwart, Styles Bridges, is restirring himself. He has nothing to worry about from his Republican opponent, but the Democrats have put up a dynamic Dartmouth professor, Herbert Hill, against him. The professor came within 11,000 votes of defeating Sherman Adams, lately of vicuna-coat fame, in the 1948 gubernatorial race.
“Curiously, the Democratic primary has been cluttered with a motley assortment of candidates who have challenged Hill for the privilege of running against Bridges. That sly, old Republican disclaims any connection with it, but he appears pleased over the muddying of Democratic waters.
“One of Hill’s primary opponents Frank L. Sullivan, was released from the Grasmere County Work Farm just in time to file for the Senate. With a police record of no fewer than 19 convictions for drunkenness since 1945, he was serving his latest 90-day sentence.
“Curious Call
“To make sure he would get out in time to run for the Senate, a former small-time bootlegger and later U. S. Marshal, Alphonse Roy, telephoned the Grasmere warden about Sullivan.
“Ralph LaVallee in charge of Grasmere, admitted to this column that he had received a telephone inquiry from Roy as to whether Sullivan would be released in time to file. But the warden denied another report that Roy had announced he was calling ‘on behalf of my friend Styles.’
“ ‘I don’t want to get implicated in anything like that,’ said LaVallee, ‘Roy didn’t mention Senator Bridges/
“Sullivan happily got out of the workhouse in time to run for the most distinguished legislative body in the world. And who should turn up on the ballot but the same Alphonse Roy who was so eager to get him out of the clink.
“Because of the peculiar population division of New Hampshire, the Irish Catholics may be inclined to vote for a Frank Sullivan while the French Canadians could be attracted by a name like Alphonse Roy. The effect would be to cut down Herb Hill’s chances.
“Convicts For Senator
“Two other curious candidates, who tried to run in the Democratic primary against Hill, were Harold P. McCarthy who has a record of nine convictions for drunkenness, assault, and brawling, and Clement P. Robinson Jr., who has a record of six brushes with the law for drunkenness and traffic violations. Robinson also received a 30-day suspended sentence for stealing two power lawnmowers and a conviction for the nonsupport of his wife and three children.
"But at least Professor Hill managed to persuade the New Hampshire Ballot Law Commission into knocking McCarthy and Robinson off the ballot,”
The trial judge gave the jury the following definition of a “lawful occasion”:
“If the end to be attained by the publication is justifiable, that is, to give useful information to those who have a right and ought to know in order that they may act upon such information, the occasion is lawful. Where, however, there is merely the color of a lawful occasion and the defendant, instead of acting in good faith, assumes to act for some justifiable end merely as a pretense to publish and circulate defamatory matter, or for other unlawful purpose, he is liable in the same manner as if such pretense had not been resorted to.”
The trial judge placed the burden of showing a “lawful occasion” on the defendants.'
One of the citations was to a Kansas decision which admirably-stated the case for the inclusion of candidates within the rule:
“[I]t is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must be privileged.” Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908).
A commentator writing in 1949 described the ambience as follows : “Charges of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies, and the like have usually filled the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent. If actionable defamation is possible in this field, one might suppose that the chief energies of the courts, for some time after every political campaign, would be absorbed by libel and slander suits.” Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col. L. Rev. 875,
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_decisiondirection
|
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